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Encyclopædia

of

Religion and Ethics

Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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Proselyte, Proselytism.

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Prayer for the Departed (Christian).

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Sometime Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh; editor of *Hesiod*.
Pindar, Prayer (Greek).

MARGOLIOUTH (DAVID SAMUEL), M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A.
Fellow of New College, and Laudian Professor of Arabic in the University of Oxford; author of *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, *Mohammedanism*, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism*.
Preaching (Muslim), **Priest, Priesthood** (Muhammadan), **Qur'an.**

MARGOLIOUTH (GEORGE), M.A. (Cantab.).
Member of the Board of Studies in Theology and Examiner in Hebrew and Aramaic in the University of London; formerly Senior Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS in the British Museum.
Sabbath (Muhammadan).

MARSHALL (JOHN TURNER), M.A., D.D.
Principal of Manchester Baptist College; Lecturer in History of Christian Doctrine in Manchester University.
Regeneration.

MARTIN (ALEXANDER STUART), M.A., B.D.
Formerly Pitt Scholar and Examiner in Theology in the University of Edinburgh, and Minister of the Church of Scotland at Aberdeen.
Predestination.

MINGANA (ALPHONSE).
Keeper of Oriental Manuscripts in the John Rylands Library; Lecturer in Arabic to the University of Manchester.
Qur'an.

MINNS (ELLIS H.), M.A.
Fellow of Pembroke College and Lecturer in Palæography in the University of Cambridge.
Note on **Russian Church.**

MITCHELL (EDWIN KNOX), M.A., D.D.
Professor of Græco-Roman and Eastern Church History in Hartford Theological Seminary.
Prophecy (Christian).

MITCHELL (WILLIAM), M.A., D.Sc.
Hughes Professor of Philosophy in the University of Adelaide, South Australia.
Production (of Wealth).

MOFFATT (JAMES), D.D., D.Litt., Hon. M.A. (Oxon.).
Professor of Church History in the United Free Church College, Glasgow; author of *Critical Introduction to New Testament Literature*, and other works.
Pistis Sophia.

MONTET (EDOUARD), D.Th., D.Philos.
Professeur d'Hébreu et d'Araméen, d'Exégèse de l'Ancien Testament, de Langue et de Littérature Arabes à l'Université de Genève.
Religious Orders (Muslim).

MOORE (ROBERT), B.A. (Oxon.), B.D. (Edin.).
Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in the Free Church College, Edinburgh.
Pre-existence.

MUIRHEAD (JOHN HENRY), LL.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Birmingham; author of *Elements of Ethics*, *The Service of the State*, *Social Purpose*, and other works.
Rights.

MULLINGER (J. BASS), Litt.D. (Camb.).
Late University Lecturer in History; formerly University Lecturer and Librarian of St. John's College, Cambridge.
Publicani.

OTTLEY (ROBERT LAURENCE), D.D.
Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; author of *The Doctrine of the Incarnation* (1895), *Aspects of the Old Testament* (1897), *The Religion of Israel* (1905), and other works.
Purity.

PARGITER (FREDERICK EDEN), M.A., I.C.S. (retired).
Formerly Judge of High Court, Calcutta; Member of Council and Vice-President of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Puranas.

PARSONS (RICHARD GODFREY), M.A. (Oxon.).
Vicar of Poynton, Cheshire, and Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Winchester; formerly Fellow and Prælector in Theology of University College, Oxford, and Principal of Wells Theological College.
Sacraments (Christian, Eastern).

PATTON (WALTER MELVILLE), M.A., Ph.D., D.D.
Professor of Biblical Literature and History of Religion, and Director of the Library, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.
Pir.

PEARSON (A. C.), M.A.
Sometime Scholar of Christ's College, Cambridge; editor of *Fragments of Sophocles*, Euripides' *Helena*, *Heraclidæ*, and *Phœnissæ*, *Zeno and Cleanthes: Fragments*.
Plutarch, Possession (Greek and Roman), **Propitiation** (Roman).

PERLES (FELIX), Ph.D.
Rabbi at Königsberg.
Prayer (Jewish).

PETRIE (WILLIAM MATTHEW FLINDERS), D.C.L. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Edin. and Aberd.), Litt.D. (Camb.).
Fellow of the Royal Society and of the British Academy; Edwards Professor of Egyptology in the University of London.
Precious Stones.

PHILLPOTTS (BERTHA SURTEES), M.A. (Dublin).
Lady Carlisle Research Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford; Fellow of the Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries (Copenhagen); formerly Librarian of Girton College, Cambridge; author of *Kindred and Clan: A Study in the Sociology of the Teutonic Races* (1913).
Purification (Teutonic).

PINCHES (THEOPHILUS GOLDRIDGE), LL.D. (Glas.), M.R.A.S.
Lecturer in Assyrian at University College, London, and at the Institute of Archæology, Liverpool; Hon. Member of the Société Asiatique.
Pilgrimage (Babylonian), **Priest, Priesthood** (Babylonian), **Righteousness** (Babylonian), **Sabaoth** (Babylonian), **Sabbath** (Babylonian).

POPE (ROBERT MARTIN), M.A. (Camb. and Manchester).
Author of *Introduction to Early Church History*, and other works.
Pride.

POPPER (WILLIAM), Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Semitic Languages in the University of California, Berkeley.
Pilgrimage (Hebrew and Jewish), **Purification** (Muslim).

POUSSIN (LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE), Docteur en philosophie et lettres (Liége), en langues orientales (Louvain).
Professor de sanscrit à l'université de Gand; Membre de l'Académie royale de Belgique; Hibbert Lecturer (1916); Membre de la R.A.S. et de la Société asiatique; Membre correspondant de l'Académie impériale de Petrograd.
Pratyekabuddha, Religious Orders (Indian).

RANKIN (WILLIAM MIRRLEES), B.D.
Minister of the United Free Church at Glasgow; author of *The Life of Christ* (1910).
Reverence.

REES (THOMAS), M.A. (Lond.), B.A. (Oxon.).
Principal and Professor of Theology at the Bala-Bangor Independent College, Bangor, N. Wales; author of *The Holy Spirit in Thought and Experience*, and other works.
Remorse.

REID (JAMES SMITH), M.A., LL.D., Litt.D.
Fellow and late Tutor of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Professor of Ancient History in the University of Cambridge; editor of the *Academica* and other works of Cicero; author of *Municipalities of the Roman Empire*.
Purification (Roman).

REVON (MICHEL), LL.D., D.Litt.
Professor of History of the Civilization of the Far East in the University of Paris; formerly Professor of Law in the Imperial University of Tokyo and Legal Adviser to the Japanese Government; author of *Le Shinntoïsme*.
Possession (Japanese), **Prayer** (Japanese).

RIVERS (W. H. R.), M.A., M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1911; author of *The Todas*, *History of Melanesian Society*, *Kinship and Social Organisation*.
Psycho-therapeutics.

ROSS (GEORGE ROBERT THOMSON), M.A., D.Phil. (Edin.), I.E.S.
Professor of Philosophy in Rangoon College.
Principle, Receptivity.

SCHILLER (FERDINAND CANNING SCOTT), M.A., D.Sc. (Oxon.).
Fellow and Senior Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; author of *Riddles of the Sphinx* (new ed. 1910), *Humanism* (1903, new ed. 1912), *Studies in Humanism* (1907, 1912), *Plato or Protagoras?* (1908), *Formal Logic* (1912), etc.
Pragmatism.

SCOTT (CHARLES ANDERSON), M.A. (Camb.), D.D. (Aberd.).
Professor of New Testament in Westminster College, Cambridge.
Priscillianism.

SHIELDS (FRANCES ROSAMOND), M.A. (Lond.).
Member of Boards of Studies (Philosophical Studies and Sociology) in the University of London; formerly Lecturer in Philosophy at Bedford College, in the University of London; Warden of Household and Social Science, King's College for Women, in the University of London.
Probation.

SHOREY (PAUL), Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D.
Professor and Head of the Department of Greek in the University of Chicago; Roosevelt Professor at the University of Berlin, 1913; Member of the American Institute of Art and Letters.
Righteousness (Greek and Roman).

SIMPSON (ANDREW FINDLATER), M.A.
Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Criticism in the Congregational Theological Hall, Edinburgh.
Pleroma, Righteousness (in Christian theology).

SMITH (HENRY PRESERVED), D.D.
Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages, and Librarian of the Union Theological Seminary, New York; formerly Professor of Old Testament Literature and the History of Religion in the Meadville Theological School, Pennsylvania.
Priest, Priesthood (Hebrew).

SMITH (VINCENT ARTHUR), M.A., Litt.D.
Of the Indian Civil Service (retired); author of *Asoka* in 'Rulers of India,' *Early History of India, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon, Akbar the Great Mogul, Oxford History of India.*

Relics (Eastern).

SPENCE (LEWIS), F.R.A.I.
Edinburgh; author of *Mythologies of Ancient Mexico and Peru, The Popol Vuh, A Dictionary of Mythology, The Civilisation of Ancient Mexico, Myths of the North American Indians.*

Popol Vuh, Prayer (Mexican), **Priest, Priesthood** (Mexican), **Prophecy** (American).

SPOONER (WILLIAM ARCHIBALD), D.D.
Warden of New College, and Hon. Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; Chaplain to the Bishop of Peterborough.

Pity, Revenge.

STALKER (JAMES), M.A., D.D.
Professor of Church History in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen.

Preaching (Christian), **Revivals of Religion, Sacraments** (Christian, Reformed).

STAWELL (FLORENCE MELIAN).
Certificated Student of Newnham College, Cambridge (Classical Tripos, 1892, Part I., Class I., Div. 1); sometime Lecturer in Classics at Newnham College.

Renunciation.

STEVENSON (Mrs. SINCLAIR), M.A., Sc.D.
Of the Irish Mission, Rajkot, India; sometime Scholar of Somerville College, Oxford; author of *Notes on Modern Jainism.*

Prayer (Jain), **Purification** (Jain).

STOKES (GEORGE J.), M.A. (Trinity College, Dublin).
Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Philosophy and Jurisprudence in University College, Cork, National University of Ireland.

Power.

STONE (DARWELL), M.A., D.D.
Principal Pusey Librarian, Oxford; author of *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist.*

Retreats.

SWINNY (SHAPLAND HUGH), M.A. (Cantab.).
President of the English Positivist Committee and the London Positivist Society; editor of the *Positivist Review*, Member of Council (late Chairman) of the Sociological Society.

Positivism.

THOMAS (EDWARD JOSEPH), M.A. (St. And. and Camb.), B.A. (Lond.).
Under-Librarian of Cambridge University; editor of *Buddhist Scriptures*; joint-editor of *Mahaniddesa* and *Jataka Tales.*

Righteousness (Buddhist).

THOMSON (J. ARTHUR), M.A., LL.D.
Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen; author of *The Study of Animal Life, The Science of Life, Heredity, The Bible of Nature, Darwinism and Human Life, Outlines of Zoology, The Biology of the Seasons, Introduction to Science, The Wonder of Life.*

Recapitulation (Biological).

TOWNSEND (HENRY CHARLES ALEXANDER), B.A., B.D.
Vicar of All Saints, Wolverhampton; author of *The Primitive Church, The Fourth Gospel, The Resurrection, The Second Gospel.*

Purification (Christian).

TOYNBEE (ARNOLD JOSEPH), B.A. (Oxford).
Formerly Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford.

Race.

TRITTON (A. S.), M.A., D.Litt.
Formerly Assistant to the Professor of Hebrew and Semitic Languages in the University of Edinburgh.

Sabæans.

TROITSKY (SERGÊI VICTOROVICH), Master of Theology.
Instructor in the Alexander-Nevskij Theological College of Petrograd; Member of the Imperial Archæological Institute of Petrograd; attached to the Chancery of the Over-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod.

Russian Church.

URQUHART (WILLIAM SPENCE), M.A., D.Phil.
Senior Professor of Philosophy in the Scottish Churches College, Calcutta; Member of Syndicate of Calcutta University.

Profanity.

WADDELL (L. AUSTINE), C.B., C.I.E., LL.D., F.L.S., F.R.A.I., M.R.A.S., M.F.L.S., M.S.B.A., Lt.-Colonel I.M.S. (retired).
Formerly Professor of Tibetan in University College, London; Hon. Correspondent of the Archæological Survey of India; author of *The Buddhism of Tibet, Lhasa and its Mysteries.*

Prayer (Tibetan).

WALLIS (WILSON D.), Ph.D. (Penn.), Diplomé in Anthropology and B.Sc. (Oxon.).
Formerly Instructor of Anthropology in the University of Pennsylvania, and in the University of California; Special Ethnologist (1914) to the Canadian Government; author of *Messiahs: Christian and Pagan.*

Prodigies and Portents.

WALTER (HOWARD ARNOLD), M.A., B.D.
Literary Secretary, National Council, Young Men's Christian Associations of India and Ceylon.

Qadiani.

WATERHOUSE (ERIC STRICKLAND), M.A., B.D. (Lond.).
Minister of the Wesleyan Church at London; author of *Modern Theories of Religion, The Psychology of the Christian Life*, and other works.

Pietism.

WATT (HENRY J.), M.A. (Aberd.), Ph.D. (Würz.), D.Phil. (Aberd.).
Lecturer on Psychology in the University of Glasgow; author of *Psychology* (1913), *The Psychology of Sound* (1917).

Psychology.

WAY (GREGORY LEWIS ALBERT), M.A. (Oxford).
One of the Librarians of the Pusey Memorial Library, Oxford.

Pusey.

WEBSTER (HUTTON), Ph.D.
Professor of Social Anthropology in the University of Nebraska; author of *Primitive Secret Societies, Rest Days, Ancient History, Mediæval and Modern History.*

Sabbath (Primitive).

WEIR (THOMAS HUNTER), B.D., M.R.A.S.
Lecturer in Arabic in the University of Glasgow; formerly Examiner in Hebrew and Aramaic in the University of London.

Repentance (Muhammadan).

WELSFORD (ENID ELDER HANCOCK).
Fellow of Newnham College, Cambridge.

Prayer (Teutonic).

WERNER (ALICE), L.L.A. (St. And.).
University Reader in Swahili and Bantu Languages, School of Oriental Studies, London; Goldsmiths' Scholar, Newnham College, Cambridge, 1878–80; Mary Ewart Travelling Scholar, 1911–13; formerly Associates' Fellow, Newnham College, Cambridge; author of *The Language Families of Africa*; *The Native Races of British Central Africa*; translator of *An Introduction to the Study of African Languages.*

Pokomo.

WHITLEY (WILLIAM THOMAS), M.A., LL.D., F.R.Hist.S., F.T.S.
Honorary Secretary and editor of the Baptist Historical Society; member of the American Historical Association; author of *Roman Catholic and Protestant Bibles, Missionary Achievement*; editor of *A Baptist Bibliography, The Works of John Smyth.*

Rynsburgers (or **Collegiants**).

WHITTAKER (THOMAS), B.A. (Oxon.).
Author of *The Neo-Platonists: A Study in the History of Hellenism.*

Reason.

WILDE (NORMAN), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Minnesota.

Pleasure.

WILLIAMSON (ROBERT WOOD), M.Sc.
Treasurer to the Anthropological Institute.

Polynesia.

WODEHOUSE (HELEN MARION), M.A., D.Phil.
Principal of the Bingley Training College, Yorkshire; formerly Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of Birmingham.

Rationalism.

WOOD (HERBERT G.), M.A.
Warden of Woodbrooke Settlement, Birmingham; formerly Fellow, and Lecturer in History, of Jesus College, Cambridge.

Puritanism.

WOODBRIDGE (FREDERICK J. E.), A.M., LL.D.
Johnsonian Professor of Philosophy, and Dean of the Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, and Pure Science, in Columbia University, New York.

Pluralism.

WOODHOUSE (WILLIAM J.), M.A.
Professor of Greek in the University of Sydney, New South Wales.

Priest, Priesthood (Greek), **Prostitution** (Greek, Roman).

WOOLLEY (REGINALD MAXWELL), D.D. (Camb.).
Rector and Vicar of Minting; Prebendary of Lincoln, and Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Lincoln.

Prayer (Christian, Liturgical), **Sacerdotalism.**

CROSS-REFERENCES

In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

Topic.	Probable Title of Article.
Phylactery	Charms and Amulets (Hebrew, Jewish).
Piety	Filial Piety.
Pig	Animals.
Pipe	Smoking.
Pitaka	Literature (Buddhist), Abhidhamma.
Pixies	Fairy.
Polygyny	Family, Marriage, Concubinage.
Poor	Poverty.
Pope	Papacy.
Popoftchins	Sects (Russian).
Prajñā	Docetism (Buddhist).
Premillenarianism	Second Adventism.
Primacy	Papacy.
Proclus	Academy, Academics.
Progress	Civilization.
Prohibition	Alcohol, Drunkenness.
Propagandism	Proselyte.
Property	Inheritance, Law.
Pseudo-Messiahs	Messiahs (Pseudo-).
Punarabhiṣeka	Abhiṣeka.
Python	Serpent.
Rabhas	Bodos.
Rājasūya	Abhiṣeka.
Rape	Crimes and Punishments.
Rasholniks	Sects (Russian).
Raudras	Saivism.
Recognition	Ordination.
Regula Fidei	Creeds, Confessions, Faith.
Reptiles	Serpent.
Reservation	Eucharist.
Riches	Wealth.
Right and Wrong	Ethics and Morality.
Rishis	Brahmanism, Inspiration (Hindu).
Rood	Cross.
Russian Sects	Sects (Russian).

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. General

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).
Ak. = Akkadian.
Alex. = Alexandrian.
Amer. = American.
Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
Apocr. = Apocrypha.
Aq. = Aquila.
Arab. = Arabic.
Aram. = Aramaic.
Arm. = Armenian.
Ary. = Aryan.
As. = Asiatic.
Assyr. = Assyrian.
AT = Altes Testament.
AV = Authorized Version.
AVm = Authorized Version margin.
A.Y. = Anno Yazdagird (A.D. 639).
Bab. = Babylonian.
c. = *circa*, about.
Can. = Canaanite.
cf. = compare.
ct. = contrast.
D = Deuteronomist.
E = Elohist.
edd. = editions or editors.
Egyp. = Egyptian.
Eng. = English.
Eth. = Ethiopic.
EV, EVV = English Version, Versions.
f. = and following verse or page.
ff. = and following verses or pages.
Fr. = French.
Germ. = German.
Gr. = Greek.
H = Law of Holiness.
Heb. = Hebrew.
Hel. = Hellenistic.
Hex. = Hexateuch.
Himy. = Himyaritic.
Ir. = Irish.
Iran. = Iranian.
Isr. = Israelite.
J = Jahwist.
J″ = Jehovah.
Jerus. = Jerusalem.
Jos. = Josephus.
LXX = Septuagint.
Min. = Minæan.
MSS = Manuscripts.
MT = Massoretic Text.
n. = note.
NT = New Testament.
Onk. = Onkelos.
OT = Old Testament.
P = Priestly Narrative.
Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
Pent. = Pentateuch.
Pers. = Persian.
Phil. = Philistine.
Phœn. = Phœnician.
Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.
R = Redactor.
Rom. = Roman.
RV = Revised Version.
RVm = Revised Version margin.
Sab. = Sabæan.
Sam. = Samaritan.
Sem. = Semitic.
Sept. = Septuagint.
Sin. = Sinaitic.
Skr. = Sanskrit.
Symm. = Symmachus.
Syr. = Syriac.
t. (following a number) = times.
Talm. = Talmud.
Targ. = Targum.
Theod. = Theodotion.
TR = Textus Receptus, Received Text.
tr. = translated or translation.
VSS = Versions.
Vulg., Vg. = Vulgate.
WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. Books of the Bible

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.
Ex = Exodus.
Lv = Leviticus.
Nu = Numbers.
Dt = Deuteronomy.
Jos = Joshua.
Jg = Judges.
Ru = Ruth.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.
Ezr = Ezra.
Neh = Nehemiah.
Est = Esther.
Job.
Ps = Psalms.
Pr = Proverbs.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.
Ca = Canticles.
Is = Isaiah.
Jer = Jeremiah.
La = Lamentations.
Ezk = Ezekiel.
Dn = Daniel.
Hos = Hosea.
Jl = Joel.
Am = Amos.
Ob = Obadiah.
Jon = Jonah.
Mic = Micah.
Nah = Nahum.
Hab = Habakkuk.
Zeph = Zephaniah.
Hag = Haggai.
Zec = Zechariah.
Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.
To = Tobit.
Jth = Judith.
Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.
Wis = Wisdom.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.
Bar = Baruch.
Three = Song of the Three Children.
Sus = Susanna.
Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.
Mk = Mark.
Lk = Luke.
Jn = John.
Ac = Acts.
Ro = Romans.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.
Gal = Galatians.
Eph = Ephesians.
Ph = Philippians.
Col = Colossians.
1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Tit = Titus.
Philem = Philemon.
He = Hebrews.
Ja = James.
1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Jude.
Rev = Revelation.

III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Baethgen = *Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
Baldwin = *Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901–05.
Barth = *Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 (²1894).
Benzinger = *Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.
Brockelmann = *Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, 2 vols. 1897–1902.
Bruns-Sachau = *Syr.-Rom. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.
Budge = *Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols. 1903.
Daremberg-Saglio = *Dict. des ant. grec. et rom.*, 1886–90.
De la Saussaye = *Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch.*³, 1905.
Denzinger = *Enchiridion Symbolorum*¹¹, Freiburg im Br., 1911.
Deussen = *Die Philos. d. Upanishads*, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].
Doughty = *Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.
Grimm = *Deutsche Mythologie*⁴, 3 vols. 1875–78, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882–88.
Hamburger = *Realencyclopadie fur Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 (²1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
Holder = *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 1891 ff.
Holtzmann-Zopffel = *Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*², 1895.
Howitt = *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, 1904.
Jubainville = *Cours de Litt. celtique*, i.–xii., 1883 ff.
Lagrange = *Études sur les religions sémitiques*², 1904.
Lane = *An Arabic-English Dictionary*, 1863 ff.
Lang = *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*², 2 vols. 1899.
Lepsius = *Denkmaler aus Aegypten u. Aethiopien*, 1849–60.
Lichtenberger = *Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.
Lidzbarski = *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898.
McCurdy = *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894–96.
Muir = *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, 1858–72.
Muss-Arnolt = *A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, 1894 ff.
Nowack = *Lehrbuch d. heb. Archaologie*, 2 vols. 1894.
Pauly-Wissowa = *Realencyc. der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1894 ff.
Perrot-Chipiez = *Hist. de l'art dans l'antiquité*, 1881 ff.
Preller = *Römische Mythologie*, 1858.
Réville = *Religion des peuples non-civilisés*, 1883.
Riehm = *Handwörterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*², 1893–94.
Robinson = *Biblical Researches in Palestine*², 1856.
Roscher = *Lex. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie*, 1884 ff.
Schaff-Herzog = *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, 1908 ff.
Schenkel = *Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869–75.
Schürer = *GJV*³, 3 vols. 1898–1901 [*HJP*, 5 vols. 1890 ff.].
Schwally = *Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892.
Siegfried-Stade = *Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT*, 1893.
Smend = *Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch.*², 1899.
Smith (G. A.) = *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*⁴, 1897.
Smith (W. R.) = *Religion of the Semites*², 1894.
Spencer (H.) = *Principles of Sociology*³, 1885–96.
Spencer-Gillenᵃ = *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899.
Spencer-Gillenᵇ = *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.
Swete = *The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
Tylor (E. B.) = *Primitive Culture*³, 1891 [⁴1903].
Ueberweg = *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872–74.
Weber = *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*², 1897.
Wiedemann = *Die Religion der alten Aegypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, *Religion of the Anc. Egyptians*, 1897].
Wilkinson = *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = *Die gottesdienstlichen Vortrage der Juden*², 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
ABAW = Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
AE = Archiv fur Ethnographie.
AEG = Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
AGG = Abhandlungen der Gottinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AGPh = Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie.
AHR = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJPh = American Journal of Philology.
AJP = American Journal of Psychology.
AJRPE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
APF = Archiv fur Papyrusforschung.
AR = Anthropological Review.
ARW = Archiv fur Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
ASWI = Archæological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Bampton Lectures.
BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSAA = Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.
BSAL = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
BSAP = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.

CAIBL = Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CBTS = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CE = Catholic Encyclopædia.
CF = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS = Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).
CI = Census of India.
CIA = Corpus Inscrip. Atticarum.
CIE = Corpus Inscrip. Etruscarum.
CIG = Corpus Inscrip. Græcarum.
CIL = Corpus Inscrip. Latinarum.
CIS = Corpus Inscrip. Semiticarum.
COT = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*[2]; see below].
CR = Contemporary Review.
CeR = Celtic Review.
ClR = Classical Review.
CQR = Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL = Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DAC = Dict. of the Apostolic Church.
DACL = Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB = Dict. of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).
DCB = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).
DCG = Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.
DI = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB = Dict. of National Biography.
DPhP = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWAW = Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi = Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr = Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM = Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
EI = Encyclopaedia of Islām.
ERE = The present work.
Exp = Expositor.
ExpT = Expository Times.
FHG = Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1885).
FL = Folklore.
FLJ = Folklore Journal.
FLR = Folklore Record.
GA = Gazette Archéologique.
GB = Golden Bough (Frazer).
GGA = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN = Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP = Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GIrP = Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV = Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes.
GVI = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HAI = Handbook of American Indians.
HDB = Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.
HE = Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL = Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI = History of Israel.
HJ = Hibbert Journal.
HJP = History of the Jewish People.
HL = Hibbert Lectures.
HN = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB = Handwörterbuch.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
ICC = International Critical Commentary.
ICO = International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR = Indian Census Report.
IG = Inscrip. Græcæ (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).
IGA = Inscrip. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI = Imperial Gazetteer of India[2] (1885); new edition (1908–09).
IJE = International Journal of Ethics.
ITL = International Theological Library.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JAFL = Journal of American Folklore.
JAI = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB = Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JASBe = Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD = Journal des Débats.
JDTh = Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE = Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS = Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS = Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ = Jenäer Litteraturzeitung.
JPh = Journal of Philology.
JPTh = Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.
JPTS = Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JQR = Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAI = Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBo = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASC = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.
JRASK = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.
JRGS = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JRS = Journal of Roman Studies.
JThSt = Journal of Theological Studies.
KAT[2] = Die Keilinschriften und das AT[2] (Schrader), 1883.
KAT[3] = Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding (really a totally distinct work), 1903.
KB or *KIB* = Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.
KGF = Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCBl = Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh = Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.
LOT = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP = Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSSt = Leipziger sem. Studien.
M = Mélusine.
MAIBL = Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
MBAW = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH = Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).
MGJV = Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.
MGWJ = Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MI = Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).
MNDPV = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR = Methodist Review.
MVG = Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.
NBAC = Nuovo Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC = Nineteenth Century.
NHWB = Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ = North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ = Notes and Queries.
NR = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED = Oxford English Dictionary.
OLZ = Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS = Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC = Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).
OTP = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS = Proceedings of American Oriental Society.

PASB = Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.
PB = Polychrome Bible (English).
PBE = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PC = Primitive Culture (Tylor).
PEFM = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Memoirs.
PEFSt = Palestine Exploration Fund Statement.
PG = Patrologia Græca (Migne).
PJB = Preussische Jahrbücher.
PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PR = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
*PRE*³ = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck).
PRR = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRS = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PRSE = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology.
PTS = Pāli Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAnth = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RAssyr = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RBEW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
RC = Revue Critique.
RCel = Revue Celtique.
RCh = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux Mondes.
RE = Realencyclopädie.
REG = Revue des Études Grecques.
REg = Revue Égyptologique.
REJ = Revue des Études Juives.
REth = Revue d'Ethnographie.
RGG = Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
RHLR = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses.
RHR = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
RMM = Revue du monde musulman.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPh = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Römische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux rélatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RThPh = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTr = Recueil de Travaux.
RVV = Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeitungen.
RWB = Realwörterbuch.
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
SBB = Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SBE = Sacred Books of the East.
SBOT = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SDB = Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
SK = Studien und Kritiken.
SMA = Sitzungsberichte d. Münchener Akademie.
SSGW = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.
SWAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
TC = Tribes and Castes.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
ThLZ = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
ThT = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TRHS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRSE = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archæology.
TU = Texte und Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZÄ = Zeitschrift für ägyp. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
ZATW = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZCP = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
ZKG = Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZKWL = Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft und kirchl. Leben.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft.
ZPhP = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
ZVRW = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*², *LOT*⁶, etc.]

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

P

PICTS.—The Picts and all connected with them—name, race, customs, and language—have long constituted a problem upon which the most contrary views have been held, and which cannot yet be said to be completely solved.

1. Name.—The word 'Picts' has been commonly derived from Lat. *picti*, 'painted men,' but it is now generally admitted that the Latin word is the form of a native name which may or may not have referred to the Pictish (and Celtic) custom of painting and tatuing the skin. The Romans used a word which resembled the native name, and which described this custom of theirs.

The native name is connected with that of the Pictones, or Pictavi, of Gaul,[1] whose town was Pictavi (Poictiers), and the name Pictones is sometimes applied to the Picts of Scotland in Irish and Scottish Chronicles.[2] The Latin name must have been commonly used in Roman Britain, and became, in Anglo-Saxon, Peohtas. As the diphthong in Poictiers corresponds to an earlier *e*, found in Ptolemy's Πηκτόνιον Ἄκρον on the coast of Poitou, Rhys conjectured that the name was Pectones rather than Pictones. The Welsh forms Peithwyr, 'Pict men,' and Peitheu must be derived from Pect (cf. Scots Pecht, A.S. Peohtas, Norse Petta). An Irish (Goidelic) equivalent, with the usual transmutation of *p* and *c*, may be *cecht*, which may give the numerous place-names with 'keith' in Scotland.[3] What the native name meant is uncertain, but an equivalent is thought to exist in Irish *cicht*, 'engraver,' or 'carver' (or, according to Rhys, 'slaughterer' or 'mighty warrior'), this meaning perhaps being influenced by the Pictish tatuing custom. Nicholson derives Picti from an Indo-European stem *peik-*, 'tatu.'[4]

Another native name has the Goidelic form Cruithni, from Qretani, the name of Picts in Ireland and Scotland, and derived from *cruth*, 'form,' 'figure'; an Irish writer, Duald MacFirbis, explains it as meaning the people who painted the forms (*crotha*) of beasts, birds, and fishes on faces and bodies. Rhys and Stokes refer it to *cruithneachd*, 'wheat,' or 'that which is reaped *or* cut.' Hence it would still suggest the supposed meaning of Picti. The corresponding Brythonic name was Pretani, in old Welsh Priten, later Prydyn (*pryd*, 'form'). Prydyn means Scotland, the Pictland of the north, while Ynys Prydain, 'Isle of the Picts,' was the name for the whole of Britain, and thus must have originated at a time when the whole island belonged to the Prydyn, or Picts.[1] This, then, accounts for the early Greek name Πρεταν̄ικαὶ Νῆσοι, 'the Pictish Isles.'

Rhys considers that Goidelic invaders of Britain called it by some such name as Inis Cruithne (from Qretani), 'Island of the Picts'—a non-Celtic race to whom the whole island had once belonged, according to him. On the arrival of the Brythons they changed this to Ynys Prydain.[2] Macbain, on the other hand, maintains that the Cruithne, Prydyn, or Picts were themselves the Celtic inhabitants of Britain, about 300 B.C., and gave their name to it.[3]

2. Classical notices.—Cæsar writes that the interior of Britain is inhabited by those said traditionally to have been born in the island itself, and the sea-coast by those who had crossed over from the Belgæ. The latter cultivated the land; most of the interior tribes did not, but lived on flesh and milk and were clad in skins. All the Britons dyed themselves with woad. Ten and even twelve of them had wives in common, brothers with brothers, fathers with sons; the children were held to be offspring of him who first espoused the virgin.[4]

Does the last statement refer to all the Britons or only to the interior tribes? Zimmer holds that the reference to 'all the Britons' is a parenthesis, and that the account of the interior tribes is resumed with this statement as to marriage. The interior tribes were presumably Picts, possibly Goidels; Cæsar's account of their promiscuity is probably worthless (§ 5 (*b*)).[5]

Cæsar knew nothing of the tribes to the north, who were certainly Pictish. His 'interior tribes' may have been Picts or Goidels, though the Goidels are thought by some to have first come to Britain from Ireland from the 2nd cent. onwards. If the Picts were a Celtic people, there must also have been aboriginal tribes separate from or mingled with them.

The northern tribes first came into notice during the time of Agricola's invasion. Tacitus calls them collectively Caledonii, and in his opinion their red hair and large limbs pointed to a Germanic origin. Some of their tribes fought from

[1] Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* iii. 11.

[2] W. F. Skene, *Chronicles of the Picts*, p. 76; J. Rhys, *Celtic Britain*[4], p. 311.

[3] Rhys, 'National Names of the Aborigines of the British Isles,' *The Scottish Review*, xviii. [1891] 126 f.

[4] E. W. B. Nicholson, *Keltic Researches*, p. 8.

[1] Rhys and D. Brynmor-Jones, *The Welsh People*, p. 76; J. Loth, *Les Mabinogion*[2], Paris, 1913, i. 273.

[2] *The Welsh People*, p. 79, *Scottish Review*, xviii. 134 f.

[3] A. Macbain, *An Etymological Dictionary of the Gaelic Language*[2], *s.v.* 'Britain,' ed. W. F. Skene, *The Highlanders of Scotland*[2], Excursus, p. 384.

[4] v. 12, 14.

[5] H. Zimmer, 'Pictish Matriarchy,' in *Leabhar nan Gleann*, ed. G. Henderson, p. 22.

chariots, like the southern Britons. They had tribal assemblies, ratified with sacred rites. Calgacus, their leader against the Romans, speaks of their harvests—which points to cultivated lands; and of their wives and children, without any reference to promiscuity. Tacitus makes no reference to the custom of painting their bodies.[1] On the whole, his Caledonians seem to differ but little from the southern tribes akin to the Gauls. Ptolemy[2] next describes the various inhabitants of Britain according to tribal groups.

South of the Forth and the Clyde were the Otadini and Gadeni on the east, and on the west the Selgovæ, Novantæ, and [illegible], the last extending to near the Tay. On the east coast, north of the Tay, were the Venicones and Tæxali; west of these were the Vacomagi, then the Caledonii and Epidii. Along the west coast were the Cerones, Creones, Carnonacæ, and [illegible], separated from the Caledonii by the Decantæ. To the north were the Lugi, Smertæ, and Cornavii.

Ptolemy's tribes to the north of the Forth and the Tay correspond to Tacitus's Caledonii, the name of the largest group with whom the Romans came in contact having been given to all the tribes. These may be regarded as Picts, since their position corresponds to that of the Picts described by Bede.[3] Possibly some of the tribes south of the estuaries (Selgovæ, Novantæ) may also have been Pictish. By *c.* 208 the tribes had apparently united into two groups, for Dio Cassius speaks of the two nations of the Caledonii and Maiatai into which the names of the others were merged.[4] The Maiatai lived in the flattish region north of the northern Roman wall, and perhaps derived their name from *magh*, 'a plain.' They dwelt in that part of Scotland which, according to Ptolemy, had been occupied by the northern portion of the Damnonii. Dio says that these tribes neglected agriculture, but had cattle, and lived on milk, the produce of the chase, and fruits, but never ate fish. They had horses and chariots, and fought with shield, sword, spear, and dagger (? a dirk). They had community of women, and their progeny were reared as the joint offspring of each small community. They had a certain food a small piece of which sufficed a man for several days. They would also run into morasses up to the neck and live there several days without eating.[5] According to Herodian, they punctured (tatued) their bodies in the forms of animals, and went naked, the better to show the ornamentation.[6]

Eumenius, who first mentions the Picts by name, says that Constantius Chlorus in A.D. 306 defeated the Caledonii and other Picts.[7] The tribes are again summed up comprehensively as Picts in the notices of the invasion of Roman Britain between the walls by them and the Scoti from Ireland or Wales in A.D. 360, and in 364 when Picts, Scots, Saxons, and Atecotti invaded Roman Britain from different directions. When Theodosius came to the rescue, the Picts are described as consisting of two divisions, Dicaledonæ and Verturiones, doubtless the equivalents of the Caledonii and Maiatai.[8]

[illegible] Verturiones is the Latin form of a Celtic [illegible] the name of the Pictish district of [illegible] (Tarbert and Montrose). Fortrenn is [illegible] or Fortriu, which again is located [illegible] (Cromartyshire). On the whole, this [illegible] the Maiatai. Dicaledonæ suggests the people of the [illegible] Caledonii; the regions divided by the [illegible] Lochy and Loch Ness.[9] Cf. Ptolemy's name for the country to the west of Scotland, Ἀνωμαλία χώρα.

Claudian says that Theodosius drove the Picts into their own region of Thule; the Scots retired to Ireland, the Saxons to the Orkneys, while he

[illegible] *HE* [illegible]
[illegible] *HE* [illegible]
[illegible], lxxvi [illegible]
[illegible] *Panegyrici Constantino*, 7
[illegible] Marcell. [illegible] 4, xxvii 8, 9
[illegible] *Celtic Britain*, pp. [illegible], *Welsh People*, pp. 12, 16

drafted the Atecotti into the Roman army.[1] Picts and Scots returned to the attack in A.D. 387 and in later years, when the Romans had finally left Britain. The Picts, however, did not continue to hold the land south of the Forth and the Tay, except partially in the district known as Manaw or Manann, where, later, Picts, Scots, Saxons, and Brythons mingled, and possibly in Galloway, where they may have been indigenous.

Manaw or Manann included the western part of Midlothian, Linlithgow, part of Stirlingshire (where the name survives in Slamannan), and apparently Clackmannan, which also preserves the name. The part south of the Forth was known to the Welsh as Manaw of the Gododin (=Ptolemy's Votadini), to distinguish it from the Isle of Man or Manaw.[2]

Rhys regards the invading Scotti from Ireland who joined the Picts from A.D. 360 onwards as themselves Pictish, mixed with Celtic Goidels. They were the Cruithni of Ulster or Dál-n Araide. Their name is cognate with Welsh *ysgwthr*, a cutting, carving, or sculpture—hence the men who were scarred or tatued. This name may have been given them by the Brythonic Celts, and Latinized as Scotti. The later Scots who settled in Argyllshire came from another Irish Pictish district, Dalriada, which name they gave to their new habitat.[3] Zimmer also regards the Scotti and Atecotti as non-Aryan people of Ireland, conquered by the Irish Celts.[4] Macbain regards the Scotti as Goidels, and their name as Goidelic = 'tatued men,' Gael. *sgath*, 'to lop off,' O. Ir. *scothaim*. 'It was their own name for themselves.'[5] Skene also regards them as distinct from the Picts, and their region of Dalriada in Ireland as one of their earliest settlements among the Ulster Picts.[6]

The Atecotti were a non-Celtic folk, the Picts of Galloway, Bede's Niduari, and possibly Ptolemy's Novantæ and Selgovæ. Their name means 'the old *or* ancient race.' This is Rhys's opinion.[7] Skene regarded them as a people from Ireland settled in Dalriada, but later considered them as inhabiting the district between the Roman walls.[8]

After the settlement of the Scots in Dalriada, which they took from the Picts early in the 6th cent.,[9] and the Saxon invasions the Picts or Caledonians occupied all Scotland north of the Firths of Forth and Tay,[10] except the region of Argyllshire and, later, the W. Isles. They partially occupied the district of Manaw, and were perhaps also found in Galloway. The remainder of southern Scotland was occupied by Brythons and Saxons.[11]

3. Traditions about the Picts.—In accordance with a tendency in mediæval Celtic legends to connect races, tribes, or heroes with classical or Biblical personages and regions, the Picts were derived from Scythia. The Welsh tradition, as found in the *Brut* of Layamon, represents the Picts as coming from Scythia with their king Roderic to Alban (Scotland), where they were defeated and Roderic was slain. Their conquerors, the Britons, gave them a district in Ireland (Caithness, according to Layamon), but refused them their daughters in marriage. Hence they obtained women of the Gwdyl (Goidels) from Ireland. Their descendants are the Scots or the Gwydyl Ffichti (=Goidelic Picts), who now through these women speak Ireland's speech.[12]

The Irish tradition is found in three forms. In one of these the children of Gleoin (Gelonus), son of Ercol (Hercules), took possession of the Orkneys. Thence they were dispersed, but Cruithne seized the north of Britain, and his seven sons—Caith, Ce, Cirig, Fib, Fidach, Fotla, and Fortrenn—divided the land into as many parts. Five others

[1] viii. 26; cf. Jerome, *adv. Jovian.* ii. 7, for the Atecotti in Gaul.

[2] Skene, *Chronicles*, pp. lxxxi, cvii, cxv; Rhys, *Celtic Britain*[4], p. 1[illegible].

[3] *Celtic Britain*[4], pp. 91, 240, 243 f., 270 f., *Welsh People*, p. 101.

[4] Zimmer, p. 26.

[5] Lecture in Skene's *Highlanders*[2], p. [illegible]

[6] Skene, *Celtic Scotland*[2], i. 137 f., 194 f., *Highlanders*[2], p. 10 f., *Chronicles*, p. cix f.

[7] Rhys, *Celtic Britain*[4], pp. 91, 99, 1[illegible], [illegible], 35, 40, 284, *Welsh People*, p. 10[illegible], Bede, *Life of St. Cuthbert*, 11. for the Niduari see also Skene, *Celtic Scotland*[2], i. 1[illegible]

[8] *Highlanders*[2], p. 10, *Celtic Scotland*[2], i. 99, 102.

[9] Cf. Bede, *HE* i. 1. 8; Skene, *Chronicles*, p. cviii.

[10] Bede, *HE* iv. 26, for the Forth as the southern boundary.

[11] Cf. Nennius, *Hist. Brit.* 7; Bede, *HE* iii. 6, cf. i. 7 f., v. 23.

[12] Skene, *Chronicles*, pp. 122 f., 155 f.; cf. Rhys, *Celtic Britain*[4], p. 2[illegible], for 'Gwydyl Ffichti.'

of the Cruithneach went to France, and there founded Pictavis. Thence they came to Erin, but were driven forth.[1] In the second form of the tradition the Cruithneach, children of Gleoin, came from Thrace. After building Pictavis, they came to Ireland, and helped Crimthann, king of Leinster, to expel the Tuatha Fidhba. Drostan, their Druid, ordered that the wounded should bathe in the milk of seven score white cows, and the poison of the weapons would not hurt them. They now gained power in Ireland, but Heremon drove them out, giving them as wives the widows of the men drowned when the Milesians came to Ireland. They now acquired Alban (Scotland). Some, however, remained in Ireland. Spells, charms, and omens are attributed to them. The metrical version of this legend says that they acquired their name 'Picti' from tatuing their fair skins, and that on being given wives they swore that from the mother should descend the right to the sovereignty.[2] A third account says that Cruithnechan went over from the sons of Mile (in Ireland) to the Britons of Fortrenn to fight the Saxons, and remained there. Wives were obtained from Ireland, Cruithnechan swearing by heaven, earth, sun, and moon that the regal succession should always be on the mother's side.[3]

The preface to the 10th cent. Pictish Chronicle says that the Picts are so called from *picto corpore*, because they are marked with various figures made by iron points with pigments. The Scots are so called because they come from Scythia, or because they are descended from Scotta, queen of the Scots, Pharaoh's daughter. They came to Ireland in the fourth age of the world, the Britons having come to Britain in the third age. The people of Scythia have white hair—hence they are called Albani—and from them the Picts and Scots originate. Cruidne, father of the Picts dwelling in this island, reigned 100 years, and had seven sons—Fib, Fidach, Floclaid, Fortrenn, Got, Ce, and Circinn.[4]

Gildas, who appears to regard the region north of the Forth and the Tay as an island, mentions the Picts as a 'transmarine' people who, with the Scots, invaded Roman Britain. They came from the north-north-east ('ab aquilone'), the Scots from the west-north-west ('a circio'). When they were ultimately driven from the region between the walls, they settled in the north of the island.[5] Nennius brings the Picts from the Orkneys, whence they occupied a third of Britain up to his own day.[6] Bede brings them from Scythia to Ireland, whence the Scots directed them to Britain (where they inhabited the northern part, the Britons being in possession of the southern), giving them wives on condition that, when any difficulty should arise, they should choose a king from the female royal race rather than the male—a custom observed among the Picts 'to this day.'[7]

The origin of the Picts from Scythia or Thrace is purely mythical, and the stories of how they obtained wives may be regarded as equally so—an ætiological myth to account for the Pictish succession. The Goidelic name for the Picts being Cruithne, an eponymous Cruithne was regarded as their ancestor, while the seven districts into which Scottish Pictavia or Cruithentuaith was divided supplied names to most if not all of his mythical sons—Fib: Fife and Fothreve; Fortrenn: Fortrenn (Strathearn and Menteith); Fodla: Atholl (Athfoitle) and Gowrie; Circenn: Maghcircin = Mearns and Angus; Cait: Caithness (Cathenesia). Fidach and Ce have no nominal equivalents.

The regions unaccounted for are Mar and Buchan, and Moray, Argyll being included in Dalriada. The legend must therefore have arisen after the occupation of Dalriada by the Scots.

The fact that there were Cruithni, or Picts, both in Ireland and in Scotland may account for the varying traditions of their coming first to Ireland or first to Scotland. One tradition says that both Irish and Scottish Cruithni were governed by the same kings to the number of thirty.[1]

4. Who were the Picts?—Rhys regards the Picts as the non-Aryan (Ivernian) aborigines, dispossessed by the incoming Goidels, whose language they adopted, although they greatly outnumbered them. The Goidels were, however, profoundly modified by them in language, race, and customs. Having driven the Ivernians before them, they later made common cause with them against the invading Brythons. Hence there was an amalgamation of the Goidelic and Ivernian elements, and 'the term Goidelic should strictly be confined to the mixed population of Aryan and non-Aryan language in possession of the country when the Brythons arrived.'[2] Before Pictish, or Ivernian, died out, it was 'loaded with words borrowed from Celtic'—Goidelic and Brythonic—but it also modified Celtic vocabulary and continued the syntax of its own speech.[3] Zimmer also regards the northern Celts as having become Goidelic in speech at an early period, while the southern Picts adopted Brythonic speech.[4]

The traces of alleged Pictish (non-Celtic) speech are scanty, but Rhys professed to find them in the Ogam inscriptions of the north, and at first equated it with Basque—an opinion afterwards abandoned. But he still adhered to the theory of its non-Aryan character, and continued to challenge the upholders of the Picts as Celtic to prove that the punctuated Ogam inscription at Lunasting in Shetland is Celtic: 'Ttocuhetts-ahehhtmnnn-hccvvevv-nehhtonn.' The challenge seems a safe one, for, as Lang says, it is 'not merely non-Aryan, but non-human! or not correctly deciphered.'[5]

Rhys also finds non-Aryan traces in Celtic nomenclature, and, assuming totemism to be non-Aryan, argues as to its existence from names like MacCon, 'Hound's son'—the name of a legendary prince whose rule extended from Ireland to Britain. Hence 'MacCon may, perhaps, be regarded as representing the whole non-Celtic race of these islands.' Totemism, however, may have been Aryan, and a personal name is not evidence of *clan* totemism. He also argues for the non-Aryan character of the Picts from their custom of succession through the mother, traces of which he also finds in the names and relationships of Irish and Welsh mythology.[6] Zimmer accepts the Pictish succession through the female line, as well as the classical references to promiscuity in the Celtic region, and incest incidents in Irish saga, as pointing to non-Aryan marriage relations. In the case of the sagas, the Celtic invaders of Ireland being in a minority, the aboriginal customs would not be changed at once, and have left their impress in legends.[7]

Skene's whole theory of the history of the Picts is connected with his opinion that there were two divisions of them, eventually distinguished as northern and southern Picts. This is based on Bede's statement that the northern Picts were separated from those of the south by 'steep and

[1] Irish additions to Nennius (Skene, *Chronicles*, p. 23 f.).
[2] *Ib.* pp. 32, 40. [3] *Ib.* p. 45.
[4] *Ib.* p. 3 f. This is perhaps derived from the *Origines* of Isidore of Seville, ix. 2. 103, who gives 'Scoti' for 'Picti' in explaining the origin of the name from tatuing.
[5] *de Excidio Britanniæ*, i. 11, 19.
[6] i. 10 f. [7] *HE* i. 1, 7.

[1] 'Tract on the Picts,' Skene, *Chronicles*, p. 320.
[2] C. H. Read, *Guide to the Antiq. of the Bronze Age, Brit. Museum*, London, 1904, p. 22.
[3] Rhys, *Celtic Britain*[4], pp. 263 f., 268 f., 276, *Welsh People*, pp. 13 f., 19.
[4] P. 11.
[5] *Proc. Soc. Antiq. Scotland*, xxvii. [1892] 263 ff., xxxii. [1898] 324 ff.; A. Lang, *Hist. of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1900, i. 493. For an attempted translation see Nicholson, p. 71 f.
[6] Rhys, *Celtic Britain*[4], p. 266 ff., *Welsh People*, pp. 16 ff. 36 ff., 66 ff.
[7] Zimmer, p. 28 ff.

rugged mountains,'[1] but such a distinction as Skene asserted is probably fallacious. His 'northern Picts' were Gaelic in race and language; the 'southern Picts' were also Gaelic, but, the Damnonii between the Forth and the Tay, who 'belonged to the Cornish variety of the British race,' having been incorporated with them, they introduced a British (Cornish) element into their language. The Damnonii are the Britons of Fortrenn.[2]

Skene's arguments for the Picts as Goidelic in race and language may be summarized as follows. (*a*) The Welsh designation for the Picts, Gwydyl Ffichti, shows that, since all Goidels were called Gwydyl by the Welsh, the Picts were thus assigned to that race. The term, however, is not an early one, nor is Ffichti the regular rendering of Picti in Welsh.[3] (*b*) St. Columba's occasional but not constant use of an interpreter while preaching to Picts was necessary because the difference between Pictish and Irish resembled that between Breton or Cornish and Welsh, which are not always mutually intelligible. The difference may none the less rather have resembled that between Irish and Welsh. (*c*) Gaelic was spoken in Galloway at a late day, and in the 12th cent. Richard of Hexham and Reginald of Durham called the Gallwegians Picts.[4] As to this it should be noted that there was an early Brythonic element in Galloway, but the district had been overrun by Goidels, which accounts for the predominance of Gaelic there. The name Picts may have been given to them by those English writers on account of the peculiarity of their language. (*d*) Many Pictish personal names in the lists of kings are of Irish form; others show a mixture of Brythonic, Gaelic, and Teutonic. The last is accounted for by the sway of the Angles over the Picts in certain districts; the Brythonic element came from the 'Britons of Fortrenn' (the Damnonii), who spoke a dialect akin to Cornish. (*e*) When the place-names are studied according to strict rule, the *generic terms* show no Cymric element in the districts occupied by the Picts. Thus 'Pen' does not occur north of Forth and Clyde. (*f*) Legend attributes a Goidelic speech to the Picts, acquired by them from the Irish women whom they married.[5] This, however, only suggests that the Picts once spoke some other language, or perhaps some other Celtic dialect.

Nicholson is also of opinion that Pictish was a language virtually identical with Irish. He holds, however, that the loss of Indo-European *p* was comparatively late in Goidelic dialects—Pictavian, Sequanian, Belgic, Menapian, proto-Irish, and proto-Pictish—but that *p* was lost in literary or old Irish. *P* in Celtic speech is therefore not always a mutated *qu* or *b*, but may be original and a sign of Goidelic occupation. Insular Pictish, like Pictavian in Gaul, was a Goidelic dialect with *p* preserved to historic times. Highland Gaelic is descended from Pictish, not from the Irish speech of the Dalriadic Scots, who did not conquer the Picts. The word 'Pict' is derived from a root *peik-*, 'tatu,' with I E *p* preserved. He also holds that the Belgæ were Goidels, and are found not only in Gaul and Britain, but also in Ireland. They are the Fir Bolgs of Irish legend, and, with the Fir Domnann (=the Damnonii) and Fir Galéoin (Picts), were Goidels who preserved *p*. The Kymry or Brythons of other writers—Gaulish, Welsh, Cornish, and Breton—were the first Celtic arrivals in Britain. Then came the Goidels, who drove the Kymry into the interior in pre-Roman times, where later Cæsar found them.[6] If, however, this order of occupation—the opposite of that usually accepted—is true, it is difficult to account for the presence of Goidelic Picts in Scotland, where presumably the Kymry would have retired before them.

Whatever may be said of these views, it is certain that neither Skene nor Nicholson sufficiently faces the fact that, rightly or wrongly, the early notices of the Picts regard them as differing from the Scots in origin, language (dialect), and the matter of the kingship.

[1] Bede, *HE* iii. 4. [2] *Celtic Scotland*[2], i. 231.

[3] Cf. Macbain, in Skene's *Highlanders*[2], p. 403; Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, p. [illegible]

[4] [illegible] maintains that the language of Gildas shows that Picts remained in the region between the walls after the last incursion, and that Bede's Niduarian Picts = Picts of Galloway (Cf. [illegible] p. [illegible] *Celtic Scotland*[2], i. [illegible]

[5] [illegible], *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, i. ch. 7 ff., *Celtic Scotland*[2], [illegible] ff.

[6] [illegible], *Celtic Researches*, p. 110 f.

Some writers are of opinion that no Goidel occupied British soil except from Ireland. Macbain regards the Picts, the Caledonii of Tacitus, the Pretanoi of Pytheas, as the first Celtic incomers to Britain, *c.* 600 B.C. They were 'a Celtic-speaking people, whose language differed both from Brittonic and Gadelic, but at the same time only differed dialectically from the Gaulish and Brittonic tongues.' Their language, unlike Goidelic, was of the *p* class of Celtic speech, and they were driven west and north by the incoming Belgi. They were thus Cæsar's aborigines of the interior.

Macbain shows that Skene's philological arguments for Pictish =Goidelic are defective. Bede speaks of the various dialects or languages spoken in Britain—those of the Angles, Britons, Picts, Scots, and Latins. Pictish was thus different from both Brythonic and Gaelic. Again, the Cruithni of Ulster were Pictish incomers from Scotland who had become Gaelic-speaking. The Irish looked upon them as a people different from themselves. The classical names from the Pictish area are mainly Celtic, and a third of them are nearer Brythonic than Gadelic. The lists of Pictish kings are 'decidedly British in phonetics.' Place-names in the Pictish region, excluding the Isles, Caithness, and Sutherland, which are largely Norse, show a veneer of Gaelic, since the Scots imposed their language as well as their rule on the Picts, but they are 'very different from names on Gadelic ground—Ireland and Dalriada.' 'The prefixes *aber* and *pet*, unknown to Gadelic, are found from Sutherland to the Forth.' The former is often superseded by Gaelic *inver*, the latter by *baile*.[1] Skene regarded *aber*, *inbher*, and *cumber* or *cymmer* as originally common to both branches of the Celtic language, retained in some dialects, obsolete in others;[2] but it is surely significant that *aber* does not occur in Argyll (Dalriada).

Other Celtic scholars, Windisch[3] and Stokes, also regard Pictish as Brythonic rather than Goidelic. Stokes, after collecting and examining all the known Pictish words down to the period of the Irish annalists, comes to the following conclusion:

'The foregoing list of names and words contains much that is still obscure; but on the whole it shows that Pictish, so far as regards its vocabulary, is an Indo-European and especially Celtic speech. Its phonetics, so far as we can ascertain them, resemble those of Welsh rather than of Irish.'[4]

D'Arbois de Jubainville identifies the Cruithni of Irish legend, who fought against the Fir Fidga, with the Brigantes, a British tribe located by Ptolemy also in the south-east of Ireland. Their Druid Trostan has a name akin to that of the Arthurian Tristan. The Fir Fidga are the Manapii, a tribe identical with the Belgic Menapii. The Brigantes, inhabitants of Britain (Prydyn), were called Cruithni = Pritanicos, by the Irish.[5]

Where philological experts are so much divided on the question of language, it is clear that it cannot be regarded as settled. If, however, the Picts were a non-Celtic race, they could not have remained so unmixed with their Celtic conquerors as Rhys's theory demands. And, again, granting that they were Celtic—Goidelic or Brythonic—such incoming Celts must have been numerically small compared with existing aboriginal tribes, which would again imply a mixture of races. Whatever the Picts were, it appears certain that they either adopted or retained Celtic speech.

5. Pictish customs.—(*a*) *Painting and tatuing.*—Cæsar says that all the Britons dyed themselves with woad;[6] and Herodian says of the northern tribes (the Picts) that they tatued themselves with coloured designs and figures of animals of all kinds, and did not wear clothing, in order that these might be seen.[7] The custom is also ascribed to them by Duald MacFirbis as an explanation of

[1] Macbain, in Skene's *Highlanders*[2], p. 389 ff., *Trans. of the Gaelic Soc. of Inverness*, xi. [1884-85] 267 ff.

[2] *Celtic Scotland*[2], i. 292.

[3] 'Keltische Sprachen,' in Ersch and Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyklopädie*.

[4] 'Linguistic Value of the Irish Annals,' *Trans. of the Philological Society*, iii. [1888-90] 302.

[5] H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les Celtes*, Paris, 1904, pp. 25, 66; cf. *Les Druides*, do. 1906, p. 37.

[6] *de Bell. Gall.* v. 14; cf. Pliny, *HN* xxii. 1.

[7] Herodian, iii. 14. 8.

their name: a Cruithneach, or Pict, is one who takes the forms, or *cruths*, of beasts, birds, and fishes on his face and body. This probably represents a tradition in Ireland. Far earlier Isidore of Seville explains the name Scotti as derived from their custom of tatuing, and this explanation of the name Picti is given in the Pictish Chronicle (see § 3). Tatuing may have been common to all Celtic tribes at one time, and Claudian personifies Britain as a woman with tatued cheeks.[1] Faces depicted on Gaulish coins have marks on them which appear to be tatu marks.[2] Probably no great distinction need be drawn between painting and tatuing. Among other peoples these customs are ornamental, are used to produce a frightful appearance, or have totemistic significance. Herodian and Cæsar associate the British custom with the first two of these respectively, but they were not likely to connect it with totemism if that existed in Britain. There is no reason to believe that tatuing was peculiar to the Picts among British tribes.

(*b*) *Descent through women.*—The community of women ascribed by Cæsar to all the British tribes (or, according to Zimmer, to those of the interior), by Dio to the Caledonians, by Strabo to the Irish (along with incest), and by the interpolator of Solinus to the people of Thule (Shetland), and, in the Hebrides, to the king, who was not allowed to possess a wife, but borrowed such women as he wanted, is regarded by Rhys[3] and Zimmer[4] as a non-Aryan practice among people in Scotland and Ireland who were not Celts, *i.e.* the Picts, and as explaining the peculiar Pictish law of succession through women. Macbain also regards this succession as non-Aryan, but adopted by the Picts (Celts) from the aborigines whom they conquered.[5] It is, however, most unlikely that the Picts, whether Celtic or not, who had advanced beyond savagery and whose general customs differed but little from those of known Celtic tribes, had such absolute community of women as these classical writers describe. We may regard it (1) as fabulous, since it is difficult to see how a society based on the matriarchate could indulge in such promiscuity as Cæsar's words denote, or (2) as a mistaken interpretation of marriage customs with which the Romans were unfamiliar. Nor need we suppose with Zimmer that promiscuity and incest incidents in Irish sagas are necessarily non-Aryan customs surviving after the Celtic conquest. They have parallels in all mythologies and all societies. As to the Pictish succession with which these customs are said to be connected, we find from the lists of Pictish kings that brothers by the same mother succeeded each other—'not an unusual feature in male succession'[6]—but no son succeeded his father, who was sometimes a foreigner. When brothers failed, the succession went to a sister's son or to the nearest male relative on the female side. This explains Bede's statement cited above (§ 3). Bede does not make the succession through women absolute; succession through males took place up to a certain point. All this has been explained as an instance of the matriarchate, and therefore non-Aryan. Lang, however, notes that words exist in Greek denoting kinship on the mother's side.[7] It has also perhaps been assumed too hastily that the evidence points to the matriarchate. In northern Welsh law, when a woman married a stranger, her son had a right to the inheritance of her father, because 'the stranger, entering the family, brought to it strength, and the nephew, son of the stranger, became the continuator of the grandfather, in some sort his son.'[1] In Ireland by special favour right of inheritance was given to a daughter's or sister's son born of a stranger. Accordingly, d'Arbois de Jubainville explains Bede's statement by the astonishment caused to Anglo-Saxons by the law of inheritance allowed by Celtic custom in the case of sons of daughters in concurrence with their cousins, sons of sons. The Picts had not a law of inheritance differing from that of the Irish or Welsh, and the facts do not require to be explained by the matriarchate.[2] Already, too, the importance of the sister's son is seen in ancient Celtic history, where, in 400 B.C., King Ambicatus placed each of his sister's sons at the head of an army, the one conquering Bohemia, the other N. Italy.[3] D'Arbois de Jubainville's explanation, however, hardly covers the anomalies of the list of Pictish kings, if that is to be regarded as in any way authentic. In Irish and Welsh sagas, where divine groups are called after the mother, or where gods and heroes have often a matronymic, while the father's name is omitted, we may have something analogous to the Pictish succession — some custom perhaps akin to the matriarchate.[4] But this is so deeply embedded in Celtic myth that we can hardly imagine that it is all borrowed from hypothetical non-Celtic custom, as Rhys maintained.[5]

6. Religion of the Picts.—Neither the classical observers nor the biographers of saints who laboured among the Pictish tribes discuss the native religion. As far as the latter are concerned, Ailred in his Life of St. Ninian speaks of the southern Picts worshipping deaf and dumb idols[6] —a vague statement. Adamnan speaks of the northern Picts as possessing Druids who extolled their own gods as more powerful than the God of the Christians.[7] Their magical acts resemble those ascribed to Irish Druids, and Adamnan does not appear to know any difference between Pictish and Celtic Druids. He refers to the fountain which St. Columba found in Pictland, 'famous among this heathen people and worshipped as a god.' The saint blessed it and caused 'the demons' to depart from it for ever.[8] The cult of wells was common among the Celts and is almost universal. If the Picts were a Celtic folk, their religion may be estimated from what is known of Celtic religion elsewhere (see art. CELTS). Bede says that the southern Picts, *i.e.* those tribes dwelling in the region immediately north of the Forth, were converted to Christianity by St. Ninian.[9] This must have been about the beginning of the 5th century. The tribes beyond these, the so-called northern Picts, were converted by St. Columba and his followers. Columba encountered the Druids of King Brude at Inverness, and preached to and baptized the king and many of his people in the latter half of the 6th century.[10]

7. Later history of the Picts.—The history of the Picts from the 7th cent. to the time of Kenneth MacAlpin is one of internecine feuds, strife with the Scots of Dalriada and with the Angles. The usual view has been that eventually Kenneth MacAlpin, king of the Dalriadic Scots, overcame

[1] *In i. Cons. Stilich.* ii. 247 f.; cf. his reference to the tatued figures fading from the cheek of the dying Pict.
[2] Nicholson, p. 150, and in *Zeitschr. für celtische Philologie*, iii. [1900] 332.
[3] *Celtic Britain*[4], p. 56. [4] P. 27.
[5] Excursus, Skene's *Highlanders*[2], p. 401.
[6] Skene, *Celtic Scotland*[2], i. 233. [7] *Hist. of Scotland*, i. 4.

[1] D'Arbois de Jubainville, *La Famille celtique*, Paris, 1905, p. 70.
[2] *Ib.* p. 69; cf. art. INHERITANCE (Celtic), vol. vii. p. 299[a].
[3] Livy, v. 34.
[4] J. A. MacCulloch, *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 222.
[5] Rhys and Brynmor-Jones, *Welsh People*, pp. 15, 36 f.
[6] Ailred, *Life of S. Ninian* ('Historians of Scotland' series, v.), Edinburgh, 1874, p. 15.
[7] Adamnan, *Life of S. Columba* ('Historians of Scotland' series, vi.), Edinburgh, 1874, bk. i. ch. 27, bk. ii. chs. 33, 35.
[8] *Ib.* bk. ii. ch. 11.
[9] Bede, *HE* iii. 4; cf. Ailred, *loc. cit.*
[10] Bede, *HE* iii. 4; Adamnan, *passim.*

the Picts, and ruled over them as king of the Scots, or, according to the 10th cent. Pictish Chronicle, extirpated them—an obviously absurd statement. But Skene, following Pinkerton to some extent, maintained that Aengus MacFergus, the Pictish king from 731 to 761, defeated the Scots and took Dalriada, which now became a Pictish province. In 832 Alpin, of Scottish race by paternal descent, but, as his name shows, a Pict by maternal descent, as king of the Scots fought the Picts and was defeated. His son Kenneth eventually obtained the throne of the Pictish kingdom. This was not the result of a foreign invasion. The events are rather to be regarded as a war of succession; Alpin and Kenneth had a claim through maternal descent to the throne and were supported in that by a party among the Picts and by the remains of the Scots of Dalriada. The Picts, a Gaelic-speaking people like the Scots, were not conquered, and suffered no change of language. There was a more or less silent revolution, a mere matter of succession according to Pictish law, and the modern Highlanders represent the older Picts.[1] Nicholson urges similar views, and points to the unsubstantial nature of the evidence for a Scottish conquest of the Picts (the fact that Alpin and Kenneth are names borne previously by Pictish, never by Dalriadic, kings), to the improbability of the Pictish nation being conquered by their Scottish subjects, as well as to the fact that the Annals still describe Kenneth and his successors as 'rex Pictorum.' Thus the position is somewhat analogous to the change which set James VI., a Scottish king, on the English throne. There was no conquest of the English in this case or of the Picts in the other case.[2] These views have been strongly combated by Macbain, who insists that the documents are not rightly handled, and that a wrong value is put upon some of them. He shows, *e.g.*, that, though Aengus conquered Dalriada, the Annals insert this significant note, 'wane of Aengus's kingdom.' Yet the conquest of the Picts cannot be clearly explained from our present materials. There had been dynastic wars—attempts to break the Pictish rule of succession. The Scots were aggressive, and superior in culture, and eventually their Gaelic speech both in Pictland and in Strathclyde 'wiped out the original Pictish and British.'[3]

The problem involved here is entirely one of evidence drawn from obscure documents and of probability, while the view adopted of the original Pictish tongue, Brythonic or Goidelic, must necessarily affect the results. Whatever theory is followed, it is certain that there must be a large Pictish admixture among the Scottish people in the region north of the Forth.

8. The Picts in folk-tradition.—With the disuse of their name in connexion with actual peoples, the 'Picts' or 'Pechts' came to be associated in folk-tradition with megalithic remains and large buildings and with myths of their origin. From being a historic folk, they became a mysterious people, more or less supernatural, and usually considered as of small stature.

'Pecht' in Shetland is synonymous with 'dwarf';[4] in Aberdeenshire 'pecht' means 'a small person,' and in the south of Scotland the 'Picts' are regarded as dwarfs, 'once very [illegible] and terrible strong'—their immense strength being [illegible] by their having been able to move [illegible] stones of archæological remains, etc., attributed to them. Hence D. MacRitchie regards the Picts as a former dwarf race in Scotland, equivalent to the fairies of popular belief[1] (see art. FAIRY, § 6). That the Picts were not a small race is proved by what Tacitus says of the Caledonii, nor is there the slightest scrap of historical evidence for the theory. The so-called 'Picts' houses' or 'earth houses'—low underground passages terminating in one or more chambers—need not indicate that they were constructed or used by people of small stature. Their position necessitated a constricted height; they were probably store-houses or hiding-places like those described by Tacitus (*Germ.* 16) among the Germans of his day, and not regular dwelling-places, since they are generally associated with remains of surface dwellings. Scattered over the Pictish area in Scotland, and perhaps of post-Roman date, they may quite likely have been constructed by the Picts, in which case the tradition of their origin would be authentic.

Generally speaking, however, the tradition which ascribes all mysterious or large structures to the Picts (*e.g.*, Glasgow Cathedral) is analogous to wide-spread traditions elsewhere in which the origin of megaliths and colossal remains is ascribed to fairies, dwarfs, giants, the devil, Cyclops, etc.

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PIETISM.—1. Use of the term.—(1) Pietism is used in a general sense to indicate a religious attitude of devotional feeling; (2) by Heppe, Ritschl, and others, the term is extended to cover all similar tendencies during the past three centuries; (3) the Roman Catholic 'pietists' are the brethren and sisters of the pious and Christian schools founded by Nicholas Barre, in 1578, for the instruction of girls and boys.

As a proper name, however, the term belongs to the movement which arose under Spener towards the close of the 17th century. Like the term 'Methodist,' it was originally bestowed in contempt.

2. The religious life of Germany at the rise of the movement.—The close of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 left German Protestantism in an impoverished condition. The Lutheran Church was ruled from without by the civil governments of the various States, and from within by theologians as autocratic as the papacy. Both civil and theological rule tend more to vigilance over doctrine than to care for Christian character. The result was that, whilst orthodoxy was never more outwardly alive, it was never more inwardly lifeless. The clergy had not entirely forgotten their functions, it is true, but they were obsessed with the belief that, if there were sound doctrine, as a necessary consequence all else would be right. Luther had placed the seat of faith in the heart, but emphasis had now shifted to the intellect.

[1] *Celtic Scotland*[2], i. [illegible] ff. [2] Nicholson, p. 80 ff.

[3] Macbain, Excursus, in Skene's *Highlanders*, pp. 387 f., 402, *Trans. of the Gaelic Society of Inverness*, xxi. [1896–97], art. 'Picts,' in [illegible], London, 1891, viii. 167 f.

[4] [illegible] in Lockhart's *Life of Sir* [illegible], ch. 29, and Scott's *Pirate*, note.

[1] *The Testimony of Tradition*, London, 1890.

It was held, accordingly, that, if intellectual knowledge (*illuminatio*) were correctly imparted, it would assuredly direct the will aright. Luther had placed the Bible above dogma. The order was now reversed, and a creed-bound Church neglected the Bible in home, school, university, and service. Theological controversy was both frequent and acrimonious. Lay rights were subordinated to pastoral prerogatives. Matters were somewhat better in the Reformed Church, and its presbyterian form of government gave a larger place to the laity; but even here the taint of legalism and the spirit of self-righteousness were only too often in evidence.

Upon this clouded sky Pietism arose, bringing a clearer and purer light. Beginning modestly in an attempt to improve the religious life of Frankfort, it spread rapidly through Middle and N. Germany. Among the forerunners of the spirit rather than the system of Pietism may be numbered Jakob Boehme (*q.v.*) the mystic, Johann Arndt, and Theophilus Grossgebauer, but the history of Pietism proper is almost entirely bound up with the life, work, and personality of the two great leaders who together and successively gave it inspiration and guided its course, namely P. J. Spener and A. H. Francke. Within the span of their lives may be measured the rise, the growth, and at least the beginning of the decline of Pietism. To sketch their biographies is therefore, in the main, to recount the history of the Pietistic movement.

3. **History of the movement; lives of Spener and Francke.**—(*a*) *Philipp Jakob Spener*, 'the father of Pietism,' was born at Rappoltsweiler, Alsace, in 1635. Trained under the influence of a devout godmother, he was impressed early in life by reading Arndt's *Vom wahren Christenthum* (Brunswick, 1606–09). Whilst a student at Strassburg, he found his 'father in Christ' in Johann Schmid. Taking his master's degree by a disputation against Hobbes's philosophy, he continued his studies at Basel, Geneva, Stuttgart, and Tübingen. At Geneva the influence of A. Leger and Jean de Labadie, the ex-Jesuit, combined with the piety, mysticism, and strict discipline of the place to shape his character. At Tübingen he read Grossgebauer's *Wächterstimme aus dem verwüsteten Zion* (Frankfort, 1661). In 1663 he became preacher at Strassburg, and lectured on philology and history. In 1666 he removed to Frankfort as chief Lutheran pastor. Here in 1670, developing an idea which he had previously tried at Strassburg, Spener instituted his famous 'Collegia Pietatis,' first in his own house, and subsequently in the church. His aim was to promote fellowship and Bible study; his means were catechizing, lecturing, and discussion. The name, and, according to Ritschl, the idea of such gatherings originated in Holland, where the 'Collegiants' met 'in collegia' for worship; but this has scarcely been proved. The attempt, inspired by good motives, was imitated, however, and in less capable hands, often indeed in the absence of all leadership, the Collegia gained a name for promoting heresies, fanaticism, and even graver abuses. Spener finally suppressed the meetings. Some were continued despite this, and mostly became separatist communities which seriously injured the good name of Pietism.

In 1675 Spener's *Pia Desideria* appeared in Frankfort. In it he advocated (1) earnest Bible study conducted in 'ecclesiolæ in ecclesia'; (2) a lay share in Church government, as the proper consequence of the Christian doctrine of the priesthood of believers; (3) that knowledge of Christianity is practical, not theoretical, and shown in charity, forgiveness, and devotion; (4) that, rather than denouncing their errors, sympathetic treatment should be given to unbelievers, to win them, if possible, to truth; (5) that theological training should be reorganized, and emphasis laid on devotion rather than on doctrine; and (6) that preaching should be more practical and less rhetorical. Spener followed up his contentions in *Das geistliche Priesterthum* (Frankfort, 1677) and *Allgemeine Gottesgelehrtheit* (do. 1680). In spite of the opposition of the orthodox, Spener's influence increased, and in 1686 he became court chaplain at Dresden. Here he offended the elector by rebuking his vices, but refused to resign his post. The Saxon court met the difficulty by obtaining for him the rectorship of St. Nicholas, Berlin, with the title Consistorial Inspector. Here, in a court where the tendency was rationalistic, Spener's true piety was honoured and appreciated.

In 1694 the University of Halle was founded, and Spener assisted in nominating the professors. Spener's coadjutor in the affairs of Halle was Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), the jurist and publicist. Thomasius is an interesting figure. A disciple of Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, he had been professor of Natural Law at Leipzig. His views were provocative. He attacked traditional methods in law and theology alike, advocated toleration for all, even for such outlaws as witches and atheists, and advised mixed marriages between Lutheran and Calvinist. Denounced from the pulpits and forbidden to write or lecture, Thomasius had to flee to Berlin to escape arrest. Here he received a welcome, and, taking part in the formation of Halle University, became its rector and professor of Law. In regard to ecclesiastical matters, Thomasius contended that a sharp distinction must be made between that which is inward and that which is external in religion. Questions of piety and of doctrine are inward. The State should therefore leave them alone. In the external matters of worship and Church life, however, the State may rightly interfere, if necessary, to promote the general wellbeing of the country and to maintain peace and order. Thus rendering to Cæsar and to God the things which were respectively theirs, Thomasius reconciled his own broad sympathies with his position as a State servant. Personally he was in the main orthodox, holding that revealed religion was necessary for salvation. Though never a Pietist, and indeed not of the Pietist temperament, Thomasius is interesting as an example of the broader tendencies of his age. He maintained cordial relations with Spener, though in later life he parted from Francke. It is obvious, however, that he had much in common with Pietism's spirit of toleration and its undoctrinal bent, and his work at Halle binds his name indissolubly with the Pietistic movement.

Meanwhile Spener's influence was creating jealousy. The theological faculties of Wittenberg and Leipzig attacked him bitterly, the former censuring in 1695 no fewer than 264 errors laid to his charge. This thunderbolt fell harmlessly, however, and Spener reiterated his position in his *Theologische Bedenken* (Halle, 1700–02). His influence maintained itself, and the Pietistic movement continued to flourish. In 1705 Spener died in Berlin.

Spener's was a quiet, well-balanced mind. Himself a profound Bible student and a charitable practical man of devotion, he united Luther's stress upon Scripture with the insistence which the Reformed Church laid upon conduct. Strictly speaking, he was neither mystic nor quietist. He was not a separatist, nor did he desire that Pietism should become a separatist movement. Ritschl indeed declares that he was not truly a Pietist,

because he did not share in the more pronounced developments of Pietism, such as insistence upon a conscious crisis as necessary in the process of salvation, and a complete breach with the world. If this is an extreme statement, it is none the less true that, except for his insistence on the need for regeneration before a man should teach theology, and a belief that the restoration of the Jews and the fall of the papacy would precede the final victory of Christianity, there was little to distinguish Spener's views from the orthodox Lutheran creed of his day.

(*b*) *August Hermann Francke*, the second great leader of Pietism, was born at Lübeck in 1663. Losing his father at an early age, Francke owed his religious training to a godly mother. He studied at Erfurt and Kiel, where he first met Pietistic influences in the person of Christian Kortholt. He proceeded to Leipzig, where he became an accomplished Hebrew and Greek scholar, graduating in 1685. Here, with Paul Anton and Johann Caspar Schade, he founded the Collegium Philobiblicum to enable graduates to study the Scriptures together, both philologically and practically—a venture of which Spener expressed approval. Francke subsequently visited Spener, and, ultimately returning to Leipzig, lectured to crowded audiences. Opposition, however, soon arose, and Francke's Bible College was suppressed and his lectures forbidden. He thereupon withdrew to a pastorate at Erfurt, but a similar outburst of opposition caused the civil authorities to expel him at forty-eight hours' notice on the charge of forming a new sect. Three months later, at the end of 1691, Spener secured for him the unsalaried chair of Greek and Oriental Languages at Halle (where his colleagues were Anton, Joachim Lange, and Joachim Justus Breithaupt) and a pastorate at Glaucha. Here Francke remained for thirty-six years until his death in 1727, exchanging, in 1698, his former position for the chair of Theology.

Francke was a man of real gifts, eloquent, learned, saintly, and industrious (for his remarkable philanthropic work see below). It is said that, as a token of the respect which his character evoked, the whole town followed his body to the graveside. As a writer Francke was less able than Spener, but, besides controversial pamphlets, he left several works for students and some books of devotion.

With the death of Francke the activities of Pietism waned. Its main power was wielded in N. and Middle Germany, but it exercised some influence throughout Europe, and especially in Switzerland. Frederick I. supported the movement, decreeing in 1729 that all who desired appointments in Prussia must study two years at Halle. Frederick II. was unsympathetic, however, and Valentin Ernst Löscher of Dresden headed an opposing movement. While Pietism withstood this in the main successfully, by the middle of the 18th cent. its force was largely spent, although the violence of the opposition weakened contemporaneously with the decline of Pietism. During the period of rationalism which followed Pietism was quiescent, but its spirit, at least, subsequently revived, and, in better fellowship with orthodoxy, is not yet dead in German evangelical Church life.

A more moderate form of Pietism, centring in Würtemberg, flourished longer. Its leader was the famous Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687–1752), together with Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–82) and others. Schaff compares the Würtemberg Pietists in their relation to Lutheranism with the early Methodists and Anglicanism. They aspired to be a movement within the Church, holding prayer-meetings, conducted by lay leaders (*Stundenhalter*), but attending church service and the sacraments. Unlike the Methodists, however, they did not entirely break away, the main body tending to become more churchly without being strict Lutherans. Some communities, like those of Kornthal and Wilhelmsdorf, seceded, following the tendency of so many Pietistic centres to become separatist.

The reaction against rationalism under Baroness von Krüdener was inspired by Pietistic influences, as was the party led by Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg which flourished at the close of the Napoleonic wars. It was mainly distinguished by its opposition to the scientific study of theology. But these were after-effects. The direct influence of Pietism ceased by the middle of the 18th century.

4. General principles of Pietism; its strength and weakness.—Spener's basis was experience. Without attacking doctrine, he relegated it to a minor place, emphasizing the will rather than knowledge, and insisting that justification by faith must be by a faith supported by works, such as repentance, conversion, and a changed life. A certain Puritan strain was manifested in the Pietist's condemnation of theatres, dancing, and such pursuits (adiaphora), and in the insistence that the regenerate alone were fitted to teach theology—a point which, somewhat strangely, gave great offence. Some Pietists indulged in millenarian speculation; many dabbled in mysticism; but, in the main, Pietism is justly to be called a movement of revaluation, which tried to attach to regeneration and sanctification as accomplished facts a higher value than to justification by faith as an approved theory. Pietism has been described as the last fruit of the heart-religion originated in the Franciscan movement; and also as the last great surge of the waves of the Reformation, and the final form of its Protestantism. Neither description is strictly accurate. 'Heart-religion' did not start with the Franciscans or end with Pietism; nor are the waves of the Reformation spent. Pietism was the reaction of the spirit against the letter. It sprang up in protest against the formalism of its day. But it represents a permanent spirit, for, just as tyranny provokes rebellion, and licentiousness creates a Puritan reaction, so will formalism always call up some form of Pietism.

The opposition to Pietism, as the lives of Spener and Francke reveal, was violent. It took the form of controversial literature, such as *Imago Pietismi* (1691), floods of pamphlets, heresy charges, and processes in the civil courts. Its first ground was doctrinal. The contemporary opponents of Pietism seized upon its antidoctrinal, or at least undoctrinal, character, alleging that it impoverished the doctrine of justification by faith by laying stress upon the subjective rather than the objective aspect of faith. They declared that Pietism was indifferent to the importance of correct knowledge in religion, and thus uprooted all sound theology. The Pietist stress upon the will offended the orthodox, who regarded the work of the Holy Spirit in conversion to be primarily in the illumination of the understanding, whereas the Pietists regarded it as consisting rather in the stimulation of the will. The later critics, however, chiefly bring charges of another character, mainly of fanaticism, though others see in the movement a retrograde tendency to Catholicism. It is suggested that the subsequent deterioration of Pietism was involved in its own principles. Its insistence upon new birth, separation from the world, and acute repentance is alleged to have led to exaggeration and frequent fanaticism. It is said to have indulged in wild prophecies, mysteries, bloody sweats, the formation

of independent communities, some fanatical like the millenarians, others criminal. A long list of unsavoury scandals can be collected, and men, like Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714), who began as Pietists and ended as fanatical mystics are quoted as examples. It is said that registers were kept for souls, and idle people supported themselves by uttering the shibboleth of Pietism, whilst others committed suicide in religious mania. Such criticism, however, defeats its own ends. It represents the Pietism of Spener and Francke as little as gluttony and drunkenness represent the philosophy of Epicurus. Pietism must be judged in the form in which it was presented by the actual leaders of the movement, not in the excesses to which it degenerated apart from their control. In this statement, however, the main weakness of Pietism is revealed. It was the lack of central control. Unlike Wesley, Spener allowed the movement that he initiated to develop unorganized and largely undisciplined. He let liberty become licence, and it led to degeneration. Spener judged that organization had killed spirituality in the Lutheran Church, but among the Pietists the lack of organization led to the same result. There were other causes. Pietism proclaimed a gospel of individual rather than universal salvation. It tended to leave the Church and the world as evil and to seek purity in isolation. There was also opposition, and subsequently the undermining influence of the rationalistic movement. But the chief cause of the decay of Pietism was none the less the false individualism which left every Pietist community free to direct its own destinies in its own way. The decay of Pietism came when it had worn down opposition; and the influence of rationalism, though hostile, is least potent of all against spiritual movements. One can but conclude that the prime cause of the ultimate failure of Pietism to maintain itself lay in the fatal error of believing that spirituality needs no organization.

5. The results of Pietism.—(*a*) *In the Church.*—Though the critics of Pietism allege that the *ecclesiolæ in ecclesia* weakened Church organization and led to separatism, there is little doubt that Pietism tended in the main to restore vitality to the Church. It showed afresh the importance of religious experience; it revealed the religious value of feeling and of practical Bible study; it vindicated lay rights. It led to some improvement in the conduct of worship and a better liturgy. It gave a fresh impetus to hymnology and religious poetry. Paul Gerhardt's hymns proved an inspiration to the Pietists, and stimulated their own production. Spener and Francke both wrote hymns, though Spener's are poor and Francke's few. Better known are those of J. A. Freylinghausen; whilst among the hymn-writers influenced more or less by Pietism may be counted W. C. Dessler, B. Schmolck, J. J. Schütz, and G. Tersteegen. Although the Pietistic movement died out without effecting the thorough renewal of the life of the Church which it aimed at securing, its indirect influence tended to restore a truer conception of religion and a more intelligent form of worship, and the legacy which it left became the joint property of many subsequent forms of evangelical revival.

(*b*) *Philanthropy.*—Perhaps the most enduring result of Pietism was the fresh impetus which it gave to philanthropic work. Francke established the famous Halle schools in 1795, and the foundation still exists. The work began modestly with a ragged school in his own house. Two years later a special building was taken, which had grown at the time of Francke's death to a large institution, supporting nearly 150 orphans, and educating between 2000 and 3000 poor children, for the most part gratuitously. The system of education was both religious and technical. It embraced natural science, physical exercises, various trades, and the German tongue. One by one were established a printing press, hospital, library, farm, brewery, and laboratory. A teachers' training college was also added and a Bible Society under Karl Hildebrand von Canstein. The best side of Pietism is illustrated in the Halle orphanage—a work which gained for it the support of those to whom its purely religious propaganda did not appeal.

Pietism was also a pioneer in foreign missionary activities. Frederick IV. of Denmark, acting under the influence of Julius Lütkens, the court preacher, who was a friend of Spener and Francke, sent men to Halle for training, and asked Francke to find missionaries to Danish E. Indian possessions. In 1704 a mission was thus established at Tranquebar, and the Danish-Halle mission received the congratulations of George I. of England. The Moravian missionary movement also owes much of its strength to the Pietist strain in its ancestry.

(*c*) *Other movements.*—The Moravians (*q.v.*) may be regarded as indirectly an offshoot of Pietism. Zinzendorf was Spener's godson and a pupil in the Halle schools. From Pietism he learned not only the missionary fervour which characterized the Moravian community, but the emphasis on vital religion also. Through the Moravians the Pietist influence came down to Schleiermacher (*q.v.*), and is found in the insistence which his philosophy lays upon feeling. The Lutheran stress upon knowledge, changed by Spener to emphasis upon will, becomes in Schleiermacher a doctrine of feeling, and in this sense also, despite Ritschl's anti-Pietistic strictures, the Ritschlian theology has its Pietistic strain. Indirectly linked with Pietism by means of Moravianism is the Methodist revival under John Wesley (see art. METHODISM).

By a strange contradiction, the *Aufklärung*, which represented the antithesis of Pietism's religious views, was in some part prepared by the Pietistic movement. In the first place, the individualism of Pietism, which attracted the robust common sense of Thomasius, prepared for the individualism of 'the Enlightenment' (*q.v.*), and, in addition, the reduction of emphasis upon doctrine provided an atmosphere of greater freedom. It is noteworthy that Johann Salomo Semler, who was one of the forerunners of theological rationalism, came from Halle, where he was professor in 1752.

Through these channels the stream of Pietism ran down to the sea and lost itself. If now the watercourse is dry, at least it may be said that the flow was not in vain. Outwardly the record of Pietism is that of a movement which spent itself, but those who take a wider view will see that it was not lost as an influence when it ceased to have an independent course as a movement. The spirit of Pietism survived its body, and still lives in every form of intensive and devotional religious life.

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PILGRIMAGE.

Arabian and Muhammadan (T. W. JUYNBOLL), p. 10.
Babylonian (T. G. PINCHES), p. 12.
Buddhist (A. S. GEDEN), p. 15.
Christian (L. D. AGATE), p. 18.
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Indian (W. CROOKE), p. 24.
Japanese (M. ANESAKI), p. 27.

PILGRIMAGE (Arabian and Muhammadan).—1. Pilgrimages in early Arabia.—A religious feast like that annually celebrated by the heathen Arabs in the neighbourhood of Meccah was called *ḥajj*. This word (like Heb. חג; see, *e.g.*, Ex 10^{9} 12^{14}, Dt 16^{13}) designated a periodical feast at any sacred place, to which the worshippers on that occasion made a pilgrimage. Probably there were various holy places in Arabia, where such a *ḥajj* took place. Epiphanius, *e.g.*, mentions the word Ἀγγαθαλβαειθ (*i.e.* 'the *ḥajj* to the holy temple') as being the Arabic name of a month in N. Arabia. We may suppose that 'the' holy temple to which this pilgrimage was made was a local sanctuary in that country, and not the distant Ka'bah at Meccah (cf. J. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*², p. 85).

Only the great *ḥajj*, celebrated annually by various Arabic tribes at the holy mountains of 'Arafah and at adjacent places, in the sacred month of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah, has survived the ancient paganism, since Muhammad incorporated these ceremonies in a somewhat modified form into his own religion. The feast took place at the end of the year (see Wellhausen, p. 94 ff.) and had originally, we may suppose, a magical character. Its purpose in early times must have been to get a happy new year with plenty of rain and sunshine, prosperity, and abundance of cattle and corn. Great fires were lit at 'Arafah and Muzdalifah, probably to induce the sun to shine in the new year. Water was poured on the ground as a charm against drought (hence, probably, the 8th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah was called 'the day of *tarwiyah*,' *i.e.* 'the day of moistening [the ground]'). Perhaps the throwing of stones at certain places in Minā, a relic of the primitive heathenism, was originally a symbol of throwing away the sins of the past year, and in this way a sort of charm against punishment and misfortune. Other theories, however, are defended by V. Chauvin ('Le Jet des pierres au pèlerinage de la Mecque,' *Ann. de l'Acad. royale d'archéol. de Belgique*, v. iv. [1902] 272-300; cf. M. T. Houtsma, 'Het skopelisme en het steenwerpen te Mina,' *Verslagen en Mededeelingen der Kon. Acad. van Wetenschappen*, IV. vi. [1894] 194-217) and many others. The excessive hurry and noise which characterized the run from 'Arafah to Muzdalifah and from Muzdalifah to Mina seem originally to have had some magical meaning. The three days at Minā (11th-13th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah) were 'days of eating, drinking, and sensual enjoyments,' according to Muslim tradition; fasting during that time was even forbidden—evidently as a symbol of the abundance that was hoped for in the following year.

Every pilgrim entered upon a special state of sacredness (*iḥrām*) during the *ḥajj*. In this state certain things, allowable at other times, were forbidden. The *muḥrim* (*i.e.* he who was in the state of *iḥrām*) was not allowed, *e.g.*, to cut his hair or nails or to shave his head. His whole body had to be left uncovered, though he might wear two pieces of white cloth (the so-called *ruḍā* and *izār*). We can hardly doubt that the real purpose of the various obligations of abstinence imposed on the *muḥrim* (cf. the Hebrew Nazirite) was originally to bring the pilgrim into a state of magical power and to strengthen the magical influence of the *ḥajj* ritual.

It must be observed, however, that in the time of Muhammad the original meaning of the old ceremonies was long forgotten. Indeed, the feast had no longer much religious, but rather a commercial, importance for the contemporaries of the Prophet, since during the *ḥajj* Meccah and the neighbouring market-places were visited by the Arabic tribes, even from distant countries. Every one could travel and trade then without fear, on account of the general truce between the tribes during the sacred months.

Pilgrimages were also made in early Arabia to the Ka'bah, the old heathen temple at Meccah. The most sacred spot of this sanctuary was the eastern corner in which the venerated Black Stone was fixed, opposite the holy well of Zemzem. It was especially in the sacred month of Rajab (the 7th month of the year) that the Ka'bah was visited by pilgrims, who made circuits round the building and sacrificed first-born camels and sheep. Meccah was surrounded by a *ḥaram* (sacred territory), the boundary of which was marked by stones. He who entered this sacred territory assumed the state of *iḥrām*, and would then pay a religious visit to the Ka'bah. The worshipping of the Meccan sanctuary was called *'umrah* (*i.e.* cultus, cultivation of the sacred building) and, as it seems, was not connected with the annual *ḥajj* of 'Arafah.

2. Incorporation of ḥajj and 'umrah into Islām by Muhammad.—Muhammad had seen the *ḥajj* since his youth. When he began to preach, he had no reason for enjoining the old Arabic rites as a religious duty on his followers. For in the revealed books of the Jews and Christians no divine prescripts were given as to the *ḥajj* feast. After the *hijrah*, however, as Muhammad had persuaded himself that the Jews and Christians had changed the true sense of their sacred books, he concluded that the Ka'bah and the ritual connected with this 'house of God' had belonged originally to the true religion, and were founded according to the will of Allāh by Ibrāhīm (Abraham), the great prophet of the Jews and Christians as well as of the Arabs. As a consequence of this theory, the pilgrimage to Meccah now became a religious duty for the Muslims at Medīnah, in the second year after the *hijrah*. Several verses of the Qur'ān, all relating to the Ka'bah and the ceremonies which must be performed there, were now revealed (see, *e.g.*, ii. 185-199, iii. 89 ff., xxii. 25 ff.).

But the unbelieving inhabitants of Meccah refused to admit the Muslims into the sacred city, and it was not till A.H. 6 that Muhammad tried to go with his followers to Meccah. The first attempt failed. As soon as the Meccans heard that the Muslims were approaching, they prepared themselves for stern resistance. The two parties met at Ḥudaibiyah, on the frontier of the sacred territory. Negotiations were opened there, and it was settled that the Muslims should return to Medīnah, but should be allowed to celebrate their feast in Meccah the next year. According to this treaty, the Prophet came in A.H. 7 with many of his followers to Meccah, and made the so-called *'umrat al-qadhā* (*i.e.* 'the *'umrah* whereby was performed at last what was neglected till

this time,' or perhaps 'the *'umrah* of the treaty').

Since Meccah was conquered by Muhammad in A.H. 8, many Muslims joined in the *ḥajj*, at first along with the unbelieving Arabs and without the Prophet himself. But, in A.H. 8, Qur'ān ix. 1 ff. and 28 were revealed. In these verses Allāh declared that all treaties between the Muslims and unbelievers must be revoked, and that nobody who was not a true Muslim might approach Meccah or the *ḥajj*. Alī ibn Abī Tālib (afterwards the fourth *khalīfah*) was sent to Meccah by the Prophet to promulgate this revelation among the pilgrims assembled at the *ḥajj* of that year.

Thus, in A.H. 10, all unbelievers were excluded from the feast, and now the Prophet came from Medīnah to Meccah in order to partake himself in the *ḥajj* and to reform the old heathen ceremonies into a good Muslim service. All later Muslims have conformed to the example set by the Prophet at this pilgrimage—the so-called *ḥajjat al-wadā'* (*i.e.* 'the farewell *ḥajj*,' because it took place in the year before his death).

3. Muslim pilgrimages (ḥajj, 'umrah, and ziyārah).—The various ceremonies of the Meccan pilgrimage have often been described, not only by Muslim authors, but also by Europeans who have witnessed them. Moreover, the Muslim law-books contain full details about all that a pilgrim has to do during the days of the *ḥajj*. The pilgrimage to Meccah is called in Muslim law one of the five 'pillars' of Islām. It is a religious duty for every Muslim 'who is able to make the journey to Meccah' (Qur'ān, iii. 91)—for women as well as for men. In a few cases believers are exempted from this duty—*e.g.*, if they have not sufficient means to pay their expenses or to provide for the support of their households till their return, or if the journey to Meccah is peculiarly dangerous on account of war or epidemic; also a woman ought not to go unless accompanied by her husband or a near relative.

At the present day most of the pilgrims arrive in the holy city from Jiddah, where they are landed by the steamers of various countries. Those who travel overland come with one of the caravans to Meccah. The two best known caravans in modern times are the Syrian, which comes from Damascus, and the Egyptian, which starts from Cairo. Each has a so-called *maḥmal*, *i.e.* a camel with a richly-ornamented saddle such as distinguished Arabic women used to ride upon. The *maḥmal* was a sort of banner in Arabia. In ancient times several *maḥmals* often appeared at the *ḥajj*, every independent *sulṭān* or *emīr* sending his own caravan to the *ḥajj* with a *maḥmal* as a visible mark of his high dignity (see C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, i. 29, 83 ff., 105). This custom was held in honour by the Turkish *sulṭāns*, who even continued to send the Egyptian as well as the Syrian caravan with a *maḥmal*, though they had become *khalīfahs* of the whole Muslim territory.

In the holy city pilgrims usually begin by performing the ceremonies of the *'umrah*, the so-called 'little pilgrimage' to the Meccan sanctuaries. Almost every pilgrim requires the assistance and information of a Meccan guide (*dalīl*, *muṭawwif*, or *shaikh*) to instruct him in the ritual and teach him to recite the prescribed sacred formulæ. The Muslim *'umrah* consists mainly of the four following ceremonies:

(1) Before entering the *ḥaram* of Meccah, the pilgrims must assume the state of *iḥrām*, abstaining thereafter from worldly affairs and devoting themselves entirely to religious duties. The inhabitants of Meccah, when performing an *'umrah*, must go out of the *ḥaram*. They assume the state of *iḥrām* on the frontier (usually at Tan'im, which is therefore often called 'Umrah).

(2) The pilgrim then proceeds to the *ṭawāf* (the circuit of the Ka'bah). He begins at the Black Stone in the eastern corner of the Ka'bah, and walks round the temple seven times. When passing the eastern corner, he must kiss the Black Stone. If the crowd is so great that he cannot get near enough to do this, he must touch it with his hand or with a stick or must look towards it.

(3) The next ceremony is the *sa'y* (the running or circuiting) between Ṣafa and Marwah, two sacred places in the immediate neighbourhood of the great mosque of Meccah. Ṣafā and Marwah must once have been hills, which were held in reverence by the Meccans. In later times the soil of Meccah has risen considerably and at the present day Ṣafā and Marwah hardly show above the surrounding houses. A revelation (Qur'ān, ii. 153) has confirmed the sacred character of these places. Starting from Ṣafā, the pilgrim runs seven times between the two sanctuaries, in a prescribed manner, moving his shoulders.

(4) At last, arriving at Marwah, he goes to the barber there, who shaves his head and thereby ends the state of *iḥrām*. Originally the ritual shaving of the head must have been a sign that a sacrifice or other religious act was performed.

The *'umrah* can be performed at any time and as often as the individual Muslim likes. The inhabitants of Meccah usually do it in the month of Ramaḍān because this is the special month for religious acts.

Before the beginning of the *ḥajj*, on the 7th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah, a *khaṭīb* ('preacher'), usually the *qāḍī* of Meccah, gives an address in the great mosque at Meccah to remind the pilgrims of the ritual of the following days. Next day (8th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah) most of the pilgrims enter upon the state of *iḥrām* for the *ḥajj*, and depart from Meccah to 'Arafah, which can be reached in about four hours by camel. According to the law-books, it is best to pass the night in Munā (formerly Minā), about half-way between Meccah and 'Arafah, but usually the great majority of the pilgrims go directly to the plain of 'Arafah. There the *wuḳūf* takes place on the 9th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah. The Muslim *wuḳūf* is simply the staying or standing in the plain of 'Arafah for the prescribed time (just after mid-day till a little after sunset). This ceremony is also a 'pillar' of the Muslim *ḥajj*. There are no special rules for the *wuḳūf* in the law-books. The pilgrims are only waiting there. Wellhausen thinks that this ceremony was of more importance in pagan times, and was perhaps a general sacrifice for all the pilgrims.

After sunset the *ifādhah* begins (*i.e.* the running from 'Arafah to Muzdalifah, half-way between 'Arafah and Munā)—according to the old heathen usage, with great hurry and noise. The pilgrims pass the second night in Muzdalifah, and many of them are present at the second *wuḳūf* there in the early morning. Before sunrise the journey to Munā must be continued.

In Munā the great offering-feast is celebrated on the 10th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah. This day is therefore called the *yaum an-naḥr* ('the day of slaughtering'). The sacrifice is preceded by the ceremony of throwing seven pebbles to the *jamrah al-'Akabah* (*i.e.* the heap of pebbles close to the mountain-road) at Munā; to-day this place is marked by a sort of buttress of rude masonry about 8 ft. high by 2½ ft. broad. The Muslims say that this ceremony has been performed since the time of Ibrāhīm because the devil (Shaitān) tried to seduce him on this spot. Before throwing each of the seven pebbles, the pilgrim must say: 'In the name of God, Allāh is almighty!'

The sacrifice at Munā, strictly speaking, concludes the *ḥajj*, and the pilgrim may then shave his head. But, before returning to the ordinary profane state, he should go to Meccah and make the *ṭawāf* round the Ka'bah, followed by a *sa'y* between Ṣafā and Marwah, if he has not already performed this ceremony on his first arrival at Meccah. It is, however, not necessary to perform the *ṭawāf* and *sa'y* on the 10th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah, though it is a meritorious act. It may be done also on one of the following days.

The remaining days, the 11th, 12th, and 13th of Dhu'l-Ḥijjah, are called the three days of the *tashrīq*. The original sense of this word is uncertain (cf. T. W. Juynboll, 'Über die Bedeutung des Wortes Taschrīḳ,' *ZA* xxvii. [1912] 1–7). It is commonly explained by later Muslims as the drying of the flesh of the victims in the sun. The pilgrims should spend these days at Munā, eating, drinking, and making merry. Moreover, they must again throw seven pebbles each day at each of the three *jimār* ('heaps of pebbles') at Munā. The law, however, allows a return from Munā to Meccah on the second day, and many pilgrims avail themselves of this privilege. Having finished the *ḥajj*, the pilgrim, before leaving Meccah, should perform a farewell *ṭawāf* round the Ka'bah.

Other pilgrimages, which are not expressly prescribed by Muslim law (*e.g.*, pilgrimages to the tombs of saints in various countries) are generally called *ziyārah* ('visit') by the Muslims. The *ziyārah* to the tomb of the Prophet at Medīnah is regarded as a religious act from which many blessings accrue. Most of the pilgrims visit it before or after the *ḥajj*.

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T. W. JUYNBOLL.

PILGRIMAGE (Babylonian).—By this word most people understand a journey to a holy place or shrine, either in the pilgrim's native land or abroad. The object of a pilgrimage is to obtain some benefit, material, moral, or spiritual, which the sanctity of the chosen spot is thought to confer. It is true that pilgrimage may be undertaken because such a journey is regarded as meritorious, but the idea of the acquisition of divine favour, either directly or through a saint, is seldom absent. All kinds of benefits may be asked in return for the labour and travail, from the healing of a bodily infirmity to the gift of everlasting life.

1. Frequency of pilgrimages.—Though pilgrimages were probably not among the means of grace recognized by the Assyro-Babylonians, they were far from rare. The making of a journey, either for business or for pleasure, must have furnished, in many instances, an opportunity for acquiring the merit or the benefit which a pilgrimage conferred. In such a case the advantages connected therewith would be merely a matter of chance, due to the seizing of the opportunity, for the Babylonians and Assyrians were much addicted to the observance of omens, and those connected with a visit to a place would naturally attract attention and lead to the decision to profit thereby. Several fragments of a tablet, or a series of tablets, dealing with the advantages to be gained from tours of this kind exist, and are of some interest in those cases where the lines are complete. The following are examples of the benefits promised:

'If he go to Lagaš, he will build a house' (word-play, *labānu* meaning 'to make to be'). 'If he go to the house (temple) of [illegible], the [illegible], he will attain perfection (*gatīlum*)' (lit. to seven, being the number of perfection). 'If he go to the city Nippur, grief of a day, peace of a year' (Nippur was the renowned shrine, first of Enlil, the older Bēl, afterwards of the god En-urta). 'If he go to Tindir (Babylon), trouble of a day, peace of a year' (there is no need to mention the importance of Babylon as a holy centre). 'If he go to Namma, and swim in the divine river (*ilu Nāru*), he will exercise power, his days will be long' (Namma [Nammu] is probably another name of the Euphrates, which was apparently a holy river like the Ganges; in the above extract Namma, which was one of the names of the river-god, was also the name of a town). 'If he go to Sirpur [probably for *Sirpurla* = Lagaš], he will be plundered' (perhaps we have to read *Sirgul*, the modern Zerghul, in which case the pun may have been by comparison with *širqu*, 'theft').

Omens of this nature were numerous, but so far comparatively few have been found.

2. Stories of visits to holy places.—Records of pilgrimages are, for several reasons, few in Assyro-Babylonian literature. It does not seem probable that pilgrimages, unconnected with other business, were often undertaken. In addition to this, it was the custom among the Babylonians, and probably among the Assyrians as well, to send their deities from place to place, in order that they might receive the homage of the faithful; and journeys to worship them, or to obtain the advantages which a pilgrimage brought, were not so much needed. The most noteworthy instance of a pilgrimage is the great journey of Gilgameš, king of Erech, to the abode of Ut-napišti^{m}, the Babylonian Noah, who had been placed by the god whom he worshipped in 'a remote place at the mouths of the rivers.' Among the benefits sought by the hero was the gift of knowing how he might attain immortality. In this case, as the Babylonian patriarch could not be brought to Gilgameš, Gilgameš had to go to him (see *ERE* ii. 315^{b}–316^{a}, vi. 643). The descent of Ištar into Hades to bring forth Tammuz, her husband, can hardly be regarded as a pilgrimage in the true sense of the term, as no devotional or spiritual benefit was sought. Different, again, is the legend of Etanna, who tried to visit Ištar in heaven, mounting thither on the back of an eagle. The aerial journey was undertaken to invoke the goddess's favour on behalf of the hero's expected child, but apparently failed because he feared to mount so high (see *ERE* ii. 315^{a}, vi. 644).

3. Travelling in general.—Babylonian tablets of from *c.* 2300 to 2000 B.C. testify to a considerable intercourse by road between the various towns of S. Babylonia and Elam. These record the transport of provisions, principally drink (probably herb-beer), food, and oil, which were sent to various cities, generally such as were considered sacred on account of their shrines and fanes. Among the places most commonly mentioned are Ur, Nippur, Susa, Anšan (the old capital of Elam), Adamdun (probably in the same district), Kimas, U-uru-a, Sabu^{m}, and Ḫuhunuri. The persons mentioned in connexion with these consignments are messengers, 'couriers,' and officials who may be classed as 'retainers.' All these seem to have journeyed from the temples of the cities where they lived, on behalf of their employers, though some at least went on their own account. Noteworthy is a statement of a tablet in a private collection, in which one of the persons mentioned is the king's son:

'30 *qa* of drink, 30 *qa* of food, ½ *gin* of oil,
Šu-dada.
10 *qa* of fine drink, 10 *qa* of food, 10 *gin* of oil,
Sur-Ninsun, the son of the king.'

That journeys are intended is shown by those lists in which the consignments are described as having been either 'within the city' or 'for the road':

'60 *qa* of royal drink,
60 *qa* of food,
1 *qa* of sesame oil,
Abum-šallu^{m}, viceroy of Sabu^{m}.
2 *qa* of drink, 2 *qa* of food,

2 *gin* of oil within the city,
1 *gur* of herb-beer, 5 *qa* of food for the road,
Maš, the "retainer."
They have taken (the above) to Sabu^{m}.'

Similar entries follow these. The date is 'Month of the Festival of Tammuz.'

As there is no reference to viceroy Abu^{m}-ṣallu^{m}'s provisions 'for the road,' he may have been coming to Lagaš, where the tablet was found. Maš, on the other hand, required provisions, as he was going to Sabu^{m}.[1]

4. Vicarious pilgrimages.—In some cases these tablets may record vicarious pilgrimages, made at the request of people who, unable or unwilling to leave their homes, sent others to represent them, and possibly to make offerings on their behalf. In all probability these journeys were in parties or caravans.

5. Later instances.—One of the most interesting visits to a holy place is that of Shalmaneser II. to Babylon, as recorded on the Bronze Gates of Balawat discovered by Hormuzd Rassam. This king relates that, after leaving Marduk-šum-iddina, king of Babylon (851 B.C.), he found 'the fulness of his heart,' and Merodach commanded him to go to Babylon and Cuthah, where the king caused offerings to be made. At Ê-sagila (the temple of Belus in Babylon) he directed the ceremonies and more offerings were made. Afterwards Shalmaneser 'took the road' to Borsippa, and made offerings to Nebo. Entering Ê-zida (the temple of Nebo at Borsippa), he caused the rites to be conducted reverently, and offered plentifully 'great oxen and fat sheep.' At both Babylon and Borsippa he made drink-offerings, and there were feasts, with food and wine. The result of all this devotion was that the gods regarded Shalmaneser, though an alien king, with joy, and heard his prayer. Two hundred years later (*c.* 650 B.C.), King Aššur-bani-âpli went to Arbela to supplicate the goddess of war, Ištar of Arbela, for her divine help against the Elamites.

6. Pilgrimages in a private capacity.—These are not always certain — they may have been simply ordinary acts of worship. Thus Meissner's rendering of *îlki* (from *âlâku*, 'to go') as 'my duty'—'I am firm in my duty at Ê-zida with regard to my father'—makes the possibility that Bêl-uḫḫu (?) went on a pilgrimage to the temple of Nebo to pray for his father very doubtful. Nevertheless he did visit the temple on his father's behalf:

'The son of the temple [Nebo, the god worshipped there], when I had prayed with regard to thee, set the time for success as being until the 4th day.'

This grace applied not only to his father Kunâ, but also to all his people. In no. 865 of R. F. Harper's *Assyrian and Babylonian Letters* (London, 1902) the writers' statement that 'he [the king] entered Babylon—he kissed the ground before Merodach and Zêr-panîtu^{m}' (*i.e.* in the temple of Belus) likewise implies at least a turning aside to perform a religious duty. But more to the point, apparently, is the following (from Babylon):

'Letter from Marduk-ibnî to Šišku, my brother. May Merodach and Zêr-panîtu^{m} promise the prosperity and the preservation of my brother. Behold, Iddina-Bêl has gone up with me to Sûnu—we made an offering there with Nergal-iddina, his brother. I am looking after your interests.'

Here, again, we have (to all appearance) the combination of business with religious duties.

7. The legend of the 'Mother of Sin.'—This is a bilingual record in which, after describing the misfortunes of the 'royal maid,' as the 'sinful mother' is called, the text, in a fresh paragraph, continues:

'Come, let us go to him, let us go to him!
As for me, to his city, let us go to him!
To the city, to the wonders, let us go to him!

To the city, to the city, to Babylon's foundation,
At the command Ištar gave,
The maid Ama-namtaga (the Mother of Sin) passed through the dust.'

Here follows a long account of Ištar's punishments, from which it would appear that not only did the 'sinful mother' make a pilgrimage to the holy places Kullab, Erech's foundation, Zazabu's foundation, Hursag-kalama at Kis, and Ê-tur-kalama ('the house of the world's repose'), but she had also to do penance and submit to Ištar's punishments, performed by her servants and ministers. The record is unfortunately incomplete, but it is probable that the deity referred to by the pronoun was Tammuz, Ištar's spouse, whom the 'sinful mother' had offended in some way.

Though the records are apparently scanty and doubtful, the journeys which pilgrimages imply were far from uncommon in Assyria and Babylonia, as the fragments referring to the benefit to be gained from visits to sacred places seem to show.

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T. G. PINCHES.

PILGRIMAGE (Buddhist).—In the earliest order and scheme of Buddhist monastic life, if the sacred books of the Tripiṭaka may be taken to reflect faithfully and in general the teaching of the Founder, there was no recognition of the duty or advantage of pilgrimage, and no sanction given to the practice. Gautama Buddha neither forbade nor enjoined his followers to imitate that which Hindu example must already have made sufficiently familiar—the journeyings to near or distant shrines for spiritual benefit and to render homage. It was impossible that with his views and teaching with regard to the future life he should have allowed the existence or recognized the validity of a habit founded upon the belief in the continuity and permanence of existence after death. The slight evidence available, however, indicates that very soon after the *parinirvāṇa*, and probably in connexion with the distribution of the relics and the building of memorial *stūpas* over them, the practice arose among the adherents and friends of the Buddha of visiting the places thus consecrated by the presence of the earthly remains of their honoured teacher and guide. From this it was an easy step to a practice of pilgrimage which endeavoured at one and the same time to secure personal advantage from a visit to the shrine and to honour the saint whose name and fame were there commemorated. Whatever its origin, the habit of pilgrimage is and for many centuries has been wide-spread in Buddhism, not only in the Mahāyāna school, where it is most prevalent, but also in the Hīnayāna of the south.

1. Origin.—It appears probable therefore that Buddhist usage in this respect is, in the first instance at least, imitative of Hindu practice, and grew up independently of any direct command. It is perhaps not without significance also that the Pāli form of the Sanskrit word for pilgrimage (*pravrajyā*, Pāli *pabbajjā*, lit. 'a going forth,' 'retirement from the world') should be the technical term for admission or 'ordination' to the first grade of the Buddhist monkhood. The pilgrim (*pravrajita*, *pravrājaka*, Pāli *pabbajita*) is defined in the *Dhammapada* as one who has abandoned

[1] As an illustration of these journeys in connexion with temples, that in which the priests (of Sippar), *c.* 1850 B.C., give a ½ shekel of silver to buy grain for a journey may, perhaps, be quoted (A. Ungnad, *Hammurabi's Gesetz*, Leipzig, 1909, no. 481, in vol. iii. p. 134). The amount was the gift of the chief singer (*nâru rabû*).

the world (x. i. 89); and in an earlier verse (i. 75) it is declared that the heedless pilgrim, so far from securing good, only scatters more widely the dust of his (unsubdued) passions. In these and other passages of the early literature there is no direct mention of any aim or purpose other than that of retirement from the world to assume the rank and status of a member of the Saṅgha. There was certainly, however, in the writer's mind the practice, wide-spread and familiar in his time, of a wandering ascetic life which was not entirely aimless, but contemplated visits to sacred temples or shrines as the profitable and meritorious end of its often toilsome and prolonged journeyings.

In all probability also the injunction laid upon Buddhist monks to adopt a wandering mode of existence without settled home or habitation contributed to the facility with which they adopted the Hindu practice of pilgrimage to the sacred places associated with their religious history and faith.[1] Only in the season of the rains, in Vassa, were they prohibited from travelling about, lest injury should be done to living creatures (*Mahāvagga*, iii.). At all other periods of the year the Buddhist monk was to be 'homeless,' possessed of no stated or fixed residence; and a habit or passion for wandering taken up as a religious duty by men to whom the idea of pilgrimage was not unfamiliar, and among a people whose nomadic mode of existence lay probably not many centuries in the past, readily developed into the practice of travel for a religious purpose to a formal and definite destination. The institution of Vassa, with its prohibition of travel, would necessarily place difficulties in the way of continuous or lengthy pilgrimages to distant shrines. In practice, however, the difficulty does not seem to have been felt. The early books and narratives, especially of the Chinese pilgrims, record prolonged journeyings in which there is no reference to interruption or delay caused by the observance of rules for retirement in the season of the rains.

In the later Buddhist literature of both the Northern and the Southern schools references to pilgrimage and the sacred places whither the pilgrims resort are not infrequent. In the *Buddha Charita* the statement recurs that purification from sin may be attained by dwelling or bathing at sacred places;[2] and these holy centres of pilgrimage are ladders to heaven.[3] The extravagant assertion is even ventured that the Buddha himself created millions of ascetics,[4] whose wanderings are more or less indefinite pilgrimages from shrine to shrine. Holy streams and *tīrthas* are recognized in the earliest homes of Buddhism, in part no doubt derived from Hindu custom, but partly associated with Buddhist history and religious origins.[5] Elsewhere right-minded and pious Buddhists are said to have their places of pilgrimage;[6] it is a pious duty to build *chaityas* (Pāli *cetiya*) in honour of Buddhas,[7] where their relics are preserved, and miracles are wrought in the presence of the assembled worshippers.[8]

In the later Mahāyāna literature therefore, and in writings of the S[illegible] that have come under the influence of this type of [illegible] the Buddha himself is represented as declaring the [illegible] character of shrines and other places associated with the lives of holy men and inculcating the virtue and duty of pilgrimage thereto.[1] It is hardly probable that this feature of his teaching is original. It bears rather the impress of a later practice, introduced from ancient Hindu usage, and in harmony with the natural desire to maintain communion with and do honour to the dead; and is part of the esoteric and mystical teaching which, according to Mahāyānist belief and assertion, was formulated by Gautama during the later years of his life. There is no real evidence in support of this; and in regard to the doctrine of the life after death and kindred ideas, or those which imply the possibility of relations between the living and the dead and the individual consciousness and capacity for good or evil of the latter, it is unlikely that the direct and limited teaching of his mature life, in which he refused to be drawn into discussion or to make affirmation concerning aught beyond this present world, was later exchanged for positive doctrine and directions based upon entirely different views. The uncertainty of date of the several works and strata of the Buddhist literature must not be overlooked. The Pāli Tripiṭaka does appear, however, to make good in most respects at least its claim to represent most faithfully the convictions and doctrine which Gautama set forth to his disciples.

2. Indian places of pilgrimage.—It is probable that the earliest centres of pilgrimage were the places most closely associated with the life and teaching of the Founder. Four of these, viz. Kapilavastu, Kuśanagara, Buddh Gayā, and Benares, were pre-eminent, and for centuries continued to be the goal to which the steps of Buddhist pilgrims were turned; two of them are venerated and resorted to by numerous Buddhist worshippers at the present day, who bring offerings from the most distant lands. Testimony to the reverential regard in which these and many other places were held is found especially in the writings of the Chinese pilgrims. In the Lumbinī Grove at Kapilavastu (*q.v.*) was the birth-place of Gautama Buddha. Buried in the dense *tarai* districts of S. Nepāl, the lost site of the town was re-discovered in the year 1895, and identified by a pillar and inscription recording the visit of the emperor Aśoka. As a centre of pilgrimage it has for a long time been inaccessible and is so at the present time, and thus awakens little interest in Buddhists themselves. Kuśanagara (*q.v.*) also, the scene of the death of the Buddha, was visited by the same Chinese monks, to pay their homage at the sacred site. According to their testimony, Kuśanagara lay at no great distance east of Kapilavastu. The exact site, however, has not been identified.

The two remaining places that shared in all probability with the traditional scenes of Gautama's birth and *parinirvāṇa* the veneration of the earliest Buddhists, and which have maintained to the present day their popularity and sacred character with thousands of Buddhist pilgrims from all parts of the Buddhist world, are Buddh Gayā, six or seven miles south of Gayā (*q.v.*) in W. Bengal, where, seated under the Bo-tree in deep meditation, Gautama attained insight and the bliss of perfect knowledge; and Benares (*q.v.*), probably the most ancient sacred city in the world, the scene of the first deliverance of his message, when in the Deer-Park (Isipatana), in his first sermon addressed to the five ascetics in whose company he had previously practised fruitless austerities, he 'set in motion the wheel of the law,' and founded 'the highest kingdom of truth.'[2] These places possess an equal sanctity in the eyes of Hindus, and they are sought out by multitudes of pilgrim worshippers of both religions.

[1] Cf. *Mahāvagga*, i. 11. 1: 'Go ye, O Bhikkhus, wander for the gain of the [illegible], for the welfare of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, for the gain, and for the welfare of gods and men.' These [illegible] directions to preach, and the pro[illegible] 'he' [illegible] will himself preach the doctrine.

[2] *Buddha Charita*, ii. 35, the thought and even the phraseology are of Hindu conception and origin.

[3] *Ib.* [illegible]. [4] *Ib.* xvii. 24 f.

[5] *Ib.* [illegible], vv. 28. Those who bathe and offer their worship in the holy river and reverence the *chaitya* of the three stones become great [illegible] *bodhisattvas*, and obtain *nirvāṇa*.

[6] *Mahā Parinibbāna Sutta*, v. 16 f.

[7] *Fo-kwo-ki*, *tsan-kina*, v. 27 f.

[8] *Milinda-pañha*, iv. viii. 51 f., cf. *Buddha Charita*, xv. 62 ff.

[1] Cf. *Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta*, v. 16-22: 'There are four places which the believing man should visit with feelings of reverence and awe, . . . the place at which the believing man can say, "Here the Tathāgata was born," . . . "Here the Tathāgata attained to the supreme and perfect insight," . . . "Here was the kingdom of righteousness set on foot by the Tathāgata," . . . "Here the Tathāgata passed finally away in that utter passing away which leaves nothing whatever to remain behind." . . . And there will come to such spots believers, brethren and sisters of the order, or devout men and devout women, . . . and they who shall die while they, with believing heart, are journeying on such pilgrimage shall be reborn after death, when the body shall dissolve, in the happy realms of heaven.'

[2] *Mahāvagga*, i. 6. 30.

After the death of the Buddha the relics of his body were collected from the funeral pyre, and divided into eight portions. These were distributed to the various claimants for their possession, and over them memorial *stūpas* were erected for their preservation. The places thus made sacred became centres of pilgrimage, which attracted devout worshippers from far and near, and were visited among others by the Chinese monks in the course of their travels through N. India.

3. Historical visits.—(*a*) *Aśoka.*—The earliest historical reference to pilgrimage undertaken with a religious motive is contained in the edicts of the Buddhist emperor Aśoka (*q.v.*) in the 3rd cent. before our era. In the midst of his zealous care for the welfare of his subjects he found time and opportunity for extensive journeyings to the sacred places of the Buddhist faith within his dominions. Besides confirming and propagating the faith by his edicts and missions he erected at these places numerous *stūpas* containing sacred relics, repairing others which had fallen into neglect or decay. For their maintenance also he provided revenues, and himself, according to the tradition, undertook the care and sustenance of 64,000 monks. The limit of his pilgrim travels northward was the ruined site of Kapilavastu; and here, in addition to the erection of a commemorative pillar with inscription, he repaired or rebuilt a *stūpa* in memory of Kanakamuni (*q.v.*), one of Gautama's predecessors of a bygone age. This enlargement or repair he is said to have accomplished for the second time. In any case his experience and action are sufficient proof of the existence in his day, and for a considerable time previously, of sacred buildings associated with the life and deeds of holy leaders and teachers of old, which had already become centres or goals of pilgrimage. Certainly the *stūpa* of Kanakamuni was not a solitary instance of a commemorative erection, where offerings were presented and homage paid. There were many others, at least in the sacred country of Buddhist origins, and probably elsewhere. The words and acts of Aśoka clearly indicate that in his day merit was considered to attach to visits to these spots, and the names and memory of those in whose honour the *stūpas* had been raised were regarded with veneration. The date and circumstances of his visit therefore and the motives that prompted it justify the conclusion that sacred pilgrimage became a recognized observance of the Buddhist faith not long after the death of its Founder.

(*b*) *Fā-Hian.*—Both Kapilavastu and the scene of Gautama's death at Kuśanagara were visited by the Chinese pilgrim Fā-Hian and others in the 5th and following centuries. The former site Fā-Hian describes as already deserted in his day, inhabited only by a few monks and some poor families; and it has remained ever since in the same state of desolation. In the course of his pilgrimage Fā-Hian visited all the important Buddhist shrines and cities in the north of India; thence he travelled to Ceylon, and paid his homage to the sacred relics there, including the tooth of the Buddha preserved in the island. Everywhere in India he found numerous monasteries with many learned and pious monks; and at the sacred places there were great companies of Buddhist pilgrims, intent on showing honour to the dead and winning merit by their self-sacrificing endeavour.

(*c*) *Hiuen Tsiang.* — The most important and celebrated Chinese traveller and pilgrim was Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang [*q.v.*]), who followed Fā-Hian at an interval of rather more than two centuries. His name and fame still survive in Central Asia, where his memory is revered as that of a wonder-working teacher and saint. His travels extended over sixteen years from A.D. 629 to 645. In these laborious journeys he covered a considerably wider area in India itself than his predecessor, but he did not visit Ceylon. He appears, moreover, to have been more interested in the present condition of Buddhism, in its doctrine, practice, and literature, than in its relics or holy places of pilgrimage, and to have been more impressed by its vitality and influence, and by the conflicts of the schools, than by the crowds of pilgrims. He visited all the great centres of the Buddhist faith, and makes frequent reference to the revival of Brāhmanism, which even in Buddh Gayā had to a considerable extent supplanted its rival.

At Buddh Gayā also Hiuen Tsiang describes the great temple built by Aśoka, 160 ft. or more in height, of eleven storeys, each of which bore golden statues of the Buddha. Probably this building was erected on the site of a more ancient monument that soon after the death of the Buddha was placed there to commemorate the spot on which he attained emancipation and perfect wisdom. The ancient building has been many times reconstructed and restored, and the pyramidal temple with its many images that now occupies the site is rarely without its pilgrim visitors from distant Buddhist countries, who present their prayers and offerings at its sacred shrines. It is surrounded by numerous *stūpas*, ancient and modern, and is as attractive and sacred a spot to Hindu devotees as to those of the Buddhist faith.

The distinctive feature of the enclosure is the ancient Bo-tree, the sacred *pīpal* (*Ficus religiosa*), under the shadow of an ancestor of which in this place the Buddha established his seat. There are several *pīpal*-trees surrounding the temple, most of them not improbably descended from the original Bo-tree. The pilgrims lay their offerings and pour their libations of oil and scents at the foot of the oldest, which they regard as the identical tree of Gautama, and affix gold-leaf to the stem, and to the low stone steps by which it is surrounded.[1] It is in his account of the Bo-tree that Hiuen Tsiang records the tradition of the Buddha walking on the water.

Second only to Buddh Gayā in its sacred associations is Sārnāth (*q.v.*), three or four miles north of Benares. It is believed to be the site of the Deer-Park (Isipatana, Skr. *ṛṣipatana*) where Gautama delivered his first address to the Hindu ascetics. The ancient *stūpa* on the site is probably the same as was seen by Hiuen Tsiang in the 7th century. Fā-Hian also found a monument existing there at the time of his visit. Recent excavations at Sārnāth, conducted by the Government of India, have resulted in the discovery of numerous *stūpas*, shrines, and sculptured stones of different epochs, including two pillars erected by the emperor Aśoka and many figures of the Buddha. Evidence also has been found of the existence of monastic buildings and settlements of monks at least as early as the 4th and 5th centuries of our era. The pilgrim history of the site is long and extensive, and if its record could be recovered would be of the greatest interest.[2]

4. Other pilgrim resorts in N. India.—A mere enumeration of the local centres of pilgrimage in N. India would not be to much profit, and a description of them all is not possible here. The narratives of the Chinese monks who travelled in India are full of notices of the sacred places where the pilgrims congregated from near and far, to

[1] See art. GAYĀ, vol. vi. p. 181 ff., and Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, pp. 390–401.

[2] See art. BENARES, vol. ii. p. 468; Monier-Williams, p. 401 ff.; E. B. Havell, *Benares, the Sacred City*, London, 1905.

worship the relics of the saints and to pay homage at their shrines. The impression gained is that such centres of pilgrimage were much more numerous in the early centuries than at the present day, and they were naturally more densely thronged at a time when India was to so large an extent Buddhist in faith. At or near Pāṭaliputra (Patna [*q.v.*]), his capital city, Aśoka built the first of the 84 *stūpas* which he is said to have erected over relics of the Buddha, and the town is described as containing monasteries and hospitals with thousands of Buddhist monks and pilgrims. According to Fā-Hian, at Śrāvastī, the ancient capital of Oudh, identified with the extensive ruins at Sāhet Māhet in the Gonda District,[1] the first sandal-wood image of Gautama was erected; and there also stood the convent or monastery of Jetavana, an early gift by a rich merchant to the community, sanctified by the frequent presence and preaching of the Master. Later, in the time of Hiuen Tsiang, the town and monasteries were deserted and ruined. Some of the most sacred sites and pilgrim resorts were to be found at Rājagṛha (see COUNCILS [Buddhist], vol. iv. p. 182), the first metropolis of Buddhism, as it has been called, where monasteries and *stūpas* were most numerous, and where some of the ashes of Gautama's body were enshrined. Vaiśālī (*ib.* p. 183), the scene of the second Buddhist Council, Nālanda (*q.v.*), the famed university town, Ayodhyā, most holy ground to Buddhists and Hindus alike, where the Buddha is believed to have preached for many years, and numerous other places were renowned centres of pilgrim resort during the period of Buddhist ascendancy in India. Few of these have retained their attraction for Buddhist pilgrims at the present day. In the farther north-west, near Peshāwar, much interest was aroused among Buddhists a few years ago by the identification of the relic mound raised by the king Kaniṣka (*q.v.*) on the spot where four hundred years before the Buddha had stood and prophesied of his coming and reign. A few fragments of bone were discovered within a relic casket, which were generally accepted as authentic remains of Gautama himself. They were transported with much ceremony to Burma, and have been preserved in a monastery at Mandalay.

5. **Pilgrim movement beyond India.**—Within the more recent centuries the stream of Buddhist pilgrimage has been to a large extent diverted from India, and the sanctuaries of the country have passed into other hands or fallen into oblivion and ruin. Buddh Gayā alone has maintained its supremacy and attraction, and is still the centre and most holy place to which the heart and eyes of the Buddhist pilgrim turn with faith and affection. Outside the country of its birth the two great lands of Southern Buddhism, Ceylon and Burma, compete to draw visitors to their sacred shrines. There is constant movement and interchange between countries so closely united in sympathy and religious belief.

(*a*) *Ceylon.*—In Ceylon the Temple of the Buddha's Tooth at Kandy is unique in its claims on the reverence and devotion of the pilgrim. Small and unimposing as the building is, compared with the great temples of Japan, it enshrines a relic of the Buddha, recognized and honoured by all his followers of every land. The Tooth is preserved in an inner chamber of the temple, resting on a golden lotus-flower within nine caskets of gold, and is exhibited by the priests to pilgrims and visitors. The original tooth is said to have been taken to Kaliṅga from the funeral pyre of Gautama, and to have been kept in the temple at Purī for a period of about eight hundred years. Later it was transferred to Ceylon and S. India and again to Ceylon, where it is said to have been burnt by the Portuguese in order to divert the people from idolatrous worship. The priests at Kandy maintain that the true relic was concealed, and an imitation substitute given over to the Portuguese rulers and destroyed by them. The existing bone is not a human tooth, and probably not of human origin (see art. KANDY, vol. vii. p. 651 f.).

There are numerous temples and *vihāras* in Ceylon with their congregations of monks and worshippers, but the most celebrated and frequented place of pilgrimage is Adam's Peak (*q.v.*), with its sacred foot-print (*śrī-pāda*) in the rock at the summit. The worship of foot-prints is universal in the East; Muhammadans, Hindus, Jains, and others take part in this veneration, and the practice is certainly of very early date, foot-prints of the Buddha being found on the sculptured stones at Bharhut and Sāñchi as well as in various other places in India, and also in Siam, Tibet, Burma, and elsewhere. The hole or mark in the rock on Adam's Peak is the most sacred of all, and is visited by pilgrims of many faiths. Hindus believe it to be the foot-print of Śiva, Christians of St. Thomas on his apostolic journey of evangelization to the island, Muhammadans of Adam or, according to others, of Alī. The pilgrims of Buddhist faith, however, greatly predominate in numbers.

(*b*) *Burma.*—Except in these two centres, the spirit and practice of pilgrimage are little effective in Ceylon. It is otherwise in Burma, the rival home and stronghold of Southern Buddhism. The pilgrim habit plays a much larger part in the life of the people, but, in entire accordance with their character, is undertaken less seriously, and is more a matter of sociability and holiday-making than of religious obligation or the discharge of religious duty. The custom, however, of more or less formal attendance at sacred shrines and fulfilment of the appropriate rites and engagements of the sacred seasons is universal; and the monks themselves connive at and even take part in the merriment and relaxation which follow upon the satisfaction of the claims of religion. The most important and celebrated of all is the Shwe Dagon pagoda at Rangoon, where crowds of pilgrims from Japan, China, and Korea jostle with worshippers from Ceylon and Siam and the more numerous natives of the country. On the various platforms of the temple are hundreds of images of the Buddha, gilded or in stone, and the summit of the building rises to the height of St. Paul's Cathedral and is crowned with the *tī*, the sacred symbol of the Buddhist faith. There are here preserved, according to the traditional belief, eight hairs of Gautama, and various relics also of the three preceding Buddhas, including the staff of Kaśyapa and the robe of Kanakamuni.

Burma is full of *dāgabas* (pagodas), many of them deserted and in ruins, but others centres of attraction to a greater or less distance throughout the surrounding country, and at the festival seasons full of a rich and varied pilgrim life. Perhaps the most renowned next to the Rangoon pagoda are those at Pegu and Prome. Within the walls of the ancient capital of Pagan are the remains of nearly a thousand such buildings; and at Mandalay itself are many *dāgabas* and temples unrivalled in their beauty and perennial fame. In the courtyard or precincts of most of these buildings is a sacred foot-print of the Buddha, which in the case of the more famous and accessible of them is rarely without its offering of fruit or flowers.

[1] The identification was made by A. Cunningham, and has been affirmed by recent discoveries.

(*c*) *China.*—Chinese Buddhism in general has been considerably affected and modified by the native Taoist beliefs of the country; and the pilgrim customs and practice of China are in most instances, as regards both their observances and their sacred centres of pilgrimage, the survivals of earlier Taoist usage. The most sacred shrines where the pilgrims congregate are in origin antecedent to the introduction of Buddhism, in the same way as in the Near East Christian sanctuaries have been taken over and converted into Muhammadan places of worship. The hermits also, whose spirit and aspirations are in all lands closely akin to those of the itinerant pilgrims, have in China adopted the haunts and homes of their Taoist forerunners. The most holy and frequented centres of pilgrimage are the four mountain shrines of Omishan in the west in the province of Szechwan, Putoshan in the east on a sacred island in the Chusan archipelago, Wutaishan in the north in the province of Shansi, and Chiuhuashan in Nganhwei in the centre near the Yangtze river. The most popular and celebrated of these is perhaps the first named, Mount Omi, where the temples on the summit of the mountain are dedicated to Pu-hsien, the *bodhisattva* Samantabhadra, an ancient bronze image of whom in one of the largest monasteries, seated on an elephant, is believed to date from the 7th century.[1] The monks of Putoshan are a sincere and religious folk who welcome yearly to their island home thousands of pilgrim-worshippers, who cross from the mainland to pay their homage at the shrines dedicated to Kwanyin, the goddess of mercy. The sanctuary on the Yangtze is the least regarded of the four, and in the Taiping rebellion many of its temples were sacked and destroyed. In the temples of Wutaishan the presiding deity and object of worship is Wenshu, the *bodhisattva* Mañjuśrī; situated near the Mongol border, the shrines are as much frequented by Mongol worshippers as by Chinese, and Tibetan emblems and practices are numerous.

There are many other centres of pilgrimage throughout China, often of more than local reputation; and the pilgrims journey for long distances, making offerings and burning incense at the shrines by the way. For the most part they travel in companies, in this respect following the example of the early travellers to India. Solitary ascetics, however, are not uncommon, whose journeying is a perpetual self-inflicted penance. The most celebrated monasteries are in the province of Chekiang, the stronghold of Buddhism in China. It is probably true that in every direction the hold of the ancient faith is slowly weakening, and the practice of pilgrimage is likely to fall gradually into desuetude with the extension of modern systems of education and the decay of Buddhist temples and rites.[2]

(*d*) *Tibet.*—In Tibet the most important centres of pilgrimage, where the sacred temples and shrines are to be found, are at Lhasa, the capital of the country, and at Tashi-hlunpo, the residence of the Tashi or Pañchen Lāma. The latter bears the higher repute for sanctity, for the office and functions of the Dalai Lāma at Lhasa have been to so great an extent intermingled and contaminated with political duties and intrigue that the sacredness of his person as an object of reverence has to a certain extent suffered eclipse. His misfortunes and exile during the last few years can hardly have raised his reputation in the eyes of his countrymen. Pilgrims, however, from all countries where Lāmaism holds sway turn their steps to the capital in great numbers to worship the incarnate Buddha, and to pay their devotions at the numerous sacred shrines. The quiet of Tashi-hlunpo, the 'Mount of Glory,' is undisturbed by the movements of politics, and the great temple and surrounding districts are favourite places of retirement for those who have finally renounced the world and its cares. The person and character of the present Tashi Lāma, who, as an incarnation of the *bodhisattva* Amitābha, receives the worship of all Tibetans, have made a most favourable impression on all Europeans who have come into contact with him.

Tibet is the most priest-ridden country in the world; and of its 3000 or more monasteries none is without its pilgrim visitants, the number of whom varies according to the reputation and accessibility of the temple-shrine. Itinerating bands of Lāmas also of Tibetan and Mongolian race are to be met with outside the country itself, in Central Asia and on the borders of India. Urga in N. Mongolia, the residence of the third Grand Lāma, known as the Bogdo or 'Saint' Lāma, is perhaps the most sacred place in the eyes of the Mongols. The Lāma himself, however, bears an evil reputation for worldliness and immorality. Mongol pilgrims come to worship at his feet and attend the festivals. There are numerous other centres of Lāmaist devotion in Mongolia and China, and the Grand Lāma at Peking is recognized and reverenced throughout all the countries where a Buddhism of this type prevails.

(*e*) *Korea and Siam.*—Neither Korea nor Siam, the two chief homes of the Buddhist faith other than those to which reference has already been made, adds materially to the history and records of Buddhist pilgrimage. Korean pilgrims in no great numbers make their way to the sacred places of Mongolia, N. China, and Tibet; but their native land contains no sanctuary of wide repute which attracts the worshipper from afar. In Siam, although the monasteries and temples are thronged at the many and popular festivals, and reverence is paid by all at the shrines, the festive seasons are occasions for friendly intercourse and conviviality, and there is little, as far as can be judged, of the true pilgrim spirit. Nor do Siamese monks make a habit of journeying overseas to the sacred shrines of other lands, although they may be found occasionally at Rangoon, and in the past at least have visited and exercised much influence on the Buddhist thought and observance of Ceylon.

6. Summary.—A brief summary, therefore, of pilgrim usage and wont in Buddhism would describe it as an almost universal practice, held in the highest esteem, which in all probability was adopted soon after the death of Gautama Buddha, the principal motive being reverence for his person and for the places where the relics of his cremated body were believed to have been preserved. To a certain extent also, which it is impossible exactly to estimate, his disciples were influenced by a more or less conscious desire to follow on the lines of ancient Hindu custom. With the earlier Hindu practice of pilgrimage they were familiar; and they seem to have wished to break as little as possible with ancestral usage. Whether the Buddha himself by his word enjoined or sanctioned the habit the uncertainty as to the dates and history of the written records makes it impracticable to decide. It is hardly probable or quite in harmony with what is known of his character and teaching to suppose that he did. If, however, the contention of the Mahāyāna school is justified that in his later life he taught a mystical and esoteric doctrine entirely different from that of his earlier years as expounded in the Pāli canonical books,

[1] See A. J. Little, *Mount Omi and Beyond*, London, 1901, p. 63 ff.

[2] For the pilgrim practice of Japan see art. PILGRIMAGE (Japanese).

then the injunctions and regulations as to pilgrimage and sacred places also may have a similar origin, and may have been framed and announced by Gautama himself, possibly as a concession to the Hindu prepossessions of his followers. The custom was certainly taken up and eagerly followed immediately after his death, and has been ever since a marked feature of popular Buddhism in the East. Nor to any appreciable extent does the practice seem to have lost its hold upon the faith and affection of the Buddhist peoples to the present day.

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A. S. GEDEN.

PILGRIMAGE (Christian).—1. Introductory.—Pilgrimage played a very prominent part in religious life in the Christian Church, particularly in the Middle Ages. The fact that it has so largely disappeared from the religious life of England to-day is apt to conceal its importance in the past and in the countries where it is still in vogue even in the present. A pilgrimage is a journey undertaken to visit sacred places, such as the scenes of our Lord's earthly life in Palestine, the 'threshold of the Apostles' at Rome, or the shrines of saints and martyrs. There were many motives at work; it might be to fulfil a vow or as an act of penance. In some cases it is difficult to say whether a given journey is a pilgrimage or not. The mere use of the word *peregrinatio* in a mediæval source can hardly decide the question. It can be considered better historically and geographically, though the purely religious and psychological sides must always be remembered. The latter are better left over and studied in connexion with the effects of the practice and its place in the history of religion.

Peregrinatio and its cognates in classical Latin refer simply to wandering, and so *peregrinus* was just a stranger. In ecclesiastical terminology a 'pilgrim' was one who went to visit sacred places while his ordinary occupation, whether he was clerk or layman, was something different, whereas a 'palmer' was one who spent his whole life in thus journeying from place to place. Dante gives a rather fanciful explanation of the terms:

'Pilgrim' may be understood 'in the wide sense, in so far as whoever is outside his fatherland is a pilgrim; in the narrow sense none is called a pilgrim save him who is journeying towards the sanctuary of St. James or is returning from it. . . . Chiamansi *Pellegrini* in quanto vanno alla casa di Galizia, però che la sepoltura di santo Jacopo fu più lontana dalla sua patria, che di niuno altro Apostolo'—they are called *palmieri* because they bring back palm-branches and *romei* as they journey to Rome.[1]

2. Palestine.—It was natural that men should wish to tread again the paths trodden by the Saviour, though the first generations of Christians did not seem to feel this as strongly as their successors. From the 3rd cent. certainly the sacred places were visited. The pilgrimages of Firmilian, bishop of Cæsarea, and a bishop Alexander from Cappadocia are mentioned by Jerome and Origen respectively. When the empress Helena visited Jerusalem and discovered what was supposed to be the true Cross, pilgrims flocked thither and the stream was ever on the increase. Many records of such journeys and also numerous itineraries have been preserved. 'The Bordeaux pilgrim' visited Jerusalem in 333. The record of this man is the earliest now extant of a Christian pilgrimage, and is very important as showing the condition of the holy places and the traditions growing up round them at the time. On his way thither he travelled from Bordeaux, south of the Garonne, through Toulouse, Narbonne, Arles, up the valley of the Rhone to Valence, then by way of Milan, Verona, Aquileia, Mitrowitza, Sophia, and Constantinople, through Bithynia, to Tarsus, Alexandretta, Antioch, Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Acre, Ptolemais, Cæsarea Palestina, then by Jezreel, Bethshean, and Shechem to Jerusalem. He did not, however, visit Galilee. Many Christians have felt far greater attraction to the scene of our Lord's passion and resurrection than to those of His earthly ministry.[1]

Paula, a friend of St. Jerome, went on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and she corresponded with him about it.[2] The teaching of St. Jerome much increased the popularity of the movement. Another famous pilgrim in early times was Etheria (Egeria or Echeria),[3] the author of the *Peregrinatio Silviæ*, or *Peregrinatio Echeriæ*, put by critics in either the 4th or the 6th century. From the 5th cent. onward the number of pilgrims steadily grew, and, though the journey was a long and arduous one, many thousands were willing to undertake it. Pilgrims came from all parts, and not least numerous or important were those from the British Isles — representatives alike of Roman, Celtic, and Anglo-Saxon Christianity in Britain, such as St. Cathaldus (bishop of Taranto, about 680) and Willibald (bishop of Eichstätt, 741).[4] The ardent wishes of Christians to see Jerusalem and the hardships which they were sometimes obliged to suffer are of the greatest importance for secular as well as ecclesiastical history, for they were among the causes which contributed to the Crusades. When Saracen rulers were tolerant, Christians had little to fear, but in times of persecution the difficulties of the journey were further increased, and thus eventually the crusading spirit was generated (see art. CRUSADES, I. 3). No doubt motives of political conquest and worldly ambition entered into the Crusades as well as into the practice of pilgrimage. Meanwhile pilgrimage gave rise to the great military orders. While the Hospitallers cared for pilgrims after their arrival in Jerusalem, the Templars protected them on the way from Antioch thither (a hospital which had first been founded by Charles the Great was destroyed in 1010 and another was built).

St. Jerome, though he believed strongly in pilgrimage, nevertheless wrote:

'Et de Hierosolymis et de Britannia æqualiter patet aula cœlestis: "Regnum enim Dei intra vos est." Antonius, cuncta Ægypti, et Mesopotamiæ, Ponti, Cappadociæ, et Armeniæ examina Monachorum non videre Hierosolymam: et patet illis absque hac urbe paradisi janua. Beatus Hilarion, cum Palæstinus esset, et in Palæstina viveret, uno tantum die vidit Hierosolymam, ut nec contemnere loca sancta propter viciniam, nec rursus Dominum loco claudere videretur.'[5]

St. Gregory of Nyssa wrote a special letter *de iis qui adeunt Jerosolyma* (*PG* xlvi. 1010 ff.).

The adventures of British pilgrims have a special interest, and almost every Welsh or Irish saint went on pilgrimage.

[1] *La Vita Nuova*, xli.; Dante also refers to pilgrims in *Paradiso*, i. 51, xxxi 43.

[1] *Itinerary from Bordeaux to Jerusalem*, '*The Bordeaux Pilgrim*' (A.D. 333), tr. Aubrey Stewart and annotated C. W. Wilson, Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, London, 1887.

[2] Jerome, *The Pilgrimage of the Holy Paula*, tr. Stewart and ann. Wilson, Pal. Pilg. Text Soc., London, 1885.

[3] *The Pilgrimage of S. Silvia of Aquitania to the Holy Places*, tr. and ed. J. H. Bernard, with an appendix by C. W. Wilson, Pal. Pilg. Text Soc., London, 1891.

[4] G. Hartwell Jones, *Celtic Britain and the Pilgrim Movement*, p. 192.

[5] *Ep.* lviii. 'ad Paulinum,' quoted in J. Usher, *Britannicarum Ecclesiarum Antiquitates*, London, 1687, p. 109.

From the 13th cent. pilgrimages to the Holy Land, though still frequent, were less numerous than those to Rome. Despite the difficulties of the journey, William Wye, Fellow of Eton, visited Compostella (see below, 11) in 1456 and travelled thence to Palestine in 1458 and again in 1462. From his MSS Wynkyn de Worde, the disciple of Caxton, compiled his *Informacion for Pylgrymes into the Holy Land* (printed in 1498, 1515, and 1524). The pilgrimages from England to the Holy Land went on continuously to Reformation times. Sir Richard de Guildforde and John Whitby, prior of Guisborough, went to Palestine, embarking at Rye, in 1506; and in 1517 Sir Richard Torkyngton, rector of Mulberton, Norfolk, visited Jerusalem.[1]

From all the countries of Europe pilgrims travelled to the Holy City. It was natural that most should come from those countries which had taken part in the Crusades, but they came also from elsewhere. Russian pilgrimages commenced soon after the country was converted, about A.D. 1000.

'In 1022 allusion is made in the Life of St. Theodosius of Kiev to Russian pilgrims in Palestine; the first known name is that of St. Varlaam, abbot of the Laura of Kiev, who visited Jerusalem in 1062.'[2]

The earliest extant record is that of Daniel, an abbot whose identity is not certain. He spent Easter of 1107 in Jerusalem. His work shows devout feeling; and, though a Greek priest, he was friendly to the Latin clergy. He travelled by way of Constantinople, Abydos, Tenedos, Mitylene, Chios, Ephesus, Samos, Patmos, Rhodes, Patara, Cyprus, thence crossing the sea to Jaffa and Jerusalem.[3] He saw the miracle of the holy fire (see below, 17) and visited the Virgin's tomb—the traditional scene of the Assumption. Though Italy had so many places sacred to the Christian, particularly the Eternal City, Italian pilgrims came in large numbers to visit Palestine. Venice sent her convoys, and the citizens of Lombardy visited Venice on the way. Among the earliest Italian pilgrims to Palestine was St. Antonio Piacenza, who went to Jerusalem in 570 and wrote *de Locis sanctis quæ perambulavit Antoninus martyr*. Pantaleone, a citizen of Amalfi, went to Palestine about 1065, and a pilgrim hostel was established by him in Jerusalem. In 1219 St. Francis of Assisi went on pilgrimage. In the 14th and 15th centuries pilgrimages became far more numerous. Roberto da Sanseverino set out from Milan in 1458. In 1486 Fra Girolamo Castiglione (or de Castellione), a native of Milan, went to Palestine and thence to Arabia and Egypt. The Cavalier Santo Brasca went to Jerusalem in 1480. He wrote an account of his journey, and his information may have stimulated Canon Pietro Casola, a member of a noble Milanese family, who undertook a pilgrimage in 1494. Casola travelled *via* Milan, Brescia, Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Venice, Ragusa, Corfu, Navarino, Candia, Rhodes, and Cyprus to Jaffa, and thence to Jerusalem. His account is quite interesting reading and has recently been made accessible to English readers.[4] The pilgrim traffic was so great that it had to be officially regulated, and, considering the discomforts of travelling at that time, it is remarkable that so large a number were willing to face the risks.

'Hans von Mergenthal, who accompanied Duke Albert of Saxony to the Holy Land in 1476, recounts that the sleeping place allotted to each pilgrim was so narrow, that the passengers almost lay one on the other, tormented by the great heat, by swarms of insects, and even by great rats which raced over their bodies in the dark. If a luckless pilgrim succeeded in dozing in spite of the general discomfort, he was soon awakened by the stamping of the animals penned up on deck, or by the talking, singing and shouting of his neighbours. Most of those who fell sick died. "God be gracious to them!"'[1]

In the 16th cent. the number of Italian pilgrimages continued to fall off, though they never entirely ceased.

3. **Rome.**—Next after Jerusalem, Rome was the city which drew the largest number of pilgrims. The causes which contributed to the rise of the papacy made Rome a pilgrim resort; more especially the tombs of St. Peter and St. Paul exalted it into the goal whither Roman Catholics flocked. One centre of interest was the catacombs. At first used as burial-places, they afterwards became sacred places, hallowed by the bones of martyrs and visited by thousands of pilgrims (see art. CATACOMBS). These came from Britain both before and after the English conquest (King Ina of Wessex founded an English school for Saxon pilgrims and scholars in Rome in 727), and Irish and Welsh saints were among the most indefatigable in their pious journeyings.[2] Archbishop Usher observes:

'Britanni hisce temporibus Romam, Hierosolymam, et Syriam invisere soliti.'[3]

So St. Bridget journeyed to Rome as a pilgrim; likewise Findan of Leinster in 847 to fulfil a vow.[4] Several Celtic saints, having performed their pilgrimage, settled permanently on the Continent, sometimes obtaining bishoprics. Ninian visited Rome during the pontificate of Pope Damasus (366–384), who had given all Christian pilgrims access to the catacombs.

As time went on, the intercourse between Britain and the Continent became more intimate, so that there was a continual stream of pilgrims to Rome, especially after the failure of the Crusades; the difficulties of travelling, pestilence, and other causes had checked the number of those who went to the Holy Land. The papal jubilee proclaimed by Boniface VIII. in 1300 with its special indulgences drew more than 20,000 pilgrims to Rome. Again at the jubilee of 1450 under Nicholas V. thousands of visitors assembled. In the English College at Rome from 100 to 200 pilgrims were provided with hospitality every year in post-Reformation times. Pilgrims have never ceased to visit Rome; the large number of churches and relics have been continuous sources of attraction.[5]

4. **England.**—The pilgrimages, however, which left the deepest mark on Britain as elsewhere in Europe were, perhaps, not those to distant lands, however holy, but those to sacred spots nearer home. There were several famous shrines in England not only of national but of world-wide fame, and many others which were prominent in religious life, although not often visited by strangers from a distance. Earliest among British shrines was Glastonbury. When first it became famous is unknown. It was a place renowned in Celtic tradition, and therefore it had become sacred before the advent of Christianity in England, and probably even before the time of Christ. It was very likely on the site of a Celtic temple. Perhaps the particular form of heathen worship there celebrated was the cult of the dead (see artt. BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Celtic] and GRAIL, THE HOLY). There was a Celtic settlement of pre-Roman date

[1] S. Heath, *Pilgrim Life in the Middle Ages*, p. 160.
[2] *The Pilgrimage of the Russian Abbot Daniel in the Holy Land, 1106–1107 A.D.*, ann. C. W. Wilson, Pal. Pilg. Text Soc., London, 1888.
[3] *Ib.*
[4] *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1494*, tr. and ed. M. M. Newett.

[1] *Casola's Pilgrimage*, Introd. p. 91.
[2] But how far all the stories of pilgrimage are historical is not certain: see F. E. Warren, in *Cambridge Medieval History*, ii., Cambridge, 1913, ch. xvi., 'Conversion of the Kelts,' p. 499.
[3] *Brit. Eccles. Antiq.*, Index Chronologicus, A.D. 388.
[4] Hartwell Jones, p. 191.
[5] See Sivry-Champagnac, *Dictionnaire des Pèlerinages*, ii. 519–831.

near by, which has recently been excavated.[1] Various legends grew up to account for its fame. In the Glastonbury Chronicle under 1259 there was this entry:

'Anno ab Incarnatione XLIII. discipuli sanctorum Philippi et Jacobi Apostolorum venerunt in Britanniam; a quibus primum Oratorium in insula Avalioniae.'

King Ina of Wessex founded a monastery at Glastonbury, then went to Rome on pilgrimage and died there.[2] Dunstan was abbot of Glastonbury; it grew in fame and importance, and became associated with many saints and heroes—St. Joseph of Arimathea and St. Patrick, King Arthur and Guinevere; and its monks gathered together a wonderful collection of relics—portions of the Crown of Thorns, the True Cross, and the Holy Sepulchre, and bones of St. John the Baptist, St. Peter, and St. Paul. Its fame outlasted the Middle Ages, and a miracle was believed to have been performed there in 1751.[3]

After Glastonbury in historical sequence, though in the later Middle Ages of even greater fame as a pilgrim resort, was the shrine of St. Thomas à Becket at Canterbury. His murder in 1170 profoundly shocked the whole of Europe, and crowds of pilgrims soon began to visit the spots made sacred by his life and death. His shrine became ever more splendid, and boasted many famous jewels, including the 'Regale' of France. The Jubilee of 1470 brought 100,000 pilgrims to Canterbury. Many of these would be from foreign countries. The pilgrims went first to the transept of the martyrdom in the Cathedral.

'Before the wooden altar the pilgrims knelt, and its guardian priest exhibited to them the various relics confided to his especial charge. But the one which surpassed all others was the rusty fragment of Le Bret's sword, which was presented to each in turn to be kissed. The foreign pilgrims, by a natural mistake, inferred from the sight of the sword that the martyr had suffered death by beheading.'[4]

Then the pilgrims went to the choir and saw the general relics, about 400 in number, then to St. Andrew's Tower, and, last of all, to the shrine itself. It had a wooden covering which, till lifted, concealed the gold, silver, and jewels with which it was encrusted. Among foreign pilgrims Leo von Rotzmital was sent on an embassy to England in 1446. Two accounts of his adventures were written, one in Bohemian, preserved in a Latin translation, the other in German. He went and saw the sights usually shown to pilgrims. He and his companions visited the shrine.

'Ibi vidimus sepulchrum et caput ipsius. Sepulchrum ex puro auro conflatum est, et gemmis adornatum, tamque magnificis donariis ditatum, ut par et nescam. Inter alias res pretiosas spectatur in eo et carbunculus gemma, qui noctu splendere solet, dimidii ovi gallinacei magnitudine.'[5]

The German account relates:

'Da zeiget man uns das schwert, damit man jm den kopf abgeschlagen hat. Da weiset man auch ein merklich stuck des heiligen creuzes, auch der nagel einen und den rechten arm des lieben herrn Ritter sant Gorgen und etlich dorn in einer tumbanzen von der durnen kron.'[6]

The Canterbury pilgrimage is remembered among those who take little interest in ecclesiastical history because of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. The journey from the Tabard Inn at Southwark was one of the three ways by which Canterbury was regularly approached by pilgrims. In 1513 a visit was paid to it by Colet and Erasmus; the wealth displayed and the superstition encouraged roused the feeling in Colet which was soon to break forth in him and others in the Protestant Reformation. Erasmus was more reserved and quiet in his criticism, less prone to depart from Catholic practice and tradition.[1] The last Jubilee at the shrine was that of 1520. The reverence shown to the memory of St. Thomas à Becket was annoying to Henry VIII., and in 1538 the shrine was destroyed by royal command.

Next in importance in mediæval England was the shrine of Our Lady at Walsingham in Norfolk. The special relic that attracted pilgrims here was a small phial reputed to contain a few drops of her milk. This shrine was likewise destroyed at the Reformation. A poem written in 1595 (of uncertain authorship) laments the desolation which had overtaken the scene of the piety of former ages. It concludes:

'Sin is where Our Lady sat,
Heaven is turned to Hell,
Satan sits where Our Lord did sway,
Walsingham, oh! farewell.'[2]

Other famous places of pilgrimage in mediæval England were Durham (for the shrine of St. Cuthbert), Lichfield, Bury St. Edmunds, and Peterborough. A special feature of English pilgrimage was its anti-royalist character—to revere as a saint one who had been condemned as a traitor.[3]

5. **Wales.**—All the Celtic parts of Britain were specially rich in shrines, just as their inhabitants went as diligently as any to Rome and the Holy Land. The chief Welsh shrine was the Holy Well of St. Winifred in Flintshire.

'It is a significant circumstance that the only road through Wales from north to south started at Holywell and ended at St. David's, both conspicuous pilgrim resorts in the Ages of Faith.'[4]

A monastery was founded at Holywell in 1119, which was destroyed at the Dissolution. The history of the shrine is important as showing the connexion of pilgrimage with sacred wells. When any well became famous, and its waters were reported to have either medicinal or miraculous qualities, it soon became a place of pilgrimage. This has been so not in Catholic Christianity alone but in the whole history of religion.

6. **Scotland.**—The earliest Scottish shrine to which pilgrims resorted was Whithorn ('Candida Casa'). The church there was built by St. Ninian in memory of St. Martin of Tours about 397. Ninian himself was buried there in 432, and the place was renowned among the Irish and among the Welsh of Strathclyde. Like Walsingham, it was popular as a place of royal pilgrimage. Another Scottish shrine was that of St. Mary of the Rock at St. Andrews. This has now been swept away by the sea. It was on the rock at the foot of the cliff on which the Cathedral now stands. Other Scottish places were Dunblane (for the relics of St. Mordoc), Dunfermline (for the shrine of St. Margaret), St. Margaret's Chapel at Edinburgh Castle, St. Nicholas' Chapel, Leith, St. Kentigern's Chapel on Loch Lomond, and St. Mungo's Chapel at Culross.

7. **Ireland.**—Pilgrimage has been for centuries a dominant feature of Irish religious life, for among the Celtic peoples every hill and well and stream has its own tutelary god or spirit or fairy. Christianity only reconsecrated many places sacred already in Celtic (possibly even in pre-Celtic) times; and, despite spasmodic efforts made by Protestant governments to repress them, Irish pilgrimage has gone on with no real interruption from the Reformation until the present day.

Most famous of Irish shrines was St. Patrick's Purgatory on Lough Derg in Donegal. In the lake there is an island round which various legends grew. It was said that a knight, Owain,

[1] F. J. Haverfield, in *Cambridge Medieval History*, i., Cambridge, 1911, ch. x. (A) 'Roman Britain,' p. 376.
[2] Asser, *Life of King Alfred*, with the *Annals of St. Neots*, ed. W. H. Stevenson, Oxford, 1904, sub anno 726.
[3] Hartwell Jones, pp. 384–384.
[4] Stanley, *Historical Memorials of Canterbury*[11], p. 217 f.
[5] *Ib.* Appendix, note B, p. 256. [6] *Ib.* p. 258.

[1] See Erasmus, *Pilgrimages to S. Mary of Walsingham and S. Thomas of Canterbury*, tr. J. G. Nichols[2].
[2] This poem is quoted in Erasmus, Appendix.
[3] J. J. Jusserand, *Les Anglais au moyen âge: la Vie nomade d'Angleterre au xive siècle*, tr. L. Toulmin Smith, *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages*, pp. 339–343.
[4] Hartwell Jones, p. 407.

descended to Purgatory from there and came back to this present life.

'This pilgrimage has been ascribed to insatiable greed and wilful deception on the part of monks, who fostered it with an eye to their own advantage; but the matter cannot be so summarily dismissed. The usage lies, doubtless, in the deep-rooted beliefs of the pre-historic period, and is a reflex of the old Druidic doctrines colouring Christianity. . . . The origin of the pilgrimage must be therefore sought, partly in the geological features of the island (suggestive to the credulous in Ireland, as in other European countries, of an entrance into the Nether Regions) and partly in a native pre-Christian mythology, the implicit belief in the existence of spirits of woodland and water, and the supposed communication carried on between them and mortals.'[1]

The connexion with St. Patrick is probably legendary, but it enhanced the glory of the place. Abuses and superstitions grew apace, and in 1497 the pilgrimage was 'abolished' by Pope Alexander VI. The Privy Council ordered its suppression in 1632, and in the second year of Queen Anne it was again prohibited.

'And whereas the superstitions of Popery are greatly increased and upheld, by the pretended sanctity of places, especially of a Place called St. Patrick's Purgatory in the County of Donegaul and of Wells to which Pilgrimages are made, by vast numbers at certain seasons. . . . Be it further enacted that all such meetings and assemblies shall be deemed and adjudged Riots and unlawful Assemblies.'[2]

A fine of ten shillings was to be imposed if the offender refused to be publicly whipped. But suppression was of little avail, and the pilgrimage has continued under ecclesiastical supervision until our own day. Pilgrimage thither is now observed in the Roman Catholic Church as a penitential exercise, and 'it seems the only pilgrimage of modern times conducted like those of the Middle Ages' (*CE* xii. 95). Other places of pilgrimage in Ireland were Downpatrick in Co. Down (sacred to St. Patrick, St. Bridget, and St. Columba), St. John's Well in Meath, and Cranfield in the parish of Drummaul, Co. Antrim.

8. France.—Among famous French mediæval shrines was Chartres:

'Avant que le christianisme eût été prêché dans les Gaules, les druides étaient dans l'usage de s'assembler tous les ans aux environs de Chartres. On prétend qu'ils avaient en ce lieu un sanctuaire révéré. C'était, dit-on, une grotte, où ils honoraient une statue qui représentait une femme assise, tenant sur elle un enfant, et l'autel portait cette inscription *Virgini parituræ*. Lors de la prédication de l'Evangile on bâtit sur cette grotte une église, vers le milieu du IIIe siècle, au plus tard.'[3]

Chartres therefore, like Glastonbury and St. Patrick's Purgatory, seems to have been the scene of an ancient Celtic cult. The wooden statue of the Virgin was destroyed at the Revolution.

Among modern French shrines the chief is Lourdes (*q.v.*). Others are La Salette in Dauphiny and Liesse.

9. Switzerland.—Of Swiss shrines the most important is Einsiedeln. There was a monastic community there in the 9th century. It is in the canton of Schwyz, became famous as a centre of pilgrimage in the 10th cent., and has continued to be so until the present time, despite the preaching of Zwingli in the 16th cent.[4] and the destruction of the monastery in 1798 by the French invaders. The yearly pilgrims are now more than 150,000.

10. Italy.—Besides Rome itself numerous other Italian cities were pilgrim resorts, though none attained special pre-eminence except perhaps Assisi, because of its connexion with St. Francis and in a lesser degree with St. Clare. Siena was associated with St. Catharine; and Venice, with its splendid basilica of St. Mark, was often visited on the way to the Holy Land. See also art. LORETO.

11. Spain.—Foremost of the shrines of Spain was that of St. James, or Santiago di Compostella, which attained a fame in the Middle Ages greater than that of almost any other city save Rome. It is said that St. James appeared there in a vision in 816, and that his remains were discovered there. The shrine became associated in legend with Charles the Great, but it was not till the 12th cent. that the foundations of its greatness were really laid. Not only Spaniards but pilgrims from all over Europe worshipped there, especially those from Wales and Ireland. In Welsh bardic literature there are many allusions to Compostella.[1] A Latin hymn to St. James has been finely translated by George Borrow.[2] The pilgrimage flourished till the 14th, but considerably diminished from the 18th century.[3]

12. Germany.—Chief among German places of pilgrimage was Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), the mediæval capital of Germany, which possessed numerous relics. The most important were the white robe in which the Virgin was clothed in the stable at Bethlehem, the swaddling clothes of the infant Christ, the linen cloth in which the body of John the Baptist was wrapped after his execution, and that in which our Lord was crucified; there were many lesser relics besides. The pilgrimage to Aix has continued till the present time. In 1881 there were 158,968 pilgrims. Another mediæval city renowned for its pilgrimage was Trier (Trèves), which possessed the seamless holy coat worn by our Lord before His crucifixion. Cologne was famous as containing relics of the three kings, traditionally called Gaspard, Melchior, and Balthasar.

13. The Syrian Church.—The pilgrimages so far considered have all been either of the West of Europe or else in Palestine itself. But beyond the frontier of the Roman Empire the Syrian Church grew and flourished, though on lines in some ways different from those of the Græco-Roman world. Pilgrimage was made by Syrian Christians at a date earlier than by those of the West. Noh, bishop of Adiabene (163–179), had been taken as a child by his parents to Jerusalem on what may fairly be called a pilgrimage.[4] Pilgrims continued to visit Jerusalem; the subject, however, is still involved in some obscurity.[5]

In 858 a Nestorian synod considered the subject:

Canon ix. declares that no new monasteries shall be built without the knowledge of the bishop of the diocese; if one were built and the bishop knew, he would give it a revenue sufficient for its upkeep and for hospitality to pilgrims. Canon xv. proclaims that the faithful ought to give their offerings and perform their vows for the remission of their sins in the places where they live, and not wander far afield. Why should they go to distant places? It is a puerile habit which gives satisfaction to the senses but not to the soul. If any of the faithful, after having visited the churches and convents of their own country, desire to visit those that are further away, not with the idea that God will there favour them more, but to give some part of their goods to the head of the convent, they are not to be hindered. But, if they wander about as people who have lost their God, not knowing where they will find Him or where He will hear them, they are sick souls in need of health and should be led to the doctrine of perfection.[6]

This shows that the abuses of pilgrimage were quite obvious at this time, and they must have been widely spread to have called down ecclesiastical censure in these terms. Gregory Bar-Hebræus, bishop of Guba (probably Bear Omshash, north-east of the Gulf of Akaba) and primate of the East († 1286), quotes from a letter of one John Bar-Finchoje to a monastic friend describing the

[1] Hartwell Jones, p. 39 f.

[2] John Richards, *The Great Folly, Superstition, and Idolatry of Pilgrimages in Ireland, especially of that of St. Patrick's Purgatory*, Dublin, 1727, p. 45; see also Hewson, *A Description of St. Patrick's Purgatory in Lough Derg and an Account of the Pilgrims' Business there*, do. 1727.

[3] Sivry-Champagnac, i. 452.

[4] The Council of Zürich abolished the Whit-Monday procession to Einsiedeln in 1524 (Kidd, *Documents Illustrative of the Continental Reformation*, p. 441).

[1] Hartwell Jones, pp. 255–261.

[2] *The Bible in Spain*, London, 1843, ch. xxvii.

[3] Sivry-Champagnac, i. 490–493.

[4] *Sources syriaques*, ed. A. Mingana, Leipzig [1908], p. 89.

[5] *Ib.* p. 132, n. 1.

[6] J. B. Chabot, *Synodicon orientale: Recueil des synodes nestoriens*, Paris, 1903, pp. 408, 441.

pilgrimage to the Holy City and what was to be seen and done there.[1]

14. The Reformation.—Changes so wide in the religious life of Europe as those which came to pass in the 16th cent. were bound to leave their mark not only on the Protestant countries, but within the bounds of Catholicism as well. Much purging of abuses took place at the Counter-Reformation; and, while in some countries Protestantism lost its first conquest, with the advancing tide of Catholicism not everything that had been destroyed was built up. Under Mary Tudor, *e.g.*, no attempt was made to restore the shrine of Becket in Canterbury Cathedral. The Continental Reformation brought with it the abolition of pilgrimage. Thus, in the programme of reforms of the bishop of Pomesania in 1525, art. 4 declares:

'Henceforward there shall be no pilgrimage nor wanderings to holy places, since they aid no man's salvation.'[2]

In Sweden the Lutheran Synod of Örebro in 1529 decreed:

'Peregrinationes ad loca sancta quanta fieri possit moderatione removebuntur,'

showing that, as in other things, Lutheranism dealt more gently with Catholicism than did Calvinism.[3] Calvin in the prefatory letter to Francis I. (23rd Aug. 1536) of his *Christianæ Religionis Institutio*, wrote:

'Cur ergo tanta saevitia et acerbitate pro missa, purgatorio peregrinationibus, et id genus nugis belligerantur, ut sine eorum explicatissima, ut ita dicam, fide salvam fore pietatem negent, cum tamen nihil eorum a verbo Dei esse probent.'[4]

The Edict of Reformation of Bern for the Pays de Vaud (24th Dec. 1536) declared in art. 17:

Benitions.—'Nous avons aussi ordonné que toutes benitions de voyage et pelerinages soient otees, et que nul soit si hardi d'aller en iceux sous peine, l'homme de dix florins, la femme de cinq florins.'[5]

The Council of Trent (1563; sess. xxv.) condemned those who affirmed that 'places dedicated to the memories of saints are vainly visited.'

15. Royal pilgrimage.—Throughout the Middle Ages pilgrimage was a constant observance among kings and princes; to show honour to the saints of their country was a natural thing, and sometimes a king went in penitence, as did Henry II. to the shrine of Becket, after the murder of the archbishop. The Scottish kings continually went to Whithorn. Margaret, daughter of Christian I. of Denmark, wife of James III. and mother of James IV. of Scotland, went thither after the birth of her son in 1473, though her journey has been described as a 'pleasant outing rather than a penitential exercise.'[6] James IV. himself went there several times, as also did James V., though not so often as his father. James IV. visited also Whitekirk in E. Lothian, where in 1430 James I. had built a house for the reception of pilgrims.

Some interest attaches to the pilgrimage of one who later became a king: Henry, Earl of Derby (afterwards Henry IV.), visited Prussia and then went on to the Holy Land. He travelled by way of Dantzig, Frankfort-on-Oder, Prague, Vienna, Treviso, Venice, Corfu, Rhodes, Jaffa, Ramah, and Jerusalem, returning through Rhodes, Cos, Corfu, Ragusa, Venice, Treviso, Pavia, Vicenza, Verona, and Milan.[7]

16. The effects of pilgrimage.—It is quite clear that a custom so widespread must have left its effect not simply on the religion but on the entire life of the world. It helped, as has been seen, to produce the Crusades; it drew far afield men who would otherwise have been content to stay in their own country, and gave them a knowledge of distant lands. The countries of Europe had, by means of the pilgrims, far more intercourse with each other in the Middle Ages, not only in religion, but also in commerce, literature, and art. The economic effect of pilgrimage was also considerable. Though many cities already famous became pilgrim resorts, in some cases towns or villages hitherto obscure became, by virtue of a shrine or the relics of a saint, places of national, perhaps even of world-wide, fame. These facts, however, must never obscure the essential religious importance of pilgrimage (it is wrong, *e.g.*, to put as one of the chief 'effects' of the custom the fame of the *Canterbury Tales*; that the pilgrimage to Canterbury afforded the occasion for some of the most famous English poetry is after all only incidental).

In post-Reformation times in Catholic countries pilgrimage has often been undertaken for the sake of cures such as those (some of which are genuine) wrought at Lourdes.

17. The place of pilgrimage in the history of religion.—It has already been noted that pilgrimage is not confined to Catholic Christianity, and also that pre-Christian shrines were consecrated to Christ and to His saints. This fact is of importance for the comparative study of religions, and, like other facts in that science, should be neither minimized nor wrongly emphasized. How far, all over the world, Christian and pre-Christian customs and rites were interwoven is not yet known for certain. As S. A. Cook says in a letter,

'The visit to the grave of the more or less deified hero, the annual meeting on the occasion of initiation or other ceremonial, the periodical festivals at which different towns or clans assembled—all these represent universal ideas.'

Some observances of Christian pilgrimage have close analogies elsewhere—*e.g.*, the miracle of the sacred fire at Jerusalem.[1] Glastonbury, St. Patrick's Purgatory, and Chartres (see above, 4, 7, 8) are instances of pagan holy places being consecrated to Christian pilgrimage.

The pilgrim with his staff, his broad flat-crowned hat, and his mussel-shell or other badge, has now disappeared, but thousands still go every year on pilgrimage. Shall we dismiss it as a mere superstition? It is something more than, although it is akin to, the sentiment that has made it the supreme desire of many whose relatives have fallen in action to visit their graves when the war is over. The underlying idea, conscious or unconscious, is that definite sanctity attaches to certain places because of what has happened there, as though some of the personal magnetism of the person who had lived or died there still survived and could communicate itself to the visitor. A similar idea would explain a so-called 'ghost,' not as the actual spirit of a dead person surviving after his bodily death in a given spot associated with him in lifetime, but rather as an impress or influence left by him still capable of affecting those who come to the place. Thus the study of pilgrimage leads us into psychic and psychological problems the solution of which is still beyond our range.

LITERATURE. i. *WORKS OF REFERENCE.*—Artt. in *EBr*[11] (A. Hauck); *DCA* (W. E. Scudamore); *CE* (Bede Jarrett); *OED*, Schaff-Herzog (J. F. Driscoll); L. de Sivry and J. B. J. Champagnac, *Dictionnaire des Pèlerinages*, Paris, 1851, forming vols. 43 and 44 of *Encyclopédie Théologique*, ser. 1., ed. J. P. Migne.

ii. *ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.*—Of much interest are the publica

[1] J. S. Assemanus, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, Rome, 1719-28, [illegible]

[2] [illegible] [3] *Ib.* p. [illegible].

[4] *Ib.* p. [illegible] [5] *Ib.* p. [illegible]

[6] James Lindsay Paul, 'Royal Pilgrimages in Scotland,' in *Proceedings of the Scottish Ecclesiological Society*, [illegible] (Aberdeen, 1905) 147-155.

[7] *Expedition to Prussia and the Holy Land made by Henry, Earl of Derby (afterwards King Henry IV.), in 1390-1 and 1392-3, having the Accounts kept by his Treasurer*, ed. L. Toulmin Smith, Camden Society, London, 1894.

[1] See for this *GB*, pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, i. 20, 131; *The Pilgrimage of the Russian Abbot Daniel in the Holy Land*; T. Tobler, *Golgotha*, St. Gall, 1851, pp. 460-488; Fulcher de Chartres, *Gesta Peregrinantium Francorum* (in John Bongarsius, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, Hanover, 1611, i. 407); Curzon, *Visits to the Monasteries of the Levant*, p. 145 f.; also *ERE* v. 846.

tions of the Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society. The records of many pilgrimages, several of which are referred to in this art., have been translated and annotated. The information is especially full on pilgrim routes and on the topography of Palestine, but not on the pilgrims themselves.

iii. *GENERAL.*—*Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1494*, tr. and ed. M. M. Newett, Manchester, 1907 (with full introd. giving much information about mediæval Italian pilgrimages to the Holy Land); Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales*; L. Conrady, *Vier rheinische Palaestina-Pilgerschriften der XIV., XV., XVI. Jahrhunderten*, Wiesbaden, 1882; R. Curzon, *Visits to the Monasteries of the Levant*, new ed., London, 1897; L. Depont, *Pèlerinages*, Paris, 1902; Desiderius Erasmus, *Pilgrimages to S. Mary of Walsingham and S. Thomas of Canterbury*, tr. and ed. J. G. Nichols[2], London, 1875; S. Graham, *With the Russian Pilgrims to Jerusalem*, do. 1913; G. Hartwell Jones, *Celtic Britain and the Pilgrim Movement*, Hon. Soc. of Cymmrodorion, do. 1912 (gives a mass of information about Celtic and other pilgrimages); S. Heath, *Pilgrim Life in the Middle Ages*, do. 1911; *MGH* xv. 80 ff. (biography of Willibald, 8th cent. bishop of Eichstätt); J. J. Jusserand, *Les Anglais au moyen âge: la Vie nomade et les routes d'Angleterre au xive siècle*, Paris, 1884, tr. L. Toulmin Smith, *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages (XIVth cent.)*[2], London, 1889; B. J. Kidd, *Documents Illustrative of the Continental Reformation*, Oxford, 1911; R. R. Madden, *Shrines and Sepulchres of the Old and New World*, 2 vols., London, 1851; J. Marx, *Das Wallfahren in der katholischen Kirche*, Trèves, 1842; R. Röhricht, *Deutsche Pilgerreisen nach dem heiligen Lande*, new ed., Innsbruck, 1900; G. B. de Rossi, *Roma sotterranea*, Rome, 1864 (for catacombs); *Sarum Missal*, ed. J. Wickham Legg, Oxford, 1916, pp. 405, 451 (pilgrim mass, prayers, and blessing); A. P. Stanley, *Historical Memorials of Canterbury*[11], London, 1912 (several interesting documents relating to the shrine of Becket in the Appendix).

L. D. AGATE.

PILGRIMAGE (Hebrew and Jewish).—The origin of the Hebrew pilgrimage is to be sought in the early Semitic life. To the primitive religious conception the deity was not ubiquitous, but was localized—by the nomads within the confines of a sacred district, frequently an oasis, by agriculturists in the sanctuary of a village or town. The performance of certain religious duties, therefore, normally involved a journey of greater or less length, which in time increased as the renown of particular sacred places, and the advantages for trading offered by a larger concourse of people, led to the further centralization of worship. Economy of time and effort, also, reduced the visits to a limited number at regularly recurring periods, to which was postponed the payment of vows replacing intervening religious duties. There thus was instituted the annual family or clan pilgrimage, as pictured in 1 S 1[3]. At times a lengthier pilgrimage into strange territory resulted in a protracted stay as a *gēr*, or even in permanent settlement; Abraham is the archetype of the pilgrim immigrant, and perhaps in Dt 26[5] *'ōbhēd* (AV 'ready to perish') contains the ideas of the Arabic root *'abada*, 'strange,' 'long from home,' 'permanent dweller.' Moreover, every traveller into strange territory was in a sense a pilgrim, a prospective visitor to the local shrine; hence, apparently, the right of sanctuary, of protection, was extended to cover the entire journey within the tribal territory—a supposition which may in part explain the sacred character of the primitive Semitic institution of hospitality (*q.v.*). At all events, the journey itself became an essential part of the religious celebration, assuming a quasi-sacred character—in itself a meritorious act.

The development of the pilgrimage of the clan into one of larger groups was due in part to the advantages of combination when the journey was long and led into strange territory; and this development was hastened when the period of pilgrimage was made to coincide with that of nomadic or, especially, with agricultural festivals. The Hebrew term *ḥagh* denotes both the pilgrimage journey and the festival ceremonies at the shrine; but which of these two ideas is the original denotation is uncertain. The concept 'encircle,' which seems common to various triliteral extensions of the biliteral root *ḥ–g*, may be seen both in the dance and in the circumambulation which concludes the pilgrim journey; nevertheless, if in Arabic *ḥajj* originally did not denote the circumambulation of the Meccan shrine but only the visit to 'Arafah (J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*, Berlin, 1897, pp. 79–84)—*i.e.* a visit, from the standpoint of Quraish, to a strange shrine under protection from the tribal adherents of that shrine—an original meaning 'pilgrimage,' 'recourse to a place of refuge,' should be preferred (cf. the roots *ḥajâ* and *ḥaja'a*).

The origin of the Hebrew *ḥagh* as involving a nomadic journey seems discernible in some of the regulations for the Hebrew festival celebrations, especially the Passover (though the latter is associated in the Pentateuch with an agricultural epoch and with traditions of a definite historic departure from Egypt). A three days' journey into the desert is made antecedent to the first Passover celebration; and the extension of the celebration of the festivals in general over an entire week is in part a reminiscence of the journey period (cf. the pilgrimage month of the Arabs). But especially the eating of unleavened bread (the nomad's usual bread), the roasting of the lamb whole (in nomad fashion), and the start by night (as frequently in the case of desert caravans) offer the setting for a dramatic revival of the ancient desert life and wanderings; therein sanctity and religious significance are attached to archaism, in the same manner as in the regulation for the building of an altar of dirt or unhewn stones (Ex 20). The pilgrimage of Tabernacles is a similar religious-dramatic revival of tent life (Hos 12[10] reads 'tents' for the 'booths' of Lv 23[42]; cf. also 2 Ch 7[10], if the phrase 'into their tents' is to be understood literally here).

The pilgrimage had also a political importance. The close association in a common purpose of large numbers of people from different tribes and communities afforded the basis for the development of a more permanent national unity, and played a part no less in ancient pan-Hebraism than in modern pan-Islāmism. In the Pentateuchal legislation which purposed the centralization of worship in Jerusalem the attempt is clear to increase the spirit of unity by bringing all males together in pilgrimage to one shrine at three different periods of the year (the festivals of Passover, Weeks, and Booths). That this legislation, however, reflects actual conditions—that all the male inhabitants of Palestine simultaneously left their homes three times every year to make what for some would have been an extended journey—seems improbable; and the special emphasis laid upon the Passover in certain passages (Nu 9[13]) or upon the Feast of Tabernacles in others (1 K 8[65]), shows perhaps that one or the other was in reality the pilgrimage period at different epochs in the national life, or (more likely) for different clans or families at the same epoch. Jeroboam testified to the political value of the pilgrimage in his attempt to counteract its unifying force by changing the place and time of it (1 K 13[27], with which cf. the reported action of Walīd ibn 'Abd al-Mālik in promoting the pilgrimage to a certain mosque in Jerusalem as against the Ka'bah, or that of the papal monarchy in diverting the pilgrimage to Rome).

After the building of the Second Temple in Jerusalem the Holy City was without rival as the objective of Jewish pilgrimage. Jews journeyed thither from Mesopotamia, and the journey itself became an even more important factor than before, often involving considerable hardship and danger; the old laws of hospitality to the pilgrim became correspondingly broader, and the inhabitants of Jerusalem took special measures to accommodate

visitors in the city as well as along the roads leading thereto.

But after the destruction of the Second Temple conditions changed; though there was still an annual celebration of the Feast of Tabernacles (on the Mount of Olives), with the cessation of sacrifice the pilgrimage, too, ceased to be an obligatory act. It assumed in general a personal and emotional character and lost much of its former joyousness. Pilgrims to the site of the Temple now came principally to mourn and to pray for the restoration of Zion, and they were not always welcomed by the non-Jewish population of the land. Conditions improved under Muhammadan rule; and in the 9th cent. many Karaites in particular made the pilgrimage. During the Crusades the pilgrimage seems to have ceased again; but with Saladin it was resumed,[1] and recovered something of its ancient joyous character. In many cases the desire to visit Jerusalem was coupled with the purpose of living and being buried on holy ground, and the pilgrimage thus became a pious immigration; as early as the 11th cent., indeed, a fully organized Jewish community existed at Ramlah; and there was a marked influx of Jews from Spain somewhat later, and from other parts of Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries. Earlier than this impulse from persecution there is found as a secondary cause of pilgrimage the general purpose of travel (as in the case of Judah Halevi and Ibn Ezra), the frequency of which is evidenced by a special travellers' prayer in the Jewish ritual.

At the same time Jerusalem again had its rivals as the object of pilgrimage. In Egypt there was a famous synagogue at Dumūh (modern Ṭammuh), near Cairo, to which Jewish families journeyed to celebrate the Feast of Weeks. But in Muhammadan countries the multiplication of shrines was due to the development especially of another type of pilgrimage—that to the tombs of pious men, of saints and reputed miracle-workers. Though evidence of the belief in the supernatural power of tombs may perhaps be found in 2 K 13[21], and such a belief among certain classes of Jews may have persisted along with other beliefs in miracles, the custom of visiting graves in order to pray and ask for divine intervention seems to have been borrowed by Jews from their Oriental neighbours; at any rate such a *ziyārah* (lit. 'visit') is sometimes made by Muhammadans and Jews to the graves of the same Biblical heroes. By the Oriental Jews themselves no distinction in reverence is made between the supposed tombs of Biblical characters and those of later saints. Palestine has many tombs of local, and several of more than local, veneration. To the supposed tomb of Zebulun at Sidon, *e.g.*, pilgrims come from all parts of Palestine, and also to that of Rabbi Meir (*q.v.*) at Tiberias. That of Simeon ben Yōḥai at Merom near Safed has long been visited by Jews even from Persia and Africa; indeed, in the 16th cent. Safed rivalled Jerusalem, especially as a place for permanent settlement, for it offered hospitality such as neither the Muhammadans nor the Jews of the Holy City any longer extended.

Outside of Palestine pilgrimages are made to several tombs in Kurdistan (*e.g.*, that of Nahum near Mosul), in Mesopotamia (*e.g.*, that of Ezra near Basrah and that of Ezekiel near Babylon), and in Persia (that of Mordecai and Esther at Hamadan). In Algeria and Morocco are several tombs of Jewish worthies of local renown, and these, too, are sometimes visited by Muhammadans and Jews together. In Europe only Galicia, Volhynia, and parts of Poland have their pilgrim shrines, though the travelling instinct as such has sometimes found expression in a sort of pilgrimage to various famous synagogues, such as at Prague, for purposes of prayer; and the wandering student, journeying far to sit at the feet of renowned rabbis, was a familiar figure until the 19th cent. in Germany and still later in Poland and Hungary.

In some cases the tomb-pilgrimages take place at fixed annual dates which, especially in Palestine, often coincide with the various festivals of the Jewish calendar; in other cases they take place at the pleasure of the individual. In Muhammadan countries a relationship with the older Semitic pilgrimage is seen in the joyous festival character which the celebration assumes, even beside the tomb.

[1] In the 13th cent., *e.g.*, there is recorded the visit of 300 rabbis from Spain and France.

LITERATURE.—J. D. Michaelis, *Das mosaische Recht*, Frankfort, 1771-75, iv. 114; W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, pp. 103, 236, 258; E. Renan, *Hist. of the People of Israel*, Eng. tr., do. 1881-91, i. 30, 46; G. A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, New York, 1902, pp. 108, 281; H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., Philadelphia, 1894, iii. 440, iv. 73; I. Abrahams, *Book of Delight*, do. 1912, pp. 127-145; S. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, 2nd ser., London, 1908, p. 205; *JE*, *s.vv.* 'Pilgrimage,' 'Tombs.'

WILLIAM POPPER.

PILGRIMAGE (Indian).—1. Origin.—Pilgrimage in India is the result of the animistic basis of the popular beliefs, reflected in the higher forms of Hinduism and even in the local developments of Islām. Nothing strikes a new-comer to the country more than the crowds of pilgrims travelling by road or rail towards some holy river, the local abode of some god or godling, the tomb of some saint or martyr.

'It seems not unlikely that the virtue of a pilgrimage arises mainly from the sacred character attaching to the place itself and not so much from the desire to honour the deity whose shrine it is. If this is so, the feeling which prompts the undertaking of the journey is not a very great advance on the primitive reverence for certain places as the abodes of spirits' (R. V. Russell, *Census of India*, 1911, vol. xiii., Central Provinces Report, pt. i. p. 91).

To this may be added the fact that water, by the analogy of the removal of physical impurities, is a potent agent in the removal of sin. Thus, in many sacred places there are pools dedicated to the god Rāma, which take his name, not because he is worshipped there, but because he bathed in this place when he wished to free himself from the sin of having killed the demon Rāvaṇa, who is held to have been a Brāhman. The germ of the idea of pilgrimage is found in the words of Indra to Hariśchandra:

'There is no happiness for him who does not travel; living in the society of men, the best man often becomes a sinner; for Indra is the friend of the traveller. Therefore wander' (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, vii. 15).

But, though in the *Ṛigveda* the animistic worship of rivers appears, pilgrimage, in its modern sense, is not referred to, and even in the *Brāhmaṇas*, while a particular sanctity attaches to river fords (*tīrtha*) and certain privileged regions, like the banks of the Sarasvatī, there is no knowledge either of pilgrimages or of holy places (A. Barth, *Religions of India*, Eng. tr., London, 1882, p. 62). Even Manu (*Laws*, viii. 92) regards visits to the Ganges or to Kurukshetra as comparatively unimportant.

Gautama, however, declares that 'all mountains, all rivers, holy lakes, places of pilgrimage, the dwellings of *ṛṣis*, cow-pens, and temples of the gods are places which destroy sin' (xix. 14 [*SBE* ii. (1879) 276]).

The origin of the modern practice may be traced to the revival of Brāhmanism and its absorption of local cults. Every place where a local spirit was propitiated or worshipped soon came under the control of a body of local priests, interested in attracting visitors because their offerings formed their means of livelihood.

2. Places of Hindu pilgrimage.—The number of places to which pilgrims resort is enormous. In

the following list the more important holy places are classified according to their geographical position and the deities mainly worshipped, it being understood that many places combine the cults of more than one deity:

(*a*) *Places.*—Bengal: Barābar, Gayā, Deogarh, Kālīghāṭ, Kāmākhyā, Sāgar Island, Tarakeśwar; Bihār and Orissa: Parasnāth, Puri-Jagannāth; Panjab: Dera Nānak, Jwālamukhī, Katās, Kurukshetra, Takht-i-Sulaimān; United Provinces of Agra and Oudh: Allāhābād, Badarināth, Batesar, Benares, Bindhāchal, Brindāban, Chitrakūt, Debipātan, Deoprayag, Gangotrī, Garhmukhteśar, Hardwār, Jamnotrī, Kedārnāth, Mahāban; Bombay: Alandī, Bechrāji, Chāṇḍod, Dwārkā, Jejurī, Nāsik, Pālitāna, Pandharpur, Shetrunjā; Madras: Bābā Badan, Bhavānī, Chidambaram, Comorin, Conjeeveram, Gokarn, Rāmeśwaram, Seringapatam, Śrirangam, Tirupati; Central Provinces: Māndhāta; Balūchistān, Hinglāj; Rājputānā and Central India: Ābu, Ajmer, Amarkantak, Barwānī, Nāthdwāra, Pushkar, Rakhabh Dev.

(*b*) *Cults.*—Brahmā: Pushkar; Viṣṇu: Badarināth, Gayā, Hardwār, Nāthdwāra, Pandharpur, Puri-Jagannāth, Tirupati; Kṛṣṇa: Mathurā, Gokul, Brindāban, Mahāban, Dwārkā; Śiva, the twelve great *liṅgas*: Somnāth in Kathiawar, Mahākāla at Ujjain, Omkāra in the Narbadā, Trayambak near Nāsik, Nāganāth in the Nizām's Dominions, Vaidyanāth in the Deccan, Bhīmaśankar on the river Bhīma, Kedāreśwar in the Himālaya, Viśvanāth at Benares, Mallikārjuna in the Karnātik, and Rāmeśwar at the extreme south of the peninsula; other places sacred to Śiva are Bakreśwar, Barābar, Chidambaram, Deogarh, Gokarn, Hardwār, Jejurī, Katās, Kedārnāth, Tarakeśwar; various forms of the mother-goddess, Kālī, Durgā, Devī, etc.: Arasū, Ambā Bhavānī, Bindhāchal, Comorin, Devipātan, Hinglāj, Jwālamukhī, Kālīghāt, Kāmakhyā; sacred rivers: Allāhābād, Amarkantak, Bāgheśwar, Batesar, Bhavānī, Chāṇḍod, Deoprayāg, Gangotrī, Garhmukhteśar, Jamnotrī, Nāsik, Sāgar Island. The chief places visited by Buddhists are: Bodh Gayā, Kuśinagara, Potala, Sarnāth; by Jains: Barwānī, Girnār, Pālitānā, Rakhabh Dev, Shetrunjā. Worshippers of Rāma and Sītā visit Ayodhya, Chitrakūt, Nāsik, and Sītākuṇḍ. The heroes of the *Mahābhārata* are venerated at Kurukshetra and Thāneśar. The cult of the dead is performed at Benares, Hardwār, Gayā, and Siddhpur. In the number of sacred places few regions rival the Himālaya, and, in particular, Kaśmīr. The latter is a country where there is not a space as large as a grain of sesamum seed without a *tīrtha*—a place of pilgrimage (Kalhaṇa, *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, ed. M. A. Stein, London, 1900, ii. 367, 376; *Āīn-i-Akbarī*, tr. H. S. Jarrett, ii. 354 ff.).

3. Pilgrimage among the Buddhists.—The great monasteries, *stūpas*, and *dāgabas* erected over the relics of Buddha, many of which had disappeared, have been unearthed by the Archæological Survey. Bodh Gayā, where Buddha gained his title, and where the *bodhi*-tree beneath which he sat became an object of veneration, still commands respect among Buddhist pilgrims from Burma and farther east. In 1905 the Tāshi Lāma of Tibet visited the ruins at Sarnāth, near Benares burned vast quantities of butter and incense, and scattered flowers. At the close of the rite of adoration the Tāshi Lāma was transfigured and the other Lāmas worshipped him (*The Times*, 20th Dec. 1905). Next to the Tree of Wisdom at Bodh Gayā, the sites regarded as most holy are the scene of Buddha's death at Kuśinagara (*q.v.*), the eight great *chaityas* which enshrined his relics, Mt. Potala in S. India, Sthambala in the north, and the *guru's* Fairy-land in Udyāna to the west. The Indian sites are seldom visited by Lāmas and Tibetans on account of the great distance and the expense of the journey. Probably for the sake of convenience and economy, they have transferred the site of Buddha's death from Kuśinagara to a place known as Sālkuśa in Assam (L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 305 ff.).

4. Places of Jain pilgrimage.—The Jains, probably on account of the retiring character of the cult and the desire to avoid pollution from animal slaughter, selected as their sacred sites places far from the abodes of men, like Mt. Ābū in Rājputānā, Pālitāna and Girnār in Kāthiāwār, Samet Sikhar or Pārasnāth in Bengal. The southern Jains have special places of pilgrimage at Padmāvati in Mysore and Guneśwar in S. Kānara (*BG* xxii. [1884] 118).

5. Holy places shared by different religions.—Some places are shared by the followers of more than one religion. Hindus and Muhammadans both visit the ledge below the Takht-i-Sulaimān, from which King Solomon is said to have taken his last view of India before he carried off his dusky bride (T. H. Holdich, *The Indian Borderland*, London, 1901, p. 73 f.; cf. *ERE* vi. 709).

6. Pilgrimages by the ascetic orders.—Some of the most extended pilgrimages are those performed by Gośāins, Sannyāsis, and other ascetics.

Jonathan Duncan (*Asiatic Researches*, v. [1799] 37 ff.) gives an interesting narrative of the pilgrimages performed by Prānpurī Sannyāsi, an Ūrdhvabāhu, *i.e.* one whose arms had become rigid by being constantly held over his head (M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 88). He journeyed to all the chief Indian shrines, Kābul, Bamiān, Baku on the Caspian Sea, Astrakan and Moscow, through Persia and Bokhara, and thence across the Himālaya to the source of the Ganges at Gangotrī. Then he went to Nepāl and the sacred lake Mānasarovar and Lhāsa, whence he returned to India bearing dispatches to Warren Hastings, who gave him a rent-free estate. When this account was written, he was still in the habit of making excursions to Nepāl and to other parts of India.

Ascetics often wear symbols of such journeys, a white conch-shell denoting a journey to Rāmeśwar in the south, iron, brass, or copper armlets indicating pilgrimages to Paśupatināth, Kedārnāth, and Badarināth in the Himālaya.

7. River pilgrimages.—The favourite form of Indian pilgrimage is to shrines on the banks of the great rivers, like the Ganges, Jumnā, Narbadā, or Godāvarī. The Indus and the Brahmāputra are too far from the Holy Land of the Hindus to have acquired special sanctity. The great rivers, though places on their banks have been occupied by the votaries of special deities, are unsectarian, and any Hindu, whatever his rank may be, may bathe, provided he avoids causing pollution to high-caste worshippers. The places at which these rivers rise, like Gangotrī, Jamnotrī, or Amarkantak, and sites on their upper waters, like Nāsik or Hardwār, are sacred. Even more highly regarded are the junctions (*sangam*) of two or more holy rivers, like the meeting of the Ganges, Jumnā, and the mythical Sarasvatī at Allāhābād, known to Hindus as Prayāga, 'the place of sacrifice' *par excellence*; Bāgheśwar, Deoprayāg, and other junctions higher up the stream; and Sāgar Island, where the river joins the sea. Such places are often dedicated to the worship of Śiva, a god of fertility. Bathing in these holy places cleanses both body and soul, and brings the pilgrim into communion with the benign water-spirits and with the honoured dead whose ashes have been consigned to the waters.

8. Rules of pilgrimage.—The dates and hours at which bathing is auspicious are fixed by the local priests, and depend on various considerations connected with the local cultus. Thus, at Allāhābād the chief bathing fair is held on the new moon of the month Māgh (Jan.–Feb.), at Hardwār at the beginning of the Hindu solar year. At both these places specially important assemblies occur every twelfth year when the planet Jupiter enters the sign of Aquarius (Kumbha), such fairs being known as the Kumbh Melā (for the importance of the sidereal revolution of Jupiter, which is completed in 11 years, 314·92 days, as affecting religious observances, see *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 49). From ancient times bathing during eclipses has been a means of expelling the evil spirits which are abroad at this time. According to tradition, the Yādavas bathed at Somnāth during an eclipse.

An important rite performed at sacred places is the circumambulation of the sacred object in the course of the sun, keeping the right shoulder towards it (*pradakṣiṇā*). Sometimes, as at Benares (*ERE* ii. 467), there is a holy road surrounding the sacred area along which the pilgrims march. Sometimes, as at Mathurā, where the sites associated with the life of Kṛṣṇa are spread over a considerable space, they are visited in rotation under

the direction of a Brāhman, who usually recites at each holy place the local religious guide-book (*mahātmyā*), which embodies the religious lore. These Brāhman guides form a special class, often notorious for roguery and rapacity, like those known as Gangāputra, 'sons of the Ganges,' the Chaubē of Mathurā, the Gayāwāl of Gayā, the Prayāgwāl of Allāhābād (Crooke, *TC*, Calcutta, 1896, ii. 387 ff.; *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901]; Kalhaṇa, Introd. i. 20). These men usually keep lodging-houses for entertainment of guests, tout for pilgrims, and keep books which record for many years the arrival of persons of particular castes or families. There is an elaborate system of touting for pilgrims to Jagannāth (W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872, i. 140).

When the holy place is, like Hardwār, Benares, Gayā, or Siddhpur, associated with the cult of the dead, the ashes of relatives, which have been preserved until this opportunity, are consigned to the water, and the mind rites (*śrāddha*) are performed. It is an interesting development that since the introduction of the Government parcel-post the ashes are often sent by it to a Brāhman competent to perform the rites, without the attendance of the relatives being required.

In the case of serious sin a special rite of atonement (*prāyaśchitta*) is performed during the pilgrimage. The hair of the penitent, which is supposed to hold his sins, is cut off, only a single tuft being left on the crown of the head. He bathes in ten different ways, each with the use of an appropriate text, dresses in clean clothes, worships the deity, and, while the Brāhman performs the fire sacrifice (*homa*), presents ten kinds of gifts, the last being the 'shadow' gift, a cup of melted butter in which he has beheld the reflexion of his own face. He then says to the priest: 'This penance of mine must be rendered valid by you,' to which the reply is made: 'It is rendered valid.' If a sinner should die leaving this rite unperformed, it is the duty of his successor to perform it; if it be neglected, father and son descend to hell (A. K. Forbes, *Ras Mālā*, London, 1878, p. 631 f.).

9. Austerities practised by pilgrims.—Besides the suffering caused by long journeys in ox-carts over ill-kept roads, the crowding in railway carriages, the inconveniences of camping on the river bank, and the bad accommodation in the pilgrim lodging-houses, special austerities are undergone. One form of penance for grievous sin is the measuring of the length of the pilgrim's body by successive prostrations on the ground as he journeys to the sacred place. Waddell notes this as a Buddhist practice at Lhāsa, where some zealots traverse the Circular Road in this way—a distance of about 6 miles, the number of prostrations being over 40,000; in some cases the hands of the pilgrims are protected by padded wooden clogs, the soles of which are studded with hob-nails (*Lhasa and its Mysteries*[3], London, 1906, pp. 364, 375).

According to the historian Rashīdu-dīn (H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India*, London, 1867–77, i. 67), at Somnāth 'many of the more deluded devotees, in performance of their vows, pass the last stage crawling along the ground upon their sides; some approach walking upon their ankles, and never touch the ground with the soles of their feet, others go before the idol upon their heads.' For similar customs at Pandharpur see *BG* xx. [1884] 1 f.

On several occasions the emperor Akbar, in imitation of the Hindu practice, walked on foot from Agra to Ajmer to visit the shrine of the saint Mu'īnu-d-dīn Chishtī (Elliot, v. 328).

The original custom of branding the pilgrim with the sacred symbol of the god as a proof that he had performed the pilgrimage is now often superseded by a mark made with moistened clay. But in S. India, among the Sri Vaisnavas and Madhavas, the votion to the monastery (*mathu*) is branded on both shoulders (E. Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes in S. India*, Madras, 1906, p. 403 f.). The practice of piercing the cheeks and tongue with a silver needle when going on pilgrimage is more common in S. than in N. India (*ib.* p. 402 f., *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, v. 399). Occasionally in S. India pilgrims keep a handkerchief tied over their mouths to show that they are subject to a vow of silence during the pilgrimage, or they wear a mouth-lock, a silver band over the mouth, with a skewer piercing both cheeks (Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, v. 399). Abū al-Faḍhl says of Nagarkot in the Panjāb:

'Pilgrims from distant parts visit it and obtain their desires. Strange it is that in order that their prayers may be favourably heard, they cut out their tongues: with some it grows again on the spot, with others after one or two days. Although the medical faculty allow the possibility of growth in the tongue, yet in so short a space of time it is sufficiently amazing' (*Ā'in-i-Akbari*, tr. H. S. Jarrett, ii. 313).

On the sacrifice of joints of the fingers at certain Indian shrines see *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 219 f. At the pilgrimage to the temple of Sāsta in Travancore the Aiyappans (for in these pilgrimages the worshippers call themselves by the name of the god) have to undergo a preliminary course of 41 days' scanty diet and sexual abstinence (*Census of India*, 1901, vol. xxvi., Travancore Report, pt. i. p. 98).

10. Muhammadan pilgrimages.—It does not fall within the scope of this article to describe the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*) to Mecca, Medīna, or Kerbela, that to Mecca having succeeded the old pagan spring feast (W. R. Smith, *Lectures and Essays*, London, 1912, p. 546). In India the number of tombs of saints (*pīr*, *auliyā*) or martyrs of the faith (*shahīd*) is legion, and they attract large bodies of pilgrims.

For N. India see A. O'Brien, 'The Muhammadan Saints of the W. Panjāb,' *JAI* xli. [1911] 509 ff.; W. R. Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, London, 1895, p. 286 ff.; Malik Muhammad Din, *Bahawalpur State Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, p. 159 ff.; *Census of India*, 1911, vol. xiii., N.W. Frontier Province Report, p. 87 f.; for Balūchistān, *FL* xiii. [1902] 259 ff.; for S. India, S. H. Bilgrami and C. Willmott, *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of the Nizam's Dominions*, Bombay, 1883–84, ii. 571 ff.; *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 360.

Such monuments abound in the vicinity of Muhammadan capital cities, like Delhi, Agra, Lahore, or Lucknow, and they are visited by low-class Hindus as well as by Muhammadans. Some shrines, like those of Mu'īnu-d-dīn Chishtī at Ajmer, the martyr Ghāzī Miyān at Bahrāich and Gorakhpur, and Shāh Madār of Makanpur, vie with Hindu holy places in attracting both Hindu and Muhammadan pilgrims. But the erection of tombs, and still more the superstitious veneration of them, is opposed to the laws of orthodox Islām, and Wahhābīs—the puritans of Islām—prohibit visits to them. The practice now so common among Muhammadans of visiting such places is clearly derived from the practices of the Hindus, and the rites performed differ little from Hindu and Buddhist custom. The pilgrims circumambulate the building in the course of the sun, crush into the tomb chamber to imbibe the breath of the saint which is supposed to survive round his remains, or, as a special privilege to be gained by payment of a fee, they are allowed to observe or even to touch clothes which are supposed to have been worn by the saint or martyr—his turban in particular, or some other article which may have belonged to him. Many of these shrines are potent in the cure of disease, and at some—*e.g.*, at the tomb of Hanwant Naik at Sangamner in the Ahmadnagar District—wooden legs or arms are offered to secure relief (*BG* xvii. [1884] 737). Many of the Panjāb shrines are efficacious in the cure of leprosy and other diseases (*Census of India*, 1911, vol. xiv., Panjab Report, pt. i. p. 385 f.).

11. Opposition to tomb-worship among some Hindu sects.—Some modern sects which aim at restoring the primitive usages of Hinduism have protested against the worship of tombs and relics, and even against pilgrimage.

The Arya Samāj (*q.v.*) discourages the practice of bathing in holy rivers, of pilgrimage, of the use of beads and sectarial marks, of gifts to worthless

mendicants, and of all the many rites of modern Hinduism (H. A. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, Lahore, 1911–14, ii. 231). The Sikh *guru* Nānak (*q.v.*) said:

'Religion consisteth not in wandering to tombs or places of cremation, or sitting in attitudes of contemplation' (M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, i. 60).

Guru Amar Dās endeavoured to prevent Sikhs from visiting Hardwār, Benares, and other places of Hindu pilgrimage (*ib.* ii. 87). But this rule is now generally disregarded, and Hardwār in particular is visited by crowds of Sikh pilgrims. Guru Govind Singh opposed the worship of saints like Guggā and Sakhī Sarwar, as well as visits to Muhammadan cemeteries and places of cremation (*ib.* v. 158). But Nānak visited the tomb of Shaikh Farīd at Ajodhan, and modern Sikhs frequent Ambela and Kartarpur (*ib.* i. 84, iii. 26). Veneration of the Sikh saints, or *bhagats*, prevails widely (*ib.* vi. 1 ff.). One of the leading principles of the Lingāyat sect in S. India is that between God and His worshipper no mediator is required, and that sacrifices, penances, pilgrimages, and fasts are unnecessary (*BG* xxii. [1884] 105; *Census of India*, 1901, vol. xxiv., Mysore Report, pt. i. p. 533).

12. Social aspect of pilgrimages.—The desire for change, the relief of the dull everyday life of the village, is an incentive to pilgrimage often stronger than religious enthusiasm. Hence women, who see little of the outer world, lose no opportunity of making these journeys. Trade is carried on at all the great religious fairs, where cattle, horses, elephants, and camels are readily bought and sold, and where women purchase their annual stock of necessaries and trifles. This movement of the people on pilgrimage has done something to relieve the parochialism of village life; the possibility of meeting an out-caste in a crowded railway carriage weakens caste restrictions, while the need of food from uncertain sources diminishes some of the precautions which the Hindu by the rules of his caste is compelled to adopt. The improvement of communication by road and rail has certainly increased the numbers of pilgrims. But Brāhmans and other managers of sacred places assert that their profits have not increased with the larger crowds. The tendency now is naturally to visit the most sacred places, while those of less religious importance are neglected. The pilgrim makes a shorter visit, and the reaction against the influence of Brāhmans tends to reduce the amount of his benefactions. The chief danger from pilgrimages is the risk of the spread of epidemic disease, and on some occasions in recent years cholera seems to have spread into Central Asia and even into E. Europe and the Mediterranean area by contagion from pilgrims visiting Hardwār and other sacred places in N. India. The burden imposed on the executive and sanitary officials in managing crowds of excited peasants, ignorant of the elementary rules of sanitation, has become increasingly arduous.

LITERATURE.—There is no monograph on the subject of Hindu and Muhammadan pilgrimage. A full list of places of pilgrimage will be found in *IGI*, Index, *s.v.* 'Pilgrimages'; for Hindu pilgrimages see W. Ward, *A View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos*[2], Serampore, 1818, ii. 324 ff., and elsewhere; W. J. Wilkins, *Modern Hinduism*, London, 1887, p. 240 ff.; for an interesting popular sketch see W. H. Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, Oxford, 1916, p. 585 ff.; for Madras, J. E. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*, Madras, 1896, p. 174 ff.; for Muhammadan and Hindu pilgrimages in N. India see Abū al-Fadhl, *Ā'in-i-Akbarī*, tr. H. S. Jarrett, Calcutta, 1873–94, iii. 303 ff.; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], Oxford, 1906, p. 597 ff.

W. CROOKE.

PILGRIMAGE (Japanese).—The practice of religious pilgrimage in Japan may be traced back to the 8th cent., when the Buddhist missionaries opened mountain passes and consecrated some of the peaks to be places of worship (see art. MISSIONS [Buddhist], vol. viii. p. 704). In the course of the 9th and 10th centuries groups of mountaineering priests gradually established definite series of pilgrim itinerancies. Legend has it that an emperor (reigned 984–985), in the distress occasioned by the death of his consort, left his palace and paid a visit, wearing monastic robes, to the thirty-three sanctuaries dedicated to Kwannon (Skr. Avalokiteśvara) in the central provinces. However this may be, we know that at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th cent. frequent pilgrimages were made by the court nobles to Buddhist and Shintō temples (on the same itinerancies), and that the pilgrimage to the thirty-three sanctuaries of Kwannon was, from the 15th cent., one of the most popular. In the former case the pilgrimage was combined with pleasure, and rhyming meetings were often held in front of the sanctuaries. In the latter case the pilgrimage was undertaken as an act of penance and accomplished by stiff climbing, for the majority of the thirty-three sanctuaries stood, and still stand, on hills or precipices—in accordance with the conception that the deity Kwannon looks down with compassion from on high upon the human world.

The pilgrim-bands to the thirty-three Kwannon sanctuaries consisted usually of a few persons, often a family, parents and children; they wore white robes, on which they received stamps of the various sanctuaries, and, while marching, they chanted hymns supposed to have been revealed by the respective deities of the places. At the places of pilgrimage acts of penance were performed, such as fasting, bathing in water-falls, and sleepless prayer. On the way the pilgrims subsisted on alms, and, when they died, they were tenderly buried by the villagers, these acts of protection to the pilgrims being considered of similar merit with the pilgrimage itself. The same may be said of all other religious pilgrimages, and that was the reason why, even in the ages of warfare and disturbance in the 15th and 16th centuries, the practice of pilgrimage came more and more into vogue, stimulated as it was by the sense of misery and by many distressing experiences. In these centuries, and more decidedly after the restoration of peace and order at the beginning of the 17th, the places of pilgrimage were multiplied enormously, being arranged in groups of from six to eighty-eight in number. Most of these were Buddhist sanctuaries dedicated to certain deities or connected with the life incidents of Buddhist saints. The distribution of the places in one group was various—sometimes limited to a certain locality, sometimes scattered over a wide area. Besides the places arranged in series there were several isolated ones, to which the pilgrims, in company or individually, paid a visit after long tiresome journeys.

A noteworthy feature in some of these pilgrimages was that they were practised as a kind of initiatory ceremony introducing young people to religious mysteries when they were entering adult life. Most pilgrimages of this kind were mountaineering trips over dales and precipices, paying homage at the sanctuaries erected here and there, and finally worshipping the chief deity enshrined on the summit. The pilgrims were guided by trained leaders, who were mostly regular mountaineering priests, and who directed the ceremonies. The most famous of the mountains visited were Kimpu-sen in Yamato, Ontaké in Shinano,[1] a group of three peaks in the north-east, the well-known Fuji, etc. Besides these and other Buddhist-Shintō sanctuaries there were several purely Buddhist or Shintō centres of pilgrimage, one of

[1] Percival Lowell, *Occult Japan*, Boston, 1895, a book chiefly based on the author's observations on Ontaké.

the most prominent being the temple of Isé dedicated to the sun-goddess. Every spring groups of pilgrims composed of young men and women made a journey of many days to it and paid homage to the supreme deity of Shintō. This pilgrimage to Isé had nothing austere in it, but was merely a pleasure trip. Yet sometimes a form of maniac frenzy took possession of many of the young people, who started on the journey without any money or provisions but were well provided for by alms. This pilgrimage and many others have, in the peaceful times since the 17th cent., more and more assumed the character of pleasure trips.

Besides the regular religious pilgrimages there was in Japan a curious kind of pilgrimage connected with poetry and romance. The classical poetry of Japan, dating chiefly from the four centuries from the 9th to the 12th, sang of places eminent for natural beauty (in many cases the poets did not compose their poems on the spots). In the course of time these places became the classical names for the respective excellences, such as Yoshino for the cherry-blossom, Sarashina for the moonlight in autumn, Fuji for snow, etc. The visit of poets to these places was called the pilgrimage to see the *uta-makura*, literally, 'the pillows of poetry'—the basis or source of poetic inspiration—and it was conducted with a certain amount of religious zeal or piety, as a cult of the beauty of nature. There was also a pilgrimage of romantic interest which consisted in paying visits to the places described in epic or romantic stories. In this case the pilgrims, whether individuals or parties, knew well enough that the stories were fictions, and yet they wandered among the mountains and forests and along the sea-coasts and streams mentioned in the stories, in order to keep alive their interest in the stories and heroes. This pilgrimage was less religious than the lyric pilgrimage, although some itinerant monks performed religious services on various spots in memory of the heroes or heroines who were said to have died there, as if their souls were still hovering about. Both of these pilgrimages have grown in fashion since the 17th cent. and have become more and more mere pleasure trips.

Another modification of pilgrimage was the wandering in search of one's enemy for the sake of revenge, for vendetta has been regarded, since the 14th cent., but more definitely since the 17th, as the duty of the son or brother of a murdered person. In this case the man aiming at revenge dressed himself as a pilgrim, and was, indeed, a true pilgrim, in so far as he naturally worshipped in various sanctuaries on his way and prayed for a speedy discovery of the enemy. The disguise of a pilgrim was also adopted by political or military spies, in this case serving a totally ulterior purpose.

Finally, we may add that pilgrimages, whether of an austere religious character or combined with pleasure, are much in vogue even to-day,[1] and that many pilgrims can be seen in the country districts marching along in the costumes that have been customary for pilgrims for centuries.

LITERATURE.—Besides works mentioned in article, see B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*,[2] London, 1905; *Encyclopædia Japonica* (Japanese), Tokyo, 1911, s.v. 'Junrei.'

M. ANESAKI.

PILGRIM FATHERS.—The Pilgrim Fathers movement is one of the most cherished memories of British and American Christianity. It has (1) a religious, and (2) a political significance. As a religious movement, it rested on the supremacy of Jesus Christ in His own Church and the sufficiency of the Bible for all the purposes of Church rule and government, and it did much to restore these elements of a living religion to their proper place in the Christian life of England. The experiment then made of relying solely on the constructive and regulative power of the gospel in building a Church has been of great value. It has had an influence far beyond the limits of the Churches which inherit directly the Pilgrim tradition. The political importance of the movement lies in the fact that it was a conspicuous experiment in democracy conditioned by religious motives and restraints, so that democracy is seen at its best. C. Borgeaud (*Rise of Modern Democracy in Old and New England*, Eng. tr., London, 1894) has shown how the parent stem of democratic constitutions in England and in the United States is to be found in the Church covenants of Independent Churches—the line of descent being, in England, through the 'Agreement of the People' (1647) to the theory of the Social Contract, and the Settlement of 1688, in America, through the contract first made in the cabin of the Mayflower to the constitutions of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, and so to the constitution of the United States itself (see esp. Borgeaud, pp. 104–116, for summary of argument of the book).

1. **Name.**—The name 'Pilgrim Fathers' belongs properly to the company of exiles for conscience' sake who founded the settlement of New Plymouth, Massachusetts. The word 'pilgrim' is not used in the ecclesiastical sense of a visitor to a shrine, but in the original meaning as a wanderer in distant lands. It became familiar to the members of the Separatist Churches owing to their compulsory migrations from England to Holland and from place to place there. It was first used about the time when plans were discussed for leaving Leyden, and may be traced to the description in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11^{13-16}) of those who 'seek a better country' as 'strangers and pilgrims on the earth.' The classic passage is in Bradford's *Hist. of Plymouth Plantation* (*Coll. of Mass. Hist. Soc.*), p. 59:

> 'And ye time being come that they must departe, they were accompanied with most of their brethren out of ye citie, unto a towne sundrie miles of, called Delfes-Haven, wher the ship lay ready to receive them. So they lefte ye goodly and pleasante citie, which had been their resting place near 12 years: but they knew they were *pilgrimes*, and looked not much on those things, but lift up their eyes to ye heavens, their dearest countrie, and quieted their spirits.'

It is important to distinguish the Separatist Pilgrims from the colonists who founded the commonwealth of Massachusetts, with which their settlement was afterwards incorporated. The Separatist was the product of gathered churches formed on a basis of spiritual affinity and the acceptance of regulative Christian principle. The distinguishing features of the colony are found chiefly in the religious ideals which inspired the Pilgrims, the association of their religion with a democratic civil government, the character of the men who formed the settlement, and the social structure of a colony cemented by religious feeling and principle.

2. **Origin.**—The impulse which formed Separatist Churches came through zealous Puritan preachers, such as Richard Bernard, Thomas Toller, and Robert Gifford, who did not themselves become Separatists. Applying the principles learned from these men, a more resolute company in Gainsborough, Scrooby, and Austerfield formed communities of worshippers who bound themselves by 'express vocal' covenant 'as the Lord's free people, to walk together in all His ways, made known, or to be made known to them, according to their best endeavour, whatsoever it should cost them, the Lord assisting them' (quoted by John Brown, in *Early Independents*, p. 103; for other covenants see John Cotton, *The Way of the Churches of Christ in New England*, London, 1645, quoted in Borgeaud, p. 82; and for the covenant of Salem

[1] Cf. F. L. Gabb, 'Pilgrimage in Tokyo,' in *Proceedings of Japan Society*, London.

see Mather, *Magnalia*, i. 18, quoted in Brown, *Pilgrim Fathers of New England*, p. 286). Their aim was to constitute a Church on the lines of the NT, and they separated from the Church by law established, because (1) 'the profane and ungodly multitude' was admitted to communion; (2) the 'various ecclesiastical offices and callings, courts and canons were unlawful and unchristian, and had no warrant in the Word of God'; and (3) the Church was 'in subjection unto an antichristian and ungodly government, clean contrary to the institution of our Saviour Christ' (Harl. MSS 360, fol. 70, quoted in Brown, p. 85).

For about ten years from 1590 there was one church formed on these principles worshipping in Gainsborough. When its numbers increased and the members from the surrounding district found the distance too great, a second church was formed at Scrooby, meeting in the house of William Brewster, an ancient manor-house which had once belonged to the archbishops of York. The pastor was Richard Clyfton, formerly a Puritan rector of Babworth in Lincolnshire, 'a grave and reverend preacher, who by his paines and diligens had done much good, and under God had been a means of ye conversion of many' (Bradford, p. 10).

3. Leading personalities.—*Robert Browne* (1550–1633).—See art. BROWNISM.

Barrowe, Greenwood, and Penry.—In 1592–93 Henry Barrowe (Clare Hall, Cambridge, 1570, Gray's Inn, 1576), a converted barrister, John Greenwood, a Cambridge graduate (Corpus, 1581), and John Penry (b. 1559, executed 1593), a Welshman and Cambridge graduate (Peterhouse, 1580), were put to death for refusing to abjure Brownist principles at the bidding of Archbishop Whitgift. The Conventicle Act of 1593 provided that persons above the age of sixteen who refused to repair to church as by law established, or attended a conventicle, should be imprisoned, and, if they failed to conform in three months, should be banished from the realm. If they returned, they should be hanged. That act led to the migration to Amsterdam and Leyden, and eventually to Massachusetts. Barrowe left his property to the church of which he had been a member, and with the help of his legacy most of the members were able to emigrate to Holland in 1593. They settled first at Kampen and then at Naarden on the Zuyder Zee, where they were so needy that the magistrates voted a small sum of money for their relief. In 1595 they were settled at Amsterdam.

Francis Johnson (1562–1618).—The pastor of the 'Ancient Church' in London—by 'ancient' the Brownists meant 'primitive'—was Francis Johnson, formerly a Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge (1584, M.A. 1585), and a popular Puritan preacher. He was expelled from the university, and imprisoned, for a sermon preached at St. Mary's, maintaining Presbyterianism to be of divine right, liberated on the petition of 68 members of the university, and allowed to emigrate to Middelburg (1589–92), where he became pastor of a Puritan church. His conversion to Separatist principles was due to a book by Barrowe and Greenwood sent out in 1591 from the Fleet prison, named *A Plaine Refutation of M. Giffard's Booke, intituled A short Treatise gainst the Donatistes of England.* Johnson was authorized by the magistrates of Dort, where the book was printed, to confiscate the whole impression. He publicly burned all but two copies. Taking up one of these 'to see their errors,' he was convinced by its argument, gave up his pastorate, and visited Barrowe in prison. He then joined the Separatist Church in London and became its pastor. When his flock emigrated, he was left behind in prison, and it was not until 1597 that he rejoined them and resumed the pastorate. He had meanwhile made a voyage in the Hopewell to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but was obliged to return to Amsterdam owing to the misfortunes that overtook his ship.

Johnson's autocratic temper led to some unfortunate disputes in the church of which he was pastor, the more discreditable that they were largely personal, concerned with his wife's dress and the criticisms of his brother George. Johnson aimed at intra-congregational Presbyterianism, maintaining that 'a body of simple church members, aggregated without Elders, had no power except to elect Elders. It could not even ordain them. It could not excommunicate an erring and unrepentant member' (H. M. Dexter, *Congregationalism of the last Three Hundred Years*, p. 326).

Henry Ainsworth (1571–1623) became a scholar of Caius College, Cambridge, in 1587. In 1593 we find him serving as a bookseller's porter in Amsterdam and a professed Brownist. He was a man of sensitive, scholarly temperament, and played an important part in the history of the church at Amsterdam, where for a time he held the office of teacher under Francis Johnson. No fewer than 23 treatises came from his pen between 1598 and 1641 (see Dexter, p. 346), of which perhaps the best known are the *Counterpoyson* and the *Apologie or Defence of such true Christians as are commonly (but unjustly) called Brownists; against such Imputations as are laid upon them by the Heads and Doctors of the University of Oxford*, which he, jointly with Francis Johnson, prepared for presentation to James I. and afterwards published in 1604 (*ib.* pp. 306–309). He was a man of wide and accurate learning, especially eminent as an Orientalist and commentator on the OT. Beginning in 1616, he published annually a book of annotations on the five books of Moses, the Psalms, and the Song of Solomon, which were greatly admired by the Hebrew scholars in the university of Leyden:

> 'They thought he had not his better for the Hebrew tongue in the University, nor scarce in Europe' (quoted in Mackennal, *English Separatists*, p. 209).

He gave up the allegorizing method of exegesis which was then general, in favour of the more modern method. His commentaries were thought worthy of republication in Edinburgh as late as 1843. Many unverifiable stories are told of Ainsworth in Amsterdam, illustrating his poverty, piety, learning, and Christian conviction. He was chosen pastor of the church at Amsterdam during the absence of Francis Johnson in Newfoundland, and later, when Johnson's autocratic rule had made unity impossible, Ainsworth withdrew. The dispute began with a discussion on the power of excommunication, in which Ainsworth maintained, against Johnson, that the power belonged to the congregation as a whole and was not to be used by the elders and officers alone. In 1610 Ainsworth and thirty others who shared his views formed a third Congregational church in Amsterdam.

D. Neal's story of Ainsworth's death is as follows:

> 'It is reported, that having found a diamond of very great value in the streets of Amsterdam, he advertised it in print, and when the owner, who was a Jew, came to demand it, he offered him any acknowledgment he would desire; but Ainsworth, though poor, would accept of nothing but a conference with some of his rabbies upon the prophecies of the Old Testament relating to the Messias, which the other promised; but not having interest enough to obtain it, and Ainsworth being resolute, it is thought he was poisoned' (*Hist. of the Puritans*, London, 1837, i. 421).

John Robinson (1576–1625) entered Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, in 1592 and became Fellow in 1599. For four following years he appears to have been a lecturer or preacher in Norwich, where he was 'worthily reverenced of all the city for the grace of God in him' (Ainsworth,

Counterpoyson). He records his own unwillingness to break with the Puritan ministry :

'Had not the truth been in my heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones, Jer. xx. 9, I had never broken those bonds of flesh and blood' (*Works*, ed. R. Ashton, London, 1851, ii. 52).

In 1603 or 1604 he was suspended for his disregard of conformity, and united himself to the church at Gainsborough. He accompanied the members of the Scrooby church to Amsterdam, expecting to join with the church already established there. They found that church troubled by dissensions about its own discipline, and decided to go on to Leyden. In the Amsterdam discussion Robinson sided with Ainsworth against John Smith, Thomas Helwys, and Francis Johnson, who were Presbyterianizing the internal government of the church. Robinson published a moderate and able statement of the Congregational position, rejecting all sectarian names and maintaining simply its justification as an original Christian type. In Leyden Robinson was admitted to the university in Sept. 1615, where he attended lectures by Episcopius and Polyander. An attempt has been made on very slight grounds to discredit the account of a debate between Robinson and Episcopius, in which Robinson defended Calvinism against the famous Arminian. Bradford's account of the debate (p. 21) is partisan, but obviously reliable, and the debate accounts for the position which Robinson holds in the Dutch records of the Pilgrim church. From this time the Independents in Leyden were known as 'Robinsonians.' A debate with Episcopius on a theological subject had all the ardours of a political contest, for the Remonstrants, who were Arminians, followed John of Barneveldt, who wanted an Erastian National Church and was in favour of the unpopular truce with Spain. The Contra-Remonstrants, who were Calvinists, were on the side of Prince Maurice—in favour of a free Church in a free State, and bent on continuing war against Spain.

Robinson's published writings are the most authoritative, balanced, scholarly, and positive statement of Separatist principles that we have. They combine the claim for liberty of worship with catholicity of feeling and belief. He debates counsels of peace, considers dissuasions against Separation, discusses reasons against it, confutes errors alleged to be held by Separatists, and deals with the nature of Christian fellowship. His teachings may be said to have leavened all Churches with the idea that spiritual affinity is the basis of Christian fellowship. In 1617 he joined with Brewster, who was associated with him as elder of the church in Leyden, in presenting 'seven articles' to the Privy Council, detailing the ecclesiastical position of the Pilgrims, in order to satisfy the Lords of the Council that they were proper persons to settle in Virginia. From that time till the actual migration in the Mayflower (1620) he was a leader in the correspondence with Sir Edwin Sandys and the negotiations with the Merchant Adventurers. It was in Robinson's clear mind that the reasons against settlement in Holland first took definite form. The Pilgrims cherished loyal attachment to the British crown and wished to live under it; their children were being drawn into service as soldiers and sailors under the Dutch government; the difficulty of earning a respectable living in Holland prevented other Englishmen from joining them, and they had 'a great hope and inward zeal of laying some good foundation or at least to make some way thereunto for ye propagating and advancing the gospel of the Kingdom of Christ in those remote parts of earth; yea, though they should be but even as stepping-stones unto others for ye performing of so great a work' (Bradford, p. 24).

The facts as to Robinson's famous address to the departing Pilgrims are as follow.

That address appears first in a brief narrative attached to Edward Winslow's *Hypocrisie Unmasked*, published in 1646, *i.e.* 26 years after the time when it was spoken. Winslow says: Robinson 'used these expressions or to the same purpose' (*A Brief Narration*, p. 98). Bradford, in his *History of Plymouth Plantation*, makes no quotation from this address, nor does Morton mention it in his *New England's Memoriale*, published in 1669. Cotton Mather, writing in 1702 (*Magnalia Christi Americana*), turns the address into the first person, and changes 'ere long' into 'quickly.' It seems probable that the address embodies the substance of a sermon preached on Ezr 8^{21}, mentioned by Bradford as following a day of solemn humiliation. Bradford says that 'he spent a good part of the day profitably and suitable to their present occasion' (p. 59). Dexter (pp. 407–409) thinks that the famous words, 'He was very confident the Lord had more truth and light yet to breake forth out of his holy Word,' refer to polity, and not to doctrine. He defends this interpretation on the ground that this alone explains Winslow's quotation in a pamphlet defending the Plymouth settlers from Separatist exclusiveness. The attempt to discredit the address as being beyond Robinson's powers, as shown in his other writings, is one of the extravagances of historical criticism. It is more within Robinson's scope than that of any others of the Pilgrims or founders of New Plymouth. The fact that the speech was duly recorded when it became of special value to the needs of the colony is in the line of experience in matters ecclesiastical and political. Such records are sometimes verbally, and almost always substantially, accurate.

With regard to the Church of England, Robinson was classed as a Semi-Separatist, Semist, or Independent, because he 'approved of communion with the Church of England, in the hearing of the word and prayer (though not in sacraments and discipline)' (John Shaw's MS *Advice to his Son*, 1664, quoted in *DNB*, art. 'Robinson, John'). He also approved of 'private communion' with godly members of the Church of England, and he preached the lawfulness of attending Anglican services as early as July 1617. He left a MS on the *Lawfulness of Hearing of the Ministers in the Church of England*, which was found in his study after his death and published in 1634. Robert Baillie (1599–1662), the Presbyterian, writes that Robinson was 'the most learned, polished, and modest spirit that ever that sect [Independents] enjoyed' (*A Dissuasive from the Errors of the Time*, London, 1645, p. 17). The English government prevented Robinson from joining the Pilgrims in the Mayflower owing to his authoritative influence with them, and, before the embargo was withdrawn, Robinson died (1st March 1625), after an illness of eight days. In 1891 the National Council of Congregational Churches of the United States affixed a memorial on the outside wall of the Pieterskerk in the Klokstieg opposite the site of Robinson's house in Leyden.

William Bradford (1590–1657) is the historian of the Pilgrim colony. He was born at Austerfield, in Yorkshire, and became a friend of William Brewster, who was 23 years his senior. He joined the Brownists in 1606, followed the Scrooby exiles to Amsterdam in 1607, and accompanied them to Leyden in 1609. He is entered in the books there as a fustian-weaver. He was one of the signatories of the letter from Leyden to Carver and Cushman in England in June 1620. In the same year he sailed in the Mayflower, and unfortunately, while he was on an exploring expedition, he lost his first wife, Dorothy May (of Wisbech, Cambridgeshire), by drowning, while the ship lay in Cape Cod harbour. Chosen governor of New Plymouth in 1621, he was re-elected every year (with exceptions at his own request) for twelve years till he 'by importunity got off' (*Hist. of Plymouth Plantation*, p. 307). He had literary and methodical habits which make his record of the doings of the Pilgrims of great value. His history of the passengers in the Mayflower, with personal notes, is priceless to the American genealogist. He left in MS a full *History of Plymouth Plantation*, which lay unidentified for many years in Lambeth Palace library, till it was recognized by Joseph Hunter,

and published by the Massachusetts Historical Society. Bradford began his history, which he modestly calls 'these scribbled writings,' in 1630 'and so pieced up at times of leisure afterward' (p. 6). The last sentence was written in 1650, when the narrative stops abruptly without any formal ending.

Miles (*or Myles*) *Standish* (1584–1656) was the soldier of the Pilgrim movement. He came of a Lancashire family, the Standishes of Standish, and had served in the Netherlands before 1602. Longfellow, who has popularized in verse the story of his courtship, says that he could trace his pedigree plainly back to Hugh Standish of Duxbury Hall in Lancashire, England, and that he was heir to vast estates, of which he was basely defrauded. Duxbury Hall is between Wigan and Chorley, lying off the highway, and it is true that a page in the registers of the parish church for 1584, the supposed year of Myles Standish's birth, shows signs of having been tampered with. He became friendly with the exiles in Leyden, and, though probably not a member of the church, he went with the Pilgrims as a military protector. He was chosen military captain of the colony, and did much to secure its safety by his rapid and skilful measures of defence against the Indians. The estates of Duxbury, New England, where he died in 1656, are still the property of his descendants. His force of character and romantic career have made him a favourite with poets and novelists.

Edward Winslow (1595–1655) of Droitwich was, according to Hutchinson, 'of a very reputable family and of a very active genius' (quoted in *Chronicles of the Pilgrim Fathers*, p. 269). He happened to pass through Leyden on his travels, and was so impressed with what he saw of the life of the Christian brotherhood there that he identified himself with them, and eventually went with the emigrants in 1620. Twenty-five years later he wrote:

'I persuade myself never people upon earth lived more lovingly together and parted more sweetly than we the Church at Leyden did; parting not rashly in a distracted humour, but upon joint and serious deliberation, often seeking the mind of God by fasting and prayer, whose gracious presence was not only found with us, but His blessing upon us from that time until now' (Young, *Chronicles of the Pilgrim Fathers*, p. 380).

His name stands third among the signers of the compact on board the Mayflower. He was in England as agent for the colony in 1623–24, and for Plymouth and the Massachusetts settlement in 1635. In 1646 he was chosen to rebut in England the charges against the colonists of religious intolerance and persecution. He died at sea on an expedition against the Spaniards in the W. Indies.

Other eminent men among the Pilgrims were:

John Carver (1575–1621), an English Puritan, who, having been chosen deacon in the church at Leyden, sailed in the Mayflower, and was made first governor of New Plymouth.

Thomas Brewer, a wealthy Puritan from Kent, who established himself as a printer in Leyden. Persecution followed him thither, and drove him to join the Pilgrims, where he was associated with William Brewster in printing and publishing several important documents.

Robert Cushman, who was closely associated with Carver in the business arrangements of the new colony. He accompanied the Pilgrims as far as Plymouth, England, but remained in England to act as their agent. In 1621 he was in the new colony.

4. The Pilgrim company in Leyden.—The piety of New England descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers has moved them to investigate every record of the sojourn of the exiled Pilgrim colony in Holland. A list of the Pilgrim company in Leyden, compiled by H. M. and M. Dexter and published in their *England and Holland of the Pilgrims*, contains 584 names, including children. The majority of these were men and women in the common walks of life. Between 7th Nov. 1598 and 4th Jan. 1617, the names of 118 Englishmen occur in the marriage records of Amsterdam.

Of these 102 have recorded their occupations: 38 are fustian-workers, six are tailors, four are glovers, three are masons, and two are classed in each of the following trades: bombazine-finishers, button-makers, chandlers, cutters, damask-weavers, embroiderers, hodmen, schoolmasters, smiths, trunk-makers, and turners. Besides these, 28 trades or professions are represented by one barber, carpenter, cobbler, compositor, cooper, draper, engraver, fireman, furrier, goldsmith, hat-dresser, ligature-worker, mercer, minister, painter, pewterer, physician, printer, sailors' barber, seaman, sheath-maker, silk-ribbon-weaver, smith's journeyman, Spanish-chair-maker, sword-cutter, tobacco-pipe-maker, turner in ivory, and wood-sawyer.

These are typical of the whole company, apart from the leaders. They were people of good sense, native intelligence, solid habits of industry, frugality, and self-reliance, and with some education in the primary sense. They were not trained by the experience of high commerce to take large risks, nor by the owning of land to the duties of rule and government. The eminent qualities needed to explain their great venture are a regnant conscience and a wide apprehension of the presence and will of God, making everything else second to the supreme endeavour to get God's will done on earth as in heaven; and these are the qualities which come out in their later history in New England. With the increasing complexity of social life, they found it difficult to agree on methods of determining the will of God in their circumstances, and this led to an increasing reliance on democratic methods and measures.

5. The Pilgrim migration. — The Separatist church existed for eight or nine years in Leyden, marked chiefly by the sustaining and conciliatory ministry of John Robinson. But it was not possible for its members to remain there. Their children began to drift into the habits and customs of the young Hollanders, and the elders realized that the next generation would probably have lost distinctive character. They had no identity of interest with the country in which they were living, and, above all, they realized that Holland offered no scope for their providential calling. They believed that it was their lot to lay the foundations of a Church and to advance the Kingdom of God in some remote part of the world. It was not enough to have 'freedom to worship God.' Their principles were constructive, and they wanted a fair field for their exercise. Robinson and Brewster privately discussed the idea of removal to America —New England or Virginia. It was then made public, and, after much discussion between enthusiastic optimists and fearful pessimists, the enthusiasts carried the day. The period of negotiations for starting a colony in New England was protracted and dreary, extending from 1617 to the sailing of the Mayflower in 1620. The usual method of launching a colony was for a company to secure a patent—or charter—from the king. The Pilgrims applied to the London Virginia Company, which numbered among its councillors Brewster's friend, Sir Edwin Sandys. But the company was torn by dissensions; and the Pilgrims' agents, John Carver and Robert Cushman, found it almost impossible to get their business through. More than once negotiations were on the point of being dropped. The church had hoped to have the right of liberty of religion granted to them and confirmed under the king's seal; but the king refused this, although he promised not to molest them if they were peaceable. When, on 19th June 1619, a patent was at last granted by the London Virginia Company and confirmed under

the company's seal, it was found that no financial help was forthcoming, for the company was penniless. At one point the problem of securing help seemed so hopeless that the church entered into treaty with some Dutch merchants who were willing to transport them to the Hudson river and to provide them with cattle if they came under the Dutch government. In this extremity help came from one Thomas Weston, a London merchant, who visited the church in Leyden. He and some Merchant Adventurers, who were his friends, had taken out a patent from the Virginia Company in the name of John Pierce, and offered to advance money to supplement what the Pilgrims had and to supply them with shipping. Articles of agreement were drawn up in London, but afterwards altered in favour of the Adventurers—much to the confusion of Cushman, who had to accept what he could get lest he should lose their help altogether. At last, as the summer of 1620 threatened to pass with nothing done, a great effort was made to speed preparations, and two ships were got ready—the Speedwell, a pinnace of 60 tons, bought and fitted in Holland, and the Mayflower, a vessel of 180 tons, hired and fitted in London.

The departure from Leyden, which is immortalized in poetic and pictorial art, is the departure of the Speedwell from Delfshaven. A day of humiliation was appointed by the Leyden church. John Robinson gave the farewell address from the text Ezr 8[21]: 'Then I proclaimed a fast there by the river Ahava, that we might afflict ourselves before our God, to seek of him a right way for us, and for our little ones, and for all our substance.' It was on this occasion that he used the words afterwards recorded by Winslow. A small majority of the church had decided to stay behind, and by agreement the pastor was to stay with the majority. They accompanied the rest to Delfshaven, and committed them affectionately to the care of Almighty God. The Speedwell arrived at Southampton on 5th August, and was there met by the Mayflower, which had sailed from London with the rest of the company.

Difficulties still awaited them. There were financial difficulties with Weston, as the body of Pilgrims refused to sign the altered articles, and he refused to give them money that they had expected. They had to part with their stock of butter to clear their debts in Southampton. When the two ships at last got away, it was found that the Speedwell was leaky. She had been overmasted and had strained her timbers. The ships put back to Plymouth, where the Barbican quay which they used is still pointed out. The Mayflower took on board the most effective part of the Speedwell's company and the latter ship was then dismissed. Among those who remained (about eighteen in all) was Cushman, who despaired of the voyage, but later recovered courage and joined the colony, where he did good service. After a voyage of nine weeks in a crowded vessel, which encountered the usual autumn storms of the Atlantic, the Pilgrims were overjoyed to sight land on 19th November. They recognized the headland as Cape Cod. Passengers and officers consulted together and decided to sail southward towards the Hudson river in the direction of the land secured by their patent. But the ship was entangled in dangerous shoals and currents, the wind failed them, and they made back to Cape Cod. The change in their destination brought with it some dangers. The Virginia Company had no rights in New England. Their patent, therefore, had no authority and could confer none. To avoid the risks of disorder under these altered circumstances, the adult males were called into the cabin of the Mayflower and all signed the memorable compact which became the basis of the constitution of the colony:

'In ye name of God, Amen. We whose names are underwritten, the loyall subjects of our dread soveraigne Lord, King James, by ye grace of God, of Great Britaine, France and Ireland King, defender of ye faith, etc., haveing undertaken, for ye glorie of God and advancemente of ye Christian faith, and honour of our King and countrie, a voyage to plant ye first colonie in ye Northerne parts of Virginia, doe by these presents solemnly and mutualy in ye presence of God, and of one another, covenant and combine our selves togeather into a civill body politick, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of ye ends aforesaid; and by vertue hearof to enacte, constitute and frame such just and equall lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions and offices from time to time, as shall be thought most meete and convenient for ye generall good of ye Colonie, unto which we promise all due submission and obedience. In Witnes wherof we have hereunder subscribed our names at Cap-Codd ye 11 of November, in ye year of ye raigne of our soveraigne lord, King James of England, France and Ireland ye eighteenth, and of Scotland ye fiftie-fourth, Ano. Dom. 1620' (Brown, p. 201 f.).

Then follow forty-one names—the most notable list of names in the history of New England.

The landing of the Pilgrims by Plymouth Rock, as they called the solitary rock which marks the sandy shore, ended one series of troubles. The problems that they had now to meet were those of a new settlement, wresting at first a bare living from nature in a severe climate and surrounded by watchful enemies. That the faith and courage of the little community were sufficient to meet and overcome these difficulties was largely due to the severe school of experience through which they had already passed successfully.

6. The Plymouth colony, Massachusetts.—As with most communities starting on a religious basis, the methods of the Pilgrim colony were at first communistic. The capital for starting the colony had been advanced by the Merchant Adventurers—a commercial undertaking, whose profits were to be derived from the sale of beaver-skins, timber, etc., collected and sent over by the colonists. The Plymouth settlement agreed that all the profits of trade and labour were to be held in common till the end of seven years, and no individual enterprise could be started by the planters for their own benefit. The land-system was completely communistic, all the land being the property of the community and all the labour expended on it being for the common good. The people were conscientious and public-spirited, full of sympathy and mutual helpfulness, but, in spite of this, their honest effort at communism broke down. Men disliked the fact that their wives had to work for other men, and complained that, as they could not command the labour of their own servants, the servants that they had brought with them were a burden without corresponding compensation. In the spring of the third year each man was given a small plot of corn-growing land for himself. The allotment was only for present use, not for inheritance; but the value of the additional incentive was at once felt. The men worked harder, and women and children went willingly to work on their own piece of land.

The following summary of the economic system of Plymouth Plantation is supplied by C. W. Eliot:

The Pilgrims were plain, labouring people who all worked with their hands and expected to get their living as 'planters.' They made their living by farming, fishing, hunting, and practising the elementary trades of a new settlement. . . . They sailed from England under articles of agreement which were to govern the proceedings of a (joint-)stock company, the shares of which were held by two classes of persons, one called 'adventurers' and the other 'planters.' The adventurers merely put capital into the outfitting of the expedition. The planters were persons who crossed the ocean and were to bear the hardships and labours of the expedition. The planters might or might not put capital into the venture. Some did acquire shares in the joint stock company as adventurers by putting in money or money's worth in goods: but the greater part did not hold shares except as planters. Every planter aged sixteen years and upwards received on going a single share in the stock company rated at ten pounds. A planter who carried

with him his wife and children or servants was allowed a share in the company for every person sixteen years old and upwards and for every two children between ten and sixteen years old. Every child under ten who went in the ship was to receive in the ultimate division of the holdings of the company fifty acres of unmanured land. All the planters were to be fed and clothed out of the common stock and goods of the company. Each planter was to work four days in each week for the company, and two for himself and family. At the end of seven years each planter, head of a family or a group, should own the house and garden land occupied by him and his. The undertaking entered into on these terms was a strong case of co-operation and co-operative management for a short term of years, with acquisition by every head of a family, at the end of that short term, of a house and garden (*The Road toward Peace*, p. 169 f.).

For the protection of the colony, every able-bodied citizen was expected to bear arms. Every youth learnt the use of the simple weapons which were then available for the chase and for war. The Pilgrims started the New England muster and military system, prototype of the admirable military organization of republican Switzerland (*ib.* p. 174).

In the fourth year the communal system was still further abandoned. A piece of land was granted in perpetuity to each family in the proportion of one acre to every person, as near to the town as might be. Gradually room had to be made for the encouragement of enterprise in the collection of furs. In 1626 the Merchant Adventurers sold their rights in the plantation to Isaac Allerton and some associates for £1800. All 'heads of families and able young men of the colony' then became partners. The land and cattle were divided, and each received by lot twenty acres of land. Bradford, Allerton, Standish, Winslow, Brewster, and three others accepted responsibility for the debts of the colony, and hired the trade of the whole community for a term of years to enable them to discharge the debts. The community then definitely broke with its communistic tradition and entered on that capitalistic phase of social organization which is still an outstanding feature of American life.

A reply to critics.—The charge most frequently levelled against the Pilgrim colony is that of illiberality. It is urged that they adopted the very methods which had driven them out of England. John Lyford, who had been sent out by the London Merchants as a clergyman, was sent home for trying to set up the ritual of the Church of England, though his offence was confined to occasional use of the Prayer Book. They persecuted Roger Williams and drove him out to become the founder of Rhode Island. They severely repressed the Quakers, and they were guilty of the confusion of Church and State functions against which they had protested in England.

The reply to this charge is twofold. (1) In the early days of the colony it existed in the midst of enemies. Its Brownist reputation exposed it to constant criticism both from England and from other colonies on the Atlantic seaboard. Its very existence depended on maintaining the purity of its own communion and its solidarity in the face of hostility. Bradford's conduct towards Roger Williams was personally merciful and considerate. He regarded him as a man 'godly and zealous . . . but very unsettled in judgemente' (p. 310), and this was true. Williams was allowed to go to Rhode Island, which was within the Plymouth patent. In each case of so-called persecution other elements were involved besides those of religious opinion. Action was taken on the ground of civil order rather than religion. The colony could not afford to be hospitable to divergences of conduct which would break up its solidarity. Measures of caution even carried to the point of excess were preferable, in the interests of public policy, to taking risks which might jeopardize the main witness and even the existence of the colony.

(2) Another line of reply is that Plymouth, in virtue of its democratic method, contained the remedy for its own mistakes. The argument for democratic liberalism is not that it will always be right, but that, when it goes wrong, it can right itself. An authoritative autocratic government is necessarily dogmatic, and, having gone wrong in a matter of judgment or policy, generally makes the wrong worse by using force to make the wrong appear right. Thus it goes from bad to worse and hastens to a catastrophe. A democratic government may make as many mistakes as an autocratic government, but the mistake, once discovered, is easily repudiated and remedied by a change of leaders and of policy. The appeal in democracy is always to some principle of reason and justice within the minds of the people, and the democratic method is the surest way of allowing that principle to assert itself. The Plymouth colony was responsible for acts that in the modern judgment, though not in its own, were illiberal, but it was never illiberal in principle. It worked out in its own way a distinction between civil and religious policy, and ultimately established a much greater freedom of individual opinion than England has yet achieved. It led the way towards the discovery that in order to live peaceably and helpfully beside each other it is only necessary that men should cherish the same ideals of public liberty, public justice, and co-operative management.

The Pilgrim colony—Plymouth—existed as a separate State only from 1620 to 1691, when it was incorporated with Massachusetts. By far the most important part of its history is included in the years before 1660. During the years 1620–60 it was under the leadership of such men as Bradford, Standish, and Brewster, and its influence was due to the precedents laid down by these outstanding personalities. For more than thirty years Plymouth was fortunate in enjoying the benefits of democracy without its drawbacks. The disadvantages of popular rule are well known: it tends to be unstable; it lacks authority; it encourages place-seeking and popularity-hunting, and sets a premium on self-advertisement. From all these Plymouth was saved by the massive character of its first leader, Bradford. He held office without salary, and so stimulated public spirit. He promoted unity in the colonial government by maintaining the pre-eminence of Plymouth and by supervising the growing townships. He gave stability to the government by preventing it from going to extremes, and he introduced social and philanthropic reforms so far in advance of the general custom in England that many have attributed them to his sojourn in Leyden, when he may have reaped the benefits of centuries of Dutch experience. So consistently was Bradford elected to the post of governor that the colony is perhaps best pictured as a large family over which this wise leader presided with paternal authority. With the exception of about five years, when at his request Winslow or Prince held office, Bradford was governor from 1621 till his death in 1657.

During his long period of office the characteristic features of the Pilgrim spirit in public affairs had time to get well established, such as local self-government based on the primary or township meeting, elective unpaid officials, State registration of births, deaths, and marriages, the registration of land transfers, State schools and pensions. The foundation of Harvard University was begun in 1636 by John Harvard, a citizen of Massachusetts, a 'godly gentleman and a lover of learning who gave one half of his estate, it being in all about one thousand seven hundred pounds, towards the erecting of a college, and all his library' (*Chron. of the Pilgrim Fathers*, p. 142). His foundation was made effective by gifts from New England towns which gave them a voice in the administration of its affairs. The public hand of the State added

the rest (Hunter, *Collections*, i. 242). The importance of those methods lies not in their local value, but in their having created a type that was imitated far and wide as settlements multiplied and colonization spread over the hinterland behind Plymouth.

7. **Survivals of Pilgrim influence.** — Heroic figures in the dawn of a nation's history constitute one of its most precious assets. Such figures are the Pilgrim settlers as they stand out against the background of battle with nature and unsympathetic governments, inspired only by great principles and a great religion. Americans have learned to treasure the memory of the men of the Pilgrim migration, and both directly and indirectly the influence of these men may be traced in the national ideals. At Plymouth in Massachusetts an obelisk commemorates the landing of the Pilgrims. The original rock on which they landed is enclosed to prevent curio-hunters from carrying away mementos. Articles of furniture belonging to the Pilgrims are preserved in a special museum. The names and genealogies of the Mayflower families are carefully preserved. A society of Americans in England is known as 'the Pilgrims,' and it has recently co-operated in the erection of a beautiful minaret at Southampton marking the spot from which the Pilgrims sailed. In the Pilgrim clubs, such as that of Philadelphia, which hold an annual dinner, diminutive models of the Mayflower are distributed to the guests; and the heroic virtues of the Pilgrims still appear in post-prandial perorations. The religious significance of the Pilgrim migration gives way on such occasions to their importance as national founders and pioneers.

More significant are such institutions as Thanksgiving Day—26th Nov.—which commemorates a turning-point in the experience of the first settlers. In October of each year the President of the United States issues a proclamation recalling occasions for special thanksgiving and recognizing providential guidance in the events of the year. The governor of each State issues a proclamation for his own State with the same general object. The people are invited to spend a day of thanksgiving on the date mentioned. Either on this day or, more commonly, on the preceding evening public and united services are held, at which an address is given on the religious significance of some public event. This is probably one of the most genuine illustrations of national religion in any country, and its general observance is the more notable as there is no Established Church in any State. It is an adequate illustration of the observance of national religion without an Established Church. 'Forefathers' Day,' which celebrates the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth, is also observed annually on 22nd Dec., though 21st Dec. (new style) more accurately represents the date of the event.

The Pilgrim colony of Plymouth exercised an influence out of proportion to its numbers on New England States with which it was incorporated, and that influence was specially marked in the direction of (1) *self-government*. The tradition of the other colonies, such as Massachusetts, had more of the old world reliance on authority, tradition, and force. The Pilgrim colony had been founded on the basis of self-government, and, although everything was done in the king's name, it was both in principle and in effect left to evolve its destiny from its own resources. It is to the relative success of these experiments that America owes its unbounded faith in the adequacy of democracy for the guidance of the affairs of a nation.

(2) Although the Pilgrims were compelled to defend themselves by the use of arms, their principles were *peace* principles. Their first effort was to live at peace with their neighbours. If other white men had not disturbed their relations with the Indians, they might have continued free from the disturbances of war. They never left peace for war willingly and without regret. This original bias in favour of peace methods has grown stronger with the history of the States, and has left its mark in the fact that America had at the beginning of the present century the smallest army in proportion to its population of any nation in the world. Its long frontier with Canada had known no fort and only one ship of war for a century. American influence in Europe is thrown consistently on the side of peace. The peace treaties of President Woodrow Wilson's Democratic Government are the most careful and ingenious instrument yet devised by any nation for the settlement of disputes without resort to the final arbitrament of war.

(3) The special genius of the American people is a singular combination of *practical philanthropy and commercial shrewdness*. It is weak on the side of governmental co-ordination, strong on the side of individual initiative and personal development. It regards education up to the university standard as a right of the American born, and relies on education as the principal method of producing national unity and patriotism. It has profound confidence in its own standards of value, and is generously active in promoting philanthropy and Christian missions. It is strongly averse to class distinction, and accepts alien immigration so long as the immigrants conform to American standards of citizenship. In spite of numerous personal eccentricities, the general standards of morality are Puritan. The relations of the sexes are natural and healthy, and a 'New England conscience' is a synonym for an exact moral rectitude that produces a high level of personal character. It would be fanciful to trace all these characteristics to one origin, but undoubtedly they have flourished in America owing to the fact that Separatist Puritanism was hospitable to those features of human progress and hostile to the opposing influences. Democracy in America is not quite so triumphant over all the evils of the Old World as some of its advocates have claimed, but it has encountered so many difficulties in its course with success that it has reasonable confidence that it will be found adequate in meeting the remainder.

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PILLARS.—See POLES AND POSTS, STONES.

PINDAR.—**1. Life.**—Pindar, the greatest lyric poet of Greece, was born at the village of Kynoskephalai near Thebes in Bœotia in (522 or) 518 B.C. The date of his death is not certainly known, but *Pyth.* viii. is assigned to the year 446 B.C. As his earliest poem, *Pyth.* x., belongs to 498 B.C., his poetical activity covers a period of more than half a century of the most stirring epoch of Greek history.

The ancient lives of Pindar, which are full of the usual type of legend attaching to the youth of genius, have little or no independent value. His family was of aristocratic blood, claiming descent from the Aigeidai (*Pyth.* v. 75 f.: *ἵκοντο Θήρανδε φῶτες Αἰγεῖδαι, ἐμοὶ πατέρες*); his father's name is variously given in the ancient lives as Daiphantos, Pagondas, Skopelinos, his mother's as Kleodike or Myrto. In the course of his poetic career he was brought into intimate relations with the ruling families of Greece proper, as well as of Macedonia, Sicily, and Kyrene in Egypt. He appears to have had a specially close connexion with Delphi, where in the temple of Apollo, according to Pausanias,

ἀνάκειται οὐ πόρρω τῆς ἑστίας θρόνος Πινδάρου· σιδήρου μέν ἐστιν ὁ θρόνος, ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτῷ φασιν ὁπότε ἀφίκοιτο ἐς Δελφούς, καθέζεσθαί τε τὸν Πίνδαρον καὶ ᾄδειν ὁπόσα τῶν ᾀσμάτων ἐς Ἀπολλωνά ἐστιν (x. xxiv. 5).

He is said to have died in Argos. His tomb in the hippodrome at Thebes is mentioned by Pausanias (IX. xxiii. 2).

Arrian (*Anab.* I. ix. 10) and Plutarch (*Alex.* 11) record the pleasing story that, when Alexander the Great razed Thebes to the ground, he spared the house of Pindar as well as the descendants of the poet 'out of reverence for Pindar.' The ruins of this house were still shown in the time of Pausanias and beside it a 'temple of the Dindymene Mother (Kybele), dedicated by Pindar, the image being the work of Aristomedes and Socrates of Thebes. The practice is to open this temple on one day in the year and no more. I had the good fortune to visit it on that day and saw the image of Pentelic marble, as well as the throne' (Paus. IX. xxv. 3). To this temple Pindar himself seems to refer in *Pyth.* iii. 77 ff.: 'But I will pray to the Mother, the awful goddess unto whom with Pan beside my door the maidens sing ofttimes by night.'

2. Works.—Pindar's lyric production covered a wide variety of subject and form. His poems were distributed by Aristophanes of Byzantium in 17 books: *ὕμνοι, παιᾶνες, διθύραμβοι* (6 books); *προσόδια* (2); *παρθένια* (3); *ὑπορχήματα* (2); *ἐγκώμια, θρῆνοι, ἐπινίκια* (4). Fragments of the various types survive, but only the epinikian odes are extant in any completeness.

The *ἐπινίκια* are classified — not always quite accurately—as Olympian, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian, according to the games at which the particular victory celebrated was won. It might seem surprising at first sight that round a theme so apparently trivial as an athletic victory Pindar should have been able to weave poetry of enduring interest and charm. But, indeed, the details of the victory are, as a rule, only lightly touched upon. The central theme of the poem is a myth connected with the history of the victor's family or city, which Pindar introduces with surprising propriety and skill. This myth, and the moral reflexions which it suggests and illustrates, constitute the real substance of the Pindaric poetry.

But, further, it is to be remembered that the great games for which Pindar wrote were much more than mere athletic gatherings such as we are familiar with in modern times. Part of the regular ritual at the funeral of a dead chieftain was an athletic contest—an *ἀγὼν ἐπιτάφιος*—such as that described in *Iliad* xxiii., embracing competitions in feats of physical strength and skill as well as in music and poetry.

Hesiod (*Works and Days*, 654 ff.) tells us that at the funeral of Amphidamas, king of Chalkis in Euboia, 'his great-hearted sons advertised many prizes: and there I say that I was victorious in the hymn and carried off an eared tripod.'

Celebrations of this sort held annually in honour of a local hero and accompanied by the due performance of offerings (*ἐναγίσματα*) to the dead are attested all over Greece. It was an amalgamation of such local hero-cults with the worship of Zeus, Apollo, and Poseidon that gave rise to the great national games of Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus.

Thus these meetings were essentially in the nature of religious festivals, of national and not merely local meaning and importance. And as national festivals they conferred on the victor and his city a glory to which it is difficult to suggest a modern parallel. Politically, too, they were of immense value for the realization of Hellenic unity, none but competitors of acknowledged Greek blood being admitted to participation in them. In the brilliant period at which Pindar wrote the Greeks had everywhere repelled the barbarians — Persian, Etruscan, Carthaginian. They had vindicated their 'place in the sun,' and had entered into full possession of their heritage of intellectual freedom, champions of civilization and conscious of their power. The games celebrated at the hallowed sanctuaries of Greece were not only for the Greeks of the mother-country but for their distant colonies beyond the seas an opportunity of meeting together to worship the gods of their ancestors and to realize amid the splendour of the festival their common pride and glory of Hellenic blood. Small wonder that the victor at Olympia or at Delphi seemed to have attained the pinnacle of earthly success.

'The victor for the rest of his life hath a honeyed calm, so far as touches games' (*Ol.* i. 97 ff.).

This is the feeling which the sculptor of the famous statue of the charioteer discovered at Delphi in 1896 has sought to realize.

'Le conducteur de char est beau, paisible, heureux d'avoir gagné le prix: il s'en contente' (E. Bourguet, *Les Ruines de Delphes*, Paris, 1914, p. 237).

3. Leading thoughts.—(*a*) *The frailty of man.*—We are told that at a Roman triumph it was customary for a slave to ride behind the general in the triumphal car, whose duty it was to remind him of his mortality: 'Respice post te, hominem memento te.'

'et, sibi consul
Ne placeat, curru servus portatur eodem' (Juv. x. 41 f.).

So in Pindar over against the brilliance of festal joy and splendour looms always the shadow of mortality. Thus in *Nem.* xi.—a poem which is, however, not an *ἐπινίκιον*—he says:

'Now if a man hath wealth and in beauty surpass others,

and foremost in games also hath displayed his might, let him remember that his raiment covers mortal limbs and that last of all he shall put on a garment of earth' (16 ff.).

But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that this is no pessimism which should blunt the edge of enthusiasm. It is only the sober colouring which human life presents 'to an eye that hath kept watch o'er man's mortality.' Hence, so far as it works in practice, it is made an incentive to redeem the time by some deed of glory which shall annul the triumph of death.

'The high adventure accepts not the coward; since we must die, wherefore should one sit in darkness nursing a nameless age without lot in glorious deeds?' (*Ol.* i. 81 ff.). 'A man forgets Hades when he attains his heart's desire' (*ib.* viii. 72 *f.*). The right spirit is the spirit of the Argonauts, in whom 'Hera kindled the all-persuasive sweet longing for the ship Argo, that none should stay behind, nursing by his mother's side an unadventurous life, but rather, even at the price of death, should earn along with his fellows valour's drug' (*Pyth.* iv. 184 ff.).

It is worthy of remark that in no single passage of Pindar are the brevity of life and the certainty of death made a plea for a life of sensual pleasure in the present.

Nothing is more characteristic of Pindar than the earnestness with which he preaches this sane and clear-eyed recognition of the limitations of mortality. Men and gods are, indeed, the children of one mother, Earth, but they are born to different destinies:

'One is the race of men, one the race of gods, and from one mother do we both have breath; but an altogether separate power (δύναμις) divideth us; man is naught, but the brazen heaven abideth, an habitation unshaken for ever' (*Nem.* vi. 1 ff.).

Human life has its own appropriate goods: health, wealth, the blessing of children, a good name; to the stable and unbroken felicity of the gods a mere mortal must not aspire.

'I come to pray that thou, O Olympic victor, mayst carry a cheerful old age unto the end, thy sons, O Psaumis, standing by thy side. If a man waters his prosperity to health, sufficient in possessions and adding thereto fair fame, let him not seek to become a god' (*Ol.* v. 21 ff.). 'Mayst thou weave life's web in happiness unto the end and thy children's children have evermore the portion that now is and better in the after days' (*Nem.* vii. 98 ff.). 'A god might have a heart untouched of woe, but happy and worthy to be sung is that man in the eyes of the wise, whoso, victorious with his hands or the excellence of his feet, hath won the mightiest of prizes by his daring and his strength, and, while he yet lives, hath seen his son duly attain the Pythian crown. The brazen heaven he may never climb; but all glories that we of mortal race attain, these he accomplishes unto the farthest voyaging. By ship nor on foot shalt thou find unto the meeting of the Hyperboreans the wondrous way' (*Pyth.* x. 21 ff.). 'If the son of Aristophanes, being beautiful and doing deeds worthy of his beauty, hath set his foot upon the utmost heights of valour, it is not easy farther to pass the trackless sea beyond the pillars of Herakles' (*Nem.* iii. 19 ff.). 'If together with many possessions a man hath won proud renown, it is not possible that a mortal should reach with his feet any farther height' (*ib.* ix. 46 f.). 'Whatsoever records are blown among men touching the infinite glory of the dead or the living, these they have attained utterly; in deeds of utmost valour they lay their hands from home upon the pillars of Herakles; seek no farther excellence' (*Isth.* iii. (iv.) 27 ff.). 'If any man fares well and is well spoken of, seek not to become Zeus; thou hast all, if this share of glory be thine. Mortal things befit mortals' (*ib.* iv. (v.) 13 ff.).

Change and uncertainty are the dominant characteristics of human life:

'Surely man's death hath no appointed term nor know we when we shall end a quiet day with enduring good; divers streams at divers times come unto men, fraught with joy or with sorrow' (*Ol.* ii. 33 ff.).

The life of man is in its very essence a tangled skein, a chequer of good and evil. For a man to aspire to more would be to seek to overstep the boundaries of justice (δίκη) — the *alte terminus haerens*, which divides the destiny of mortals from that of the gods.

'A man with his mortal mind should seek such things from the gods as are meet, knowing that which lies at his feet, such destiny as we are born to. Aspire not, O my soul, to deathless life, but exhaust thy practicable means' (*Pyth.* iii. 59 ff.). 'If thou, O Theron, canst understand the sum of words, thou knowest by hearsay from men of old: for one good thing the Immortals deal to mortals two ends together. Now this the foolish are not able to bear in orderly wise (κοσμίως φέρειν), but only good men who turn the far things out' (*ib.* iii. 81).

On no other condition can human prosperity attain such relative stability and permanence as are attainable by mortality than that it be made up both of 'these and those' (τὰ καὶ τά), of good and evil.

'Yet quench the boast in silence; Zeus giveth both these and those, Zeus the lord of all' (*Isth.* iv. (v.) 51 ff.). 'They say that just so a man's felicity, if it blooms enduringly, must take both these and those' (*Pyth.* vii. 16 ff.). 'Even for men who strive there is uncertainty of Fortune till they reach the very end. For she giveth both of these things and of those' (*Isth.* iii. (iv.) 52 ff.).

(*b*) *The strength of the gods.*—Over against the frailty and mutability of mortality Pindar emphasizes the strength and stability of the gods:

'Time (αἰών) with the rolling days brings ever other changes: but the children of the gods are unwounded' (*Isth.* iii. 18). 'In a little while the pleasure of men grows up, and even so it falls to the ground when shaken by an adverse doom. Creatures of a day! what is anybody? what is nobody? Man is the dream of a shadow' (*Pyth.* viii. 92 ff.).

The background of Pindar's theology is the orthodox traditional theology of his race, with its anthropomorphic representation of the gods as a race of beings superior, indeed, to men but of like passions with them. But the reasoned beliefs of the worshipper are inevitably framed in a setting of tradition, much of which is repugnant alike to his intellect and to his moral sense. It is quite evident that Pindar, like Æschylus, felt strongly that the orthodox theology held much that was inconsistent with a worthy conception of the gods. He would have sympathized with Xenophanes in his censure of Homer and Hesiod, 'who have attributed to the gods all things that are a shame and a reproach among men,' and he would have agreed with the famous line of Euripides (*ap.* Plut. *Mor.* 21 A): εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσι φαῦλον, οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί. 'Meet is it,' says Pindar, 'that a man should speak noble things of the gods: the blame is less' (*Ol.* i. 35).

This feeling is well illustrated by the manner in which Pindar on occasion refines the grosser elements of the traditional mythology.

Thus in *Ol.* i. he deals with the story of Pelops, son of Tantalos. Legend told how Tantalos invited the gods to a banquet at which he served up to them his son Pelops. The gods did not partake of the flesh, save only Demeter, who ate a portion of his shoulder, which was afterwards replaced by a piece of ivory. This story Pindar rejects. It is a mere invention of the envious neighbours to account for the supernatural carrying off of Pelops by Poseidon; the ivory shoulder (referring probably to some family birthmark) was congenital: he had it even 'when Klotho took him from the basin of purification' (l. 26) - the λεβὴς καθαρός, the bath of purification, not a Medea-cauldron in which, Pelias-like, the *membra disjecta* of the boy were cooked into a new life.

Again, take his treatment of the story of Neoptolemos, son of Achilles, in *Nem.* vii. There was a persistent tradition that Neoptolemos was slain at Delphi. According to one version, he had come to plunder the temple of Apollo (Paus. x. vii. 1: Πύρρος ὁ Ἀχιλλέως ἐπεχείρησεν αὐτῷ) and was slain at the instance of the Pythian priestess by the Delphians (*ib.* i. xiii. 9: Πύρρον δὲ τὸν Ἀχιλλέως ἡ Πυθία προσέταξεν ἀποκτεῖναι Δελφοῖς) or by Apollo's priest himself (*ib.* x. xxiv. 4: θεάσαιο δ' ἂν ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐστίαν ἐφ' ᾗ Νεοπτόλεμον τὸν Ἀχιλλέως ὁ ἱερεὺς ἀπέκτεινε τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος). In Pindar's version all the untoward elements of the myth disappear. Neoptolemos came, not as an enemy, but to offer to Apollo the firstfruits of the spoil of Troy. His death was the result of a chance quarrel that he might fulfil the destiny which required that one of the house of Aiakos should dwell within the grove of Apollo and be the presiding genius at the hero-celebrations; so far from the Delphians causing his death, they were much grieved by it: 'He went unto the god, bringing treasure of firstfruits from Troy: and there in a quarrel over meats a man slew him with a knife (μαχαίρᾳ). The hospitable Delphians were grieved exceedingly. Yet he but fulfilled his destiny: it was decreed that within that most ancient grove there should be in time to come, beside this well-walled abode of the god, some one of the lords Aiakidai, and that he should dwell there to be keeper of judgments for the sacrificial hero-processions to maintain justice of fair name' (*Nem.* vii. 40 *f.*).

Yet again, Homer tells us in *Iliad* v. 395 *ff.* how Herakles wounded Hades at Pylos (Elean): 'And giant Hades therewithal suffered a swift arrow, when this same man, the son of Zeus, smote him in Pylos amid the dead and gave him over to pain. And he went unto the dwelling of Zeus and high Olympos, grieved at heart and pierced with pain; for the arrow was driven into his shoulder and grieved his soul.' Pindar, in emphasizing the prowess to which men may attain by favour of the gods, instances this feat of Herakles. But, as the issue

seems to reflect upon a god, Pindar, employing the figure of aposiopesis, breaks off suddenly and says nothing of the wounding of Hades: 'By favour of God (δαίμων) are men good and wise. For how else could Herakles have brandished in his hands his club against the trident, what time at Pylos Poseidon stood and pressed him hard: pressed him, too, Phoibos warring with his silver bow, nor did Hades keep unmoved the wand, wherewith he brings down to the hollow way of them that die the mortal bodies? Fling from thee, O my mouth, this tale! To speak evil of the gods is hateful skill, and untimely vaunting strikes a note of madness. Prate not, then, of such things; leave war and battle altogether apart (χωρίς) from the immortals' (*Pyth.* ix. 28 ff.). The word χωρίς, which Pindar uses here, is almost technical in this special sense; cf. Æsch. *Ag.* 636 f.:

εὔφημον ἡμαρ οὐ πρέπει κακαγγέλῳ
γλωσσῃ μιαίνειν· χωρὶς ἡ τιμη θεῶν.

The same tendency is seen in his treatment of the story of the Danaids in *Pyth.* ix. 111 ff. and in the emphatic μόνον in *Pyth.* iii. 100 f. (ὀνπερ μόνον ἀθανάτα τίκτεν ἐν Φθίᾳ Θέτις), which rejects in passing the gruesome saga which represented Achilles as the sole survivor of seven children (Lycophr. 178; schol. *Il.* xvi. 37, etc.). Pindar's position is, in fact, precisely that of Euripides, *Iph. in Taur.* 386 ff., where Iphigeneia rejects the idea of human sacrifice being pleasing to Artemis:

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν
τὰ Ταντάλου θεοῖσιν ἑστιάματα
ἄπιστα κρίνω, παιδὸς ἡσθῆναι βορᾷ,
τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ', αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἀνθρωποκτόνους,
εἰς τὴν θεὸν τὸ φαῦλον ἀναφέρειν δοκῶ·
οὐδένα γὰρ οἶμαι δαιμόνων εἶναι κακόν.

'Si Dieu a fait l'homme à son image, l'homme le lui a bien rendu.'

The gods, according to Pindar's view, though they had birth, like men, are deathless and ageless, free from disease and pain (frag. 143, *ap.* Plut. *de Superstit.* 6), omniscient (*Ol.* i. 64), and all-powerful:

'God accomplishes every purpose according to his hopes; God who overtakes the winged eagle and outstrips the dolphin in the sea, and brings low many a proud man, but to others gives ageless glory' (*Pyth.* ii. 49 ff.). 'Swift is the doing and the ways are short when gods are fain' (*ib.* ix. 67 f.). 'For me no marvel is beyond belief when it is wrought by gods' (*ib.* x. 48 ff.). 'God is able to raise undefiled light from black night and to hide the clear radiance of day in cloudy darkness' (frag. 142, *ap.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. 708).

The gods are the authors of all human success and achievement:

'From the gods are all means (μαχαναί) for mortal excellence (ἀρεταί); from them are men wise and mighty of hand and eloquent of tongue' (*Pyth.* i. 41 f.; cf. *Ol.* x. (xi.) 10). Only such success as the gods give is to be desired: 'May I desire glory from God' (θεόθεν) (*Pyth.* xi. 50). Only such success can be enduring: 'The prosperity that is begotten by the grace of God is more enduring for men' (*Nem.* viii. 17). Man proposes, God disposes: 'Now I hope, but the issue lies with God' (*Ol.* xiii. 104 f.). What is done without God is better left unsung: 'Each thing that is without God is not worse hushed in silence' (*ib.* ix. 103).

The ineluctability of fate or destiny is strongly affirmed in Pindar, but it is not an uncompromising fatalism and is in no way inconsistent with an overruling Providence, or deterrent of the initiative and effort of men. A man should cherish good hope (*Isth.* vii. (viii.) 15)—not the κεναὶ ἐλπίδες whose issue is vanity (*Nem.* viii. 45, *Pyth.* iii. 23); not the desire of the moth for the star: that way lies madness (*Nem.* xi. 48). A man's duty is to aim at a reasonable ambition (*ib.* xi. 47); in the perplexities of life to look to the immediate duty (*Isth.* vii. (viii.) 13 f.). In pursuit of his aim he must spend and be spent, though the issue is uncertain (*Ol.* v. 15 f.). He cannot foresee the future, and fortune now bestows and now withholds:

'The black fields do not give their fruit continuously nor will the trees in every circling year bear their fragrant flowers with equal wealth, but only alternately. Even so Fate (μοῖρα) guides the race of men. There is given of Zeus no certain mark for men. Yet do we embark on high emprise and plan many deeds; for our limbs are chained by hope unabashed; but the river of Foreknowledge is set afar' (*Nem.* xi. 39 ff.).

We must be content to accept what fate has in store for us—not an austere impersonal fate, but the will of God: τὸ μόρσιμον Διόθεν πεπρωμένον (*Nem.* iv. 61; cf. *Pyth.* xii. 28 ff.).

'The mighty mind of Zeus steers (κυβερνᾷ) the destiny (δαίμονα) of men whom he loves' (*Pyth.* v. 122 f.).

In this conviction Pindar says:

'To me whatsoever excellence sovereign Destiny (Πότμος) has assigned, I know well that Time in his course shall bring it to its fated fulfilment' (*Nem.* iv. 41 ff.)—words which might almost seem to have been in the mind of Milton when he wrote:

'Yet, be it less or more, or soon or slow,
It shall be still in strictest measure even
To that same lot, however mean or high,
Toward which Time leads me, and the will of Heaven
(*Sonnets*, ii. 9 ff.).

The cruder form of the doctrine of the envy of the gods was of course familiar to Pindar. It is clear that Pindar, who calls envy 'the companion of fools' (φθόνον κενεοφρόνων ἑταῖρον [frag. 128]), would not seriously attribute envy to the gods. When he alludes to it, it will be seen that it is merely a *façon de parler* and ethically means simply that a man should not seem to encroach on the prerogatives of the gods,

'Or pass beyond the goal of ordinance
Where all should pause as is most meet for all'
(Tennyson, *Tithonos*, 30 f.)

That this is so becomes clear upon an examination of Pindar's references to the doctrine. In *Pyth.* x. 19 ff. the train of thought is evident. The Aleuadai have had great success; may they not meet with envious reversals (φθονεραὶ μετατροπίαι) from the gods; a god may have perfect and unbroken felicity, man must expect alternatives of weal and woe; he cannot climb the brazen heaven. In the second passage, *Ol.* xiii. 25, it is little more than a form of speech. The third passage, *Isth.* vi. (vii.) 39 ff., rightly interpreted, is an admirable commentary on the ethical content of the doctrine of the φθόνος θεῶν:

'Let not the envy of the immortals disturb (cf. *Ol.* vi. 97) whatsoever pleasant thing of the day I pursue quietly unto old age and for my destined life. For all alike we die, but destiny differs. But if one looks for far things, his stature is too short to reach the brazen abode of the gods: the winged Pegasos threw his master Bellerophon when he would have come to the habitations of Olympos amid the company of Zeus.' That is to say: I recognize my mortality; I will not seek the things afar; being the creature of a day, I will pursue quietly (ἔκαλος, not with violence and wantonness, but ἡσυχᾷ νεμόμενος; cf. *Pyth.* xi. 54 ff.: φθονεροὶ δ' ἀμύνονται ἄται· εἴ τις ἄκρον ἑλὼν ἡσυχᾷ τε νεμόμενος αἰνὰν ὕβριν ἀπέφυγεν), not the far things, but the good of to-day which is ever the highest for a mere mortal (τὸ δ' αἰεὶ παράμερον ἐσλὸν ὕπατον ἕρχεται παντὶ βροτῷ [*Ol.* i. 99 f.]). So shall I not be liable to the envy of the gods.

Pindar's attitude may be summed up in three words—ὕβρις, κόρος, ἄτη. The precise meaning of these terms is somewhat fluctuating and the relation of the first two is sometimes reversed. ὕβρις is 'insolence,' 'wantonness,' 'pride' (*Pyth.* ii. 28, viii. 12, x. 36, xi. 55, *Ol.* vii. 90, *Isth.* iii. (iv.) 27), or 'violence' (*Nem.* i. 50, *Pyth.* iv. 112). κόρος is 'satiety' (*Ol.* ii. 95, *Pyth.* i. 82, viii. 32, *Nem.* vii. 52, x. 20) or the resulting 'insolence,' 'pride' (*Ol.* i. 56, *Nem.* i. 65). Hence Pindar (*Ol.* xiii. 10) makes Ὕβρις the bold-mouthed mother (ματέρα θρασύμυθον) of Κόρος (so, too, the oracle in Herod. viii. 77: δῖα Δίκη σβέσσει κρατερὸν Κόρον Ὕβριος υἱόν), whereas elsewhere (Theognis, 153; Solon, frag. 8) Κόρος is father of Ὕβρις. Ἄτη is in Pindar 'woe' (*Ol.* i. 57, xi. (x.) 37, *Pyth.* xi. 55, *Nem.* ix. 21, and frag. 42 (171). 4), but αὐάτα is 'infatuation' (*Pyth.* ii. 28, iii. 24). The doctrine of sin implied in these terms is illustrated by the following passages:

'He [Tantalos] could not digest his great prosperity, but for his insolence (κόρῳ) won an exceeding woe (ἄταν)' (*Ol.* i. 55 ff.); Ixion was greatly blest, 'but lust (ὕβρις) drove him to an exceeding infatuation (αὐάταν) and speedily he suffered his deserts and won a choice affliction' (*Pyth.* ii. 28 f.).

The sequence is success (ὄλβος), pride (ὕβρις), infatuation, or moral blindness (ἄτη)—'quem deus vult perdere, dementat prius.' Æschylus, rejecting, as Pindar does, the crude conception of the envy of the gods, gives a similar sequence (*Ag.* 750 ff.): old Ὕβρις begets a young Ὕβρις and unholy Θράσος, which are dark Ἄται for the house. In other words, success leads to pride, whence springs sin; one sin leads to another, and with repeated sin comes greater boldness (cf. 222 ff.: βροτοὺς θρασύνει γὰρ αἰσχρόμητις τάλαινα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων). Precisely so in the OT 'Jeshurun waxed fat, and kicked: . . .

then he forsook God which made him, and lightly esteemed the Rock of his salvation. They moved him to jealousy with strange gods, with abominations provoked they him to anger' (Dt 32[15f.]).

(*c*) *Man's relation to the gods and to fellow-men.*—Man's duty in relation to the gods (εὐσέβεια) necessarily includes the performance of his duty to his fellow-men, but it involves, further, the specifically religious duties of prayer and sacrifice. According to Hesiod, the doom of the silver race came upon them because they did not refrain from violence to one another, 'neither would they worship the immortals nor do sacrifice upon the holy altars of the blessed ones' (*Works and Days*, 134 ff.). So in Pindar:

'Success is given for the sake of their piety (εὐσεβείας χάριν) in answer to the prayers of men' (*Ol.* viii. 9). 'Me anywise my spirit bids declare that to the Emmenidai and to Theron glory hath come by gift of the Tyndaridai of goodly steeds, forasmuch as they more than any other among men visit them with hospitable tables, with pious mind maintaining the rites of the blessed ones (εὐσεβεῖ γνώμᾳ φυλάσσοντες μακάρων τελετάς)' (*Ol.* iii. 38 ff.).

Similarly in *Ol.* vi. 77 ff. success in the games is directly connected with such observances:

'Surely as thy mother's brothers, O Hagesias, in their home beneath Kyllene's hill presented with many prayerful sacrifices (λιταῖς θυσίαις) piously (εὐσεβέως) Hermes, the herald of the gods, who keeps contests and the dispensation of games, . . . it is he with his father the thunderer who accomplishes thy success.'

The duty of man towards his fellows is summed up in the word δίκη. This in its essence is the due observance of use and wont, νόμος, τρόπος, *Sittlichkeit*. Eunomia is the daughter of Themis (*Ol.* ix. 15 f.) and sister of Eirene and Dike, worshipped by the Korinthians, who are fain to keep from them Hybris, the mother of Koros (*ib.* xiii. 6 ff.). Ixion's temptation of Hera is described as εὖναι παράτροποι (*Pyth.* ii. 35). Men are tempted to accept a guileful gain in preference to justice, but they travel to a stern reckoning (*ib.* iv. 139 f.). Dike regulates also the relation of man to the gods; any encroachment on the prerogatives is sternly punished:

τὸ δὲ παρ δίκαν γλυκὺ πικροτάτα μενει τελευτά (*Isth.* vi. (vii.) 47 f.).

First in the list of specific virtues we may put εὐορκία, keeping of oaths. Those who enjoy eternal happiness after death are briefly described in *Ol.* ii. 65 as those who rejoiced in keeping their oaths (ἔχαιρον εὐορκίαις). Next comes truthfulness:

'In every sort of state the man of straight speech (εὐθύγλωσσος) is best: in a tyranny and when the loud mob (λάβρος στρατός) and when the wise (σοφοί) keep the city' (*Pyth.* ii. 86 ff.).

The slanderer, on the other hand, is an unmitigated evil:

'Rhadamanthus fares well because he reaped the blameless fruit of his soul (καρπὸν ἀμώμητον φρενῶν) and delights not his heart with deeds, such as ever attend the wiles of whisperers; an invincible evil to both parties are the suggestions of slander, like to the mood of the fox' (*Pyth.* ii. 73 ff.).

And it is not only straightness of speech that Pindar praises but also straightness in action:

'Divers are the arts of divers men, but a man must walk in straight paths (εὐθείαις ὁδοῖς) and fight according to his nature' (*Nem.* i. 25 ff.).

Diagoras, the heavy-weight from Rhodes, is described as a 'huge straight-fighting (εὐθυμάχαν) man' (*Ol.* vii. 15). In one passage, indeed, Pindar does seem to suggest that craft should be met with craft, when he speaks of an athlete who made up for deficiency of stature by the cunning of the fox:

'One must do everything to bring low the foe' (*Isth.* iii. 66 (iv. 98)).

Already Plutarch (*Mor.* 21 A) had noted this as inconsistent with other passages of Pindar. Next the duty of gratitude is pointed by the fate of Ixion, who was a signal example of ingratitude:

'Bested by command of the gods to his winged wheel he declares to men that one should repay the benefactor with kindly recompense' (*Pyth.* ii. 21 ff.).

On the other hand, the poet grieves to see 'envy requiting noble deeds' (*Pyth.* vii. 18 ff.). Kindness is commended, cruelty condemned, by the examples of Kroisos and Phalaris (*Pyth.* i. 94 ff.). The second *Pythian* is beset with many difficulties of interpretation, but it is impossible to quote as Pindar's own view:

'Let me love him who loves me: but towards my enemy as an enemy I will run upon him like a wolf, treading now this way, now that, in crooked paths' (*Pyth.* ii. 83 ff.).

Rather Pindar's position is expressed in *Pyth.* ix. 93 ff.:

'Therefore a citizen be he friend or be he foe, let him not hide that which is well done for the common weal, nor make void the saying of the old man of the sea who said that one should praise even a foe who doth good deeds.'

Among the primary duties are honour to parents and patriotism:

'In that thou keepest thy father at thy right hand, thou maintainest the precept which of old among the hills they say that Philyra's son gave to the fatherless son of Peleus: to honour above all the son of Kronos . . . but never to rob of like honour the destined life of his parents. Of old Antilochos (φιλοπάτωρ [Xen. *Kyneg.* i. 14]) had this mind, who died for his father' (*Pyth.* vi. 19 ff.).

'Whoso in this cloud wards off the hail of blood for his dear fatherland, inflicting death upon the foe, let him know of a surety that he wins the highest glory for his fellow-citizens, whether he live or die' (*Isth.* vi. (vii.) 27 ff.).

Although Thebes occupied an unworthy position in the great struggle against the barbarians, Pindar speaks with real feeling of the glory of the victory which removed the 'Tantalos-stone' which hung over the head of Hellas (*Isth.* vii. (viii.) 10; cf. *Pyth.* i. 76, *Isth.* iv. (v.) 48 ff.). Pindar recognizes, too, the duty of kindness to the stranger within the gates (*Ol.* ii. 6, *Isth.* ii. 39 f., and *passim*). It is noteworthy that the μύσται in the *Ranæ* of Aristophanes base their claim to bliss on the two grounds that μεμυήμεθ' εὐσεβῆ τε διήγομεν τρόπον περὶ τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας (456 ff.).

Pindar, as an aristocrat, insists much on the virtues of heredity:

'That which is by nature is always best' (*Ol.* ix. 100; cf. ii. 85 ff., etc.);

and he is much impressed with the splendour of a tyranny such as he witnessed in Sicily:

'On a tyrant, leader of a people, looks the high Fortune if on any man' (*Pyth.* iii. 85); 'Divers are the kinds of greatness, but the crown of greatness is for kings' (*Ol.* i. 113 f.).

But his personal predilection is for a modern aristocracy in which the government is in the hands of the σοφοί or ἀγαθοί. The middle estate is the more enduring. The great virtues are those of social service, those which exalt the State (*Pyth.* xi. 52 ff.).

There be some who mock at a man who jeers at those who spend money on the great games and hoard their own wealth, forgetting that at the last they shall 'render their souls to Hades without glory' (*Isth.* i. 68).

Pindar's own ideal of life is beautifully expressed in the following:

'May I cleave to the simple paths of life that, when I die, I may attach to my children no evil fame. They pray for gold and some for limitless lands. Mine be it amid the love of my townsmen to hide my limbs in earth, praising what is worthy of praise, and scattering rebuke on sinners' (*Nem.* viii. 35 ff.).

(*d*) *The soul.*—A special interest attaches to Pindar's views of the origin and ultimate destiny of the soul. According to the typical Homeric conception, when death occurs, or in any case after the body has been consumed on the funeral pyre, the soul goes to the sunless house of Hades under earth, leaving behind its 'manhood and youth,' existing still in a dim half-life, and no more affecting or affected by the things of the upper world. Only some favoured mortal, like Menelaos, may by special dispensation of the gods pass without dying to the Elysian plain (*Od.* iv. 563), an idealized earthly paradise.

According to Hesiod (*Work and Days*, 156 ff.), the fourth race, *i.e.* the race immediately preceding our own, was the race of heroes or half-gods:

ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, οἱ καλέονται
ἡμίθεοι προτέρῃ γενεῇ κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.

These were the men who warred at Thebes and Troy, and, after death,

'Zeus the son of Kronos gave them a life and an abode apart from men, at the ends of the earth, far from the immortals. Among them Kronos rules. And they, with heart free from sorrow, dwell in the Islands of the Blest beside deep-eddying Okeanos, happy heroes, for whom the bounteous earth bears honeysweet fruit, blooming thrice a year' (*ib.* 166 ff.).

Now both these ideas are familiar to Pindar. We have first the Hyperboreoi, worshippers of Apollo (*Ol.* iii. 16), whose life is perpetual bliss:

'Disease nor age touches that holy race, but they dwell apart from toil and battle, escaped from overjust Nemesis' (*Pyth.* x. 41 ff.; cf. *Isth.* v. (vi.) 23).

Then we have the miraculous carrying off of Pelops and Ganymede to Olympos (*Ol.* i. 40 ff.); the swallowing up of Amphiaraos by the earth (*Nem.* ix. 24); Ino (Leukothea) lives an immortal life with the Nereids (*Ol.* ii. 28 ff.); even after death Semele is raised to Olympos (*ib.* ii. 25 f.), Polydeukes is raised to alternate life with his brother Kastor—'half the time beneath the earth and half in the golden halls of Heaven' (*Nem.* x. 87 f.); and so on.

But of far more importance is the Hesiodic passage. The conception of the 'heroes'—the great men of the heroic past—as being after death exalted to perpetual felicity had become part of the orthodox Greek belief. And the word 'hero' (ἥρως) had taken on a new meaning. It was no longer confined to the great figures who had fought at Thebes and Troy. Great men of a less remote past who had deserved well of their fellow-men were conceived as enjoying an exalted state after death and received the honours and offerings of hero-worship. The founder (οἰκιστής) of a city, especially, was worshipped as a hero in the city which he had founded.

The full content of this hero-conception cannot be discussed here. The offerings made to them were specifically called ἐναγίσματα; thus Pollux, viii. 91, in enumerating the duties of the ἄρχων πολέμαρχος, says:

θύει μὲν Ἀρτέμιδι ἀγροτέρᾳ καὶ τῷ Ἐνυαλίῳ· διατίθησι δὲ τὸν ἐπιτάφιον ἀγῶνα τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθανόντων· καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἁρμόδιον ἐναγίζει.

They were conceived as occupying an intermediate state between men and gods, though they seem rarely to have been appealed to as intercessors for man with the gods (but see *Nem.* vii. 95 f.). As compared with the gods, their range for good or evil is restricted, their worship and their influence being local and attached to the place of their grave. Hence we hear constantly of the bones of a hero being brought home from a foreign land where he had died, that they might find sepulture there, and there form the centre of his worship. But, like the gods, the heroes could take on bodily shape, human or otherwise, to aid their worshippers in a crisis, and such phantom appearances (φάσματα) are often referred to — *e.g.*, Echetlus or Echetlaios (the man of the plough-stilt), who appeared at Marathon and, like Hay of Luncarty, dealt havoc with his plough (Paus. I. xxxii. 5; cf. I. xv. 3), Neoptolemos and others, who helped to repel the Gauls at Delphi (τά τε τῶν ἡρώων τηνικαῦτά σφισιν ἐφάνη φάσματα, ὁ Ὑπέροχος καὶ ὁ Ἀαόδικός τε καὶ Πύρρος [Paus. X. xxiii. 2; cf. I. iv. 4]).

Hero-worship is closely akin to the cult of the chthonian deities and the veneration of the dead, and found an especially congenial soil in Bœotia, and hence interests prominently the Bœotian poets Hesiod and Pindar. Pindar knows of the hero-cult of Pelops at Olympia where 'in his grave by the stream of Alpheos he hath part in splendid blood-offerings' (*Ol.* i. 90 f.), of Neoptolemos and others at Delphi (*Nem.* vii. 31 ff.; cf. Νεοπτολέμου . . . τάφος· καὶ οἱ κατὰ ἔτος ἐναγίζουσιν οἱ Δελφοί [Paus. X. xxiv. 6]), and, besides others, most significantly of all, Battos (Aristoteles), founder of Kyrene (*c.* 630 B.C.):

'Aristoteles . . . built greater groves of the god and laid down a straight-cut horse-trodden way across the plain for the processions of Apollo; where at the end of the marketplace he lies apart in death. Blessed was he while he dwelt with men, and thereafter a hero worshipped by the people (ἥρως λαοσεβής)' (*Pyth.* v. 89 ff.; cf. R. M. Smith and E. A. Porcher, *Hist. of the Recent Discoveries at Cyrene, 1860–61*, London, 1864).

Pindar's deep interest in the state after death is unmistakable. He likes to imagine the dead still touched by the fortunes of their living descendants:

'And apart in front of the halls are other holy kings (βασιλέες ἱεροί) who have Hades for their lot, and when great deeds are bedewed with song, they haply hear with the hearing of the dead (χθονίᾳ φρενί) of the success which is common to them and to Arkesilas' (*Pyth.* v. 96 ff.). 'Go now, Echo, to the dark-walled house of Persephone, bearing to his father the glorious tidings . . . of his son's victory at Pisa' (*Ol.* xiv. 19 ff.). 'The dead too have some part in things duly done, and the dust hides not the good grace of their kin. May Iphion hear from Aggelia, daughter of Hermes, and tell Kallimachos of the bright honour at Olympia which Zeus hath granted to his kin' (*Ol.* viii. 77 ff.; cf. *Nem.* iv. 85).

At the supreme moment of the family's fate

'Entsteigen ihren Grabern manche Schatten,
Die Seelen schweben von dem Himmel nieder,
Die Heimat und die Freunde zu besuchen.
Sie nahen dir mit geisterhaften Schimmer,
Umstrahlt von heil'gem überird'schem Glanz.
Sie bringen doch die alte Liebe mit'
(W. Hauff, *Der Schwester Traum*).

But of quite special importance are certain other passages of Pindar, which are best considered together:

(*a*) *Ol.* ii. 53 ff.: 'Wealth adorned with deeds of excellence brings occasion for these things and for those, bringing a deep wild mood—a bright star it is, a most true light (φέγγος) for a man. And if he that hath it knows that which is to be—that of the dead the helpless souls (φρένες here, not ψυχαί) straightway here pay the penalty, while the sins done in this realm of Zeus one judges under earth, pronouncing doom by hateful constraint. And, ever more equally by day and night enjoying the sun, the good receive a life free from travail, vexing not the earth with labour of the hand nor the waters of the sea in that shadowy life, but with the honoured of the gods those who rejoiced in keeping their oaths live a tearless life; but the others endure woe not to be beheld. But whoso, abiding unto three times on either side, have endured to keep their soul (ψυχάν) utterly from iniquity, rise by the way of Zeus unto the tower of Kronos. There round the Islands of the Blest the breezes of Okeanos blow and flowers of gold are glowing, some ashore on glorious trees, while others the water feeds, with chains whereof they entwine their hands and twine garlands, according to the just council of Rhadamanthus, whom the mighty sire, husband of Rhea throned in the highest, hath as ready assessor. Peleus and Kadmos are numbered among these, and thither his mother carried Achilleus, when she had persuaded the heart of Zeus by her prayers.'

(*b*) Frag. 129 (*ap.* Plut. *Consol. ad. Apoll.* 35): 'For them shines the strength of the sun below while it is night here; and in meadows (λειμῶνες) of purple roses their suburb is shady with frankincense and laden with golden fruits. . . . And some in horses, some in feats of strength, some in draughts, and some in the lyre take their delight, and by them blooms all fair-flowering bliss. And fragrance is spread about the lovely place (χῶρος) as they mingle evermore all manner of offerings in far-shining fire on the altars of the gods.'

(*c*) Frag. 131 (*ap.* Plut. *loc. cit.*): 'By happy dispensation all (travel to) an end that delivers from travail (λυσίπονον τελευτάν). And the body indeed of all men follows overmastering death; yet is there left alive a copy of life (αἰῶνος εἴδωλον); for this alone cometh from the gods; and it sleeps while the limbs are active; but to sleeping men it reveals (δείκνυσιν) in many a dream the coming judgment of happiness and woe.'

(*d*) Frag. 133 (*ap.* Plato, *Meno*, 81 B): 'From whomsoever Persephone accepts atonement for the ancient woe (ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος), the soul of these she sends back again in the ninth year to the upper sun. From these spring glorious kings and the swift of strength and the mightiest in wisdom. And for the time to come they are called by men holy heroes (ἥρωες ἁγνοί).'

(*e*) Frag. 137 (*ap.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iii. 518): 'Happy is he who hath seen these things ere he goes beneath the earth; he knows the end of life, and he knows its god-given beginning.'

We take no note here of frag. 132, which is generally regarded as spurious.

A full discussion of these passages is impossible in the scope of this article. There are many difficulties of interpretation, due in some cases to absence of the context, in others to the fact that some of the words used may have possessed an esoteric meaning which we do not fully realize—*e.g.*, φέγγος ἐτυμώτατον (cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 454 ff., where the Eleusinian μύσται say: μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρόν ἐστιν, ὅσοι μεμυήμεθ' εὐσεβῆ τε διήγομεν τρόπον περὶ τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας). ἀγροτέραν (it seems significant that this is an epithet

of Artemis; cf. the sacrifice offered by the polemarch [Pollux, viii. 91; Plutarch, *de Malign. Herod.* 26]), and so on. Also we do not know how far the passages represent one consistent doctrine.

But in general outline the essentials are as follows. The soul and the soul alone 'comes from the gods.' By reason of ancient sin—πένθος, suffering which is sin—the soul is imprisoned in the body. Then it passes through a period of trial 'three times on either side.' Some commentators take this to mean three times in all—once here, once in Hades, and lastly here. But it more naturally means once here and then below; then here and again below; then once more here and once more below. Having passed these six alternating periods successfully, in the ninth year—the sacral ἐνναετηρίς—Persephone accepting atonement, the soul enters its final life in the body of a king, a mighty athlete, a poet, or a philosopher, after which it passes in the guise of a hero to the Isles of the Blest.

How much Pindar in these speculations owed to the mysteries of Eleusis (to which frag. 137 especially seems to refer), how much to the rise of Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines in the latter part of the 6th cent. B.C., we need not here inquire. Nor can we discuss the influence which, through Pindar, these doctrines exercised on Plato and later thinkers. What is important is that Pindar expounds, with all the earnestness of personal conviction, the doctrine that the soul is in her origin divine and that she carries in her the seed of emancipation from the flesh—an emancipation to be attained, not by some peculiar dispensation of the gods, but by her own effort towards purity.

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PĪR.—1. The term and its synonyms.—*Pīr* is a term denoting a spiritual director or guide among the Ṣūfīs, or mystics of Islām. The functionary described by the title is known also under other names: *shaikh, murshid, ustadh*. *Pīr* is a Persian word, but is applied to a spiritual guide more commonly in India and Turkey than in its native home; *shaikh* in our special sense is in general use throughout Islām; *murshid* is also wide-spread, but in Turkish- or Arabic-speaking countries rather than in India; *ustadh* is found in Persia.[1]

2. The authority of the spiritual guide.—Theoretically speaking, any one who has advanced sufficiently in the mystical experience of divine reality may undertake to give spiritual guidance to others. But, as a matter of fact, the *pīr*, or *murshid*, nearly always bases his right to direct souls on the authorization of some teacher who has directed him in the mystic way (*ṭarīqah*). This authority is valid only in so far as the teacher traces his claim to teach through a succession of teachers, or *murshids*, to the founder of some one of the numerous Darwīsh orders. The *murshid* follows the tradition of the order to which he belongs. He is under the grand *shaikh* of his order, who resides at the place where the tomb of the founder of the confraternity is found. The grand *shaikh*, for his part also, proves an authority lineally derived from the founder.[1] He makes little or no attempt to control the local *shaikhs* of his order. It is in his power to summon a general council of *shaikhs*, whose action would be binding on each of them and on the Darwīshes subject to them; but such councils are and always have been of exceedingly rare occurrence. In reality there is little official restraint on the independence of the Darwīsh *shaikhs*.[2] Even in their relation to the civil power they occupy a position of special privilege, and *shaikhs* of pre-eminent sanctity or strong character make a large place for themselves in public life. The local influence of many *shaikhs* is very significant; their word is felt to have the force of law, and the demands which they may make on the community are granted without dispute. If they levy a fine because of some offence against a member of their order, it will be paid. Government officials pay them respect in various ways.[3]

On the whole, the part played by the *shaikhs* in the communities of the Muslim world has been in favour of order and public welfare. They have taught by example and precept the principle of loyalty to authority, and they have been devoted to the interests of Islām, which they recognize to be inseparable from the interests of the sovereign State.[4]

3. The pīr and the mystical life.—In order to act as a spiritual guide in the life of the mystic (*taṣawwuf*, 'to live the life of a Ṣūfī') the *pīr*, or *murshid*, must hold a *sanad* from his teacher. This is a written permission (*ijāzah*) giving him the right to pass on to others the *ṭarīqah*, or mystical discipline, as he has learned it, and also conferring upon him the authority to perform healing miracles and to work signs. The validity of the *sanad* depends upon the chain of guides whose names connect the name of the issuing *shaikh* with that of the founder of the *ṭarīqah*, or order.[5] The *shaikh* may hold the *ijāzah* of more than one teacher if he has followed more than one

[1] *Shaikh* is used also of the *khalīfahs*, or deputies, of a *pīr*, or *murshid*. These men may have their own disciples, usually of the poorer class or such as are at a distance from their own proper guide. They may give the mystic way (*ṭarīqah*) to those who seek it, and may even confer the rank of *shaikh* upon such as have advanced sufficiently. *Shaikh* often describes the actual head of a Darwīsh community rather than the same man as the spiritual director of a narrower group of disciples connected. *Pīr* is employed also somewhat loosely of the founder of a Darwīsh order, and still more generally of a *walī*, or saint. In Persia, India, and Turkey the term is current among non-Muslims as well as Muslims. The Hindus apply it to their dead saints, and in Persia and Turkey it designates an inferior priest among the Yezīdis. In this non-Muslim usage the same extraordinary gifts of knowledge and miracle-working are implied as the Muslims ascribe to their *pīrs*.

[1] The grand *shaikh* is described as occupying the *sajjādah*, or prayer-carpet, of the *pīr*, or founder.

[2] The Shaikh al-Bakrī, who is supposed to be descended from Abu Bakr, the first *khalīfah*, is appointed by the Egyptian Government to have supervision over the Darwīsh orders in Egypt, and within the borders of that country exercises a real official authority. The office which he holds finds no analogy in other Muslim countries, and in Egypt its purpose is not to dictate but to prevent excesses.

[3] (*a*) Occasionally a specially forceful *shaikh* may be accorded a controlling influence over several local Darwīsh fraternities, and the recognition may even be given to his son after him. This does not necessarily imply the right to modify the spiritual discipline of these fraternities or the direction of novices. The influence is more or less irregular and affects the general well-being of the orders rather than their respective *ṭarīqahs*. The conduct of the latter is in the hands of the *pīrs*, or *murshids* (*shaikhs* who are spiritual directors). (*b*) The history of Morocco in former times was that of a country governed by Ṣūfī *shaikhs*. In Persia the political power of the *shaikhs* has been a constant factor in the history of the kingdom. The great poets of Persia in most cases have been Ṣūfī teachers. In Turkey the highest places of power sometimes have been held by Darwīsh *shaikhs*—*e.g.*, Abu Hudā, the personal *imām* of the Sulṭān Abdu'l-Hamīd. The weight of influence exerted by hundreds of powerful Darwīsh *shaikhs* throughout the Ottoman empire is admitted by competent observers.

[4] The principles of Ṣūfīism, if pressed to a logical conclusion, are anarchistic, but Ṣūfī practice knows little of revolt against either civil or religious authority. Even the Darwīsh excesses which are promoted by the *shaikhs* have in them no spirit of antagonism to the public order. The Wahhābī, Mahdīst, and Senūsī movements are, indeed, revolutionary in character, but neither professedly nor really are they part of the Ṣūfī movement.

[5] The chain of supporting names (*isnād*) is, of course, carried back from the founder to the Prophet and thence back to Abraham, Adam, and God Himself. The *sanad* usually bears the seals of other *shaikhs* as additional credentials.

ṭarīqah and has been admitted to membership in more than one Darwīsh order.

The presupposition is that one who holds a *sanad* has attained to that stage of advancement in the mystic path which brings him to an intuitive knowledge of God. He has attained to *ma'rifah* ('gnosis') and is himself an *'ārif* ('gnostic'). The consciousness of self has been absorbed in the consciousness of Allāh (*fanā fi'llah*) and he is regarded as *majdhūb* ('attracted'). The one who is to guide others in the *ṭarīqah* must have gone at least thus far himself. He through his teacher has become possessor of the *silsilah* ('spiritual chain'), which ensures that the teachings and spirit (*rūḥaniyyah*) of the founder of his order have come down to him. Spiritual guides possess a trained susceptibility to hypnotic influences, whether mediated through the environment, through other persons, or through autohypnosis. Training also enables them to arrange conditions adapted to produce hypnotic states in others.[1]

It may be allowed that a great many of the Ṣūfī *shaikhs* meet fairly well the conditions laid down by the great Ṣūfī al-Ghazālī for the *murshid*. They are orthodox, faithful to the *sunnah* of the Prophet, and correct in life. They are not usually well trained in the higher branches of Muslim learning. Very many are of humble attainments outside of the tradition and ritual of their particular order. The greater number hold scientific knowledge in slight esteem, as conveying a false conception of reality and so hindering progress towards an immediate perception of truth (*dhauq*).[2] A relatively small number of *shaikhs* are serious students of theology and law, and some of these have established for themselves a secure reputation as teachers of these sciences.[3]

4. The shaikhs and learning.—The attitude of the *faqīhs* and *'ulamā* towards the spiritual guides of Ṣūfiism is not now so hostile as it was in the early centuries of the movement. Many are still covertly suspicious or jealous, but nearly all recognize that the *shaikhs* are meeting a deep craving of the Muslim world for a satisfying experience of communion with God. They infuse a spiritual vitality into Islām which theology and law have never been able to contribute, and the orthodox doctors admit this. The majority of the learned teaching class have put themselves under the direction of spiritual directors and are members of some Darwīsh order.[4]

The Ṣūfī view of knowledge is that to be true it must be given to the heart by God (*ilhām*). The task of the Ṣūfī guide is to prepare the heart that Allāh may open it and lodge therein the apprehension of reality. The impartation of ideas and cultivation of logical capacity are not his special task, but rather the development of the power of suggestion and direct emotional impression. If this is secured, the vivid and immediate states of mind which result seem to the untrained observer to be of the nature of supernatural communications. Highly wrought feelings and ecstasy become themselves the most perfect apprehension of the real. Ineffable emotions, because of the intense pleasure which they afford, are in themselves the experience of the divine; and as, for the time being, they suspend deliberate attention and volition, except in relation to themselves, all knowledge and all being are swallowed up in the immediate consciousness of God, and God becomes the only reality. Every other thing is but phenomenal; the real is He. The discipline of the *shaikhs* seeks to bring the *murīd* to the point where this inference from an absorbing emotional consciousness becomes a fixed belief furnishing a powerful and constant motive for life. In the greater number of cases the motive of those who follow the guidance of the *murshid* is a mixed motive. The emotional satisfactions are made an end in themselves and not merely an index of divine reality. In view of the moral danger involved in the dominance of this lower motive, al-Ghazālī taught that the true Ṣūfī should be careful to fulfil ethical obligations, and should make his mystical experiences subserve that end. The *shaikhs* of greatest influence to-day follow this rule.

5. The shaikhs and their circle of influence.—There are certain moral aspects of the Darwīsh life which, indeed, are rarely if ever wanting. The disciple chooses his spiritual director without constraint, binds himself to him freely, and holds to him to the end, though the relation between them is under moral sanctions only. The devotion given is complete, spontaneous, and marked by affectionate veneration amounting almost to worship. The *shaikhs* live for their followers, and inculcate on all the duties of brotherliness towards one another and general benevolence towards all. Hence the assistance given to wayfarers and needy persons at the *takiyyahs* (or *zāwiyahs*, Darwīsh houses), and the readiness of Darwīshes to share even a meagre portion with those in want.

The greater *shaikhs* are men of agreeable and magnetic personality, and show conspicuous gifts of leadership and organization.[1] They do not impress one as fanatical or as lacking in practical wisdom in the direction of affairs. The success of the Ṣūfī *shaikhs* in providing for a real spiritual need has made them effective propagandists in the cause of Islām. They have been more successful in this regard than the *mullas* and other orthodox agencies. The mystical fellowship of the Darwīsh fraternities has been of itself an attraction to outsiders, but the *pīr* himself, with what he has to promise, has been the indispensable factor.[2]

Among the *shaikhs* of a lower type are found some men of weak or unbalanced minds. Many of these are looked upon as saints (*walīs*) and *faqīrs*, and are consulted in sickness or other special need. Their influence lies in this direction and not in the control and guidance of a group of disciples.

The influence of the *shaikhs* touches women as well as men. Indeed, as far as occasional consultation of the *pīr* goes, women turn to him more frequently than men. There is no prohibition against their being admitted to the *ṭarīqah*, and there is eminent Ṣūfī authority for the view that the female mind is more sensitive to mystical

[1] The Oriental is much more subject to hypnotic influence than the Occidental, but the hypnotic powers possessed by individual *shaikhs* vary. There are those who may induce hypnosis with little or no exercise of will. The vulgar account of hypnotic states is that the persons concerned are *melbūs* (possessed by the power of Allāh).

[2] The ordinary believer looks upon the *murshid* as one who has been directly taught of God, and therefore has a superior kind of knowledge to that of him who merely learns from others.

[3] The literary activity of the *shaikhs* does not commonly extend beyond tracts or manuals of direction for the use of their disciples (*murīds*). The disciple is cautioned sometimes against allowing others to see his books. The *shaikhs* often direct specially gifted pupils to study the works of the great mystical writers in order to attain more fully the advantages of the mystic life. Sometimes the *shaikh* himself will teach his disciple theology and subsequently initiate him into the *ṭarīqah*. This order of instruction is that approved by the *'ulamā*.

[4] The open opposition of the orthodox authorities to Ṣūfiism is now directed for the most part against the cheap love of wonders, the hypocritical asceticism of the begging *faqīrs*, and the loose living of such as claim falsely to be above the common obligations of morality and law.

[1] The temper of the Ṣūfī movement admits the assertion of individual leadership rather than the effective co-operation of leaders.

[2] The *shaikhs* have in their *khalīfahs* very effective agents to second their influence. The *murīds* also actively recommend their own *shaikh* to others.

impressions than the male mind; still, the number of women Darwīshes is not relatively great.[1]

The *shaikh's* high standing with God is attested by the miracles (*karamāt*) with which God honours him. The *shaikh* is not said to perform miracles; God gives them to him.[2] In all parts of the Muslim world healing miracles are attributed to *walīs* and *murshids*: they are a mark of their special holiness. The most famous instances of these healings occur in connexion with wounds or serpent-bites inflicted in the *dhikrs* (Darwīsh religious exercises) of the Darwīsh orders. *Shaikhs* of the soundest reputation do not favour the extravagant self-mutilations inflicted in the *dhikrs* of special orders, and in general give their approval only to the miraculous cure of disease or wounds resulting from accident. They are inclined to demand also that those to be cured shall be known to be of good character. There are as striking instances of cure by means of suggestive therapeutics in the Darwīsh circles as are to be found anywhere, and, similarly, the immunity from injury which may be secured through hypnotic suggestion is very strikingly illustrated in the self-inflicted woundings and burnings and the serpent-bites permitted, *e.g.*, in the societies of the Rifā'īyyah order. In hundreds of instances neither pain nor permanent injury follows.[3]

The power to reveal the unseen and to predict the future is explained also as a gift with which Allāh honours the holiness of his servants. In certain cases the *shaikhs* show remarkable powers of mind-reading, telepathy, and clairvoyance, and some quite accurate verifications of their predictions are on record.

The *shaikh's* circle of influence includes those who are in the habit of consulting him when need arises; those who take part occasionally in the *dhikrs* which he directs, because they find it either pleasant or helpful to do so; those who have chosen the *shaikh* as their *murshid*, or spiritual guide, and either look forward to joining his order or are already members of it; and those who occupy a cell in the *zāwiyah*, or *takiyyah*. The first three classes have not separated themselves from the world; the last have done so and are living a celibate life under the constant superintendence of the *shaikh*. It is possible to have such a class only where there is a *zāwiyah* that is large enough to provide lodging for a group of brothers in addition to the assembly room of the fraternity.

6. The vocation of the shaikh.—The *shaikh* may hold his position by nomination on the part of his predecessor, or, if the latter is his father or brother, possibly by right of inheritance, or he may be elected by the vote of the local group of Darwīshes. His appointment will be confirmed by the *muftī* of the place, in rare cases by the Sulṭān himself, and regularly by the grand *shaikh* of his order. The celibate life is not binding upon him, and in certain cases the rule is that his office is inherited by his son. Where there is no *zāwiyah* with a resident group of disciples, the *shaikh*, unless he is a mendicant, will follow some secular vocation. If there is a Darwīsh hostel, it may have land attached to it, which will be cultivated by the resident *murīds*. The *shaikhs* who do not follow any trade are supported by gifts from their disciples and others. The *zāwiyahs* over which they preside are provided for by income from local endowment funds, grants from public endowment funds (*waqf*), or private gifts. The gifts which fall to the *shaikh* he regularly devotes to the purposes of his community.[1]

As the *shaikh* may arrange, meetings of the local fraternity are held in the assembly room of the *zāwiyah* from time to time. If there is no *zāwiyah*, the group meets regularly in a mosque. The usual meetings are a daily meeting, a more important weekly one (often held on the eve of Friday), a monthly observance in honour of the founder of the order, a similar service for the Prophet, and a yearly celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (*Maulid en-Nabī*). The assembly room serves not merely for the performance of the *dhikrs*, but as a meeting-place for the brothers and those interested in the order. Not all present are permitted to join in the religious exercises, and not all care to do so.

7. The murīd and the ṭarīqah.—The life of the disciple (*murīd*) who has chosen for himself a spiritual guide is subject in all respects to the direction of the latter. He confides in him implicitly, and refers to him all his concerns and plans. The disciples resident in the *zāwiyah* take part in the regular *dhikrs* (religious exercises), and, in addition, are assigned special exercises for their own private observance. In a general way the *shaikh* instructs each *murīd* how to conduct his life with a view to the attainment of the mystic goal. He may from time to time visit the *murīds* in their cells. They visit him each week in his cell for the purpose of disclosing to him their religious progress and receiving from him necessary directions.[2] The *shaikh* is one who is practised in noting the signs of spiritual advancement in his disciples.

The nature of the *shaikh's* relation to the *murīd* in the *ṭarīqah* is well illustrated in the typical instance of Tawakkul Beg's initiation at the hands of Mulla Shah.[3] Tawakkul Beg chose Mulla Shah as his spiritual director and was accepted by him as a *murīd*. The *ṭālib* ('seeker') usually undertakes a long course of penitential discipline prescribed for him by his guide with a view to securing a complete detachment from the world of sensuous things and an utter humility which will prepare him to receive the positive blessings of the mystic way.[4] The *shaikh* then admits him as a *sālik*, or traveller on the way. He takes the *'ahd*, or oath, declaring particularly his devotion to the founder of the order whose *ṭarīqah* he is following and to the special guide whom he has selected. These steps are not described by Tawakkul Beg, but in those which follow he shows how through private exercises of devotion[5] and the hypnotic influence of Mulla Shah and his *khalīfahs* the initiate reached the goal of union with God.

The method of guidance is expressed by the term *dhikr*, 'recollection.' This implies the fixing in the mind of some object of thought. It is accomplished by concentrating the attention upon the conception and its name, or upon some religious idea and its corresponding formula of expression. To assist in fixing the notion the mental effort is accompanied by vocal repetition of the name or formula with varying tone, pitch, and force of voice. In the vocal exercises the breathing is timed and adapted to accord with the strict rhythm and time of the vocal utterance. In the collective *dhikrs* of the

[1] There exist orders of women Darwīshes, and among the outstanding Sufi leaders of history one or two women *shaikhs* are named.

[2] The *karamat* of the *shaikh* are of a different genus from the authenticating miracles (*mu'jizat*) granted to a prophet.

[3] In the *Dausa* ceremony, where a mounted *shaikh* rides over the prostrate bodies of his followers without injury to them, the immunity from harm is credited to their faith. Both the *shaikh* and the disciples in this instance are under the stress of intense religious excitement.

[1] Some *zawiyahs* have endowments more than adequate to meet their expenses. The erection of *zawiyahs* is provided for by gifts which may be supplemented by grants from the public religious endowments (*waqf*).

[2] The formal instruction of the *shaikh* is called *talqīn*.

[3] Cf. Macdonald, *Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, pp. 195–200. Mulla Shah had attained the mystic goal without the aid of a *shaikh*. Nowadays it is held to be enormously difficult to do this, and the choice of a *murshid*, or spiritual director, is insisted on.

[4] This 'repentance' (*tawbah*) is for the purpose of eradicating the *shahwah kādhibah*, or evil impulses.

[5] The exercises include oral or silent repetition of formulas taken from the Qur'ān, the recitation of longer sections from the Holy Book, the repeated thought or expression of one of the sacred names of Allāh or of a pronoun referring to Allāh. The repetitions may be assisted by means of a rosary of 33, 66, or 99 beads. Such is the usage of the Darwīshes to day.

Darwish fraternity the *shaikh* fixes the programme of exercises and determines the number of repetitions of a given formula and the manner of recitation in each part (*dharb*) of the *dhikr*. He or his *khalīfahs* superintend the ceremonies, exercising constant and close control in order to secure perfect harmony of voice and movement among those taking part.[1] Each *shaikh* holds to the traditions of his own order, but at the same time there is a large element that is common to the *dhikrs* of the various Darwīsh orders. It is in the exercises prescribed for the private use of individuals that particular *shaikhs* feel free to adapt their spiritual directions to the needs of special cases.

The advancement of the *sālik* is in the hands of the spiritual director, who lays down the means by which it is to be realized, and decides when the respective stages of progress have been reached. There are four major objectives which are to be successively attained. The first of these is described by the technical term *fanā fi-'lshaikh* ('disappearance[2] in the *shaikh*'). The disciple is directed to fix attention upon the thought and mental image of the spiritual director, while the director projects himself into the consciousness of his disciple.[3] By these means and by the help of various external exercises such as have been already referred to hypnosis is at last effected and the *sālik* feels that his identity is merged in that of the *shaikh*. He declares to his instructor, no longer 'I am I,' but 'I am thou.'

When *dhikrs* have served their purpose in this way, the director introduces into the mystic discipline exercises in meditation (*murāqabah*) to fix firmly certain convictions and to intensify spiritual longing. The next major objective[4] is designated *fanā fi-'llah* ('disappearance in God'), and the *shaikh* declares it to have been attained when, through the hypnotic influence of his will exercised upon the *murīd* and through assistance of the prescribed discipline, the *murīd* feels 'I am He' (God). His own identity has become an element in his consciousness of God, and, similarly, his sense of the phenomenal world has ceased to be separately true and has passed over to be an element in his sense of God. The *sālik* who has travelled on the way (*ṭarīqah*) until he has attained *to* God in the way described is 'united' (*ittihād*) or 'attracted' (*majdhūb*) and henceforth will travel on *in* God.[5] He will be permitted to enter the circle of the initiated, may wear the characteristic garb of his order, and may receive authority to pass on the *ṭarīqah* to others as a *murshid*. Before the last objective shall have been reached he must still seek to reach *fanā ul-fanā* ('disappearance of *fanā*'), in which he loses all sense of 'union,' 'attraction,' or 'absorption,' and the sense of God which results from these processes is all in all. Beyond that is the ultimate goal, *baqā*, in which the heart returns to express itself in the relations of the phenomenal world, while never losing the true vision of reality, namely, that there is but one real being and that the world and self are but phenomenal manifestations of the one.[6]

It is obvious that this pantheistic teaching of the Ṣūfī *shaikhs* is not logically consistent with the theology and law of Islām. Sane Ṣūfī teachers have explicitly said that one who was *majdhūb*, or attracted, was above the law; and the division of the Darwīsh orders into Ba-Shar' ('within the law') and Bi-Shar' ('without the law') gives ground for the suspicion which the orthodox have felt towards certain of the orders. For most of the *shaikhs* a reconciliation with the law has been possible. They have looked upon it as useful in the penitential preparation (*taubah*) for the mystic way, and they have regarded the observance of it on the part of the Ṣūfī initiates as a useful condescension for the sake of common believers (*'ahlu-'ttaqlīd*). It may help them to gain paradise, though for Ṣūfīs (*'ahlu-'lhaqq*) it may afford no help in their practice of the mystical life (*taṣawwuf*).

In relation to the *sunnah* a large majority of the *shaikhs* are Sunnīs, but in Persia and N.W. India there is a substantial Shī'ah element. The movement is of Shī'ah origin, and much of the Ṣūfī teaching and method may be traced through the Shī'ah to Yoga and Vedāntist influences in India.

Finally, there are *shaikhs* who look upon the desire to guide souls as a lingering attachment to the world and therefore something to be renounced in order to an unconditional oneness with God, the only reality.

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PIŚĀCHAS.—In modern India a *piśācha* is a kind of ghoul, usually the ghost of some one who has died an unnatural death, or for whom the requisite funeral rites have not been performed. He is classed as a *bhūta*, or ghost, and the term *bhūt-piśāch* is commonly used to indicate demons generally. *Piśāchas* haunt burial-grounds and places of cremation, and eat human flesh. Their speech is a kind of gibberish, and hence modern English is called *piśācha-bhāṣā*, or 'goblin language,' by those who cannot understand it.[1] In S. India the small circular storms, called 'devils' by Europeans, are called *piśāchīs*, or 'she-ghouls.'[2]

In ancient India *piśāchas* played a much more prominent part. They are frequently mentioned in Vedic literature. Here they are also called *kravyād*, a term which, like *piśācha*, is said to mean 'an eater of raw flesh.' Most scholars agree that these Vedic *piśāchas* were malignant demons,[3] but A. Hillebrandt[4] considers it to be quite possible

[1] In many orders the actions of the participants in the *dhikrs* are accompanied by music rendered by attendant *murshids*. This accompaniment materially assists the process of hypnosis desired by the *shaikh*. The motions of the body in time with the regulation of the breathing tend in the same direction.

[2] *Fanā* is an equivalent of *ghaiba*, 'disappearance,' 'absence.'

[3] The process is helped forward by the novice fixing his eyes upon the face of his director.

[4] Intermediate objectives may be placed before the *sālik* (traveller), namely, *fanā fi-'lpīr* ('disappearance in the founder') and *fanā fi-'nNabī* ('disappearance in the Prophet'). A synonym for *fanā fi-'llah* is *fanā fi-'lhaqq* ('disappearance in the real').

[5] When one has become *majdhūb*, his soul and its motions are ruled by gnosis, the mystic knowledge of the real, and love, the mystic fulfilment of desire. Such an one has attained a status (*waqfah*).

[6] In *baqā* the traveller has reached the *quṭb*, the focal point in which the onward movement of the spiritual life rests. It may be remarked that the discipline imposed by the *shaikhs* quite frequently brings to those who subject themselves to it a weakening of the power of nervous resistance, a loss of will power, and a general weakening of character. Through self-absorption, and even autohypnosis, their social value and their value for work are lessened.

[1] *PR*[2] i. 238.

[2] H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*[2], London, 1903, p. 714.

[3] Cf. H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 264 n.; A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (*GIAP* III. i., Strassburg, 1897), p. 164; and A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, i. 533.

[4] *Vedische Mythologie*, Breslau, 1902, iii. 426.

that they were ancient enemies who subsequently became traditional fiends, while Macdonell and Keith (*loc. cit.*) admit that in later times the name may have been given in scorn to human tribes. In one place (*Rigveda*, I. cxvii. 21) the commentator Sāyana explains the word *dasyu*—generally explained as meaning non-Aryan aborigines—by 'the *asuras*, *piśāchas*, etc., who destroy.'

In the *Rāmāyaṇa* they do not appear very often, and then only as ghouls; but in the *Mahābhārata*, while the demon character is most often assigned to them, they also over and over again appear as a race or races of men inhabiting N.W. India, the Himālaya, and Central Asia. They are described as performing human sacrifices and as eaters of raw flesh. They have a form of marriage which consists in embracing a woman who is asleep or drugged, and are guilty of other abominable practices. Two *piśāchas* are specially mentioned as living by the river Vipāśa, who were progenitors of an impure W. Panjāb tribe known as Bahīkas. On the other hand, individual *piśāchas* are here and there referred to as pious ascetics living by holy streams in N.W. India.[1]

In later Sanskrit literature, with important exceptions to be noted below, the human nature of the *piśāchas* has disappeared, and they are merely demons. Sometimes they serve men for a *quid pro quo*. Thus, in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* ([11th cent. A.D.], I. ii. 262) a *piśācha* is possessed of surgical skill, and will cure a wound, provided he is always given a new wound to cure as soon as his present job is finished. Otherwise he kills his patient. With this we may perhaps compare the unknown science called *piśācha-vēda*, or *piśācha-vidyā*, mentioned in two works of the late Vedic period.[2]

According to the *Purāṇa* legends, the valley of Kashmīr was once a lake. When the water had been drained off by the god Śiva, it was peopled by the Prajāpati Kaśyapa. This Kaśyapa had several wives. Three were Kadrū, Krōdhavaśā, and Khasā. By the first he had as offspring the *nāgas*, or snake-gods, by the second the *piśāchas*, and by the third the cognate *yakṣas* and *rākṣasas*.[3] In Buddhist literature the *yakṣas* and *piśāchas* are confounded, and both had cannibal propensities.[4] Similarly, Kalhaṇa, the non-Buddhist chronicler of Kashmīr (12th cent. A.D.), in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (i. 184), uses the word *yakṣa* as equivalent to *piśācha*. At the present day, in Kashmīr and the neighbouring countries lying south of the Hindū Kush, while the word *piśācha* has fallen out of use, *yakṣa*, under the form of *yachh*, is still the name given to malignant demons who are cannibal.

This brings us to the work known as the *Nīlamata*, a legendary account of Kashmīr certainly older than the 11th cent. and perhaps as old as the 6th or 7th. According to it, when the valley of Kashmīr was formed, Kaśyapa at first peopled it with his sons, the *nāgas*, who were the former inhabitants of the now dried-up lake. He wished to introduce men (*i.e.* people from Aryan India?) also, but the *nāgas* objected, and he thereupon cursed them, so that thenceforth the country was peopled for six months of each year by his other sons, the *piśāchas*. These came from an island in the sand ocean, *i.e.* from an oasis in the Central Asian desert, possibly Khōtan, where there are also found similar traditions of *yakṣas* (i.e. *piśāchas*) superseding the *nāgas*. In after generations the Kashmīr *piśāchas* were finally expelled, and the country became inhabited only by *nāgas* and men, as it is at present.[1] All over the so-called Dard country north and west of Kashmīr, as far as Kāfiristān, there are still told numerous legends, some of them intimately connected with the foundation of a tribe or of its religion, in which cannibalism plays a prominent and important part.[2]

F. Lacôte[3] maintains that there is no sufficient reason for assuming that there was ever a tribe or tribes known as Piśācha, and this opinion is shared by S. Konow;[4] but a consideration of the legends just recounted and of the references to *piśāchas* in the *Mahābhārata* entitles us to believe that (1) there were actual people whom the Aryan Indians called Piśāchas—ὠμοφάγοι; (2) this name and also the name *yakṣa* were possibly opprobrious epithets, derived from the names of demons; or, as an alternative, they were names of tribes, which hate in later times converted into names of demons; (3) the *Mahābhārata* considered these people as inhabiting the north-west of India and the neighbouring mountainous tracts, and Kashmīr tradition connected their original home with an oasis in the Central Asian desert.

The question next arises as to the language spoken by these *piśāchas*. There are two independent streams of tradition concerning this. In the first place, there is the great encyclopædia of stories appearing in Sanskrit under various forms, the best known of which is the famous *Kathāsaritsāgara*.[5] All these collections come from the Himālaya—one from Nēpāl and two others from Kashmīr.[6] They purport to be translations into Sanskrit made from an older version, entitled the *Bṛhatkathā*, which is said to have been communicated to one Guṇāḍhya by a *piśācha*, in 'Paiśāchī.' 'Paiśāchī' means 'the *piśācha* language,' and is usually explained as signifying the language believed to have been spoken by these demons or by these people. Lacôte, however, maintains (p. 45) that the language was given this name simply because the original narrator was represented to be a *piśācha*, and that Paiśāchī was really a literary adaptation of the vulgar speech of the tribes of the north-west. As it has been shown above that there were people in the north-west who were called Piśāchas—a fact denied by Lacôte—the point so far is of little importance. The other stream of tradition is contained in the works of the Indian grammarians. Several of their grammars of the Prakrit language contain sections dealing with Paiśāchī. The oldest of them—Vararuchi (*c.* 6th cent. A.D.)—knows only one Paiśāchī dialect, but, as time went on, the number of dialects mentioned increased till Markandēya (17th cent.) discusses no fewer than thirteen. Without doubt the later grammarians included under the name many local dialects spoken in various

[1] For further details and references see G. A. Grierson, 'Pisacas in the Mahābhārata,' in *Festschrift für Wilhelm Thomsen*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 188 ff. Cf. also G. A. Grierson, 'Paiśācī, Pisacas and "Modern Piśācha,"' in *ZDMG* lxvi. (1912) 68.

[2] *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, I. i. 10, and *Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra*, x. viii. 6, both quoted by Macdonell and Keith, *loc. cit.*

[3] The various Puranic accounts of these legends are conveniently summarized in H. H. Wilson and F. Hall's tr. of the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, London, 1865, ii. 74. The *nāgas*, of course, not only were mythical demi-gods, but also represented memories of a race of men so called. According to other legends, the name of the mother of the *piśāchas* was Kapiśā, with which may be compared the name of the ancient town Kapiśā at the southern foot of the Hindū Kush (see F. Thomas, in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 461). Kapiśā looks like a metathesis of Kaśyapā, the feminine of Kaśyapa.

[4] See, *e.g.*, *Jātaka*, tr. H. T. Francis, Cambridge, 1905, p. 128, note 3.

[1] Nowadays the *nāgas* are the presiding deities of the numerous springs in Kashmīr. For full details of the above legends, and also for other legends of the supersession of *nāgas* by *yakṣas* or *piśāchas* in other localities of the same tract of country, see G. A. Grierson, in *ZDMG* lxvi. 70 ff.

[2] See G. A. Grierson, 'Piśāca = Ὠμοφάγος,' *JRAS*, 1905, p. 285 ff.

[3] *Essai sur Guṇāḍhya et la Bṛhatkathā*, Paris, 1908, p. 47.

[4] 'The Home of Paiśācī,' *ZDMG* lxiv. (1910) 102.

[5] Tr. C. H. Tawney, Calcutta, 1880-84.

[6] For full particulars see F. Lacôte, *op. cit.*, and also his ed. of Buddhasvamin's *Bṛhatkathā Ślōkasaṁgraha*, Paris, 1908.

parts of India which had nothing whatever to do with Paiśāchī; and it will be safest to accept the statement of Hēmachandra (13th cent.) that of the real Paiśāchī there were at most three varieties. The later grammarians gave lists of the localities where Paiśāchī was spoken, but these differ greatly among themselves, and the localities are very widely scattered over the whole of India, north, south, east, and north-west. They all agree in regard to one, and only one, locality—Kēkaya, a country on the east bank of the Indus, in the N.W. Panjāb, *i.e.* in the extreme north-west of modern India. Moreover, Mārkaṇḍēya, in his treatment of this Kēkaya Paiśāchī, which he calls the standard, or principal, dialect, and which closely agrees with the form described by Vararuchi, quotes in his examples a phrase that he specially says is taken from the *Bṛhatkathā*. We may therefore assume that at least this grammarian, who is our only authority on the point, considered that the Paiśāchī of this work belonged to N.W. India. Except the accounts of these grammarians, no traces of Paiśāchī have survived in Indian literature.

All scholars do not, or did not, accept the theory of a north-western origin for Paiśāchī. An account of the various theories will be found on p. 74 of the present writer's article on 'Paiśācī, Piśācas, and "Modern Piśācha"' already quoted, and the following is a brief summary:

In 1880 A. F. Hoernle considered it to be the low Prakrit spoken by Dravidian aborigines. In 1886 E. Senart suggested that it was merely the name of the popular language of India. In 1900 R. Pischel claimed it as an independent Prakrit dialect of N.W. India. This theory was adopted by the present writer in 1906. In 1908 F. Lacôte argued that it was an Aryan language of N.W. India, but spoken by non-Aryan people. In 1910 S. Konow returned to Hoernle's opinion, and considered it to be an Aryan language spoken by Dravidians in Central India.

Konow's theory—ably argued in his article in *ZDMG* already quoted—is partly based on the fact that much of the main story of the *Bṛhatkathā* deals with events occurring in Central India, but the evidence for a north-western home for the language seems to the present writer to be overwhelming. It must at the same time be admitted that there is clear linguistic evidence of traces of Paiśāchī in the modern languages not only of Central but also of W. India, and this can best be explained by the assumption that the speakers of Paiśāchī spread from the north-west, as from a nidus, down the Indus, into Gujarāt, Central India, and the Marāṭhā country of the western coast.

Konow has, on the other hand, made an important contribution to the discussion by pointing out the close connexion that exists between Paiśāchī and the Pāli language of the Buddhist scriptures. Pāli has been localized, without great success, in many parts of India, and, if Paiśāchī is, as Konow maintains, a Central Indian language, then the arguments favouring the localization of Pāli round Ujjayinī in that tract would be greatly strengthened. But there is an alternative, and, to the mind of the present writer, a much more likely theory. In the country of Kēkaya was situated the famous university of Takṣaśilā, a home and centre of Buddhist learning.[1] This at once explains the close connexion between Paiśāchī and Pāli, and will entitle us to consider the latter as the literary and polished form of the folk-speech of the country in which the university was situated.

It remains to consider whether Paiśāchī has left any traces of its former existence in the modern languages of N.W. India. This is denied by Konow; but the present writer, in his article in the *ZDMG* already quoted (p. 78 ff.), has shown numerous points of agreement. The subject is of a character too minute to be discussed here. Suffice it to say that the writer considers that the inhabitants of the W. Panjāb and of the wild country to the north below the Hindū Kush may be taken as in the main representing the ancient *piśāchas*, and that the many varying languages of these tracts, including Kāshmīrī, though in later times much subjected to Iranian influence and possibly retaining peculiarities from the proto-Iranian stage of the Aryan language, have at their basis a form of speech not dissimilar from the ancient Paiśāchī. At the same time the extremely mixed character of all these tongues prevents him from calling them 'Modern Paiśāchī,' and he prefers to group them, under the name of the people, as 'Modern Piśācha.'[2]

LITERATURE.—This is indicated throughout the article.

G. A. GRIERSON.

PISTIS SOPHIA.—1. Characteristics.—The *Pistis Sophia* is a miscellany of weird, fantastic fragments which apparently voice the theosophy of some Gnostic Christian circles in Egypt (*ERE* iv. 115). The particular type of Gnosticism cannot be identified, however, as it exploits the mythological romance of Sophia's redemption; some critics have ascribed it to the Valentinians (*q.v.*) or even to (a disciple of) Valentinus himself,[1] others to the Ophites, others, again, to the Barbelo-Gnostics (cf. *ERE* vi. 239[a], 241[b]). The first point to notice is that Coptic scholars generally agree that the extant MS represents the Sahidic translation of a Greek original. The MS itself, written in double columns on both sides of a parchment, cannot be dated earlier than the end of the 4th or the opening of the 5th century. How much earlier the original was composed it is impossible to say; the fact that the Epistles of the NT are quoted as Scripture seems to fix a *terminus a quo* not earlier than *c.* A.D. 140; but the internal evidence is too uncertain to allow any precise inferences to be drawn with regard to the period at which it was compiled. What is certain is that the *Pistis Sophia* is a product of the later Gnosticism, especially of Gnosticism as it grew upon Egyptian soil; and, as few of the Gnostic documents have survived in their entirety, this invests it with special value for a student of the movement; its contents are often tedious and occasionally trivial, but they are of first-rate importance for the comparative criticism of the scattered pieces which in most cases represent all that is extant of the rich Gnostic literature. We have here the morbid craving for an esoteric revelation, as well as the blending of mythology and ritual, which made some of the Gnostic circles more than mere schools of religious philosophy. We have sacramental rites combined with Christology,[2] in a form whose spirit is sometimes not far from Catholicism. We have theurgical elements fused with ceremonial (cf. *ERE* viii. 277). We have also astrological mysticism in a peculiar combination of Christian faith and intricate theosophical speculation, whose general outlook is most nearly parallel to the attempt of Bardesanes on more orthodox and sober lines. Finally, from the point of view of literary form, we have in the *Pistis Sophia* an illustration of how Gnostic writers could employ the dialogue and the hymn[3] in order to convey their opinions, and of how they personified abstractions as Æschylus had done more dramatically in the *Prometheus Vinctus*, and the Hebrews in the Sophia of Proverbs and of the Wisdom-literature more simply.

The affinities of the theosophy reflected in the *Pistis Sophia* are with that branch of Ophitism which is called Barbelo-Gnosticism (*ERE* vi. 238[a]); the description of this sect, as given by Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* i. 29) in what seems an extract from the Gnostic 'Gospel of Mary' (cf. *DAC* i. 502[a]), does not exactly tally with the details of the *Pistis Sophia*, but this is not surprising, as the latter reflects innovations and modifications of any Gnostic scheme. The Barbelo-Gnostics seem to have been originally Syrian, and to have passed south-west into Egypt. The characteristic feature of their occult speculations was the place assigned to the female principle (*ERE* v. 827 ff.), which led to an exploitation of the term 'Barbelo.' This was applied by them to the female deity, either as the supreme ἔννοια of the invisible God[4] or as the

[1] See, *e.g.*, the *Jātakas*, *passim*.

[2] See also G. A. Grierson, *The Piśāca Languages of N.W. India*, London, 1906.

[1] Appealing incautiously to Tertullian's language in *adv. Valentin.* ii. ('porro facies Dei spectatur in simplicitate quaerendi, ut docet ipsa Sophia, non quidem Valentini, sed Solomonis'). So F. Legge, 'Some Heretic Gospels,' in *The Scottish Review*, xxii. [1893] 133–162.

[2] Cf. E. Bevan, 'The Gnostic Redeemer,' *HJ* xi. [1912–13] 137–152.

[3] On the development of the hymn in Syriac Christianity see *ERE* vii. 12.

[4] According to Irenæus, Barbelo was 'an æon, in virgin-shape, who never aged,' existing with the 'innominabilis Pater.' The

lower Sophia, and it gave them their distinctive name. It is this figure, not the serpent of the specific or narrower Ophites, that appears in the cosmology of the *Pistis Sophia*. The representation thus resembles the account of the Gnostics given by Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxvi.); whether or not the *Pistis Sophia* in its present form or in the original form of any part is to be identified with the 'Little Questions of Mary' which Epiphanius mentions as a document of that sect, the similarity of physiognomy is unmistakable. The insistence on the virgin-birth of Jesus, the salvation of the spiritual through initiation into the mysteries, and the identification of the Highest Being with supreme light recall these Ophites, and, even more so, the description of the tyrants who guard the portals of eternity (cf. Origen, *c. Cels.* vi. 30 f.); but the functions of Ialdabaoth (cf. *ERE* vi. 236) differ, and the adventures of (Pistis) Sophia are not quite the same as those of Sophia Achamoth in the Valentinian scheme or in the Ophite; in the *Pistis Sophia* she is not connected with the origin of matter, and she is represented as the object of redemption by Christ, not as a medium or principle of redemption, much less as a sister or as the mother of Christ. The conception of the light-maiden Barbelo, again, is variously defined in the extant notices of the Gnostic theosophies, and her ill-defined characteristics in the *Pistis Sophia* differ from the views which dubbed her Prunicus or set her in the eighth heaven, as the mother of Sabaoth or of Ialdabaoth (=ילדא בהות, son of Chaos?), who, to her sorrow, usurped the seventh heaven. In the *Pistis Sophia* she is a great Power of the invisible God, but she does not produce Jesus as 'the Light'; she merely confers on Him His vesture of light, and Ialdabaoth is in the chaos of the under world, a torturing fiend instead of a demiurgus. The Barbelo-Gnostics were evidently not homogeneous, but the occurrence of Barbelo in the *Pistis Sophia* assigns that miscellany to some circle more or less allied to the pious theosophists of the 2nd cent. whom we know as the Ophites collectively, and as the Nicolaitans, Simonians, and Barbelo-Gnostics specifically. For the Ophites, though numerically insignificant, were influential, and the tenets which they started seem to have been capable of permutation and modification in several directions.

Five etymologies of the term 'Barbelo' (Βαρβηλώ) have been proposed: (*a*) 'daughter of the Lord,' an equivalent for ברת־בעל; (*b*) 'God in the Tetrad,' בארבע אלוה, which is probably the most satisfactory explanation; (*c*) 'the supreme Limit,' *paravela*, from the Indian *vela*, 'limit'—a suggestion made by Julius Grill (*Untersuchungen über die Entstehung des vierten Evangeliums*, Tübingen, 1902, pp. 395-397), who connects it with the Valentinian Ὅρος, the Barbelo being called 'the supreme limit' in relation to the Πατὴρ ἀκατονόμαστος on the one side and to the lower syzygies on the other; (*d*) Bousset (*Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, p. 14 f.) suggests, on the lines of (*a*), that the word is a mutilation of παρθένος—the intermediate form, βαρθενώς, actually occurring in Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxvi. 1) as the name of Noah's wife; (*e*) finally, Hort's (*DCB* i. 225, 249) conjecture has to be chronicled, which regards 'Barbelo' as identical in meaning with its equivalent 'Babel' in the Gnosticism of Justinus (Hippol. *adv. Hær.* v. 26), *i.e.* as the chaotic germ of manifold existence—though the seductive, cosmological functions of Babel are very different from the celestial position of Barbelo and her Christological significance in the *Pistis Sophia*.

The only quotations are from the OT and the NT, the former including the Odes of Solomon among the canonical Psalms, the latter ranging over the four Gospels and most of the Epistles (with the exception of Hebrews). Instead of depreciating the OT, the *Pistis Sophia* believes in its inspiration; the divine power in Christ is traced in the OT as well as in the NT, and this absence of anti-Semitic bias differentiates the miscellany from the general class of Gnostic (Ophite) speculations. Furthermore, it makes no appeal to outside myths, as did the Ophites and the other Gnostic sects described by Hippolytus. Whether this was intentional or not, whether the *Pistis Sophia* documents came from a circle less cultured than the rest or from Gnostics who were shy of syncretism, it is a feature which allies them, in spite of their fantastic cosmogony and kabbalistic expressions, to the main body of the Church. Nor is it the only feature of this kind. Belief in the absolute efficacy of the sacraments, a certain reserve in exploiting mythology, a real devotion to Christ, and an evangelical sense of 'God for all the world' shimmer through the coloured and wavering mists of theosophy in the *Pistis Sophia*, and suggest that a genuine faith lay behind the chimeras and amalgamated texture of these Gnostics' cosmology.[1]

latter produces the female tetrad of ἔννοια, προγνωσις, ἀφθαρσια, and ζωη αιωνιος, while Barbelo produces the male triad of φῶς, (=Christ), νους, and λογος.

a. Contents.—The esoteric mysteries are as usual represented to be a revelation—in this case, as in many other Gnostic documents which are known more or less fragmentarily, a revelation made by the Risen Christ to the inner circle of His disciples. The precedent for this method had been furnished by the Catholic Church, in the interests of apostolic tradition. Thus Justin Martyr (*Apol.* i. 67) closes his account of the Christian sacraments and teaching by claiming that he was only setting before his pagan readers what 'Jesus had taught when He appeared on Sunday to His apostles and disciples'—an amplification of Mt 28[20]. In the *Pistis Sophia* the main purpose of Christ is to reveal and institute mysteries, and mysteries of a sacramental order, by which alone redemption from sin is possible for the elect. The starting-point is the same as in the uncanonical gospels which dealt with the Resurrection and passed into apocalypses, viz. the period of forty days which, according to Ac 1[3], Jesus spent with His disciples between the Resurrection and the Ascension. The communications which He was supposed to have imparted to His followers during this interval were shaped into fantastic revelations of heaven and earth. The *Pistis Sophia* (1-5)[2] starts also from the instructions given by the Risen Jesus to the disciples on Mount Olivet; but the remarkable and unique feature is that the writer extends the period to eleven years. Even this prolonged period did not enable the Lord to impart more than an elementary knowledge of the mysterious Light-world. Since He had not yet ascended, the esoteric meaning of the æons and spheres which intervene between the human soul and the supreme Light had still to be revealed, although the disciples complacently thought that they had already attained a perfect insight. Hence, after the ascension to the Prime Mystery (or Supreme God) on the 15th day of the month Tybi[3] (cf. *ERE* iii. 93) at full moon, when the passage of Jesus through the firmaments into the higher world had produced confusion among the powers of heaven and an earthquake which dismayed the disciples, He returned (cf. W. R. Newbold, *JBL* xxxi. (1912) 168-200) next day in dazzling glory and, to their delight, promised to complete their knowledge of the heavenly world, *i.e.* to describe the Ineffable One, who was above the Prime Mystery. The gnosis is practical; it is a revelation of the proper methods by which the disciples can attain, and help others to attain, the goal of their quest, viz. the attainment of the Light-world,[4] instead of the present mixed (κεραστμός) world which is destined to perish at the end.

The remainder of the first book (6-62) is devoted to this exposition, Jesus being occasionally questioned in the course of it by Mary Magdalene, Philip, Peter, Martha, John, Andrew, Thomas, Matthew, James, Salome, and the Virgin Mary, all of whom not only put questions but reveal for the approval of Jesus what is in their minds. The literary quality is not high, but the setting of the dialogue is sometimes quaint—Mary 'gazing into the air for an hour' (17) before she ventures to ask a question, Philip sitting and writing down the words of Jesus (22), Peter angrily complaining that Mary talked too much (36), and James reverently kissing the breast of Jesus before he speaks a word (51). The exposition itself is from time to time linked to mystical interpretations of OT texts; *e.g.*, one of the grotesque applications of Ps 85[10] ('mercy and truth are met together') is that these words denote the meeting of the Virgin Mary and Elisabeth (Lk 1[40]), since 'Mercy' was the divine

[1] Christ breaks the power of fate (εἱμαρμένη) over the soul (22 f.); but this preoccupation with the problem of destiny, which haunted the early centuries (cf. Gilbert Murray, *HJ* ix. [1910-11] 15 f.) like a nightmare, was faced by Christian thinkers in the Church, like Origen and Bardesanes, as well as by Gnostics (cf. the *Excerpta Theodoti*).

[2] Schmidt's numbering of the chapters, in his standard ed. (see under Literature), is followed throughout this article.

[3] Basilides and his school generally made this day the date of the baptism of Jesus (Clem. *Strom.* i. 21. 146) in the fifteenth year of Tiberius.

[4] Cf. and ct. the basal idea of Manichæism (*ERE* viii. 397, 400), and the discussion in the second book (xlix f.) of the Clementine *Recognitions*. But the *Pistis Sophia* is prior to the rise of Manichæism, and less dualistic in tone.

Power in Mary which issued in the shape of Jesus, while 'Truth' in Elisabeth developed into John the Baptist, the herald of the Truth (62).

Jesus begins (7) by describing the origin of the twelve apostles not from the rulers of the æons (*i.e.* the zodiac), as in the case of ordinary men, but from twelve Powers[1] taken by him from the twelve saviours of the Treasure of Light and placed in their mothers' wombs. John the Baptist's soul is similarly formed from a Power granted to Jesus by the beneficent 'little Iaô' and from the soul of Elijah.[2] His own incarnation (8) is due to His implanting of 'the first power I had received from Barbelô, that is to say, the body (σῶμα) which I had borne in the height, and instead of the soul (ψυχή), the power I had received from the great Sabaôth, the beneficent,' in Mary His mother. He then describes His investiture with three robes of light and His ascension through the various compartments or spheres, His victorious conflict with the archons and hostile powers of the twelve æons,[3] who were organized to thwart the redemption of the light, and His discovery, behind the veils of the thirteenth æon, of poor lonely Pistis Sophia (29) seated underneath that æon and mourning over her exclusion. The story of this pathetic figure is now told. She was the last and lowest of the twenty-four emanations, and she had incurred the hatred of the twelve æons by desiring the light of the Highest; furthermore, Arrogant (αὐθάδης), who sought control of the thirteenth æon, did his best to keep her out by issuing a lion-faced Power and other emanations in chaos (including Ialdabaoth), whose evil fascinations drew Pistis Sophia down through the twelve æons until, harried and darkened by her foes, and having abandoned her consort (σύζυγος), she reached chaos itself. Then, coming to herself, she repents of having mistaken the deceptive light of Ialdabaoth for the True, and cries to the Light of lights; by a twelvefold act of repentance, elaborately explained, she expiates the twelve æons, succoured at every stage by help from on high against Arrogant and his allies, and finally (57), having repented for abandoning the thirteenth æon,[4] she is led from chaos by a Power of Light sent by Jesus,[5] which crowns her with unquenchable radiance and inspires her to praise the Power of Light in a song.

An interpolated paragraph of alphabetical gibberish[6] has been inserted at this point (62). The following section (63–148) is entitled 'the second book of Pistis Sophia,' but the division is artificial and the name of the original document evidently was not 'Pistis Sophia' at all; at the close of 100 we read 'a portion of the books or texts (τεύχη) of the Saviour'—which covers 63–100. The next section (101) appears to be the conclusion of a different document altogether. Another 'portion of the books of the Saviour' follows (102–135), and the final section (136–148) has a later note appended, which recalls the contents of Mk 16^{9-20}.

The so-called 'second book of Pistis Sophia' continues the heroine's career. She is driven down by a fresh attack of her foes, but Jesus orders Gabriel and Michael to assist her by means of a stream of light against the archons and emanations who still thwart her progress; finally she is set in the centre of the Light itself, triumphing over the hostile æons of darkness by the direct aid of Jesus, who paralyzes Arrogant and his emanations. Her songs of praise and the revelations made to her are expounded at length; she accompanies Jesus into the thirteenth æon; then, after a hymn of praise, she passes suddenly, singing, out of the story. No more is heard of her. The remainder of the book (83 ff.) is occupied by an elaborate Gnostic survey of hierarchies, æons, and spheres. The drama gives place to exposition, and the theme is the next world, with special reference to the destiny of the soul and its varying fortunes there. The literary method is the same as in the first book: Jesus invites His hearers from time to time to guess the meaning of what He has said, and praises the answer; or He allows Himself to be questioned. But Mary does nearly all the speaking in the second book, though she confesses (72) that she is in terror of Peter—'I fear Peter, for he threatens me, and he hates our sex.'[1] She even, by permission of Jesus, explains at a later stage the mystic sense of Ex 21^{17} to Salome (132). The special feature of the dialogue is a severe rebuke of Andrew[2] for ignorance, but he is pardoned, at the humble request of the others (100). At this particular point the book becomes heterogeneous. The extract from 'the books (τεύχη) of the Saviour' gives place suddenly to the brief (101) conclusion of some lost Gnostic treatise or apocalypse of Jesus; this beatitude on the members who are initiated into the mysteries breaks the thread of the story, and, when a second extract from these books (102–135) opens, we find ourselves in a different world. The bizarre element predominates. Conversations between Jesus and the group continue, but the topics are less ethereal and speculative, connected for the most part with the gnosis of the initiated—*e.g.*, the power and limits of forgiveness, the influence of the living over the souls of the departed, the efficacy of baptism, the rules for imparting the mysteries of the faith, the meaning of destiny, etc. The sense of sin is deep, but the hope for sinners[3] lies in the rites of the Gnostic faith thus revealed. Finally, Mary exclaims: 'My Lord, lo, we know plainly, openly, and clearly (φανερῶς) that thou hast brought the keys of the mysteries of the realm of light, which forgive the sins of souls and purify them and make them pure light, and bring them into the light' (135). The entire section is a blend of puerile speculation, austere ethics, and sincere piety of the sacramental order, which some critics have thought to connect with the Marcosian sect.

The MS then contains a section which is usually called the fourth book (136–148). It has no connexion with the foregoing. Substantially it is a piece of Gnostic sacramentalism, couched in eclectic and often crude terms. The disciples, including the women (and, for the first time, Simon the Canaanite and Bartholomew), come to Jesus after the Resurrection, as He stands, clothed in white linen, on the shore of the ocean; their cry is,[4] 'Our Lord, have pity on us, for we have left father and mother and all the world and have followed thee.' Jesus, then, by a mystic incantation pronounced 'at the altar,' moves the spheres[5] right and left, transporting Himself and the disciples to an aerial region lying between, where He discourses to them upon the celestial hierarchies and the various torments endured by souls before they are released from the different rulers of the spheres. He comforts them, in view of all this, by reaffirming His gift to them of 'the keys of the heavenly realm' (141). A fresh incantation raises them to a sphere of light, where they receive a vision of fire, water, wine, and blood, which is explained as the meaning of Lk 12^{49}, Jn $4^{10.14}$, Mt 26^{27}, and Jn 19^{34}: 'I brought nothing into the world, when I came, except this fire, this water, this wine, and this blood; the water and the fire I brought from the region of the Light of lights, from the treasure of light, and the wine and the blood I brought from the region of Barbelo. Shortly afterwards, my Father sent me the holy spirit in the form of a dove. The fire, the water, and the wine were for the purifying of all the sins of the world; the blood was a sign for me of the human body which I received in the region of Barbelo, the great Power of the invisible God. The Spirit, again, draws all souls and leads them to the region of light.' Jesus then transports them back to the mountain of Galilee, institutes (cf. *ERE* vii. 408a) a mystic sacrament (142) of water, wine, and bread, intercedes successfully with the Powers who remit sins, on behalf of the disciples, and explains the efficacy of the supreme Name as a charm against the rulers of the spheres. There is a gap in the MS at this point. When it recommences, we are listening to a recapitulation, uttered with gusto and gloating, of the Dantesque punishments inflicted on the soul guilty of cursing, the slanderer, the murderer,[6] the thief, the scorner, the blasphemer, the sodomite, the obscene sorcerer,[7] and the good man who has not been

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[1] An indication of the Gnostic claim to apostolic authority and of the apostolic prestige in their theosophy. The treason of Judas is ignored.

[2] This is held to explain Mt $17^{11.12}$ 11^{14}. The older Gnosticism, described by Irenæus, made John the Baptist and Jesus emanations of Sophia herself, through the unconscious agency of Ialdabaoth. Here, as elsewhere, the *Pistis Sophia* departs from the Christology of the earlier schools of Gnostic speculation.

[3] Even in the medley of celestial figures Christ is supreme over these tyrannical lords of destiny (εἱμαρμένη). According to the *Pistis Sophia*, which tallies here with the Ophite system in general, the stars in their courses fight against the saints, and Jesus has to intervene in order to shorten the times for the sake of the elect.

[4] This is held to explain Ps 51^{1-4}.

[5] After His ascension. Her fall and preliminary rise seem to be prior to the advent of Christ; the completion of her rescue and uplifting is accomplished by the Ascended Christ.

[6] The jargon of foreign syllables and names in the *Pistis Sophia* prompted this scribe to try such composition on his own account. In 137, *e.g.*, we read a Word of Jesus to this effect: 'He (Jesu) drew another Power from ἴψανταχουνχαΐνχουχεωχ—who is one of the three gods of triple power—and bound it to Arês; and he drew a Power from χαΐνχωωωχ—who is also one of the three gods of triple power—and bound it to Hermes; and again he drew a Power from Pistis Sophia, the daughter of Barbelo, and bound it to Aphrodite.' Cf. C. Bigg, *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, London, 1905, p. 63 f.

[1] This may reflect a Gnostic claim for women in the prophetic ministry of the Church, as against an attempt on the part of the (Roman?) authorities to put them down.

[2] He gets the rebuke of Mt 17^{17} for wondering how the disembodied soul can escape the archons and powers.

[3] It is a free gospel. 'I have called and said to all men, sinners and just persons, "Seek that ye may find, knock that it may be opened to you; for everyone who seeks in truth shall find, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. For I have said to all men, that they are to seek the mysteries of the realm of Light, which will cleanse them and purify them and bring them to the Light"' (133).

[4] This cry for more light than the old gospel could furnish on the problems of the universe marks, as Harnack observes, the common plea of Gnosticism and catholicism; the simple gospel of Jesus had to be expanded to meet the speculative problems of the age.

[5] Among the grotesque semi-Egyptian colours of this sketch, it must be noted that the spheral powers include 'the basis (βάσις) of the moon, which was like a ship steered by a male and a female dragon, and drawn by two white oxen. On the poop of the moon there was the figure of a child who drove the dragons that had seized the light from the archons. At the bow was the face of a cat.'

[6] At this point Peter again protests that the women (Mary and Salome) are putting too many questions, and Jesus bids them let the men have a chance of speaking (146).

[7] These denunciations show how the *Pistis Sophia* abjured the libertinism which was rampant in some of the ultra-spiritualistic circles of Gnosticism. For the Egyptian basis of the Gnostic hell see E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904, i. 265 f.

initiated. Each case is proposed by a disciple, and answered by Jesus. He closes by declaring that (148) a man is punished separately for every sin, but that the penitent initiate is sure of pardon; also, He describes the best time for those to be born who shall be initiated into the mysteries. The original MS then ends with the words, 'When Jesus spoke thus to his disciples in Amenti, the disciples wept and wailed: "Woe, woe to the sinners on whom the indifference and forgetfulness of the archons lies, till they leave the body and are led to these punishments! Have pity on us, have pity on us, Son of the Holy One, and take compassion on us that we may be delivered from these punishments and judgments prepared for sinners—for we too have sinned, our Lord and our Light!"' The entire fourth book is kabbalistic as none of its predecessors is; the moral demand, which counteracted the magical element (*ERE* iv. 115[b]) in the sacramental doctrine, begins to fall away, and the religious temper narrows as well as hardens.

3. **Composition.**—The problem of the *Pistis Sophia* is twofold—literary and religious. The literary problem is to analyze the structure of the miscellany. Even when the first three books are taken by themselves, their original title cannot have been *Pistis Sophia*. This designation[1] may be retained for the sake of convenience, but it is the addition of a later scribe, and is just as appropriate as 'The Book of Una' would be for the *Faerie Queene*; the miscellany is much more comprehensive than such a title would suggest. Either 'The Books of the Saviour' or 'Questions of Mary and the Disciples concerning Repentance and Forgiveness, with the Answers of the Lord' would cover the contents more accurately. Even this, however, does not explain the juxtaposition of the fragments. One theory (Schmidt) is that the fourth book, together with the allied books of Jeû in the Bruce MS, must reflect an earlier stage of this Gnostic theosophy, at which the 'lower' mysteries as yet consisted mainly of a baptismal sacramentalism (*ERE* ii. 388[a]). The rival hypothesis (Liechtenhan) reconstructs an original document by omitting 64–80 as an interpolation. These theories are complicated by (*a*) the probability that the *Pistis Sophia* is based upon earlier Gnostic treatises of the 2nd cent. which are known to us, as far as they are known at all, mainly by their titles;[2] and (*b*) by the obvious connexion between our miscellany and the 'two books of Jeû,'[3] which happen to be preserved in the allied Sahidic MS of Bruce. The *Pistis Sophia* mentions these books (134) as containing the higher mysteries and as 'written by Enoch when I spoke with him from the tree of knowledge and from the tree of life.' But the books mentioned here can hardly be the books of the Bruce MS, for the latter do not profess to have been composed by Enoch. Nevertheless, there is a general similarity between the two MSS, which involves literary and religious questions that have not yet been answered definitely by experts. In the extant books of Jeû Jesus is also revealing the mysteries of the celestial spheres to His disciples, the sacramentalism is still more emphatic, the ascetic note is loudly struck, and the underlying aim is, as in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, to provide a safe passage for the initiated soul through the hostile regions of the other world. The latter aim, more explicitly than in the *Pistis Sophia*, dominates the sacramental interest; it must be admitted that the entire scheme of both works presents a grotesque, weird elaboration of the sacramental mysteries, compared with which the later Catholic construction may be described as simple and sober (cf. *ERE* v. 548[b]).

[1] E. Dulaurier and E. Renan (*Marc-Aurèle*[3], Paris, 1882, p. 120f.) proposed to read πιστη σοφια ('faithful *or* believing Wisdom'), but 'Faith-Wisdom' is quite intelligible, especially when it is remembered that the twelve æons posited by Valentinus commence with πιστις and end with σοφια.

[2] The discovery of the *Odes of Solomon* (*ERE* vii. 13[a]) has put one of these treatises in our hands; the *Pistis Sophia* quotes, among the canonical Psalms, from five of these Odes (i., v., vi., xxii., xxv.).

[3] Jeû in the *Pistis Sophia* is the father of Sabaoth, and consequently (see above, p. 47[a]) 'the father of the father' of Jesus. The pre-existence of Christ is assumed in the story of these books' origin; indeed, the pre-existence and the ascended activities of Christ in this literature are much more vital than the historical life and mission on earth, the main significance of the latter being that it inaugurated the sacramental rites. Jeû, in the *Pistis Sophia*, keeps the lower archons in order, but his principal mission is to transmit light from the higher Treasure to the regions below him, by way of revelation; he is more important as a medium than as a celestial potentate.

LITERATURE.—The literature may be grouped under the successive stages of criticism. The MS of the *Pistis Sophia*, originally possessed by A. Askew, passed into the keeping of the British Museum [MS Add. 5114] towards the end of the 18th century. Some passages had been already copied and noticed by C. A. Woide, the Coptic expert (cf. J. A. Cramer, *Beitrage zur Beforderung theologischer. . . . Kenntnisse*, Kiel and Hamburg, 1778, p. 82 f.), who assigned it, on palæographic grounds, to the 4th cent.; and in 1843 it was discussed by J. Matter, *Hist. critique du gnosticisme*[2], Paris, 1843-44, ii. 41 f., 350 f. E. Dulaurier (*JA*, 4th ser., ix. [1847] 534–548) ascribed the work to Valentinus; but his Fr. version was never published, and the first ed. of the MS did not appear till 1851, when M. G. Schwartze's Lat. tr. was posthumously ed. by J. H. Petermann (*Pistis Sophia, opus gnosticum Valentino adiudicatum*, Berlin, 1851), who attributed the document to the Ophites, an opinion shared by K. R. Köstlin in his exhaustive essay on the Gnostic system of the *Pistis Sophia* (*Theologische Jahrbücher*, xiii. [1854] 1–104, 137–196), and by R. A. Lipsius (*DCB* iv. 405–415). Portions were translated from Schwartze's version into Eng. by C. W. King, *Gnostics and their Remains*[2], London, 1887. A Fr. version by E. Amélineau followed (*La Pistis Sophia: Ouvrage gnostique de Valentin, traduit du copte en français, avec une introduction*, Paris, 1895), which was severely criticized by E. Andersson (*Sphinx*, viii. [1904] 237–253) and C. Schmidt (*GGA*, 1891, p. 640 f., 1892, p. 201 f.). An Eng. version, based on Schwartze and Amélineau, was published by G. R. S. Mead (*Pistis Sophia, a Gnostic Gospel . . . now for the first time Englished*, London, 1896). C. Schmidt's Germ. tr. (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, Leipzig, 1905, i. 1–254) had been preceded by his ed. and study of the allied Gnostic documents in *TU* viii. 1–2 [1892] ('Gnostische Schriften in koptischer Sprache aus dem Codex Brucianus'), as well as by A. Harnack's monograph, 'Ueber das gnostische Buch Pistis-Sophia,' in *TU* vii. 2 [1891]. Harnack's views are summarized in his *Gesch. der altchristlichen Litteratur*, i. (Leipzig, 1893) 171 f., ii. 2. (1904) 193 f. Schmidt's theory, that the two books of Jeû (in the Bruce MS) represent, along with the (so-called) fourth book of the *Pistis Sophia*, an earlier stage, is criticized adversely by E. Preuschen (*ThLZ* xix. [1894] 183–187) and defended by Schmidt in *ZWT* xxxvii. [1894] 555 ff.; Harnack tends to think that Schmidt has not proved his thesis at this point, and a similar scepticism, accompanied by an independent, positive reconstruction, is reflected by R. Liechtenhan in his 'Untersuchungen zur koptisch-gnostischen Litteratur' (*ZWT* ix. [1901] 236 ff.) and in *PRE*[3] xiv. 404 ff. The discovery of the *Odes of Solomon*, five of which were already preserved in the *Pistis Sophia*, has reopened the problem of the latter book; cf. J. Rendel Harris, *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon*, Cambridge, 1909, pp. 10–35, and W. H. Worrell, 'The Odes of Solomon and the Pistis Sophia,' *JThSt* xiii. [1911] 29–46. The most recent discussions of the *Pistis Sophia* will be found in W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, which brings out the syncretistic features; E. de Faye, *Introd. à l'étude du gnosticisme*, Paris, 1903, pp. 109–139, and *Gnostiques et gnosticisme*, do. 1913, p. 247 ff., the latter of which thinks highly—some will feel, too highly—of its religious value; P. D. Scott-Moncrieff, *Paganism and Christianity in Egypt*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 148 ff., which elucidates the Egyptian characteristics of the miscellany; and F. Legge, *Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity*, Cambridge, 1915, ii. 134 f.

JAMES MOFFATT.

PITṚS.—See ANCESTOR-WORSHIP (Indian).

PITṚYĀNA.—See DEVAYĀNA.

PITY.—Pity is pre-eminently a human emotion; it is either not shared at all or shared in a very inferior degree by the brutes. As a human emotion it is very widely spread, but affects men at different times and in different races in different degrees. Women are more moved by pity than men, civilized men than savages, and probably the northern more than the southern races. Among the Greeks and Romans pity was less felt than among Christian nations, in the mediæval life less than in the modern world. This is, perhaps, due to the increased ease of communication between one part of the world and another, and, as a consequence of this, to the growing solidarity of the human race. Hostility and anger are both apt to obliterate pity, or at any rate greatly to diminish it; on the other hand, affection for and contiguity to the sufferer enhance it.

1. **Greek.** In Homer pity is recognized as a

quality which prevails to some extent and ought to prevail among both gods and men. Yet no great stress is laid upon it, nor does its absence excite much indignation. In one passage (of doubtful authority) it or, rather, the respect which gives rise to pity is described as a quality 'which greatly injures and also greatly benefits men' (*Il.* xxiv. 45). In the tragedians the feeling of pity is more marked and occupies a more prominent place. Indeed, as Aristotle points out, tragedy could not exist and would have no point, did not human misfortune excite pity and were not people capable of being moved by the imaginary misfortunes of their fellow-men. He says that the object of tragedy is 'by means of pity and terror to effect a purging of such emotions' (*Poetics*, 1459^{b}, ed. Bywater, Oxford, 1909).[1] In some ways the most remarkable instance of pity exhibited in Attic tragedy is Prometheus's self-sacrifice for the good of mankind, brought about by the pity which he felt for their forlorn condition; with this is contrasted the pitiless inexorability of Zeus. This has in it some touch of the Christian doctrine of God's pity for man, though in spirit it stands greatly opposed to it. In Plato there is no formal treatment of the emotion of pity, though he recognizes it as a natural and proper human sentiment (*e.g.*, *Phædo*, 58 E). It is further characteristic of Plato that he thinks the condition of ignorance or mistake more to be pitied than that of those who fall into misfortune (*Rep.* 539 A). In Aristotle the emotion is treated more formally and at greater length. But in the *Ethics* he describes it along with desire, anger, and fear as a feeling (*πάθος*) (*Nic. Eth.* ii. 1105^{b}); in the *Rhetoric* he discusses at length the character of the emotion at least as it can be used for rhetorical purposes. Of course, as a simple emotion pity defies definition; no one could ever make the feeling of pity intelligible to a man who had never known it; but it is possible to analyze the circumstances in which it will arise and be felt, and this is what Aristotle attempts.

He describes it as 'a painful feeling arising on the sight of evil either destructive or painful, which happens to one who is unworthy of it, an evil of a kind which one might expect to suffer oneself or that one of one's friends should do so, and this when the evil appears close at hand. For it is clear that it is necessary that he who should feel pity should be such as to think that he might suffer the evil either in his own person or in that of one of his friends, and that the evil should be such, or very much such, as has been described in the definition' (*Rhet.* ii. 8).

The definition gives at first sight a somewhat selfish complexion to the feeling of pity; yet there can be no doubt that it lays the conditions down under which pity is most readily felt, and, though there is a pity which transcends this account of it, the definition accurately describes the pity by which the great majority of ordinary men are moved.

2. Roman.—In Latin literature the sentiment of pity occupies no prominent place; the Romans were not a compassionate people, and their literature faithfully reproduces this trait of their character. The passage where the feeling of pity is most finely touched upon in Latin literature is in Virgil:

'Hic . . .
Sunt lachrymae rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt'
(*Æn.* i. 462).

There is also a striking passage in which Tacitus contrasts the pity felt by some of the rough soldiers after the battle of Bedriacum, at the horrors which the field of battle displayed, with the callousness of Vitellius and his entourage (*Hist.* ii. 70). Cicero also knew what pity was; he described it as 'ill ease of mind growing out of the misfortune of another' (*Tusc. Quæst.* iii. 10), and 'the ill ease excited by the misery of another who suffers wrongfully' (*ib.* iv. 8).

[1] What the precise meaning of Aristotle's definition of the object of tragedy is has been much debated, and need not be discussed here.

3. Biblical.—In the Bible it is to be observed that the terms 'pity,' 'compassion,' and 'mercy' are used as practically synonymous (being all used in different places as translations of the same Hebrew and Greek words), and that they occupy a position which is unique in the religious literature of any people. For God is represented in Hebrew as well as in Christian literature not only as a God of justice but as pitiful, compassionate, and merciful. That such are the characteristics of God was a conviction which grew upon the prophets of Israel and the religious leaders of Jewish thought till it culminated in the teaching of our Lord Himself.

In the earlier books of the OT the pity and compassion of God are comparatively little emphasized. The most important passage occurs in the decalogue in both of the forms in which it has come down to us:

'Shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments' (Ex 20^{6}, Dt 5^{10} [*ποιῶν ἔλεος εἰς χιλιάδας τοῖς ἀγαπῶσί με καὶ τοῖς φυλάσσουσι τὰ προστάγματά μου*]);

but in the Psalms and in certain of the prophets the thought is very prominent—*e.g.*, Ps 86^{5} 103$^{8, 13}$ 130^{7} etc., Is 54$^{8, 10}$ 63^{9}, Jer 12^{15}, Hos 1^{7}.

In the NT the belief in God's pity or mercy follows as a direct consequence from the doctrine of God's fatherhood and God's love (*e.g.*, Lk 6^{36}). To St. Paul God is a God of mercy. God is the Father of mercies (2 Co 1^{3}); He is rich in mercy (Eph 2^{4}); mercy and peace come from God through Jesus Christ our Lord (1 Ti 1^{2}, 2 Ti 1^{2}, Tit 1^{4}, 2 Jn ^{3}).

Pity towards men is commended to us in the Bible as a consequence of the pity and mercy of God, and particularly of His pity and mercy as expressed by and revealed in the sending of Jesus Christ. Pity and mercy towards aliens and strangers were in early days perhaps no more recognized as a duty by the Israelites than they were by the Greeks and Romans; indeed, there is a passage (Dt 13^{8}) in which it is expressly forbidden that pity should be felt or shown towards those who try to pervert God's people from the worship of Jahweh into the worship of any strange god; but throughout the OT mercy and pity are inculcated towards members of the house of Israel, and the failure to have pity on the widow, the fatherless, and the destitute is strongly reprobated. In the NT the command to be pitiful has no such restrictions. The teaching of the parable of the Good Samaritan implies that our acts of charity, pity, and mercy are by no means to be limited to those of our own nation, and, as a matter of fact, under the teaching of Christianity pity has been extended so as to embrace sufferers of the whole human race, and in our day embraces the animal world as well.

4. Augustine.—In Augustine's *de Civitate Dei* there is an interesting chapter (ix. 5) devoted to the manifestation of pity as exhibited by God and man. He maintains against the Stoics, who asserted that God could not be moved by pity, that, while the claims of pity must always be subordinated to justice, it is yet an emotion which is not unworthy of God and should be exhibited by men to their fellow-men, being naturally called out by the sight of distress. The pity of God, of course, must depend on the repentance of man; yet, granted this condition, God's pity can flow out towards man, and, it would seem, inevitably does so. The pitiful God of the Christians stands thus contrasted with the passionless God of the Stoics, just as the compassionate man under the Christian dispensation is opposed to the unfeeling man of the Stoical ideal.

Yet, in spite of what Augustine urges, the idea of a pitiful God is not altogether an easy one

to embrace. It has to be taken in close connexion with the teaching of the NT on repentance. The good will, the love, the fatherhood of God to man, is a permanent attitude which remains, whatever man's conduct. Sin turns man's thoughts and his affections away from God; repentance makes possible the renewal of the relation between God and man, which has been there potentially all the time, but has been interrupted. The changed attitude of God to man consequent on repentance expresses itself in pity. The bearing of this doctrine on the question of the Atonement is outside the present article (cf. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT [Christian]).

5. English moralists.—In the English moralists the phenomena of pity and the cognate emotions held a considerable place. Hobbes started the investigation:

'Grieve, for the Calamity of another,' he says, 'is Pitty; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also Compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a Fellow-feeling: And therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same' (*Leviathan*, pt. i. ch. 6).

This selfish doctrine of pity is vehemently opposed by Butler in his two sermons on compassion (*Sermons*, v. and vi.). Having stated Hobbes's definition of pity as given in his treatise on *Human Nature*, ch. ix. § 10, as 'the imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense (he means sight or knowledge) of another man's calamity,' he proceeds to criticize it in the following way (*Sermon* v. 'Upon Compassion').

In the first place, he contends that it is no account of pity or compassion at all. The sight of a friend's misfortune might in some minds give rise to the feeling of fear for ourselves which Hobbes describes, but, if it gave rise to such a feeling, the feeling would not be one of pity or compassion, but something quite different. Again, there are objects which give rise to a sense of our own danger—*e.g.*, a sudden sight or sound, or some association of ideas—but no one would say that we compassionate or pity such objects; it would be ridiculous to do so. Again, fear, pity, and compassion would be on Hobbes's showing the same sentiment and a fearful and compassionate man the same character—which every one immediately sees are totally different. Again, while compassion and pity exhibited towards others, and especially towards our friends, commend us to the favour of all good men, fear or anxiety on our own account by no means equally recommends us. Pity, then, and compassion, Butler concludes, are not forms of self-love, but original affections, being grief at the distresses or misfortunes of others, are a primitive sentiment in human nature, a sentiment implanted in us, intended to prompt us to relieve those many miseries and sufferings of which, in Butler's view, life is so full. The emotion does not supplant reason, but fortifies it, reason being often too weak to induce men by itself to alleviate or attempt to banish the sufferings of our fellow-men unless supported by those feelings of compassion and pity with which, as a matter of fact, the better class of men are endowed.

One other question Butler touches upon in the course of these two sermons. Pity and compassion were regarded by many of the Stoics in earlier days and by some of Butler's own contemporaries as a weakness which the 'wise man' will seek to get rid of. To this Butler replies that the gratification of the affection may be, and often is, a source of pleasure to him who indulges it, and certainly makes compliance with the dictates of the sense of duty and reason easier and more possible than without such a sentiment they are likely to prove to the majority of mankind. In this way he answered by anticipation the objections of Kant, who took up on this point a position even more extreme than most of the Stoics. Kant said: 'The passions themselves, being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that, on the contrary, it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them' (*Grundleg. zur Metaphysik der Sitten* [*Sammtl. Werke*, ed. K. Rosenkranz and F. W. Schubert, Leipzig, 1838-40, viii. 50]).

Hume has a good deal to say about pity and compassion. Pity is defined by him as 'a concern for the misery of others' (*Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. ii. pt. ii. § 7). He does not accept Hobbes's view, that it is an affection springing from the sight of others suffering which makes us apprehensive on our own account. It has its source in the imagination, in the power which we have of putting ourselves in the place of others and gaining an impression of the ideas which they actually experience. It is a peculiarity of the passion, he continues, that the communicated passion of sympathy sometimes acquires strength from the weakness of its original feeling.

'A man who is not dejected by misfortunes is the more lamented on account of his patience' (*ib.*).

This principle of sympathy is largely invoked by Adam Smith to explain some of the phenomena which pity and compassion exhibit. Why is it, he asks, as Hume had also asked, that we feel more compassion for the man who exhibits greater magnanimity in his sufferings than for one who allows himself to be overwhelmed by them? The reason is, he answers, that we can more easily enter into, or sympathize with, the actual feeling which he displays.

'We wonder with surprise and astonishment at that strength of mind which is capable of so noble and generous an effort' (*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Edinburgh, 1849, pt. i. sect. iii. ch. 1).

6. Conclusion.—Pity, then, is a universal or almost universal human feeling, of the existence of which as a fact of human nature there can be no doubt, though the explanation of the feeling itself, and still more of the phenomena which it exhibits, may be in doubt; it is a feeling the presence of which in men, and still more in women, we approve, the absence of which we blame and deplore, but on condition that it leads to active interposition on behalf of those who are in distress; it is a feeling, moreover, which we readily attribute to God Himself, because we recognize that it is a form which love takes, a proof not of weakness but of strength.

LITERATURE. — The authorities are cited throughout the article.

W. A. SPOONER.

PLACES (Sacred).—In primitive religious conceptions the gods are not exempt from general limitations of space and time. Arguing by analogy, the savage ascribes to all material objects a life similar to that of which he himself is conscious, and he easily confounds the spiritual force with its visible embodiment. Hence in primitive myth we find animate and inanimate things equally capable of feeling and action, while transformations of men into animals are perfectly natural. The gods have a physical environment, on and through which they act. Nowhere ubiquitous, they are conceived of as bounded by certain local limits: the god's land is the land of his worshippers, and his immediate sphere of influence is his residence. Among the early Semites ideas of divine preference came to be associated with the fertility of particular places, whether from rainfall or from springs and watercourses, the local gods, or *bᵉʿālīm*, being recognized and appeased by a tribute of firstfruits, and, by a natural extension of meaning, of firstlings of cattle and men. Thus the idea grew that the gods have their proper homes or haunts where the worshippers lay their gifts on sacred ground, hang them on a sacred tree, or, in the case of sacrificial blood, pour it over a sacred stone. Later the home or sanctuary of a god was a temple, which could be erected only in a place where a god had manifested his presence. A theophany was held to justify the act of sacrificing on the spot (Gn 12^{7}, Ex 17^{15} etc.). Hence came the idea of the sanctity of such places as Bethel, Mamre, Shechem, Beersheba, etc. The theophany in Ex 3 took place on Sinai, because it is holy ground, Jahweh's habitual dwelling-place (W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[3], London, 1894, p. 118). Thus we see that holy places are older than temples, and that places become holy as the natural haunts of a god, these being in their earlier forms a cave, a rock, a fountain, or a tree. These places and things, as

the favourite haunts of divine beings, come naturally to be regarded as holy, as opposed to common, and are reserved for the use of the god and his ministers. In relation to man such sanctuaries come to be surrounded by restrictions as to access, especially for such persons as are physically unclean or have shed blood. The right of asylum in the OT was limited to involuntary homicide, and confined to certain old sanctuaries —the cities of refuge. But at some Arabian sanctuaries all fugitives were admitted to shelter. The idea of holiness had thus come to involve restriction or prohibition, together with the idea of protection from encroachment, as may be seen in the root-meaning of the Hebrew word *ḥimā*, a sacred enclosure or *temenos*. The god and his worshippers belong to a community of kinship, most probably on the basis of a totemistic conception of mutual relationship. Hence men naturally fell into the way of observing rules of holiness—'a system of restrictions on man's arbitrary use of natural things, enforced by the dread of supernatural penalties' (*ib.* p. 152), as found among all primitive peoples. This is the primitive institution to which the name 'tabu' has been given, including both rules of conduct for the regulation of man's contact with propitious deities and precautions against the approach of evil spirits and the like. The distinction between the holy and the unclean is real enough, though it may not be always precise, and both may overlap, as in the Levitical legislation.

The sanctuary, being protected by rigid tabus, had of course to be clearly marked in its limits. The *ḥimā* in Arabia sometimes included a large tract of pasture land marked off by pillars, and the *ḥaram*, or sacred territory, of Mecca extends for miles on almost every side of the city. The whole mountain of Horeb was sacred ground. The customary symbol or permanent visible object at and through which the worshipper comes into direct contact with his god is sometimes a natural object, as a fountain or tree, or an artificial erection, as a pillar or pile of stones. It is easy for the primitive imagination to connect ideas of animate life and quickening energy with running water or with the rustling leafage of a tree. And we find ideas of sanctity attached to rivers, as the Belus and the Adonis, and to springs at shrines with healing qualities, as the seven wells of Beersheba, etc., into which propitiatory gifts were cast with a view to divination or prophetic inspiration. The extension of the idea of sanctity to purposes of adjuration and ordeal is obvious enough. Trees were adored as divine among all the Semitic peoples, and still are as *manāhil* by the modern Arabs. The local sanctuaries of the Hebrews were altar-sanctuaries erected under trees, but the altar had an *ăshērāh*, or pole, beside it (Dt 16[21]). Again, grottoes or caves were supposed to be specially sacred, and the oldest Phœnician temples took this form. The holy cave was the original sanctuary of the temple of Apollo at Delos, and the *adytum*, or dark inner chamber, was common alike in Semitic and in Greek temples, being frequently the place where oracles were delivered. The sacrificial stone or altar in the Semitic sanctuary was the locality of most intimate communion between the worshipper and his god, on which sacrifices were burned and offerings set forth. The Arabian form was usually a cairn or heap of stones, upon which, or at the base of which, the sacrificial blood was poured out, as was the case also with the Greeks and Romans. We read in the OT of monoliths (*maṣṣēbhôth*) at sanctuaries, as at Shechem, Gilgal, etc.

'It seems clear that the altar is a differentiated form of the primitive rude stone pillar, the *nesb* or *maṣṣēba*. But the sacred stone is more than an altar, for in Hebrew and Canaanite sanctuaries the altar, in its developed form as a table or hearth, does not supersede the pillar; the two are found side by side at the same sanctuary, the altar as a piece of sacrificial apparatus, and the pillar as a visible symbol or embodiment of the presence of the deity, which in process of time comes to be fashioned and carved in various ways, till ultimately it becomes a statue or anthropomorphic idol of stone, just as the sacred tree or post was ultimately developed into an image of wood' (*ib.* p. 204).

Such sacred stones are found in connexion with the worship of the most various gods, in all parts of the world, as among the Ainus, the Brazilian tribes, the Samoans, etc. The *ăshērāh* develops into the wooden idol, the primitive unhewn monolith into the marble statue of the god, with which the altar still continues to be associated, and from these elements eventually the temple was built. The primitive altar grew out of totemistic ideas, and there is in the earlier stages no need to suppose that the stone or image in front of which the rites of worship are performed actually contained the god. The identification of the god and the abode in which he may be pleased to make his resting-place is, however, an easy transition. Thus among the American Indians the place of national worship for the Oneidas was the Oneida stone from which they claimed descent. The Dakotas and Ojibwas had similar stones, which they called 'grandfather.' The shaping of a likeness to the human face was natural enough, but by no means universal, as we see in the unchanged idol of Astarte at Paphos. It must be clearly understood that the idea of the stone becoming the permanent rather than an occasional dwelling-place of the god represents a later stage of development. The existence of sacrifice implies an earlier totemistic stage, in which the blood sprinkled is that of the totem-animal, and the object is the renewal of the blood-covenant between the totem-clan and the totem-god (F. B. Jevons, *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*[6], London, 1914, p. 141). This superstition lingered long. It was condemned by the Council of Nantes in 895, but it survives to this day in some corners of France and Norway.

In ancient Rome, in the earliest times, there was no temple or image representing a deity. Certain places were regarded as *religiosa*, affected by tabu, as distinguished from *loca sacra*, places made over to the deity by certain formulæ, under the authority of the State, by the processes of *consecratio*. Such a place, in which a deity had taken up his abode, was a *fanum*, containing a *sacellum*, or small roofless enclosure, with an *ara*. Among *loca religiosa* were the spots where thunderbolts had fallen and burial-grounds. This feeling or scruple (*religio*) as applied to places finds expression in Virgil's lines describing the visit of Æneas to the site of the future Rome:

'Hinc ad Tarpeiam sedem et Capitolia ducit,
Aurea nunc, olim silvestribus horrida dumis.
Jam tum religio pavidos terrebat agrestis
Dira loci; jam tum silvam saxumque tremebant.
"Hoc nemus, hunc," inquit, "frondoso vertice collem,
(Quis deus, incertum est) habitat deus"'
(*Æn.* viii. 347 ff.).

The temple on the Capitol, with its statue of Jupiter, and that of Diana on the Aventine, with its reproduction of the ξόανον of Artemis at Massilia, were the earliest statues of the gods in roofed temples at Rome. From the earliest times the Roman boundaries, house, burial-place, and spring were considered as in a special sense sacred, needing constant religious care. The hearth (*focus*) was the 'natural altar of the dwelling-room of man' ('Aust's admirable expression,' as Warde Fowler styles it, quoting E. Aust, *Die Religion der Römer*, Münster, 1899, p. 214), and the seat of Vesta, the spirit of the fire. Behind the hearth was the *penus*, or storing-place of the household, inhabited or guarded by spirits, the *di penates*,

who together with Vesta represent the material vitality of the family (W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, lect. iv.). The protecting door-spirit was Janus; and in the *Janus bifrons* in the symbolic gate of the Forum Fowler sees a developed form of the spirit of the house-door. The *lar* was originally the presiding spirit, not of the house, but of an allotment, or the whole of the land of a *familia*, including that on which the house stood. The *terminus* was the boundary-mark of the land belonging to the *familia*, or the *pagus* (an association of farms and homesteads), and its care was marked by detailed religious ceremonies. The *lustratio*, or purification, of land, city, etc., was carried out by means of a solemn procession accompanied with sacrifice. And, as the *ager* of the city-state had its boundary made sacred by a *lustratio*, so the city had its *pomœrium*, or boundary-line between the sacred and the profane, like that of the farm, within whose limits alone the *auspicia* of the city could be taken. See, further, art. LANDMARKS AND BOUNDARIES.

The earliest Teutonic word for temple means also wood, and the primitive shrine of the deity was a holy place untouched by human hand, a grove. A god may inhabit a mountain-top, a cave, or a river, but the general worship was a forest cultus, its seat a sacred tree (cf. Tac. *Germ.* ix.). This is not pure nature-worship, for the gods dwelt in these groves, although as yet no walls were built or images set up. Among the Saxons and Frisians the veneration of groves long survived the introduction of Christianity. At the beginning of the 11th cent. Bishop Unwan of Bremen had all such woods cut down in his diocese, and Grimm (*Teutonic Mythology*, i. 73 f.) tells us of a holy oak near Wormeln, Paderborn, to which even in his time the neighbouring peasants made a solemn procession every year. The earliest temples were built on the sites of the more ancient trees or groves, and, later, Christian churches were erected on the same spot, so that the old sacredness did not depart from the place, but merely passed into a higher relation.

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T. DAVIDSON.

PLAINS INDIANS. — **1. Distribution and history.**—The region that gives a geographical name to this group of American Indians is of an irregular oblong shape, some 2500 miles from north to south and 1000 to 1500 miles from east to west. Roughly speaking, the Plains extend from the Rio Grande in S.W. United States to the Saskatchewan River in Canada, and from the base of the Rocky Mountains to Lake Winnipeg in Canada and the Missouri and the Mississippi in the United States. Down the long easterly slope of this broad stretch of land flow many streams that take their rise in the Western mountains. Trees border these numerous waterways, but the country is barren of forests. This was formerly the home of over twenty different tribes, belonging to six different linguistic stocks. They were as follows:

(1) Algonquian: Arapaho, Blackfeet (or Siksika), Cheyenne, and Cree; (2) Athapascan: Apache; (3) Caddoan: Arikara and Pawnee, (4) Kiowan: Kiowa, (5) Shoshonean: Comanche; (6) Siouan: Assiniboin, Crow (or Absaroka), Dakota, Hidatsa, Iowa, Kansas, Mandan, Missouri, Omaha, Osage, Otoe, Ponca, and Quapa.

To and fro over the wide Plains formerly moved vast herds of buffalo, which gave abundant food and furnished the Indians with pelts for clothing as well as covering for their tents. The tribes regarded these animals as specially provided for the sustenance and welfare of the native people, and this gift was gratefully recognized in their religious rites.

The Indians of the Plains had been attracted thither by the buffalo herds. Some of the tribes had come from the woods on the north, east, and west, where the game, although plentiful, was more or less difficult to secure; others had come up from the south for similar reasons. After the settlement of the white colonists on the Atlantic coast a new force was felt over the land. A gradual displacement of the native tribes formerly dwelling on the eastern littoral and its streams began and went on increasing, until it was felt as a westward pressure up to the eastern border of the Plains. This steady displacement, added to the influence of the white traders, the adventurers, and the 'opening up of the country,' brought to the Indians new diseases, intoxicants, and many other evils which greatly reduced their number.

The horse reached the Plains with the expedition of Coronado in 1541. Later, strays multiplied rapidly, and finally formed the herds of wild horses that became the principal source of the Indian supply. What tribe introduced them on the Plains and used them for hunting is not known, but they were first met by tribes of the Siouan stock, among the Comanche, who were famous for their horsemanship, and from that tribe knowledge was obtained of the use and care of the horse. Not only did the horse modify hunting methods, but it introduced a new species of property, changed social customs, and led to foraging expeditions and to wars.

Although the Plains was never a peaceful country, the changing conditions increased its turbulence until it became a great battle-field as well as a hunting-ground. The greatest blow that the native life of the Indian ever received came during the first decades of the latter half of the 19th cent., when, in the interests of trade, the buffalo were slaughtered by the thousand, until within a few years they were practically extinct. What that catastrophe meant to the Indian it is difficult for one of our race fully to appreciate. The present writer can never forget the occasion, some thirty years ago, when its meaning was really borne in upon her.

The aged Omaha keeper of the sacred rites that inaugurated the annual tribal buffalo-hunt consented to recite the rituals, for historic preservation; he stood alone in his little cabin before the graphophone to voice for the last time the words that told of the birth of the buffalo-herds. When he came to the promise given by Wakonda, in answer to man's appeal, that the herds should come to the people from all directions, the tears rolled down his withered cheeks as he sobbingly murmured: 'Not now, not now!' To him, Wakonda had abandoned the Indian and the world had become desolate.

The old man did not long survive this recital.

2. Religious and social ideas. — The social organization and religious ceremonials of the Plains Indians varied in a number of particulars. Those tribes belonging to the Algonquian linguistic stock had formerly dwelt under sedentary and agricultural conditions, and many of the habits then formed were lost under the stress of hunting; the binding force of a close social organization also gave way, with the result that religious rites and social customs were modified. With the affiliated Arapaho and Cheyenne tribes the 'Sun-dance' became the principal ceremony of the people. This composite rite spread to some tribes of the Siouan linguistic stock. It was not directly connected with the worship of the sun, as its name might imply. It is true that the 'dancer' turned towards the sun, but it was viewed as a symbol of the unseen Power that had granted the prayer of

the dancer—usually a supplication for the recovery of a sick relative, the sincerity of the request to be proved by the suppliant going through the torture of the Sun-dance. The Sun-dance witnessed by the writer in 1882 was the fulfilment of a vow made that the life of a sister might be spared to her family. There was therefore an altruistic teaching in this seemingly barbarous rite.[1]

Among the Cheyenne there is an ancient ceremonial connected with four sacred arrows that have been preserved time out of mind, which was related to the teaching of the sanctity of life within the tribe. Little is known of this rite, as no one having any white blood has ever been allowed to witness it. See art. CHEYENNE.

The tribes of the Caddoan linguistic stock had long been familiar with the cultivation of the maize which figured in their tribal rites. These were elaborate, and presented phases of anthropomorphism that were not met with elsewhere.

The tribes of the Siouan linguistic stock dwelt on the eastern border of the Plains, along the banks of the Missouri River and the lower part of some of the tributaries of the Mississippi. The people lived in villages and cultivated maize, beans, and a few other plants; they went out to hunt buffalo and other game, returning home with their supply of meat and pelts. Early in the 17th cent. these tribes came into touch with French traders from the south, by way of the Mississippi, and across country to the north and east from the lakes and the St. Lawrence River. With the influx of wares during the 18th and 19th centuries, the native arts of weaving, pottery-making, and the manufacture of implements and weapons from stone, bone, and wood declined and finally ceased altogether. Under these influences hunting grew to be more or less a mercantile pursuit, and the religious rites formerly connected with it began to lose their power.

During the latter half of the 19th cent. the life of the tribes became greatly modified and at its close hardly a tribe was practising its ancient vocations and rites, or was dependent for social order upon its tribal form of government. The entire country was under the control of the white race, railroads stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the mountains were no barriers, and portions of the Plains once regarded as a desert yielded to modern methods of land cultivation, so that the old life passed for ever out of sight. The native race survived under the new conditions, nor were their ancient beliefs wholly obliterated; these had too long been vital to the race to yield to mere external pressure. What those beliefs were has assumed new importance to the student of the development of the mind and thought of man while under the direct and sole tutelage of nature.

The American Indians belong to an observant, thoughtful, out-of-door people who for generations have lived on intimate relations with an unmodified environment. All animals pursued their own untrammelled mode of life, only the dog being domesticated. With few exceptions, the plants were undisturbed in their manner of growth; there were no highways to break the wide expanse of grass, or bridges to span the streams. There was nothing to suggest any break in the continuity of the natural relation between man and his surroundings. It is difficult for one of our race to conceive of that once unbroken stretch of country, giving no sign of the master-hand of man or of his permanent occupancy. It was amid such untouched, unforced conditions that the American Indian attentively watched the various phases of life about him and pondered upon what he saw.

[1] For a description of the Sun-dance see art. PHALLISM, § 2.

Everywhere he seemed to discern that dual forces were employed to reproduce and so to perpetuate living forms. The fructifying power of the sun was needed to make the earth fruitful, and only on the union of the two, sky and earth, was life in its various forms made possible. Upon these two opposites he projected human relations and made them, to a degree, anthropomorphic; the sky became masculine, the earth feminine. Finally, by thinking along these lines, as his rituals reveal, he was led to conceive of the cosmos as a unit, permeated with the same life force of which he was conscious within himself—a force that gave to his environment its stable character, to every living thing on land and water the power of growth and of movement, to man not only his physical capacities but the ability to think, to will, to bring to pass. This unseen, undying, unifying force is called by the Omaha and cognate tribes Wakonda. Through Wakonda all things came into being, are ever related, and made more or less interdependent. Consequently, nature stood to the Indian as the manifestation of an order that had been instituted by Wakonda, of which man was an integral part. To this order he turned for guidance when establishing those means, religious and secular, that would ensure to him, individually and socially, safety and continuous life.

Finding himself to be one of a wide-reaching cosmic family, the Omaha (and his cognates) planned the tribal organization upon the type of that family. The people were divided into two great sections, one to represent the sky, the other the earth. Each section was composed of a number of kinship groups, called by a general term meaning 'village.' (These are spoken of by our students as 'clans' or 'gentes.') Each village stood for some one of the forms of life seen in Wakonda's instituted order. The sky was the abode of the sun, the stars, the winds, and the storm-cloud with its thunder and lightning, and to each village of that section was committed something regarded as symbolic of one of these manifestations. The earth, with its land and water, was the abode of the trees, grasses, and the various animals so closely allied to man and his needs, and to each village of that section was committed something typical or symbolic of one of these manifestations of life. In this way the tribal organization aimed at mirroring man's environment, as ordained by Wakonda, and was primarily religious in character, and secondarily political in its function. The tribal rites were instituted to emphasize that which the tribal organization portrayed, and to provide means by which the people should together acknowledge the order inaugurated by Wakonda, of which man was a part. In these rites all the villages of the two sections had a share, as well as the symbols committed to their keeping, so that the people, standing in the appointed order, with one voice appealed to the invisible Wakonda for help to secure food, safety, and long life.

A few words are necessary regarding the symbolic objects committed to the villages, as there has been considerable misconception of these and the Indian's use of them. Each village, according to the section to which it belonged, had charge of one of these symbols. The term by which it was designated in the Omaha language meant 'that by which they make themselves known as a people.' It is to this object that the term 'totem' has been applied. The symbol, representing, as it did, one of the forms of life in the sky or on the earth, as created by Wakonda, had a sacred significance to the people of the village and held the central place in their ceremonies. It bound the people together by a sacred tie, made them

distinctive among the other villages, and was a link between them and the invisible Wakonda. The symbol belonging to a village was always metaphorically referred to in the name of the village, and also in the personal name ceremonially given to every child born within the village. The symbol might be an animal (*e.g.*, the buffalo) or a force (*e.g.*, the wind), and the people might be spoken of by the name of the symbol of their village (*e.g.*, the buffalo people, or the wind people). This form of speech never meant to imply that the people were descended from the buffalo or any other symbolic object. Certain articles were regarded as associated with the different symbols; these were always treated with marked respect, and the people of a village never touched the articles associated with their own sacred symbol.

The tribal rites of the Omaha and cognates were composed of dramatic acts, the recitation of rituals, and the singing of ritualistic songs. In these are embodied the myths setting forth the genesis of man and his relation to nature. The stories, symbols, and metaphors are often highly imaginative and not infrequently touched with poetic feeling. These formed a nimbus about the rites that both illuminated and made elusive their meaning.

In the tribal rites can be traced the gropings of the Indian's mind to find that power, greater than man, which was the source of visible nature, to discover a way for man to approach it and receive help from it, and to search for the meaning of the activities that were everywhere apparent. The religious and social ideas developed through this search, extending through generations, as evidenced in the rituals, were gradually evolved and formulated in the tribal rites, wherein were clearly set forth the importance of the perpetuation of human life and the recognition that Wakonda is ever present in all things that surround man.

There were no specially designated persons in the tribe whose duty was to teach religion or ethics, nor were there any succinct, practical commandments as to the beliefs or actions. Religious and ethical teachings were embedded in the tribal and other rites. The duty of explanation and instruction to the laity, concerning the meaning and the teaching of these rites, devolved on the thoughtful elders of the tribe, who generally belonged to those eligible for the office of keeper and who formed a kind of hereditary priesthood.

3. **Wakonda.**—The term *wakonda* is not modern and does not lend itself to analysis. It is distinct from the word meaning 'spirit' and has nothing in common with it. *Wakonda* is not a synonym of 'Great Spirit,' of nature, or of an objective god, a being apart from nature. It is difficult to formulate the native idea expressed in this word. The European mind demands a kind of intellectual crystallization of conceptions which is not essential to the Indian and which, when attempted, is apt to modify the original meaning. *Wakonda* stands for the mysterious life-power permeating all natural forms and forces and all phases of man's conscious life. The idea of *wakonda* is therefore fundamental to the Indian's relation to nature and to all living forms, including man. While the conception of *wakonda* may appear vague, certain anthropomorphic attributes were ascribed to it, approximating to a kind of personality. Besides the insistence on truthfulness in word and deed, there were qualities involving pity and compassion, as shown in certain rites. All experiences of life were directed by *wakonda*—a belief that led to a kind of fatalism.

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PLANTS.—See TREES AND PLANTS.

PLATO AND PLATONISM.—1. **Life.**—Aristocles, known always in after life as Plato (Πλάτων), was born at Athens (or, as some say, at Ægina) on 26th or 27th May 427 B.C. (or, as some say, 5th or 6th June 428 B.C.). He was well born, his father, Ariston, being of the family of Codrus, and his mother, Perictione, or Potone, of that of Solon; he was well bred; he was well-to-do. In his youth he received the customary education in music and gymnastic, and he performed the usual military service. He is said to have had poetical aspirations—dramatic, epic, lyric. In all probability he looked forward to a political career. Having been in early years introduced to the Heracleitean philosophy by Cratylus, he became acquainted about 407 with Socrates, and henceforward was one of his 'familiars' or 'associates' (ἑταῖροι). Presumably Plato shared Socrates' political unorthodoxy; that is to say, he was a 'moderate' of the type of Theramenes, and, whilst he had no sympathy with Critias and the extreme oligarchs, desired a stringent reform of the 'unmixed democracy.' Accordingly, he was one of those Socratics who, on the death of their master in 399, withdrew from Athens and found a refuge with Eucleides at Megara. It is possible that Plato returned to Athens in or about 394. Then came a time of travel, when he is said to have visited Egypt, Cyrene, Magna Græcia, and Sicily. At Syracuse he made acquaintance with Dion, and with Dion's brother-in-law, the 'tyrant' Dionysius the Elder. It is said that Dionysius, taking offence at remarks made by Plato about the ethics of tyranny, revenged himself by delivering Plato to one Pollis, a Spartan diplomatist; that Pollis sold Plato in the market-place of Ægina, as though he were a prisoner taken in war; that Anniceris of Cyrene bought him and set him free; that Plato's friends proposed to repay to Anniceris the sum which he had expended; and that, when Anniceris declined their offer, the money was spent in the purchase of the garden of Academus. Whatever may be thought of this curious story, Plato, when he returned to Athens about 387, established, first in the gymnasium of Academus and afterwards in the garden hard by, the school known henceforward to all time as the Academy. Here he lived, thought, taught, and wrote. It may be conjectured that in the earlier days of the Academy Plato not only delivered formal lectures, but also gave personal instruction to his abler pupils, using his written dialogues as texts for catechetical teaching; and that he shared the common life of the school. But there is reason to believe that in later years he delegated the personal teaching to others, and that towards the end of his life his public lectures were few and far between. In 367 he made a second journey to Syracuse in the vain hope of winning the younger Dionysius to philosophy, and thus realizing his scheme of an ideal polity governed by a philosopher-king. A third journey to Sicily in 361, having for its object the reconciliation of Dionysius with his uncle, Dion, was conspicuously unsuccessful. Plato died at Athens in 347.

2. **Writings.**—In the age of the emperor Tiberius the grammarian Thrasylus framed a canon of Plato's writings, and included in it the *Apology of Socrates*, which purports to represent the unpremeditated defence addressed by Socrates

to his judges; the *Epistles*, a collection of letters supposed to have been written by Plato to his friends; and 34 dialogues on philosophical subjects. There has been, and there still is, controversy about the epistles, some thinking that all are genuine, others that some, and in particular vii. and viii., are genuine, and others again (with whom the present writer ranges himself) that all are spurious. Doubts have been raised about certain of the 34 dialogues; but no serious critic of the present day questions any of the more considerable of them. It is easy to see why Plato gave to his writings a conversational form. Socrates had held that the teacher should elicit and suggest rather than inculcate and dogmatize, and had therefore preferred spoken to written discourse, question and answer to continuous exposition. Plato accepted his master's principle; and accordingly, though he deserted his example so far as to make use of writing, he was careful in so doing to imitate conversation. In most of the dialogues Socrates is the chief speaker; but Plato's Socrates is an idealized Socrates, who has an urbanity foreign to the Socrates of history, and he sometimes propounds physical and metaphysical doctrines which could not have found favour with a philosophical agnostic. In the *Parmenides* Socrates takes the second place; in the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Timæus* he retires into the background; and in the *Laws* he does not appear. The dialogues differ in structure, inasmuch as the conversation is sometimes written down in the words of the supposed interlocutors; sometimes is reported by X, who has taken part in the discussion or has been present at it; once is reported by X, who heard the story from Y; and once is reported by X, who heard it from Y, who heard it from Z. They differ also in literary character and treatment. Some are lively and dramatic; some are eloquent and poetical; some are severely dialectical. Though in general the conversational form is studiously maintained, there are upon occasion great stretches of continuous discourse; and in particular there are imaginative interludes called myths (μῦθοι), which, making no pretension to exactitude of statement, claim notwithstanding to be substantially true, and, where experience fails, to fill a gap by provisional hypotheses (*Phædo*, 114 D). Thus, the making and the maintenance of the universe, prehistoric society, the day of judgment, and the future state are mythically described. In a word, the myth is a profession of faith. The introductions prefixed to some of the dialogues and the description of the last hours of Socrates in the *Phædo* are the very perfection of continuous narrative. The style is always the best possible for the occasion; for Plato's harp has many strings.

3. The grouping of the dialogues.—Assuming that, when Plato began to write, the fundamentals of his system were already settled, and that accordingly the order of the principal writings was determined by the needs and the conveniences of exposition, Schleiermacher,[1] the father of the modern study of Platonism, recognized three groups of dialogues: elementary, transitional, and constructive. The *Phædrus*, he thought, was the earliest of the dialogues; the *Republic*, the *Timæus*, the *Critias*, and the *Laws* were the latest. On the other hand, K. F. Hermann,[2] denying that the system came into existence full-grown, saw in the several dialogues the results and the evidence of Plato's doctrinal development, and distinguished three periods of his literary activity: (1) the years immediately following the death of Socrates; (2) the residence at Megara; and (3) the years 387–347. Subsequent inquirers, however much they differ in detail from one another and from Hermann, seem on the whole to agree in accepting his principle of interpretation.

It will be convenient to note, first, the principal points in which the critics are agreed; secondly, the principal points in which they differ. The critics are for the most part agreed in recognizing a group of dialogues in which Plato, despite certain differences of nomenclature and method, has not yet advanced beyond the Socratic standpoint; and it is obvious to assign these to an early date. Again, tradition ascribes to the *Laws* the last place; and modern scholarship readily assents, adding that the *Timæus* and the *Critias* come next before it. Further, on internal evidence it is obvious to suppose that certain dialogues which are critical of educational methods—*Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Phædrus*, *Euthydemus*, *Symposium*, and *Meno*—preceded the *Republic*, in which Plato propounds his own educational theory. Thus far there is little disagreement. But there is an eager controversy about certain dialogues which have been described as 'dialectical' or 'professorial,' namely, the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus*, the *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*, and about their relation to the *Republic*, some regarding them as dialectical exercises preparatory to the dogmatic teaching of that great dialogue, whilst others find in them a style later than that of the *Republic*, reasoned criticism of its metaphysical doctrine, and substantial contributions to a revised and reconstituted system. The present writer, who holds that the five dialogues called dialectical or professorial look back to the *Phædo* and the *Republic*, forward to the *Timæus*, and together with the *Timæus* represent Plato's philosophical maturity, would arrange the principal dialogues in five groups corresponding to successive stages in Plato's intellectual development, namely: (1) Socratic dialogues, (2) educational dialogues, (3) *Republic*, *Phædo*, *Cratylus*, (4) professorial dialogues, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Theætetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, together with *Timæus*, (5) *Laws*. An attempt must now be made to characterize these several stages of Plato's intellectual development, and to show how the principal dialogues illustrate and elucidate them.

4. The five stages of Plato's intellectual development.—(1) *The Socratic dialogues.*—About the middle of the 5th cent., say 450 B.C., the philosophers who sought knowledge for its own sake were faced and baffled by three questions: (*a*) What is being? (*b*) What is knowledge? (*c*) What is predication?; and, for the moment, philosophical inquiry seemed to be at a standstill. Democritus indeed had not abandoned the attempt to provide a scientific cosmology and cosmogony; and, towards the end of the century, the neo-Heracleitean Cratylus, recognizing that, if all things are in flux, there is nothing to be perceived, looked to etymology for evidence of something permanent underlying the perpetual process of phenomena. But Democritus belonged to the past, and the etymological theory of Cratylus never established itself. Accordingly, in the latter half of the 5th cent. (450–400) the main stream of thought set strongly in the direction of philosophical agnosticism, and the intellectual aspirations of central Greece found expression for the most part in humanism—that is to say, the literary humanism of the Sophists and the ethical humanism of Socrates. Plato's youthful study of Heracleitean flux had made him a philosophical agnostic; for, even in early days, he must have recognized the futility of Cratylus's etymological

[1] *Platons Werke*, Berlin, 1855–62, I. i. 32–36.
[2] *Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie*, pt. i. (do. 1839) p. 384, etc.

theory. He was then ready to receive and assimilate the positivism of Socrates; and for a time he found a refuge in dialectical theory and practice. But, whereas Socrates had seen in the study of ethical consistency a sufficient occupation for his energies and had rested in it, Plato, taking his departure from the logic of consistency, proceeded to build upon it, first, a philosophy, secondly, a science, and, thirdly, a sociology. Moral error, Socrates had thought, is largely due to the misapplication of general terms which, once affixed to a person or an act—possibly in a moment of passion or prejudice—stand in the way of a sober and serious judgment. In order to guard against error of this sort, and to secure in the individual at any rate consistency of thought, and, in so far, consistency of speech and action, Socrates spent his life in seeking, and helping others to seek, 'the what,' or the definition, of the words by which the moral quality of actions is described. This statement of the aim which Socrates had steadily pursued exactly describes the end which Plato proposed to himself in the Socratic dialogues of his first period. But Socrates had talked, and Plato wrote. Consequently, whereas Socrates, who talked, having satisfied himself that the ἔλεγχος, or cross-examination, had made the hearer aware of his ignorance, might, and did, point the way to a definition, Plato, who wrote, if he was not to sacrifice the advantage of the elenctic stimulus, was obliged to stop short of dogmatic reconstruction.

E.g., in the *Euthyphro* Socrates invites his interlocutor to define 'piety' or 'holiness.' At first Euthyphro does not understand what Socrates means by a definition. Socrates explains. Then Euthyphro propounds in succession several definitions, and Socrates shows their insufficiency. Again and again confuted, but in no wise abashed, Euthyphro pleads an engagement, and the dialogue ends. We may perhaps conjecture that Plato intends to define piety or holiness as 'that part of justice which is concerned with the service of the gods'; but, in order that the reader may be compelled to think for himself, Plato carefully refrains from formulating his result.

The Platonic dialogue of this period is, then, an exercise in Socratic dialectic; but, whereas the destructive process is set out at length, the constructive process is left to be supplied by the reader. Contrariwise, Xenophon, who, being apologist rather than educator, cares little for the ἔλεγχος, and is chiefly anxious to justify his master's morality, neglects the destructive process and dwells upon the constructive results. Besides the *Euthyphro* (piety), the *Charmides* (temperance), the *Laches* (courage), the *Lysis* (friendship), and the *Hippias Maior* (beauty) are characteristic dialogues of the first or Socratic period. In this period Plato uses the terms 'form' (εἶδος) and 'idea' (ἰδέα) to mean the characteristic or characteristics included in a Socratic definition, *i.e.* 'the one in the many,' the element common to a plurality of things which we propose to call by the same name. But, inasmuch as the Socratic definition of a term of morality or art does not presume, either in or out of nature, any objective unity corresponding to it, the 'form' or 'idea' has no separate existence, it is not χωριστόν τι. In this stage, then, the forms or ideas are moral and æsthetic concepts framed by the individual in order that he may be consistent in thought, word, and deed, and that he and his interlocutor may not misunderstand one another.

(2) *The educational dialogues.*—The dialogues of the second period show a notable advance upon the dialogues of the first both in their style and in their doctrine: in their style, for they are more complex, more literary, and more dramatic; and in their doctrine, for Socrates, the protagonist, propounds doctrines unknown to the Socrates of history, the Socrates of Xenophon, and the Socrates of Plato's Socratic writings. These dialogues are primarily concerned with the criticism of earlier and contemporaneous theories of education. Thus the *Protagoras* brings the educational methods of Protagoras and the Sophists face to face with the educational method of Socrates; the *Gorgias* and the *Phædrus* deal respectively with the moral and intellectual aspects of the forensic rhetoric of Gorgias and the political rhetoric of Isocrates; the *Meno* criticizes the makeshift method of those who, despising systematic teaching, regarded the practical politician as the true educator; the *Euthydemus* caricatures the contemporary eristic; and all these dialogues, together with the *Symposium*, whilst they demonstrate the superiority of Socratic dialectic to the current sophistries, show a growing consciousness of its limitations and insufficiency. If education is to do what we expect of it, surely it should have for its basis, not personal consistency, but objective truth. Where, then, is truth to be found? Not in objects of sense, which are confessedly imperfect, but in the type or form with which we instinctively compare them. In the words of John Stuart Mill:[1]

'All the objects of sense are that which they are, in only an imperfect manner, and suggest to the mind a type of what they are, far more perfect than themselves; a "something far more deeply interfused," which eye has not seen nor ear heard, but of which that which can be seen or heard is an imperfect and often very distant resemblance. . . . What, then, could be more natural than to regard the types as real objects concealed from sense, but cognisable directly by the mind? . . . The self-beautiful, the self-good, which not only were to all beautiful and good things as the ideal is to the actual, but united in themselves the separate perfections of all the various kinds of beauty and goodness—must not they be realities in a far higher sense than the particulars which are within sensible cognisance? particulars which indeed are not realities: for there is no particular good or beautiful or just thing, which is not, in some case that may be supposed, unjust, evil, and unbeautiful.'

This paragraph is not indeed what Mill meant it to be, a complete and final summary of Plato's theory of ideas; but it cannot be bettered as a statement of the imaginative speculation out of which that theory was afterwards to grow; *i.e.* as a description of the process by which Plato arrived at the conception of a sole reality, eternal, immutable, perfect, whereof perishable, mutable, imperfect things are, in the language of Goethe, no more than 'likenesses.'

For the exposition of this imaginative speculation in its primitive and poetical form the *Phædrus* and the *Symposium* are all-important. There are, we are told in the *Phædrus* (247–250), certain real existences (ὄντως ὄντα), such as self-justice, self-temperance, self-knowledge, of whose transcendental perfection, revealed to us in a previous existence, we are *reminded* by their imperfect earthly counterparts. This rudimentary theory of being becomes a rudimentary theory of knowledge when we are further told in the *Symposium* (210 A ff.) that the lover of beauty rises from the sight of persons, souls, and institutions, which are imperfectly beautiful, through the corresponding universal or Socratic definition, to the knowledge of the eternally existent self-beautiful (αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι καλόν). In a word, Plato postulates really existent unities, of which unities phenomenal pluralities are imperfect likenesses, and supposes the really existent unities to become known to us, through Socratic definitions, by means of *reminiscence* (ἀνάμνησις). But he makes no attempt to explain how the imperfectly beautiful particular is related to the perfect self-beautiful; nor does he define the content of the world of ideas. In this second period, then, the forms or ideas are moral and æsthetic unities, eternal, substantial, separately existent; but we are not told how their particulars participate in them, nor what the things are which have ideas corresponding to them.

[1] *Dissertations and Discussions* London, 1867, iii. 348.

(3) *The earlier theory of ideas.*—And now, in a third period, taking his departure from the rudimentary conception of eternally existent unities, Plato proceeds to develop a systematic theory which shall afford answers to the three great questions, What is being?, What is knowledge?, What is predication? This systematic theory, the earlier theory of ideas, may be summed up in four propositions—a fundamental proposition and three supplementary articles. The fundamental proposition is the proposition already indicated in the poetical speculation of the second period, and henceforward steadfastly maintained: beside pluralities of phenomena, transient, mutable, imperfect, which become, and are objects of opinion, there are unities, eternal, immutable, perfect, which really exist, and are objects of knowledge. The supplementary articles which convert the poetry of the *Phædrus* and the *Symposium* into the philosophy of the *Republic*, the *Phædo*, and the *Cratylus* are: (*a*) wherever a plurality of particulars are called by the same name, there is a corresponding idea or form (*Republic*, 596 A; cf. *Phædo*, 65 D); thus there are now ideas, not merely of good, just, beautiful, but also of bad, unjust, unbeautiful; of chairs and tables; of fever; of hot and cold; in short, of every common term; (*b*) it is the presence, immanence, communion (παρουσία, κοινωνία) of the form or idea in the particular—or, in other words, it is the particular's participation (μέθεξις) in the idea—that makes particulars what they are (*Phædo*, 100 D; cf. *Republic*, 476); that is to say, a thing is beautiful because the idea of beauty is present in it; a thing is unbeautiful because the idea of unbeautiful is present in it; a thing is both beautiful and unbeautiful because both the ideas are present in it; (*c*) foremost of the ideas is the idea of good.

'For,' says Socrates (*Republic*, 509 B), 'just as the sun furnishes to the objects of sight not only their capacity for being seen, but also their generation, growth, and nutrition, even so the objects of knowledge derive from the good not only their capacity for being known, but also their existence and their reality, though the good is not reality, and is on the other side of it, transcending it in majesty and power.'

With the help of these supplementary articles, the fundamental proposition becomes a theory of being, a theory of knowledge, and a theory of predication. It is a theory of being inasmuch as the ideas are eternal, immutable unities. It is a theory of knowledge inasmuch as in the *Republic* (vi. *ad fin.*) Plato hopes to ascend from observed particulars through Socratic definitions to a definition of the self-good, and thus to convert provisional definitions of things into certified representations of ideas. It is a theory of predication inasmuch at it affords or seems to afford an answer to certain logical paradoxes which had sorely perplexed Plato's contemporaries and for the moment himself. For, whereas the proposition 'Likes cannot be unlike, nor unlikes like,' which Zeno had regarded as a truth, seemed to his successors to cut at the root of all predication, Plato in this stage conceived that, though the unities like and unlike cannot be affirmed the one of the other, a particular can be simultaneously like and unlike in the sense that the ideas of like and unlike are simultaneously present in it. That this was the origin of the hypothesis of the particular's participation (μέθεξις) in the idea is plainly affirmed in the *Parmenides*; and it would seem that, when Plato wrote the *Republic*, he was not yet aware of the limitations and inconsistencies which were speedily to prove fatal to this, the earlier theory of ideas.

(4) *The later theory of ideas.*—Plato's fourth period, in which his philosophy reached its consummation, is represented by six remarkable dialogues, of which three—*Parmenides*, *Philebus*, and *Timæus*—are chiefly ontological, and three—*Theætetus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus*, or *Statesman*—are chiefly logical. In all of these, unmistakable references to the *Republic* and the *Phædo* show that Plato has now finally renounced the supplementary articles of the earlier theory of ideas; but the critical or destructive element is especially conspicuous in the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*, which may be placed respectively first and second at the beginning of the series. The *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*, which deal with the logical problems of the time and clear the way for the reconstruction of the system, naturally follow; cf. Aristotle's statement (*Metaphysics*, A. vi.) that Plato's theory of ideas, *i.e.* the later theory, rested upon a logic which was all his own. The series ends with the *Timæus*, which, if it does not formulate a dogmatic ontology, at any rate lays the foundations of what R. D. Archer Hind has well called 'a thorough-going idealism.' Of each of these dialogues something must now be said.

In the *Parmenides* Plato takes up again the proposition 'Likes cannot be unlike, nor unlikes like.' Socrates, a mere stripling, disputes Zeno's supposed truth, and maintains that the same thing may be at once like and unlike by reason of the immanence in it of the ideas of like and unlike, or, in other words, by reason of the particular's participation in those ideas. That is to say, he attempts to dispose of the contemporary paradox of predication by an appeal to the characteristic doctrine of the *Republic* and the *Phædo*. Hereupon Parmenides—not the Parmenides of history, but an anachronistic Parmenides; in fact, Plato himself in the fullness of his powers—intervenes, and shows (*a*) that, whereas by assumption the idea is a unity (for otherwise the difficulties which beset the particular would beset the idea also), if two or more things are called by the name of the idea in virtue of their common participation in it, the unity of the immanent idea is sacrificed, either by multiplication or by division, in the world of sense (*Parmenides*, 130 E ff.); (*b*) that, if without participation in the idea there is no predication, the unity of the idea is sacrificed in the world of ideas; for the particular man and the idea of man are both called man, and by assumption this common predication implies the existence of a secondary idea of man, and so on *ad infinitum* (131 E, 132 D); (*c*) that the theory of the *Republic* and the *Phædo* does not explain how the idea, which is a unity, can be the subject of predication; for by assumption the subject of predication is not a unity, but a complex or bundle of ideas (129 C, E); (*d*) that the dogma 'Every common term has an idea corresponding to it' conflicts with the theory of the idea's perfection (130 C); (*e*) that, while without ideas there can be no knowledge, the unconditioned idea can no more be apprehended by man than the conditioned phenomenon can be apprehended by God (134 A ff.). That is to say, the theory of immanence, by which Plato in the earlier time had sought to explain the supposed paradox of the one thing and its many predicates, involves another paradox, the paradox of the one idea and its many particulars; and it will be necessary for us, if we are to attempt a reconstruction of the theory of being, to provide a new solution of the paradox of diverse attributions. For this new solution, so far as *relations* are concerned, we must look to the latter part of the dialogue. Here, at the instance of the other two, Parmenides proceeds to investigate his own doctrine of the existence of the one; but he extends the scope of the inquiry so that it shall take account of the antithesis of the one and the many whether that one or that many is supposed to be or not to be, and not only as the antithesis was understood by himself and by Zeno, but also as it was interpreted by their successors, and in particular by

Plato himself both in his earlier theory and in his later. In the course of the inquiry the antithesis of the one and the others, *i.e.* of the one thing and its many attributions, is brought before us in eight hypotheses; and in each case we ask ourselves, How does this particular hypothesis deal with the paradox of likeness and unlikeness? Does it recognize that the same thing can be like and unlike, old and young, and so forth, in which case cognition of some sort is possible? Or does it deny these attributes, and thus bring philosophy to a deadlock? The eight hypotheses and their results may be briefly stated as follows:

(i.) If the One is one, that is to say, in a strict sense a unity, the attributes like and unlike, great and small, resting and moving, old and young, etc., cannot be predicated of the One, and there can be neither knowledge nor sensation nor opinion of it.

(ii.) If the One participates in existence and, through a finite many (πολλα), becomes an infinite many (ἄπειρα), diverse predicates such as like and unlike, etc., can be affirmed and denied of the One in its relations to itself and to the others; and the One can be known, opined, perceived.

(iii.) If the One is, and, through a finite many, an infinite many can be conjoined in the One, diverse predicates such as like and unlike, etc., can be affirmed of the others in relation to themselves and to one another.

(iv.) If the One is, but, inasmuch as there is no finite plurality to mediate between the others and the One, the others are wholly dissociated from the One, diverse predicates such as like and unlike, etc., cannot be affirmed of the others.

(v.) If the One is not, *i.e.* if the One is negatively determined by its otherness from what is, diverse predicates such as like and unlike may be affirmed about the One and it can be known.

(vi.) If the One is not, *i.e.* if the One is absolutely non-existent, diverse predicates cannot be affirmed about it, and it cannot be known.

(vii.) If the One is not, and yet there are others—*i.e.* things other than one another—the others may have the semblance of grouping, even if there is no finite plurality to determine the groups, and in this way diverse predicates may be affirmed of the phenomenal others, and opinion, though not knowledge, is possible thereof.

(viii.) If the One is not, and there is no semblance of grouping, the others being no more than disconnected particulars, diverse predicates cannot be affirmed of them.

Now of these eight hypotheses four, namely i., iv., vi., viii., give negative results only; that is to say, there can be neither predication nor knowledge either of the One or of the others as here described. But (*a*) of the One and the others as conceived in ii. and iii., where the finite many mediates between the unity and infinite plurality, and (*b*) of the One of v., which is negatively determined, there may be predication and knowledge, and (*c*) vii. permits qualified predication and opinion in the region of sense. Accordingly, we shall find that ii. and iii. are the foundation of the *Philebus* and the *Timæus*, and that v. and vii. find a place in the three logical dialogues, *Theætetus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus*. In a word, the *Parmenides* not only rejects the earlier theory of ideas, but also maps out the later. And this is not all. From the eight hypotheses Parmenides draws the enigmatical conclusion:

'Whether One exists or does not exist, both One and the others are, and are not, all things in all ways, and appear to be, and do not appear to be, all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to one another.'

This summary of the eight hypotheses is Plato's resolution of the paradox of likeness and unlikeness. For he has shown practically in many particular instances that, whether we suppose the One to be existent or to be non-existent, and howsoever we conceive it, we can affirm and deny, of it and of them, *in its and their relations to itself and to themselves*, diverse predicates such as like and unlike, resting and moving, small and great, etc. Thus, when we affirm diverse predicates of any thing, there is no inconsistency such as Antisthenes had supposed; because what is affirmed or denied is always a *relation*, and the same thing can be like in one relation and unlike in another. And this resolution of the contemporary difficulty carries with it an important corollary; it is now open to us to expunge relations from the list of the εἴδη, and in this way to escape, so far as relations are concerned, from the paradox of the multiplication or the division of the idea. Or, if we prefer still to recognize εἴδη of relations, distinguishing between εἴδη which are αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and εἴδη which are not αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, we may relegate εἴδη of relations to the latter class.

But again, as has been said, the *Parmenides* affords hints for reconstruction: (1) the second and third hypotheses show that, if exact predication and knowledge are to be possible, a finite plurality must needs intervene between unity and infinite plurality; *i.e.*, as is affirmed in the *Philebus*, a finite number of kinds must needs intervene between the unity of existence and the infinity of particulars; (2) from the fifth hypothesis we learn what is shown at length in the *Sophist*, that a member or members of the finite plurality can be negatively described; (3) the seventh hypothesis shows that, where there is no finite plurality, there may still be a finity of apparent, artificial groups, by which inexact predication, and opinion, but not knowledge, become possible. It would seem, then, that the *Parmenides*—which some have regarded as a dialectical exercise preparatory to the *Republic*, and most have deliberately neglected—not only disposes of the earlier doctrine, and maps out the later, but also announces that withdrawal of ideas of relation which Aristotle plainly regarded as a notable characteristic of Plato's maturity (*Met.* A. ix. 990[b] 16).

The work of reconstruction begun in the *Parmenides* is continued in the *Philebus*. Here Socrates reverts to the question propounded in *Republic*, vi. 505 A ff., What is the *summum bonum*? Is it pleasure? Is it intelligence? This ethical question is quickly and summarily disposed of: the chief good of man is a mixed life of intelligence and pure pleasure. But a new question, wider in its scope, arises out of it and takes its place. What is it that makes the mixed life, or anything else, good? In the *Republic* and the *Phædo* Plato had made answer: 'A thing is good because, side by side with the constitutive idea, the idea of good, the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, is present in it.' But in the interval the theory of the immanent idea has been discredited, and now in the *Philebus* we start anew from the dogma foreshadowed in the second and third hypotheses of the *Parmenides*: 'All things which are or exist in our universe are combinations of *finity* (πέρας), and *indefinity*' (ἀπειρία); and we call them good or bad according as they approximate to, or diverge from, the πέρας ἔχοντα, their constitutive ideas. Whence it would seem (1) that, inasmuch as the particular is good by reason of its approximation to its formative idea, the intervention of the idea of good is no longer required to account for the particular's excellence, and (2) that, inasmuch as particulars approximate to, and diverge from, their respective ideas, the particular *imitates* (μιμεῖται) the idea and no longer *participates* in it (μετέχει). Incidentally it appears that we no longer need ideas of 'hot' and 'cold,' inasmuch as these qualities are divergences from an indifference point which is neither the one nor the other.

The *Theætetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Statesman* are a trilogy, not only in the sense that the conversation begun in the first of the three is continued in the other two, but also inasmuch as the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, though ostensibly they discuss a new question, Are sophist, statesman, and philosopher one, two, or three?, resume and dispose of the question left unanswered in the *Theætetus*, What is knowledge?

According to Aristotle (*Met.* A. vi. 987[a] 32), Plato, who in early years had been the pupil of the Heracleitean Cratylus, was true in later life to the Heracleitean principle, 'All sensibles are in

flux and therefore cannot be known,' whence he inferred the existence of things other than sensibles, and these things he called *forms* or *ideas*. The *Theætetus* is Plato's justification of the Heracleitean principle; and, if the corollary is not explicitly formulated, at any rate the way to it is made plain. Knowledge, we find, is not sensation, which has sensibles for its object; nor is it true opinion, opinion being judgment about sensibles; nor is it true opinion supported by a definition, Socratic or otherwise. Hence, if there is to be any knowledge —and Plato does not despair—there must be things other than sensibles, and such are the ideas, which, in the second and third hypotheses of the *Parmenides*, mediate between the unity of being and the infinity of particulars.

In the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* the interlocutors of the *Theætetus* together with an Eleatic stranger, who now appears for the first time, discuss the question, 'Are sophist, statesman, and philosopher one, two, or three?', and come to the conclusion that the true statesman is identical with the philosopher, and the mere politician identical with the sophist. Thus in our search for the sophist we stumble upon the philosopher (253 C); and it is therefore unnecessary either to suppose that a dialogue about 'the philosopher' was planned but remained unwritten, or to find a 'philosopher' in one of the extant dialogues. Incidentally, the definition of the philosopher carries with it a definition of knowledge, and in this way the *Sophist*, hereafter to be supplemented by the *Statesman*, resumes the discussion raised and dropped in the *Theætetus*, and the unity of the trilogy is assured.

In the search for a definition of 'sophist' the Eleate finds himself obliged 'in violation of the principle of our father Parmenides,' to attribute existence to the non-existent or non-ent. An investigation of the non-ent (*μὴ ὄν*) thus becomes necessary; and, as in the *Parmenides* the investigation of the existent unity involves that of unity which is non-existent, so here the study of the non-ent involves that of the ent also. In the investigation of the two taken together the following discoveries are made: (1) beside *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἴδη*, which are incommunicable, incapable of being predicated of one another, there are *γένη* or *εἴδη*, not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*, which communicate, some within narrow limits, others generally but not universally, such as 'rest' (*στάσις*) and motion (*κίνησις*), and others, again, universally, namely ent (*ὄν*), same (*ταὐτόν*), other (*θάτερον*); (2) there is no *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος* of sophist; (3) the function of dialectic is classification according to kinds (*τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι*), whereby we are preserved from thinking that which is the same different or that which is different the same; and he who can thus classify is the philosopher whom we seek; (4) ent (*ὄν*) and non-ent (*μὴ ὄν*) are intercommunicable, if by non-ent we mean, not that which is contrary (*ἐναντίον*) to ent, but that which is different (*ἕτερον*) from it, and accordingly *μὴ μέγα* and *μὴ καλόν* may be as truly existent as *μέγα* and *καλόν* (cf. the fifth hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, and cf. *Republic*, v. *ad fin.*); (5) the troubles of contemporary logic principally depend upon misunderstandings in regard to the negative. The merits of this great dialogue cannot be exaggerated.

The method of *division* (*διαίρεσις*) announced in the *Sophist* is developed and illustrated in the *Statesman* (*πολιτικός*). Division is indeed no new thing; but the use now to be made of it is novel and important. In the *Philebus* (16 B) Socrates professes himself enamoured of it, though it has often left him stranded: and as early as the *Phædrus* (263 A) he has employed it in framing Socratic definitions with a view to consistency in the use of debatable terms (*ἀμφισβητήσιμα*) such as just, unjust; in other words, in making artificial groups where nature does not give us definite kinds. In the *Sophist*, when we seek definitions of *ἀσπαλιευτική* and *σοφιστική*, and even in the *Statesman*, when the stranger starts upon his inquiry, division has no more ambitious aim than *ὁμολογία*. But at 261 D ff., and especially at 266 A ff., we find ourselves applying it to animal kinds with a view to the discovery of incorporeal *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἴδη*. That is to say, *διαίρεσις* is now used, not with a view to the creation of artificial groups in the region of *ἀμφισβητήσιμα*, but as a means of ascertaining the likenesses and the unlikenesses of nature's fixities, the *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἴδη*. In other words, the natural types, or *αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ εἴδη*, are the proper objects of knowledge, and what can be known about them is their mutual resemblances and differences. And, when it is understood that the end of *διαίρεσις* is now the determination of the affinities of *εἴδη*, and not a mere definition 'per genus et differentias' of a single *εἶδος*, certain precepts here added and exemplified become for the first time intelligible. *E.g.*, the longer dichotomy is, as such, the better, because we obtain by it fuller information about an *ἐπιστητόν*. We have then here the foundation of the classificatory science which was for a time to play so great a part in the Academy. The latter part of the dialogue prepares the way for the reconstituted sociology of Plato's fifth period.

The *Timæus* is the keystone of the later theory of ideas. Here, in a cosmogonical myth, Plato shows that the universe, as we know it under conditions of time and space, may be conceived as the thoughts of universal mind together with the thoughts of those thoughts. The ideas are the thoughts of God (*νοήματα θεοῦ*), or, in other words, the laws of universal mind's thinking. But, whereas universal mind, the subject, thinks a plurality of thoughts, it thinks those thoughts, its objects, in space; and, in so far as it thinks them under spacial conditions, it thinks them in terms of certain regular geometrical figures—pyramid, octahedron, eikosahedron, cube — and these regular geometrical figures are respectively the ideas of fire, air, water, earth, the elements which go to make (*a*) the body of the universe, (*b*) the bodies of the stars, which are the first-born thoughts of creative mind, and (*c*) the bodies of the animals and vegetables, which creative mind thinks, not directly as it thinks the stars, but indirectly through the minds of the stars, its first-born thoughts; and, whereas God, or mind, the creator, thinks humanity or caninity, as an eternal unity, the stars, His first-born thoughts, when they think humanity or caninity corporealized under spacial conditions, conceive it, not as an eternal unity, but as a transient plurality. Thus particular men or dogs are, as it were, reflexions of the idea of man or dog, invested with bodily form under conditions of time and space; and in this way, in virtue of the hypothesis that 'that which superior mind *conceives* as a subjective thought is *perceived* by inferior mind, however imperfectly, as an objective thing,' Plato is able to show, at any rate, the possibility of expressing in terms of mind the materiality and the externality of things. And these results carry with them an important corollary. If particular men and particular dogs owe their respective existences to eternal, immutable ideas of man and dog, it should be possible for us—even if we cannot apprehend those ideas—to study by the method of division (*διαίρεσις*) announced in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* the *bodily* resemblances and differences of natural kinds. In a word, the proper function of the man of science is the study of classificatory zoology and botany, because in these subjects the

ideas of the respective animals and vegetables assure us of the existence of natural kinds. On the other hand, where there are no ideas, and therefore no determinate natural kinds, though we may 'study the subject as a recreation, and derive from it a sober and sensible amusement (59 C),' there can be no exact science. *E.g.*, mineralogy, inasmuch as the several minerals are irregular, indeterminate, combinations of the four simple bodies, combinations which are not definitely marked off from one another by nature, is not an exact science. Nevertheless it would seem that Plato by no means confined his attention to the exact sciences, the sciences founded upon ideas; for in the latter part of the *Timæus* he has much to say both about inexact sciences, such as mineralogy, and about the parts and organs of the body and their several functions. His pronouncements on these subjects are highly speculative; but, as indications of his scientific aims, they are by no means unimportant.

We may now tabulate the later theory of ideas with a view to a comparison of its supplementary articles with those of the earlier theory. The fundamental proposition is still—as it has been ever since Plato freed himself from Socratic limitations—'Beside pluralities of phenomena, transient, mutable, imperfect, which come into being, and are objects of opinion, there are unities, eternal, immutable, perfect, which really exist, and are objects of knowledge.'

The supplementary articles are as follows: (*a*) there are substantive, self-existent ideas (*αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*) of the universe; of fire, air, water, earth; of the several stars; and of the several animal and vegetable species; but of nothing else. (*b*) It is not the idea's immanence in particulars, but the imitation or reflexion of the idea in matter—*i.e.* in space—that brings particulars into existence and makes them what they are. (*c*) Unity = mind = good = God is the cause, the sole cause, of all things; it is the cause of the ideas, of particulars, and even of its own correlative—plurality = space = evil = necessity. (*d*) The ideas are the thoughts of the sole cause, namely, unity or mind. (*e*) Infinite mind develops within itself a complete universe of thoughts, primary and secondary; and this universe of thoughts, as seen from within by a finite intelligence included in it, is our universe of things.

In this stage, then, the forms or ideas are unities from which nature's fixities—the universe, the four simple bodies, the stars, and the animal and vegetable kinds—are respectively derived; they are substantial and eternal; they are the thoughts of universal mind; they are not immanent in particulars, but are imitated or reflected as particulars in space.

(5) *The Laws.*—We now come to the fifth period of Plato's philosophical and literary activity. Having given to his metaphysic its final shape, and having shown how, through the doctrine of natural kinds, it affords a foundation for the scientific study of animal and vegetable species, Plato leaves to his nephew Speusippus the direction of the biological studies of the school, and himself, reverting to ethics and sociology, revises his earlier conclusions about those subjects from the standpoint of his later philosophy. When he wrote the *Republic*, he had hoped to attain through the self-good to the knowledge of the ideas, and thus to establish a 'philosophical morality.' If man could know the self-good and the ideal virtues which spring from it, he would no longer—except in early years when he had not yet completed his education—require that 'popular and civic virtue' which society artificially builds up by means of rewards and punishments; the knowledge of the self good would be his one and only end and his exceeding great reward. Such had been Plato's aspiration when in a burst of enthusiasm he wrote the *Republic*. But since that time he had become aware of the limitations of human nature. Man cannot know the self-good; and, what is more, inasmuch as man has a bodily nature, the self-good and the human good are not identical. This being so, we cannot dispense with 'popular and civic morality,' and it becomes necessary to do what we can to strengthen and improve it. Hence, whereas in the *Republic* he plans a constitution and provides for its maintenance, but commits to his trained magistrates all the responsibilities of administration, in the *Laws*, recognizing that under existing conditions legislation is indispensable, he seeks to provide for the guidance of his countrymen a complete code of enactments. In this remarkable treatise Plato leaves metaphysic and science behind him; but there is one metaphysical pronouncement, and at first sight it flagrantly conflicts with the teaching of the *Timæus*. Whereas in that dialogue Plato claims to have found in universal mind the one and only cause of the infinite variety of things, here, in the *Laws* (896 E), he confidently affirms that there are two world-souls, the one beneficent, the other maleficent—God and devil. The truth is that, writing popularly, he stops short of his final analysis. The good world-soul and the bad world-soul of the *Laws* are the providence (*πρόνοια*) and the necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) of the *Timæus*; and the fact that in the unmetaphysical *Laws* Plato rests in the penultimate dualism of the great metaphysical dialogue is no reason for supposing that he had abandoned his ultimate henism.

Never perhaps was any other philosopher as progressive as Plato. In his early years he had studied the two philosophies which were afterwards to be the foundations of his own system—the Heracleitean theory of flux and the Socratic doctrine of ethical universals. In the first period of his independent thought he attempted no more than to carry on by written discourse the oral teaching of his master and thus to secure a greater consistency in the use of those terms of morality which have so great an influence upon actions. In the second, noting that, in moral and æsthetic practice, we find ourselves perpetually referring to an ideal standard, he conceives that in a previous existence we have known certain suprasensual realities such as goodness, beauty, and justice, of which their counterparts in this world imperfectly remind us. In the third, bewildered by Zeno's axiom that likes cannot be unlike, nor unlikes like, he assumes that for every predicate there is a suprasensual reality, and that this suprasensual reality, though separately existent and a unity, is present in every particular which bears the same name. In the fourth, having in the interval realized that things which are like in one relation may be unlike in another, and having disposed of other logical difficulties of the time, Plato now postulates ideas only where he finds fixities in nature. Such fixities are the universe itself, the four so-called simple bodies, the stars, and the animal and vegetable kinds. These are natural fixities because they derive their existence from the ideas, which are the eternal immutable thoughts of universal mind. Universal mind is the sole cause of the universe and all that is in it. In the fifth period, having learnt to limit his intellectual aspirations, Plato revises and supplements the sociological schemes of his third period.

5. **Ethical teaching.**—Plato's ethical teaching can hardly be called systematic. In his first period he is a Socratic, pure and simple. In his second he indicates, but does not develop, the theory of ideas upon which he at that time hoped to build a transcendental ethic. In the third, if we look to

the *Republic* for a positive morality, we find ourselves disappointed; for this great treatise, in which Plato discusses the well-being of the state and the well-being of the individual, merges ethic in education, and makes the educated man a law to himself and to his inferiors. In the fourth period the *Philebus* and the *Statesman* do something to correlate the earlier morality with the later theory of ideas. Finally, the *Laws* is written, not from the standpoint of the professional moralist, but from that of the legislator, who, recognizing the importance of political institutions and the value of rewards and punishments, endeavours to improve the contemporary methods. See, further, art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Greek), § 12.

6. The school of Plato.—It has been seen that Plato in his maturity was not only philosopher but also man of science. That is to say, the metaphysical theory of ideas carried with it the physical theory of natural kinds and thus provided a basis for the classificatory sciences of zoology and botany. But the two theories were not inseparable. Plato's nephew, Speusippus, who in 347 succeeded him as head of the school, rested his biological researches upon the theory of kinds, while he rejected the theory of ideas as a superfluous hypothesis. Aristotle, while he impatiently and peremptorily dismissed the theory of ideas, was careful to reconstitute the theory of kinds, taking his departure from the two principles *οὐδὲν ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις* and *ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*. Xenocrates, indeed, who succeeded Speusippus in 339—a moralist rather than a metaphysician—attempted to maintain the idealist tradition; but his arithmetical interpretation of the phrase 'ideal number' shows a strange misconception of his master's teaching. Polemo, who followed Xenocrates in 314, took definitely the ethical direction. With Crates, who succeeded Polemo in 270, the so-called Old Academy ended. Platonism, *i.e.* the idealism upon which Plato rested the theory of kinds, ceased to be a living force when Plato died. For the subsequent history of the school see art. ACADEMY.

LITERATURE.—The following editions of Plato's writings deserve special mention: (1) whole works: I. Bekker, Berlin, 1816–23; J. G. Baiter, J. C. Orelli, and A. W. Winckelmann, Zürich, 1839–42; K. F. Hermann, Leipzig, 1851–53; F. W. Wagner, Leipzig, 1841–77, with German translation and commentary; J. Burnet, Oxford, 1901–06 (an excellent conservative text); (2) selected dialogues: L. F. Heindorf, Berlin, 1802–28; (3) particular dialogues: W. H. Thompson, *Phædrus*, London, 1868, and *Gorgias*, do. 1871; R. D. Archer Hind, *Phædo*, do. 1883, and *Timæus*, do. 1888. The best-known English translation of the whole works is that of B. Jowett, Oxford, 1871.

For Plato's philosophy see E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*[3], Leipzig, 1869–81, II. i., tr. S. F. Alleyne and A. Goodwin, *Plato and the older Academy*, London, 1876 (not always to be trusted); F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*[8], Berlin, 1894–97 (Eng. tr., H. P. Smith and P. Schaff, London, 1880), contains, together with a useful summary of Plato's teaching, a very valuable bibliography.

The writer of the present article has occasionally used in it sentences and phrases borrowed from a sketch of the history of Greek philosophy down to Aristotle which he contributed to *A Companion to Greek Studies*[2], Cambridge, 1906, pp. 163–187. His present statement of the later Platonism set forth in 'the six dialogues' is largely based upon papers published in *JPh* x. [1881–82] 253–298, xi. [1882] 1–22, 287–331, xiii. [1884–85] 1–40, 242–272, xiv. [1885] 173–230, xv. [1886] 280–305, xxv. [1897] 4–25, but the views there indicated, while they have in some respect modified themselves, have for the most part become more definite with the lapse of time. For certain recent speculations about Plato and the relation of his teaching to that of Socrates see A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, Oxford, 1911, and J. Burnet, *Plato's Phædo*, do. 1911, *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., London, 1914.

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PLAY.—See DRAMA, GAMES, DEVELOPMENT (Mental).

PLEASURE.—Both pleasure and pain are too well known to require description and too elemental to admit of analysis. They are experiences which are co-extensive with all other forms of mental life—sensations, images, memories, reasonings, willings, emotions, all being capable of taking on these pleasant or unpleasant colourings, although all, apparently, except perhaps the last, are able to exist in a neutral phase. Yet in spite of the familiarity and prominence of these states, both in daily life and in ethical controversy, the more exact determination of their nature is one of the most confused problems in modern psychology. As a problem it was seriously considered by Plato and by Aristotle, but it was not until the intellectualist tradition had been questioned by Rousseau, and interest in the more inarticulate phases of mental life had been quickened by evolutionary biology, that the feelings were made objects of exact investigation. Within the last twenty years, however, much has been done, and, while it is impossible to say that conclusions have been established, it is at least true that many facts have been determined and alternative theories defined.

1. The term 'pleasure' itself has been recognized as too ambiguous for technical use, and there has developed a tendency to substitute for it 'agreeableness' or 'pleasantness,' and to include both it and its opposite, pain or unpleasantness, under the common term 'affection' as denoting the non-cognitive aspect of mental life. Pleasantness and unpleasantness would thus be recognized as affective phases of mental complexes into which any of the other elements or phases might enter. For those complexes in which the affective phase is most prominent or characteristic the term 'feeling' has been suggested, as the feelings of gladness or depression. Pleasure, in popular usage, is generally identified with one of these complex processes of feeling and not with the abstract affective phase of pleasantness. It is the whole process of eating a good dinner or of enjoying a reunion that is called a 'pleasure.' Much of the confusion in ethical discussions of the good has arisen from failure to make this distinction between pleasure as affective tone and as complex feeling, the value recognized by common sense in the latter being identified by hedonistic theory with the former.

2. The historic problem of quality of pleasure also has light thrown upon it by this distinction. John Stuart Mill's revival of the Platonic doctrine of differences of kind in pleasures involves the failure to make this analysis into pleasantness and pleasant object, with the consequent apparent ascription to the one of the moral worth found in the other, the differences in the pleasures of the fool and Socrates lying not in the affective element but in the total feeling. So, too, the common popular classification into higher and lower kinds of pleasure is really a distinction between higher and lower forms of experience as a complex whole rather than between kinds of pleasantness as such.

Yet, even on the basis of this analysis, modern psychology is not a unit as to the quality of affection. Wundt insists upon a threefold distinction within affection itself—upon three pairs of opposites: pleasantness and unpleasantness, excitement and depression, tension and relaxation. Within each of these pairs, again, he recognizes an indefinite number of qualitatively distinct affective elements. This tri-dimensional theory of feeling involves the concept of pleasure mainly so far as concerns the recognition of varieties of pleasantness and unpleasantness, although undoubtedly much of what popular consciousness includes in pleasure would, under this theory, be assignable to excitement or relaxation. In his main contention for the greater complexity of the affections Royce agrees with Wundt, though seeing his way as yet to the recognition of only two antagonistic lines of difference—pleasantness and unpleasantness, restless-

ness and quiescence, with their included minor distinctions.

On the other side are those who recognize only two antagonistic aspects of affection—pleasantness and unpleasantness — analyzing the other two dimensions into organic and muscular sensations. Certainly, when we have eliminated our sensations of muscular strain, the feeling of tension vanishes, and, equally, excitement seems to have little meaning apart from sensations of tension and respiration and consciousness of rapidity in the flow of ideas. On the whole, the dual theory seems to have the weight of testimony, both lay and expert, in its favour.

Incidentally, it may be remarked that the unpleasantness recognized in this analysis is not to be identified with the sensation of organic pain, which, while usually existing in an extremely unpleasant complex, may yet, when of slight intensity, have the pleasantness of interest.

The question as to whether pleasantness itself admits of qualitative differences is not to be answered with any positiveness. Introspection gives varying testimony on the point, and whereas, if we assume that the phases of affection correspond to a general central process, we are inclined to expect only differences of degree, when we also assume that every element in a complex varies with the changes in the total complex, we tend to look for qualitative differences in pleasantness according as the total process varies. Certainly the burden of proof seems to rest heavily on those who affirm such differences in quality.

3. **As to the psychological status of pleasure—its place among other mental processes** — three theories hold the field.

(1) *The qualitative theory* (Stout, Marshall).—Pleasure and pain are general qualities or attributes of mental process, either of which may be attached to any mental element. The term 'quality' is here explained as used in the same sense as when applied to intensity as a quality of sensation. Pleasantness thus has no substantive standing, but is always pleasantness of something, just as intensity never exists by itself but always as an essential attribute of another state.

(2) *The sensational theory* (Stumpf).—Pleasure and pain are sensations of the organic type. Pleasure is a diffused sensation of tickling or a weak sensation of lust. If pleasure were a mere attribute of sensation, it would not itself have attributes such as intensity and duration, nor would a sensation persist in the absence of its attributes as is the case relative to pleasure and pain.

(3) *The affective element theory* (Titchener).—Pleasure and pain are the two phases of a simple affective process which forms one of the two elementary constituents of mental life, if we group sensation and image together as the second. Affection is similar to sensation in possessing quality, intensity, duration, but it lacks clearness, and shows an antagonism and incompatibility of its opposite qualities which mark it off from sensation. Tickling has its own sensory quality, which may be either pleasant or unpleasant, but which is not synonymous with pleasantness.

While no consensus of opinion can be invoked on the questions involved in these theories, it may be remarked that the point at issue between (1) and both (2) and (3) seems to resolve itself into the somewhat profitless logical distinction between substance and quality. As between (2) and (3), while one may not be satisfied with the form in which the latter theory is usually stated, one cannot but feel that, in its recognition of the distinctness of pleasantness as an elementary aspect of mental life, it has in its favour the almost unanimous testimony of introspection.

4. **As to the conditions of pleasure, our knowledge is still more incomplete.** From the genetic point of view, it has been suggested that affection is undeveloped sensation or a mode of experience of which sensation is a later phase, and that the free sensory nerve-endings may be its organ (Titchener). We have also the biological generalization that pleasure is the accompaniment of actions useful to the organism (Spencer), but such a generalization needs qualifying conditions which it is beyond our present power to supply. A widely applicable psychological formula is that pleasure is the accompaniment of uninterrupted activity, of progress towards an end, whatever the end may be (Stout, Angell). This end may not be useful for life as a whole, and hence the activity may not have survival value, but in so far as it is an actual end the progressive realization of it gives pleasure. Such a formula seems more adequate for the more active type of pleasures but hardly for pleasure in its whole extent. From the physiological point of view, there is a general tendency to consider the conditions for affection as central rather than peripheral, but guesses differ as to whether it is a matter of general nutritive condition or of motor preparedness, as well as to whether a special cortical region is involved or the whole cortex.

5. **For the place of pleasure in ethical systems** see art. HEDONISM.

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PLEROMA.—This term has acquired a certain celebrity from its use in the later NT books, in relation to deity, and in one of the most fully developed systems of Gnosticism, as a designation of what may be called the Gnostic heaven—that supersensible spiritual sphere in which the Godhead was thought to exist and manifest itself above and apart from the material world. There were, of course, many fantastic and extravagant notions in the Gnostic idea, but every careful student who follows the course of Christian thought in the 2nd cent., at the time when Christianity came face to face with the advanced conclusions of speculative religious philosophy, will see how significant a phenomenon the Gnostic heaven is. This article will deal exclusively with the conception embodied in the word 'Pleroma,' and will endeavour to follow its use from the NT up to the form in which it finally appears in the Valentinian system of Æons. The various elements of thought which are there united, and which form a fairly well rounded system of God and the world, had grown up out of, and had been gathered from, the great systems which dominated the ancient world; but these appear here fused and blended with the new ideas that Christianity had introduced. It was the first great attempt to exhibit Christianity as a part of the system of the world—and no mean effort either, as we shall readily see, if we are able to thread our way through the tangled maze of grotesque and mythical phraseology in which the Gnostic teachers indulged. In its most fantastic shapes, however, there are usually visible some gleams of rational thought.

1. **NT use.**—The NT use of the term 'Pleroma,'

in relation to deity, is given in Col 1^{19} 2^{9}, Eph 1^{23} 3^{19} 4^{13}, Jn 1^{16}. The word is found in other parts of the NT in the ordinary sense of 'fullness' variously applied, but in these passages it stands in a context which seems to require a special theological connotation with which the reader is supposed to be already familiar. In St. Paul's language two great conceptions are affirmed or implied: (1) that the whole fullness of deity, the entire plenitude of divine excellences, energies, and powers resides in Christ; and (2) that, through union with Him, the Christian Church is destined to share in the fullness which dwells in Him. Both these conceptions appear in the subsequent phases of Gnostic thought, but they are placed in new connexions and relations, and in the handling of them the lead of Scripture and the limits within which they are viewed in Scripture are soon lost sight of. In the views which St. Paul combats at Colossæ we recognize some incipient forms of Gnosticism which are easily identified with well-known features of popular Jewish beliefs characteristic of the age—an undue prominence given to angels as mediators between God and the world, and the false authority ascribed to various ascetic practices. The revelation of God which was given in the incarnation and mission of the Son had for ever set aside the necessity for inferior mediators, whether angels or men; and the Apostle's contention is that all the energies and powers of deity, all divine functions in the order and government of the world, reside in Him, all things visible and invisible, thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers being subject to Him. The Jewish teachers at Colossæ had doubtless taken their stand upon the common belief that there were many mediators through whom God communicates His will to men, and that to each of these a measure of divine honour or worship might be due. They had not yet discovered that in Christianity was given the final and absolute revelation of God to the world.

The idea that the entire fullness of the Godhead is manifested in Christ is fundamental to Christianity, and is, indeed, a wide-reaching conception, difficult to grasp by the intellect—a mystery profoundly significant and precious to faith. The Christian recognizes in Him the embodiment of all divine excellence, the full glory of the Father. In the later books of the NT we note an important advance upon the Christology of the Acts and earlier Epistles. In the latter the chief aspects of His Messianic dignity and glory are set forth as the ground for faith in Him as the Mediator of the Messianic salvation. The full content of the Messianic idea was not laid open, and was probably not called for in the earlier preaching. But at a later stage, with the advance of thought and a growing faith, the doctrine of the person of the Son became richer and fuller. It was seen that He is the full and complete expression of the Father's nature and glory, 'the image of the invisible God,' 'the effulgence of His glory,' 'the very impress of His being.' The Fourth Gospel, the latest phase of NT teaching, exhibits this conception in relation to the earthly life of the Redeemer, showing that the Son is the entire and complete manifestation of the Father. It is doubtless the spiritual and ethical perfections of deity that are chiefly in view in the passages in which the Pleroma of the Godhead is ascribed to the Son, since these chiefly will be thought of as constituting the great essentials of the eternal life, which was with the Father, and which the Redeemer conveys to men. Yet, though we have difficulty in believing that all the recesses of deity are open to the knowledge of men, it is manifest that in the NT conception of the Incarnation there is given, besides the ethical perfections of the Godhead, a universal cosmic principle—the energies and powers which produce and sustain the course of the world. It is not easy to separate in thought the cosmic and ethical elements in the idea; in reality the two must meet and blend to form a complete whole. The ethical perfections of the Godhead are manifested not in empty space, but in the complex life of the material world, in which they must be sustained and vindicated by physical energies and powers. The Pleroma of the Godhead, therefore, contains not merely the totality of all ethical perfections, but all divine energies which the cosmos displays; and, all these being ascribed without limitation to the Son, there arises the necessary inference that He is the final and absolute manifestation of deity to men.

2. The Valentinian system.—From the various contexts in which the term 'Pleroma' is used in the NT it is to be gathered that the idea was new in the sphere of religion, and that towards the close of the Apostolic Age it was denied or opposed by other and contrary hypotheses, viz. that there were many mediating agencies between God and men, and that the whole fullness of deity could not be communicated to any one being or person, however eminent.

The last thought appears in various shapes in all the forms of Gnosticism, and it is usually implied that no entire or perfect revelation of deity is possible in material things, that all perfect manifestations of God are confined to the sphere within which deity is to be found—the sphere to which they apply the term 'Pleroma' in a local or topographical sense. In some passages where the word occurs incidentally we see that the idea is of capital importance, and we are prepared for the bold effort which is made in the Valentinian system to reach a definite and rounded doctrine in regard to it. Among the earlier Gnostics the attempt was made to obviate the difficulty involved in the incarnation and passion of the Son, either by assuming that our Lord's body was not real flesh and blood, but a form assumed for a time, or by saying that Jesus was the son of Joseph and Mary by ordinary generation, and that the Christ who descended upon him at his baptism, being a spiritual being and, as such, impassible, departed from him at the Crucifixion.

Irenæus describes this party as maintaining that Jesus was 'merely a receptacle of Christ upon whom the Christ, as a dove, descended from above, and that when He had declared the unnameable Father He entered into the Pleroma in an incomprehensible and invisible manner' (*Hær.* III. xvi. 1). The same view appears in another passage, where it is said that 'the Christ from above . . . continued impassible,' and that, though He had descended upon Jesus the Son of the Demiourgos, He 'flew back again into His own *pleroma*' (III. xi. 1).

These two examples serve to show the point at which the Gnostic view diverges from St. Paul and the NT. He teaches that all divine powers and energies reside in Christ in permanent form, while they maintained that only a single power—the Christ from above—had dwelt in Jesus for a time, and afterwards returned to the Pleroma, from which thought it is clear that the Pleroma is viewed as the special sphere or abode of deity, separate from the rest of the world and not homogeneous with it.

Turning now to the system of Valentinus as it is expounded by Irenæus and Hippolytus, we find that the Pleroma forms the centre of an elaborate theory of the world—of divine emanations, of creation, and redemption. It is the exclusive sphere of deity within which the evolution of the Æons is accomplished. It has over against it the κένωμα, the 'void,' the sphere of matter which includes all that is outward, corporeal, physical, sensible. These two spheres include the totality of being real or conceivable, and there is an absolute difference and antithesis between them.

such that the one is the home of all that is perfect, godlike, eternal, imperishable; while in the other things are corrupt, perishable, shadowy, unreal. The Æons which are begotten from the unfathomable abyss of deity are the divine energies, the functions of infinite life which manifest themselves in a definite order and succession; but towards the end of the series, where presumably their strength and purity have diminished, the last being far from the centre and source of life, one of them, Sophia, somehow passes out into the void beyond, and out of her tears, sorrows, and distresses the material creation arises. The antithesis between these two spheres as conceived by Valentinus himself is probably better expressed by the term *ὑστέρημα*, 'defect,' than by *κένωμα*, 'void,' since the view of matter or the world which is prominent in the teaching of the school regards it as having its origin in some disturbance in the life of deity itself, and therefore not of an opposite or contrary nature. The sphere of the Æons is marked off by definite bounds from the sphere beyond, but the movement implied in the generation of the Æons in some of its remoter effects passes over the limits into the sphere in which the world arises, so that an affinity is established between the two from the first. The later Æons—Sophia, Christ, and the Holy Spirit—carry over the living and redeeming energies of the Pleroma into the lower sphere where, divine seeds being already sown from the tears and labours of Sophia, all that is kindred with the Pleroma, after being redeemed and purified, returns to it at last as its ultimate home.

3. The Gnostic reconstruction.—From this outline we are in a position to see how far the Gnostic conception has parted from the NT standpoint, and where it passes over into a region unknown and unknowable to man. It has already lost sight of the spiritual and ethical quality of the concept of God, characteristic of Scripture, in which omniscience and omnipresence are implied, and sets about establishing bounds between the sphere appropriate to deity and an outer world. In this respect it still keeps to the old contrast of God and the world which dominated all the ancient systems. A parallel to this drift of thought is seen in the strong tendency towards the unknown and the marvellous exhibited in the apocryphal Christian literature which was contemporaneous with the great Gnostic movement. Yet the speculative effort to reach an adequate idea of God, in harmony with the new data which Christianity had established, has much interest and significance. It was really the first great attempt to construct a philosophy of religion with Christianity taken into account. In the Valentinian Pleroma there appear the chief conceptions regarding the nature of deity which speculative thought had then reached, but they are blended with the new view of the world which Christianity had established. In the doctrine of God taught in the Palestinian school the action of God in the material world was thought to be effected by various mediating agencies and powers of a supermundane angelic character, personal and impersonal. God Himself was too highly exalted in majesty and glory to come into immediate contact with man's world. Hence it was thought that the purposes of His will and government were carried through by various orders of ministering angels. This view had grown out of the earlier OT doctrine of the holiness and exaltation of Jahweh, which at first was preached mainly with reference to sin and the imperfections of man's life, but in the later theology of the schools it had practically separated the Godhead from all contact with the world, leaving only the abstract idea of a Being exalted above all human thought, inscrutable and unnameable. With Philo and among the Alexandrians the same result was reached by much the same process, partly also by the help of Platonic conceptions. Here also God in Himself is defined in terms of absolute being, mostly negative, without attributes or qualities. His agency in the world is represented and sustained by His Logos, or reason, and the vast multitude of inferior *λόγοι* which determine all particular things. Among the Greeks, since Plato and Aristotle, God was defined as the highest good or the supreme cause far removed from the actual world, who leaves the care of it to inferior agencies or powers. With Plato (*Timæus*) the demiourgos, or creator of the world, acts the part of an inferior deity, since he must build the world on the patterns furnished by the eternal ideas and from material already existent.

Now, having such an idea of deity to start from, and with the conviction that Christianity had brought something new in the sphere of religion—that in fact it was revelation from the highest God, as was held in all the phases of Gnostic speculation—Gnosticism set itself to a reconstruction along the whole line of the theistic conception, to provide for the passing of deity from the primal silence of a past eternity into a process of self-manifestation in a series of Æons, in a Pleroma, or spirit-sphere, to constitute an ideal world, from and after which the existing system of material things arose, in such wise that the creative and redeeming agencies which Christianity reveals are found to be not only in accord with the laws of the higher sphere, but also the immediate revelation of them. The Gnostics all seem to have been greatly troubled with the imperfections of all earlier conceptions of God, Jewish as well as heathen, and, by assigning the various defects of the world and of earlier religions to inferior beings or agencies, they doubtless thought to secure a clear field for the new world which they saw in the new religion. To be thorough, they began their reconstruction from the beginning, and assumed a movement from within the depths of the Godhead outwards, towards a world different from itself, to arise out of itself, and destined in its purer parts to return to it again, by the process of redemption which Christianity reveals and accomplishes.

4. The process of emanations.—A tolerably clear account of the Pleroma in the system of Valentinus is given by Irenæus and Hippolytus. Their eagerness to expose the absurdities of the system has often led them off the points of greatest interest for us, who want to understand, and are outside the sphere of danger.

First of all, then, there exists in 'the invisible and ineffable heights above' a certain perfect pre-existent Æon whom they call Proarche, Propator, Bythos, invisible, incomprehensible, eternal, and unbegotten, remaining throughout innumerable cycles of ages in profound serenity and quiescence. Along with Him there existed Ennoia ('thought'), called also Charis or Sigê ('grace,' 'silence'). At last this Bythos determined to produce from Himself the beginning of all things. From the union of Bythos and Sigê ('depth' and 'silence') was produced Nous ('mind,' 'intelligence'), called also Monogenês ('only-begotten'), father and the beginning of all things. Along with Nous was produced Alêtheia ('truth') as his mate. These four constitute the first tetrad, and are called the root of things. From Nous and Alêtheia arise Logos and Zoê ('reason' and 'life'), and from these again Anthrôpos and Ecclêsia ('man' and 'church'), *ideally conceived*. Here, then, we have the first ogdoad, called (let us be careful to note) 'the root and substance of all things, the beginning and fashioning of the entire Pleroma.' In this ogdoad we have given the essential, the determining, part of the conception, the source or ground from which the others proceed according to the same principle. The first movements of life within the hidden recesses of deity give birth to the ideal forms of all rational life—mind or intelligence, truth or reality, reason, life, man, church. These must first exist in God, and be evolved in the divine self-consciousness as the essential and primary functions in the inner life of deity, the patterns or models of life also in man's world.

The first ogdoad, then, must be primary, since all the Æons

which follow are contained or given in them by implication. From Logos and Zoē arise other ten, from Anthrōpos and Ecclēsia twelve. Reckoning Bythos and Sigē as the first in the series, we have thirty in all—the complete number of the Æons. But, since Christ and the Holy Spirit are sometimes spoken of as Æons, they would have to be added as later developments, and probably in some computations Bythos and Sigē are not reckoned within the thirty, as being the fountain of all the rest. The language of our sources varies a good deal on this point. Sophia is repeatedly spoken of as the last of the Æons, through whom confusion was begun in the Pleroma, which confusion was afterwards allayed by Christ and the Holy Spirit projected by the will of the Father for this purpose. It would seem, then, that these two should be regarded as later developments which arise in view of the sorrows of Sophia and the world, which should arise out of her tears. Christ and the Holy Spirit undoubtedly belong to the Pleroma, but they differ from the earlier Æons in this, that, though belonging to the Pleroma, they are intermediate with it and the sphere of the world (for the significance attaching to them see below). Meanwhile, reckoning the thirty as complete without them, we have three series—an ogdoad, a decad, and a dodecad, thus:

The primary ogdoad:
Bythos (=Proarchē=Propator) and Ennoia (=Charis=Sigē),
Nous and Alētheia,
Logos and Zoē,
Anthrōpos and Ecclēsia.

The decad produced by Nous and Alētheia (with some by Logos and Zoē):

1. Bythios, 'deep,'
2. Mixis, 'mixture,'
3. Agēratos, 'undecaying,'
4. Henosis, 'unification,'
5. Autophyēs, 'self-grown,'
6. Hēdonē, 'pleasure,'
7. Akinatos, 'unmoved,'
8. Syncrasis, 'composition,'
9. Monogenēs, 'only-begotten,'
10. Macaria, 'blessedness.'

The dodecad by Anthrōpos and Ecclēsia:

1. Paraclētos, 'comforter,'
2. Pistis, 'faith,'
3. Patricos, 'paternal,'
4. Elpis, 'hope,'
5. Metricos, 'temperate,'
6. Agapē, 'love,'
7. Synesis, 'understanding,'
8. Ecclēsiasticos, 'ecclesiastical,'
9. Ainos, 'praise,'
10. Macariotēs, 'felicity,'
11. Thelētos, 'volition,'
12. Sophia, 'wisdom.'

In the sources there are some small variations in the lists of the Æons, as also a difference of opinion as to the pairs by whom the decad or the dodecad were produced. From the outline it will be seen that the terms in some cases overlap. A more rigid logic could easily reduce the number. It is probable that the symbolism implied in the numbers 4, 8, 10, and 30 may have suggested 30 in all, as the number denoting the highest perfection. All the Æons taken together were meant to represent an ideal outline of things, to be realized in the material sphere, for which reason their perfection as a whole is more in prominence than the logical proportion of the parts, if, indeed, we should speak of logic at all in a construction so largely mythical. The conception offers an outline of the supposed life of deity, within the sphere of the eternal, according to which the life of man is to be modelled, the decad and the dodecad being an ideal sketch of the Gnostic Church from different standpoints. It will also be seen that the emanations or projections follow a descending series in such manner as to show that each series in the succession is a further unfolding of the essential content of those above, and the entire company constitute a fellowship in which each is necessary to all, and the felicity of each is dependent on the felicity of all. It is an image of the life of deity, not in the abysmal solitude of a bygone eternity, but at the stage when it has entered on a process of self-manifestation in which all the life powers and functions latent from the beginning take their place in an order of being which constitutes a heaven self-sufficing and eternal.

But our view of it is not complete till we see how the process of emanation, begun in the depths of deity, terminates in the production of the world and the redemption of man. The process is not conceived in the manner of pantheism. It has definite bounds, and terminates at a point where a *ὅρος*, 'limit,' is placed at the boundary where the *κένωμα*, or the *ὑστέρημα*, a sphere of another nature, begins. The Æons are not nature-powers which follow a necessity of nature; they are rather ethical personalities, and they constitute a spirit realm whose arrangements and working follow a Christian ideal. The frame for the conception was probably suggested by Platonism, from the place assigned to the eternal ideas in the building of the world, but the content is essentially Christian, and the heaven which they constitute is a Christian heaven. They furnish the model for the life of the lower world from which all that is purified and perfected at last ascends to dwell with the Æons. The first eight represent the great conceptions which underlie all forms of rational life. The next ten, which arise from Logos and Zoē, represent chiefly cosmical principles or powers which are necessary as a basis of ethical life. The last twelve, produced from Anthrōpos and Ecclēsia, are mostly the qualities of the perfected humanity which Christianity is destined to produce.

A scheme for a Pleroma was contained in the earlier system of Basilides, but the term does not seem to have been applied to it. Basilides confined the evolution of the divine life within deity to the seven powers—mind, reason, thought, wisdom, might, righteousness, and peace. But from this point the evolution continued through numberless grades of existence in a descending series—a conception which abandons the problem raised by Christianity.

5. The Pleroma and the world.—Returning, then, to the Valentinian Pleroma, how did the system account for the origin of the world, and what is the relation of the Pleroma to the world? The passage from spirit to matter, from the absolute and the perfect to the finite and the imperfect, is the great problem that confronts all philosophies which attempt to explain the origin of the world. The Gnostic attempts on this problem show great constructive skill and profound conceptions of what Christianity was expected to effect in the transformation of the world. Considerable difference of view appears, however, as to the manner in which the life of the Pleroma passes over into the region beyond. The myth of Sophia, which generally covers the origin of the world from the Pleroma, is put in various shapes, and it is not easy to gain a definite picture of the process as the Gnostics conceived it, if that was possible even to them. To a certain extent the myth of Sophia—*i.e.* the wisdom, or constructive skill, which had laboured to bring about the world—had taken various shapes before speculative thought had attempted the bolder task of picturing the life of deity in itself. We have seen that schools of opposite tendencies were agreed in placing supreme deity at the farthest possible distance from the world. But Jewish thought, while agreeing with the results of Greek speculation on this point, sought to explain the action of God in and upon the world by assuming the agency of various semi-divine mediating beings. Among these high prominence was assigned to wisdom (Sophia) as a world-building and world-ruling power. Closely allied to this conception was that of a demiourgos, or world-builder, which was introduced by Plato in his account of creation in the *Timæus*, and which became a favourite figure with the Gnostics. These personifications represented agencies more or less inferior to the highest deity, and, by ascribing the existing world with its many defects to these or similar beings, Gnosticism maintained a direct antithesis between God in Himself and all inferior agents who might have sway in the world. Deeply penetrated with the thought that Christianity was something absolutely new, that the Jewish dispensation which preceded it was mainly the work of inferior beings, that the mission and work of Christ were a revela-

tion from the highest God, the Gnostics sought for a conception of the Godhead which should stand in closer harmony with Christianity and explain the present anomalies of the world. To some extent, then, their speculative construction of the world had preceded their attempt at the heaven of the Æons, and the myth of Sophia had probably grown into some of its forms before the Æons of the Pleroma were fully established. The problem was, not to construct a material world by a process of emanation from the Pleroma, but to form a bridge between two systems of thought which had grown up apart and from the opposite ends of existence. Already in Christianity Christ and the Holy Spirit had been revealed as ethical and cosmic powers. They had come from the great unknown, and place must be found for them in the Pleroma of the Æons. The conception of the Pleroma would not be complete till it was shown how the life of the Godhead, already perfect in itself in the higher sphere, is reproduced in the lower, and draws up into itself all that is susceptible of redemption.

The passage of creative life from the Pleroma over the ὅρος, 'limit,' into the region beyond is represented somewhat thus:

> The life of the Æons was not one of perfect rest and quiescence like that of the Eternal and the Unbegotten in the beginning; for the desire arose among the Æons to search into the depths of the uncreated which remained invisible and incomprehensible to all except Nous alone. He alone exulted in the greatness of the Father and he sought how he might reveal to the rest how mighty the Father was. The rest of the Æons also had a wish to behold the author of their being. However, this was not the will of the Father, and Nous was restrained in his desire. Yet the last of the Æons (Sophia), conceiving this passion by contagion from the others, desired to comprehend the greatness of the Father. But, aiming at what was impossible, she became involved in great agony of mind, and was with difficulty restored to herself, by the power of ὅρος. By another account, a fuller and larger part of the myth, Sophia, through the excess of her desire, gave birth to an amorphous spiritual substance which, being separated by ὅρος from the circle of the Æons, constituted the beginning of the material world. Thus arose three distinct kinds of existence, the spiritual, the psychical, and the material—distinctions which play an important part in Gnostic teaching.
>
> Now these movements of desire within the circle of the Æons showed how disturbance might arise even in that world. Accordingly, by the forethought of the Father, Nous or Monogenês gave origin to another pair of Æons—Christ and the Holy Spirit—lest any similar calamity should happen again, and to fortify and strengthen the Pleroma, and to complete the number of the Æons. By Christ and the Holy Spirit the Æons were instructed as to the knowledge of the Father, since such knowledge was given to Monogenês alone. Being thereby restored to rest and peace, out of gratitude they brought together the best of what each possessed of beauty and preciousness, and, uniting the whole, they produced a being of the most perfect beauty, 'the very star of the Pleroma, Jesus, whom they name Saviour Christ, and everything, because he was framed from the contributions of all.'

Returning now to the offspring of Sophia, which was separated from the Pleroma and constituted the beginnings of the world, the myth represents the world as a growth from seed which has fallen from the Pleroma. It describes the effects produced upon it by the action of Christ as one of the heavenly Æons and Jesus the Saviour. The lower world is shown to be of a kindred nature with the higher. Spiritual men, who are the seed of the Pleroma in greatest perfection, yet share in the benefits secured by the heavenly Logos and the Saviour, and rise to the Pleroma, chiefly in virtue of their nature. Psychical men, who form the majority of ordinary Christians, stand in special need of the redemption which Christianity provides, while those who yield themselves to the seductions of the material world are subject to the destruction which awaits it.

6. Conclusion.—In this brief outline the reader will see much that is fantastic and strange to the Western mind. Yet there are many gleams of profound thinking. The nearest parallels in modern systems of thought will be found in those of Boehme and Schelling. For fuller details see art. GNOSTICISM, and the literature mentioned below. A few general remarks may still be added.

The underlying conception of the Valentinian Pleroma implies a modified or weakened form of dualism. The antithesis to the heaven of the Æons is not a world of dead matter which resists and opposes the creative action of spirit. It is rather one of emptiness or defect which is waiting to be filled with the overflowings of divine life, which yet needs to be redeemed by powers that go forth from the heavenly sphere. The life of the world is an ethical process. The spiritual portion of mankind, having the largest share of pneumatic life, is already within the sphere of salvation. The psychical men, still wavering between flesh and spirit, are in need of redemptive help and ethical trial, while those who are buried in the life of sense are left to destruction.

It should also be noted that the life of deity within the Pleroma was liable to disturbance and had to be restored by the heavenly Logos and the Holy Spirit. The perfect felicity of the Æons lies in each keeping within the assigned limits. The fullness of deity does not belong to them as individuals, but as a whole. Disturbance arises when they desire to pass the limits assigned to each. Individually, therefore, they are beset with limitations, and exhibit the life of the absolute only in their totality. They present the manifold life and energies of the Godhead in a process of self-manifestation that results in an ideal spirit-realm, in which the life of each is perfected, not in itself, but in the whole. The original part of the conception does not lie in the view of an inscrutable fountain of unknown deity, for that was common to all the speculative systems of the time. It lies in the construction of a heaven of Æons which shall constitute the ideal of, and supply dynamic for, the world that Christianity reveals and creates. The Gnostic Pleroma is distinctively a creation of Christian thought, and was meant to exhibit a general scheme of the world on which Christianity was thought to be based, and which it was destined to realize and perfect. This fully appears in many other parts of Gnostic thought which aimed at reaching a comprehensive view of the whole scheme of revelation and the course of the world. It did, in fact, offer a special philosophy of the nature of revelation in the pre-Christian time, of the manner in which deity was given in the person of Christ, and of the perfecting of the susceptible portion of mankind through the Holy Spirit.

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PLOTINUS.—See NEO-PLATONISM.

PLURALISM.—Pluralism is currently defined as the metaphysical doctrine that all existence is ultimately reducible to a multiplicity of distinct and independent beings or elements.[1] So defined, it is the obvious antithesis to monism (*q.v.*), and differs from dualism not only in emphasizing many as distinct from two realities, but also in providing for greater qualitative diversity among the many. Dualism (*q.v.*) is primarily a doctrine of two substances, one material and the other spiritual, and

[1] See, *e.g.*, Baldwin's *DPhP*, *s.v.*; *Bull. de la société française de philosophie*, xiii. [1901–05] 182; and R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, Berlin, 1899. The *Bulletin*, however, recognizes in a *remarque* another form of pluralism which will be considered in the last section of this article.

is commonly stated in terms of the contrast between body and mind. It is apparent, however, that the material and the spiritual substance may each be regarded as reducible to many separate elements which, in spite of their likeness in kind, are really independent and self-existent. There may be many independent atoms of matter, and there may be many independent spirits or minds. In a case like this, dualism is essentially pluralistic. Even monism may be similarly pluralistic if it is conceived as only a doctrine of one substance, either material or spiritual, as opposed to more than one. For it is evident that the one substance may be considered as reducible to many elements independently existing although qualitatively alike. The possible forms which pluralism may take are, therefore, many. It is not important, however, either to attempt to classify them or to discuss them, because only materialistic pluralism and spiritualistic pluralism have had any significant presentation in the history of thought.

1. **Materialistic pluralism.**—Materialistic pluralism has been represented by the consistent atomists from the time of Democritus. The atom and the medium in which the atoms move have, however, been variously conceived. The view usually ascribed to Democritus, and held by many subsequent thinkers, is apparently the simplest statement of the theory. The atoms are very small particles of matter, so hard that they resist division or change. They are qualitatively alike, but differ in size and shape, *i.e.* in their geometrical properties. They have always existed and are indestructible. They move freely in space by their own natural motion. Space is mere emptiness, the void, and consequently offers no resistance to the movement of the atoms. The motion of each atom, if left to itself, would be rectilinear, but, since the atoms differ in size and shape, they collide with one another, and the motion of the whole mass is, consequently, turbulent. As a result the geometrically similar atoms tend to congregate and form selected and ordered systems, first the 'worlds' in space and then the particular things of each world. But the general instability of the whole mass keeps any particular combination of atoms from persisting indefinitely. There is, consequently, perpetual combining and recombining among the atoms; and, on account of the many geometrical differences between the atoms, the number of permutations and combinations is practically limitless. With Democritus, as with most of his followers, this view of the atomic structure of all things seems to have resulted from the attempt to generalize, solely in terms of the geometrical properties involved, the empirical fact of the divisibility of concrete masses of matter. The qualitative diversity which the world obviously presents is usually either disregarded or viewed as a consequence of our way of perceiving. Democritus is reported to have said that, while we commonly speak of colours, sounds, etc., in reality there is nothing but atoms and the void.

The atomic theory (*q.v.*) admits of many variations, but its pluralistic character is not affected so long as the atoms are kept intact and the medium in which they move is equivalent to empty space. The atoms may be qualitatively different or the ultimate elements of a limited number of different material substances; they may expand and contract; they may have natural affinities and repugnances; they may be acted on by forces exterior to them or be impelled by forces resident in them; they may be so closely packed as virtually to exclude the necessity of a medium, and yet be conceived as in themselves permanent and underived. When, however, the medium in which the atoms operate is not conceived as empty space or its equivalent, the pluralistic character of the system is affected. For it is evident that the new medium—the ether, *e.g.*—cannot be atomic in structure, but must be continuous. The atoms cannot break the continuity. The medium must, therefore, penetrate them, but this penetration robs the atoms of their original simple character, and tends to make them appear as modes, rifts, involutions, or concretions of some sort in the medium itself. Such a direction as this recent chemistry and physics have taken, impelled thereto not only by speculative considerations, but also by experiments, like those of Sir William Ramsay, which have done much to make current once more the notion that material substances are convertible. The doctrine of relativity in physics moves in the same direction. Judged, therefore, by contemporaneous tendencies, materialistic pluralism as above defined does not represent the progressive ideas of the sciences which deal with matter. The tendency is rather towards a monistic conception or a complete relativism.

2. **Spiritualistic pluralism.**—The leading historical representative of spiritualistic pluralism is Leibniz (*q.v.*). Although thinkers in all ages have believed in the existence of many independent minds, few of them have, like him, made this belief the dominant and controlling factor in metaphysics. His philosophy, although among those which have had considerable historical influence, was not the result of the generalization of empirical fact such as marked the theory of atoms. It was the result rather of his attempt to avoid the monism of Spinoza, on the one hand, and atomism, on the other. In place of the atom he puts the monad—an ultimate, simple, and self-existent spiritual being. The monads do not have geometrical properties, nor do they exist in space as in a void. Their independence and metaphysical exteriority to one another constitute a kind of quasi-space in which they may be said to exist. Their properties are spiritual or psychical, such as appetite, desire, perception. Each is self-contained, 'windowless,' and neither influences nor is influenced by another. Each has its own inherent law of life or development, so that all the monads may be represented in a series from the lowest, or 'sleeping,' monads to the highest, or self-conscious, each differing from its neighbour by the least possible difference. They are thus all in a kind of 'pre-established harmony,' each reflecting, as it were, the whole range of possible development from its own peculiar position in the series. All things are made up of monads. The highest monad in the body is the soul, and the highest monad in the system is God. But God's relation to the other monads is not always clear. At times He is one of the monads, at times their creator, at times the unity in the system. Among the monads there is no spatial motion, for their life is not that of physical movement, but that of purposeful development. It is their externality to one another combined with their concerted life that gives us the phenomenon of physical movement in physical space.

This doctrine of monads may be taken as representative of spiritualistic pluralism generally. It has never had the influence on scientific procedure which the doctrine to which it is opposed has had. For the atomic theory is an attempt to generalize the empirical fact of the divisibility of matter and to employ the apparatus of mathematics to make this generalization workable. As a result it has been embraced by many who are not materialists, but who have found it a potent instrument in scientific investigation. The theory of monads—and similar attempts to construct a pluralistic system of spiritual entities—is, as already noticed,

fundamentally a protest against materialism. When it addresses itself to the concrete facts of nature, it amounts to little more than the attempt to make the atoms spiritual—to substitute psychical properties for physical, and internal purposeful development for external physical motion. That is why it appears to be more an ingenious speculation than a fructifying hypothesis.

3. The new pluralism.—Although philosophical usage has recognized in the theories just considered the two classical forms of pluralism, it should be observed that neither of them denies the fundamental unity and wholeness of the universe. There may be many atoms or many minds, but in either case there is only one universe, and this universe is a coherent and self-contained whole. The resulting speculative opposition between the one and the many has probably done more to keep philosophical interest in these systems alive than any genuine illumination which they afford. For this opposition has proved itself repeatedly to be a potent stimulus to philosophical reflexion. In terms of it a different form of pluralism may be defined which has many supporters among contemporary philosophers.

This new pluralism is not a doctrine of many substances opposed to monism conceived as a doctrine of one. It is rather the doctrine that there is no absolute unity in the universe, and it is opposed to the controlling absolutistic—and in that sense monistic—systems of the greater part of the 19th century. Absolutism in some form had as its supporters nearly all the leading thinkers of the world, and had become almost a settled dogma in philosophy. In the face of an absolutistic logic and of the principle of the conservation of energy, few philosophers had the courage to deny that the universe is a thoroughly coherent system in which, by virtue of its unity, a place and time and cause are, at any moment, implied for every event that has taken place or can take place. Thinking was constrained by the principle so eloquently set forth, *e.g.*, in Emil du Bois-Reymond's famous essay, *Über die Grenzen des Naturerkennens* (Leipzig, 1872), that, did we know completely the state of the universe at any one moment, we should be able to calculate its state at any other moment. Opposition to this dogma was not very effective until towards the close of the century, when the writings principally of William James, John Dewey, F. C. S. Schiller, and Henri Bergson effectively challenged it and put it on the defensive.[1]

James was, doubtless, the protagonist in the movement. He named his philosophy 'radical empiricism,' and occasionally 'pluralism.' In the preface to *The Will to Believe* (1897) he gives this general statement of his position:

'The crudity of experience remains an eternal element thereof. There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact. Real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real moral life, just as common-sense conceives these things, may remain in empiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt either to "overcome" or to reinterpret in monistic form' (p. ix).

Dewey's insistence that thinking is a real instrument which brings situations essentially indeterminate into determinate form, Schiller's rather individual and peculiar type of pragmatism, and Bergson's insistence that evolution is essentially creative and discontinuous, all exhibit this new tendency in different forms, but to the same end.

There has not yet, however, so far as the writer is aware, appeared any systematic presentation of the metaphysics underlying this new movement in philosophy. What is here called pluralism represents a tendency rather than an achievement. The general direction of this tendency in various departments of human interest is indicated below, but here an attempt may be made to suggest the basal conceptions which this tendency seems to imply. Emphasis falls on change, adaptation, reorganization, or action as an original and genuine fact wherever and whenever it occurs. Accordingly there is no moment in the world's history when all possible changes may be said to be determined. All things are in process of becoming determined, and what that process will be is contingent, not simply on what has already happened, but on what may happen. But what may happen is a genuine possibility with nothing fully to determine it before it arrives. The world is thus never fully made, but always in the making. The fact that it perpetually has a future negatives any absolutistic conception of it. Our inability to grasp the world as a single, unified, and complete system is, therefore, due, not to our incapacity or ignorance, but to its essential nature as a genuine time-process which reaches many concrete and specific ends, but which implies no absolute end that limits and closes the process as a whole.

We have in these considerations not, as might be superficially supposed, a revival of the doctrine of freedom as opposed to necessity, but the beginnings of a genuinely constructive metaphysics of activity. That is, pluralism does not start with a self-contained system of terms and relations which is, in general, responsible for everything that happens, and then claim that there may be free and spontaneous infractions of the system. It starts rather with the conception of activity as empirically exhibited in any change, and tries to generalize this conception and draw out the implications that seem to be empirically involved. As every action takes time, the course of the action when followed out empirically in detail gives us, not the effect of causes all operative at the moment when the action begins, but the interplay of causes operative only from moment to moment as the action proceeds. It is only where the action is viewed retrospectively from some specific point of view in its career that it can be construed absolutely; *i.e.*, only then can any of its issues be construed as the necessary effect of causes which have determined it. Such retrospective views can give us formulæ and laws of accomplished fact and thus afford a basis for prediction in similar cases, but they cannot give us any action in its concrete vitality and operation, because every action is forward-moving. Now, the generalization of this view of activity naturally forbids a monistic or absolutistic view of the world as a whole. For, if we now speak of the world as a whole, or of the 'universe' in any intelligible sense, we must speak of it, not as something already accomplished which can be viewed retrospectively, but as something moving forward with a genuine future and real possibilities. Yet, even so, we could not conceive it as a single movement, but only as the interplay of many movements. Otherwise the movement of the universe would be only movement abstracted from its concrete setting. It could not be itself a concrete movement illustrating the interplay of factors which operate only from moment to moment as the movement pro-

[1] For other writings of the same general tenor see the bibliography at the end of this article. The opposition under consideration has not always borne the name of pluralism. One finds the same general tendencies in the supporters of pragmatism (q.v.) and the advocates of personal idealism. The latter doctrine, represented principally by Henry C. Sturt in England and George H. Howison in America, is a reaction against absolutism in the interest of personality conceived as spiritual and free. Howison is frankly pluralistic and exhibits close similarities with Leibniz's doctrine of monads. Sturt bases all speculation on the principles that personal experience should be the basis of all philosophical synthesis and that personal experience is spiritual, but he believes in a 'totality of goodness,' a 'moral totality,' and that the cosmos must be dominated by a single intelligence.

ceeds. Such appears to be the general metaphysical groundwork of the new pluralism.

In psychology these tendencies had their initiative, and here they have been most effective. During the past thirty years the attempt to construe the mind or consciousness as a substance or as a complex of elementary sensations united by fixed laws of association has progressively yielded to the attempt to construe mental life in terms of activity and response. Although many psychologists have independently contributed to this progress, the publication in 1890 of James's *Principles of Psychology* may justly be cited as critical. Here was the first effective and systematic attack upon the older view. To-day the idea that 'to have a mind' means 'to act in a certain way' has become a commonplace in psychology. To think has become an adventure and a real instrument in adaptation. Knowledge has ceased to be regarded as simply the mental counterpart or image of an objective order, and knowing has become an active participation in the order of events. In other words, to be conscious of objects does not mean to possess their psychical equivalents or imply a possible consciousness which might possess the equivalents of all objects whatever, and so be the perfect and complete representative of the world. It means rather to operate with objects effectively, to seek and avoid, to work changes — in short, to organize experience. This newer conception of the mind has spread beyond psychology and markedly affected anthropology and sociology. Primitive peoples and society are studied more in terms of what they do and less in terms of the supposed 'consciousness' that they were once credited with possessing.

In logic the new movement has been more equivocal in its success. It has illuminated in a brilliant way the concrete procedure of thinking, showing how distinctions like object or thing and idea arise in its course and are not the constituent elements of thinking itself. It has given us the logic of 'how we think.' But the opposition to formal logic which has too frequently accompanied this service has obscured many logical issues and problems. The structure of accomplished thought has been too much neglected. The older logic, especially in the form set forth by Bertrand Russell, is still an active and constructive opponent of the newer tendencies.

In morals and religion it is premature to attempt to state with conclusiveness the effects which the new movement is likely to produce. Yet, so far as morals are concerned, the general direction is fairly clear, as may be seen from the *Ethics* of Dewey and Tufts (1908). The tendency is away from fixed, *a priori* principles, and towards the concrete exigencies of life. Morality is conceived, not as a system of rules which should be obeyed, but as the type of life which characterizes beings who desire and wish, hope and fear. Responsibility is conceived, not in terms of an obligation imposed upon living, but in terms of an increasing sensibility of the value of human relationships. There are no absolutes. Justice, *e.g.*, is not such. It is rather the attempt to deal with human adjustments in a progressively effective manner. In brief, morality is not an absolute ideal which, being somehow imposed on man, orders him to be moral. It is the kind of life that man conceives to be most adequately expressive of his natural impulses and his ideal hopes.

There is in these considerations a close resemblance to the more refined forms of utilitarianism, but the doctrine is not utilitarian as commonly understood. No simple or elaborate computation of pleasures and pains is implied. No attempt is made first to estimate the greatest good of the greatest number, and then to act accordingly. There is rather the attempt to take human relationships as they are empirically given — the family, friends, the State, love, property, marriage —to see towards what they point, what desires and hopes they engender, and then to bring the resources of knowledge to bear upon the perfecting of them or the elimination from them of that which makes communal living difficult and unlovely.

In religion the tendencies are not as yet well defined. It is possible, however, to recognize among religious writers influenced by the new movement a growing appreciation of religion as something humanly characteristic, rather than as a matter beginning with the gods. There is, too, as in the ethical tendencies, the denial of absolutistic ideas. Consequently there is recognized no one religion which can be judged valid as over against all others. In estimating the worth of any religion moral instead of logical or metaphysical standards are employed.

It is mainly as a new and potent stimulus to fresh philosophizing that current pluralistic tendencies are to be estimated. Under the absolutistic systems of the last century, philosophy had largely lost its vitality. It had become almost exclusively historical, a comparative study of systems, and was not an intimate companion of living or a vivid aid to reflexion. It was largely an intellectual interest set apart from the sum of intellectual interests generally. Pluralism has effected a change in this regard. There is to-day a genuine revival of philosophical interest which is making its impression not only upon the traditional 'problems of philosophy,' but also upon the whole domain of inquiry. It is common to hear of the 'new chemistry,' the 'new physics,' the 'new biology,' the 'new history.' When we inquire generally what is the underlying motive of this 'newness,' we almost invariably find a desire for the recognition of real possibilities and a revolt against absolutistic systems.

There is, doubtless, some confusion and disadvantage in grouping under the name of 'pluralism' the tendencies which have just been considered, although the grouping has warrant in contemporary usage. There is some confusion because these tendencies are motived not simply nor always by metaphysical considerations growing out of the opposition between monistic and pluralistic speculations. They are motived also by obvious empirical considerations. A thinker who takes the world as he finds it, and, in reflecting on it, follows the lead of concrete tendencies as they arise and come to an issue, will doubtless be led to view the world as a process involving many different factors and not as an already completely unified and permanently organized whole. He might find some disadvantage in calling his view of things pluralism, because he might feel that, in so doing, he was affirming kinship with some form of the substantial pluralism noticed in the beginning of this article, or with the leading motives and principles of that philosophy. Substantial pluralism is a positive doctrine. The new pluralism is as yet largely negative. It is not so much the affirmation that the world is many as it is the denial that the world is one. That is the main reason why it represents to-day a tendency in philosophy much more than a systematic metaphysics.

LITERATURE. — For the older form of pluralism it is sufficient to refer to the standard histories of philosophy and to introductions to philosophy. For the newer form the following will be found illustrating the tendencies set forth in the article, by way both of support and of opposition: H. Bergson, *Matière et mémoire*, Paris, 1896, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*[2], do. 1898, *L'Évolution créatrice*, do. 1907; J. H. H. Boëx-Borel, *Le Pluralisme*, do. 1909; J. Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, Chicago, 1903, *The Influence of Darwin on*

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PLUTARCH.—1. Life.—Plutarch was born about A.D. 46, as may be inferred from the statement that in 66, the year of Nero's visit to Greece, he was a pupil of the Academic philosopher Ammonius in Athens (*de EI apud Delphos*, 1, p. 385 B). He was a native of Chæronea in Bœotia, and showed a constant affection for his birth-place, which he ultimately made his home. Belonging to a family of good position, he received the best education open to a young man of his time. He was instructed in medicine and natural science by the physician Onesicrates (*de Mus.* 2, p. 1131 C); and, though there is no direct evidence of his public profession of the art of declamation, his rhetorical training is manifest in such of his early writings as the *de Fortuna Romanorum* (pp. 317–326) and the *Aquane an Ignis sit utilior* (pp. 955–958).

While still a young man, he was sent as an envoy representing his native town on a mission to the proconsul (*Præc. ger. Reip.* 16, p. 816 D). It seems that political business was also at any rate the ostensible cause of his visits to Rome (*Demosth.* 2), the earliest of which must have taken place in the reign of Vespasian (*de Sollert. Anim.* 19, p. 974 A). It is a legitimate assumption that he made several visits (cf. *Quæst. Conv.* viii. 7. 1, p. 727 B), and that they occupied a considerable time; for he shows an intimate acquaintance with Roman topography (e.g., *Poplic.* 8), and was so well known there that he was accustomed to deliver lectures in public (*de Curios.* 15, p. 522 E). Among the chief of his Roman friends may be reckoned C. Sosius Senecio, who was four times consul under Trajan, and to whom several of the *Parallel Lives* were dedicated, and Mestrius Florus, another consular, in whose company he visited the historical sites of Gallia Cisalpina (*Oth.* 14). During his residence in Italy he acquired a high reputation as a teacher of moral philosophy, and was rewarded with the devotion of a large band of pupils. It is evident that in this intercourse the medium of communication was the Greek language; for Plutarch makes the interesting confession that he was well advanced in years before he commenced to study Latin (*Demosth.* 2), and the errors which he makes in his incidental references to the language (*e.g.*, *σίνε πάτρις, οἷον ἄνευ πατρός* [*Quæst. Rom.* 103, p. 288 F]) are such as to prove that his acquaintance with it was never more than superficial.

Subsequently, if we may trust the authority of Suidas (*s.v.* Πλούταρχος), he enjoyed the favour of the emperor Trajan, by whom he was elevated to consular rank, while the governor of the province was enjoined to take his advice upon all matters of importance. It is probable that he survived to witness the early part of the reign of Hadrian, but died not long after 120; for he speaks of the Olympieium in Athens as unfinished (*Solon*, 32), whereas we know that it was completed by Hadrian between the years 125 and 130.

In the latter part of his life Plutarch seems to have settled permanently at Chæronea, where he was uninterruptedly engaged in literary labour, except during the performance of the duties attached to his municipal offices. At Chæronea he filled the post of overseer of buildings (*Præc. ger. Reip.* 15, p. 811 B), as well as that of archon *ἐπώνυμος* (*Quæst. Conv.* ii. 10. 1, p. 643 F). He was also an associate of the college of priests to Apollo at Delphi (*ib.* vii. 2. 2, p. 700 E), and was a member of the council which superintended the organization of the Pythian games (*ib.* v. 2, p. 674 E). Notwithstanding these activities, he gave lectures from time to time both on philosophical subjects and on others of wider interest (cf. *de Rect. Rat. Aud.* 1, p. 37 C). In his domestic life his relations with his wife and children were strikingly tender and affectionate, and are charmingly illustrated in the letter of consolation addressed to his wife Timoxena on the death of their infant daughter, who was named after her mother. From this letter a single sentence may be quoted:

'As she was herself the dearest object for her parents to fondle, gaze upon, or listen to, so should her memory remain to us as a joy far exceeding its pain' (*Consol. ad Uxor.* 3, p. 608 E).

From the same source (5, p. 609 D) we learn that two of the four sons born to Plutarch and his wife died at an early age. The names of the two sons who survived, Autobulus and Plutarchus, are recorded in the dedication to them of the treatise *de Animæ Procreatione in Timæo* (p. 1030 D); and they are mentioned as taking part in the various discussions which arose at their father's table (cf. *Quæst. Conv.* viii. 10. 3, p. 735 C). We read also of the marriage of Autobulus (*ib.* iv. 3. 1, p. 666 D), who appears again as the narrator of the *Amatorius*, and as a character in the dialogue *de Sollertia Animalium*. But it was not merely within the family circle that the kindliness and geniality of Plutarch's character were displayed. There is abundant evidence from his *Table Talk* (*Quæstiones Convivales*) and the other dialogues that to his friends he was an object of affectionate regard no less than of respect for his moderation and common sense. His writings have made a similar impression upon posterity. Among many testimonies to his worth we may instance the judgment of Mahaffy, who happily remarks:

'We feel him, as we feel Sir Walter Scott, not only the originator of an inestimably instructive form of historiography, but also essentially a gentleman—a man of honour and of kindliness, the best type of the best man of his day' (*Greek World under Roman Sway*, p. 293).

2. Works.—The most celebrated of Plutarch's works is his *Parallel Lives*, intended to exhibit a comparison of the greatest men whom Greece and Rome had produced, by the publication of their biographies side by side in pairs. Forty-six of these lives have come down to modern times, and their world-wide celebrity makes it the less necessary to describe their characteristics, especially as we are more nearly concerned with the other branch of his writings, which is conveniently but inaccurately labelled the *Moralia*. It is enough to say that the *Lives* were not so much the fruit of historical research as an endeavour to illustrate the moral writings of their author by depicting the characters and dispositions of men who have actually lived.

The collection of the *Moralia* (*ἠθικά*) is so described because most of the treatises which it comprises deal with what may be called 'moral' subjects, although not with the principles of formal ethics. The writings are actually a miscellany, containing discussions on religion, literature, politics, education, philology, folk-lore, archæology, and natural history, as well as some of a severely philosophical type. Plutarch is less a philosopher than an essayist, and the most characteristic of

his writings are those which, in dealing with such subjects as garrulousness, false shame, restraint of anger, or flattery and friendship, display, together with a profusion of illustration and anecdote, the good taste, common sense, and genuine humanity of their author. Not the least of their merits for the modern world is that, apart from a wealth of information on literary history, the *Moralia* are a plentiful storehouse of quotations from the lost writings of early poets and philosophers.

3. Leading ideas.— (*a*) *Philosophical and religious.*—By his adoption of the dialogue form for most of these treatises Plutarch acknowledged himself as much a follower of Plato's literary methods as he was formally an adherent of his teaching (cf. *de Def. Or.* 37, p. 431 A). The latest tendency of the Academy had been in the direction of eclecticism. Philo and Antiochus had abandoned the extreme scepticism of Arcesilaus and Carneades, and, while laying greater stress upon ethical doctrines, had made an approach towards the positions of the Stoics and Peripatetics by advocating life according to nature, and the plurality of virtue as well as its self-sufficiency. In the 1st cent. of the Christian era the beginnings of a new movement, of which Plutarch was the most distinguished representative, gradually become apparent. Its leading features are two—a closer application to the study of the Platonic writings, and the growth of a spirit of religious mysticism, which ultimately issued in Neo-Platonism. Not that the accretion of alien doctrine was entirely repudiated; for it has even been said of Plutarch that 'it would be hard to say whether the number of Stoic dogmas which he rejects exceeds that which he quotes with approval' (Mahaffy, p. 301). At the same time the most important of Plutarch's strictly philosophical writings are those directed from an Academic standpoint against the Stoics (*de Stoicorum Repugnantiis*, *de Communibus Notitiis*) and against the Epicureans (*adversus Coloten*, *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*). His positive contributions towards the elucidation of the Platonic text are contained in the *de Animæ Procreatione in Timæo*, and are of much less importance to the student of philosophy than the controversial writings previously mentioned. Plutarch adopted from Plato as his two ultimate first principles the One and the Indeterminate Dyad (δυὰς ἀόριστος). The latter, as the element of shapelessness and disorder, is called Infinity (ἀπειρία), whereas the nature of the One, by defining and occupying the Infinity, which is empty, irrational, and indeterminate, endows it with form, and so makes it capable of supporting and containing the determination which is a necessary accompaniment of sensible objects (*de Def. Or.* 35, p. 428 F ff.). The combination of these two principles, unity and duality, is seen most clearly in the production from them of numbers (*ib.*). The creation of the world was the result of the concatenation of three factors —God, matter, and form. Matter is the shapeless underlying substratum; form is the fairest model; and God is the best of causes. God, in His desire to leave nothing indeterminate, but to organize nature with proportion, measure, and number, produced a unity by a combination of His material. This was the universe (κόσμος), equal to matter in extent, and similar to form in quality (*Quæst. Conv.* viii. 2. 4, p. 720 A, B). It must be remembered, however, that, according to Plato's doctrine, matter, being itself formless and inert, is not the cause of evil, which proceeds from a foul and malignant necessity struggling with and rebelling against God (*de Anim. Procr.* 6, p. 1015 A, *de Is. et Osir.* 48, p. 370 F). The war of these opposing principles is especially to be detected in man's chequered existence, and in the region of inequality and change which lies between the earth and the moon (*de Is. et Osir.* 45, p. 369 D). God exists not in time, but in eternity, which for His unity is an everlasting present, without beginning or end, past or future. As being absolute unity, He is incapable of differentiation (ἑτερότης [*de EI apud Delph.* 20, p. 393 A, B]). God sees, but cannot be seen (*de Is. et Osir.* 75, p. 381 B). He is absolutely pure and undefiled by any form of existence liable to destruction and death; hence our souls, which are encompassed by the body and its attributes, cannot reach God, save only in so far as, by the exercise of pure reason and through the medium of philosophy, they may attain to an indistinct vision of His image (*ib.* 78, p. 382 F). Life in the body upon earth is an exile of the soul (*de Exil.* 17, p. 607 D). It has come from the gods and will return thither, so soon as it is discharged from the trammels of the body. It is like a flame which shoots upwards in spite of the misty vapours that cling round it and seek to bind it to the earth. Hence it is not the bodies of good men that go to heaven; but their souls pass into heroes, from heroes into demons, and, when at last they have been mysteriously cleansed and sanctified, so that they are free from any mortal affection, then in no merely conventional sense, but in very truth and by a blessed consummation, they are caught up to join the gods (*Rom.* 28, *de Def. Or.* 10, p. 415 B). Some souls are not entirely imprisoned within the body, but, by keeping the purest portion in external association with the topmost surface of their owners' heads, who are thus lifted upwards and saved from complete submersion, they preserve their immortality free from bodily taints. This part, called the intelligence (νοῦς), and generally supposed to be innate, is actually external, and would more properly be known as 'demon' (*de Gen. Soc.* 22, p. 591 D). It is unreasonable to disbelieve in the inspiration of certain individuals, if we retain our belief that God is a lover of mankind. The ordinary man learns the commands of God by signs, which the prophetic art interprets, but there are a few who on rare occasions have direct intercourse with the divinity. Further, when souls freed from the body have at length become demons, they still retain their interest in the world which they have left, as Hesiod was aware (*Op.* 120), and are allowed by God to assist the final struggles of those aspiring souls which are yet in the last period of their incarnation (*de Gen. Soc.* 24, p. 593 A ff.). There are, however, bad demons as well as the good; and they are elsewhere described as belonging to the borderland which separates gods and men, and as subject to mortal affections and the changes wrought by necessity (*de Def. Or.* 12, p. 416 C; cf. 17, p. 419 A, *de Is. et Osir.* 25, p. 360 E). These passages are typical of much in Plutarch, and their Platonic character is unmistakable. At the same time, it should be observed that, in emphasizing his belief in demons, he was echoing the teaching of the Stoics (see art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Greek]). The same remark applies to his treatment of μαντική. Divination is the gift of God to man (*de Def. Or.* 8, p. 413 C), but the decay of oracles is not on that account to be attributed to Him, but rather to the failure of matter (*ib.* 9, p. 414 D, E). In a curious passage (*ib.* 40, p. 432 D) he speaks of the prophetic capacity as resembling a sheet of white paper, ready to receive impressions from the warnings of sensation, when the seer is withdrawn (ἑκστῇ) from the influences of the present and is filled with the spirit of prophecy (ἐνθουσιασμός). This inspiration may come from the inner constitution of the body, but is frequently conveyed either through air or through water at particular

places in the form of flowing water or breath. Elsewhere (*de Pyth. Or.* 7, p. 397 D) he says more simply that God does not inspire the voice of the prophetess or the words which she uses, but merely provides the sense-impressions (φαντασίας), and gives light in the soul, enabling it to look upon the future. Thus, though agreeing with the Stoics in upholding the truth of μαντική, Plutarch refused altogether to countenance the Stoic doctrine that the divine spirit permeated every stone and piece of metal in the world (*ib.* 8, p. 398 C). His whole attitude towards religion is guided by a spirit of conservatism, seeking to uphold each venerable institution, while finding elements of truth in the various devices by which philosophers sought to remove traditional difficulties (*ib.* 18, p. 402 E, *Amat.* 13, p. 756 B). Thus he would steer a middle course between superstition and atheism, recognizing that there is not so much difference in the nature of the gods as the various conceptions of them by Greeks and barbarians, and the names given to them, might seem to imply, but that there is only one Reason that sets in order and one Providence that controls the world (*de Is. et Osir.* 67, p. 377 F ff.). The elaborate discussion of Egyptian religion (*de Iside et Osiride*) is a testimony to the progress of these foreign cults in the estimation of his fellow-countrymen, and is so constructed as to show that the ideas which underlay them are essentially the same as those which are recognized by the theologians of Greece. The leading motive of the short essay *de Superstitione*, which is, however, regarded by some merely as a rhetorical exercise undertaken in defence of a paradox, and not therefore characteristic of its author's real view (Mahaffy, p. 318), is to show that a perverted and ignorant belief respecting the nature of the gods and their attitude to mankind is more harmful to the peace of the soul than an obstinate refusal to believe in their existence. While he had no sympathy with Epicurean rationalism, which destroyed the value of piety (*adv. Colot.* 27, p. 1123 A), he was no less disinclined to accept the reckless allegorizing of the Stoics, which, by making Ares a mere synonym for combativeness, Aphrodite for desire, and Athene for intelligence, destroyed the individualities of the old gods and plunged their worshippers into a gulf of atheism (*Amat.* 13, p. 757 B). It was therefore quite consistent with his general attitude towards religion that Plutarch, as we have seen, himself exercised priestly functions, and attended with his wife to take part in the sacrifice offered on the occasion of the festival of Eros at Thespiæ (*ib.* 2, p. 749 B). The same moderation may be detected in his attitude towards Orphism. While he wholeheartedly condemns the follies of excess attendant upon the popular celebration of its rites, the modes of cleansing and purifications which were themselves filthy, the wearing of ragged garments, the wallowings in the mud, the ridiculous importance attached to the eating or drinking of particular solids or liquids (*de Superst.* 7, p. 168 D, 12, p. 171 B), he was himself the advocate of a reasonable abstinence and asceticism (*de Tuend. Sanit.* 19, p. 132 E, *de Is. et Osir.* 2, p. 352 A), and, by his abstention from eggs for a season in consequence of a dream, laid himself open to the suspicion of having adopted Orphic tenets (*Quæst. Conv.* ii. 3. 1, p. 635 A).

We have seen that Plutarch regarded the existence of evil as an outcome of necessity, but he has much more to say on the kindred problem why the gods permit the existence of moral evil without exacting appropriate punishment. To this subject he has devoted the important dialogue *de Sera Numinis Vindicta*. The occasion is provided by a supposed lecture of Epicurus, and various answers are given to the objection raised against what is assumed to be the ordinary dealing of Providence, namely, that the delay in punishment encourages the sinner and disappoints the injured. Thus it is said (1) that the gods wish to give time for repentance, and thus set an example to others, teaching them to beware of hasty resentment, and (2) that by this delay they are able to distinguish those who are incurable and require extirpation from those who, having erred rather through ignorance than of deliberate choice, are deserving of remedial treatment (5, p. 550 C ff.). Again, since it is always possible that a wicked parent may beget a virtuous offspring, it is natural that God should not immediately root out an evil stock, without waiting to see whether it will not produce a good fruit (7, p. 553 B). But the best answer of all is that the delay is only apparent, since sin, by the misery which it causes to the sinner, brings its own punishment with it, so that length of life becomes an aggravated unhappiness (9, p. 554 A ff.). We are then introduced to the topic of punishment in the next world, and the dialogue concludes with a myth concerning the experiences of one Thespesius, who, during a trance, was permitted to be a witness of the treatment accorded to the souls of the dead. The myth is obviously modelled on the story of Er in the tenth book of Plato's *Republic*, and serves once more to illustrate Plutarch's admiration for his great predecessor. The same tendency appears in the parallel case of the myth of Timarchus in the *de Genio Socratis*, where an account is given of the supernatural visions granted to him after his descent into the cave of Trophonius at Lebadeia (*de Gen. Soc.* 21, p. 589 F ff.).

(*b*) *Ethical.*—The strictly ethical treatises are in the nature of short essays on moral subjects, based upon psychological observation, and designed to effect the moral improvement of their readers. Here we find Plutarch in the character of a physician of the soul, a public preacher who, so far from being inspired with the fervour of a new revelation, sought, by means of copious illustration and apt quotations from the poets, to instil a reasonable exercise of the humaner virtues. The practical aim of his advice may be seen in the three treatises belonging to the consolatory type (παραμυθητικοί), acknowledged by the schools as a special branch of casuistry (παραινετικὸς τόπος; see the present writer's notes on Cleanth. frag. 92 f. [*Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, Cambridge, 1891]). These are the *de Exilio* and the *Consolatio ad Uxorem*, which have already been mentioned, and the more elaborate *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, which was largely indebted to Crantor's περὶ Πένθους. In fact, a considerable number of these writings are open to the suspicion that they are dependent upon unacknowledged, principally Stoic, sources.

As an example we may instance the short treatise *de Virtute Morali*, which contains comparatively little of Plutarch's characteristic manner, but, while designed to support the Platonic psychology by advocating the submission of the emotions to reason rather than their entire eradication, is constructed to serve as a compendium of moral doctrine with material drawn from the severer text-books of the Peripatetics and Stoics.[1]

He had no sympathy with the formal dogmatism of the schools, but did not hesitate to borrow from them whatever approved itself to his common sense as conducive to moral welfare. When we turn to those passages where he seems more especially to give utterance to his innermost convictions, we find him inculcating self-control, patience, and cheerfulness as the surest defences against the jars and worries of social and domestic life. Thus,

[1] M. Pohlenz, in *Hermes*, xxxi. [1896] 332, 338, finds the original source of the treatise in a work of Hieronymus of Rhodes.

after mentioning the advantages of various forms of abstinence, he continues:

'I put beside them a vow no less acceptable to the gods: I resolved, as if I were making a wineless oblation of milk and honey, to keep myself free from passion first of all for a few days; then, to extend the period by gradual experiment to one or two months, so that I continually made progress in the tolerance of evil, exercising an unceasing control upon my tongue in order to appear cheerful and void of resentment. I refrained consistently from base talk and extravagant action, and repressed any emotion which provoked violent agitation or shameful remorse for the satisfaction of a mean or trifling pleasure. By these means I am contented, and, by the favour of heaven, experience has confirmed the truth of my conviction that the spirit of cheerfulness, gentleness, and kindness is to none of his associates so gracious, welcome, and comforting as to its possessor' (*de Cohib. Ira*, 16, p. 464 C).

In another passage he deduces a similar moral from the contemplation of the glories of the physical world, which, following ultimately a Peripatetic model (I. Bywater, in *JPh* vii. [1876] 80), he compares with an august temple, where the most exalted mysteries are being continually celebrated:

'Yet men debase this festival which God has provided for them by unceasing lamentation and dejection, permitting themselves ever to be harassed by wearisome anxiety' (*de Tranq. An.* 20, p. 477 E).

Just as in religion he endeavoured by compromise to adjust extreme views, so in ethics he sought to reconcile the divergencies of the dogmatic schools by refusing to accept in their entirety the tendencies with which he partly sympathized.

'He will not adopt with Plato the equality of the sexes, or with the Stoics the injustice of slavery, or with the Pythagoreans the rights of the lower animals to justice at the hands of men, yet he goes a long way with all three—magnifying the position and the dignity of the house-mother both by example and precept, inculcating everywhere kindness and consideration to slaves, adopting even vegetarian doctrines in some of his earlier treatises, and upholding with satire and with paradox the superior insight and intelligence of the animals we patronize or oppress' (Mahaffy, p. 301).

(*c*) *Political.*—In regard to politics, Plutarch repudiated the Epicurean advocacy of abstention (*Pyrrh.* 20) as expressed in the formula 'Live in retirement' (λάθε βιώσας), against which he directed a short treatise (*de Latenter Vivendo*, pp. 1128–1130). But he lived in an age in which the limits of political activity were severely narrow, and he was the last man to waste himself in chafing against a restriction which it was neither wise nor possible to break down. Thus he sincerely believed that monarchy was the most perfect of all forms of government (*An Seni sit Resp. ger.* 11, p. 790 A), but that the wise ruler must be careful to observe a mean between laxity and severity, so that he may not incur either the hatred or the contempt of his subjects by aiming at despotism or making concessions in favour of popular government (*Thes. et Rom. Comp.* 2). He recognized that it was idle to rebel against the imperial dominion or to cast wistful eyes upon the historic battlefields of Marathon and Platæa (*Præc. ger. Reip.* 17, p. 814 C). The chief political virtues are not pride and stubbornness, but patience and tolerance, which are the fruits of a well-trained reason (*Coriol.* 15). He has even a good word to say for Theramenes and his proverbial 'boot which fitted either leg' (*Præc. ger. Reip.* 32, p. 824 B), and holds that the politician should make it his chief aim to avoid a crisis. Thus, if the greatest blessings which communities can enjoy are taken into account, it will be found that, in regard to peace, the Greeks have nothing left to desire, since every form of warfare, domestic or foreign, has come to an end; while, in respect of freedom, they enjoy as much as their masters allow them, which is perhaps as much as is good for them (*ib.* p. 824 C). What sort of politics other than the petty activities of municipal government was it possible for Plutarch to recommend? His own life is now seen to furnish a near approach to the only ideal which he regarded as attainable. A public lawsuit or a deputation to the emperor is the chief opportunity for a courageous and prudent man to seek his own advancement (*ib.* 10, p. 805 A). We should not always be striving after the highest offices, such as that of *strategus* in Athens, *prytanis* in Rhodes, or *Bœotarch* in Bœotia; but rather we should endeavour to impart lustre to those of less account, and preserve a mien suitable to the sphere of authority assigned to us by the responsible powers (*ib.* 17, p. 813 D, E). Such was the temper of the man whose chief title to fame is as the biographer of the heroes of the ancient world. Nevertheless, Plutarch was far from being a time-server, or one who would put his private interests before his country's good (*ib.* 18, p. 814 D). His quietism was founded on the reasoned conviction that, as resistance is impossible, a cheerful submission is wiser than an inopportune struggle against overwhelming odds (cf. *Philop.* 17). But, whereas the folly of ill-judged patriotism may at least claim the sympathy of a generous heart, the conduct of those who make the welfare of Greece of no account as compared with their own comfort and enjoyment deserves our profound contempt (*Non posse suaviter*, 19, p. 1100 D).

LITERATURE.—The chief texts of the *Moralia* are by D. Wyttenbach, 8 vols. in 15, with notes and *index verborum*, Oxford, 1795–1830; by F. Dübner in the Didot series, Paris, 1839–42; and by G. N. Bernardakis in the Teubner series, 7 vols., Leipzig, 1888–96. For the life and opinions of Plutarch the following may be consulted: R. Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1869; J. P. Mahaffy, *The Greek World under Roman Sway*, London, 1890, pp. 291–350; J. Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, do. 1902; R. Hirzel, 'Plutarch,' Heft iv. of *Das Erbe der Alten: Schriften über Wesen und Wirkung der Antike*, ed. O. Crusius, O. Immisch, and T. Zielinski, Leipzig, 1912.

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PLYMOUTH BRETHREN.—See BRETHREN (Plymouth).

POETRY.—See HYMNS, LITERATURE.

POINTS OF THE COMPASS.—I. *INTRODUCTORY AND GENERAL.*—Owing to the marked way in which, in several lands, notably in ancient Greece and in Christendom, sacred buildings have been placed with their most important front towards the east, this subject is generally known as orientation, and that term will be used in this article. As a title it might, however, in some cases be open to the charge of begging the question, and the one here chosen is non-committal and more comprehensive.

The religions of many peoples—perhaps of most—have taken account of the cardinal points of the compass, though the importance attached to them may have varied. The feelings aroused by sunrise and sunset must always have been very much the same all the world over, and they are in some degree expressed by the terms used for the cardinal points. Skeat (*Etymological Dictionary*[2], Oxford, 1884) traces the word 'east' to the Aryan root *us*, 'shine,' 'burn.' Bradley (*OED*) gives the root *aus*, 'dawn.' Skeat derives 'west' from the Aryan root *was*, 'dwell,' and says that the allusion is to the apparent resting-place or abiding-place of the sun at night. 'South' seems to mean simply the 'sunned' quarter; the derivation of the word 'north' is unknown (Skeat).

The Hebrew imagines himself to be facing east and describes east, west, north, south by the expressions 'before,' 'behind,' 'left,' 'right.' This nomenclature, even more than the Aryan tongues, suggests ideas about the four quarters of the horizon that were definite and important, and it is therefore not surprising to find that the point of the compass is stated with precision in the story

of the Fall and elsewhere. This precision is not really inconsistent with the inaccuracies in Gn 11[1f.] and other passages. The Indo-European peoples picture themselves as facing north and call the hand towards the rising sun the better hand, the dexterous one, and the other (although the Greek veiled it by euphemisms) the sinister. The Etruscans, on the contrary, thought of themselves as looking south; the Roman augurs continued the tradition and considered the left the lucky hand. Thus it will be seen that the Indo-European peoples really had the same notions about the east as the Semitic. Walter Johnson gives useful examples of this habit (*Byways of British Archæology*).

The subject may be said to have been neglected if not ignored till within the last decade or two. Most books on architecture, even those dealing with countries in which orientation is a marked characteristic of the buildings, make no reference to it; the most comprehensive general encyclopædias have short and perfunctory articles or none at all; works on folk-lore, which are of necessity much concerned with ritual, seldom record any observations or offer any explanations, while very often neither the word 'orientation' nor the names of the cardinal points are to be found in the index. This neglect, at least so far as Britain is concerned, is no doubt due to the belief that the custom of orientation has no historical significance, that it was even in the earliest historical times inherited from a long-buried past and had comparatively little relation to the beliefs of the age that practised it. Hence many published plans of buildings have no compass at all; of the others most have but a rough indication with nothing to show whether true north or magnetic north is intended. It is still more rare to find a plan which, while stating that the observation is magnetic north, gives also the date of the observation, although it is well known that the variation between the magnetic and the true north changes rapidly and irregularly. In the south of England the needle now points above 15° W. of polar N.; this difference is diminishing six or seven minutes a year, so that, if the decrease were constant—which it is not—the variation would be reduced by a degree in about nine years. In works of the highest scientific value we find such errors as the plan of St. Peter's at Rome turned round so as to bring the altar to the east; the magnetic variation shown east instead of west; while a third goes to the opposite extreme and carries accuracy so far as to give not only the date of the observation but the hour also. Descriptions are often loose; to say that a church 'faces east' may mean either an east door or an east altar; burial 'to the east' is equally vague; when Guiderius says, 'Nay, Cadwal, we must lay his head to th' East,' he certainly meant 'to the west' (Shakespeare, *Cymbeline*, act iv. sc. 2). The only unambiguous descriptions are 'altar to east (or west),' 'feet to east (or west).'

Lately the architectural side of the subject has been approached by a few observers in a scientific spirit in Germany and in England, and some records of the customs of savage races have been made

In this article we shall deal with the following questions: (1) ritual acts: the direction in which the suppliant looks while praying or sacrificing, during baptism, or while performing other ritual acts; (2) the aspect of buildings: the direction of the main axis, or the aspect of the door, altar, or other feature of the temple, using that word in its widest sense; (3) burial: the direction in which the grave is made, or the body of the dead is placed in the tomb, and consequently the planning of the tomb itself; (4) beliefs unclassified (called for brevity 'superstition'): points of the compass from which attacks of evil spirits are most to be feared, and the like.

It is clear that all these, especially the three first, are in a great degree interdependent. They should therefore be discussed together wherever possible. But in some cases this would be inconvenient, and it will be necessary to consider separately the orientation of the more important classes of temples.

1. Ritual acts. The practice of orientation has been very generally observed in ritual acts, although from the nature of the case it has not in the past left such a clear record as have temples and burials.

The direction in which the suppliant looks when at prayer or performing ritual acts has had, we shall find, in almost every form of religion a direct relation to the sun, his beliefs about it and the emotions which it arouses. Those beliefs and those emotions range through every shade from sun-worship and totemism to perhaps mere wonder at the never-fading impressiveness of the phenomenon of sunrise. In the relatively few cases in which ritual is independent of the position or course of the sun it is governed by simple and easily ascertainable facts, such as the Muhammadan's prayer towards Mecca.

It is probable that some peoples who did not orientate their buildings did face a particular direction when in the act of adoration; some savage races who have not reached or have scarcely reached the stage of temple-building observe an orientation in their ritual; the Jew and the Muhammadan observe what may be called a 'local' orientation in prayer; the Christian still retains a considerable amount of traditional orientation in his ritual.

2. Temples. — The aspect of buildings must almost inevitably have a close relationship with the direction in which the prayer is uttered or the rite performed, for it is governed by the same ideas — this notwithstanding the very varying degrees in which the building, in different religions, can be regarded as a house of prayer or as the home of a god. But, whereas a more or less correct general position sufficed or suffices for the private person at prayer, the temple is the work and the instrument of the professors of religion and for the most part of somewhat elaborate religions, each acknowledging and dedicating its buildings to many different gods, as the ancient Greeks, or in honour of special patron saints, as in the Christian Church. This consideration complicates, or has been thought to complicate, the inquiry into this part of the subject. We shall also have to bear in mind that in the case of the building, to a greater extent than in the attitude of prayer, tradition counts for much, as in the Christian Church at the present day, long after the matter has ceased to be thought important or indeed to have any meaning at all.

3. Burial.—The position of the body in relation to the points of the compass varies much, but the underlying idea which dictated it is in the main fairly general. Expressed briefly, it is that a dead person is laid in the grave in that position which will make the journey of the spirit as easy as possible. The journey is usually to a home of the dead. Consequently the position varies according to the conception of that home.

This idea of facilitating the journey of the dead is, however, sometimes found acting in an opposite direction: it may be desirable to keep the spirit in the grave. Thus the soul of the chief should continue to reside among and to protect the tribe; that of the wicked man should be prevented from returning to the village and disturbing the peace of the surviving relatives. J. G. Frazer sees a survival of the latter feeling in the custom in this country, not long since given up, of burying a suicide with a stake through his body (*The Belief in Immortality*, London, 1913, i. 164). The further opinion may perhaps be hazarded that the selection of cross-roads as the place was suggested by the thought that, if the spirit did make its escape, it might be puzzled as to which road led home; in the same way it is still believed that the sick are cured by being taken to the cross-roads, the original idea probably having been that, when the evil spirit was expelled from the patient, it was liable to lose its way.

The journey of the spirit may be made (*a*) to the land of the forefathers, (*b*) to an under world, (*c*) to the isles of the blest, (*d*) to the place where the totem of the dead person resides. There are some doubtful exceptions to this rule, namely burial towards one

of the cardinal points or in the path of the sun—doubtful because they may after all prove to be connected with a journey. We shall have to consider these classes more at large. Meanwhile we must bear in mind Frazer's warning not to expect uniformity even among people of one tribe; modes in the disposal of the dead vary according to sex, rank, moral character, and manner of death.

(*a*) *The land of the forefathers.*—The journey to the land of the forefathers is the hypothesis of Herbert Spencer. The land of the dead is the land from which the tribe migrated. The idea may be summed up in the words, 'The dead man has gone home.' The body is laid with the feet in that direction. It is this hypothesis that now finds favour as the one which best fits the facts, rather than that of Tylor, to which further reference is made below. But it will none the more bear too general an application. It appears to express the most common conception among savage tribes at the present time.

(*b*) *The under world.* — The most familiar instance of this conception is that of mediæval Christianity. The belief appears to be shared by some primitive peoples of to-day. A. C. Kruijt, whose observations are used by Perry, maintains (see art. INDONESIANS, vol. vii. p. 245) that an idea common to all conceptions of the hereafter is that the soul has to cross the sea, and that this belief found its origin in the theory that the sun crossed the sea every day on its way to the land of souls under the earth; he points out that the word meaning 'setting of the sun' is used for dying, and states that many of the tribes think that the land of souls is under the earth.

(*c*) *The isles of the blest.*—There are two remarkable examples of belief in the happy islands. They are from opposite ends of Europe. The first is that of the Greeks. Of the second W. Ridgeway says:

'There is some evidence that the northern cremationists, like the Acheans, believed that the Spirit-land lay in the West. Perhaps the ordinance of Odin that the ashes of the dead should be sent out to sea points in this direction, but it is clear from Procopius [*de Bell. Goth.* iv. 20] that in the sixth century of our era, the peoples of north-west Europe held that the soul of the departed journeyed westward . . . into the western part of Britain. A peninsula opposite Britain was inhabited by a folk (probably the Veneti of Armorica [Brittany]), who . . . were subject to the Franks, but paid no tribute by virtue of the ancient service of ferrying the souls out into the Ocean to Britain' (*The Early Age of Greece*, Cambridge, 1901, i. 517).

The expression 'to go west' for 'to die' is still in use and has been extended to include anything that is lost.

(*d*) *Totemism.* — Two instances will be noted below in which a man is buried with his head to the point of the compass appropriate to his totem; but these may prove to be cases of class (*a*), the journey of the spirit to the land of the forefathers.

Each of the above classes presupposes a journey to be made by the soul. It remains to notice the apparent exceptions referred to above. Burials, chiefly pre-historic, occur which seem to have a direct relation to the course of the sun and do not suggest a reference to a journey. Thus the graves of Teutonic peoples on the Continent and in England often, if not generally, have the foot towards the N. but occasionally to the S.; sometimes they are E. and W. with the foot sometimes E. and sometimes W., but with the body laid on its side and facing S. The idea may have been a desire for comfort, and seems to take the form of a wish to lie in the path of the sun. It lends some weight to Tylor's hypothesis, applied by him no doubt too generally, viz.:

Orientation originates in 'the association in men's minds of the east with light and warmth, life and happiness and glory, of the west with darkness and chill, death and decay, [which] has from remote ages rooted itself in religious belief' and has affected the position alike of temple and of grave (*PC*[3] ii. 421).

To the ancient Egyptian the west was the land of souls; he complains:

'The West is a land of sleep and of heavy shadows. . . . Let me be placed by the edge of the water with my face to the North, that the breezes may caress me' (G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*[4], Eng. tr., London, 1901, p. 113).

The legend that Christ was buried with His head to the W. is attributed by Tylor to wide-spread solar ideas. We have an instance of Australian tribesmen who prefer to lie 'in the path of the sun' (Johnson, p. 274). The Tlingits, a people of Alaska, bury with the head to the sunrise (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iii. 274); the reason given, namely to allow the spirit to return, makes it doubtful whether this class is really an exception to the general rule that position is determined by desire to facilitate a journey. As a doubtful case we may perhaps class with it the instance mentioned below of the Egyptian buried in a cramped position in the hope, it is suggested, of facilitating the re-birth of the body.

4. **Superstition.** — No generalizations can at present be made on this branch of the subject. Most of the beliefs may presumably have some connexion, now lost, with ritual and ideas of death. A few examples will be noted below (VI. 12, X. 1, and table at end of art.). Probably a good deal of material still remains to be collected.

II. *EGYPT.*—1. **Temples.** — The Egyptians appear to have been indifferent as to the direction in which their temples lay; at least, if they had a system, it is by most people considered to be unknown to us. J. Fergusson expressly states (*Hist. of Architecture*[3], London, 1891–93, i. 119) that they did not orientate their buildings; but in his day no system had been suggested, and he accepted the obvious reading of the evidence. The evidence is that the temples face in all directions. The silence of other writers on Egyptian architecture may be assumed to mean that they take the same view as Fergusson, and students of the elaborate religion of the Egyptians give us little help.

Attempts have recently been made, however, to reduce the apparent confusion to a system. Two of these attempts—those of Nissen and of Lockyer—were apparently made more or less independently of one another, but they may be considered together. Nissen discusses eleven examples.

Every temple is directed towards the point on the horizon at which the sun or the star to which the temple is dedicated rose or set on the feast-day at the time when the temple was founded. When the axis of a temple lies nearly E. and W., it necessarily points to sunrise on some day of the year and to sunset on some other day, and the temple is then called a sun-temple. If, however, the axis points to a spot on the horizon outside the limits of sunrise and sunset at midsummer, the temple is considered to be a star-temple. The point on the horizon at which the sun or a star rises on any particular day of the year is constantly changing, owing to the movement of the pole of the earth round the pole of the heavens, and it is pointed out by Lockyer that in 13,000 years this point for a star may shift 47°. Some star is then looked for which rose or set at that particular spot at some time during the epoch in which the temple must be supposed, on archæological grounds, to have been founded. A likely star having been found, the exact date, to within a very few decades, at which it rose or set at the point in question is easily calculated. This date is the date of the building. A likely star is one which can be shown to have some possible connexion with the temple, and great ingenuity is shown in finding such connexions; *e.g.*, the temple of Sebak-Ra at Ombos seems to point towards the setting of Arcturus, which was sometimes represented by the Egyptians as a crocodile, and the god Sebak-Ra was also represented as crocodile-headed (Nissen, *Orientation*, p. 52). Inscriptions from Annu, Denderah, and elsewhere are quoted by both Nissen and Lockyer describing the foundation of temples, a ceremony of the greatest importance: the king himself stretches the measuring-cord and directs his glance to the course of the rising stars, his eye is fixed on the Great Bear, and he gives the corners of the temple. But it is admitted that the Denderah inscription is very late; it refers to the emperor Augustus, who, it is said, was never at Denderah; nor did the Great Bear set at Denderah in his time; it must therefore reproduce an earlier inscription (Lockyer, *The Dawn of Astronomy*, p. 178). An exact orientation was of the greatest importance, and Lockyer suggests that the long series of halls and courts which formed an Egyptian temple would make an

excellent telescope of a sort; the halls, especially those at the farther end, were dark, and the dividing walls were each pierced by a central doorway; a priest standing in the dark at the farther end, looking through this long series of doorways, would have a good view of a star at heliacal rising, *i.e.* rising a little before sunrise, and would thus be warned that it was time to prepare sacrifice; the fairway to the horizon was always carefully preserved uninterrupted. True, later temples were sometimes built right across the fairway, but that was done on purpose by the later priests to spite those of the old temple. The sun-temples make admirable observatories for ascertaining the exact time of the summer solstice; the measurement of time was a most important matter in an agricultural country; it was a duty monopolized by the priests. The orientation of star-temples is often what we may call indirect, *i.e.*, it is not the long axis, but the short, that points to the rising of the star, as at Denderah and Edfu (Nissen, pp. 36, 43); and the Egyptians had the habit of building neighbouring temples at right angles to one another (Lockyer, pp. 168, 316; Nissen, p. 59).

These views have been accepted by R. Phené Spiers (*EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Orientation'), E. A. Wallis Budge, and F. C. Penrose. They are strongly controverted by a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* (clxxx. [1894] 418 ff.). The weak points of the theory, besides those indicated above, are that, owing to the movement of the earth's axis, the same star would not serve for more than 200 or 300 years, as Lockyer admits; that that is a very short space of time in Egyptian history, so that the fact must have been observed comparatively soon; that the very late inscriptions describing the setting out of the temple with a cord by the king, inscriptions rewritten and indeed freely 'edited,' should not be accepted as plain statements of fact, devoid of poetic or religious fervour. The writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, indeed, points out that the older inscriptions say nothing about the star, while in the later instances 'the Great Bear' simply means 'the north.' Lockyer does not support his views of Egyptian sacerdotal history by reference to authorities. Nissen is less fanciful, but scarcely more convincing.

The sun and stars entered so largely into Egyptian religion and the observation of their movements was so important for making the calendar that the case can at most be said to be not proven. This would seem to be the view of W. M. Flinders Petrie (art. ARCHITECTURE [Egyptian], vol. i. p. 722 ff.), who, however, appears to avoid a definite statement of opinion. He does, indeed, give interesting facts about the temple of Abydos (p. 723[a]), but no explanation of them or even a hint as to whether he thinks an explanation is required. In the earliest plan the entrance is a passage between walls 4 ft. apart and 35 ft. long, facing S.; it is probably of the Ist dynasty; in the new temples of the VIth dynasty the principal door is to the N. and the lesser to the S.; later still it was several times rebuilt or remodelled facing N. and then E.; in all there are seven (*sic*) different plans, dating from the Ist to the XXVIth dynasty and facing successively S., N., N.?, N., N.?, E., E., E.

2. Burials.—In the earliest burials in Egypt the body is said to be laid on the left side, lying N. and S. with face towards the E. (Maspero, pp. 112 A, 361). Budge, referring apparently to the same period, says that the skeleton is laid on the left side with limbs bent and the face generally to the S., adding, however, that no invariable rule seems to have been observed as to the points of the compass. At a somewhat later but still prehistoric time and before the days of embalming, the graves are 'oriented either north or south' (*Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life*, p. 159). Budge thinks that the cramped attitude, the ante-natal position of the child, may perhaps have been adopted in order to facilitate the re-birth of the body (p. 162).

The royal tombs of the Ist dynasty at Abydos are made parallel to the river valley and hill line, and not true to the cardinal points, the nominal N.S. line being really N.W. and S.E. But the builders recognized this diagonal direction (*Egyptian Explor. Fund Report*, London, 1900, pt. i.).

The pyramids of Gizeh are of the IVth dynasty (variously estimated at 4000 to 6000 B.C.). They are accurately set out so that one side faces due N. They are not absolutely accurate; the sides of the Great Pyramid, which should point N., do actually bear 4′ W. of N. Petrie (*The Pyramids and Temples of Gizeh*, London, 1893, pp. 40–42) thinks that this discrepancy is due, not to a fault in the setting out, but to a movement of the pole; he thus tacitly assumes that absolute accuracy was desired. Six of the nine remaining pyramids at Gizeh have a N. entrance passage sloping down towards the centre at a mean angle of 26° 47′; and at Abousseir, of the only two which are sufficiently well preserved, one has a passage at an angle of 27° 5′, and the other at 26°. All these must have given view of the then pole star at its lower culmination—'a circumstance which can hardly be supposed to have been unintentional' (J. F. W. Herschel, *Outlines of Astronomy*[9], London, 1867, p. 205 f.).

Opposite to the middle of the E. side of each pyramid there was a temple, where the worship of the deified king was carried on.

The temple, says Petrie (p. 81), looked 'towards the pyramid which stood on the W. of it (the "blessed West," the land of souls).'

In connexion with the second pyramid temple there is a granite temple about a quarter of a mile away. A paved causeway leads from one to the other. This granite temple is duly orientated to the E., but it is about E. by S. of the pyramid, this position evidently being decided by the lie of the ground. A causeway also runs E. from the third pyramid temple.

Most of the other pyramids of Egypt face N. with greater or less degrees of inaccuracy, and all have the entrance to the N. Of that at Sakkara the N.S. line is, according to Fergusson, 4′ 35″ E. of N.

In the Sūdān, however, there are some important groups of pyramids which are placed diagonally to the meridian. These are at Gebal Barkal and at Meroë, east of the Nile, and at Nuri or Belal, west of the Nile. The shrines are against the S.E. faces. Budge, who made observations, accepts the views of Lockyer and Penrose [and Nissen], and holds that these pyramids are orientated to the sun or, where its rays could not enter the shrine, to some star (*Proc. Royal Soc. London*, lxv. 333).

The Sphinx seems to have been called Har-em-khu by the ancient Egyptians (the Harmakhis of the Greeks and Romans), equivalent to 'Horus on the horizon' or the sun in the act of rising. The sun-god Horus takes several forms, one of which was 'Horus of the two [*i.e.* E. and W.] horizons.' Horus in one of his qualities is primarily the god of the sunrise, and as such is the counterpart of Hathor, the god of the west, who received the dead. It is this eastward gaze of his that has made the Sphinx so impressive to all who have beheld him, and that long ago gained for him the name of 'the Watcher.' The work is usually attributed to the XVIIIth dynasty (*c.* 16th and 17th centuries B.C.), by which time the origin of all forms of religion was sought in sun-worship, and nearly every principal deity became amalgamated with the sun-god (A. Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, p. 12).

But, though theology may have changed during the course of ancient Egyptian history, we may safely guess that ritual, with which we are here concerned, remained very much the same in that

most conservative land. Egypt was a land of sun-worship in one form or another from the earliest pre-historic times till the dawn of the present era. The worship centred in Pa Rā (the house of Rā), the Greek Heliopolis. Thither a Pharaoh of the XIIth dynasty went in procession, and on the sandhill sacrificed before the god Rā at his rising and, returning to the great temple of the sun, went alone into the holy of holies to see the god, his father, Rā himself (*ib.* p. 21).

The *mastabas*, or private tombs of dynasties III. to X., have generally the entrance to the E., sometimes to the N. or S., never to the W. There was also a sort of blocked-up door facing E.; this was for the use of the dead; the spirit could enter or leave by it. An inscription is recorded invoking blessing on the dead 'that burial might be granted to him in Amentît the land of the West' (Maspero, p. 250). At the far end of the building, set back in a recess in the W. wall, is a stele.

Wiedemann thus describes a funeral:

'When the tomb had been reached, the coffin was set up on end, with face turned towards the south, on a small sandhill intended to represent the Mountain of the West—the realm of the dead' (p. 236).

III. *ASSYRIA, CHALDÆA, PERSIA: TEMPLES AND BURIALS.*—Our knowledge of these regions in ancient times is still marred by serious lacunæ. The old Chaldæans had their theory of a world of the dead—either an under world or one lying E. or N. Of burial places other than those of royal persons nothing seems to be known, and even of those the authorities do not tell us much.

The temple, a succession of terraces about three in number, forming a sort of irregular stepped pyramid, was placed with its corners to the cardinal points—*e.g.*, the temple of Nannar at Uru in Chaldæa (Maspero, p. 629) and Nin-maḫ at Babylon (T. G. Pinches, art. ARCHITECTURE [Assyro-Babylonian], vol. i. p. 689[b]). This may be chance, but, in describing the precinct of the temple-tower of Belus at Babylon, Pinches says:

'In accordance with the usual Babylonian custom, the angles indicated the cardinal points, and each side had an entrance. Inside the enclosure . . . stood some kind of erection 200 ft. square, connected with the *ziggurat*, or tower, and having round its base the chapels or temples of the various gods, on all four sides, and facing the cardinal points' (p. 690 f.).

The principal buildings, with the couch of the god and the throne, were to the W. (p. 691[a]). Sippara and Larsa, cities where the sun-god was worshipped, have not been thoroughly investigated. Persepolis was orientated to the cardinal points. The palace of Sargon in Mesopotamia has its diagonals pointing to them.

IV. *GREECE.*—1. **Temples.**—The normal position of a Greek temple is approximately E. and W., and it was an E. aspect that was aimed at. But an E. aspect meant the opposite of what we now mean. A religion like Christianity which has developed an indoor congregational worship considers the position of the altar within the temple and the attitude of the worshipper as the essential points; the position of the door is a corollary. But in a religion such as that of the ancient Greeks, where the temple is a mysterious home of the god entered by the few while the people remain in the *temenos* to see the sacrifice, it is the entrance front and the altar before it that are the first considerations. Greek temples therefore generally have the entrance to the E.; the altar (see art. ALTAR [Greek], vol. i. p. 343[a]) is, if possible, placed in front of it on the main axis and so that the person sacrificing faced E. with his back to the temple—*e.g.*, temples of Aphæa at Ægina, of Apollo at Delphi. If this was difficult or impossible, the altar was elsewhere, as that of Zeus at Olympia and of Athene on the Acropolis at Athens.

By far the greater number of temples face towards the E. Nissen's useful list of 113 Greek temples (pt. ii. p. 224) shows that 75 per cent are within an arc of 50°, or 25° on either side of true E., while more than half are within an arc of 20°, or 10° on either side of E. Of the remainder there are four principal groups with the entrance facing approximately N.E., N., W., and S. There are several large gaps: no temples have the entrance to S.S.E., N.N.E., N.N.W., or W.N.W., while there is a gap of no less than 65° from about W.S.W. to nearly due S. containing only two temples. This distribution is partly geographical and partly according to cult, but never directly chronological.

Geographically all temples on the mainland, with but five exceptions, face between N.E. and S.E., the bulk of them either just N. of E. or about E.S.E.; those in Sicily and Italy are for the most part just S. of E.; the islands and Asia Minor form three nearly equal groups facing E., S., and W. fairly accurately.

Grouped under cults, the temples of Zeus, Athene, Asklepios, and Hera face fairly uniformly E., except when in some Asia Minor examples the door is turned to W. or S. The temples of Artemis, Dionysos, and Demeter show rather greater variation. Temples to Apollo point in many directions. Among the temples of unknown dedication there is singular uniformity: they all face nearly due E., except one, which is nearly due S.

Although no general classification according to period can be combined with a classification according to direction, yet dates of buildings cannot be ignored: thus the Asia Minor temples of Zeus and Athene facing W. and S. are late, those of Artemis early; we shall have occasion to notice the Delos temples in this connexion. Still less can we neglect the period of the cult in examining the direction, as we shall see in considering the temples of Isis and Serapis. Most important of all will be the original seat of the cult, as in the cases of Apollo and the Ephesian Artemis.

The normal aspect of the entrance to a Greek temple is therefore E. Deviations from it are abnormal and are of varying degrees of importance. The reason of the E. aspect must be sought in sun-worship of some sort; the time and perhaps the place of its origin are obscured by distance. Statues of gods before house or temple doors were called *δαίμονες ἀντήλιοι*, 'deities facing the sun.' In Homer's poems, says L. R. Farnell (art. GREEK RELIGION, vol. vi. p. 401[a]), the sun was anthropomorphized, but it is doubtful if it was so for the average Greek, who merely kissed his hand to it every morning or bowed to it on coming out of his house. The same author points out that the earliest temples—Homeric and pre-Homeric of the Minoan-Mycenæan culture—are, with one exception, domestic chapels in royal palaces and mark the sacred character of the king (p. 397[b]). Of the palaces themselves those that are known to us do not face E.: Tiryns and Phylakopi face due S.; Mycenæ about W.N.W.; Troy S.E.; Knossos seems to have had several fronts, one about S. by W. and others to the corresponding points. Some of these sites are too cramped to have afforded a choice of aspect.

Some light is obtained from literature, but it is not conclusive.

In the *Ion* of Euripides the great tent set up by Ion, the son of Apollo, is scrupulously orientated—for it is a *ἱερόν*, a sacred or tabu place—so that it should not face the mid shafts of the sun's fire nor its dying rays (lines 1132–1137). On the roof were embroidered pictures of the sun, moon, and certain stars. There is nothing to connect the tent with Apollo-worship and the orientation seems to aim not so much at facing N. and E. as at avoiding S. and W.

Hesiod (*c.* 800 B.C.) has some passages in *Works and Days* referring to the movements of the stars and the time for reap-

ing and other agricultural work, and other ancient authors refer to the means of measuring time by the heavenly bodies.

Deviations from true E., where these are slight, as in the case of dedications to Zeus and Athene, may be explained in one of two ways: they may be due to indifference as to exactness, or we may, with Nissen and Penrose, see in them deliberate intention in conformity with an elaborate system.

These authors suggest that the axis is directed to the point of sunrise on the feast-day; that the variations among temples having the same dedication are due to the varying customs in different states, and to the varying position of the place of sunrise caused by the movements of the earth's axis; that the latter cause incidentally gives us an indication of the date of the temple; that it was important for the priest to have warning of sunrise so that he might prepare the sacrifice; and that this was given to him by the appearing of a star which was known to rise a little before the sun. Both Penrose and Nissen, by calculating from the known movement of the earth's axis (the precession of the equinoxes), have arrived at dates at which the axes of most of the extant temples would point to a heliacal star. They have thus fixed the dates of the foundations of the temples. Penrose points out that the dates thus deduced are in most cases clearly earlier than the existing remains. His explanation is that the temple has been rebuilt on an old site, and the direction of the old axis has been followed. Lockyer agrees in the general theory, and it has been accepted by J. B. S. Holborn (art. ARCHITECTURE [Greek], vol. i. p. 738[a]) and by Spiers (*EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Orientation'), who both state that temples of gods face E. and those of heroes W. It is opposed with force by a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* (clxxx. 418) in an article on Lockyer's *Dawn of Astronomy*.

The theory indeed seems to require a broader basis of evidence. Penrose himself points out that the same star would not serve for more than 200 or 300 years, and he finds that at the rebuilding of a temple the axis has sometimes followed the star and sometimes not.

The fact that most temples point nearly due E. may be due to an old tradition having been adhered to and fairly accurately carried out. On the other hand, we may, with Nissen, find the explanation in the Greek calendar: the chief festivals were equinoctial—March, April, and early May (from the opening of navigation to the beginning of harvest [May]), and August, September, and the beginning of October, interrupted by vintage and ended by the closing of navigation.

Certainly the importance of accurate observation of the movements of the stars for the regulation of the calendar and for timing agricultural operations was fully realized. The terms 'heliacal,' 'acronychal,' and 'cosmical' rising and setting were used by the early astronomers.

After this general indication we may take a closer view. The temples of Zeus and Athene show, as stated above, a general agreement, but there is considerable difference between the two limits—some 36° in the case of Zeus and 21° in the case of Athene, not including the early temple at Miletus, Asia Minor. In Asia Minor Zeus has a temple at Magnesia with the door due W. (220 B.C. [Nissen]); Athene has two at Miletus at right angles to one another, E.S.E. and S.S.W., and one at Pergamon due S. With these exceptions, there is no connexion between direction of axis and geographical position. There is a difference of nearly 4° between the early temple of Athene on the Acropolis and the Parthenon: they are respectively 260° 55′ and 257° 7′, given S. = 0° and going sunwise (Nissen, Penrose).

Athene, Asklepios, and Demeter keep their E. door at Priene, Asia Minor. The two temples of Artemis in Asia Minor, at Ephesus and Magnesia, have the door approximately to W., though they differ considerably in direction of axis. This reversal is perhaps due to the confusion of the Greek Artemis with the Asiatic goddess.

The Erechtheum points rather N. of E., being nearly parallel with the Parthenon. The Theseum is 13° S. of E.; Nissen holds with the view that it has nothing to do with Theseus, but connects it with Iacchus, son of Demeter, and the Eleusinian mysteries (p. 177).

This brings us to Demeter. Her temples are mostly not far from parallel with one another and with one of the two Persephone temples, while they are only 12° removed from the Theseum on one side, and 14° from the second Persephone temple on the other side, their axis pointing 295° or about E.S.E. These Demeter temples are widely scattered—Eleusis and Sicily. But in Asia Minor there is one temple of Demeter at Priene, and in Arcadia a temple of Despœna, the Arcadian name of Persephone, both facing due E. In Sicily at Selinus there is a temple said to be of Demeter facing almost N.E.; this is remarkable because all the eight other temples at Selinus are exactly parallel with one another and face somewhat S. of E., or not far from the direction of the other Demeter temples.

The temples of Apollo present perhaps the greatest problem in Greek orientation. Even Nissen, who has an explanation for most things, admits that they are difficult. They point in many directions. This is probably due to the foreign extraction of the god: he has been thought to have come from Asia, from Egypt, from the north. Farnell says (art. GREEK RELIGION, vol. vi. p. 395[b]) that he was no doubt a cult figure of tribes other than Achæans, and that in the Hyperborean ritual, which reflects at points the earliest days of Hellenism, we can follow the track of Apollo's invasion from the north. Nissen ingeniously suggests that the simple mountain shepherds of Arcadia and Ætolia accepted with the foreign god his foreign ritual and gave to his temples at Bassæ, near Phigeleia, and at Thermon the N.S. axis with the door at the N. end (that at Bassæ has also a door in the E. side); but advanced city communities with a popular theology adjusted the axis to suit their own views; thus the temples at Selinus and Syracuse face due E., and that at Corinth nearly so. But on this hypothesis the temple at Delphi facing N.E. and that at Didyma in Argolis a little S. of N.E. are difficult to place. The temple at Metapontum on the south coast of Italy, with the entrance to the S.E., may be said to conform with the custom of the country; that in the Ægean island of Thera is parallel with it; that at Letoon has its door to the S.S.W. There remain two temples of Apollo at Delos, one facing due E. and the other due W.; these must be purely political, faced according to the dictates of the times to which they belong, as Athens or Asia Minor was in the ascendant. Besides these there are in Delos two old temples facing W. which, Nissen says, Wilhelm Dörpfeld is inclined to dedicate to Apollo; finally there is the nameless temple at Mycenæ with the doorway to the S., which is perhaps more likely to have been dedicated to Apollo than to any other god.

The Delos temples were first built facing W.—the rock-cut, the Leto, two which are nameless, and one dedicated to Apollo. The aspect is perhaps due to the influence of Asia Minor—except of course the rock-cut. Then, under the influence of Athens in the 4th cent., the temples of Zeus and Apollo were built with the door to the E., and finally, according to Nissen, when the island passed away from Athens, the temple of the foreign Isis looked W.

A foreign god, as Nissen points out, may retain or may yield his native ritual. We have seen that Apollo illustrates both processes. At Alexandria the parent temple of Serapis faces S.; the daughter at Taormina is turned E., while in Delos she keeps the door to the S. The temple of Isis is turned to the W. at Delos, but keeps its S. door at Priene.

It is probably a mistake to suppose that the aspect of temples was much more than a fashion, that it expresses any definite idea in theology. We have an exactly parallel case in the Christian Church; most of our buildings have the door to the W., but in some of the most famous it is to the E. Probably few people are aware of the latter fact, even when they are attending service, although it sometimes requires a slightly different ritual. Perhaps to the Greek the matter was a little more important, but not much.

The temple with the door to the W. did not face W., any more than St. Peter's in Rome faces W.; it only faced E. in a different manner. Nissen thinks that it did face W., and that this aspect symbolizes 'world empire.' So it does, but the symbolism is of the 20th cent. and Teutonic. It is generally thought that on the feast-day the rays of the rising sun were to fall through the open door and light up the statue of the god, and the northward-facing temple at Bassæ has indeed the famous side door to the E., opposite the spot where the statue stood. But how could this have been arranged in a westward-facing temple? A hypæthral opening would throw only a reflected light on the figure. Vitruvius has some remarks on the subject which we shall presently notice.

2. **Burials.**—The Greek idea of death is complicated by many cross-currents, but the notion of a voyage or a journey of some sort enters largely into it. S. Baring-Gould says (*A Book of Folklore*, London, n.d., p. 160) that the ancient Greek inscribed the word εὔπλοια, 'favourable voyage,' on a gravestone and that his descendant carves a pair of oars.

In five shaft graves on the Acropolis at Mycenæ two bodies lie N. and S., with feet to S., and all the others, eleven or more, lie E. and W. with feet to W. At Vaphio the chief is laid E. and W. with feet to E.; possibly this is only in order that he should face the door of the tomb, which is to E.

Ridgeway (i. 490) thinks that we may infer that burial with feet to W. was the characteristic orientation of the autochthonous race. He points out (i. 516) that Odysseus did not descend into Hades as did Æneas and Dante; he sailed west; and in post-Homeric belief there was no under world, but isles of the blest, which lay in the west. At Phylakopi in Melos the orientation of the tombs depended wholly on the conformation of the ground (Hellenic Society, suppl. paper no. 4 [1904], p. 234).

In later times the position of the body varied. Thus Solon proved the justice of the claim of Athens to Salamis as against the Megarians by pointing out that the tombs which he opened faced E., and that the corpses in them were turned to the E. in the Athenian fashion. We have therefore the tradition at least that in the days of Solon (*c.* 600 B.C.) there were in different parts of Greece two well recognized positions for the body. Such customs 'probably . . . depend on the ideas which each people has formed of the direction in which lies the land of the dead' (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv. 214).

V. *ROME.*—1. **Temples.**—It is generally agreed among modern writers that the Romans, whatever their theories, did not orientate their buildings (W. J. Anderson and R. P. Spiers, *Greek and Roman Architecture*[2], London, 1907, p. 188). The silence of Fergusson, of Middleton (*Remains of Ancient Rome*, 2 vols., London, 1892), and of Lanciani is perhaps as eloquent on the same side. E. A. Gardner (art. ALTAR [Roman], vol. i. p. 349) says that, the orientation of the temples being varied, that of the altar varied also, and that, from the position of the altar, the sacrificer appears to have stood with his side to the temple, and in some cases with his back to it. J. Dürm lays it down that the Etruscan rule required that the temple axis should be N. and S.; that the Roman turned to the E. during prayer; therefore either the temple statue had to face W. or the axis of the temple had to lie E. and W. (*Handbuch der Architektur*, Stuttgart, 1905, sect. 431).

Of the Etruscan practice we know almost nothing. The Roman augurs inherited as the basis of their ritual the Etruscan idea of the natural or normal attitude; *i.e.*, they imagined themselves as facing S., so that the lucky side—that towards the E.—was the left, and the unlucky side the right. But with the Roman populace the opposite was the rule: they faced N., and the right was the lucky side. Both these notions show that, whatever was the practice with regard to buildings, there was in early times a special veneration for the east.

Vitruvius, who lived and wrote in the 1st cent. B.C., is a useful link between Greece and Rome. He was an architect with a practical knowledge of work in Rome in his own day and with some outside book-knowledge of Greek lands. He has a chapter on 'The Position of Temples according to the Regions':

> 'The sacred temples of the immortal gods should be so disposed, that, if there is no impediment and the use of the temple permits, the statue which is placed in the cell may seem to look towards the evening region of the heavens; so that those who approach the altar, to make their offerings, or perform sacrifices, may look towards the eastern sky and to the image which is in the temple. By this means the temple, the eastern sky, the supplicants and sacrificers making their vows, and the image seeming to rise to behold them will all be seen at one view: for it is proper that the altars of the gods should be disposed to the east.
>
> But, if the nature of the place prevents that position, then the temple is to be turned to the view of the greater part of the city walls and temples of the gods; or should sacred fanes be built near a river, like those near the Nile in Egypt, they should look towards the banks of the river; so likewise, if near a public way they should be so situated that the passengers may behold it, and pay their salutations' (*de Architectura*, tr. W. Newton, London, 1791, bk. iv. ch. v.). Pseudoperipteral temples 'are appropriated to the use of sacrifices, for the same kinds of temples are not erected indiscriminately to all gods, because the sacred rites performed to each are different' (bk. iv. ch. vii.). 'Altars should regard the east' (bk. iv. ch. viii.).

In these passages, it appears, Vitruvius combines unconsciously what he had learned from books about Greek work with his practical knowledge of Roman custom in his own day. He had not travelled, and clearly the Greek architecture about which he had read was, as we might perhaps expect, chiefly that of Asia Minor. As to Roman work, he seems to consider the W. orientation to be a counsel of perfection, which was to give way before considerations of architecture and convenience.

In practice temples face in every direction; a glance at a plan of Rome or at a table of orientations makes this clear, and an attempt to work the data into a system would indeed be bold. But it has been made by Nissen; his lists contain 33 Roman temples and 34 temples in Italy outside Rome.

That the Romans and the Etruscans before them were very susceptible to outside influences—Greece, Egypt, and Asia—is a commonplace of history. It would be remarkable, then, if in the placing of their buildings even in Rome itself they never followed the practice of countries where orientation was general—countries within whose borders they themselves were building temples carefully orientated in accordance with native custom.

But, if we would look for truly orientated buildings, it must be on open sites or among the early buildings of a town before the place had become congested, or at least among those which, if not

early, might be expected to preserve early traditions. In Rome the circular temple of Vesta in the Forum faces E.N.E. (R. Lanciani, *Forma Urbis Romæ*, Milan, 1893–1901, pt. iv. pl. xxix.) or due E. (O. Richter, *Topographie der Stadt Rom*, Munich, 1901, pl. x.). The old Domus Publica (Middleton) and the Regia, neighbouring buildings associated with the temple, have also the E. direction—a direction contrasting strongly with all the buildings round them. The temple of Vesta was one of the most sacred of buildings, and it owed both its form and its sanctity to its extreme antiquity. The house for keeping alive a fire for the use of the community was probably the earliest building which primitive man attempted, earlier even than the shelter for his own head. The actual building in the Forum was destroyed and rebuilt more than once, and even its position had been slightly moved, but the old round form was preserved. The plan came to receive a symbolical meaning, but there can be no doubt that it was simply the natural form in which primitive man built, and that it was perpetuated in a specially sacred building by a well-known tendency just because it was primitive. It is suggested that the E. direction also is that of the primitive building, and that it points to a true orientation having been observed in early times. The well-known round temple to Mater Matuta, of early foundation, opposite S. Maria in Cosmedin has its door almost due E. (Lanciani, pt. viii. pl. xxviii.). The door of the Tullianum also looks due E. This building has, like the Regia, the trapezoidal plan which is believed to be the mark of a very primitive tradition. The Lapis Niger over the grave of Romulus is trapezoidal, but its axes run N.W. to S.E. and N.E. to S.W. The early quadruple temple on the Capitol faced about S.S.E. (*ib.*), and the early temples on the S.W. corner of the Palatine face S. by W. Outside Rome: the temple of Vesta at Tivoli has the door facing S.W. by S. (G. L. Taylor and E. Cresy, *Architectural Antiquities of Rome*, London, 1821–22, pl. lxvi. [vol. ii.]) probably for local reasons. The Artemisium at Nemi runs N. and S. with the door to the S. Thus it is difficult to detect a system even among the early buildings, unless it is perhaps a tendency to make buildings face approximately either E. or S. But much could not be expected from so few remains.

It is possible that other buildings might be found in which there might be discovered a cause for the direction of the axis other than practical or architectural considerations. Contact with neighbouring or distant nations may more than once have had its influence; the third legion of the army, for instance, learned during its stay in Syria the custom of saluting the rising sun (*GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 416).

The orientation of buildings in Rome in historical times seems to have been made to conform to the lay-out of the city generally, as Vitruvius suggests. The lay-out of the city must be considered in areas. In the earliest town the Forum Boarium may have been truly orientated, either from ritual tradition or because of the relative positions of the Capitol and the river. The Palatine, on the other hand, is laid out on a line running N.E. and S.W.; this was probably determined by the limits of the hill and by the valley which formerly crossed it. To the N. of it were the Forum Magnum and the Via Sacra running from N.W. to S.E. Some early buildings in these parts and on the Capitol have been referred to above. The buildings of later times, such as the temples of the Forum Magnum, face in all directions, seemingly without system. Outside this primitive area and within the wall of Servius Tullius, the planning generally is determined by the run of the hills and valleys. But the greater part of the flat Campus Martius between the wall and the river, as well as the Vatican district beyond the river, is methodically laid out on lines due N.S. and E.W. The Mausoleum of Hadrian facing S., four circuses, and most of the other important buildings have this orientation. Included among these are the Pantheon, which faces N., the baths of Alexander Severus and of Agrippa, and the Porticus Argonautum, containing the Neptunium with door to E., and the Basilica Matidies with door to E. But the buildings in the north part of the Campus Martius, north of the Via Recta, conform to the Via Flaminia (practically the Corso). The important group of buildings forming the imperial Fora (of Trajan, etc.), with their temples, are symmetrically arranged on an axis running N.W. and S.E. Three of the four remaining great baths—those of Diocletian, Titus, and Caracalla—are on an axis running N.E. and S.W., perhaps partly to fit the hill-tops and to suit the principal streets, and partly from considerations of sun and weather. The baths of Constantine face N.S. and E.W., and appear to conform intentionally with the Campus Martius scheme. Although this planning is chiefly secular, it is in different quarters so definitely orientated that it can scarcely be neglected. Temples seem to be invariably built to suit the road, as, for instance, that called of Fortuna Virilis facing N., a group of three just south of the theatre of Marcellus facing E., and those west of the Capitol which face S.W.

Outside Rome the same probably holds good—that orientation was observed to some extent, and often gave way to practical considerations. Nissen finds a system at Naples and Pompeii. The Forum at Pompeii runs N. and S., and its two temples of Jupiter and of Apollo face S. The temple of Vespasian and the sanctuary of the city Lares face W.

But, if Rome herself was influenced more by architectural effect and considerations of convenience than by religious or ritual motive, we find in the countries which she conquered a very different result, produced perhaps by the same causes. The Roman buildings in other lands are definitely orientated, though not always to the E. The determining influence may have been a desire to conform to the custom of the country or to the surrounding buildings, though in some cases the axis seems to have been fixed by religious influences, for the temple is at an angle with the street. The temple of Zeus Olympius in Athens is fairly true E. and W., with the door to E. The temples of the sun and of Zeus at Baalbek have the door to E., while that of Venus faces N.; the temple of the sun at Palmyra has a N. and S. axis, with the door in the long W. side.

At Silchester there are two square buildings near the present church which are believed by the discoverers to be temples, and are compared by them with similar buildings in Gaul. These temples do not conform with the general lines of the Roman city, but they are nearly parallel with one another and also with the mediæval church, which, it is suggested, may itself stand on the site of another pagan temple. The axes of the church and temples seem to be a little S. of E., but the point is somewhat obscured because the magnetic variation in this plan and in others, where it is given at all, is shown as E. instead of W., which has not been the case since the year 1656 (*Archæologia*, lii. [1890] pl. xxx.).

2. Burials.—The Romans for the greater part of their history cremated their dead, so that the orientation of their monuments had not to be considered.

VI. *CHRISTENDOM.*—**1. Early ritual.**—Orienta-

tion in some form was probably practised, if not in the time of the apostles, at least in that immediately following, for we learn from Tertullian that it was observed at prayer in his days (A.D. *c.* 160–240). He says that the Christians were thought to be sun-worshippers because they prayed towards the E. (*Apol.* 16). If this attitude was general and its objections realized and its abandonment considered possible at such an early time, and if, as was the case, the temples of both Jew and Gentile had from time immemorial faced E., the inference is that the practice was continuous. But Tylor says that orientation was unknown in primitive Christianity and was developed in the first four centuries (*PC*[3] ii. 427).

The *Apostolical Constitutions* are very clear both as to ritual and as to buildings:

'After this, let all rise up with one consent, and looking towards the east, after the catechumens and penitents are gone out, pray to God eastward, who ascended up to the heaven of heavens to the east; remembering also the ancient situation of paradise in the east'; and, as to the church, 'let the building be long, with its head to the east' (*Apost. Const.*, ed. J. Donaldson, Edinburgh, n.d., ii. 57).

Cyril of Jerusalem in the 4th cent. not only explains that turning to the E. in prayer was symbolical of the situation of paradise (*Catech. Lect.* xix. 9), but also describes the actual ritual:

We are to remember that at baptism we entered the outer hall [porch] of the baptistery and there, facing W., heard the command to stretch forth the hand and, as in the presence of Satan, renounced him (*ib.* xix. 2).

The rite is said to be still retained in the Greek Church.

Pope Leo in the 5th cent. complains that people turned to salute the rising sun as it shone through the E. door of St. Peter's, and it has been suggested that this was one of the causes of the reversal of churches to their present aspect with the door to the W., though at St. Peter's itself no alteration was made.

It appears, then, from the evidence of the earliest writers and of the earliest buildings (1) that orientation was strictly followed—*i.e.*, a symbolical meaning was attached to the attitude of the individual, and the E.W. direction of the main axis of churches was preserved; (2) that the ritual was not without its inconvenience (as Leo complained); and (3) that the E.W. axis sometimes means that the door faced E. and sometimes that it faced W.

This result is scarcely surprising when we consider the various facets from which the light of the gospel was reflected. There were customs both Hebrew and pagan to be utterly reversed, on the one hand, or, on the other, to be retained and infused with new meaning. Of buildings there were the Temple at Jerusalem and most of the Greek and Asiatic-Roman temples with the door to the E., while there were notable exceptions at Magnesia, Ephesus, and Delos.

2. Early buildings.—It may be that there was always variety in the buildings owing to the various influences at work: Greece proper, Greek work in Asia Minor, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Rome. On the one hand, there is (1) the church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem with an E. door, of which the earliest work begins in A.D. 326 (though here the site hardly left a free choice); (2) a statement by Paulinus of Nola († 432) that the façade to the E. was more usual (though this is ambiguous); (3) the description of the early church with E. door at Antioch, not later than the first half of the 5th cent.; (4) important churches in Rome, many of which still exist, while records remain of others, including the old basilica of St. Peter, first built early in the 4th cent.; and (5) a considerable number of early churches in Northern, Central, and Western Europe.

On the other hand, there is (1) the undoubted fact that, if churches were originally built with W. altar and E. door, they were reversed in the Eastern Church at least at a very early period; (2) Socrates the historian, writing in the first half of the 5th cent., says that the door was generally to the W.; (3) the church at Antioch is described as being exceptional; (4) the churches of Constantine at Byzantium either were all built with the E. altar or were all reversed by about the time of Justinian; (5) moreover, there is the obvious inconvenience of prayers towards the E. and the altar to the W.

The churches of Southern, Northern, and Western Europe retained the W. altar long after the E., while some still retain it. That the conservative East should have changed—as it probably did—while the progressive West kept to the old plan is perhaps an index of the theological activity of the Eastern Church in early times. It may have been due, to some extent, to a dread of the influence of Asiatic sun-worship.

The turning round of churches from what seems to have been the normal aspect with the W. altar to the present direction of altar to the E. is somewhat obscure. It seems that all the churches built by Constantine (272?–337) himself had the W. altar and E. door. Besides the church of the Holy Sepulchre already mentioned, there is a church at Tyre 'restored' by him and several churches in Rome: St. Peter's (Vatican), W. altar; St. Peter in Montorio, N.N.W. (since rebuilt); St. Chrysogonus in Trastevere, W.N.W.; St. Sebastian on the Appian Way, W. (Scott, *Essay on the Hist. of English Church Architecture*, p. 18). It must be remembered that in addition to these other churches in Rome built under the direct influence of Constantine, though not nominally founded by him, such as St. John Lateran, also have the E. door.

3. Eastern Church.—No work of Constantine remains above ground in Constantinople, and the orientation which he there adopted must remain a secret until some foundations of his churches are exposed. All the present buildings have the door to the W. A. van Millingen (*Byzantine Churches in Constantinople*, London, 1912) gives the plans of 22 churches; two of these have the door to N.W.; all the rest lie between W.N.W. and W.S.W., and about six of them are practically due W. (The observations are probably all magnetic, though they are not always stated to be so.)

The churches of Syria, Armenia, and Cyprus, with scarcely an exception, have the door to the W. Many of these are very early. All the Jerusalem churches, with the exception of one with a S. door, have the door to the W. The churches of Salonica, some of them of the 5th and 6th centuries, and of Mount Athos have the W. door, except the early church at Salonica, probably late 4th cent., now the mosque Eski Juma, which had the altar at the W. end. The church of St. Felix at Nola and a church at Trieste have the W. altar.

Probably many Greek temples became Christian churches. The Parthenon was converted into a church and an apse was built at the E. end.

In like manner the churches of Greece which were built for Christian worship all have an E. altar and a W. door—*e.g.*, the 'small metropolis' of Athens (8th or 9th cent.), the Kapnikaræa (9th cent.?) in the middle of Rue d'Hermès, the church at Daphne (12th or 13th cent.), and the coupled 10th cent. churches of the monastery of St. Luke of Stiris in Phocis (due W.) and that of St. Nicholas near Skripou in Bœotia (N.W.).

The Coptic churches in Egypt, whatever their age, may be taken to represent very ancient practice. They all have the altar to the E., and the door is at the W., although it does not open directly into the main body of the church. The priests sit in a semi-circular apse behind the altar, thus facing W.

4. Western Church.—The orientation of the churches of Rome forms a strong contrast with the rest of Christendom, for a large majority of the old buildings have the altar to the W. and the door to the E. In this connexion we must remember that, from the circumstances of early Christianity, the church plan of every type must have been developed outside of Rome.

In early times, when Christians worshipped where they would attract least attention, the orientation of buildings cannot have been observed, though it would often be possible to preserve it in ritual even in private houses. Churches were indeed built before the time of Constantine, but thenceforth services were held in all sorts of buildings, and, large as was the increase in the number of Christians, the buildings available for worship would be adequate from the time when the removal of the government to Byzantium left, as it must have done, many buildings deserted. The early Christians did not object to making use of any sort of building. The smaller buildings, such as temples, were converted bodily into churches; of the larger buildings, such as thermæ, theatres, and the like, a part only was used. Lanciani (*Pagan and Christian Rome*, London, 1892, p. 160) states that he has hardly found an ancient pagan building in Rome that has not evidence of having been used as a church at some period.

The Christian adapters of most of these buildings must have ignored orientation. But they probably regarded most of them as temporary, and few pagan buildings are still used as churches; the best known are the round temple of Romulus with the adjoining *templum sacræ urbis*, since the 6th cent. the church of SS. Cosmo and Damian, in which the altar is to the E.N.E., and the Pantheon, the door of which is to the N.

Of the churches actually built by Constantine or under his auspices almost all have the W. altar and the E. narthex. When this is not the case, there is generally some obvious explanation. Scott (*Essay on Eng. Ch. Arch.*, p. 18) gives very useful lists of the old churches of Rome showing approximately their direction. Of the 53 churches recorded only 11 have the E. altar, the aspects lying for the most part between E.N.E. and E.S.E. Of these three may have been reversed and two, the important churches of S. Lorenzo without the walls and S. Paolo without the walls, certainly have. Some of them owe their foundation to Constantine. But the churches which (in Scott's list) have the W. altar number 42. These include St. Peter's and the small church of St. Stephen near the apsidal end, now removed, each with its altar to the W.; the great basilicas of St. John Lateran with altar to the W.; Sta. Maria Maggiore, N.W.; S. Lorenzo without the walls, in its original state, W.; and to them must be added S. Paolo without the walls, before it was rebuilt by Valentinian II., W.; all these except Sta. Maria Maggiore are attributed to Constantine. Three other Constantinian buildings are included in the list as well as the important churches of S. Clemente (the lower building perhaps 6th cent.), W.N.W., and Sta. Maria in Trastevere, W. Many of these, like the first and last, have been rebuilt or remodelled in late times, but preserve the old orientation. Half of them point approximately due E. and W.; about a quarter have the altar N.W. and the door S.E.; one has the altar facing S. of W.

The turning round of the two great churches outside the walls happened in different ways. The W. apse of S. Lorenzo, as built by Constantine and partly rebuilt by Pope Pelagius II., was taken down in 1216 by Pope Honorius III., who built a large nave to the west of it. Honorius then made a raised floor, in what had been the nave, to form an elevated presbytery; this accounts for the way in which the ancient columns of the original nave are partly hidden. S. Paolo, on the other hand, was a case of entire rebuilding. Constantine built a very small church over the tomb of St. Paul on the W. side of the road to Ostia, the atrium reaching right up to the road. In the 4th cent. this little church was taken down, and a very large one built in its place. But it was impossible to move the tomb of the Apostle, and there was not room between it and the road for a large church. The body of the new church was therefore built W. of the old church, with the door at the W. end; the site of the old church with the tomb below it occupies that part of the transept of the present church immediately in front of the apse. We shall find evidence of something analogous to each of these processes of revolution in England.

In these early churches the altar stood on the chord of the apse; against the walls of the apse there were seats for the presbyters, the central one being for the bishop. The clergy therefore looked E. over the altar towards the people; the people looked W. towards the altar and the tomb of the blessed martyr; for many of the churches of Rome, including the most important, were built over the tombs of martyrs or on the places where they suffered death or torture. Lanciani says that 58 churches originated thus. The conditions which he lays down are these three: (1) the tomb-altar was not to be moved vertically or horizontally; (2) the tomb was to be in the centre of the apse; (3) the [concavity of the] apse and the front of the edifice were to look E. Durandus, in the first book of the *Rationale*, is clear as to the ritual of the second half of the 13th cent.:

'The priest is to pray towards the E., whence in churches which have a W. door he turns in the Salutations to the people; but in churches which have the entrance to E., as in Rome, there is no need in the Salutations for turning round, because the priest is always turned to the people.' Durandus gives several reasons for praying towards the E. (*The Symbolism of Churches and Church Ornaments*, tr. J. M. Neale and B. Webb, Leeds, 1843, v. ii. 57, app. B).

Scott gives the following facts with regard to present day use:

The priest faces E. and away from the people when the altar is to the E., except in two cases in which the altar arrangements have clearly been modernized; he faces E. towards the people in 17 cases out of 40 where the altar is at the W. end, including the most important and those which have best retained their early arrangements.

Scott fairly claims that from the point of view of mediæval and modern ecclesiology this position of the priest facing the people is so singular that 'we may well be surprised, not that in many Roman churches, having western sanctuaries, the primitive orientation of the celebrant has been lost, but that it has been preserved in so many instances, in defiance of the fashion of mediæval and modern times' (*Essay on Eng. Ch. Arch.*, p. 22).

The early churches of Italy outside Rome were built under Byzantine influence and date from a later time than the adoption of the E. altar at Byzantium. All accordingly have the E. altar. Ravenna possesses the most remarkable buildings of this class. They are of the first half of the 6th century. The basilican church which preceded the present church of St. Mark at Venice faced in the same direction; its altar was to the E.; but it was of comparatively late date, being of the 9th century.

5. Roman missions.—We have seen that Rome occupies an almost unique position in preserving the W. altar. But some at least of her early missions observed the same orientation. The Romano-British church recently brought to light at Silchester (*Archæologia*, liii. [1892] 26) is a small basilica with a W. apse and transepts, clear indications of an altar on the chord of the apse, and an E. narthex. The evidence that this was indeed a Christian church only stops short of absolute proof. Its date is very uncertain, but it is thought to belong to the 4th century. Other churches of a later date with the same orientation are not uncommon. No example is to be found in England now, but it has been thought that both the earliest church at Canterbury, to which reference is made below, and Wilfrith's church at Ripon had their altars to the W. There are several instances on the Continent: Great St. Martin's at Cologne

(12th cent.) and St. George's, Dinkelsbühl, of which the present building is 15th century. St. Stephen, Mayence, appears to have a choir at the W. end. St. Sebald, Nüremberg, a collegiate church, has a choir at each end, but the E. choir is an addition of the 14th century. At Verdun the cathedral has E. and W. choirs, but that at the W. end is called the old choir.

6. Double-apse churches.—There is a remarkable type of early church which it remains to notice. It has an apse and an altar at either end. It is found over a very wide area, and the place and manner of its origin do not seem to have been conclusively explained. W. R. Lethaby (*Mediæval Art*, London, 1904, p. 29), quoting Strzygowski, derives it from Egypt and Syria. The importance of the N. African churches lies in the fact that they were so planned from the first. Another well-known example is the monastic church of St. Gall in Switzerland, near Lake Constance.

A 9th cent. plan of the whole monastery of St. Gall has been preserved; it seems clear that this does not represent what was already in existence; it is a scheme in contemplation, and it was not exactly adhered to in execution. It is therefore valuable as showing the ideal of the 9th century (R. Willis, *Archæological Journal*, v. [1848] 85). There is an apse at either end. That to the E. contains the high altar and the altar of St. Peter. In front of it is the monks' choir. The W. apse contains another altar of St. Peter, and before it is another choir, on either side of which are entrances for the public. There is no bishop's throne. The side altars are so placed that the officiating priest faces E. The chapels of the infirmary and of the novices' hostel are placed back to back, the altar of one being at the E. end and that of the other at the W. end.

There are not a few double-apsed churches on the Continent, and they are known to have been used in England. But a great proportion of these reached their ultimate double form by receiving additions to the original plan. They therefore come under a different category from those which were so planned from the first, and they may perhaps be taken to show one phase in a transition —an abandonment of the W. altar for the E.

Double-apse churches are found at the following places among others: Gernrode, in the Hartz; St. Cyriac's (collegiate); Hildersheim, St. Michael's; Laach, St. Mary (Benedictine); Worms Cathedral; Trèves Cathedral (the W. apse is said to be the latest); Mayence Cathedral (probably both choirs entered into the original scheme; the W. choir is called the parish choir); Naumburg Cathedral (the W. apse appears to be a creation of the 13th cent. and not to continue an early tradition); Bamberg Cathedral (the E. apse is rather the earlier and has a crypt, but the church is thought to follow an earlier plan); Augsburg (the W. choir is called the parish choir); Oppenheim, St. Catherine's (the present W. choir is later, but probably occupies the site of an early church); Reichenau on the Lake of Constance.

Outside Germany double-apse churches are rarely met with on the Continent. J. T. Micklethwaite ('Something about Saxon Church Building,' *Archæological Journal*, liii. [1896] 293) suggests that in Germany they may possibly be due to the English tradition taken thither by St. Boniface. In England we know of three: Abingdon (7th cent.), Lyminge, and Christ Church Cathedral, Canterbury. Of the last-named we have a description of the building that was burnt in 1067. Below the E. apse, which contained the high altar (of Christ), there was a crypt, but the W. apse contained the bishop's throne behind the altar of the Virgin. About the middle of its length the church was flanked by a tower on either side. It is thought that St. Augustine found an old building (Bede [*HE* i. 33] says Roman) with a W. apse, and with a narthex and towers at the E. end, that he restored this, and that after his time the nave was lengthened eastwards and a second apse built. At Lyminge the foundations of a W. apse have been found; the work is said by Scott (*Essay on Eng. Ch. Arch.*, p. 20) to be Roman.

7. Position of altar in later Middle Ages.—The turning round of the churches of Western Europe so that the altar should be at the E. end instead of at the W. probably happened in different places at different times. Micklethwaite thinks that in double-apse churches a monks' choir at the E. end gradually overshadowed the people's choir at the W. end, till in the 11th and 12th centuries the W. altar came to be looked upon as abnormal, and at the general rebuilding of churches in that age the W. altar was put against the rood screen. A simpler explanation would be that it was a gradual conforming tendency to what had become the orthodox practice at a much earlier period.

Probably the direction of the altar was at no period held to be of very great importance. We have noticed a great amount of variety. At all times minor altars seem to have been often placed against side walls so that they faced N. or S. There are several in the plan of St. Gall which might apparently have been placed with as great convenience against the E. walls of their respective chapels. There are a few striking instances of churches with a N.S. direction. At Siena Cathedral the altar is at the E. end, but we may see the beginnings of a great 14th cent. scheme for a new cathedral which was to run N. and S. and was to absorb the old building (the present church) and convert it into a transept. Naples Cathedral is another instance; the old and new buildings are at right angles to each other.

In England it was natural that Augustine († 604), Birinus († 650), and Wilfrid (634–709), under Roman influence, should place their altar to the W. It might also be expected that the Scottish mission of Aidan († 651) should use the E. position. This we find to be the case. But at an early date the E. altar predominated and became universal.

8. Deviation from due E.—English churches generally have their axes near enough to true E. W. for deviation to be unnoticeable to most people. But the orientation is by no means accurate, and occasionally the deviation is very considerable. This deviation has been explained by the pretty theory that the axis is in the direction of sunrise on the day of the particular saint in honour of whom the church is dedicated. But this theory has not found favour with serious ecclesiologists in England. It is just possible that this direction was adopted occasionally, and in the aggregate such instances might be numerous, though those who hold the theory have never been at the pains to compile a list. But it is open to serious objections. There are in ancient writers no directions or orders for so placing churches and no hint that they ever were so placed, while Durandus distinctly says that churches are to point to sunrise at the equinoxes and not at the solstices (i. 8). And the exceptions are so numerous as to be in the majority. We may notice a few well-known buildings (see table at end of article). These and all observations must be corrected to suit the unreformed calendar. The calendar was reformed in England in 1751, when we had to omit eleven days. If we take the year 1100 as an average date for the foundation of our churches, the calendar would then be seven days wrong. This would not make a difference of 2°. It will be seen that most buildings face nearly E., regardless of their dedication. Rochester Cathedral is fairly correct for its feast-day, but there can hardly be a doubt that it is turned so far to the S. to accommodate it to a cramped site. At Westminster there are three notable buildings—the Abbey, St. Margaret's Church, and St. Stephen's Chapel of the old royal palace, now absorbed in the Houses of Parliament. The feasts are 29th June, 20th July, and 26th December. But the axes of the three are nearly parallel and point E. or slightly S. of E., instead of almost N.E. and S.E.

Ely Cathedral, an instance favouring the theory, may be quoted to show the rashness of holding it

without very careful inquiry. The dedication is to the Holy and Undivided Trinity. As it is a cathedral church, its history is preserved and we know that before the Reformation the dedication was in honour of the Blessed Virgin (25th March), of St. Peter (29th June), and of St. Etheldreda (whose feast was 23rd June, and whose translation in 695 and in 1106 was on 17th Oct. and in 1252 on 17th Sept.). It is not known whether St. Etheldreda dedicated her church in honour of the Blessed Virgin or of St. Peter or of both. The feast of the translation of a saint's relics was no doubt a great occasion, but it is difficult to conceive of its giving the orientation of a building, because it would be hardly possible to foresee, on the fixing of the axis, when the new building would be ready for the translation. Thus the building probably does not derive its direction from the first translation of 17th Oct. 695. But it is to sunrise on about 17th Oct. that the axis points, and it may be argued that the present building was made to suit sunrise on the anniversary of the first translation. But it is more probable that, if any day fixed the axis, it would be either St. Peter's Day (29th June) or Lady Day (25th March). We have seen that the direction does not suit 29th June. It would indeed suit Lady Day fairly well, though not exactly.

We may test the theory further by applying it to a group of small churches taken at random in one district. None of the following churches deviates more than 5° N. of true E. or 5° S. of true E., except one which is about 10° N. of true E. (it will be seen that the dates of the feasts vary from midsummer to nearly mid-winter, at which seasons the points of sunrise are about 80 apart): St. Margaret, Norwich and Swannington (20th July); St. John Baptist, Alderford (24th June); St. Andrew, Attlebridge (30th Nov.); St. Agnes, Cawston (21st Jan.); St. Nicholas, Brandiston (6th Dec.); All Saints, Weston (1st Nov.).

A point to be borne in mind in this connexion is that the dedications of churches have not infrequently been altered; some earlier dedications have been changed to that of the Blessed Virgin Mary; this was common in the 14th cent.; others were changed to that of the Holy Trinity at the Reformation. Some places still preserve, it is said, a primeval solar feast.

In Rome, out of 45 churches (nearly the whole number in Scott's lists) 15 point reasonably near to the sunrise on the feast-day, and 30 are quite wide of it.

9. Bend in axis of churches.—Another popular theory is this: when the axis of a chancel is found not to be in a straight line with that of the nave, the deflexion was intentional and was meant to symbolize the drooping of the head of our Lord upon the Cross. Here again we have no authority from the ancient writers, and we have no right to attribute to them a meaning which they do not acknowledge. F. Bond (*Dedications and Patron Saints of English Churches*, London, 1914, p. 249) indeed quotes the case of a 14th cent. architect who died of grief on finding that a church that he had built at Metz had a bent axis.

Bond says that the theory has been supported recently by Emile Male, Victor Mortet, J. A. Brutails, Anthyme Saint-Paul, and to some extent by de Caumont, Viollet-le-Duc, and Camille Enlart, but rejected by Auguste Choisy and Robert de Lasteyrie. Johnson (p. 238) suggests that the bend was intended to produce an agreeable optical illusion. He states that deviation is generally to the S.; Bond says that it is to the N.

A little consideration will show that the deflexion must always be accidental. When a chancel is to be rebuilt, the chancel arch is blocked by a temporary wall so that the nave can continue in use. Unless the axis of the nave is carefully found and continued eastwards before this wall is built, and unless the stakes in the ground are carefully preserved, the chances are that the axis of the new chancel will not be in the same straight line, because it is difficult to make it exactly perpendicular to the short base afforded by the piers (perhaps themselves irregular) of the chancel arch. And it is not going too far to say that the deflexion is never found except where one part of the church has been rebuilt. It is, moreover, seldom found in the best buildings—more often in the churches of country towns and villages than in cathedrals and great churches, and more often in great churches which are in other respects irregular and of various periods than in those which are of fairly uniform style and are acknowledged masterpieces.

No bend is found in Winchester, Durham, Salisbury, Wells, Norwich, Lincoln, Peterborough, Exeter, Hereford, Gloucester, Worcester, Chester, Llandaff, Oxford, Southwell. This list contains all the buildings of the first rank except a few notable cases of partial rebuilding. It would be strange indeed if Canterbury with its complicated plan and its long history showed no bend, or Chichester, which is notoriously irregular. Moreover, the evidence of symbolism in these and other buildings is vitiated by the fact that each has several deviations: Canterbury has four axes; Chichester appears to have seven; Rochester has several axes, but the deviations are very slight. And again, when there are two bends in the axis, they are sometimes in different directions. The only important buildings with a deviation which will serve for symbolism are therefore Lichfield, Bristol, St. Albans, and Ripon, with an inclination of the choir to N.; and Ely and York, to S. In each of these either the choir or the nave has been rebuilt.

The force of even these few instances is lessened still more when we see that the bend in the axis is only one irregularity among the many found in old buildings; *e.g.*, in six cathedral churches the W. door is not in the centre, and in one, Manchester, the axes of nave and choir are parallel but not in the same straight line; only the irregular Lady chapel at the E. end deviates.

It may be that the above analysis is subject to correction, because plans, however carefully measured (like the *Builder* series here used), may occasionally omit a slight deviation. But, if the deviation is so slight as to escape the notice of the surveyor, it can have but little value as a symbol.

It is true that the cruciform plan of our great churches symbolizes the Cross. But it was a symbolism read into the cross-form after it had been evolved on other grounds. Exactly the same process is happening now in regard to the inclination of the head of the Cross.

10. Details of orientation in buildings and furniture and in ritual.—The site chosen for the English parish church was usually to the N. of the village; perhaps it would be more correct to say that a site was chosen such that the village should be S. of it. There may have been some now unknown motive in this, or it may be simply that it was preferred to approach the church through the burial-ground, which was usually to the S. Similarly, there are two possible explanations of the burial-ground being to the S. There is a prejudice against burial on the N. side. J. Brand records (*Popular Antiquities*, new ed., London, 1900, p. 475) that it was formerly appropriated to unbaptized infants, the excommunicated, the executed, and suicides. This prejudice may be due to an old belief or simply to a natural dislike of a cold, damp place with rank herbage. Thus the principal door of the church is generally to the S., but there is almost invariably a N. door opposite to it, which is often nearly or quite disused.

Tombs in the aisles are on either N. or S. side indifferently. But in the chancel the place of honour was on the N. side; this was undoubtedly in order that the tomb might be used as the Easter Sepulchre, which was on the N. side, presumably because our Lord was pierced on the right side.

In early churches the Gospel ambo was on the N. side; from it sermons were preached and decrees and excommunications read; hence there is still a

slight tendency in Anglican churches to place the pulpit on the N. side. The Paschal candlestick also was on the N. side. The Epistle ambo was on the S. side. The sedilia of mediæval type are believed to be a relic of the presbyters' seats round the apse of the early churches. They have been kept on the S. side and not on the N., doubtless because it is more convenient for the assistant to approach the celebrant, who is facing E., on his right hand. Close to the sedilia was placed the piscina. The bishop's throne is also on the S. side. There was a custom, very commonly if not generally kept up in country places till the beginning of the 19th cent., of separating the men and women, the men sitting on the S. side of the church and the women on the N. This custom had doubtless continued without a break from the earliest days of Christianity, and it is perhaps of pre-Christian origin. It is noted by Durandus (i. 46).

The dissenting bodies from the Anglican Church do not observe orientation.

11. Burial.—Christianity no doubt inherits the custom of burial with feet to E. from paganism. The reason for it given by the early Christians was that Christ at His second coming will appear in the E. and the dead will rise to move towards Him. In practice graves are made parallel with the church without any attempt at accuracy.

12. Superstition.—Few definite beliefs in this country about the points of the compass are recorded. The following has not previously been published:

An old gentleman who had to undergo a slight operation declined to allow it to be performed until the sofa on which he was lying had been placed N. and S. It is thought that he held some views about magnetism.

It is said that in Scotland there is an idea that if the passing of the soul is to be easy the floor-boards of the sick room should not run N. and S.

The association in Ireland of colours with the points of the compass will be noted presently in describing similar ideas in other parts of the world (see below, X.). Green is said to be an unlucky colour in England (Baring-Gould, p. 15).

VII. *JEWS.*—The Hebrew word for east means literally 'the front,' and that for west 'the back,' so that south is on the right hand and north on the left. This suggests some form of sun-worship at an early period. The supposition is supported by evidence from a later time: the Tabernacle had its door facing E. ('and for the hinder part of the tabernacle westward thou shalt make six boards' [Ex 26^{22} RV]). This true orientation was notwithstanding the ban of sun-worship by Moses (Dt 4^{19}).

Lapses into worship of sun, moon, and stars are frequent all through Jewish history: Manasseh 'worshipped all the host of heaven' (2 K 21^{3}); Josiah 'took away the horses that the kings of Judah had given to the sun' (23^{11}); Amos upbraids Israel with carrying with them 'the star of your god' (Am 5^{26}); Ezekiel sees 'between the porch and the altar, about five and twenty men, with their backs toward the temple of the Lord, and their faces toward the east; and they worshipped the sun toward the east' (Ezk 8^{16}). The custom of saluting the moon by kissing the hand referred to in Job $31^{26f.}$ may have been learned in Assyria (see *JE*, *s.v.* 'Star-Worship').

The Jewish attitude of prayer is an instance of what may be called 'local orientation'; it was not a turning to a point of the compass, but a turning to a place. We have a suggestion of this in Solomon's prayer at the dedication of the Temple: if a man 'spread forth his hands toward this house: then hear thou in heaven thy dwelling place' (1 K $8^{38f.}$). And, when Daniel prayed, 'his windows were open in his chamber toward Jerusalem' (Dn 6^{10}). This became the law; a worshipper out of Palestine should turn towards Palestine, one in Palestine towards Jerusalem, in Jerusalem towards the Temple, in the Temple towards the Holy of Holies (*JE*, *s.v.* 'Mizrah'). In *JE*, *s.v.* 'East,' however, facing to the E. is said to have been the attitude of prayer, and reference is made to *Apost. Const.* ii. 57, which the writer maintains to have a pre-Christian Hebrew foundation.

In regard to buildings the custom of a true orientation, which had been established by the arrangement of the Tabernacle, was continued. It was followed in Solomon's Temple and in all subsequent rebuildings. Ezekiel is very precise on the orientation of the temple of his vision (40–47). Comparison may be made with the Apocalypse (Rev 7^{2} 16^{12}). Synagogues (apparently those of the pre-Christian era) are said by A. W. Brunner (R. Sturgis, *Dict. of Architecture and Building*, 3 vols., New York and London, 1901, *s.v.* 'Synagogue') to have had 'the holy ark or sanctuary' at the E. end, but no authority is given. Those of the 2nd cent. A.D. in Galilee all faced S. (*ib. s.v.* 'Syria'). Synagogues are now planned so that the ark may be towards Palestine (*JE*, *s.v.* 'Mizrah').

VIII. *MUHAMMADANS.*—The Muhammadans, like the Jews, observe a 'local orientation'; they turn in prayer towards a place, Mecca. The Ka'bah at Mecca, adapted by Muhammad as a mosque, had been a pagan temple with its entrance to the E. (J. Gwilt, *Encyclopædia of Architecture*, ed. W. Papworth, London, 1867, § 118).

The essential feature of a mosque is the *qiblah* or *mihrab*, a niche or recess in a wall, the direction of the wall being at right angles with a straight line to Mecca. In front of the *qiblah* is an area covered by a roof supported on columns which form a series of aisles running towards the Mecca wall. These form the prayer chamber; in front of it is an open court with covered walks at the sides leading from the entrance, which is generally opposite the Mecca wall. As the Jews had but one temple, synagogues being but houses of prayer, so the Muhammadans had only one temple, that at Mecca (Fergusson[3], ii. 516); mosques are places of prayer arranged so as to show the direction of Mecca, though they have acquired a sanctity of their own, not less than that of the shrines of other faiths.

Orientation of a kind was therefore of the first importance in a mosque. At Ispahan the axis of the great bazaar runs N. and S. The front of the mosque occupies the S. side of this, but the axis of the porch is bent at an angle of 45° so as to suit the mosque itself, the main axis of which is duly pointed to Mecca.

Private prayer on the housetop is also directed towards Mecca.

In burial the Muhammadan is laid on his right side facing Mecca (see art. DEATH [Muhammadan], vol. iv. p. 502^{a}).

IX. *THE EAST.*—Orientation in ritual observance is perhaps most pronounced in Asia, which may be more or less indirectly the source from which the European observance is derived. Tylor holds that the adoration of the sun in the ancient Aryan religion is revealed in ritual orientation.

The Brāhman turns E. at sunrise, says Tylor, and at noon, after adoration of the sun, he turns again E. to read his daily portion of the Veda and to make his daily offering.

'It is with first and principal direction to the east that the consecration of the fire and the sacrificial implements, a ceremony which is the groundwork of all his religious acts, has to be performed' (*PC*[3] ii. 425).

An example of the orientated altar is given in art. ALTAR (Hindu), vol. i. p. 345^{b}. Hindu temples are sometimes dedicated to the sun-god, but the

moon-god has none (art. BRĀHMANISM, vol. ii. p. 805[b]). Temples seem to be duly orientated in the wider sense of the word.

The Indian Buddhist generally orientated his buildings fairly closely to the cardinal points, and seemed to prefer to make his entrance face E. But the Jain temples did not follow a rule, 'the Jains being indifferent apparently to any particular direction for their buildings' (H. Cousens, in *Archæological Survey of India*, Calcutta, 1907–08, p. 195).

The Thugs, on the other hand, are worshippers of Kali, the death-goddess. In her honour human victims were murdered; to her the sacred pickaxe was consecrated with which the graves of slain were dug, and the elaborate ritual of this consecration was performed facing W. The mediæval Tatars made a mound over the grave and placed on it a statue facing E. (*PC*[3] ii. 423).

Buddhism varies much in different countries, and presumably its buildings and ritual vary. In China it appears that the temples are truly orientated (see ARCHITECTURE [Chinese], vol. i. p. 695[b]) and there is therefore, it is to be supposed, some orientation of ritual. There is a paradise of the dead in the W., and the chief book read in the presence of the departed person is 'the "Sūtra of Amitābha," or the Buddha representing the sun in the west, behind which lies paradise' (art. CHINA [Buddhism in], vol. iii. p. 554[a]; cf. art. CONFUCIUS, vol. iv. p. 19[a]).

In the Confucian religion there are many sacrifices offered with an elaborate ritual. The most important of these is described in art. CONFUCIAN RELIGION (vol. iv. p. 13), and the points of the compass are carefully mentioned, but their religious significance, if they have any, is not indicated. The sacrifices of the second rank are made at altars and temples in and about Peking. The sun-god has an altar-terrace outside the main E. gate towards the region of the sunrise; the moon-goddess has an altar outside the W. gate, because the W. is the region where the new moon is born.

X. *SAVAGE RACES.*—1. **Ritual acts.**—The ritual of primitive races is with difficulty ascertained, and not very much has been recorded. The Pangin, one of the tribes of the Indian Archipelago, on all ceremonial occasions salute and invoke the directions of the rising and setting sun; the people sleep with their faces to the E., and on cremating the dead they place the body to face in the same direction; the land of the dead is in the E., and it seems that that is the direction to which most importance is attached:

'The only disturbing feature is the fact that the "setting sun" is said to be invoked. This may be due to the influence of a solar cult' (W. J. Perry, *JRAI* xliv. 285).

Another tribe, the Toraja of Central Celebes, place their houses in an E. and W. direction with the door at the W. end, thus facing the land of the dead; but this is really religious.

A neighbouring tribe, the Tobada, build their 'village-house' N. and S., 'so that, as they say, on entering, one faces to the north, the direction whence they have come, and in which direction they place the land of the dead. The holy place of the house is the north centre-pile . . . and there the ghosts come to live in bunches of leaves of the aruru palm' (*ib.* p. 290).

This seems to be a first, but very important, step towards temple worship. The largest and most important temple of the Tonapoe has a door on the E. side, thus facing towards the land of the dead and in the direction whence the tribe came. A number of cases are recorded in which houses are built with due regard to the direction of the land of the dead, and of others in which a place is provided as a residence for the ghost, or an entrance into the house is made for it.

In ritual observances the following may be noted:

In old Mexico, where sun-worship was the central doctrine of a complex religion, men knelt in prayer to the E. and doors of sanctuaries looked mostly W. (*PC*[3] ii. 424). The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, though they are now Christians, have preserved their ancient practice of turning to the sun at his rising, just as the Christians of Europe turn to the E. at certain parts of their worship. The cave-temple of the sun-worshipping Apalaches of Florida had its opening to the E., and the priest stood in the opening early in the morning of the feast-days waiting for sunrise. The Comanches, also sun-worshippers, when preparing for the war-path, place their weapons over night on the E. side of the lodge to receive the morning sun's first rays. The ancient Peruvians were sun-worshippers, and had in their capital, Cuzco, a temple duly orientated, with a great golden disk on the W. wall to reflect the rising sun as it shone through the E. door (*ib.* ii. 424). The Hopi mother, on the twentieth day after the birth of her child, presents it to the sun at the moment of sunrise (see BIRTH [Introduction], vol. ii. p. 642[b], and *Journ. Amer. Eth. and Arch.* ii. [1892] 163).

The following symbolic orientation is characteristic (A. C. Haddon tells the present writer) of the Pawnee, but to a greater or less extent applies to the Plains Indians generally. The 'earth lodges' are built in the traditional manner according to a divinely inspired plan, and serve for ceremonial purposes as well as dwelling-houses; the same symbolism is found in the summer tents, or *tipi*. The entrance always faces E. The central circular fireplace represents the sun, and the cleared space round it the horizon. For certain ceremonies an altar of rugs is placed to the W. of the fireplace, and on it is deposited the sacred bundle; behind it, in the place of honour, sit the priests; the space between the altar and the fireplace is holy ground, over which no priest can pass till purified by thurification. This region in the W. is sacred to the evening star, the beneficent guardian of fertility, and to her four attendant messengers: wind, clouds, thunder, and rain. To the N. of the fireplace there should be a bison's skull to represent at once the gods in the heavens and the home of Tirawa, the high god, the all-embracing, the morning star, the bloodthirsty controller of the heat of the sun in the E., who prevents his brother, the sun, from burning up the world. The S. is the land of death and the receivers of the souls of the unfortunate dead, while the malevolent deity of sickness is stationed in the S.W. In ceremonial pipe-smoking puffs of smoke may be blown in various directions as offerings to these and other heavenly bodies.

J. W. Fewkes (*Journ. Amer. Eth. and Arch.* ii. 14–22) says that the underground *estufas* or *kib-vas* (ceremonial chambers) in the Tusayan (Hopi) Pueblo of Wál-pi in Arizona 'are generally placed with their walls corresponding to the conception of the primary points but not to our cardinal directions. . . . The variation of their N. is W. of the true N. (varying from 42° to 50°); consequently the N.S. lines of thier *kib-vas* are in reality N.E. and S.W. lines.' The orientation 'is probably intentional, but it may be determined by the possibilities in direction of the recesses in which they are constructed.'

R. M. W. Swan considers that the temples of Mashonaland were orientated (J. T. Bent, *Ruined Cities of Mashonaland*, London, 1892).

We may here notice the wide-spread association of certain colours with the various points of the compass. A table is appended showing some of the recorded observations. It will be seen that these are from N. and S. America, China, and other parts of the world, including Ireland. There is no approach to uniformity and only a few tendencies can be faintly traced, as, *e.g.*, that black is practically never associated with the S. or E. It is just possible that the well-known liturgical colours of the Christian Church, although of late use, are not entirely unconnected with these ideas.

2. **Burial.**—Practically all peoples who practise inhumation follow some rule as to the direction in which the body is to be laid.

A journey to the land whence the tribe migrated is probably the most general conception at the present time. The dead are laid in the direction of the land of the dead, and this, when both can be ascertained, is found to coincide with the direction of the land of the forefathers.

Perry gives many instances from the E. Indian Archipelago. One tribe makes the grave parallel to a river up which the spirit must travel, the tribe having migrated down the river; another, which believes that the land of the forefathers is to the S., lays the body on its side with head to W., feet to E., and facing S.; another places the body in a sitting position facing the land of the dead. In one case the direction of the grave is towards the land of the dead and in the direction of those places where the first chiefs procured their wives; in another the dead are buried on the S. side of the village, the land of the

dead is situated in the S., and it is from the S. that the people believe themselves to have come. Cases are recorded where the bodies of the dead are definitely orientated to the land of their forefathers, the situation of the land of the dead being unascertained. An exceptional and special case may help to illustrate the belief in the journey which the spirit was to take: the body of a man whose head had been cut off by a member of another clan was brought in and placed sitting on the ground against a pile of the house and facing the land of his enemy; when buried, it was placed in a sitting position still facing in the same direction (*JRAI* xliv. 289); presumably the first business of the ghost was to go and have his revenge. A tribe in E. Africa buries a man who dies in a strange place with his face towards his mother's village (art. DEATH [Introductory], vol. iv. p. 425[b]).

A man of the Wotjobaluk tribe of Vetona, Australia, is buried with his head towards the point of the compass appropriate to his totem (*ib.* p. 425[a]).

'Among the Battas of Sumatra men of different totems are buried with their heads in different directions, but the reasons for these differences are not always manifest. On the analogy of the Hot-Wind totem and the Sun totem among the Wotjoballuk we may conjecture that the direction in which the body was buried was the direction in which the totem was supposed especially to reside, so that the intention of interring the bodies in these positions may have been to enable the released spirits of the dead to rejoin their totems' (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv. 213). But, as Haddon points out, since the people are supposed to be related to or descended from their totem, this seems to be but another form of the journey of the spirit to the land of the forefathers.

The orientation of the graves of some primitive peoples is recorded without any indication of the beliefs which decided the direction; burial with feet to the W. is observed by races of N. America, Central Africa, Samoa, Fiji, and Australia. Tylor mentions some Australian tribes who bury their dead in a sitting position facing E., even while believing that the land of the dead is in the W.

XI. *PRE-HISTORIC WESTERN EUROPE.* — **1. Temples.**—Under this heading brief reference will be made to the great well-known megalithic monuments. They are included in this article because they have been called temples and tombs, and have been said to be orientated in the sense that their aspect was decided by religious considerations. But as a matter of fact we do not know their use, or what determined their direction, their age, or the religion of the folk who built them. If we knew any two or even any one of these facts, it might be possible to deduce the others. But we have no working base, not even any uniformity among the remains.

The two most famous examples are Carnac in Morbihan and Stonehenge in Wiltshire. Carnac is a series of immense parallel avenues running roughly E. and W. along the coast of Brittany. Stonehenge is a horseshoe within three concentric circles, two of stone and one of earth. From the outer circle runs a straight depression between earth banks. A line drawn down this depression and continued through the horseshoe divides it symmetrically and passes through a flat slab called the 'altar.' This line points to the place of sunrise on mid-summer day about, according to Lockyer (*Stonehenge*, p. 67), the year 1680 B.C. It may be that Stonehenge is a sun-temple, as Lockyer argues, and that it was built about that time. But it may not be a sun-temple, and, as to the date, A. R. Hinks points out (*NC* liii. [1903] 1002 ff.) that, if the first glimpse of the sun is observed, we get the year A.D. 3000; if the middle of the disk is observed, the conditions are right for to-day; if we wait for the completion of the sunrise, the date must be put back about 2000 years.

The works at Avebury consist of a large circle enclosing two others; there is an avenue leading from the outer circle in a S.E. direction. On Hakpen Hill there is a circle with indications of an avenue leading N.W. The circles forming 'King Arthur's Round Table,' Penrith, are broken towards the N.E. and S.W. The work at Arbor Low, Derbyshire, seems to be orientated almost due N. and S. (Fergusson, *Rude Stone Monuments*, London, 1872).

Callernish in the island of Lewis is a circle with a stone in the centre. From the circle single lines of stone stretch out S. and E. and W., while a wide avenue runs to the N. (These directions appear to be approximate only.) A tomb within the circle has an axis roughly N.E. and S.W., the entrance being towards the N.E.

There are considerable remains in Ireland. Those around Lough Gur, Limerick, have been described by B. C. Windle, who made careful observations of the bearings in those cases where they 'might possibly be significant' (*Proc. Royal Irish Acad.* xxx. [1912] sect. C, p. 283). The monuments near Lough Swilly, Co. Donegal, have been recorded by H. Boyle Somerville, who detects several systems of orientation, monuments being orientated for the solstitial sunrises or sunsets or both, for sunrise or sunset at the equinoxes, for sunrise or sunset at a point equidistant in time between solstice and equinox, for rising or setting of a star or of the moon (*Journ. Royal Soc. of Antiquaries of Ireland*, xxxix. [1909] 192, 215, 343).

2. Burials.—Until recently burials both on the Continent and in Britain appeared to be haphazard. But recent research seems to show that two or perhaps three definite systems were followed, though in each of these there were not a few exceptions. In some cemeteries the skeletons are found laid on their backs E. and W. with feet to E., while in others they are N. and S. with feet to N., but occasionally to S. Others again are laid on the side E. and W. with the feet sometimes E. and sometimes W., but always looking S. In some cases a single group contains skeletons pointing to all four cardinal points, as at Broughton Poggs. At the Saxon cemetery at Fairford the feet were almost invariably to the N., and W. M. Wylie thinks that this was the prevailing pagan practice among Teutons (*Archæologia*, xxxvii. [1857] 459). In Sussex and Surrey and in the south of England generally the feet are most commonly E., but, when they are not, they are almost invariably to the N. In the round barrows of Wiltshire the tendency is for the bodies to be facing S.

One of the most remarkable examples of orientation (taking the word in its wide sense) is the 7th or 8th cent. Christian cemetery at Hartlepool, the first monastic seat of Hilda of Whitby. Here were found a dozen bodies with memorial slabs incised with crosses and Christian inscriptions; yet all were lying N. and S.

There seems good ground for believing that the Teutons held the north sacred. The classical passage in mediæval literature is in *Reineke Fuchs* and is quoted by J. Grimm (*Deutsche Mythologie*, Göttingen, 1854, i. 30). Here the fox turns in the Christian direction, while the wolf is content with the heathen orientation towards the N. G. B. Brown (*The Early Arts in England*, London, 1915, iii. 161) points out that this orientation cannot have formed an important item in Teutonic paganism or it would have left a more decided mark in literature. On their conversion to Christianity the Teutons for the most part seem to have abandoned this direction in their burials for that of E. and W.

The general conclusions are as follows, though we must not expect uniformity even in the same race. Burial with the feet to the N. was probably the practice of the pagan Saxons, though this was not universal. For the most part they adopted the E. and W. position on conversion to Christianity. On the other hand, some Christian burials are, as we have seen, N. and S. Some burials on the side with feet to E. or W. but with the face

always to the S. suggest a desire to face, or lie in the path of, the sun. These general tendencies are interfered with by the survival or overlap of more ancient customs, by indifference and ignorance, and by local conditions such as a steep slope in the ground.

List of English churches showing direction of axis, dedication, and date of festival, with direction of sunrise on the festival (see above, VI. 8).

SS. Peter and Paul, 29 June, N.E. by E.	
Exeter Cathedral	E. by S.
Gloucester Cathedral	E. by S.
Llandaff Cathedral	E. by S.
London, Old St. Paul's Cathedral	E.
London, Westminster Abbey	E. by S.
Peterborough Cathedral	E.
Winchester Cathedral	E. by S.
York Cathedral	E.
Chichester Cathedral	E. by S.
The Blessed Virgin, 25 March, E.	
Carlisle Cathedral	E
Fountains Abbey	E. by N.
Jervaulx Abbey	E. by N.
Holyrood Chapel	E. by N.
Lincoln Cathedral	E.
Rievaulx Abbey	N.
Salisbury Cathedral	E.
Old Sarum Cathedral	E. by S.
Southwell Cathedral	E. by S.
Worcester Cathedral	E.
York, St. Mary's Abbey	N.E.
St. Etheldreda, 25 June, N.E. by E., and E. by S.; St. Peter, 29 June, N.E. by E.; B.V.M., 25 March, E.	
Ely Cathedral	E. by S.
St. Cuthbert, 20 March, E., and 4 Sept., E. by N.; B.V.M., 25 March, E.	
Durham Cathedral (St. Cuthbert and B.V.M.)	E. by S.
Wells, St. Cuthbert's Church	E.N.E.
St. Werburgh, 3 Feb., E.S.E.; SS. Peter and Paul, 29 June, E.; B.V.M., 25 March, E.	
Chester Cathedral	E. by N.
St. Andrew, 30 Nov., S.E. by E.; St. David, 1 March, E. by S.	
Rochester Cathedral, present building (S. Andrew)	S.E.
Saxon building	S.E. by E.
St. David's Cathedral (SS. Andrew and David)	E.
Wells Cathedral (S. Andrew)	E.
Christ, 25 March, E., 25 Dec., S.E. by E.	
Canterbury Cathedral	E. by S.
Norwich Cathedral	E. by N.
St. John Baptist, 24 June, N.E. by E.	
Chester, St. John's Church	N.E. by E.
Peterborough, St. John's Church	E. by S.
St. Alban, 25 June, N.E. by E. (Dedication of Church, 29 Dec., S.E. by E.[1])	
St. Alban's Cathedral	E.S.E.
St. Ethelbert, 24 Feb., E. by S., or 20 May, N.E. by E.; B.V.M., 25 March, E.	
Hereford Cathedral	E.
St. Frideswide, 19 Oct., E. by S.	
Oxford Cathedral	E.
St. Nicholas, 6 Dec., S.E. by E.	
Cambridge, King's College Chapel (St. Nicholas and B.V.M.)	E. by N.
Newcastle Cathedral	E.N.E.
Yarmouth Parish Church	E. by S.
St. Chad, 2 March, E.	
Lichfield	N.E. by E.
St. Margaret, 20 July, N.E. by E.	
Westminster (St. Margaret's Church)	E.
St. Stephen, 26 Dec., S.E. by E.	
Westminster (Chapel Royal)	E. by S.

[1] Nicolas, *Chron. of Hist.*

Table showing the colours which represent the points of the compass and the common liturgical colours (see VI. 12 and X. 1).

	N.	S.	E.	W.
Pueblo, Arizona[1]	Blue (green) or yellow	Red	White	Yellow or blue
Zuñi[2]	Yellow	Red	White	Black
Navaho[2]	Black	Blue	White	Yellow
Moki[2]	White	Red	Yellow	Blue
Pueblo[2]	White	Blue	Red	Yellow
Isleta, Pueblo[2]	Black	Red	White	Blue
Cherokee[2]	Blue (trouble)	White (happiness, peace)	Red (success)	Black (death)
Mexico and Cent. America[2]	Black, yellow	Red, blue	Yellow, red	White, white
Tewa Indians, New Mexico[3]	Blue, green	Red	White	Yellow
Yucatan, Mexico[4]	White	Yellow	Red	Black
Ireland[4]	Black	White	Purple	Dun
Navaho[4]	White	Blue	Dark	Yellow
Veda[4]	Very dark	White	Red	Dark or dark blue
China and ancient Java[4]	Black	Red	Green	White
Liturgical colours in common use in Western Christian Church[5]	Advent and Lent	Christmas and Easter	Good Friday	Oct. of Epiph. to Candlemas and Trin. to Advent
	Sorrow	Purity	Death	Life
	Violet	White or, for Passion, Easter and Love, red	Black	Green

Literature.—The only work dealing comprehensively with the subject is Heinrich Nissen, *Orientation*, Berlin, 1906–10 (only pts. 1–3 [Egyptian to early Christian] have been issued). Egypt is dealt with partially by E. A. Wallis Budge, *Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life*, London, 1899, and 'The Pyramids and Temples in the Sûdân,' in *Proc. of Royal Society of London*, lxv. [1899], and more fully by J. Norman Lockyer, *The Dawn of Astronomy*, London, 1894. Greek temples are discussed by F. C. Penrose, in *Proc. of Royal Society of London*, liii. [1893], lxv. [1899], and early Christian churches by G. G. Scott, junr., *Essay on the Hist. of English Church Architecture*, London, 1881. An important contribution on primitive races is W. J. Perry, 'Orientation of the Dead in Indonesia,' *JRAI* xliv. [1914] 281 ff. He opposes the hypothesis of E. B. Tylor, *PC*[3], London, 1891. Lockyer has expounded his theories on Stonehenge in his *Stonehenge and other British Stone Monuments*, London, 1906. James Fergusson's *Rude Stone Monuments in all Countries*, London, 1872, is still valuable. Pre-historic work is discussed by G. Baldwin Brown, *The Early Arts in England*, 4 vols., do. 1903–15, and by Walter Johnson, *Byways of British Archæology*, Cambridge, 1912. Both these authors give useful references to recent research. J. G. Frazer's works, although, curiously enough, not dealing directly with the subject, must of course be studied.

T. D. Atkinson.

POKOMO.—1. Distribution.—The Pokomo are a Bantu people inhabiting the Tana Valley, in the north-eastern part of the British E. Africa Protectorate. Their proper tribal name is Wa-Fokomo (*f* representing the 'bi-labial *f*' which in this language corresponds to Swahili *p* and Giryama *h*), but they are called Wapokomo by the Swahili and Munyu by the Galla. A recent official estimate gives their number at about 18,000. They are divided into thirteen tribes (*vyeti*, plur. of *keti*), occupying definite areas with recognized bound-

[1] Fewkes, *Journ. Am. Eth. and Arch.* ii. 14–22, 111.
[2] G. Mallery, *4 RBEW* [1886], p. 56.
[3] J. P. Harrington, *29 RBEW* [1916], p. 43.
[4] A. C. Haddon, *Evolution in Art*, London, 1895, p. 123 f.
[5] R. A. S. Macalister, *Eccles. Vestments*, London, 1896, pp. 224–226.

aries. None of their villages is found at any great distance from the river, with which their tribal life is so closely bound up that they have a saying 'The Tsana is our brother' (they call it Tsana, Tana being the Swahili pronunciation; the Galla name is Galana Maro). Their farthest north-western limit appears to be about 39° 30′ E., on the bend of the river; this is the district of the Korokoro tribe; the rest, in order, going down the river, are Malankote, Malalulu, Zubaki, Ndura, Kinakomba, Gwano, Ndera, Mwina, Ngatana, Dzunza, Buu, Kalindi. The first nine of these are known as the 'upper' tribes (*Wantu wa dzuu*); the Ngatana (whose district is about 3° 30′ S. by 40° E.), Dzunza, Buu, and Kalindi are the 'lower' (*Wantu wa nsini*). These two sections differ considerably in dialect and customs; they are sometimes said never to intermarry, but the rule is not absolute. On the confines of the Kalindi area, between Chara and Kau, and on the Ozi estuary, are some villages of 'Mahaji'—Pokomo who have become Muhammadans and more or less adopted Swahili dress and customs. The Zubaki are the most numerous tribe, numbering about 2000.

The first European to mention the Pokomo is probably Boteler, who was at Lamu in 1823, and says:

'Above the town of Kow [Kau], at every twelve or fifteen miles, there are large villages on the northern bank inhabited by the Pocomas, a tribe dependent on it, and at the distance of fifteen days' journey in a canoe, . . . is situated the town of Zoobakey, beyond which the current of the river is too strong to proceed against it' (*Narr. of Voyage of Discovery*, i. 393).

The 'town of Zoobakey' is probably a mistake for the Zubaki tribe; the distance is approximately correct.

Krapf, though he never visited the Tana, heard of this tribe, and mentions their kinship with the 'Wanyika' (see art. NYIKA). He obtained a good deal of information from two Muhammadan Pokomo settled at Takaungu, who, among other things, gave him a list of the 'principal places' on the Tana, most of which are the names of the tribes already given; others may be those of villages which have since been removed. The Pokomo, though not nomadic, like the Galla, have at various times been forced to migrate by changes in the course of the Tana, the last of which seems to have taken place about 50 years ago, the river being deflected near Marfano from its old bed, which ran to the north-east of the present one.

Von der Decken was at Kau in the early part of 1865, and speaks of the Pokomo as 'friedliche und fleissige Ackerbauer,' whose villages begin above Chara (*Reisen in Ostafrika*, ii. 271). His companion, R. Brenner, returned in 1867 and ascended the Tana as far as the Malankote district. Between these two dates the Tana had been visited by New and Wakefield, of the United Methodist Free Church Mission, who founded a station at Golbanti, primarily for the benefit of the Galla, though the Pokomo were found to be more promising converts. This station has long been without a resident European, but is in charge of a native teacher; and there is a small number of Christian Pokomo at other stations of the same mission. Brenner's estimate of these people, it may be remarked, is unduly severe. The Tana was explored in 1878–79 by Gustav and Clemens Denhardt, who ascended as far as Masa, in lat. 1° 15′ S. The former gives some account of the Pokomo in the *Journal of the Berlin Geographical Society* for 1884. Subsequent information is derived chiefly from the German missionaries belonging to the Neukirchen body, who began work on the Tana in 1887, soon after the proclamation of the German Protectorate over Witu, which lasted till 1890.

2. Origin, language, etc.—The traditions of the Nyika tribes seem, on the whole, to import that the Pokomo came, like them, from Sungwaya, though they moved southward considerably earlier. They were already settled in the Tana Valley when the Wanyika were driven from their homes by the Galla invasion. The Kauma version of the matter is that 'we refused to be conquered by the Galla, but the Pokomo consented,' and retained their country at the price of their freedom. They have been, in fact, more or less tributary to the Galla ever since—or at least till the Galla power was reduced by the attacks of the Somali on one side and the Masai on the other. According to Von der Decken (ii. 271), the Pokomo were, in 1865, dependent on the Galla 'ohne jedoch von ihnen gedrückt zu werden.' The Korokoro tribe have, like the Wasanye, ceased to use their own language and adopted Galla instead.

Krapf records the fact that the inhabitants of the Taita hills call the Wanyika 'Ambakomo,' because they believe them to be descended from the Pokomo on the Tana. It also appears, from independent traditions preserved by both peoples, that some of the Rabai tribe at one time took refuge among the Pokomo, who have derived one of their 'mysteries,' the 'great *ngadzi*' (see below), from them (Krapf, *Dict. of Suahili*, London, 1882, *s.v.* 'Mutsi mwiru'). The Pokomo traditions, together with various features of their language and customs, indicate a composite origin: (1) a Bantu immigration from Sungwaya, (2) the hunter tribes (Wasanye and Waboni) previously in occupation of the Tana forests, (3) the backward migration from Rabai (Werner, *Journ. of Afr. Soc.* xiii. 364 f., *FL* xxiv. 457; Böcking, *Zeitschr. für afrikan. und ocean. Sprachen*, ii. 33). The tribes seem to have reached the Tana Valley separately. Some say that the Buu and Ngatana were the first to arrive, coming from the north or north-east; others that the Mwina, Dzunza, and Kalindi were there before them. A legend given by Böcking (p. 36), and independently by the present writer (*Journ. of Afr. Soc.* xiii. 363 f.), derives the Buu from a single ancestor, Vere, who 'appeared' in the country near the 'old Tana' and was taught to make fire (by friction) by a Musanye named Mitsotsozini. As this man is claimed as a direct ancestor by the Katsae clan of the Buu, it seems that either Vere himself or his children intermarried with the Wasanye. The traditions go on to state that, when the Pokomo were attacked, first by the Galla and afterwards by the Swahili (Watsawaa), some of them emigrated (but subsequently returned), others dug pits (*dindi*) and retired underground: hence the name Kalindi (Böcking, p. 36; [Krafft], *Grammatik der Pokomo-Sprache*, p. 137). The subjugation by the Galla is here spoken of as prior to that by the Swahili, but other accounts indicate that the latter came first—*i.e.*, if the accounts are to be trusted which place Liongo Fumo in the 13th century. That legendary hero (whose story is given in E. Steere, *Swahili Tales*, London, 1870) is said to have made the Pokomo tributary 'from Chara to Mwina'; he went no higher up the river. Some say that he imposed the 'tribute of heads' (*i.e.* four slaves from every large village and two from every small one), which was afterwards commuted into a payment of so many sacks of rice. This was received by the Sultans of Witu till quite late in the 19th century (Würtz, in *Zeitschr. für afrikan. und ocean. Sprachen*, ii. 89). The Pokomo tradition about Liongo agrees quite closely with the Swahili one given by Steere, which still lives at Kipini and Lamu—his grave and other sites connected with him are pointed out at the former place. Some say that he warred against the Portuguese, which would make him much later; but the matter is still involved in much uncertainty. Some of the

Pokomo make him contemporary with Vere, and others, while not asserting this, are positive that there were Swahili towns on the coast when this ancestor came to the Tana Valley, which may indicate that the Pokomo settled there at any rate later than 689, the date generally accepted for the foundation of Pate. It seems probable that the Pokomo were the earliest Bantu with whom the Arab settlers came in contact, and that their language forms the groundwork of Swahili—or at least of the Lamu dialect.

The Pokomo language contains, as might be expected, a great many Galla words and also a number of others which do not seem to be Galla, but are difficult to parallel in any other Bantu language. Considering the traditions above referred to and other points which make it highly probable that these people are partly descended from the Wasanye, we may not be far wrong in assigning these words to the language of the latter. It is difficult to establish this point at present, because most of the Wasanye have disused their own language, and (like the Korokoro) speak Galla; the few who still know the old speech are to be found in the neighbourhood of Witu.

The Pokomo, though cultivators of the soil, are also hunters and fishermen; and their hunting customs, tabus, and traditions show that the practice is of great antiquity. Their burial customs also seem to connect them with the Wasanye, for, instead of burying in the village, or even in the dead man's own house, as do most Bantu tribes, they carry the dead away into the forest. One of their 'mysteries,' the *fufuriye*, is avowedly borrowed from the Wasanye, as the great *ngadzi*, or sacred friction-drum, is said to have been derived from the Warabai. We have therefore every right to assume a composite origin for the Pokomo; and this seems also to be borne out, *e.g.*, by the numerous gradations of skin-colour met with, 'black' and 'red' (*i.e.* darker and lighter) individuals being frequently seen among the children of the same father and mother. As a rule, they are of sturdier build than the Wasanye, but not often tall. Otherwise their physical type calls for no special remark. Denhardt (p. 145) says that cicatrization was common in 1878, but it is not often seen now. The two middle lower incisors are sometimes removed, or partly chipped away, but this is not universal, and seems to have, nowadays at least, no ritual significance. Denhardt, although he found that all boys underwent this operation about their eighth year, was repeatedly assured that this and the cicatrization were 'nur Schönheitsmittel.' The tribes of the Lower Tana do not practise circumcision (except such individuals as have adopted Islām); those of the Upper Tana do.

3. **Social organization.**—The Pokomo *vyeti* consist of exogamous clans (*masindo*, plur. of *sindo*). Many of them bear Galla names (*e.g.*, Uta, Meta, Ilani, etc.); but these are of later adoption, and some have their old Pokomo name side by side with the Galla one—*e.g.*, Kinakaliani of Zubaki, which is also Garijela (=Gardyed). The clans of the Wasanye also have Galla names. Traces of totemism, though no doubt it once existed, are not very obvious at the present day. The tribal organization is similar to that of the Giryama and other Nyika tribes, and also to that of the Galla, the Masai, and apparently the Wasanye. The system of 'ages' (Giryama *marika*) is known by the Galla name of *luva*. Circumcision, as above stated, is not practised by the Pokomo of the Lower Tana; but all the boys who enter the 'young men's house' (*gane*, or *nyumba ya warani*) at the same time (which they do about the age of 14 or 15) constitute a *luva*. They remain in the *gane* till they marry, the next *luva* entering a few years after them, so that there are always two 'companies' (*vitaro*) in the house at the same time. There is a twofold division of the tribe, apparently corresponding to the 'right-hand' and 'left-hand' circumcision of the Masai, the two halves being called Honge and Vibare, and the senior *luva* in the *gane* belonging to each of these alternately. Apparently the *luva* does not receive a name till it has passed into the highest stage of eldership. In 1912 the young married men of the Buu tribe at Ngao were *wana wa magomba*, belonging to the Vibare section; the men of the previous *luva*, older, but not old enough to be their fathers, were *wana wa mperuya*, and the *luva* before that (to which belonged Nyota, the senior chief, then almost incapacitated through age) was *magomba*. The *magomba* are the fathers of the *wana wa magomba*, and the sons of the latter are at present known as *wadzukuu* ('grandsons') *wa magomba*. The *luva* before *magomba* was *mperuya*, of which few, if any, were still living in 1912. The duration of a *luva* would seem to be about fifteen or sixteen years—roughly, half a generation.

The word *rika* is used by the Pokomo, but is applied to a feast given to the whole tribe by the members of a new *luva* on their admission.

These age-classes must not be confused with the 'degrees' or 'orders' to which men and women are admitted at various stages of their existence, and which correspond to the *habasi* and *kambi* of the Giryama. Boys are supposed to be bought into the *makombe* by their fathers as soon as possible after birth, but the ceremony may be delayed if the family cannot afford the fee. The initiate is entitled to wear a coronet of palm-leaf (*tama*) and ear-ornaments called *vipuli*. The next step is *njere* (Giryama *nyere*), followed by *kundya*, which a man is supposed to have entered before he marries. Married men are initiated into the *kiroo*, whose badge is an ostrich-feather worn in a little clay 'holder' plastered on the head, like the nest of the mason-wasp (whence its name, *nyumba ya nyiro*). After this comes the higher grade, *ngadzi*, with three divisions: the *fufuriye*, lesser *ngadzi*, and greater *ngadzi*. The special 'mystery' of the *fufuriye* (derived, as already stated, from the Wasanye, who strictly keep the secret from the Galla) consists of two flutes (called 'male' and 'female'), differing in diameter and in pitch, which are played together. They are kept at a lodge in the forest and shown only to the initiated. The lesser *ngadzi* has three stages and the greater six, one of which is called *mwanja* (=Giryama *mwandza*). The *ngadzi* itself is a huge friction-drum made of a hollowed log, 12 ft. long and weighing half a ton. There is one *ngadzi* for the Wantu wa dzuu, and another for the Wantu wa nsini, with whom are included the Wasanye.

The members of the *ngadzi* are all called 'elders' (*wakijo*), though those belonging to the greater *ngadzi* enjoy most consideration. The government of the tribe is in their hands, and from them the two chiefs (*mahaju*) are chosen. One of them belongs to the Honge and one to the Vibare section. They appear to hold office till they die or are incapacitated by age. The name *haju* is the Galla *hayu*, 'chief.'

The *wagangana*, or sorcerers, form a distinct gild, with their own rules and initiation. There are five grades of them, the lowest called *mwana wa mpefu*, 'son of the spirits.' A man who has passed through all but the highest is supposed to be eligible for that when his son enters the lowest. Both *wakijo* and *wagangana* are buried with special honours, and the face and breast of the corpse are painted in three colours, with soot, ashes, and red clay (*zazi*).

Women have two orders, the *vara*, corresponding to the *makombe* of the youths, girls being bought in by their fathers as soon as they can afford it, and the *nkaka ya mumio* (also called *ngorosho*), which they join after marriage, their husbands paying the fees. It is probable that they have a *ngadzi* (or some equivalent) of their own, but the present writer was never able to ascertain this point.

An arrangement as yet insufficiently investigated is the division of each village into 'upper' and 'lower' sections (*danda ya dzuu* and *danda ya nsini*), which appears to have no relation to either clans or *luvas*. At Ngao, in 1912, each section had two elders (one of the four being the junior *haju*).

4. Material culture.—Pokomo huts are very much like those of the Galla; they are hemispherical, or beehive-shaped, thatched with grass on a framework of poles, which are planted in a circle and tied together at the top (not, as by the Zulus, bent over to form arches). Rice was formerly the staple crop cultivated, but, since the Tana has had a freer outlet to the sea through the Belezoni canal and the Ozi estuary, the cultivation of rice has diminished and that of maize increased, owing to the smaller area now covered by the annual inundations. All Pokomo are expert swimmers and canoe-men; the craft generally used (*waho*, plur. *maho*) is the usual African dug-out, but for long journeys performed by a large party they have the *sangala*—two canoes lashed together, with a platform of sticks between them.

Fishing is carried on with hook and line, by spearing (the fish-spear, *yutsoma*, is distinct from the hunting-spear, *fumo*), or by means of wicker traps (*mono*) and weirs. The most important animals hunted (before the game-laws were in force) were the hippopotamus, the elephant, and the crocodile. Each has its appropriate ceremonies and is celebrated in special songs. No hunt could take place without the permission of the *wakijo*, who chose a lucky day, performed incantations to ensure success, and insisted on the observance of the complicated etiquette regulating the distribution of the meat. The chief hunting weapon is the spear; bows and arrows (with iron heads, or poisoned ones, with reed points) are sometimes seen, but are commoner among the Wasanye. The crocodile is a favourite food, and is therefore to a certain extent preserved; the Pokomo are always reluctant to destroy its eggs. Other items of food, especially in times of scarcity, are wild fruits and roots—*e.g.*, the fruits of the *mkoma*-palm (*Hyphæne thebaica*) and the tubers, the receptacle, and upper part of the stalk of the blue or white water-lily (*junji*).

As might be expected from their being largely a hunting tribe, the Pokomo have an interest in animals and a knowledge of their habits which recall the S. African Bushmen. Böcking has recorded some of their hippopotamus and elephant songs, and many others might be gathered from the lips of the people. A specially noteworthy point is the fondness of the women for improvising songs about birds, many of which are remembered and handed down. The Tana is unusually rich in bird-life, and the creatures celebrated in the songs (the osprey, a kind of plover, etc.) seem to have attracted attention by their beauty and grace and are not, so far as one can discover, considered from a utilitarian point of view.

5. Customs, etc.—So far as the Pokomo are differentiated from other Bantu, it appears to be firstly by their affinities with the hunting tribes, and secondly by the specialized life consequent on their riverine habitat. In many ways their customs do not call for separate remark—*e.g.*, those connected with marriage are much the same as those of other Bantu, except, perhaps, that it is more usual than elsewhere for a man to bespeak his friend's daughter in infancy or even before birth. This may be due to a comparative scarcity of women; and it was the present writer's impression that men with two wives at once—and certainly with more than two—were not common; but she gives this with hesitation, as her observation of natives not under missionary influence was limited. The rules of *hlonipa* are strictly observed, applying to a prospective as well as an actual mother-in-law, to her sisters, and, in a less degree, to other members of the family.

Pokomo folklore is of the usual Bantu type, but has interesting points of contact with that of the Galla, while the latter shows striking parallels with the Nama and Masai.

LITERATURE.—T. Boteler, *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia, performed in His Majesty's Ships Leven and Barracouta, from 1821 to 1826*, 2 vols., London, 1835 (much of Boteler's journal is reproduced, though with textual variations, in F. W. Owen, *Narrative*, etc. [1833]); J. L. Krapf, *Reisen in Ost-Afrika, ausgeführt in den Jahren 1837-1855*, Stuttgart, 1858 (Eng. ed., London, 1860); C. New, *Life, Wanderings and Labours in East Africa*, London, 1873; E. S. Wakefield, *Thomas Wakefield: Missionary and Geographical Pioneer in Eastern Equatorial Africa*, do. 1904; C. C. von der Decken, *Reisen in Ost-Afrika in den Jahren 1859 bis 1865*, 4 vols., Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1869-70 (the references to the Pokomo are in vol. ii.); R. Brenner, *Forschungen in Ost-Afrika*, in A. Petermann's *Mittheilungen*, Gotha, 1868, pp. 175-179, 361-367, 456-465 [Pokomo, p. 461]; C. and G. Denhardt, 'Bemerkungen zur Originalkarte des unteren Tanagebietes,' in *Zeitschr. der Gesellsch. für Erdkunde*, xix. [1884] 122-160, 194-217; F. Würtz and G. Böcking, 'Lieder der Wapokomo,' in *Zeitschr. für afrikanische und oceanische Sprachen*, i. [1895] 324; Böcking, 'Sagen der Wapokomo,' *ib.* ii. [1896] 33-39; [H. Krafft], *Grammatik der Pokomo-Sprache*, Neukirchen, 1901 (privately printed); A. Werner, 'Some Notes on the Wapokomo,' in *Journal of the African Society*, xiii. [1913], 'Pokomo Folklore,' in *FL* xxiv. [1913] 456-476, 'The Bantu Coast Tribes of the E. Africa Protectorate,' in *JRAI* xlv. [1915] 326 ff.

A. WERNER.

POLABIANS.—See SLAVS.

POLES.—See SLAVS.

POLES AND POSTS.—In many parts of the world poles and posts have had a religious or magic significance. There is reason to believe that in many countries the post or pole has gained its significance as the representative of a once sacred tree, the spirit of the tree being supposed to have passed into it. Whether this explanation will hold for all parts of the world is problematical.

1. Babylonia and Assyria.—One of the oldest Babylonian inscriptions known[1] (so old that its writing is almost pictographic) bears on one side the picture of a man who wears a feathered head-dress and stands before two pillars or posts. These have each a globular enlargement near the top; and just beneath this enlargement there are on one pole four horizontal marks, and on the other eight. The inscription, of which no translation has ever been published, refers to the building and dedication of a temple. It begins:

'Wood unworked, reeds unworked, Ennamag,
suitable for a dwelling, brought.
Uninjured was the chief, uninjured was the officer Ennamag.
Ennamag with firmness laid the bricks; the princely dwelling made.
By it was a tall tree; by the tree he planted a post.'

The association of trees and posts to which this ancient text bears witness is confirmed by a number of early Babylonian seals, on which, in connexion with the picture of a god, a tree and a post are also pictured. Thus one seal[2] represents the sun-god stepping over the mountain of the eastern horizon, and behind him is a palm-tree. Before

[1] E. de Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, Paris, 1885-1912, pl. i. *bis*.
[2] W. H. Ward, *Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Washington, 1910, no. 260.

him stands the moon-god, and between the two gods is a post having at the middle a globular enlargement similar to that of Ennamag. Another[1] represents the seated sun-god, behind whom is a tree, while two posts, one before and one behind him, are carved at the top into a slightly tree-like form. It thus appears that the sacred tree and the sacred posts were associated.

The sacred tree was in Babylonia usually a palm-tree. This is shown by the pictures on many seals.[2] The fact that the god resided in the tree is graphically shown by two seals, on which the tree is portrayed as an anthropomorphic deity whose head is surmounted by the horns of divinity, and from whose body the branches of a tree protrude.[3] This was the spirit which, it was thought in early times, could be persuaded to go and reside in a pole or post that could be transported from place to place. The conception was analogous to the idea that the spirit of a crag could be persuaded to reside in a smaller movable stone and then in an idol.

The posts were often surmounted by the symbol of the deity to whose worship they were attached. The symbol of Ishtar was a star, and on many seals this symbol is pictured as resting on the top of a post.[4] Out of this combination the sign was evolved by which the goddess's name was expressed in later Babylonian writing.[5] A late seal, bearing an Aramaic inscription, actually has a form of the post practically identical with the sign.[6] The post was sometimes surmounted by a sun-disk;[7] at least once it is surmounted by both the star and the crescent moon;[8] sometimes it bore a triangle, and sometimes a bird.[9] When thus surmounted, it became the symbol of different deities. Thus, when it bore the head of an eagle or a hawk, it was the symbol of Zamama, the god of Kish; when it bore the head of a lion, of some unidentified deity; when the heads of two lions, it was the symbol of Ninib.[10] Sometimes the post terminated at the top in a crook which turned to the right hand or the left, and in one instance it bore horns like those of a cow turned downwards.[11]

Representations of the post, when so curved, easily pass into representations of the *caduceus*, which, according to Ward, was a serpent emblem. Sometimes objects which he designates as *caducei* seem more like posts.[12] It seems probable that the posts were sometimes carved to resemble serpents, and that the two emblems merge at times the one into the other.

Another object on the seals is of a puzzling nature. It looks like a post with a projection on one side.[13] Frequently, though not always, a vase is pictured above it. Ward calls the vase the symbol of Aquarius, and suggests that the object in question may be the balance of Libra.[14] This suggestion seems most dubious. Why should a balance always stand on end? The balance-signs in the Babylonian writing are never made like this picture. The pictures of the posts on the earlier seals, which represent them with a globular enlargement towards the top or above the middle, indicate that this, too, is a post, though why it should be made in this form it is impossible to conjecture.

1 Ward, *Seal Cylinders*, no. 271; cf. no. 374.
2 *Ib.*, nos. 362, 388, 389, 421, and 725; cf. also 200, 217, 296, and 317.
3 *Ib.*, nos. 474, 578.
4 *Ib.*, nos. 126, 222, 244, 270, 274, 279, 283, 362.
5 Cf. E. S. Ogden, *The Origin of the Cuneiform Signs in Babylonia*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 44 f., and G. A. Barton, *The Origin and Development of Babylonian Writing*, do. 1913, pt. ii. p. 64.
6 See *CIS* ii., Tabula, no. 84.
7 Ward, no. 413. 8 *Ib.*, no. 257. 9 *Ib.*, no. 1292.
10 See Ward, p. 205. 11 See Ward, no. 904.
12 See Ward, *Cylinders and other Oriental Seals in the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan*, New York, 1909, no. 114.
13 *Ib.*, in Ward, *Seal Cylinders*, nos. 312, 331, 334-337.
14 *Ib.*, p. 113.

There is reason to believe that the primitive Semitic name for a sacred post was expressed by the consonants *'šr*, for in S. Arabia it was known as *athirat*, in Phœnician and Hebrew as *ăshērāh*, and in Akkadian as *ashirtu* or *eshirtu*.[1] Apparently in early times such posts marked the limits of a sanctuary, for in course of time *ashirtu*, or *eshirtu*, became the Akkadian word for 'sanctuary,' and so passed into Assyrian. If we are right in supposing that the post was a surrogate for an earlier tree, it would follow that the limits of the earliest Babylonian sanctuaries were determined by the position of sacred trees. F. Hommel suggested[2] several years ago that the name of the god Ashur was derived from *ashirtu*, 'sanctuary'—a view that Barton afterwards accepted.[3] If this be so, not only the name of Ashur, but the city that bore his name, as well as the warlike empire that grew out of it, all bear witness to the popularity of the cultus-post in early Mesopotamian religion.

No shrine was thought to be complete without such posts. Thus, when the Assyrian armies erected temporary shrines in order to propitiate by sacrifice a river-deity before crossing the river, they set up not only a temporary *maṣṣēbhāh*, but two posts. This is shown in the case of the army of Shalmaneser III. in the pictures on the Bronze Gates of Balawat. The *maṣṣēbhāh* here has a broad base so that it will stand on the ground; the two posts, surmounted with sun-disks, are provided with a base in the form of a tripod. Friedrich Delitzsch calls these 'candelabra,'[4] but in view of the evidence of the seals and the Carthaginian *cippi*, cited below, they are probably representatives of the older posts. As Shalmaneser does not inform us of the nature of these objects or of the material of which they are made, we are left to conjecture. The object that we have designated a *maṣṣēbhāh* may have been made of wood. If so, it was also an *ăshērāh*. In any event it has near the top some of the horizontal lines borne by the post of Ennamag already mentioned.

Whether sacredness attached to the posts of doors and gates is problematical. If H. C. Trumbull's explanation[5] of the origin of the sacredness of the threshold is correct, the door-post, which represented the male, should be as sacred as the door-socket or threshold, which represented the female. Possibly this was the case in Assyria, since at Khorsabad foundation deposits were found, not only under the corners of the city which were sacred (see art. CORNERS), but under each gate-post of the eight gates of the city. This seems to show that the gate-posts shared in the sacredness of the corners. It is possible, therefore, that some sacred symbolism attached to the gate-posts pictured on the seals of the sun-god Shamash.[6] He is represented as stepping over the mountains of the east and through the gate of the morning by which he emerged from the subterranean passage which was supposed to lead from the west to the east. There are, however, no symbols at the top of these posts, as on some Phœnician gate-posts, to indicate that they were sacred, and the point cannot now be determined.

The Assyrian kings sometimes savagely boast that they impaled their captives on stakes round the cities which they had conquered.[7] Such victims were at times killed before they were impaled. It has been customary to ascribe these acts to the savage brutality of the Assyrians; but, in view of a method of sacrifice by impaling cited below (§ 8), it is possible that we have in this custom the

1 See G. F. Moore, *EBi*, s.v. 'Ashera.'
2 *Aufsatze und Abhandlungen*, Munich, 1900, ii. 209.
3 *Semitic Origins*, p. 223. 4 *BASS* vi. pt. i. [1908].
5 *The Threshold Covenant*, New York, 1896, ch. iv.
6 Ward, *Seal Cylinders*, ch. xiii.
7 See *KB* i. 56, ii. 86, 164, and Shalmaneser Obelisk, 155.

survival of a primitive sacrifice by impaling on a post. Such a sacrifice could originate only in a period when men were in a very savage state. The Assyrians were the most brutal of all the Semites, and it is possible that such a primitive custom may have survived among them. It was exercised only in war, when persistent resistance especially enraged them. As all their wars were carried on in the name of Ashur, such resistance was impious to him, and he would take pleasure in the sacrifice of the victims. If this view be true, the stakes or posts on which the victims were impaled were a kind of rude altar.

2. Arabia.—Nearly all direct evidence of the use of the sacred post in Arabian heathenism has disappeared along with the rest of the cultus of the 'times of ignorance' which Islām supplanted. The one bit of evidence that has survived is contained in a Minæan inscription published by Hommel, which mentions a goddess Athirat as the consort of the god Wadd.[1] Athirat is the S. Arabic equivalent of Ashera (Assyr. Ashirtu). As in N. Semitic lands the word designated first the name of the post and only later that of a deity, it is probable that the same was true of Arabia, especially as the palm-tree is shown by historical[2] and archæological[3] evidence to have been sacred in Arabia as well as in Babylonia. The only heathen shrine of Arabia of which we have a tolerably full description is the Ka'bah at Mecca, and, while in the descriptions of that the sacred stone is mentioned, there is no mention of the sacred post.[4]

3. Phœnicia and her colonies.—Most of our knowledge of sacred posts in the Phœnician world comes from Cyprus and Carthage. The word *asherath* in the sense of 'sanctuary' occurs in a Phœnician inscription from Masub that was discovered in 1885.[5] This use of the word accords with the Akkadian. A seal, possibly Babylonian (in any case it reflects Babylonian influence), seems to represent the limits of a sanctuary as marked by two posts similar in shape to one of the Babylonian forms.[6]

There is much evidence that in Phœnician religious thought the palm-tree held the same place as it did in Babylonian thought. In Cyprus terra-cotta figures of three women dancing round a palm-tree have been found in considerable numbers.[7] Although these are broken, a reconstruction of the original is possible and furnishes proof of the devotion of women to this tree. Evidence of the sacredness of the tree is also afforded by many of the votive *cippi* from Carthage, on which it is drawn in more or less realistic fashion.[8] The transition from the tree to the sacred post is shown by a terra-cotta object from Cyprus now in the museum of Bonn University.[9]

As to the forms which the post assumed in the Phœnician cult we cannot always speak with definiteness, since from the drawings on the votive *cippi* it is not possible to distinguish in every case which objects were made of wood and which of stone. The *ăshērāh* is once represented as a slender post surmounted by the crescent moon,[10] and several times as a slender post surmounted by curved lines which form a kind of sun-disk, or two sun-disks one above the other; in some instances two wavy lines branch out below the sun-disks.[1] These are clearly rude representations of the palm-tree made by using as few lines as possible. Another series of figures, more elaborately made, affords the transition to the more common sort of post. These are in the form of posts surmounted by the curves which resemble the sun-disks, but they still have the horns or streamers which represent the hanging date-fruit.[2] The post as most commonly represented on these *cippi* is identical in form with this conventionalized date-palm, except that the lines which represented the hanging dates are absent. Sometimes two globular curves are represented at the top, sometimes one, and at times even one curve is so incomplete that the post appears to be surmounted by two horns. This series of pictures demonstrates the date-palm origin of the cultus-post for the Semitic world.

The posts appear on the *cippi* in various connexions. At times they stand by the triangular figure of the goddess Tanith; this is the most common representation.[3] Sometimes with the figure of the goddess there stands a hand which represented at this time the *maṣṣēbhāh*, or pillar.[4] This hand appears also on various seals made under the mingled influences of Babylonia and other countries of W. Asia.[5] The hand was a euphemistic symbol of the phallus, which the pillar was believed to represent. This is its meaning in Is 57[8] in the phrase 'thou sawest the hand' יד חזית. That this is the significance of the hand on these *cippi* is indicated by a picture in which the posts appear together with the figure of the goddess and a phallus.[6] At times it is accompanied by two hands. Various conjectures have been made as to the significance of the posts. It seems clear from these combinations, and from the dance of the women of Cyprus about the palm-tree, that in the Phœnician religion they represented the female principle of fertility as the pillars did the male principle.

In some representations of Phœnician temples which have survived the door-posts are surmounted by curves similar to those at the top of some of the cultus-posts.[7] Apparently, when such posts were of wood, they had a significance similar to that of the cultus-posts. Sometimes, however, they were of stone, like those at Tyre described by Herodotus.[8] Perhaps, in that case, the sacredness of the *maṣṣēbhôth* attached to the pillars. In any event the sacredness of the doorway was connected with the two sets of symbols.

A number of the *cippi* are dedicated to Tanith and to Ba'al-Shamin, or the sun-god. Naturally it was thought that the female principle would appeal to the god, just as the male principle did to the goddess. The rude representations of the top of the palm-tree appear, as already noted, somewhat like sun-disks. In time, then, these posts were known as 'sun-pillars' (cf. Is 27[9], Lv 26[30], where RV renders 'sun-images').

4. Amorites.—As was the case with Arabia, no archæological evidence of the use of the cultus-post has come down to us from the Amorites, and yet we know that they not only used the post, but, like the Arabians, gave its name to a goddess. When the El-Amarna Letters were written, in the first half of the 14th cent. B.C., a compact group of Amorites were living in N. Palestine. Their

[1] ii. 206. [2] See Barton, *Semitic Origins*, p. 79.
[3] See *CIS* iv., Tab., no. 13.
[4] See J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*[2], Berlin, 1897, p. 74 ff.
[5] Cf. C. Clermont-Ganneau, *RA* v. [1885] 380; and G. Hoffmann, *Über einige phonikische Inschriften*, Gottingen, 1889, p. 20 ff.
[6] Cf. J. Menant, *Glyptique orientale*, Paris, 1886, ii. 65, fig. 60; and Ohnefalsch-Richter, *Kypros*, pl. lxxviii. 8.
[7] Cf. Ohnefalsch-Richter, i. 127–131, ii. pl. lxxvi.
[8] See *CIS* i., Tab., nos. 184, 189, 245, 2719, 2732, 2969.
[9] Cf. Ohnefalsch-Richter, pl. xvii. 1.
[10] *CIS* i., Tab., no. 426.

[1] *CIS* i., Tab., nos. 326, 365, 370, 372, 388, 397, 398.
[2] *Ib.*, nos. 2629, 2730, 2813.
[3] *E.g.*, *ib.*, nos. 238, 2666, 2706, 2833, 2992, 2986, 3031, 3038, 3049, 3055, 3056.
[4] *Ib.*, nos. 3042, 3080, 3122, 3142, 3144, 3192. At times the post and hand stand alone, as in nos. 282, 2953, 2958.
[5] See, *e.g.*, Ward, *Seal Cylinders*, no. 901.
[6] *CIS* i., Tab., no. 188.
[7] See, *e.g.*, Ohnefalsch-Richter, pl. lxxxii. 8. [8] ii. 44.

habitat stretched from the sea-coast at Accho, across the territory afterwards occupied by the tribe of Asher, up into the great valley between the ranges of the Lebanons. The chieftain of this tribe was called in the letters Arad-ilu-A-shi-ir-ti, the Akkadian form of Ebed-Ashera, a name meaning 'the servant of Ashera.'[1] The presence of this name is proof of the antiquity of this phase of the cult among the Amorites, and of its close association with deity. The memory of this name of the Amorite goddess lingered long in the Orient, for in a Babylonian hymn of the Greek period we read:[2]

> 'Unto the god Amurru, lord of the mountain,
> Unto Ashrat, lady of the plain.'

5. Canaanites and Hebrews.—There is abundant testimony in the book of Deuteronomy that the pre-Israelitish inhabitants of Canaan equipped their high places with both pillars (*maṣṣēbhôth*) and wooden posts (*ăshērîm*). The Hebrews are strictly admonished to break down the one and to cut down the other (Dt 7[5] 12[3] etc.). It has often been inferred from 16[21], 'Thou shalt not plant thee an Asherah of any kind of tree,' that the *ăshērîm* were trees. In accordance with this view, the AV translated the term 'groves.' More recently G. F. Moore[3] and K. Budde[4] have endeavoured to show that the *ăshērāh* was always a wooden post, and that the verse in question should be rendered 'an Asherah of any kind of wood.' It is true that the *ăshērim* were sometimes erected under living trees (2 K 17[10]), but it was the opinion of some of the rabbis of the Talmud that it was a living tree (*Abōda Zārā*, 45*ab*); and, from what we have learned of its origin, its resemblance to the living tree may sometimes have been closer than at other times. The Canaanitish post must have at times been quite large, since the one cut down by Gideon (Jg 6[28]) furnished fuel with which to burn the sacrifice of a bullock.

Such posts were a part of the cultus-equipment of the temple of Jahweh in Jerusalem down to the reign of King Josiah, for he removed them at the time of his reform in 621 B.C. (2 K 23[6]). The sanctuary at Jerusalem was not peculiar in this respect, since the posts existed at Bethel (2 K 23[15]), Samaria (2 K 13[6]), and doubtless at all other shrines. It is worthy of notice that *ăshērāh*, which represented the female principle, formed in Hebrew a masculine plural, *ăshērîm*, while the *maṣṣēbhāh*, which represented the male principle, formed a feminine plural, *maṣṣēbhôth*. Possibly this occurred because of the supposed affinity of male deities for the female principle and *vice versa*. As noted above, this would account for the fact that the surrogate of the feminine sacred tree became the emblem of the masculine sun-god (cf., *e.g.*, Is 27[9]).

In the Hebrew cult the posts were sometimes carved into the semblance of the human form or of its reproductive organs; when carved into such forms, the posts were sometimes draped; down to the time of Josiah there were connected with the temple women who wove hangings for the *ăshērāh* (2 K 23[7]). There are several passages, as the Hebrew text now stands, which indicate that, as in Arabia and among the Amorites, the *ăshērāh* became a goddess, or rather a group of goddesses. Thus Jg 3[7] speaks of 'the Baalim and the Asheroth,' and 2 K 23[4] of 'vessels that were made for Baal, and for the Asherah.' We also hear of 'the prophets of Baal . . . and the prophets of the Asherah' (1 K 18[19]). Moore[1] holds that it is probable that in these cases the text of the OT has been glossed, and that the presence of a goddess Ashera is due to a confusion between Ashtoreth and her symbol. It is probable that, wherever the name of the post became the name of a divinity, it was because of such confusion, but it is certain that among the Amorites and in Arabia the name of the post passed into the name of a goddess, and it is quite possible that it was so in Israel. We sometimes are too suspicious of the Massoretic text.

In view of the form of the cultus-post as it is shown on Phœnician votive *cippi*, and in view of the analogy of this form with the shape of the pillars at the doors of Phœnician temples, it is tempting to see in the *ăshērāh* the origin of the pillars (*'ammudîm*, not *maṣṣēbhôth*) that stood on either side of the entrance to Solomon's temple, and which were named Jachin and Boaz. They were constructed of bronze, and their tops were carved into lily-work. The writer is disposed to believe that they were transformed cultus-posts. As already noted, such posts were found in Cyprus made of terra-cotta, shaped to imitate the natural wood. It is not improbable that the form of Jachin and Boaz originated from a much conventionalized palm-tree. W. R. Smith thought[2] that they represented the oldest type of fire-altar; but this is most doubtful.

Cf. also art. MAṢṢĒBHĀH.

6. Egypt.—It appears that in Egyptian worship Osiris was the only god with whom a cultus-post was associated. The Osiris-post was of medium height and carved so that the upper part (about one-third of the whole) resembled four cups or four lotus-blossoms standing one within the other.[3] Remembering how the palm-tree was conventionalized in Babylonia and Phœnicia, we readily see in this post also a conventionalized palm-tree. So closely was the post associated with Osiris that it became the hieroglyphic symbol for his name in all periods of Egyptian writing.[4]

While other gods appear not to have been associated with posts, standards borne upon rods played a great part in their cults. Thus on the palette and mace head of Nār-mer, a king of the 1st dynasty, if not a pre-dynastic king, four divine symbols are borne aloft on poles, each about three times the height of a man.[5] Not only were these symbols borne in procession, but they are frequently represented in Egyptian reliefs as planted in the ground, so that they seem like posts surmounted by the symbol of the god. These are found from the time of the Middle Kingdom[6] down to the latest Egyptian dynasty.[7] They appear in many combinations; at times they seem half-humorous, as when one of the divine sceptres and the sign *'nḫ*, signifying life, are pictured with hands supporting such standards.[8]

Similar to these standards are the rod-like sceptres carried by most Egyptian gods. Possibly there was originally some connexion between them, though it cannot now be traced.

7. Indo-Europeans. — Posts and poles do not play so important a part in the religion of the Indo-European peoples as they do among the Semites; nevertheless they are not wholly wanting.

(1) In the Vedas of *India* we hear of the 'sacrificial posts' which apparently stood before every

[1] The best ed. of the original text is in *Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler der königl. Museen zu Berlin*, xi. [1914], no. 41. The name occurs in line 8. It is found also in no. 52, i. 9. For tr. see J. A. Knudtzon, *Die El Amarna Tafeln*, Leipzig, 1912, nos. 84, 103, or Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, Philadelphia, 1916, p. 344 f.

[2] The text is found in G. A. Reisner, *Sumerische-babylonische Hymnen*, Berlin, 1896, p. 92, see line 18. Cf., for a full tr., S. Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, Paris, 1909, pp. 151-167.

[3] In *EBi* 331.

[4] In *The New World*, viii. [1899] 784.

[1] *EBi* 331, 332.

[2] Cf. *Rel. Sem.*[2], pp. 208, 488.

[3] See A. Erman, *Die ägyptische Religion*[2], Berlin, 1909, p. 22.

[4] Cf. G. Möller, *Hieratische Palæographie*, Leipzig, 1909-12, no. 541.

[5] E. A. W. Budge, *A Hist. of Egypt*, London, 1902, i. 183, 185.

[6] Cf. *RTv* xxxii. [1910] 52 ff.

[7] Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904, ii. 271.

[8] See Ohnefalsch-Richter, pl. cxxiii. 4 f.

altar.[1] Oldenberg believes that in Rigveda I. xiii. 11 such a post is addressed as a 'tree.'[2] To these posts the sacrificial victims were tied before they were slain.[3]

In the *Mahābharata* (xii.) these stakes are described thus:

'Sacrificial stakes of timber with their golden fastenings graced,
Consecrated by the *mantra* are in sumptuous order placed.'

Further on we read:

'Six good stakes of *vilwa* timber, six of hard *khadira* wood,
Six of seasoned *sarvavarnin*, on the place of *yajna* stood.

Two were made of *devadaru*, pine that on Himalay grows,
One was made of wood of *slesha*, which the sacrificer knows,

Other stakes of golden lustre quaint with curious carving done,
Draped in silk and gold-brocaded like the constellations shone! . . .

Bulls of various breed and colour, steeds of mettle true and tried,
Other creatures, full three hundred, to the many stakes were tied.'

At least in poetry a certain personification of the stake occurred.[4] Whether the post became specially sacred in earlier Hinduism is problematical, though it was such a constant accessary of sacrificial places that, in a hymn in the Atharvaveda, in which the burning sun is apostrophized as sacrificial fire, the mountains of the earth are described as the 'sacrificial posts.'[5]

In later Hinduism the symbol of Śiva, the *liṅga* or phallus, is usually a smooth post of stone or wood. Whether this is an evolution from the sacrificial post of earlier days, or an intrusion from the Dravidian population of India, cannot now be determined.

(2) Among the *Persians* trees were apparently sacred in early times, for there is in the *Bundahishn* a myth of a tree that was supernatural and generated all seeds.[6] Worship of trees combined with sun-worship appears to have survived among the Magi, but it found expression in the use of 'rods' or the branches of trees, rather than in the consecration and veneration of posts.[7]

(3) Among the *Greeks* and their Cretan forerunners there are traces of a sacred post. Plato describes[8] a sacrifice of a bull that is said to have been offered in the sunken island of Atlantis, by which it has been conjectured[9] that he meant Crete. The bull was led to a pillar or column on which the law and a curse were inscribed, and was slain 'against the top of the column over the writing.' His blood was thus brought into contact with the column or post on which the laws were written.

Some coins from Ilium bear witness to the existence there of a cultus-post not unlike the sacrificial posts of India. One of these coins pictures 'Athena Ilias with her fillet-twined spear and owl,' and on her right a pillar to which a bull is hung. Evidently the pillar was connected with the sacrifice in some way, though not in the manner described by Plato. Another coin shows the goddess standing on a post, while before her is a cow, apparently waiting for sacrifice. A third coin pictures the goddess standing on her post, and before her is a cow hanging head uppermost from a tree.[10] Miss Harrison thinks that the post was once the goddess, and that the representation of an anthropomorphic figure standing on the pillar is a later development.

The Greek god Hermes apparently developed out of a post or pillar.[1] In the early art he is represented as a square post with a human head.[2] Gilbert Murray[3] holds that the phallic post was placed at the head of graves to symbolize the renewal of life, and that its spirit came to be regarded as a means of communicating with the dead. Such a post was called a 'Herm,' and in time the collective totality of such posts became the god Hermes, the messenger of the gods. Later the post form of Hermes was discarded for more artistic anthropomorphic representations, and the post was even regarded with aversion.

(4) There are many survivals of tree-worship in the customs of *modern Europeans*, and among these the May-pole celebrations and dances hold a prominent place.[4] In one form or another they are found in Bohemia, Swabia, among the Wends of Saxony, and in various other parts of Germany; also in Corfu, Sweden, Alsace, Provence, and Ireland; and nowhere do these customs appear in such completeness as in England. They are found in all parts of the country, have persisted almost to the present, and have found a considerable place in literature.[5] The idea that the May-pole prevents sterility in women and cattle is almost universal among these peoples. In Saxony May-trees or May-poles were set up before houses, stables, and cattle-stalls, and even before the chambers of sweethearts; in Sweden, where the celebration comes in midsummer, young fir-trees are set up at the doorway and elsewhere about the house; in Suffolk, according to an old custom, a servant who first brought a branch of hawthorn on the 1st of May was entitled to a dish of cream—a custom that until recently continued with some modification in Cornwall.

In many of these countries the May-pole was brought into the village each year with great rejoicings.[6] In some cases bands had been seeking it in the woods all night. Philip Stubbes, writing in the time of Queen Elizabeth, says that the May-pole was brought home with twenty or forty oxen, each ox having a nosegay of flowers on his horns, while the pole was also decorated with flowers. It was raised in all the countries with rejoicings in which old and young shared. In England, as in many places on the Continent, dancing was an important feature of the celebrations. In Northumberland, in the 18th cent., after the dancing there was a feast for which a sillabub was made of milk warm from the cow, sweet cakes, and wine. A wedding-ring was dropped into this, and the young people fished for it with a ladle. The finder was supposed to be wedded first. The customs and superstitions associated with the May-pole indicate that it was a surrogate for a divine tree, and that the sacredness of the tree was connected with the idea of fertility.

8. Native races of India.—In Hinduism the god Śiva is not represented by an idol, but by the *liṅga*, or *liṅgam*, a phallic post. It is generally supposed that the *liṅga*, of which there is no trace in the Vedas, is a contribution from the Dravidian peoples. The *liṅgam* are generally made of stone[7]

[1] See Rigveda, v. ii. 7; Atharvaveda, xii. i. 13, 38.
[2] See *SBE* xlvi. [1897] 12, n. 1.
[3] Cf. R. Dutt, *Maha-Bharata, the Epic of Ancient India, condensed into English Verse*, London, 1898, p. 167.
[4] See the references cited by H Oldenberg in *SBE* xlvi. 12, n. 1.
[5] Atharvaveda, xiii. i. 47.
[6] See *Bundahishn* (*SBE* v. [1880]), ix. 5 f., xviii. 9, xxvii. 2, xxix. 5; and *Zāt-sparam*, viii. 3.
[7] Cf. J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, p. 189.
[8] *Krito*, 119 D and E.
[9] See J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, p. 163 ff.
[10] *Ib.* p. 164 f.

[1] Frothingham seeks to show that he was developed from the Babylonian *caduceus* and was a snake-god; cf. *American Journal of Archaeology*, xx. [1916] 175–211.
[2] Harrison, *Themis*, p. 365.
[3] *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 74.
[4] See *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 52–71.
[5] Cf. W. C. Hazlitt's ed. of Brand's *Popular Antiquities of Great Britain*, ii. 402–406.
[6] Full accounts of these may be found in the works of Hazlitt and Frazer cited above. The statement given above is mainly a condensation of *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 52–71.
[7] Cf. W. T. Elmore, *Dravidian Gods in Modern Hinduism*, p. 142.

and painted red,[1] though possibly at times of wood. The use of this symbol seems now to be co-extensive with the Śiva-cult. Of other religious uses of posts in India there seems slight trace.

On the fourth day of the festival of Ankamma, a Dravidian village-goddess, 'a man disguised as a woman carries a paper balloon in procession on the end of a long pole. Above the balloon is a pot, and above that a drinking-cup, while the royal staff and snake hood are carried behind accompanied by drumming and shouting. On the last day the cruel features of the worship take place. The village carpenter prepares a rude cart on which are set stakes sharply pointed at the upper end. The usual number of the stakes is nine. On these are impaled alive a goat, a pig, a lamb, a chicken, and other small animals. The story-teller . . . rides to Ankamma's temple in the midst of the suffering animals. . . . After they have arrived at the temple, a live sheep is impaled on a stake set for that purpose in the ground in front of the temple. All of these animals of course die in their agonies.'[2] It is believed that Ankamma is propitiated by this suffering and shedding of blood.

In this case the stakes or posts become practically altars for the offering in a most horrible way of such sacrifices as are supposed to appeal to the savage god. According to Dravidian legends, men have sometimes been put to death by being impaled on such stakes.[3]

9. Burma.—The Red Karens hold a festival every year in April at which the principal ceremony is the erection of a post on ground, in or near each village, set apart for the purpose. A new post is set up every year. The old ones are left standing, but, when they decay, are not renewed. The posts are really poles, 20 to 30 ft. high. The tree from which each is made is selected each year by omens obtained from chicken-bones. When the pole is set up, the people join in rude dances not unlike the May-pole dances of Europe. They feast on pork and drink quantities of liquor.[4]

10. China.—While in China there is evidence of a semi-sacredness attaching to trees because they are supposed to be the abodes of spirits that must be propitiated,[5] no evidence of the employment of a sacred pole or post in that country is known to the writer. The nearest approach to anything of the kind is the system of poles by which a coffin is carried from the house to the grave.[6] The coffin is placed on a frame-work which is attached to a heavy pole or beam. At each end of this there are cross-poles, which rest on the shoulders of the bearers. There are never fewer than four bearers, and, by increasing the system of cross-poles, there may be eight, sixteen, or thirty-two. These poles have no sacred significance, except in so far as everything connected with burial is to a degree sacred in China. The pole device may have been dictated by convenience, since the frame on which the coffin rests is attached to the large pole by a swivel and can be turned in any direction at will—a great convenience in passing through the winding alleys of Chinese cities.

Brooms and bundles of twigs are employed to drive away evil spirits,[7] but this is a development from the primitive sacredness of trees different from that represented by sacred poles and posts.

11. Japan.—Trees among the Japanese might be considered *kami*, 'wonderful' or 'divine.' *Kami* was the nearest Japanese equivalent to 'god.' Trees, accordingly, were often sacred. This is shown in the Shintō ritual, where it is directed that heavenly twigs be clipped at the top and bottom, 'making thereof a complete array of one thousand stands for offerings.'[8] Apparently each twig became a little post for the support of an offering, and was thus a temporary sacred post. More significant are the many phallic emblems in Japan that were formerly connected with the Shintō ritual.[1] Down to 1872 phallic symbols were to be seen at many Japanese shrines. They were usually made of stone, though often of wood, and in later times of terra-cotta, iron, and gold.[2] In connexion with Shintō there were, accordingly, many sacred posts kindred in significance to the sacred posts of the Semitic peoples. In Japan they represented the male principle, the female being indicated by an emblem of different shape.

12. Kamchatka.—Among the Koryaks, when a pestilence is raging, a dog is killed and his entrails are wound round two poles. The people then pass between the poles, which are supposed to have power to prevent the demon of pestilence from following them.[3]

13. Celebes.—(1) Among the *Tokoelawi* in the interior of Central Celebes it is customary to hold a sacred festival on the eighth day after the death of a man and on the ninth day after the death of a woman. On the way home from the festival the guests pass under two poles placed in a slanting direction the one against the other, and they must not, while doing this, look round at the house where the death occurred. In this way, with the supernatural or magic aid of the poles, they take leave of the soul of the departed.[4]

(2) Among the *Toboengkoe*, another tribe of Central Celebes, when a man buries his wife, 'he goes to the grave by a different road from that along which the corpse is carried, and on certain days afterwards he bathes, and on returning from the bath must pass through' a structure shaped like an inverted V. The structure is formed by splitting a pole up the middle and separating the two parts widely at one end, while they adhere at the other. The ceremony is believed to protect the man's second wife, if he has one, from soon following the first.[5] The leaning poles form an archway, somewhat similar to that made of boughs by the people of Borneo, beyond which a spirit is supposed to be unable to pass. Among the Toboengkoe it is the spirit of the dead wife, who is believed to be jealous of her living rival, against which protection is sought.

14. Melanesia.—Among the Melanesians there are few traces of sacred posts. (1) In *Santa Cruz* stocks or posts are set up as memorials of the dead.[6] They are of the rudest sort, and have only such sacred character as attaches to the dead. In the *Banks' Islands* tree-trunks cut into very rude figures of men are frequently seen at funeral feasts. They are memorials of the dead, but have no sacred character.[7] In the same islands rough idols are carved out of tree-trunks, varying from the rudest stock to elaborately carved images. The posts of houses are also carved into *nules*, the setting up of which is attended by a celebration called *kolekole*.[8]

(2) In *Lepers' Island* they have a way of communicating with ghosts by means of a bamboo pole.

They build a little hut in the forest near their village, adorning it with leaves and coco-nut fronds. The hut is divided by a partition, through which runs a bamboo pole 12 or 16 ft. long. To ascertain whether a ghost is present, the men sit at night on one side of the partition with their hands under one end of the pole and call the names of people who have recently died. When the bamboo rises in their hands, they know that the ghost of the last called is present. When they name one of

[1] N. Macmeol, *Indian Theism*, p. 124.
[2] Hastings, p. 25 and pl. vii., where there is a picture of the altar scene.
[3] *Ib.* p. 26. [4] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 69 ff.
[5] J. J. M. de Groot, *Religion in China*, New York, 1912, p. 19; *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 31.
[6] A description of the whole structure with drawings is given in de Groot's *Religious System of China*, i. 180 ff.
[7] De Groot, vi. 971 f.
[8] Cf. W. G. Aston, *A Hist. of Japanese Literature*, London, 1899, p. 11 f.

[1] See E. Buckley, *Phallicism in Japan*; W. E. Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, pp. 29 f., 49–53.
[2] See Buckley, p. 14 f.; Griffis, *loc. cit.*
[3] *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, ii. 179.
[4] *Ib.* p. 178. [5] *Ib.* p. 179.
[6] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 174.
[7] *Ib.* [8] *Ib.*

themselves, asking the ghost where the man named is, the pole rises and strikes the man named. After this they go out singing, with one end of the pole in their hands, and the ghost leads them whither it will. If they sing that they will go uphill, it leads them down. If they sing that they do not wish to return to the village, it leads them there. A man is said to have put a bamboo pole over his shoulder with a basket attached, when a ghost came and got into the basket, weighing it down to the ground. After that the pole led people whither it would.[1]

(3) Some of the *Torres Straits* islanders performed a ceremony with poles when a turtle was caught.

The turtle was placed on a beach and two highly decorated and carved poles were erected, one on either side of its neck. These poles bore carved faces, somewhat resembling totem-poles. They were surrounded by a number of men, four of whom grasped long ropes that were attached to the tops of the poles. Beginning at the turtle's head, they walked counter-clockwise with a kind of dancing movement round the turtle. When they had advanced a short distance, they partly retraced their steps without turning round, then advanced again until they had gone completely round. All the time they were making overhauling movements with their hands on the ropes, and a drum was beaten and a song was chanted. One of the poles was regarded as male and the other as female.[2]

15. Australia.—In Australia poles are associated with the totemic ceremonies of certain tribes. (1) Thus, in the *Arunta* tribe, when a boy is circumcised or subincised, although the number of performers is very small, a sacred pole is frequently employed. This usually represents the totemic animal or plant. At such times the boy beholds the mystic ceremonies of the tribe for the first time.[3]

(2) Among the *Kingilli* a part of the fire-ceremony as witnessed by Spencer and Gillen was as follows:

The women danced round a pole about 15 ft. high, which bore on its top a sort of tuft;[4] and after the dance, while the men were performing other parts of the ceremony, the women lay on the ground by the pole for the whole night.[5] In the morning the men approached the pole in single file and crouched down, while the women, each carrying a little bag of stones in her hand, danced again round the pole, jingling the stones.[6]

The performers could give no explanation of the ceremony; it had been handed down to them from antiquity.

(3) Among the *Mara and Anula* tribes there is another curious ceremony in which a post figures.

When a man dies and his flesh has been eaten, his bones are collected and brought to his father and mother. They are first spread out to dry, after which they are wrapped up in paper-bark and the parcel is fixed into the fork of a stout stick which stands upright in the ground. The stick 'is placed in the centre of a little cleared space outlined by a raised circle of sand, in which an opening is left on one side.' Within the circle a small fire, which must be lighted by rubbing two sticks together, is made and kept burning. No one may approach it but the father and mother of the dead, and no stick may be taken from it. The spirit is supposed to come and hover over the bones and the fire, and at times may be seen by the father and mother standing near the fire.[7] After the lapse of a considerable time, often a year or more, other important ceremonies having been performed in the meantime,[8] the bones are removed, put into a hollow log, the ends of which are stopped up, and buried.[9]

16. Africa.—Posts and poles are used in various semi-sacred ceremonies by the savage tribes of Africa, but the religion of most of them is so inchoate that it is often difficult to tell what degree of religious significance is attached to the posts. A few examples must suffice.

(1) The *Yorubas* used to employ posts when offering human sacrifice to Ogun, their god of war.

A place was selected where rocks and boulders enclosed a kind of natural temple. As soon as it was known that such a sacrifice was to be made and that a slave had been selected as a victim, the women of the tribe were seized with great excitement. They rushed to the victim, addressed prayers to him, sent messages by him to departed friends, and gave him their choicest articles of food. Then, encircling him, they engaged in a wild dance of amazing rapidity, which continued until the victim had been decapitated. While this dance was in progress, the officiating priest placed two forked sticks or posts about 7 ft. high in the ground, one on each side of the entrance to the rock-enclosed space, and across these he laid a pole from which a fringe of palm-leaves was suspended. While the dancing continued, the victim, in the space described, was laid on his face and beheaded. The head was placed in a fantastically decorated earthen pot in the rear, while the body was left lying where the decapitation occurred.[1] The sticks and pole possessed some ritual significance, though just what it was is not clear.

(2) On the *Upper Congo* a chieftain is, after his death, given a kind of worship for a time. As a part of the reverence shown to him, four of his wives are buried alive under his body, their legs and arms having first been broken so that they will not crawl out. In order that he may be properly attended in the spirit world, ten of his slaves are decapitated that their spirits may go with his. The ritual of this decapitation is as follows:

'A tall flexible pole is stuck in the ground, at some distance behind the seat' in which the slaves are to be placed one by one. 'From the top of the pole a cage-like arrangement is suspended by a cord. The pole is bent down, and the cage is fitted to the unfortunate man's head. He is blindfolded, but he knows what is happening,' having on former similar occasions seen it done to others. 'The executioner commences to dance, and make feints; at last, with a fearful yell, he decapitates his victim, with one sweep of the huge knife. The pole thus released springs the head into the air. The crowd yells with delight and excitement.'[2]

17. American Indians.—'The sacred pole was found widely among the American Indians. It was planted in the centre of their villages, or, if the tribe was nomadic, it was carried about in an ark or wrapping and set up in a tent by itself in their encampment. It typified the communal life of the tribe and represented the "mystery tree," which was intimately associated with their legendary origin.'[3]

The most striking of all these are the totem-poles of the Indian tribes of the north-west coast of America. The largest of these, as well as the most curious, are those of the Tlingit of Alaska and the Haida of Queen Charlotte Islands.

'Some of them stand in front of houses, or very near them; others are set near the beach, beyond the village. When old they are weather-beaten and gray. They are sometimes compared to a forest of tree trunks left after a fire has swept through a wooded district.'[4]

'There are three kinds of these carved posts—totem-posts, commemorative posts, and death-posts. The death-posts are the simplest of the three. Among the Tlingit and the Haida the dead were usually burned. If the man had been important, a display was made of his body. . . . After the body had been burned, the ashes were gathered and put into a box, which was placed in a cavity hollowed out of the lower part of the death-post. . . . At the top of the death-post was a cross-board on which was carved or painted the totem of the dead man.'[5]

'The second kind of carved post is the commemorative post, put up to commemorate some important event.'[6] Thus an old chief once erected a post to commemorate the failure and consequent withdrawal from his village of missionaries of the Græco-Russian Church. On the pole were carved, from the top downward, an eagle, a man pointing with his right hand to the sky, an angel, a priest with hands crossed on his breast, and a trader.[7]

The totem-posts are the most interesting. They are taller and more elaborately carved than the others. 'They stand in front of the houses; among the Tlingit to one side, among the Haida at the very middle and close to the house. In fact among the Haida the doorway of the house was a hole cut through the lower end of the totem-post.'[8]

Among these tribes every one bears the name of some animal or bird, such as 'the wolf, bear, eagle, whale, shark, porpoise, puffin, orca, orca-bear, raven, frog, goose, beaver, owl, sea-lion, salmon, dog-fish, crow.' The totem-poles bear the pictures of the totems of the persons living in each house. The husband and wife are of different totems, so both of their totems appear, that of the man at the top, that of the woman at the bottom. Between them other designs are frequently carved

[1] Codrington, *The Melanesians*, p. 223 f.
[2] A. C. Haddon, *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, vi. 214 ff.
[3] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 178. [4] *Ib.* pp. 195, 387 f., and fig. 119.
[5] *Ib.* p. 391. [6] *Ib.* p. 392. [7] *Ib.* p. 549.
[8] *Ib.* pp. 549–559. [9] *Ib.* p. 553.

[1] R. H. Stone, *In Afric's Forest and Jungle*, p. 244 f.
[2] W. H. Bentley, *Pioneering on the Congo*, i. 254 f.
[3] D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 152.
[4] F. Starr, *American Indians*, p. 195.
[5] *Ib.* p. 195 ff. [6] *Ib.* p. 197. [7] *Ib.* [8] *Ib.*

to 'tell the tale of the man's wealth and importance, or they might represent some family story.'[1] Descent is reckoned through the mother in these tribes; consequently the carving at the bottom is most important, as it tells the totem of the mother and children. These poles are a kind of door-plate and tell at the same time something of a family's history and importance.

Besides the carved totem-poles there are also frequently carved columns or posts inside their houses.[2] They serve to support the two great rafters on which the jack-rafters and the roof rest. The carvings resemble those on the totem-poles and have, no doubt, a similar significance.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been fully cited in the notes. Most of it is of a fragmentary character. The more connected discussions may be recapitulated here with a few additions: M. H. Ohnefalsch-Richter, *Kypros, the Bible and Homer*, i., London, 1893, pp. 141–202; W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*[2], do. 1894, pp. 187–191; W. C. Allen, 'Asherah,' in *HDB*; K. Budde, 'Ashera in the OT,' *The New World*, viii. [1899] 732–740; G. F. Moore, 'Asherah,' in *EBi*; G. A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, New York, 1902, pp. 106, 246–249, 'Asherah,' in *JE*; P. Torge, *Aschera und Astarte*, Leipzig, 1902; A. R. S. Kennedy, 'Asherah,' in *SDB*; H. Oldenberg, in *SBE* xlvi. [1897] 12; J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 163–165, 365; Gilbert Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, New York, 1912, p. 74 ff.; *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 52–71, pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, do. 1914, ii. 178–180; W. C. Hazlitt, *Faiths and Folklore*, forming a new ed. of Brand's *Popular Antiquities of Great Britain*, do. 1905, ii. 402–406; N. Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, Oxford, 1915, p. 124; W. T. Elmore, *Dravidian Gods in Modern Hinduism*, Hamilton, N.Y., 1915, pp. 25 ff., 96 ff., 142; J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1892–1910, i. 178–181, vi. 971 f.; E. Buckley, *Phallicism in Japan*, Chicago, 1898; W. E. Griffis, *The Religions of Japan*, New York, 1895, pp. 29 f., 49 ff.; R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, pp. 174, 223 ff.; A. C. Haddon, *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, vi. [1908] 214 ff.; Spencer-Gillen[b], London, 1904, pp. 178, 195, 387–392, 549–553; R. H. Stone, *In Afric's Forest and Jungle*, New York, 1899, p. 244 f.; W. H. Bentley, *Pioneering on the Congo*, London and New York, 1900, i. 254 f.; D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, New York, 1898, p. 152; F. Starr, *American Indians*, Boston, 1899, ch. xxix.; F. S. Dellenbaugh, *The North Americans of Yesterday*, New York, 1901, pp. 161–164.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY.—See ECONOMICS.

POLITICS.—1. Scope of the article.—The word 'politics' is used to refer both to administration or legislation and to the study of this department of human activity. Although the usual sense of the word refers rather to public activities than to theory, the subject here spoken of must be what is more strictly called the theory of politics, or political theory. The practical importance of this theory is very great, both because it obstructs and because it assists the attainment of justice and liberty. Theory has often made the accidental conditions of a passing age seem to be the nature of things, and has therefore perpetuated abuses; and it has often shown a better way when politicians were blind to facts. The facts of political life will, therefore, be treated here as a basis for speculation, analysis, and suggestion (see, further, art. STATE). That part of life which is political is generally supposed to be concerned with the organization of social relations with a view to justice and liberty. Political theory is the analysis and criticism of the attempt to attain those ends; and such theory may be divided into political science (an analysis of facts) and political philosophy (a criticism and moral evaluation of political society). But, since political society is not the only form of society, the theory of politics is only one section of social theory; and it must be distinguished from other kindred subjects. Political society is distinct from the earlier or more primitive forms of social organization (*q.v.*). In political as opposed to primitive society there is a conscious adjustment of social relations by members of a society. Until that occurs, there is, properly speaking, no political life, although, obviously, there is no moment nor any one place in which political life appears, and it must also be allowed that the more primitive social forces are active even in an elaborate political organization. Again, in early but not very primitive society there was no distinction between what we now call 'political' and what we now call 'religious' organization. There was, therefore, no separate theory of religious institutions; but there should be one now, if our social theory is to be complete. Political theory must exclude this. In still less primitive times, and even as late as the 19th cent., no clear distinction was made between economic and political purposes. Therefore a study called 'political economy' arose; and the study of organization for economic wealth was confused with the study of organization for justice and liberty. But, however close the connexion between them, we shall presume that economics (*q.v.*) is quite distinct from political theory, at least in its subject-matter, if not in its method. Finally, politics is connected, through the general theory of society, with ethics (*q.v.*), or the study of right action; but, although ethics should be regarded as fundamentally social and should not isolate the individual, it deals with more general issues.

[1] Dellenbaugh, *The North Americans of Yesterday*, p. [illegible]

2. The Greek conception.—The first political theory was Greek; and it was based upon the half-conscious political organizations—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—which are reviewed in the famous passage of Herodotus.[1] The criticisms there made mark the beginning of political theory. They are based upon Greek experience, aided by observation of Eastern practices; and the forms of government are distinguished by psychological observation of the actions of men in half-organized groups. The immediately following practice and theory were based upon the experience of the πόλις—a peculiar and unique organization or institution which has not only given a name to our subject, but very profoundly affected the view usually taken of it. A word is necessary as to the nature of the πόλις. It was the organization of a small local group of male slave-owners, based upon what we may call religious or ritual community. It was originally exclusive, segmented according to military purposes and organized politically, in our sense of the word (*i.e.* for the purpose of justice and liberty), in one of the three ways mentioned above. But it was a society in which the political was not yet clearly distinguished from the economic or religious needs of man. For this and other reasons, therefore, it is impossible to suppose that the πόλις was essentially a State (see STATE). But upon the experience of the πόλις was based all the Greek theory of society; and the Greek theory of the πόλις is therefore rather an early form of philosophical sociology than what we now call political theory. The pre-Socratic views of society probably veered between the idea that all social organization is a convention (and as such a break with 'nature') and the idea that the organization of civilized society is natural. The theory of convention was probably connected with the attack on slavery and the subjection of women. 'Nature' was the name given to what would be better than the established custom. But we have no complete statement of this view of society. The most valuable and effective political theory began with Socrates (*q.v.*), and is found in Plato's dialogues. Although it is not systematically presented, we can quite clearly see the main lines of the Socratic-Platonic analysis and suggestions of social betterment. This theory of society is part of a general theory of the nature and purposes of man; and,

[1] iii. 80.

since man is essentially social, ethics is part of the theory of social life which is called, in our transliteration of the Greek word, 'politics.' It is false to say that politics in this sense is only a part of ethics; it is absurd to suppose that Socrates and Plato (*q.v.*) were thinking only or chiefly of what *we* call 'politics.' Organized society presented itself to them as a whole—religious, cultural, and economic, as well as what we call political—and the discussion always refers to *all* the relations or contacts of man with man. For this reason the psychological analysis of the individual in the *Republic* is regarded as an equivalent to an analysis of society. The fundamental statement implied in Plato's work is that society is the result of three distinct elements of the character or nature of man; the reverse, he would admit, is also true that the three elements are the result of society.[1] For it is not possible to say of the individual or of society that one exists, in time, before the other. The *Republic* is in the main an analysis of fact, and only in a secondary sense a Utopia; the fact is the life of the πόλις. Therefore the Socratic-Platonic theory is only in part what we should now call political, and in that part is concerned more with the purpose of political action than with political devices or methods. The discovery and promulgation of what is worth doing rather than the administration of society so that its members should do it were the chief interests of Socrates. Law meant to him and to Plato what it meant to most Greeks—a statement of the reasonable rule to be followed rather than a command. And those who could discover this rule were, therefore, the only hope of society. Unimaginative commentators have turned this 'spiritual power' into a military autocracy, because of the Spartan tendencies in Plato; for Plato is indeed too impatient of the method of trial and error in politics. But the value of his work lies in suggestiveness as to ultimate ends rather than in ideas of method. He is the first political philosopher.

The situation had changed in the interval between Socrates and Aristotle; but Aristotle (*q.v.*) continues to repeat the established analysis and to depend for evidence upon an already fast disappearing life of the πόλις. His analysis, however, is carried farther than Plato's, and his suggestions, though less radical, are more detailed. In his *Politics* he reviews the general principles on which the πόλις was organized; and he begins to subordinate, as later ages did more completely, all other interests of man to the desire for orderly administration. In addition to principles shared with Plato, he gives us suggestions as to the dependence of social organization upon external or natural circumstances; he perceives the importance of economic facts; and he attempts to combine the good points of the different systems of government so far discovered by the Greeks. He is the first political scientist. Apart from his unsurpassed ability in analysis of political fact, he formulates well certain principles already discovered. The true State exists not for wealth or power, but for a full and noble life; administration is to provide opportunity for the highest social abilities of man; it is to give these opportunities to all who are capable of using them, women and slaves being proved by 'experience' incapable; and good government is such as prevents the exploitation of some members of a given society by others.

Great as Plato and Aristotle were, they omitted or under-estimated the value of certain facts of the social life which they analyzed. They treated the πόλις as in essence self-sufficing; but the evidence was against them. Nearly all the Greek city-States were dependent, for food, luxuries, or ideas, on other communities; and Athens, confessedly the most advanced, if not, in the philosophers' judgment, the best organized, was civilized largely by foreign contacts. Secondly, they omitted to notice the growing departmentalizing of function which was making the primitive and all-inclusive πόλις into one of many institutions. Voluntary unions existed for economics, religion, or culture, which are simply disregarded by Plato and Aristotle.

So much with respect to facts; but as to conceptions of social betterment also the two great philosophers are deficient. Although each gives hints of the unity of Greece,[1] they neglect too much the attempt of Sophists like Gorgias, Lysias, and Isocrates to counteract the isolation of the πόλις and make an inter-State political structure. And they hark back to the primitive all-inclusive organization, since they desire a πόλις which is merely 'a parochial Sinai.' The history of their influence has unfortunately been as much a history of their mistakes and omissions as of their illuminating conceptions, and this both in the sphere of practical politics and in political theory. But they still give the most suggestive introduction to the general theory of society and the social nature of man. At about the same period political theory and development were beginning in China; but the early promise does not seem to have led to anything new or strange to the Western tradition, which, at any rate, continued for more than 2000 years unaffected by the East. We may therefore suppose that political, if not social, theory, as it now stands, is almost exclusively Western.

3. Roman contribution to the theory.—The domination of Rome marks the second stage in political development. A single State gradually acquired the administration of all the different local groups in W. Europe, W. Asia, and N. Africa. But even this State was a much more simple and all-inclusive organization than any modern State. It was, like the πόλις, in its basis religious, and in the form of its institutions military; and, although the same administration in the 2nd cent. of our era covered vast territory with many races, the structure of the State was still sufficiently like that of the original *urbs* for the conception of the Greek philosophers to be applied to it. With some modifications made by Cicero and Polybius, the idea of political life remained almost Aristotelian. Polybius is perhaps the more important, since he introduced to the political tradition the idea of a balance of social powers as a good method for administration.[2] But the real experience of the Romans is contained not in the philosophical commentators, but in the lawyers. For the social need of the time seems to have been orderly administration, and the desire for local or individual development was sufficiently satisfied if peace was secured.

The Roman lawyers added to the political tradition two important conceptions: an early form of the idea of sovereignty and the idea of a natural law. The one was a reflex of the imperial unity of the Roman world, the other an attempt to explain the basis of civil law. A single source of law and the dependence of all forms of association upon the will of the political power are conceptions of extreme importance in the Middle Ages, with sinister consequences in the Renaissance. And the idea of natural law lived on to affect the first efforts at international law and the early claims to 'the rights of man.' But no complete and comprehensive theory of politics had been developed among the Romans when the Roman world fell in ruin.

4. The Middle Ages. — The development of political life and theory was then interrupted.

[1] Cf. *Rep.* 443.

[1] Plato, *Rep.* 470; Arist. *Pol.* 1327b.

[2] *Hist.* vi. 15.

The Dark Ages contain nothing but gradual loss of the civilized administration and exact thinking of the past, together with fitful and primitive efforts to retain the ghost of the dead world or to inspire a new earth. When the darkness begins to lift, a single form appears—the Roman Church. The only stable and effective organization, with real power for ordering and directing life in every corner of W. Europe, it took over the prestige of the half-forgotten Roman rule and bestowed it upon one of the most fantastic creations of the political imagination—the Holy Roman Empire. What the Church was for the Middle Ages was largely due to Augustine's *de Civitate Dei*, which is an attempt to provide a theory to replace that of the Roman law and the Greek philosophy. Its importance for us here is that, continuing some of the old ideas of administration, it adds to them (1) a conception of another world for which temporal or earthly life is preparatory, and (2) a vague theory as to the equal value of all human beings.

Mediæval political experience may be summarized under two headings: (*a*) the distinction of Church and State, and (*b*) the hierarchy of rulers.

(*a*) Under the first heading come the two great facts—the distinction between the various human interests, and the unity of Europe. The interests for the first time appearing distinct were then called spiritual and temporal. Men were impressed with the existence of other values than those of wealth and power, and they lived in the firm conviction that another and a better existence was to be attained by all who deserved it. To deserve heaven involved, indeed, partly moral and partly magical action; but, in any case, the conception of what was called the spiritual was based upon actual experience. On the other hand, men felt the need for material goods and for orderly administration. This need it is not necessary to explain in the 20th century. Out of those two needs came the mediæval Church and the mediæval attempts at political administration; but the delimitation of function was never decided. In political theory the observation of the facts was complicated by an unhistorical reading of the Bible and Aristotle. Men thought that they saw in the mediæval system the Jewish priesthood and kings, mingled with the society of the old city-State. And the spiritual and temporal needs, differently supplied and differently explained, gave rise to thinkers whom we may roughly classify as ecclesiastical or civil. But, since the Church had control of most of the teaching, the ecclesiastical view of society prevailed in the mediæval books. Thomas Aquinas may stand for many others in his subordination of the civil to the ecclesiastical authority. And even Dante grants in theory a superiority of the Church which he feared in practice. The whole issue was discussed as though it were only a question of two authorities to which all men were equally subject.

As for the unity of Europe, this great mediæval idea was not destroyed by the conflict of Church and State. In fact, Europe was one in its general culture and in its social classifications, although politically it was one only in sentiment. No effective organization of the political order was produced by this sentiment. But in theory all thinkers agreed that the basis of political organization was the interdependence of all the groups of the humanity which counted. The existence of the Eastern empire, of heathen kingdoms and of distant civilizations, hardly seemed to trouble the theorists. Civilized humanity for them was one family, the inhabitants of W. Europe.

(*b*) Mediæval political life was formed by the system called feudal and by kingship. The local administrations of feudalism remain effective in the quaint idea that ownership of land implies the right to govern the inhabitants of that land, and in certain peculiar caste-sentiments; but as a political system feudalism gave place to kingship, and it has hardly been the occasion of any valuable political idea. In fact it was essentially pre-political and socially primitive. Kingship, on the other hand, has been important to political life and to theory. The mediæval king was a sacred person, responsible to God, and an exponent, with advisers, of 'natural' or of customary law. He was not a despot, a representative, an official, or the source of law. He became, especially in England and France, the focus of the effort towards settled and therefore centralized government and the symbol of the new national sentiment. In theory the king has some special divinely-given qualities; he is the necessary result of the desire for one kind of law in any group, and he seems to be given some peculiar physical power of transmitting abilities to his children.

5. The Renaissance.—The decay of the mediæval system, towards the end of the 14th cent., left the unity of Europe a vague memory, the conflict of Church and State a tiresome and half-forgotten quarrel, feudalism practically defunct, and kingship supreme. But the influence of a new economic situation, due in part to discoveries and inventions, together with the disappearance of old ideals and the appearance of political realism, soon transformed mediæval kingship into Renaissance sovereignty. Theory changed as quickly as practice. First, William of Ockham and his follower, Marsiglio of Padua, attempted to give to the State the prestige of the Church by proving it to be fundamentally necessary and not secondary in importance. Then the minds of great numbers of men were gradually turned away from the desire for heaven. This had the double effect of degrading all political conceptions into the merely economic and at the same time of lifting ordinary life by making it seem more worthy of consideration. The supreme political fact of the Renaissance was the existence of personal government in different mutually jealous groups. The situation is generally described in books on history—a subject that has become since the Renaissance predominantly political. Indeed, conscious political development began again at about this date. And this resulted in a succession of brilliant analyses of political life and suggestions of change. Machiavelli is the first and greatest observer of facts; he is valuable because neither the Bible nor Aristotle obscured his view of life as it was; and since his time no political thinking has been based upon books. Even his suggestions for the future are not more than observations of the plans usually followed. The State is for him an instrument of the prince, chiefly for the attainment of 'glory'; and it is essentially an organization for exploitation, either within its frontiers, of the many by the few, or, outside of its frontiers, of one group by another—an analysis which is not altogether inapplicable to modern States.

A slight change of experience is marked by the consolidation of personal government on a more economic and less military basis, over nations rather than districts. France and England provide the evidence, and Jean Bodin analyzes the new phase of political life. The monarch is less prominent in theory and the organization more, although even in Bodin the theory of government in general is always tending to become an analysis of personal rule only. The *Six Livres de la République* (Paris, 1576) expresses for the first time clearly the complete doctrine of sovereignty, at least with respect to the internal organization of the State. This was a great step forward. From that time it has been taken for granted that there is within each

politically organized group an authority, a source of law and administration, beyond or above which there is no other. Legal supremacy of one authority within one territory was, therefore, seen to be necessary for political life. Bodin, however, never lost sight of the fact that legal supremacy does not imply moral superiority, and that legal submission does not imply moral allegiance. He recognizes other institutions and even grants that they existed before the State; but he seems to say that, the State having come into existence, all other social allegiances derive their force from the State and bind only in subordination to the State. This is probably due to the influence of the Greek theory of the πόλις and of Roman law. It marks the Renaissance identification of political with the whole of social theory. Hobbes's *Leviathan* (London, 1651) still remains the best expression of the full meaning of this attitude. The State is the highest, most complete, and at the same time most fundamental or original form of society. It is doubtful if Hobbes (*q.v.*) saw anything but perversity in other social obligations than those of the State. For him the real social world was altogether included in the two problems of the individual and the State. The original war of each against all was to be avoided only by the mutual agreement (compact or contract) to erect and to obey one authority above the whole group. Groups which had not so compacted were still essentially at war each with the other. This natural war of each against all, according to Hobbes, survives between organized groups or States, and it is described as the use of force and fraud. Within the frontiers of the State there is no appeal against 'the mortal god' who, in effect, is a monarch, although in theory the sovereign may be a multitude; and there is no appeal because force is against any such appeal. As for a Church, either it is the State itself in one of its functions or it is a subordinate form of society like a goose-club. Political realism could go no farther; and with some uncertainty perhaps, but with evident intention, force is made to be the fundamental political fact. Against this Locke's conception of civil government was in part a protest. Man is not for him quite so physical, and 'the state of nature' is clearly distinguished from war. Primitive man is rightly considered to have social tendencies; and Locke (*q.v.*) adds to the idea of a compact the valuable conception that civil administration is not based upon an unlimited surrender of individuality, but on limitation of independence with a view to particular purposes. He implies that these purposes are not the only purposes of life, and he definitely makes allegiance to a government depend upon its success in attaining the purpose for which it exists.

The two leading conceptions of the period in all writers were those of a state of nature and of a social compact or contract. They have been many times proved untenable, and, although they survived into the Revolutionary period and perhaps influenced the idea of 'the rights of man,' they had been already exploded. For it is obvious that primitive man was neither so unsocial as Hobbes imagined him nor so intelligent as Rousseau thought. And even as a logical basis for society, as opposed to a historical origin, a social compact implies far too calculating and conscious an activity. But perhaps now we need rather to understand the element of truth in these two ideas of the late Renaissance. It is true that political society is based, logically and historically, on a tangle of primitive impulses and that its best purpose is the preservation and development of the constructive tendencies which are 'natural'; on the other hand, it is true that a relation not unlike a compact is logically implied in the half-reasoned acceptance by citizens of the political conditions under which they live.

The international law of this period deserves special consideration, for it reflects a new phase of political experience and adds something to political theory, but with strangely little effect upon the idea of sovereignty. International law was primarily an attempt to supply another conception for the mediæval idea of the unity of civilization. It was based upon the obvious facts that no State was isolated, and that the relations between States were not altogether those of force and fraud. There were indications that at intervals even sovereigns regarded other sovereigns as trustworthy or amicable; and, when the peculiar habit called war broke out, there seemed to be some limits set to the amount of force or to the intricacy of the fraud usually maintained. How was this to be explained? The attempts which were made to explain it culminated in Grotius (*q.v.*), who established or revived for many generations the conception of a natural law, with Christian connexions, superior to the will of States or princes. Besides being only the expression of the moral feeling of that particular period, this natural law, in so far as it was defined, was a mild restrictive suggestion which the international lawyers tried to believe was a command. But its presupposition was that the agents of States could use anything except a few peculiar practices, and need not feel even that restriction when the existence of their own form of government was in danger. Personal rule had created a mythical State-person, having all the qualities of personality except moral responsibility. At the close of the Renaissance period another great political realist appeared. Charles de Secondat Montesquieu set himself, in *L'Esprit des lois* (Geneva, 1748), to study political facts by the method of comparing the usages of different peoples. The evidence at his disposal was very deficient, but he arrived at some valuable conclusions—*e.g.*, that environment affects institutions. His attempt to distinguish the inner spirit of different forms of government as well as their external forms is also valuable.[1] His aloofness is partly that of the scholar, partly due to the spirit of the 18th cent., when passionate feeling had not yet disturbed or developed the course of political thought.

6. Influence of Rousseau.—Meanwhile the dumb majority were living and dying, hardly troubled by 'glory' and gradually rising to a hope for something more than food and clothing, of which, indeed, the prevailing social organization made the distribution more and more uneven. The movements of the following centuries were political largely because economic needs could not be supplied without political disruption. And it was beginning to be felt that government for the good of the governed should not be a kindly concession by the established powers, but a right—*i.e.*, it must be conceived as the very nature of government and the only basis of moral allegiance. A new and truer conception of humanity was shaking the barriers which divided social castes.

The new age was heralded by the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau (*q.v.*). Still moving in the confused region of contracts, rights, and sovereignty, Rousseau redeemed the old words and foretold a new spirit by his undeluded love of men. He thought in terms of real life, even when he used the musty language of his predecessors. In the analysis of fact Rousseau emphasized chiefly the dependence of the individual upon society for his thought and feeling as well as for his material wants, but he so phrased his conceptions that the

choice of the individual seemed to be the ultimate source of government. As for suggestions of social betterment, he required a complete supremacy of all adult men of the group, who were to rule directly through their agents. They were, however, to have power, not because of their combined force, but because their real will could not be mistaken. This was a moralizing of politics; but in effect Rousseau only transferred to popular government the absolutism and the divine right (*q.v.*) which had hitherto been allowed to personal government. Again, for him as well as for most of his contemporaries, the State meant the whole of organized society. And, again, in the effort to preserve local political vitality he repudiated the device of representative government. These are obvious mistakes. But the great importance of Rousseau is not merely due to the effect of his work on his own generation; it comes from the fact that he re-established the old Greek and fundamentally human idea of political society as an opportunity for the full realization of what is best in man. His argument is often bad and his language always ineffective, because of the obsolete conceptions with which he had to work. But one can feel the effort to express a new meaning. Men were to be truly free in political society; they were to find in it more than they had surrendered in the mythical contract; and they were to be 'citizens,' because 'subjects' only of the general will. The Revolution was intoxicated with the word 'citizen'; and it marks a new age, if we consider that for writers like Hobbes the products of the social contract are only subjects. With the title of citizen the common man felt that he could rise from his knees; and, even if later he mistakenly worshipped himself, he was at least given a dignity without which the political progress of recent years would have been impossible.

Burke, who imagined himself as far as possible opposed to Rousseau, is full of the same kind of humanism. He feels the naturalness of institutions and the value of tradition, but his intellectual analysis of facts is inadequate. The circumstances of the time often misled him into the maintenance of what was obsolete, and he saw objections against any new idea much more clearly than the evils of the established system.

The two great political changes of the period, of which the importance is hardly recognized even to-day, were the political experiments in N. America and in France. 'The rights of man,' vaguely conceived by English revolutionaries, were taken as the theoretical basis for the republic of the United States and, under the influence of thinkers, adopted by the revolutionaries of France. The phrase, however, sounds so empty to-day that it is difficult for us to understand the force that it once had. It meant that there was to be recognized by every political society a fundamental humanity in every man which should not be, as it still is, forgotten in the pursuit of wealth, or because governments desire to act without being criticized, or because we know that men differ in ability.

In the meantime men were turning away from the comparison of different organizations to the criticism of all organization in view of fundamental needs. The new question was not which form of administration was best for the attainment of old purposes, but what purpose any administration should pursue.

7. Utilitarianism and politics.—Political thought renewed its life in the utilitarians. The experience which gave rise to their calculus of pleasures was the dismal beginning of industrialism. At first a revolt against the restrictive influence of the remnants of the mediæval system, utilitarianism (*q.v.*) became ultimately an appeal for the full and free development of all human beings. Jeremy Bentham was the source of the new energy. 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number' became the new gospel. The effect of Bentham's theory upon political practice was so obvious and is still so recent that even practical politicians admit in this case the importance of theory. For Bentham initiated the modern practice of continuous legislation. The State was not merely to maintain, but to develop and increase the opportunities for civilized life. From this period we derive the conception of a scientific use of legislation for definite social effects and the desire to have as few restrictions on individual action as is consistent with order. J. S. Mill (*q.v.*) was the most philosophical thinker of the new school, especially as regards the fact that spontaneous individual action is the only source of a valuable social life. So far as the analysis of fact is concerned, the most important influence upon political thought came from the new study of economic facts. At one time the State seemed to be concerned only or chiefly with wealth. Mill represents this element in the new phase of political thought. Much discussion turned upon commercial policy, and for the first time a proper attention was directed to the relation of administration and economic production. English political thought has since fallen into the hands of the lawyers, whose natural interest is in methods rather than in moral ends to be pursued. The problem of legal sovereignty has bulked largely in their imagination, and they have done admirable work in making the machinery of government more effective. Their deficiencies were due largely to an extreme provincialism. French thought, meanwhile, was making progress in the basic conceptions of political society. It was perceived that society could not be understood as a machine, and that the conception of individuals as nerveless similar units was destroying social vitality in the attempt to prevent the growth of privilege. The republic was criticized as severely as any monarchy had been. In Germany the philosophical study of man led to conceptions of society vaguely correct but hopelessly without reference to contemporary facts. The most valuable idea developed was that of the historical evolution of various forms of organization.

The attitude towards established government, adopted chiefly in France and England, was one of suspicion. It seemed to imply that the individual was best when alone or was by nature isolated. *Laissez-faire* (*q.v.*) led to brute conflict, and the State was becoming a machine for the use of manufacturers. The influence of the historical school, both on the Continent and in England, should be counted as correcting the mistakes of this false individualism. In practice it had been corrected, for the political influence of the later utilitarians was by no means directed to isolating the individual. But the theory of the State as a living and natural unit was needed to complete the tendency towards socializing all political activities. The historical school rightly looked back to a form of political humanism in their opposition to what appeared to be a too mechanical conception of society and the State. But their ambitions misled them. They lost sight of the individual in the endeavour to transcend him; they confounded the State with society as a whole and, in the desire for organic conceptions, they raised from the grave of Leviathan a monstrous ghost—the mystical State which is above all morality.

8. A new political theory. The crude and as yet unexamined conceptions of nationalism at present popular are in part due to the mistakes of the

historical school. Already, however, especially among French writers, there is a return to the individualism (*q.v.*) of earlier times, with such corrections as must be allowed from the suggestions of Auguste Comte and his followers (see art. POSITIVISM). Society is clearly not a mere collection of individuals, nor is the State a mere contract of citizens; but, on the other hand, the social unit or the State is not to be explained except as a special form of relation between individuals. Neither the atomic individual nor the mystical crowd-mind is a fact; and with such negatives the history of political theory ends, except for the study of special or departmental interests.

Again, however, political life outgrows the formulæ of established theory. Within the frontiers of every civilized State independent quasi-voluntary associations have arisen — the trade-unions (*q.v.*). Across the frontier voluntary associations for the use of capital in undeveloped countries have become powerful. State action has immensely increased, and no clear limit appears as to what the State can do; but other organizations have begun to repudiate the idea that they owe their existence to the State. Further, by contrast to the preceding period, States are compelled by force of circumstances to act together; and, most important of all, for the first time in human history every human being is brought into continuous political contact with every other, since all the States of the world are at last connected. The mass of new facts has led to extreme specialization in action and thought; and so far no comprehensive view has become common nor is any suggestion of improvement generally accepted. Recent political thought is to be found embedded in the discussion of general social and economic questions. Socialism and syndicalism (*qq.v.*), although implying political conclusions, are far-reaching social movements rather than programmes of State action. For the old theories of the State begin to appear superficial to an age impatient of fundamental evils and unlikely for much longer to be satisfied with the modification of a few officialisms. Already there is evidence that a new political theory is arising out of the new social theory; and the new experiences of recent years will perhaps require an entirely new analysis of fact, not to speak of new suggestions of reform. It is becoming obvious that political thought should concern itself not only with devices of government, but with the establishment of more ideal purposes than those now commonly accepted.

Although the situation has indeed changed in so many ways that much of the old political theory is obsolete and all of it is inadequate, we owe much to the statesmen and thinkers of the past. The results acquired in practice are probably such as that the consent of the governed is essential for good government, that different situations need different systems, that political life changes and therefore the system of administration should change. These are principles which may be observed to be implied in the action of the more advanced political groups. In the sphere of theory the old truths still valid are such as that society is a real and natural whole, that man is made by society and yet the individual is the only source of development. But, naturally it is impossible to distinguish clearly theory from practice when we are making a summary of our indebtedness for the achievements of past ages. We can only build the future upon the good already established by men now dead. The greatest good, however, that we may derive from them, in the effort to elevate political action and illuminate political theory, is the power to repudiate what we have inherited when it hampers our perception of evil or dulls our desire to destroy it.

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POLYANDRY.—See MARRIAGE, FAMILY.

POLYDÆMONISM. — See DEMONS AND SPIRITS.

POLYGAMY.—See MARRIAGE, FAMILY.

POLYNESIA.—**1. Introductory.**—Polynesia is the name given to a number of Pacific islands whose inhabitants are closely related to one another, speak dialects of substantially the same language, are similar in physique, and are, in fact, a distinct, though not a pure, race. The chief groups of islands included in the area are Samoa, Tonga, Tahiti and the Society Islands, the Hervey or Cook Islands, the Marquesas and the Paumotu, with the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands to the north and New Zealand to the south. The Fiji Islands form part of Melanesia; but their people are largely Polynesian in character; and there are, scattered among the islands of Melanesia and Micronesia, small outlying settlements of people either wholly or partly Polynesian.

The Polynesians have long been subject to the influence of white men. Mission stations were established long ago in most of their groups, and the people have been in constant contact with travellers, traders, government officials, and others. The old religious beliefs have been swept away, and superseded by Christianity; early social and political systems and customs have been displaced; past cultures have been forgotten. It is therefore necessary, in writing about these things, to adopt the past tense, even though some of the matters spoken of still survive. It must not be assumed that every statement which follows applies to all the islands, the intention of this article being merely to indicate, as far as possible in the space available, some of the more widely spread or characteristic features of Polynesian customs and beliefs.

2. Origin and migrations.—It is believed that, prior to the migrations about to be mentioned, the islands of Polynesia, or many of them, must have been occupied by a people more primitive in culture than these later migrants. This belief is based upon a recognition of physical differences among the people; upon an investigation of the systems of relationship, nomenclature in connexion with those systems, and certain relationship duties and privileges found in Polynesia; upon a study of certain Polynesian beliefs, cultures, and customs, including the custom of *kava*-drinking; and upon a comparison of all these matters with what has been found in Melanesia. Much fresh light has been thrown upon this difficult subject by W. H. R. Rivers in his recent great work, *The History of Melanesian Society*. The later migrants moved into the Pacific from the islands of Indonesia; they had probably passed to those islands from an earlier home on the mainland of further India; and there are grounds for suggesting a still earlier home to the north-west. Their movements from India to Indonesia, and afterwards, by routes skirting some of the islands of Melanesia, to the Pacific, are believed to have been caused by pressure from behind; and it is thought that in the course of their migrations through Indonesia they themselves came in contact with, and to a certain extent pushed before them, Papuans or Melanesians then

occupying the islands. Their legends indicate that their first halting-places in the Pacific were probably the Fiji Islands, from which they reached the Samoan and Tongan groups, and from all these they spread westward among the other groups which now constitute the islands of Polynesia. Certain definite migrations are recorded in these legends; but there must have been unrecorded movements, and, indeed, it is possible that during the whole period there was a more or less undefined and intermittent process of passing from India southward and eastward. The period of what is regarded as the first recorded migration from India to Indonesia has been placed in the last century prior to the Christian era; but it has been suggested that the movement began some few hundred years earlier. Their first recorded appearance in Fiji has been allocated to the 5th cent. A.D., but probably there were Polynesian colonies in Fiji before then. It will be seen, therefore, that, if these figures are anything like correct, the whole period of migration may have been extremely prolonged; and, whatever may have occurred before the departures from India, there must have been, during this period, numberless times of separation and isolation of bodies of migrants, and the people must have come into contact with other races. Then, again, after the Polynesians were scattered about in the Pacific, further separation and opportunities for differentiation arose. It is therefore hardly to be wondered at that, when many centuries afterwards they came under the notice of white observers, it was found that, notwithstanding the general similarity among the people, there were marked differences in their cultures and beliefs. The period, extending over centuries, of occupation of the western islands—Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga—has been spoken of as the Homeric age of the Polynesians, when flourished so many of their heroes, whose deeds are embodied in the traditions and songs that form the classics of the race.

3. **Political systems.**—The political division of the people was largely geographical, each village, subdistrict, district, and large division of an island, and each island or group of islands, being to a large extent a separate entity, managing its own affairs. The political power, and such rude systems of justice as the people possessed, were in some of the islands mainly in the hands of the chiefs, small chiefs controlling villages and small districts and great chiefs ruling over the larger areas, whilst in most of the islands or groups there were powerful head chiefs, sometimes with special distinctive titles, who are generally spoken of by writers as 'kings.' In some of the islands there were classes of landed proprietors inferior in rank to the families of the chiefs, from whom they were distinct, but who nevertheless possessed considerable influence and power. This was the case in Tahiti, where no important proposal could be carried out without the concurrence of the landed proprietors, and perhaps still more so in the islands of the Samoan group, where each village, subdistrict, district, division, and island had its *fono*, or meeting of land-owners, by whom the affairs of the area under their jurisdiction were discussed and regulated, and whose powers rivalled, and in some places seem to have over-ridden, those of the chiefs.

4. **Past clan systems.**—There was little or no clearly defined system of division into clans, with their accompanying practices of clan exogamy and clan totemism; but there is abundant evidence that such a system must have prevailed in earlier days and that some of its features still survived. This evidence is diverse in character. An enormous number of their gods were incarnate or immanent in animals and plants or in parts of them, in inanimate objects, such as stones, and in phenomena of nature; and the attitude of the people towards these things, and the imagined attitude of the latter towards the people, seem to point irresistibly to a totemic origin—that is to say, these visible representations of their gods were deified totems, or, as has been suggested, had been the totems of deified heroes and ancestors of long ago. For instance, a Polynesian would be unwilling to kill, and still more unwilling to eat, the animal which was the incarnation of his own god or that of his people, and the accidental killing of one of these animals, or the finding of it dead, would cause great distress, and perhaps involve a religious ceremony; he would, however, have no scruples in regard to the god of his neighbour or a neighbouring people. He not only trusted the incarnation of his god to do him no injury, provided, of course, he had not been guilty of a grave offence, but he actually looked to it for guidance, help, and protection. There is, moreover, evidence which points to beliefs as to animal incarnations having been the ancestors of their worshippers, or the offspring of human ancestresses. Then, as regards the more social aspects of a clan system, the attitude of the people towards one another includes features highly significant of clanship; these features are various, but by way of example reference may be made to the idea prevalent in some of the islands, that, if A killed B, it was a social and even religious duty of all B's people to join in retaliating, and their vengeance was directed, not only against A, but also against all his people, a whole village sometimes being involved in the matter. There were also clear and unmistakable relics of clan exogamy; and in some of the groups—notably in Tonga—family rank descended by a matrilineal system, and there were traces of the same thing in other groups.

5. **Myths of creation.**—The dominant idea of some of what are believed to have been the oldest Polynesian myths of creation was the evolution of light from darkness, with which was sometimes associated the beginning of sound and of stability.

The Maori myth told of the embrace of the original parents, sky and earth. So close was this embrace that their children, who were between them, were being smothered, until one of these, Tane, succeeded in forcing their father, the sky, upwards and so letting in light and air. The same myth was known in Niue (Savage Island); and the belief that the sky had originally been forced and propped up from below prevailed widely in Polynesia. The beautiful Marquesan legend told of the victory of Atea (representing light, or perhaps even the sun) over darkness, and of sound over silence; and the marriage of Atea with the dawn. The Hawaiian myth narrated the achievements of Kane (the Hawaiian spelling of Tane) representing light, and two other beings, representing sound and stability, who broke up darkness and chaos, admitted light, and created the heavens and earth and, lastly, man. In Mangaia (Hervey group) the legend of creation begins with references to certain spirit-beings, not of human form; and then goes on to tell of a woman, called the 'very beginning,' or the 'beginning and the bottom,' who dwelt in the depths below the earth, and of the children whom she produced by tearing off portions of her own flesh, of whom the eldest, Vatea, representing the noon, and so in effect the light, was the divine ancestor of mankind.

Several of the Polynesian myths, in the form of a recital of a series of consecutive births or evolutions, suggest the development of firm rock or foundation from sand, slime, or dust. Tane and Kane were the same god; Atea and Vatea were also the same as Tane, or at least represented the same conception; and to Tane must, perhaps, be accorded the original primacy in the Polynesian pantheon; though he had not retained it in all the groups, and in some of them, in particular, had been wholly or partially forgotten and supplanted by another god, Tangaroa, who was there regarded as the creator of all things. Another idea which was widely scattered in Polynesia was that the islands or groups had been dragged up by one or

other of their ancient gods, by means of a fish-hook, from the bottom of the sea.

6. Ideas as to earth, heaven, hades, etc.—A belief prevailing in Polynesia was that the earth—a term generally confined to one island or group of islands and the surrounding sea—was a flat surface, overarched by the sky, and ending abruptly at the horizon, where sea and sky met. In some of the groups we find the idea that the heavens, above the visible sky, were formed in a series of concentric layers or strata, the higher being darker than the lower, and the highest being absolutely dark. These upper or more distant heavens, spoken of as the region of Po, or night, were believed to envelop all things, both the visible sky and the earth, so that it was Po in the remote heavens above, and Po in the regions below the earth. This idea has an important bearing upon Polynesian beliefs as to the homes of their gods and the destination of the souls of the dead. The old migration traditions and myths point to the west as the place from which they came. The home of their gods, some of them known in most or all of the groups (possibly gods or living heroes of Indonesian or pre-Indonesian days), was a beautiful paradise away to the west, and in the region of darkness, which was believed in some islands to be in the sky above, and in others to be in the depths below. The apparent confusion between the distant west, beyond the horizon, and the sky above was natural, for anything coming from the former was visibly approaching from the sky; and the further confusion between the sky above and the region below arose from their conception of Po. Similarly, the most general belief as to the destiny of the souls of the dead was either that they went to live with the gods in their western paradise or that they passed into Po.

7. The soul during life.—The belief that man possessed a spiritual personality quite distinct from his physical body—a ghostly self, which we may call a soul—and that this soul survived the body at death is found throughout Polynesia; the statement as to survival must be qualified, however, by saying that in some islands it was believed that the souls of the low-class people died with their bodies. There was a distinction in their minds between this soul, on the one hand, and the mental and moral faculties and emotions, on the other. The belief that, when dreaming, the soul of the sleeper left his body and actually saw what appeared to him in his vision was apparently widely spread; and dreams were a recognized method of inspiration by the souls of the departed and the gods. In some of the islands the possession of a soul, or at all events of a mysterious invisible self, was attributed not to man alone, but also to animals, and even to trees, plants, and inanimate objects; and we find beliefs that with these also this invisible self survived the death of its owner.

8. Good and bad conduct.—It may be said generally that a man's conduct, as between himself and his fellow-men, had no influence upon his life on earth or upon the future of his soul. The only offences noticed by the gods were acts of disrespect to themselves—omissions of acts of devotion, shortcomings in performance of the usual religious observances, breaches of the tabu, and, perhaps especially, neglect in offering in sufficient quantities the required sacrifices, the last offence being one to which the priests, for obvious reasons, attached special importance. For offences of this sort the gods inflicted the punishment of illness; and, if the offence was serious and the gods were not appeased, the illness would be followed by death.

9. The soul after death.—The conduct of a man during life, even as between him and the gods, had no influence upon the destination of his soul after death. In some of the islands all souls went to the same place; in others there was an alternative between what may be called heaven and some region under the earth—generally Po. But in nearly all the groups it was solely a question of rank, only the chiefs and upper classes going to heaven, and the common people, if their souls survived at all, going below; though in one group the alternative depended upon an entirely different matter.

In Samoa and Tonga the souls of chiefs went to their heaven, Bulotu, which was one of the homes of their gods—indeed, the souls of Tongan chiefs became gods; the souls of common people of Samoa went to a sort of hades, called Sa-le-fee, which was not exactly Po, but was for all practical purposes the same; the souls of common people of Tonga died (according to the more prevalent beliefs) with their bodies. Bulotu was away to the west; the Samoans believed it to be a region under the sea, and the Tongans thought that it was an island. It was a beautiful place, abundantly supplied with plants, bearing the richest fruits and most beautiful flowers, and with quantities of pigs; and, when the flowers were plucked and the pigs killed, others immediately took their place. Sa-le-fee was under the earth; it was the home of the family of the cuttlefish god, and, though not apparently a place of actual torture, was an unpleasant place to live in.

The Society Islands heaven was Rohutu-noa-noa, a home of the gods. It was primarily the destination of the souls of members of the great Society Islands semi-sacred Areoi society; but, as any one could go there whose surviving relatives could afford a somewhat expensive ceremony after his death, it was also in effect the destination of chiefs and important persons. All other souls went to Po. Rohutu-noa-noa, which was really Bulotu with another name, was by these people believed to be near (apparently above, in the sky) a mountain on the north-west side of the most westerly island of the group; the description of it is similar to that of Bulotu. All souls which did not attain to life in Rohutu-noa-noa had to go to Po, the journey to which appears to have been a westward one; it was a home of the gods, and was not regarded as a revolting or terrible place.

In Mangaia (Hervey Islands) the alternative destinations of the souls were paradise in the heavens above and a subterranean Po—both of them homes of the gods. Here the soul's destiny did not depend upon rank; the souls of those slain in battle went to paradise, but all others went to Po. The heavens were above, built of azure stone; and the souls that reached them were clothed with beautiful and sweet-scented flowers, laughed, danced, and enjoyed themselves in every way, looking down with disgust at the poor wretches in Po, who had to endure the indignity of being covered with the dung which fell from their more fortunate friends above. There were three points of departure for Po; but they all faced westward. The beliefs of the people of Rarotonga (Hervey Islands) were fundamentally similar to those of Mangaia.

In the Marquesas the souls of the upper classes went to heaven, this being, they thought, an island up in the sky, apparently beyond the seas, abounding in everything delightful; those of the lower classes went to Po, beneath the earth. Each of these was a home of the gods.

The Maoris of New Zealand recognized the idea of Po in its original form, as extending in concentric layers both above the visible sky and beneath the earth. Po above was the home of the gods;

and Po below was the destination of all human souls, which after death descended to the impenetrable darkness of its lowest depths, where they gradually pined away and ultimately became annihilated.

In Hawaii there was a common belief that the souls of the dead went to Po and were there eaten or annihilated by the gods; but there were variations of this belief.

It will be noticed that generally the alternative destinations were paradise and what we may call Hades; that each of these was a home of the gods; and that, whilst the former was delightful, the latter, though not necessarily a place of torment, was not a desirable residence—among other things it was always dark and gloomy. It will also be observed that heaven was usually supposed to be situated somewhere in the west; and so generally was Hades; for the most usual route to either one or the other was westerly, commencing with a rock facing the sea at the westerly end of the island group, from which the soul leapt into the sea. In New Zealand the leaping place was at the northerly extremity of the islands; but the migrations to this group of the Maoris were from central Polynesia, and a glance at a map will explain what might otherwise be regarded as an inconsistency. It may be that the custom which, as will be seen, prevailed in some of the islands of placing the remains of the dead in a canoe or a canoe-shaped receptacle is significant of a belief as to the journey of the soul when released from the body. It is thought that all these beliefs concerning the west must be associated with the early traditions of the people about the quarter from which their remote ancestors had migrated; for this would be the natural habitation of their oldest racial gods, and, to a certain extent, of their pantheon generally, and the natural destination of the souls of the dead.

In some of the islands it was believed that the soul during its journey might have a chance of turning back and re-entering its body. This was so in the Hervey Islands and in Samoa. In the latter group the belief was that, if the soul struck against a coco-nut-tree near the western land extremity at which it leapt into the sea, it could come back; and a man apparently dying, but afterwards recovering, was believed to have died and come to life again through this fortunate accident to his soul.

A belief which prevailed in many of the islands was that the souls, on reaching their ultimate destination, were eaten by the gods, or one of them. Except perhaps in one or two groups, this fate awaited only the souls that went to Po, and not those bound for paradise. It is sometimes spoken of by writers as a punishment for the people's sins against the gods. So far as the Society Islands were concerned, this statement receives some support; for we are told that in that group those who had sinned were eaten and the innocent were spared; in other groups it was the fate of all, good or bad. There is ground for suggesting that this soul-eating was not merely a matter of divine gastronomical enjoyment, but that there was connected with it an underlying idea of the passing of the souls through the gods, for the purpose of purifying them and making them fit to live among the gods.

The souls would sometimes linger about their old haunts before starting on their final journey, and in some of the groups they would actually return from their abode in paradise or Po and revisit their friends. They seem to have appeared usually in human form, but to have been immaterial and mist-like. Their visits were much dreaded by the people, though it does not appear that they were usually believed to act malevolently during their wanderings.

10. The gods.—The Polynesian gods were extremely numerous, and differed widely in celebrity and power. They were greedy of respect and religious attentions and merciless with those who failed in these matters; but it cannot be said that they were regarded merely as a body of malignant beings, only to be propitiated. The people appealed to them for active guidance and assistance in all the affairs of life, both great and small, and relied confidently upon receiving it; and a large proportion of the omens which governed the people's decisions, even in most important matters such as peace or war, were the actions and movements, most carefully watched, of the divine incarnations. First in rank came what may be called the racial gods—great deities, one or more of whose names were known in nearly all the groups; these included Tane, Tangaroa, Rongo, Tiki (or Tii), Tu, Ru, the demigod Maui, and others; they were the oldest gods, possibly the divinities or heroes of the Polynesian ancestors in the Indonesian days or earlier. At the periods of visits of white men to the islands there was much confusion as to these gods. In one group only one or two were known, whilst in another group it would be another or others of them; in one group one held the supremacy, whilst in another group another was supreme; the beliefs as to the relationships of these gods, one to another, and even their origins, attributes, and spheres of influence, differed in the several groups. As a rule, they were not the objects of prayer and sacrifice, except on specially important occasions, the reason being that they were believed to be too remote to concern themselves with unimportant human affairs. Each island group, and many a single island, had gods wholly or mainly peculiar to itself; there were tutelar gods of specific sections of the people, of districts, and of villages, and family gods; and individual Polynesians had special gods, selected by themselves, or by their parents for them at birth, under whose protection and guidance they placed themselves. There were gods of the air, of the mountains, of valleys, of streams, of the sea, of animals, of plants, of fishes, of the forces and phenomena of nature. There were gods of various trades or occupations, from the most important productive labours to mere matters of personal entertainment. Of all these deities, some (including the great gods above mentioned) were spoken of as 'original gods,' or 'gods of night,' being regarded as having evolved themselves in the far distant past, never having been human; others were supposed to have been descended from, or created by, these original gods; others again were admittedly deified human beings. It may be said generally that these gods were believed to be influenced by sentiments, inclinations, and passions, and, as regards many of them, to engage in occupations and enjoyments very similar to those of the human race, though they were more enlightened and possessed supernatural powers. Very many of them were believed to be incarnate or immanent in, or to enter or take the forms of, birds, beasts, fishes, insects, plants, stones, and other inanimate objects and natural phenomena, all of which necessarily became sacred, each one to its own worshippers. There were, besides these deities, a number of spirits, some purely supernatural, others human in origin, some vindictive to humanity in general, others only to the enemies of their own clients, but all greatly feared by the people. It was usually through their help that sorcery was practised.

11. Hero- and ancestor-worship.—As many of the gods were admittedly departed human beings, and in some islands chiefs became gods immediately

after death, it may be said that the religion of the Polynesians included the worship of the dead. Whether it can be said that they were hero-worshippers or ancestor-worshippers depends mainly upon the definitions to be put upon these terms. As regards hero-worship, if, as is probable, a number of the Polynesian deities had been human beings—great chiefs, successful warriors, distinguished navigators, etc.—then to this extent their religion perhaps may be regarded as having had its origin, in part at all events, in hero-worship. As regards ancestor-worship, a Tongan chief would go to the grave of his deceased father or grandfather, and pray to him; but this does not necessarily mean ancestor-worship; the ancestor was regarded by the chief as a god, to whom he might pray, not merely because of ancestry, but because, having been a chief, the ancestor after death had become a god; and other people not descended from the deified chief also might pray to him. Some of the myths of creation ended in the birth of a god who was the ancestor of the human race, *i.e.* of the particular people who believed in the myth and worshipped the god; and this idea perhaps may be regarded as pointing to a past cult of ancestors. There is, however, no evidence to justify the suggestion of a general custom for members of families to worship their ancestors, either actual or collateral.

12. Sun-worship.—The evidence of sun-worship in the past is of a varied and scattered character; but its cumulative weight seems to be irresistible. Only a few indications of the nature of some of this evidence can be given here. Some of the gods are in certain groups associated with the sun—so much so that writers speak of them as sun-gods. There is a Tahitian legend, almost classic in form, concerning a god Hiro, which, though he was not there regarded as a sun-god, is very suggestive.

Hiro was voyaging with his companions in search of the *maro ura*, the special red girdle which was perhaps the most sacred object in Tahiti and is believed to have been specially connected with sun-worship. On one occasion, when he was sleeping in a grotto, evidently under the sea, his enemies, the gods of darkness, taking advantage of his absence, raised a violent storm, in the hope of destroying his boat and companions; Hiro, however, awaking just at daybreak, reappeared on the surface of the water, and with a look dispersed his enemies with the darkness.

Other evidence is connected with the great Areoi societies of the Society Islands and the Marquesas, and with certain seasonal festivals in which they engaged. These societies, which have been compared, and indeed associated, with the secret societies of Melanesia, appear, both from the legends as to their origin and from the performances in which they engaged, to have been connected with the worship of the sun. Among their performances in the Marquesas and perhaps in some of the islands in the Society group were certain seasonal festivals of a significant character. The summer, ending in April or May, was a season of rejoicing; but on its termination feasts were held to celebrate the departure of the gods to the abode of darkness; and, after these, prayers were offered to the gods to return. Then the *areoi* went into mourning, suspending all amusements, and retired to their homes to lament the absence of the gods; this continued until the spring, when, about October, they had another feast to celebrate the return of the gods (and especially, it would seem, the sun-god) and their period of rejoicing recommenced. These festivals, as might be expected, if the suggestion as to their significance is correct, were closely connected with the ideas of fertility and reproduction, and abundant crops and harvest. It may be noticed that this marked differentiation between summer and winter must in itself be regarded as an indication that these people came from some latitude very different from that of the central Pacific islands. A custom of orientation of the bodies of the dead prevailed in some of the islands, but, in view of the beliefs of the people as to their place of origin, the homes of the gods, and the destination of the soul, this custom must not necessarily be regarded as evidence of sun-worship.

13. The priesthood.—There is ground for believing that at one time religious and civil authority were united in Polynesia. In Tonga there were two head chiefs or kings, of whom one, the *tuitonga*, held a purely sacred office, having little or no secular power, while the other, the *tuikanokubolu* or *hau*, was the actual civil and military ruler of the people; and the same division of the supreme power is found in Mangaia and Rotuma. The Tongan traditions go back to a time when religious and civil supremacy were united in the *tuitonga*, and tell of his parting with the latter; but probably the change was gradual. In some of the islands the head chief or king was the high-priest of the island; in all of them the chiefs, or at all events the higher chiefs, were regarded as divine or nearly so; and in some of them the chiefs were in many ways closely associated with the priesthood. In some of the groups there were recognized separate ranks or grades of priests, but this was not general. Considerable differences are found in the social status of the priests and their co-operation as an organized and distinct class. In some islands they formed a powerful united caste; in others they were merely members of the lay classes (and not necessarily of the highest of these), engaged in the ordinary vocations of life, and, except when actually inspired, having no special social status or power. Each of them, as a general rule, was associated with a specific god. As diviners and interpreters of the will of the gods, able in cases of illness to ascertain the cause of the divine displeasure and to specify the offerings required for its removal—offerings in which they usually had a substantial interest—they had considerable power; and the practice of sorcery gave them a special method of terrorizing the people. In some groups the sorcerers were regarded as a separate caste, distinct from and inferior to the priests, and there were certain ranks of priests who do not appear to have practised sorcery; but in some groups even high-class priests did this; and it cannot be said that there was any general defined distinction between priests and sorcerers. The father, or other head of the family, was in some of the groups the person to approach the tutelar family god.

14. Temples and places for disposal of the dead.—The Polynesians had temples and places for the disposal of the bodies of the dead. In many of the islands the temples were the mortuaries; in some the two were distinct. Where, as in Tonga, a chief became a god after death, the place where he was buried became in a sense a temple; for it was there that supplications would be addressed to him; but in Tonga they also had temples for their other gods. The temples included great national temples, temples of districts, of villages, and of families, the places of sepulture generally belonging to families. The great national temples, the domestic temples of the great chiefs, and in some of the islands the family burying-places of the chiefs were often massive structures; one form of these was a huge raised quadrangular arena, enclosed and supported on one or more of its sides by boundaries made of immense blocks of stone, the interior being flat, or rising upwards from the sides to the centre, and often wholly or partly paved. In some cases the stone boundary rose in steps; in some a portion of the enclosed arena was occupied by a massive stone structure, in the form

of a truncated pyramid, with sides rising in steps. The prevalence of this form of step-like boundary and pyramid may be a matter of some significance. In some islands the temples were merely houses, in form like domestic dwellings, and usually enclosed by an encircling fence. Similarly, in some of the islands, where it was the custom to keep the bodies of the dead above ground, house-like structures were erected for their retention.

In or about the larger temples there were usually some other erections connected with the religious rites conducted in them. These erections were different in the several groups; but they commonly included images, great and small, altars, upon which the sacrifices were laid, and houses for keeping some of the smaller images and other sacred objects, and for the occupation of priests and custodians of the temples. The images erected outside varied in character. Some were of stone and others of wood; some were rudely carved with more or less grotesque representations of the human form, others were not carved at all. And so with the smaller images kept inside the houses; some were merely shapeless logs of wood, or only poles or sticks, covered perhaps with sinnet and ornamented with red feathers—that sacred form of decoration throughout Polynesia; others were mere bundles of cloth, decorated with red feathers.

As regards all these objects, it must be stated that the old missionary idea that the people actually worshipped them was mistaken. They were images or symbols of the gods, to whom alone the worship was offered, and as such they were of course sacred; but this sanctity was not inherent in themselves, but due merely to their association with the gods. Sometimes, as in Tahiti, the god was supposed to enter temporarily one of these images, and through its medium to speak to the priest. On such an occasion the image would necessarily become specially sacred, just as the commonest Tongan layman would be sacred during a period of inspiration by the gods; but this does not mean that the image was worshipped as an 'idol.'

15. Religious observances.—Fear of the gods and spirits, the wish to turn away their wrath, and the desire to secure their guidance and help were for ever present in the minds of the Polynesians. Hence we have records of their methods of invocation and praise, possession, inspiration and divination, intercession, self-humiliation, offerings and sacrifices, and of their belief in omens, use of charms, and practices of sorcery. Religious ceremonies of one sort or another were associated, not only with the leading events of the lives of the people, from birth to death, but also with their daily life, their industries and occupations, and even amusements. Many of the prayers repeated by the priests were expressed in metaphorical and obscure language, the meaning of which was sometimes hardly understood by the speakers themselves; some of them included references to the traditions of the people, the genealogies of their chiefs, the feats of their heroes and histories of wars, and any other events of which the priests professed to have knowledge.

The faculty of obtaining inspiration from the gods and of expressing their wishes and intentions does not seem to have been nearly so much a monopoly of the priests as was that of invocation and intercession. In some of the islands any one might become temporarily inspired. Possession by the gods was generally indicated by great bodily agitation, in which the limbs became convulsed and the features distorted, the inspired person sometimes rolling on the ground in his frenzy, foaming at the mouth, and giving vent to violent cries. Thus they ascertained and announced the will of the gods in matters great and small, public and private. In cases of illness the priests and sorcerers were the doctors, for they claimed to be able to find out the cause of illness—always either an offence by the patient or by some person connected with him, against the gods, or else sorcery—and plead with the gods for mercy, or try to counteract the machinations of the hostile sorcerer. There were actual remedies for known illnesses; but the curative powers of these remedies seem to have been attributed by the people to supernatural agency, the medicines being the vehicles or media by which the gods acted. The doings of these priests and sorcerers, and the articles, including medicines, used by them differed in the several islands, and indeed, as regards different individuals; but the predominant matters seem to have been the fees to be paid to themselves and the offerings to be made to the gods, this generally meaning, in part at least, to the priest. Sometimes one of these men would, without actually applying sorcery to make a man ill, frighten him into the belief that he was so and thus reap a harvest from him and his friends. Another customary feature was the acts of humiliation of the patient or his friends, intended to soften the hearts of the gods.

16. Omens.—Omens were believed in largely in Polynesia, some of them relating to the ordinary affairs of life, but the majority being connected with war. The people noted the position of the moon, the appearance of the stars, the forms and movements of the clouds, the advent of shooting stars and comets, the position of rainbows, the direction from which thunder was heard, the character and locality of lightning discharges, the sunset sky and other matters, and especially the movements and behaviour of birds and other living creatures in which their gods were supposed to be incarnate. The matters which these signs portended included, besides success or failure in war, the approach of death to a member of a household, the recovery or otherwise from an illness, the death of some chief, whose identity the omen did not disclose, or an invasion from a neighbouring island, etc. All these omens were believed to be signs sent by the gods; when the guidance was given by an animal incarnation, it was the god himself who was pointing out what should be done. The appearance before a Polynesian of the creature in which the god whom he worshipped was incarnate—perhaps a bird, a fish, or a crab—was sometimes regarded as a prognostication of his death; the god had come to receive his spirit.

17. Tabu.—The principle of the tabu, which was in effect a prohibition based upon the idea of sanctity, permeated deeply the minds of the Polynesians; it has been defined as a prohibition resting on a magico-religious sanction. There were certain forms of tabu which, though doubtless having a similar basis, were, in their application, of a social rather than an obviously religious character; and these cannot be dealt with here. Most of the other tabus fell under one or other of the following categories: they might be directed against (*a*) touching of a sacred person or object; (*b*) entering a sacred place or one in which a sacred ceremony was being performed; (*c*) doing certain things on certain solemn occasions; and (*d*) interfering with things upon which a specific tabu had been placed. The penalty usually expected for breach of any of these tabus was punishment by the gods, inflicted in the form of illness or even death. A few illustrations of these tabus will indicate their general character.

(*a*) The belief as to the sanctity of kings and great chiefs was almost universal in Polynesia, and none might come in contact with them, direct or indirect. In some of the islands no one

might touch one of these divine people or anything with which he had been in contact, or sit near him; in some places his food had to be thrown to him. In Tahiti the king was so sacred that any dwelling-house which he had entered, or furniture which he had used, or articles from or with which he had eaten or drunk could not be touched by any one else, and had to be burnt; even the ground upon which he trod became sacred, and so he had to be carried about on the shoulders of a bearer, who therefore himself became sacred. Any person who broke this tabu and came into contact, direct or indirect, became tabu himself. It was the same with those who had, in performance of the funeral offices, handled the bodies of the dead; they became tabu. The most widely recognized result of such a situation was that the person thus infected with sanctity must not handle his own food, as, if he did so, the sanctity would be transmitted to the food, and he would become ill and die. The removal of the tabu was effected in different ways in different islands. In Tonga, *e.g.*, a humble act of piety had to be performed before another great chief, whilst in Samoa the remedy was sprinkling with coco-nut-water. The tabu of the dead man was sometimes terminated on the completion of one of the regular funeral ceremonies.

(*b*) Entry into temples, or portions of them, and other sacred places, and even into private houses, when religious ceremonies were being carried on there, was in many islands forbidden to all except the priests, and perhaps the chiefs; and a violation of any tabu of this character would be regarded as a sacrilege, from which the direst consequences would ensue. The most widely spread form of tabu sign, intended to warn off trespassers, was a flag or piece of white cloth.

(*c*) There were certain acts of every-day life which were forbidden during the performance of certain solemn ceremonies and for a period after the death of a great chief. These differed somewhat in the several groups; but they included such things as eating food, or eating it in the day-time, lighting fires, engaging in certain occupations, launching a canoe, or passing in a canoe the place of ceremony or the place where the dead man lay.

(*d*) The placing of tabu upon specific things was a somewhat different matter. A king or chief, or perhaps a priest acting on his instructions, would place a general tabu upon a grove of coco-nut-trees or a patch of some other produce or upon the whole of some form of diet; and no man would dare to break it, even in secret. This restraint was not merely based on fear of discovery and earthly punishment; the tabu food was under the protection of the gods; a violation of the tabu would be an offence against them, and they would punish the offender. This point is illustrated by the fact that any man could place a tabu upon his own property; if it were, say, a coco-nut-tree, he would tie round it perhaps a frond of coco-nut or a wisp of grass or leaves; and any would-be pilferer knew well what this meant, and dared not risk the curse which would follow a violation of the tabu.

18. Sorcery.—Sorcery was practised by lower classes of priests, commonly spoken of by writers as sorcerers, and also, in some islands, by the higher priests. The supernatural beings through whose help it was accomplished were usually evil spirits, inferior in rank to the gods; but the gods themselves were not always superior to such work, at all events in some of the islands. One method of sorcery was what may be called contagious magic. A man, wishing to avenge himself on an enemy, procured some of his hair, saliva, urine, or excrement, or some remnants of his food, or a piece of his loin-cloth, or something else which had been in contact with his body, and handed this, with the requisite fee, to the sorcerer. The latter might take these things to his house or to the temple with which he was connected, and engage in incantations over them; or he might place them in a little bag, in which he carried images or other symbols of the supernatural beings whose aid he would invoke; and the bag might also contain such things as lizard-skin, parts of special plants, peculiarly formed stones, etc.; and he would probably bury the bag and its contents. Another method of contagious magic consisted in rubbing with a human skull food that a man was going to eat. Another form of sorcery was that of cursing No doubt the prayers of the sorcerer engaged in contagious magic would be of the nature of curses; but in some of the islands it was believed that disaster could be brought upon the head of an enemy by merely cursing him. Presumably the imprecation was supposed to move the god or spirit, just as did the proceedings in connexion with contagious magic. In Tonga they had some special curses, amounting to commands that the person cursed should maltreat a superior relation, such as 'Bake your grandfather till his skin turns into cracknel, and gnaw his skull for your share,' or 'Dig up your father by moonlight, and make soup of his bones,' and others of a highly indelicate character. These Tongan curses are referred to specifically because of what they would appear to involve. It was a tenet of Tongan religion that human merit, for failure in which a man might be punished by the gods, included among other things the paying of respect to aged persons and filial love; and it was considered a crime to eat food that a superior relative had touched; so, in pronouncing either of these curses, a man was commanding the committal of a double offence, for which the gods would punish the offender; for, if it was wrong to eat an aged relative's food, it must have been very wrong to eat the aged relative himself. How these curses operated is not stated; but it must not be assumed that it was believed that the victim would actually be impelled to commit the crime; for many of the Polynesian ceremonies were purely symbolic, and symbolism may well have been behind these curses, in the sense that the suggestion of the act took the place of its actual committal. Sometimes the victim was not aware of what was being attempted against him; but sometimes he was told of it, and then he would often pine away and die from sheer fright.

The underlying idea of Polynesian sorcery seems to have been that the supernatural being to whom the sorcerer appealed actually entered into the victim, sometimes perhaps through his food, and sometimes by direct entry into his body. The sensations of a person so possessed were far from pleasant; we are told, *e.g.*, of the evil spirit twisting and knotting the man's internal organs; and again of his causing the feeling of being transfixed internally by a barbed hook. These descriptions suggest certain internal complaints, which may well have been ignorantly attributed to sorcery.

There is a description by a missionary of a young Tahitian who had been subjected to sorcery. He was lying on the ground, writhing in anguish, foaming at the mouth, his eyes ready to start from his head, and his countenance exhibiting every form of terrific distortion and pain, while his limbs were agitated with violent and involuntary convulsions.

In some of the groups, however, the spell seems to have worked differently; in the Marquesas, for instance, it is said to have operated only slowly, the victim first becoming sick and then growing daily weaker, until, after about three weeks, he seemed to die from loss of strength.

In some of the islands there were alternative methods of saving a man who was under the spell of sorcery. One was to find out who was the sorcerer that had inflicted it, and by means of presents to him, exceeding in value those given to him by his original client, to induce him to call off the malignant and devouring spirit. The other was to call in the services of another sorcerer, associated with another supernatural spirit, more powerful than that which had produced the trouble, or perhaps, if only equal in power, stimulated to greater energy by more costly gifts. When a victim died, the instigator, or suspected instigator, of the calamity would often become himself the victim of persecution by the dead man's family.

19. Funeral ceremonies.—Something has already been said about the attitude and conduct of the priests, acting as doctors, diviners, and suppliants to the gods in time of illness. This matter of illness and subsequent death is also interesting as regards the attitude of the people, the relatives and friends of the sick man, especially when the invalid was a great chief or king, and thus the subject of anxiety and concern of a deep and

wide-spread character. Large numbers of people —relatives, friends, and chiefs and other important personages—came to the village of the dying man, bringing with them enormous quantities of cloth and of pigs and other food, to be offered to the offended gods. There was a general wailing, and much self-wounding and blood-letting; in the Tongan Islands women or children were in the case of a great chief strangled and offered to the gods; in the Marquesas on the illness of a priest enemy victims were sacrificed; sometimes only symbolic sacrifices were made, the people going to the temple with ropes round their necks, but not being actually slain. There is a narrative concerning the dying of a Tongan secular king, who was carried by his friends to the cook-house of the sacred king, and there placed over the cooking-hole, as a symbolic offering to the gods of the patient himself; we are told also of the same thing being done with the sacred king. The discovery that all efforts had been unavailing and that the chief was indeed dead was usually the occasion for a general howl of despair.

The methods of dealing with the bodies of the great dead, and the ceremonies with which the funerals were conducted, differed so widely in the several groups that it is impossible even to attempt to explain them here; there were, however, certain interesting features in some of the ceremonies, to which attention may be drawn, and a short statement may be made as to the modes of dealing with the corpse.

Immediately and for some time after the death all the people engaged in loud lamentations, which were, in most of the groups, renewed at certain stages of the funeral ceremonies. The lamentations were accompanied by most amazing self-wounding and laceration. The people in many of the groups would beat themselves almost senseless with clubs and other weapons, and stones, cut themselves shockingly on the heads, temples, cheeks, and breasts with instruments armed with sharks' teeth, lacerate themselves with shells, knives, and spears, sometimes driving spears into their limbs and bodies, or even through the cheeks into their mouths, thus making hideous wounds, from which the blood flowed profusely; they would tear off their hair in handfuls, and burn their bodies with lighted sticks or pieces of cloth. Various motives have been suggested by observers for these wild and excessive manifestations of grief. One suggestion is that it was intended to please the ghost, another that it was to please the gods, and yet another that it was merely a testimony of respect for the dead man's memory and of fidelity to his family. Any, or all, of these explanations may be correct; but none of them seems entirely adequate. It may be that a more correct explanation is to be deduced from the custom, which prevailed in Tahiti and perhaps others of the Society Islands, of catching the flowing blood in cloths and throwing these under the bier which held the corpse; and that the underlying idea was, or originally had been, an offering of blood to the ghost of the dead man, to strengthen it on its journey to the other world.

Another interesting practice, found in some of the islands, was that of giving the dead man some of his earthly possessions—either burying them with him or placing them on or near the bier—to which were sometimes added further offerings by his friends. Suggestions have been made by writers that the reason for the burial of the dead man's property with his body was that they were tabu; and this perhaps may have been the case as regards garments, mats, cloths, etc., which had been in contact with his dead body; but it can hardly be an explanation of everything. The idea of providing the ghost with things for use in its new world is well known, and must surely be the explanation of many of the Polynesian practices. In Samoa valuable mats and other things were sometimes buried with the body; the grave of a warrior was surrounded with spears, fixed upright in the ground, while his club was sometimes placed on the ground and allowed to decay, no one daring to touch it; a few little trinkets and playthings might often be seen on the grave of a dead child. In Tonga most of the valuable property of the sacred chief, together with presents brought to the funeral, were buried with him. In Rarotonga they placed the dead chief's adze in his right hand, and his staff and drinking-cup by his side; and with a woman of rank they buried her cloth mallet and other domestic utensils. The practice of putting to death the dead man's wives and burying them with him prevailed, though apparently only to a limited extent, in the Tongan Islands. The custom of placing food on or near a grave or burial platform, and renewing it from time to time, was wide-spread.

Boxing and sham fights were usual features in most Polynesian festivities; but in some of the islands the ceremonies attending the burial of a chief included fights of a special character. In Mangaia (Hervey Islands) they had combats between parties, of which one was called 'the friends' and the other represented malignant spirits, and the former was always successful. In the Society Islands, when the body of a chief had been put on its resting-place—a bier, placed in the temple—it was surrounded by his family and people, all well armed. Shortly afterwards an armed party of friends from an adjoining district approached; they were called 'the mourners,' and they asked to be admitted to lament their chief. Permission was always refused; and thereupon arose a battle, which, though quite friendly and purely formal, often caused loss of life; and apparently the mourners were always the victors. In Samoa also they sometimes had combats which, though we have no description of them, there is reason for thinking had a special significance connecting them with those of Mangaia and the Society Islands. The special interest of these mock conflicts rests on the fact that a comparison of them with the ceremonial funeral combats usual in a district of Australia and in certain places in Melanesia seems to suggest that their underlying idea was an attack upon the hostile spirit that had caused the man's death.

Another curious ceremony practised in some of the islands may be called the 'burying of the dead man's sins.' In Tahiti a hole was dug in the ground, beneath the bier upon which the dead body lay; and the priest prayed to the god that the sins of the dead man, and especially that for which he had been called away, might be buried in the hole, so that the surviving relatives might be free from anxiety as to their future; the hole was then filled in, and the priest addressed the corpse, exhorting it (*i.e.* the ghost) to be content with its new conditions, and not to distress its surviving relatives by returning to them. Somewhat similar ceremonies were performed in some of the other islands.

20. Disposal of the corpse.—The methods of dealing with the corpse can be stated only in barest outline. Throughout Polynesia common people were usually buried underground with but little ceremony; but the modes of disposing of dead chiefs differed in the several groups.

In the Society Islands the body was taken to the seashore, and there is a statement that it was usually carried in a canoe as far as the opening of the reef, and back again. Within a short period

—generally three or four days after death—it was taken to the temple of the chief's family, and there placed upon a platform or bier, sheltered from sun and rain by a roof, in shape rather like an inverted canoe. There it was subjected to a process of preservation—a sort of simple embalming—and, when sufficiently dried up, it was wrapped in cloth, placed in a sitting posture on the bier, and allowed to remain exposed for an indefinite time. Ultimately it was buried underground beneath the platform. In time of war the bodies or their remains were often carried away to almost inaccessible spots in the mountains, in order to secure them from the sacrilege of the enemy.

In Tonga the body of a dead chief was carried, generally within a few days after death, to the burial-place of his family. The interment was underground in a vault, made of six huge masses of stone, one forming the bottom, four making the sides and ends, and one closing it in at the top, the whole being sunk underground, and covered with earth. These vaults were generally about 8 ft. long, 6 ft. broad, and 8 ft. deep; but that of a very important family might be larger, one such vault being described as capable of holding thirty bodies.

In Samoa there appear to have been alternative methods of disposing of the body. The more usual one was burial underground, some ten, fifteen, or twenty days after death. Ultimately the body was placed in a canoe, or a canoe-shaped receptacle, and buried underground, with its head to the east and its feet to the west, in the family vault—a stone structure within the family temple, evidently somewhat similar to that of Tonga. Above the vault was erected a mound of stones, neatly built up in an oblong slanting form, about 4 ft. high at the head, and 3 ft. at the foot. Sometimes, however, the body was subjected to a rude process of preservation or embalming, and then either placed in a canoe and sent adrift out to sea or placed on a stage erected in the forest, and there left to decay, after which the bones were collected and buried. One or two of the leading families had a custom of embalming the bodies of their dead, placing them on platforms raised on double canoes, in houses built for the purpose, and leaving them there. Some Samoans used to exhume the dead bodies of their relatives, sever the head—that most sacred member in Polynesia—and reinter it in a family burying-place in the mountains, the intention being to save the head from enemies in case of war.

In Mangaia (Hervey Islands) the bodies of the dead were usually deposited in caves. Some of these were of the nature of chasms, into which the body had to be let down with vine ropes from above, and a description of one discloses that it was full of water, into which the body was dropped; others were apparently caves that could be entered from below. Some bodies were buried underground in the temples. They were fixed in a doubled-up position, with the chin and knees meeting, and the limbs secured with sinnet cord, and were then placed in the grave, face downward, with the head turning towards the east. A thin covering of earth was laid over the body, and heavy stones were piled on the top.

In the Marquesas the body was usually retained in the house in which the man had died, or in another house—sometimes for weeks or months; and there is a statement that it was flayed, the skin being preserved among the family treasures. Eventually it was put in a canoe-shaped coffin, which was placed upon a covered platform or bier (evidently very like that of the Society Islands) in the temple. Later, when the flesh had all decayed away, the bones were cleaned, and some of them were kept as relics, the rest being buried in the temple. Sometimes the body, it would seem, was kept in a private dwelling-house until the time came for cleaning and breaking up the skeleton. The death of a high-priest involved human sacrifice and a cannibal feast; but apparently all the victims were not eaten. If the high-priest had been killed in battle, and his body had not been recovered from the enemy, his soul, we are told, could not travel to its destination until they had captured and killed a sufficient number of enemy men to paddle it thither; and fighting would actually take place for the purpose of securing a full crew.

In New Zealand the mode of dealing with the remains of the dead differed in the several parts of the islands. In some places the body was buried in a sitting posture underground in the house of the dead man; one or more of his wives strangled themselves, and several slaves were killed, so that the ghost might not be without attendants. After an interval of about four weeks the body was taken up for the purpose of a further funeral ceremony, and then reinterred. After two years the bones were again dug up, scraped, painted red (the sacred colour of Polynesia), wrapped up in mats, and deposited in a canoe, which was elevated on a pole, or in a small house, or they were placed on a stage at the top of a sacred tree, or put into a hollow trunk, or conveyed to a cave or a fissure in the rocks, or burnt. Another custom was to put the body into a kind of frame, formed by two pieces of an old canoe, and standing about 6 ft. high, the body being placed in a sitting posture on a grating in the hollow place between the parts of the canoe. After a time the skeleton was removed and scraped. Near the seaside bodies were often buried in the sand drifts.

In Hawaii some of the bones of the kings and principal chiefs were preserved, and either deposited in the temple or distributed among the relatives; and the rest of the remains were either burnt or buried. The bodies of priests and chiefs of inferior rank were laid out straight and buried in that position; and a pile of stones, and often a surrounding circle of high poles, marked the position of the grave. Priests were buried in the temples at which they had officiated. For other people natural graves were preferred, such as caves in the sides of steep rocks, or large subterranean caverns. Their artificial graves were only shallow, and were often dug in their gardens, or sometimes in their houses or in sequestered spots near them, the bodies being generally placed in them in a sitting posture.

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POLYTHEISM.—Polytheism is the stage or phase of the religious development of mankind in which the belief in and worship of many gods prevails. It is distinguished from the previous stage (polydæmonism) by the nature, and from the subsequent stage (pantheism, monotheism) by the number, of the objects of worship.

1. The antecedents of polytheism.—It is not necessary to retrace the development from its beginnings in animism (*q.v.*) or possibly an even earlier animatism (R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 15). Only two general remarks need be made.

(*a*) In the first place, the primitive monotheism which has been asserted has not been proved, as the assertion rests on insufficient and inconclusive evidence; and to this view applies the same objection as to the view that polytheism belongs to the pre-animistic stage.

'I am not at present prepared to admit,' says Marett (p. xvii), 'the postulate of a world-wide degeneration from the belief in such beings ['high gods'], as accounting for pre-animistic phenomena in general. On the contrary, I assume for working purposes that Mr. Lang's "high gods" must have had a psychological pre-history of some kind which, if known, would connect them with vaguer and ever vaguer shapes—phantoms teeming in the penumbra of the primitive mind, and dancing about the darkling rim of the tribal fire-circle.'

From the psychological standpoint the movement of the mind from the indefinite to the definite, the incoherent to the coherent, multiplicity to unity, is incomparably more probable than the reverse process. It is incumbent on us to try to make the development of the religious consciousness intelligible; and this we do, not by assuming any belief as a 'bolt from the blue,' a gift from heaven dropped down on earth, but by connecting it with the probable movement in the human mind under the given conditions of life.

(*b*) In the second place, totemism (*q.v.*) cannot be assumed as primitive or as a necessary phase of the development of the religious consciousness.

'The totemistic theory of the origin of worship has been widely propagated through the brilliant and learned monograph of W. R. Smith (*Journ. Philol.* ix. 75 ff.), and its fascinating exposition by Jevons (*Introduction to the History of Religion*, 1896); but the main body of English anthropologists refuse to regard it as primitive, while in France the hypothesis has been subjected to close and learned criticism (Marillier, 'La place du Totemisme dans l'evolution religieuse,' in *Rev. de l'Hist. des Religions*, 1897–98). Totemism seems most intelligible when viewed as formed under the play of savage thought or misconception, and as intruding upon and overrunning earlier forms of worship which found a god in nature or the spirits of men' (*HDB* iv. 331b).

Totemism assumes that the stage of generalization in thought has been reached, as the totem is not an individual, but an animal or plant class, and also presupposes the stage of tribal unity in life, neither of which can be regarded as primitive. There is not the same evidence that all religions have passed through a totemistic stage as there is regarding an animistic; and the psychological probability is not so great. We can hardly say that it appears necessary for religious thought to have passed through this phase. We cannot therefore connect polytheism so exclusively with totemism as Jevons does (pp. 234–248). Where the phase of totemism did exist, it is not at all improbable that, as he argues, the objects of the tribal cults, when a political union took place, were either fused together (syncretism), if for one or other of the reasons he suggests the spirits were not definitely enough distinguished either in belief or in worship to remain apart, or placed side by side in a national pantheon (polytheism). Totemism, however, was not monotheistic (belief in the existence of one God alone), nor even had it reached the stage of monolatry (the worship of one God combined with the belief in the existence of others).

As Jevons concedes (p. 239), 'the sky-god, whose favour is essential to the herbage which supports the herdsman's cattle, as well as to the farmer's crops, may be worshipped concurrently with the totem plant or animal, and retain his independence, as the Dyaus, Zeus, Jupiter, of the Aryans, did.'

Accordingly, we may question whether his statement, 'polytheism is the price which must be paid for political development' (p. 241), is so absolutely or universally applicable. Even where totemism does prevail, is it so certain that it must advance to monotheism? Polytheism need not then be regarded as a relapse from totemism; it may be regarded generally as an advance on polydæmonism (the belief in an indefinite multitude of spirits, and the worship of some of them). It must, of course, be understood that the distinction is logical, for our thought, rather than chronological, in time. Polydæmonism and polytheism overlap and intermingle. Gods and spirits may be worshipped together; but we may call a religion polytheistic when the worship of the gods is more prominent.

2. The transition from polydæmonism to polytheism.—How shall we distinguish the spirit from the god as the object of worship?

(*a*) The conception of the spirit is less definite than the conception of the god; he has less individuality; he has generally no name. As the god is conceived more definitely, he is less confined to, and more detached from, the individual object than the spirit which inhabits and controls it, and yet is not separated from it. As the god gets more of 'a name,' he has less of 'a local habitation' than the spirit. As man realizes more fully his weakness in comparison with the forces of nature, which he conceives as living, he endows the objects of his worship with powers, which we may at least describe as 'superhuman,' if 'supernatural' suggests too advanced a mode of thought; the god has more power than the spirit.

(*b*) Again, as man gets more familiar with the world, he begins to observe resemblances and connexions; he begins to classify plants and animals; he begins to recognize the effect of the great objects of nature—sun, moon, earth, etc.—on his environment; he begins to think of the objects in nature (may we say?) departmentally rather than individually. Each tree, stone, or stream may have its own spirit; there is a god of vegetation, of a land, of seas and rivers.

'The material progress made by man,' says Jevons (p. 234), 'as he advanced from the material basis of subsistence on roots, fruits, and the chase, first to pastoral and then to agricultural life, required that he should make an ever-increasing use for his own ends of natural forces. These forces were to him living beings with superhuman powers, of whom he stood in dread, but whose co-operation he required. Without some confidence that it was possible, if he set about it in the right way, to secure their favour and assistance, his efforts would have been paralysed. That confidence was given him by religion; he was brought into friendly relations with powers from which, in his previously narrow circle of interests, he had had little to hope or to gain.'

This practical interest was the main, if not the sole, motive of the intellectual development sketched above. Speaking generally, the relation to the gods is more definite, intimate, and confident than that to the spirits. As man comes, as it were, to be at home in his world, getting to know it, and so to use it more for his own good, the powers that he depends on, and whose assistance he seeks, appear to him more friendly, and he cultivates their friendship more carefully.

(*c*) Man only gradually distinguishes himself from living creatures, and animals especially; and thus his conception of the spirits or gods is not at once anthropomorphic. He does not at once make his god in his own likeness. There is a stage, which we may call the zoomorphic, when he thinks of the spirits as living beings. There follow as

stage, even where totemism does not prevail, where, feeling his kinship with some animals at least, he thinks of the spirits or gods as altogether animal, or partly animal and partly human. We may call this the therianthropic stage. At last, when he lifts himself above all his fellow-creatures, he thinks of the gods as men (or women) of like passions and forms as himself (the anthropopathic or anthropomorphic stage). In Egyptian religion we have a conspicuous instance of this development (see art. GOD [Egyptian]).

At first the god is an animal: 'Khnum of Elephantine was a ram, Hathor a cow, Nekhbeb a vulture, Bast a cat, Horus a falcon, Anubis a jackal, Sebek a crocodile, Thoth an ibis, and so on' (G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, i. 147). Next the god is represented with an animal-head; lastly the god assumes a human form, but the animal which once represented him remains sacred to him.

3. The mythology of polytheism.—So much it seems possible to state of a general character about polytheism. The development of polytheism in each religion was determined by so many varied and varying factors that no simple uniformity but a bewildering variety appeared. Physical conditions, racial characteristics, political circumstances, historical occurrences—all affected the forms assumed by the belief and worship of the many gods. The personification of natural processes, the endowment of these gods with human qualities, passions, relations, and activities, the free play of the imagination with this varied material, the reflex influence of language on thought, metaphor begetting myth, the absence of any control of this development by scientific knowledge, moral sense, and religious reverence—all these factors combined explain the luxuriant, extravagant, and sometimes grotesque and even offensive mythology which connects itself with polytheism in the religions of mankind.

(*a*) *The moral defects of mythology.*—The description of natural processes as the personal actions of gods and goddesses, especially the comparison of these processes to sexual relations, results in the ascription to deity of what to a more developed moral sense appears immorality, although there was no such intention originally. Religion is more conservative in belief and worship than is morality, and much is told about the gods which a decent man would not do. Paul's condemnation of polytheism had been anticipated by Xenophanes in the ridicule which he casts upon anthropomorphism and anthropopathism.

'The Ethiopians imagine their gods flat-nosed and black; the Thracians, blue-eyed and red-haired; and if cattle and horses or lions had hands and could draw, horses would draw the gods as horses and cattle as cattle—each kind would make its gods in its own likeness' (Moore, i. 458).

To quote Xenophanes' own words:

'Homer and Hesiod ascribe to the gods everything that among men is a shame and a disgrace—theft, adultery, and deceit' (quoted by Moore, *loc. cit.*).

Only one other instance of such criticism of popular mythology need be given—Amphitryon's address to Zeus in the *Herakles* of Euripides:

'O Zeus, in vain I shared my wife with thee, in vain I called thee father of my son; thou hast not proved the friend thou dost pretend to be. Mortal that I am, I am much better than thou, a great god! For I did not betray Herakles's children, but thou understandest how stealthily to find thy way to men's beds, taking possession of others' couches without their consent, but how to save thine own friends thou dost not know. Thou art a stupid god, if not an honest one!' (quoted by Moore, p. 488).

It is no wonder that Plato desired that these stories should not be told to children because corrupting to their morals.

(*b*) *National differences in mythology.*—Not all nations were equally interested in their gods to develop a mythology about them. Of the Chinese deities Moore says:

'These powers have no plastic, dramatic individuality, like the gods of Greece; no mythology recites their exploits. They have definite functions, and by these alone they themselves are defined. In this, as in other respects, the religion of China strikingly resembles that of the Romans; for a practical people it is enough to know what the gods do, and what their worshippers have to do to secure their favour, without trying to imagine what they are like' (p. 22).

But China and Japan offer the same contrast as Rome and Greece; for Shintō has an abundant and even grotesque genealogy of its many gods. Like Greece in the wealth of its mythology, Japan differs from it in the representation of the gods. While Greece represented the gods in the likeness of man, in a Japanese temple the deity is represented by some holy object (*shintai*) in which the spiritual presence (*mitama*) dwells; thus a mirror is the symbol of the presence of the sun-goddess. While Greece in its matchless art endowed its gods with beauty of form, Indian idols are 'to our taste grotesquely hideous—a human body with an elephant's head; tricephalous monsters; heads with a third eye in the middle of the forehead; human trunks with supernumerary arms and legs, and the like' (Moore, p. 345). Of this difference Moore offers an interesting explanation:

'It should be remembered, however, that all this ugliness is symbolical; the supernatural powers of the deity are intended to be expressed by these unnatural forms. The Hindu gods are less beautiful than the purely anthropomorphic gods of Greek art, because of the effort to make them more manifestly divine' (p. 345 f.).

In China heaven (T'ien) is the supreme emperor (Shang-ti), and determines both the moral and the natural order; in Japan the sun-goddess takes the highest place, but she has no relation to any moral order, although Japan did possess a customary morality even before the advent of Confucianism.

(*c*) *The influence of political conditions on mythology.*—Political conditions very directly and potently affected religious ideas. Over each city-State in Egypt a god watched, cared, and ruled; when political combinations took place, the gods were brought into relation to one another. The chief god had a wife and a son. Amon of Thebes has as wife Mut (=Nekhebt of Eleithyiapolis) and as son Montu (of Hermonthis). These triads have a special peculiarity:

'The son is the successor of his father, and it is his destiny in turn to marry his mother and so to reproduce himself, that is his own successor; and so though constantly dying he is ever renewed. The mother, not being a sun-god, does not die. If we remember that the gods have to do with the sun these things need not shock us, nor need we wonder at the statement which is very frequently met with, that a god is self-begotten, or that he produces his own members' (A. Menzies, *Hist. of Religion*, p. 135).

Rā, the solar deity of Heliopolis, rose to be the supreme god of the Middle Kingdom; but, as the political importance of the provincial cities increased, their local cults could not be suppressed, and each deity was in turn identified with Rā, and appropriated his attributes.

'From the Heliopolitan priests came also a theogony which put the god of their city, Atum, at the beginning of all things, and derived from him, through two intermediate generations, the gods of the Osirian circle as it appeared in the Delta' (Moore, p. 169).

When Babylon became the capital of the new dynasty in Babylonia, its god Marduk supplanted Enlil of Nippur, claimed Ea of Eridu with his wisdom as his father, and made Nabu, the god of Borsippa, his son and prophet. In one hymn the other gods are treated as only variant names of Marduk in his varying functions.

(*d*) *The influence of religion on mythology.*—The changes in thought about the gods did not, however, always depend on political conditions; religious belief and worship must also be taken into account. Before Marduk assumed the supremacy, the gods at the head of the pantheon were Ea of Eridu, Enlil of Nippur, and Anu, held in high honour, if not the patron deity, in Uruk; and they owed their place to the influence on the religious development exercised by their temples and priest-

hoods. An attempt at systematic theology appears in the partition of the universe among these three gods; Anu rules in heaven, Enlil in earth and air, and Ea in the waters. The Vedic gods are divided into three classes also—gods of the sky, gods of the air, and gods of the earth. Another interesting feature of the Vedic polytheism is that there are indications of the supersession of one order of gods by another, the *asuras* by the *devas*. Varuṇa, Mitra, and Ṛta fall into the background, and their places are taken by Indra, the Maruts, etc. While in the Rigveda the *asuras* are gods, in the Atharvaveda they have become demons. In the Iranian sister-religion the reverse process took place. If Ahura Mazda is the same god as Varuṇa, he becomes supreme in Zoroastrianism, and is in conflict with the *daevas*, the gods of the popular religion.

India offers an interesting illustration of the reflex influence of the worship on the theology. Sacrifice is conveyed to the gods by means of fire. Fire itself (Agni) becomes deified, and yet he is being constantly reborn when two sticks are rubbed together to produce the spark. The drink of the gods is *soma*. They love it so much that the gift of it can influence them. Soma becomes a god with power over the other gods. *Brahman*, the absolute deity of religious speculation, is probably to be traced back to the hymn or prayer which accompanied sacrifice (see Max Müller, *Origin and Growth of Religion*, pp. 358, 359, note). The Hindu Trimurti is a priestly device to combine their cult with the popular worship of Viṣṇu and Śiva. These two gods, together with Brahmā (masc.), the personal god, are manifestations of *Brahman* (neut.), the absolute reality.

(*e*) *The reflex influence of language on mythology.*—One instance of this must suffice. As a rule, heaven is thought of as father and earth as mother; so in the Vedic mythology, in which Dyaus and Pṛthivi are the universal parents, and in the Maori. In Egypt by an accident of grammatical gender the earth (Geb) is masculine, and the heaven or sky (Nut) is feminine; and the relation in the myth has to be altered accordingly. The influences affecting the ideas about the gods and their functions and relations being so manifold, it is evident that we cannot treat polytheism as one phenomenon of which any description of a general character can be given.

See also MONOLATRY AND HENOTHEISM, MONOTHEISM.

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A. E. GARVIE.

PONTIFEX.—See PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Roman), ROMAN RELIGION.

POOR MEN OF LYONS.—See WALDENSES.

POPOL VUH.—The *Popol Vuh* is a mythic and heroic saga of the Quiché Indians of Guatemala, on whose mythology and ancient history it is our chief source of information. It is of great comparative value when studied in conjunction with the mythology of the pre-Columbian inhabitants of Mexico and Yucatan. The text, as extant, was written by a Christianized native of Guatemala some time in the 17th cent., and was copied in the Quiché language, in which it was originally written, by a monk of the Order of Predicadores, Francisco Ximenez, who added a Spanish translation and scholia.

A great deal of doubt has been cast upon the genuineness of the *Popol Vuh*, and it has been contended that it is merely the imaginative production of a Quiché native whose ideas were coloured by Christian influences; but these reflexions on this venerable compilation originated with persons who were for the most part unacquainted with the history and mythology of Central America, who possessed no insight into aboriginal habits of thought, and who, in short, were improperly equipped for the criticism of such a work.

C. Scherzer, an Austrian savant, became aware that such a work as the *Popol Vuh* had existed through the medium of a letter from the Abbé Brasseur de Bourbourg to the Duc de Valmy, in which the Abbé deplored the supposed loss of the collection. Bent on the recovery of a relic of such profound interest, Scherzer journeyed to Guatemala in 1854 or 1855, found that the *Popol Vuh* had been made use of early in the 19th cent. by a certain Don Felix Cabrera, and was successful in tracing the missing MS in the library of the university of San Carlos, in the city of Guatemala. It appears that Ximenez had deposited it in the library of his convent at Chichicastenango, whence it passed to the library of San Carlos in 1830. Scherzer copied the Spanish translation of the MS, as did Brasseur, and these were published at Vienna and Paris in 1856 and 1861 respectively. Most unfortunately the Spanish and French translations leave much to be desired as regards accuracy, and the misleading notes which accompany them must be read very critically. A Spanish translation, published as a number of the *Biblioteca Centro-Americano*, is scarcely more accurate, but is burdened by notes which show a total ignorance of his subject on the part of the editor, and which are substantially those of Brasseur.

The name *Popol Vuh* means, in its literal translation, according to some authorities, 'The Book of the Mat,' or, in more sophisticated phrase, 'The Record of the Community,' but it is likely that a correct rendering of the title is 'The Collection of Written Leaves,' *popol* signifying the prepared bark upon which aboriginal writing is often set down, and *vuh*, 'paper' or 'book,' from the verb *uoch*, 'to write.' Thus a still more simple translation would give 'The Book of Bark.' It is a work of the same family as the Chinese *History of the Five Books*, the Japanese *Nihongi*, the *Danish History* of Saxo, the *Heimskringla* of Snorre, and some of the Hindu sacred books—a compilation in which pure mythology gradually shades off into veritable history. The language in which it was composed, the Quiché, is a dialect of the great Maya-Quiché tongue, spoken at the time of the discovery in Western Guatemala, where it is still used by the natives, and it is the only remaining monument of this tongue. Evidence is not wanting to prove the considerable antiquity of the compilation, and a decided metrical tendency in its composition would lead us to the conclusion that it was originally composed in metre, and that consequently, like the poems of Homer and Ossian, before it was reduced to writing it depended for its popularity upon the aboriginal memory alone. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the work as we possess it probably does not stand in its pristine simplicity; that it has become sophisticated in a certain degree by Christian thought and influence can hardly be doubted; but it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that such sophistication is merely a surface one, and that it has not succeeded in penetrating to the lower strata of aboriginal thought. The evidence of language, too, is certain proof that it was penned by none other than a member of the Quiché race. The almost insur-

mountable difficulties of the Quiche language render it impossible that a European of the 17th cent. could have in any way tampered with the compilation, and the evidence of its contents is conclusive, as the Quiche mythology concurs in many respects with those of Mexico and Yucatan, which were as sealed books to the scholars of the time in which the MS was written. Furthermore, the Quiche mythology, as set forth in the pages of the *Popol Vuh*, accords in its general characteristics with the great laws of mythologic science.

The *Popol Vuh* is divided into four books, the first cosmological, the second dealing with the adventures of certain hero-gods in the nether world, the third detailing the origin and early migrations of the Quiche race, and the last a pseudo-chronicle of the Quiche kings.

In the beginning we see the god Hurakan ('the one-legged') hovering in the dense and primeval gloom over a waste of waters. As a mighty wind he passed over the surface of the sea and ejaculated the one word 'Earth.' In answer to his evocation the solid land rose slowly from the deep—vast, wet, and unstable. The gods took counsel together, presided over by Hurakan. Gucumatz, the serpent covered with green feathers, and Xpiyacoc and Xmucane, male and female creative divinities, were present.

Gucumatz is merely a Quiche variant of the Mexican Quetzalcoatl, known to the Maya as Kukulcan. It must be borne in mind that to the Nahua of Mexico Quetzalcoatl was an alien deity, and regarded as a culture-hero who brought them the seeds of civilization and then departed, whereas in the *Popol Vuh* we find him a native deity, assisting in the act of creation. It is strange to find him acting as the inferior of Hurakan, and, in fact, in this pantheon on the whole we cannot discover much affinity with Maya forms, so far as we are at present acquainted with the characteristics of these. The affinities, oddly enough, seem to be with Mexican deities. *E.g.*, Hurakan may be safely equated with Tezcatlipoca, and Xpiyacoc and Xmucane have all the characteristics of Ometecutli and Omeciuatl. Certainly Gucumatz has many points of contact with P. Schellhas's god P which he identifies with Kukulcan. As a Quiche deity, Gucumatz would undoubtedly seem to figure as a rain-god pure and simple—rather a different rôle from that which he plays in the mythology of the Mexicans. His serpent form is symbolic of water; and, as the god of the elements whose shape is serpentine is almost universal throughout N. America, but by no means so in the southern sub-continent, there is a possibility that he originated in the north. Of course, it is possible that as Quetzalcoatl he may have been adopted by the Mexicans from the Southern Maya, and that his name and fame may have filtered northwards, where they are found even to-day, as in the Kumsnöotl, or Kanikilak, of certain British Columbian tribes.

As the result of the deliberations of the gods, animals were created, but as yet man was not. The want of a higher type of being was felt, and, to supply the deficiency, the gods carved mannikins out of wood, and endowed them with life. But these were frivolous and irreverent, and in their nature too puppet-like to be quite human; so the gods, irritated by their conduct, resolved upon their destruction. Hurakan therefore sent a great flood upon the mannikin folk, which was accompanied by a resinous rain falling from the heavens. In their drowning the mannikins were tormented by fierce birds which plucked out their eyes and tore their flesh; and, as the rain increased, the animals and plants, and even the domestic utensils that they had made, their millstones, plates, and cups, rose up against them and jeered at them. The wretched mannikins rushed hither and thither in their despair, but could find no place of shelter, until at last all were drowned, save a mere handful whose descendants are said to be 'the little monkeys that live in the woods.'

The composite character of the *Popol Vuh* may be recognized from the circumstance that we discover at least three agencies assisting in the work of creation. From this it appears that three separate cosmologies may have been welded together into one account, as in the case of other and more familiar instances, the most remarkable of which will readily occur to all students of comparative religion.

After earth had somewhat recovered from this deluge, there arose a being, orgulous and full of pride, named Vukub-cakix, which signifies 'seven times the colour of fire,' or 'very brilliant,' an earth-god like the Scandinavian Jotunn or Greek Titans, who took the shape of the arara bird or great macaw. His eyes were of silver, his teeth of emerald, and his body was composed of various precious metals. His overweening conceit so irritated the gods that they resolved upon his destruction. To that end they dispatched the twin hero-gods Hun-ahpu and Xbalanque to earth, to chastise the arrogance of Vukub-cakix. These, arriving in his domain, wounded the god severely in the mouth with a dart from a magic blow-pipe. Afterwards, with Xpiyacoc and Xmucane, they proceeded to his dwelling, disguised as physicians, and extracted the unfortunate Titan's emerald teeth, for which they substituted grains of maize. After the operation Vukub-cakix expired.

This would seem to be a myth explaining the first fertilization of the earth with seed, and the substitution of the maize-plant for the green, virgin soil. But the progeny of Vukub-cakix had yet to be disposed of. Zipacna, the earth-heaper, and Cabrakan, the earth-quake, were also destroyed by craft, so that the race of Titans was now extinct.

The second book yields much interesting material for the mythologist. It relates the under-world adventures of Hunhun-ahpu and Vukub-hun-ahpu, the sons of Xpiyacoc and Xmucane.

Hunhun-ahpu and his brothers were great exponents of the native game of ball, a kind of hockey. On one occasion the course of their play took them into the vicinity of the realm of Xibalba, the under world, the monarchs of which challenged them to a game with the malicious intent, common to all supernatural folk, of defeating and disgracing them. The challenge was accepted, and, after crossing over a river of blood, the brothers came to the residence of the lord of the Quiche hades, where they underwent a series of insults and tortures. First they were requested to place themselves in a seat of honour, but hastily arose when they found that it was a red-hot stone. Then they were thrust into the House of Gloom, where they were tortured, killed, and buried. The head of Hunhun-ahpu was, however, suspended from a tree, which speedily became covered with gourds. Xquiq ('blood'), the daughter of a notable of Xibalba, was standing underneath its shade, when the head of Hunhun-ahpu expectorated into her palm, so that she conceived. The head told her to go to his home on earth, where she would be received by Xmucane, to whom she must tell the story of the brothers' tragic fate. She did so, but Xmucane would not at first credit her story. Xquiq, however, to prove her supernatural origin, gathered a basket of maize where no maize grew—quite a natural thing for a deity of the under world to do, as they are invariably associated with the growing of grain. Xquiq became the mother of Hun-ahpu and Xbalanque, the twin-heroes alluded to in the first book. They were so noisy that Xmucane, their grandmother, thrust them out of doors. Extremely precocious, they were made to clear ground for the plantation of maize, but, as they possessed magic tools which could work of themselves, they went on hunting expeditions and neglected their duties, and during the night the wild animals met and undid the work that the magic tools had accomplished. The brothers watched for the purpose of capturing the miscreants, but the animals escaped, all save one, the rat, which in return for its life recounted to them the glorious deeds of their father and uncle, and how they had been entrapped in Xibalba. Shortly after this the twins themselves received a challenge to play ball from the lords of the under world, which they accepted. On their arrival in Xibalba, the community of which seems to have been conducted on the lines of a native secret society with a form of initiation, they passed scatheless through several of the ordeals, and defeated the lords of the Plutonian realm at ball. They were placed in the House of Lances, but escaped by bribing the lancers. They were then thrust into the House of Cold, where they cheated their tormentors by warming themselves with burning pine-cones. In the House of Tigers and the House of Gloom they passed a night each without misfortune, but in the House of Bats Hun-ahpu's head was cut off by Camazotz, ruler of the bats. The head was suspended in the ball-court, but the tortoise passed by the severed neck of Hun-ahpu, to which it became attached, turning into a new head.

The Camazotz here referred to is a figure of some importance. With the Central American peoples generally the bat was the symbol of gloom and darkness, therefore Camazotz is the god of subterranean caves in which that animal is usually found. It is plain, in fact, that here we have to deal with a form of the deity of mountain caverns and cave-worship. Pictures of the bat-god are found in the Borgian, Vatican, and Fejervary Codices — all Mexican MSS—as Seler first pointed out, and

this is strange, as in Mexico itself the cult of a bat-god does not appear to have been known. But it is probable that the MSS which give representations of this god originated near the southern borders of the Mexican empire, nearer the sphere of Maya influence. In the Borgian Codex the bat-god is represented as holding a severed human head in the left hand, and as in the act of tearing a man's head from the body with his right hand. He is also frequently met with on the Copan reliefs, and in the Maya Dresden Codex, and his head appears in the Maya conventional sign for the cardinal point of the north. In a vase excavated by E. P. Dieseldorff he is well portrayed with outstretched wings on which are depicted half-moons, symbolic of his nocturnal character. We find his name also reproduced in that of the two royal families of the Cakchiquels, who were called Ah-po-zotzil and Ah-po-xa, and, according to another passage in the *Popol Vuh*, we find that the Cakchiquels designated him Zotzilaha Chamalcan, who, we are told, took the bat for his image. But Zotzilaha does not mean 'bat,' but 'bat's house,' therefore it is reasonable to suppose that this god possessed more than one form, *i.e.*, that, besides the bat which he symbolized, he had the form of a cave-god.

The brothers, having outwitted their fiendish hosts, now entered upon a veritable orgy of magic, even submitting to be killed and coming to life again, after their bones had been beaten to powder and thrown into the river. The monarchs of Xibalba requested to be killed also, but, as the brothers omitted to revive them, their reign was at an end. They then showed themselves in their true colours, degraded the princes of Xibalba, and, after paying fitting funeral honours to their father and uncle, set them in the heavens as the sun and moon.

In this myth it is easy to see the harrying of hell so common to the mythologies of all nations. The Quiche Xibalba is, of course, a place of the dead, with many departments, like the Egyptian Amenti, where both just and unjust alike are lodged. The savage mind trembles at the idea of a place of eternal doom of which it knows nothing; therefore it invents myths of the descent into its hades of its most heroic and god-like figures, who are described as achieving the conquest of the terrors of death and hell, and making the way easy for those who come after them.

In the third book we find the gods once more in council, their object this time being the creation of man.

Four perfect men were fashioned by Hurakan out of red and white maize. But these beings were too perfect, and in knowledge closely approached to the gods themselves. The creators, alarmed at this condition of things, felt that it was not good that man should approach them in wisdom, so they contracted his sight so that he might only be able to see a portion of the earth. The gods then provided the first four men with wives. These eight people were the ancestors of the Quiche only, the progenitors of other tribes being created subsequently. As yet there was no sun in the heavens, and, despite the prayers of the early Quiche, no luminary appeared. A desire to migrate came upon the first men, and they set out for Tulan-Zuiva. Attempts have been made to identify this locality with the city of Tollan, the capital of the Toltecs of ancient Mexico. In that place the Quiche received gods, each man being given a special and probably tribal deity. One of these, Tohil, whose name signifies 'the rumbler,' and who is a thunder- and rain-god, provided a servant of Quetzalcoatl or Gucumatz, supplied the emigrants with fire by striking his feet (which were compressed [illegible] together, and producing lightning. At Tulan the speech of men became confounded, so that the four progenitors of the Quiche could no longer comprehend one another. Leaving Tulan under the leadership of Tohil, they wandered on, meeting innumerable hardships, making their way through [illegible] mountain passes, and passing through the sea, which was miraculously divided for their journey from shore to shore. At length they came to the mountain Hueavitz, called after one of their gods, where they halted, as they had been told that at this spot they should see the sun. At last he appeared above the horizon, warm and as reflected in a glass, and, as his beams lighted upon them, the tribal gods were turned into stone, as were the gods worshipped by the animals.

It is probable that this myth recounts a migration from the cold north to the warm south. The sun grows stronger as the journey proceeds, which would seem to show that, to begin with, the ancestors of the Quiche people must have dwelt in a comparatively cold climate. T. A. Joyce (*Mexican Archæology*, p. 362 f.) sees in this myth the adoption of a solar calendar or rather the fixing of a date to form a starting-point for a time-count modelled on solar time. The whole myth is strikingly akin to that of the wanderings of the Israelites, but the conditions of migration undergone by the Quiche, though similar to those recounted in the book of Exodus, possess as many points of difference, and are by no means a mere variation of the Scriptural version, as stated by short-sighted collators of both. The best proof that the myth is of purely native origin is that such myths of undoubted aboriginal manufacture abound in America. Thus we find in an Aztec migration-myth in the Boturini Collection that the Aztecs issuing from Aztlan carried their god Huitzilopochtli before them when they came by water to Colhuacan. We also find a similar myth in the *Wallam Olum*, or Painted Records of the Lenapé Indians, which state that the Lenapé left the dwelling of Talli for the Snake Land, to reach which they passed over the water of the frozen sea. The *Popol Vuh*, indeed, may be a dim and distant echo of a migration from N.E. Asia to American soil. The circumstance that the tribal gods of the Quiche were turned to stone on the appearance of the sun recalls a myth of the Zuñi Indians of New Mexico, in which the great gods turned certain animals into stone, which afterwards became fetishes.

The fourth book of the *Popol Vuh* is almost purely pseudo-historical, and as such possesses no interest for the student of comparative religion. Enough has been said to prove that the *Popol Vuh* is the New World's richest mythological mine, abounding with treasure awaiting those who will take the pains to unearth it. In especial there can be no question that it throws much light upon the mythologies of the Mexicans and Maya, but our knowledge of these is so slight that at present it is found not a little difficult to apply the light shed by the *Popol Vuh* so as to dispel the gloom which surrounds them.

LITERATURE.—Brasseur de Bourbourg, *Popol Vuh*, Paris, 1861; F. Ximenez, *Los Historias del Origin de los Indios de Guatemala*, Vienna, 1856; L. Spence, *The Popol Vuh* (in 'Popular Studies in Mythology, Romance, and Folk-lore' series), London, 1908, *The Myths of Mexico and Peru*, do. 1913; T. A. Joyce, *Mexican Archæology*, do. 1914. The brief essay of Max Müller upon the *Popol Vuh* is worthless. A tr. is in course of preparation in Austria, and a tr. from the original Quiche is understood to be in progress by a distinguished German student of Mexican archæology.

LEWIS SPENCE.

PORPHYRY.—See NEO-PLATONISM.

PORTENTS.—See PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS.

PORT ROYAL.—See JANSENISM

POSITIVISM.—**1. Derivation and definition.**—Derived from the French *positif*, 'sure,' 'certain,' 'positivism' was the term chosen by Auguste Comte to designate a system of thought and life dealing with realities and based on the sure results reached by scientific methods, which aimed not only at certainty, but also at precision in the varying degree that each particular branch of science allows. When, however, the word was applied to a system of life as well as of thought, it obtained the additional connotation of 'useful'; and, as our knowledge of the world depends on the powers of mankind, we also get the meaning 'relative.' With the study of biology and sociology, science becomes organic, and, with the recognition of the union of mankind in the social organism, sympathetic. Positivism, therefore, in spite of its name, is not purely intellectual. It is not only

real, certain, and precise, but also useful, relative, organic, and sympathetic.

2. History before Comte.—The general application of scientific methods, the accumulation of a mass of ordered knowledge, the building up in turn of the various abstract sciences—all this has been a long and gradual process. While in the theocracies of Babylon and Egypt concrete facts were observed, recorded, and utilized, calendars made, canals dug, land measured, temples and pyramids built, it was only in Greece that abstract laws of co-existence and succession were formulated. But the abstract science of Greece made considerable progress only in mathematics and astronomy; it was essentially statical, failing to solve even so simple a problem as that presented by the acceleration of a falling body; it did not reach the subjects—health, politics, morals—most interesting to mankind, for in these subjects Greek knowledge remained almost entirely concrete and empirical. Other interests and needs, the development of Roman law, the rise of a new religion, the inroads of the barbarians, distracted the attention of the ancient world, and Greek science not only ceased to make progress, but would have been lost, had it not been preserved and even slightly increased by the Arabs. At the Renaissance the scientific advance was resumed. Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo introduced the new astronomy; the earth ceased to be the centre of the universe; problems of motion were successfully solved. Bacon and Descartes discussed the purpose, methods, and scope of science, and the former foresaw its extension to social and moral phenomena. In the two centuries after Bacon the sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology made great progress, and a long series of thinkers began tentatively to investigate the laws of social structure and development, the working of the human mind, and the relation of subject and object. Building on the results of these labours and gathering up the scattered threads of these 18th cent. investigations, Comte founded a scientific philosophy and a purely human religion.

3. Comte.—Auguste Comte was born at Montpellier on 19th Jan. 1798, the son of a revenue officer of small means. His parents were royalists and devout Catholics, but he had abandoned theology before he was fifteen, and was throughout his life a firm republican. At the Lycée at Montpellier he showed such precocity that, while still a pupil, he took the place of the absent mathematical professor. Thence he passed to the famous Polytechnic School, first of his list in the entrance examination when sixteen, though he was not allowed to join till the next year. In 1816—the year after Waterloo—he took a leading part in a demonstration against an unpopular official, and was expelled with the other students of his year, the whole school being suspected of republican sentiments. He was, however, already known to some eminent men, and on their recommendation he obtained pupils. Later he was appointed to two small mathematical posts in the Polytechnic as teacher and examiner. Having already published some important essays, he began, in 1826, a course of lectures on the positive philosophy, which was interrupted by a mental breakdown; but after his recovery it was resumed and completed. The course was attended by some of the most eminent men of science of the day, and formed a first sketch of the *Positive Philosophy* (6 vols., 1830–42). This was followed in 1848 by the *General View of Positivism*, the introduction to his second great work, the *Positive Polity* (4 vols., the last being published in 1854). Between the two works his outlook on life had developed. An early marriage had turned out unhappy; his wife grudged his devotion to his chosen task, and wished to direct his powers into more lucrative channels; eventually she left him. Some years afterwards he formed a devoted friendship for Madame de Vaux, whose husband was a fugitive from justice. Clotilde de Vaux was not perhaps a woman of exceptional mental capacity, but she was quite able to appreciate Comte's genius. She was not, however, in the least in love with him, and their friendship led to no closer union. It began in April 1844, and ended by her death just a year later. This short episode had a lasting effect on his career. From the outset, as he had shown in his early essays, he had sought the good of mankind as the proper goal of all human effort. But he had sought it by an intellectual regeneration, a philosophy of science, a synthesis of human knowledge. Clotilde de Vaux could add nothing to his intellectual equipment, but their friendship opened his eyes to sides of human life previously unseen, to other needs of the human heart and other values in human conduct. Henceforth, while recognizing the primary necessity of scientific synthesis, he saw that there must be a synthesis embracing all sides of human nature, action, and affection as well as intellect—in other words, a religion at once scientific and human. Thus he became the founder of the Religion of Humanity. This was the dominant note of the *Positive Polity* and the *Catechism of Positive Religion*. In his last work, the *Subjective Synthesis*, he returned to mathematics, considered from a social and religious point of view. A companion treatise on morals he did not live to write. He died on 5th Sept. 1857, in Paris, and was buried in Père Lachaise Cemetery. A monument was erected to his memory outside the Sorbonne in 1898. Many years before his death he was deprived of his posts at the Polytechnic; for the scientific specialists disliked his insistence on synthesis, and vehemently rejected his claim that science should fulfil a social mission. Some of his earlier supporters, notably M. P. E. Littré and John Stuart Mill, declined to follow him in his religious developments. But he gathered round him a small body of disciples who remained after his death to defend his memory and propagate his ideas.

When twenty years old, Comte became acquainted with Henri Saint-Simon (1760–1825), who was already famous. Saint-Simon had conceived the idea of a reformed social order in which all the resources of the State should be used for the benefit of the whole people, and was in fact one of the originators of modern socialism, though the word was then unknown, while, unlike most socialists, he had no confidence in democratic institutions. He believed that the new order must rest on a basis of science; but he had led a roving and adventurous life little compatible with scientific studies. This lack Comte seemed eminently fitted to supply. He wrote his two earliest essays under Saint-Simon's influence, and the third at his request; but, when this was written, it was the master who first perceived the discrepancy between his ideas and those of his disciple. Saint-Simon had expressed his purpose in the title which he had suggested: 'Plan of the Scientific Operations necessary for reorganizing Society.' He wanted an immediate application of science to this purpose. Comte saw that much more was needed, and that a much longer task lay before him: a new science of sociology must be founded irrespective of any immediate application; and science itself stood in need of reorganization. He soon came to see that a scientific philosophy must precede a polity founded on science. Thus, after six years, master and disciple separated; and Comte, who in every other case was so ready to acknowledge his indebtedness to his predecessors,

always insisted that Condorcet was his immediate intellectual ancestor, and that he owed nothing to Saint-Simon. It is true that he gained little intellectually from the connexion; for Saint-Simon's ideas were constantly changing and often inconsistent—he was a visionary rather than a systematic thinker. Nevertheless, Comte was affected both for good and for evil: for good, since Saint-Simon was well fitted to impress on him the need of reconstruction, and had some confused glimpses of its true conditions; for evil, because he retained to the end of his life Saint-Simon's tendency to expect quick results and to outrun scientific forecast in his zeal for social reconstruction. The first is, indeed, the common failing of reformers; the second led Comte to make his forecasts of the future more detailed than the complex character of social phenomena allows.

It was in this third essay (1822) that Comte put forward his law of intellectual development, which he named the 'Law of the Three States,' and his classification of the sciences. The former had already been stated by Turgot in an early thesis, but without adequate proof or recognition of its scope; and it was open to fatal misunderstanding unless combined with a classification of the sciences in the order of their historic development. Here is a statement of the law by Comte:

'From the nature of the human intellect each branch of knowledge, in its development, is necessarily obliged to pass through three different theoretical states: the theological or fictitious state; the metaphysical or abstract state; the scientific or positive state' (*Early Essays in Social Philosophy*, Eng. tr.[2], p. 131).

In the first stage men, interpreting the unknown by the known, attribute the phenomena of the world without to the action of beings moved by human passions; in the third they content themselves with discovering the order in which events occur, noting the relations of co-existence or succession, which give the conditions of human action. Between these there is a transitional stage in which personified or merely verbal entities take the place of divine wills. Thus a pestilence, which is in primitive times or among backward peoples a punishment sent by the gods, passes into an entity, which comes and goes without assigned cause, till with increasing knowledge the conditions of its appearance and the course of its development are discovered, its microbe isolated, it may be, and so its prevention or cure becomes possible. The natural rights of man, supposed the same in all ages and under all conditions, supply an example in politics of the metaphysical transition from the divine right of kings to the ordering of society in accordance with the needs of a developing civilization. Of such entities Nature is the most general. At the beginning of the transition it is hardly distinguishable from a divinity or at least a living being, as in such expressions as 'Nature abhors a vacuum.' In the end it becomes a convenient summary for the totality of phenomena and their laws.

But, in order to understand correctly the Law of the Three States, a classification of the abstract sciences was necessary. Comte proposed to range them in a linear series, beginning with the most general and simple and proceeding to the most special and complex—mathematics, astronomy (celestial physics), physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology, to which he afterwards added ethics, the first four being condensed into cosmology on occasion. This order was that actually followed by the sciences in their historic development—the order in which they in turn reached the positive stage. Herbert Spencer attacked this classification on the ground that no linear arrangement was possible, the sciences being interdependent. But classification is a logical artifice, which usually accentuates the divisions found in nature, and is intended for the assistance of human reason. For exposition a linear order is necessary, and of such orders Comte's conforms most nearly to the order of historical development; and in its main lines it has been adopted by Spencer himself in his exposition of the synthetic philosophy, with one amendment which does not affect the order of the series. This amendment consists in the intercalation of psychology between biology and sociology. In fact, the most serious criticism directed against Comte's classification is that he has treated psychology as a department—the concluding section—of biology and not as a separate science; but, if the criticism be allowed, it would mean only the insertion of a new term, not a recasting of the whole. Whether psychology is to be considered as a separate science depends, according to Comte's principles, on whether it requires a new method; for the main distinction between the various sciences lies in the methods necessary for their investigation.

It will thus be seen, if we consider the Law of the Three States in combination with the classification of the sciences, that at any given period all three stages will be represented, the simpler sciences being already positive, while the more complex are partly or wholly metaphysical or theological. In the earliest societies of which we have knowledge some simple positive notions will have been derived from practical life, while even in the present age the most complex sciences have not become completely positive.

Comte is generally recognized as the founder of sociology. It is true that the necessary conditions of human society were discussed by Aristotle, and that therefore, in its purely statical aspects, the subject was studied in ancient Greece. Early in the 18th cent. Vico attempted to establish a new science of society, but the necessary foundation in the simpler sciences was wanting; the same century saw the successful treatment of many isolated questions relating to social structure and development; and towards its close Herder, Kant, and Condorcet sought the laws of the progress of civilization in the study of history. But Comte was the first to map out the field of sociology, to show its true relation to the earlier sciences, especially biology, to distinguish social statics from social dynamics, and to put forward and apply the special method proper to the latter. In this, which Comte called 'historic filiation' and J. S. Mill 'inverse deduction,' a generalization is made inductively from the facts of history. Then the same result is deduced by showing how the sequence of events could be attributed to the known facts of human nature, or to what we already know of the development of societies and the conditions of social action. By this method Comte reached his law of intellectual development and corresponding laws of the evolution of activity and affection. Thus in the Western transition, while human activity was at first organized for conquest and then for defence, eventually industry becomes recognized as the chief occupation of mankind. In correspondence with this the status of the workers changes from slavery to serfdom and then to freedom. In the last stage there is a further advance from the metaphysical concept of individual rights and the absolute control of wealth by its possessor to the acceptance of social duty or convenience as regulating industrial relations. In the language of Pierre Laffitte, Comte's successor as leader of the Positivist body, we should regard 'wealth as social in its origin and destination' (*The Positive Science of Morals*, Eng. tr., p. 191). So, too, there is a widening of the moral sphere, a law of moral progress. At one

time moral duties are bounded by the family, class, or tribe. Later they are extended to all of the same city or nation. Finally, they include the whole human race.

The field of social statics, as we have seen, had been cultivated from ancient times. Comte, however, made some important additions to the work of his predecessors. He brought out more fully than they had done the co-ordination that exists between institutions in corresponding stages of social evolution, while avoiding the error of supposing this co-ordination to be as exact as in biology, where R. Owen was able from a single bone to reconstruct the form of an extinct bird. More important is Comte's classification of the elements of society—first into spiritual and temporal, these tending to further subdivision, the former into emotionals and intellectuals, the latter into chiefs and people. The progress of sociology has not been so rapid as Comte hoped, but it is now generally recognized as a science under that name, which he gave it. The chief sociologists since his time have pursued the study from rather different standpoints. Herbert Spencer has dealt largely with the influence on the social organism of the laws of the lower sciences, especially the biological laws of heredity. P. G. Frédéric Le Play has shown how the environment chiefly affects social structure and development indirectly through its control of industry, the work of the hunter, the fisher, the shepherd, and the tiller of the soil each giving rise to a different type of civilization. But in sociology physical and biological laws only give the conditions of social existence. The environment is most powerful in the early stages of civilization and becomes less and less so as the social heritage grows. Following the example of other sciences, sociology must discover laws by the direct study of social phenomena, the structure of human societies, and the development of human civilization. In this field Comte has been the chief pioneer.

The importance of his discoveries is seen in the light which they throw on history. He traces the development of civilization from fetishism or animism, through astrolatry, the worship of the heavenly bodies, to polytheism, found in a theocratic form in the great river valleys, isolated by strong natural barriers, as in Egypt, or in a military form in Greece or Rome. In Greece the geographical configuration of the country did not favour a career of conquest, and amid the freedom and rivalry of the small city-States Greek art and Greek science arose. Rome, on the contrary, conquered and united the Mediterranean world. Polytheism passed into monotheism and conquest into defence. For some centuries the energies and intellect of the West were occupied in civilizing the barbarian and creating the Catholic Church. But, as that was accomplished, a new intellectual curiosity arose, stimulated by contact with the Muhammadan world and later by the revival of ancient learning. From the 14th cent. onwards Europe entered on that revolutionary transition which culminated in the 18th. But, alongside of the movement of destruction, the breakdown of the old institutions and beliefs, there was a movement of construction, the building up of modern science. In this growth of science Comte saw the promise of the close of the revolutionary era, for scientific results were true for all, transcending national bounds and giving a certitude in which all could share. From a study of the past he reached the following conclusions as to the characteristics of the new era: (1) as the field of scientific investigation was continually enlarging, as that was becoming more and more the test of certitude and the bond of intellectual unity, the philosophy of the future must be founded on science, and the religion of the future must be compatible with science; (2) however much the peace of the world might be troubled by nations in a more backward stage of civilization—and even in Europe some are behind others—industry was becoming more and more the chief occupation of man's energies; peace was becoming normal, war abnormal; (3) in politics the metaphysical conception of natural rights, the same in all places and times, was giving way to the acceptance of duties, changing with the development of civilization; (4) conduct was being more and more judged by human and social standards. Aristotle had described man as a civic animal. 'We are members one of another' (Eph 4^{25}), St. Paul proclaimed. In the 17th cent. this recognition of solidarity was extended—at least in the intellectual sphere—to continuity, when Pascal said:

> 'The whole succession of men during the course of so many centuries should be considered as one man, ever living and continually learning' (*Préface sur le Traité du Vide*, *Œuvres*, Paris, 1908, ii. 139).

In Comte's view the human race formed one great organism, Humanity, living a continuous life in accordance with its own laws of development, its elements becoming more and more closely connected. The individual as such is an abstraction; for every one is a member of a family, then of a city or nation, and finally of Humanity, which is made up of all the nations of the earth. On these collective elements the thought and life of each individual depend, and that thought and life necessarily differ in different stages of human development. Each is the child of his own nation and time.

Religion, in Comte's definition, consists in the full harmony of life, and embraces equally the heart and the intellect, 'for both of these must concur to produce any true unity of life' (*Positive Polity*, Eng. tr., ii. 8). Its function is to regulate the individual life and to combine collective lives. In the earlier stages of man's development this was attained by the unconscious creation, first of fetishes, then of gods, the unknown outside being interpreted in terms of men's own feelings. But intellectually, in one department after another, natural laws take the place of divine wills, and in morals the desire to please or appease the gods becomes less potent as a motive for good actions than the love of our fellow-men. Humanity thus becomes the new centre of unity; the Religion of Humanity, a religion capable of uniting all, and 'Live for others' its guiding principle. The term 'altruism,' now in general use, was introduced by Comte.

Three sources of misunderstanding must be guarded against in considering this religion. (1) It is not mere cosmopolitanism. Humanity is made up of families and nations. For the great mass of men and women—indeed, for all in many relations of their lives—it must be served through service to family and country, to kinsmen, friends, and fellow-countrymen. Humanity is strengthened, not by reducing all nations to one level, but by each nation in its free development bringing to the common service of mankind the special aptitudes and resources which it has developed. Devotion to Humanity is based upon family affection and love of country. Humanity does not set aside nationality; it only controls it, making a nation's glory consist in service and not in domination. (2) Positivism does not regard the earlier religions as bad and false. They are such approximations to the truth as were possible in the ages in which they arose. Their acceptance and, indeed, their continued existence, where they still exist, show that they answer to certain human needs;

and, so far as they fulfil a necessary function, to be destroyed, they must be replaced. They were centres of unity to their adherents, even when their rivalry made for disunion. Thus Positivists honour the great teachers of all religions and gladly accept what is permanent in their work—*e.g.*, the separation of spiritual from temporal power under the mediæval Church. But they also honour apostles of enlightenment like Diderot and Condorcet, who, though they failed justly to appreciate the past, made ready the way for the future. (3) Altruism is inconsistent with self-immolation or with purposeless self-denial. Pleasure is not an evil, except where it involves neglect of duty in ourselves or pain to others. To live for others implies the maintenance of our full powers of service, including physical health and cheerfulness of temper. Asceticism, save as training for service, is alien to the Religion of Humanity.

Comte has been blamed for neglect of epistemology and formal logic. The latter he considered best studied in the several sciences, methods being thus seen in their application. As to the former, the validity of scientific methods and the underlying assumptions of science were in his view sufficiently established by the success of modern science and the continual extension of its sphere. The uniformity of nature, the reign of natural law, the relativity of knowledge, the distinction between subjective and objective derived from Kant, were accepted as postulates of scientific investigation. He did, however, formulate under the designation *The First Philosophy* a series of general principles or laws on which the abstract sciences rest. Hypotheses, far from being condemned, were held to be legitimate provided they were verifiable. Without the use of hypothesis scientific discovery is impossible. Knowledge was not to be pursued for its own sake, but for a social purpose.

'Know in order to foresee, and foresee in order to provide' (*Politique positive*, i., table facing p. 726).

As to those ultimate problems which occupied so large a space in man's early speculations, Comte considered them insoluble. The absolute is out of reach of man's relative powers. We can postulate benevolence of his immediate environment and the laws that control his destiny only in so far as they have allowed Humanity to arise and develop. To that extent the earth and the whole body of natural laws—'le grand milieu,' in Comte's expression—were rightly venerated by mankind, but only as a consequence of their relation to Humanity. The old cosmogonies made man the objective centre of the universe. Comte aimed only at a subjective synthesis. In positivism all knowledge is viewed in its relation to man, and human knowledge is considered adequate for all human needs. At the same time Comte was not purely intellectualist. He recognized the effect of practical life and feeling on thought. He took all sides of human nature into account. He insisted on the need of social aims even in scientific inquiry.

'The Intellect should always be the servant of the Heart, never its slave' (*A General View of Positivism*, Eng. tr.[2], original title-page).

To the positive philosophy corresponds a positive education, replacing instruction in letters by a training in science and a knowledge of realities. Comte divided the education of the young into three phases. Till seven years of age the child would remain entirely in his mother's charge, gradually exercising his powers, but in an informal way, and not even being taught to read. From seven to fourteen, while he would learn to read and write, his education would be mainly artistic. He would sing and draw, and become acquainted with the literature of his own country, and possibly towards the end of the period he might begin to study foreign languages. Comte hoped that eventually mothers who had already received a positivist education would be capable of teaching their children during the second, as well as the first, period, but for the present he recognized that this would be impossible. Finally, in the third stage, from fourteen to twenty-one, the youth, while engaged in preparing for the active work of his life—in general as apprentice—would follow courses on all the seven abstract sciences, from mathematics to ethics, on two evenings in the week during the first two years, on one evening during the last five. Girls would go through precisely the same course, except that, to prevent overstrain, they would have only one evening a week throughout. For such classes to be largely attended, they would obviously have to fulfil certain conditions. (1) The hours of labour would have to be short. Comte hoped that the hours even of adults would ultimately be reduced to thirty-five a week. (2) The study of each science must be limited. There was to be no question of training the boys and girls to be teachers of mathematics or chemists or surgeons. For such professional instruction there would be special institutions. The general courses would be open to all and would have to recognize two limitations. They must be sufficient only (*a*) to give the student a grasp of scientific method, of the scientific way of looking at the world, and (*b*) to enable him to proceed to the later sciences. Each science would be pursued—till the last was reached—in order to understand its method and have a firm basis for later studies. (3) The course of seven years must form a connected whole, and be infused with a social purpose. The teachers, therefore, were to be men of philosophic outlook—Comte referred to them as a philosophical priesthood—who, while their chief business would be teaching, would also form a spiritual power, international as science is, and independent of political parties, who, as they would renounce all temporal ambition, could give disinterested counsel in relation to public affairs.

Many other institutions were suggested by Comte. Of these it is possible here to describe only the Positivist Library and the Positivist Calendars.

The Positivist Library for the Nineteenth Century was a selection of books made by Comte, 'with the view of guiding the more thoughtful minds among the people in their choice of books for constant use.' It is divided into four sections: poetry and fiction, science, history, and philosophy and religion. Of these the first and last have naturally the most permanent interest, the one containing the great masterpieces of imaginative literature from Homer and Æschylus to Goethe and Walter Scott, the other, not only the sacred books of Hebrew, Christian, and Muslim, the Bible and the Qur'an, with St. Augustine, St. Bernard, Thomas à Kempis, and Bossuet, but the great philosophers, from Aristotle, through Bacon and Descartes, to Diderot, Condorcet, and Comte. The collection was purely provisional and intended only for the West. It includes only those religious writings that have directly affected Western civilization; it excludes the great epics of India. This is in the main true also of the Historical Calendar, though the first month contains the names of Buddha, Confucius, and Zoroaster as well as those of Moses, Isaiah, and Muhammad. The year is divided into thirteen months, each representing a phase in human development: theocratic civilization, ancient poetry, philosophy, science, military civilization, catholicism, feudalism, modern epic poetry, industry, drama, philosophy, statesmanship, and science. The month is divided into

twenty-eight days. At the head of each month is a great name, Homer, Dante, Shakespeare for the three months of poetry, Aristotle and Descartes for the two of philosophy, Julius Cæsar, St. Paul, Charlemagne, etc. Other types preside over each week, while every day recalls some eminent man, with substitutes in some cases for leap-years. The whole forms a wonderful picture of European progress from the dawn of history to the French Revolution. It is professedly a record of construction rather than destruction; except in the first month it deals almost entirely with the West; it is temporary, save as a historical sketch, and even historical values change. On the other hand, the Abstract Calendar is general and permanent. In this the first month is dedicated to Humanity, the next five to family and industrial relationships, then three to the preparatory historic phases, fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism, and the last four to the normal functions—the moral providence of women, the intellectual providence of the teachers and thinkers, the material providence of the industrial leaders, and the general providence of the proletariate. Both Calendars end with an additional day not included in any month—a day dedicated to no particular individual but to 'all the dead,' since every man, in the course of his life, however useless or degraded, has done some useful or even honourable actions. In leap-year one day more has to be added, and this is devoted to a general commemoration of those illustrious women who, under exceptional circumstances, have, like Joan of Arc, passed beyond the sphere of woman's ordinary duties. Under the influence of a higher standard of education, Comte thought the number of such women would increase in the future, but that the great mass of women would still devote themselves to the indispensable duties of the home, and remain the moral providence of Humanity. The first day of the first month of the year was assigned as the festival of Humanity, not as the day of all the dead, a commemoration of the individuals who compose the human race, but as the day of that great human organism considered as a whole and built up by the convergent efforts of all generations. Comte also instituted a series of nine social sacraments 'consecrating all the successive phases of private life by connecting each with public life' (*The Catechism of Positive Religion*, Eng. tr.[2], p. 90).

4. Spread of positivism. — Comte founded the Positivist Society of Paris in 1848. His philosophy was spread from an independent standpoint in England by John Stuart Mill, George Henry Lewes, and Harriet Martineau. Later a Positivist Society was founded in London by Richard Congreve, E. S. Beesly, J. H. Bridges, Frederic Harrison, and Henry Crompton. They concerned themselves not only with the philosophic but also with the religious side of his teaching and with the practical application of positivism to public affairs. Believing with Comte that 'the proletariate class is not, properly speaking, a class at all, but constitutes the body of society' (*A General View of Positivism*, Eng. tr.[2], p. 147), and that trade unionism is a powerful instrument for the emancipation of the workers, the English positivists were foremost in the agitation for the strengthening and legal recognition of the Unions. Believing that politics should be subordinate to moral considerations, they have actively opposed all schemes of aggressive imperialism, whether on the part of their own or on that of other countries, and they protested in 1871 against the dismemberment of France. Recognizing that Humanity consists, not of an undifferentiated aggregate, but in a consensus of free nations, they have supported the claims of subject nationalities, as Ireland and Poland, to control their own internal affairs and develop in their own way. The term 'Comtist' was repudiated by Comte, and has not been accepted by positivists, as it misinterprets the relationship between that great teacher and those who have carried on the positivist movement and propagated the Religion of Humanity since his death. Positivism being founded on science and on scientific philosophy, its doctrine and practice must be adapted to the new truth that results from scientific development. It is a synthesis, but not a closed and rigid synthesis. It is a relative, an organic, and an expanding synthesis, in which all new developments of science must find their place. The positive philosophy neither began nor ended with Comte, though it was under the inspiration of his genius that positivism ceased to be purely intellectual, and embraced not only the intellect, but also the feelings and activity of man.

At present there exist an International Positivist Society with its seat in Paris, of which Emile Corra is president, and local Positivist Societies (some of which are attached to the International Society and some independent) in many places—notably in London and Liverpool, and in several parts of Latin America, with scattered groups or individuals in almost every country. Among distinguished adherents in the past or present may be mentioned, in addition to the English positivists named above, in France Pierre Laffitte, who succeeded Comte, and had among his disciples many of the founders of the Third French Republic, George Eliot, the English novelist, John Kells Ingram in Ireland, Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magaelens, founder of the Brazilian Republic, Theophilo Braga, chief of the provisional government and second President of the Portuguese Republic, Ahmed Riza, speaker of the first Turkish Parliament after the Revolution, and Dwarka Nath Mitter, first Indian Judge of the High Court at Calcutta. *La Revue positiviste internationale*, published six times a year at Paris, is the organ of the central body. *The Positivist Review* is published monthly in London.

5. Principles.—The English Positivist Committee (The Church of Humanity, 19 Chapel Street, Lamb's Conduit Street, London, W.C.) have recently issued the following statement under the title, 'Some Principles of the Religion of Humanity.'

'As the bounds of human love and duty extend from family to country, from country to all races and peoples, as science develops till it embraces the laws of the world and of life, of Man and Society, Humanity becomes recognised as an organic whole, which has existed through the ages and has continually grown in knowledge and unity. The old religions are seen to be worthy of honour so far as they foreshadowed this unity, as they inspired love and service, the pursuit of social aims, and the advance in righteousness and knowledge. The Religion of Humanity attains these ends more completely and more directly; for it has grown out of the whole past of Man; it is inspired by human love; it is based solely on human science; it has human service as its highest aim. It gives us a criterion of duty and a test of progress. In the presence of our duty to Humanity, all lesser duties find their true place and meaning. We can reconcile family affection and private friendship with public endeavour, devotion to country with love of all mankind.

The Religion of Humanity does not destroy the older religions, it fulfils their highest aims. It does not weaken family ties; it purifies and consecrates them. It does not repudiate the love of country; it honours each nation, however small or primitive, as a necessary element of a greater whole—an element more glorious as in its free development it brings its special gifts to the general service and the common task. It does not disregard physical and material well-being; but it subordinates them to the social and moral point of view, considering human happiness of greater importance than the accumulation of wealth, and the welfare of the great mass of the people than that of any section. This religion is based on the positive philosophy which includes in its scope the social organisation, the historic filiation of the ages, and the conduct of Man in Society, and it involves full liberty of speech and teaching for all. Humanity and science, love and knowledge, are alike necessary to right action. Inspired by the one, and enlightened by the other, we go forward in the great work of human service' (Leaflet, p. 1 f.).

The Committee invites the adhesion of 'all those who wish to see life inspired by a human religion, guided by a philosophy founded on science and directed to the service of Man' (*ib.* p. 2).

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POSSESSION.

Introductory (E. N. FALLAIZE), p. 122.
American.—See COMMUNION WITH DEITY (American).
Chinese.—See TAOISM.
Greek and Roman (A. C. PEARSON), p. 127.
Indian (W. CROOKE), p. 130.
Japanese (M. REVON), p. 131.
Muslim.—See 'Semitic and Christian.'
Semitic and Christian (G. A. BARTON), p. 133.
Slavic.—See DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Slavic).
Teutonic.—See DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Teutonic).

POSSESSION (Introductory and Primitive).—The belief that supernatural powers, spiritual or divine, may become embodied in man, either permanently or temporarily, is found at all stages of human development and has had a profound effect on the history of religious belief. Possession, a temporary embodiment of an influence or spirit alien to the subject, is a conception in full logical agreement with primitive animistic theories; it was officially recognized in the early Christian Church; and it underlay the cruder forms of modern revivalism. Abnormal physical and psychical manifestations are regarded as evidence of the presence of a deity or spirit, good or evil, and every word and action of the subject are held to be outside his or her control and to proceed solely from the indwelling power. The primitive mind has been quick to seize the advantage of the supposed presence of a supernatural being in order to influence or ascertain the future course of events, and this in one form or another has persisted throughout the religious and spiritual history of mankind. And, since those who are, or have been, under the influence of possession are regarded as oracles, prophets, magicians, and diviners, it has followed that, where the physical and mental peculiarities which are regarded as signs of the spiritual influence are not present from natural causes, they have been simulated or artificially induced. Possession in primitive custom may, therefore, be distinguished as being either involuntary or voluntary. This distinction, though not clearly present to the primitive mind, is nevertheless real.

1. Origin of belief.—The spiritual theory of the universe, which is the basis of primitive modes of thought and ascribes powers and attributes which would now be regarded as supernatural to every man or woman, might be held adequate to account for the nature of the belief. It is clear, however, that, while this attitude of the primitive mind has suggested its general form, its interest centres in what is abnormal in the phenomena. The constant association of possession with pathological states of mind and body indicates that as a theory it is an attempt to explain the existence of epileptics, neurotics, perverts, and those who are subject to other forms of mental diseases. It is particularly significant that it is precisely in those areas in which what is known as 'arctic hysteria' is prevalent, and especially in Siberia, that the mediumistic side of the shaman's functions are most prominent and most constantly in request.

2. Description of phenomena.—The interesting physical and psychical phenomena of possession as described both in antiquity and in recent times are essentially identical wherever encountered. The subject, having attained by means of some stimulus or other a state of intense emotional excitation, is seized with convulsive shiverings and shakings of the body, makes violent gestures with the arms, and his looks become wild and excited.

An account of a case of possession in the Sandwich Islands says that the priest who was the subject worked himself up to the highest pitch of frenzy, the limbs seemed convulsed, the body swelled, the countenance became terrific and the features distorted, the eyes wild and strained. While in this state, he rolled on the earth, foaming at the mouth as if labouring under the influence of the divinity. The will of the gods was then revealed in shrill cries, in violent and often indistinct sounds. When the response of the oracle had been given, the violent paroxysm gradually subsided and comparative composure ensued (W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832–36, i. 372–375). This account may well be compared with that given by Vergil:

> '. . . subito non vultus, non color unus,
> Non comptae mansere comae; sed pectus anhelum,
> Et rabie fera corda tument; majorque videri,
> Nec mortale sonans; afflata est numine quando
> Jam propiore dei' (*Æn.* vi. 47–51).

The exclamations, the cry 'Apollo,' and the disjointed utterances with which Cassandra in the *Agamemnon* begins to prophesy under the influence of the god (Æsch. *Agam.* 1072 f.) in like manner find a parallel in the description of possession among primitive races. In the Vedda ceremony the shaman cries 'Ah, Ah,' as the *yaka* enters into possession of him and when it leaves; in Fiji, when the priest was seized, the god announced his name with the subject's voice (*GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 378, quoting L. Fison).

The gradual cessation of the paroxysm is not universal. Among the Veddas the termination of possession takes place suddenly after a crucial act in the pantomime of which the ceremonial consists and the shaman falls back exhausted into the arms of his supporters. In a careful study of the phenomena in the Vedda shaman Seligmann says that, although the performer can co-ordinate his movements, he has only a general idea of what he is doing and is more or less in an automatic condition in which he goes through all the emotional movements of the dance correctly and in the proper order. He acts without complete volitional consciousness. The shamans themselves said that both at the beginning and at the end of the performance they were seized with vertigo and nausea. One said that he heard booming noises in his ears when the spirits left him. Apparently the determining factors are a profound belief in the reality of possession and a subconscious attitude of expectancy. It appears to be clear that the possession of the bystanders is non-volitional. A Sinhalese 'devil-dancer' appeared to suffer considerable pain, or at any rate inconvenience, although he did not wish to be, and had taken pains to avoid becoming, possessed. At the end of the dance the performer seems to be genuinely tired. The Veddas show no particular indications of a neurotic or hysterical tendency (C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 130, 134 f., 209 ff.).

3. Possession and disease. — Although the primitive theory of possession does not discriminate between the cause of cases which are pathological and those in which an abnormal state is the result of the more or less voluntary action of the subject, both alike being attributed to the presence of spirits, in practice a distinction is made between an accidental or occasional seizure and the ceremonial observance of rites to summon spirits to materialize for a special purpose.

Forms of possession which, in the light of this distinction, might be classed in the former category, would include such as are explained as arising from neglect of what is fitting in respect of, or by way of offerings to, a spirit.

Among the Lushei of India, on the occasion of the tribal feasts, the spirits of the dead are believed to be present and it is usual to place offerings of food for them in the eaves of the houses. If it should happen that a girl who has recently lost her mother should fall in a faint, it is taken as a case of possession; 'the dead has taken her place.' This is a sign that the spirit is not satisfied with the costume and ornaments with which she was decked on the occasion of the funeral. In order that the girl may be relieved and the spirit appeased, her clothes, ornaments, etc., are placed on that part of the floor where the body lay and one of her old petticoats and cloths is burnt in the forge (J. Shakespeare, *The Lushei Kuki Clans*, London, 1912, p. 65).

Possession may follow some act of impiety.

It is recorded that a Javanese coolie in the Malay Peninsula who cut down a tree known to be tenanted by a *hantu* (spirit) was seized by something resembling an epileptic fit, which was regarded by the Malays as possession. No Malay would cut down a tree known as the abode of a spirit unless directed to do so in the course of an exorcism conducted by the medicine-man (C. O. Blagden, quoted by W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 64 f.).

Near relatives appear to be peculiarly susceptible to attacks by spirits of the deceased, as in the Lushei case of mother and daughter cited above. In other cases, as, *e.g.*, among the Akikúyu, who believe diseases to be caused by *n'góma* (spirits of the dead), there is peculiar danger for the relatives.

The *n'góma* haunt especially the place of the man's death and, if he has been an evil liver, his spirit does as much harm as possible, in particular by taking possession of people whenever he has an opportunity. In such cases the medicine-man is called in to interpret the spirit's desire. If it is not satisfied, it will torment its victim at night and probably cause madness (W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, London, 1910, p. 240 f.).

Possession and causing madness are here specifically mentioned as activities of an evil spirit, but among the primitive theories of disease causation by spirits who enter into or torment the patient holds a prominent place. The therapeutic measures of the medicine-man, in so far as they are not purely materialistic, like the extraction of a bone or pebble, are largely directed towards driving out or propitiating the demons or spirits responsible for the disease (see art. SHAMANISM). It also finds expression in the customs of driving out disease-spirits at special festivals, of sending them away in boats, or of diverting them to a scapegoat.

It is, however, to the more violent and abnormal forms of disease in particular that the theory of possession is applied.

The Bathonga hold that possession in the form in which it is recognized among them is caused by the spirits of the dead, not, be it noted, spirits of their own dead, but Zulu or Banjao spirits. It occurs chiefly among those who travel outside Thonga boundaries. The attacks are not confined to the time of their absence from their own country; they may bring back the infection with them, and, indeed, though now less frequently than formerly, at times the disease has assumed the proportions of an epidemic. The preliminary symptoms are a nervous crisis, persistent pain in chest, hiccough, extraordinary yawning, and emaciation. If, after consultation of the divinatory bones, the medicine-man decides that the patient is possessed, the spirit is exorcized. In the course of the elaborate series of ceremonies which follows the patient in a frenzy, declares the name of the spirit which possesses him, speaking in Zulu or Njao even if he has no previous acquaintance with the language. The spirits are appeased by the offering of a goat. When the throat of the goat is cut, the patient sucks blood from the cut until his stomach is full and is then torn away from the carcass by the bystanders. He is given drugs which act as an emetic and the spirit is declared to have left him. At the end of the ceremony which closes the rites, and after a probationary period of a year, the possessed are regarded as fully initiated medicine-men and are distinguished by white beads woven into their hair (H. A. Junod, *Life of a S. African Tribe*, London, 1913, ii. 436 ff.). Among the Zulu, where possession occurs in a very similar form and with almost identical symptoms, it is ascribed to the ancestral spirits (*amatongo*); from some it departs of its own accord, others have the ghost laid, while in other cases the disease is allowed to take its own course and they become diviners (H. Callaway, *Religious System of the Amazulu*, London, 1870, pp. 185, 289, etc.).

The magico-medical theories of the Malays which are based upon the idea of 'mischiefs' are peculiarly instructive as illustrations of this side of the possession theory. As an example may be cited the form of treatment which aims at inducing the disease to pass along a parti-coloured thread from the patient to small dough figures of birds, beasts, and fishes (Skeat, p. 432 f.).

In Borneo the pagan tribes regard madmen as possessed by some *toh* (spirit), while the Melanaus extend this theory to other forms of sickness. Exorcism for possession is practised by all the pagan tribes, least frequently among the Kayans, most elaborately among the Klemantan. The different forms of dementia are ascribed to different devils. They are said to be ghosts with red eyes; the *amok* devil comes from the swamp and is different from the suicide devil, both being distinct from the devils which cause simple lunacy (C. Hose and W. McDougall, *Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 28, 31, 46).

It will not be necessary to enter more fully into this side of the subject here, on which further information may be found elsewhere (see artt. DISEASE AND MEDICINE, SHAMANISM). Enough has been said to indicate that, while possession is one of the more important theories of disease, it is applied especially to those cases in which peculiarly violent or abnormal symptoms are plainly to be observed.

4. Possession and initiation.—The pathological character of those affections which are regarded by primitive peoples as evidence of possession is such that the symptoms of the disease or weakness would recur at more or less frequent intervals. It is therefore not surprising to find that those who are subject to such nervous crises come to be regarded as a class apart—a class of peculiar sanctity. This offers in part an explanation of the origin and power of the medicine-man on one side of his functions—as healer, wonder-worker, and prophet. Those who have been in such close relation with the spirits are expected to have special power over them and special knowledge of their will (see J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, i., London, 1913, p. 15).

The Bathonga who had been exorcized for possession after a period of probation himself became a medicine-man and exorcist (Junod, ii. 436 f.). The Melanau woman who has been under the influence of the *toh*, when she has undergone the full

ceremony of exorcism, becomes a medicine-woman with full powers to summon the spirits to assist her in healing others (Hose-McDougall, ii. 130).

In both these cases the abnormal condition did not bring about the automatic inclusion of the subject in the class of medicine-men and -women. The further ceremonies beyond the minimum necessary for mere exorcism, as well as the probationary year in the Thonga case, suggest that, while the actual case of possession had indicated the fitness of the subject, some further process was necessary before he or she was regarded as fully qualified. In this connexion it may be mentioned that in the secret societies, and especially in those of W. Africa, of which initiation is such an important feature, the spiritualistic element which is prominent in certain forms of possession appears to be strongly cultivated (see Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, New York, 1908, p. 174 ff., and P. A. Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush*, do. 1912, p. 40). On the other hand, the mere fact of possession is sometimes adequate to secure recognition of magical powers.

Among the Patagonians those who were seized with the falling sickness or St. Vitus' dance were at once selected to be sorcerers as chosen by the demons themselves (T. Falkner, *Description of Patagonia*, Hereford, 1774, p. 116). In some cases the power was confined to certain families; among some Siberian tribes the office of shaman tended to become hereditary, but the supernatural gift was a necessary qualification, and the shamans also adopted children who appeared suitable to succeed them, *i.e.* those who showed signs of an epileptic or neurotic tendency. Notwithstanding the prevalence of arctic hysteria, it is probable that the qualities necessary for a successful shaman were not too common, as not only must he differ from the ordinary patient in having great control over himself between the fits, which occurred only at the ceremonies, but he had also to have a strong personality, tact, and knowledge to control those with whom he came into contact (M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, Oxford, 1914, p. 169 ff.; *PC*[4], London, 1903, ii. 133, quoting Georgi).

Yet, notwithstanding their selection on the grounds of special fitness, whether due to inheritance or as manifested in the susceptibility to possession, the shamans, after a call which usually follows an acute nervous crisis, have to undergo a period of preparation varying from tribe to tribe, but which in the case of the Yakuts is a lengthy and elaborate ceremony of initiation.

On the other hand, even where a predisposition or the actual symptoms of previous disease were not a condition of becoming a priest, diviner, or soothsayer, the novitiate often imposed conditions which could not fail to lead to an abnormal or unhealthy frame of mind.

The probationary periods required from the aspirant to the profession of the medicine-man among the N. American tribes not infrequently included long fasts and periods of solitude spent in the mountains, during which the novice saw visions, dreamed dreams, and entered into relation with spirits, while the immediate followers of the medicine-men in periodic seclusion in the woods often inflict upon themselves mutilations and injuries which suggest the influence of hysteria (C. Hill-Tout, *British North America*, i., *The Far West*, London, 1907, p. 174 f.; *NR*, San Francisco, 1882–83, i. 170 f., 202, 284, 777, etc.). Among the Chukchi, Koryak, and Gilyak, during the long periods of seclusion in the forests, not only did the shamans learn and practise their professional arts—singing, dancing, ventriloquism, and playing the drum—but they endured hardships of cold, hunger, and solitude which could not but intensify their natural predisposition towards hysteria (Czaplicka, p. 178 f.).

These facts appear to lend support to the view that possession voluntarily induced was not entirely imposture, as those in whom lay the power of acting as media would be recruited from neurotic and mentally weak members of the community who, having a natural predisposition to instability, would be peculiarly susceptible to the influence of excitement and auto-suggestion.

In view of the sanctity of the chief and king and the close connexion of these offices with that of priest and medicine-man, it is not surprising to find that it is believed that the presence of the deity or the spirit may be made manifest in the person of the ruler or leader of a community.

In the Sandwich Islands the god spoke through the king (Ellis, *loc. cit.*). In Fiji the god could be approached only through the medium of the priest, who announced the will of the deity while under the influence of divine possession, but the offices of priest and chief were combined. If, however, the chief was of high rank, it was considered derogatory to his dignity that he should become possessed (B. Thomson, *Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 159).

5. The spirit helper.—As a result of the seclusion which forms part of the novitiate both in Siberia and in N. America, the shaman acquires a familiar spirit or helper which usually appears to him in the form of some animal. When he becomes possessed subsequently, it is by the intermediation of this helper that he comes into relation with the spirit world.

In the Siberian séance, the shaman being a skilled ventriloquist, the voices of the spirits come from all sides of the room as well as from the ceiling. The spirits speak with their own voices, unless they happen to be wolf, fox, or raven, which can speak in the language of man. Sometimes the shaman himself does not understand the language; it may be a mixture of Koryak, Yakut, and Yukaghir, and it may have to be translated for the benefit of Russianized shamans. One Tungus shaman having Koryak spirits, they spoke through him in that tongue. The Asiatic Eskimos have a spirit language analogous to that of the Eskimos of Alaska and Eastern N. America. On the other hand, a Chukchi shamaness, while in a state of possession, in which she produced small pebbles from a larger pebble with no apparent change in the latter, by wringing it with her hands, was unable to answer questions except by signs, because, it was said, she had temporarily lost the knowledge of her own language (Czaplicka, pp. 231, 233).

6. Voluntary possession.—The theory of possession is not applied solely to those intermittent manifestations of abnormality to which it owes its origin. It could hardly be expected that those who are subject to attacks should not take advantage of the power given them by the feelings of awe and terror aroused by their supposed relation to the spirit world. But, as a crisis of their disease cannot be relied upon to coincide with the moment when their advice may be sought or their assistance invoked by the ordinary member of the community, possession is superinduced voluntarily by an artificial stimulus. The fact that in the majority of cases possession is not a morbid state due to purely natural causes, but is artificially induced, as well as the comparative certainty and facility with which the state of exaltation is attained, has caused question to be raised as to the genuine character of the manifestations and the honesty of the performers. When the peculiar temperament of the performers is taken into account, however, there can be little doubt that, notwithstanding imposture in details, the seizure is genuine and the performer himself often believes to a great extent in the reality of his powers. Many writers concur in ascribing a peculiar cast of countenance to the medicine-man as distinct from other members of his tribe. There is often said to be an appearance of evasive cunning and malice, especially in the expression of the eyes. More probably it is due to a highly-strung or neurotic temperament (see especially writers quoted in Czaplicka, *loc. cit.*).

Various means are employed to superinduce the state of possession. These are usually of such a character as might be expected to set up a state of automatism in the chief actor, and, where possession is not confined to the central figure, to stir up a sympathetic state of excitement in the bystanders. Usually some form of action with a strong rhythmic appeal is a prominent feature in the preliminary ceremonies.

The Veddha form of possession is preceded by a dance in which the shaman, while uttering invocations to the spirits, circles round the offerings; the dance increases in speed until the seizure takes place. In one dance in which there were two principal performers the second joined in when the first, who had already become possessed, waved a cloth in front of him. This cloth was the vehicle by which the spirit was supposed to have entered the first dancer, and presumably by the action of waving the cloth in front of the second it was also transmitted to him (C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, p. 230). In Borneo the Kayan medicine-women, in the course of the exorcism of the

evil spirit for the cure of disease, whirl round until they fall in a faint (Hose-McDougall, ii. 133).

Among all the Siberian tribes the most important part of the shaman's outfit is the magic drum, on which he beats at first softly and then louder and louder as his excitement increases. The shamans of the Chukchi and the Asiatic Eskimo sing while beating the drum, and responses are given by an answering chorus consisting in the former case of novices, in the latter of the members of the shaman's family (Czaplicka, p. 230 f.). The Samoyed shaman holds in one hand two arrows, from the points of which hang two bells, and in the other a mystic staff, with which he beats the bells rhythmically as he sings (*ib.* p. 239). In the course of the Bathonga ceremony for exorcizing the spirit of possession—a ceremony which consisted chiefly of an orgy of noise made by drums, rattles, etc., round the subject, sometimes for as long a period as a fortnight—the patient composes a song, usually in Zulu, by the repetition of which subsequently he can be roused or arouse himself to a state of excitation. This is his special song and is used by him on all occasions when, having become a fully-fledged medicine-man, he exercises his powers. One peculiarity connected with this song is that it is invariably composed in Zulu or Njao, even though the subject is unacquainted with these languages. In Fiji the priest appears to set up a state of auto-hypnosis. He takes in his hand, and gazes fixedly at, a whale's tooth until he begins to tremble with a violent muscular action and to sob (Thomson, p. 160). The Yakut shaman also in the preliminary performance gazes fixedly on some point in the darkened room, usually the fire. The peculiar effect of suggestion is indicated in this case by the artificial hiccough which the shaman keeps up during the early part of the performance in the complete silence of a darkened room before he begins to beat his drum (W. Sieroszewski, quoted in Czaplicka, p. 235).

The action of other means employed is more obvious. Intoxicants of various kinds are used.

In Mangaia before giving oracles the priests drank an intoxicating liquor (W. W. Gill, *Myths and Songs from the S. Pacific*, London, 1876, p. 75). In Bali incense was inhaled by the seer or he was surrounded by a band of singing men and women (F. A. Liefrinck, quoted in *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 379).

Smoke from the foliage of a sacred tree or plant was sometimes used.

Among the tribes of the Hindu Kush the priestess veiled her head with a cloth and inhaled smoke from the fire of the sacred cedar until seized with convulsions (J. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh*, Calcutta, 1880, p. 97). The priestess of Apollo ate and was fumigated with laurel, while the Bacchanals ate ivy (Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* 112). In Uganda tobacco was smoked (J. Roscoe, 'Further Notes on the Manners and Customs of the Baganda,' *JRAI* xxxii. [1902] 42). Chukchi and Tungus shamans smoked pipes containing narcotic tobacco; the Yakuts also smoked, swallowing the smoke (Czaplicka, pp. 230, 234). In Madura the medium inhaled incense as she sat on a tripod (*GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 384).

A repulsive but not uncommon method of excitation was to suck or drink the blood of a sacrificial victim.

Among the Kuruvikkārans of S. India the goddess Kali descends on the priest after he has sucked blood from a goat of which the throat has been cut (E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, iv. 187). In S. Celebes the priest runs to put his head inside the carcass of a pig which has been cut open. The impulsive character of this act may be compared with the convulsive sucking of the victim's blood in the Bathonga case quoted above (*GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 382). Analogous examples are to be found in the records of antiquity. In Rhetra, the religious capital of the W. Slavs, the priest tasted the blood of the victim in order to prophesy better (F. J. Mone, *Gesch. des Heidenthums*, Leipzig, 1822, p. 188). The heathen of Harrān, although holding blood unclean and the food of demons, drank it in order to enter into communion with them. In ancient Greece drinking bulls' blood was both a test of the chastity of the priestess and, in Argos, at Ægira in Achaia, a preliminary to the descent of the priestess into the cave from which she prophesied (*GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 381 f.). In S. India self-mutilation was part of the rite. The devil-dancer cuts and lacerates his flesh with a huge whip till the blood flows, presses a torch to his breast, drinks blood from his own wounds and then from the throat of the sacrificial victim (R. Caldwell, 'On Demonolatry in S. India,' *JASB* i. [1832] 101 ff.).

7. Objects to be attained by possession.—(*a*) *Oracles, divination, and prophecy.*—It follows from the primitive interpretation of this abnormal state of exaltation as one of possession by a spirit or by a deity that anything said by the subject while in this state should be regarded as the utterance of the spirit itself. A condition of the success of an attempt to exorcize the possessing spirit is that it should be compelled to declare through the mouth of the victim either its name, thus giving the operator power over it in accordance with a generally recognized rule of magical practice, or its desires (usually a request for offerings), knowledge of which makes it possible for it to be expelled by propitiation. It requires only a slight extension of the argument that these sayings are an expression of the will of the gods to transform them into a channel for the revelation of the future. There is abundant evidence in the recorded instances of possession to show that this is not merely an *a priori* view, but is in accordance with the facts, and, even when the state of possession may have been induced primarily with another object in view, advantage has been taken to obtain knowledge of the future through the possessed person.

In the Sandwich Islands it was believed that, when the priest had reached the height of his frenzy, he revealed the will of the gods. But it was also held that the god did not leave him immediately after his recovery, but continued to possess him for two or three days longer. During this time, when he wore a cloth of a peculiar kind in order to mark his abnormal condition, all his acts were regarded as those of the god, and the greatest attention was paid to his expressions and his whole deportment (Ellis, i. 372–375).

When it is believed that these manifestations of the deity or of spirits are not such involuntary seizures as may occur at any time or to any person, but are subject to what to the savage mind must appear to be certain rules or natural laws, in that they can be superinduced by magical formulæ or magical acts, or in virtue of magical powers inherent in certain individuals, the custom arises of performing these actions or resorting to these individuals whenever it is desired to obtain knowledge of the future. Those who are subject to possession by entering voluntarily into the state of exaltation at the request of their consultants attain the position of oracles. Analogies more or less close to the priestess of Apollo at Delphi and the Sibyl at Cumæ are found in almost every part of the world.

The germ of the prophetic character of possession is to be seen in the Vedda dance in honour of the *nae yaku*, when the direction in which game will be found is indicated by the direction in which the pot of rice falls after it has been set spinning by the shaman as his last act before he ends his performance. In another dance the shaman splits a coco-nut with an *aude* (ceremonial arrow); if a clean break is made, the animal to be shot will be a female, but, if the edge is jagged, it will be a male (C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, pp. 221, 223). In Bali it was held that, when the *pĕrmas* had been taken to the temple and had been raised to a proper pitch of excitement by the incense and the singing of groups of men and women who surrounded him, his soul left his body, which was then at the disposal of the deity. He was regarded as a god and as such gave answers to all questions (F. A. Liefrinck, quoted in *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 379).

The belief that the subject spoke no longer with his own voice but with that of the god is supported by peculiarities of diction and intonation. The utterance may be intermittent or the quality of the voice may be changed.

The Patagonian shaman, when he has worked himself into a frenzy by drumming and rattling, speaks in a low mournful voice (Falkner, *loc. cit.*). In the Sandwich Islands the god gives utterance through the priest to shrill cries and sounds violent and indistinct (Ellis, pp. 352, 373). In Guinea the fetish woman snorts and gasps and her responses are given in a shrill whistling voice (Römer, *Guinea*, p. 57, quoted in *PC*[4], p. 134 f.). As already mentioned, the Siberian shaman, by his skill in ventriloquism, was able to convince his audience of the presence of his spirit or spirits by the cries, appropriate to their supposed animal form, which they uttered. In the case of those animals which spoke with the human voice their utterance was distinguished by a peculiar timbre (Czaplicka, p. 231).

(*b*) *Propitiation.*—These abnormal manifestations may also be evoked in order to propitiate spiritual powers or to enter into communion with those powers; or they may even become an act of worship.

This aspect of the belief is very apparent in the pantomime dances of the Veddas, which form the most important element in their ritual and of which the essential object is that the shaman, the central figure, should become possessed by the spirits invoked. The end to be attained is the material success of the tribe, especially success in the matter of food supply, by propitiating the spirits of the recently dead and those spirits who are specially concerned with hunting, the gathering of honey, and the like. These dances are of the greatest interest; their details throw much light on similar dances elsewhere and on the belief in possession generally. The details of the ceremony, and

especially the eating of the offerings after its termination by all present, point to an attempt thoroughly to unite the spirit in a community of membership with the group and thus to secure the exercise of his power to its advantage, the shaman being both the convener and the vehicle of materialization. The dances take place around offerings to the *yaku* (spirits of the dead). The shaman, while dancing and uttering an invocation summoning the spirits, is seized by the *yaka* invoked. It is interesting to note that the spirit cannot enter directly into the shaman, but only by some vehicle, an *aude*, sword, cloth, or other object held in his hand,[1] or the leaves of a bower of branches usually erected near by. The bower is beaten and stripped when the dance is over in order that the spirits may not linger in the neighbourhood longer than is thought desirable. When the spirit enters the shaman, his first act is to approve the offering; this is signified by the shaman bending over the bowl in which it is contained and then springing away. It is expected that the spirit will grant them what they desire out of gratitude. The pantomime dance then begins; the movement usually leads up to some critical action, after which the shaman collapses. This critical act in a dance devoted to Kande Wauniya, a hunting hero, of which the object is to secure success in hunting, is the shooting of the *sambar* deer by the medicine-man. Another dance, in which Bambura Yaka is invoked for success in getting yams and pigs, staple foods, involves three separate possessions of the chief performer, one of each of the personages mentioned as helping Bambura to kill the boar in the hunting story represented by the action of the dance. In each of the dances the spirit invoked to take possession of the dancers and accept the offerings is appropriate to the end desired, Kande Wauniya for success in hunting, Bambura Yaka for pigs and yams, Pata Yaka in childbirth, Dola Yaka for success in collecting rock honey, Rahu Yaku in collecting the honey and in illness. One of the chief dances is that in honour of the *nae yaku*, the recently dead. Some of the dances, in addition to being intended to secure success in the future, are thanksgivings for past favours (C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, p. 209 ff.).

Possession also forms an element in Malay dances, which, although now a form of amusement, retain some traces of a religious origin. The dance is preceded by an invocation and offering to the spirit of dancing, during which it is usual for the performer to lie down, but in the 'monkey-dance,' which is performed by a girl of about ten years of age, she lies in a swinging cradle, is rocked until she is dizzy, and is fed with salt and areca-nut. At the end of the invocation the spirit is supposed to have taken possession of the dancer. Sometimes the dancer in the monkey-dance is said to perform extraordinary feats of climbing while under the spirit's influence. The child is called by name when it is time for her to recover or, if that fails, she is bathed with coco-nut milk. At the end of the dances an invocation escorts the spirit home. In the 'spit-dance' the dancer holds two iron spits in his hand which at a certain point in the dance he drives into his arms, where they hang (Skeat, pp. 463–467).[2]

(*c*) *The treatment of disease.*—As has been stated above, the primitive theory of disease, in one of its forms, attributes it to the influence of spirits. This being the case, it is thought that its cure may be effected by entering into relation with the spirits and ascertaining their will. Frequently desire to obtain a knowledge of the future is merely secondary. The function of the Siberian shamanistic rites of possession was primarily to remove disease; only when this was accomplished did the shaman at times turn to prophecy. Among the Yakuts the gift of prophecy, however, was retained for some time after the cessation of the rites (Czaplicka, p. 237).

An instructive instance in which the relation of possession to both propitiation and cure of disease is illustrated is to be found in the *bori* cult of the Hausas of Nigeria and Tunis. The *bori* are spirits, some of Muhammadan origin, some purely pagan, who are regarded as the cause of the various diseases. Each spirit is known by name, is responsible for a particular disease, and is summoned to the accompaniment of drumming and the burning of incense by his or her special song. The dancers, both male and female, are 'mounted' by the spirits in the great ceremonial dances when offerings are made. In addition to these propitiation ceremonies which avert the attacks of disease, the medium may be called into consultation in case of an actual illness to make the offerings to appease the offended spirit, or for purposes of divination (A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Ban of the Bori*, London, n.d. [1914], pp. 243 ff., 280 ff.).

In S. India and Ceylon in the course of the devil-dances the performers by becoming possessed enter into relation with the demons who are responsible for cases of illness. It may be noted, however, that in some cases the aim of the performer is to avoid possession by the spirit responsible for the disease, especially if the spirit be very powerful. In the Gonagalla ceremony, at the stage when the Riri Yaka was invoked, a cock was substituted for the dancer as the subject for possession owing to the great malignity of this spirit (B. Z. Seligmann, *JRAI* xxxviii. 374).

In such dances as these the object of the dancer is to cure or to avert disease by appeasing or propitiating the spirits responsible, and in these cases possession is only one of the means, though it may be the most important, by which the goodwill of the spirits is secured and made manifest.

In Cambodia in the time of an epidemic the villagers will seek a man whom they consider suitable, take him to the temple, and then, when he is possessed by the god, ask him to ward off the plague from their village (J. Moura, *Le Royaume de Cambodge*, Paris, 1883, i. 177).

But, while in this case and in other cases—*e.g.*, the *bori* quoted above—spiritual causation is recognized, the exact relation of the spirit to the patient is not clearly expressed. When, however, disease is regarded as due to an indwelling spirit, the obvious aim of the exorcist is to drive out the possessing influence. Such is the case in the Thonga form of possession, when the object of the exorcist is to master the spirit by learning its name and thus acquiring power to drive it away. It is possible to trace the development of the idea of the relation of possession and disease through various stages. The exorcist as among the Bathonga, Zulus, Kayans, and many other peoples, some already mentioned, is usually one who has himself or herself suffered from possession, and therefore may be supposed to stand in a peculiar relation to the spirits. Even when disease is attributed to a material cause, a pebble or bone introduced by magical means into the body, the assistance of the deity may be invoked through his agent.

In Poso in Central Celebes, when the priestess is consulted in a case of disease, she becomes possessed and it is the god who speaks through her mouth, and through her hands draws the evil from the patient (*GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 368 f., quoting A. C. Kruijt).

The intervention may be less direct and the god or spirit may do nothing more than indicate the measures propitiatory or therapeutic that will relieve the patient, as among the Akikúyu (Routledge, p. 241). On the other hand, a logical development is to summon a stronger spirit to possess the exorcist and drive out the malignant spirit.

This is the object of the elaborate rite of the Melanaus of Borneo. If a woman who is possessed goes through the complete rite of exorcism known as *bayok*, she herself becomes an exorcist and can cast out devils from others. This rite is divided into three parts, extending with intervals over eleven nights; the first part is to satisfy the people, the second part to appease the spirits, and the third secures the patient's acceptance as an exorcist. The *bayok sadong* ceremony is undertaken when fowls and eggs have been offered without effect to good spirits. It takes place in a room which is elaborately decorated and on the floor of which coloured rice in the shape of crocodiles, popcorn, maize, tobacco, etc., have been scattered as an offering. The object of the ceremony is to summon the evil spirits to take possession of the medicine-women, three or four of whom are present. In the course of the ceremony the patient is brought to the centre of the room and is whirled round in a sealed cone of shavings until she has been worked up into a frenzy. The medicine-women themselves whirl round until they fall in a faint. The native explanation of the ceremony is that it serves as a summons to the spirits, who keep on coming until one sufficiently strong to deal with the case arrives. This one then takes possession of the chief medicine-woman, and in her person eats the rice and other offerings which have been prepared. The spirit in her then calls out the evil spirit from the patient. Sometimes a rattan swing is provided for the patient and chief medicine-woman,

[1] It is stated that carved bamboos and arrows to be used for a similar purpose were found in the hut of a Sakai medicine-man (W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 252). In a Sinhalese devil dance at Gonagalla, however, while a sword brought the dancer *en rapport* with the spirits, an arrow was used to prevent possession by a dangerous spirit (B. Z. Seligmann, 'A Devil Ceremony of the Peasant Sinhalese,' *JRAI* xxxviii. [1908] 372).

[2] Insensibility to pain or invulnerability is a mark of divine possession. In Bali, when the divinity had seized the possessed person, his body became immaterial and therefore invulnerable, and in the dance with swords or pikes which followed no weapon could hurt him. The S. Indian devil dancer cut and lacerated his flesh until the blood flowed. The Siberian shaman apparently stabbed himself in the body with a knife in the course of the rite as practised among the Kamchadal Eskimos, Chukchi, Yukaghir, and some other of the Siberian tribes, but close observers consider this an effect of sleight of hand, at most a scratch being responsible for the blood shown (Czaplicka, p. 233).

while near at hand is a stand for the evil spirit (Hose-McDougall, pp. 28, 31, 46, 130 ff.).

The Sakai and Jakun, when they have built their little shelters, place the patient inside and then call upon the spirits to descend on themselves. The Blandas summon the spirits of elephants and monkeys (Skeat-Blagden, ii. 252, 295), while the Malay *pawang*, in dealing with a serious case of illness after possession by the tiger-spirit, when he imitates the actions and voice of that animal in movement, in eating, and in licking the body of the patient, engages in a hand-to-hand conflict with the malignant spirit and stabs it after it has taken refuge in jars of water or other receptacles placed for the purpose (Skeat, pp. 436–444).

8. Possession of animals and inanimate objects.—Finally it may be noted that possession is not confined to human beings.

The Todas believe that gods sometimes possess their buffaloes (W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 451). This may be compared with the belief that disease may be transferred to cattle. When the cattle of the Bahima suffer from an epidemic, it is the custom to secure by means of a ceremony the transfer of the disease to one member of the herd which is then driven out for sacrifice as scapegoat (J. Roscoe, 'The Bahima: a Cow Tribe of Enkole in the Uganda Protectorate,' *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 111). The Yakut shaman sometimes frightens away disease, driving it off by spitting and blowing, but sometimes it is transferred to cattle, which are then sacrificed. The dance which forms part of the ceremony is said to be symbolical of their journey to the sky, and in olden days, it is said, there were shamans who themselves ascended to the heavens (Sieroszewski, in Czaplicka, p. 237 f.).

Among the Malays, in a species of spiritualistic performance, after invocation and offerings, spirits are made to take possession of inanimate objects such as palm-blossoms or a fish-trap, and make them go through the motions of a dance. A parallel may be found in the spiritualistic performances of the shaman of the Reindeer Chukchi. Their spirits are said to be very mischievous. Invisible hands turn everything in the tents upside down and throw different objects about. Should the spectators try to touch the spirit, they resent it and may kill the shaman by stabbing him or breaking his head (Czaplicka, p. 232).

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently quoted throughout.

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POSSESSION (Greek and Roman).—The conception of divine possession—the incarnation of a god in human form—prevailed extensively in the earlier stages of religious history. It may be that, as evidenced by the practices of Australian savages, this consciousness in states of excitement of an internal but overmastering force is felt without relation to a personal god (J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 65); but such considerations are inapplicable to the Greeks of the historical age. When the body of the priest or celebrant passed for a time into the possession of the god, all his acts and words were not merely prompted by but proceeded from the god himself. The devotee identified himself with the god and affected to exercise the divine functions. Illustrations may be drawn from the professions of savage medicine-men, such as the *wakan* men of the Dakotas or the Maori *tohungas* (A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, i. 112 f.). The best of the Greek instances is the giving of the name Bacchus to those who participated as worshippers in the orgiastic cult of Dionysus (schol. Aristoph. *Eq.* 408); and the impersonations of the Curetes, who took part in the Cretan mysteries of Zagreus (Eur. frag. 472), were similar to those enacted by the enthusiastic followers of the god at Eleusis or Delphi. The ultimate explanation of these phenomena—whether the collective emotion of the group meeting together for the performance of mimetic rites, when projected and externalized, led to the conception of a personalized god (J. E. Harrison, p. 46), or whether, again, the religion of Dionysus was entirely developed from the worship of a god of vegetation (*GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, i. 1 ff.)—cannot be discussed here. It is sufficient to observe that in all cults where the god enters into the worshipper the worshipper regularly assumes the name of the god. The famous line, to which Plato alludes (*Phædo*, 69 D)—'Many are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the inspired (Bacchi)'—may be ascribed to the theological movement of the 6th cent. B.C., which laid increased stress on the mystical value of the communion of the celebrant with the god (C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829, p. 813; T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., London, 1901, i. 132). Less familiar instances are Sabi and Sabæ, names given to the inspired worshippers of Sabazius (H. Usener, *Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896, p. 44), Bassaræ and Bassarides applied to the Mænads (Athenæus, 198 E; Nonnus, *Dionys.* 14. 395), Cybebi, the designation of the enrapt votaries of the Great Mother (Phot. *s.v.* Κύβηβος), Hermæ, the boy attendants at the oracle of Trophonius (Paus. ix. 39. 7), and Melissæ, the bee-priestesses of Demeter and other deities (A. B. Cook, in *JHS* xv. [1895] 14 f.; Frazer, *Paus.* VIII. xiii. 1). With the last we cannot fail to compare the Thriæ, the prophetic bee-goddesses mentioned below, and the dove-priestesses (Peleiades) at Dodona (R. C. Jebb, *Soph. Trach.*, Cambridge, 1892, p. 202 ff.). The identity of the Peleiades is obscure, but it has recently been suggested with some plausibility that the name was given to a class of magicians who, by intimate association with the birds, had learnt to understand their language, and, as the birds' interpreters, wore a kind of bird-dress when giving response to their questioners (W. R. Halliday, *Greek Divination*, p. 265 ff.). The external association displayed in this mimicry may be compared with the wearing of horns by the Thracian Mænads (Μιμαλλόνες) in order to identify themselves with the bull-god Dionysus (schol. Lycophr. 1237). These impersonations are not always or even usually to be classed as merely deliberate impostures. The visionary who is conscious of the divine possession yields to the emotional impulses stirred in his responsive nature by the whirling dance, the wild music of the flutes, and the intoxication of the midnight hour. And it would not be difficult to adduce modern parallels for the hallucinations of the Bacchants, when they saw the earth flowing with milk, wine, and honey, and inhaled the fragrance of Syrian unguents (Plat. *Ion*, 534 A; Eur. *Bacch.* 141 ff.), or for their insensibility to the attack of fire and sword (Eur. *Bacch.* 747; Ov. *Trist.* IV. i. 41 f.).

The condition of the inspired devotee is described as a divine seizure (κάτοχος, θεόληπτος); and the original sense of the word 'enthusiasm' (cf. ἔνθεος, ἐνθεάζειν) is derived from the indwelling faculty which evokes the display of superhuman power. Corresponding to the entrance into the devotee of an overmastering force was the release of the soul from its corporeal subjection (ἔκστασις, our 'ecstasy'; cf. Plat. *Ion*, 534 B). This temporary expropriation is defined as a brief madness (Galen, xix. 462), which is not to be understood as an irresponsible unsteadiness, but rather as the complete occupation of the mental faculties by a sacred energy (Procl. in Plato, *Rep.* 59. 19). A description of the outward effects of inspiration is given by Vergil in connexion with the visit of Æneas to the Cumæan Sibyl:

'Even as she spoke neither her features nor her complexion remained the same, nor was her hair confined within its braid; her bosom heaved, and her wild heart was swollen with frenzy; her stature was larger to the sight, her voice no longer human: so soon was she inspired by the breath of the god as it came ever nearer. . . . At length, no longer submitting herself to Phoebus, the prophetess rages furiously in her cavern, if so be she may succeed in flinging off the mighty god from her bosom. All the more he plies her frenzied mouth, subduing her wild heart, and fashions her to his will by constraint' (*Æn.* vi. 46 ff., 77 ff.).

Even more explicitly Lucan (v. 161 ff.) describes the vapour from the chasm inspiring the Pythia, and the god forcing his way through the whole of her frame, and compelling her nature to yield to his exclusive guidance. Then he passes to an account of her distraction, as she shakes the

sacred garlands from her head, and overturns the holy vessels of the temple in feverish efforts to escape from the wrath of the god.

The notion that the entrance of the divine afflatus swells the physical frame of the seer recurs in Ov. *Fast.* vi. 537 ff., where Ino consults Carmentis, the prophetic mother of Evander; and the reluctance of the seer to yield to the overpowering strength of the god is illustrated by Cassandra's cry:

'Again the fearful pangs of true prophetic vision stir my soul, and whirl me with their dizzy prelude' (Æsch. *Ag.* 1214 f.).

Those who would avail themselves of the prophet's insight must encounter his natural tendency to resist by binding him fast when they have caught him (A. Lang, *Making of Religion*, p. 142)—a proceeding which receives illustration from the story of Proteus (Hom. *Od.* iv. 415 ff.; Verg. *Georg.* iv. 395 ff.). It has been observed that a divine possession produces the appearance of madness; and, while especially characteristic of the diviner (cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 298), the signs of madness are wont to accompany every ecstatic impulse, as when Hector with foaming mouth and flashing eyes rushes upon the Greek ships, and savage Ares entering into him fills every sinew with increased might (Hom. *Il.* xv. 605, xvii. 210 f.). For inspiration may be put in operation by the agency of various deities, more particularly of those whose individuality was less firmly marked or whose worship was infected with Oriental or at least foreign influences. To the latter class, besides the instances already mentioned, may be assigned the inspiration of Hecate and Cybele (Eur. *Hipp.* 142 ff.). The former, who belong to an earlier and indigenous stratum of thought, include Pan (Poll. i. 19), the Nymphs (νυμφόληπτος), and the Muses (μουσόληπτος). The Muses (*q.v.*) are merely a subdivision of the Nymphs (*FHG* i. 36); and the Nymphs themselves, of whom the Sphragitides of Cithæron may be cited as typical (Paus. IX. iii. 9; Plut. *Aristid.* 11), were gradually forced to yield the sanctities of their shrines to the superior majesty of the Olympians. Plutarch (*Amat.* 16, p. 758 E) includes various kinds of inspiration (ἐπίπνοια) which overturns the reason under the generic term 'enthusiasm.' Besides the inspiration of the diviner by Apollo, he names the Bacchic frenzy of Dionysus, with which he couples the orgiastic ecstasies of Cybele and Pan, the poets' frenzy inspired by the Muses, the warlike frenzy of Ares, and what he calls the fiercest and most fiery of all, the frenzy of love. It must be remembered that Plutarch was writing as a philosopher and man of letters; for in popular estimation the inspiration of the seer was essentially distinct from the rest. Although Apollo had no monopoly of divination, the presiding functionaries of the leading oracles, such as the Pythia at Delphi and the Sibyl of Erythræ, passed increasingly into his service. Among the exceptions may be mentioned Erato, prophetess of Pan at Lycosura in Arcadia (Paus. VIII. xxxvii. 1), and the ministers who prophesied at the temple of Artemis Sarpedonia in Cilicia (Strabo, p. 676).

The entrance into the ecstatic condition was not effected without the co-operation of the seer himself, and various methods were adopted to bring him into communion with the god. The drinking of wine, supposed to contain the vital essence of the god, was practised by the priests at the shrine of Dionysus among the Thracian Ligyraei (Macrob. I. xviii. 1). The oracle of the Clarian Apollo at Colophon was served by a priest drawn from a particular class, who, although utterly ignorant of letters, was able, after drinking the water of a secret spring, to give utterance to oracles composed in formal verse (Tac. *Ann.* ii. 54). A similar potency was ascribed to the waters of the Delphian Cassotis (Paus. X. xxiv. 7) and of the sacred well at Hysiæ in Bœotia (*ib.* IX. ii. 1). The mystical power of the water might be manifested otherwise, as at the oracle of Apollo Thyrxeus near Cyaneæ in Lycia, where the spring showed to any one looking into it whatever he wished to see (*ib.* VII. xxi. 13). The priestess of Apollo Diradiotes at Argos became inspired by drinking the blood of a lamb which had been sacrificed (*ib.* II. xxiv. 1), and Pliny records that, as a preliminary to the exercise of her prophetic power, the priestess of Earth at Ægira in Achaia was accustomed to drink the blood of a bull (*HN* xxviii. 147). The crudity of the conception that the eating of the flesh of a prophetic animal imparts the prophetic faculty by way of corporeal assimilation is illustrated by the remarkable statement of Porphyry (*de Abst.* ii. 48) that those who wish to become possessed of a prophetic spirit swallow the most effective parts of similarly endowed animals, such as the hearts of crows, moles, and hawks. The temple of Apollo at Delphi occupied the site of an old Earth-oracle, which was placed over a deep chasm with a narrow outlet. Here the Pythia, seated on a tripod above the outlet, received the mephitic vapours which rose from the hollow, and was thereby inspired to the utterance of the answers appropriate to the needs of the inquirers (Strabo, p. 419; Cic. *de Divin.* i. 79; Pliny, *HN* ii. 206). Herodotus relates (vii. 111) that at a Thracian oracle of Dionysus belonging to the Satræ, and situated among the loftiest peaks, a priestess of the religious order of the Bessi pronounced the oracles in the same manner as the Pythia, *i.e.* in a condition of ecstatic rapture—but how induced he does not explain. However the result was attained, at Delphi the supremacy of Apollo was acknowledged by his priestess, when, before entering upon her duties, she chewed laurel-leaves (Lucian, *Bis Accus.* 1) or was fumigated with their smoke (Plut. *Pyth. Or.* 6, p. 397 A). Similarly, the Bacchic frenzy was believed to be imparted by the ivy which the Bacchanals ate (Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* 112, p. 291 A). The Thriæ of Mt. Parnassus were conceived either as actually having the form of bees or as winged females with a bee's body from the waist; in either case they were fabled as willing to utter true prophecy when they had fed on fresh honey and were inspired by its intoxicating madness (*Hom. hymn Herm.* 561 f.; with Allen and Sikes's [London, 1904] Appendix, p. 313). Sometimes inspiration was conferred as the result of a sexual union: Numa exercised prophetic power in his capacity as the husband of Egeria (Plut. *Num.* 8); and Apollo was said to have espoused not only Cassandra, but also the Sibyl Herophile (Paus. X. xii. 2) and the priestess at Patara in Lycia (Herod. i. 182).

Whether Theoclymenus in the *Odyssey* (xx. 350) is described as under the influence of inspiration has been disputed; but Calchas and Helenus speak the words that Apollo puts into their mouth (*Il.* i. 385, vii. 53), and the story of Cassandra is a clear proof that the phenomenon was familiar to the writers of the Cyclic epics. From an early date the constitution of Lycurgus was believed to have been inspired from heaven, whether Lycurgus himself was the direct medium for conveying the divine message (Plato, *Legg.* 691 E), or was formally commissioned by the Pythian oracle (Herod. i. 65). The sayings of inspired prophets began to be collected perhaps first during the progress of the religious movement of the 6th cent., to which reference has already been made. The prophet Amphilytus encouraged Pisistratus with an oracle immediately before his victory at Pallene (Herod. i. 62), and Onomacritus, the founder of the Orphic community at Athens, who lived at the court of

the tyrant, was charged with the preparation of a collection of the oracles attributed to Musæus, and was subsequently banished for interpolating it with his own compositions (*ib.* vii. 6). Besides the oracles of Musæus the most notorious were those assigned to Bakis—originally the generic term for a seer, whence a fictitious personality was developed. Collections of oracles were not merely preserved among the state records, but circulated freely among the public without any official endorsement. In fact, the calling of an oracle-monger tended to grow into a profession, which traded on the credulity and superstition of the masses; and the extent of the evil may be measured by the violence with which Diopeithes and others of the same class are denounced by Aristophanes (*Eq.* 1085, etc.). Another impostor of the same period was Eurycles the ventriloquist, who claimed to be inspired by an indwelling demon (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Greek]). In later ages the belief in demons, fostered even among cultivated circles by the adherence to it of the Stoic philosophy, kept alive also the notion that the divine power could inform and stimulate the human seer. When pressed to account for the failure of the Pythian oracle to maintain its former reputation, Chrysippus (ii. 1215 [Arn.]) was content to explain that the peculiar virtue of the locality, which imparted her inspiration to the priestess by means of the exhalations rising from the ground, had decayed through lapse of time. The Stoic theories of the universal immanence of the divine πνεῦμα, and of the harmonious co-ordination of every part of the world (ii. 546 [Arn.]), seemed to give a scientific sanction to the popular belief in the inspiration of the professional diviners (ii. 1211 [Arn.]).

A position of special eminence was accorded to the Sibyl, whose earliest mention is to be found in Heraclitus:

> 'The Sibyl with raving voice speaks words that have no part in laughter or in rich apparel or in unguents. Yet she prevails; for it is the god who drives her' (frag. 92, in H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, i.[3] 94).

The name is believed to be of Semitic origin, and to bear the meaning 'seized by the god' (Gruppe, *Gr. Myth.* p. 927). It will be observed that in Heraclitus, as in Aristophanes (*Pax*, 1095) and Plato (*Phædr.* 244 B), there is no mention of more than one Sibyl; and there is very little doubt that her original home—*i.e.* from the Greek point of view—was at Erythræ on the west coast of Asia Minor (Paus. x. xii. 7). In the later authorities several Sibyls are mentioned, so that the name, once introduced, seems to have spread over the Greek world (cf. Livy, i. 7). One of the most famous was the Sibyl of Cumæ introduced by Vergil into the narrative of *Æn.* vi., and it was she who, according to the legend, brought the Sibylline books to King Tarquin.

The idea of possession may be traced also in the ritual of the dream-oracle. The dream itself was a divine message sent to the sleeper in concrete form (Hom. *Od.* iv. 796 ff.), and clear evidence is wanting that it was commonly regarded as the working of a demonic being within the body of the sleeper himself. On the contrary, it is the normal belief of savages that the soul of the sleeper passes out of his body during sleep (*GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 36 ff.); and there are some indications that a similar view was adopted by the Greeks (Cic. *de Divin.* i. 30, etc.). Nevertheless, the custom whereby inquirers were wont to spread beneath them the skin of the sacrificial victim before seeking sleep in the temple—a custom which is well attested for the shrine of Amphiaraus in Attica, and for other places (Frazer, on Paus. I. xxxiv. 5)—shows that the revelation of the dream required for its transmission the establishment of a special relation between the worshipper and the god. It has also been suggested that the sleeping on the bare earth attested for ordinary persons (Lucian, *Necyom.* 7), as well as for the Selli of Dodona (Hom. *Il.* xvi. 235), was intended to assist the entrance into the body of the sleeper of the chthonic influences coming from below. Sometimes the inquirer is not brought directly into contact with the sacred influence, but receives his message from the lips of a priestly intermediary, whose functions are similar to those of the medium in modern spiritualism. At the temple of Dionysus at Amphiclea in Phocis the god was said to announce cures for sickness in dreams, not directly, but using the priest as his inspired mouth-piece (Paus. x. xxxiii. 11). Further, inscriptional evidence seems to prove the existence of a class of inspired persons (κάτοχοι), who superintended the incubation-rites at various dream-oracles in Egypt and Syria (Gruppe, p. 928).

The Greek poets always spoke of themselves and of other singers as inspired (θεῖος ἀοιδός [cf. Hom. *Od.* iv. 17; Pind. frag. 150; Bacchyl. viii. 3]). This was not so much a metaphor as a survival, since the origin of the conception is to be referred to a primitive era in which the functions of poet and seer were not yet differentiated. The early medicine-man, like Apollo himself, was at once prophet, poet, doctor, diviner, and wizard; but the gradual emergence of the various arts and sciences continually stripped him of his attributes (Halliday, pp. 57, 75). Hence, even in the earliest of our literary records, poetry and divination appear as distinct arts; and in the 5th cent. the sense of their original connexion had so entirely disappeared that it was almost a paradox for Democritus to declare that no good poetry was possible without a mental ardour and inspiration akin to madness (frags. 17, 18 [Diels]). Similarly, the Platonic Socrates asserted that poets compose their songs not by virtue of any wisdom or skill, but owing to a kind of natural inspiration, like that of seers and prophets (*Apol.* 22 C, *Ion*, 533 E). Inspiration had come to be a general notion covering many different kinds of activity which seemed to spring from some transcendent or pre-eminent ability. It was in accordance with this habit of thought that Pindar, emphasizing his preference for inborn over acquired characteristics, spoke of all wisdom as inspired (*Ol.* ix. 28, xi. 10). Since it was the characteristic of seers, as being merely the mouth-pieces of the god, to utter what they did not understand, Plato concluded that statesmen, who, though often successful in their speeches and policies, were equally ignorant of the real meaning of their words, must be guided by divine inspiration (*Meno*, 99 C, D). Again, the wisdom of the philosopher may be described as enthusiasm in the fullest sense; for, though derided by the masses as dotage, it is derived from constant association with the divine (*Phædr.* 249 D).

Roman religion has been so much overlaid with Greek innovations, particularly in so far as our evidence is derived from literary sources, that it is generally difficult to discover old Italian beliefs which have not been contaminated with foreign associations. The early date of this Greek influence may be gauged by the legend which refers the acquisition of the Sibylline books to the end of the regal period, and by the authentic statement that they were first consulted in the year 496 B.C. (Dion. Hal. vi. 17). It is certain, however, that prophetic inspiration must have been as familiar to the old Roman religion as it has been found to be everywhere else; and it is unnecessary in this place to do more than refer to some scanty traces of native divination which occasionally meet us in Latin literature. Besides the Sibylline books, we

read of collections of oracles attributed to Marcius and Publicius (Cic. *de Divin.* i. 115, ii. 113). Of the latter nothing further is known, but the *carmina Marciana*, if Livy's extract (xxv. 12) may be trusted, contained allusions to Greek myths, and must have been of comparatively late origin. To take another illustration, there is no doubt that Faunus was a native Italian wood-spirit, although he was constantly assimilated to Pan by Græcizing writers. Moreover, Fauni (in the plural) are well-evidenced as the semi-divine occupants of oracular shrines. Ennius, in a well-known line, refers to the verses in which Fauns or prophets chanted of old (213 [ed. J. Vahlen, Leipzig, 1854]). Vergil described the visit of Latinus to the dream-oracle of Faunus at Albunea, where a sacred spring in the midst of a dark grove emitted sulphurous fumes (*Æn.* vii. 81 ff.). This character of Faunus is confirmed by the tradition that his wife was named Fatua, and that she foretold the future in the frenzy of divine inspiration (Justin, xliii. 1. 8). He himself also bore the title Fatuus, which, though connected by modern philologists (K. Brugmann, *Comparative Grammar*, Eng. tr., London, 1888, i. 151; W. M. Lindsay, *Latin Language*, Oxford, 1894, p. 324) with *fa-ri*, 'to speak,' was understood by the ancients as descriptive of the inspired madness of the seer (Plin. *HN* xxvii. 107). In his mantic capacity Faunus was associated with Picus, the woodpecker-king or prophetic bird-spirit (Plut. *Num.* 15; see also Harrison, *Themis*, p. 106 ff.).

LITERATURE.—E. B. Tylor, *PC*[4], London, 1903, pp. 124-143; A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, do. 1899, i. 108 ff., *The Making of Religion*, do. 1898; J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], do. 1911-15; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, Munich, 1906, p. 924 ff.; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, Tübingen, 1910, ii. 19 ff.; W. R. Halliday, *Greek Divination*, London, 1913, pp. 54-99.

A. C. PEARSON.

POSSESSION (Indian).—The question of the possession of spirits in the case of the medium, who in a state of hysteria mutters incoherent words which are interpreted as oracles, and of persons in an abnormal condition, as at puberty, pregnancy, and the like, has been discussed in art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Indian), vol. iv. p. 604 ff. In the present article some points hitherto unnoticed are considered.

1. Possession at domestic rites.—Cases of possession often occur at domestic rites.

(*a*) *Death.*—The practice of the Paniyans of Madras is typical:

A man enters with his legs girt with bells, the music of which is supposed to scare the malevolent spirits which are present at the time of a death. He advances with short steps, rolling his eyes and staggering to and fro, sawing the air with two short sticks which he holds in his hands, and thus works himself into a frenzied state of inspiration, while the mourners wail and ask why the dead has been taken from them. Presently a convulsive shiver attacks the medium, who staggers more violently, and at last falls on the ground. He tries to support himself by holding one of the poles of the funeral shed, while he gasps out disjointed sentences which are taken to be the voice of the god.

The object here is to ascertain the fate of the spirit of the dead man, and to discover the cause of his death, which may be due to some misconduct on the part of his relatives—witchcraft, sorcery, or the like. In another form of the rite in the same tribe the intention seems to be to secure communion with the deity who is supposed to be responsible for the death.

Here three masked dancers—one representing the tribal goddess, the other two her ministers—waving sticks and shivering, go before each elder of the tribe and apparently receive his blessing, the elder placing his hands on their faces as a form of salutation, and then rubbing them on his own face. The man representing the goddess then seats himself on a stool and gives an address to the assemblage, admonishing them as to their future conduct (E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, vi. 67, 69).

The desire to effect communion with the spirit of a person lately dead is illustrated by the practice of the Tiyans of Madras.

A girl becomes possessed by the spirit, and talks and acts, it is said, just like the person who has lately died, calling the children, relatives, and friends by name, and giving commands for the future conduct of the surviving members of the family. 'After this, the spirit is severed from earthly trammels, and attains heavenly bliss' (*ib.* vii. 91).

(*b*) *Marriage.*—The Gollas of Madras at their marriages worship Gangā, the goddess of the river Ganges.

They draw coloured figures on the floor of the house and during the preparation of these some people, more particularly boys and those of feeble mind, are excluded from the yard, as some ill luck would befall them if they caught sight of the figures before the rite of removing the evil eye from them had been performed. Food and incense are waved before the figure of Gangā, and a cock is sacrificed, its neck being wrung. The three men who perform the rite prostrate themselves before the goddess and salute her. One of them gradually begins to perspire, and the spectators exclaim that he is about to become possessed by the spirit of an ancestor. Taking up a sword, he tries to cut himself with it, but he is careful to use only the blunt edge. The sword is wrested from him and placed on the figure of the goddess. He then walks round the figure, shaking and twisting his body. Then the bridegroom enters, and he also becomes possessed. Incense and lights are carried round the figure, and the man representing the ancestor announces that the marriage will be fortunate; in other words, the family ancestor sanctions the union of the couple (*ib.* ii. 295).

2. Possession among Muhammadans.—The cult of spirits is a later addition to the orthodox form of Islām, but it is inevitable in India where so many of the converts are drawn from animistic tribes and castes. Among people of this class the spirit-scaring power of the tombs of certain saints and martyrs is prominent.

The shrine of Mirān Sayyid 'Ali, at Unjā in N. Gujarāt, is famous for its power of relieving persons attacked by spirits. When such a patient arrives, the warden (*mujāvir*) provides him with accommodation in one of the open rooms or outhouses of the shrine. In the evening he takes his place beside the railing of the saint's grave and is given a cup of water from the shrine well or cistern. If he is really spirit-possessed, the spirit manifests itself by causing him to shake his body, or, in the case of a woman, to fling her hair about and roll her eyes. If after one or two draughts of water these effects are not produced, the ailment is supposed to be constitutional, and the remedy prescribed is the external or internal use of the leaves of the tree which grows near the saint's grave. This is said to be of a variety elsewhere unknown, but to have grown from a piece of wood which the saint used to clean his teeth—an idea which savours of Buddhism (*PR* ii. 89 f.). In more serious cases the patient seems to be dragged by some unseen force, writhing and raving as if he were undergoing chastisement. 'At last when he gives a faithful promise of future good conduct, and when the fit is exhausted, he removes himself from the place, often with a shoe between his teeth as a sign of abject admission of defeat, and runs from the shrine enclosure, and drops as if dead. He is now in his proper senses, the wild and fagged look in his face during the days of his possession has disappeared, the dazed expression with the snake-like fixedness of the eyeballs is gone. He regains his usual spirits, and after the performance of his vow is sent back to his home' (*BG* ix. pt. ii [1899] 128 f.).

3. Shaikh Saddū.—Among the spirits which attack women in India the chief is Shaikh Saddū. He was a learned man, but a hypocrite, who found a copper lamp engraved with mystical characters. When he lighted it, as in the case of Aladdin (R. F. Burton, *Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night*, London, 1894, x. 33 ff.), a *jinn* appeared to serve him. But, when he employed the *jinn* to gain for him the daughter of a king and to appropriate a mosque which he coveted, the spirits tore him to pieces.

'It is very common to hear the vulgar people say if any of their friends is affected with melancholy, hypochondria, etc., "Ay, it is the spirit of Shaikh Saddu has possessed him." In such cases the spirit is to be dislodged from the afflicted person by sweetmeats, to be distributed among the poor; to which is added, if possible, the sacrifice of a black goat' (Mrs. Meer Hasan Ali, *Observations on the Mussulmauns of India*, London, 1832, ii. 323 ff.).

Some women, regarded as impious by the orthodox, dress themselves in men's clothes, and have a séance in which Shaikh Saddū 'comes on the head' of one of them.

She becomes possessed, waves her head about, and women who desire any special boon, such as the birth of a child, implore her aid. The medium gives her a packet of betel-leaves, and some which she has herself chewed, or sweets

'which she with her profound faith, actually eats. However, God is Lord of all, and it depends on His will and pleasure whether the woman shall be with child or not. But if perchance she should bring forth a child, the belief of these unfortunate creatures in these things is wonderfully confirmed, and they turn real infidels. Should she not have a child, she concludes Miyân [the saint] is angry with her, and repeats the ceremony with redoubled credulity' (Jaffur Shurreef, *Qanoon-e-Islam; or the Customs of the Mussulmans of India*², Madras, 1863, p. 184 f.).

LITERATURE.—The literature has been quoted in the article; see also *ERE* iv. 608.

W. CROOKE.

POSSESSION (Japanese).—*Kangakari*, which is a contraction of *kami*, 'god,' and *kakari*, a word implying the idea of 'possession,' means literally 'god-attachment,' and expresses the idea of the passive attitude of a man under a superior influence which takes possession of him. The Japanese also use two words of Chinese origin to denote inspiration, *shintaku* and *takusen*, both of which imply the idea of divine revelation—of a communication made by divinity by means of an inspired man as intermediary. In pure Japanese the latter idea is also rendered by the expression *kami no shirase*, 'information of the god.'

1. In ancient literature. — This supernatural phenomenon is described in the most ancient Shintō documents. One of the most important mythological tales is that of a famous goddess, Ame no Uzume (the Dread Female of Heaven), who is a sort of prophetess. It is she who, by a sacred dance before the rock cavern in which the sun-goddess has hidden, finally leads her to reappear and lighten the world again. In this connexion an expression is employed in the *Kojiki* (*kamugakari-shite*, 'accomplishing divine possession') which is not very clear, and may be taken in the sense of feigned possession (this is the sense adopted by B. H. Chamberlain, *Kojiki*², Tokyo, 1906, p. 69, n. 32); but the corresponding passage in the *Nihongi* rather seems to indicate that it is real possession (see *Nihongi*, Shūkai ed., i. 40; and cf. tr. by W. G. Aston, London, 1896, i. 44). Moreover, Uzume is regarded as the mythical ancestor of the *sarume* (monkey-women), who performed religious dances (*kagura*) at court; and the divinely-inspired utterance which, according to the *Nihongi*, she pronounced in front of the celestial cavern (and which, according to another version, consisted only of the words *Hi, fu, mi, yo, itsu, mu, nana, ya, kokono, tō*—simply the numerals from one to ten) is the prototype of the revelations of the *miko* ('august child'), young priestesses attached to the principal Shintō temples, who dance the *kagura* to this day and sometimes acted as mediums, particularly at Ise.

Another and more characteristic case of possession is furnished by the prelude to the story of the expedition of the empress Jingō, the first legendary conqueror of Korea. The scene, which is one of ancient grandeur, is thus described in the *Kojiki*:

'The Empress, Her Augustness Princess Okinaga-tarashi [the ancient name of the empress], was at that time divinely possessed. So when the Heavenly Sovereign [Emperor Chūai], dwelling at the palace of Kashiki in Tsukushi [Kyūshū], was about to smite the Land of Kumaso, the Heavenly Sovereign played on his august lute [the *Azuma-koto*, an instrument 5 or 6 ft. long, with six strings], and the Prime Minister, the Noble Take-uchi, being in the pure court [*sa-niha*], requested the divine orders. Hereupon the Empress, divinely possessed, charged him with this instruction and counsel: "There is a land to the Westward, and in that land is abundance of various treasures dazzling to the eye, from gold and silver downwards. I will now bestow this land upon thee." Then the Heavenly Sovereign replied, saying: "If one ascend to a high place and look Westward, no country is to be seen. There is only the great sea"; and saying, "They are lying Deities," he pushed away his august lute, did not play on it, and sat silent. Then the Deities were very angry, and said: "Altogether as for this empire, it is not a land over which thou oughtest to rule. Do thou go to the one road!" [*i.e.* Hades]. Hereupon the Prime Minister, the noble Take-uchi, said: "[I am filled with] awe, my Heavenly Sovereign! Continue playing thy great august lute." Then he slowly drew his august lute to him, and languidly played on it. So almost immediately the sound of the august lute became inaudible. On their forthwith lifting a light and looking, [the Heavenly Sovereign] was dead' (*Kojiki*, 284 f.; cf. *Nihongi*, i. 221 f.).

After the tragic death of the emperor, which was the punishment for his impiety, the empress and her prime minister, alarmed and dismayed, perform the ceremonies of the Great Purification of the country; then Take-uchi tries to obtain a new inspiration from the gods.

'The Noble Take-uchi again stood in the pure court and requested the Deities' commands. Thereupon the manner of their instruction and counsel was exactly the same as on the former day: "Altogether this land is a land to be ruled over by the august child in thine Augustness's august womb." [The deities now speak to, as well as through, the empress.] Then the Noble Take-uchi said: "[I am filled with] awe, my Great Deities! The august child in this Deity's womb, what [sort of] child may it be?" [The Deities] replied, saying: "It is a male child." Then [the Noble Take-uchi] requested more particularly, [saying]: "I wish to know the august names of the Great Deities whose words have now instructed us." Forthwith [the Deities] replied, saying: "It is the august doing of the Great-August-Heaven-Shining-Deity; likewise it is the three Great Deities Bottom-Possessing-Male, Middle-Possessing-Male and Surface-Possessing-Male [three of the deities born at the time of the purification of Izanagi, on his return from Hades], etc. . . ."' (*Kojiki*, 286 f.).

Whereupon these divinities reveal the offerings and mysterious rites by means of which the crossing of the sea and the conquest of Korea will be successfully accomplished.

It is to be noted that, in this text, the empress is accorded 'divinity' (*kami*). This title may have been given to her, as sometimes happened, simply on account of her supreme rank (cf. *Kojiki*, 333, 364 f., etc.); but it is more probable that, as has been supposed by the native commentator Motoori, the prime minister made an exceptional use of the title here, because at the moment she was 'divinely possessed.' However this may be, both this narrative and that of the death of the emperor have a corresponding passage in the *Nihongi* (i. 225 f.) which shows that the interrogation of the gods in a sacred place, with a lute accompaniment, in order to know their names and desires, was a form of divination regularly employed in the most ancient Shintō; and we see also that this practice admitted of the presence of two persons, the one, in a state of possession, serving as a medium, and the other entrusted with the asking of the necessary questions, and also, no doubt, with the explanation of the obscure answers, as the priests of Delphi interpreted the unintelligible words of the pythoness.

2. Development and modification by Buddhism.—After these fundamental narratives of the sacred books, mention might be made of many other cases of inspiration in the course of Japanese history. Without relating them here in detail, we may draw from them two observations of a general kind. (1) Any persons whatever may be possessed as subjects of divination. They may be men (*e.g.*, *Nihongi*, i. 225, 391 f., ii. 317 f.), particularly inferior priests (ii. 76 f., 318), or women (i. 152, 221), especially priestesses (i. 176), or even children (i. 163). (2) We find that the objects of inspiration are usually the oracles of a god who demands a cult either for himself (*e.g.*, *Nihongi*, i. 154 f., 163, 221, ii. 76 f.) or for some other god (i. 391 f.), or who complains that his already existing cult is neglected (i. 152, ii. 77, 318), asks for the erection of a new temple (i. 176, ii. 77), or specifies the particular offerings and observances agreeable to him (i. 153, 222, 226, 391 f., ii. 77, 318). All this represents something rather vulgar. It is, in a word, a secondary divinatory practice, which the court and the upper Shintō clergy, faithful to the official method of the 'Greater Divination' (see DIVINATION [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 802), regard with a certain mistrust. *E.g.*, in the year 812 a decree announced penalties against peasants who, without reason, predicted good or bad fortune.

It is true that this document ordered the local authorities to report to the central government all authentic predictions. But later, when, in 1348, a bonze of Ise, after a thousand days of prayers, found floating on the sea a glittering sword, which a young boy, divinely inspired, declared to be one of the three imperial insignia—the sacred sword lost in 1184 at the great naval battle of Dan-no-ura—the court refused to recognize it as such. This shows that, if possession plays an important part in the most ancient Shintō, it tends afterwards to become rather a popular proceeding, more and more neglected by the official religion.

On the other hand, however, Buddhism lays hold of it, and often avails itself of it in its politics and its 'pious expedients' (*hōben*), *i.e.* cleverly appropriating Shintō by representing its gods as incarnations of its own saints. Thus, in the 8th cent., the priest Gyōgi, having prayed seven days and seven nights under a tree near the great temple of Ise, receives an oracle the result of which is that the sun-goddess must be identified with Vairochana, a Buddhist personification of spiritual illumination and purity. At the same time this foreign influence brings to Japanese possession moral characteristics which pure Shintō did not know. Henceforth the gods teach kindness, charity towards the poor, righteousness, purity of heart—all Buddhist and Confucian virtues. Even Hachiman, the terrible god of war, enjoins on his followers pity for mendicants and lepers, for ants and crickets. A glance through the odd collection of oracles of the *Wa Rongo* ('Japanese Analects,' 1669), of which Aston gives an analysis (*Shinto*, London, 1905, pp. 367–372), will make one realize this transformation. It is a mixture of foreign ideas, attributed to the gods of various Shintōist temples, which contradict not only each other but all that we know of these Japanese gods. At the same time, however, there are in many cases conceptions of a much higher moral level than that of the old indigenous religions.

3. Present-day practice.—At the present day possession is represented chiefly by popular practices of which the principal element is hypnotism. It is certain that this phenomenon was the basis of primitive possession, although the ancient documents do not describe it minutely. Nervous phenomena in general played a large part in Shintō, and gave birth especially to some curious beliefs and legends founded on dissociation of personality (see M. Revon, *Anthologie de la littérature japonaise*, Paris, 1910, pp. 58, 134, etc.). Hysteria was also well known to the early Japanese, who treated it by massage (see W. N. Whitney, 'Notes on the History of Medical Progress in Japan,' in *TASJ* xii. pt. iv. [Tōkyō, 1885] 351). This state of things being understood, it is not astonishing to find that in our day the hypnotic crisis constitutes the essential point of the spiritual séances so well described by Percival Lowell ('Esoteric Shinto,' in *TASJ* xxi. [1893] 106–135, 152–197, 241–270, xii. pt. i. [1894] 1–26, and *Occult Japan*, Boston, 1895).

In a purified place a small group of believers assemble, of whom the principal personages are the *naka-za* ('middle-seat'), *i.e.* the medium, and the *mae-za* ('front-seat'), who directs the ceremony and interrogates the medium himself. It is easy to recognize in these two modern rôles those which we have already found, in primitive times, in the persons of the divinely-possessed Empress Jingō and her minister Take-uchi. After various preliminary ceremonies (in which Buddhist influence is sufficiently marked, by the employment, as accompaniment to the songs, of the *shaku-jō*, a staff to the end of which metal rings are attached, as well as of incense, and by other foreign customs), the *naka-za* sits down, closes his eyes and receives from the *mae-za* the *gohei*, *i.e.* a wand adorned with strips of white paper, which is the sacred emblem of Shintō. Then there is singing, and the descent of the god (*kami-oroshi*) is awaited. At first the *naka-za* remains motionless, but suddenly the *gohei* quivers in his hands, and gradually trembles more and more until the man enters into a state of convulsion. In some cases his eyes remain half-closed; in others they open, and, when the crisis subsides into a permanent trembling, remain fixed, with the look peculiar to hypnosis. The man has then become a god, and the *mae-za*, bowing respectfully, first asks his name, and then puts some questions to him, to which the god, on his part, replies. When this dialogue is finished, the *naka-za*, after a last prayer, rouses him by striking him on the back. After that one of the audience offers him a cup of water, and, when he manages to drink it, others rub his arms and his body until he recovers from his catalepsy.

It may be added that, even in some forms of inspiration in which hypnotism does not play the principal part, as in divination by the *eki*, the soothsayer allows himself to be put into a certain nervous state, marked by a violent contraction of the face, foaming of the lips, and trembling of the whole body. The present writer has seen a man in this state of traditional delirium in the exercise of his prophetic office, who was ordinarily quite gentle — the famous soothsayer Takashima (cf. DIVINATION [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 804[b]).

4. Possession by human spirits. — There is another kind of possession, in which it is not gods that are invoked, but human spirits, either of living men, or, more frequently, of the dead, and especially of deceased relatives. These evocations are practised, also by means of hypnosis, by sorceresses called *ichi-ko*, or *agata-miko*, or sometimes *azusa-miko*, because in their conjurations they make use of the *azusa-yumi*, a bow of *azusa*-wood. Some are parish mediums, others itinerant mediums of a more humble position. This necromancy is, however, a modern custom.

5. Animal-possession.—The last form of possession to be noticed is possession by the fox, the badger, and other animals. The Japanese employ for animal-possession the same expression as for divine possession: 'to be possessed by the fox' is *kitsune ga kakari*. But the fox and the badger do not appear in the primitive documents unless just as any other animals, and Aston is wrong (*Nihongi*, i. 59, n. 10) in including their enchantments among the calamities (*wazahahi*) which required ritual purification. He has confused two aspects of the Japanese fox, which must be all the more carefully distinguished because they are in direct opposition to each other. If the fox holds a place in Shintō, it is only on account of its gradual identification with the god Inari, 'the Man of the Rice,' who is himself connected with Uka no Mi-tama, 'the August Spirit of Food,' a hypostasis of the goddess of food, Ukemochi. It is only in Buddhism that he is regarded as an agent of possession; and he appears there not as a beneficent god, but, on the contrary, as an evil demon.[1] The traditional badger (*tanuki*, which in fact is not a real badger, but a small black fox, the *canis procynoides*) also appears only in popular superstitions, just as does the *mujina*, a kind of badger mentioned in some tales of the *Nihongi* (i. 184, ii. 155).

A famous story in Japan is that of the badger in a monastery which assumed the shape of a tea-kettle and, by its fantastic gambols, caused consternation among all the priests. When they sold it to a coppersmith, the animal took its own shape again, and made the fortune of its new master, who exhibited it as an animal both curious and sacred (A. B. Mitford, *Tales of Old Japan*, London, 1888, p. 175 f.).

That these popular beliefs persist even to-day is shown by a well-known anecdote.

In 1889 a phantom train suddenly appeared to the engine-driver of a real train on the line from Tōkyō to Yokohama. After a desperate pursuit the phantom train was overtaken, and a fox was found crushed to pieces under the wheels of the real locomotive.

[1] For the legendary point of view see W. de Visser, 'The Fox and Badger in the Japanese Folklore,' in *TASJ* xxxvi. pt. iii. [1908]; Lafcadio Hearn, *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*, Boston, 1896, i. 310 f.; W. Anderson, *Catal. of Jap. and Chin. Paintings in the British Museum*, London, 1886, pp. 391, 424; J. M. James, in *TASJ* vii. pt. iv. [1890] 276 f., etc.; cf. also J. L. Nevius, *Demon Possession and Allied Themes*, Chicago, 1894, pp. 46, 51, 71, 104, 202; for the medical point of view the observations of E. Baelz, of the University of Tokyō, a résumé of which will be found in B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[3], Tōkyō, 1898, *s.v.* 'Demoniacal Possession.'

It must also be mentioned that, besides persons possessed by the fox, there are others who possess the fox (*kitsune-mochi*) and can, like the fox himself, employ charms against their enemies. In the old province of Izumo whole families exist who are supposed to have invisible foxes protecting them; but these families are regarded with a general feeling of repulsion, and it is only other families also possessing the fox who will agree to become united to them by marriage. Lastly, it may be recalled in this connexion that the soul of the dead fox is sometimes employed in a kind of secondary divination practised by the *kitsune-tsukahi* (see DIVINATION [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 803[b]).

LITERATURE.—The literature is cited throughout the article.

MICHEL REVON.

POSSESSION (Semitic and Christian). — Among the Semitic peoples, as among the other peoples of the world, there survived from the animistic stage of culture the belief that a spirit can take possession of a person either for good or for evil. This will be made more clear by passing in review the facts in detail.

1. Babylonia and Assyria.—Among the ancient Babylonians the idea of possession in its completest form survived only in the case of evil spirits, though some attenuated traces of the conception that the spirit of a god might take possession of a man are also found. In every period of Babylonian history it was believed that sickness was caused by a demon which entered into persons and took possession of them. This conception is reflected in the oldest Babylonian religious text known, an incantation inscribed on a foundation cylinder of the time of the dynasty of Akkad, about 2800–2600 B.C., now in the University Museum in Philadelphia. The cylinder is fragmentary, the beginning being broken away. But in one of the early columns the demon is addressed thus:

'The light of the city,—in the light of the city are they.
The darkness of the city,—in the darkness of the city are they.
The people of the city,—among the people of the city are they.'

In a later column we read:

'Enlil declares to him:
"Gone is the sickness from the face of the land."
As a protector he removed it,—
Enlil's are they,—
As a protector he removed it.'

It is clear from this text that sickness was a demon, but a demon that Enlil could expel. The beneficent god was more powerful than the demon.

The Babylonians distinguished one demon from another just as a modern physician distinguishes one germ from another. Ashakku was the demon of a wasting disease, perhaps a form of tuberculosis. Akhkhazu, the 'seizer,' was the demon of liver troubles. Labartu, who was pictured as a monster with swine sucking at her breasts, attacked women in childbirth and their infant children.[1] Toothache was supposed to be caused by a demon that was identified with a worm. This is made clear by the following text:

'After Anu [had created the heavens]
The heavens created the earth,
The earth created the rivers,
The rivers created the canals,
The canals created the marsh,
The marsh created the worm.
Then came the worm weeping before Shamash;
Before Ea came her tears:
"What wilt thou give me for my food?
What wilt thou give me as mine to destroy?"
"I will give thee the ripe figs (?) and soft pomegranates (?)."
"Me! What are these ripe figs (?) to me? And soft pomegranates (?)?
Lift me up, between the teeth and the jaw-bone set me,
That I may destroy the blood of the teeth,
And ruin their strength,
Grasp the prong and seize the root."'[1]

As disease was possession by a demon, so cure consisted of expelling the demon from the body. This is most clearly shown in an incantation text in which the demon is addressed thus:[2]

'Out! Out! Far away! Far away!
Shame! Shame! Perish! Perish!
Turn thy body! Out! Far away!
From my body go out!
From my body far away!
From my body, for shame!
From my body perish!
From my body turn!
From my body thy body!
Into my body do not return!
To my body do not approach!
In my body do not dwell!
On my body do not press!
By Shamash, the mighty, be exorcized!
By Ea, lord of all, be exorcized!
By Marduk, chief exorcizer of the gods, be exorcized!
By the fire-god, who burns you, be exorcized!
From my body be ye separated!'

It was a common belief that demons of sickness might enter the body through the agency of other people. Such bewitchment or the casting of a spell over the body of another was an easy way of avenging real or supposed injuries. So frequent were attempts to bewitch personal enemies, and so potent were the spells or charms believed to be, that the second section of the Code of Ḫammurabi is directed against the practice. It is taken up immediately after cases in which men are accused of a capital crime, and one who was accused of practising such arts was compelled by the law to purge himself by the ordeal of plunging into the sacred river. If he could swim out, he was innocent.

This belief in bewitchment is recognized in a number of the incantations, as in the following:[3]

'An evil curse, like a demon, rests upon the man,
A voice, a wretchedness has fallen upon him,
A voice not good has fallen upon him,
An evil curse, a ban of pestilence!
That man an evil curse has slaughtered like a lamb;
His god has retired from his body,
His prayer-answering goddess stands aside,
The voice, the wretchedness covers him like a garment, it overwhelms him.
Marduk saw him,
Into the house of Ea, his father, he entered and spoke:
"My father, an evil curse, like a demon, has fallen on a man."
A second time he said to him:
"What that man should do I do not know. By what may he be cured?"
Ea answered his son Marduk:
"My son, what dost thou not know? What can I add to thee?
Marduk, what dost thou not know? What can I add to thee?
What I know, thou knowest.
Go to him, my son Marduk,
To the house of holy cleansing take him,
His ban loose, his ban break!
The restless evil of his body,
Whether it be curse of his father,
Or curse of his mother,
Or curse of his elder brother,
Or curse of a pest-demon,
Or curse of a man unknown,
Like an onion may it be peeled off,
Like a date may it be cut off,
Like a palm-raceme may it be broken off!
O curse, by Heaven be thou exorcized!
By the Earth be thou exorcized!"'

This text makes it clear that, when the demon took possession of a person, the god or goddess (in other words, good spirits) was believed to withdraw. A similar conception prevailed among the Hebrews.

[1] Cf. M. Jastrow, *The Medicine of the Babylonians and Assyrians*, p. 7.

[1] For the original see *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum*, xvii. [1903] 50, and for trr. R. W. Rogers, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, New York, 1908, p. 155, *Cuneiform Parallels to the OT*, do. 1912, p. 52 ff.; and H. Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder zum AT*, Tübingen, 1909, p. 28.

[2] K. L. Tallqvist, *Die assyrische Beschwörungsserie Maqlû*, Tafel v. 166–184.

[3] H. Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der babylonischen Religion*, Tafel v. 1 ff.

In order to exorcize the demon not only words but symbolic acts were employed. The incantation from which the last quotation comes is continued by a series of sections, each devoted to a symbolic casting into the fire of different kinds of material—an onion, a date, a palm-raceme, a little fleece, a goat-skin, wool, and seed. The portion of it which accompanied the use of the onion reads:

'As this onion is peeled and cast into the fire,
The devouring flame seizes it,
In a garden it will never be planted,
Amid pools and irrigating-ditches will not be placed,
Its roots will not strike into the ground,
Its stalk will not shoot up, will never see the sun,
Unto the feast of a god or a king will not approach,
So be the curse, the ban, the torture, the bewitchment,
The sickness, sighing, sin, misdeed, wrong, and transgression,—
The sickness which in my body, my flesh, my members dwells.
As this onion is peeled and
On this day the devouring flame seizes it,
May the curse be removed! May I see light!'

Similar utterances accompanied the burning of the other materials. To such an extent did the belief in the possession of evil demons prevail that, at least in later times, the whole life of Babylonia was pervaded by the fear of them. This is proved by the extent and variety of the incantation literature. This need not be more fully quoted here, as its fundamental conceptions are embodied in the extracts given above. The rest of it presents in different ways and with a variety of outward symbols endless variations of this theme.

Because of the difficulties of life in the Babylonian climate, struggle, sickness, and pain were more common than exultant joy. Perhaps it was for this reason that, while belief in the possession of demons was developed to a pseudo-science, there is almost no trace of a belief in the possession of a man by a good spirit or god. Nevertheless men who accomplished unusual deeds recognized that their power was not their own—that it came to them from the gods. As a rule, however, they did not claim possession of the gods, but held that each god had imparted to them some special attribute of his as a gift.

Thus Lugalzaggisi, the first to carry the Babylonian arms to the Mediterranean coast (c. 2800 B.C.), claims that intelligence was given him by Enki, the god of wisdom, that he was nourished with the milk of life by Ninkharsag, that he was called by Shamash, and chosen to be the king of the world by Enlil.[1] Earlier than he Eannatum, the conquering king of Lagash, made similar claims. Eannatum also relates a more intimate religious experience. When the men of Umma had raided the fertile plain of Guedin and carried off the crop which was of such value to the men of Lagash, Eannatum fell on his face before the god Ningirsu and prayed for guidance in the important crisis. Thereupon Ningirsu appeared to him, apparently in a dream (we cannot be sure, since the text is broken) and gave him the desired guidance and power. Filled with enthusiasm because of this communion with his god, Eannatum went forth and completely subdued his enemies.[2]

Five or six centuries after Eannatum Gudea, another ruler of Lagash, had a similar experience. The overflow of the rivers had failed, and a famine had resulted. Naturally the ruler was most anxious. Two gods appeared to him in a dream and told him to rebuild the temple of Eninnû,[3] which he proceeded to do. Evidently Gudea believed that in this experience divine intelligence was imparted to him, for he boasts that he introduced by his superior understanding a new type of temple architecture.

This method of gaining divine power continued down to the end of the Assyrian period, though in a somewhat attenuated form.

In the time of Ashurbanipal, *e.g.*, when the king was once invading Elam, both he and his troops were in trouble on account of the river Ididi being in flood. Ashurbanipal prayed, and the goddess Ishtar answered, but now it was not the king to whom the goddess appeared in a dream, but a seer.[4] The vision came by proxy.

[1] *Cf.* F. Thureau-Dangin, *Die sumerischen und akkadischen Königsinschriften*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 152.
[2] *Ib.* p. 13, and L. W. King, *Hist. of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, p. 123 ff.
[3] See Thureau-Dangin, pp. 89-93.
[4] *Cf.* G. A. Barton, *Archæology and the Bible*, Philadelphia, 1916, p. 417.

Perhaps it was because of the heightening of this conception—that gods occasionally appeared to their devoted followers and empowered them to unusual deeds—into a belief that these exceptional men were possessed by the gods or by divine powers that led to the deification of a few Babylonian rulers. It has long been one of the puzzles of Babylonian history why Naram-Sin, Gudea, Dungi, Bur-Sin, and Gimil-Sin claimed to be gods. Granted that the last two may have inherited the title from Dungi, why should it have been accorded spontaneously to three of Babylonia's great rulers, and not to a number of others equally great? None of the theories previously put forward (such as Egyptian influence or the possession of the shrine of Nippur) is adequate. A more probable hypothesis would seem to be that for some reason Naram-Sin, Gudea, and Dungi were believed to be possessed of the divine powers.

2. Phœnicia.—While most of the Phœnician literature has perished, interesting evidence of Phœnician belief in possession is found in an Egyptian document known as the 'Report of Wenamon,'[1] an Egyptian who was sent to Byblos (Gebal) in Phœnicia in the reign of Ramses XII. (1118–1090 B.C.). It was a troubled period of history, and Wenamon had many adventures, being robbed at Dor on his way to Phœnicia, and driven by adverse winds to Cyprus on his way home. Fortunately he lived to narrate his experiences, not the least of which occurred at Byblos itself.

The king of Byblos, Zakar-Baal, was at first unfriendly. This part of the narrative runs:

'I spent nineteen days in his [harbour], and he continually sent to me daily saying: "Betake thyself from my harbour."

Now, when he sacrificed to his gods, the god seized one of his noble youths, making him frenzied, so that he said:

"Bring [the god] hither! Bring the messenger of Amon who hath him, Send him and let him go."'

'The god' in this passage refers to an image of the Theban god Amon called Amon-of-the-way—a kind of travelling Amon which Wenamon had with him. Wenamon continues:

'Now, while the frenzied (youth) continued in frenzy during this night, I found a ship for Egypt, and I loaded all my belongings into it.'

He then relates how, as he was about to flee, Zakar-Baal, at the command of the god through the frenzied youth, sent and recalled him.

The whole incident shows that the Phœnicians believed in possession by a god, and that what was uttered by one so possessed was a divine command that should be given the strictest heed. It is a conception of prophecy familiar to students of the OT.

3. Israel.—The OT affords much evidence that the belief in possession in Israel in the early days of her history was identical with that in Phœnicia. A classical instance of this is Balaam.

The king of Moab sent for him to curse Israel. Balaam strongly desired to comply; to comply meant rich rewards. But, according to the E account, Jahweh met Balaam in the way, and 'put a word in Balaam's mouth' (Nu $23^{4f.}$). Jahweh so took possession of Balaam that in spite of his desires he blessed Israel. The J document says of his experience, 'The spirit of God came upon him' [Balaam] (24^{2}).

That Balaam had the ecstatic experience of the Byblite youth is clearly shown by the poems attributed to him. One of these describes him as the man

'Who seeth the vision of the Almighty,
Falling down and having his eyes open' (24^{16b})—

clearly a description of the frenzied or ecstatic state. The powerlessness of Balaam when thus possessed by the divine spirit is expressed in the lines:

'How shall I curse, whom God hath not cursed?
And how shall I defy, whom Jahweh hath not defied?' (23^{8}).

A still more patent example of the view that pro-

[1] For the whole document see Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, iv. §§ 583-591, or, for the most important parts of it, Barton, pp. 352-366.

phecy is the result of ecstatic possession is afforded by the case of King Saul.

According to the narrative in 1 S 19[18ff.], when David fled for protection to Samuel, Saul sent messengers to bring David back. 'And when they saw the company of the prophets prophesying, and Samuel standing as head over them, the spirit of God came upon the messengers of Saul, and they also prophesied.' The experiment was repeated three times, with the same result. The messengers were so overcome with the ecstasy that some one else had to return to tell Saul what had happened. Finally Saul himself started to go and fetch David, and 'the spirit of God came upon him also, and he went on, and prophesied, until he came to Naioth in Ramah. And he also stripped off his clothes, and he also prophesied before Samuel, and lay down naked all that day and all that night. Wherefore they say, Is Saul also among the prophets?'

It is clear from this story that the prophetic frenzy in the case of Saul rendered him unconscious or, at any rate, unable to stand. It also so possessed him that he became regardless of the ordinary proprieties of dress. Not only is it impossible to obtain stronger evidence of possession, but it is made clear that Samuel's prophecy was also of this order. Indeed *nibba*,' 'he prophesied,' is a passive form, indicating that his words bubbled out under the influence of the power that possessed him.

That this was still the conception of prophecy in the time of Elisha is shown by the narrative in 2 K 3, which gives an account of the campaign of Jehoram, Jehoshaphat, and the king of Edom against Moab.

Elisha accompanied the expedition, and, when the prophet was asked for an oracle concerning where they could find a water-supply, he called for a minstrel to play before him. As the minstrel played, 'the hand of Jahweh came upon him,' *i.e.*, the prophetic ecstasy was induced, and he gave the desired oracle.

From this type of prophecy the literary prophets of later time clearly differentiated themselves. Amos declared: 'I am no *nabî*'!' (7[14]). We find in this period no trace of possession by demons, for in Hebrew thought the spirits were not yet differentiated into good and bad. They were still non-ethical. They were regarded by men as good or evil according as Jahweh sent them on missions that were for the benefit or for the injury of mankind. This is shown by the narrative in 1 K 22, in which the prophet Micaiah explains the fact that the other prophets of the court of Ahab differed from him, because Jahweh had sent forth a spirit to be a lying spirit in the mouths of these prophets.

The case of King Saul was of the same type. We find his melancholia or insanity explained thus: 'Now the spirit of Jahweh had departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from Jahweh troubled him' (1 S 16[14]). The evil spirit came from Jahweh, just as the spirit of Jahweh did, but it was evil because its effects were different. Just as in Babylonia the god and goddess were thought to depart before the demon could come into the man, so the spirit of Jahweh departed before the evil spirit entered into Saul. His possession by this spirit was believed to be the cause of his darkened reason.

The idea of possession appears also to have included the belief that a person could be possessed of the spirit of a departed person. Thus a necromancer is described as *baal 'ob*, 'the possessor of an *'ob*.' The meaning of *'ob* is obscure, but apparently it refers to the spirit of the dead. Thus in 1 S 28, where Saul consulted a woman who possessed an *'ob*, the spirit of Samuel seemed to possess her, for she spoke as though she were Samuel. Necromancers were also called *yidde'oni*, and they were described in Is 8[19] as those 'who chirp . . . and mutter'—possibly because they spoke in the voices of the dead.

In the time after the Exile the literature affords little trace of the conception of possession by the spirit of God. God had become in the theology of the time exalted and remote. Prophets continued to speak, but, as in the case of Zechariah, they received their messages through angels. Eventually even prophecy died out and apocalyptic took its place, and the apocalypses record visions which the God, once nigh, but now most remote, had formerly vouchsafed to men. In such an age the idea of divine possession became impossible.

In this period the belief in demons was fully developed (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Heb.]). Apparently the older view that men might be possessed of a supernatural being continued, but it was inferred in all such cases that the patient was possessed of a demon and not by the spirit of God. While there is no direct evidence on this point in the literature, the prevalence of the belief in demoniacal possession by the people of Palestine that is reflected in the NT is sufficient proof. It is predicted in Zec 13[3ff.] that in future, when any shall prophesy, 'his father and his mother that begat him . . . shall thrust him through when he prophesieth.' This prediction belongs to the latest of the Hebrew prophecies. Was it not uttered because possession was now coming to be regarded as always possession of the devil? See, further, PROPHECY (Hebrew).

4. Arabia.—The beliefs of the early Arabs concerning spirits and possession were similar to those of early Israel. The Arabs believed in a great mass of spirits called *jinn*, or *jan* (the more common name is *jinn*).[1] These were not pure spirits, for they were often represented as hairy and often as having the form of an ostrich or a snake. It was believed that, when a *jinni* was killed, a solid carcass was left behind. Nevertheless the *jinn* had the power to appear and disappear, to assume temporarily any form that pleased them. They are usually spoken of collectively, and were not individualized. Similarly they were originally non-ethical. Whether they were good or bad depended upon the attitude that for the time being they assumed towards men. They were generally supposed to inhabit desolate places and to be unsocial in nature. Their powers were superhuman and they were capable of taking possession of men.

Poets were supposed to owe their power to such possession.

E.g., it is related of Ḥassān ibn Thābit, a devoted follower of Muḥammad who was very useful to the Prophet in replying in a sort of poetry to abusive attacks upon his master, that, while still a young man, before the rise of Islām, he met one day in a street of Medina a female *jinnī*, who leaped upon him and compelled him to utter three verses of poetry. This was his initiation into the versifier's art. Thereafter he was a poet, but each poem came to him as the result of inspiration from the *jinn*.[2]

The separateness of the poets from other men greatly impressed the Arabs.

'From time to time, too, in the intense nervous susceptibility of the Arab race in the keen desert air, there fell upon him [the poet] cataleptic rigors, swoons, and dreams, from which he returned with strange words in his mouth.'[3]

So the poets, when under inspiration, were believed to be under the power of *jinn*. This gave them great distinction. They were, before Islām, often the leaders and representatives of these tribes. Honour was accorded them, not from appreciation of intellectual endowment or of artistic genius, but because of their uncanny connexion with the supernatural. There is a striking parallel between the way in which the poet Ḥassān 'was thrown down by the female spirit and had verses pressed out of him,' and the way in which 'the first utterances of prophecy were pressed from Muḥammad by the angel Gabriel.'[4] In

[1] For more complete accounts see E. W. Lane, *The Thousand and One Nights*, London, 1838–41, note 21, i. 29 ff.; J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*[2], p. 148 ff.; and W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], p. 119 ff.

[2] Cf. D. B. Macdonald, *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, p. 18 ff.

[3] *Ib.* p. 24.

[4] *Ib.* p. 19.

Arabian thought only the Prophet experienced angelic possession.

Beside the poet (*shā'ir*), and below him, was the *kāhin*, or soothsayer, and below him the *'arrāf*, a kind of diviner. These, too, were under the influence of the *jinn*, but in a less exalted way. The *kāhins* were soothsayers connected with a sanctuary, while the *'arrāfs*, like Samuel, told where lost articles might be found. Nevertheless the *kāhins* usually cast their oracles in verse. Their inspiration came, however, in the sanctuary, while that of the poet came as freely as the air of heaven. The ecstatic inspiration of the *kāhin* is interestingly set forth in the following account from the *Kitāb al-Aghānī*, viii. 66, of the approach of the Banu Asad to Imrul-Qais.[1]

'Then the Banū Asad advanced until, when they were a day's journey from Tihāma, their Kāhin, who was 'Awf ibn Rabī'a, prophesied [a prophetic fit came upon him] and said unto them, "O my servants!" They said, "With Thee! O our Lord!" He said, "Who is the king, the ruddy one, the all-conqueror, the unconquered, among camels as if they were a herd of gazelles, with no clamor by his head? He! his blood is scattered wide! He, tomorrow, is the first of the stripped and spoiled!" They said, "Who is it, O our Lord?" He said, "If my heaving soul were not disquieted, I would tell you that he is Ḥujr openly." Then they mounted all, every beast broken and unbroken, and the day had not risen upon them when they came upon the army of Ḥujr, and charged upon his tent.'

This passage describes the oncoming of the prophetic fit, which closely resembled those of which we know in Phœnicia and in Israel; it proceeds to tell us graphically what the *kāhin* uttered and how it was fulfilled. It reveals clearly to us the Arabian notions of possession. The speaker bears witness to the fact that his soul was disquieted by a power not its own.

Muhammad, when first his ecstatic revelations came to him, believed that he was possessed by a *jinni*, and only gradually came to the conviction that it was a divine revelation. He seems to have been subject to ecstatic disturbances, and began his career as a prophet in this way. Later he was compelled to simulate such states in order to keep up the illusion of his followers. It was accordingly natural that, when he began to preach, the Meccans should class him with the *kāhins* and attribute his inspiration to a *jinni*.[2]

There is an interesting story of a Jewish boy at Medina, in the time of Muhammad's residence there, who was subject to epileptic or cataleptic fits. His name was Ibn Ṣayyād. When in his fits, he would lie wrapped up in a rough mantle, muttering to himself, as Muhammad himself had done at the first.[3] The Jews regarded him as a prophet, and Muhammad appears to have been puzzled whether to regard the boy as a prophet or as the Jewish Antichrist.[4] In the one case his possession would be that of angels; in the other of *jinn*.

The adoption by Islām of the Jewish-Christian conception of angels tended to make demons of the *jinn*, but the movement was never completely successful. Though they are sometimes called satans (*shaitans*), they still maintain on the whole their impersonal character, and draw the satans into it. On the whole Islām took over the *jinn* in their original form, and in this form believes in them to this day. Their legal status and their relations to mankind, such as marriage and property, were discussed by Muslim jurists, and, so far as possible, fixed. They were divided into two classes, good and bad, and Muslim saints, such as al-Ghazālī, are said to have had relations with them. The *jinn* were believed to be of a lower order than men, and the saints are frequently said to have preached to them and to have taught them.[6]

5. **Egypt.**—The conceptions concerning possession in Egypt were more nearly parallel to those in Babylonia than to those in Israel and Arabia. In Egypt and Babylonia the spirits were differentiated into good and bad at a much earlier period, and in Egypt, as in Babylonia, the conception that a person might be possessed by supernatural powers was confined largely to belief in demoniacal possession. All disease was accounted for in this way, and, although a kind of medical science developed in Egypt to a higher degree of excellence than in many countries, not only did this conception of demoniacal possession lie behind it, but the administration of purely medical remedies was, to the latest time, accompanied by the recitation of formulæ that were supposed to have power over the disease-giving spirit.

One of the clearest expressions of this view is found in a tale[1] invented at the end of the XXth dynasty of some fictitious events that are said to have transpired in the reign of Ramses II.

That king is said to have married, among others, a princess of Bakhtan. Afterwards the king of Bakhtan sent to Ramses, saying that Bentresht, another daughter of his, was very ill, and begged that an Egyptian physician might be sent to heal her. The most skilful physician went, but found her possessed of a spirit, and could do nothing. Evidently he laboured in vain for a long time, for nine years later the father sent again for aid. This time a charmed statue of the god Khons, called Khons-who-executes-plans-and-drives-out-rebels, was sent. This Khons proceeded to Bakhtan, touched the princess, and the spirit went out of her. Like some of those in the Gospels, he did not depart in silence. He said: 'Welcome, thou great god who drivest out rebels; the city of Bakhtan is thine, its people are thy slaves, I am thy slave. I will go to the place whence I came, to satisfy thy heart concerning the matter of thy journey. Let thy majesty be pleased to command that a festival be celebrated in my honour by the prince of Bakhtan.' The god then nodded to his priest saying: 'It behoves that the prince of Bakhtan make a rich offering to this spirit.'

As Naville has pointed out, this story was intended as an advertisement of the god Khons to the Egyptians. It reflects Egyptian ideas, setting forth in a detailed way their conceptions of possession. A god who advertised such cures hoped to have an opportunity to treat many similar patients in Egypt.

That similar ideas of possession underlay the Egyptian conception of disease is shown by the incantations that were to be spoken at the administration of certain prescriptions.

With a fermentation of honey and other ingredients, *e.g.*, one was to say:[2] 'It has discharged and departed, that which has no fruit. It has gone away, that which has no arms. Turn back (*O mšpn-t*) for I am Horus. Yield (*O mšpn-t*) (for) I am the son of Osiris. The magic of my mother is the protection of my members. Thy evil shall not arise in my body nor any *mšpn-t* in thy members. It has been discharged seven times.' The words were to be spoken over *ínnk-w* herbs. They were to be cooked, mashed, and applied thereto. In like manner, when a kind of beer[3] called *dśr-t*-beer was administered, the *sem*-priest was to be present with his implements—statue, bird-catcher's net, oil, some kind of a flower, etc.—and say: 'Drink the beer. I have brought it to drive out the *tśt-e*-god, the male death, the female death, which is in my body,' etc.

The demons of disease were supposed to be always lurking about, watching for an opportunity to attack. This belief made life a constant terror. No mother could lay a child to rest without invoking unseen powers to spare the little one from malice and disease that lurked in every dark corner or slipped through the open door as the gloom of night gathered, to prostrate the little ones with sickness. One can almost hear the voice of the mother as she said:[4]

'Run out, thou who comest in the darkness, who enterest in stealth, his nose behind him, his face turned backward, who loses that for which he came.
Run out, thou who comest in darkness, who enterest in stealth, her nose behind her, her face turned backward, who loses that for which she came.'

The demons might come under the guise of friends in order to gain access to the child. Hence the mother continues:

'Comest thou to kiss the child? I will not let thee kiss him.
Comest thou to soothe (him)? I will not let thee soothe him.

[1] Tr. Macdonald, p. 81 f.
[2] Qur'ān, lxxiv.
[3] *Ib.* p. 144 ff.
[4] *Ib.* pp. 33, 37.
[5] See Macdonald, p. 34 ff.

[1] See E. Naville, *The Old Egyptian Faith*, pp. 250–258.
[2] Cf. G. A. Reisner, *The Hearst Medical Papyrus*, p. 6.
[3] *Ib.* p. 7.
[4] See Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 291.

Comest thou to harm him? I will not let thee harm him.
Comest thou to take him away? I will not let thee take him away.'

The danger from demons not only accompanied one throughout this life, but also followed one into the hereafter. Hence the charms that had been potent to protect one here were applied to the life beyond. In the time of the empire the folk-charm invaded the *Book of the Dead*, where it forms the 'Chapter of not Permitting a Man's Heart to be Taken Away from Him in the Nether World.'[1]

While belief in possession by demons developed to an elaborate system in Egypt, belief in possession by gods left little trace. In one of the Pyramid Texts of the Old Kingdom King Unis is represented as practising on the gods a kind of cannibalism, in order to possess himself of their powers. The passage reads:[2]

'King Unis is one who eats men and lives on gods,
Lord of messengers, who [dispatches] his messages;
It is "Grasper-of-Forelocks" living in Kehew
Who binds them for king Unis.
It is the serpent "Splendid-Head"
Who watches them for him and repels them for him.
It is "He-who-is-upon-the-Willows"
Who lassoes them for him.
It is "Punisher-of-all-Evil-doers"
Who stabs them for king Unis.
He takes out for him their entrails,
He is a messenger whom he (king Unis) sends to [punish].
Shesmu cuts them up for king Unis
And cooks for him a portion of them
In his evening kettles (or "as his evening kettles = meal").
King Unis is he who eats their charms,
And devours their glorious ones (souls).
. . . . . .
He has taken the hearts of the gods;
He has eaten the Red,
He has swallowed the Green.
King Unis is nourished on satisfied organs,
He is satisfied, living on their hearts and their charms.
. . . . . .
Their charms are in his belly.
The dignities of king Unis are not taken away from him;
He hath swallowed the knowledge of every god.
. . . . . .
Lo, their (the gods') soul is in the belly of king Unis,
. . . . . .
Lo, their soul is with king Unis.'

This text, which incidentally reveals the cannibalism that lay behind Egyptian civilization, was written to account for the intelligence, power, and divine qualities of King Unis. It reverses the usual idea of possession, however. The gods did not possess him, but he possessed them. How all Egyptian kings came to be regarded as gods we can now only conjecture, but evidently one pathway by which it came was this cannibalistic conception of possession.

In the Egyptian priesthood there was an order of prophets, but their particular functions are obscure. They appear to have differed little from the other priests in character. So far as appears, their functions did not depend, like those of the prophets of early Israel, upon ecstatic experiences.

6. Possession in the Gospels.—There is considerable evidence in the Gospels that, in spite of the silence of the later pre-Christian literature on the subject, belief in the possession of demons survived among the peasantry of Palestine, and was often supposed to be the cause of disease. Thus it is regarded as the cause of dumbness (Mt 9^{32}, Lk 11^{14}), of deafness, dumbness, and epilepsy (Mk 9^{25}), of dumbness and blindness (Mt 12^{22}), of curvature of the spine (Lk 13^{11}), and epilepsy (Mk 1^{26}). Ascription of these diseases to unclean spirits is not uniformly made; they are sometimes spoken of merely as disease (Mt 15^{30}, Mk 7^{32}, Lk 18^{35}). In some passages possession and these diseases are enumerated as separate things (Mt 10^{8}, Mk 1^{32}, Lk $6^{17f.}$ 7^{21} 13^{32}). It would seem that, among some, knowledge of the nature of physical disease had progressed far enough to be distinguished from possession, though this was not universal. Once, at least, the old Hebrew and Arabic idea of the multitude and impersonality of the demons comes to the front in the Gospels. The Gerasene demoniac, when asked his name, replied: 'My name is Legion; for we are many' (Mk 5^{9}). This narrative and those in Mk 1 and 9 indicate that insanity and epilepsy were the ills most commonly attributed to demoniac possession. This belief still prevails in Palestine.

The present writer once came upon a group of men near Beitin (Bethel) who were surrounding another, waving sticks at him and shouting. At an opportune moment one behind him dropped his club and caught the hands of the man in the centre, pinioning them behind him. When the writer asked the cause, he was informed that the man was *majnun*, 'possessed of a *jinni*.'

It is indicated in the Gospels that in the time of Christ there were professional exorcists who cast out demons (Mt 12^{27}). Jesus, too, cast them out. Some of His most marvellous cures were of this nature. Attempts have been made by some theologians to prove that Jesus did not Himself believe in possession, but accommodated Himself to the views of His patients and their friends. There is no evidence for this view and much against it. He made the validity of the belief the basis of argument with others, assumed that certain Pharisees could exorcize the demons, and that He, too, could do so (Mt $12^{27f.}$, Lk $11^{16ff.}$). He also assumed that, after expulsion, the existence of the demons was real, and that they could still do harm (Mk $5^{12ff.}$). His humanity was real, and He fully shared the beliefs of His contemporaries upon this point.

7. The Apostolic Age.—In the Gospels possession appears to be confined to demons; in the rest of the NT we hear mainly of being possessed of the Spirit, though references to demoniacal possession are not wanting. This change was wrought by the experience of the day of Pentecost (Ac 2) when the disciples were so possessed of the Spirit that they spoke ecstatically and the beholders thought them drunken. A later historian understood that this speaking, which was called *glossolalia*, 'speaking-tongues,' was the ability to speak foreign languages (v.[8]), but the narrative nevertheless contains evidence that this was a misunderstanding (v.[13]). The disciples were thrown into an ecstasy; they were exalted in mood; they were taken out of themselves. We learn from St. Paul (1 Co 12 and 14) that this type of public utterance was in his time exalted above all other types. His discussion of the subject also makes the nature of the phenomenon quite clear. One who 'spoke in a tongue' spoke with his spirit, but his understanding was unfruitful (1 Co 14^{14}); the hearers did not understand (14^{2}); those out of sympathy, when they witnessed such utterances, naturally called the speakers mad (14^{23}). Paul, with his sound common sense, rated intelligent speaking more highly than this speaking in a tongue, but so popular was this type of possession that even he could not but treat it with great consideration. 'Be not drunken with wine, wherein is riot but be filled with the Spirit' (Eph 5^{18}) could have been written only in an age when complete fullness of the Spirit was supposed to produce effects similar to the drinking of wine. The greatest enemies of the Christians were still thought to be demons and their chief, the 'prince of the power of the air' (2^{2}). The militant disciple wrestled 'against . . . the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places' (6^{12}). It is implied that these controlled, if they did not possess, men. One instance of such possession is presented in the Philippian slave-girl who possessed 'a spirit of Python' (Ac 16^{16}).

[1] See Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 291 ff.
[2] *Ib.* p. 127 ff.

Not only did the Philippians believe her possessed, but St. Paul did also, for he addressed the spirit in exorcizing it (16[18]).

8. The Montanists.—In the 2nd cent. the ecstatic type of prophecy was revived by Montanus in Phrygia, who became the champion of the prophetic ministry. Eusebius, quoting an unnamed informant, says:

> 'He was carried away in spirit, and wrought up into a certain kind of frenzy and irregular ecstasy, raving, and speaking and uttering strange things, and proclaiming what was contrary to the institutions that had prevailed in the Church.'[1]

This is the report of an unsympathetic critic, but among the few sayings of Montanus that have come down to us is one that confirms the view that he was subject to the phenomenon of possession. It runs:

> 'Man is like a lyre, and I [the Holy Spirit] play him like a plectrum. Man sleeps; I [the Holy Spirit] am awake.'[2]

The Church had lost the fire of enthusiasm that made such possession possible, and cast out Montanus and his followers as heretics; nevertheless they lingered in Phrygia until in the 6th cent. they were forcibly exterminated. To what extent the ecstatic experiences were repeated by the followers of Montanus after the 2nd cent. we do not know.[3]

9. The Church and possession.—The condemnation of Montanus registered the belief of the Church that possession of the Holy Spirit in this extraordinary way was no longer possible—a view that was maintained by all the Church until the Reformation and is still maintained by all except some smaller sections of Protestantism. Belief in the possession of demons was still maintained and, as time passed, was intensified. The presence of this belief in the early centuries clearly moulded certain features of the ritual of the Church. Thus, according to the Roman usage, a catechumen, preparatory to baptism, first presented himself to the priest, who breathed upon him (*i.e.* performed the act of insufflation) and recited a prayer of exorcism with his hand extended over the candidate's head. A part of the petition was: 'Break all the snares of Satan by which he has been bound.'[4] The insufflation typified the reception of the Holy Spirit whereby the evil spirit was driven out. In the Gallican ritual the exorcism came first, then unction, and the insufflation last.[5] One curious sentence of this ritual reads: 'I approach thee, thou most unclean, damned spirit.' The liturgy of the East contains similar ceremonies of exorcism and insufflation.[6] The insufflation was a symbolic repetition of the act of Jesus when He breathed on His disciples and said: 'Receive ye the Holy Spirit' (Jn 20[22]). Apparently it was believed that the candidate, who as a sinner had been possessed of Satan before, now became possessed of the Holy Spirit. Such possession was but an attenuated form, so far as outward manifestations were concerned, of that of earlier time. The belief that insufflation imparted such possession extended to oil and water, for, in the consecration of these, the priest breathed on them.[7]

While the belief in possession of the Spirit took this symbolic form, belief in demoniacal possession continued in its original vigour. In W. Europe it was gradually intensified by the survival of pagan beliefs, stories, and practices. Many of these the Church took over and consecrated, but all those not so consecrated were regarded as of the devil. He was supposed to possess those who practised arts that had been banned by the Church. Witches who practised them were in league with him or possessed of him. When in the 13th cent. sects began to spring up, it was natural for ecclesiastics to regard them as in league with the evil one. Thus in 1223 Gregory IX. promulgated a letter exhorting a crusade against the Stedingers, a sect in Friesland and Lower Saxony, in which he accused them of worshipping and having secret communion with the prince of darkness. In 1303 John XXII. complained, in two letters, that both he and many members of his flock were in danger of their lives by reason of the arts of sorcerers. Finally Innocent VIII. in 1484 promulgated his famous bull 'Ad forturan rei memoriam,' in which he accused many persons of both sexes of mixing with devils and injuring by their conjurations unborn children, young animals, all sorts of crops, inflicting all kinds of pains and sickness on people and animals, preventing men from procreation and women from conception, and making them recant their Christian faith. He appointed Heinrich Krämer (Institor) and Jakob Sprenger to be prime inquisitors to rid the land of such. Sprenger had composed his *Malleus Maleficarum* ('Witch-Hammer,' 1489, Cologne, 1520) which, with the papal bull, precipitated a long drawn battle against witches, who were believed to be in league with Satan or possessed of him.[1] The movement spread to England, where in the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth laws were enacted against witches. It called forth Reginald Scot's noted work, *The Discoverie of Witchcraft* (London, 1584). The war against witches and the devil spread to the New World; in Salem, Massachusetts, a number of people were executed at the end of the 17th cent. on suspicion of exercising demoniacal powers. Of course the clergy supported the crusade on both sides of the Atlantic. How many lost their lives in consequence of this dread belief cannot now be ascertained.

Although the increase of scientific knowledge has stopped the execution of people on such charges, the belief in demoniacal possession dies hard. Several cases were reported among the peasantry of Germany in the early part of the 19th cent., vouched for by accredited doctors and clergymen.[2]

10. Possession and revivals.—With the spread of experimental religion as distinguished from ecclesiastical religion since the Reformation there has been a recrudescence of the ancient belief that ecstatic experiences are the work of the Holy Spirit—a kind of possession. Such ecstasies occurred at times under the preaching of the early Friends in the 17th cent. in England, and were interpreted as manifestations of the power of God.[3] They manifested themselves again in the 18th cent. in England under the preaching of Wesley,[4] and in Massachusetts under the ministry of Jonathan Edwards.[5] They accompanied the Scottish-Irish revival in Kentucky in 1800–03[6] and the revival in Ulster in 1859.[7] They may still sometimes be seen in the meetings of the American Negroes.[8] Enthusiastic revivalists have down to recent times regarded them as striking evidences of divine visitation, though the wisest of them, such as Jonathan Edwards, lost faith in them, and Wesley's judgment finally tended in the same direction. Under Finney and Moody common sense asserted itself and evangelism rose to a more healthy plane, though such phenomena still sometimes appear. Science has taught us that they are due to disordered nerves, and the primitive belief in possession that has survived so long is fading away.

1 *HE* v. 16.
2 Cf. R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, p. 40 ff.
3 Cf. art. MONTANISM.
4 See L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship*[3], p. 296.
5 *Ib.* pp. 317, 319. 6 *Ib.* p. 328. 7 *Ib.* pp. 306, 312.

1 V. Rydberg, *The Magic of the Middle Ages*, pp. 173–200.
2 See J. L. Nevius, *Demon Possession*, p. 111 ff.
3 See, *e.g.*, W. C. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, p. 167.
4 Cf. F. M. Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, ch. ix.
5 *Ib.* ch. viii. 6 *Ib.* ch. vii.
7 *Ib.* ch. vi. 8 *Ib.* ch. v.

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POSTS.—See POLES AND POSTS.

POTTAWATOMIES. — See ALGONQUINS (Prairie Tribes), vol. i. p. 325.

POVERTY.—**1. Definition.**—In the Poor Law Commissioners' Report of 1834 poverty is defined as the state of one who, in order to obtain mere subsistence, is forced to have recourse to labour. This the Commissioners distinguish from indigence, by which they understand the state of a person unable to labour, or unable to obtain, in return for his labour, the means of subsistence. Probably B. Seebohm Rowntree's definition (*Poverty: A Study of Town Life*) is more satisfactory: families whose total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of mere physical efficiency may be described as living in 'primary' poverty. This he distinguishes from 'secondary' poverty, under which come those families whose earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of mere physical efficiency, were it not that some portion of it is absorbed by other expenditure, either useful or wasteful. If this definition of poverty is accepted, indigence or destitution is included under 'primary' poverty.

2. History.—This is of a very restricted nature, and is practically limited to the history of destitution, or extreme poverty. Even at the present day the information available concerning poverty is very slight, as scientific investigations have been made in only very few towns, and the results vary so much that it is impossible to generalize.

The only attempt to compare conditions in this country at two different periods is that of Robert Giffen. We give his conclusions, whilst bringing the figures rather more up to date.

For 1843, the first year for which we have income-tax returns, Giffen estimated the income of the country to be £515,000,000, of which £280,000,000 belonged to persons with over £150 per annum and £235,000,000 to persons with under £150 per annum. The £280,000,000 was shared by 200,000 to 250,000 persons, or, including their families, by 1,000,000 to 1,250,000 persons. The £235,000,000 was shared by about 25,500,000 persons. The income-tax paying class had about £250 per head, while the rest of the population had something under £10 per head.

For 1908 Leo G. Chiozza Money estimated the income of the country to be £1,844,000,000, of which £909,000,000 belonged to persons with over £160 per annum and £930,000,000 to persons with under £160 per annum. The £909,000,000 was shared by 1,100,000 persons, or, including their families, by 5,500,000 persons. The £935,000,000 was shared by 39,000,000 persons. The income-tax paying class had about £165 per head as compared with £250 in 1843, whilst the rest of the population had about £24 per head, as compared with under £10 in 1843.

Other figures which bear out the contention that the income-tax paying class has increased much more rapidly than the non-income-tax paying class are those relating to the value of estates passing at death.

In 1838, 25,368 probates were granted, the average amount per estate being £2160. In 1908, 67,524 probates were granted, the average amount per estate being £4000. The increase in the number of estates (165 per cent) was much greater than the increase in the population (70 per cent), so that the wealth of the country was becoming more diffused, or, in other words, a growing proportion of the population was leaving estates.

The figures relating to the consumption of comforts and conventional necessaries consumed by the masses confirm the improved conditions of the bulk of the population. The following table gives the quantities of the principal imported and excisable articles retained for home consumption per head of the population of the United Kingdom in the years 1840 and 1911.

	1840.	1911.
Currants and raisins .	1·45 lbs.	4·89 lbs.
Rice	0·90 ,,	15·08 ,,
Sugar	15·20 ,,	92·07 ,,
Tea	1·22 ,,	6·48 ,,
Tobacco	0·86 ,,	2·05 ,,

The great increase in the consumption of currants, raisins, rice, sugar, tea, and tobacco can be accounted for only by the much greater use that is made of them by the bulk of the population; and such greater use would not be possible but for the increased incomes at the disposal of the masses. Figures showing the growing incomes of the non-income-tax paying classes have already been quoted and these may be supported by the Board of Trade index numbers of wages.

If the general level of wages in 1850 be taken as 100, then the figure for 1907 was 181·7, showing an increase of 81·7 per cent in 57 years (Cd. 4671, p. 44).

From the early part of the 19th cent. until 1896 prices fell very considerably, and, though they have risen since, they were much lower shortly before the war than they were during most years of the 19th century. A few figures from Sauerbeck's average prices of all commodities may be quoted:

Average of 1867-77 = 100	1873 = 111
1820 = 112	1880 = 83
1830 = 91	1890 = 72
1840 = 103	1896 = 61
1850 = 77	1900 = 75
1860 = 99	1910 = 78
1870 = 96	1911 = 80

With the rise in incomes and the fall in prices, there can be little doubt that the masses were much better off in the early 20th cent. than they were 50 or 100 years previously. The growth of Savings Banks deposits (£29,000,000 in 1850 to £257,000,000 in 1911), of the accumulated funds of Friendly Societies (£14,000,000 in 1877 to £50,500,000 in 1905), and of the loan and share capital of Co-operative Societies (£8,500,000 in 1883 to £45,250,000 in 1909) are other indications of greater general prosperity.

3. Extent.—(*a*) The earliest investigation is that of Charles Booth, who conducted an inquiry into the extent of poverty in London in 1886-88. By 'poor' he understood those who had a sufficiently regular, though bare, income, such as 18s.

to 21s. per week for a 'moderate family,' and by 'very poor,' those who from any cause fell much below this standard. Booth obtained his information from the London School Board visitors, who were in daily contact with the people and had considerable knowledge of the parents of the school children. He then assumed that the whole population was the same as the tested part, *i.e.* families with school children. When it is remembered that the part of the population which was not investigated included all the families with children above school age, and with no children, it will be realized that the condition of the bulk was better than the part tested, so that Booth's figures, in so far as they err, err on the dark side. In other words, conditions were probably not so bad as Booth's figures would suggest.

Booth divided the population into 8 classes:

A. The lowest class of occasional labourers, loafers, and semi-criminals.
B. Casual earnings—'very poor.'
C. Intermittent earnings } together the 'poor.'
D. Small regular earnings }
E. Regular standard earnings—above the poverty line.
F. Higher class labour.
G. Lower middle class.
H. Upper middle class.

As the result of his investigations he divides the population among these classes as follows:

A. (lowest) . . .	37,610	or	0·9 per cent
B. (very poor) . .	316,834		7·5 ,,
C. and D. (poor) . .	938,293		22·3 ,,
E. and F. (working class, comfortable) . .	2,166,503		51·5 ,,
G. and H. (middle class and above) . .	749,930		17·8 ,,
	4,209,170		100·0 ,,
Inmates of institutions	99,830		
	4,309,000		

According to Booth's inquiry, 30·7 per cent of the population of London were living in poverty in 1887. This may be taken to include what Rowntree calls 'secondary' as well as 'primary' poverty. That nearly one-third of the inhabitants of London were living in poverty appears very startling, yet the investigations in other towns seem to bear out the probable accuracy of this figure.

(*b*) Seebohm Rowntree conducted his investigations into the extent of poverty in York in 1899. As the population at that time was about 75,000, it was possible to make a house to house investigation in respect of every wage-earning family. Particulars were obtained concerning 11,560 families consisting of 46,754 persons. The population was divided into 7 classes:

A. Total family income under 18s. for a moderate family.
B. Total family income 18s. and under 21s. for a moderate family.
C. Total family income 21s. and under 30s. for a moderate family.
D. Total family income over 30s.
E. Domestic servants.
F. Servant-keeping class.
G. Persons in institutions.

By moderate family was meant a family consisting of father, mother, and from two to four children. In classifying, allowance was made for families which were smaller or larger.

On this basis Rowntree divided the population as follows:

A.	1,957	or	2·6 per cent
B.	4,492		5·9 ,,
C.	15,710		20·7 ,,
D.	24,595		32·4 ,,
E.	4,296		5·7 ,,
F.	21,830		28·8 ,,
G.	2,932		3·9 ,,
	75,812		100·0

Rowntree, instead of adopting Booth's somewhat rough and ready method of saying that all families with less than a certain weekly income were living in poverty, sought to establish a scientific poverty line. He estimated the minimum necessary expenditure for the maintenance of mere physical health and then ascertained whether each family had sufficient earnings to pay for the requisite food, housing accommodation, and household sundries.

With regard to food, he took as the basis of his calculations the diet adopted at the York Workhouse, but excluded butcher meat, as this diminished the cost without reducing the allowance of protein, fats, and carbo-hydrates below the minimum requisite for physical efficiency. The weekly cost of this diet in 1899 was as follows:

Men.	Women.	Child. 8–16.	Child. 3–8.	Child. under 3.
3s. 3d.	2s. 9d.	2s. 7d.	2s. 1d.	2s. 1d.
Average for adults, 3s.; average for children, 2s. 3d.				

With regard to rent, the actual sums paid for rent were taken as the necessary minimum rent expenditure.

With regard to household sundries, Rowntree allowed 1s. 10d. (=1½ bags [140 lbs.] at 1s. 3d.) for coal, 6d. for adults and 5d. for children for clothing, and 2d. per head for all other sundries.

Thus a table was established showing the minimum necessary expenditure per week for families of various sizes; *e.g.*, a family of father, mother, and three children would require 21s. 8d. made up as below:

	s.	d.
Food: 2 at 3s. and 3 at 2s. 3d.	12	9
Rent	4	0
Household sundries: coal	1	10
clothing: 2 at 6d. and 3 at 5d.	2	3
other sundries 5 at 2d. . .	0	10
	21	8

When the earnings of every family were examined by this table, it was ascertained that 1465 families, comprising 7230 persons, were living in 'primary' poverty. This was equal to 9·91 per cent of the whole population of the city and to 15·46 per cent of the working-class population. The number of persons living in 'secondary' poverty was ascertained by deducting the numbers of persons living in 'primary' poverty from the total number of persons living in poverty, the latter number being an estimate of the investigator, formed by his noting down evidences of poverty during his house to house investigation. By this method it was found that families comprising 20,302 persons, equal to 27·84 per cent of the population of the city, were living in poverty. Of these 7230 persons, or 9·91 per cent of the population, were living in 'primary' poverty and 13,072, or 17·93 per cent of the population, in 'secondary' poverty. According to this inquiry, the percentage of the population of York living in poverty (27·84) was only a little less than that in London (30·7). In the case of the towns mentioned below a similar comparison cannot be made, as the extent of 'primary' poverty alone has been investigated.

(*c*) An investigation at Northampton was made by A. R. Burnett-Hurst in July 1913. There, as also at Warrington, Stanley, and Reading, the system adopted was to investigate the conditions prevailing in some 5 per cent of the households and to generalize from these. Further, in each of these cases it was necessary to make allowance for the rise in the general level of prices between 1899 and 1913 before using Rowntree's poverty line figures. Thus the York food allowance of 3s. for adults and 2s. 3d. for children became 3s. 6d. and 2s. 7d. respectively. Fourpence was added for State insurance, and the expenditure on coal was adjusted to meet local conditions.

In Northampton, of the 693 working-class families investigated 57 were below the poverty line. These were equivalent to 8·2 per cent of the working-class households of the town and to 6·4 per cent of all households. These 57 families contained 9 per cent of the working-class population which fell within the scope of the inquiry. In York 15·46 per cent of the working-class population was living below the poverty line in 1899.

(*d*) Burnett-Hurst's inquiry at Warrington was conducted in the early autumn of 1913. Of the 640 working-class families investigated 78 were below the poverty line. These were equivalent to 12·2 per cent of the working-class households and to 11·5 per cent of all households. These 78 families contained 14·7 per cent of the working-class population which fell within the scope of the inquiry.

(*e*) The mining village of Stanley, in the Durham coalfield, was investigated by Burnett-Hurst in July 1913. Of the 203 working-class families whose circumstances were inquired into 12, containing 6 per cent of the working-class population investigated, were below the poverty line.

(*f*) A. L. Bowley conducted an investigation in Reading in the autumn of 1912. 128 families of the 622 investigated were below the poverty line. This is equivalent to 20·6 per cent of the working-class households and to 15·3 per cent of all households. The 128 households below the poverty line contained 29 per cent of the population which fell within the scope of the inquiry.

(*g*) An investigation of quite a different character into the extent of poverty in the United Kingdom has been made on two occasions by Leo G. Chiozza Money. His first inquiry related to 1903 and his second to 1908. As the income-tax returns constituted the basis of his inquiry, he divides the population into three groups, with £160 and £700 as the dividing lines:

	1903.		1908.	
	Number.	Income £ mil.	Number.	Income £ mil.
RICHES.				
Persons with incomes of £700 per annum and upwards and their families . .	1,250,000	570	1,400,000	634
COMFORT.				
Persons with incomes between £160 and £700 per annum and their families . .	4,000,000	260	4,100,000	275
POVERTY.				
Persons with incomes of less than £160 per annum and their families	37,250,000	880	39,100,000	935
	43,000,000	1,710	44,500,000	1,844

(*h*) The statistics relating to pauperism enable us to gauge destitution or extreme poverty, which must not be confused with poverty as defined by Rowntree. The average daily number of paupers in receipt of relief in the United Kingdom at the beginning of 1914 was 933,163, or 20·3 per 1000 of the population.

(*i*) On 26th Dec. 1913 there were 982,292 old age pensions payable in the United Kingdom. Of these, 685,288 were payable in England and Wales, 97,702 in Scotland, and 199,302 in Ireland. Of the total number of persons in England and Wales who are over 70 years of age three-fifths are old age pensioners, *i.e.* persons whose incomes are less than £31 10s. per annum.

4. Causes.—All these investigators of poverty have analyzed its immediate causes, and their conclusions are given below.

(*a*) Booth analyzed 4076 cases of the poor and very poor in London, known to selected School Board visitors, and summarized the results as follows:

Loafers		60 or 1·5 per cent	
Questions of employment—			
Casual work, low pay, irregular earnings	2546	62·4	,,
Questions of habit—			
Drunkenness and thriftlessness . .	533	13·6	,,
Questions of circumstances—			
Large families and illness . . .	917	22·5	,,
	4076	100·0	

(*b*) Rowntree analyzed the causes of 'primary' poverty under somewhat different headings.

Immediate cause of 'primary' poverty.	No. of households affected.	No. of persons affected.	Percentage of total population living in 'primary' poverty.
Death of chief wage-earner	403	1,130	15·63
Illness or old age of chief wage-earner . .	146	370	5·11
Chief wage-earner out of work	38	167	2·31
Irregularity of work .	51	205	2·83
Largeness of family, *i.e.* more than 4 children .	187	1,602	22·16
In regular work but low wages	640	3,756	51·96
	1,465	7,230	100·00

(*c*) The information collected by Bowley and Burnett-Hurst in Northampton, Warrington, and Reading may be summarized in one table; the figures for Stanley are omitted, being too small to express in percentages.

Immediate cause of poverty.	Percentage of households below the Rowntree standard.		
	Northampton.	Warrington.	Reading.
Chief wage-earner dead .	21	6	14
do. ill or old . . .	14	1	11
do. out of work . .	..	3	2
do. irregularly employed . . .	..	3	4
do. regularly employed:			
Wage insufficient for 3 children . . .			
3 children or less .	11	22	33
4 children or more .	9	38	15
Wage sufficient for 3 but family more than 3 .	35	27	21
	100	100	100

In the case of each of the five towns where the immediate causes of poverty have been analyzed the predominant cause is the same, viz. low wages, frequently in conjunction with large families. In York (1899) 10 per cent of the adult males earned under 20s. a week and 26 per cent earned between 20s. and 24s. In Northampton (1913) 13 per cent of the adult males earned under 20s. a week and 14 per cent earned between 20s. and 24s. In Warrington (1913) 3·5 per cent of the adult males earned under 20s. a week and 28·5 per cent earned between 20s. and 24s. In Reading (1912) 15 per

cent of the adult male population earned under 20s. a week and 35·5 per cent earned between 20s. and 24s. When from one quarter to one half of the adult male populations of these towns was earning less than 24s. a week, it is not astonishing that poverty should be very prevalent.

The growth of population has undoubtedly a serious influence on the general extent of poverty in old countries. Sooner or later increasing supplies of food and minerals can be obtained only at increasing cost. As the population of an old country grows and the supply of labour as a consequence increases, the productive capacity of the country grows, but not in the same proportion as the population. For a time this tendency may be overcome by new inventions, the accumulation of more capital, and the greater efficiency of the workers; under these circumstances an advance in the general welfare of the community may be achieved, in spite of the increase of population. This has probably been the case in this country during the past hundred years or so, but we cannot look to similar conditions continuing indefinitely in the future.

5. Present system of dealing with poverty.—At the present time in this country there are various methods, public and private, but not too well co-ordinated, for dealing with poverty. Most are palliative in character and only too few are remedial. This, however, is hardly astonishing, seeing how difficult the problem is.

(*a*) *Public methods.*—(1) The poor relief granted by Boards of Guardians or Poor Law Boards must be mentioned first. Nearly £18,000,000 per annum are being spent by these bodies in the United Kingdom, but they assist no one unless he or she is absolutely destitute, so that their help is accorded only to a small proportion of the poor. Out-relief, which with certain exceptions is not granted to able-bodied persons, is generally very inadequate. Indoor relief, on the other hand, is very costly, and not infrequently has the effect of making persons relieved into more or less permanent paupers, by bringing them into contact with some of the least desirable guests of the Guardians. Undoubtedly, the most satisfactory work done by the Guardians is that done in their children's homes and in their hospitals.

(2) Under the Old Age Pension Act, 1908, every person of British nationality and twelve years' residence within the United Kingdom whose income is below £31 10s. per annum becomes entitled, subject to certain small exceptions, on attaining the age of 70 to a pension of 5s. a week from the Exchequer. At the present time about a million persons benefit by this Act at a cost to the community of some £13,000,000. As the result of the passing of this Act, the number of paupers in England and Wales over 70 years of age has greatly diminished. It was 229,474 on 31st March 1906, whereas it had fallen to 57,948 on 1st Jan. 1914.

(3) The Unemployed Workmen Act, 1905, provides for the establishment of Distress Committees which, if satisfied that an applicant is a person honestly desirous of obtaining work, but unable to do so from exceptional causes over which he has no control, and that his case is capable of more suitable treatment under the Act than under the Poor Law, can endeavour to obtain work for him or themselves undertake to assist him. This assistance may take the form of (α) aiding emigration, (β) aiding migration to another area, or (γ) providing or contributing towards the provision of temporary work. The Distress Committees have dealt with only a very limited number of the unemployed: in 1912–13 the applicants for relief in England and Wales numbered 43,381, and of these 30,662 were found qualified for assistance. The majority of the applicants were general or casual labourers.

(4) A far greater number of unemployed are dealt with by Labour Exchanges, established under the Labour Exchanges Act, 1909. On 16th Jan. 1914 423 Exchanges were open. During 1913 the total number of individuals who applied to the Exchanges for employment was 1,871,671, the total number of registrations being 2,965,893. During the year 652,306 individuals were given work, the number of vacancies filled being 921,853.

(5) Another attempt to minimize the consequences of unemployment, and indirectly of poverty, has been the introduction of compulsory insurance against unemployment in certain trades, under pt. II. of the National Insurance Act, 1911, since amended by the National Insurance Act, 1914. The principal industries concerned are building, shipbuilding, works of construction, engineering, iron-founding, and the construction of vehicles. On 17th Jan. 1914 the number of workpeople insured was 2,282,324. The total amount of unemployment benefit paid to workpeople during 1913 was £497,725.

(6) The compulsory health insurance established by pt. I. of the National Insurance Act, 1911, since amended by the National Insurance Act, 1913, should ultimately have a considerable effect in increasing the welfare of the population, as ill-health undoubtedly lies at the bottom of a good deal of inefficiency, and the consequent low wages. A return made in February 1914 stated that there were 13,759,400 insured persons in the United Kingdom, of whom 360,000 were deposit contributors.

(7) The most direct effort to raise the low level of wages which is at the bottom of so much poverty was made when the Trade Boards Act, 1909, was passed. The Act applied at first only to the four trades specified in the schedule—tailoring, cardboard box-making, machine-made lace, and chain-making—but the list may be extended by Provisional Order, confirmed by Act of Parliament. In 1913 the Act was applied to four new trades—shirt-making, sugar confectionery and food-preserving, hollow-ware, and linen and cotton embroidery. For each trade or branch of a trade one or more Trade Boards are to be established. The duties of a Trade Board include the fixing of minimum time and piece rates.

Investigations into the working of the Act have been made in the chain-making and tailoring trades by R. H. Tawney, and in the box-making trade by Miss M. E. Bulkley, under the auspices of the Ratan Tata Foundation of which Tawney is director. The following table relating to the wages earned by mastermen and journeymen chain-makers, before and after the establishment of minimum rates, gives some indication of the work of a Trade Board:

Weekly wages.	Mastermen.		Journeymen.	
	1911.	1913.	1911.	1913.
Under 15s.	56·7 %	1·3 %	61·3 %	0·7 %
15s. and under 20s.	33·7 ,,	20·2 ,,	37·2 ,,	14·6 ,,
20s. and under 25s.	9·4 ,,	60·8 ,,	1·4 ,,	48·1 ,,
25s. and under 30s.	..	17·5 ,,	..	30·6 ,,
30s. and over	..	..	..	5·8 ,,

(8) Of the persons who fall below the poverty line there can be little doubt that the school children and infants constitute the majority and that they are the worst sufferers. As a result of their investigations Bowley and Burnett-Hurst

inform us that in Northampton just under one-sixth of the school children and just over one-sixth of the infants, in Warrington a quarter of the school children and almost a quarter of the infants, in Reading nearly half the school children and 45 per cent of the infants belonging to working-class families are living in households in 'primary' poverty.

The direct efforts of the State to remedy these conditions in England and Wales are connected with the feeding and the medical inspection of school children.

(*a*) The Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1906, which permits rates to be spent on the provision of food, is optional, and its adoption by Local Education Authorities is by no means universal. In many cases the authorities have contented themselves with making arrangements with voluntary agencies. In 1911–12, out of 322 Local Education Authorities in England and Wales, 131 were making some provision for feeding school children. Of these, 95 were spending rates on the provision of food. In 1908–09, £67,524 from the rates, and £85,690 in all, were spent in the provision of meals by Local Education Authorities. In 1911–12 the corresponding figures were £151,763 and £157,127. The total number of meals provided in 1911 was 8,487,824 in London and 7,634,395 in the rest of England and Wales. Both these figures show a small decrease on the previous year. The total number of children fed is given in the returns for 1911 as 124,685. The number is apparently too low; and Miss Bulkley, in her investigation under the Ratan Tata Foundation, estimates that the total number of children who were fed at some time or other during the year was about 230,000 out of a total school population of 5,357,567. The Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1914, has removed the chief financial restrictions imposed by the earlier Act, and provides for an Exchequer grant which may amount to half the local authority's expenditure. It is hoped that this grant will prove a stimulus to increased provision of school meals and a means by which the Board of Education can level up the conditions under which the provision is made.

(*β*) The School Medical Service was set up under the Education (Administrative Provisions) Act, 1907. The medical inspection of all children attending public elementary schools is obligatory, but their treatment is optional. In 1913–14 there were 841 school medical officers in England and Wales, and in addition there were 578 officers appointed for special work, especially dentistry. In 277 out of the 317 Elementary Education Areas in England and Wales school nurses had been appointed. Medical treatment was provided by 241 out of the 317 authorities. The treatment is generally limited to minor ailments, uncleanliness, ring-worm, and other common skin-diseases of children, defective eyesight or hearing, some external affections of the eyes and ears, and various temporary conditions of the mouth (including teeth), nose, and throat.

(*b*) *Private methods.* — These vary greatly in character. There is much individual charity, people who are well-to-do helping those who are less fortunate. In many cases it is the poor who help the very poor, whether they be relatives or merely neighbours. Further, there are many charitable foundations and institutions whose funds are obtained from endowments or subscriptions, or from both these sources, such as Dr. Barnardo's Homes and the Church Army. Other types of organization are the Charity Organization Society and the Gilds of Help that exist in several towns; these organizations exist with the special object of investigating cases of poverty and helping them or bringing them into touch with some means of help. At times of unusual distress, such as is caused by a famine or a coal-mine disaster, a special fund is often raised to meet the emergency. Many trade unions, although not charitable organizations, relieve distress by the payment of out-of-work benefits.

How many people in the grip of poverty are helped by private efforts, and how much money is spent in this way, it is impossible to say. Definite information with regard to public efforts to alleviate poverty is also very difficult to obtain. The ideal of public and private methods should undoubtedly be gradually to reduce the amount of poverty by abolishing the ultimate causes of poverty. That many of the efforts are not remedial, but merely palliative, must be admitted. Further, no expenditure of money, however lavish, no raising of wages, no bettering of urban and rural housing accommodation, no improving of sanitary conditions, in fact, no material improvements alone, can hope to achieve permanent results, unless they are accompanied by certain moral changes in the character of the people. Thrift, sobriety, tidiness, and cleanliness—these and other virtues must be developed, if people are to reap the full benefits of any material changes which are likely to be effected. Much, in fact, could be achieved by moral development alone, and it is of the greatest importance to realize this, as material improvements at a time of high prices and great national impoverishment due to the war are hardly likely to be forthcoming in any large measure in the immediate future.

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DOUGLAS KNOOP.

POWER.—The definition of power, or potency, and the distinction of power into active and passive are most clearly given by Aristotle. In this respect later writers, as Hobbes and Locke, have done little more than repeat Aristotle.

In *Met.* (iv.) v. 12 Aristotle distinguishes three senses of the term:

'"Potency" means (1) a source of movement or change, which is in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing *qua* other, *e.g.* the art of building is a potency which is not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which is a potency, might be in the man healed, but not in him *qua* healed. "Potency" then means the source, in general, of change or movement in another thing or in the same thing *qua* other, and also the source of a thing's being moved by another thing or by itself *qua* other. For in virtue of that principle, in virtue of which the patient suffers anything, we call it "capable" of suffering; and this we do sometimes if it suffers anything at all, sometimes not in respect of everything it suffers, but only if it suffers a change for the better.—(2) The capacity of performing this well or according to intention; for sometimes we say of those who merely can walk or speak but not well or not as they intend, that they *cannot* speak or walk. The case of passivity is similar.—(3) The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the worse, are called potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in general destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one and by lacking something, and things are impassive with respect to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected by them, because of a "potency" and because they "can" do something and are in some positive state' (*Metaphysica*, tr. W. D. Ross, in *Works of Aristotle*, tr. J. A. Smith and W. D Ross, vol. viii. Oxford, 1908).

In *Met.* (viii.) ix. 1, having mentioned these different kinds of potency, Aristotle says:

'Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be "capable" either because it can be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain motive principle, and because even the matter is a motive principle, that the thing acted on is acted on, one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily is *inflammable*, and that which *yields* in a particular way can be *crushed*; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potency is in the agent, *e.g.* heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things' (tr. Ross; cf. Reid's *Works*[2], ed. Hamilton, p. 519, note).

Aristotle also refers to the use of the term in geometry, and says that it is due to analogy.

The foregoing quotations contain not only the germ of all that has been subsequently written, but also anticipations of what is suggested by the most recent results of science.

The language of Hobbes is not essentially different from that of Aristotle. Hobbes reduces all change to motion. Hence power is confined by Hobbes to what Aristotle regards as only one sense of the word 'power.'

'All mutation,' says Hobbes, 'consists in motion only'; 'there can be no cause of motion, except in a body contiguous and moved'; 'motion is not resisted by rest, but by contrary motion' (*English Works*, ed. Molesworth, i. 123–125).

Hobbes continues:

'Whensoever any agent has all those accidents which are necessarily requisite for the production of some effect in the patient, then we say that agent has *power* to produce that effect, if it be applied to a patient. . . . The same accidents, which constitute the efficient cause, constitute also the *power* of the agent. Wherefore the *power of the agent* and the *efficient cause* are the same thing. But they are considered with this difference, that *cause* is so called in respect of the effect already produced, and power in respect of the same effect to be produced hereafter; so that *cause* respects the past, *power* the future time. Also the *power of the agent* is that which is commonly called *active power*.' Power of the patient, passive power, material cause are, he says, the same thing, 'but with this different consideration, that in cause the past time, and in power the future, is respected.' The power of the agent and patient together he styles 'entire or *plenary power*.' It is the same thing with entire cause—'the aggregate of all the accidents, as well in the agent as in the patient, which are requisite for the production of the effect' (*ib.* i. 127 f.).

The language of Hobbes reminds us of J. S. Mill, who regards the cause as the sum total of conditions, positive and negative taken together, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows. To Mill, however, the distinction of agent and patient is illusory, whereas Hobbes follows closely the Aristotelian analysis given above. They are two aspects necessarily united.

'These powers . . . are but conditional, namely, *the agent has power, if it be applied to a patient; and the patient has power, if it be applied to an agent*; otherwise neither of them have power, nor can the accidents, which are in them severally, be properly called powers; nor any action be said to be possible for the power of the agent alone or of the patient alone' (*ib.* i. 129).

Neither in Hobbes nor in Mill do we find any satisfactory account of power as a subjective phenomenon. This question was first raised by Locke, who uses language, in some respects, similar to that of Hobbes, but not so objective. He says:

'Power also is another of those simple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection: for, observing in ourselves that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest; the effects, also, that natural bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our senses, we both these ways get the idea of power' (*Essay*, ii. vii. 8).

'*This Idea how got.*—The mind being every day informed by the senses of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before, reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice, and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things, by like agents, and by the like ways; considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change: and so comes by that idea which we call power. . . . The power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas; for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon, anything, but by the observable change of its sensible ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas' (*ib.* ii. xxi. 1).

In these sentences we come face to face with the psychological and epistemological problems which, in modern times, circle round the meaning of the term. Apart from these questions, power is to Locke, as to Aristotle and Hobbes, active and passive.

'Power, thus considered, is two-fold; viz., as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called active, and the other passive power' (*ib.* ii. xxi. 2).

He suggests that matter may be wholly destitute of active power, as its author, God, is truly above all passive power, and that created spirits alone are capable of both active and passive power. He also suggests that the clearest idea of active power is got from spirit, from reflexion on the operations of our minds, from which only we have the ideas of thinking and of the beginning of motion. These ideas of Locke lead inevitably to the question as to the relation that the power of which we seem to be conscious to control our own thoughts and actions has to power considered as existing in the external world.

It is not unusual to evade the problems thus raised by Locke by distinguishing different senses of the word 'power'; by saying that, when we use 'power' in the psychological sense, as an apparent phenomenon of our inner consciousness, the sense is quite different from and unrelated to such uses of 'power' as are exemplified when the 'mechanical powers' are spoken of, or 'power' as the rate of doing work per unit of time, or, again, as implied in the phrase 'potential energy'; or in the theory of *potential* introduced into electrical science by G. Green in 1828. The question as to the total discrimination of these different senses from the psychological cannot be determined *a priori*, by mere introspection. We, therefore, propose to consider: (1) the psychological data from which the concept of power is derived; (2) the scientific uses of the term; (3) the metaphysical connexion (if any) which exists between the psychological concept and the scientific use; and (4) the epistemological value of the concept.

1. The psychological origin.—The passage quoted above from Locke was early taken exception to by Hume.

'I believe,' says Hume, 'the most general and most popular explication of this matter, is to say, that finding from experience, that there are several new productions in matter, such as the motions and variations of body, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power and efficacy. But to be convinc'd that this explication is more popular than philosophical, we need but reflect on two very obvious principles. *First*, That reason alone can never give rise to any original idea, and *secondly*, that reason, as distinguish'd from experience, can never make us conclude, that a cause or productive quality is absolutely requisite to every beginning of existence' (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, new ed., London, 1909, i. 452).

In the *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, he says:

'From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning' (sect. vii. pt. 1).

Hume then inquires whether this idea is derived from reflexion on the operations of our minds, and is copied from any internal impression—*e.g.*, an act of volition. His conclusion is:

'The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being

immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry' (*ib.*). His general conclusion is: 'All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*. And as we can have no idea of anything which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion *seems* to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life' (*ib.* sect. vii. pt. 2).

These views regarding power were accepted and repeated by Thomas Brown.

'We give the name of *cause* to the object which we believe to be the invariable antecedent of a particular change; we give the name of *effect*, reciprocally to that invariable consequent; and the relation itself, when considered abstractly, we denominate *power* in the object that is the invariable antecedent,—*susceptibility* in the object that exhibits, in its change, the invariable consequent. We say of fire, that it has the *power* of melting metals, and of metals that they are *susceptible* of fusion by fire,—but, in all this variety of words, we mean nothing more than our belief, that when a solid metal is subjected for a certain time to the application of a strong heat, it will begin afterwards to exist in that different state which is termed liquidity,—that, in all past time, in the same circumstances, it would have exhibited the same change,—and that it will continue to do so in the same circumstances in all future time' (*Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect*[3], p. 15 f.).

The analysis of Hume and Brown reduces the idea of power, efficiency, necessary connexion, considered as a subjective phenomenon, to an illusion.

'In the sequence of events called Cause and Effect,' says James Mill, 'men were not contented with the Cause and the Effect; they imagined a third thing, called Force or Power, which was not the cause, but something emanating from the Cause, and the true and immediate cause of the Effect' (*Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, new ed., London, 1869, ii. 328).

In opposition to Hume's opinion, Reid held that reason might give rise to a new original idea; in what way it is difficult to say.

'It is not easy to say in what way we first get the notion or idea of *power*. It is neither an object of sense nor of consciousness. We see events, one succeeding another; but we see not the power by which they are produced. We are conscious of the operations of our minds; but power is not an operation of mind. If we had no notions but such as are furnished by the external senses, and by consciousness, it seems to be impossible that we should ever have any conception of power' (*Works*[2], ed. Hamilton, p. 446). 'Our conception of power is relative to its exertions or effects' (p. 514). From the consciousness of our own activity, seems to be derived not only the clearest, but the only conception we can form of activity, or the exertion of active power' (p. 523).

The view expressed in these and other passages, and already suggested by Locke, that the conception of active power is derived solely from the consciousness of our own exertions, occurs frequently in subsequent philosophy. In its most significant form it seeks to derive the notion of power from the consciousness of our voluntary activities and, in particular, our motor energies. This view had been already combated by Hume (*Inquiry*, sect. vii.), and his arguments are repeated by Hamilton (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, Edinburgh and London, 1859, ii. 391 f., Reid's *Works*[2], p. 866 f.). To escape the force of Hume's arguments, H. L. Mansel (*Prolegomena Logica*[2], Oxford, 1860, p. 151, *Metaphysics*[3], Edinburgh, 1875, p. 269) and V. Cousin (*Fragments philosophiques*, Paris, 1826, preface) were led to seek an immediate intuition of power in mind as determining its own modifications—in Cousin's language, in a causation wholly spiritual. Quite recently an attempt has been made to prove experimentally such purely mental determination. Such mental determination seems equivalent to the *fiat* of William James (*Principles of Psychology*, London, 1905, ii. 561). But, just in so far as the element of effort is eliminated, the experience becomes correspondingly unfruitful as the source of the origin of our notion of power.

If, however, the sense of effort, and in particular of muscular effort, is retained as an integral part of our volitional consciousness, we encounter a grave difficulty. The experiment of D. Ferrier (*Functions of the Brain*[2], London, 1886, p. 386) seems to show that the consciousness of effort is an afferent, not an efferent, sensation, and dependent in every case upon some muscular contraction. Ferrier's argument was powerfully pressed by Hugo Münsterberg, in *Die Willenshandlung* (Freiburg, 1888, pp. 73, 82, quoted by James, ii. 505); nor does it seem possible now to maintain the view formerly held by Hamilton, Bain, and Wundt, that we have a direct consciousness of effort, or energy expended, accompanying the innervation of the motor nerves. Muscular afferent sensations are as subjective as those of brightness, noise, and smell. Thus P. G. Tait (*Dynamics*, London, 1885, p. 354) regards the idea of force as corresponding to some process going on outside us, but quite different from the sensation which suggests it. If this view is sustained, a philosophy like that of Maine de Biran or Schopenhauer, which seeks to interpret the universe in analogy with will force, is excluded.

In his *Metaphysic* Lotze says:

'These effects or actions [of things], which proceed from them and are sense-stimuli to us, are no doubt only motions and themselves neither red nor sweet; but what is there to prevent our supposing that, by acting through our nerves, they make that same redness or sweetness arise, as our sensation, in our souls, which also attaches as a quality to the things themselves? Such a process would be no more wonderful than the performances of the telephone, which receives waves of sound, propagates them in a form of motion quite different, and in the end conducts them to the ear retransformed into waves of sound' (Eng. tr.[2], Oxford, 1887, ii. 204 f.).

The objectivity of the qualities of sensation has been maintained by J. H. von Kirchmann (*Katechismus der Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1877, p. 103), H. Schwarz (*Das Wahrnehmungsproblem*, Leipzig, 1892, p. 76), and apparently by Bergson (*Matter and Memory*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, p. 49 ff.). Wundt long ago recognized that his argument against the specific energies of the nerves, according to which the quality of sensation does not belong originally to the nerves, but is due to the action upon them of the normal stimulus, involves as a consequence that the sensation is brought nearer to the stimulus and made dependent upon it. These tendencies in modern writers show that it may still be possible to interpret the feeling of effort or force objectively, even though it be mediated by a sensory, not a motor, nerve. The objectivity of our perception of force does not really depend upon whether the nerve is incoming or outgoing, but depends upon the nature of the impression which is thereby conveyed. Here a difference presents itself. In the case of other impressions the phenomenon disclosed to consciousness seems purely subjective. In the perception of force we are confronted with a transeunt phenomenon. At whatever point the transition into sensuous consciousness takes place, the nature of force is to exist and to be perceived only as coming from without, just as we feel at the point of the pen the resistance of the paper over which it moves. This is what Hamilton means by the 'quasi-primary phasis' of the secundo-primary qualities (Reid's *Works*[2], note D, § 2). His analysis of the apprehension is correct, even if he be wrong in assigning it to a locomotive faculty instead of to the muscular sense. It is also implied in Reid's 'relative' notion.

2. The scientific use of 'power.'—If a force is applied to overcome a resistance, no matter at what time-rate the force acts, the force so applied has been called the 'power,' and that independently of any mechanical advantage gained. Power in this sense is now called the effort.

When, by use of a simple machine, mechanical advantage is gained, the instrumentality through which this advantage is obtained has been called a 'power,' as in the phrase 'the mechanical powers,'

applied to the lever, the wheel and axle, the inclined plane, the wedge, the movable pulley, and the screw. Such a machine is not a force or power in itself, but only a contrivance for concentrating force on a particular resistance. Since the work done by a simple machine may be taken as equal to that done upon it, it is not itself a power in the sense of doing work.

Power is the rate of doing work, or the quantity of work the agent can perform in a given time.

If it can be shown that the power, or *actio agentis*, of a material agent stands to the object upon which it acts in a relation analogous to that which governs the relations of the material and spiritual generally, we shall have a confirmation of the foregoing theory of the perception of force.

3. Metaphysical connexion of the subjective and objective aspects of power.—The well-known law of Fechner, that the increase of sensation is as the logarithm of the stimulus, is commonly discussed as a purely phenomenal law—a formula to which the facts of our sensitive consciousness rather curiously happen to conform. As such it has been regarded rather contemptuously by James. In recent years attempts have been made to extend it not only to the organic, but also to the inorganic, world. To Fechner himself it was something infinitely more than such a mere phenomenal rule. It was no less than a fundamental law, governing the relations of the physical to the psychical, and, conversely, of the psychical to the physical. It was closely connected with Fechner's psycho-physical parallelism. Fechner's doctrine was quite different from ordinary psycho-physical parallelism. The latter endeavours to find for each mental state, and each fragment thereof, its underlying physical equivalent (*e.g.*, Münsterberg, *Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1891). Fechner, on the other hand, saw clearly that to a single mental unity a distinguishable material multiplicity may correspond (*Zend-Avesta*[3], Hamburg, 1906, ii. 141). This is quite in accordance with his law. Here it is only necessary to call attention to the fact that, if in the physical world energy increases as the square of the velocity, in the psychic world the resistance to the stimulus increases by a similar law.

4. Epistemological conclusion.—If there is thus in the relations of the spiritual and physical something like that which holds between potential energy, depending upon configuration, and movement, something analogous to the strain implied in that which on other grounds has been called 'potential' (J. Clerk Maxwell, *Theory of Heat*, new ed., London, 1894, p. 91), it is a reasonable inference to say that it is just the very nature of this power which as 'quasi-primary phasis' we experience in our muscular activities, and that the secundo-primary qualities are experienced in an objective sense.

LITERATURE. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*; Hobbes, *English Works*, ed. W. Molesworth, London, 1839-45, i.; Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, do. 1690, bk. ii. ch. xxi.; Hume, *An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, do. 1748; T. Reid, *Works*[2], ed. W. Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1849; Maine de Biran, *Nouvelles Considérations sur les rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme*, Paris, 1834; Thomas Brown, *Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect*[4], Edinburgh, 1835.

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POWER OF THE KEYS.—This term is derived from the promise of our Lord to St. Peter: 'I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven' (Mt 16[19]). In Jewish literature the key is symbolical of authority (cf. Is 22[22], Rev 1[18] 3[7]; G. Dalman, *Word of Jesus*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1902, p. 213). Here the expression contains a manifest reference to Is 22[22]. In that passage the prophet announces that 'the key of the house of David' is to be taken from the unworthy Shebna and given to Eliakim; in other words, the latter is to be appointed the king's minister, and to govern the kingdom in his name. 'The Kingdom of Heaven' is the term ordinarily employed by our Lord to signify the Church which He had come on earth to found—the organized, theocratic society of those who accepted His claims. Thus the promise, it would seem, can have but one meaning: Peter is to be Christ's vicegerent to rule the Church on His behalf. It is true that a few recent writers have sought to give another sense to the passage by connecting it with our Lord's words to the scribes: 'Ye have taken away the key of knowledge' (Lk 11[52]). They suppose that scribes were instituted to office by the ceremonial delivery of a key, and conclude that the words addressed to Peter signify no more than that he is a scribe fully instructed unto the Kingdom of Heaven. The contention is devoid of all probability, for there is no evidence for any such ceremony of institution. The natural interpretation of the expression as employed in Lk 11 is simply that the scribes had prevented all access to the knowledge of the way of salvation (cf. A. Plummer, 'St. Luke'[2], in *ICC*, Edinburgh, 1898, p. 314).

The nature of the power conferred on St. Peter is indicated by what follows: 'Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.' It seems generally admitted that the power of binding and loosing (*q.v.*) signifies primarily the gift of legislative authority. In theological literature, however, from Patristic times to the present day, the term has commonly been employed to denote the judicial power exercised by the Church in regard to the forgiveness of sins. This use is not without justification. In every State supreme legislative authority carries with it supreme judicial authority; the one is the corollary of the other. Hence, when Christ constituted St. Peter and subsequently (Mt 18[18]) the whole apostolic college legislators of His kingdom, He thereby made them likewise its judges. But the judicial power which is proper to the Church must in the nature of things differ very greatly from that exercised by a civil government. The function of the State is simply to secure the temporal welfare of its citizens; hence it takes cognizance only of external acts and not of the internal motive ('De internis non judicat praetor'). The Church, on the other hand, exists for the salvation of souls. From this it may be concluded that in her judicial capacity she must deal with sin as such, and must be authorized to remit it or refuse remission as the case may demand. This power, as the traditional theology of the Church has always taught, was granted in express terms on a subsequent occasion (Jn 20[23]).

In Patristic literature we find two interpretations of the promise of the keys. Neither of the two, however, gives us quite the full force of the Hebrew metaphor. Thus several of the fathers, while recognizing that St. Peter is the recipient of an exceptional favour marking him out as the chief of the Twelve, understand the privilege as having reference not to the Church militant but to the celestial Kingdom. Our Lord, they hold, foretold that it should be Peter's office to receive the souls of the just into beatitude and exclude the unworthy, and by this prerogative constituted him the prince of the apostles. St. Asterius of Amasea writes as follows:

'He receives by this promise the keys of the kingdom, and becomes lord of the gates thereof, so as to open them to whom he will, and to close them to those against whom they should justly be shut' (*Hom. viii. in SS. Pet. et Paul.* [*PG* xl. 280]).

St. Cyril of Jerusalem speaks of 'the Prince of the Apostles, the key-bearer of the kingdom of heaven'

(*Cat.* xvii., *de Spiritu Sancto*, ii. [*PG* xxxiii. 997]; cf. Basil, *de Judicio Dei*, 7 [*PG* xxxi. 671]; Chrysostom, *Hom. in St. Ignat.* n. 4 [*PG* l. 591]; Eph. Syrus, *Serm. Syr.* lvi. [tom. ii. p. 559]).

In another and much the most frequent class of passages the promise is understood of the power of absolution alone. To men thoroughly familiar with the institution of penance the metaphor of the keys seemed intended to signify that to Peter was granted authority to forgive sins and thereby to open or bar the road which alone gives access to heaven. This application, as we have explained above, is admissible, though it is far from exhausting the full significance of Christ's words. But some at least of those who adopted it failed to see that the metaphor implied the gift of supreme authority in general, and restricted its meaning entirely to the sacrament of penance. Thus we find Augustine so completely identifying the keys with the power of absolution that he expressly denies that the gift was personal to Peter. It was bestowed, he says, no less on all the Twelve, and it is in virtue of this gift that the Church, wherever it is found, exercises the right to forgive sins (*Serm.* cxlix. 7 [*PL* xxxviii. 802]; for other examples see Ambros. *de Pœn.* i. 33 [*PL* xvi. 496]; August. *Serm.* cccxcii. 3 [*PL* xxxix. 1711]; Hilary, *in Matt.* xvi. 7 [*PL* ix. 1010]; Origen, *in Matt.* xii. 14 [*PG* xiii. 1014]; *Conc. Œc. Eph.* Act iii. [Hardouin, i. 1477]). This explanation of the passage leads naturally to the question why, if the power conferred belonged to all the apostles, the keys were committed to Peter alone. To this it is replied that thereby is signalized Peter's pre-eminence among the apostles (Origen, *in Matt.* xiii. 31 [*PG* xiii. 1179]; Hilary, *loc. cit.*; August. *Serm.* ccxcv. 2 [*PL* xxxviii. 1349]). Stress is further laid on the consideration that in giving the keys to the chief apostle alone Christ designed to make it clear that the Church is in her essence one (August. *loc. cit.*; Optatus, *de Schismate Donat.* vii. 3 [*PL* xi. 1087]).

The Scholastic theologians of the 12th and 13th centuries, when they treat of the sacrament of penance, devote a special section to 'de Clavibus,' in which they examine the nature of the power of absolution (Hugo Victorinus, *Summa Sententiarum*, vi. 14 [*PL* clxxvi. 152]; Rolandus, *Sententiæ*, p. 264 [ed. A. M. Gietl, Freiburg im Br., 1891]; Petrus Lombardus, *Lib. Sent.* iv. 18 [*PL* cxcii. 885]; Petrus Pictaviensis, *Sent.* iii. 16 [*PL* ccxi. 1073], etc.). There are, they say, two keys, viz. *discretio* and *potestas*—the *clavis scientiæ* and the *clavis potentiæ*. The original source of this curious distinction is apparently the *Glossa interlinearis* of Anselm of Laon, where it occurs in the comment on Mt 16 (*PL* clxii. 1396). The idea of a *clavis scientiæ* is most probably connected with Lk 11[52]. To the objection that many who are not priests possess *scientia* Thomas Aquinas replies that the *clavis scientiæ* is not knowledge as such, but the authority to inquire judicially previously to pronouncing judgment (*Summa Theol.* Suppl. qu. 17, art. 3, ad 2). It appears, however, from a passage in a decree of John XXII. which deals incidentally with this point that some theologians at least rejected this distinction of the *clavis scientiæ* and *clavis potentiæ* as an artificial refinement (*Corpus Juris Canonici: Extravagantes*, xiv. 5, 'Quia Quorundam').

Towards the end of the 13th cent. a new interpretation makes its appearance. At this period the struggle between the empire and the papacy was at its height, and on either side the pen was hardly less active than the sword. The imperial legists claimed for the emperor complete supremacy over the ecclesiastical order; and the canonists replied by maintaining that the pope as Christ's vicar possessed direct authority over secular princes, that it lay with him to appoint them, and, if need be, to depose them. Christ's gift of the keys to Peter was employed to support this contention. It was urged that the gift was not of one key alone, but of two; and that this symbolized Peter's supremacy alike over spirituals and over temporals. The first, it would seem, to employ this argument was the famous canonist Henry of Segusio (Hostiensis) († 1274), who writes:

'Ideo etiam Dominus dominorum non sine causa dixit Petro: Et tibi dabo claves regni coelorum. Et nota, non dixit clavem sed claves, scilicet duas, unam quae claudat et aperiat, liget et solvat quoad spiritualia; aliam qua utatur quoad temporalia' (*Summa Aurea*, lib. iv. tit. 'Qui filii sint legitimi,' n. 10).

The same claim was made in the following century by Augustinus Triumphus († 1328) and Alvarus Pelagius († 1352) (*de Planctu Ecclesiæ*, 13). It is perhaps not to be wondered at that, at a period when Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jandun were advocating their revolutionary theories, the controversialists of the opposite school should have fallen into exaggerations on their side. On the other hand, the theologians who denied that the pope possessed direct authority over secular princes called attention to the fact that it was the keys of the Kingdom of heaven, not those of an earthly kingdom, that Christ gave to His apostle (cf. Cornelius a Lapide, *in loc.*).

Since the 16th cent. Roman Catholic theologians appear to be practically unanimous in their understanding of the passage. By the gift of the keys, they hold, is signified ecclesiastical authority in its widest scope. This authority is multiple, and embraces (1) the power of order, exercised in regard to sacrifice and sacrament, (2) the power to teach authoritatively the revealed word of God, and (3) the power of jurisdiction, in virtue of which the Church rules and legislates for the faithful. This authority was conferred in its fullness on Peter and his successors. It was, however, to be shared by others in due measure, though always in dependence on the chief pastor. Thus the pope is the supreme ruler and teacher of the Church. Yet all bishops and priests possess the power of order; and they receive in due degree authority to teach, and in most cases some measure of jurisdiction. In absolving from sin the Church is exercising the powers of order and of jurisdiction. This is, however, but one aspect of the gift signified under the metaphor of the keys of the Kingdom of heaven.

LITERATURE.—F. Suarez, *De Pœnitentia*, xvi. 4 (ed. Paris, 1856-61, xxii. 357); R. Bellarmine, *Controversiæ de Rom. Pont.*, Ingolstadt, 1601, i. 12 f.; F. Macedo, *De Clavibus Petri*, Rome, 1660, i. 2; J. Blötzer, art. 'Schlüsselgewalt,' in Wetzer-Welte, *Kirchenlexikon*, x. [Freiburg im Br., 1897] 1834; Cornelius a Lapide, *Comment. in Script. Sacr.*, Lyons, 1872, xv. 370.

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PRADHĀNA.—Pradhāna, properly 'fundamental substance,' is a Sanskrit term employed in the Sāṅkhya (*q.v.*) philosophy as a synonym for *prakṛti*, to denote the primeval substance. Since in all material developments this primeval substance retains a place though transformed, and the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya expressly asserts the identity of the material cause and the product, the words *pradhāna* and *prakṛti* in the Sāṅkhya texts not seldom denote also the matter which is the result of evolution, *i.e.* the material universe in general.

R. GARBE.

PRAGMATISM.—Pragmatism has come into use since 1898, when the word first occurred in William James's pamphlet on *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results*, as the technical name for a tendency which can be traced throughout the history of philosophy, but has only of late grown self-conscious, systematic, and general. The term had been coined twenty years before by

C. S. Peirce (without regard to the existing, but obsolescent, word 'pragmatic') in order to express the scientific need of testing the meaning and value of our conceptions and terms by their use, *i.e.* by applying them to the things which they were supposed to stand for, instead of allowing their own apparent self-evidence or intuitive certainty to attest their truth without more ado. He insisted, therefore, that the truth (and indeed the meaning) of every conception depended on the difference which it made in a scientific situation and on the 'consequences' to which its assumption led, and systematically denied that it could be determined in any *a priori* way. Thus every 'truth' became a question of empirical observation and scientific experiment. This critical method was, however, widely understood to mean practical consequences in the way of action alone, and so pragmatism was regarded as a sort of 'practicalism,' and as a disparagement of 'theoretic' truth which was a direct insult to all who cultivated the latter. But, though many pragmatists emphasized the importance of bringing fine-spun theorizing to some sort of definite test, and showed that in point of fact practical consequences frequently formed such a test, this interpretation of pragmatism is untenable. It is not correct etymologically, for the word is derived from πράγματα ('things') not from πρᾶξις ('action'). It is seriously misleading scientifically, unless it is fully understood that 'practical' is taken by pragmatism in a very wide sense, which includes what is ordinarily called the 'theoretic,' for which 'in practice' means 'in use for any purpose,' for which every thought is essentially an act, and the test of a thought may be another thought to which it leads in some psychological connexion. Pragmatism is really a denial of the absoluteness or ultimateness of the traditional antithesis between 'theory' and 'practice,' and relies for its justification on the fact that everything that we think and do has first to be willed, and has ultimately some biological value as a vital adaptation, successful or the reverse. The controversial significance of this critical and empirical attitude towards doctrines and beliefs lies, of course, in the wide prevalence of credulity and dogmatism, which cannot bear questioning. It is evident, moreover, that this pragmatist questioning may arise in various contexts and in various ways, each of which will constitute an approach to pragmatism which can be used independently of the rest. Hence what is really a very simple method is apt to assume the appearance of a perplexing complexity of doctrines. It will be best, therefore, first to survey the problems that most obviously demand pragmatic treatment in ordinary life and in the various sciences, in order to appreciate the solutions which pragmatism offers, remembering always that this treatment is ultimately logical, *i.e.* if 'logic' be taken in a sufficiently wide sense.

1. The problems leading to pragmatism.—(1) Common sense is quite aware that the world is full of deceptive appearances, that things are not all what they seem, that not everything is real or true that claims to be, that not all 'facts' are facts, that not every form of words has a meaning, that much which passes for profundity is unmeaning nonsense, that, though all things are real in some sense (seeing that they can be talked about), they are very frequently not so in the sense in which they profess to be; in short, that the intellectual world is pervaded and perverted by errors, lies, fictions, and illusions. It is recognized, therefore, on quite a simple level of reflexion that precautions must be taken, and the needs of (*a*) determining the meaning, and (*b*) testing the truth, of assertions make themselves felt. A method is demanded for distinguishing the meaningful from the meaningless, the true from the false, the real from the unreal. It is also extensively known that our ability to form conceptions and to lay down definitions is not decisive of their real value and in no way ensures that they will apply to reality in a successful and fruitful way or that reality will conform to them.

(2) The everyday problems of practical knowing reappear in logic and the theory of knowledge as 'the problem of error' and the questions about the definition and 'criterion' of truth, the 'import' of propositions, the 'reference to reality' of judgments, the formal 'validity' of proof, and the absoluteness or relativity of knowledge. But their treatment has always been vague and inadequate, because it has not been perceived that they are all concerned with one and the same central difficulty of knowledge and with the problem of logical values.

(3) Similarly, logic has never succeeded in determining its relations to psychology in a comprehensive and consistent way. It has professed to be somehow 'independent' of psychology and to be entitled to regulate the course of actual thought; yet it could never quite deny that all logical processes occur in a psychological setting, and are derived from the cognitive operations of human minds. These, however, are found to differ widely from the ideas of pure thought which logic constructs and contemplates. It appears that all actual thought is full of 'non-intellectual' factors; it is active, volitional, emotional, purposive, selective, and its understanding presupposes a study of the effects of interest, attention, desire, bias, satisfaction. But, while the actual thought is thus dependent on, and expressive of, its thinker's total personality, its logical representative has hitherto been permitted to abstract from personality. Hence there arises an acute problem of how to correlate the theories of logic with the facts of human psychology, and to determine what effect the actual nature of thought should have on its 'ideal.' For, even though this effect may be considered wholly deleterious, it is ineradicable; all truths are, and must be, on one side matters of belief. Moreover, the discrepancy between the facts and the theories of knowing is hardly less marked within the field of psychology proper. Nearly all psychological theories still abstract from the biological and functional import of the psychic processes which they describe and classify; their descriptions are in terms of 'faculties' and 'elements,' which are creatures of abstract analysis and not objects of immediate experience. They consequently overlook that all mental functioning must be understood as a reaction of the total organism, that beliefs are essentially rules for action, and that valuations occur as the stimuli to thought as well as to action.

(4) This occurrence of valuations connects pragmatism with the one science that has hitherto professed concern with value-judgments, viz. ethics. Pragmatism notices (*a*) that all the different kinds of value, ethical, æsthetical, logical, and economic, have in common a relativity, to their several purposes in the first place, and ultimately to the final end of action, 'the good.' They are all means to intrinsically valuable ends ('goods'), and as such valuable or 'useful.' It notices (*b*) that any 'truth' asserted about any 'real' is a latent value—both because it is the achievement of a purpose and because it is selected from a number of competitors and preferred as the *best* of them. Similarly, whatever is recognized as 'real' is logically in a position of superiority to other *claimants* to reality. Thus the 'true' and the 'real' have to be viewed as forms of the 'good,' and as satisfactions of desire. It is evident, however, that goods,

ends, and values may come into conflict with one another, and that intricate problems arise when we ask how much beauty or moral goodness will make up for lack of scientific evidence for a belief, or how intolerable a 'truth' may be before it is rejected as incredible.

(5) Such problems have long agitated the philosophy of religion and familiarized it with the antithesis of 'knowledge' and 'faith.' Pragmatism notes, indeed, that most men, especially when excited, regard the unsupported satisfactoriness of a belief, and their mere 'will to believe' it, as sufficient proof of its truth; but it is not true that it approves of this; for it dispenses with verification no more here than elsewhere, and observes that religious beliefs also are in fact tested, though not perhaps as systematically as they might be, by their 'working.' Still it does not simply dismiss 'faith' as a source of error alone, with the traditional rationalism. For the faith-attitude or 'will to believe' appears to it to have important cognitive functions. It may be, psychologically, a necessary condition of the discovery, not only of religious, but also of scientific, truth. It is, moreover, latent in the very notion of 'knowledge.' For the 'principles' which every system of knowledge assumes are not to be understood either as mere generalizations from experience or as sheer necessities of thought; they seem to be intelligible only as 'postulates' which are adopted by an act of faith, before they are 'proved' by the subsequent working of the science. Nor, on the other hand, does it seem proper to regard a belief as established merely because it evokes a strong will to believe. The truth is that the religious questions as to the sort and amount of evidence required by a postulate of faith are peculiarly difficult.

2. The pragmatist handling of these problems.—(1) *The problem of meaning.*—Pragmatism contends that alleged meanings, to be tested, must be applied or used, and thereupon valued or revalued according as they work well or ill. Of all the formulæ for defining pragmatism none is better than 'meaning depends on application,' which condemns the absolute distinction between theory and practice and the entire separation between 'pure' and 'applied' science (*e.g.* in mathematics). Thus inapplicable notions (like unknowable and absolute truths and realities) are declared to be unmeaning. Moreover, if two notions do not differ in their application, the distinction between them is said to be unmeaning; they are really identical and differ only in words—differences that make no difference are not worth making.

(2) *The problem of truth.*—Applying the same principle to alleged truths ('truth-claims'), we see that, since all assertions formally claim to be true, and mostly are not, truth-claim or formal truth is not what common sense and science mean by 'truth,' and that all claims have to be tested by their applications or 'consequences.' If they work well, their claim to truth-value is confirmed; if ill, it is doubted or rejected as false or erroneous. Hence the pragmatist formulæ, 'All truths are useful' and 'Genuine truth must work,' are corollaries from this method of testing truth-claims. But it should be observed that these formulæ are not formal definitions and so must not be treated as convertible; pragmatism does not affirm that whatever is useful or works is true. To assert this would be to ignore the existence of lies, fictions, errors, methodological assumptions, and other varieties of truth-claim, which are not generally called truths, and are the very things which pragmatism prides itself on distinguishing from genuine truths. It should be noted, further, that the question what sort of 'working' is relevant to the truth of a claim is relative to the inquiry, and is often disputable. In general it must be left to the experts in the various subjects concerned. But in all subjects truth always remains relative to the state of knowledge, because only the consequences known up to date can be used to test a truth-claim. Hence no amount of successful working ever leads to the complete verification of any truth, or renders it 'absolute'; further confirmation is always possible and conceivable. But this denial that any truths are absolute and immutable is quite in accord with the practice of the sciences; it leaves room for literally infinite improvement in the reigning 'truths,' and explains their continual changes. For a truth remains true only so long as it is the best to be had; it becomes false as soon as it can be bettered.

(3) *The problem of truth and error* is solved by regarding both as values, positive and negative, *i.e.* as success and failure relatively to a cognitive purpose. A *bona fide* truth-claim is always supposed by its maker to be as true as he can make it at the time; but it may nevertheless fail subsequently and be declared false, nor is its formal truth-claim any protection against this fate. Consequently there can be (4) *no criterion of truth* which is formal or absolute, nor (5) any *formally valid proof* which renders its conclusion certain as a fact, in advance of observation. Successful verification never amounts to 'valid proof,' because it involves the formal defect of 'affirming the consequent.' The same conclusion follows from the formal defects of syllogistic reasoning. It is impossible to get any guarantee of the absolute truth of the premisses used, because these cannot be truer than the sciences can make them, and because 'self-evident' intuitions have always to be tested. Moreover, as Alfred Sidgwick was the first to point out, the 'truth' of a premiss is ambiguous. A premiss may be true in general and yet false for the special purpose in hand. When, therefore, it is used, a false conclusion is deduced. After the event this failure may be described as a 'fallacy of accident,' or as an 'ambiguity in the middle term'; but the potential flaw was imperceptible before, and could not be guarded against. Hence we can never know whether a formally valid deduction will be true in fact, nor can we be absolutely assured in advance that an apparent 'case' of a rule, 'law,' or 'universal' will turn out to be one in actual fact.

As regards the psychological aspects of logic, pragmatism demands especially a recognition of *the relation of thinking* (6) *to personality and* (7) *to doubt.* Emphasis on the former has led to the systematic extension of pragmatism called humanism (*q.v.*), but it is evident that in logical theory also the traditional abstraction from the personal context and particular occasion of assertions must be called in question. In particular, the relation of meaning to purpose and context, the psychological impossibility of asserting truths which are thought to be useless, the selectiveness of human thought, the importance of interest in starting and of attention and relevance in conducting reasoning, and the massive, and still more the subtle, effects of bias and passion in distorting it, may be mentioned as implications of personality which have far-reaching (and unexplored) logical effects. The dependence of thought upon the stimulus of doubt has been specially elaborated by John Dewey, who has emphasized the need of a continual reconstruction of beliefs and the experimental nature of all judgment. (8) Dewey also emphasizes *the biological function of thinking* as an instrument of vital adaptation, and his name for pragmatism, 'instrumentalism,' conceives it as a radical application of Darwinism to psychology. But, though it is clear that pragmatism entails a

reform of psychology as well as of logic, and that it has had a certain effect in promoting psychological explanation in terms of 'function' rather than of structure, it cannot as yet claim to have led to the working out systematically of a non-intellectualistic and biological psychology.

Much the same may be said about the bearing of pragmatism on the ethical and religious values. It is certainly important, for pragmatism cannot but affect the factitious value which they have derived from their acceptance as absolute, immutable, and infallible. Actually, however, they do not seem to be able to substantiate these claims, which are contradicted by the facts of their history, and they probably stand to gain more than they could lose by being humanized and brought into closer relation with the needs of life. It is also evident that, whereas the belief that truth, reality, and good are each one, absolute, immutable, and infallible was in principle bound to lead to dissensions between men each of whom believed that because he was right the others must be wrong, the pragmatist doctrine that truth, right, and good, being relative to circumstances though not less precious on this account, may be different for different persons, and must, moreover, be developed by the continuous correction of errors and the substitution of better and more satisfactory views for worse, is highly conducive to toleration and social harmony. Even so, it does not seem probable that on questions which affect different temperaments so differently anything like universal agreement will ever be reached; but a convergence of opinion sufficient for social purposes is far more likely, if greater freedom to experiment in ways of living were granted and if men were allowed to see for themselves which methods are successful and satisfactory and which are practically sure to fail.

3. Pragmatism and absolutism.—It was natural that so distinctive and comprehensive an attitude as the pragmatic should be highly controversial, especially as it was diametrically antithetical to the intellectualistic 'idealism' which conceived the essential function of intelligence as a static contemplation of 'eternal' truths and possessed great academic vogue. The ensuing controversy has chiefly raged round the conceptions of truth and its absoluteness. The pragmatists have accused the traditional accounts of truth of being unduly intellectualistic and ultimately devoid of meaning. Thus the realistic 'correspondence' theory, which makes truth depend on an agreement with a reality which transcends the process of knowing, has no means of establishing or testing the correspondence which it alleges between the object as it is known and the object as it is *per se*. Its rival, the (idealistic) 'coherence' theory, not only has to *postulate* an absolutely coherent system of truth on the (inadequate) evidence of the relatively coherent systems of the sciences, and so (inadvertently) requires a voluntaristic logic to justify it, but leads to a conclusion which confutes this same premiss. For it finds that the absolutely coherent truth which it demands cannot be possessed by any human mind; it has, therefore, to allege an Absolute to be the receptacle of such absolute truth. But this is equivalent to scepticism as regards human knowledge, while it relapses into a 'correspondence' theory as regards the relation of human truth to absolute. Pragmatism, therefore, rejects both these absolutist metaphysics and the absoluteness of the truths known to man. They are all regarded as relative to man and to the condition of human knowledge for the time being, as the history of the sciences exemplifies. From this point of view also, humanism becomes an appropriate description of pragmatism.

LITERATURE.—The literature of pragmatism is still largely scattered in the philosophic periodicals, especially in *Mind* and the *Journal of Philosophy*. Its history as an avowed doctrine begins in America, with William James's lecture on *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results* at Berkeley, Cal., 1898. James acknowledged that he had taken the name from his friend C. S. Peirce, who had written on 'How to make our Ideas clear,' in *Popular Science Monthly*, xii. [1878] 287 ff., without using the word; but James himself had long been teaching pragmatism in everything but the name. His *Will to Believe*, New York and London, 1897, states (p. 124) the pragmatic test of truth, in a paper dating from 1881. His epoch-making *Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., do. 1890, also is full of pragmatism, and was admittedly the chief source from which the other leaders derived it. After the movement had been baptized, James devoted himself to its popularization, in his *Pragmatism*, do. 1907, *The Meaning of Truth*, do. 1909, *A Pluralistic Universe*, do. 1909, the unfinished *Some Problems of Philosophy*, do. 1911, and the posthumous collection of *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, do. 1912. The applications of pragmatism to logic were made in America by John Dewey and his pupils, who studied especially the dependence of knowledge on doubt and on the need of reconstructing beliefs (*Studies in Logical Theory*, Chicago, 1903, *How we Think*, Boston, 1910, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, New York, 1910, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, Chicago, 1916, *Creative Intelligence*, New York, 1917). In England Alfred Sidgwick had worked out a pragmatic logic independently (*Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs*, London, 1892, *The Use of Words in Reasoning*, do. 1901, *The Application of Logic*, do. 1910, *Elementary Logic*, Cambridge, 1914). F. C. S. Schiller's writings elaborate chiefly the epistemological, logical, and polemical sides of pragmatism, in 'Axioms as Postulates' (in *Personal Idealism*, ed. H. Sturt, London, 1902), *Humanism*, do. 1903, ²1912, *Studies in Humanism*, do. 1907, ²1912, the new ed. of *Riddles of the Sphinx*, do. 1910, and *Formal Logic*, do. 1912. As simple introductions, D. L. Murray, *Pragmatism*, London, 1912, and H. V. Knox, *William James*, do. 1914, may be recommended; the full history of the movement has been written in Dutch in T. B. Muller, *De Kennisleer van het Anglo-Amerikaansch Pragmatisme*, The Hague, 1913. The validity of the pragmatic argument from consequences and the connexion of truth with what 'works' was upheld (*à propos* of A. J. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*) by A. Seth (Pringle-Pattison), *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, Edinburgh, 1897. Other pragmatist books of value are A. W. Moore, *Pragmatism and its Critics*, Chicago, 1910; I. E. Miller, *Psychology of Thinking*, New York, 1909; J. E. Boodin, *Truth and Reality*, do. 1911. For the religious applications of pragmatism cf. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, London and New York, 1902; G. Tyrrell, *Lex Orandi*, London, 1904, *Lex Credendi*, do. 1906; I. King, *The Development of Religion*, do. 1910.

Abroad pragmatism has great affinities with the French anti-intellectualism of Henri Bergson and his school (especially Le Roy and Wilbois) and the criticism of scientific procedure by H. Poincaré, E. Boutroux, G. Milhaud, P. Duhem, etc. In Germany the same may be said of the theories of knowledge of F. W. Nietzsche (*The Will to Power*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1907-10), H. Vaihinger (*Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, Berlin, 1911), E. Mach (*Zur Analyse der Empfindungen*⁶, Jena, 1911), W. Ostwald, W. Jerusalem, and G. Simmel.

In the way of criticism of pragmatism nothing systematic has yet been accomplished, but the best materials may be found in B. A. W. Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, London, 1910; L. J. Walker, Stonyhurst manual on *Theories of Knowledge*, do. 1910; W. M. Keane, *Pragmatism and the Scholastic Synthesis*, Dublin, 1910; J. B. Pratt, *What is Pragmatism?*, New York, 1909; R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, do. 1912; W. Caldwell, *Pragmatism and Idealism*, London, 1913. A. Schinz, *Antipragmatism*, do. 1910, is of value as a display of the emotional reaction elicited by pragmatism, and F. H. Bradley, *Essays in Truth and Reality*, Oxford, 1914, as a record of the reluctant, but in the end decisive, concessions to which idealistic absolutism has been driven (cf. Schiller's art. in *Mind*, no. 95 [1915]).

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

PRAISE.—See HYMNS, WORSHIP.

PRAKRTI.—See PRADHĀNA, SAṄKHYA, NATURE (Hindu).

PRĀNNĀTHĪS.—This is the name of an Indian sect founded by Prānnāth, or Prāna-nātha, in the early part of the 18th century. He was a Kṣatriya by caste, and came from Kāthiāwār. After long wanderings over W. India he reached Bundēlkhand, and settled near Pannā with a large following of disciples. During his stay there he indicated the Pannā diamond-mines to Chhatraśāla Bundēlā († 1732), the local Rājā, who became his disciple.

Prānnāth founded an eclectic religion combining the best elements of Islām and Hinduism. He was the author of at least sixteen works written in a strange jargon, a mixture of Hindī, Sindhī,

Gujarātī, Arabic, and Sanskrit, by no means easy to understand. Growse ('The Sect of the Prānnāthīs,' *JASBe* xlviii. pt. i.) has edited and translated one of these—the *Qiyāmat-nāma*, or 'Account of the Day of Judgment.' Verses 28 ff. of this give a good idea of the attitude taken by the teacher:

'(According to the Hindūs) the Kalki (incarnation of Viṣṇu) will make an end of the Kali Yuga. The Gospel says that Christ is the head of all, and that He will come and do justice. The Jews say that Moses is the greatest, and that all will be saved through him. All follow different customs, and each proclaims the greatness of his own master. Thus idly quarrelling they fix upon different names; but the end of all is the same, the Supreme God.'

One of the names of this Supreme God is Dhām, and hence the Prānnāthīs also call themselves 'Dhāmīs.'

Prānnāth disallowed the use of intoxicating drugs, tobacco, wine, meat, and unlawful visits to women, and preached peace and charity. He prohibited idolatry, but at the present day one of his books, called the *Qulzum*, is worshipped at the temple at Pannā. All else that is seen at his shrines here and elsewhere is a small bed with a turban on it, called Prānnāth's seat. In 1764 Murtaẓa Ḥusain saw the bed with a stool on each side of it. On one was a copy of the Qur'ān, and on the other a copy of the Hindū *Purāṇas*, with learned men of both religions in attendance ready to give profitable answers to all inquirers. Most of the replies made to him involved the unity of God.

There are only a few hundred followers of this cult in modern times. Most of them live at Pannā, and others are found in small numbers in the United Provinces and in Nēpāl. Those of Bundēlkhand bury their dead at Pannā. Elsewhere they burn them, and carry the relics thither.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindūs*, in *Works*, ed. R. Rost, London, 1861–77, i. 351; F. S. Growse, 'The Sect of the Prānnāthīs,' *JASBe* xlviii. [1879] pt. i. p. 171, reprinted in *Mathura, a District Memoir*², Allahābād, 1880, p. 212; [Jagēshar Prasād Tiwārī], *Juvenile Hist. of Charkhārī, by a Native Servant of the State*, Benares, 1886, p. 12 ff.; C. E. Luard, *Gazetteer of Bundelkhand*, Lucknow, 1907, p. 199. Lāl Kavi, *Chhatra Prakāśa*, Calcutta, 1829, and Benares, 1903, chs. 133 ff., contains a contemporary account of Prānnāth's dealings with Chhatraśāla. Murtaza Husain, Allahyār, wrote the *Hadīqatu'l-aqālīm* about 1782. In this is described the author's visit to Pannā about the year 1764, with a full description of the Prānnāthīs and their temple (p. 669 of the lithographed ed., Lucknow, n.d.).

G. A. GRIERSON.

PRAPATTI-MĀRGA.—*Prapatti-mārga* was a development of the Indian *Bhakti-mārga* (*q.v.*) which took its rise in S. India in the 13th cent. A.D. *Bhakti* connotes active love and devotion to the adorable, while *prapatti* is simply passive surrender. There are two schools of Vaiṣṇava thought in S. India. The Vaḍagalai, of the country north of, say, Conjeeveram, lays stress on *bhakti*, and the Teṅgalai, of the country south of that town, on *prapatti*. The attitude of a follower of the Vaḍagalai school is compared to that of a baby monkey, which is carried about and protected by its mother, but nevertheless has to cling to her, while that of a follower of the Teṅgalai school is compared to the passive surrender of a kitten carried about in its mother's mouth. They are hence nicknamed the 'monkey-school' (*markaṭa-nyāya*) and 'cat-school' (*mārjāra-nyāya*) respectively. The corresponding attitudes of the deity in these two cases are, respectively, *sahētuka-kṛpā*, or 'grace sought,' and *nir-hētuka-kṛpā*, or 'grace unsought,' which may be compared with the 'co-operative grace' and 'irresistible grace' of Western theologians.

A man who has adopted the *prapatti-mārga* is called a *prapanna*, 'refugee,' or 'suppliant,' and he may be either *dṛpta*, 'patient,' or *ārta*, 'impatient.' A patient suppliant is one who lives an ordinary life, straight in thought, speech, and deed. An impatient suppliant is one whom *prapatti* has caused to loathe the ordinary life and everything connecting him with this world, and who, impatient of salvation, beseeches and besieges God to bring him to Himself.

The argument of the teachers of the *prapatti-mārga* is that the active concentration upon and adoration of God demanded by the *bhakti-mārga* is a means of salvation that tries the utmost strength and capacity of mortals, and is beyond the powers of most. Hence God in His mercy has opened the way of *prapatti*, which demands merely unconditional self-surrender, and is accessible to all, irrespective of caste, colour, or creed.

Although essentially a creed of S. India, the *prapatti-mārga* in later times found its way to the Ganges Valley in the north, and gave consolation to many pious souls afflicted by the tragedies that overwhelmed Hindōstān in the 17th and 18th centuries (cf. art. CHARAN DĀSIS).

A further development of the ideas contained in this doctrine is called *ācḥāryābhimāna*, 'resort to a teacher or mediator.' In this a mediator, tangibly present and accessible, conducts the soul to a God, who is to many beyond the reach of human thought. The mediator is represented as possessing two arms. With one he reaches downwards and rescues the proselyte soul from the world of sin, and with the other he reaches upwards and presents the soul, purified from earthly taint, before the throne of the Adorable.

LITERATURE.—A. Gōvindāchārya and G. A. Grierson, 'The Artha-pañchaka' (text and tr.), *JRAS*, 1910, p. 565, 'Teṅgalai and Vaḍagalai,' *ib.* 1912, p. 714; A. Gōvindāchārya, 'The Ashṭadaśa Bhēdas' (account of the doctrinal differences between Teṅgalai and Vaḍagalai), *ib.* 1910, p. 1103.

G. A. GRIERSON.

PRĀRTHANĀ SAMĀJ.—The Prārthanā Samāj is the Brāhma Samāj (*q.v.*) of the Bombay Presidency, but it has noteworthy characteristics of its own.

Through the final defeat of the Marāṭhas in 1818 the Bombay Presidency, almost to its present extent, came under direct British rule, and Mountstuart Elphinstone was the first governor. Under settled government things began to improve; Western education was introduced; with John Wilson missions took a fresh start, employing new methods; and, in consequence, the Indian mind showed signs of awaking. About 1845 discussions on religious and social questions began to agitate both the Hindu and the Parsi communities in Bombay. The Hindus took action first. The earliest organization was a secret society, called the Gupta Sabhā, for the discussion of religious questions. This was followed in 1849 by a larger secret society, called the Paramahaṁsa Sabhā, which was meant to advance liberal ideas, both social and religious, and above all to break down caste. But in 1860 the matter was made public, and the society broke up.

Yet liberal ideas were not thereby crushed, and the movement was quickened by a visit which Keshab Chandra Sen (see art. BRĀHMA SAMĀJ) paid to Bombay in 1864. Finally, in 1867, the Prārthanā Samāj (*i.e.* 'Prayer Society') was organized. There was no man of genius among those who founded the society, but three strong men, the brothers Pandurang and N. M. Paramanand, stood out as leaders. The chief interests of the Samāj were theistic worship and social reform; and a simple congregational organization was adopted. In 1870 two young men of character and capacity joined the movement, M. G. Ranade (later Justice Ranade) and R. G. Bhandarkar (now Sir R. G. Bhandarkar), the well-known scholar. Ranade was the most influential leader the Samāj has had, and to this day its teaching and activity bear the impress of his

spirit. The Samāj building was erected in Girgaum, Bombay, in 1874, and since then has been the chief centre of theism in the West. In 1882 another young man, now Sir N. G. Chandavarkar, became a member of the Samāj. Bhandarkar and Chandavarkar, the former in Poona, the latter in Bombay, have been by far the most prominent men in the movement since Ranade's death in 1901. There have been no groups of vigorous missionaries connected with the Samāj such as built up Brāhmaism in Bengal, but there have been individual workers who have done faithful service, notably S. P. Kelkar and V. R. Shinde; but something hinders; for no one remains long in the work. There are also a number of cultured laymen whose assistance must be valuable—K. Natarajan, V. A. Sukhtankar, N. G. Velinkar, and others.

There is also a strong Samāj in Ahmadābād in the Gujarātī country, the first leader of which was Bholanath Sarabhai. Poona, Kirkee, Kolhāpur, and Sātāra, all in the Marāṭha-speaking portion of the Presidency, have each a Samāj. Of the twenty-nine theistic societies in the Madras Presidency eighteen bear the name Prārthanā Samāj.

The beliefs and teaching of the Samāj are very similar to those of the Sādhāraṇa Brāhma Samāj of Calcutta. They are theists and opposed to idolatry with all its accompaniments. The inspiration of the Vedas and the doctrine of transmigration and *karma* have been surrendered. While the thought and life of the Samāj are largely fed from Hindu theology and literature—the hymns of Tukārām, Nāmdev, and other leaders of the *bhakti* school of Marātha-land being much used—yet the teaching of Christianity, religious, moral, and social, has had quite as much influence as in the Brāhma Samāj. One striking difference, however, has to be noted: in the Sādhāraṇa Brāhma Samāj and also in the New Dispensation section vows are taken by every full member whereby he promises to give up both caste and idolatry absolutely, while in the Prārthanā Samāj no such promises are made; and, though the leading members are as strict in these matters as any Brāhma could possibly be, there are others who belong to the Samāj and yet have banished neither idolatry nor caste from their homes. Thus the Bombay society stands nearer Hinduism and has closer relations with the Hindu community.

The religious services of the Samāj are very similar to those of the Brāhma Samāj, the language being Marāṭhī in Bombay, Poona, and the other southern centres, but Gujarātī in Ahmadābād. Passages are read from the Hindu Scriptures, and hymns are sung. There are prayers and a sermon.

The literature of the Samāj is partly in English, partly in the vernacular. Sermons and hymn-books are in the vernacular, and have a fair circulation. The literature in English is very scanty. Indeed, the weakness of the Samāj in theology is very notable, and was fully recognized by Ranade. Attempts are being made to produce books to enrich the teaching and the thought of the community, but the results are meagre.

Apart from the regular Sunday services, the religious activities of the Samāj are the Young Theists' Union, the Sunday School, the Postal Mission, and the *Subodh Patrika*, an Anglo-Marāṭhī journal. The Students' Brotherhood, a sort of theistic Y.M.C.A., whose active workers belong to several communities, owes much to the Samāj.

A good deal of educational and charitable work is carried on. In Bombay schools are maintained for children and for women, night-schools are conducted for working men, and there is a Home for the Homeless; there is also an Orphanage, with a Foundling Asylum, and Distressed Widows' Refuge, at Paṇḍharpur.

It is a very remarkable fact that, although the organization of the Prārthanā Samāj with reference to social questions is lax as compared with the Brāhma Samāj, yet its services to the cause of social reform, to philanthropy, and to social service have been very great. It was Ranade who organized the friends of social reform and started the National Social Conference, which meets annually. The first Conference was held in 1888, and ever since that day members of the Prārthanā Samāj have taken a very large part in its activities. Similarly, the rise of the Depressed Classes' Mission, a society organized in 1906 to help and uplift the out-castes, which draws its support from various communities, is due almost entirely to V. R. Shinde and other Samājists. A third instance is the Social Service League recently founded in Bombay under Sir N. G. Chandavarkar.

Like the sister organization in Bengal, the Prārthanā Samāj remains weak in numbers but strong in influence.

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J. N. FARQUHAR.

PRATYEKABUDDHA.—1. Introduction and definition.—In the course of ages the Law (*dharma*) has been successively taught by a long line of saviours or perfect Buddhas (*samyaksambuddha*). They are not only Buddhas, *i.e.* in possession of the knowledge (*bodhi*) that works out *arhat*-ship or liberation (*nirvāṇa*); they are perfect Buddhas—omniscient, omnipotent, and very compassionate. These qualities they owe to the long practice of the 'perfect virtues' (*pāramitās*) as *bodhisattvas* (see artt. BODHISATTVA, MAHĀYĀNA).

The seed of the Law bears different fruit according to the dispositions of the disciples. A threefold distinction must be made. (1) Some disciples (mediate or immediate) of a perfect Buddha resolve to imitate him; they follow the practice of the *bodhisattvas*, and finally become perfect Buddhas, revealing the Truth and establishing the Church. For, after a few centuries, the visible work of a perfect Buddha perishes, the very name of Buddha and the path to *nirvāṇa* die away. It is the lot of the *bodhisattva* to build the path again and again. (2) Some disciples realize the fruit of the religious life, and become *arhats* or Buddhas and reach *nirvāṇa* while the Law is yet living; the (later) technical name for such disciples, taught by Buddha or the Church, is *śrāvaka*. This word is commonly translated 'auditor,' 'disciple,' but it also means 'preacher,' and this meaning (supported by *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, iv. 53, with the commentary of Chandrakīrti thereon) points out one of the features of these saints: they are preachers. They are the fathers and the doctors of the Church together with the *bodhisattvas*. (3) But not every disciple, either monk or layman, becomes an *arhat* or a Buddha during the short period of the duration of the Church. The consequence is that, during the much longer periods of the disappearance of the Church, these already converted men continue to progress in holiness and wisdom; they develop their old 'roots of merit'; they will finally reach knowledge (*bodhi*), without being actually taught by a perfect Buddha, without being trained under the rule of the Church created by a perfect Buddha; they will, in their last birth, discover the Truth by themselves, as Śākyamuni did and as all perfect Buddhas do. But they will not be perfect Buddhas; they will not move the wheel of

the Law; they will not re-establish the decayed Church. These saints are named *pratyekabuddhas* (*paccekabuddha*, *raṅ-saṅs-rgyas*), 'private Buddhas' (Kern), 'Bouddhas individuels' (Burnouf); 'they desire their own peace' (*raṅ zhi don gñer*, *svaśāntyarthaka*); 'they rule themselves, not the others; it is themselves they bring to *nirvāṇa*' (*ekam ātmānaṃ damenti parinirvāpayanti*).

'The name and the nature of a Buddha,' says Chandrakirti,[1] 'belong to three classes of persons, the *śrāvakas*, the *pratyekabuddhas*, and the incomparable perfect Buddhas. The name of Buddha is therefore suitable for the *pratyekabuddhas*. These, owing to their merits and knowledge, are greater than the *śrāvakas*. But, as they lack the equipment of merit and knowledge [of the perfect Buddhas], the great compassion,[2] the universal knowledge, they are inferior to the perfect Buddhas. They are intermediary. And as knowledge [*i.e.* the knowledge that brings *nirvāṇa*] is born in them without a teacher, as they are Buddhas by themselves, isolated and acting for their own sake, they are *pratyekabuddhas*.'

2. Bodhisattva and pratyekabuddha. — All *pratyekabuddhas* are not *śrāvakas* who have failed to obtain knowledge (*bodhi*, *arhat*-ship) during the duration of the Church. A *bodhisattva* may abandon his career of a *bodhisattva* and become a *pratyekabuddha* in order to obtain *nirvāṇa* sooner. A legend told in the *Kanakavarṇāvadāna*[3] illustrates the leading motive of the *pratyekabuddha*:

A *bodhisattva* chanced to be aware of a hideous crime (incest); he felt disgusted with the creatures whom he was trying to liberate by becoming a perfect Buddha: 'Beings are corrupt! Nay, they are very corrupt! Who would have the courage to work so long a time for the sake of so wicked beings?' Accordingly, this *bodhisattva* made up his mind to obtain *nirvāṇa* as soon as possible (*i.e.* the *pratiṣṭhita nirvāṇa*); he sat at the root of a tree, meditated on the origination and passing away of the *skandhas* (elements of the 'self'), and soon realized *bodhi*, the *pratyeka bodhi*.

The *Avadāna* adds that this *bodhisattva*, changed into a *pratyekabuddha*, did not totally lose his previous charity.[4] He thought that he had not done anything for others, having only provided for himself (*svakārtham*). Being unable to preach, he begged in order that the donors might acquire merit by giving to such a 'holy vessel' as a *pratyekabuddha*. Some *pratyekabuddhas* are known to display miraculous powers—a poor substitute for the Word, but a proof of their altruism.

3. Why pratyekabuddhas do not preach.—The *pratyekabuddha* possesses the *bodhi*, or the knowledge necessary to *nirvāṇa*, but he is not a perfect Buddha: he lacks omniscience, omnipotence, supreme compassion; and the reason is clear enough. The *pratyekabuddha* is an *arhat* 'en retard,' who has had to work very hard, in an egoistical way (*svakārtham*), to compensate for the want of actual teaching; he has not followed the practice of the *bodhisattva* which assumes high compassion and creates omniscience and omnipotence. But why does he not preach as *śrāvakas*, as even ordinary monks and laymen do? For he has both compassion and learning. The reason of his silence, of his incapacity for preaching and even speaking, is to be found in the special nature of his training.

The *pratyekabuddhas* have led a lonely life for centuries, as 'solitary contemplative philosophers,' as 'hermits' (Kern); they have not met with laymen, monks, or other *pratyekabuddhas*; they have had neither teacher nor spiritual friends (*kalyāṇamitras*). They have been living 'like a rhinoceros' (*khaḍgaviṣāṇakalpa*).[5] The natural consequence of this solitary life, of this excessive distaste for 'human contact' (*saṃsarga*) in order to avoid 'attachment' (*sneha*), is that they are unable to preach the truth that they have discovered.

4. Ṛṣis and pratyekabuddhas.—There is little doubt that this theory of the *pratyekabuddha*, the hermit saint, arises from actual fact. The *pratyekabuddha* embodies the old ideal of a solitary and silent life—an ideal that was flourishing before Śākyamuni came. Śākyamuni did not favour it; he, indeed, condemned the vow of silence, and did his best to encourage spiritual exercises in common—reading, teaching, and social activities of many kinds. But he was shrewd enough to leave some scope to the more ascetic tendencies of his countrymen. Accordingly, after they had undergone some training (novitiate), monks were allowed to live in the forests, like the *ṛṣis* of old.

Hermits are supposed to have great magical power, and to be angry when troubled in their contemplations; the same is true of the *pratyekabuddhas*, and there are some legends to this effect.

5. The vehicle of the pratyekabuddha.—Owing to their austerities and long meditations, the *pratyekabuddhas* are superior to the ordinary *śrāvakas* in power and in science. But do they acquire *bodhi* by the same method as the *śrāvakas* or by some other method? Both Mādhyamikas and Vijñānavādins state that the *śrāvakas* and the *pratyekabuddhas* are 'conveyed' to *bodhi* by the same vehicle.

'The path of the *pratyekabuddha* is of the same nature (*tulyajātiya*) as the path of the *śrāvaka*. The difference is that in their last birth, owing to their former exercise, they realize without a master the thirty-seven qualities leading to *bodhi* and obtain *arhattva*, the abandonment of all vices' (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, I. vi. 6; *Muséon*, new ser., xii. [1911] 168).

'All saints are born from the Buddhas. The Buddhas teach dependent origination. By hearing it, pondering over it, meditating on it, the *śrāvakas* and the other saints will obtain, according to their intentions, the perfection of their own state. But some of them [the *pratyekabuddhas*] . . . do not obtain *nirvāṇa* in this life; they therefore will obtain it, without further exertion, in another life' (*Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 2; *Muséon*, new ser., viii. 252; Chandrakirti quotes Āryadeva, *Śataka*, viii. 22, and Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamaka*, xviii. 12).

On the other hand, Tibetan and Chinese authorities maintain that, while the *śrāvakas* meditate on the Four Truths (*chaturāryasatya*), the *pratyekabuddhas* obtain their *bodhi* by meditating on 'dependent origination' (*pratītya - samutpāda*). The Chinese translations of *pratyekabuddha* mean 'alone-Buddha,' '*pratyayabuddha*.' The Tibetan equivalents are 'who meditates on *pratītya*' (*rten ḥbrel bsgom*), 'who understands only the causes' (*rkyen gcig rtogs?*).[1] We are told that the proper way of such meditation is to look at the birth and decay of the leaves.

The present writer believes that this distinction is purely scholastic. Dependent origination is only the commentary of the Second Truth.

6. Mahāyānist criticism. — According to the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (p. 44, and *passim*), there is not a *śrāvaka*-vehicle or a *pratyekabuddha*-vehicle. *Śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* do not reach *bodhi* or *nirvāṇa*. They have to become *bodhisattvas* to enter into the Great Vehicle, which is the only vehicle.[2]

The *Prajñāparamitā*, on the contrary, maintains that it is not necessary to become a *bodhisattva* in order to reach *bodhi*. There is a *śrāvaka*-vehicle, a *pratyeka*-vehicle (see *Saddharma*, pp. 79, 260; *Dharma-Saṃgraha*, etc.). But one cannot

[1] *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Bibl. Buddhica, ix. 3. 18; tr. in *Muséon*, new ser., viii. [1907] 254.

[2] The 'compassion' (*karuṇā*) is compassion 'consisting in absence of hatred' towards beings of Kāmadhātu (see COSMOGONY [Buddhist]) as far as they are enduring the first kind of suffering (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*). The 'great compassion' (*mahāka ruṇā*) includes all beings and all kinds of suffering.

[3] *Divyāvadāna*, ed. Cowell and Neil, p. 293 ff.; tr. E. Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 94.

[4] Cf. *Avadānaśataka*, Bibl. Buddh. iii. [Petrograd, 1906–09], ii. 116: the *pratyekabuddhas* are said to be *hinadīnānukampaka*.

[5] Later, it seems, a second category of *pratyekabuddha* was admitted (by the Sautrāntikas, says Wassilieff [*Buddhismus*, p. 304]; but it seems that the Vaibhāṣikas agree), the *pratyekabuddhas* 'who are living together' (*vargacārin*); Kern (*Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 62, n. 1) compares *vaggasārin* in the *Sutta-Nipāta*, 371, 800, 912.

[1] See Wassilieff, p. 13; Eitel, *Handbook*, p. 123; Sarat Chandra Das, *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, p. 1166.

[2] See also the *sūtra* quoted, *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 97.

become a *śrāvaka* and *pratyeka* by the mere understanding of the Four Truths or of dependent origination. Understanding of voidness (*śūnyatā*) is necessary.[1]

7. Technical details.—Many technical details are to be found in the Abhidharma and Vijñānavādin books—*e.g.*, the theory of the last incarnation of a future *pratyeka*.

The *chakravartin* (sovereign king) is conscious when descending into the maternal womb; then he becomes unconscious and is born unconscious. The future *pratyeka* remains conscious in the womb. The *bodhisattva* at his last birth is born conscious.

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II. I. J. Schmidt, 'Über einige Grundlehren des Buddhaismus,' *Mém. de l'Acad. de St. Pétersbourg*, 6th ser., 'Sciences politiques, histoire et philologie,' i. [1832] 241; A. Rémusat, *Foé koué ki*, Paris, 1836, p. 165; E. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien*, do. 1844 (reprint 1876), pp. 94, 297, 438, *Le Lotus de la bonne loi*, do. 1852, pp. 52, 315; S. Beal, *A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese*, London, 1871, p. 253; E. J. Eitel, *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*[2], do. 1888, p. 123; C. F. Koppen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, Berlin, 1857–59, i. 419, 426; W. Wassilieff, *Der Buddhismus*, Petrograd, 1860, pp. 13, 162, 289, 304; Sarat Chandra Das, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary*, Calcutta, 1902; R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, London, 1850, p. 290, *Manual of Buddhism*[2], do. 1880, p. 38; R. C. Childers, *Dictionary of Pali*, do. 1875, p. 309; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 61 f.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

PRAYER.

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PRAYER (Introductory and Primitive). — **1. Origin and development.**—In its simplest and most primitive form prayer is the expression of a desire, cast in the form of a request, to influence some force or power conceived as supernatural. Apart from the modern usage of the term, which connotes spiritual communion, it is usually understood to imply reverent entreaty. It must be said, however, that in the primitive mind reverence is usually obscured by fear—all spirits, whether good or bad, are regarded as dangerous—while the idea of entreaty, though the ostensible influence in determining the form, is largely coloured by a desire to compel or command. Genetically, prayer is related to the spell or charm; and it is frequently a matter of difficulty to determine whether a particular formula should be assigned to one category or to the other. Although the form of the address may be of assistance—some writers have endeavoured to distinguish between spell and prayer by assigning to the latter those formulæ which contain a vocative (see W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 272)—in the rudimentary forms the underlying psychological elements are hardly distinguishable. In performing a magical act the performer often supplements the mimetic action by indicating in a phrase or two what it is that he wishes to be done.

The Australian black-fellow who works magic against his enemy by pointing and stabbing with his spear says, 'Strike! kill.' Here a simple command emphasizes the action. In another and more complex example the Maidu medicine-man inflicts disease on the neighbouring villages by burning certain roots and blowing smoke towards them saying, 'Over there! Over there! Not here! To the other place! Do not come back this way. We are good. Make these people sick. Kill them; they are bad people!' (R. B. Dixon, 'The Northern Maidu,' *Bull. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xvii. pt. 3 [1905] 328 f.). In form this is a direct command, but in spirit it differs hardly, if at all, from supplication.

A familiar process of magic is to work evil against an enemy by performing a ceremony over some part of the body, such as hair or a piece of nail, or some object which has been in intimate contact with the body, such as earth impressed with a footprint. The ceremony is accompanied as a rule by some formula.

[1] *Astasāhasrikā*, Bibl. Indica (Calcutta, 1888), p. 379; *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 353 (a different opinion, p. 351).

The Maori priest was believed to be able to 'pray' mother and child to death by using the placenta in this way (G. Bennett, *Wanderings in New South Wales, Batavia, etc.*, London, 1834, i. 128).

The relation between formula and ceremony is shown in a Malay charm in which the nature and meaning of the treatment of the soil from the centre of a footprint were indicated by saying:

> 'It is not earth that I switch,
> But the heart of *So-and-so*.'

But, while this instance merely illustrates the desire to make clear the intention of the charm (though it must be noted that it is an essential part in securing success), another charm from the same part of the world illustrates by a curious conjunction the primitive attitude of mind towards the powers to whom these invocations are addressed: in one of the ceremonies for bringing sickness, injury, or death upon an enemy by the mutilation or transfixing of a waxen image the operator, in the course of his address to the spirit, says:

> 'Lo, I am burying the corpse of *Somebody*,
> . . . . . .
> Do you assist in killing him or making him sick:
> If you do not make him sick, if you do not kill him,
> You shall be a rebel against God,
> A rebel against Muhammad,'

which illustrates at once the request for help, the idea of compulsion involved in the charm, and a threat in case of non-compliance (W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, pp. 569, 571). In some addresses to the dead, especially when the fear of the dead, however well disposed, has been much exaggerated by any peculiar or unusual circumstance, magical ceremony, entreaty, and command combine in much the same way.

The Oráons appear to regard the spirit of a woman who has died in childbirth or while pregnant as specially malignant. Not only is she buried with special precautions (the ankles are broken and the body is laid face downward with the bones of a donkey), but various invocations are addressed to her, such as, 'If you come back, may you turn into a donkey!' The roots of a palm-tree may be burned, while the mourners say, 'May you come home only when the leaves of the palm-tree wither!' (P. Dehon, 'Religion and Customs of the Oráons,' *Mem. As. Soc. Bengal*, i. 9 [1906], p. 139).

On the other hand, the Thonga formula at the *tjeba* ceremony of collective fishing by the community, which takes place when the lakes are

drying up, seems to be passing, if it has not already passed, into the category of prayer.

An offering is made by the descendant of an inhabitant of the country, who, however, does not perform the full sacramental *tsu*, which consists in placing part of the offering in the mouth and then spitting it out, but merely spits without having placed anything in his mouth, and says, 'Let fish abound! Let them not hide in the mud! Let there be enough of them to satisfy everyone!'

Notwithstanding the form of the address and the circumstances of the ceremony, which give it a magical turn, the stress laid upon the ancestral connexion seems to indicate a more definite direction of the supplication than would be expected in an endeavour to compel a successful issue by magic alone (H. A. Junod, *Life of a S. African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912–13, ii. 70). Among the Veddas of Ceylon many of the invocations which form a part of the ceremonial dances by which the favour of the spirits is secured are Sinhalese charms which are meaningless to them and as such are merely the 'word of power.' But in form, whatever may be the spirit in which the invocations as a whole are used, whether merely as spells or as supplications with full appreciation of their purpose and meaning, they belong to the category of prayer. This appears clearly in the following instance of an invocation to the *nae yaku*, the spirits of the dead:

'O father who went to that world, come to this world. Come quickly to place (for us) the sambar deer, the spotted deer. Take this betel leaf. Come very quickly. Come quickly. My mother's people take the rice, take the rock honey, take the betel leaf. To place the sambar, to place the spotted deer, come very quickly' (C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 277).

Notwithstanding the change in mental attitude involved by the transition from spell to prayer, there is always a tendency for the latter to retain or to revert to the character of the former. The primitive mind clings firmly to the idea of control over power which is involved by the use of name or formula. Among the Todas, with whom ritual has almost overwhelmed religion, prayers are divided into two portions, of which the petition or prayer proper forms the second. The first part consists almost entirely of names known as *kwarzam*; it is made up of a number of clauses, each consisting of the name of an object of reverence followed by *idith*, 'for the sake of.' Much care is taken that this part of the prayer should not be overheard; it is muttered in the throat. It has been conjectured that the *kwarzam* was originally a form of supplication to the gods with which other words have come to be included. The objects of reverence named are of various kinds, including the names of gods, buffaloes, villages, dairies, and parts thereof. As in other cases—*e.g.*, the Vedda prayers, for which there is a special vocabulary—these things are referred to not by their ordinary names, but by special names (Rivers, pp. 216, 229). This formalization of prayer which assimilates it to a spell can be paralleled from the Avesta, in which the conception of the magical power of prayer is such that the mere repetition of the words, if correct, is sufficient for efficacy, and it is commanded that they should be repeated as a sort of preservative at fixed hours of the day (W. Geiger, *Civilization of the Eastern Irānians in Ancient Times*, Eng. tr., London, 1885–86, i. 71)—a use of 'vain repetition as the heathen do' which finds expression in an extreme form in the employment of the Buddhist prayer-wheel (*q.v.*).

2. Occasions on which prayer is offered.—It follows from the close genetic relationship between spell, or charm, and prayer that the latter, when first it begins to modify its magical character of compulsion and to take on the character of an appeal for assistance, is employed intermittently only.

It is said of the Baganda that, when everything goes smoothly and the family is in good health, a man does not trouble to pray or make offerings, but does so only in times of danger or sickness. If a ghost was troubling a family, offerings were made and prayer was addressed to a stronger ghost to secure its assistance. Prayer was offered to Musisi, the god of earthquake, when he exhibited his power; Nagawonyi received offerings when the women desired children (J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, pp. 286 f., 318 f.). The Fijian addressed a prayer to his totem when he was in danger; *e.g.*, a man who capsized at sea called on the shark-god, and a shark appeared and towed him ashore (B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 115).

Illness, when recognized as caused by a spirit, was another occasion which called for prayer, either to the spirit responsible, or to a spirit which possessed the power to heal.

Among the Kayans of Borneo the chant of the *dayong* (medicine-man or -woman), before starting on the soul-hunt, is essentially a prayer for assistance addressed to Laki Tenangan, the supreme being of the universe, or in the case of a woman to Doh Tenangan, his wife (C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 29 f.). The Thonga medicine-man, before entering upon the treatment of a case of illness, prays to his ancestors, and in particular to that one of them from whom he holds that his knowledge was acquired, to give their blessing to his treatment (Junod, ii. 362). The oblation which follows the circumcision ceremony performed on the young men to secure the recovery of a Fijian chief is accompanied by prayer to the ancestral spirits (Thomson, p. 157).

Drought is a frequent occasion—especially in Africa—for prayer in connexion with rain-making ceremonies, as, *e.g.*, among the N'yanga and N'goni tribes, when the chief at the head of the whole community offers up prayers as a part of a propitiatory ceremony addressed to his predecessors and ancestors. Every village has its prayer-tree, usually a fig, standing in the open space, under which sacrifices are offered (A. Werner, *Natives of British Central Africa*, London, 1906, pp. 51, 53, 62 f.).

A remarkable development of the theory of divine punishment which bears upon the efficacy of prayer as a remedial measure in case of drought is recorded among the Torajas of Central Celebes.

Divine displeasure in cases of incest is marked by torrential falls of rain. In cases of prolonged drought they simulate incest among their animals. A cock and a sow are killed and laid side by side in an intimate embrace. The headman then prays, 'O gods above and gods below, if you have pity on us, and will that we eat this year, give rain. If you will not give rain, well we have here buried a cock and a sow in an intimate embrace,' *i.e.* show your displeasure by sending storms (A. C. Kruijt, quoted in *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 113).

Another occasion when the assistance of superhuman powers may be sought is in divination.

The Baganda leather-thrower, when consulted in a case of sickness, or the Thonga diviner, when consulting his bones, usually offered up a prayer to the god or to the ancestors (Roscoe, p. 339; Junod, ii. 363).

Although it cannot be said that among the more primitive races, with certain exceptions, there is any conception of prayer as anything more than a call in the hour of need and as occasion arises, there is an approximation to the idea of an organized ritual in the constant but irregularly recurring crises in which it is thought desirable to petition the spirits or deities for benefit or protection.

One of these is death or burial—a time when evil influences are most potent and are brought more intimately into touch with human life. Among the Igorots after a death an old man relates the story of the first man and woman after the flood. Cabunian taught them to bury the dead, and, after burying the dead, he said, 'You should make prayers and offerings so that you may not be affected by any kind of disease' (A. Robertson, 'The Igorots of Lepanto,' *Philippine Journ. Science*, sect. D. 9 [Manila, 1914], p. 514). Among the Bathonga a burial, a ceremony of which the traditional solemnity is indicated by the exceptional prominence assigned the uterine nephew, was one of the important occasions in the family ceremonial in which prayer was offered. Another was a marriage, when the father of the bride prayed the gods to give children to the union. When a man departed on a journey, the medicine-man prepared drugs, spat on him, and prayed for his protection (Junod, ii. 362). In the Philippines the native tribes spend a great part of their time in collecting animals with which to make feasts. The spirits are invited to these feasts in order to secure their favour. They precede almost every action of any importance, such as the first hair-cutting of a son, harvest, irrigation and other work connected with the crops and, inevitably, are part of the treatment of disease. In a feast preceding a journey to

make a purchase a man will invite the attendance of certain spirits, asking them to put it in the mind of whomsoever he may buy from to sell the animal cheap (R. F. Barton, 'The Harvest Feast of the Kiangan Ifugao,' *Philippine Journ. Science*, sect. D. 6 [1911], p. 83). Among the Igorots the feasts, whether made for a particular object or with the general aim of securing spiritual assistance, are not only the occasions for a petition; the reply is also forthcoming, being furnished by an examination of the liver of the victim (Robertson, p. 472 *f.*). Among hunting tribes with strongly developed animistic ideas it was usual to address some form of prayer to their prey by way of propitiation, either before or after its death (see HUNTING AND FISHING). The hunter of N. America sometimes thanked the animal for allowing itself to be killed (C. Hill-Tout, *British N. America*, i. *The Far West*, London, 1907, p. 168). This practice was also extended to the vegetable kingdom, and prayer to vegetation-spirits formed a part of the numerous firstfruit ceremonies which were a prominent feature in the culture of the American Indian. Before young people ate the first raspberry-shoots of the new season they addressed the plant and asked for its favour. Further, in both the raspberry-shoot ceremony and the salmon ceremony of the tribes of the north-west, ceremonies which inaugurated the new season's replenishment of the stock of food, the prayer offered by the medicine-man to the spirits of the raspberry or the salmon was an essential element in the ceremony (*ib.* pp. 168 *f.*, 171 *f.*). Agricultural ceremonies of all descriptions, and especially those connected with sowing and the harvest, have had a marked influence in the development of regularity in the occasions for prayer. At the time of sowing the Iroquois prayed to the thunder-spirit and at harvest they thanked him for the gift of rain (*GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 369). In the Malay Peninsula every one who is to take part in the rice cultivation must bring to the mosque half a quart of grain (for 'mother seed') in order that prayers may be read over it. When they are finished, every man goes to the rice-field, if possible on the same day, to begin to plough the nursery plot, and at the various stages of cultivation in the course of the ceremonies appropriate to each —*e.g.*, in the sowing and in the ceremonial reaping by the *pawang*—charms or prayers are repeated. In the case of the ceremonial reaping the 'ten prayers,' which are in effect a petition for daily bread never to be lacking on earth or in heaven, have to be repeated in one breath (Skeat, p. 240). If there was danger that the crop might fail from drought or from other causes, offerings were made and magical ceremonies performed which were sometimes accompanied by prayers. The two elements are combined in a rain-making ceremony in Angoniland when the people repair to the rain-temple and the leader pours beer into a pot, which is buried in the ground, and prays 'Master Chauta, you have hardened your heart towards us, what would you have us do? We must perish indeed. Give your children the rains, there is the beer we have given you.' On their return they find a pot of water set at a doorway by an old woman, in which they dip branches and scatter the water aloft (R. S. Rattray, *Some Folk Stories and Songs in Chinyanja*, London, 1907, p. 118). At the harvest feast of the Kiangan Ifugao prayers were addressed to every class of spirit in whose control lay any kind of influence, for good or ill, on the crop—spirits that make men remember and forget, earth-gods, sky-gods, the spirits that control locusts, wind, rain, and drought. The earth- and sky-gods, who are especially concerned with the growth of plants, are asked to 'speed the harvesters, make the rice grains numerous as the sands, increase the rice' (Barton, p. 89 *f.*). One of the Igorot feasts was given by a man once every four or five years. To this feast he summoned all the rich men of the neighbouring towns and all the poor of his own. It was accompanied by a dance and a petition was offered up for favour to be shown to the host. The petitioners prayed to the *anitos* (spirits) and the souls of their dead ancestors not to destroy his plants and not to kill his animals, so that he might be able to use these animals to give another feast for the *anitos* (Robertson, p. 513). In the peculiar and exceptional *nanga* rites of Fiji prayers to the ancestors formed part of the ceremony; these rites also appear from the character of the offerings to have been in certain of their aspects a firstfruit ceremony (Thomson, p. 155).

In a few cases peoples of a primitive type have advanced beyond this conception of prayer as intermittent and have incorporated it as a regular function in their life.

Among the Todas, *e.g.*, prayer both morning and evening is a regular part of the ceremonial of the *ti* dairies, while at the village dairies it is offered in the evening only. Each village has its own prayer, which is used in all the dairies of the village (Rivers, p. 213). Among the Masai and peoples of related culture, such as the Gallas, Nandi, and Suk, prayers form a regular part of their life. Not only are they offered on special occasions, such as the appearance of the new moon, a raid (when the warriors after victory give thanks and pray for safe return to their homes, while the women and girls who have been left behind also pray for their safety), the building of a house, etc., but the Nandi, *e.g.*, believe that the deity takes an intimate interest in all affairs of their life and pray to him regularly. Among the Masai the women offer up prayer twice a day, while the men pray with regularity, though less frequently (C. Eliot, in A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. xix, and *The Nandi*, do. 1909, p. xix *f.*; K. R. Dundas, 'Notes on the Tribes inhabiting the Baringo District, E. Africa Protectorate,' *JRAI* xl. [1910] 61).

It must be admitted, however, that these cases are exceptional and that, generally speaking, prayer is a refuge in time of crisis for purposes of protection or propitiation. The primitive attitude in its crudest form is perhaps best indicated by the Solomon Islands belief that prayer is not available for all and sundry, but, to be acceptable to the power, ghost, or spirit addressed, it should be in a regular form of words known only to the person who has access to the power (R. W. Williamson, *The Ways of the South Sea Savage*, London, 1914, p. 73). The belief is not universally held in the Solomon Islands—natural calls for help are made in time of danger or distress—but in so far as it is held it places prayer on a level with the esoteric magic of the medicine-man, from which the ordinary individual is debarred.

3. Powers to whom prayer is addressed.—It would be impossible to give here a complete account of the powers, spirits, deities, whatever they may be called, to whom prayers are addressed. It will be sufficient to indicate briefly the general principles upon which the primitive mind works in turning to higher powers for assistance. Prayer has been defined as 'the address of personal spirit to personal spirit' (*PC*[4] ii. 364). This definition, however, at any rate in regard to the lower culture, by specifying terms of personality, appears to apply too precise a conception to what is in all probability a somewhat vague attitude of mind. The Australian black-fellow's phrase, 'Strike! Kill!' is perfectly definite in its intention of producing a result by setting certain forces into operation, but the attention is focused on power rather than personality, whether that of the speaker or that of something external to himself. Prayer, in fact, develops through the conception of powers, or, as some would prefer to call it, using the Melanesian term, *mana*, rather than by an increasingly precise attribution of personality to the supernormal, a factor which comes into prominence only at a later stage. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that bases prayer on the analogy of human intercourse; for, while the form of spell and prayer may well be modelled on command and entreaty, the idea of the relative strength of the powers at the command of different individuals is perfectly familiar to primitive experience. The regular method of combating magic is to control a stronger magic.

The Creek shamans held contests to determine their superiority, and among the Shushwap, if two shamans with equally powerful spirits tried to bewitch one another, both died, one shortly after the other (G. Speck, 'The Creek Indians of Taskigi Town,' *Mem. Amer. Anthrop. Assoc.* ii. [1903] 74; J. Teit, 'The Shushwap,' *Jesup N. Pacific Exped.* ii. 7 [1909], p. 613).

Failure to compel by magical ceremony a power adequate to the purpose would lead naturally to an attempt to secure the services of greater powers either through the expert—the medicine-man—or by propitiation and entreaty.

In Uganda, when a ghost troubles a family, prayers and offerings are made to a stronger ghost to secure its assistance (Roscoe, p. 286).

The extent to which such powers are attributed to the human individual and the relation of the ordinary man to a person endowed with these powers differ in degree and not in kind from the relation to the superhuman spirit world. This in some cases leads to a form of address which to all intents and purposes is a prayer.

It is recorded that the natives of Brazil, when they went to meet the medicine-man, prostrated themselves on the ground before him and said, 'Grant that I be not ill, that I do not die, neither I nor my children' (*GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 358).

It must not be assumed that all objects of veneration, or of fear and awe, are addressed in prayer. Indeed, of some primitive races who recognize the existence of spirits it is not recorded that they made any use of prayer. Further, when

in the lower forms of religion the existence of a supreme spirit is recognized, this spirit is usually looked upon as otiose, propitiatory offerings and prayer being made to the lower spirits, who, if not actually regarded as more powerful, are held to be more actively concerned in human affairs. Even when this extreme view is not taken, the supreme being is often approached by intercession rather than directly.

Among the Philippine tribes to whom reference has been made above prayer is offered to the *anitos* and ancestral spirits in order that they may intercede with the *batala*, the supreme being (Robertson, pp. 472, quoting Loarca [*c.* 1580], 514, etc.). The Kayans, though addressing the gods by name in terms of praise and supplication, appear to believe that the prayers are transmitted to them by the souls of domestic pigs and fowls. One of these animals is always killed and charged to carry the message to the gods. Also a fire is always at hand, the ascending smoke of which seems to establish communication with the god. Oding Lahang, who is regarded by the Kayans as a deified chief, is also invoked for his intercession with Laki Tenangan (Hose and McDougall, ii. 6 ff.). On the other hand, the Masai group (using the term in the extended sense to cover all the peoples—Suk, Nandi, etc.—of related culture in N.E. Africa), whose exceptional position in the matter of prayer has already been noted, frequently pray to the supreme deity, the sky-god; *e.g.*, the Masai women after childbirth pray for children to the god who thunders and rains, the old men pray for rain to the 'black god,' *i.e.* the god of the rain-cloud. This god is Engai, 'who is prayed to and hears' (Hollis, *Masai*, pp. 345 f., xix). Among the Galla the supreme deity to whom prayer is addressed daily is Wak; among the Nandi Asis, the supreme deity, is supposed to take a friendly interest in the details of their daily life, and at such events as, *e.g.*, the building of a house prayer is offered. The potter, when baking pots, prays, 'God give us strength, let us bake them so that men may like them.' It is interesting to note, however, that the medicine-men, who are Masai, pray to their ancestors and not to the Masai Engai (Hollis, *Nandi*, p. xx f.). Among the gods and spirits summoned to the harvest feast of the Ifugao are the earth- and sky-gods, while the conception which underlies the Iroquois prayer to the thunder-spirit at sowing time and the thanksgiving at harvest is evidently an analogous appeal to the controlling powers of natural phenomena.

Natural objects, or rather the indwelling spirits, are not infrequently addressed in prayer.

When a Masai sees a new moon, he throws a twig or stone at it, saying, 'Give me long life,' or 'Give me strength,' and a pregnant woman will make an offering of milk and say, 'Moon, give me my child safely' (Hollis, *Masai*, p. 274). The Nandi also pray to the new moon (Hollis, *Nandi*, *loc. cit.*). In the Kei Islands, when the warriors have gone on an expedition, the women bring baskets containing stones and fruit, which they anoint and place on a board murmuring, 'O Lord, Sun, Moon, let the bullets rebound from our husbands, brothers, betrothed and other relations just as the raindrops rebound from these objects which are smeared with oil' (C. M. Pleyte, 'Ethnog. Beschr. der Kei Eilanden,' *Tijd. van het Ned. Aard. Genootsch.* II. x. [1893] 805). The Baganda, before crossing any river, take a few coffee-berries and, after asking the spirit for a safe passage, throw them into the water (Roscoe, p. 319).

The magical element in prayer requires that the powers addressed should be adequate to carry out the request of the petitioner.

The Ifugao of the township of Cayan in cases of sickness summon an old woman, a *baylan* (priestess), who makes an offering and prays to the *anito*; if the prayer has been offered to the right *anito*, the patient recovers; but, if not, another priestess is summoned and a fresh offering is made to another *anito*, and so on until the right one is found.

This principle is still more clearly indicated when departmental spirits and deities are recognized.

In Uganda, *e.g.*, there are four principal classes of objects of veneration: the fetishes which, though made by man in many cases, possess ghosts and hear and answer supplications; national gods whose duty is the protection of the king and the State; ghosts; and amulets. Appeals are addressed to the high gods on special occasions. To Mukasa, the great god, the king sent an annual offering, when a special appeal was made for the prosperity of the crops; Musisi, the father of Mukasa, was responsible for earthquakes, and, when an earthquake occurred, he was asked to keep quiet; Nagawonyi, the goddess of hunger, was addressed in times of famine; Mbale was resorted to by women who desired children; Nagadya interceded with the other gods when rain was required, and so forth (Roscoe, pp. 273, 298, 313 ff.).

The reverence for the ghost which forms part of the Baganda religion is one phase of the cult of the dead, which in various forms is wide-spread among primitive peoples. The offerings made to the dead either to secure their influence or to ward off any harm that they might do are usually accompanied by some form of address.

In Central Africa among the Yaos the spirit of any deceased person, with the exception of wizards and witches, is regarded as an object of homage. In the prayers for the community on such occasions, *e.g.*, as a petition for rain, the chief addresses his immediate predecessor as the representative of all who have lived in the village in past times and the whole line of his ancestors, and the individual may approach his dead relatives in the same way on his own behalf (Werner, p. 49). In the prayers of the Igorots the ancestors are invoked side by side with the *anitos* (Robertson, *loc. cit.*). The Bathonga, as has been mentioned above, pray to their ancestors. The medicine-man, in praying for the sick, will call on the god who caused the illness, asking him to bring with him all the gods who have helped, or he may call his own father, asking him to bring his grandfather and so on until all his ancestors, including collaterals, have been named. On the other hand, the priest, if praying for the country as a whole, will begin with the remotest ancestor and name the successors in order until he reaches his father. An exception is found in the Maluleke district, where at the cooking of the new yams an offering and prayer are made to the spirits of the Ba-Nyai (a people conquered by the Maluleke) as the original owners of the land (Junod, ii. 363, 367). The Vedda invocations are also addressed to the spirits of the dead; departmental spirits are invoked for success in hunting, in honey-gathering, and in getting food supply (Seligmann, pp. 133, 166, 272 f.); but the myths which attach to these spirits would suggest that they are a development of the cult of the dead, spirits which in course of time have become individualized as heroic figures.

4. Persons by whom prayer is offered.—The development of prayer is closely connected with the growth of a specialized class of priests. Although it is the case that at all stages of development prayers are offered by individuals on their own behalf, there are two influences which tend to confine the ceremony, or the principal part in the ceremony, to a particular class. One is the special knowledge of the requirements and powers of the spirit whose aid is to be invoked—a knowledge of the special magic for the occasion—and the other is the communal interest of the occasion on which prayer is offered.

(1) An example of the first, of frequent and wide-spread occurrence, is to be found in the treatment of disease, where, the specialist—the medicine-man—having been called in, it is naturally a part of his function that he should utter the invocations, if any should form part of the ceremonies of which his treatment consists. Instances have already been mentioned — *e.g.*, among the Igorots, where, if one medicine-woman fails, another must be consulted until the spirit who can deal with the case has been found. On the analogy of other cases it might be assumed that in this case knowledge of the right formula is necessary to success, just as it is believed in the Solomon Islands that those who offer prayer must know the form of words acceptable to the power addressed.

In the Ifugao harvest feast, the prayers are uttered by the old men, who alone know the words which should be uttered, while the younger men act as acolytes (Barton, p. 83).

This is not an isolated instance, but it states explicitly a reason which may be held to account for the form of solo and chorus often followed in offering prayer.

(2) It is probable that the second influence has grown out of the first, and that magical power or knowledge is the basis of the union of temporal and spiritual which makes the chief the spokesman of the community in those invocations which seek the benefit of the whole community.

In such a ceremony as that of the Central African Anjanga, in which the chief utters prayers while alone in a small hut, while the people outside chant accompaniments and clap their hands (Werner, p. 63), the chief as rain-maker has become the chief as priest. In Fiji, where the offices of chief and priest were combined, the tribal gods could be approached only through the priests. In Uganda the national gods were approached through the intermediacy of their priests; at the sacrifice offered at the building of a temple to the god Mukasa it was the chief priest who prayed the god to accept the blood and grant an increase of cattle, children, and food; but the rebuilding of the temple could be undertaken only with the consent of the king; and it was the king who sent offerings

annually to secure prosperity of the crops (Roscoe, pp. 292, 294). In this instance, although the offices of king and priest are fully differentiated, there is a special and significant relation between the king and national religion and prosperity.

On the other hand, the duty of acting as the representative of the community may fall entirely on the medicine-man.

In the ceremonial dances of the Veddas the leader who utters the invocation and takes the chief part is invariably a shaman (Seligmann, *loc. cit.*), and in the firstfruit ceremonies of N. America the shaman utters the prayer, while the members of the community stand round in a circle. In Toda ritual, although the individual may pray for his private ends, the prayers upon which the prosperity of the dairy, the chief matter of tribal concern, depends are part of the duties of the priests or keepers of the dairy (Rivers, p. 229).

The position of a father or head of a family is analogous.

Among the Bathonga in all ceremonies connected with the family on which prayers are offered this is the duty of the father (Junod, ii. 362).

5. Conclusion. — In the preceding analysis of prayer in its development from the spell to an invocation addressed to high gods or to the supreme deity there is one characteristic in which it differs fundamentally from the conception of the higher religions, viz. that prayer is an entering into communion with the deity: the benefit for which petition is made is material and not spiritual, and the ethical note is almost entirely absent. The epithets 'good' and 'bad' in the prayer of the Maidu medicine-men to the spirits of disease have a tribal rather than an ethical significance. In fact, in the lower culture there is expressed neither a desire for moral goodness nor a request for forgiveness for moral sin. On the other hand, an Aztec prayer for the ruler recognizes the ethical principle in the words:

'Make him, Lord, as your true image, and permit him not to be proud and haughty in your throne and court; but vouchsafe, Lord, that he may calmly and carefully rule and govern them whom he has in charge' (Sahagun, quoted in *PC*[4], ii. 373).

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E. N. FALLAIZE.

PRAYER (American).—Any ritual observance designed to bring man into nearer relation with the unseen powers of nature is prayer. In this broad sense prayer includes not merely the spoken or chanted word, but also dramatic and symbolic ceremonies, and above all, for the American Indian, the 'dances' in which most of his cults centre. Such ritual prayer has elsewhere been discussed (see esp. COMMUNION WITH DEITY [American], MUSIC [American], SECRET SOCIETIES [American]). But, in a narrower and perhaps finer sense, prayer signifies a personal and intimate expression, non-ritualistic in spirit and commonly in form. The degree in which the native American could possess and consciously prize such expression may appropriately be indicated here.

Half magical spell, half articulation of desperate need, are the crude utterances of the Montagnais which so shocked Le Jeune:

'Their religion, or rather their superstition, consists besides in praying; but, *O mon Dieu!* what prayers they make! In the morning, when the little children come out from their cabins, they shout, "Come, Porcupines; come, Beavers; come, Elk"; and this is all of their prayers' (R. G. Thwaites, *Jesuit Relations*, Cleveland, 1896-1901, vi. [*Quebec, 1633-34*] 203).

Three centuries later another Jesuit says of the Kansas Indians—a thousand miles away:

'The religious sentiment is deeply implanted in their souls. . . . They never take the calumet, without first rendering some homage to the Great Spirit. In the midst of their infuriate passions they address to him certain prayers, and even in assassinating a defenceless child, or a woman, they invoke the Master of Life. To be enabled to take many a scalp from their enemies, or to rob them of many horses, becomes the object of their most fervid prayers, to which they sometimes add fasts, mortifications and sacrifices. What did they not do last spring, to render the heavens propitious? And for what? To obtain the power, in the absence of their warriors, to massacre all the women and children of the Pawnees!' (*Life, Letters and Travels of Father Pierre-Jean de Smet*, 4 vols., New York, 1905, i. 284 f.).

Yet de Smet could find in these people 'natural Christians':

'When we showed them an "Ecce Homo" and a statue of our Lady of the Seven Dolours . . . we beheld an affecting illustration of the beautiful thought of Tertullian, that the soul of man is naturally Christian' (*ib.* i. 285 f.).

So Ragueneau had said of the Hurons (1647–48):

'Though they were barbarians, there remained in their hearts a secret idea of the Divinity and of a first Principle, the author of all things, whom they invoked without knowing him. In the forests and during the chase, on the waters and when in danger of shipwreck, they name him *Airsekoui Soutanditenr*, and call him to their aid. In war, and in the midst of their battles, they give him the name of *Ondoutaeté* and believe that he alone awards the victory. Very frequently, they address themselves to the Sky, paying it homage; and they call upon the Sun to be witness of their courage, of their misery, or of their innocence. But, above all, in the treaties of peace and alliance with foreign nations they invoke, as witnesses of their sincerity, the Sun and the Sky, which see into the depths of their hearts, and will wreak vengeance on the treachery of those who betray their trust and do not keep their word. So true is what Tertullian said of the most infidel nations, that nature in the midst of perils makes them speak with a Christian voice,—*exclamant vocem naturaliter Christianam*,—and have recourse to a God whom they invoke almost without knowing him,—*Ignoto Deo*' (Thwaites, xxxiii. [*Lower Canada, Abenakis, 1650-51*] 225).

Perhaps more impartial and certainly not less sympathetic accounts of the Indian's attitude towards prayer have come from modern students; and among these none is more illuminating than Alice C. Fletcher's account of the initiation of the Omaha youth to the spiritual life:

'The rite [is] known by the name of Nonzhinzhon. The literal meaning of the word is "to stand sleeping"; it here implies that during the rite the person stands as if oblivious of the outward world and conscious only of what transpires within himself, his own mind.' The rite takes place at puberty, when the mind of the child has 'become white.' 'When the youth is at the verge of his conscious individual life, is "old enough to know sorrow," it was considered time that through the rite Nonzhinzhon he should enter into personal relations with the mysterious power that permeates and controls all nature as well as his own existence.' The history of the rite is given in a legend: 'The people felt themselves weak and poor. Then the old men gathered together and said: "Let us make our children cry to Wakonda that he may give us strength." So all the parents took their children who were old enough to pray in earnest, put soft clay on their faces, and sent them forth to lonely places. The old men said to the youths: "You shall go forth to cry to Wakonda. When on the hills you shall not ask for any particular thing. The answer may not come to you as you expect; whatever is good, that may Wakonda give." Four days upon the hills shall the youths pray, crying. When they stop, they shall wipe their tears with the palms of their hands and lift their wet hands to the sky, then lay them to the earth. This was the people's first appeal to Wakonda' (*27 RBEW* [1911], p. 128 f.).

The youth could repeat this rite from time to time until he came to marry; then, unless he were a priest, he gave it up. The Omaha recognized other powers besides Wakonda, as the Earth, the Sky, the Sun, the Moon, but personal prayers were addressed directly to this higher power, penetrating them all.

'A man would take a pipe and go alone to the hills; there he would silently offer smoke and utter the call, *Wakonda ho!*, while the moving cause, the purport of his prayer, would remain unexpressed in words. . . . Women did not use the pipe when praying; their appeals were made directly, without any intermediary' (*ib.* p. 599).

From the illustrations given (and they are only fugitive examples from wide materials) it is obvious that the American Indians have two kinds of prayer: (1) spells and oaths and pleas addressed to the lesser, the environmental, powers of nature, expressed in a magical or hortatory mood; and (2) true spiritual supplications directed to a power variously interpreted as the Great Spirit, the Master of Life, the Heavenly Father. 'Father' is a frequent epithet in their invocations. J. Mooney says of the Arapaho *niga* or *aniqu* that it 'is a term of reverential affection, about equivalent to "our father" in the Lord's prayer'; the ordinary word for 'father' is quite different (*14 RBEW* [1896], pt. ii. p. 966). Again it is

Mooney who says of one of the most pathetic of the Arapaho prayer-songs—'sung to a plaintive tune, sometimes with tears rolling down the cheeks'—that 'it may be considered the Indian paraphrase of the Lord's prayer':

'Father, have pity upon me!
I am weeping from hunger;
There is nothing here to satisfy me'
(*ib.* p. 977).

LITERATURE.—See under artt. referred to.

H. B. ALEXANDER.

PRAYER (Babylonian).—Prayer in the Sumero-Babylonian religion was almost exclusively confined to the private cults, or services for individuals, and the types of prayer which these peoples evolved may be classified in two distinct groups. These two types of prayer designed for the rituals of atonement for individuals are distinguished by their origin and usage. (1) The public liturgies tended to develop a liturgical type of prayer as the last melody or recessional of the song service, and these final passages of the liturgies were adapted for private penance. Prayers of this type are always liturgical in character, metrical in form, and disconnected with every form of magic. (2) On the other hand, a type of prayer was evolved in connexion with the magic rituals of atonement, and formed part of those mysterious and involved rituals. They are free from liturgical formality and usually inspired with great individuality and spiritual sentiment. Inasmuch as the liturgical type of private prayer was the direct offspring of the public liturgies, we shall introduce their discussion by describing the forms of public prayers which ended the Babylonian liturgies.[1]

1. The recessional of the public liturgies.—When the Sumerian liturgists of the 24th to the 21st centuries B.C. finally succeeded in the completion of the long and intricate public services, they introduced a new musical and liturgical motive to end the service. These epilogues or recessionals differ both in literary composition and in musical accompaniment from the various passages which compose the main body of the service. They were known as *er-šem-ma*[2] to the Sumerian liturgists, *i.e.* 'a song sung to the flute.' The choir appears to have been accompanied through the many choral passages of these public services by the lyre, drum, and cymbals, but in the final passage the instruments were changed to the flute for the prayer of intercession. In the ancient liturgies as well as in the main body of the completed products of the Isin period the element of prayer or intercession was not prominent. But these long and intricate services of the Isin period were completed by attaching the intercessions at the end, for the need of prayer pressed itself increasingly upon the religious consciousness of mankind. These intercessions were at first of a purely public character and in harmony with the communal nature of the whole liturgy. The following extracts from the recessional prayer at the end of an Enlil liturgy will serve as an example of these public intercessions at the origin of their use:

'Oh heart repent, repent; oh heart repose, repose.
Oh heart of Anu repent, repent.
Oh heart of Enlil repent, repent.

. . . . . .

"Oh heart of the lord repose," let be spoken unto thee.
Unto thy city hasten in glory like the sun.
Unto Nippur hasten in glory like the sun.

. . . . . .

Thy city Nippur be rebuilt.
Thy temple Ekur in Nippur be rebuilt.

. . . . . .

May one utter petition unto thee.
May one utter intercession unto thee.
Oh heart be reconciled, oh heart repose.'[1]

These Sumerian public services were employed without an interlinear translation by the Semites before 2000 B.C., but at some unknown point in the middle period of the history of Babylonia and Assyria the Semitic liturgists edited these texts with a Semitic version. They continued, however, to the very end of Babylonian civilization, as late as the last century before our era, to conduct the liturgies in Sumerian.

2. Rise of the penitential prayers.—Gradually the intercessions of these public services became more individualistic in thought and expression. In due time arose the beautiful responsive intercessions at the end of the liturgies, where the people and choir no longer voice the appeal of the city and nation, but represent themselves as penitents pleading for mercy before the deity to whom they had sung a long series of litanies. With the intercessional *er-šem-ma* of the Sumerian liturgy, quoted above, compare the following epilogue said at the end of a late liturgy to Marduk:

Choir:
'Oh lord, not wilt thou reject me, not, oh lord, wilt thou reject me.
Oh lord, divine ram of heaven and earth, not wilt thou reject me.
Oh lord Marduk, not wilt thou reject me.'

. . . . . .

Priest:
'He that renders petition am I, thou wilt not reject me.
One of prayer am I, thou wilt not reject me.
One of intercession am I, thou wilt not reject me.'

Choir:
'A father who has begotten I am, thou wilt not reject me.
Oh soon repose, thou wilt not reject me.
How long, oh lord of righteousness? thou wilt not reject me.'

. . . . . .

Priest:
'"Turn thy neck unto him in faithfulness," I will say to thee.
"May thy heart repose," I will say to thee.
"May thy soul repose," I will say to thee.
Thy heart like the heart of a child-bearing mother may return to its place.
As a child-bearing mother, as a begetting father, to its place may it return.'[2]

We have here a fully developed penitential prayer of the liturgical type, the new element of responses between priest and choir being introduced. The influence of the private confessional is obvious, and this public intercession was probably employed in the service of the confessionals. So arose under the influence of the public recessional the prayers of private penance said in secret with a priest in the seclusion of the temple cloisters and chapels. These penitential prayers were said in Sumerian, but are always provided with an interlinear translation for the more important lines.[3] They were apparently unknown to the Sumerians; the pure Sumerian prayers of that type were probably composed by Semites. They are the direct offspring of the *er-šem-ma*, but, when employed for private penance, they were known as *er-šag-tug-mal*, 'weeping that appeases the heart.'[4]

3. The er-šag-tug-mal.—It is obvious that prayers of such formal character, said in the sacred language not understood by laymen and requiring intonation, could not become popular. The ordinary

[1] The Babylonian liturgies, which are numerous and fundamental to the discussion of Babylonian religion, are treated as a supplement to this article (below, §§ 13–18).

[2] The Semitic rendering of this term is still unknown. Reisner has suggested *takribti ḫalḫallati*, and this has been adopted by Jensen, but the evidence is not satisfactory.

[1] Taken from the epilogue of the liturgy to Enlil in H. Zimmern, *Sumerische Kultlieder aus altbabylonischer Zeit*, no. 12, restored by the present writer from a Philadelphia text in his *Liturgical Texts from Nippur*.

[2] The *er-šem-ma* of *en-zu sá-mar-mar* liturgy in S. Langdon, *Babylonian Liturgies*, pp. 114–123.

[3] Pure Sumerian penitential prayers without Semitic translations were in use, as is proved by the fragment of one of this type in Langdon, *Bab. Liturgies*, K. 11874=no. 64, and C. D. Gray, *The Shamash Religious Texts*, Chicago, 1901, pl. xiii. K. 4795. See also Langdon, *Sumerian Liturgical Texts*, p. 118 (a penitential psalm to the god Amurru).

[4] The Semitic rendering was probably *šigû*, the שִׁגָּיוֹן of Hebrew poetry. This identification is based upon a comparison of iv. Rawl.[2] 54, no. 2, lines 14 and 21, *šigû*, with *ib.* line 17, *er-šag-tug-mal*, and rev. 19, *er-šag-tug-mal*.

Babylonian and Assyrian preferred the services of the magic cults, where he said his prayers in Semitic. Consequently few of the liturgical prayers of penance have been found, whereas a large and increasing number of Semitic prayers of the secret cults are known. Only educated and distinguished laymen employed the liturgical prayers. They are mentioned in connexion with a ritual for the king, where they are intercalated in the service of a magic ritual along with the prayers of 'the lifting of the hand,'[1] which were always accompanied by sacramental ceremonies. We possess many rituals of this kind both for kings and for laymen, but this is the only one which directs the use of the liturgical penitential prayers. The king is directed to recite these prayers, or sometimes the priest recites them for him. In this case the service seems to have been performed on the roof of the palace.[2]

Another ritual tablet of this class also orders the saying of an *er-šag-tug-mal* to Ishtar.[3] So we have substantial evidence that these liturgical prayers could be employed in the magic cults, but perhaps only in the rituals for kings and educated laymen. Asurbanipal employed homage[4] and liturgical prayers to appease the gods.[5]

Only ten penitential prayers of this kind are known. They may be readily detected by two easy tests even when the literary note is broken from the end of the tablets. Used in the proper sense, an *er-šag-tug-mal*[6] must be written in Sumerian with interlinear Semitic version and be composed in liturgical style. The penitential psalms are:

(*a*) and (*b*) On a neo-Babylonian tablet in Berlin—one psalm to the god Sakkut and one to Marduk.[7] The psalm to Sakkut is responsive, but that to Marduk is sung for the penitent by the priest.

(*c*) A long psalm to 'any god' and the best example of a deep sense of religious contrition for moral sin;[8] sung throughout by the penitent.

(*d*) Psalm to Aja, consort of the sun-god at Sippar; a fine responsive composition which imitates the public intercessions closely.[9]

(*e*) Psalm to Innini-Ishtar in the same style as (*d*), but sung throughout by the penitent.[10]

(*f*) Fragment of a beautiful responsive psalm:

'He weeps and cannot restrain it.
My deeds I will speak of, my unspeakable deeds.
My words I will rehearse, my word unrelatable.
Yea, oh my god, of my deeds I will speak, my needs not to be told.'[11]

(*g*) Fragment of a psalm similar to (*f*).[12]

(*h*) Responsive prayer in imitation of a public intercession to Enlil.[1]

(*i*) A liturgical prayer similar to (*h*) mentioning an historical event; recited by the penitent (or choir?); possibly an *er-šem-ma*;[2] intercession to Ishtar.

(*j*) Fragment of a beautiful prayer to a god.[3]

4. Semitic private prayers. — Besides these formal penitential prayers, a few Semitic prayers are known which probably represent the work of lay hymnologists, and hence approach more nearly our modern standards of poetry. They do not appear to have had any connexion with official worship. One of the best and longest examples of this type of private prayer is the fine appeal of Ašurnaṣirpal I. to Ishtar of Nineveh in which he intercedes for help in governing his kingdom and mercy upon himself as a sinner. According to one passage of this prayer, it was made at the time when the king dedicated to Ishtar a bed of ebony in her temple.[4] Another long Semitic prayer to Marduk, which devotes special attention to this god's mythical deeds, appears to be a real act of private devotion by Asurbanipal in which he asks Zerbanit to intercede for him with Marduk.[5] On an even more abstract and ceremonially detached plane stands the well-known hymn and prayer to the sun-god in which the best Babylonian ethical wisdom is discussed.[6] A long but badly damaged secular prayer of this type to Nebo contains some remarkable lines.

'Oh lord open (hearted), that puttest an end to sorrow,
Thou of wide ears, that holdest the writing tablet,
Oh Nebo open-hearted, that puttest an end to sorrow,
Thou of wide ears, that holdest the writing tablet,
Oh wise lord, thou hast become angry against thy servant.
Upon him have fallen woe and suffering.
In the billows of the flood he is thrown, the deluge [mounts] over him.
The shore is far from him, far away is the dry land.
He has perished in a deep place, upon a reef he has been caught.
He stands in a river of pitch, he is caught in the morass.
Take thou his hand, not shall thy servant be brought to naught.
Cause his sin to go forth, lift him from the river of pitch.
Oh Nebo, take his hand, not shall thy servant be brought to naught.'[7]

5. Acrostics.—To this class of secular prayer belongs a group of artificially constructed prayers arranged in sections so that each section has the same number of lines, and each of these lines begins with the same vowel or syllable. These initial syllables of the sections spell out a sentence.

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[1] See below.

[2] This ritual for the atonement of a king will be found in v. R.[2] 54, no. 2, with additions on pl. 10 at the end.

[3] H. Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der babylonischen Religion*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 164, no. 51.

[4] *Takribtu*, a Semitic word for liturgy in this passage(?) (v. R. iv. 89).

[5] The Semitic prayers, employed only in the magic cults, by long association in the cults of atonement for royal persons where the liturgical prayers were also permitted, were also erroneously called *er-šag-tug-mal*; *e.g.*, the Semitic prayer addressed to Ishtar in a ritual for a sick man in iv. R.[2] 55, no. 2, obv. 25—rev. 5 is called a *šu-il-la*, which is the proper title, but also an *er-šag-tug-mal*, which is erroneous.

[6] The reading *er-šag-tug-ga* is also possible.

[7] Text in Reisner, *Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen*, no. 30; tr. in Langdon, *Bab. Liturgies*, pp. 124–130.

[8] Text in iv. R. 10. The principal edd. are H. Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 61–74, and in *Der alte Orient*, vii. pt. iii. pp. 22–24; A. Ungnad, in H. Gressman's *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder*, Tubingen, 1909, p. 90f. The advanced ethical conception of sin in this text points to a rather late date. The tablet was copied from a Babylonian original for Asurbanipal's library.

[9] Text in P. Haupt, *Akkadische und sumerische Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1882, p. 122 f.; ed. Zimmern, *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, pp. 51–61; A. H. Sayce, *Origin and Growth of Religion* (*HL*, 1887), London, 1909, p. 523.

[10] Text in Haupt, p. 116 f.; ed. Zimmern, *Bab. Busspsalmen*, pp. 33–51, and *Der alte Orient*, vii. pt. iii. [1905] p. 24; Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, pp. 256–258; Sayce, p. 521.

[11] Text from two fragmentary duplicates, iv. R. 26, no. 8 and 27, no. 3; ed. Zimmern, *Bab. Busspsalmen*, pp. 85–87, and *Der alte Orient*, vii. pt. iii. p. 25; Sayce, p. 526.

[12] Text in v. R. 29**; ed. Zimmern, *Bab. Busspsalmen*, pp. 9–33; Sayce, p. 521; Langdon, *Sum. and Bab. Psalms*, pp. 268–271.

[1] Text in iv. R. 21*, no. 2; ed. Zimmern, *Bab. Busspsalmen*, pp. 78–85.

[2] Text in iv. R. 19, no. 3 and corrections, pl. 4; ed. Zimmern, *ib.* pp. 74–78. The colophon is broken away and hence this intercession may be the epilogue of some liturgy. Other fragments of penitential prayers are published by T. Meek, *BASS* x. pt. i. [1913], nos. 15, 16 (fragments of three different prayers, one of which is also published in Langdon, *Bab. Liturgies*, p. 183), and 17; K. 4648 in the British Museum (unpublished) is also a psalm of this class.

[3] Text in iv. R. 24, no. 3; cf. Haupt, p. 208; M. Jastrow, *Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1905–13, ii. 110. The number of prayers of this class was certainly more numerous than the known examples would lead us to infer. A tablet, Rm. 2220, in the British Museum contains a few titles of such prayers; since it is a fragment of a large tablet, it originally contained a long list of these liturgical psalms.

[4] Text in *ZA* v. [1890] 79 f.; tr. in Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, Oxford, 1914, pp. 65–69.

[5] Text in J. A. Craig, *Assyrian and Babylonian Religious Texts*, Leipzig, 1895, i. 29–31; ed. J. Hehn, in *BASS* v. [1903] 309–319; P. Jensen, *Texte zur assyrisch-babylonischen Religion*, Berlin, 1915, pp. 108–117. The first letters of the lines are an acrostic and read *a-na-ku aš-šur-ba-an-ap-li ša il-su-ka bu-ul-liṭ-a-ni-ma ma-ru-du-uk da-li-li-ka lu-ud-lul*, 'I am Asurbanipal who pray to thee; grant me life, oh Marduk, and I will sing thy praise.'

[6] A long text in four columns, published by C. D. Gray, pls. i., ii., ed. *ib.* pp. 12–23; also by A. Jeremias, in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Shamash'; see also Zimmern, *Der alte Orient*, xiii. pt. i. [1911] p. 23; A. Schollmeyer, *ib.* p. 80 ff., and P. Jensen, *Texte zur assyrisch-babylonischen Religion*, pp. 96–107.

[7] Text in *ZA* iv. [1889] 252–255 and 256 f. Similar prayers to Marduk are published, *ib.* pp. 36–40, and ed. Hehn, *ib.* pp. 319–325; by Hehn, *ib.* p. 392 f., and ed. pp. 368–373.

Naturally a composition of that kind was bound to extend to a great length. The best example is the acrostic published by Zimmern[1] and Craig.[2] The text is badly damaged and only a few words of the acrostic can be read: *a-na-ku . . . ub-bi-ib-ma . . . i-li u šar-ri*, 'I am . . . he has cleansed . . . of god and king.' Naturally the name of some king was spelled out after *a-na-ku*. Each section contains eleven lines, and each line is ruled into four accents, or word-groups. A fragment of an acrostic in sections of four lines has been published by Pinches[3] which is obviously a royal prayer. Only one word of the acrostic can be read, viz. *zi-kir-šu*, 'his name.' The best example of an acrostic in sections of four lines is a fragment of which only three sections are preserved.[4] The lines begin and end with the same syllable.

'He whom thou hast seized	not shall be lifted up [his head] among the gods,
Of the weak and down-cast	thou establishest the [foundation],
He that is entangled in pit and mire	looks unto thee.
May thy good wind blow	and I be delivered.
I have cried unto thee, Oh Nebo!	Receive me with favour and I shall rejoice.
I am fallen low among men,	I refuse sleep.
I am undone like magician	who knows not what he shall pray for.
I cry aloud to the gods,	loudly calling.
The down-cast who puts his trust on thee	shall be satiated with abundance.
Thou fortifiest the wall of the faithful,	and establishest the foundation thereof.
Thou givest goodness	and puttest far away sin.
The stone wall of the wicked	thou turnest to clay.'

6. Prayers of dedication. — Closely allied to these unceremonial prayers and, like them, written for special occasions are the numerous prayers connected with dedications. The historical inscriptions of Sumerian rulers are usually written upon objects of art dedicated to a deity. At the end stands invariably[5] the personal petition of the king.

E.g., the deeds of Lugalzaggisi, king of Erech, are written upon a vase dedicated to Enlil in the temple of Nippur and conclude with a prayer in prose. 'May Enlil, king of the lands to Anu his beloved father, repeat my prayer and to my life, life add. May he cause the world to abide in peace.'[6] A statue of Gudea, patesi of Lagash, dedicated to the goddess Ninharsag to commemorate the building of her temple, ends with a prayer, 'The queen who in heaven and earth decrees fates, Nintud mother of the gods may lengthen the life of Gudea who built this temple.'[7]

The Sumerians no doubt attached a magical influence to these prayers. They produced in a positive sense the intervention of the gods in the same way as the curses which they often attached to monuments were supposed to invoke the wrath of the gods upon those who violated the statue.

The Semites did not imitate the Sumerian prayers at the end of their historical inscriptions[8] until late in the history of Babylonia. All the historical inscriptions of Assyria from the period of the early rulers of Aššur to the reign of Asurbanipal in the 7th cent. end with a curse. Although in Assyria this Semitic conservatism in regard to ancient canons of historical composition remained to the end, yet we possess some examples of prayers on objects dedicated to deities as early as the 15th cent.,[1] and many other beautiful Assyrian prayers of this kind in later reigns.[2] These are regularly written in metrical form. The following are the best-known Semitic prayers of this kind:

(*a*) A hymn and prayer on a gold censer dedicated to Marduk in his temple at Babylon, by Asurbanipal.[3]
(*b*) Hymn, prayer, and curse to Nusku written on an image of the storm bird.[4]

A tendency to add prayers to the end of historical inscriptions is found among the Semites only in Babylonia and is probably to be explained as a survival of Sumerian influence. The Babylonian inscriptions of Asurbanipal preface the curse by a prayer,[5] and one of them ends with a metrical penitential prayer.[6] The full consequence of this literary movement was realized in the historical inscriptions of the Neo-Babylonian empire. Here from Nabopolassar onwards the records of these kings end with admirable prose prayers, and the curse disappears. From a religious and literary point of view, this represents a great advance on all preceding historical composition. The prayers of this class and period are numerous and should be referred to by the student who wishes to study the secular Semitic prayers at their best. The following prayer of Nebuchadrezzar is intercalated in an unusual manner into the preface of his greatest historical inscription (it is addressed to Marduk):

'Without thee, oh lord, what were the portion of the king whom thou lovest, whose name thou callest as it seemed good to thee? Thou directest his being and guidest him in a righteous way. I am thine obedient prince, the creation of thy hand. Thou hast created me and hast entrusted me with the rulership of all peoples. According to thy kindness, oh lord, with which thou carest for all of them cause thy majestic rule to be merciful, and fear of thy divinity cause to be in my heart. Grant me what seems good to thee.'[7]

7. Rise of the šu-il-la and its later application to private prayer in incantations.—By far the most important and numerous class of prayers are the so-called 'prayers of the lifting of the hand'[8] which arose out of the curse in the Sumerian incantations. In the early period the ritual of the incantations consisted in acts of symbolic magic accompanied by an invocation to one of the deities and a curse. The whole was said by the priest. The afflicted person in this period was supposed to have been attacked by the demons. Gradually a more ethical view of sin arose, in which the priests attributed the invasion of the spell (*mamit*) and the flight of the man's protecting deity to the penitent's own immoral deeds.[9] *Pari passu* with this higher conception of sin increased the tendency to secure divine intervention by prayer and confession of these sins. Hence in the course of time the Babylonians developed a ritual of atonement, which, while preserving the magic acts and

[1] *ZA* x. [1895] 1–24.
[2] Craig, i. 44–52. See for a tr. François Martin, *Textes religieux assyriens et babyloniens*, 1st ser., Paris, 1903, pp. 164–194.
[3] T. G. Pinches, *Texts in the Babylonian Wedge-Writing*, London, 1882, pl. 15. This text is DT. 83 in the British Museum and has been studied by Sayce, p. 514, and S. A. Strong, *PSBA* xvii. [1895] 131 ff.
[4] Published by Strong, pp. 138–141. See also C. Bezold, *Catalogue of the Cuneiform Tablets in the British Museum*, London, 1889–99, K. 8204.
[5] That is in case of objects dedicated to a god.
[6] F. Thureau-Dangin, *Die sumerische und akkadische Königsinschriften*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 155 f.
[7] *Ib.* p. 67. For other prayers of this kind in the Sumerian period see *ib.* p. 83, ix. 1–3, p. 194 (*z*) 209 (*a*). Note especially the fine prayer of Arad-Sin, king of Larsa (*ib.* 215 (*d*) rev.).
[8] *The Cruciform Monument of Manishtusu, e.g.*, ends with a curse (L. W. King, *RAssyr* ix. [1912] 104) and so does the stele of the Code of Ḫammurabi. The historical inscriptions of Ḫammurabi, Samsuiluna, and Ammizaduga do not end with prayers.

[1] A short Semitic prayer at the end of a memorial tablet of the scribe of Ašuruballiṭ, king of Assyria at the end of the 15th cent., will be found in King, *Annals of the Kings of Assyria*, London, 1902, pp. 388–390. The fine prayer of Ašurnaṣirpal I. in the 12th cent. cited above is really a dedicatory prayer written on the occasion of presenting a bed to Ishtar.
[2] Cf. the dedication of a statue of Nebo by a governor of Calah, i. R. 35, no. 2; J. Pinckert, *Hymnen und Gebete an Nebo*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 27.
[3] The text is known only from a copy by an Assyrian scribe; text by Strong, *JA*, new ser., i. [1893] 365 f., and Craig, pp. 10–13; ed. Martin, pp. 46–53.
[4] Text known only from an Assyrian copy, published by Craig, p. 35 f.; ed. Martin, pp. 134–138.
[5] See the cylinder inscr. L^2, record of the rebuilding of Ebarra in Sippar (C. F. Lehmann, *Šamaššumukîn*, Leipzig, 1892, pt. ii. 19–21).
[6] Lehmann, pt. ii. 21–23, inscr. 4^3.
[7] Langdon, *Die neubabylonische Königsinschriften*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 122, lines 55–72. The prayers of this class will be found at the end of each inscription in this volume.
[8] Sumerian *šu-il-la*, Semitic *nîš qāti*.
[9] On the principles of the Babylonian atonement see art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Babylonian).

the curses, introduces long prayers to the deities by the priest and penitent. Finally, a still higher ritual resulted in banishing the priest's prayers entirely and assigning them all to the sinner. In a ritual of the latter class the priest confined himself to the acts of magic which accompanied the prayers. Usually the directions for the magic ritual are written after each prayer said by the man seeking atonement from sin or healing of disease. Sometimes the prayers of the penitent are written on one set of tablets and the ritual for the priest on another.[1] Prayers said by a penitent are called 'lifting of the hand,' and were always said in the vernacular familiar to laymen. In those rituals where the priest took over a portion of the prayers we find them named by an ancient liturgical term *ki-[šub]*, 'prostration.' The priests almost invariably employ Sumerian in their prayers of the magic rituals, which were private ceremonies.

Since the ceremonial prayers of private penance were evolved by the Semites directly from the epilogues of the Sumerian liturgies, we should naturally expect that the prayers introduced into the ceremonies of the secret magic cults were modelled upon classic Sumerian incantation rituals. In fact, an Assyrian catalogue of official liturgies and recessional psalms adds also a long list of titles of Sumerian prayers of the 'lifting of the hand' to various gods,[2] and a small fragment of another catalogue contains several more.[3] Since these have Sumerian titles, they perhaps may go back, like the liturgies, to Sumerian times. It will be seen, however, that *šu-il-la* in these catalogues designated a liturgical public prayer. Only at a later period did the term apply to the Semitic prayers of penitents in the magic rituals. The present writer does not believe that the incantation ceremonies, as they came into the hands of the Semites in the age of Ḫammurabi, afforded any opportunity for the prayers of the sinner. They were too ritualistic and priest-ridden to permit of such concessions to laymen. Nor had they risen to the necessary conceptions of sin to produce private prayers as we have them in the later cults. When they passed on their rites of atonement to the Semites, they had probably arrived at the stage in which the priest alone adds prayer to the ban and the magic ritual. These priestly prayers were called *ki-šub* in the Sumerian ceremonies, and, when the Semites introduced their beautiful prayers for the sinner into those ceremonies, they called them *šu-il-la*; since they take the place of the ancient 'curse,' they invariably bear also the title 'incantation.'

8. Prayers of the older type in Semitic times; the kisub of liturgies applied to priests' prayers.—Ceremonies of atonement of the Sumerian type in which the priest said part of the prayers on behalf of the sinner persisted in the Semitic religion of Babylonia. These are of course bilingual, said by the priests in Sumerian and possibly interpreted to the penitent by means of the Semitic interlinear version. The following are the best known examples of this class:

(*a*) A long bilingual prayer to the sun-god, followed by a Semitic prayer of the penitent; part of a ritual of atonement for the king.[4] A portion of the priest's prayer is as follows:

> [illegible] the bound, to heal the sick is in thy power.
> [illegible] god of this man for his son stands humbly before thee to [illegible] faithfully the freeing.
> The lord has sent me;
> Ea, the great lord of Eridu has sent me.
> Stand forth and learn his command and render his decision.
> When thou marchest the dark-headed people, thou directest:
> The light of peace create for him, and so may his trouble be smoothed out.
> Punishment for sin has been laid upon a man, son of his god.
> His limbs are afflicted with pain; he lies suffering with sickness.
> Oh sun-god, observe the "lifting of my hand."
> Consume his food, receive his drink-offering and his god place at his side.
> At thy command may his punishment be forgiven, his condemnation removed.
> That which binds him let be undone, from his sickness may he live.
> As long as he lives may he speak of thy majesty.
> And I the magician, thy servant, will sing thy praise.'[1]

(*b*) Part of a similar series containing the priest's prayer to Shamash and the first line of the penitent's Semitic prayer. A portion of the Sumerian has no interlinear version.[2]

(*c*) Fragment of a similar series. Only the prayer of the priest to Shamash is preserved. The last lines duplicate no. (*b*).[3]

(*d*) Fragment of a similar series. Only about half of the priest's prayer to Shamash is preserved.[4]

(*e*) A complete series of prayers in the 'house of washing' for the healing and atonement of a king. The service begins by a long prayer of the priest, after which follows a section from the lower type of incantations, and then a short Semitic prayer of the king; finally a long prayer of the priest. This service is also said to Shamash.[5]

(*f*) Fragment of an incantation ceremony to Marduk. The end of one of the penitent's prayers in Semitic and most of one of the priest's prayers are preserved.[6]

(*g*) A complete prayer of a priest addressed to Shamash as an incantation to deliver a woman at childbirth.[7]

(*h*) Fragment of a ceremony in the house of washing, containing a portion of the priest's prayer and the end of the penitent's prayer.[8]

(*i*) Fragment of a ceremony addressed to Bau, goddess of healing; portions of the priest's prayer and beginnings of a few lines of the penitent's prayer.[9]

(*j*) A priest's prayer, called an 'incantation and prayer of prostration to the setting sun,' with catch-line for a succeeding Sumerian prayer.[10]

(*k*) A long and nearly complete bilingual prayer to the moon-god is called a *šu-il-la* by the scribe, but it has more similarity to the epilogues (*er-šem-ma*) of liturgies than to the prayers of priests in the magic ceremonies.[11] It was followed by a similar Sumerian prayer. This tablet testifies to the existence of a series of liturgical prayers probably written for public services and closely related to the liturgies.[12]

It is evident, therefore, that the Babylonians employed the word *šu-il-la* originally for a Sumerian public prayer, and, although we have but one example of these, yet the catalogue shows that they possessed a great number. The titles of prayers in the incantations were, therefore, taken from the musical terminology of the public services. The name of the choral passages in the liturgies (*kišub*) was given to the Sumerian prayers of the priests in these magic rituals, and the name of public solo prayers of the temple choristers (*šu-il-la*) came to designate the prayers of the

[1] *E.g.*, the rituals for one of the rites of atonement in the [illegible] (*bit rimki*) will be found in Zimmern, [illegible] The tablets of prayers to be said by the penitent (here the king) are also partially preserved (see L. W. King, *Babylonian Magic and Sorcery*, London, 1896, no. 1).

[2] [illegible] iv. R. [illegible] no. 41 [illegible]

[3] No. 108, in Langdon, *Bab. Liturgies*.

[4] Text iv. R. 17, ed. A. Schollmeyer, *Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen und Gebete an Samas*, Paderborn, 1912, no. 2.

[1] This class of prayer usually has the title, *enim-enim-ma ki-[šu-bi-im] dingir X kam*, 'An incantation, prayer of prostration to the god X.' This title was taken from an old liturgical term, *kišub*, melody in a public liturgy.

[2] Text iv. R. 20, no. 2; ed. Schollmeyer, no. 4.

[3] iv. R. 28, no. 1; Schollmeyer, no. 5.

[4] iv. R. 19, no. 21; Zimmern, *Der alte Orient*, vii. pt. iii. p. 15; Schollmeyer, no. 3.

[5] Text in v. R. 50 f.; restored and edited with omission of the interlinear version in Langdon, *Sumerian Grammar*, Paris, 1911, pp. 187–196; Schollmeyer, no. 1.

[6] iv. R. 29, no. 1; ed. C. F. Fossey, pp. 364–369; Hehn, pp. 334–337.

[7] Meek, no. 1.

[8] Gray, *Shamash*, pl. vi.; ed. Schollmeyer, no. 20.

[9] Text by Craig, pl. 18; ed. Martin, p. 70.

[10] Text by G. Bertin, in *RAssyr* i. (1886) 157–161 with tr.; see also Schollmeyer, no. 7. The purpose of this ceremony remains obscure. It may possibly belong to a series of prayers for the dedication of a temple or some similar service.

[11] Text in iv. R. 9; ed. E. G. Perry, *Hymnen und Gebete an Sin*, Leipzig, 1907, no. 1; and E. Combe, *Hist. du culte de Sin*, Paris, 1908, no. 1; Zimmern, *Der alte Orient*, vii. pt. iii. p. 11 f. The title of this prayer was entered in the catalogue (Langdon, *Bab. Liturgies*, no. 103, line 8) and the title of the colophon *elimma umun dingir ra* in the same catalogue (line 10).

[12] The bilingual prayer said at the close of the public services of the New Year festival by a priest is also called *šu-il-la* (F. H. Weissbach, *Babylonische Miscellen*, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 36–41; iv. R. 18, no. 2).

laymen in these incantations. Both of these literary terms have, therefore, a double usage in Babylonia and Assyria, which proves clearly enough that the prayers of incantation ceremonies are of much later origin than the liturgies.

9. The šu-il-la prayers of the magic cult.—From every point of view the prayers of the laymen, said in their own vernacular Semitic, form the largest and most valuable collection of private devotional literature of the Babylonians and Assyrians. The tendency to regard moral transgression as the cause of divine anger resulted in the increasing importance of the prayers of the penitent. Most of their best rituals of atonement have eliminated the prayers of the priests entirely. We possess a large number of these prayers of 'the lifting of the hand' to be used as the books of the various rituals appoint. They follow one another, each to a different deity, while the priest performs the necessary rites of magic. All the known tablets of prayers of this class belong to the late period, as we must expect; for fervent intercession based upon a spiritual consciousness of sin is of slow growth in any religion. It never was attained by the Sumerians, and the Semites themselves advanced to these higher forms of atonement only after 2000 years and more of their consecutive history. These prayers, despite their fine literary composition and lofty sentiment, always bear the title 'incantation and lifting of the hand,' but the former title, implying a low type of religion, appears here only because these prayers belong to the secret rituals of the priests of atonement. It is possible to give only lists of groups of these prayer-tablets, since their number is very great.

The earliest known incantation rituals, in which the prayers are either partly or wholly assigned to the laymen, belong to the city of Aššur, capital of the early Assyrian empire, and probably belong to the period of Tiglathpileser I.[1] and his successors. These have been recently excavated by the German Oriental Society on the site of modern Kalah Shergat. The religious texts recovered by the Germans at Aššur were not published until late in 1915,[2] and consequently Assyriologists have not yet been able to make critical editions of them. The following list of tablets in the official publications will contain the more important of the early Assyrian prayers of this class:

No. 23: portions of two prayers to Marduk. Ritual accompanies each prayer.[3]

No. 25: part of a prayer to Nebo followed by the ritual and beginning of a prayer to Marduk.[4] The Marduk prayer was employed in many other services and will serve as a good example of these Semitic compositions:

'Mighty and glorified one, splendid one of Eridu,
Lofty prince, first born of Nudimmud,
Marduk the terrible one, who maketh Egurra to rejoice,
Lord of Esagila, help of Babylon, who showeth mercy unto Ezida,
Who giveth peace unto the soul, chieftain of Emahtila, who reneweth life,
Protecting shadow of the land, sparing the wide-dwelling peoples,
Regent of the sacred chapels everywhere,
Thy name is good in the mouth of peoples everywhere.
Marduk, great lord, merciful god,
By thy mighty command may I live and prosper and look upon thy divinity.
Whatsoever I plan may I attain.
Fix justice in my mouth.
Cause to be words of goodness in my heart.
May guard and watchmen speak of (my) good deeds.
May my god stand at my right.
May my goddess stand at my left.
May a saving god be faithful at my side.
Oh grant to speak, and hear and be gracious.
The word which I utter, even as I utter it, may be favourably received.
Oh Marduk, great lord, bestow life.
Command that my soul live.
May I enjoy unto satiety walking in purity before thee.
May Enlil rejoice for thee, and Ea be glad for thee.
May the gods of the universe adore thee,
And the great gods make kind thy heart.'

This prayer was followed in the Aššur service by another to Marduk, then by one to Sin, the moon-god, and finally by one to Enlil. After each the scribe gives the ritual for the priest.

No. 26: a ceremony in which the priest introduces the penitent to Marduk, explaining his sorrows in Semitic. Then follows a very long prayer to Marduk by the penitent. The service ends with a complicated and long ritual.

No. 32 contains a long prayer to Shamash preceded by a ritual.

No. 55 contains a prayer to Shamash. As no ritual is given, it probably belongs to a series in which prayers and ritual were given on separate tablets.

No. 58 contains a prayer to Shamash and four to Nusku, the fire-god, without ritual.

No. 59 begins with the prayer to Marduk translated above, and is followed by one to Enlil.

No. 68 contains only one long and beautiful prayer to Enlil without ritual.

No. 80 begins with ritualistic directions for the priest, after which follows a long prayer of the penitent to Shamash.

The Asurbanipal library has been up to the present our principal source of information concerning these rituals of atonement. The tablets of prayers and ceremonies belonging to that collection have been published together in King's *Babylonian Magic and Sorcery*, and they have been widely studied in special monographs. These ceremonies, however, have never received a proper scientific treatment, since the various monographs founded upon them, by selecting only prayers for a particular deity, dissect the ceremonies and omit the rituals.[1]

Prayers of 'the lifting of the hand' from Babylonia are also well documented. The longest, and in many ways the finest, of all these *šu-il-la* prayers is addressed to Ishtar and contains 110 lines.[2] Several tablets from ceremonies of this kind belong to the collection of the University Museum in Philadelphia and have been published by D. W. Myhrman, *Babylonian Hymns and Prayers*.

No. 12 contains a prayer of 'the lifting of the hand' to Shamash by the king Shamash-shum-ukm. Ordinarily these prayers contain a blank space for the insertion of the name of the layman. This and no. 18, a prayer to Marduk, and Ebeling, no. 55, a prayer to Shamash by Asurbanipal, are the only known instances where the text gives the name of the person who used it. In fact, we have two Assyrian ceremonies which employed Myhrman, no. 12, both with the usual blank space for the name of the layman.[3]

No. 17: a prayer to Enlil, and first line of the next prayer to Ninlil. This prayer illustrates Babylonian religion at its best:[4]

'Oh lord magnified, fortress of the heaven spirits,
Councillor of the earth spirits, solicitous prince,
Oh Enlil, lord magnified, fortress of the heaven spirits,
Councillor of the earth spirits, solicitous prince,
Self-renewing, the utterance of whose mouth is unalterable,
The word of whose lips no god has put aside,
Lord of lords, king of kings, father who begat the great gods,
Lord of fate and of the designs of things, ordering heaven and earth, lord of the lands.

[1] 12th century.

[2] E. Ebeling, *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur Religiosen Inhalts*, Berlin, 1915, pts. i. and ii.

[3] It is somewhat rare to find these prayers addressed to the same god. A similar service, in which a succession of three prayers to Nebo occurs, will be found in King, *Bab. Magic*, no. 22. The first prayer to Marduk is a duplicate of the one mentioned in the following note.

[4] The Marduk prayer is known from a service employed at Nineveh, where it occurs as the first prayer on one of the tablets of a series (King, *Bab. Magic*, no. 9). Naturally both copies came from Babylon. It has been ed. by Hehn, *BASS* v. [1905] 347–349). A nearly complete duplicate is the first prayer in Ebeling, no. 59.

[1] The various prayers to Sin, Shamash, Marduk, etc., are thus taken out of their connexion in these ceremonies and grouped together for special study. This method is peculiar to the Leipzig school of Assyriologists.

[2] Text in King, *The Seven Tablets of Creation*, London, 1902, ii., appendix 5; ed. in i. 222–237. See R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the OT*, New York, 1912, pp. 153–161, and literature cited.

[3] King, *Bab. Magic*, nos. 6 and 10. This prayer was ed. by Schollmeyer, no. 14. See corrections to this edition in *AJSL* xxix. [1913] 209.

[4] Ed. S. Langdon, *PSBA* xxxiv. [1912] 152–156; corrections by Zimmern, *ZA* xxviii. [1913] 68. The same prayer was employed in Assyria by the king at the dark of the moon (King, *Bab. Magic*, no. 19).

Who completest judgment, whose commandment changes not.
Fixing the fates of the gods altogether,
By thy order humanity has been begotten.
Of king and prefect, the being thou definest.
Since to create god and king rests with thee,
And thou hast caused the weak to attain the measure of the strong,
Among the multitudinous stars of heaven,
Oh lord, I put my trust in thee, I adore thee, and my ears are unto thee.
The fate of my life decree.
Command that my name be created.
Undo the evil, create for me justice.
Pour out upon me a form, bestow upon me abundance.
Put upon me thy vast abundance.
May god and king hold me in esteem.
May lord and prince do what I command.
May there be unto me one that sees me.
In the assembly of elders may my speech be heard.
May the protecting spirit, commanding acceptance of prayer and mercy,
Daily walk with me.
May the gods adore thee, may the goddess seek thee.
And I thy servant would live, would prosper.
Thy greatness I would glorify, thy praise I would sing.'

All the prayers discussed in the above section are designated by the literary note *šu-il-la*, but they by no means exhaust the literature of this kind. The incantation rituals of the lower types, such as the Maḫlû and Šurpu series, often contain incantations which are real prayers, and they are often repeated by the laymen. But the scribes do not dignify them by the name *šu-il-la*, and on the whole the distinction which they made, evidently on a ceremonial basis, holds good. In the *šu-il-la* we have a real prayer in which the sinner takes no part in the ritual.[1] In the other ceremonies, where he utters the incantations, he himself takes part in the magic ritual. Consequently the incantations not designated as *šu-il-la* are on the whole of a lower type as literature and from a religious point of view.

10. **The ba-gur-da-kam prayers.**—We possess one tablet of prayers which has the subscription, 'Incantation to cause god and goddess to repent.'[2] Since all prayers are incantations, we have here in reality evidence that the Babylonians possessed at least some series of private prayers for laymen, absolutely untrammelled by magic rituals. We may perhaps assume too much by this estimate of Babylonian religion, for which this tablet is at present our only evidence. But the three prayers which here follow each other are so lofty and fervent, and the second and third so monotheistic, that we cannot refrain from crediting the Babylonians with having attained this the highest level of all religion—private prayer.

A few lines of the second prayer will confirm this criticism.

'My god, I know not the sins of . . .
Thy revered name scoffingly have I spoken?
Thy titles have I forgotten and mightily have I . . .?
Thy work in time of trouble have I neglected?
Thy boundaries have I transgressed?'

. . . . . .

Many are my sins; as I have done, mayest thou not requite.
Oh, my god, sever and undo, free the toils of my heart.
Forget my folly, receive my prayer.
Turn my sins unto favour.'[3]

[1] In a letter to the king concerning a list of rituals of the *nam-bur-bi* series (see below) the priest of incantation refers to the prayers or incantations in that service as *šu-il-la*, and the letter implies that the priest himself said them. This illustrates the indefinite application of *šu-il-la*. Here it is used for the lower type of prayer allied to the real incantations. See R. F. Harper, *Assyrian and Babylonian Letters*, Chicago, 1892, i. 24, ed. E. Behrens, *Assyrisch-babylonische Briefe*, Leipzig, 1906, no. 7.

[2] Craig, ii. 6 f., and duplicate in Myhrman, no. 14; ed. Langdon, *PSBA* xxxiv. [1912] 75–79; important corrections in *ZA* xxviii. [1913] 71, and *AJSL* xxx. [1914] 228.

[3] In Craig, p. 13 f., will be found a tablet with prayers which properly belong to this type of service. Here even the superscription, *šu-il-la*, which precedes all prayers, is omitted. To an advanced type of ritual belongs the tablet in Craig, pp. 15–18, restored by Langdon, *RAssyr* xiii. [1916] 105–117, from Ebeling, no. 5. The prayers are addressed to Tammuz and Ishtar and are neither preceded nor ended by a literary note to designate them as incantations.

11. **The prayers of the nam-bur-bī series.**—A much more extensive series of atonement rituals existed, apparently designed for the use of those upon whom had fallen some misfortune, by which the Babylonians inferred that the gods were turned against a man, and that atonement was necessary. This series, which aimed at providing for all sorts of emergencies, bore the title *nam-bur-bī*,[1] 'the redemption.' An event of evil augury having occurred, the priests selected for the person concerned that part of the series which applied to his case. Much magic was employed, and the unfortunate man repeated a Semitic prayer provided by these books for the occasion.

E.g., the 135th tablet provided for the event, 'If a man has lost or [dropped] into the river a cylinder seal or a stone pestle (?).' After an elaborate ritual to cleanse that man's house by the priest, the man himself prays to Ishtar. The ritual closes with other complicated magical acts.[2] Another tablet of this series provides for, 'If evil signs and omens come upon a king and his land.'[3] The ritual seems to have preserved parts of two prayers said by the king or his delegate.[4]

Prayers and rituals from this series are frequently prescribed by astrologers at times of unfavourable omens.[5] A letter from one of the priests of atonement to the king refers to the *nam-bur-bī*, 'If the moon and Saturn stand together in a misty ring,' which was taken as an evil omen.[6] In the same letter the priest speaks of having read 21 tablets (!) of this series to avoid the ominous events. Another letter to the king informs him of a *nam-bur-bī* at the time of an earthquake.[7] Another letter mentions an astrological event for which the series provided no prayers and rituals.[8]

Most of the great rituals of atonement contain prayers employed as incantations; consequently the number of these compositions is well-nigh unlimited. A ritual for purifying a newly-built house to prepare it for the owner's occupation contains two prayers intercalated with the ritual.[9] The prayers of the priests in the rituals of the New Year celebrations during the first eleven days of Nisan belong to the public ceremonies and are said in a mixture of Sumerian and Semitic. These bear the title *šub*,[10] always employed for the Sumerian prayers in distinction from the *šu-il-la*, or Semitic prayers,[11] and were probably accompanied by music.[12]

12. **Prayers of preparation (ikrib).**—The intricate and comprehensive religious literature of the Babylonians provided rituals and prayers for every conceivable necessity, and one of the most import-

[1] The Semitic loan-word was probably *nam-bur-bû* (iv. R. 17*b*, 15: King, *Bab. Magic*, no. 6212); *nam-bur* means 'freeing,' 'unbinding,' and *bi* means 'to speak.' The same element *bi* is found in *sag-bi* = *mâmitu*, 'curse.' For *nam-bur-bû* see Behrens, pp. 95–97.

[2] Text in Craig, p. 66 f.; ed. Martin, pp. 242–247.

[3] iv. R. 60. Restore the catch-line, *šumma idâti ittâti aḫâti ana šarri u mâti-šu ibkâ*.

[4] See, for partial tr., *Babyloniaca*, iii. 25, and Schollmeyer, no. 6. A similar ritual certainly belonging to this series and also performed against astrological omens is King, *Bab. Magic*, no. 62.

[5] See R. C. Thompson, *Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers*, London, 1900, nos. 88 and 82.

[6] *Šumma Sin u Šamaš ana tarbaṣi zinnatu ibkû iziniš* (Harper, *Letters*, i. 23, 15).

[7] Harper, *Letters*, no. 355, 11.

[8] A partial eclipse of the rising sun (*ib.* no. 470).

[9] Text in Craig, p. 75 f., and Zimmern, *ZA* xxiii. [1909] 369. See also Langdon, 'Babylonian Magic,' in *Scientia*, xv. [1914] 239, and Jensen, p. 54.

[10] An abbreviation of *kîšub*.

[11] The *šu-il-la* designated also Sumerian prayers of the priests, as already stated. When employed in this sense, they are related to the *kîšub* or *šub*, the difference consisting probably in the use of a musical accompaniment for the *kîšub* or *šub* prayers.

[12] The text of the New Year rituals will be found in iv. R. 40, and *RAssyr* viii. [1911] 42 (by P. Dhorme). These texts preserve most of the prayers and rituals for the days 2nd–5th Nisan. An unplaced fragment was published by Hehn, pp. 398–400, and ed. pp. 375–380. The final prayer of this service on 11th Nisan is called a *šu-il-la* (see above). Some of these public prayers were translated by Langdon in *Exp* vii. viii. [1909] 153–158.

ant parts of a priest's duties was to prepare himself properly for his sacred services. Undoubtedly the prayers provided for such preparation were extensive, but our sources supply us with adequate information upon only one point. The diviners (*barû*) invariably prepared themselves for consulting the omens revealed on sheep's livers by performing long purificatory rites interspersed with prayers to the deities Shamash and Adad, who presided over the art of augury. These prayers are not called incantations, nor do they bear any of the Sumerian literary indices so common to the prayers of the official cults. This points to their Semitic and comparatively late origin. They were classified as *ikrib* prayers—a pure Semitic expression.[1] These prayers all end with a formula which is practically unvaried:

'In all that I offer to you, oh Shamash and Adad, stand by; in my discourse, my prayer, in whatsoever I do, in the inquiry which I present let there be trustworthiness.'

13. Liturgies or public prayers.—For their public worship the Babylonians and Assyrians adopted that of the Sumerians, without any appreciable change. And they continued to use in the daily liturgies of that vanished people the language in which they were originally written. Semitic Babylonia and Assyria presented a close parallel to the Roman Catholic Church, which still conducts most of its formal public service in the sacred language in which it was originally written. An investigation of the liturgies must concern itself primarily with the origin, evolution, and use of Sumerian public worship. When the liturgists of the late Sumerian period finally constructed the long public services, the Semites adopted them as sacred books, and in many cases we can trace the use of these litanies from Sumerian days to the 2nd century B.C. Many of the late Assyrian and Babylonian editions are edited with partial interlinear versions; sometimes musical (to us unintelligible) notes are added; comments and variant readings[2] often encumber the text, but the faithful adherence to the ancient Sumerian original is remarkable. Perhaps a few of the epilogues which were later adopted as psalms of private penance (*er-šag-tug-mal*) arose in Semitic times, but even this is uncertain.

14. Public prayer older than private prayer.—We have already seen that in the complicated rituals of the Semites the prayers of private devotion are the product of the Semitic mind. Even the formal prayers in which the priests took part, although composed in Sumerian, were probably the work of Semites. There is no proof that Sumerian worship possessed any of these private or public solo chants of the priests. It is of course possible that they originated the Sumerian *šu-il-la* prayers which, as we have seen, existed alongside of the Semitic *šu-il-la* prayers. But these were public prayers, chanted by a priest and closely related to the choral liturgies. On the other hand, the Sumerian people, apparently incapable of individualism in worship, found the full expression of their religious psychology in common devotion. And devotion *en masse*, public songs participated in by the whole people, arose at an extremely early period. The Sumerian cared only to lose himself in the fellowship of religious experience.

15. Origin of liturgies.—It is difficult for moderns to understand the problems that confronted mankind in constructing religious services. In Sumer they began by using short chants based upon some calamity which had befallen the city. From the beginning music was essential to these public choral threnodies, and the earliest known compositions are characterized by refrains. In the early period anterior to the last dynasty of Ur each Sumerian city seems to have possessed its own corpus of sorrowful litanies based upon local calamities in its long history. At present Sumerian antiquities have produced only fragmentary examples of the public services of the early period.[1] But a few of these short threnodies survived and were current in the Ur and Isin periods, when the complicated liturgies were being worked out. The following public choral service of Lagash will illustrate the origin of these compositions (here the words are supposed to be uttered by Bau, the mother-goddess of Lagash):

'Oh city, alas the treasures! my soul sighs for thee.
My city Girsu, alas the treasures! my soul sighs for thee.
Oh brick-walls of Lagash, alas the treasures! my soul sighs for thee.
Oh abode of temple Ninnū, alas the treasures! my soul sighs for thee.
Oh my high altar of Ninā, alas the treasures! my soul sighs for thee.
Oh brick-walls of my Sirar, alas the treasures! my soul sighs for thee.
Oh ye highlands(?) of Lagash, alas the treasures! my soul sighs for thee.
Of my city the treasures are scattered.
In shining Girsu the children are distressed.
Unto the interior of the city, oh day of woe!
Unto the exterior of Girsu, oh sorrow, my holy place.
Within the splendid sanctuary the transgressor came.
Unto my abode the transgressor came.
Unto joyful . . . the transgressor came.
Unto the consort of the great hero the transgressor came.[2]
From their queen he caused him to go forth.
From their temple the august queen he caused to go forth.
The queen of my city with misery [is afflicted]
The mother, the wild cow queen, with misery [is afflicted]
. . . . . .
My city my father gave as a gift.
Girsu Enlil cared for faithfully.
In my city which he[3] ruined altogether,
In Lagash which he ruined altogether,
In Sirar which he ruined altogether,
In Ninā which he ruined altogether,
Oh afflicting shepherd, I will appease thee.
Oh afflicting shepherd, let me appease thee.
Oh lord of lamentation, by the woe of my city, by the woe of my temple, accept repose(?).'[4]

These early single song compositions were probably named after the musical instruments chiefly employed in their composition. The liturgy translated above was called an *er-šem-ma*, 'lament on the double flute.' All the known early liturgies are of this class. It is, however, probable that other song services were accompanied by stringed instruments, particularly the lyre, and were called 'lament on the lyre.'[5] Choral passages of this kind were always known as *sir*, 'song,' to designate them as liturgical in character. A pronounced tendency to enlarge these single song services until they became of considerable length manifested itself at all the great temple schools. Some of them extend to nearly 100 lines.

16. Rise of a standard breviary.—As a national consciousness slowly permeated the disunited Sumerian communities, and the national myths and epics became common property, the various liturgical schools began to borrow from each other. If, *e.g.*, a choral song of Nippur possessed attractive words and a successful melody, the liturgists of other cities adopted it into their own breviary, inserting a line or lines to mention their own

[1] Most of the *ikrib* prayers and rituals will be found in Zimmern, *Beiträge*, pp. 190–219. A ritual of *barû* preparations containing *ikrib* prayers to Adad and Sin will be found in Perry, *Hymnen und Gebete an Sin*, pp. 24–28. Another fragment of the same ritual with prayers to the astral deities, moon, Jupiter, and Venus is published by Langdon in *RAssyr* xii. [1915] 189–192.

[2] *E.g.*, see the much glossed text iv R. 30, no. 1; ed. in Langdon, *Sum. and Bab. Psalms*, pp. 247–255.

[1] They are cited in Langdon, *Bab. Liturgies*, p. i, note 3, and one is partially tr. in *PSBA* xxxiv. [1912] 156.

[2] Note how the people inadvertently forget the situation and reveal the real fact that they themselves are wailing.

[3] The pronoun refers to Enlil; all calamity was attributed to the anger of the gods.

[4] Text in *Cun. Texts*, xv. 22, London, 1902; variant in Zimmern, *Sumerische Kultlieder aus altbabylonischer Zeit*, no. 2, rev. ii. 10–42; ed. in Langdon, *Sum. and Bab. Psalms*, pp. 284–287.

[5] See Langdon, *Bab. Liturgies*, p. xxxviii, and p. xlv, note 1.

temples and city.[1] The various lamentations to the weeping mother tended to produce catholicity, for she was a common possession of all Sumerian worshippers. Thus the growth of a standard breviary received on all sides a powerful impetus. And the priests of the prosperous and cosmopolitan age of Ur and Isin were not satisfied with these short songs. They desired longer services, more variety in melody, and more dogmatic theology. They began to evolve longer liturgies by the somewhat crude process of compiling a few old songs without regard to their content.[2] But such uncertain procedure was not tolerated to any great extent. The hymnologists naturally insisted upon working out a single religious idea and upon designing each liturgy for the worship of a single deity. They chose some ancient single song service for the first melody, reducing it to moderate length. The second melody was made by an extract from some old song. In this way the liturgists obtained the long services of 20 to 30 melodies, all selected from songs addressed to the same deity. Finally, the rule obtained that the next to the last melody should be a special theological litany, in which the names of all the gods are sung to a refrain peculiar to that service. This 'titular melody' is followed by the liturgical prayer, *er-šem-ma*, which gave rise to the *er-šag-tug-mal*, as explained above.

17. The word.—In most of these long liturgies we find at least one song to the 'word,' always described as the cause of all calamities. In the case of those liturgies sung to the great gods the word is described as going forth from the mouth of God to execute His judgment upon sinful mankind. In the weeping mother litanies the word seizes upon this mother-goddess, causing her to wail with her people. For all the liturgies addressed to the mother-goddess (Bau, Gula, Innini) represent her not as angered against humanity, but as sharing their sorrows and wailing with them in their lamentations.

18. The canon of liturgical literature.—Although we now know a very large number of these liturgies either complete or, as is generally the case, in fragmentary condition, we are far from possessing the whole number of the series of songs which formed the canon of sacred literature. The scribes of the Isin period probably drew up a list of the first lines of all liturgies that had received ecclesiastical sanction. Their number must have been large, possibly 600 or 700. At any rate, the canon was closed by the Sumerian liturgists themselves. Even in Assyria, which adopted the entire Sumerian canon of sacred liturgy, we find no mention of any Assyrian city or temple. The local cults of these northern Semites came too late to be entered into the songs of the public services, and they present the curious spectacle of a great people who said their public prayers in liturgies which never made any reference to themselves.

LITERATURE.—For the prayers of the private cults and the public solo prayers of priests the entire literature is cited in the notes. The subject of liturgies, which is much more extensive and difficult, may be studied in the following works:

I. TEXTS.—G. Reisner, *Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen*, Berlin, 1896; H. Zimmern, *Sumerische Kultlieder aus altbabylonischer Zeit*, Leipzig, 1912-13; S. Langdon, *Babylonian Liturgies*, Paris, 1913; H. Radau, 'Miscellaneous Sumerian Texts,' in *Hilprecht Anniversary Volume*, Leipzig, 1909, pp. 3[illegible]-[illegible]7, *Sumerian Hymns and Prayers to god Nin-Ib*, Philadelphia, 1911; D. W. Myhrman, *Babylonian Hymns and Prayers*, do. 1910; Langdon, 'Fragment of a Babylonian Liturgy,' (*Babyloniaca*, iii 241-249), Paris, 1910; L. W. King, *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum*, London, 1902; Langdon, *Sumerian Liturgical Texts from Nippur*, Philadelphia, 1917.

II. TRANSLATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS.—Langdon, *Sumerian and Bab. Psalms*, Paris, 1909, *Babylonian Liturgies*, *Sumerian Liturgical Texts*, and *Public Worship in Babylonia* (in the press); Zimmern, 'Babylonische Hymnen und Gebete,' in *Der alte Orient*, xiii. pt. i. [Leipzig, 1911].

S. LANGDON.

[1] See Langdon, *Sum. and Bab. Psalms*, pp. 292-295, a Nippur song employed at Ur and Larsa.

[2] The best example of a service of this kind is Zimmern, *Sumerische Kultlieder*, no. [illegible], a curious service made by joining songs to Tammuz, Enlil, and Ea.

PRAYER (Buddhist).—1. General.—Buddhism teaches that there is no personal creator or ruler of the world, and that the perfection of religious and moral ideals rests solely on one's own self-perfection. Thus in the Buddhist religion there is no room for prayer, in the sense of a petition or solicitation addressed to a god. This was the reason why Buddha so carefully guarded against the use of prayer (*manta*, Skr. *mantra*) addressed to a god for the purpose of securing a certain benefit through his special favour.[1] But, when prayer is understood in a broader way, there is the Buddhist prayer as an expression of earnest faith, determined intention, as a means of self-perfection in Buddhist ideals. Moreover, the Buddhist religion developed, after the death of its founder, in the direction of adoring him not only as a perfect human personality but as an embodiment of universal truth, *i.e.* in the conception of the *dharmakāya*. In this developed form an individual striving for the attainment of *bodhi* ('enlightenment') stands to Buddha in the relation of the disciple to the Master, and of the saved to the Saviour. Here the practice of expressing the earnest intention of realizing Buddhahood gradually took the form of solemn vows taken to commit oneself to practise Buddhist morality, assisted by encouraging assurance given by Buddha, in his actual presence or in spiritual manifestation. Many of these vows are in reality prayers, addressed to Buddha as well as to the universal truth revealed by him. These vows, or prayers, are called *praṇidhāna* in Sanskrit (Pāli *paṇidhāna*).

Now, in the Pāli books, *paṇidhāna* means concentration of mind upon a certain idea or object, which helps in tranquillizing the mind.

'That disciple should concentrate (*paṇidahitabbam*) his mind upon a certain thing (*attha*) as the condition of tranquillizing; when the mind is concentrated upon that tranquillizing condition, cheer arises and from cheer joy arises . . . (Then he should think) I shall concentrate mind upon this thing and this thing being realized I shall now dwell on that.'[2]

In this sense *paṇidhāna* is a general name for various endeavours to calm and concentrate mind, such as *pasādha*, repose or faith in the Three Treasures and Buddhist morality; *chhanda*, earnest desire for realizing supernormal powers (*iddhi*); *sati*, thought intently fixed on Buddha and his teachings, etc.[3] Indeed, Buddhism is exceedingly rich in these terms, ideas, and practices of mental concentration and spiritual drill, and they all play the part of prayer or orison, with a special emphasis laid on the concentration of mind on a certain point of Buddhist truths. These experiences are described by similes which enable us only to guess what were the effects of the mental concentration; and the total result of the spiritual exercise may be formulated as a direct assurance and personal experience of the unity of existence, which may be expressed as an expansion of self or an absorption of the cosmos into self. There are prescribed formulæ for these practices of meditation and for their results, and these capital passages in the scriptures served as manuals of practice as well as a kind of prayer, in the sense of inspiration and assurance. *E.g.*, the fourfold faith (*pasādha*) mentioned above and the seven stages of enlightenment (*bojjhaṅga*) were used for expelling the pain of disease, though the real import of these meditations consisted in something more and deeper than mere guards against ills.

[1] For the use of *mantra* in later forms of Buddhism see art. TANTRA.

[2] *Saṁyutta*, xlvii. 10 (PTS ed. v. 156).

[3] Similar terms are *vipassanā*, *samatha*, *pariyesanā*, *cheto vimutti*, *jhāna*, etc.; cf. art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Buddhist).

It was the same with the fourfold infinite expansion of mind (*appamāṇa-cheto-vimutti*) against hatred and ill-will and for realization of love, compassion, etc.[1]

Buddhist ethics emphasizes the importance of thought and intention as the source of bodily acts and utterances of speech. It is on this ground that the concentration of thought is so persistently insisted on in the various methods of meditation and carefully formulated in their descriptions. Thought may be expressed in utterance, whether in reciting the holy texts or in confessing one's faith, and these expressions naturally take the form of prayer as found in any other religion. Prayer in this sense is not a petition, but an utterance of devotion to the Buddhist cause, of determination to accomplish Buddhist ideals, of conviction in the final destiny of mankind to reach Buddhist perfection.

Thus, Buddhist prayer is an expression as well as an inspiration—an expression of belief and intention and an inspiration of ideal and zeal. As an expression of faith, Buddhist prayer pays homage to Buddha, to his truth and community, mostly in adoration and exaltation, which serve at the same time as a confession of faith.[2] As an inspiration of ideal aspiration, it takes the form of a solemn vow to commit oneself to efforts in moral perfection, equally on the part of Buddha himself and on that of his followers. The latter aspect had an important bearing on the significance and development of Buddhist prayer, because it was this aspect that stimulated the Buddhists not only to follow the Master's steps but to emulate his work. The ideal perfection of Buddhist morality consists in the attainment of the *tathāgata*-ship, on the part of every Buddhist, and, just as Buddha Gotama is said to have passed a long training of the *bodhisattva*-ship, every Buddhist is expected, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, to be a *bodhisattva* (cf. art. ETHICS AND MORALITY [Buddhist]). The essential condition in starting for the *bodhisattva* training is regarded as an earnest determination (*chitta-utpāda*) to go through the severe discipline of *bodhisattva* morality, and the determination is expressed in the vow or prayer (*praṇidhāna*). The vows are addressed to a certain Buddha, who testificates the oaths and gives assurance for their fulfilment. This act of Buddha is called *vyākaraṇa*, 'encouraging assurance,' and is the necessary counterpart of the vow. After the address of the vow to Buddha and its acceptance by him, a *bodhisattva* is expected to do the works of self-perfection with the wish to dedicate all the merits of his works to the Buddhist cause, *i.e.* for the sake of all fellow-beings, that they may participate in the joint stock of merits (*puṇya-kṣetra*) and proceed on the all-embracing sole road of Buddhist perfection.

2. Buddha's own prayer.—This model of taking vows is narrated in the introduction (*Nidāna-kathā*) to the *Jātaka* stories,[3] where Buddha's first start on his long training is told in the adoration of his enthusiasm. It was in a remote past that a Brāhman Sumedha took vows before the Buddha Dīpaṅkara to march on the way to Buddhahood; and indeed this Sumedha proved, in the course of time, to be worthy of his determination and finally became Buddha Gotama, or Śākyamuni. The vows say:

> 'Since now I make this earnest wish [*adhikāra*],
> In presence of this Best of Men,
> Omniscience sometime I'll achieve,
> And multitudes convey across.
>
> I'll rebirth's circling stream arrest,
> Destroy existence's three modes;
> I'll climb the sides of Doctrine's ship [*dhamma-nava*],
> And men and gods convey across'
>
> (verses 67 and 68, Warren's tr.).

Then Buddha Dīpaṅkara gives assurance of the fulfilment of the vows (verses 71–80), and Sumedha further commits himself to the practice of the ten methods of perfection (*pārami*). When he concludes his solemn pledge, the whole universe gives response to the vows.

> 'Now pondering these conditions ten,
> Their nature [*sabhava*], essence [*sarasa*], character [*lakkhaṇa*],
> Such fiery vigor had they all,
> That all the worlds ten thousand quaked' (verse 176).

This corresponds to something like a voice from heaven—the prayer is accepted and will be fulfilled. This is a metaphor, and behind it lies the metaphysical idea of the oneness of existence, the unity of *dhammatā* (the fundamental nature of things). All existences are one in their basic nature; therefore the vows taken and prayers expressed are addressed to a certain Buddha as well as to one's own self and to the whole existence, while the acceptance of the prayer is expressed in Buddha's *vyākaraṇa*, whose consequences are the cosmic response and the *bodhisattva's* practice of the ten *pārami*.

Now, the same thing is told about the preliminary training of Buddha, in the Mahāsanghika book *Mahāvastu*.[1] There the deeds (*chāryā*) of the *bodhisattva* are classified in four stages: (1) deeds in accordance with his inherent good nature (*prakṛti*), (2) deeds in accordance with his vows (*praṇidhāna*), (3) deeds in accordance with his ideals (*anuloma*), *i.e.* the practice of the six *pāramitās*, (4) deeds in accordance with the indefatigable virtues (*anivartana*).[2] Then the story of Buddha's conversion is told. Buddha, when he was a Brāhman, determined to perfect himself, and expressed his desire and determination in presence of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara and his congregation. The prayer says:

> 'Indeed, let it be so, that I could be born as one who, having overcome the world, would work in the world for the benefit of the world and should live for the weal of this world,' etc.

Dīpaṅkara, knowing that the vow-taker would surely attain the supreme enlightenment, gives him the assurance:

> 'Thou shalt at a certain future time become a Buddha, being born as a son to the Sakya clan, and work for the benefit of men and gods.'[3]

3. In Mahāyāna Buddhism.—Now, this idea of *praṇidhāna* and of its associate conditions was developed in Mahāyāna and applied to all Buddhists, who were, therefore, called *bodhisattvas*. The underlying idea was the same, yet the significance of *praṇidhāna* was interpreted metaphysically by the doctrine of the basic unity of existence (*tathatā*) and its application made wider by the extension of the *bodhisattva* ideal. The metaphysical conception of oneness was identified with the ultimate entity of Buddha's personality (*dharma-kāya*), and the person of Buddha, who testified the vows, was conceived to be his blissful manifestation (*sambhoga-kāya*) or one of his earthly condescensions (*nirmāṇā-kāya*). Thus, the theory of the threefold personality (*tri-kāya*) of Buddha

[1] Recitation of holy texts plays a very important part in the Buddhist religion and serves as credo, prayer, hymn, ritual, and inculcation at the same time. A collection of the sacred texts, called the *Parittam*, is most widely used among the Buddhists of the south. In the north and east the text used varies according to sects, but the most widely used one is the *Lotus* (*Saddharmapuṇḍarika*).

[2] See, *e.g.*, *Ratana-sutta* in *Sutta-nipāta* (*SBE* x. [1898] pt. ii. pp. 36–39).

[3] *Jātaka*, ed. V. Fausböll (i. 11–28), tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, London, 1880, pp. 10–18; H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translation*[3], Cambridge, Mass., 1900, pp. 14–31.

[1] *Mahāvastu*, ed. E. Senart, Paris, 1882, Introd. p. xxi, and i. 1. The Chinese version of the same book (B. Nanjio, *Catalogue of Chinese Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 587) gives the story in more detail.

[2] The Chinese version omits the negative *a* and interprets this to mean the 'consummating transformation,' *i.e.* the transformation of human nature to Buddhahood.

[3] *Mahāvastu*, i. 3.

was brought closer to the life of the *bodhisattva* and made the object to which the vows were addressed. Thus, every prayer addressed to Buddha is at the same time a vow by which the vow-taker commits himself to the practice of the ideas expressed therein. Vows are taken by a Buddhist and assurance is given by a Buddha, but the two parties are one in the basic entity, and the response given to a prayer is a necessary consequence of this oneness of existence. Yet, quite naturally, the vow and the response will remain void, unless the vow-taker practises his determination and dedicates all his goods to the broad cause of realizing the all-embracing Buddhist communion. This is the working out of the thought expressed in the vow, the practice of moral life with the intention of dedicating all goods to the Buddhist ideal, and is called *pariṇāmaṇā*, 'dedication.' The efficacy of dedication is guaranteed by the Buddha, who is a pioneer in the realization of the one road. In this way the Buddhist conception of prayer emphasizes the unity of its three phases, *praṇidhāna*, *vyākaraṇa*, and *pariṇāmaṇā*.

After all, the Buddhist religion conceives the world as the stage of spiritual development in which all beings participate in, and contribute to, the realization of the truth of oneness (*eka-yāna* or *ekatvam*) or of the cosmic enlightenment (*bodhi-chitta*).[1] A prayer addressed to a Buddha, an enlightened soul, is meant and destined to awaken in one's own mind or soul (*chitta*) the same *chitta* as the Buddha's own. To worship a deity—which is admitted by Mahāyāna Buddhism—means, not to adore it as a being external to oneself, but to realize the excellent qualities found in the deity. Likewise, to pray may be understood to mean asking something of a deity, but the truth is that the one who is asked and the one who asks are one in the fundamental nature, and, therefore, the prayer is in its ultimate significance a self-inculcation, a self-committal to the moral ideals of Buddhism. Although the Mahāyāna practice of offering prayer differs much, in its appearance, from the practice of primitive Buddhism, the final goal and the conception underlying the practice are the same—mental training for the attainment of Buddhahood.

Mahāyāna books are full of the stories of how a certain Buddha, in the preparatory stage, or a *bodhisattva*, started on his life of *bodhisattva*-ship, by taking vows in presence of his predecessor and master. All those narratives are modelled on the story of Sumedha, and the vows are essentially the same, consisting in an expression of the determination to save self together with others. As the typical representative of the Mahāyāna vows we take here the 'four great vows of the *bodhisattva*.' They say:

> 'There are beings without limit,
> Let us take the vow to convey them all across.
>
> There are depravities in us without number,
> Let us take the vow to extinguish them all.
>
> There are truths without end,
> Let us take the vow to comprehend them all.
>
> There is the Way of Buddha without comparison,
> Let us take the vow to accomplish it perfectly.'

Here it is emphasized that, without striving to fulfil the first vow, of saving others, the following three are vain, even if they could be executed. Another prayer, more frequently recited, is taken from the *Lotus*,[2] and says:

> 'Let these merits (now performed) universally pervade all,
> And let us, together with them, soon realize the life of Buddhahood.'

Another point to be noted in the Mahāyāna notion of prayer is that great stress is laid on the *vyākaraṇa* given by the presiding Buddha, and the assurance takes the form of prophecy. A prophecy of this kind is an encouragement given to the *bodhisattva* as well as an exaltation of his future achievements. Glorifications in the prophecy are always proportional to the enthusiasm of the vows, and these together served to impress the believers with the grandeur of the start, the magnitude of the merits accumulated by the *bodhisattva*, and to stimulate the followers to the similar practice of *praṇidhāna* and *pariṇāmaṇā*. The effects of these inspirations were great, and in many cases they gave an impetus to enthusiasts, who thereby became great teachers or reformers.

The greatest document of Mahāyāna Buddhism in this respect is the *Lotus of Truth*.[1] Besides various points of Buddhist doctrines expounded in it, the main topic of the book is the continuity of the vows taken, merits accomplished, and results attained, through the Buddhas of the past, Buddha Śākyamuni, and the future Buddhas.

The second chapter, entitled 'Tactfulness,' emphasizes the unity of all Buddhas in the purpose, methods, and goal of their long training.

> 'There shall be no one of beings, who, having heard the Truth, will not become Buddhas.'[2]

This is the earnest desire, vow, and prayer of all Buddhas. The discourse then proceeds to give *vyākaraṇa* to many disciples of Śākyamuni, by assuring them of Buddha's love of all beings and his power to lead them to the highest goal. Then, in ch. xii., entitled 'Perseverance,' Buddha's disciples are encouraged to emulate their predecessors' zeal and effort and to endure hardships in working among the perverted people of the latter days of degeneration. The disciples, in response, utter a prayer for endurance, pledging themselves to stand through all kinds of persecution and perils. After enumerating the perils, the prayer concludes with the following words:

> 'They will scold us and scorn and ridicule us. And thus we shall be repeatedly and repeatedly driven out of our own monasteries and sanctuaries. All this, hatred and persecutions, shall we bear in forbearance and perseverance, because we are mindful of our Lord's command. In whichever cities or villages, where there may be any one who would listen to us, we shall surely go there and preach as has been commissioned by Buddha. We are thy messengers, O Lord of the World, we have nothing to fear, in proclaiming thy truth. Now we take these vows in thy presence and in presence of all Buddhas, who have come here from the ten quarters. May st thou, O Buddha, know our intention and determination!'[3]

This prayer was not only an expression of ardent desire for the Buddhist cause cherished by many Buddhists, but was also a source of fiery inspiration given to many others who really lived their lives according to the dictates of the vows.

4. **'Adoration to the Lotus of the Perfect Truth.'**—The *Lotus* played in Mahāyāna Buddhism a rôle similar to the Johannine literature in Christianity. Highest tributes were paid to the book by most Mahāyānists, from various points of view, doctrinal, ethical, apocalyptic. The final result was the formulation of a prayer to the book itself, as the embodiment of the whole content of Buddhist and cosmic truths. The man who standardized this formula was Nichiren (1222–82), a man of prophetic zeal who was intensely inspired by the 'Prayer of Perseverance,' cited above, and lived his life in perils and hardships. His formula was '*Namu Myo-Horenge-kyo*,' which

[1] See art. LIFE AND MORALITY (Buddhist); D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 244 f.

[2] *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, tr. H. Kern, in *SBE* xxi. (1884). The [illegible] is a translation from the Chinese version of [illegible], which is used as authoritative by the Eastern Buddhists. The extant original differs from this a [illegible] (cf. p. [illegible] of the Eng. tr. and p. 177 of the original, ed. Bernard Nanjio, Petrograd, 1912).

[1] Cited above, usually called *Lotus of the True Law* (*q.v.*). *SBE* xxi.

[2] ii. 99 (*SBE* xxi. 59).

[3] This passage is in verse and is here taken from the Chinese version (cf. *SBE* xxi. 261).

was the Sino-Japanese form of '*Namḥ Sad-dharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtrāya*,' 'Adoration be to the Lotus of the Perfect Truth.'[1] We shall give a brief account of his theory and practice.

Worship, according to the Mahāyāna theory, amounts to the elevation of self to Buddhahood and the discovery of *bodhi* in self. This doctrine was formulated by the Chinese philosopher Chi-i (531–597) on the authority of the *Lotus*, as the truth of 'mutual participation' or interdependence of all existences. All existences are interrelated; therefore Buddhahood is found in every being, as demoniac nature is not lacking but subdued even in Buddha. The universe consisting of these interrelated existences is the stage on which the truth of interdependence manifests itself, on which universal truths realize themselves in particular existences. Nichiren adopted this theory and represented it in a palpable way. His representation of the universe was to have the 'sacred title' (of the *Lotus of Truth*) written down in the centre, and the names of Buddhas, sages, gods and men, spirits and demons, represented round the central truth. This symbolic visualization of the universe, or of the supreme being together with all beings, is, according to Nichiren, the best means of realizing the cosmic truth in every worshipper's soul. The adoration of the book *Lotus* in this way is not a mere bibliolatry, but the worship of the universal truth, as revealed in the book. Now, this adoration is uttered in speech, *i.e.* in the formula as shown above, and the oral utterance is prayer, hymn, confession, and oath of fidelity all at once. Although the utterance is an act of an individual, it is destined, by the very nature of cosmic structure, to awaken in one's self, together with all others, enlightenment in the quintessence of cosmic truths, and thus to accelerate the full bloom of the cosmic lotus-flower in every existence.[2]

This thought about the adoration is expressed by Nichiren as follows: 'The letters which open every chapter [of the Scripture] are five [in Chinese ideograms denoting the *Lotus of the Perfect Truth*] and the same conclude each one of the chapters. Thus, the beginning and the consummation, as well as the whole between them, amount to the seven letters [denoting] the Adoration of the Truth. To utter this Adoration is the sole clue to the propagation of the Truth in the latter days of degeneration. Any one who does not see the spirit of the Adoration and therefore fails to grasp the key to the essential principle [of the truth and its propagation] is not worthy of a teacher in the latter ages, but moreover misses the real spirit of Nichiren's teaching. For my, Nichiren's, disciples and followers there is no need of any other device than the sole practice [of the Adoration].' In short, the adoration is the means of realizing the truth of the mutual participation in every one's life, and the formula is a prayer addressed to Buddha and to the truths revealed by him, as well as to all beings and to one's own deeper self.

5. 'Homage to the Buddha of infinite light.'—As we have seen, the stories of various Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* are told in Mahāyāna books, with their respective vows of salvation. These stories and vows became sources of inspiration and stimulants to emulation for the respective believers in the superhuman beings.[3] Among the objects of adoration and devotion in this sense Amitābha, the Buddha of infinite light, played the most significant part, and his worship formed a distinct stream of Buddhist pietism.[1] This form of Buddhism lays more emphasis on devotion than on emulation, in spite of the fact that the vows taken by Amitābha, while he was still a monk Dharmākara, are a specimen of the grand prayer for the salvation of all beings. In any case, the faith in Amitābha's all-embracing compassion and all-saving device caused many prayers of devotion to be uttered or written down, and the final result was a formulation of the prayer in a simple form, '*Namu Amida-butsu*,' which is the Sino-Japanese form of '*Namo 'mitābhāya Buddhāya*,' 'Homage be to the Buddha of infinite light.'

Before considering this simple prayer to Amitābha, we shall give a specimen of the prayers addressed to him. Vasubandhu opens his commentary on the *Sukhāvatī-vyūhā* (Nanjio, no. 1204) with a prayer:

'O Exalted One! I trust myself whole-heartedly
To the Tathagata whose light pervades,
Without any impediment, the regions in the ten quarters,
And express my earnest desire to be born in Thy Land.
. . . . . .
In realizing in vision the appearance of Thy Land,
I know that it surpasses all realms in the threefold existence,
That it is like sky, embracing all,
Vast and spacious without boundaries.
Thy mercy and compassion in accordance with the righteous way
Is an outgrowth of the stock of merits (accumulated by Thee),
which are beyond all worldly good;
And Thy light permeates everywhere,
Like the mirrors of the Sun and the Moon.
[Further description of the excellence of the Paradise.]
Let me pray that all beings, having been born there,
Shall proclaim the Truth, like Buddha Thyself.
Herewith I write down this essay and utter these verses,
And pray that I could see Thee, O Buddha, face to face,
And that I could, together with all my fellow-beings,
Attain the birth in the Land of Bliss.'
(In this prose translation, the lines of the original verse are kept.)

Vasubandhu further prescribes the five methods of worship to those who desire the communion of the land of bliss: (1) reverence shown by bodily acts of worship; (2) adoration expressed in oral utterance; (3) earnest thought and prayer carried out by the fixation of mind; (4) intent thought to visualize the Buddha and his land; (5) dedication of all good will and works to the welfare of fellow-beings.

Among these five methods adoration by oral utterance, especially in calling the Buddha's name (*nāmadheya*), became an important factor in the worship, and the final result was the formula cited above. This kind of prayer tends very naturally to become a mechanical repetition of the name, and there were and are many Buddhists practising the method in that way. Yet we must know that devotional piety and earnest thought are kept and stimulated even by the repetition of the Buddha's name, and also that the leaders of this Buddhist pietism were always keen on emphasizing faith and moral life as manifestations of piety.[2]

Moreover, there is another interesting phase in the development of Amita-Buddhism, viz. that a special theory of prayer was propounded by one of its leaders, Shinran (1173–1262), a Japanese reformer. He explains the faithful thought to mean, not only a thought, but also reverence shown towards the Buddha, through one's moral life, as well as the adoration of his grace by oral utterance of his name. This adoration, the repeti-

[1] This kind of adoration paid to a sacred book is as old as the origin of Mahāyāna, and every Mahāyāna book opens with a homage paid to the book. In some cases the homage is extended to Buddha and his community, and the adoration takes the form of a prayer. This practice may be traced back to the Pāli books, in which the formula '*Namo tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammā-Sambuddhassa*' precedes the text. An introductory prayer of this kind is found in nearly every treatise on doctrines, one of which is cited below.

[2] Cf. M. Anesaki, *Nichiren, the Buddhist Prophet*, Cambridge, Mass., 1916.

[3] One of those deities whose vows are adored and to whom many prayers are addressed is Avalokiteśvara, the chief figure of ch. xxiv. (xxv. in Chinese) of the *Lotus*. For one of the prayers addressed to him see J. Estlin Carpenter, *Comparative Religion* (Home University Library), London [1913], p. 153 f.

[1] The story of Amitābha's conversion and vows is told in the *Sukhāvatī-vyūha* (*SBE* xlix. pt. ii.). The scenes are depicted in a highly imaginative way and the vows taken are elaborate and high-sounding, yet all after the model of the story of Sumedha. This link of affinity between the two stories is a strong point against the theory that the belief in this Buddha was a product of Christian influence. Another point to the same effect is the development of the faith, which can be traced step by step in India, China, and Japan.

[2] The threefold thought in devotion is faithful thought, profound thought, and the thought to attain the final bliss by dedicating all good to that end (cf. *SBE* xlix. pt. ii. p. 188).

tion of the Buddha's name, ought to be uttered, never with any idea of petition, but always as an expression of absolute dependence on, and of gratitude towards, the Buddha's grace. Shinran taught this doctrine of prayer because he believed in the infinite strength of the Buddha's saving power, which reduces any idea of exertion or self-reliance, not only to useless redundance, but to a harmful impediment to the true devotion. Thus, prayer is regarded by Shinran as an expression of absolute dependence, on our part, on the Buddha's compassion and redeeming plan.

Shinran's religion was, in this way, the antipodes of the religion of self-perfection, as we see it in the original tenet of Buddhism; yet, in strictly excluding the idea of petition from prayer, he returned to the original standpoint of Buddhism, in contrast to some of the prevailing forms of the Buddhism of his time.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited throughout, especially D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1907, pp. 290–310.

M. ANESAKI.

PRAYER (Chinese).—The idea of prayer has permeated the whole religious life of China, under whatever form that life has manifested itself from the earliest ages of which we have any knowledge down to the present time. The Chinese had 'in everything by prayer and supplication' made known their requests long before St. Paul wrote those words.[1]

The present writer has heard extempore prayer in a temple,[2] but set forms are very largely used. Supplications are prepared to meet different circumstances with blanks to fill in personal particulars of names, etc. These are burned, this process, it is believed, ensuring their passage to the other world. Among such are prayers after bad dreams,[3] and when some untoward event has been seen, as a crowing hen, a dog digging a hole, etc.

When Confucius was ill, one of his disciples wished prayer to be offered to the spirits for his master.[4] The duke of Chow prayed for King Wu, his brother, to their great-grandfather, grandfather, and father.[5] The famous general Chu Koliang in ancient times prayed for restoration to health.[6] Sons pray for long life for their parents,[7] and petitions are offered for offspring (the goddess of mercy is much sought after for that purpose). Confucius was born after prayer by his mother.[8]

Almost as varied as the objects of prayer are the deities to whom prayers are made, the first and highest being Shang Ti, the Supreme Ruler. From ancient times this worship of God has been regularly kept up by the sovereign.[9] As one instance of it, the emperor Kien Lung 'in times of scarcity . . . begged grain from the Ruler above.'[10]

With this basis of monotheism there was also worship of the spirits presiding over rivers and hills of note, 'the mounds, dykes, plains, forests, and the spirits of sages and worthies of ancient times' who were subordinate to the Supreme Ruler.[11] The prayers to these were in the character of announcements, thanksgivings, petitions, or adoration. Those of adoration are the only kind used in the worship to Confucius.

Heaven and earth, as the manifestations and revelations of the Supreme Being, were the objects of imperial worship[1] and also at times of that of the common people.

The present writer will never forget a most impressive instance of it during a terrific typhoon. Amidst the howling tempest, with many drowning, the Chinese nurse knelt down on the breaking verandah and poured forth an earnest and impassioned prayer.

Ancestor-worship is regularly engaged in by every family which is not Christian. Numerous gods and goddesses, deified heroes, sacred trees, smooth stones from the brook, bridges, etc., or their spirits, are worshipped with prayer and offerings.

Buddhist and Taoist monks and priests read liturgies and *sutras* in the temples and monasteries. There is no suggestion of prayer in the *Tao Teh King* of Lao-tzu,[2] though it soon appears in Taoism.

Buddhist gods are ideas personified, mostly 'fictitious personations,' so that Buddhist worship, except among the simple-minded in China, is but 'a homage rendered to ideas and is only supposed to be reflex in its effects. Their worship is useful as a discipline, but not effectual as prayer.' Prayer is not absolutely necessary to the Buddhist.[3] But the common man or woman in China, like the rest of the human race, feels the need of prayer and is not concerned with this esoteric view.

The following prayer was used by the Ming emperors at the solstice worship of Shang Ti:

'All the numerous tribes of animated beings are indebted to Thy favour for their beginning. Men and creatures are emparadised, O Ti (Lord), in Thy love. All living things are indebted to Thy goodness, but who knows whence his blessing comes to him? It is Thou alone, O Lord, who art the true parent of all things. . . . The Service of Song is completed but our poor sincerity cannot be fully expressed. Sovereign goodness is infinite. As a potter Thou hast made all living things. Great and small are curtained round. As engraven on the heart of Thy poor servant is the sense of Thy goodness, but my feeling cannot be fully displayed. With great kindness Thou dost bear with us, and notwithstanding our demerits dost grant us life and prosperity.'[4]

This very high level of spirituality is not reached in many of the ritual prayers.

Though a tablet to the emperor appeared in the larger temples, it is only recently that prayer for the government and those in authority has been desired, and the Chinese turned to the Christians for it, the emperor having been dethroned with his State worship.

One of the most eminent Chinese philosophers, a great Confucian commentator, said:

'Prayer is the expression of repentance and promise of amendment, to supplicate the help of the spirits. If there may not be those things, then there is no need for praying. In the case of the Sage [Confucius], he had committed no errors, and admitted of no amendment. In all his conduct he had been in harmony with the spiritual intelligences, and therefore he said: "My praying has been for a long time."'[5]

The spirit in which prayer is offered is considered by the Chinese to be of the utmost importance. The Master (Confucius) said: 'Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles,'[6] and the spirit in which prayer is offered must be a sincere one. Some amount of ceremony is generally observed with prayer. Offerings of meat and vegetables are often presented and cups of wine; wax candles are lighted and incense-sticks and mock paper money burned.

The attitude taken in prayer is typical of reverence. Kneeling mats are provided in temples for

[1] E. H. Parker, *Ancient China Simplified*, London, 1908, p. 58; *Chinese Recorder*, Shanghai, 1869–1914, xliv. 133, 146.

[2] J. Dyer Ball, *Is Buddhism a Preparation or a Hindrance to Christianity in China?*, Hongkong, 1907, p. 14 ff.

[3] *Chinese Recorder*, lxiv. 369, 370 f.

[4] J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861–72, i. 'Confucian Analects,' etc., p. 70.

[5] See art. HUMAN SACRIFICE (Chinese); *Chinese Recorder*, lxiv. 289, 379.

[6] *Chinese Recorder*, lxiv. 291.

[7] *Ib.* p. 292. [8] *Ib.* p. 294 f.

[9] J. Legge, *The Religions of China*, London, 1880, p. 25.

[10] E. H. Parker, *Studies in Chinese Religion*, London, 1910, p. 191.

[11] Legge, *The Religions of China*, p. 25 f.; also his *Chinese Classics*, ii., 'The Works of Mencius' p. 193 f., iii., 'The Shoo King' ii. 152.

[1] Legge, *Religions of China*, p. 34; J. Edkins, *Religion in China*[2], London, 1878, p. 18 f.

[2] Parker, *Studies in Chinese Religion*, p. 111.

[3] Edkins, *Religion in China*[2], p. 60.

[4] Nelson Bitton, *The Regeneration of New China*, London, 1914, ch. iii.

[5] *Chinese Recorder*, lxiv. 289 f.

[6] Legge, *Chinese Classics*, i. 5.

the worshippers, who not only kneel but often touch the ground with their foreheads and perform the kowtow. If weak and unable to kneel, the worshipper is told in pious books that he may stand. In prayer the hands are laid palm to palm with extended fingers and raised up and down several times.

LITERATURE.—Authorities are cited in the footnotes.

J. DYER BALL.

PRAYER (Christian, Theological).—The fact of prayer is the supreme proof of the importance of religion as an element in human life. Face to face with vast and mysterious forces, beset by dangers, urged on by unceasing needs, man turns instinctively for help to powers other and greater than himself. Prayer is wide as the world and older than history. The animistic savage and the polytheist, as well as the Christian, practise it. Even the Buddhist, though in strictness his creed should find no place for it, seeks solace in prayer. In the presence of such facts, it is not wrong to speak of prayer as an instinct of the human heart. It is an instinct springing from man's sense of his own weakness and limitations and from his recognition of the greatness of the universe in which he dwells. Prayer may truly be said to be prior to all definite creeds, to be indeed the expression of the need which all creeds seek to satisfy. 'He that cometh to God must believe that he is' (He 11[6]), we are taught, and the saying is true; but the belief is often implicit rather than explicit.

With the advent of monotheism, prayer reaches a new dignity and power. Belief in the one Deity, sovereign in the universe, carries with it a sense of security and of elevation which has an ennobling influence on thought and life. It makes men strong and free in the world. Here is the secret of the transformation which Islām effects for the African animist. Christianity offers better gifts, but the gifts of Islām are not to be despised. The monotheist, set free from the terrors of the animistic demon-world, or from the uncertainties and confusions of the polytheistic pantheon, lifts his face to heaven and gives his worship to the Supreme alone, and asks help from a Power which, he is assured, has no rival.

1. Definition.—Prayer is not necessarily petition, the asking for benefits. Any intercourse of a human soul with higher powers may rightly be termed prayer. For the monotheist prayer is intercourse with God. Prayer, says Jeremy Taylor, is 'an ascent of the mind to God.'[1] All forms of such ascent — adoration, confession, thanksgiving, as well as petitions seeking for definite gifts—may be included in the generic term 'prayer.' Prayer is, in general, the communion of the human soul with God.

This communion is not necessarily an inward consciousness of spiritual relationship with God. There is a tendency in modern writings on this subject to regard prayer as necessarily involving an apprehension of the Divine Presence in an essentially inward manner. But there is no proof of this. The inward apprehension of God is the soul of all mysticism; and it would be going too far to claim mystical experience for every prayer. Such experience is a mark of a somewhat advanced stage of religion. The child, the uneducated, and the simple unreflecting mind, as a rule, seek God above, not within. Hence the tendency of all such to speak prayers aloud, no matter how private and personal the prayers may be. The prayer of Solomon, 'Hear thou in heaven, thy dwelling-place' (1 K 8[30]), expresses the natural thought of the simple mind.

[1] *The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living*, London, 1686, ch. iv. § 7, identical with Aquinas's 'ascensus intellectus in Deum' (*Summa Theol.* II. ii. qu. lxxxiii. art. 13, 'de Oratione').

2. OT.—Monotheistic prayer in its pre-Christian form reaches its greatest elevation in the OT. All the forms which the intercourse of the human soul with God is able to assume will be found there in unexampled nobility and splendour. The cry of the soul for God, as in Ps 42; confession of sin, as in Ps 51; intercession, thanksgiving, petition—all these are found in the OT, and especially in the Psalms and the Prophets, in forms which stand to-day as the most perfect utterances of spiritual devotion.

The principal elements which distinguish the prayers of the OT are: (1) a vivid consciousness of God as a living personal Presence and as possessing supreme power, and (2) an unfailing realization of His holiness, involving the conviction that only through moral goodness can men become acceptable in His sight. Ps 139 affords a striking instance of both these elements; but they are to be found everywhere. God as the living God, and righteousness of life as that which alone can bring man into harmony with Him — these are the essentials of the monotheism of the OT and they are the distinguishing marks of its prayers.

3. NT.—Christian prayer demands more detailed consideration. The NT is full of exhortations to prayer and promises of blessing to those who pray aright. It also contains many examples of prayer. So important a place does prayer occupy in its teachings that it may be affirmed positively that to doubt the efficacy of prayer is to shake the very foundations of Christianity. To determine the essential elements of Christian prayer, we must go to the teachings of Christ Himself. The fullest and most characteristic is contained in Mt 6[5-16]. A brief analysis of this passage will exhibit the principles of Christian prayer.

(1) Prayer must have spiritual reality. This truth is enforced by means of a warning against hypocrisy, *i.e.* against unreality. The warning is twofold: (*a*) against that unreality which uses the observances of prayer for outward show, in order to gain credit in the world, and (*b*) against vain repetitions, *i.e.* against using the forms of prayer as incantations or magical formulæ, the mere repetition of which will, it is imagined, avert some evil or effect some good. Prayer is to be real spiritual intercourse between the soul and God: 'When thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret' (Mt 6[6]).

(2) In prayer the soul is to approach God as a child drawing near to a father, with perfect simplicity and directness, in confidence and love. 'Pray to thy Father'; and remember that 'your Father knoweth what things ye have need of, before ye ask him' (Mt 6[8]). He is a Father whose knowledge of your needs is infinitely greater than your own.

(3) Christ gives a form of prayer which is to serve as a pattern. The Lord's Prayer teaches us what to pray for. It also teaches us how to pray. In it we are taught to pray for the supreme end which God Himself seeks, and also for temporal and spiritual good for ourselves. Most remarkable is the order in which the petitions are arranged. The prayers for God's glory and Kingdom come before the prayers for personal blessing. From this we gather that all private and personal ends must be subordinated to the higher purposes of the Divine Will. All our prayers must be offered up with the condition that the supreme end, which is the universal good, must overrule all particular ends. There must be no selfishness in prayer. The greatest instance of the application of this principle is to be found in the life of Christ Himself. When confronted with the last great sacrifice, He prayed that He might be delivered, but added, 'nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done' (Lk 22[42]).

This is the same principle as that which Christ sets forth as the supreme rule of all true living: 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness' (Mt 6[33]). In this principle also we find the significance of the characteristic law of Christian prayer that it is offered 'in the name of Christ.' The mission, sacrifice, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ form the means by which the Kingdom is established through the overcoming of evil and the perfecting of humanity. In and through Him human wills become identified with the supreme Divine purpose. 'If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you' (Jn 15[7]). Prayer which is truly 'in Christ' can never be in vain.

It is not going too far to say that, when these principles are grasped firmly, the difficulties which have so frequently troubled the minds of thoughtful people on the subject of prayer will be found capable of solution. Our purpose here is to exhibit this fact as clearly and simply as possible and to deal briefly with the deeper scientific and philosophical problems which are involved.

4. Two main difficulties.—Two great objections have been made against the efficacy of petitionary prayer.

(*a*) *The moral, or theological, objection.*—This difficulty has troubled devout minds in all ages. It assumes many forms, but, in its commonest shape, may be presented thus: God knows, better than we do, all that is good for us. Trusting in His supreme wisdom and power, we may rely upon Him to do what is best without any request on our part. To ask Him for gifts is really an effort to get Him to do something for us which we fear He may not do. Instead of being an exercise of faith, it is in truth a manifestation of doubt, perhaps even of selfishness. It is, in effect, an attempt to induce God to change His mind. Hence it is concluded that the only justifiable prayer is the prayer for resignation or, more properly, for submission of the will to God. The intercourse of the soul with God, it is said, should never be the asking for definite gifts, but always the bringing of the human will into harmony with the Divine.

In all this there would seem to be an element of truth and an element of error. The element of truth will be found in the final words in which the objection has just been stated: true prayer must always involve the bringing of the mind and will of man into harmony with the mind and will of God. This is another way of expressing the third condition of Christian prayer as given above: all private and personal aims must be subordinated to the higher purposes of the Divine Will. The element of error will be found in the supposition that this bringing of the human will into harmony with the Divine renders impossible the asking and the receiving of special benefits. The true inference is quite opposite. When the will has been brought into harmony with the great universal purpose of God, the soul becomes capable of benefits which were before impossible. To regard the Will of God as determining a fixed unalterable arrangement of events is inconsistent with that spiritual view of the universe which is the basis of the whole argument: it is to leave out of account the incessant action and reaction of the spiritual world. The unchangeableness of God does not mean that the universe is a perfectly articulated mechanical system in which everything is given from the beginning. It means, rather, that the principles and purposes of the Divine Providence are eternal and unchangeable. If God be a living God—a personal Life with whom our souls are in relationship—it follows that to every movement of the human will there is some corresponding Divine reaction. When, therefore, the will of man is brought into harmony with the Will of God, the soul is rendered capable of blessings which were before impossible. The moral condition on which those blessings depend has been fulfilled. Now, prayer is essentially the fulfilment of this moral condition. True prayer is the movement of the human soul into a new relationship with God. Every true prayer, therefore, renders some blessing possible. An illustration will make this statement clearer. The forgiveness of sins is granted in response to the prayer which expresses true repentance. Confession of sin which has no spiritual reality behind it, which is a mere form of words, cannot call down pardon. Only when the soul moves into harmony with the Divine Will—a movement which finds its inevitable expression in the prayer of contrition—is the blessing bestowed. This instance is that selected by Christ Himself. Commenting on the petition, 'Forgive us our debts as we also have forgiven our debtors,' He says: 'If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses' (Mt 6[14f.]). Here the condition of the great gift of pardon is the bringing of the mind and will of man into harmony with the mind and will of God. When that movement of the soul has taken place, the gift becomes possible. True prayer is the expression of a spiritual change which brings a new capacity to receive blessing from God. Nor is there any reason why this capacity should be relative only to spiritual gifts. The principle involved applies to the whole range of blessing, temporal as well as spiritual. In a moral and spiritual universe all the possessions and capacities of moral and spiritual beings must be morally and spiritually conditioned.

The whole force, then, of the moral, or theological, difficulty in relation to prayer is derived from an erroneous—indeed impossible—view of the nature of the spiritual universe. This view attributes to the spiritual a mechanical rigidity which is altogether alien from its true nature.

(*b*) *The scientific objection.*—This difficulty is one which has pressed with great weight upon the modern mind, for it derives its force from modern scientific conceptions of the universe. It depends upon the scientific principle of natural law. The advance of science, so wonderful in the modern world, has been secured by the progressive discovery of what are termed 'laws of nature,' *i.e.* a great order according to which events happen. Cause and effect are linked together in the natural world by certain unvarying uniformities of sequence. When one of these uniformities has been determined, it is found to be constant and unchangeable. And, the further science advances, the more fully does it appear that things and events in nature are subject to the sway of such uniformity. From this it seems to follow that the whole course of nature is a perfectly determined system. Everything that happens is the result of the previous state of things, in a relationship which is absolutely necessary.

The effect of all this on many devout minds has been such that prayer for benefits involving material elements has been regarded as meaningless. How can we pray for fair weather if we believe that the weather is determined by natural causes in a necessary order? How can we pray for recovery from sickness if we believe that sickness and health depend on the physical condition of the organism, and that that condition arises from certain antecedent causes in accordance with unvarying laws? Some of those who have been

influenced by this reasoning divide the world of human experience into two parts, spiritual and material. In the former, they think, prayer is efficacious; spiritual blessings may be obtained by it; in the latter they believe prayer to be wholly unreasonable and ineffective. Such thinkers, regarding the laws of nature as the expression of the Divine Will, hold that, when we pray for material results, we are guilty of the folly of asking God to abrogate His own laws.

It is not surprising that a conception of natural law which has had so great an effect upon sincerely religious minds should have been even more influential in relation to the common opinion of the modern world. Materialism and naturalism have become popular doctrines. They hold (the former more crudely, the latter in a more subtle manner) that the universe is a continuous development, necessarily ordered from beginning to end in accordance with natural law. In such a system there can be no place for Divine intervention; prayer is meaningless.

It is true that these doctrines find no place for God in the scheme of their thought, and therefore they are bound to deny altogether the value of prayer; but it must be remembered that many who hold these views as working hypotheses for scientific purposes are not prepared to go so far as this. Like the devout minds already mentioned, they are apt to think in water-tight compartments. They are materialists, or naturalists, while dealing with the physical world, but are inclined to admit the existence of a spiritual realm in which events occur which are not subject to the laws of physical causation. To such, an answer to prayer involving change in the physical order seems impossible, but in the spiritual realm the intercourse of a soul with God may well be a means of great and varied blessing.

In considering this mode of thought, it is necessary first to take account of the sharp distinction which is so frequently made between the material and the spiritual. In regard to the latter, it is admitted that prayer may have results; its efficacy in relation to the former is denied. And here again a distinction must be made. There are some who believe in a real response of God to the cry of the human soul seeking for spiritual blessing; there are others who think that the spiritual value of prayer is to be accounted for only by its subjective influence upon the devout mind: prayer attunes the soul to higher things; it brings peace, resignation, trust; these are its real benefits. None can deny these subjective effects; but, if prayer be no more, it loses even this value; for it becomes an impossibility for the enlightened. Who could seek peace in prayer, knowing all the time that his cry for help could bring no real response? This doctrine is but another form of the cynical view which regards religion as a useful superstition—an illusion which gives comfort to those whose ignorance permits them to enjoy it. More important is the view of those who hold that there is a real Divine response in the spiritual sphere, as distinguished from the physical. Many great religious thinkers of the 19th cent. made this distinction. Their reason for doing so has already been explained. It was a mode of thought characteristic of the time. More recent movements of science and philosophy have been showing that this sharp division between the two realms of being cannot be maintained. Psychology has been proving the greatness of the influence of mind upon matter, and physiology has been revealing the fact that the brain is an organ which subserves the directing agency of intelligence (see W. McDougall, *Body and Mind*, London, 1911; and H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Eng. tr., do. 1911). The brain has been compared by Bergson to a telephone exchange. It is the instrument by which the response of the organism to a stimulus from without is controlled.

In relation to all such forms of thinking, however, our common sense supplies a ready solution of the problem which we are now considering. And here common sense is most perfectly expressed in the simple words of Christ: 'Pray to thy Father.' When a child asks for some gift, he never pauses to think whether the gift is material or spiritual. His prayer expresses his need with the utmost simplicity and directness. As to material benefits, he knows perfectly well that his father can bestow them. Human beings can intervene to help one another. A man drowning in deep water cries out for help because he knows that human power may be able to save him. A sick man calls in a doctor because he knows that his medical skill is often able to arrest the progress of disease. We are all aware that there are limits to human power in its intervention in the course of natural events; but that, within those limits, its ability to produce changes in that course are infinite, we are assured by our commonest experiences. The mind and will of man can subordinate the course of nature to human purposes.

Further, this power is not inconsistent with the perfect fulfilment of the laws of nature. Man is able to use natural forces, and combine them in multitudes of ways, for his own ends; but every force so employed operates in accordance with its proper laws. Thus it is that all human works are accomplished. Thus almost the whole surface of the globe has been altered, the seas covered with fleets, the earth penetrated in pursuit of its hidden wealth. So it is that man can rise high in air in opposition to the force of gravitation, speak to a friend miles away, and send his messages round the world.

And not only is all this done in accordance with the laws of nature, but its very possibility is dependent upon the existence of natural law. The laws of nature are only another name for the trustworthiness of natural forces. When we find that nature is not capricious, but trustworthy, we are able to use physical forces to effect the purposes which we have in view. It is the knowledge of natural law as unfailing that gives man his power in dealing with nature. When man has grasped these unfailing laws, he finds the material world plastic in his hands.

Now, it is absurd to suppose that this characteristic of natural law, which gives to man all his power over nature, creates an obstacle in the way of Divine activity. Are we to suppose that the Supreme Spirit labours under a disability from which His creature, man, is free; that He is so shackled by His own laws that He is unable to respond to the changing needs of His creation? Surely it must be true that, if the uniformity of nature is the means by which human liberty, in dealing with the forces of nature, is secured, that uniformity must in some far higher way subserve the Divine freedom.

It is not difficult to discover the source of the confusion of mind which is so common on this question. We forget to take account of the practical side of science. When applying scientific principles, we think only of theoretical science. Theoretical science discovers the uniformities of nature; practical science makes use of those uniformities for the effecting of human purposes. But the history of discovery shows that the practical aim is really dominant throughout. Man has learned to master natural forces for his own benefit by finding out how they work. The one supreme lesson is that nature is thus mastered.

Forgetting to consider this, and regarding nature in an abstract theoretical way as a system of laws, we form a purely factitious conception of it from which all spiritual initiative is excluded. We then apply this conception to God's relation to the universe, and forget that the impotence which we thus ascribe to God should first be ascribed to ourselves. Thus arises the illusion which has darkened so many souls.

Far clearer in thought and truer in principle is the faith which passes with simplicity from the common earthly experience to God in relation to human need. The earthly father can and does help his child; how much more must the Heavenly Father be able and willing to answer the prayers of His children!

It may be urged as an objection against all this that, in the case of man, we can trace his intervention in the succession of natural causes: we see him at work, selecting and combining the elements with which he deals, and so bringing about the results which he has in view. The drowning man cries for help; his shout is heard; and, by means of a rope or a boat, he is pulled out of danger. But we see no sign of similar interventions by Divine agency in response to prayer. When devout souls believe that their prayers are answered, it will be found that the desired results have come about by means of the apparently undisturbed operation of natural causes. If this be, in truth, God's work in answer to prayer, His method must be very different from that employed by man when he controls the succession of events. This is an important objection, and, up to a certain point, perfectly sound. It is not to be supposed that God's response to prayer takes place in the superficial way characteristic of man's work. Whatever conception we may form of the Divine relation to the forces and laws of nature, we cannot believe that the Almighty works as man works. Man by constant and painful trial has burrowed a little beneath the surface of things and so made useful discoveries which enable him, in a manner which is marvellous for him, to guide the course of nature for his own purposes. But God's control of natural forces must be very different. Man works upon the surface; God directs things from the centre. What we call forces and laws of nature are but fragments abstracted from the whole and presented in forms which have been shaped by our human needs and methods. It is absurd to suppose that the Supreme Spirit must approach the material universe in the same limited way. But the objection assumes that there can be no other way in which to approach it—an absurd supposition. The whole meaning of the argument which has been presented above is just this: if man with his very limited knowledge and power is able to control natural forces for the satisfaction of human needs, how much more must the Eternal God, with His infinitely larger and deeper grasp of the material universe, be able to use the laws and processes of nature for the realization of the ends demanded by the spiritual relationships into which He enters with His human children! Neither in the human sphere nor in the divine is it necessary to suppose any violation or suspension of natural law.

5. **Some minor objections.**—The two difficulties which so far have occupied our attention are by far the greatest and most formidable of all in connexion with the subject of prayer. Some minor objections deserve a brief consideration.

(*a*) *The littleness of man.*—It is urged that man is too small a being to claim the interest and attention of the Almighty. The vastness of the physical universe as revealed by astronomy, and its immeasurable history as disclosed by geology and biology, teach us that man is of very little account in the whole scheme. It is sheer presumption on his part to ask God to attend to his petitions. And how much more does this apply to the individual human being, who is but one out of many hundreds of millions of beings of the same sort?

In a similar spirit, it has been said that it is inconceivable that God can 'give serious ear and individual consideration to each and all' of the multitude of petitions, 'wise and unwise, selfish and unselfish,' which are addressed to Him 'daily and hourly by hundreds of millions of human beings' (C. Stewart, in *HJ* ix. 386).

In answer to such objections, it must be observed (*a*) that, no matter how small and weak man may be, he is yet a spiritual being, capable of knowledge, goodness, and love, able to enter into communion with God; and (*β*) that such arguments, instead of attributing greatness to God, really detract from His greatness. A worthy conception of God's greatness will discern that nothing is little, nothing insignificant, in His sight. He is not like a collector who prizes a thing because it is rare, nor like a megalomaniac who admires only the gigantic, nor like a tired official who finds details wearisome and settles every question by red tape. In God's universe the midge is as perfectly formed as the whale, the snowflake as harmonious as the solar system. But, above all, God's supreme greatness is His spiritual perfection. To Him spiritual ends are supremely important. Therefore the perfecting of every human being possessed of personality must be a matter outweighing all material considerations.

(*b*) *The inconsistency of human prayers.*—It is often said that petitions addressed to God are so conflicting, owing to the diversity of human interests, that it is impossible to suppose that they can be rightly offered, or can call down an answer. One farmer prays for rain, another for fair weather. In every war both sides pray for victory.

It is indeed astonishing that this objection has been seriously entertained by some reasonable people. Every true prayer must be offered up, as we have seen, with the condition that the granting of it is not inconsistent with the higher purposes of the Divine Will. 'Not my will, but thine, be done' must express the spirit of every prayer. Further, every true prayer, recognizing the fact of human ignorance, must involve the 'if it be possible,' which even Christ Himself uttered. And it is surely true that no Christian soul ever expects the answer to his prayer to take precisely the shape fashioned by his own desires and imagination. On the contrary, he is convinced that, whatever the appearance may be, the God who knows 'our necessities before we ask, and our ignorance in asking,' will always give to His children more and better than they can ever 'ask or think' in response to their petitions.

(*c*) *Prayer inconsistent with self-reliance.*—The habit of prayer, it has been thought, tends to weaken character. Men should learn to exert themselves, and so win, by their own efforts, what they require, and not look continually to some great power above them for help. The records of Christianity afford a sufficient answer. St. Paul, Athanasius, Augustine, Luther, Cromwell, Wesley, Gordon, were not moral weaklings. Christianity is the religion of the most vigorous races. The fact is that a true dependence upon God cannot weaken any character, because the true life of every soul is to be found in God. The identification of mind and will with God brings with it the consciousness of a new strength. It is also to be observed that many prayers are answered through the normal exercise of human powers. Thus the

prayer, 'Give us this day our daily bread' (Mt 6[11]), finds its usual response in the reward which comes to man when he exerts himself in taking advantage of the opportunities presented to him. No religious mind regards this response as the less providential on that account. On the contrary, the offering of the prayer involves the recognition that we are to expect a blessing upon our work, and is therefore a stimulus to exertion. 'Work out your own salvation . . . for it is God which worketh in you' (Ph 2[12,13]), is a principle which pervades all Christian devotion and life.

(*d*) *Experimental test.*—It has been urged that the effects of prayer, if it has any, must be of such a nature as to be open to proof by ordinary scientific methods. Tyndall proposed that two wards in a hospital should be selected; in one the patients should be treated by medical science, in the other they should be made the subjects of prayer only (*CR* xx. [1872] 210). Others suggested tests by observation. Sovereigns and royal princes are prayed for more constantly than other people; can we see, in the records of such persons, that they have enjoyed longer life and been endowed with greater blessings, spiritual and temporal, than those who have not been so much prayed for? (F. Galton, *Fortnightly Review*, new ser., xii. [1872] 125).

The crudeness of these suggestions is perhaps more obvious now than at the time when they were made.

(1) It is now known that the influence of suggestion upon both mind and body is very great, and there is clear evidence that suggestion can act subconsciously. Also there is good evidence for telepathy, *i.e.* the influence of mind upon mind at a distance and independently of material and sensational methods of communication.

(2) It would therefore be impossible to determine the real conditions of such an experiment as Tyndall proposed. It is obvious also that royal princes, in their relation to their mental and moral environment, are in a position very different from that of ordinary men. Further, it is impossible to isolate any human soul from the influence of prayer.

In addition to these considerations, it should be remembered that Tyndall's proposed experiment would violate the very first principle of true prayer. It would be altogether lacking in spiritual reality. It would be an exhibition of doubt rather than of faith. It would be treating the Almighty as if He were a chemical reaction.

(*e*) *Intercessory prayer.* — There is a peculiar difficulty involved in prayer of this kind. We have seen that, when a soul turns to God in sincere prayer, the spiritual movement which the prayer expresses establishes a new relation of the soul to God which makes possible blessings that would otherwise be impossible. Thus the prayer of contrition fits a soul to receive the Divine pardon. This consideration enabled us to perceive that true prayer is not inconsistent with a perfect submission to the unchanging purposes of the Divine Will. But how, it will be asked, can the movement of a soul towards God be efficacious for the benefit of another?

The problems involved in this question are very profound, and to consider them with any fullness would lead us very far. Two principles may be laid down which will be found to give help. (1) Modern psychology has shown that one mind can influence another in other ways than by speech and sight, and therefore can alter to some degree the moral relationship in which the other mind stands to God. (2) A soul which yields itself to God in prayer may become the channel through which Divine influences can flow to others as well as to itself. As the influence of goodness in a human being can spread from soul to soul, so surely, only in a far greater degree, can the influence of Divine goodness pass through one human soul to another.

6. Deeper problems.—(*a*) *Conception of God.*—Prayer assumes the being of God. But in what sense? We are now concerned only with Christian monotheism. The essence of this doctrine is that God is one, holy, supreme in the universe, and standing in a moral relationship with His creatures. All our arguments so far have gone upon this postulate. But this doctrine is capable of several interpretations.

(1) God is sometimes conceived as altogether transcendent. He is a creator who called the world into being, giving it a certain definite constitution. This thought of God is founded on an analogy from human work. An engineer makes a machine, fitting its parts together, so constructing an instrument by means of which certain desired results can be accomplished. So God, having a great purpose in view, created the universe. Out of this conception a very great difficulty is apt to arise. It is only a very imperfect machine which requires to be continually set right. If the universe needs constant interference in the shape of answers to prayer, or miracles, it must be a very imperfect construction. On the other hand, if God foresaw and ordered everything from the beginning, what place can there be for changes in answer to the petitions of men? To this question there can be only one possible answer. It is an answer which some theologians have not hesitated to give: both the prayer and its answer must be parts of the original Divine plan (J. McCosh, *CR* xx. 777).

It must be confessed that this solution seems to make prayer unreal; the spontaneity of human initiative has disappeared; everything is settled beforehand. The truth is that it is the conception with which we started that is at fault. We have pushed a useful analogy too far.

(2) Our thoughts on this subject can be to a great degree corrected by introducing another conception. We can think of God as the immanent Life of the universe. This conception brings our thoughts into very suggestive relationship with modern ideas of evolution. It also enables us to think of God as one with whom we ourselves and every other living being, and every element in nature, are in continual intercourse and contact. We are thus lifted out of those purely mechanical ideas within which the former conception confined us. At the same time, the idea of immanence is in constant danger of drifting into pantheism, and therefore of losing belief in that moral relationship between God and man which is the very life of a monotheistic creed, and the foundation of all faith in the efficacy of prayer.

(3) There is a higher conception of Divine transcendence which is not inconsistent with belief in the immanence of God. This conception is founded on a full recognition of all the data of experience. Discerning in the principle of personality our surest guide to the nature of the ultimate reality, it takes account of the moral freedom of the human individual. It therefore thinks of God as the supreme personal Life, within the sphere of whose being there is room for the free interaction of the whole multitude of finite persons. He is at once the Infinite in whom we live and move and have our being, and the Father of spirits on whose love and providence we depend. The difficulty of making this conception perfectly consistent is simply due to the difficulty of reconciling in one scheme of thought the diverse elements of the world of our experience. The true value of this view of God, as at the same time immanent and

transcendent in this higher sense, is that it takes account of all the facts and holds fast to that fundamental monotheism which is the ultimate justification of the conviction that the moral aim is supreme in the universe.

(*b*) *The unchangeableness of God.*—The conception of God which has just been set forth gives us the true solution of this problem. When we speak of God as unchangeable, we do not mean that the whole universe is fixed by His fiat in a complete rigidity. That is the mechanical conception which, as we have seen, is wholly inconsistent with the facts of life and morality. God is unchangeable in the sense of being absolutely trustworthy. His purpose cannot be altered. That purpose is the realization of the moral ideal. It is the good of all and the good of each. It is the Kingdom of God, or Kingdom of Love. In its application to the infinite variety of human and moral situations, this unchangeable purpose must take the form of an unfailing Divine response to every element and tendency of good in the character and life of finite personalities.

(*c*) *Conception of law.*—Much confusion has been caused by the failure to distinguish between the various meanings of the word 'law.' We speak of the laws of nature, and also of the moral law. It has sometimes been asked, Are we to pray to God to abrogate His own laws? The reference is to the laws of nature which have been ascertained by science; but the whole force of the question resides in the connexion of the word 'law' with God, and our reverence for the great moral laws which we have been taught to trace to Him. A law of nature is merely an observed uniformity, a sequence of physical cause and effect, a certain order in the way in which events follow one another. Such a law is not, in itself, capable of effecting anything. It is even wrong therefore to speak of nature as being governed by laws. A law of nature is, in fact, simply our way of grouping our observations. It is a description and nothing more. Nor are we at all sure that such descriptions of grouped natural processes as have been so far ascertained, and labelled laws, are anything but provisional statements. There are indications that even such vast generalizations as the law of gravitation or the law of the conservation of energy may some day be merged in larger descriptions of the sequences which they include.

A deeper philosophy is now showing good reason to believe that these laws of nature, which are essentially the description of natural processes in terms of human intelligence, are relative to our mode of grasping our experience of the physical world with a view to the satisfaction of our needs (see Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, ch. ii.). They have, that is, been shaped by the practical aims of human life. It is altogether in harmony with this doctrine that the knowledge of these laws is the very means which man employs in order to control natural processes for his own purposes. His amazing success in this work is revealed at every turn in our wonderful modern world. The absurdity of supposing that the discovery of these laws makes it improper for us to pray to God for benefits which involve changes in the physical sphere is therefore manifest.

The most notable expression of the doctrine that the laws of nature forbid prayer is Tyndall's famous attempt to show that the principle of the conservation of energy rules out all possibility of Divine intervention in the physical world.

'The principle,' he writes, 'teaches us that the Italian wind gliding over the crest of the Matterhorn is as firmly ruled as the earth in its orbital revolution round the sun; and that the fall of the vapour into clouds is exactly as much a matter of necessity as the return of the seasons . . . Without a disturbance of natural law, quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse, or the rolling of the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara, no act of humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven, or deflect towards us a single beam of the sun' (*Fragments of Science*, p. 35 f., 'Prayer and Natural Law').

This argument, enforced as it was by the authority of a distinguished man of science, had an enormous effect at the time when it was first presented (see Stopford Brooke, *Christ in Modern Life*, p. 132) and is not without influence even now. But, as Oliver Lodge points out, it is open to objection—

'Even from the strictly scientific point of view: the law of the conservation of energy is needlessly dragged in when it has nothing really to do with it. We ourselves, for instance, though we have no power, nor hint of any power, to override the conservation of energy, are yet readily able, by a simple physical experiment, or by an engineering operation, to deflect a ray of light, or to dissipate a mist, or divert a wind, or pump water uphill' (*Man and the Universe*, p. 7; see also chs. i.–iii., and *Life and Matter*).

George Stokes deals with objections of this kind in a similar manner and with equal clearness and decision (*Natural Theology*, p. 220). These utterances of competent scientific authorities are in perfect accord with what has been said above on this subject. The principle which they express is just this: natural law is indeed unfailing, but all experience proves that this constancy does not prevent human intelligence and skill from making use of physical forces and so effecting results which the natural course of things, left to itself, could never bring about. If human power can do so much, why should Divine power be helpless? As we have seen, the existence of those constant uniformities which we call the laws of nature is the very foundation of all human power in dealing with the forces of nature. Therefore we have reason to believe that, in a far profounder way, the order of nature subserves the operations of Divine Providence.

(*d*) *Prayer and miracle.*—Objection is sometimes made that prayer is in essence the request that God should interfere miraculously for our benefit. Fundamentally, it is said, answers to prayer and miracles, if such things happen, are indistinguishable. This is not the place to discuss the great and intricate question of the miraculous (see art. MIRACLE). Let it suffice to say that those who believe in miracles do not, in our time, suppose that a miracle is a violation of law. It is usually held to be the manifestation of forces, and possibly of laws, which do not enter into our ordinary experiences. But, while all this is admitted, it must be remembered, as shown above, that natural laws, as we apprehend them, belong to abstract realms of experience and are probably relative to our mode of apprehension. There is a sense also in which it must be said that the miraculous is relative to our mode of apprehension. As the control which civilized men exercise over natural forces appears, or might appear, miraculous to the intelligent savage, so a superhuman control of natural forces may well be the true nature of what we call miracle. There is therefore no objection to miracle on the ground of scientific principle. But this is not a sufficient account of the matter. The Christian miracles, as recorded in the NT, are not mere wonders. They are not even mere displays of superhuman power. Their distinctive quality is to be found in the fact that, while exhibiting superhuman power, they also reveal Divine character. They might be described as 'acts of revelation.' Here is the force of the term 'signs' (σημεῖα) by which they are designated. This consideration at once makes clear the distinction between a miracle and an answer to prayer. It may well be that, so far as the method of their performance goes, there is no difference between them. But the former is intended to reveal the operation

of One who is able to exert superhuman power and, in exerting that power, to manifest His character. The latter is for the simple bestowing of a benefit. In the former the Divine element is made startlingly manifest in order to attract attention. In the latter we must expect that the Divine direction of events takes place secretly, in the inmost heart of things, producing results which are as obviously natural as the falling of a leaf or the flowing of a river. The difference between the two is to be found rather in the purpose which guides the operations of Divine Providence than in the nature of the method by which the results are effected. Miracles are therefore exceptional. They 'do not happen,' to quote a famous phrase, in our ordinary experience. Answers to prayer occur every day.

7. Summary.—The result of our whole investigation is this: to a believer in a living God the efficacy of prayer is capable of ample justification. None of the objections which have been made against it on scientific or philosophical grounds can be sustained.

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PRAYER (Christian, Liturgical).—If prayer is the natural and necessary outcome of belief in God, it is most natural and most necessary to the Christian believer. Before the Christian dispensation God was far off from man, unapproachable, unknowable, far above man and the needs of man. The incarnation of the Son of God brought man as it were into touch with God. God revealed Himself to man in the Incarnate Christ, and the Son of God, by taking our nature upon Him, lifts humanity into close communion with God. God was no longer far away, beyond the ken of mankind, no longer so far beyond man as to seem unable to condescend to the needs, the longings, and the understanding of His creature. The Son of God reigning in highest heaven is also Son of Man, understanding and knowing by virtue of His incarnation man's needs and man's weaknesses, loving man not only with a love divine, but with a perfect sympathy inasmuch as in virtue of His manhood He is of the same substance as man. Prayer then, since the Incarnation, became something infinitely more real than ever it could be before—a real and intimate connexion between heaven and earth, between God and man. Our spiritual aspirations and worldly needs can be brought before the Eternal Father by the mediation of Him who lived and prayed and died among us, and ascended to the right hand of the Father to be our Mediator and Saviour.

Our Lord bade us pray, and Himself in this as in all things sets us an example. First there is individual prayer, which concerns the needs of the individual, whether spiritual or temporal. But there is another aspect of prayer. Our Lord teaches us above all things the brotherhood of man, that the whole race of humanity is one great family with a common Father. So prayer must also be collective, consisting of worship which is due from the whole family alike to God their Father, and supplication for those many necessities both of body and of soul which are common to all men. Our Lord has therefore taught us to pray in common, and indeed His own model prayer, 'Our Father,' is a common prayer.

Individual prayer is essentially private, bearing on personal and private needs. Such a prayer as 'O God of the crosses that are laid upon us, help thy servant Apphouas,' which has survived in a 4th cent. fragment (*Ox. Pap.* vii. [1910] no. 1058), may be taken as an example of prayer to God in time of intense personal need—such a prayer as has been prayed millions of times.

Collective prayer is public, the common prayers used when the family of God gather together to give Him the worship due from all. The history of common prayer is to be found in the liturgical service of the Church. Christ came to fulfil the law, not to destroy it. The Christian Church regarded itself as the fulfilment and the perfection of the Jewish Church. Christ Himself taught in the synagogues and took part in the synagogue worship. He went up to Jerusalem and took part in the Temple worship at the great feasts. The Eucharist was instituted by Him at the Passover Supper, and is the Christian Passover, the memorial of our redemption. So we find the Apostles in Jerusalem after the Ascension still frequenting the Temple and taking part in its worship. The Eucharist only seems to have been their own distinctive act of worship. St. James the Lord's brother frequented the Temple till the day of his death. Even St. Paul used the synagogue worship as long as he could, and it was not the Church that cut the connexion with Judaism, but Judaism that cast off the Church.

Thus, when we come to consider Christian prayer in its public forms, we should naturally expect to find that it is a Christian development of Jewish forms of worship. Unfortunately there exists very little Jewish liturgical material of the time of Christ, but none the less it seems, from that which is extant and from what we know from other sources, that Christian worship is based upon the worship so familiar to the majority of the first generation of Christians before they came to the faith of Christ.

Jewish public worship consisted of the synagogue worship and the Temple worship. The synagogue services were held every Sabbath day, and there were also services on the third and fifth days of the week, Tuesday and Thursday. The synagogue service was definite and fixed, and we know from the Mishnāh of what it consisted. It began with the Shema ('Hear, O Israel'); then came a lection

from the Law and a lection from the Prophets; then came the blessing, followed by the Targum, an explanation in the vernacular of the Hebrew lections, and a discourse or sermon on what had been read. Such a service our Lord, as we know from the Gospels, was not only present at on Sabbath days, but frequently took part in as reader and preacher.

The Temple service existed of course only in Jerusalem. Here day by day there was the morning and the evening sacrifice. In connexion with these was the singing of psalms, and the eighteen benedictions or ascriptions of praise to God were made daily. Then there were the great annual festivals, at the chief of which, the Passover, many thousands of Jews gathered together from all parts of the world. The ritual of the Passover Supper we know partly at least from the Mishnāh, which probably represents the use of our Lord's time. The liturgy of the Paschal Supper begins with ritual question and answer, and then the celebrant recites the Haggādāh, the story of God's mercies to Israel, speaking of the bitter treatment of the people in Egypt, and of their wonderful redemption from slavery, and closing with a burst of worship and praise.

1. **The Eucharist.**—It is almost a certainty that the Eucharist was instituted by our Lord at this Passover Supper. The Haggādāh is doubtless represented by the expression, 'when he had given thanks'; then followed the giving of the Bread and the Cup to the disciples, with the charge that they should always do this in remembrance of Him. Thus we see how closely Christian worship is bound up with the older worship, how true was the feeling that there was an unbroken continuity between the old and the new dispensations, and how the new dispensation of Christ was but the fulfilment and perfecting of the old. For the Eucharist was the central act of Christian worship from the very first.

Of the early ritual of the Eucharist we know very little. In the Acts the Sunday reunions of Christians for 'the breaking of bread' doubtless imply the Eucharist, whether in connexion with the Agape or not. Elsewhere of course the expression 'breaking of bread,' as, *e.g.*, at Emmaus, simply implies an ordinary meal. In St. Paul's references to the Eucharist in connexion with the abuses at Corinth (1 Co 11) we are told nothing definite; but the words that he uses—'For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you' (v.[23])—seem to imply some recognized outline, at least, in the form of thanksgiving used, which would apparently include some reference to, or perhaps recitation of, the account of the institution. The *Didache* gives forms which are most certainly Eucharistic prayers, but the date of the *Didache* is so uncertain, and the authority of the work so doubtful, that it is not safe to build too much on these forms. They seem to be a form of the grace before and after meals specially adapted to the Eucharist. These forms of grace are found again in the tract of St. Athanasius *On Virginity*, but simply as graces.

The first actual description of the Eucharist is found in St. Justin Martyr (*c.* A.D. 150) in his *First Apology* (65), and there are several references to it in his *Dialogue*. According to the description in his *Apology*, the Eucharist begins with the kiss of peace, then the offering of bread and the mixed cup is made, and the celebrant proceeds to offer praise and worship and thanksgiving, to which the people answer, 'Amen,' and then follows the communion. Elsewhere he speaks of the εὐχαριστία, or thanksgiving prayer, as including thanksgiving for the creation of the world and all that is in it, for our redemption, and for the breaking of the power of evil (*Dial.* 41). His reference to the words of institution perhaps imply that they were included in the thanksgiving. But there were as yet no forms fixed except in outline. Justin's description implies that everywhere the Eucharist would be celebrated in the same way, but, on the other hand, he states definitely that the actual wording of the prayers was left to the celebrant.

But, according to Justin, the Eucharist proper was preceded by another service in close connexion with it (*Apol.* i. 67). This consisted in lections from the Gospels or Prophets or both, then a sermon by the bishop or celebrant, and this was followed by prayers. Closely on this followed the Eucharist. One is struck at once by the similarity between this service, which is the later Præanaphora of the liturgy, and the synagogue Sunday service, and we are drawn to the conclusion that this first part of the Eucharistic liturgy is based upon the synagogue worship just as the anaphora, or Eucharist proper, is based upon the ritual of the Passover Supper.

St. Clement of Rome, St. Irenæus, Tertullian, and St. Cyprian also refer occasionally to the Eucharist. In Cyprian the beginning of the Eucharistic prayer already has a technical name, the 'Preface' (*præfatio*). Also in certain non-orthodox works of the end of the 2nd cent. or the beginning of the 3rd, the *Acts of John* and the *Acts of Thomas*, we are given partial descriptions of the celebration of the Eucharist.

It is when we reach the era of the Church Orders, however, that we first come to definite accounts of the actual Eucharistic ritual. The Church Orders seem to have been almost authoritative, or certainly of very wide vogue, and are certainly based on the writings of Hippolytus. There seem to be two recensions of the Church Order, the first about A.D. 250, existing now in various versions, Latin, Coptic, Ethiopic, Arabic (including the so-called *Canons of Hippolytus*), and Syriac (embedded in a work called *The Testament of our Lord*, and in its present form of about A.D. 350). The second recension seems to have been made in the 4th cent., and in this the original Greek survives, with versions in Coptic and Ethiopic.

In addition to these there is what is known as the *Didascalia*, a work which forms the basis of the first six books of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, the 8th book of which is the latest recension of the Church Orders. The 7th book of the *Apostolic Constitutions* is based on the *Didache*, the whole work belonging to the second half of the 4th century. In this extremely valuable collection of documents we have a detailed description of the Eucharistic liturgy of the 3rd and 4th centuries.

The two divisions of the Eucharistic liturgy are still clearly marked. First comes the Præanaphora, consisting of a series of lections from Law, Prophets, Gospels, Acts, and Epistles, apparently unfixed in number, interspersed with psalms which survive in the introit, gradual offertory, and communion of the Latin Church. These are followed by the sermon, and then, as in Justin, comes the prayer for all estates, after which catechumens and those under penitence depart. Then follows the anaphora introduced with the kiss of peace. The anaphora begins with the 'Sursum corda' and Preface. The Preface, or thanksgiving, contains thanksgiving for all God's mercies to mankind, leading up to the Passion and an account of the institution, and ending with the anamnesis, or formal act of remembrance, and the invocation of the Holy Spirit, the whole concluding with the Lord's Prayer. After the communion come the act of thanksgiving and the dismissal.

This construction of the liturgy appears in all these documents, the later recensions already show-

ing developments. Thus in the earlier Church Order it is still definitely left to the celebrant to use his own words, the forms provided being apparently a model, or for the use of those who had not a ready flow of words. It is in the invocation of the Holy Spirit that the most interesting development took place. The invocation was originally an invocation of the Holy Spirit on the act of communion, a prayer that those receiving might receive the full virtue of the sacrament. This idea extended gradually to the idea of the invocation of the Holy Spirit on the elements that He might make them the Body and Blood of the Lord. The invocation of the *Apostolic Constitutions* is half-way between the two; that of St. Cyril is definitely on the elements, as is the invocation in all later Eastern liturgies, which, however, retain some signs of the earlier idea. In the liturgy of Sarapion, bishop of Thmuis in Egypt (*c.* A.D. 360), we have perhaps the first example of a liturgy used as it was written. This liturgy consists of the anaphora only, and is interesting, moreover, in the fact that the invocation is of the Word and not of the Holy Spirit. The liturgy generally tended to become definitely a fixed and written service about the end of the 4th century.

In the East the extant liturgies are all of the same structure as that of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, and have developed only in length.

In the West the history of the liturgy is not so clear. In the work once attributed to St. Ambrose, the *de Sacramentis* of *c.* A.D. 400, there is an account given of the liturgy. This liturgy is apparently that underlying the later Roman Mass, and already contains the chief prayers of the latter. The later history in the West is obscure. In Charlemagne's time there were two types of liturgy extant in the West, the Roman and that called the Gallican. The latter type, less formal and much more verbose than the Roman, was displaced by it, and survives only in the Mozarabic rite and in the Ambrosian Liturgy of Milan, though the latter has been very much Romanized.

It is from the Roman that all other Western liturgies are derived. Thus the uses of England—the Sarum, York, Hereford, and Bangor—are all Roman, with the exception of certain prayers peculiar to the use added. And this is true of very many Continental uses, all of which had their own peculiarities, and of which those of France survived till the middle of the 19th cent., when they were displaced by the Roman rite. All alike are fundamentally Roman. The English Prayer Book is based on the older pre-Reformation uses, and is thus Roman in type. See also art. LITANY.

2. The daily offices.—The Eucharist was from the first the central act of Christian worship, but alongside of this other forms of additional worship very soon sprang into being. We have seen, *e.g.*, that the liturgy is formed of two parts, the Præanaphora and the Anaphora, and that the union of these two was at first very loose. In fact, it seems that the former could be and was used separately with a sermon. So it was used, in certain places —*e.g.*, Alexandria—on the station days, Wednesday and Friday. But the growth of other services was very early, and this too seems to have been a Christian development of Jewish devotion. In the book of Daniel there is a reference to three set hours of prayer, and perhaps the same is implied in Ps 55[17]: 'Evening, and morning, and at noonday, will I pray.' Again in the Acts we find the three hours—the third, sixth, and ninth—observed as times of prayer. In the *Didache* the Lord's Prayer is ordered to be said three times a day. Tertullian and the Church Orders refer to prayer at the third, sixth, and ninth hours, but these were private devotions only and said at home. There were, however, apparently, when it was possible, morning and evening prayers said publicly, and forms of these prayers are given in the *Testament of our Lord* and the *Apostolic Constitutions*, consisting of psalms and prayers. Gradually the three hours began to become times of public service, and this was perhaps largely due to the rise of monasticism, by which these hours tended to become common services in the case of men and women living in communities. In addition to these there was the night office, which originated apparently from the vigil of Easter, which in early days was strictly kept, and was extended to the eves of local saints and thence became a definite night service. The night service seems to have originated as a regular observance in Syria, and it was introduced into the West by Cassian—the mattins of the Breviary. In the *Peregrinatio of Etheria* (*Silvia*) we are told that the hours observed at Jerusalem were mattins, the sixth hour, the ninth, and vespers, and to these in Lent was added the observance of the third hour. Eventually the offices in the Breviary amounted to eight—mattins, lauds, prime, terce, sext, none, vespers, and compline. Originally monastic, they were enjoined on all clergy, and the laity were expected to (and did) attend at least some of them.

3. Popular devotions.—But the hours tended to become more and more a clerical office, and the devotional book of the laity from the 10th or 11th cent. is the *Little Hours* or the *Primer*. The 'little hours' were originally additional devotions in honour of the Blessed Virgin, and were generally called 'the Hours of the Virgin.' But they speedily became the popular devotion of the laity, and as such tended to develop so as to meet the needs of lay folk. Thus the 'little hours' contained a series of hours of prayer, sometimes several such series—*e.g.*, 'the Hours of the Virgin,' 'the Hours of the Cross,' 'the Hours of the Holy Ghost.' To these were appended the gradual psalms, the penitential psalms, sometimes the whole Psalter; also the offices of the dead, the commendation, generally a litany, and various prayers for various purposes. These *Horæ* were very popular and very common, both in Latin and in the vernacular. They are frequently mentioned in wills, and a considerable number of them survive to the present day. Other popular works there were, such, *e.g.*, as the *Layfolks' Mass Book*, instructing folk how to occupy their time devoutly at the Mass. But the *Primer* remained the book of the laity.

The Reformation of course made a great difference. The fact of the Reformed service-books being in English tended rather to obviate the need of such books as the *Primer*. But for some time after the Reformation editions of the *Primer* continued to be issued. Three primers were issued in several editions in the reign of Henry VIII. Of these the first, Marshall's *Primer*, contained a good deal of novelty. It contains the hours of prayer, dirge, and the commendations, but with an admonition against praying for the dead. It also contains a good deal of instruction and exposition of a reforming type. This book appeared in 1534, and was denounced in Convocation, but was reissued at least twice. In 1539 the *Primer* of John Hilsey, bishop of Rochester, appeared. This contains the hours and dirge, but many of the lessons are changed to new ones, the litany with many of the saints omitted, and an instruction on hearing Mass, and other matter of a devotional and instructive kind. Both these primers were superseded by *The King's Primer* in 1545 and its Latin form, the *Orarium* (1546). These were much less pronounced than the former books, and contained the hours, penitential psalms, litany, dirge, and commendations, the psalms and devotions of the

Passion, and a few private prayers. *The King's Primer* was reprinted in the reign of Edward VI., and again in 1551 with some omissions—*e.g.*, the 'Hail, Mary,' and the names of the saints in the litany—and again in Mary's reign. In 1553 appeared the *Primer* of Thomas Cottesford. It is of an entirely different character from the preceding books, and is simply a book of private prayer for each day of the week, followed by the collects and 'sundry godly prayers,' omitting entirely the hours, etc.

In Elizabeth's reign the *Primer* of 1551 was reprinted in 1559 and a very similar edition in 1566. The *Primer* of 1553 was reprinted in 1560 and 1568. Also in 1560 she published a Latin form of her primer, the *Orarium*, differing, however, in some respects from the English book. In 1564 appeared her *Preces Privatæ*, containing a Latin order for mattins and evensong similar to but not the same as that of the Prayer Book, with hymns, and a large collection of various forms of devotion. This was republished with some additions in 1573. *A Book of Christian Prayers* appeared in 1569, and was several times republished (with some alterations from the original edition) in Elizabeth's reign and in the reign of James I. This consists of many devotions for various occasions, and has the litany as an appendix.

By this time the English *Book of Common Prayer* seems to have become to lay people what the *Primer* was to them in the days of the old Latin services. Devotional books henceforth were put forth only by private enterprise, and were simply intended to be used with the Prayer Book. One exception perhaps may be instanced, and that is Cosin's *Collection of Private Devotions*, which he published in 1627, and which is based on the *Primer* of Elizabeth of 1560 and follows the old arrangement of hours. Later devotional books which had a great vogue may be instanced, such as Bishop Andrewes' *Preces Privatæ* (Oxford, 1675), Jeremy Taylor's *Holy Living and Holy Dying* (London, 1686), Bishop Wilson's *Sacra Privata* (London, 1900), and through the 18th cent. the Prayer Book was commonly bound up with a *Companion to the Altar*, containing devotions for preparation for communion and for communion, and forms of thanksgiving. In the 19th cent. an immense number of devotional books has been issued—too many to deal with here.

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R. M. WOOLLEY.

PRAYER (Egyptian).—Of forms of prayer in Egyptian ritual little is known. Among the magical formulæ, addresses, statements, and adorations in the daily ritual of the temples there are few, if any, words of request; in one passage, when the officiant in the temple of Amen-re exclaims, 'Come unto me, Amen-re, open for me the gates of heaven, throw open for me the gates of earth,' etc., the demand seems directed to carrying out the immediate objects of the ritual on behalf of the deity rather than the direct benefit of any one (cf. A. Moret, *Le Rituel du culte divin journalier en Egypte*, Paris, 1902, p. 81 [several prayers in this tr. would be better interpreted as direct statements]). The funerary ritual is similar, but late copies contain a short prayer to all the gods for the welfare of the dead (E. Schiaparelli, *Il Libro dei Funerali*, Rome, 1882–90, ii. 108).

While attitudes of adoration, submission, etc., are represented frequently on the monuments, there seems to be none which is distinctive of prayer. Of times and places for prayer also little can be said; sunrise and sunset appear to have been the special hours for adoration of the forms of Re, the sun-god; the graffiti on temples and sacred places belonging chiefly to the late ages of paganism show that prayers were offered in and about them.

From the Old Kingdom very little is preserved in the nature of prayers beyond the funerary formula (see below); this applies even to the enormous body of the Pyramid Texts in which ritual charms and hymns are brought together for the welfare of the dead king. The texts of the Middle Kingdom are more productive in this respect. In the New Kingdom, especially after the days of Akhenaton (the enthusiastic monotheist and heretic at the end of the XVIIIth dynasty), an age of personal piety began in which the worshipper turned naturally to his god for protection, help, and comfort. This spirit, finding utterance in combined hymns and prayers, was never lost, though formalism and magic reasserted their sway with greater strength than ever in the lives and writings of the ultra-religious Egyptians.

The funerary formula.—A form of prayer for the comfort of the dead, beginning with an obscure phrase, 'Grace that the king grants, grace that Anubis (or other gods) grants,' is seen everywhere from the Old Kingdom onwards, and continues almost to the end of paganism. In the Old Kingdom the prayer, as prescribed on the great tombs, usually for a good burial after a good old age, for food, etc., daily and on the feast days, and 'to travel on the roads on which worthy veterans travel,' etc., is addressed to the funerary gods; later it was addressed also to local and other deities and often greatly developed according to individual taste. Tombstones request the passer-by to repeat it, adjuring him by his love of life, hatred of death, and devotion to his local god, and by his desire to bequeath his office to his children, and remind him that it will cost him no more than a little breath.

Salutations.—In speech and in writing these were prayers. After the name of royalty or a superior it was proper to add, '(May he continue) living prosperous and in health.' Letters of the Middle Kingdom end, 'May your hearing (of this) be fortunate.' In the New Kingdom a letter addressed to a king begins with prayers for his prosperity and long life (Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri from Kahûn and Gurob*, London, 1898, pp. 67 ff. and 91). In later times a petition or letter to a great man commences, 'May Ammon cause his life to be long.'

In early times to 'lift up the voice' (probably wanton shouting) in the tomb chapel was considered a gross offence, and doubtless both tomb and temple were places of solemn silence during the greater part of the day; hence religion tended to be associated with silence. On the vivid realization in the New Kingdom of personal relationship between the individual worshipper, however humble, and his protecting deity, we find insistence laid upon the value of secret prayer and contemplation.

'Thoth is as a sweet well to him who thirsts in the desert, closed to him who finds utterance, open to him who is silent' (*Papyrus Sallier*, i. 8, 5-7); 'Be not of many words, for in silence thou shalt gain good. . . . As for the precinct of God, his abomination is crying out; pray thou with a desiring heart whose every word is hidden, and he will supply thy need and

hear thy speech and receive thy offering' (*Maximes d'Ani*, 3, 1–4; see J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York, 1912, p. 355).

At the same period models of human ears and stelæ sculptured with ears were dedicated in the temples to the succouring god or goddess, 'who heard the prayer of the traveller afar off'; and in a group of little shrines in the necropolis of Thebes votive stelæ were set up in honour of various deities, recording the plagues inflicted on the sinner and their goodness to the repentant who sought their aid.

The goddess 'is a lion; she smiteth as a fierce lion smiteth and pursueth him that trespasseth against her. I cried to my mistress and found that she came to me with sweet breath. She was gracious to me after she had caused me to see her hand. She turned again to me in favour, she let me forget the sickness that was on me,' etc. (Erman, 'Denksteine aus der thebanischen Gräberstadt,' in *SBAW*, 1911, p. 1086).

LITERATURE.—An elaborate examination of the funerary formula by Gardiner, who explains it as a statement rather than a prayer, is printed in N. de G. Davies and A. H. Gardiner, *The Tomb of Amenemhēt*, London, 1915, p. 79 ff. Hymns and prayers prefixed to the *Book of the Dead* are tr. by E. A. Wallis Budge in various edd. of that text.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

PRAYER (Finns and Lapps).—1. Ancient Finns and Lapps.—The ancient Finns and Lapps attributed to every natural object a living spirit. The Lapps sometimes called these spirits 'men'; water-spirits, *e.g.*, were known as *cacce-olmak*, 'water-men.' Indeed the relations between men and spirits were at first, as Castrén has pointed out,[1] like those between men and men. As a man would naturally call a neighbour to his assistance rather than a stranger, so the ancient Finns and Lapps would pray to familiar spirits, like those of well-known trees and streams, rather than to remote beings, like sky-spirits, whom they did not know and could not expect to control. But spirits came to be thought of as free, personal beings, able to move about and occasionally visible, whose existence was not entirely dependent upon the objects of which they were the spirits and guardians, so that the spirit of one object might guard also other objects. In the course of time (before A.D. 600) they were named *haltiat* (Finnish) or *haldek* (Lappish), a Scandinavian word meaning 'rulers' or 'guardians.' The most important spirits were undoubtedly those of the dead. So awe-inspiring were the spirits of dead men buried in the forest or by the side of lakes and rivers, and so much more full of power than any other spirits of land or water, that they were credited with the guardianship of animals and fish, which could not be taken without their permission. Thus, when the Lapps prayed for help in hunting, as we are told they did every morning and evening,[2] to Leib-olmai, 'alder-tree-man,' the spirit to which they prayed was a forest-god, who was probably, like Tapio and Hiisi, the forest-gods of the Finns, connected with the cult of the dead, and who was the tutelary spirit of the bear, the most powerful animal that they knew. Again, when they prayed, as they did constantly,[3] to 'water-men' to aid their fishing, they were addressing themselves to local spirits of the dead who guarded different fishing-places. Moreover, the spirits of the dead were thought to be still in very close relationship with the living, whom they could either help or injure, so that their favour was in every respect of the utmost importance. There were several methods by which they might be approached, viz. through (1) idolatry, (2) reincarnation, (3) shamanism, and (4) the use of special means and instruments.

(1) Among the ancient Finns spirits were located in pillars of stone or wood, in rocks or trees of peculiar appearance, and in pebbles, twigs, or rude images.[1] All the Finnish tribes seem to have possessed as household gods loose stones or faggots, images, or dolls, which almost certainly embodied the spirits of dead ancestors.[2] The Lapps too worshipped idols of stone or wood called sometimes by the Scandinavian name *storjunkare*, 'great governors,' sometimes *seitas*, sometimes *passegedge*, 'holy stones.'[3] Every Lapp family and clan had their *storjunkare* standing near their settlement, and private persons sometimes had one or more of their own. Prayers were offered to these idols with both communal and private oblations.[4]

The Lapp Fjellner described to von Düben a communal sacrifice of which he had been an eye-witness, where the worshippers knelt down and prayed after a sacrificial meal.[5] A man, before going to hunt or fish, kissed his *seita* three times, and promised it some of his prey.[6] A Lapp told Fellman that his *seita* helped him as long as he kept it in a good humour[7] If *seitas* did not help, they were often whipped or abandoned.[8]

(2) Spirits of the dead might also be embodied in the person of a living man. They then became his guardians, and he could make a bargain with them that they should help him whenever he called upon them. According to the Lappish *saivo*-doctrine, ancestors came to life again in persons named after them; by obtaining the names of several ancestors a Lapp could obtain several guardian-spirits.

(3) Both Finns and Lapps at one time made use of intermediaries between themselves and spirits. These were the shamans (Finnish *noitas*, Lappish *noaides*), men who, owing to their exceptional nature and training, could communicate with the spirits of the dead, and through them learn the wishes of remote gods. The Samoyed shamans sent their spirits up to the sky-god Num to ask his will.[9] Various Finnish tribes practised divination for a like purpose, and Esthonian and Karelian shamans are sometimes described as 'diviners.' The Lapps divined through their magic drums, but they retained the primitive mysteries of shamanism; for, when their divination failed, as often happened, it was still necessary for the *noaide* to make a journey to the world of the dead, to appease the spirits or to obtain their help.

(4) Distant spirits, like those of the dead, could not hear men's feeble voices. But, if ordinary words and tones could not reach them, they might perhaps hear strange shouts, mysterious whispers, or the noise of a drum. Two special means were used by the Lapps to attract the spirits' attention: (*a*) *juoigen*, incantation, and (*b*) *myran*, magic action, especially magic drumming.

(*a*) *Juoigen*.—This was a sacred chant, 'the tenor of which no Lapp has ever been willing to confess.'[10] It was taught to every Lapp boy, 'so that the boy, before he could speak distinctly, had mastered the elements of this rude melody, or rather, if it pleases better, this howling.'[11] Acerbi described it as the most

[1] M. Alexander Castrén, *Vorlesungen über die finnische Mythologie*, ed. A. Schiefner, Petrograd, 1853, p. 195.
[2] K. Leem, *De Lapponibus Finmarchiæ eorumque lingua, vita et religione*, Copenhagen, 1767, pp. 412 f., 417, Eng. tr. in J. Pinkerton's *Voyages and Travels*, London, 1808, i. 458 f.
[3] *Ib.*

[1] C. E. Lencqvist, *De superstitione veterum Fennorum*, Abo, 1782, p. 16.
[2] J. Abercromby, *The Pre- and Proto-historic Finns*, London, 1898, i. 167, 179.
[3] P. Hogström, *Beskrifning öfver de til Sveriges krona lydande Lappmarker*, Stockholm, n.d. [1746–47], p. 181; G. von Düben, *Om Lappland och Lapparne*, Stockholm, 1873, p. 236; Leem, p. 457. Hogström (p. 193) calls these idols *saivos*. Their connexion with the *saivo*-cult, or worship of the dead, was first established by Castrén, p. 207 ff.
[4] It should be stated that women were rigidly excluded from this worship. They paid their devotions apart to certain birth-goddesses.
[5] Von Düben, p. 258.
[6] J. Qvigstad and G. Sandberg, *Lappiske eventyr og folkesagn*, Christiania, 1887, p. 112.
[7] Von Düben, p. 237.
[8] O. Donner, *Lieder der Lappen*, Helsingfors, 1876, p. 26.
[9] Castrén, *Nordiska Resor och forskingar*, Helsingfors, 1852, i. 207.
[10] Trondhjem MS, *ap.* J. A. Friis, *Lappisk Mythologi eventyr og folkesagn*, Christiania, 1871, p. 24.
[11] Leem, p. 484.

hideous kind of yelling.[1] In E. Lindahl and J. Ohrling's *Lexicon Lapponicum* (Stockholm, 1780, p. 96) *juoiket* is defined as 'Lapponum more canere, tremulo cantu canere.' The words of such incantations are not known.[2] Fjellner said that some prayers were presented in a whisper with words not used in ordinary speech.[3] The omission of one word would render the chant ineffective, and might cause a shaman's death.[4]

(*b*) *Myran.*—When the help of spirits was sought on important occasions, several *noaides* went into a hut set apart for the purpose, and there shamanized 'per rò juoigen et myran,' *i.e.* by incantations mixed with magic action and especially drumming.[5] Although the magic drum was adapted by the Lapps and others to divination, its original object was to attract the attention of the spirits of the dead who lived underground out of ordinary ear-shot, and who were thereby summoned to place themselves inside the drum and help the shaman.

The *kamlanie* of the Lapp *noaides* resembles that of Siberian and other shamans, and the best accessible account is that translated from Mikhailovskii in *JAI* xxiv. 145 f.[6] The *juoigen* which accompanied it was of great importance, and, if the onlookers ceased singing during the *noaide's* trance, he could never come to life again.[7] Nevertheless, the main feature of the performance was coercive action. Prayer was in a very rudimentary stage.

2. Finns of Finland.—It seems certain that the Finns of Finland, like other members of the Finno-Ugrian family, anciently used shamanistic methods of coercing spirits similar to those of the Lapps. But they soon left the Lapps far behind, partly because they came under Christian influences some centuries earlier, but chiefly because their higher intelligence led them even before that time to assimilate the culture of more advanced neighbours. The Finns must have reformed their old religion long before the 12th cent., when Christianity was introduced to them. There is evidence of this in their traditional poetry, known chiefly through Lönnrot's compilation, the *Kalevala*[6] (*q.v.*), which, though very largely mediæval, is not entirely so, and reflects much of the old life of the Finnish people, but has little or nothing to say of primitive shamanism.[9] The heroes of Finnish poetry are magicians, but they do not perform any shamanistic actions.[10] Their magic is carried out by the utterance of word-charms. For instance, the rivalry between Finnish and Lapp wizards which is expressed in the strife of Väinämöinen and Joukahainen in *Kalevala*, vi., is a contest not in *kamlanie* but in the singing of spells. Divination is practised by rhabdomancy[11] or by the sieve.[12] The magic drum has been forgotten and is never mentioned.[13] The rude incantations which accompanied the shaman's performances have given place to those magic songs which are so prominent in Finnish poetry. Of the large number of such songs published by Lönnrot in 1880 under the title *Loitsurunoja*[14] most seem to be later than the 12th cent., and few can have come from professional magicians. They are certainly popular products, and presuppose a revolt against the official shamanism which prevailed generally among Finno-Ugrian peoples.[1] As a result of this reformation laymen must have taken to themselves the power of approaching spirits which had been restricted to an initiated class. Personal supplications, and word-charms which were always benevolent and which were gathered mainly from the common stock of European magic, entirely superseded the crude mimetic actions and unintelligible incantations by which the official wizard tried to enforce his will on spiritual powers. Thus the prayers and spells of the Finlanders were not, like the Accadian formulæ to which Lenormant compared them,[2] priestly incantations in a secret tongue, nor, like the Lapp *juoigen* and *myran*, mere mechanical acts of sorcery, but they were aids to popular religion belonging generally to mediæval and comparatively modern times, when a man had learnt to approach the spirit world on his own account either with spells or with genuine prayers.

Lönnrot's collection comprises, besides general formulæ of magic, a large number of exorcisms, which are borrowed mainly from Scandinavia, and include some well-known and wide-spread charms, such as the Merseburger Gebet.[3] It also contains 'origins,' or 'births' (*synty*),[4] songs which describe fantastically, and often in a derisive manner, the genesis of animals, diseases, and other things, the aim of the singer being, apparently, to demonstrate the feebleness of the object and induce it to act as he wishes. The remaining 73 songs are called 'prayers,' most of them having several variants, some as many as 30. They are addressed indifferently to old Finnish gods and spirits, such as Ukko, Hiisi, Tapio, Ahti, etc., and to various objects of Christian worship, the most popular of whom is the Virgin Mary. She is addressed sometimes by her own name, but often by beautiful Finnish epithets such as Suvetar, 'daughter of summer,' Etelätär, 'daughter of the south wind,' Luonnotar, 'daughter of creation,' Kivutar, 'daughter of pain.' A large proportion are hunters' and fishers' prayers. Most of these seem comparatively modern, and so do the agricultural prayers, excepting perhaps those relating to a vegetation-spirit known as Sämpsä Pellervoinen, which were sung at the spring sowing festivals of 'Ukko's Cup' and 'Ukko's Chests,' vestiges of which have been noted in recent years. These sowing charms may be read, woven together by Lönnrot, in *Kalevala*, ii.[6]

The 'prayers' generally bear out Lencqvist's remark that the Finns pray only for material benefits.[6] Nevertheless, they reveal the kind and simple heart of the Finn, his warm love of nature, and his peculiar but genuine gift of poetic imagination. We may quote a short sailor's prayer:[7]

Ilo-tintu ilmahinen.

'O bird of joy, bird of the air,
Fly whither I command,
Fly to the infinite East,
Fly to the chambers of the morning Sun!
Puff out your cheeks,
And blow a favouring gale;
That I may have a fair wind,
And may freely pass
Over the wide waters,
Across the far-spread sea.

LITERATURE.—Most of this is indicated in the notes; other critical literature is published in Finnish.

CHARLES J. BILLSON.

PRAYER (Greek).—1. Expressions used to denote prayer.—The normal expression in Greek for 'prayer' is εὐχή, for 'to pray,' εὐχεσθαι, with

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[1] J. Acerbi, *Travels through Sweden, Finland, Lapland to N. Cape*, London, 1802, ii. 311.

[2] Donner, p. 28: Acerbi (ii. 311) quotes a fragment of a wolf-charm.

[3] Von Duben, p. 260.

[4] *JAI* xxiv. (1894) 146; cf. *Kalevala*, xvi. and xvii., where Vainamoinen goes first to Tuonela and then to Vipunen to recover three magic words which he has forgotten.

[5] E. J. Jessen, *De Finnorum Lapponumque Norwegicorum religione pagana*, Copenhagen, 1767, p. 60.

[6] See also Leem, pp. 477–479.

[7] J. Scheffer, *Lapponia*, Frankfort, 1673, p. 139 f. In the *Journal de la Société Finno-Ougrienne*, viii. [Helsingfors, 1890] 121–125, E. N. Setälä gives the text of the MS on which Scheffer's account is based.

[8] 1st ed. (32 cantos), Helsingfors, 1835, 2nd ed. (50 cantos), do. 1849, Eng. tr. by W. F. Kirby, in 'Everyman's Library,' 2 vols., London, n.d.

[9] See D. Comparetti, *The Traditional Poetry of the Finns*, Eng. tr., [illegible], 1898, p. 263 f. (the progress of Finnish research has invalidated some of Comparetti's work).

[10] Their occasional changes of shape are not necessarily reminiscences of shamanism.

[11] *Kalevala*, xxix. 7–110; *Kanteletar*[3], Helsingfors, 1887, ii. 128, 143; *Suomen Kansan Muinaisia Loitsurunoja*, do. 1880, p. 111 f.

[12] Lencqvist, p. 51; *Loitsurunoja*, p. vii f.

[13] The only allusion to it known to the present writer is in *Loitsurunoja*, p. 22, where *kankanmus*, 'hand-drum,' is used as a synonym of the kantele. Erne's view (pp. 147, 199) that *sampo* was a magic drum is quite untenable.

[14] A good deal of this material had been used in the *Kalevala*, and some had been published by earlier collectors; *e.g.*, see H. G. Porthan, *De Poesi Fennica*, Abo, 1766–78; Lencqvist, *op. cit.*; C. Ganander, *Mythologia Fennica*, Abo, 1789; and esp. D. H. R. von Schröter, *Finnische Runen*, Upsala, 1819.

[1] See Abercromby, ii. 45.

[2] F. Lenormant, *Chaldean Magic*, Eng. tr., London, 1877, ch. xvi. f.

[3] *Loitsurunoja*, p. 75 f.

[4] There are 83 'origins' (including variants), over 50 of which may be read in the *Kalevala*; see *FL* vi. [1895] 545.

[5] Of the 'Planting of the Barley' (*Loitsurunoja*, p. 296) L. L. le Duc wrote: 'Les vieux Finnois prononcent encore aujourd'hui cette invocation en ensemençant leurs champs' (*Le Kalevala traduit*, Paris, 1879, p. 17, note). Comparetti (p. 188) identified Sämpsä with the Biblical Samson, but his name has since been explained as that of a kind of grass which springs up as soon as the snow melts. The songs of Sampsa show influence of the Scandinavian cult of Frey.

[6] Lencqvist, p. 54.

[7] *Loitsurunoja*, p. 267.

compounds προσεύχεσθαι, ἐπεύχεσθαι. Another word, used chiefly by the poets, is λιτή, or rather λιταί, with its corresponding verb λίσσεσθαι.

In Homer the regular verb of prayer addressed by men to the gods is εὔχομαι. Only in one passage (*Il.* ix. 501) does he use λίσσομαι in this way. On the other hand, Homer has εὐχή (in plur.) only in *Od.* x. 526; λιτή (in plur.) in *Od.* xi. 34, *Il.* ix. 502.

Although, naturally enough, these expressions tend to get confused, it seems to the present writer that there is a fundamental distinction between them. Εὔχομαι corresponds very closely to the Latin *voveo* in its double sense of 'vow' and 'wish' and hence is the regular word for a prayer to the gods for future blessing. On the other hand, λιταί are not properly prayers for future blessing, but are in the nature of prayers for forgiveness, prayers of atonement. This is borne out by the use of the corresponding Latin verb *litare*, which is not 'to pray,' but 'to propitiate.'

Thus, to take first *Od.* xi. 34 f. (the passage occurs in the *Nekyia*): Odysseus digs a trench into which he pours offerings to all the dead. He then vows to perform certain sacrifices to them on his return to Ithaca. Then the passage proceeds: τοὺς δ' ἐπεὶ εὐχωλῇσι λιτῇσί τε, ἔθνεα νεκρῶν, ἐλλισάμην, where one may suppose that εὐχωλαί refers to his vows, λιταί to his entreaties or propitiatory prayer.

Turn now to *Il.* ix. 496 ff., which Leaf translates thus: 'Therefore, Achilles, rule thy high spirit; neither beseemeth it thee to have a ruthless heart. Nay, even the very gods can bend (στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί), and theirs withal is loftier majesty and honour and might. Their hearts by incense (θυέεσσι), and reverent vows (εὐχωλῆς ἁγανῇσι) and drink offering (λοιβῇ) and burnt offering (κνίσῃ) men turn with prayer (λισσόμενοι), so oft as any transgresseth and doeth sin. Moreover, Prayers of penitence (Λιταί) are daughters of great Zeus, halting and wrinkled and of eyes askance, that have their task withal to go in the steps of Sin (Ἀτῃ). For Sin is strong and fleet of foot, wherefore she far outrunneth all Prayers, and goeth before them over all the earth making men fall (βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους), and Prayers follow to heal the harm (αἱ δ' ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω). Now whosoever reverenceth Zeus's daughters when they draw near, him they greatly bless and hear his petitions; but when one denieth them and stiffly refuseth, then depart they and make prayer unto Zeus the son of Kronos that Sin may come upon such an one, that he may fall and pay the price. Nay, Achilles, look thou too that there attend upon the daughters of Zeus the reverence that bendeth the heart of all men that be right-minded. For if Atreides brought thee not gifts and foretold thee not more hereafter, but were ever furiously wroth, then I were not he that should bid thee cast aside thine anger . . . but now he both offereth thee forthwith many gifts, and promiseth thee more hereafter, and hath sent heroes to beseech thee . . . dishonour not thou their petition.'

An examination of Greek literature confirms this view of λιταί.

Hesiod has neither λιταί nor λίσσομαι, and only one case of λιτανευω (*Theog.* 469)—of the prayer of Rhea to Earth and starry Heaven, before the birth of Zeus. On the other hand, εὐχαι occurs (*ib.* 419) of prayer to Hecate and (frag. 246) in a proverbial line, ἔργα νέων, βουλαὶ δὲ μέσων, εὐχαὶ δὲ γερόντων. Εὔχομαι occurs in *Theog.* 441, *Works and Days*, 465, 738, and frag. 81; εὐχωλή in *Sc.* 68. Theognis has neither λιταί nor λίσσομαι, but he has εὐχή (341) and εὔχομαι (13, 129, 171, 1141, 1151). In the group of early lyric poets—Archilochus, Simonides, Mimnermus, Solon, Tyrtæus—there is no case of either λιταί or λίσσομαι, while εὔχομαι occurs in Simon. frags. 7, 84, and Solon, frag. 5. In Pindar λίσσομαι has become practically the same thing as εὔχομαι (*Pyth.* i. 71, *Ol.* xii. 1, *Nem.* iii. 1, frag. 90, *Pyth.* iv. 207), and in *Isth.* v. (vi.) 45 is combined with εὐχαὶς ὑπὸ θεσπεσίαις λίσσομαι. But λιταί occurs only twice: *Ol.* ii. 88, where Thetis Ζηνὸς ἦτορ λιταῖς ἔπεισε, and got Achilles conveyed to the Islands of the Blest, and *Ol.* viii. 8. What appears to be an adjectival form occurs twice: *Ol.* vi. 78, λιταὶ θυσίαι (sacrifices of propitiation offered to Hermes, no doubt in his character of ψυχοπομπός—the right use of λιταί) and *Pyth.* iv. 217, λιταὶ ἐπαοιδαί (propitiatory incantations—again the normal use of λιταί). In frag. 21, Λιτὴν Ἠώ, it is, as the scholiast says=εὐκταίαν. In Bacchylides λίσσομαι occurs in v. 100, where it is definitely of prayers to appease the anger of Artemis—a chthonian deity—and in x. 69, where it is used in the Homeric sense of an appeal by mortals to mortals. He has no example of λιταί.

When we turn to the dramatists, we find that Æschylus has λίσσομαι once only (*Suppl.* 748), in an appeal by a mortal to a mortal; λιταί he has in *Prom.* 1009, *Sept.* 143, 173, 214, 320, 626, 620, *Pers.* 499, *Ag.* 228, 396, *Eum.* 362, *Suppl.* 173, 378, 521. An examination of these passages confirms our general view. Εὔχομαι and εὐχαί occur in Æschylus very frequently, and are his normal expressions for 'pray' and 'prayer.' The usage of Sophocles is quite in accordance with our position. He has εὐχαι in *Œd. Tyr.* 239, *El.* 636, εὐχή in *Ph.* 771, and εὔχομαι frequently. Λίσσομαι as a general term for entreaty occurs some seven or eight times; λιταί occurs in *Ph.* 60, 495, *Œd. Col.* 485, 1015, 1311, 1554, *El.* 187, *Ant.* 1006—all normal uses. In Aristophanes εὐχαί occurs three times, εὐχή twice, εὔχομαι twenty times, εὐχωλή once; he has no case of λιταί; λίσσομαι occurs in *Pax*, 382, addressed to Hermes; λίτομαι is coupled with εὐχαί in *Th.* 313; in *Th.* 1040 λίτομαι is definitely 'supplicating.'

Of prose authors Herodotus has εὔχομαι and εὐχωλή, no case apparently of λίσσομαι, but λιταί (i. 105) of propitiatory prayer. Thucydides has no example of λίσσομαι or λιταί, nor do the words occur in any of the orators.

Εὐχαί, then, is the normal Greek word for prayer; λιταί are in the nature of penitential or propitiatory prayer; προσεύχομαι is normally 'thanksgiving' (*e.g.*, Aristoph. *Plut.* 841, 958, *Ran.* 891, *Pax*, 560), though also used (*e.g.*, Plato, *Crit.* 106 A) as practically equivalent to εὔχομαι.

Other expressions for 'prayer' and 'pray' are ἀρή (ἀρά) and ἀράομαι.

There is no clear distinction in Homer between ἀράομαι (occurring some 39 times) and εὔχομαι, with which, indeed, it is frequently expressly equated, as, *e.g.*, *Il.* v. 114, 121, x. 295 f.; and the same is true of ἀρή (occurring six times)—*e.g.*, *Il.* xv. 377, εὐχόμενος followed by ἀράων (378). The fact is that 'prayer' and 'curse' are essentially undifferentiated. Thus it happens that Althæa's prayer (*Il.* ix. 565 ff.) is a prayer for death to her son Meleager, and is therefore a 'curse,' just as it happens that ἀρήσετ' Ἐρινὺς (*Od.* ii. 135) is a summoning of the Erinyes to exact vengeance and so amounts to a curse. The notion that it could mean 'curse the Erinyes' is utterly wrong, being consonant neither with the Homeric use of ἀράομαι nor with Greek syntax. It is noticeable that Homer has ἀρητήρ= 'priest' (*Il.* i. 11, 94, v. 78). In Hesiod ἀράομαι does not occur and ἀραί in the one example of it (*Works and Days*, 726)= 'prayers.' Pindar has ἀραί once only (never ἀράομαι) in *Isth.* v. (vi.) 43, where it='prayers.' But in the dramatists 'curse' is the normal, or even the invariable, sense of ἀρά (ἀραί)—*e.g.*, Æsch. *Sept.* 70, 695, 833, 894, 954, *Eum.* 417, *Ch.* 406, 593; Sophocles, *Œd. Tyr.* 295, 744, 820, *Œd. Col.* 152, 956, 1377, 1386, *Ant.* 423, etc. So ἀράομαι is 'curse' in Æsch. *Prom.* 912, *Sept.* 633 (the only examples); Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 251, 1291, etc. Yet Sophocles has the verb in the sense of 'pray' three times (*Aj.* 504, *Œd. Col.* 1447, *Tr.* 48). In later Greek the sense of 'curse' prevails completely.

2. Attitude in prayer.—The most striking characteristic of the Greek attitude in prayer is directness of address. The worshipper endeavours to be, so far as possible, literally in touch with his god.

Thus, in Pindar, *Ol.* vi. 58, when Iamus prayed to Poseidon, 'he went down into the midst of Alpheus [Poseidon being a river-god as well as a sea-god] and called on wide-ruling Poseidon his grandsire . . . and he stood beneath the heavens, and it was night.' So, in *Ol.* i. 71, Pelops 'came and stood on the margin of the grey sea, alone in the darkness of the night and called on the deep-voiced Lord of the Trident.' So, too, in Hom. *Il.* i. 348–351, 'Achilles wept and sat down apart . . . on the beach of the grey sea, gazing over the boundless deep: he stretched forth his hands and prayed instantly to his dear mother,' *i.e.* to Thetis, a sea-deity.

Typically, when Zeus or any other of the Olympians was invoked, the worshipper turned his face to the heavens (*e.g.*, Hom. *Il.* iii. 364 f.: 'Thereat Atreides groaned, looking up to the wide heaven: "Father Zeus,"' etc.), the hands uplifted palms upwards (χεῖρες ὑπτίαι [Philostr. *Imag.* 341; Plutarch, *Compar. Philopoem. et Tit.* 2: τοῦ Τίτου τὰς χεῖρας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑπτίας ἀνατείνοντος, ἑστῶτος καὶ προσευχομένου]; cf. the *manus supinæ* of the Roman prayer [Verg. *Æn.* iii. 176, Ovid, *Met.* viii. 681; Hor. *Carm.* iii. 23. 1]). Of the veiled head (*caput velatum*) of the Roman worshipper (Verg. *Æn.* iii. 545; Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 3. 10, etc.) there is no trace in Greek, nor of the turning to the right (east) so typical of Roman prayer (Pliny, *HN* xi. 45, 251; Plut. *Marcell.* 6; Plaut. *Curc.* i. 69; Val. Flacc. viii. 246; Sueton. *Vitell.* 2; Stat. *Theb.* vi. 215; Livy, v. 21). Prostration was regarded as Oriental and un-Greek. Normally the Greek prayed standing upright. Yet a fragment of a bas-relief from the Asklepieion shows Asklepios standing upright and a woman on her knees before him, touching his ἱμάτιον with her right hand (*REG* xxix. [1916] 131, p. 78).

If a sea-deity were invoked, the worshipper stretched his hands towards the sea (Hom. *Il.* i. 351), though Polyphemus, praying to Poseidon (*Od.* ix. 527), raises his hands to the starry heaven. In prayer to river nymphs the worshipper fixed his eyes on the water (Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 737 f.). Achilles in Troad, addressing his home

river Spercheios, looks over the sea (*Il.* xxiii. 143 f.). In prayer to a chthonian deity the hands were held downwards or placed on the ground :

'Come now swear to me by the inviolable water of Styx, and with one of thy hands grasp the fertile earth, and with the other the shining sea, that all may be witnesses to us, even all the gods below that are with Kronos,' etc. (Hom. *Il.* xiv. 271 ff.; cf. Bacchyl. v. 42, vii. 41).

Sometimes, to reinforce his prayer to a chthonian deity, the worshipper would beat the ground with his hands :

Althæa, 'grieved for her brethren's death, prayed instantly to the gods, and with her hands she beat upon the fertile earth, calling on Hades and dread Persephone, while she knelt upon her knees and made her bosom wet with tears, to bring her son (Meleager) to death ; and Erinnys that walketh in darkness, whose heart knoweth not compassion, heard her from Erebos' (Hom. *Il.* ix. 565 ff.). 'Straightway the ox-eyed lady Hera prayed, striking the earth with the flat of her hand, and spake saying, "Hearken to me now, O Earth and the wide Heavens above, and ye gods called Titans, dwelling beneath earth in great Tartaros"' (Hom. *Hymn. Apoll.* 332 f.). 'So spake she and lashed the earth with her stout hand ; and earth, giver of livelihood, was stirred, and Hera, beholding it, was glad at heart, for she deemed that her prayer would be fulfilled' (*ib.* 340 ff.); cf. Paus. viii. 15. 3 : 'I know too that on the most important affairs most of the Pheneatians swear by the Petroma. There is a round cover on it, which contains a mask of Demeter Cidaria : this mask the priest puts on his face at the greater mysteries, and smites the Underground Folks with rods—I imagine, in conformity with some legend.' On Theocritus, vii. 106, 'And if, dear Pan, thou dost those things, may the Arcadian boys not smite thee on sides and shoulders with squills, when there is little meat,' the schol. remarks: Μούνατός φησιν ἑορτὴν Ἀρκαδικὴν εἶναι ἐν ᾗ οἱ παῖδες τὸν Πᾶνα σκίλλαις βαλλουσι· γίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ὅταν οἱ χορηγοὶ λεπτὸν ἱερεῖον θυσωσι καὶ μὴ ἱκανὸν ᾖ τοῖς ἐσθίουσι. Similarly, in Colluthus, *Rape of Helen*, 46 ff., Strife, who had not been invited to the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, 'rose often from her stony seat and again sat down : and with her hand she smote the broad bosom of earth and heeded not the rock. She would fain have burst the bars of the darksome hollows and roused the Titans from their pits beneath the earth and laid waste the heavens, the seat of Zeus who rules on high.'

3. The utterance of prayer.—Normally prayer was not merely thought, but uttered aloud. The same was the case among the Jews, as is well illustrated by the prayer of Hannah (1 S 1[12f.]) :

'And it came to pass, as she continued praying before the Lord, that Eli marked her mouth. Now Hannah, she spake in her heart (ברברת על־לבה ; LXX, ἐλάλει ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτῆς) ; only her lips moved, but her voice was not heard : therefore Eli thought she had been drunken.'

It would be easy to illustrate this practice from all periods of Greek literature :

Hom. *Il.* i. 450, iii. 275 : μεγάλ' εὔχετο, 'prayed loudly' ; so μέγα εὔξατο in *Od.* xvii. 239. Prayer is overheard (*Il.* xix. 255 f., *Od.* xvii 248 ; Xen. *Sympos.* iv. 55 : καὶ πρῴην ἐγώ σου ἤκουον εὐχομένου πρὸς τοὺς θεούς).

The loudness of the voice increased with the fervour of the prayer. It may rise to a βοή, or loud cry :

ἐγὼ δὲ θεοὺς ἐπιβώσομαι αἰὲν ἐόντας (Hom. *Od.* i. 378, ii. 143), precisely as, in a moment of great peril, Nestor βόασε παῖδα Φόν (Pind. *Pyth.* vi. 36).

Similarly, among the Romans, the mother prays more loudly for beauty in the case of her daughters than in the case of her boys, according to Juvenal, x. 289 f. :

'Formam optat modico pueris, maiore puellis
Murmure, cum Veneris fanum videt anxia mater.'

When prayer is not uttered or is uttered in a low voice, the motive is generally expressed or implied. And the motives are several.

(*a*) In Hom. *Il.* vii. 194 ff., the motive is apparently the fear that the knowledge of the prayer might enable the enemy to counteract it by some more potent spell ; it might in fact 'give useful information to the enemy.'

Ajax is about to fight with Hector in single combat, and he exhorts the Greeks, while he is putting on his armour, to pray to Zeus 'in silence by yourselves that the Trojans may not know, nor even openly, since we fear no one' (σιγῇ ἐφ' ὑμείων, ἵνα μὴ Τρῶες γε πύθωνται, . . . ἠ καὶ ἀμφαδίῃ, ἐπεὶ οὔ τινα δείδιμεν ἔμπης).

(*b*) External circumstances might make a spoken prayer impossible.

Thus Odysseus, swimming for his life, 'prayed in his heart' (ἐξύξατο δὲ κατὰ θυμὸν ἑῷ [illegible] 441), and thus may be the motive of *Il.* xx. [illegible] in the crisis of the fight 'prayed to grey-eyed Athene in his heart.'

(*c*) Again, the motive might be a natural desire for privacy—a desire, as we say, to be alone with God.

Thus, in *Od.* xii. 333 ff., Odysseus says : 'Then I went away through the island that I might pray to the gods, if haply some one should show me the way to go. And when on my way through the island I had avoided my comrades, I washed my hands where was a shelter from the wind, and prayed to all the gods who keep Olympos.' So Pind. *Ol.* i. 71 f. : Pelops 'went nigh unto the gray sea alone in the darkness' (οἶος ἐν ὄρφνᾳ) to pray to Poseidon. So 'going apart' (ἀπάνευθε κιών) is said of one who prays (*Il.* i. 35, *Od.* ii. 260).

(*d*) The motive is obvious which makes Orestes pray silently or rather in a low voice in presence of Aigisthos :

δεσπότης δ' ἐμὸς
τἀναντί' ηὔχετ', οὐ γεγωνίσκων λόγους (Eur. *El.* 808 f.).

(*e*) Another motive is modesty. This is especially the case with the prayer of the lover.

Thus Pind. *Pyth.* ix. 97 ff., of the successful athlete : 'Full many times at the yearly festival of Pallas the maidens have seen thee victorious and mutely prayed each for herself that such an one as thou, O Telesikrates, might be her beloved husband or her son' (ἄφωνοι θ' ὡς ἑκάστα φίλτατον παρθενικαὶ πόσιν ἢ υἱὸν εὔχοντ', ὦ Τελεσίκρατες, ἔμμεν).

The opposite of μέγα φθέγγεσθαι is ψιθυρίζειν, 'whisper,' and doubtless this explains the cult-title of Ἀφροδίτη ψίθυρος, to whom prayers were whispered (cf. Tibull. II. i. 83 ; Catull. lxiv. 104).

(*f*) A leading motive is that the prayer is a shameful prayer.

Pythagoras (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iv. 26, § 173) enjoined μετὰ φωνῆς εὔχεσθαι. Seneca, *Ep.* x. 5, quotes from Athenodorus : 'Know that you are free from all desires when you reach a stage where you ask nothing from God except what you can ask openly,' and he goes on to say that 'men now whisper the most shameful prayers to the gods ; if any one hearkens, they become silent, and they tell to God what they do not want man to hear' ; cf. Hor. *Ep.* i. 16, 59 f. ; Pers. ii. 3–75 ; Mayor, on Juv. x. 289 f. Cf. the 'loud voice' of the Prayer Book.

(*g*) The prayers or incantations of the magician are naturally spoken in a low voice.

So in the OT Is 8[19] : 'Seek unto them that have familiar spirits and unto the wizards, that chirp and that mutter' (LXX ζητήσατε τοὺς ἐγγαστριμύθους . . . οἱ ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας φωνοῦσιν).

4. The relation of the suppliant to his god.—In the earliest times the suppliant compelled his god to do his will—traces of which may be found in the beating of the ground and the flagellation of Pan mentioned above, and the smiting of the ὑποχθόνιοι in Paus. *loc. cit.*

The next stage is one of bargain, which is the typical form of prayer in Homer. This bargain-theory of prayer may assume different forms.

(*a*) If ever I did that for thee, so do thou this for me.

Thus Hom. *Il.* i. 35 ff. of the priest Chryses : 'Then went that old man apart and prayed aloud to King Apollo, whom Leto of the fair locks bare : "Hear me, lord of the silver bow, that standest about Chryse and holy Killa, and rulest Tenedos by thy might, O Smintheus ! if ever I built a temple pleasant in thine eyes, or if I ever burnt to thee fat flesh of the thighs of bulls or of goats, fulfil thou this my desire."' So *Od.* iv. 763 ff., *Il.* xv. 372 ff.

(*b*) If thou do this for me, I will do that for thee.

A typical example is Hom. *Od.* iii. 380 ff., where Nestor prays to Athene : 'Be gracious, O queen, and give me fair fame—for myself and my children and gracious wife ; and I in turn will sacrifice to thee a heifer,' etc. ; cf. *Il.* vi. 115.

One form of this is the explicit assertion that it is for the advantage of the gods to protect their worshippers.

Thus Theognis, 773 ff. : 'O Lord Phœbus, thyself didst build the High City, doing a favour to Alcathous son of Pelops ; thyself keep from this city the froward host of the Medes, that with joy the people may send thee glorious hecatombs when spring comes round, rejoicing in cithara and delectable mirth, in paean choir and song around thy altar.' Similarly and still more frankly, Æschylus, in *Sept.* 76 f., makes Eteocles pray to the gods to save Thebes : 'Be our refuge. And I think I speak for our common interest : for a prosperous city honours the gods.'

(*c*) The third type is that which J. Adam (*The Religious Teachers of Greece*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 46) has compared to our

'God of our fathers, be the God
Of their succeeding race,'

i.e., even as thou didst of old, so do also now.

Thus Hom. *Il.* i. 450 ff.: 'Then Chryses lifted up his hands and prayed aloud for them: "Hearken to me, god of the silver bow, . . . even as erst thou didst hear my prayer and didst me honour and greatly afflictedst the people of the Danaans, even so now fulfil me this my desire."' Cf. *Il.* i. 453 ff., v. 118 ff., x. 278 ff.; Pind. *Isth.* vi. 42 f. In *Il.* x. 284 ff. this type is combined with type (*b*).

(*d*) There is the type in which man makes no bargain, the normal type from the 5th cent. B.C.—*e.g.*, Pind. *Ol.* xiv. 5, *Pyth.* v. 124; Æsch. *Ag.* 946 f.; Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 187 f.; Demosth. *de Cor.* i., and *passim.*

It is to be noted that the personal piety of the worshipper—*εὐσέβεια*—was considered by the Greeks to make his prayer more likely to be answered.

Thus Hom. *Il.* i. 218: *ὅς τε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθηται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ*, 'if a man obeys the gods, they surely hearken to him,' and Pind. *Ol.* viii. 8: *ἄνεται δὲ πρὸς χάριν εὐσεβίας ἀνδρῶν λιταῖς*, 'fulfilment is granted to the prayers of men for the sake of their piety.' Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 3; Eur. frag. 946. Contrast the case of the wicked man: 'No god hears his prayers' (Æsch. *Ag.* 387; cf. Hor. *Carm.* III. xxiii. 17; Pers. *Sat.* ii. 73).

5. The ritual of prayer.—The simplest form of prayer is little more than an ejaculation, and is typically expressed in Greek by the name of the god in the vocative case, followed by an infinitive (dependent on some word for 'give' or 'grant' understood) expressing the request.

Thus Hom. *Il.* vii. 175 ff.: 'So he spake and each marked his lot, and they cast them into the helmet of Agamemnon, son of Atreus; and the people prayed and lifted up their hands to the gods; and thus would one say as he looked unto the wide heaven:

Ζεῦ ἄνα ἢ Αἴαντα λαχεῖν, ἢ Τυδέος υἱόν,
ἢ αὐτὸν βασιλῆα πολυχρύσοιο Μυκήνης!'

Cf. Herod. v. 105, where Darius, hearing that Sardis had been burnt by the Athenians, 'called for a bow, and, having received one, he put an arrow into it and shot it into the air, with these words: *ὦ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενέσθαί μοι Ἀθηναίους τίσασθαι.*'

A still shorter form of the ejaculatory prayer is the use of the vocative alone—*e.g.*, *Ἀπόλλων ἀποτρόπαιε* (Aristoph. *Av.* 61, etc.); Herondas, vii. 74: *Ἐμὴ τε κερδέων καὶ σύ, κερδίη Πειθοῖ*; cf. such expressions as 'Hercle,' 'mehercule,' 'medius fidius,' in Latin. The ejaculatory prayer is commended by Marcus Aurelius, v. 7.

The more elaborate ritual will be best explained by definite examples.

(*a*) The account of the Argonauts starting on their voyage in quest of the Golden Fleece:

'Now when that goodly crew were come to Iolkos, Jason mustered them with thanks to each, and the seer Mopsos prophesied by omens and by sacred lots, and with good will sped the host on board. And when they had hung the anchors over the prow, then their chief, taking in his hands a golden goblet, stood upon the stern and called on Zeus whose spear is the lightning, and on the tides of waves and winds and the nights, and the paths of the sea, to speed them quickly over, and for kindly days and the friendly fortune of return. And from the clouds a favourable voice of thunder pealed in answer; and then came bright lightning flashes bursting through.

Then the heroes took heart in obedience to the heavenly signs; and the seer bade them strike into the water with their oars, while he spake to them of happy hopes; and in their rapid hands the oars sped untiringly' (Pind. *Pyth.* iv. 188 ff.).

(*b*) Compare with this the famous passage in which Thucydides tells of the start of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 B.C.:

'Now when the ships were manned and everything with which they were to put to sea was on board, the signal for silence was given by the trumpet and they made the customary prayers before putting to sea, not ship by ship but all together, led by a herald (*κῆρυξ*) throughout all the army, marines and generals alike making libation with cups (*ἐκπώματα*) of gold and silver. And in their prayers joined also the general crowd on shore, not only Athenians but any other friendly person who was present. And when they had sung the pæan and finished their libations (*παιωνίσαντες δὲ καὶ τελεώσαντες τὰς σπονδάς*) they put to sea' (vi. 32).

(*c*) Or, again, take what is really a Greek view, though it refers to a Carthaginian—the story of the conduct of Hamilkar during the battle of Himera:

'The following story is related by the Carthaginians with great probability, that whilst the barbarians were engaged with Greeks of Sicily in that battle, which began early in the morning and lasted to the twilight of the evening, Amilkar, continuing in the camp, sacrificed entire victims upon a large pile: and when he saw his army flying, as he happened to be pouring libations on the victims, he threw himself into the flames, and thus, being burnt up, disappeared' (Herod. vii. 167).

(*d*) Precisely the same ritual meets us in the account given by Herodotus vii. 54 of the prayer of Xerxes as he was about to cross the Hellespont for the invasion of Greece:

'The rest of the day was spent in disposing all things in order to their passage: and on the next day they waited for the sun, as they wished to see it rising, and in the meantime burnt all sorts of perfumes upon the bridges, and strewed the way with myrtle branches. When the sun was risen, Xerxes, pouring a libation into the sea out of a golden cup (*σπένδων ἐκ χρυσέης φιάλης ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν*), addressed a prayer to the sun, that he might not meet with any impediment so great as to prevent him from subduing Europe.' Then follows a less Greek incident: 'After which he threw the cup into the Hellespont with a bowl of gold and a Persian scimitar. But I cannot determine whether he wished by throwing them into the sea to consecrate these things to the sun, or whether he repented of having scourged the Hellespont (vii. 35), and as a compensation made that gift to it.'

The normal ritual of prayer is: (1) the hands are washed (if this were omitted, libation and prayer are vain [Hes. *Works and Days*, 724 ff., 740 f.; Hom. *Il.* vi. 266 ff.]); (2) prayer is made; (3) after the prayer comes the sacrifice; (4) last of all comes the pouring of libations.

Thus Hom. *Il.* i. 447 ff.: 'They set in order for the god the holy hecatomb about his well-builded altar; next washed they their hands (*χερνίψαντο*) and took up the barley corns (*οὐλοχύται*). Then Chryses lifted up his hands and prayed. . . . Now when they had prayed and sprinkled the barley corns, first they drew back the victims' heads and slaughtered them and flayed them, and cut slices from the thighs and wrapped them in fat, making a double fold, and laid raw collops thereon, and the old man burnt them on cleft wood and made libation over them of gleaming wine. Next they feasted, and then, 'when they had put from them the desire of meat and drink, the young men crowned the bowls with wine, and gave each man his portion after the drink-offering had been poured into the cups. So all day long they worshipped the god with music, singing the beautiful pæan, the sons of the Achæans making music to the Archer-god; and his heart was glad to hear.'

6. Mode of addressing the deity (*ἐπίκλησις*).—It was a matter of importance that the deity invoked should be addressed by his right cult-titles.

Thus Achilles (*Il.* xvi. 233 f.) at Troy invokes Zeus as *Ζεῦ ἄνα, Δωδωναῖε, Πελασγικέ, τηλόθι ναίων, Δωδώνης μεδέων δυσχειμέρου.* Apollo is invoked by Chryses in *Il.* i. 37 ff. as *ἀργυρότοξος* and *Σμινθεύς.* Especially noteworthy is Æschylus, *Ag.* 160 ff., where we find the curious expression 'Zeus whoever he be, if it please him so to be called, by that title I address him,' on which the commentators refer to Plato, *Cratyl.* 400 D f: 'One excellent principle which, as sensible men, we should follow: that with regard to the gods we know nothing, either with regard to themselves or the names by which they call themselves; for it is evident that they call themselves by their true names. The second best principle of correctness is, as it is customary in our prayers to pray, that we ourselves call them by the names and titles, whatever they may be, by which they like to be named (*οἵτινές τε καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι*), since we know no more; for that appears to me a right custom.' The phrase *Ζεὺς ὅστις ἐστίν* (cf. Eur. *Troad.* 885, *Herc. Fur.* 1263, frag. 483 [Melanippe]) carries out this principle (imitated Hor. *Sat.* II. vi. 20; Milton, *Par. Lost*, iii. 1–7). In the same way Callim. *Hymn to Zeus*, 4: 'How now shall we sing of thee? as Diktaios or Lykaios?', *Hymn to Apollo*, 69 ff.: 'O Apollo, many call thee Boedromios and many call thee Klarios, . . . but I call thee Karneios'; cf. *ib.* 47: *Φοῖβον καὶ Νόμιον*, and Pind. *Pyth.* ix. 66: 'Agreus and Nomios and by some called Aristaios'; cf. Eur. frag. 781. 11 f.

7. To whom prayer is addressed.—The general phrase for offering prayer is 'pray to the gods' (*θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι, δαίμοσιν ἀρήσασθαι* [Hom.]), but the particular deity addressed varies with the situation: the poet prays to Apollo or the Muses, the hunter to Artemis, the farmer to Demeter, and so on. Not an unusual thing is to pray to Zeus and the particular god more especially concerned; *e.g.*, Hesiod (*Works and Days*, 463) bids the farmer pray to Zeus and Demeter. Again, a god may be invoked under a special cult-title in reference to the particular boon desired—*e.g.*, *Ζεὺς Ὄμβριος* for rain, *Ζεὺς Οὔριος* for a favourable wind, and so on; hence the point of the amusing prayer of the Acharnian farmer as he holds up his tattered garment to the light:

ὦ Ζεῦ Διόπτα καὶ Κατόπτα πανταχῆ
ἐνσκευάσασθαί μ' οἷον ἀθλιώτατα

(Aristoph. *Acharn.* 435 f.) — an excellent example of the *Stossgebet.*

Particularly interesting is the case of prayers made by special classes of people to minor deities or semi-divinities, in whom they have a, so to say, 'superstitious' faith. Thus, *e.g.*, the sailor prays not merely to Poseidon but to the 'Samothracian gods,' *i.e.* the Cabeiri or the Dioscuri (Callim. *Ep.* 47; Diod. iv. 43; Theophrast. *Char.* xxvii. [xxv.]).

8. The dead and the chthonian gods.—Prayers to the dead and the chthonian gods have certain special characters in common, which cannot be discussed here. The ἀνάκλησις, or solemn evocation of the dead, is illustrated by Æschylus's *Persæ* and *Choephoræ*. The chthonian gods are especially powers of vengeance.

In Hom. *Il.* iii. 278 f., they are specially appealed to as punishers of perjury:

> καὶ οἳ ὑπενέρθε καμόντας
> ἀνθρώπους τίνυσθον, ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ

(the dual in bracketing especially, in all seeming, Ζεὺς καταχθόνιος and Persephone). It is to their ministers, the Erinyes, that Penelope will appeal for vengeance (*Od.* ii. 135). It is to them that people 'devote' enemies by a solemn *devotio* (κατάδεσμος). It need only be said here that the ritual of the curse is so far at least like the prayer that it apparently requires to be spoken (even the κατάδεσμος was in all probability inscribed to the accompaniment of a recital of its contents).

Thus in Æsch. *Ag.* 226 ff. the lips of Iphigeneia are gagged to prevent her uttering a curse. Similarly, in the *Choephoræ* (83 f.) Electra does not know what words to utter as she makes an offering at her father's tomb, but she feels that she can hardly do it without some prayer spoken; to do so would be just like throwing out refuse:

> ἦ σίγ' ἀτίμως, ὡσπερ οὖν ἀπώλετο
> πατήρ, τάδ' ἐκχεοῦσα, γάποτον χυσίν,
> στείχω, καθάρμαθ' ὧς τις ἐκπέμψας πάλιν
> δικοῖσα τεῖχος ἀστρόφοισιν ὄμμασιν (88 ff.).

9. The occasions of prayer.—No business of importance was begun without prayer; indeed, the pious man begins no business of any sort without first praying:

Socr. 'It would be your business, it seems, to speak next, after duly invoking the gods' (καλεσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεούς). *Tim.* 'All men, Socrates, who have even a little portion of right feeling, on starting upon any business, small or great, always call on God. And we who are about to discuss the nature of the Universe—how it was created or exists uncreate—if we are not completely out of our wits, must certainly call upon gods and goddesses and pray that our words may be acceptable to them and consistent with ourselves' (Plato, *Tim.* 27 C; cf. Xen. *Ec.* v. 19 f.).

Prayer was made on all solemn occasions, at the opening of the ecclesia or the law-courts, on the new moon (Demosth. *Aristop.* 99), etc.; at sunrise and sunset (Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 338 f.).

For prayer at sunrise cf. Plato, *Symp.* 220 D, where Socrates, having stood in a trance from one morning to the next, prayed to the rising sun and went home (εἱστήκει μέχρι ἕως ἐγένετο καὶ ἥλιον ἀνέσχεν· ὅπειτα ᾤχετ' ἀπιὼν προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ).

10. The content of prayer.—It would not be true to say that the Greek prayer was never a prayer of thanksgiving. This conception is more a question of language than anything else, and προσεύχεσθαι gives more nearly what we generally include in 'prayer' than εὔχεσθαι. But it is undoubtedly true that prayer in general, as we find it in the Greek authors, is essentially a petition for blessings of a utilitarian kind—health and wealth, children, success in business and in battle. The special circumstances of the case make it absurd to quote Simonides, frag. xxii. 17 ff., as an example of the prayer of a contrite heart.

The refinements of the philosophers perhaps hardly concern us here.[1] Socrates emphasizes the efficacy of the prayers (and the curses) of parents in Plato, *Leges*, 931 C.

He himself 'prayed to the gods simply that they would give him good things, believing that the gods know best what sort of things are good. As for those who prayed for gold or silver or a tyranny or such like, he believed that was just as if they prayed for gambling or battle or any thing else the issue of which is uncertain' (Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 2).

[1] See Max. Tyr. xl. 5 (prayer ἀ ὁμιλία καὶ διάλεκτος πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς περὶ τῶν παρόντων, οὐ περὶ αἰτήσεις τῶν οὐ παρόντων); Marc. Aurel. iv. 23, ix. 40; Philostr. *Apoll. Tyan.* iv. 40 (δόσ' εὐχόμαι, ὦ θεοί, δοίητε μοι τὰ δεδεόμενα), Sen. *Ep.* x. 5, xli. 1.

Not altogether unlike is Pindar's

'Some pray for gold and some for limitless land: but mine be it with the favour of my townsmen to hide my limbs in earth, praising what is worthy of praise and sowing rebuke on sinners' (*Nem.* viii. 36 ff.).

In Plato, *Alcib.* ii. 143 A, Socrates is made to say:

'He seems to have been a wise poet, Alcibiades, who, seeing, as I believe, his friends, who were foolish men, praying for and doing things which it was not good for them to do, offered a prayer in behalf of them all to this effect: "King Zeus, what things are good, give us even without asking; but what is evil, keep away from us even if we ask them."'

His prayer in Plato, *Phædr.* 279 B,

'O dear Pan and other gods who are here, grant me to become beautiful within (καλῷ γενέσθαι τἔνδοθεν), and grant that whatever outward possessions I have may be friendly to that which is within. Let me count the wise man a wealthy man. As for gold, give me just so much as none but the prudent man could bear or carry,'

is very close in spirit to the prayer of Pindar just referred to which commences:

'O father Zeus! never may such a character be mine, but let me cleave to simple [*i.e.* honest, true] paths of life, that when I die I may leave to my children no evil name.'

LITERATURE.—In addition to general works on Greek religion, see L. R. Farnell, *The Evolution of Religion*, London, 1905; C. Ausfeld, *De Græcorum precationibus quæstiones* (Fleckeisen, *Jahrbucher*, Suppl. xxviii.), Leipzig, 1903; C. Ziegler, *De precationum apud Græcos formis quæstiones selectæ*, Breslau Dissert., 1905; E. von Lasaulx, *Der Fluch bei den Griechen und Römern*, Würzburg, 1843; S. Sudhaus, 'Lautes und leises Beten,' *ARW* ix. [1906] 185 ff.; L. Radermacher, 'Schelten und Fluchen,' *ARW* xi. [1908] 11 ff.

A. W. MAIR.

PRAYER (Iranian).—Zoroastrianism being essentially a religion of ritual observance and of practical morality, Zoroastrian prayer is bound to be different from that of religions of a more cultual or devotional type. What we call 'prayers' in the Avesta are either mere invocations of gods and celestial powers—a recitation of names in a list of deities, such as often occurs in the *Yasna*—or confessions of a more theoretic or dogmatic character, as the *Ahuna Vairya*, the *Ashem vohū*, and other formulas. We also find—especially in the *Gāthas*—personal petitions, more for instruction and mental enlightenment, however, than for help or direct salvation. A system of prayers for the dead is included in the ritual. Requests for material gifts are far less important in the Avesta than *e.g.*, in the Vedic ritual.

1. Ritual invocation.—The usual form in the *Yasna* is the following, repeated continually:

'I announce and I (will) complete (my offering) to Ahura Mazda, the Creator, the radiant and glorious, the greatest and the best . . . the most firm, the wisest. . . . I announce and complete to Vohu Manō, Asha Vahista, Khshathra-Vairiya, Spenta Ārmaiti . . . etc. . . . Yea, all ye lords, the greatest ones, holy lords of the ritual order, if I have offended you by thought, or word, or deed, whether with my will, or without intending error, I praise you (now the more) for this' (*Ys.* i. 1–22).

Another form (as in *Ys.* xvii. 11 ff.) is:

'We worship thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son! . . . We worship the good and best waters Mazda-made. . . . We worship the Mâthra-spenta . . . We worship the good and [illegible]ious prayer for blessings . . . and all the greatest chieftains, lords of the ritual order.'

Most of the verbs used in these texts are of the ritualistic type: *nivaedhayemi*, *hañkāraiyemi*, 'I announce and complete,' *yazamaidlē*, 'we worship' (in the sense of performing devotional acts). The verb *stuye*, 'I praise,' in i. 22, means oral praise, as known from the Sanskrit *stotra*, 'hymn'; all these terms convey the idea of glorifying the deities and the religion.

Sometimes, as in *Ys.* xviii. 4, the worshipper may ask for the blessings of religion:

'Grant me, Thou maker of the plants and waters, Immortality, Mazda!';

but ordinarily he expects to possess these prerogatives as a 'righteous' man (*i.e.* a Zoroastrian) and offers Mazda his praise in return for salvation:

'As to those, Immortality, the Righteous Order, and the Kingdom of Welfare, which Thou, O Mazdā! hast given through (holy) deeds, words, and the sacrifice . . . gifts [shall] be offered (by us) in return to Thee, O Ahura!' (*Y.* xxxiv. 1);

and now he begs Mazda to continue to uphold this order of salvation and to keep his followers in the truth :

'We pray for Thy Fire, O Ahura ! strong through Righteousness, most swift, [most] powerful, to the house with joy receiving it, in many wonderful ways our help, but to the hater, O Mazda ! it is a steadfast harm as if with weapons hurled from the hands' (*ib.* 4).

2. **Petitions for personal enlightenment.**—Petitions for mental enlightenment take up a great deal of space in the *Gāthas*; not a few of the holy truths are communicated in the form of questions and requests addressed by the prophet to Ahura Mazda or Vohu Manō. The whole of *Yasna* xliv., dealing with the theory of creation and cosmology, is in this form :

'This I ask Thee, O Ahura ! tell me aright: who, as a skilful artisan, hath made the lights and the darkness ?' (5).

Such questions assume the typical character of prayer when the worshipper asks for special instructions necessary for his own personal salvation :

'(Come Ye) and show me the worthy aims of our faith, so that I may approach and fulfil them with (Thy) Good Mind, the offering, O Mazda ! of the One like You, or the words of praises offered with Righteousness. And give Ye, as Your offering (of grace to me) the abiding gifts of Your Immortality and Welfare !' (*Ys.* xxxiii. 8).

In most of the *Gāthas* the prophet continues in the same idealistic but intellectualistic way. As the Zoroastrian believer must know—and receive—the truth in order to be saved, Zoroaster, as an example to his followers, must pray for his own and for their enlightenment.

3. **Prayer for the dying and dead.**—Another form of praying for salvation is seen in the prayers for the dying and the dead who belong to the religious community; unbelievers are excluded from salvation. These prayers, which are still made among the Parsis after the death of a beloved one (see J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, p. 313, n. 2), are called *āfrīngān* and *srōsh darūn* in Avesta. Their aim is to secure for the dead eternal bliss and happiness in heaven and in the future world, and they consist in sacerdotal ceremonies, celebrated on various occasions, but especially at the time when the dead are expected to visit the earth, and in connexion with funeral festivals. At these ceremonies the priests invoke many gods and genii, especially the angel of death, Srōsh (Sraosha), the psychopompos of the Iranians, who carries the dead to heaven and protects them from demons. In this dangerous task Sraosha needs the assistance of the offerings and prayers of the survivors. Yet the ceremonial act is an *opus operatum* of mere invocations, no immediate petitions being made in the ritual. Only the final words (of late date) in *Srōsh Yašt Hādhōkat* (*Yašt* xi.) express a direct request for bliss for the deceased :

'[Give] unto that man brightness and glory, . . . give him the bright, all-happy, blissful abode of the holy Ones !' (*Yt.* xi. 23).

4. **Prayer for material gifts.**—Material gifts are desired and asked for in the Avesta as in other religions, particularly as the general aim of the Zoroastrian religion is the conservation and renovation of the material world. Such petitions occur more frequently in the later Avesta than in the *Gāthas*, whose abstract and solemn character forbids them to descend to personal and private desires. The earthly bliss that the *Gātha*-singer longs for is more the general state of material happiness than any single advantage. A typical strophe in this respect is *Ys.* xxxiii. 10 :

'All prosperous states in being which have been enjoyed in the past, which men are now enjoying, and which shall be known in the future, do Thou grant (me) these in Thy love. (Yea), cause (our) bodily and personal life to be blest with salvation.'

The paraphrases of the commentators are usually far more concerned with concrete and individual happiness — *e.g.*, Neriosangh comments on this strophe :

'Let them continue to live well, and be prosperous in all things, those females who are born thus,' etc. (*SBE* xxxi. 77, n. 7).

They breathe the spirit of the later Avesta, which is more realistic in tone and is always seeking for the material help of the gods.

An offering is made to Mithra, Ashi Vanguhi, and the other gods of the *Yašts* for bringing 'swiftness to our teams, strength to our own bodies, and that we may watch with full success those who hate us, smite down our foes, and destroy at one stroke our adversaries' (petition to Mithra, *Yt.* x. 94). 'O ye waters, I beseech of you for wealth of many kinds, power, and for an offspring self-dependent whom multitudes will bless' (to Ardvi Sūra Anahita, *Ys.* lxv. 11). In the *Fravardīn Yašt* (xiii.) to the Fravashis such petitions abound; and the genii bestow wealth and fertility on their own kindred, when they make offerings to them, saying: 'May my country grow and increase !' (68), offering to them 'for a dominion full of splendour, for a long, long life, and for all boons and remedies . . . to withstand the evil done by oppressors' (135).

The piety of the Zoroastrians was more realistic in the later Avesta, but not more personal or devotional than in the times of the *Gāthas*. On the contrary, in these hymns of old we meet with strophes of a very noble tenor, where the prophet tells of his sufferings and hopes and ardently beseeches his Lord and Master for help and consolation in his striving :

'How shall I conciliate Thy (grace) O Lord ? . . . Therefore I cry to Thee ; behold it, Lord ! desiring helpful grace for me, as friend bestows on friend. . . . Thee, for mine exhorter and commander, Living Lord ! I choose' (*Ys.* xlvi. 1–3).

LITERATURE.—There is no general discussion of the subject; for details see the introductions to the ritualistic hymns in J. Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta*, 3 vols., Paris, 1892–93, esp. his general introduction to the *Yasna*. K. F. Geldner, *GIAP* ii. [1896–1904] 23, gives a short description of the prayers (§ 20). The ritualistic hymns are translated by L. H. Mills and Darmesteter in *SBE* xxxi. [1887] and xxiii. [1883].

E. LEHMANN.

PRAYER (Jain).—It is extraordinarily difficult to discover the exact place that prayer holds in the Jain system. Every Jain is on the defensive lest his creed should be considered atheistic, and is unwilling to make any admission that might seem to point in that direction. Again, Jainism, like every other Indian faith, is so influenced by its environment and, in especial, borrows so much from Hinduism that not infrequently orthodox Jains in actual practice do many things not really in harmony with the principles of their religion; the difficulty is further enhanced for the investigator by the inexplicable ignorance which prevails among many Jains as to the articles of their creed. The most satisfactory way, perhaps, of arriving at any conclusion is to divide the subject of prayer into various elements, such as petition, intercession, adoration, confession, worship, and thanksgiving, and to note under each head the actual practice and the sometimes conflicting opinions of the Jains.

1. **Petition.**—As the Jain system is based on the root-idea of previously acquired *karma* automatically conditioning every incident of a man's life, past, present, and future, there is no subject which could logically be affected by petition. If a man is strong, happy, and wealthy in this life, it is owing to the merit that he has acquired in previous births; but no petition can prolong his fortunate condition. Again, if he is ill, unhappy, and poverty-stricken, it is due to his separate sins in a previous existence, and, as long as the accumulated energy of past bad actions lasts, his lot is evil and continues to be so until the moment arrives when the ill-omened energy is expended, the mechanism stops, the clock runs down, and the man, having worked out that particular sentence, passes on to endure the good or evil effects of the succeeding *karma* that he has attracted. But no petition can affect the mechanism of *karma*, no prayer mitigate his sentence of lives-long imprison-

ment to it. The Jains therefore hold that logically it is of no use to pray for health, wealth, or fame, since all are inexorably fixed by *karma*.

Again, not only is there no subject that could be affected by petition, but there is no one to whom prayer could be addressed, since the Jains acknowledge no supreme God, not knowing Him either as Creator, Father, or Friend. Nor would it, logically, be of any avail to pray to the deified men who have passed to the still land of endless inaction; for they take no more interest in worldly affairs. 'Of what use would it be for us to pray to a Siddha?', said a Jain gentleman to the present writer, 'he would no more hear us than would a dead animal.' Consequently, though the Jains perhaps lay greater stress on the duty of forgiving others for all personal slights, injuries, and offences than the followers of any other religion, one great subject of petition—forgiveness for sin—is, they hold, logically excluded, since there is no one to forgive the sin, no one greater than the mechanism of *karma*, no one who has never experienced its sway.

2. **Intercession.**—In the same way there is no room in the Jain system for intercession. As the belief in *karma* dries up all sympathy for the suffering of others, so it impedes any intercession for their deliverance. A child-widow is merely expiating the sin of adultery committed in a previous birth; a leper is only serving his sentence for some former, though unremembered, crime; and no intercession could mitigate or shorten their penal term of suffering.

Indeed, not only is intercession ineffectual, but to Jain ideas it is tainted by actual sin—the sin of spiritual bribery. If (since human need and human longings are greater than any creed) a prayer is wrung from an anguished mother in her extremity as she watches beside the sick-bed of her little child, she is told that she has committed the grave sin of *lokottara mithyātva*,[1] under which would also be included a childless woman's vow that, if a son be born to her, she will offer a cradle at some saint's shrine.

No people in India are prouder than the Jain community of their loyalty to British rule, but it is impossible for them logically to offer up prayers for the success of the Allied cause, as the Muhammadans and Hindus frequently do; all that is permissible for them is to hold meetings to express their ardent good wishes and fervent desires for a victorious peace.

Some well-instructed Jains account for the fact that some of the members of their community do use such phrases as 'O Lord (*Prabhu*), give me wealth,' 'O Lord (*Prabhu*), forgive me my sin,' by saying that the prayer is addressed neither to a supreme God nor to a deified man, but to their own inner consciousness, to stir themselves up to greater efforts; others, again, say that such phrases are metaphorical; a third explanation sometimes given is that they are due to the pervading influence of Hinduism.[2]

3. **Adoration.**—A Jain said to the writer: 'We are not beggars, and we cannot petition for boons like beggars, but by remembering our Tīrthaṅkara, we can pluck up heart to follow their example.' To this extent one element of prayer—adoration—is found in the Jain system. A Sthānakavāsī (non-idol-worshipping) Jain will declare that he rises before sunrise and, rosary in hand, adores the great saints and the great principles of the Jain creed; but, when the meaning of his devotion is fully explained, one realizes that the act is salutation rather than adoration. The attitude of the worshipper seems (to quote an illustration which all the Jain friends consulted by the writer have accepted) nearer to that of a French soldier paying his homage at the tomb of Napoleon and saluting the memory of a great hero than to the warm, personal adoration and loving faith connected with the Hindu idea of *bhakti*. Indeed, a Hindu told the writer that the vital distinction between the two creeds seemed to him to lie in the fact that the Jain system had no room for *bhakti*. The Jain telling his rosary of 108 beads would salute the Five Great Ones (Arihanta, Siddha, Āchārya, Upādhyāya, and Sādhu) and the great principles of knowledge, faith, character, and austerity. Then, repairing to the monastery or to some quiet place in his house, he would perform *sāmāyika*,[1] during which, after begging forgiveness for any injury done to the tiniest insect on his way to his devotions, he would promise to commit no sin for the space of forty-eight minutes, and then praise the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkara, saluting each by name in a set form of Māgadhī words, and would conclude by a salutation to a director (*guru*) if present; if not, to the north-east corner of the building.

4. **Confession.**—This is followed by the confession of sin, or *paḍikamaṇuṁ*, which is an essential part of Jain worship. The object of this confession, the Jain says, is not to obtain forgiveness of sins and removal of the guilt, but, by confessing and carrying out the penance imposed by the director, to perform an austerity, in the fire of which it is hoped to burn up some of the *karma* acquired by sinning. A difficulty has occasionally arisen in the minds of students of Jainism owing to the use of such expressions in Jain prayers as 'I crave forgiveness,' whereas the accepted Gujarātī comment or translation of such words appears to be little more than an expression of desire to be free from the fruit of such sin.[2] In this formal confession, however, the worshipper acknowledges his sins in the most careful way, confessing if he has sinned against knowledge in any of the fourteen special ways, or against faith in five ways, or if he has uttered any of the twenty-five kinds of falsehood, or committed any of the eighteen classes of sin, or in any way sinned against the Five Great Ones of the Jain faith, being specially careful of course to confess any sin against animal life, the taking of which is the most heinous crime to a Jain. This is followed by a repetition of the salutation to the Five Great Ones, and this, in turn, by another form of confession of the sins of that particular day, by a vow to fast in some way or other, if only for an hour (for the Jains lay the greatest stress on fasting), and the whole is concluded by an act of general praise. A devout Jain will repeat these religious exercises (which generally take about forty-eight minutes) in the evening. It is illuminating to notice that the director never seems to pronounce an absolution; he imposes a penance, generally concerned with fasting in some way or other, and the penitent simply goes away and performs it to the satisfaction of his own conscience.

No Jain is content with the austerity of a confession of sin night and morning; it is also incumbent upon him to examine his conscience still more scrupulously every fortnight, even more thoroughly at the four-monthly confession, whilst the most important of all is the great yearly confession at *Saṁvatsarī* (see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS [Jain]).

After the evening confession the Jain, before sleeping, sings the praises of the Tīrthaṅkara, and

[1] M. Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, p. 131.

[2] A Śvetāmbara Jain friend of the writer keeps Hindu gods in his house, that he may address petitions to them.

[1] For further details see Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, p. 265 ff.

[2] Cf. *Sāmāyak* (in Māgadhī, with Gujarātī tr.), p. 11: 'May what I have done wrong be without fruit to my *jīva*.'

tells his beads, again making salutation to the Five Great Ones.

5. Temple-worship. — Besides meditation and confession, the daily devotions of a Śvetāmbara Jain include a visit to the temple, which he circumambulates three times before entering (as he crosses the threshold he touches it and utters three times the word '*Nissahi*,' which puts on one side all sins and worldly cares). The morning ritual[1] has eight parts—bathing the idol, marking it with the auspicious mark, offering it flowers and garlands, waving a lighted incense-stick in front of the image, waving a lamp before the shrine, offering rice, offering sweetmeats, and offering nuts. The first part, bathing the idol, can be performed only once, so only one worshipper can do that, but any man who has time to bathe at the temple and to don the special dress may mark the idol, offer flowers to it, and wave the incense-stick, which all involve entering the inner shrine and therefore are forbidden to any not in special clothes and to all women, who, however, may perform the remaining acts of worship. Before leaving the temple, the worshipper may sing the praises of the Tīrthaṅkara (this can be done at any time by any one entering the temple), and he then strikes a gong to show that he has finished. As he recrosses the temple threshold, he says, '*Āvissahi*' before resuming his usual vocation. About sunset he would perhaps go to the temple again and perform the evening worship, which consists in waving a lamp before the idol. On great festivals and at pilgrim resorts the worship is of course more elaborate.

6. Thanksgiving.—Just as no Jain can beg boons, so no Jain returns thanks for answered prayers, for sins forgiven, for hopes fulfilled. Every good thing that happens to him in this life is in direct payment for his own good actions in a past existence.

'Certainly,' says a recent writer,[2] 'the Jaina does not hope to ride into heaven on the "back of another." To him hope has about the same meaning as it has to the scientist who knows that H_2O would never fail to give him a drop of water if he would only take the trouble to work out the formula in practice.'

Perhaps for a European the whole Jain attitude to prayer is best summed up in Henley's words:

'I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul'—

lines which it is interesting to compare with the *śloka* which many devout Jains repeat at night after they have read their sacred books:

'The soul is the maker and the non-maker, and itself makes happiness and misery, is its own friend and its own foe, decides its own condition good or evil. . . . The soul is the cow from which all desires can be milked, the soul is my heavenly garden.'

LITERATURE.—The information contained in this article has been derived directly from Jain informants. The reader may also consult the present writer's *Notes on Modern Jainism*, Oxford, 1910, *The Heart of Jainism*, do. 1915, and vernacular prayer-books and hymn-books, such as *Śrī Sāmāyaka tathā Śuddha Śra ddha svarupa*, Ahmadabad, 1899, or *Anupūrvi ane Sadhuvandana*, do. 1894; and *SBE* xxii. [1884], xlv. [1895].

MARGARET STEVENSON.

PRAYER (Japanese).—The prayers of Shintō, the Japanese national religion, are of a type conforming more to the formulæ of primitive magic than to modern Western prayer (see MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. esp. pp. 296[b], 299[b], *in fine*). They can be best understood by analyzing the characteristics of prayer in the earliest times.

1. By whom offered.—Private individual prayer, addressed by the worshipper directly to his god, scarcely ever occurs in the earliest sources. The *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*, collections of the traditions of the mythology and early history of the empire, are naturally not concerned with the details of individuals, and merely mention now and then the worship of some legendary hero or important personage in some temple (*e.g.*, *Kojiki*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain[2], Tōkyō, 1906, pp. 216, 238, 260, etc.). But, when we notice that among the numerous archaic poems preserved in those collections (111 in the *Kojiki*, 132 in the *Nihongi*) there is not a single hymn or other such religious effusion, we are almost forced to the conclusion that prayer must have been of little moment in the everyday life of the primitive Japanese. On the other hand, individual prayers are fairly often mentioned in the poems of the *Manyōshiu*, which are not much later in date (9th cent.); but it is often difficult to distinguish the true Shintō element in these from the Buddhist influence already in evidence. In the pre-Buddhist period, then, we have scarcely any evidence of prayer except in its official, public form—offered, *i.e.*, in the name of the whole people first by the Mikado in person, whose office, according to etymology (*matsurigoto*), implied the idea of worship, then, when he delegated his sacerdotal function and retained only his political power, by the priests officiating as his representatives, the *nakatomi*, 'intermediary ministers,' the privileged, hereditary reciters of the *norito* (rituals). Another hereditary corporation, however, the *imibe*, 'abstaining' priests, used to read certain of the *norito* (nos. 8 and 9 in the *Engishiki* collection; see MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 297). Apart from the emperor, the heads of noble families had charge of certain forms of cult—which explains the establishment, in 577, of a hereditary corporation for the worship of the sun. Finally, as the priesthood underwent organization, different classes of local priests performed similar functions, from the *kannushi*, chief priests in charge of a temple, down to the *hafuri* or *hōri*, inferior priests who were originally sacrificers but whose name came to be written with the Chinese characters meaning 'prayer-officials,' and the *negi*, also of humble rank, whose name seems simply to come from the verb *negafu*, 'to pray.'

2. To whom offered.—The *norito* were addressed sometimes to one or several individual gods, sometimes to a class of gods (*e.g.*, in 866 to the deities of all the provinces of the Nankaido district), and sometimes to all the gods (see MAGIC [Japanese]). An interesting point to notice here is that, with the development of the imperial prestige on the one hand, and ancestor-worship under Chinese influence on the other, the custom arose of addressing prayers to deceased Mikados. These prayers are not mentioned in any of the *norito* of the *Engishiki*, but only in the later *norito* (9th cent. onwards).

Prayers for rain were made in 841 to the emperor Jimmu and the empress Jingō: in 850 Jimmu was again besought to cure an illness of the reigning Mikado; in 864 and 866 prayers were offered to the emperor Ojin, who, under the name Hachiman, was destined to become one of the favourite figures in the Japanese pantheon.

3. For whom offered.—Prayer was made for the emperor, his court, and his people (see MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. esp. p. 296[b], rituals 1–3, p. 297, rituals 4, 8–10, p. 298, rituals 12, 15, p. 299, rituals 25, 27). But it must be observed that in this very simple conception there is none of the moral ideas that lead us at various times to pray specially for the just, or for sinners, or for infidels, and so on. Similarly, there were no prayers for the dead, the idea of the soul's survival and fate in another world being very vague among the primitive Japanese (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Japanese], vol. i. p. 456[b]).

4. For what offered.—Prayer was not made for the spiritual blessings that are regarded as the primary object of prayer in the West, but for far more practical and everyday boons. The Christian

[1] For further details see Stevenson, *Notes on Modern Jainism*, p. 102 ff.

[2] In the *Jaina Gazette*, Lucknow, Aug. 1915, p. 196.

prays for whatever will help him to attain his final goal, viz. happiness in the future life; when he asks for grace, virtue, or other spiritual blessings, it is with this ideal in view; and he does not pray for bodily or material blessings, such as health and success, except as means to this end. The primitive Japanese had no such ideas. Their *norito* have no conception of moral progress or eternal salvation; they simply seek for earthly goods—for the emperor health, long life, protection of his palace from all forms of destruction, especially fire, safe journeys for ambassadors to foreign lands, and internal and external peace for his empire (see art. MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 297, ritual 8 f., p. 298, rituals 11 f., 14 f., p. 299, rituals 23, 27); for the people a good harvest, protection of the crops from inclement weather or floods, rain in times of drought, safety from epidemics, and general prosperity (*ib.* p. 296[b], ritual 1, p. 297, ritual, 4, p. 298, ritual 13, p. 299, ritual 25). The idea of purification, which often appears in these texts (*ib.* p. 297[b], ritual 10, and *passim*), is confined mainly to ritual purity, though the moral element is not quite excluded. Sometimes the *norito* is meant to appease the anger of the gods, when the care of their temples or the precautions for ritual purity necessary for their worship have been neglected. Finally, besides petitions and expiations, the *norito* is sometimes a means of announcing some important piece of news to the gods—an accession to the throne, the changing of the name of an era, an enemy invasion, the nomination of a prince as heir or of a vestal of imperial blood, and so on. The most interesting among these announcements are unquestionably those advising a deity of his promotion, by the emperor, to a higher rank in the celestial hierarchy (based on the Chinese system of official ranks, in the 7th century).

In 672 three deities supplied some useful military information; as soon as the war was finished, the emperor, upon the report received from his generals, raised these deities to higher rank. In 838 a similar distinction was bestowed on a young god in defiance of seniority, and a jealous goddess showed her anger by pouring a volcanic shower on the eastern provinces. In 840 the great deity of Deha sent a shower of stones, and the emperor conferred the second grade of the fourth rank on her, with congratulations on her marvellous power. In 851 Susa-no-wo and Oho-kuni-nushi (see NATURE [Japanese], vol. ix. p. 235[b], and HEROES AND HERO-GODS [Japanese], vol. vi. p. 662[b]) obtained the second grade of the third rank, and, eight years after, the first grade of the same rank, which, however, does not make them higher than an important minister or a successful chamberlain. In 860 a volcano of Satsuma was placed in a lower subdivision of the second grade of the fourth rank. In 868 the gods of Hirota and Ikuta caused seismic shocks, and were immediately presented with a diploma. In 898, 340 gods were promoted by the emperor Daigo as a bounty, at his happy accession. In 1076 and 1172 promotions were made *en masse*.

These examples show the essentially positive character of the *norito* and the distance that separates them from the lyrical outbursts that we think of when we speak of prayer properly so called. Even in those *norito* which approach most nearly to normal prayer the formula is more of the nature of a contract with the gods; gifts and vague praises are offered to them in exchange for their benefits, and they are promised further rewards, if necessary, should their services turn out satisfactory (see MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 296[b], rituals, 1–3, p. 297, ritual 4).

5. Nature of prayer.—We must distinguish between the basis and the form, the moral dispositions and the material conditions. As regards the inner feelings, a reading of the *norito* shows that the primitive Japanese, though they felt sincere regard for the beneficent gods (see NATURE [Japanese], vol. ix. p. 233), never had that implicit confidence in addressing them which is generally considered, especially among Christian peoples, an essential quality in prayer. On the contrary, it is clearly seen that they often distrusted their gods, for they sometimes made them conditional offerings only (*e.g.*, MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 296[b], ritual 1, and below, ritual 3). This attitude throws light on the magical rather than religious character of their invocations.

As regards the material conditions, it is not surprising to find that this people, always so polite, maintained a most respectful attitude towards their gods. Sometimes they bowed to the ground (the verb *wogamu*, 'to pray,' comes from *worikagamu*, 'to bend,' according to the native philologists); sometimes they bent the knee 'like the stag,' or 'plunged down the root of the neck like the cormorant'; they clapped their hands (*kashihade*)—a mark of respect in ancient Japan; they 'humbly presented' or 'raised aloft' in front of them or on their heads (*itadaku*) their offerings, which, they declared, had been 'prepared with profound respect'; and in the same deferential attitude they 'lifted their eyes' (*awogu*) to the heavens (see *TASJ* vii. [1889], pt. ii. pp. 116 f., 130, pt. iv. pp. 426, 433 f., 444, etc.). But there is no doubt that the essential point was the perfect accuracy of the formula pronounced, for on it depended the magical virtue of the prayer (see, *e.g.*, MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 298[a]). The Japanese, however, gave the gods the credit of being sensitive to the literary beauty of the text, to the sonorousness of their long, majestically balanced periods; *e.g.*, in one version of the *Nihongi* (i. 46; tr. W. G. Aston, London, 1896, i. 49) the sun-goddess is represented as having been won over by the harmonious language of the ritual composed to persuade her to leave her cavern and light the universe again.

6. Place of prayer.—The place for offering prayers naturally depended on the ceremonies with which they were connected. It was often the palace itself (*e.g.*, to mention only some of the important rituals, nos. 1, 8, 10, 12, etc.), the great temple of Ise (*e.g.*, nos. 16–24), or other sacred places, and sometimes the temple of a local god (*e.g.*, no. 5, at Hirano, a village in the province of Settsu). In many cases the chief ceremony took place at Kyōto and was repeated in the province. There were also domestic celebrations, as at the *Nihiname* (see MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 298[b], ritual 14), which, besides its public rites in the temple, was performed privately in the family, and to which no stranger was admitted—for fear of pollution, no doubt. What the texts never mention is the intimate individual prayer in the inner chamber which the gospel recommends (Mt 6[6]). This seems to have had practically no place in the devotions of the primitive Japanese.

7. Times of prayer.—Sometimes prayers were monthly (the title of the 7th ritual, *Tsukinami no Matsuri*, shows that originally at least it was a 'monthly' celebration), sometimes twice a year (*e.g.*, 10th ritual), sometimes annual (*e.g.*, 1st ritual), at certain appointed months and days (*e.g.*, 1st ritual on 4th day of 2nd month; 10th ritual, on last day of 6th and 12th months), and at fixed hours (*e.g.*, 3rd ritual, at sunrise; 10th ritual, at sunset). Others were used only when the occasion for which they were suited arose (*e.g.*, 14th ritual, at the accession of a new emperor). The priestly functionaries, from the Mikado himself, seem to have prayed much more frequently; we know, *e.g.*, that a high official called *haku*, who presided over the Jingikwan ('Department of Religion'), took the emperor's place whenever he was prevented by illness from saying his daily prayers. But here again the texts make no mention of daily prayers, far less of prayers twice or thrice daily, among the people, and it is probable that they were usually content to leave that duty to those whose professional function it was to offer prayers.

8. Typical example of Shintō prayer.—As a

typical example, in which the general features of the rituals are combined under the recognized form, we may quote the 3rd *norito*, which is neither among the finest nor among the poorest, but is a good average, and is short. It is addressed to the goddess of food, one of the great figures in Shintō (see NATURE [Japanese], vol. ix. p. 239[b], last paragraph, and p. 240), and, secondarily, to the gods of ravines who send water to irrigate the imperial farms.

'He [the *nakatomi*, in the name of the Mikado] declares the august name of the sovran god whose praises are fulfilled at Kahahi in Hirose [a village in the district of Hirose, where the goddess has a secondary temple, her chief temple being at Ise]. Declaring her august name at the Young-food-woman's augustness [Waka-uka-no-me no mikoto, one of the alternative names of the goddess], who rules over the august food, he fulfils praises in the august presence of this sovran deity. He says: "Hear all ye *kannushi* and *hafuri* the fulfilling of praises, by sending the princes and councillors to lift up and bring the great august offerings of the sovran august grandchild's augustness." He says: "Deign to declare in the presence of the sovran deity that as to great august offerings which are set up, he deposits in abundance and offers up, as to august clothing, bright cloth, glittering cloth, fine cloth, and coarse cloth, the five kinds of things, a mantlet, spear, and august horse; and as to august liquors, raising high the beer [saké]-jars, filling and ranging in rows the bellies of the beer-jars, in soft grain and in coarse grain [*i.e.* hulled rice and paddy]; as to things which dwell in the mountains, things soft of hair and things rough of hair [birds and beasts]; as to things which grow in the great field plain, sweet herbs and bitter herbs; as to things which dwell in the blue sea plain, things wide of fin and things narrow of fin, down to weeds of the offing and weeds of the shore." He says: "Declare in the presence of the sovran deity that, if the sovran deity with peaceful and tranquil heart accepts as peaceful august offerings and sufficient august offerings the great august offerings thus set up, and if the sovran deity will deign to perfect and bless in many-bundled ears the sovran deity's harvest-fields in the first place and also the late-ripening august harvest which the august children [princes of the blood], princes, councillors and great august people of the region under heaven shall make by dripping the foam from their arms and drawing the mud together between the opposing thighs, in order that it may be taken by the sovran august grandchild's augustness with ruddy countenance as his long august food and distant august food, he will draw hither the firstfruits both in liquor and in husk, even to a thousand plants and many thousands plants, and piling them up like a range of hills, will offer them up at the autumn service." He says: "Hear all ye *kannushi* and *hafuri*." He sets up the great august offerings of the sovran august grandchild's augustness, bright cloth, glittering cloth, soft cloth, and coarse cloth, the five kinds of things, down on the mantlet and spear, in the presence of the sovran gods also who dwell in the entrances of mountains of the six august farms of the province of Yamato. As to the setting up of offerings in this way, if the water which the sovran gods deign to send boiling down the ravines from the entrances of the mountains which they rule be received as sweet water, and ye [gods of the mountains] will deign to bless the late-ripening harvest which the great august people of the region under heaven have made, and deign not to inflict on it bad winds and rough waters, the princes, councillors, functionaries, down to the male and female servants of the six august farms of the province of Yamato, will all come forth on the [number] day of the [number] month of this year, to set up the firstfruits in juice and in the husk, raising high the beer-jars, filling and ranging in rows the bellies of the beer-jars, piling up the offerings like a range of hills, and plunging down the root of the neck cormorant-wise in the presence of the sovran gods, will fulfil praises as the morning sun rises in glory' (*Hirose oho-imi no matsuri*, tr. E. Satow, in *TASJ* vii. pt. iv. p. 433).

9. Modern prayer.—Later, when the nationalist scholars tried to revive pure Shintō, in opposition to Buddhism and Confucianism, the most devout of them, Hirata, composed in 1811 a book of prayers called *Tamadasuki*, which, unlike the ancient *norito*, was meant for private worship. It is interesting to see how prayer was conceived by the chief theologian of modern Shintoism. Hirata's views are as follows:

'As the number of the gods who possess different functions is so great, it will be convenient to worship by name only the most important, and to include the rest in a general petition. Those whose daily affairs are so multitudinous that they have no time to go through the whole of the following morning prayers, may content themselves with adoring the residence of the emperor, the domestic *kami-dana* [the shelf on which the household gods are placed], the spirits of their ancestors, their local patron god, and the deity of their particular calling in life. In praying to the gods, the blessings which each has it in his power to bestow are to be mentioned in a few words, and they are not to be annoyed with greedy petitions; for the Mikado in his palace offers up petitions daily on behalf of his people, which are far more effectual than those of his subjects. Rising early in the morning, wash your face and hands, rinse out the mouth, and cleanse the body. Then turn towards the province of Yamato, strike the palms of the hands together twice, and worship, bowing the head to the ground. The proper posture is that of kneeling on the heels, which is ordinarily assumed in saluting a superior.'

Then follows a specimen prayer: 'From a distance I reverently worship with awe before Ame no Mi-hashira and Kuni no Mi-hashira, also called Shina-tsu-hiko no kami and Shina-tsu hime no kami [the god and goddess of wind; see art. NATURE [Japanese], vol. ix. p. 236[a]], to whom is consecrated the palace built with stout pillars at Tatsuta no Tachinu in the department of Heguri in the province of Yamato [cf. art. MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 297[a], ritual 4]. I say with awe, deign to bless me by correcting the unwitting faults which, seen and heard by you, I have committed, by blowing off and clearing away the calamities which evil gods might inflict, by causing me to live long like the hard and lasting rock, and by repeating to the gods of heavenly origin and to the gods of earthly origin the petitions which I present every day, along with your breath, that they may hear with the sharp-earedness of the forth-galloping colt.' (Other analogous prayers follow, addressed to other deities, for which see Satow, 'The Revival of pure Shin-tau,' in *TASJ* iii., App., Yokohama, 1883, p. 72 ff.)

Without emphasizing the artificial nature of these prayers, which, in spite of the express aim of their author to the contrary, are patently inspired largely by Buddhist tendencies and especially by Chinese ideas, we may question whether they were ever used by the worshippers for whom they were intended, for the first five volumes of Hirata's book were not printed till 1829, and the following four not till some time after his death, which occurred in 1843.

Official *norito* are composed to this day, for all special occasions (*e.g.*, the conferring of posthumous honours on early Mikados, invocation of the gods of war, etc.). On the other hand, the common people offer informal prayers to various familiar gods—*e.g.*, to Inari, originally the protector of agriculture, then a kind of Japanese Providence, when they are sowing rice or beginning a commercial enterprise, etc. The worshipper who may be seen standing in front of a temple, pulling the white cord that rings a bell to attract the attention of the god, and then praying for a moment with clasped hands, is usually offering a personal petition of the most paltry kind. The more general type of modern prayer asks for 'peace to the land, safety to the household, and abundant harvest.' But modern Shintō prayers, like those of twelve hundred years ago, are always essentially positive, inspired by human wisdom alone; and, whenever a somewhat elevated moral or mystical idea appears in them, it is the result of Buddhist influence.

LITERATURE.—See the sources cited in the article.

MICHEL REVON.

PRAYER (Jewish).—I. *BIBLICAL AND PRE-TALMUDIC.*—As far back as we can trace its history, we find prayer occupying a central position in the Jewish religion. It was an inseparable accompaniment of sacrifice, and its significance in the religious life of the individual and of the nation at large increased in the same degree as the knowledge of the power, justice, and goodness of God advanced. A profound conception of the nature of prayer is betrayed in the designation *tephillāh*, which, according to Goldziher, really means 'invocation of God as judge.' In the mouth of almost all the important characters of the OT, from Abraham onwards, we find personal prayers—prayers of thanksgiving and praise, of intercession and confession. A very characteristic example is found in Solomon's prayer at the dedication of the Temple (1 K 8^{12-53}), which, although undoubtedly of a later date, contains all the four kinds of prayer mentioned above. Down to the last days of the first Temple there were no formal prescribed prayers—not even a general command to pray. Prayer was rather, both in form and in contents, an individual thing, nor was there any kind of precept as to its time or place. In Dt $26^{5-10, 13-15}$

we meet for the first time with forms of prayer, which are to be uttered on the occasions of offering the firstlings and the tithes. Among the prayers of individuals before the Exile those of the prophet Jeremiah are of the highest order (Smend, *AT Religionsgeschichte*[2], p. 263 f.).

1. The prophets.—The work of the prophets in making religion more of an inward thing, which found expression chiefly in their low estimate of the sacrificial cult, did not have its full effect among the mass of the people till the time of the Exile, when it found its natural expression in the prayers of the Jews. Towards the end of the Exile a prophet (Is 56[7]) describes the temple of the future as a 'house of prayer for all peoples.'

2. The Psalms.—At a later date the prayers known to us as 'the Psalms' took their rise, but, owing to a tendency of a still later period, they were referred back to remote antiquity—to the time of David. They are far more probably the fruit of the religion of the prophets, giving in prayer-form the thoughts that had entered into the consciousness of the people from the teaching of the prophets. After the return from the Exile, and when the second Temple had been erected, the Psalms became the Temple liturgy, in spite of the fact that, to a considerable extent, they formed a protest against the sacrificial cult of the Temple. That God desires and needs no sacrifice, but only the pure heart and the good deed, is a constantly recurring theme of the Psalms. Besides the moral teaching of the religion of the prophets, the Psalms deal chiefly with the sufferings of the people—particularly of the righteous—the sins of the nation and of the individual, memories of the nation's past, hopes of the final mercy of God, and His justice and power in nature and in history.

The collecting of the Psalms, which was gradually accomplished between the Exile and the Maccabæan period, was undoubtedly made in the first place for liturgical purposes; still it is very questionable, in the case of many Psalms, whether they were originally composed as songs for the congregation, while, in the case of others, the titles themselves as well as internal evidence point to their liturgical use. In form the Psalms are very varied and differ much in value, but, as far as their contents are concerned, they represent the highest product of the religious poetry of all nations.

'After reading the prayers of other nations, no unprejudiced critic would deny that the Hebrew Psalms stand out unique among the prayers of the whole world, by their simplicity, their power and the majesty of their language, though, like all collections of prayers, the collection of the Psalms also contains some which one would not be sorry to miss' (Max Muller, 'On Ancient Prayers,' in *Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut*, Berlin, 1897, p. 40).

3. The synagogue.—The Psalms, which indeed still presuppose the sacrificial cult, and were sung in connexion with it, symbolize the transition to the new form of worship which we find in the synagogue. The origin of the synagogue is hidden in obscurity, but it is pretty certain that the work of Ezra, in introducing the Tôrāh as the law-book and book of devotion for the whole people, led to the institution of the synagogue (*bēth hakkᵉnīsēth*, 'house of assembling'; then translated Gr. συναγωγή along with προσευχή). The first mention of synagogues seems to occur in a Maccabæan Psalm (74[8]). In the first place the synagogue served the purposes of religious instruction, and was the means by which the Tôrāh entered into the flesh and blood of the people—a result which we see clearly in several Psalms (19[8-12] 119). In the reading of the Tôrāh, with accompanying translation and explanation in the Aramaic dialect of the people, which took place on all the Sabbaths, feast-days, and the market-days (Mondays and Thursdays), the people were at first entirely passive, being merely listeners. Gradually prayer was added—at first only in the form of several important sections of the Tôrāh, which bore the character of a devotional or edifying reading, and which were repeated by the people as a sort of confession. This is the so-called *Shᵉma'* (Dt 6[4-8] 11[13-21], Nu 15[37-41]). It was regarded by Josephus (*Ant.* IV. viii. 13) as an institution that had long existed. Gradually the *Shᵉma'* was provided with a framework of introductory and concluding pieces, which were no longer taken from the Tôrāh, but were original compositions that, as far as their contents were concerned, were prayers in the real sense of the term.

Besides these, there arose, perhaps at the same time, a quite independent prayer, which was designated as the prayer κατ' ἐξοχήν, as *tᵉphillāh*. This prayer, which has gone through a considerable historical development and in its later form was called *Shᵉmōneh 'Esrēh* (*i.e.* 'eighteen,' because it contains eighteen benedictions), seems to be influenced in some way by the Hebrew Psalm of Sirach (51[12]). The oldest part of the prayer is composed of the first three and the last three benedictions. The *Shᵉmōneh 'Esrēh* remains to the present day the real congregational prayer of Judaism. It is very well suited to this purpose, as it unites in simple speech the four chief kinds of prayer (thanksgiving, praise, petition, and confession), and gives expression to them from the standpoint of the people as a whole.

4. Family prayer.—Along with the synagogue the home also became a place of worship. It is doubtful whether the praying three times a day mentioned in Ps 55[17] and Dn 6[10] was a standing institution. In any case it is certain that at an early date family prayer, with a special liturgy for the evening of the Passover and for the beginning and end of the Sabbath (*Qiddūsh, Habhdālāh*), was customary. Then, too, prayer was offered at the beginning and end of every meal; and, later, on the occasion of every enjoyment whatever, at the commencement of every important work, at every outstanding event or experience, a special *bᵉrākhāh* (blessing) was spoken. Thus in course of time every activity of life, every place, and every portion of time were permeated with thoughts of God. The demand that every action should be *lᵉshēm shāmāyim* ('to the name of God,' 'consecrated to God') was thus literally fulfilled and 'the whole of life became a Divine service with interruptions' (M. Steinschneider).

5. Rivalry between synagogue and Temple.—This new form of worship in the synagogue and in the home constitutes perhaps the greatest and most radical reform in the whole history of the Jewish religion. For, although we possess no historical report of any revolt against the introduction of this worship, there naturally existed from the beginning a deep-seated opposition between the ancient Temple cult, which presupposed only one central sanctuary, and the synagogues, which existed in countless numbers and could be erected even beyond the confines of Palestine, wherever Jews were to be found. In the Temple a hereditary priestly aristocracy conducted the service, while the new form of worship was based on a purely democratic foundation, and any one who possessed sufficient knowledge and commanded respect might officiate. In the one case sacrifices, which at least in part were of a sacramental nature (*e.g.*, the sacrifices of atonement and purification), formed the chief part of the service, while the liturgy had only a secondary place. In the synagogue, on the other hand, the model of a purely spiritual service was seen for the first time. Here

there was to be found nothing mystical or symbolical—only prayer and instruction, without any ritual accompaniment. In this respect the synagogue is the most real result of the prophetic religion. It made Judaism entirely independent of the Temple, and prepared men's minds for its overthrow.

6. Use of the popular dialect.—It is also worthy of mention that everywhere the dialect of the people was used in prayer along with Hebrew. In fact, in many important prayers the popular language was prescribed for those who did not know Hebrew. The Egyptian Jews in particular, who used the Septuagint instead of the Hebrew originals in divine service, developed also a Greek prayer-book. The numerous prayers contained in the Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha indicate how rich this literature must have been.

The early Christian liturgy is entirely modelled on the Jewish. This is seen not only in the Lord's Prayer, which is entirely composed of parts of Jewish prayer, but also in the other ancient Christian prayers as well as in the whole organization of the service.

7. Consequences of the destruction of the Temple.—After the fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple the synagogue, which had for long been the most important representative of Jewish religious life, became the only centre uniting the Jews of the Dispersion. From this time onwards the scribes sought more and more to establish, as far as possible, uniformity in the services. With the exception of a few ancient prayers in the Aramaic dialect (*e.g.*, the *Qaddish*), Hebrew alone came to be used in public prayer. The language of the prayers also became more fixed; in particular, the *Shᵉmōneh 'Esrēh* underwent what was for the time at least a final revision; new prayers for the service of the congregation were composed; the time and the outward form of the service as a whole were more and more fixed with painful exactness. While at an earlier date the element of instruction held the chief place, now prayer came to occupy an equally important position. The reading, translation, and explanation of the Scriptures on Sabbaths and feast-days continued to form an integral part of the service. In addition to the reading of the Tôrāh, lessons were also read from the Prophets, to which the name *haphṭārāh* (*i.e.* 'closing') was applied, because they concluded the service, or because they concluded the reading of the Tôrāh. The explanation of the sections read from the Tôrāh was called the Midrāsh, and developed gradually into lectures based on a Scripture text and embracing the whole body of Jewish religious and national ideas. These lectures formed the model for the Christian sermon.

The classical work of Zunz, *Die gottesdienstliche Vorträge der Juden*, gives a critical history of the Midrāsh and at the same time of the synagogue service, while it brings out clearly the intimate historical connexion between prayer and sermon, which mutually completed and enriched each other.

The content of the prayers was widened after the destruction of the Temple, when the desire for the restoration of political independence, the rebuilding of the Temple, and the re-introduction of its worship came to occupy an important place. This desire appears, for the most part, in connexion with the Messianic hope, which is found in prayers from the time of Sirach, but first obtained decisive significance in the consciousness of the people after the great national catastrophe. This hope appears now in a gross form in the purely external conception that an earthly saviour would free the people from misery and servitude, now in a deeper and more spiritual form in the vision of the coming of the Kingdom of God (*Malkhūth shāmāyim*), *i.e.* the time when God shall be acknowledged and worshipped by all peoples, and when righteousness and peace shall reign on the whole earth.

This thought finds full expression in the prayers appointed for the New Year Festival and for the Day of Atonement, partly composed at the beginning of the 3rd century A.D.

As an example we may refer to the prayer ascribed to Rabh (175–247) based on Sirach 36 (33)[1ff.]: 'Lay then Thy fear on all Thy creatures, that all beings may worship, that all whom Thou hast created may fall before Thee, and that all may make one only covenant to do Thy will with all their heart, as we have long known that the power and the might belongeth unto Thee, and that Thy name is exalted over all that Thou hast created.'

In the liturgy associated with these two festivals the creative religious genius of Talmudic Judaism was specially manifested. For the richness of this New Year's liturgy in beautiful and thoughtful prayers was really the first thing to lend a religious significance to this festival, and to give it the place which it has since held in the popular consciousness alongside of the festival of the Day of Atonement as one of the chief festivals of the year. These prayers, in which the national element recedes into the background, ascribe to God the dignity of the world's Judge on the one hand and that of the forgiving Father on the other, and offer us a clear view of the whole Jewish system of doctrine regarding sin, repentance, and forgiveness.

II. *TALMUDIC AND MEDIÆVAL.*—**1. Prayer and service in the Talmud.**—The predominating place which the synagogue service came to occupy in the religious life finds outward expression in the fact that the Mishnāh, the official law-book (closed about A.D. 200), begins with the treatise *Bᵉrākhôth*, which deals with prayer in all its aspects. The wealth of material contained in this treatise, as well as in the treatises *Mᵉgillāh* and *Ta'anîth* in the Mishnāh, and in the contemporaneous but unaccepted collection Tosephta, was materially increased in the following three centuries in the high schools of Palestine and Babylon, and its religious and historical significance has never been sufficiently appreciated. In spite of the scruples entertained among Jewish scholars about reducing prayers to a fixed form, and although they even censured those who could not vary them, and opposed the writing down of prayers ('Those who commit prayers to writing burn the Tôrāh' [Tos. *Shabbāth*, xiii. 4]), the necessities of life brought about a uniformity in the synagogue service and partially even in family worship. This was the case among the whole people, the individuality of the worshipper being disregarded. It required several centuries, however, before congregational prayer really assumed a fixed form. Within the prescribed prayers room was of course left at various places for the individual needs of the worshipper.

This stated synagogue service was of the greatest importance in the religious training of the people. Prayers were offered three times every day (*shaḥarīth*, *minḥāh*, *ma'ariḥh*); on Sabbaths and feast-days a fourth supplementary prayer (*mūsāph*) took the place of the earlier sacrifices. By means of these services the most important religious duties, the chief doctrines of Judaism, and the most important hopes of his nation were ever afresh brought home to the consciousness of the worshipper, so that he never was actually freed from the atmosphere of prayer.

On the other hand, there was a danger in these prayers which were fixed and unchangeable as to hour, content, and form. They tended, among the masses of the people, to make prayer a purely external and mechanical affair. Hence the scholars who were the framers of the public liturgy constantly emphasized that prayer was to be regarded not as an obligatory service, but as a 'worship with the heart'—that 'God desires only the heart.'

Accordingly, short prayers were frequently recommended, and as early as the beginning of the 3rd cent. a short extract was taken from the *Shᵉmōneh 'Esrēh* (*Hābhinēnū*). In this connexion there is a specially significant conception for which we have no term in any other ancient language—not even in the NT—namely, *kawwānāh*, 'devotion' (more exactly *kawwānāth hallēbh*, 'direction of the heart'). The *kawwānāh* is, in numerous passages in the Talmud, demanded as the chief requirement for every prayer. These passages have been collected by Maimonides (12th cent.), who has expressed the demand for contemplative devotion in the following form:

'Prayer without devotion is no prayer at all. The man who has prayed without devotion ought to pray once more. He whose thoughts are wandering or occupied with other things need not pray. . . . What then is devotion? One must free his heart from all other thoughts and regard himself as standing in the presence of God. Therefore, before engaging in prayer, the worshipper ought to go aside for a little in order to bring himself into a devotional frame of mind, and then he must pray quietly and with feeling, not like one who carries a weight and throws it away and goes farther. Then after prayer the worshipper ought to sit quiet for a little and then depart. The pious folk of old waited an hour before prayer and an hour after, and engaged in prayer for a whole hour. . . . One ought not to go to prayer immediately after jest or frivolous talk, or conversation, quarrelling or anger, but only after a discourse of a religious tenor' (*Mishneh Tōrah, Hilᵉkhōth Tᵉphillah* iv. 15 f.).

2. Social significance of the service.—Since in the prayers of the congregation the individual's private interests had to take a second place, the public services constituted an important social factor. In the synagogue there was no room for egoistic prayers, and even in the prayers for the congregation requests for material good were subordinated to petitions for the enlightening of the spirit and for moral power. As these prayers did not satisfy the individual needs of the worshipper, a number of personal prayers were formed for private devotion which differed in outward form from the prayers of the congregation by the use of the singular, while the latter invariably use the plural. These personal prayers were said at the end of the public worship (cf. Elbogen, *Studien*, p. 41). They are characterized by a special tenderness and inwardness and only a few of them have been included in the Jewish Prayer Book. As an example of these private prayers we may quote the prayer of R. Yehuda, the redactor of the Mishnāh, which is still preserved in the daily morning prayer:

'May it be Thy will, eternal God, our God, the God of our fathers, to keep us [in the Prayer Book 'me'] from insolence that is foreign to us, or arrogance that is our own, from an evil man, an evil fate, an evil instinct, an evil companion, an evil neighbour, from the tempter who brings destruction, from a cruel judgment-seat and a cruel enemy, be he a son of the covenant [*i.e.* a Jew] or be he a stranger' (*Berākhōth*, 16b). A number of other private prayers are found translated in the present writer's *Bousset's Rel. des Judentums . . . kritisch untersucht*, p. 99 f.

Beautiful thoughts on prayer are to be found scattered through the whole of the Talmudic literature, and they testify to a sound moral judgment as well as to keenness in psychological insight. We may here quote the most interesting sentence:

'It can be discovered from the prayers of a man, whether he be a *talmidh hakhām* [*i.e.* a man of culture in the moral and religious sphere] or a *bōr* [*i.e.* an uncultured person]' (Tos. *Berākhōth*, i. 6, and parallel passages).

3. External form of the service.—Regarding the external form of the service, we can gather very little from ancient sources. The reason for this silence is, of course, to be found in the absolute simplicity of the service, which was devoid of anything like ceremony. Owing to the lack of any written prayer book in the age of the Talmud, the prayers had to be spoken by a reciter (*shᵉliaḥ ṣibbûr*, lit. 'deputy of the congregation'; later, *ḥazzān*), and the people took part in them, repeating in many places 'Amen,' but often expressing their agreement in longer responses. Any full-grown male Jew might act as leader in prayer, but the duty was preferably entrusted to the most learned. The leader went (at least in Babylonia; cf. Elbogen, *Studien*, p. 33) to a lower place in front of the worshippers and prayed standing, with his face turned towards the sacred ark. The congregation, consisting of at least ten male adults, stood during a part of the prayers (particularly during the *Shᵉmōneh 'Esrēh*, which thus came to be called *'Amīdhah*). At other parts they bent their heads, and at some portions sank down on their knees. During prayer the worshippers covered themselves with the prayer-cloth (*ṭallīth*), which was provided with fringes (*ṣīṣīth*). On week-days the phylacteries (*tᵉphillīn*) were also worn on the head and the left arm. The use of these was based on the literal interpretation of the two passages contained in the *Shᵉma'* (viz. Dt 6⁸ and Nu 15³⁷ᶠᶠ.). The *ṭallīth* and *tᵉphillīn* were supposed to serve as memorials (*'ōth*), but not as amulets. Neither to any of the customs mentioned nor to prayer at all (contrasting with Christianity) was there any kind of material influence ascribed. Nor, as was expressly emphasized, did the benediction of the priest have any external effect, 'as God but not the priests can grant blessing' (*Siphrē*, § 43, on Nu 6²⁷). Moreover, the strict monotheism of the Jews permitted no kind of mediation in prayer by higher beings. Only in a few places (and in none of the official prayers) do we find the angels called on to intercede, while eminent scholars protested emphatically against the custom. It was not till the Middle Ages, when, owing to external oppression and internal ignorance, a darker spirit took possession of Judaism, that the expression 'the angel of mercy' was introduced into the Prayer Book by the Ḳabbālā. Even the names of the angels invoked in prayer—Sandalphōn and Meṭaṭrōn—show that we have here to do with ideas introduced from without.

The close of the Talmud (*c.* A.D. 500), when all Jewish traditions were reduced to writing, did not by any means give the liturgy a stereotyped form, although prayer-books can be traced back to the 7th century. On the other hand, we have now, much more than formerly, alongside of the statutory prayers, to reckon with the *minhāgh*, *i.e.* the local usage which not only decided on form and use and created many new prayers, but also often directly opposed the Talmud. In consequence of the dispersion of the Jews in the different lands, climate and external circumstances exerted quite as strong an influence on the *minhāgh* as the language, customs, and civilization of the neighbouring peoples. In order to restrict the variety that thus arose in the ritual, the Gᵉônîm, or heads of the Babylonian high schools, whose authority was recognized by all Jews, gave reasoned decisions, in answer to questions addressed to them. These decisions were then collected, and are preserved to the present day. We have to thank the Gᵉônîm for the first ordered form of prayer with reasons for the same, called *Siddûr*, of which the oldest extant is that of Gāôn 'Amrām (9th century). Special importance attaches to the *Siddûr* of Gāôn Sa'adya (10th century). The later and more complete collections of this kind were called *Maḥzōr* (lit. 'year-cycle')—an expression which came to be used for prayer-books generally, particularly in connexion with the feast-days.

In spite of all decisions and ordered forms for prayer, in spite also of all endeavours of the great codifiers (among them Maimonides [*q.v.*]), the attempt to obtain uniformity of service was not successful. In fact, there came to be two groups

of sharply contrasted liturgical services which were further subdivided into many smaller groups: (1) the Palestinian group, which permeated the nations of N. Europe, and thus came to be called the 'German'; and (2) the Arabic group, which drew its adherents from the Jews dwelling round the Mediterranean (with the exception of Greece and Italy), and, as it was in use principally in the Peninsula, was called the 'Spanish' group. These two groups, which still exist alongside of each other, differ particularly with regard to the poetical prayers which, since the 8th cent., it has been customary on the feast-days and on certain Sabbaths to insert in the principal prayers.

4. The synagogue poetry.—Little can be discovered with regard to the origin of the synagogue poetry—*pīyyûṭ*, as it was called.

It is not at all improbable that the Syrian and Greek hymns of the Church had an influence in the matter. The term applied to the poet of the synagogue—*paiṭān* or *payyáṭ* (from ποιητής)—points at once to a foreign origin. Zunz rightly emphasizes the fact that the Jews had in their Psalms an ancient foundation, to build on which they required only the fitting materials. Any account of the history of the *pīyyûṭ* must be based on the work of Zunz, *Die synagogale Poesie des Mittelalters*.

The oldest poetical compositions were without rhyme or metre, and for the most part with alphabetical arrangement of the lines and sections. Rhyme is found as early as the 8th cent., while verse measure was introduced by Spanish poets after the second half of the 10th century.

Zunz traces the origin of synagogue poetry to the tendency 'to give to the history and sacred traditions of Israel a form ennobled by art and beautified by song, and (by changing the commanded service into a spontaneous homage) in this way to make the synagogue to the Jew what the Olympic games and tragedies had been to the Greek—a place where the national genius was embodied and spiritualized, where it was seen and felt to be the costliest possession of the community and of every individual' (*Literaturgesch. der synagogalen Poesie*, p. 22 f.).

The authors of the oldest synagogue poems are unknown to us. These were composed, no doubt, for the most part by the leaders in prayer themselves, and were, to begin with, only listened to by the congregation but not repeated. Before long, however, these poems were also sung, so that the voice of song in divine service, which had been silent since the destruction of the Temple, was heard once more, and the leader in prayer became the precentor. Poetical sections were first inserted in the passages preceding and following the *Shᵉma'*; hence their names (*yōṣēr*, *ōphān*, *zūlāth*). But the main endeavours of the *paiṭānîm* were directed towards adorning the first blessings of the *tᵉphillāh*. The compositions belonging to this class were called *qᵉrōbhāh* (cf. Syr. *kūrōbhō*, 'mass'). Further poetical compositions were provided for the Day of Atonement (*'abhōdhāh*, a description of the Temple service at that day in old times), for *shābhū'ôth* (*'azhārôth*, enumerations of the precepts of the Tōrāh), for the 9th of Ab (the day of mourning for the destruction of the Temple, called *qīnôth*, 'lamentations'), and for the seventh day of the Feast of Tabernacles, called *hōsha'nôth*.

'In course of time the *pīyyûṭ* found its way into every part of the religious life and every portion of the service. Nor was it confined to the synagogue. It entered into the family, and had its place there at the Sabbath meals, at the close of the Sabbath, in the joys as well as in the sorrows of the house, at births and at funerals' (Zunz, *Die synagogale Poesie des Mittelalters*, p. 70).

Material for the *pīyyûṭ* was found in the inexhaustible wealth of ideas contained in the Midrāsh, whose place was gradually taken in the course of the centuries by the *pīyyûṭ*, as the ever-increasing number of poetical compositions quite displaced the lecture.

A specially important kind of synagogue poetry is the *sᵉlīḥāh*, prayer for forgiveness, penitential prayer. The service for the Day of Atonement was the first to be enriched with special prayers, which belong in part even to the age of the Talmud. The length of the service, which lasted from morning till evening, and the special significance of the day led to the expansion of the liturgy. Thus Bible verses referring to God's forgiveness were collected, and poetical prayers dealing with the same subject were composed. The *qᵉrōbhāh*, along with these *sᵉlīḥôth*, was called *ma'amādh*. The *sᵉlīḥôth* became in course of time even more artistic in form and rich in content. Special pieces provided with a refrain were called *pizmōn*. The difference of content between the *pīyyûṭ* and *sᵉlīḥāh* is thus stated by Zunz:

'The *pīyyûṭ* gives history and Midrash, the *sᵉlīḥāh* feeling and presence; the *pīyyûṭ* tends to become prophecy, the *sᵉlīḥāh* a psalm' (*ib.* p. 83).

While in the *pīyyûṭ* the element of teaching is in the forefront, the *sᵉlīḥāh* is in form and content more the expression of the feelings with which the people were filled, and thus more a prayer in the strict sense of the term. The chief theme, which is treated in endless variations, is sin and suffering. The unceasing affliction which a thousand years of persecution brought upon the Jews finds as touching expression as does the believing humility with which they sought the reason of their misery in themselves rather than in the injustice of God. We also find the undying hope that God will finally put an end to their sorrows. Thus the *sᵉlīḥôth* are the most valuable testimony to the piety of the Jewish people during the Middle Ages, and must from this point of view be regarded as the continuation of the Psalms.

See, further, for the synagogue poets, LITERATURE (Jewish), III. 5, IBN GABIROL, IBN EZRA, HALEVI.

5. Influence of philosophy.—In spite of the fact that we possess synagogue poems from almost all the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, from Sa'adya onwards, and although the greatest poets were also philosophers, we have comparatively only a few philosophic prayers (*e.g.*, 'the King's Crown' of Gabirol). The reason for this striking phenomenon is probably to be found not so much in the difficulty of clothing philosophic thought in prayer form as in the fact that prayer was an attempt to satisfy the claims of the heart by warm personal outpourings, which the coldness of philosophic rationalism rendered well-nigh impossible.

6. Influence of mysticism.—If there are few traces of philosophy proper in the prayers of the synagogue, mysticism, on the other hand, has exercised a most harmful influence, since the end of the 12th cent., on both the conception and the content of prayer.

'Although the more respectable mystics did something for spiritual religion and for devotion as opposed to thoughtless formalism, yet the liturgy lost more than it gained by their influence' (Zunz, *Die Ritus*, p. 24).

Since the beginning of the 16th cent. the liturgy has hardly been enriched except by additions from the Ḳabbālā, which only burdened the form and content of the service. On the other hand, the mystical sect of the Ḥasîdîm, which arose about the middle of the 18th cent., originated a most important movement among the people. This movement directed itself chiefly against the rigid codification of all matters relating to prayer brought about by Joseph Qaro's ritual code, called *Shulḥān 'Ārūkh* (1565), which had been generally acknowledged since the end of the 16th century. In opposition to it, the Ḥasîdîm denied that the traditional form and the appointed times of prayer were binding, and, in place of meaningless habitual repetitions, demanded devotion springing from personal inspiration. Unfortunately this important movement, which at first seemed likely to be so fruitful, soon exhausted itself, owing to the opposition of the rabbis and to internal degeneration.

III. *MODERN CONDITIONS.* — Since the last quarter of the 18th cent., when the Jews, especially in Germany, began to participate in general culture, an important change has gradually come over the Jewish service. It was no real innovation to provide the Prayer Book everywhere with a translation into the language of the country, for, as early as the 16th cent., Italian, Spanish, and Jewish-German translations had appeared. The innovation rather concerned the service itself. Refined taste demanded a corresponding form, and changed circumstances called for a partial change in the contents of the prayers. In particular, the greater part of the poetry of the synagogue no longer suited the needs of modern times. It was only after bitter contests that in the course of the 19th cent. a series of reforms were generally accepted in the whole of W. Europe. In the first place, the sermon in the language of the country, which in Germany and elsewhere for various reasons had wholly fallen into disuse, was reintroduced. Prayers in the popular speech, alongside of those in Hebrew, and the curtailing of the synagogal poetry, have not, however, been so generally accepted. A number of congregations have also introduced choir-singing and even organs to accompany the prayers, as well as a shortening and reformation of the old chief prayers. One congregation in Europe (viz. the reformed congregation in Berlin, founded in 1845) and many American congregations have absolutely broken with tradition, by keeping the Sunday instead of the Jewish Sabbath, by almost entirely abolishing Hebrew as the language of prayer, by creating a completely new liturgy, which omits all the national memories and hopes, by doing away with the separation of men and women in the synagogues, and by praying with the head uncovered. In this way the unity of the liturgy is irrevocably lost. Thus the divine service, which for more than two thousand years had been the chief mark of the unity of Judaism, has become a bone of contention among opposing parties—a circumstance which has not failed to exercise a baneful influence on the whole religious life.

LITERATURE.—i. *GENERAL*: *JE* viii. 132, art. 'Liturgy' (L. Blau), x. 164, art. 'Prayer'—the chief part on 'Prayer in the Rabbinic literature' (J. D. Eisenstein [uncritical]); I. Abrahams, 'Some Rabbinic Ideas on Prayer,' *JQR* xx. [1908] 272 ff.

ii. *PRAYER IN THE OT*: R. Smend, *Lehrbuch der AT Religionsgeschichte*[2], Freiburg, 1899, Index; *PRE*[3] vi. 393 (G. Buhl), *EBi* iii. 3823 (T. K. Cheyne).

iii. *SYNAGOGUE SERVICE*: L. Zunz, *Die gottesdienstl. Vorträge der Juden*, Berlin, 1832, [2]Frankfort, 1892; L. Löw, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Szegedin, 1889-1900, iv., 'Der synagogale Ritus,' v., 'Synagogale Altertümer: Plan und *Kollektaneen*'; E. Schürer, *GJV*[4], Berlin, 1901-11, ii. Index; W. Bousset, *Rel. des Judentums im NT Zeitalter*[2], Berlin, 1906, pp. 201 ff., 417 ff.; and, in opposition, F. Perles, *Bousset's Religion des Judentums im NT Zeitalter, kritisch untersucht*, do. 1903, pp. 94-108; *PRE*[3] vii. 7, art. 'Gottesdienst (synagogaler)' (G. Dalman); *EBi* iv. 4832, art. 'Synagogue' (I. J. Peritz); *HDB* iv. 636 ff., art. 'Synagogue' (W. Bacher); *JE* xi. 619 ff., art. 'Synagogue' (W. Bacher); I. Elbogen, *Gesch. des Achtzehngebets*, Breslau, 1903, 'Studies in the Jewish Liturgy,' in *JQR* xix. [1906] 329 ff., 704 ff., *Studien zur Gesch. des jüdischen Gottesdienstes*, Berlin, 1907, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst in seiner geschichtl. Entwicklung*, Leipzig, 1913.

iv. *SYNAGOGUE POETRY*: M. Sachs, *Relig. Poesie der Juden in Spanien*, Berlin, 1845, [2]1901; L. Zunz, *Die synagog. Poesie des Mittelalters*, do. 1855, *Die Ritus des synagog. Gottesdienstes*, do. 1859, *Literaturgesch. der synagog. Poesie*, do. 1865, and supplement, 1867.

v. *PRAYER-BOOKS*: *JE* x. 171 (J. D. Eisenstein).

vi. *SAMARITAN LITURGY*: J. A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans*, Philadelphia, 1907, p. 297 ff.; A. E. Cowley, *The Samaritan Liturgy*, i. ii., Oxford, 1909.

vii. *THE KARAITES*: Zunz, *Die Ritus der synagog. Poesie*, p. 158; *ERE* vii. 663 ff. (S. Poznanski).

viii. *THE HASIDIM*: *JE* vi. 251 (S. M. Dubnow).

FELIX PERLES.

PRAYER (Mexican). The great repository of Mexican aboriginal prayer is the work of Bernardino de Sahagun, *Historia General de las Cosas de Nueva España* (3 vols., Mexico, 1829), in which he furnishes us with numerous examples of Aztec devotion, of a public and ritual as well as of a private character. As he lived and worked in the generation immediately succeeding the Spanish conquest of Mexico, and had abundant opportunities of meeting and speaking with natives who well recalled the times of Aztec paganism, there is no reason to believe that these productions are not the genuine outpourings of the Aztec mind or that they have in any manner been sophisticated.

The ritual and public prayers consist for the most part of appeals made to the various gods on the occasion of religious festivals, war, sacrifices, baptisms, funerals, and purifications, or in time of pestilence, and are extremely hortatory in tone, the purpose being the edification of the hearers. Particularly noteworthy are the prayers to Tezcatlipoca on the occasion of confession. These are of the most intense earnestness and lofty in tone and language. Nearly all the ritual prayers are of considerable length, and are obviously the products of a priesthood possessing ample time for pious consideration. It is only occasionally that Mexican prayer throws any light on the theological beliefs of the Aztec people, and, as practically every deity is addressed in the most exalted terms, it is impossible to judge the relative importance of the gods from the prayers offered up to them.

Private prayers, which appear to have been of a ritual character, were offered up to avert poverty, to obtain the necessaries of life, for agricultural reasons, and, indeed, for heavenly assistance in every activity of life. The exhortations of parents to children, which have frequently been called prayers and are so characteristic a feature of Mexican life, are, in reality, advisory sermons embracing codes of conduct for young people. The whole body of matter has been brought together in the sixth book of Sahagun's work mentioned above. LEWIS SPENCE.

PRAYER (Muhammadan).—**1. The ritual of the daily ṣalāt.**—The most important part of the Muslim liturgy was, from the beginnings of Islām, the ritual prayer, the so-called *ṣalāt*. Muhammad's intention in prescribing this ceremony as a religious duty to his followers was undoubtedly to imitate the ritual prayer of the Christians and Jews in the Orient, at least as far as it was known to him. Like this prayer, the Muslim *ṣalāt* consisted chiefly of prostrations, praises of God, the reciting of formulæ, etc. The name *ṣalāt* is not originally Arabic, but borrowed from the language of the Eastern Christians and the Jews (viz. the Aramaic ܨܠܘܬܐ).

The Muslim law prescribes in great detail how a Muslim must perform his *ṣalāt*. A considerable proportion of these regulations may really be based upon the old *sunnah* (the common practice) of the Prophet and his contemporaries, but many of the rules concerned with details, as to which there still existed difference of opinion in the first centuries after Muhammad's death, must be of later date.

When performing a *ṣalat*, a Muslim stands, raises his open hands on either side of his face, and says: '*Allāhu akbar!*' ('God is most great!'). This ejaculation is called *takbīr* (or *takbīrah*). Then, still standing, he recites some verses of the Qur'ān, especially the Fātihah (*i.e.* the opening chapter, i. 1-7). After this recitation the various inclinations and postures follow (described, *e.g.*, by E. W. Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, London, 1895, ch. iii., with figures in the text): (1) the worshipper first inclines his head and body till his hands reach the height of his knees, and then rises again (this is called the *rukū'*, 'inclination'); (2) then he proceeds to the first prostration (*sujūd*), dropping gently on his knees, placing his hands on the ground a little in front of his knees, and putting his forehead also to the ground; (3) he raises his head and body (but his knees must remain on the ground) and performs the second *sujūd*. This completes a *rak'ah* (*i.e.* one of the subdivisions of the *ṣalāt*). Having finished one *rak'ah*, the worshipper rises to his feet and goes

through the same again (the recitation of some verses of the Qur'ān, the *rukū'* and the two *sujūds*). Before the *rukū'* and before and after each *sujūd* of every *rak'ah* he recites the *takbīr*; and after the last *rak'ah* he recites: (1) the *shahādah* (*i.e.* the confession of faith); (2) a salutation over the Prophet, and (3) a second salutation (the *taslīmah*, *i.e.* the invoking of a blessing, saying '*al-salām 'alaikum*'), which is considered by most Muslims to be addressed to the guardian angels who watch over the worshipper.

At first—at least immediately after the *hijrah*—the Prophet used to turn his face towards Jerusalem during the *ṣalāt*, like the Jews. But in the second year after his arrival at Medīna a revelation (Qur'ān, ii. 136–145) changed this, Muhammad having quarrelled with the Jews in that town. Ever since that time the Muslim must turn his face towards Allāh's house, the Ka'bah at Mecca, to perform the *ṣalāt*.

While performing the *ṣalāt*, the worshipper is in a state of consecration (*iḥrām*) and must observe special prescriptions. According to the primitive conceptions, every worshipper was supposed to be exposed to particular dangers from evil spirits when he was adoring his Lord. Many of the religious observances of the *ṣalāt* may originally have had no other purpose than to protect the worshipper against the maliciousness of the demons.[1] Thus (1) he must take care that his body is sufficiently covered; according to the Muslim lawbooks, a woman must cover her whole body during the *ṣalāt* (except her face and her hands); and a man at least the part of his body between his waist and his knees; the heads of both men and women are also supposed to be covered. (2) He must say before reciting the Qur'ān verses: 'I seek my refuge near God from Satan' (cf. Qur'ān, xvi. 100), and raise his hands in pronouncing every *takbīr* in order to avert the evil spirits that may be present (or, according to the Ḥanifites, he must do so only in pronouncing the first *takbīr*, the *takbīrat al-iḥrām*; cf. Goldziher, 'Zauberelemente im islamischen Gebet,' in *Festschrift-Nöldeke*, Giessen, 1906, i. 320–325). (3) Special emphasis is laid on ritual ablution before the *ṣalāt*. It was a general custom of the ancient Arabs to employ water as a charm against demoniacal influences (see Goldziher, 'Wasser als Dämonenabwehrendesmittel,' in *ARW* xiii. [1910] 20–46); some of the earlier Muslim scholars held that an ablution was necessary before every *ṣalāt* (cf. Qur'ān, v. 8), but this view was rejected by other *faqīhs* (see Goldziher, *Die Ẓâhiriten*, Leipzig, 1884, pp. 48–50). According to the four orthodox *fiqh*-schools, a ritual ablution (*wuḍū* or *ghusl*) is required before the *ṣalāt* only when the worshipper is in a state of ritual impurity. It must be observed, however, that the ritual ablution is usually considered simply as a purification (see art. PURIFICATION [Muslim]); the original purpose of this ceremony may have been forgotten by the Muslims. (4) Further, it is desirable for a Muslim to recite the formulæ of the *adhān* (*i.e.* the call to prayer; see below) before beginning a *ṣalāt*—at least when he is not already summoned by the *adhān* that is chanted from the mosque. This usage must also be regarded as a kind of charm; the demons are supposed to flee when they hear the sacred words of the *adhān*.

2. Obligatory and supererogatory daily ṣalāts.—Some of the earlier verses of the Qur'ān (see xi. 116, xvii. 80 f., xxx. 16 f., lxxiii. 1) require Muslims to perform the *ṣalāt* thrice every day—in the morning before sunrise, at the close of day, and during a part of the night. To these *ṣalāts* another was added after the *hijrah*, the 'middle *ṣalāt*' (*ṣalāt al-wustā*), mentioned in Qur'ān, ii. 239, probably an imitation of the Jewish mid-day prayer (the *minḥāh*). Moreover, the Prophet, according to the tradition, used to perform *ṣalāts* on various other occasions. In the first generations after his death it was a subject of discussion which of the daily *ṣalāts* must be regarded as obligatory, and there was also difference of opinion as to the exact times of day at which the Prophet had usually performed his devotions.[1] But gradually it was recognized in the whole Muslim world that the five following *ṣalāts* were obligatory for every Muslim: (1) the *ṣalāt al-ṣubḥ* (at daybreak); (2) the *ṣalāt al-ẓuhr* (at noon, or rather a little later, when the sun has begun to decline); (3) the *ṣalāt al-'aṣr* (in the afternoon, about half-way between noon and nightfall); (4) the *ṣalāt al-maghrib* (at sunset, or rather about five minutes later, for it is forbidden to perform a *ṣalāt* just at sunrise or sunset, because the heathen Arabs used to do so); and (5) the *ṣalāt al-'ishā'* (at nightfall, when it is quite dark). Each of the five prescribed periods ends when the next commences, except that of the *ṣalāt al-ṣubḥ*, which ends just before sunrise. The worshipper is recommended, however, to perform every *ṣalāt* as near the beginning of the prescribed period as possible. The *ṣalāt* at daybreak must consist of two *rak'ahs*, that of sunset of three, and each of the others of four; it is meritorious to add some supererogatory *rak'ahs* to each of the five daily *ṣalāts*. The four *fiqh*-schools disagree as to the exact number of these voluntary *rak'ahs*.

The three following daily *ṣalāts*, though not prescribed by the law as obligatory, are regarded as commendable and meritorious:

(1) The *ṣalāt al-tahajjud* (the night-*ṣalāt*) mentioned in some verses of the Qur'ān (see above).—This *ṣalāt* had evidently been gradually neglected by most of Muhammad's followers at Medina; not all the members of the continually increasing Muslim community could show so much zeal for the service of their Lord, and Allāh at last yielded to their wishes! (see Qur'ān, lxxiii. 20). This *ṣalāt* was no longer to have an obligatory character. Nevertheless it is still regarded as very meritorious by the Muslims. It must consist of an even number of *rak'ahs*—two, four, or more. The middle third of the night is thought to be the best time for this devotion. Hence in many Muslim lands a sign is given in the mosque about midnight to announce the time of the *tahajjud*.

(2) The *ṣalāt al-witr*.—It is meritorious to make odd the even number of *rak'ahs* of the last *ṣalāt* of the night (*i.e.* the *ṣalāt al-'ishā'* or the *tahajjud*) by adding an odd number of *rak'ahs* or at least one *rak'ah*. Usually the *ṣalāt al-witr* is added to the *ṣalāt al-'ishā'* (since most people neglect the *tahajjud*). A well-known tradition says: 'Allāh is *witr* (odd) and loves the *witr*,' and the Muslims therefore pay a certain respect to every odd number. According to the Ḥanifites, the *ṣalāt al-witr* is even obligatory.

(3) The *ṣalāt al-ḍuḥā* (*ṣalāt* in the morning) at the time between sunrise and noon, consisting of from two to twelve *rak'ahs*.—This ceremony also is not obligatory, though some of the earlier Muslim scholars thought it was. According to some traditionalists, it was a custom of the Prophet to perform this *ṣalāt* every morning, but this is denied in many other traditions.

3. The mosque and the daily public service in the mosque.—The so-called mosque of the Prophet at Medīna was only an open enclosure, adjacent to his dwelling. On one side there was a kind of portico, a flat roof supported by wooden pillars. This was where Muhammad usually performed his *ṣalāts*, either alone or with some of his followers. But this *masjid* was used also for various other purposes; it was, *e.g.*, the place where Muhammad received the embassies of Arabian tribes and where he gave banquets to his guests. We may assume that the houses of other men of rank at Medīna had also a *masjid* of the same type.[2] Originally

[1] See for the following rules especially A. J. Wensinck, 'Animismus und Dämonenglaube im Untergrunde des jüdischen und islamischen rituellen Gebets,' *Der Islam*, iv. [1913] 219 ff., and 'Die Entstehung der muslimischen Reinheitsgesetzgebung,' *ib.* v. [1914] 68–80; I. Goldziher, 'Die Entblössung des Hauptes,' *ib.* vi. [1916] 301 ff.

[1] See, for further details, M. T. Houtsma, 'Iets over den dagelijkschen çalat,' *Theolog. Tijdschrift*, xxiv. [1890] 127 ff.; Goldziher, 'Die Bedeutung der Nachmittagszeit im Islam,' *ARW* ix. [1906] 293 ff.; T. Nöldeke and F. Schwally, *Gesch. des Qorāns*², Leipzig, 1909, p. 57, n. 1; E. Mittwoch, 'Zur Entstehungsgesch. des islamischen Gebets und Kultus,' *ABAW*, Phil.-hist. Classe, 1913, p. 11 ff.; Wensinck, in *Der Islam*, iv. 232 ff.

[2] Maqrīzī (*Khiṭaṭ*, Būlāq, 1270, ii. 270. 11) says that there

the mosque in Muslim society took the place of the old heathen *majlis*, the open space near the tent or dwelling of the head of the tribe where all deliberations of the tribesmen took place (see H. Lammens, 'Ziād ibn Abīhi,' in *Rivista degli studi orientali*, iv. [1911–12] 240 ff.; L. Caetani, *Annali dell' Islam*, Milan, 1905, i. 432 ff.; C. H. Becker, 'Zur Gesch. des islamischen Kultus,' in *Der Islam*, iii. [1912] 394 f.). Once a week the Muslims were convoked to an assembly in Muhammad's *masjid*—a usage probably originally introduced by the Prophet in imitation of the weekly congregations of the Christians and Jews. But the Muslims assembled on Fridays—at least at Medina, some time after the *hijrah*. One Friday, just before the service, a caravan with merchandise arrived at Medīna, and most of the believers forgot their religious duty, being occupied in buying and selling. Then Qur'ān, lxii. 9, was revealed:

'When the call to prayer soundeth on Friday (or on the day of the congregation), then go to praise the Lord and abandon business,' etc.

About A.H. 7 or 8 a *minbar*, a sort of wooden throne or raised seat with two steps, was placed in Muhammad's *masjid*, and the Prophet always sat upon this when presiding at the meetings (see Becker, 'Die Kanzel im Kultus des alten Islam,' in *Festschrift-Nöldeke*, pp. 331–351). On special occasions Muhammad and his followers went out of Medīna to the *muṣallā* (the place where the *ṣalāt* and other ceremonies were performed in the open field). Later, a lance was carried before the Prophet as an emblem of his authority; on the *muṣallā* this lance was stuck into the ground before him, marking the direction of the Ka'bah.[1]

After Muhammad's death the Muslim liturgy remained very simple. In the great encampments of the Arabs in the conquered countries each of the tribes had its own *masjid*, where the tribesmen assembled. There was also a general *masjid* near the dwelling of the *wali*, the head of the place or the governor of the province. Originally this head mosque was very simple, often being only a large open square, surrounded by a ditch or by walls and with an open portico in front facing towards Mecca, supported on stone pillars and covered with a roof (see, *e.g.*, Ṭabarī, i. 2489). It was a general place of meeting, not reserved for the Friday service and other religious purposes. When general deliberation was necessary, the believers were convoked to a public *ṣalāt* before the further transactions, and the *wali*, or, in the residence, the *khalīfah* himself, presided at these meetings (see Goldziher, in *ZDMG* xlix. [1895] 315; Belādsorī, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1866, p. 229. 3 [*Fragmenta hist. arabic.*, ed. de Goeje and P. de Jong, do. 1869, p. 217. 5]; al-Bayān al-Mughrib, ed. R. Dozy, do. 1848, p. 55. 16; al-Fahrī, ed. W. Ahlwardt, Gotha, 1860, p. 95. 11; Becker, in *Der Islam*, iii. 395; and Lammens, in *Rivista degli studi orientali*, iv. 242 ff.). The Umayyad *khalīfahs* and also many of their high functionaries in the provinces used to sit on a *minbar* in these assemblies just as the Prophet had done before them. At first, however, this was regarded by some people as improper for a *wali*; the *khalīfah* 'Umar forbade 'Amr, his governor of Egypt, to sit on a *minbar*.

It was only gradually that the mosque became a place exclusively dedicated to worship; a regular daily service was instituted, and the Muslim liturgy began to develop and take fixed forms. The service of the Christian churches and Jewish synagogues may have influenced this development (see esp. Mittwoch, 'Zur Entstehungsgesch. des islam. Gebets und Kultus'; and Becker, 'Zur Gesch. des islam. Kultus'). It became a general custom to announce the times of the daily *ṣalāt* from the minarets of the mosque (the origin of the minaret is discussed in detail by H. Thiersch, *Pharos: Antike, Islam und Occident: Beitrag zur Architekturgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1909). The *adhān*, which is chanted from the minaret by the *muadhdhin*, consists of the following formulæ:

'God is most great' (this is said four times); 'I testify that there is no God but Allāh' (twice); 'I testify that Muhammad is Allāh's apostle' (twice); 'Come to prayer' (twice); 'Come to security' (twice); 'God is most great' (twice); 'There is no God but Allāh.'

The public *ṣalāt* in the mosque requires a leader, since all worshippers must perform the prescribed ceremonies together and at the same moment; every mosque has its own *imām*, who officiates over all who may be present at the times of the daily *ṣalāts*.[1] It must be observed that the position of this *imām* is very different from that of a priest, since he does not perform any sacramental action; he is only the leader of the *ṣalāt*, and, according to the theory of Muslim law, he may even cede his place to any other member of the congregation who is competent for the office. The beginning of the *ṣalāt* is announced in the mosque by a second call to prayer, the *iqāmah*, which consists chiefly of the same formulæ as the *adhān* (most of the formulæ of the *iqāmah*, however, are recited only once, and the words, 'The time of the *ṣalāt* is [now] come,' which are twice repeated, must be inserted after the formula, 'Come to security'). The *imām* then places himself before the *miḥrāb*, the niche that indicates the direction to Mecca,[2] and performs the *ṣalāt* with the congregation. Only the voice of the *imām*, who recites the prescribed formulæ, may be heard during the *ṣalāt*. In the great mosques, however, where the congregation is usually so numerous that the believers cannot all see and hear the leader, the *takbīrs* of the *imām*, marking the various postures of the *ṣalāt* (see above), are repeated loudly by persons especially charged with this office (the *muballigh*s).

4. The Friday service and the public ṣalāt on feast-days and other occasions.—On Friday the *ṣalāt al-jum'ah* (the *ṣalāt* of the Friday) must be substituted for the ordinary noon-prayer. It is a service celebrated by the whole community in the head mosque (*jāmi'*) of the place, consisting chiefly of two parts: the *khuṭbah* ('sermon') and a *ṣalāt* of two *rak'ahs*. In later times the *khuṭbah* preceded the *ṣalāt*; but this was not the original usage. According to Muslim tradition, it was an innovation introduced by the first Umayyad *khalīfah*, Mu'awiyyah. Before the beginning of the sermon the *adhān*, which has already been chanted from the minarets, is repeated in the mosque. The preacher (*khaṭīb*) then delivers his sermon, standing on the *minbar*, and holding, as prescribed by ancient custom, a staff or wooden sword (or a bow) in his hands (see PREACHING [Muslim]). When the *khaṭīb* has finished his *khuṭbah*, he descends from the *minbar*, then the *iqāmah* is chanted, and the whole congregation performs the two prescribed *rak'ahs* of the *ṣalāt al-jum'ah*. It is considered meritorious to perform, before and after the obligatory Friday *ṣalāt*, the usual supererogatory *rak'ahs* of noon.

The Friday service formerly required a general

were nine *masjids* at Medina besides that of the Prophet, see also the traditions concerning the *masjid al-ḍirār* (mentioned in Qur'ān, ix. 108).

[1] At a later time it was still a custom in some Muslim countries to indicate the direction towards Mecca by means of a staff or lance, behind which the leader of the *ṣalāt* placed himself. The *ṣalāt* was then performed *'ala 'l-'anaz* (*i.e.* in the direction of this staff).

[1] Other persons perform the lower offices in the mosque—lighting the lamps, sweeping the mosque, attending to the receptacles for water necessary for the ablutions, etc.

[2] See further, on the *miḥrāb*, N. Rhodokanakis, in *WZKM* xix. [1905] 296 ff., and xxv. [1911] 71 ff.

assembly of the whole community. Muslim law therefore forbids that this service should be celebrated in different mosques of the same town, unless the place is so populous that it would be practically impossible to assemble in one mosque. Moreover, according to the Shāfi'ites, the *ṣalāt al-jum'ah* is valid only when at least forty persons join in it; the Ḥanifites, on the other hand, hold that no fixed number is required, and that the Friday service can be validly celebrated by an *imām* and only three persons.

Twice a year, on the two Muslim feast-days (at the end of the fasting month and on the 10th of the month of Dhu'l-hijjah, in connexion with the sacrificial feast of the pilgrims in the neighbourhood of Mecca) a special service, the *ṣalāt al-'īd* ('feast-*ṣalāt*') is celebrated which resembles the Friday service in many respects. There are, however, some points of difference: (1) the time recommended for the *ṣalāt al-'īd* is the morning, about half-way between sunrise and noon; (2) it is supposed in the lawbooks that this ceremony should take place not in a mosque but in the open field; (3) the service consists of a *khuṭbah* and a *ṣalāt* of two *rak'ahs* like the Friday service, but the *ṣalāt* must precede the *khuṭbah*; and (4) the *adhān* and *iqāmah* are omitted; the *muaddhin* before the service only calls: '*Al-ṣalāta jāmi'atan!*' ('[Now perform] the *ṣalāt* together!'). We may assume that in all these respects the feast-*ṣalāt* is still more ancient than the Friday service.

Another religious assembly takes place on each evening of the fasting month. It is counted meritorious to perform the *ṣalāt al-tarāwīḥ* ('the *ṣalāt* with pauses') after the daily *ṣalāt al-'aṣr* in this holy month. This ceremony consists of twenty *rak'ahs*, each pair of which is separated from the rest by a *taslīmah* (see above). Though this *ṣalāt* is not obligatory, many persons usually take part in it. This great zeal for the *ṣalāt al-tarāwīḥ* can only be explained by its particular connexion with the holy fasting month.

When there was a great drought, the pagan Arabs tried to induce rain by enchantments. These heathen practices were replaced in Islām by the *ṣalāt al-istisqā'* ('the *ṣalāt* for imploring rain'), a public service that differs little from the service on the two feast-days. It is still characterized by the following ceremony: after the *ṣalāt* the *imām* and the other worshippers who are present move about and shake their upper garments; this custom is probably to be regarded as a survival of Arabian heathenism (see Goldziher, 'Zauberelemente im islamischen Gebet,' pp. 308–312). During an eclipse of the sun or moon a public service is celebrated which resembles the feast-*ṣalāt* in most respects. As regards details of the liturgy on these and other occasions, the opinions of the different *fiqh*-schools disagree.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works mentioned throughout see esp. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, Hague, 1888–89, ii. 78 ff., *The Achehnese*, Leyden, 1906, i. 61 ff., 80 ff., 230 ff., ii. 283, and 'Islam und Phonograph,' in *Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasch Genootschap*, xlii. [1900] 401–404; E. Sell, *The Faith of Islam*, London and Madras, 1880, p. 188 ff.; A. J. Wensinck, *Mohammed en de Joden te Medina*, Leyden, 1908, p. 102 ff., and the first and second chapters of the various Muslim *fiqh*-books.

TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

PRAYER (Roman).—As in many other phases of religion, the religious life of the Romans offers an exceptional opportunity for the study of prayer. Between the prayers of Cato and those of Marcus Aurelius we have, as it were, a complete gamut of religious experiences, and, though these two landmarks are less than 400 years apart, Cato represents many centuries before his time, and Marcus Aurelius is the prototype of many centuries to follow. Prayer, as distinguished, on the one hand, from magic and, on the other, from mystical absorption, is the orthodox communication between man and those powers outside of him which are called God or gods according to circumstances. Upon the orthodoxy of the act depends this distinction, and it is this element of orthodoxy alone that distinguishes primitive prayer from the mazes of magic, and advanced prayer from the formlessness of mystical absorption—so true is it that primitive prayer is closely akin to magic, and advanced prayer to religious absorption.

But, before we begin even this outline study of Roman prayer, we should make ourselves fully aware of three facts: (1) that the actual number of Roman prayers transmitted to us is relatively small; (2) that many prayers, so called, especially those in the poets, do not represent trustworthy evidence, and are apt to be either fanciful or under Greek influence, and therefore not available for our present purpose; and (3) that there is scarcely an operation in the world more delicate, and therefore more difficult, than the attempt to deduce the religious attitude of the individual from the formal experiences handed down to us.

1. Primitive prayer.—Here it should be noted that this title includes not only prayer as practised in the historical period which we call primitive and prayer as practised in later times by persons of primitive intelligence, but also many primitive forms of prayer retained by religious conservatism and practised by all orthodox persons. This observation is very necessary owing to the peculiar conditions under which the religious life of ancient Rome had its development. This development represents a series of accretions—a mechanical rather than a physiological growth. Man's spiritual evolution expressed itself not nearly so much in the transforming of the old formulæ as in their absolute conservation and the adding to them of outer coatings, new tree-rings of more modern thought. This was possible because of the absolutely formal character of all Roman religious concepts; and the only exceptions to it are found in the more spiritual cults of the Orient and in the impotent enthusiasms of a spiritual philosophy. The success of primitive prayer depended principally upon two things—the scrupulous exactness of expression and the correctness of the name and title of the deity addressed. Exactness of expression is an absolute requisite. This idea is, of course, common to both prayer and magic, and the orthodoxy of the one and the illegitimacy of the other form almost the only criterion of distinction. The question whether all primitive prayers were of a rhythmical character — the *carmina*, common to both prayer and magic—is a difficult one to answer,[1] but certainly very many primitive prayers were, for we have instances of them.

Every effort was made to obtain the strictest verbal accuracy, on the theory[2] that whatever was said had legal validity.[3] The formulæ themselves were collected and preserved in the books of the priests.[4] The formulæ were never changed, even though the language was so archaic that the priests themselves scarcely understood it. This was true, *e.g.*, of the prayers of the Salii, of which Quintilian[5] says:

'The prayers of the Salii were scarcely understood by the priests themselves, but religious conservatism forbade the changing of them, and the consecrated forms must still be used.'

[1] Cf. R. Westphal, *Theorie der griech. Metrik*, Leipzig, 1887, iii. 1, 67, *Allgemeine Metrik*, Berlin, 1892, p. 223; C. Zander, *Vers. Ital. antiqui*, Lund, 1890, p. 36.

[2] *Verba certa*; Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 10, and Paul. p. 88, *s.v.* 'Fanum.'

[3] Cf. Festus, p. 173: 'As the tongue has spoken, so is the law'; and Cic. *de Orat.* i. 245.

[4] Gell. xiii. 23. 1.

[5] *Inst. Or.* i. 6. 40.

In the cult of the Arval Brothers[1] a similar state of affairs existed, and as a safeguard against mistake the priests used prayer-books out of which they sang as they danced. In other cases the worshipper repeated the words of the prayer as they were said by an assistant.[2] The penalties for an error were indeed great, for a trifling mistake rendered the whole performance null and void. In the year 176 B.C.,[3] at the celebration of the Latin Festival, the officiating magistrate from Lanuvium forgot to pray for the Roman people, and, when the matter was discovered, the senate referred it to the pontifical college, who in turn decreed that owing to the omission the festival could not be considered as performed and must be gone through all over again, and, as the magistrate from Lanuvium had made the mistake, Lanuvium must pay the cost of the new performance; and Plutarch remarks:

'In later ages one and the same sacrifice was performed thirty times over because of the occurrence of some defect or mistake or accident in the service—such was the Roman reverence and caution in religious matters.'[4]

In relation to this verbal accuracy, we find ourselves between the realm of magic and that of law. Regarded as a charm, the prayer needed to be absolutely accurate in order to be effective, but in prayer regarded as a legal transaction such accuracy was equally important.

E.g., in the year 200 B.C. we read that 'the Roman people directed the consul to vow games and an offering to Jupiter. But the vow suffered a delay; the Pontifex Maximus Licinius asserted that one could not make a vow of an indefinite sum because this money ought not to serve for the needs of the war but should be put apart at once and kept apart and not be mixed with any other money, for, if such a mixture took place, the fulfilment of the vow would be irregular. . . . The consul was asked to consult the College of Pontifices to know whether it were possible to vow in regular form an indefinite sum. The Pontifices replied that the vow was possible and entirely regular. The consul, repeating the exact expression of the Pontifex Maximus, pronounced the vow in the form employed previously for five year vows.'[5]

We shall have occasion below to return to the legal aspect of Roman prayer, but, before leaving the interrelation of prayer and magic, it is important to notice that they have one other point in common, namely, that they depend for their effectiveness upon a knowledge of the exact name of the object addressed. In order that a prayer may be effectual, it must be addressed not only to the proper deity, but to some particular phase of that deity's activity as expressed in some adjective or *cognomen*. Hence the development of a great science of nomenclature—lists of gods and lists of *cognomina*.[6]

It is the same line of reasoning that makes it desirable to keep secret the name of one's special deity so that one's enemies may not be able to take advantage of it in prayer and call forth one's gods by the mysterious process of *exauguratio*. Hence Servius[7] tells us that in pontifical law special precautions were taken that the gods of the Romans should not be called by their right names, in order that they might not be exaugurated. Similarly, Macrobius says:

'It is certain that every city has a god under whose protection it is placed; and the Romans had a mysterious custom, of which many persons are ignorant, that when they were besieging a city and thought they were on the point of capturing it, they worked the deities by means of a certain formula. Without this they did not think the city could be captured, or, at least, they would have considered it a sacrilege to take the gods captive. It was for this reason that the Romans always kept concealed the name of the god who protected Rome, and even the Latin name of the City.'[8]

[1] Cf. art. ARVAL BROTHERS.
[2] *Verba prisca praeiari*, *Sacra Carmina praecantare*.
[3] Cf. Livy, xli. 16. [4] *Coriol.* 25. [5] Livy, xxxi. 9.
[6] Cf. the *Indigitamenta*; G. Wissowa, *De dis Romanorum indigetibus et novensidibus disputatio*, Marburg, 1892; J. B. Carter, *De Deorum Romanorum Cognominibus*, Leipzig, 1898; Warde Fowler, *Rel. Exper. of the Roman People*, p. 152.
[7] *Æn.* ii. 351. [8] *Sat.* iii. 9.

Of course, much nonsense was talked among the antiquarians regarding the secret name of Rome and of the god who protected Rome, and very possibly the secret names were so secret that they never existed, but the principle underlying the whole discussion is a genuine one.

Practically all the writers on Roman religion, with the exception of Warde Fowler,[1] have unduly emphasized the magical and the legal bargaining aspects of Roman prayer. These two aspects were indeed prominent, but alongside of them existed, if only in embryo, the concept of the power and greatness of the deity and the powerlessness of man. 'The language is the language of prayer, not of compulsion or even of bargaining.'[2] We see this most clearly in the famous four prayers in Cato's 'Farm Almanack'—prayers which are such precious and unique documents that the quoting of them in full is better than many pages of explanations.

Prayer for the cattle at the flowering of the pear-trees (Cato, *de Re Rust.* 131 f.): 'At the flowering of the pear-trees make sacrifice for the cattle. . . . Thus shall the offering be made. Give to Jupiter Dapalis a measure of wine, as much as you see fit. On the day of the sacrifice let there be a holiday for the cattle, the herdsman, and for those who make the sacrifice. When you have to make the offering, you shall do as follows: "O Jupiter Dapalis, in regard to the sacrifice of a measure of wine which I make to thee in my house and in my family, mayst Thou be graciously increased by this sacrifice." Then wash your hands and afterwards take the wine, saying, "O Jupiter Dapalis, mayst Thou be increased by this sacrifice which I make unto Thee, mayst Thou be increased by this wine which I offer Thee."'

Prayer before the harvest (*ib.* 134): 'Before commencing the harvest, it is necessary to sacrifice a pig in the following manner: The sacrifice of a female pig should be made to Ceres before harvesting the following—spelt, wheat, barley, beans, and turnips. Before sacrificing the pig, invoke with incense and wine Janus, Jupiter and Juno. Present the pig to Janus with this prayer, "O Father Janus, in offering Thee this pig I pray that Thou wouldst be propitious to me, to my sons, to my house, to my family. Be Thou increased by this offering." Then offer the sacred pig to Jupiter, saying, "O Jupiter, in offering Thee this pig, I pray that Thou wouldst be propitious to me, to my sons, to my house, to my family. Be Thou increased by this offering." Afterwards give wine to Janus as follows: "O Father Janus, just as in offering the pig to Thee I prayed good prayer to Thee, for the sake of this thing mayst Thou be increased with the wine which I offer Thee." And thereafter pray to Jupiter as follows: "O Jupiter, mayst Thou be increased with this offering, and mayst Thou also be increased with the wine which I offer Thee." Thereupon slaughter the pig.'

Prayer on making a clearing (*ib.* 139): 'According to the custom of the Romans, thus should a clearing be made. Make an expiatory sacrifice of a pig and recite the following prayer: "Whether Thou be god or goddess to whom this wood is sacred, be there paid to Thee thy due, the expiatory sacrifice of a pig for the cutting of this sacred wood. For this purpose, whether I perform the sacred act or others do so at my command, may it be well done, even as it has been done. With this intention I sacrifice this pig in expiation, and I turn to Thee my pious prayers that Thou shouldst wish to be kindly disposed toward me, my house, my dependents, my sons. Therefore mayst Thou be increased by this pig of expiation which I am offering to Thee."'

Prayer at the lustration of the farm (*ib.* 141): 'Thus should the lustration of the fields take place. Thus shall you order the suovetaurilia to be led about them: "With the consent of the gods and with every favourable omen, I commit to you, O Manius, the task of leading the suovetaurilia about my farm, my fields, my land, in whatsoever part you should think best that they should be led about." Then make libation with wine and invoke according to formula Janus and Jupiter, and speak as follows: "O Father Mars, I pray and beseech of Thee that Thou wouldst be well willing and propitious to me, to my house, to my dependents; and for this reason I have ordered that the suovetaurilia should be led around my fields, my land and my farm, that Thou shouldst hold back, hinder and drive away sickness visible and invisible, desolation, ruin, damages and storm; and that Thou shouldst cause to grow and prosper the fruits of the soil, the grain, the vineyards and the thickets; that Thou shouldst keep in safety the shepherds and the sheep; that Thou shouldst give prosperity and health to me, to my house and to my dependents. For these reasons, and because, as I have said, I am lustrating and causing to be lustrated my farm, my lands, and my fields, mayst Thou be increased by this suovetaurilia which is being offered Thee. O Father Mars, mayst Thou be increased by this suovetaurilia which is being offered Thee."'

2. Prayer as a votum.—Prayer in the religion of the Roman State was virtually a bargain

[1] *Rel. Exper. of the Roman People*, p. 182 ff. [2] *Ib.* p. 189.

between man and god, whereby man, the party of the first part, agreed to pay to the god, the party of the second part, such and such things if the god, the party of the second part, performed certain acts for man, the party of the first part. Such prayer was called a *votum*, a 'vow,' because the important and distinguishing feature was the promise to pay if service was rendered. As a rule, payment was not made until the deity had performed the desired acts. But there was one important exception to this general rule, the *devotio*, in which case payment was made in advance. It is not at all impossible that such payment in advance may have been intended as a means of binding the god and thus exercising a species of compulsory magic. The *devotio* is the vow uttered by a Roman general in the moment of battle whereby he agrees to give up his own life in order that his army may be victorious. If he succeeded in this act of self-destruction, it was felt that the gods had accepted his death, and that, having accepted it, they were compelled to grant the victory to his side. This curious reasoning was carried one step further, and it was thought that the gods were free from any obligation if the enemy succeeded in opening their ranks and letting him pass through unharmed.

The *devotio* may therefore be considered as in a certain sense forming the link between the magical and the legal point of view, for all ordinary *vota* were a strictly legal performance. The favours demanded of the gods were as infinitely various as were the promises to pay in case of fulfilment. These promises included votive offerings, games, sacrifices, the building of an altar or of a temple.

3. Outward characteristics of Roman prayer.—The worshipper faced the image of the god, and, as the god usually faced west, so the worshipper usually faced east. His position, as a rule, was standing, though occasionally he walked round the altar.[1] During the actual prayer itself the worshipper often held the altar.[2] Generally the hands were raised, but sometimes special positions were required; *e.g.*, in a prayer to Neptune the hands were stretched out towards the sea,[3] while in praying to Tellus or Ops the suppliant touched the earth.[4] We also find references to kneeling.[5] At the end of the prayer there followed the moment of adoration (*adoratio*), when the worshipper put his right hand to his mouth.[6]

Prayers were normally said in a distinct and usually a loud voice. This was the natural method in antiquity, just as all reading was done aloud. This fact makes possible many scenes in the drama when prayers are overheard.[7] Silent prayer was sometimes motived by modesty,[8] and sometimes by shame;[9] but whispered prayers were not orthodox,[10] and he who indulged in them fell readily under the suspicion of practising magic.

4. Spiritual prayer. — Philosophy and the spiritual cults of the Orient, which entered Rome at the beginning of the empire, tended to introduce gradually an entirely new concept of prayer. It was no longer a formal process by which man obtained physical benefits from the gods either by compulsory magic or by legal bargaining. It became instead an effort of adoration, a communion with God, a moment of spiritual exaltation;[1] and it was into this atmosphere that Christianity came.

LITERATURE.—G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 318 ff.; W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, *passim*, and esp. pp. 181–191; Brissonius, *De formulis et sollemnibus populi Romani verbis*, Halle and Leipzig, 1731, i. 1–69; S. Sudhaus, 'Lautes und leises Beten,' *ARW* ix. [1906] 185 ff.; L. Friedländer, *Sittengesch.*[6], Leipzig, 1888–90, iii. 578 ff.; S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*[2], London, 1905, pp. 394–420; R. R. Marett, *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Prayer.'

JESSE BENEDICT CARTER.

PRAYER (Teutonic).—1. Prayer to the gods.—Our knowledge of heathen prayer among the Teutonic peoples is very scanty, and comes almost entirely from Scandinavian sources. From the prose Edda we learn that prayer was a regular part of the worship of the Aesir and Asynjur. Njorðr is to be invoked for sea-voyages and for hunting (*Gylfaginning*, xxiii. [*Die pros. Edda*, ed. E. Wilken, Paderborn, 1912, p. 32]). Freya is particularly well-disposed towards those who pray to her for help in love affairs (*Gylf.* xxiv. [p. 34]). In the sagas we frequently hear of men who have a special devotion to Thor, whom they invoke in difficulties and whom they consult before any important undertaking. In these cases it is hard to distinguish between prayer and divination.

'Thorolf Mostrarskegg made a great sacrifice and went to consult with Thor, his beloved friend' (F. Holthausen, *Altisländ. Lesebuch*, Weimar, 1896, p. 64). 'Helgi was very mixed in his faith. He put his trust in Christ and named his homestead after him; but yet he would pray to Thor on sea-voyages, and in hard stresses, and in all those things which he thought were of most account to him' (*Landnamabók*, III. xiv. 3, in G. Vigfusson and F. Y. Powell, *Origines Islandicæ*, Oxford, 1905, i. 149). 'Then Aur-lyg called upon bishop Patrec, but as for Coll he called upon Thor' (*ib.* I. vi. 2).

In *Vigaglum's Saga*, 9, there is an interesting example of prayer to Frey:

'Thorkel had been forced to sell his land to Glum. Before he departed from Thverá he went to the temple of Frey, leading thither an ox, and said: "Frey, who long hast been my patron, and hast accepted many gifts from me and rewarded me well, now I give this ox to thee, so that Glum may leave Thveráland as much against his will as I do now; let me see some token whether thou acceptest it from me or not." At this the ox bellowed loud and fell dead, which Thorkel liked well, and he was less sad because he thought his prayer was heard' (P. B. du Chaillu, *The Viking Age*, London, 1889, i. 352).

There are several stories of Earl Hakon's devotion to Thorgerðr Holgabrúðr (also Hörðabrúðr, Horgabrúðr) and the earnest prayers that he was wont to make to her in moments of crisis. On one occasion Hakon desired her help for his friend Sigmund, whom he led into her temple.

'Hakon and Sigmund with a few others went into this house, where there were many gods; it had also many glass windows so that there was no shadow in it. At the inner end was a woman magnificently dressed. The Earl threw himself down at her feet, and lay there a long time. Then he rose up and told Sigmund that they should make her some offering, laying the money on the seat in front of her, "and we shall have this token," said he, "whether she will accept it or not, that I have wished her to let go the ring that she has on her hand. From that ring you will obtain good luck." The Earl then laid hold of the ring, and it seemed to Sigmund as if she closed her hand, so that he could not get it off. The Earl lay down again before her, and Sigmund noticed that he was in tears. Again he stood up, and laid hold of the ring, and this time it was loose. He gave Sigmund the ring' (*Flateyjarbók*, i. 144, quoted in W. A. Craigie, *Scandinavian Folklore*, London, 1896, p. 33).

An instance of prayer addressed to a stone occurs in *Hörd's Saga*, 37:

'Hörd's brother-in-law Indridi wished to slay the bondi Thorstein Gullknapr (gold-button), and waited for him on the way to his sacrificing house, whither he was wont to go. When Thorstein came, he entered the sacrificing house and fell on his face before the stone he worshipped, which stood there, and then he spoke to it' (du Chaillu, i. 383).

2. Prayer and sacrifice.—The obscure verse in *Hóvamál*, 176 (*Die Lieder der älteren Edda*, ed.

[1] Serv. *Æn.* iv. 62.
[2] *Ib.* iv. 219; Verg. *Æn.* xii. 201; Ovid, *Amores*, i. 4. 27; Varro, *ap.* Macr. *Sat.* iii. 2. 8.
[3] Verg. *Æn.* v. 233. [4] Macr. *Sat.* i. 10. 21, iii. 9. 12.
[5] For Umbria, *Tab. Iguv.* vi. G. 5; for the Oscans, J. Friedländer, *Die oskischen Munzen*, Leipzig, 1850, v. 81 ff., Taf. ix. 9–12, x. 18–19; H. A. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic in British Museum*, London, 1910, ii. 323; cf. Quintil. *Inst. Or.* ix. 4. 11; Petron. 133.
[6] Pliny, *HN* xi. 251; cf. Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des Ant.*, Paris, 1877–1916, i. 80 ff.
[7] Cf. Plaut. *Rudens*, 258. [8] Cf. Tibull. ii. 1. 83.
[9] Cf. Hor. *Epist.* i. 16. 60, where a man prays aloud to Janus and Apollo, and whispers a petition to Laverna to give him success in cheating; cf. also Persius, ii. 3 ff.
[10] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* x.: 'Speak to God as though all men were listening.'

[1] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* x. 5, xli. 1.

K. Hildebrand, Paderborn, 1912, p. 56), 'Betra's óbeðit an sé ofblótit,' may perhaps be translated, 'It is better not to pray at all than to sacrifice overmuch'; but it is not clear whether sacrifice and prayer are here contrasted or considered as practically synonymous. Certainly in Teutonic as in other religions the two modes of worship were closely connected.

'Sacrifice is a prayer offered up with gifts. And wherever there was occasion for prayer, there was also for sacrifice' (Grimm, *Teut. Mythol.* i. 29).

Ibn Fadhlan gives a detailed account of the worship of the Scandinavian Russians:

'As soon as the ship arrives in the haven, each one of them goes ashore, taking with him bread, meat, onions, milk and intoxicating drink, and makes his way to a tall piece of wood set up, which has something resembling a human face and is surrounded by small statues behind which are erected still other tall pieces of wood. He goes up to the great wooden image and throws himself down before it, saying: "O my lord, I am come from distant lands, bringing with me such and such a number of maidens, and such and such a number of sable skins." When he has counted up all his stock, he proceeds: "I have brought this gift to thee," and lays down what he has brought before the wooden statue and says: "I desire that thou wouldst provide me with a merchant who has plenty of gold and silver and will buy from me all that I wish to sell and will challenge nothing that I say." He then goes away. If, however, his trade does not proceed favourably and his stay is too protracted, he comes again, bringing a second or even a third gift. If he still has difficulty in obtaining what he wants, he brings a gift to each of the little images and asks them for their intercession, saying, "These are the wives and daughters of our Lord"' (C. M. Frähn, *Ibn-Foszlan's und anderer Araber Berichte uber die Russen alterer Zeit*, Petrograd, 1823, p. 7 ff.).

Prayer was not always accompanied by offerings.

Sigrdrifa, having been roused from a magic sleep by Sigurd Fafnirsbane, makes this invocation: 'Hail day! Hail sons of day! Hail night and her kinswoman! With favourable eyes, look upon us who are sitting here, and grant us victory! Hail aesir; hail asynjur! Hail also to the bountiful earth! Give wisdom and eloquence to us two glorious ones, and hands of healing during our lives!' (*Sigrdrifumál*, ii. 3 [Hildebrand, p. 317 f.]).

When Earl Hakon and Gudbrand were pursuing Hrapp, who had plundered the shrine dedicated to Thor, Thorgerðr Holgabrúðr, and Irpa, 'the earl went aside by himself, away from other men, and bade that no man should follow him, and so he stays awhile. He fell down on both his knees, and held his hands before his eyes; after that he went back to them' (*The Story of Burnt Njál*, tr. G. W. Dasent [Everyman's Library], London, 1911, p. 156).

During his fight with the Jomsborg Vikings Hakon prayed to Thorgerðr Hörðabrúðr, but his prayer proved unavailing until he had sacrificed his son Erling (cf. Craigie, p. 33).

3. Manner of prayer.—Little is known of the form and manner of heathen prayer. Tacitus (*Germ.* x.) informs us that among the Teutons divination was practised by a priest or paterfamilias, 'having prayed to the gods and glanced up to heaven.' In the sagas we hear frequently of worshippers prostrating themselves before images of the gods.

'The island was thickly wooded, and Hakon went to a clearing in the forest, where he lay down, looking to the north and prayed in the way he thought best, calling upon her in whom he put all his trust, Thorgerðr Hörðabrúðr' (Craigie, p. 35; for the heathen custom of turning to the north in prayer cf. Grimm, i. 34).

LITERATURE.—J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, vol. i. ch. iii.; P. Herrmann, *Nordische Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 449 ff., *Deutsche Mythologie*, do. 1898, p. 470 ff.; E. Mogk, *Mythologie*, Strassburg, 1900, in H. Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*, iii. 384 ff.

ENID WELSFORD.

PRAYER (Tibetan).—Prayer is more prevalent among the people of the Land of the Lamas than among any other nation perhaps in the world. This is owing partly to the extreme devotion fostered by the hierarchy which wields the temporal rule of the country, and partly to the intense piety engendered by generations of extreme isolation from the rest of the world, amidst environments where Nature in her severest moods tends to inspire a superstitious dread of malignant spirits, who can be appeased or coerced only by prayer and sacrifice. Prayers are thus ever on the lips of the laity in all spare moments, apart from the daily priestly services in the temples, and in the houses of the well-to-do, which generally possess a small shrine with miniature altar, before which domestic prayer is rendered.

1. General character of the prayers.—The prayers are generally genuine petitions addressed to one or more bountiful Buddhas or Buddhist divinities, whose spiritual or material succour is entreated; or they may be stanzas uttered in praise of the particular deity or deities invoked; and, in nearly all, one or other Buddha, human or celestial, is referred to in addition to the other deity implored. The frequent repetition of such formal prayers tends to degenerate into a mechanical routine. Yet, although the prayers consist usually of formal litanies and other rituals extracted from the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist canonical scriptures, spontaneous private prayers are not uncommon. The present writer has often heard Tibetan votaries, after making an offering of lamps on the altar of wayside temples, address God for spiritual and temporal blessing, for prevention of bodily peril or ailment, and for provision for daily wants, very much after the manner of Christian worshippers at the present day.

2. Buddhist form of Tibetan prayers.—The formal prayers, collected in printed or written manuals, consist mainly of extracts from the Indian Buddhist canon or from the rituals composed by early Indian and Tibetan monks. The class of canonical works furnishing these prayers is generally the same as that employed by the 'Southern' Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam for the purpose, under the name of *paritta* or *pirit* (='protection'), and are *suttas* from the Pāli canon specially composed and prescribed by Buddha himself[1] to be recited as prayers to avert malign influence, for recovery from disease, to remove physical difficulties, and to procure happiness and a good rebirth. They are addressed to the moon, sun, and various other divinities, especially the *yaksha*—a general term for the orthodox Buddhist gods on Aśoka's monuments (250 B.C.), though latterly viewed as more or less malignant. While the Tibetans thus use for prayers the corresponding canonical texts to the Hīnayāna Pāli canon of the Southern Buddhists,[2] they have the advantage over the latter in that they have translated these texts into the vernacular so that the people can understand the meaning of the prayer or praise, whereas the Southern Buddhist laity repeat the texts in the foreign and long dead Pāli, which is unintelligible to them, making the 'prayer' an unmeaning mummery. Even the ingenious Bön religionists in the remoter districts have now generally assimilated their prayers to the type of the dominant Buddhists.

3. Deities and saints invoked.—The gods chiefly invoked by the Tibetans are found by the present writer to be orthodox Buddhist gods. For, contrary to the statements of Western writers on primitive Buddhism,[3] he finds that gods enter very largely into the religion of Śākyamuni himself, as evidenced in the earliest Pāli canonical books, and into that of his greatest propagandist, the emperor Aśoka, not only in his inscribed monuments at Bharhut, but also in his edicts. Thus the latest authoritative reading of the Sahasrām rock-inscription states:

'Men in Jambu-dvipa (India) who up till this time had been unassociated with the gods, have (now) been made associated with the gods.'[4]

[1] Cf. D. J. Gogerly, *Ceylon Buddhism*, Colombo and London, 1908, ii. 328; and L. A. Waddell, 'Dhāraṇī Cult in Buddhism,' *Ostasiat. Zeitschr.* ii. [1913] 155 f.

[2] For list of the Buddhist canonical texts used as prayers in Pali, and trr. of several, see Gogerly, ii. 329–393.

[3] *Eg.*, T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *passim*.

[4] Tr. by E. Hultzsch, *JRAS*, 1911, p. 1115; cf. also Waddell, 'Dhāraṇī Cult,' pp. 155–171.

The first deity or divine saint to be invoked is Buddha himself, though not the most frequently addressed by the Tibetans. This also is paralleled in Southern Buddhism, which is supposed to represent the primitive form of Gotama's religion, wherein Gotama (Śākyamuni), although regarded as having passed away totally from the world, is not regarded as 'extinct,' as in the later mystical Buddhism, but is invoked as a still existing divinity, and not a mere pious memory:

> 'I bow my head to the ground and worship
> The sacred dust of his holy feet:
> If in aught I have sinned against Buddha
> May Buddha forgive me my sin.'[1]

He is also invoked daily in the refuge-formula: 'We go for refuge to Buddha, to his word or law (*Dharma*), and to his order of monks (*Saṅgha*),' in Tibetan[2] as in Southern Buddhism, as if he were still existent.

More frequently than the quondam human Buddha are invoked the celestial Buddhas of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. They are regarded as everlasting gods, and are reflexes of the Hindu gods to whom the title of 'Buddha,' or Buddha's other favourite title, 'Jina' or 'the Victor,' has been transferred. Of these the primordial self-existent god, corresponding to the late Brāhmanist creator-god Brahmā, is Ādibuddha, and he bears various titles according to different sects of Lāmas. Thus he is the 'Thunderbolt-Holder' (rDorje 'chan = Skr. Vajradhara), or the 'Thunderbolt-Souled' (rDorje sems-dpa = Skr. Vajrasattva), or 'Receptacle of Light' or 'Ever-shining' (rNam-par snan-mdsad = Skr. Vairochana), presumably a form of the popular solar Buddha, Amitābha, or the 'Boundless Light,' the god of the Western Paradise, though nominally different from the latter. Latterly there was a fivefold division of these celestial Buddhas according to the five directions, namely the four quarters and the zenith.[3]

Much more frequently implored are the celestial *bodhisattvas*, or nominally potential Buddhas among the gods, most of whom are everlasting gods of an energetic order and invoked for their active aid. One of these, common to Southern Buddhism and Indian Mahāyāna, is the Buddhist Messiah, Maitreya (Tib. Byams-pa), who was placed by Śākyamuni in the heaven of Indra or Śakra. Gotama's (or Śākyamuni's) frequent references to him and to his abode in Indra's heaven offer another confutation of the statement so frequently made by the Pāli school of writers that Buddha was atheistic and did not recognize the Hindu gods in his system. Of this Buddhist Messiah many colossal images are carved on cliffs along roads in Tibet, and are the object of prayer to passers-by. But the most frequently worshipped and invoked of all is the Indian Buddhist goddess the 'Saviouress' (sGrol-ma, pronounced Dö-mä, the Skr. Tārā), who is the primordial Mother-goddess, Māyā, which was also the name of Buddha's mother; and, under the name Māyā, Tārā is worshipped by the Burmese and other Southern Buddhists. She is the special patron of women and children, and succourer in distress on land and sea. She is the Queen of Heaven, independently on her own account as well as in the form of consort to the Indian Avalokita (sPyan-ras-zigs, pronounced Chä-rä-si), the 'All-seeing One' (lit. 'Clad with Eyes,' according to its Tibetan translation). The latter as the god of transmigration is the special favourite and patron-god of the Tibetans, and is associated with two others, as the defenders of Lāmaism, who also are of Indian origin, namely the 'Thunderbolt-Wielder' (Phyag-rdor, Skr. Vajrapāṇi), the Śaivist Jupiter Pluvius, and the 'Sweet-Voiced' god of wisdom or Buddhist Apollo ('Jam-dbaṅs, Skr. Mañjuśrī)—all three of whom are in great request, though Avalokita, to whom the *Oṁ maṇipadme Huṁ* formula is addressed, is the most frequently invoked of all, and by all sects. The other popular *bodhisattva* gods and goddesses are enumerated in the list of their prayer-spells below, § 6.

Of the saints who are specially invoked for aid, each different sect of monks gives pre-eminence to its own particular founder; thus the Yellow-caps invoke Tsongkhapa; the new Red-Cap, Dug-pa, invoke Marpa or Milarāpa; and the old Red-cap, the original founder of the order of the Lāmas, Padmasambhava or Padmakara (*q.v.*). The laity, however, of all the sects especially invoke the last-named saint and esteem him to be practically as powerful as their favourite god, and he receives full divine honours—though this is paid covertly in communities where the Yellow-cap priests predominate, by whom he is banned as unorthodox.

'Demons' are not ordinarily invoked as such, or directly, even by the unreformed Red-caps, except on certain rare occasions of 'feeding the devils' and in disease- or death-ritual; and even then the invocation is usually preceded by some Buddhistic ceremony, although embodying aboriginal Bön rites. But the Śaivist forms of the Thunderbolt-Holder as the 'Defender of the Faith,' although not technically regarded by the Tibetans as devils, are really demoniacal and are identical with the demonist forms of the Hindu god Śiva as the spirit of destruction and death. These demonist forms were not inventions of the Tibetans, as generally asserted, but were all borrowed by the Tibetans ready-made from mediæval Indian Buddhism, which, to maintain its popularity, had been forced to adopt these depraved elements from the degenerated Indian Brāhmanism, while the poor deluded Tibetans believed that they were all right, as they imported them from the home of Buddhism at Bodh Gaya. As a result, each Tibetan monk has to select one of these demonist Śivas as his tutelary,[1] and each morning he privately invokes him for his protection throughout the day. But the unsophisticated layman invokes for this purpose the deified saint Padmasambhava, and the women implore Dö-mä, or Tārā, when they proceed beyond the self-sufficient *Oṁ maṇipadme Huṁ*.

4. Prayers in celebration services.—The priestly arrangement of prayers for the worship of each Buddhist divinity among Tibetans is usually divided into seven stages, and the text is printed or written in separate little pocket manuals or prayer-books for each deity, all in vernacular Tibetan. The stages are:[2] (1) the invocation—calling to the feast or sacrifice; (2) inviting the deity to be seated on the altar; (3) presentation of sacrificial offerings—sacred cake, rice, water, flowers, incense, lamps, musical instruments; (4) hymns in praise; (5) repetition of the special spell of the deity in Sanskrit; (6) prayers for benefits, present and to come; (7) benediction. When demons have been worshipped, they are 'invited to depart' before the benediction.

5. Specimen of ritualistic prayer.—A good example of the formal prayers is seen in the follow-

[1] Pāli *Pātimokka*, Dickson 5; this does not appear in the version translated by Gogerly, i. 160–210, and is therefore presumably not used by all Ceylonese Buddhists; but it is found almost literally in the Tibetan versions—*e.g.*, E. Schlagintweit, *Buddhism in Tibet*, London, 1863, p. 126 f., where the text specially adds: 'I believe that the body of all the Buddhas does not enter into Nirvana (of Extinction),' evidently intended to confute as a heresy the doctrine of total extinction.

[2] Waddell, 'Lamaism,' in *Gazetteer of Sikhim*, Calcutta, 1894, p. 308.

[3] For details see Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, pp. 346–352.

[1] See Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 152, 222 f.

[2] For details see *ib.* p. 424 f.

ing extract from the ritual of Tārā, the Queen of Heaven, which has been translated in full by the present writer.[1] It is composed in metre.

Invocation.

'Hail! O verdant Tārā! The Saviour of all beings!
Descend, we beseech thee, from thy heavenly mansion at Potala,
With all thy host[2] of gods, titans, and deliverers.
We humbly prostrate ourselves at thy lotus-feet!
Deliver us from all distress, O holy Mother!'

Presentation of sacrificial offerings.

'We hail thee, O revered and sublime Tārā!
Who art adored by all the kings and princes
Of the ten directions,[3] of the present, past and future.
We pray thee to accept these offerings
Of flowers, incense, perfumed lamps, precious food,
The music of cymbals and the other offerings!
We sincerely beg thee in all thy divine forms[4]
To partake of the food now offered.
On confessing to thee penitently their sins
The most sinful hearts, yea, even the committers of
The ten vices and the five boundless sins
Will obtain forgiveness and
Reach perfection of soul, through thee!
If we have amassed any merit in the three states,[5]
We rejoice in this good fortune, when we consider
The unfortunate lot of the poor (lower) animals
Still piteously engulfed in the ocean of misery.
On their behalf, we now turn the wheel of religion!
We implore thee by whatever merit we have accumulated
To kindly regard all the (lower) animals.
And for ourselves, when our merit has reached perfection,
Let us not, we pray thee, linger longer in this world.'

Hymns in Tārā's praise.

(The hymns are in verse, the metre of which is not here reproduced.)

'Hail! exalted Tārā-the-Saviouress!
Heroic mother, the messenger
Of the three-world Lord,
Rich in power and compassion.

Hail to thee whose hand is decked
By the golden lotus,
Eager soother of our woe,
Ever tireless worker, thou!'

(and so on for 21 verses).

Repetition of the spell and prayer of the deity.

Here is repeated 108 times on the rosary, or, if time presses, as often as possible, the special mystic spell of Tārā in Sanskrit, namely:

'*Oṁ! Tā-re tu Tā-re tu-re Svā-hā!*'

Prayers for blessings.

'We implore thee, O revered Blessed One,[6] Victorious and Merciful Mother! purify us and all other beings from the two evil thoughts. . . .

Wherever we dwell, we beg thee to soothe there disease and poverty, fighting and disputes, and increase the true religion. . . .

Let us obtain the favourite tutelary angels[7] of our former lives and entry into the paradise of the Buddhas of the past, present and future.'

Benediction.

'Now, O mighty Worker, speedy Soother and gracious Mother,
Holding the *utpal*-lotus flower, may thy glory come and all happiness!'

One of the ordinary hymns to Buddha opens as follows:

'Om! Hail to the Omniscient Ones: Buddha, (His) Law, and (His) Order of Monks!
Hail to the blessed Buddha, the victorious and all-wise Tathā-gata Arhat, who has gone to happiness!
He is the guide of gods and men.
He is the root of virtue and fountain of treasure.
He is adorned with perfect endurance and all beauty.
He is the greatest flower of all the race.
He is admirable in all his actions, in the eyes of all.
He delights in the faithful ones.
He is the Almighty Power, the Universal Guide.
He is the father of all the Bodhisats,
The king of the revered ones and leader of all the dead.
He owns infinite knowledge, immeasurable fortitude.
His commands are all-perfect, his voice all-pleasing.
He is without equal, without desires, without evil.
He delivers all from sorrow, from sin, from worldliness.
His senses are the sharpest. He bravely cuts all knots.
He delivers all from deepest misery, from earthly woes.
He has crossed the ocean of misery.
He is perfect in foreknowledge.
He knows the past, present and future.
He lives far from death.
He lives in the pure land of bliss, whence enthroned he sees all beings!'

6. Rosaries. — The supposed efficacy of the mechanical repetition of prayers as devotional exercises has led in Tibet, as in the Roman Church, to the extensive use of the rosary; and nearly every layman and woman in Tibet carries a rosary to register the performance of these pious tasks. The rosaries are formed of various materials of mystical significance,[1] and the beads reach the mystic number of 108. The leading prayer-spell formulæ recited on these beads are of a Sanskritic character, and are shown in the following table along with the deity or saint to whom they are addressed and the kind of rosary employed.

Deity.	The prayer-spell.	Kind of rosary.
1. Chā-rā-si, Skr. Avalokita.	*Oṁ! maṇipadme Huṁ.*	Conch-shell or crystal.
2. Dorje jik-je, Skr. Vajrabhairava.	*Oṁ! Yamāntaka Huṁ phat.*	Human skull or 'stomach'-stone.
3. Chā-na dorje, Skr. Vajrapāṇi.	*Oṁ! Vajrapāṇi Huṁ phat.*	*Raksha*-seed.
4. Do-mā (green), Skr. Tārā.	*Oṁ! Tāre tut Tāre ture Svā-hā.*	*Bodhi*-tree wood or turquoise.
5. Dö-kar (white), Skr. Sitā-Tārā.	*Oṁ! Tāre tut Tāre mama āyur punyedsanyana pushpitta kuru Sva-ha.*	*Bodhi*-tree wood.
6. Dorje p'agmo, Skr. Vajravarahi.	*Oṁ! Sarva Buddha dakkinnī Huṁ, phat.*	do.
7. 'Ozer chän-ma, Skr. Marichi.	*Oṁ! Marichyē maṁ Svā-hā.*	do.
8. Gon-po nagpo, Skr. Kālanātha.	*Oṁ! Srē Mahākāla Huṁ phat Sva-ha.*	*Raksha*-seed.
9. Nam-sē, Skr. Vaiśravaṇa.	*Oṁ! Vaiśravaṇa-ye Sva-ha.*	*Nanga-pāni*-seed.
10. Dsambha-la, Skr. Jambhala.	*Oṁ! Jambhala dsalendra-ye Sva-ha.*	do.
11. Sen-ge-da, Skr. Sinhanāda.	*Oṁ! Ahrih Sinhanāda Huṁ phat.*	Conch-shell or crystal.
12. Jam-yang, Skr. Manjughosha.	*Oṁ! Ara-paca-nadhi.*	Yellow.
13. Demchog, Skr. Samvara.	*Oṁ! Hrih ha-ha Huṁ Huṁ phat.*	*Bodhi*-tree.
14. Padma-jungnā, Skr. Padmasambhava.	*Oṁ! Vajra Guru Padma Siddhi Huṁ.*	Coral or *bodhi*-tree.

7. Graces before meat.—Before drinking tea, the usual beverage, the Lāmas, like the Romans in regard to wine, pour out a little as a libation to the *lares* and other gods. A usual grace for tea is:

'We humbly beseech thee that we and our relatives throughout our life-cycles may never be separated from the Three Holy Ones! May the blessing of the Trinity enter into this drink!'

Then, before drinking, they sprinkle a few drops with the tips of the fingers on the floor or ground, and continue the grace:

'To all the dread local demons of this country we offer this good Chinese tea! Let us obtain our wishes, and may the doctrines of Buddha be extended!'

When any flesh-meat is in the diet, '*Oṁ abhira khechara, Huṁ!*' is repeated to counteract the sin of slaughter and of eating flesh, and by the efficacy of this prayer-spell the animal whose flesh is eaten is supposed to be reborn in a higher state of existence, and even in heaven.

8. Prayer-wheels and prayer-flags.—With the laity the panacea prayer-formula is the ubiquitous

[1] See Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 435.

[2] '*Khor*=' circle.'

[3] That is the four cardinal points, the intermediate half-points, the zenith and nadir.

[4] This goddess has different forms and names as incorporating all aspects of the primordial divine mother; see Waddell's tr. of Tibetan *Dhāraṇī*, in *IA* xlii. [1914] 37-95.

[5] The three mystic worlds of Brahmanism: desire, form, and formlessness (*kāma*, *rūpa*, and *a-rūpa*).

[6] *Bhagavatī*, the feminine of *bhagavat*, the ordinary title for Buddha in the Pāli and often in the Sanskrit.

[7] Lit. 'spirit' or 'gods' (*lha*).

[1] For details see Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 202-210.

Om maṇipadme Hum, which is the Pater Noster of Tibetans, though it is of Indian origin. In virtue of the supposed efficacy of its mechanical repetition, it is printed thousands of times on long strips of paper which are coiled inside revolving metal cylinders to form the so-called hand-'prayer-wheels' which are the most conspicuous part of the pious outfit of the Tibetans, laity and Lāmas, and are carried spinning in their hands, in the belief that each revolution of the printed sentences is equivalent to uttering the formula an equal number of times (cf. art. PRAYER-WHEELS). On the 'prayer-flags,' which are erected on tall masts in the neighbourhood of temples and wayside shrines, and, fluttering in the breeze, form a very artistic and picturesque feature of the landscape, are inscribed various prayers of an astrological kind, especially for the good fortune of the person erecting these flags, which are really 'luck-flags.' Their name *lung-rta* has been shown by the present writer[1] to incorporate the Chinese *long-ma*, 'horse-dragon,' which has an analogous ritual. After several spells in Sanskrit we find written in Tibetan:

'May all the above deities [Avalokita and others] prosper the year [here is inserted the year of birth of the individual votary] and prosper the body, speech, and mind of this year-holder and may the true religion [of Buddha] prosper!'

Analogous paper banners, in the shape of dragons and other animals, are offered also by the Southern Buddhists of Burma at temples and other shrines inscribed with similar sentences in Pāli and the vernacular, such as:

'May the man born on Friday gain reward by this pious offering.' 'May the man born on Monday be freed from sickness and the three calamities.' 'By the merit of this may Wednesday's children be blessed by spirits and men.'[2]

These Tibetan luck-flags are also tied to certain bushes over dangerous parts of streams and near cairns, like the rag-bushes in Muhammadan and other Eastern countries.

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted throughout.

L. A. WADDELL.

PRAYER, BOOK OF COMMON.—1. Introduction.—(*a*) The English Prayer Book, as we now have it, is a very composite production. A study of the title-page alone is sufficient indication of this. It runs thus:

'The Book of Common Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments, and other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church according to the Use of the Church of England;[3] together with the Psalter or Psalms of David, pointed as they are to be sung or said in Churches; and the Form and Manner of Making, Ordaining, and Consecrating of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons.'

The cumbrousness of this title is not merely a relic of the days when such prolix titles to books were in fashion, but is also due to the fact that by the middle of the 16th cent. the still recent invention of printing and the constant improvements in it enabled our Reformers to begin to bring together into a single volume all the more necessary services and other materials for public worship, which had as a rule hitherto been copied out with much labour in several separate tomes.[4] Thus 'the Common Prayer' represents the former Breviary (and perhaps we may add the Primer); 'the Administration of the Sacraments,' etc., represents the Missal and the Manual; the 'Psalter' speaks for itself; and the 'Form of Making,' etc., stands for the old Pontifical. This, of course, is far from exhausting the books in use before the Reformation, such as the Hymnary (of which we now have no authorized representative), the Antiphoner, Lectionary, etc. Some of these (*e.g.*, the Antiphoner) have been almost entirely removed from the services in the present book, the reason being thus stated in the Preface of 1549:

'For this cause be cut off Anthems, Responds, Invitatories and such like things as did break the continual course of the reading of the Scripture.'[1]

Others are either provided for as by the references in the Table of Lessons or printed in full as in the Epistles and Gospels of the Day, etc., while the use of hymns in numerous unauthorized collections has taken the place of the ancient Hymnary.[2] The musical notes, however, which the old books often supplied are now wholly wanting,[3] except by prescriptive use, though the rubrics in various places contain references to the clerks and their singing, which obviously recognize the place of music in public worship as legitimate; and the Psalter is specially said to be 'pointed' for singing or saying[4] in churches.

In the Ordinal, which was first issued separately in March 1549–50, the most notable omission, when we compare it with the ancient Pontificals, is of any provision for the consecration of churches and for the coronation of the sovereign. It is not easy now to account for this serious oversight, which, at least in the case of opening new churches for public use, has been a great drawback ever since. We have no exact guide as to what was the mind of the Church at that period, and the celebration of the divine mysteries as an essential of the rite has usually been almost entirely lost sight of.[5]

(*b*) We may now proceed briefly to review the reasons and principles which guided the first compilers of the new book, and which have been accepted in the bulk by all subsequent revisers.

(1) One main reason for the fundamental change of substituting English for Latin throughout is the obvious one and is thus stated in the Preface of 1549: 'that the people might understand and have profit by hearing the same.' But it is a mistake to suppose that this was an entirely unheard-of innovation in the reign of Henry VIII. Apart from the fact that it was after all only a return to primitive practice,[6] it is worth noting that in the marriage service of the unreformed rite the betrothal had from of old taken place in the mother tongue, though the rest of the ceremony was conducted in Latin, while for at least 150 years the private devotions of the laity had been provided for in English by the Primers, which were put forth by authority from time to time.[7] These contained some of the more important prayers, canticles, etc., from the Breviary offices,

[1] Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 412 f.

[2] Shway Yoe (J. G. Scott), *The Burman, his Life and Notions*, London, 1882, i. 225.

[3] The title originally ended here; until 1662 the Psalter had its own separate title-page and the Ordinal still has, though since 1662 it has also been printed on the front page (see below).

[4] Cf. the Preface of 1549: 'by this order the curates shall need none other books . . . but this book and the Bible and . . . the people shall not be at so great charge for books as in time past they have been' (these words are now omitted).

[1] A few traces, however, are left: (1) the reference to the Advent antiphon 'O Sapientia' (16th Dec.); (2) the mention of the anthem 'in Quires and Places where they sing' at Mattins and Evensong; this rubric, however, dates from 1662; (3) old antiphons have been introduced into (*a*) the Litany ('O God,' etc.), (*b*) the Burial Service ('Man that is born,' etc., and 'I heard a voice,' etc.), and (*c*) the Visitation of the Sick ('O Saviour,' etc.), and (*d*) the collect for the Sunday after Ascension day is an adaptation of an old antiphon.

[2] Only one metrical hymn is now contained in the Prayer Book, viz. 'Veni Creator' (in two versions) in the Ordinal.

[3] Merbeck's notation (1550) was apparently to be the norm at one time; but see Procter and Frere, *New Hist. of the Book of Common Prayer*, p. 42 f.

[4] 'Sing'=recite with musical inflexions; 'say'=recite in monotone.

[5] Obviously, if this contention is correct, the usual method of a priest celebrating the Holy Communion before the consecration by the bishop is uncanonical and reduces the Episcopal service almost to a farce. In the order of consecration provided in the American Prayer Book, Holy Communion does form an integral part, though it is rather spoilt by too much attention being directed to Mattins which precede it.

[6] Cf. A. Fortescue, *The Mass*, new ed., London, 1914, p. 126: 'There was no idea of a special liturgical language at that time [for the first 2 centuries]; people said their prayers in the vulgar tongue.'

[7] For the Reformed Primers of Henry VIII.'s reign see Procter and Frere, p. 43 f.

and thus for a considerable period the more thoughtful and religious lay-folk had become familiarized with a certain portion of the Church services. Still the restoration of the use of the vernacular into public worship—a use which had ceased for many centuries—was a new departure of the very highest importance and was under God due to Henry VIII. and his advisers.[1]

The first step taken in that direction was in 1543, when the Canterbury Convocation ordered Lessons from the English Bible to be read at Mattins and Vespers. But the first service proper to be published in English was the Litany in the year following (1544). It is interesting to note that the reason which suggested this was very similar to that which originated litanies in the West in the 5th and 6th centuries, viz. the prevalence of bad seasons and other troubles at home and of wars abroad.

The next step in the same direction was at the beginning of Edward VI.'s reign, when—pending the decision as to the use of English in general—an Order of Communion in English was issued in March 1548. This[2] contained the Exhortation, Confession, Absolution, the 'Comfortable Words,' the Prayer of 'Humble Access,' nearly as we have them now, and was to be inserted in the Latin Mass before the Communion of the people. The Epistle and Gospel were also to be read in English.

Three other principles guided the Reformers in compiling the Prayer Book, as the original Preface makes clear.

(2) They aimed at clearing away that which was only legendary and calculated to foster superstition:

'Here are left out many things, whereof some are untrue, some uncertain, some vain and superstitious,'

and at restoring the continuous and orderly reading of the Holy Scripture day by day together with the monthly recital of the whole Psalter.

(3) They greatly simplified the forms and ceremonies in vogue:

'The number and hardness of the rules . . . and the manifold changes of the service was the cause that . . . many times there was more business to find out what should be read than to read it when it was found out.'

At first this process was much more drastically carried out in the case of the Daily Offices than in that of the Liturgy proper, where in 1549 a very considerable portion of the ancient usages was retained, whilst those in Morning and Evening Prayer were reduced to a bare minimum—suitable, as it was thought, for the busier members of the laity as well as for others. But later changes (especially in 1552) in the Liturgy itself were far less conservative and liturgically defensible. Even so the first paragraphs of the present Preface drawn up by Robert Sanderson, bishop of Lincoln, and prefixed to the original portion ('concerning the service,' etc.) so late as 1662 still profess

'to observe the like moderation as we find to have been used . . . in former times. And therefore . . . we have rejected all such [alterations] as were . . . of dangerous consequence as secretly striking at some . . . laudable practice of the Church of England or indeed of the whole Catholic Church of Christ.'

(4) They desired uniformity of use throughout the kingdom.

'Whereas heretofore there hath been great diversity . . . some following Sallsbury use, some Hereford use, etc. . . . now, from henceforth all the whole Realm shall have but one use.'

(5) Yet another principle of the Reformers has so far been taken for granted rather than asserted, except as the use of the English tongue and supplication of the forms give evidence of it, viz. their intention to give the laity proper facilities for joining in the divine service. This of course specially refers to the Daily Offices. The theory always had been that the people as well as the clergy should attend the day hours in the parish church, though it may be doubted if it was ever very generally put in practice. In 1549 and onwards the aim was to facilitate the practice as much as possible, though still with doubtful success.

The Preface, as it now (since 1662) stands, bids 'all Priests and Deacons to say daily the Morning and Evening Prayer either privately or openly, not being let by sickness or some other urgent cause' (in 1552 'preaching and studying of divinity' had been particularized). 'And the Curate . . . being at home and not being otherwise hindered . . . shall cause a bell to be tolled thereunto a convenient time before he begin, that the people may come to hear God's Word and to pray with him.'

Fresh emphasis was likewise given to the obligation in 1662, when the words 'daily to be said and used throughout the year' were added to the first title of 'Morning and Evening Prayer.'

It should be observed that much of the original Preface recalls the language of Cardinal Quignon's Preface to his Breviary (1535), because it shows that the Spanish Reformer's ideas had clearly as much influence on Cranmer as, if not more than, those of Luther and other less conservative Reformers on the Continent.

2. Historical résumé.—It is now matter of common knowledge that, though a great deal of the work of constructing the Prayer Book had been done in Henry VIII.'s reign, yet the first edition was not actually published till 1549, when Edward VI. had been on the throne more than a year. It was to come into use on Whitsunday, 9th June.[1] But the great and rapid progress made by the extreme Puritan party during this reign availed very soon to bring about much more radical changes, and by All Saints' day 1552 the First was superseded by the Second Book, the contents of which are much more nearly what we are familiar with in our present Book; in fact most of the subsequent modifications have been by way of addition to, rather than alteration of, its text.

Edward died in July 1553, and during the reign of Mary the old unreformed services and ceremonies were restored in their entirety.

When Elizabeth in her turn came to the throne (1558), she had to be content with the fewest possible improvements in the Second Book, which was then again (1559) brought into use: such as the addition of Sunday Lessons, the omission of the petition against 'the Bishop of Rome and his detestable enormities' from the Litany, and the present words of distribution in the Holy Communion, which combine the formulas of 1549 and 1552. By the end of her reign the Puritans had regained such strength that they hoped on the accession of James I. (1603) to get rid of much that they disliked, but at the Hampton Court Conference, to which both sides were summoned, hardly any of their demands were conceded. The most important change was the addition to the Catechism of the part about the sacraments (by John Overall, then dean of St. Paul's, afterwards bishop of Norwich), which the Puritans can hardly have regarded as favouring their views.

The next stage in revision was at the Restoration of Charles II. (1660), when the Prayer Book was brought back into use, after being suppressed during the Commonwealth. In 1661 a conference was held in the Savoy, at which it was again felt

[1] Of the two schemes drawn up before 1549 by Cranmer (recently published by Henry Bradshaw Society, vol. l. [1915]) the first retains the Latin language throughout, but the second introduces the use of English for the Lord's Prayer and the Lessons.

[2] Published by H. Bradshaw Soc., vol. xxxiv. [1908].

[3] It is curious to reflect that after the Council of Trent (1563) the Roman Church followed suit, and since then has rigorously repressed local uses, with rare exceptions.

[1] But without the Ordinal at first (see above, p. 205).

impossible to entertain most of the Puritan proposals, such as the doing away with the sign of the cross in Holy Baptism and with the kneeling posture at Holy Communion. A fair number of changes were, however, admitted under the direction of John Cosin, bishop of Durham, and they were mostly by way of distinct improvement. They came into force in the year following (1662).

Another attempt at revision made in 1689 was ineffectual, and not much has been done since then. We may note, however, (*a*) that of four State services drawn up for occasions of national importance in the 17th cent. only one has been retained since 1859, that for the king's accession (revised 1901); (*b*) that a new Lectionary was issued with the sanction of Canterbury and York Convocations in 1871; and (*c*) that a limited permission was given in 1872 to shorten or modify the service and use hymns. Of these changes the first two must be reckoned as of advantage, while the third is of more questionable value. But that the time has come, or ought to have come, when yet another general revision should be taken in hand to meet modern needs on carefully considered and wisely conservative lines is obvious to most thinking Churchmen. But so far only tentative proposals are forthcoming and 'adhuc sub iudice lis est,' though a certain amount of progress has recently been made.

3. The contents of the present Book in detail.—It will not be possible to describe in full the various contents under separate heads. We must be content with drawing attention to salient features as best we can.

(*a*) *The Preface.*—The first five paragraphs were prefixed in 1662, having been composed by Sanderson of Lincoln and slightly altered by Convocation before approval.

(*b*) *Concerning the service of the Church.*—Here the original Preface (1549) began; it was probably the work of Cranmer, as was also the section that follows, *Of Ceremonies*; but the latter was transferred from the end of the Book to its present place in 1552, while *Certain notes for the more plain explanation and decent ministration of things contained in this Book* were then expunged.[1] Besides one or two verbal alterations of small importance, three interesting sentences are now omitted. The first has been already quoted (p. 205a, n. 4), the second justifies the adoption of a single use throughout the realm, and the third, which only in a general way bound to the saying of the Daily Offices such of the clergy as serve the congregation in cathedral and other churches, has given way to the present much more definite and stringent regulation (see above, p. 206).

(*c*) *The order how the Psalter is appointed to be read* originally contained a special provision for the first three months of the year, by which 31st Jan. and 1st March were to be treated as if they were 1st and 29th (or 30th) Feb. respectively and the rest of the days of the month shifted forward by one (*i.e.* 1st Feb. became 2nd and so on); and in leap-year on the intercalary day (between the 25th and 26th) the Psalms (and Lessons) of the previous day were to be repeated. The order about repeating 'Gloria Patri' at the end of each Psalm, always provided for in the rubric, was not originally inserted here.

(*d*) *The order how the rest of the Holy Scripture, etc.*—The original provisions in this section were modified in 1871 to suit the New Lectionary now in use. It is impossible here to compare the old with the new course or to indicate the changes made and the principles of selection.

(*e*) *The Calendar* proper as published in 1549 contained but few commemorations and of these the only one that calls for notice is [St. Mary] Magdalen (22nd July), because it was at first furnished with a special Introit, Collect, Epistle, and Gospel, but in 1552 all mention of her was removed. The bare name, however, was restored in 1561 together with several other names, St. Anne (26th July) among them.

The list of commemorations underwent various vicissitudes (1561, 1604, 1662) chiefly in the way of addition, though it is not always easy to arrive at the reasons for the selections: some of the saints are very obscure—*e.g.*, Valentine Bp., Nicomede Mart., Enurchus (Evortius) Bp.,[2] and Machutus Bp.—and there are some notable omissions (*e.g.*, of Eastern worthies).

The following details are to be observed: (1) St. Alban's day, now 17th June, is usually the 22nd, and St. Cyprian's, now 26th Sept., the 14th; (2) the Transfiguration (6th Aug.) was not formally authorized in the West till 1457 (to commemorate the deliverance of Belgrade from the Turks); it now has a proper Collect, Epistle, and Gospel in the American Prayer Book; (3) the Name of Jesus (7th Aug.) was never a very general commemoration; (4) Enurchus Bp. (7th Sept.) is probably a misprint for Evortius, bishop of Orleans (4th cent.); (5) it is somewhat strange to find the Visitation (2nd July) and Nativity of B.V.M. (8th Sept.) included, since her Falling asleep (15th Aug.), a much more general feast-day, is omitted; (6) 'O Sapientia' (16th Dec.) marks the beginning of the series of Advent antiphons before Christmas, though no provision is made for their use in Magnificat during that season; (7) K. Charles Mart. (30th Jan.) was added in 1662 and has been omitted without authority, since the special service of that day was abolished in 1859.

(*f*) *Tables and rules for feasts and fasts.*—These were first added in 1662, probably at Cosin's suggestion. Hitherto they had been kept according to tradition and custom only, except that in the Calendar the vigils had been marked. It is to be noted, (1) that only the 'red letter' days among the feasts are here mentioned; (2) that the Friday fast is of unusual strictness, being now only relaxed when Christmas falls on that day of the week; the ancient rule extended the relaxation to all Fridays within Easter and Christmastide and those on which a feast falls; and (3) the distinction between fasting and abstinence (as if the latter were less strict than the former) is to some extent a modern (Roman Catholic) innovation.

(*g*) *The tables for finding Easter* are too technical and elaborate to find treatment in this article (cf. CALENDAR [Christian]). And the same may be said about the '*Ornaments' Rubric*, that stands before the Order for Morning Prayer.[1]

(*h*) *The Daily Offices.*—Roughly speaking, Morning Prayer is compiled from the mediæval offices of Mattins, Lauds, and Prime, Evening Prayer from those of Vespers and Compline, with certain new elements added to each later. Thus the former, from the first Lord's Prayer (with which in 1549 the service began) to 'Te Deum,' followed the lines of Mattins and, from the second lesson to the third collect (with which it ended), the lines of Lauds. But Evening Prayer was made to conform more to the new Mattins, and therefore the materials taken from the ancient Vespers and Compline were subjected to rather greater changes, though here again the first part up to Magnificat more or less corresponds to Vespers and the latter part to Compline. The opening sentences, Exhortation, Confession, and Absolution, were added to Mattins in 1552 and to Evensong in 1662. The concluding prayers were transferred from the end of the Litany to their present place in 1662. Of these the second was composed in 1604; the others were inserted in 1559, the first dating from 1545 (or possibly 1534) and the third being found in the so-called 'Gelasian' Sacramentary. The fourth concludes the Deacon's Litany before the 'Little Entrance' in the Liturgies of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom. It stands therefore suitably at the end of our Litany, when it is followed by Holy Communion, as was originally intended, but is less suitable at the end of Mattins and Evensong.

(*i*) *Quicunque vult* before the Reformation had been appointed for daily use at Prime. In 1549 it was turned into English and ordered to be used immediately after Benedictus on the six great festivals; and in 1552 seven saints' days were added, which brought up its recitation to about once a month throughout the year. The direction that it is to be said 'instead of the Apostles' Creed' was added in 1662.

(*j*) *The Litany* in its present form is perhaps Cranmer's greatest liturgical triumph. Any one acquainted with mediæval litanies will appreciate the masterly skill with which he has by various devices (such as the grouping of petitions drawn from different sources[2] and the exercising of great wisdom both in selection and in omission[3]) turned the old forms from barren strings of names and short petitions into an astonishingly rich and satisfactory instrument of devotion—at all events for occasions when humiliation of the soul and deep penitence are timely, even if we could desire an alternative form which should be more suitable for times of uplifting and rejoicing.

As to the second part of the Litany after the Lord's Prayer, it is impossible to give here a complete description of the materials of which it is built up. The first versicle, response, and collect are taken from Luther's Litany; the collect, however, is ancient, being that 'in Missa pro tribulatione cordis' (Sarum); the 'Amen' has never been printed. Then follows a section taken from a litany for Rogationtide; it consists of anthem and psalm with 'Gloria Patri'; only (perhaps by accident) the repeated anthem[4] precedes the 'Gloria' instead of following it, as it ought to do. The versicles and responses,[5] which come next, ought properly to be sung by the clerks: they were for special use 'in tempore belli' in the Sarum use.

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[1] But partly incorporated (much modified) in the rubrics at the beginning of Morning Prayer.

[2] Not included in the Elizabethan Calendar (1561), but added in 1604, perhaps because it had been Elizabeth's birthday and therefore a public holiday for some years. Similar national or even local reasons may have guided the selection in other cases (*e.g.*, St. Audrey [17th Oct.], the great E. Anglian fair-day).

[1] Much that is reasonably and usefully to be said on opposing views of this rubric will be found in F. C. Eeles' tract no. 17 in Mowbray's *Churchman's Penny Library* and in G. Harford's art. *s.v.* in *Prayer Book Dictionary*, p. 516 ff.

[2] Not only did he use the old Roman forms, but he also used Luther's Litany (1529) and the Deacon's Litany in the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom.

[3] At first (1544) invocations of St. Mary Mother of God, the angels, blessed spirits, patriarchs, etc., were retained, but in 1549 they were removed.

[4] The variation in the anthem is unusual.

[5] The address 'O Son of David' probably stands for the original 'Fili Dei vivi,' as if it were 'Fili Davidis.'

The concluding versicle, response, and collect are freely adapted from the Sarum Rogations. The Grace (2 Co 13) was added in 1559.

(*k*) *Holy Communion.*—We here deal mainly with the present order, characterizing the contents *seriatim* as briefly as may be.

The *first Lord's Prayer and the Collect for Purity* appear in the Latin rite among the private devotions of the priest before the Mass; hence perhaps comes his repeating the former alone, 'Amen' and all.

The *Ten Commandments* have been a special feature of our service since 1552.[1] Apparently they are intended to recall or represent the *Lectio Prophetica* (the OT lesson) of the early Liturgies. Their present use with the tenfold (instead of the former ninefold) repetition of 'Kyrie eleison' (specially applied to each individual soul) is a very happy inspiration of Cranmer's, to which, in spite of certain difficulties of interpretation and application, English Christianity owes much of its certainty as to the true standard of good living.

The (alternative) *Collects for the King*, composed in 1549, were then ordered for use after the collect of the day, not before as now.

The *Collects proper* may be divided into three classes: (i.) those which belong to the pre-Reformation period, some of them as old as the 'Leonine' or 'Gelasian' or 'Gregorian' books;[2] (ii.) those first issued in 1549; (iii.) those issued in 1662. But it must be remembered that many of the older forms have received important additions or modifications in either 1549 or 1662 or at both dates.

As to the *Epistle* (during which the right position for the people is that of sitting), it is worth noticing that out of 90 passages chosen seven are taken from Isaiah or one of the Prophets (only one of these being for a Sunday, viz. that next before Advent), thirteen out of the Acts, and four out of the Revelation (of which two are from the last book for Sundays, viz. Whitsunday and Trinity Sunday).

As to the *Gospel* (for which the rubric especially orders the people to stand), all that need be said is that the ascription before ('Glory be,' etc.) inserted in 1549 was removed in 1552 and was not restored in 1662, though Cosin desired it and it had been inserted in the Scottish Office (1637) together with 'Thanks be,' etc., afterwards.

The rubric ordering a *Sermon* after the Creed is one of the very few references to preaching during service in the Book, the others being in the baptismal and marriage services, while in the Ordinal the Sermon is put before the Litany instead of in the usual place. The traditional and natural place for exposition or exhortation is after the reading of God's Word.

Offertory sentences.—In 1549 one or more of these were to be sung 'where there be Clerks,' but this direction was removed in 1552 and now only the saying of them by the priest is mentioned.

The *Prayer for the Church* [+*Militant here in earth*, 1552].—This portion of the Canon of 1549 was separated from the consecration of the elements and placed here in 1552: and at the same time the Lord's Prayer,[3] with which in accordance with ancient use the Canon ended, was placed after the Communion of the people as now, and the first of the two following prayers was likewise cut off and put separate, as an alternative to the Thanksgiving.

It is to be observed (1) that with the Church militant are now included 'all thy servants departed this life in thy faith and fear' (which is strictly inaccurate), and (2) that 'oblations' are generally considered to mean the sacred elements in contradistinction to the 'alms' for the poor; but there are grounds for holding that they more correctly refer to the people's contribution to the support of the clergy or their offerings in general.

The three *Exhortations* which follow are a special feature of our Book originally introduced in 1549; since then they have been subjected to many changes, and are still printed though but seldom used, the need of them having now in a large measure gone. Nevertheless, they contain much valuable teaching and advice, though some of it has given rise to unfortunate misunderstandings (*e.g.*, as to the 'unworthiness' of those who receive). The first is for ordinary use in giving notice of Communion, and suggests the lines on which private confession to a minister is desirable in the English Church; the second (attributed to Peter Martyr) is to be substituted when there is negligence as to attendance; the third is to be used at the Communion itself, after the communicants have been 'conveniently placed' for the reception. No reference to the withdrawal of non-communicants now remains.

The section from 'Ye that do truly,' etc., down to 'We do not,' etc., came after the Consecration and immediately before the people's Communion at first (see above, p. 206). It was removed to its present much less appropriate position in 1552, the Prayer of 'Humble Access' being then separated from the rest of the section by the first part of the Canon.

The *Canon* began with 'The Lord be with you, ℟ and with thy spirit,' in 1549, in accordance with ancient usage; but this was omitted in 1552. It is now much broken up, and other traces of unobjectionable pre-Reformation beliefs and practices besides those mentioned have been obliterated. In particular the beautiful Epiclesis of 1549 has gone: 'With thy holy spirit and word vouchsafe to bless and sanctify these thy gifts and creatures of bread and wine, that they may be unto us the body and blood of thy most dearly beloved Son Jesus Christ.' The directions for the manual acts, removed in 1552, were brought back in 1662.

The present form of words at the people's Communion happily combines both the forms of 1549 and 1552 and dates from 1559 (see above, p. 206).

The *second post-Communion prayer* of thanksgiving was composed in 1549 and then stood alone, but is now (since 1552) an alternative for the prayer of oblation (see above).

The '*Gloria in Excelsis*' in 1549 occupied its ancient place between the 'Kyrie' and the collect, but was removed in 1552 to the end of the service; and, though this position is contrary to all precedent, it may justly be considered a fitting conclusion to our worship.

The *Blessing* (1549) is likewise a distinct improvement on the rather abrupt ending of the Roman Mass ('Ite: missa est'), to which, however, since 1604 an appendix with a short blessing has been added.[1]

The last six collects, of which the first, second, and fourth are old and the rest date from 1549, were originally appointed for use 'after the offertory, when there is no Communion,' but may now be used at other times.

(*l*) *Holy baptism.*—Of the three offices now supplied the first, as issued in 1549, was mostly derived from the ancient services considerably modified and simplified. From the first the use of salt and the *Ephphatha* were omitted, but the chief points then retained and now since 1552 given up are the exorcism, the anointing, and the chrism; the interrogations, the sign of the Cross, and the reception into the Church are, however, still kept. The novel feature is the insertion of the several exhortations suggested by Luther's *Baptismal Book* and Hermann of Cologne's *Consultatio* (1543).

A second form (for private baptism and subsequent reception into the Church, if the child survived) also appeared in 1549 and has always been retained with such modifications (esp. in 1662) as were required to safeguard the validity of the sacrament and also to bring it into conformity with the first office as altered in 1552.

The third form (for baptism of adults) was inserted in 1662 (George Griffith, bishop of St. Asaph, being the chief member of the committee that drew it up) to meet the growing needs of the natives in our 'plantations' (=colonies) and others converted to the faith (from anabaptism, etc.). It follows the lines of the first office with such adaptations as are appropriate, and the rubric prefixed definitely recognizes (1) that the bishop is ultimately responsible for the administration of the sacrament 'per se vel per alium,' and (2) that fasting as well as instruction and prayer should form part of the candidate's preparation.

(*m*) *Catechism.*—The former part was drawn up and issued in 1549 and has not been altered since. The latter part (on the sacraments of the Gospel) was due to Overall, dean of St. Paul's in 1603. In spite of certain defects,[2] which need rectifying, the whole is a valuable manual of elementary instruction in Christian doctrine, so far as it goes.

(*n*) *Confirmation.*—The order in 1549 began at 'Our help,' etc., and included the signing on the forehead as well as the laying on of hands; but the former of these ceremonies was abolished in 1552 and the present prayer at the imposition of hands substituted for the older form. The preliminary exhortation, which incorporates the substance of a former rubric (and this accounts for its complete inappropriateness)[3] together with the bishop's question and the answer, were not added till 1662. This addition has had the unfortunate effect of obscuring the true meaning of the rite in the minds of many.

(*o*) *Holy matrimony.*—This office has remained without any change of much importance since 1549. But the following are of sufficient interest to be noted: (1) a phrase *in parenthesi*, 'after bracelets and jewels of gold given of the one to the other for tokens of their matrimony,' after 'as Isaac and Rebecca' in the prayer 'O Eternal God,' etc., was omitted in 1552, when the words in the rubric which suggested it were also omitted: 'a ring, and other tokens of spousage as gold or silver'; (2) the phrase about the sending of 'thy Angel Raphael to Tobias and Sarah the daughter of Raguel' was altered to the sending of 'thy blessing upon Abraham and Sarah' in the prayer 'O God of Abraham,' etc. (an undoubted improvement); (3) the phrase 'loving . . . husband' in the prayer 'O God who,' etc., was substituted in 1662 for a quaint reference to the wifely virtues of Rachel, Rebecca, and Sarah which had stood there hitherto; (4) before the address in 1549 the rubric ran: 'Then shall he begin the Communion, and after the Gospel shall be said a Sermon,' etc., whilst another rubric required the newly-married persons to receive the Communion the same day. These indica-

[1] In the Nonjuror's Prayer Book (1718) Mt 22[37-40] was substituted for them. The Scottish Office (of 1764) allows these verses as an alternative for the Decalogue. The present American Prayer Book (1892) allows the alternative only on days when the Decalogue has already been recited.

[2] This nomenclature is misleading, but much of their contents belongs to the 5th cent. at least. The great majority of the 'Sarum' Collects are drawn from them.

[3] The present position of the Lord's Prayer here seems to be in accordance with a principle of the Reformers noticeable elsewhere, it occupies a similar position at Baptism, Confirmation, Matrimony, and Burial, i.e., when the principal or essential ceremony has been performed.

[1] See Fortescue, p. 392 ff.

[2] *E.g.*, the answer does not usually contain the gist of the question; the unity of God is not established, and there is no mention of the Church and its constitution.

[3] See F. H. Chase, *Confirmation in the Apostolic Age*, London, 1909, p. 13 n.

tions of the retention of a nuptial mass were not obliterated till 1662, when the present rubric before the address was substituted, and afterwards it is only stated to be 'convenient' (*i.e.* suitable) that they should communicate at the first opportunity.

(*p*) *Visitation of the sick.*—After the salutation the form in 1549 proceeded with Ps 143 (omitted 1552). The second collect, 'Hear us,' etc., made mention of Peter's wife's mother, the captain's servant, and Tobias and Sarah preserved from danger by the angel, in 1549; the last reference was omitted in 1552, and the other two in 1662, when the present form was adopted.

The second part begins with an exhortation and proceeds to an examination of the sick person with a view to his confession and absolution, if he feel his conscience troubled with any weighty matter (on the lines laid down also in the Holy Communion Office [see above]). Since 1662 the sick person is to 'be moved' to do this; previously it had been left to his own initiative. The form of absolution here is naturally more authoritative and personal than those in the Daily Offices and at Holy Communion.

The third part consists of collect (partly old) and Psalm 71 with anthem ('O Saviour,' etc.) and blessing. The commendation to God's mercy was added in 1662 and also the appendix (containing four well written though somewhat long occasional prayers).

A service for anointing the sick if desired, which was included in 1549, has been omitted since 1552.

(*q*) *The Communion of the sick.*—The present form (with certain alterations in 1662) has been in use since 1552, when preservation of the sacrament for the sick in the modified form of 1549 was abolished.

(*r*) *Burial of the dead.*—The present form dates practically from 1552, when the definite expressions of prayer for the dead and the provisions for Holy Communion made in 1549 were omitted. The last 'collect' was originally the collect at the Communion. The alternative Psalms were not added till 1662; and the lesson was then transferred to its present place, having previously been read at the grave between the anthem ('I heard a voice,' etc.) and the Lesser Litany. The Grace was added in 1662.

(*s*) *Churching of women.*—The title (1549) was 'Purification of women,' altered to its present form in 1552. In the first rubric (1) the phrase 'decently apparelled,' added in 1662, is thought to refer to the old custom of wearing a veil, which had been discarded during the Commonwealth; (2) the words 'convenient place' had been more carefully defined as 'nigh unto the quire door' (1549), or 'nigh unto the place where the Table standeth' (1552). Ps 121 (1549) was replaced by Ps 116 and the alternative Ps 127 also added in 1662. The final rubric shows that the office is intended as the woman's preparation for Communion.

(*t*) A *Commination* was for use on Ash Wednesday only in 1549. The present title was given to the service in 1552, when it was ordered to be used at 'divers times in the year.' Its use on Ash Wednesday was again specified as well in 1662.

The opening address advocates the restoring of the primitive church discipline of open confession and penance, which had gradually given way to private confession (whether occasional or regular). The final prayer of humiliation by minister and people is called an 'anthem to be said or sung' in 1549. The special form of Blessing (from Nu $6^{24ff.}$) was added in 1662.

(*u*) *Prayers to be used at sea.*—Those were first inserted in 1662, though some provision of the sort had been made previously in 1644 by order of parliament.

(*v*) *The Ordinal* (see above, p 205).—The Preface was altered in 1662 (1) better to guarantee episcopal ordination after the laxity which had prevailed during the Commonwealth, (2) to raise the age of deacons from 21 to 23, (3) to restrict the times of ordination usually to the Ember seasons.

The present rubric (1662) orders candidates for either the diaconate or the priesthood to be 'decently habited.' The exact meaning of this is doubtful; probably it was intended to restore such distinctive clerical attire (*e.g.*, cassock, surplice, and hood) as had fallen into desuetude during the Commonwealth, and that is how it is now interpreted. In 1550 they were to wear 'a plain alb'; in 1552 no direction is given at all. So, too, in 1550 the 'Gospel Deacon' was 'to put on a tunicle' (for which see also the 4th rubric before Holy Communion [1549]). But since 1552 this direction has been omitted.

The special petition in the Litany did not actually mention either the deacon's or the priest's office till 1662; in fact the petition was omitted altogether in 1559.

Since 1865 the Oath of the Royal Supremacy has not been administered to either priests or deacons during the service.

The present Gospel (Lk $12^{35ff.}$) at the *Making of Deacons* was substituted for the Gospel of the day in 1662.

In the *Ordering of priests* the first presentation of candidates came after 'Veni Creator,' which followed the Gospel, till 1662, when the present arrangement was made.

The present Epistle (Eph $4^{7ff.}$) was substituted for two others, which were alternative, in 1662.

Jn $20^{19ff.}$ has been a third alternative Gospel (for priests) in 1552, but this was omitted in 1662 and is now one of three alternatives at the consecration of bishops.

Veni Creator.—The first and shorter version (in all probability by Cosin) was added in 1662 and is far superior to the diffuse anonymous version of 1550, which has been slightly touched up and improved since then but is very seldom used.

The *Commission* 'Receive the Holy Ghost.'—The very important addition 'for the Office and Work of a Priest . . . hands' was made in 1662.

The ancient ceremony of handing 'the chalice or cup with the bread' to the priests has been omitted since 1552.

In the *Consecration of bishops* the collect was added and the present selection of Epistles and Gospels was made in 1662. There has been no *traditio instrumentorum* since 1552; in 1549 the bishop elect received the pastoral staff and the Bible was laid on his neck. The present vaguer injunction (to read and be a good shepherd) was substituted in 1552. In 1550 he was to wear a surplice and cope; so likewise were the bishops who presented him (also their staffs); in 1552 no direction was given; the present rubric 'vested with his rochet' was added in 1662.

(*w*) *Accession service.*—This is now the only survivor of four State services (see above, p. 207). The present revision, which provides three separate forms, was made in 1901 and is on sound liturgical lines. We may note in particular the careful way in which the method of pointing preserves the composite character of 'Te Deum.'

(*x*) The *Articles of Religion* (1571), though usually printed in the volume, form no proper part of our Prayer Book.

LITERATURE.—Of the large number of books that have been published on the subject only some of the more practically useful (and mostly more modern) are here mentioned.

(*a*) The Irish Prayer Book, 1877; the Welsh (only a tr. from the English), 1567 and onwards; the Scottish, 1637; the Communion has important differences which have undergone various vicissitudes (see J. Dowden, *Annotated Scottish Com. Office*, London, 1884); the American, 1789; alterations have since been made in 1877, 1886, 1889, and 1892.

(*b*) C. Wheatley, *A Rational Illustration of the Book of Common Prayer*, ed. G. E. Corrie, Cambridge, 1858; W. Palmer, *Origines Liturgicæ*[4], Oxford, 1845; J. H. Blunt, *Annotated Book of Common Prayer*, London, 1866; F. Procter and W. H. Frere, *New Hist. of the Book of Common Prayer*[2], do. 1902; *Teacher's Prayer Book*, ed. A. Barry, do. 1882; *Prayer Book Commentary*, ed. F. E. Warren, do. 1905; J. H. Maude, *Hist. of the Book of Common Prayer*, do. 1899; Leighton Pullan, *Hist. of Book of Common Prayer*, do. 1900; E. Burridge, *Liturgies and Offices of the Church*, do. 1885; W. E. Scudamore, *Notitia Eucharistica*[2], do. 1876; J. Dowden, *Workmanship of the Prayerbook*[2], do. 1902, *Further Studies in the Prayerbook*, do. 1908; H. B. Swete *Church Services and Service-books before the Reformation*, do. 1896; *The Prayer Book Dictionary*, do. 1912; F. E. Brightman, *The English Rite*, do. 1915; *Cranmer's Liturgical Projects*, ed. Henry Bradshaw Society, l. [1915]; W. H. Frere, *Some Principles of Liturgical Reform*, London, 1911; C. Gore, *Body of Christ*, do. 1901; J. Wordsworth, *Ministry of Grace*, do. 1901.

C. L. FELTOE.

PRAYER FOR THE DEPARTED (Christian).—**1. The custom earlier than the development of doctrine.**—That prayers for the faithful departed do not, as a matter of history, depend necessarily on any particular doctrine of the intermediate state between death and judgment is seen from the fact that they existed long before the doctrines on that subject were developed. Even in comparatively late times the form of the prayers for the departed was framed before the teaching was stereotyped. The only thing that the custom necessarily assumes is that the departed, or some of them, can make progress in holiness after death and before the Last Day.

The custom does not necessarily even assume that the departed are conscious; for it is quite conceivable that progress might be made by an unconscious soul. But it was the practically universal belief of Christian antiquity that the souls of the departed, good and bad, are conscious, the belief being based chiefly on passages such as the promise to the penitent robber (Lk 23^{43}), the descent of our Lord to Hades (1 P $3^{18f.}$ 4^{6} etc.), the parable of Dives and Lazarus (Lk $16^{19ff.}$), and on the desire of St. Paul to be absent from the body and at home with the Lord, to depart and be with Christ (2 Co 5^{8}, Ph 1^{23}).

This article, then, will not deal with doctrines about the intermediate state except so far as it is necessary to refer to them in order to explain the historical custom of prayers for the departed.

2. Jewish background of the custom.—It was only in the two centuries immediately preceding the Christian era that Jewish conceptions about the dead were developed. But in 2 Mac 12^{39-44} we find prayers for the departed mentioned and defended. For the soldiers who had fallen, when it was discovered that under their garments were consecrated tokens of idols and that this was the cause of their death, their companions 'betook themselves unto supplication, beseeching that the sin committed might be wholly blotted out'; and Judas Maccabæus sent alms to Jerusalem to offer a sacrifice for sin. This the writer justifies, because of the resurrection: 'If he were not expecting that they that had fallen would rise again,

it were superfluous and idle to pray for the dead.' This book is an abridgment of a lost work by Jason of Cyrene (2[23]). Jason wrote *c.* 150 B.C., and the abridgment was made between that date and the destruction of Jerusalem (A.D. 70). The passage in question probably shows the existence among the Jews of the custom under consideration in the 2nd cent. before our era; but whether Judas extended it beyond the limits afterwards approved by the Christians (below, § 6) is another matter. That Jews inscribed on their tombstones words similar to 'Requiescat in pace,' and that in later times (as at the present day) they habitually prayed for the dead, is universally agreed; but the dates of the tombstones are uncertain (for the evidence on these heads reference may be made to Luckock, *After Death*[3], pp. 56–65). It has often been said that the Jews would never have borrowed the custom from the Christians. This is a line of argument which history shows not to be very safe; but in this case we have the evidence from 2 Mac. for the early existence of prayer for the dead among the Jews. We must not, however, push this argument too far; the practice was, almost certainly, not universal among the Jews at the beginning of our era, for the Sadducees would not have used it. And it is hazardous in any case to say that our Lord approved everything in the teaching of the Jews which He did not condemn.

3. **Early Christian evidence.**—The silence of the very earliest ages on the subject is somewhat remarkable, in view of the fact that the custom was in existence among the Jews. Our Lord does not refer to it. A phrase in the Pastoral Epistles (2 Ti 1[18]) has been not unnaturally judged to be a prayer for Onesiphorus after his death (see the context, v.[16] 4[19]). The wording is not much more than a pious wish: 'the Lord grant unto him to find mercy of the Lord in that day.' The lately-discovered liturgical portion of Clement of Rome's *Epistle to the Corinthians* (59–61), though it contains intercessions for the living, has none for the departed (*c.* A.D. 96). The *Didache* (*c.* A.D. 120 ?) in its prayers at the agape (or eucharist) only prays God to remember His Church and deliver it from all evil, perfect it in His love, and gather it together from the four winds (§ 10)—a petition which must by its wording include the whole Church, but does not explicitly mention the departed.

We find, however, copious evidence of prayers for the departed in the catacombs, usually in the simple form 'Mayest thou live in peace,' or the like. There are some inscriptions asking those who come to the catacombs to pray for the deceased person (Swete, in *JThSt* viii. 502). The exact dates of these are uncertain, but they are undoubtedly ancient. An inscription in Phrygia gives the remains of the epitaph made for himself by Avircius (Abercius) Marcellus, bishop of Hierapolis, in the 2nd century. This is also given by other authorities, and has been restored by Lightfoot (*Apost. Fathers*, pt. ii., 'Ignatius and Polycarp,'[2] London, 1889, i. 496); it contains this line: 'Let every friend who observeth this pray for me' (the extant inscription breaks off before this). For Perpetua's prayer for the dead at the end of the 2nd cent. see below, § 6. Tertullian (*de Monogam.* 10 [*c.* A.D. 217]) bases an argument against remarriage on the fact that the widow prays for her deceased husband that he may have refreshment and fellowship in the first resurrection. Of later writers it is necessary to mention only Eusebius, who describes how all the people, with the priests, prayed for Constantine's soul after his death (A.D. 337; *Vita Const.* iv. 71).

4. **Prayer for the departed in public worship.** This first appears in Tertullian, who, however, does not treat it as a novelty; and for some time we have no absolutely certain evidence of it outside the province of 'Africa.' We read of eucharists for the departed on their anniversaries, 'as birthday honours,' in Tertullian (*de Cor.* 3, *de Monogam.* 10); and so in Cyprian (*Ep.* xxxix. [xxxiii.] 3, on the ordination of Celerinus) we read of them being offered for the repose even of martyrs and confessors on their anniversaries (see also § 6 below). At the end of the 3rd cent. the 'African' Arnobius speaks of the Christian churches (*conventicula*) in which 'peace and pardon are asked for all . . . for those still living and those freed from the bond of the bodies' (*adv. Gentes*, iv. 36). Such anniversaries were apparently known to Origen, who testifies to the reading of Codex Claromontanus in Ro 12[13] of *μνείαις*, 'memorials,' for *χρείαις*, 'needs' [of the saints]; but some think that this passage is due to Rufinus's Latin translation and not to Origen.[1] Two references in the *Canons of Hippolytus* (xxxiii. [ed. H. Achelis, *TU* vi. 4 (1889), § 169 f.], and in E. Hauler's *Didascaliæ Apostolorum Fragmenta Veronensia Latina*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 85), which, though themselves perhaps of the 4th cent., yet, if so, adhere closely to a 3rd cent. original, attest memorial eucharists for the departed at the time when they were written, and perhaps 100 years earlier. In the 4th cent. memorial eucharists are constantly attested—*e.g.*, in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (vi. 30 [*c.* A.D. 375]), which say that they were held in cemeteries (so the *Verona Fragments*, as above); in pseudo-Pionius (*Life of Polycarp*, § 20 [Lightfoot, iii. 452]), who says that at the funeral of Bishop Bucolus (Polycarp's predecessor at Smyrna; early 2nd cent.) 'they offered bread for Bucolus and the rest' (we can only take this as evidence for the 4th cent., when the *Life* was written); in Ambrose (*de Excessu Satyri*, i. 80, ii. 5, and elsewhere), who speaks of the eucharists on the solemn anniversaries of the departed. An earlier example is in the Leucian *Acts of John*, which speak of a eucharist on the third day after death at a grave; but the date is not quite certain. Augustine describes the eucharist at the grave when his mother Monica was buried (*Conf.* ix. 32 [12]), and says that it was a universal custom, because eucharist and alms help the departed (*Serm.* clxxii. 2). We also read of an agape, or commemorative feast, for the departed (*e.g.*, *Can. of Hipp.*, *loc. cit.*; *Apost. Const.* viii. 44; see also art. AGAPE). And we frequently read of alms being given for the benefit of the dead; in the *Testament of our Lord* (*c.* A.D. 350 ?) they are taken out of the deceased's possessions and given to the poor that he may be profited (ii. 15, 23).

As the earliest written liturgies known to us are of the 4th cent. (but see below), we cannot tell whether the departed were prayed for at the ordinary eucharists before that time; and, indeed, the intercessions were probably developed into fixed forms somewhat later than the other parts of the service (see art. INTERCESSION [Liturgical]). In the early liturgy known as the Old Ethiopic, which some believe to be a translation of Hippolytus's liturgy of the 3rd cent., there is no intercession given (Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. 189). But we find the departed prayed for either in the 'Great Intercession' or in the 'people's prayers' given in the *Testament of our Lord*, by Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 348), by Sarapion, bishop of Thmuis in Egypt (*c.* A.D. 350), in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (bk. viii.), and the *Arabic Didascalia* (*c.* A.D. 400 ?), as in all the

[1] Origen is clear that the departed pray for the living—*e.g.*, *Com. in Ep. ad Rom.* ii. 4. So the *Testament of Abraham*, § 14, a work probably of the 2nd cent. A.D. (ed. M. R. James, in *TS* ii. 2 [Cambridge, 1892], p. 94).

Great Liturgies of the following ages. Sarapion also gives a prayer for the departed, to be used at a funeral (§ 18).

5. Purport of the prayers.—In several of our authorities the language is severely restrained, the prayers being, as in Sarapion, for the repose of the departed in 'chambers (ταμείοις) of rest' and for his resurrection 'in the day which thou hast ordained,' and that his transgression and sins be not remembered (§ 18), or, as in the prayer which follows the recitation (ὑποβολή, lit. 'prompting') of the names of the departed at the eucharist, for their sanctification. So in the *Testament of our Lord* the prayer is for a place of rest and remembrance (i. 23, 35). Note especially the oration of Gregory of Nazianzus on his brother Cæsarius (*c.* A.D. 369). He prays for him that he may have an entrance into heaven, and enjoy 'such repose as the bosom of Abraham affords,' and 'behold the choir of angels and the glories and splendour of sainted men and share their joy,' etc. (§ 17). Nothing is said of suffering for sin. Compare also Gregory's oration on his deceased sister Gorgonia (§ 23). Many of the Great Liturgies have an equally restrained prayer for the dead: the Byzantine 'St. Basil' and 'St. Chrysostom' (Brightman, i. 332, 388); the Greek 'St. Mark' (Egyptian [*ib.* i. 129]), which asks for them rest and that they be made worthy of the Kingdom of Heaven, and for us a Christian end; the Coptic (*ib.* i. 170), which has nearly the same language, but somewhat amplified; the Greek 'St. James' (Syrian rite [*ib.* i. 57]); and the Armenian (*ib.* i. 440).

In other cases the forgiveness of the sins of the departed is explicitly prayed for. In Arnobius we find the first instance of this (above, § 4), though perhaps he means 'pardon' for the living and 'peace' for the dead. But forgiveness of sins is emphasized by Augustine (*Conf.* ix. 34 f. [13]; he is speaking of his mother Monica); and so in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (viii. 41: 'that God . . . may forgive him every sin, voluntary and involuntary'), and in several of the Great Liturgies, as in the Syriac 'St. James' (Brightman, i. 95), the E. Syrian 'Addai and Mari' (*ib.* i. 265); and in the West in the Leonine, Gregorian, and Gelasian sacramentaries (for the Gregorian see H. A. Wilson's ed., Henry Bradshaw Soc. [London, 1915] p. 209, etc.). Theodoret tells us (*HE* v. 36) how the emperor Theodosius II., when the body of St. Chrysostom was brought to Constantinople, laid his head against the bier and 'prayed for his parents and for pardon on them who had ignorantly sinned, for his parents had long ago been dead.' Augustine (*Enchiridion*, 29) uses the word 'propitiation.' Cyril of Jerusalem had already spoken of 'propitiating our merciful God both for them [the departed, 'though they be sinners'] and for ourselves' (*Cat.* xxiii. [*Myst.* v.] 10).

6. Who were prayed for.—(*a*) There seems to have been a difference of opinion in Christian antiquity as to whether all the faithful departed should be prayed for, or the martyrs and great saints should be excepted. Cyprian (*Ep.* xxxix. [xxxiii.] 3) speaks of offering sacrifices for certain martyrs 'as often as we celebrate the passions and days of the martyrs in the annual commemoration.' At the end of the 3rd cent., in 'Africa,' Arnobius makes no limitation (see above, § 4: 'for all'). In the 4th cent. also there is no limitation in the prayers in the *Testament of our Lord* (i. 23, 35), and Epiphanius of Cyprus expressly says:

'We make our memorial on behalf of righteous and of sinners; on behalf of sinners praying for the mercy of God, and on behalf of righteous and fathers and patriarchs, prophets and apostles and evangelists and martyrs and confessors, and bishops and anchorets and all the estate (πάγματος) [of man], that we may separate the Lord Jesus Christ from the order (τάξεως) of men by means of the honour given to him, and that we may render worship (σέβας) to him, remembering that the Lord is not to be put on the same footing with any man' (*Hær.* lxxv. 8).

Already, it seems, there was a tendency to exalt the greatest saints to a superhuman position.

In Syria the *Apostolic Constitutions* mention assemblies in the cemeteries with lections and with psalm-singing (ψάλλοντες) on behalf of (ὑπέρ) the martyrs and all saints who have fallen asleep (vi. 30), and the liturgy in bk. viii. explicitly says:

'We offer to thee also on behalf of all the saints who from the beginning have pleased thee, patriarchs, prophets, just men, apostles, martyrs, confessors,' etc. (ch. 12).

In the era of the Great Liturgies the same feeling still survived in some Churches. The Greek 'St. Mark' prays for rest and remembrance for the souls of the patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors, and others, including St. Mark himself by name (Brightman, i. 128). In the Byzantine rite the Greek 'St. Chrysostom' and the Armenian liturgy have an almost identical prayer (*ib.* i. 387 f., 440).[1]

On the other hand, there was a tendency in some circles in the 4th cent. to abstain from prayers for the martyrs and the greatest saints. Cyril of Jerusalem, speaking of the Great Intercession in the eucharist, makes a distinction:

'We commemorate . . . first patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, that at their prayers and intervention God would receive our petition. Afterwards also on behalf of the holy fathers and bishops who have fallen asleep before us, and, in a word, of all who in past years have fallen asleep among us, believing that it will be a very great advantage to the souls, for whom the supplication is put up, while that holy and most awful sacrifice is presented' (*Cat.* xxiii. [*Myst.* v.] 9).

Augustine (*Serm.* clix. 1) expressly denies that martyrs are prayed for, though they are commemorated at the altar; and he considers that it is an insult (*injuria*) to pray for a martyr, 'to whose prayers we ought to commend ourselves.' And we see the same feeling in several of the Great Liturgies—in the Greek 'St. James' (Syrian rite [Brightman, i. 47 f.]), the E. Syrian 'Addai and Mari' (*ib.* i. 264), and the Abyssinian Liturgy (*ib.* i. 206, 208, 228 f.). The Coptic takes a middle line (*ib.* i. 169). It asks for rest and remembrance for all the great saints, including the 'holy Theotokos Mary,' but goes on to say:

'Not that we . . . are worthy to intercede for their blessedness . . . but . . . that . . . they may in recompense intercede for our poverty and weakness.'

The question depended much on whether it was believed that the greatest saints have already received their full reward or await it at the Last Day. That they have already received it is denied by Justin Martyr (*Dial.* 80) and Irenæus (*Hær.* v. 31). Tertullian (*de Anima*, 55, *de Res. Carn.* 43) makes an exception only in the case of the martyrs. In the 3rd cent. Origen makes no exception (*Hom. in Lev.* vii. 2: 'not even the apostles have yet received their joy'). So, indeed, Augustine, though with some hesitation, makes the Last Day the time for all the faithful to receive their complete reward (*Serm.* cclxxx. 5). But gradually in the West the view prevailed that all the great saints, whether martyrs or not, are already reigning with Christ, and ought not to be prayed for (for a review of belief on this subject see A. J. Mason, *Purgatory*, pp. 81–96).

(*b*) There was a general feeling that it was of no avail to pray for the heathen departed, for any but the baptized. There might, indeed, be an exception, especially in times of persecution, in the case

[1] This article is not concerned with the subject of the invocation of saints; but, as an illustration of the feeling expressed in these authorities that all the faithful departed are of one class, it may be mentioned that the Greek Orthodox Church at the present day habitually invokes the prayers, not only of the saints, but of departed relatives, whether they were especially saintly or not. There is a beautiful poem by Alexis Khomiakoff, asking his dead children to pray for him (Birkbeck, *Russia and the English Church*, p. 21).

of a catechumen who desired baptism but died before he could receive that sacrament. The *Canons of Hippolytus* (x., ed. Achelis, § 63) say that catechumens are already 'Christians,' and so the 7th canon of the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381). The former work (xix. [101]), the *Egyptian Church Order* (Sahidic, § 44), and the *Testament of our Lord* (ii. 5) recognize a martyred catechumen as 'baptized in his own blood.' But, generally speaking, only the baptized were prayed for. Augustine says (*Enchir.* 29): 'We offer . . . for all baptized departed.' We do, indeed, read that Perpetua prayed for her brother Dinocrates, who, as we gather from her own words, was unbaptized, though Augustine denied this. A similar case is found in the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* (Swete, *JThSt* viii. 502 f.). Gregory the Great prayed for the soul of the emperor Trajan, and was warned in a vision not again to pray for the unbaptized (Lightfoot, *Ignatius*, i. 5). But these were mere private speculations, which did not represent the ordinary feeling of Christianity.

For those who died in wilful sin it was felt that prayer could not be offered. The *Apostolic Constitutions* (viii. 43) say that one will never help the wicked (ἀσεβῶν), even though he gave all the goods in the world to the poor. Augustine (*de Civ. Dei*, XXI. xxiv. 2) says that prayers are not for unbelieving and unholy dead; they are (*Enchir.* 29) neither for those who are very good nor yet for those who are very bad. In the 3rd cent. Cyprian had forbidden the eucharist to be offered for the soul of a certain person who had seriously transgressed an ecclesiastical rule and had died impenitent (*Ep.* i. [lxv.] 2, to the clergy and people at Furni).

7. Early objectors to the custom.—In the 4th cent. Aerius, a presbyter in Pontus, the founder of the sect named after him (it seems scarcely to have survived his death), protested against prayers for the departed. We learn about his history and his views from Epiphanius, who says that he was alive in his time (*Hær.* lxxv. 1), and from Augustine (*de Hær.* liii.). He had been disappointed at not being made bishop, and lapsed into Arianism. Among other things he said that the eucharist[1] 'ought not to be offered for them that sleep.' He adduced as the reason for his objection the danger of a man leading a sinful life in the hope that he would be saved from punishment by the prayers of his friends.

Though Aerius is the only person in antiquity known by name who objected to prayers for the departed, there must have been others. Cyril of Jerusalem says that 'many' held that they were profitless (*Cat.* xxiii. [*Myst.* v.] 10); and the language of Augustine (*Enchir.* 29) and others seems to imply that the question was frequently debated in the 4th century. Yet the objection cannot have been much pressed, for Augustine (*Serm.* clxxii. 2) says that the custom was universal, and Epiphanius (*Hær.* lxxv. 8) traces it back to primitive times.[2]

8. Mediæval Western views.—As doctrines about the intermediate state developed in the West, chiefly in consequence of the tentative suggestions of Augustine and the visions related by Gregory the Great, the principal aim of prayer for the departed came to be the deliverance of souls from a penal purgatory. The schoolmen discussed the matter at considerable length. Their speculations concern us here only so far as they resulted in the particular shape taken by the prayers. When purgatory was conceived as a place of punishment whose tortures differed from those of hell only in not being eternal, it is not surprising that men's energies were directed to the deliverance, by prayer and alms, of their friends therefrom. Yet the prayers of the mediæval Latin service-books show great restraint, and do not reflect popular beliefs to any very large extent. But they exhibit a sadness which is not found in earlier rites. The keynote to the Sarum service for the burial of the dead is struck by the opening antiphon:

'Circumdederunt me gemitus mortis, dolores inferni circumdederunt me' (see W. Maskell, *Monumenta ritualia Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ*[2], Oxford, 1882, i. 142).

The popular conceptions about purgatory are not necessarily the official views of the Church of Rome. According to Roman Catholic writers of repute, the only statement which is of faith in that communion is that 'there is a purgatory and that the souls detained in it are helped by the prayers of the faithful' (Creed of Pope Pius V.). The Council of Trent (*Canones et Decreta*, sess. xxii. § 2) says that the eucharist is offered 'for the departed in Christ not yet fully cleansed'; and sess. xxv. (decree on purgatory, A.D. 1563) has the words just quoted from the Creed, adding 'especially the acceptable sacrifice of the altar,' and enacting that a 'sane doctrine of purgatory, handed down from the holy fathers and sacred councils, is to be believed and taught.' The last words probably are meant to rebuke the extravagances of some popular teaching.

9. The Church of England at the Reformation took a middle course. In the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. (1549) there were explicit prayers for the departed. But since 1552 these have been removed from the public services; the only relics of them remaining are the petitions in the Communion Service (perhaps purposely left ambiguous) that 'we and all thy whole Church may obtain remission of our sins,' etc., and (in the prayer for the Church militant) that 'with them (the departed) we may be partakers of thy heavenly kingdom'; in the latter case the title does not exactly correspond with the contents of the prayer, as is sometimes the case in the Thirty-nine Articles. In the Burial Service there is a prayer 'that we, with all those that are departed in the true faith of thy holy Name, may have our perfect consummation and bliss,' etc. But, while thus removing explicit prayers for the departed from its Prayer Book, the Church of England declined to condemn the practice in itself. In the original draft of art. xxii. it was proposed to do so, but the condemnatory words were struck out (see E. C. S. Gibson, *The Thirty-nine Articles*, London, 1897, p. 537 f.). And the Act of Uniformity of 1552 expressly declared that the First Book of 1549 was 'a very godly order, agreeable to the Word of God and the primitive Church.' In the Second Book of Homilies, on the other hand, the homily on prayer repudiates prayers for the dead; and this book is said by art. xxxv. to 'contain a godly and wholesome doctrine,' though all its opinions are not necessarily the official views of the Church of England. The position of that Church is thus a mediating one. It neither commands nor condemns the practice, and leaves it, as far as private practice is concerned, to the discretion of its members.

10. The Westminster Confession.—This was adopted as a standard by the Presbyterian General Assembly in Scotland, A.D. 1647. It takes a very precise line on the subject now under consideration. It says:

'Prayer is to be made . . . for all sorts of men living, or that shall live hereafter; but not for the dead, nor for those of whom it may be known that they have sinned the sin unto death' (xxi. 4).

[1] This is clearly the meaning. At the time προσφέρειν and *offerre* were used absolutely, without a substantive, as the technical terms for celebrating the eucharist. See the present writer's *Ancient Church Orders*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 48.

[2] On the subject of prayers for the departed reference may be made to a learned catena of Patristic and liturgical writings (as far as they were known in his day) by James Ussher, archbishop of Armagh (1625–56), reprinted in the Oxford *Tracts for the Times* (Tract 72, London, 1837).

The same statement (with a slight difference of wording) is found in the *Larger Catechism* of 1648 (qu. 182), but is not contained in the *Shorter Catechism* of the same date. Already in 1580 the Scottish National Covenant, when denouncing (in the strong language of the day) 'that Roman Antichrist,' had repudiated among many other things 'his purgatory prayers for the dead.'

The reason for the prohibition of prayers for the departed in the *Westminster Confession* is seen in its teaching as to the state of the faithful after death. All progress after death is denied. After saying that at death man's soul does not die nor sleep, it goes on:

'The souls of the righteous, being then [at death] made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies: and the souls of the wicked are cast into hell. . . . Besides these two places for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none' (xxxii. 1).

Very similar is the wording of the *Larger Catechism* (qu. 86). The well-known words of the *Shorter Catechism* (qu. 37) are:

'The souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness and do immediately pass into glory; and their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection.'

This may be taken to be the general teaching, not only of Presbyterians, but of a large number of other Protestant communities throughout the world. Luther, however, favoured the practice of praying for the departed (see S. C. Gayford, *The Future State*, London, 1903, p. 58).

11. The Eastern Orthodox Church.—The teaching of this Church remains much the same with regard to prayer for the departed as that of the Greek Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries. It is remarkably cautious in refusing to dogmatize. The eminent Russian layman, Alexis Khomiakoff, remarks (Birkbeck, p. 217 f.):

'Each person owes his prayers on behalf of all, the living and the dead, and even those who are as yet unborn. . . . We do not acknowledge purgatory, that is the purification of souls by sufferings from which they may be redeemed by their own works or those of others. . . . Who will forbid us to pray [God] to glorify his saints and to give repose to his elect?' (see above, § 6).

The official treatise *On the Duty of Parish Priests* (§ 16 [Blackmore, *Doctrine of the Russian Church*, p. 281]) says that we ought to pray for the departed in the hope and faith of the resurrection of them that sleep, and bases this teaching on Bar 3[4f.], 2 Mac 12[41ff.], and on apostolic and primitive tradition. The Synod of Jerusalem (or Bethlehem, A.D. 1672) went farther than Khomiakoff and most Eastern theologians would approve. 'The doctrine of purgatorial fire has never been recognized or admitted in the Eastern Church' (Duckworth, *Greek Manuals*, p. 63); but the Synod, which was held at a time when the Eastern Church was largely under Roman influence, pronounced in favour of some sort of punishment in purgatory for a certain number of sinners, and affirmed that 'they are released by God's goodness in answer to the prayers of priests and the benefactions done in the name of the departed by their kinsfolk,' and that for this the eucharist is 'of especial avail'; 'but the time of their release we know not' (*ib.* p. 64 f.). On the other hand, Archbishop Philaret of Moscow, the author of the *Longer Catechism* of the Russian Church in its present form, denies that there is such a thing as purgatory in which souls have to pass through fiery torments in order to prepare them for blessedness (Headlam, *Teaching of the Russian Church*, p. 17). And the Catechism itself (Blackmore, p. 98 f.) says nothing of any punishment even for those who have died without having had time to bring forth fruits worthy of repentance, but affirms that they may be aided towards the attainment of a blessed resurrection by prayers, eucharists, and works of mercy offered for them. It says of all the righteous dead that they 'are in light and rest with a foretaste of eternal happiness,' while the wicked 'are in a state the reverse of this'; the righteous do not attain to perfect happiness till the resurrection of the body.

12. The Separated Churches of the East.—The service-books of these communities have already been dealt with, in reference to prayer for the departed (§§ 5, 6). We may, however, in conclusion notice a very remarkable custom which is found among both the Armenians and the E. Syrians (Nestorians), namely that of animal sacrifices. These seem to be properly memorials of the dead (for the custom among the E. Syrians see A. J. Maclean and W. H. Browne, *The Catholicos of the East*, London, 1892, p. 334; for the Armenians see F. C. Conybeare and A. J. Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum*, Oxford, 1905, pp. 54–60). This custom appears to be a curious survival of paganism.

LITERATURE.—A. J. Mason, *Purgatory, the State of the Faithful Departed, Invocations of Saints*, London, 1901; H. B. Swete, 'Prayer for the Departed in the first four Centuries,' in *JThSt* viii. [1907] 500 ff.; H. M. Luckock, *After Death*[3], London, 1881; E. H. Plumptre, *The Spirits in Prison*[5], do. 1886, ch. ix. f.; F. G. Lee, *Christian Doctrine of Prayer for the Departed*[2], do. 1875; F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i., Oxford, 1896 (for the Eastern liturgies); W. E. Scudamore, art. 'Obsequies of the Dead,' in *DCA*; P. J. Toner, art. 'Dead, Prayers for the,' in *CE* iv. 653 ff.; R. W. Blackmore, *Doctrine of the Russian Church*, Aberdeen, 1845; W. J. Birkbeck, *Russia and the English Church*, London, 1895; H. T. F. Duckworth, *Greek Manuals of Church Doctrine*, do. 1901; A. C. Headlam, *Teaching of the Russian Church*, do. 1897; E. C. Dewick, *Primitive Christian Eschatology*, Cambridge, 1912.

A. J. MACLEAN.

PRAYER-WHEELS (or 'magical wheels').—This name is applied to wheels or cylinders which are made to revolve in the expectation of spiritual or magical profits. Sometimes they are actual wheels, hung in a temple and turned by hand or by means of a cord. To this category belong the small metal wheels fixed in the wooden pillars at the entrance of certain Japanese pagodas.[1] Such also are the so-called 'wheels of fortune,' suspended from the ceiling or attached to the pillars of some Breton churches. Worshippers are allowed to turn these on payment of a few pence for behoof of a saint whose image is placed alongside, and which bears the name of 'Saint of the Wheel' (*Santic-ar-rod*). The Japanese wheels have metal rings, which slide along the spokes and make a silvery sound. The Breton wheels produce the same effect by means of the small bells with which they are decorated. The use of these instruments is of long standing in the Church. According to the *Monasticon Anglicanum*, St. Ethelwold, bishop of Winchester in the 10th cent., introduced into his cathedral a wheel of gilt metal, all covered with little bells ('tintinnabulis plenam'), which was made to revolve on saints' days, to increase the devotion of the faithful ('ad majoris excitationem devotionis').[2] Among the ancient Greeks the grammarian Dionysius of Thrace notes 'the wheels which are revolved in the temples of the gods.'[3] Plutarch and Heron testify to their presence in Egyptian temples of a late period. Plutarch makes them a symbol of the instability of human things,[4] Heron an instrument of purification: 'Below the colonnade of the Egyptian temples are placed movable bronze wheels, which are turned by those entering, in the belief that the bronze purifies.'[5]

[1] See illustration in Simpson, *The Buddhist Praying-Wheel*, p. 116.
[2] *Monasticon Anglicanum*, ed. W. Dugdale, London, 1655, p. 104.
[3] *ap.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. p. 568. [4] *Numa*, xiv.
[5] *Veterum Mathematicorum Opera*, Paris, 1693, p. 220.

Again, the instruments used may be cylinders, or rather cylindrical boxes, containing texts or sacred objects. Such are the praying-mills, which have assumed special importance among the Buddhists of the North. The smallest ones are bobbins, often of silver, attached to a wooden handle, which the lāmas by a slight movement of the wrist keep steadily revolving for whole days, while they repeat the invocation engraved on the surface—generally the famous formula, *Om maṇi padme Hūṁ*, 'O the jewel in the lotus!' Other cylinders, of a larger size, generally of wood painted in bright colours, are to be seen in the vicinity of the lamaseries. Passers-by make them revolve by means of a handle which returns to the hand, making a bell ring several times. As many as 300 of these wheels may be found, placed side by side like barrels in a beer-cellar.[1] Some are of such a size that it requires several persons to set them in motion. The traveller Gérard saw one at the monastery of Sunum which carried 108 lighted lamps. Others contain shrines, images, and prayers, and occasionally a number of manuscripts. Each revolution confers on the worshipper the same spiritual benefits as the reading of all the texts. Miss Gordon Cumming found some in Japan which were veritable libraries—'circulating libraries,' as William Simpson wittily called them.[2] Gabriel Bonvalot mentions having encountered, in the monastery of Dotou, 100 large bobbins, each containing 10,000 invocations. As a few minutes suffice to revolve the whole in succession, one may thus rapidly gain the benefit of the indulgences attached to the recitation of 1,000,000 formulæ.[3]

In the Himālayas these mills are often erected above a rushing stream, which turns unceasingly a wheel with blades dipping into the water. It appears that the merit mechanically engendered by these applications of natural forces goes to increase the *karma* of those who constructed the apparatus. E. R. Huc,[4] Gilmour, and W. W. Rockhill[5] report that among the Mongols there are mills made of paper and hung in the tents over the fireplace in such a way that they may be set in motion by the displacement of the heated air.

Such is the fashion in which the Buddhists of the Northern school have materialized the 'wheel of the Law,' the *Dharmachakra*, the chain of causes and effects. There is no mention of praying-mills in the oldest Buddhist treatises. Nor are these instruments known among the Buddhists of the South. Nevertheless the symbol of the wheel was in very early times held in high esteem by the followers of the Buddha. It is to be seen on Buddhist monuments prior even to the first appearance of the image of the Master. The wheel figures in the oldest Buddhist sculptures, in the place of honour upon altars, where it receives the homage of the faithful.[6] A. Cunningham supposed that it represented the Buddha himself.[7] But it is more probable that it personified his teaching, the 'wheel which he set in motion for the salvation of humanity,' by the revelation of the Four Great Truths in his famous sermon at Benares.

[1] J. Gilmour, *Among the Mongols*, London, n.d., p. 164.
[2] P. 21.
[3] *Across Thibet*, Eng. tr., London, 1891, ii. 170; *Tour du monde*, lxii. [1891] 390.
[4] *Travels in Tartary*, Eng. tr., London [1852], vol. i. ch. ix.
[5] *JRAS* for May, 1894, p. 323.
[6] J. Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship*, London, 1868, pl. xlvi. fig. 1.
[7] *Bhilsa Topes*, London, 1854, p. 352.

We may suppose that the Buddhists have combined their symbolism of the wheel with a magical rite previously practised either by the Scythian races of Central Asia or by the Brāhmans of Northern India. In support of the former of these conjectures use may be made of the circumstance that on a coin of the Indo-Scythian king Hoerkes or Hūvichka this monarch holds in his hand a spindle-shaped object in which some have thought to recognize a praying-mill.[1] On the other hand, William Simpson has found in the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* a text which shows beyond question that the Brāhmans revolved chariot-wheels horizontally around a stake fixed in the ground, while they chanted a hymn from the *Samaveda* in honour of the sun-god Savitri.[2]

What was the original purpose of this rite? The wheel, which has a round shape, and which implies a movement of translation in space, has everywhere been one of the images most frequently employed to represent the sun. The latter is called by the Latins *rota altivolans*,[3] in the Edda 'the beautiful wheel' (*fagravel*),[4] by the Celts 'the luminous wheel' (*roth fail*),[5] and the *Rigveda* invokes the god who directs 'the golden wheel of the sun.'[6] The wheel thus becomes the symbol of the regular course of the sun, and consequently of the celestial or cosmic order, the *rita*. Another passage of the *Rigveda*[7] speaks of it as 'the immortal wheel which nothing stops, on which all existence depends.' It was this symbolism that the Buddhists applied to their 'wheel of the Law,' with its thousand spokes, the *Dharmachakra*, 'that wheel which not by any Sahmana or Brāhman, not by any god, not by any Brahmā or Mārā, not by any one in the universe can ever be turned back!'[8] All observers agree in stating that the praying-mills must turn in the direction followed by the sun.[9]

On the principle of imitative magic, to revolve the wheel in the apparent direction of the sun's course is to facilitate or assure the beneficent movement of the sun, and thus to secure general luck, as in the similar case of circumambulation (*q.v.*). Hence the popular customs, described by Mannhardt[10] and Gaidoz,[11] in which the inhabitants of certain districts—in Germany, France, and England—may be seen driving a wheel, sometimes set on fire, across the fields. As Mannhardt maintains, this is simply a solar charm, intended to secure an abundant harvest.

Finally, mention must be made of certain forms of rattles used by the inhabitants of New Mexico. In so far as they are magical instruments, they resemble in construction the invocation-cylinder, but they belong to quite a different symbolism.

LITERATURE.—C. F. Gordon Cumming, 'The Wheel as a Symbol in Religion,' in *Scribner's Monthly*, xxii. [1881] 733 ff.; William Simpson, *The Buddhist Praying-Wheel*, London, 1896; H. Gaidoz, 'Le Dieu gaulois du soleil et le symbolisme de la roue,' in *RA* iii. iv. [1884]; Goblet d'Alviella, 'Moulins à prières,' in *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles*, 1897, and 'Les Roues symboliques de l'ancienne Egypte,' in *Bulletin de l'Académie royale*, Brussels, 1899.

GOBLET D'ALVIELLA.

[1] This identification is questioned by Percy Gardner, who reproduces the coin in his *Indian Coins in the British Museum*, 'Greek and Scythic Kings of Bactria and India,' London, 1886, pl. xxvii. no. 16.
[2] v. i. 5. 2 (*SBE* xli. [1894] 22 f.).
[3] Lucretius, *de Rer. Nat.* v. 434.
[4] J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, ii. 701 f.
[5] J. Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*², London, 1892, p. 214.
[6] v. vi. 56. [7] v. i. 164. [8] *SBE* xi. [1900] 153 f.
[9] J. Edkins, *Religion in China*², London, 1878, p. 238.
[10] *RA* iii. iv. 14 ff.
[11] *Der Baumkultus*, Berlin, 1875, p. 510.

PREACHING.

Christian (J. STALKER), p. 215.
Jewish (H. HIRSCHFELD), p. 220.
Muslim (D. S. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 221.

PREACHING (Christian). — **1. The early Church.** — From the accounts of Christian worship in the NT, especially in the Epistles to the Corinthians, it can be gathered that great liberty of prophesying was allowed in the meetings of the primitive Christians, although there was a general understanding that the prompting to speak should come from the Spirit of God. As early as the *Didache* the 'prophets' are mentioned as a separate class, the members of which wandered from community to community in the exercise of their gift; but already their inspiration was so far from being above suspicion that the churches were coming to be better satisfied with any authentic light they could receive from their own elders than with the illumination afforded by those wandering stars. This tendency was increased by the growing sense of the inexhaustible treasures of wisdom and spiritual power lodged in the Holy Scriptures the canon of which was gradually forming. From the synagogue the Church had inherited the practice of reading aloud the sacred writings and attaching to this reading the word of exhortation. When the Christian community had the whole of the NT and the OT thus to draw upon, it could not lack the bread of life, if a moderate amount of attention or skill were given to the application of what had been read to the life of the individual and the community. At all events the first form of preaching was homiletical, a homily being a running commentary on a passage read. This is known to have been the form of instruction given at the first college for the training of preachers, the Catechetical School of Alexandria, of which Clement and Origen were the shining lights. Many of Origen's homilies have come down to us; and they show how boundless a thesaurus of truth he was sensible of possessing in the Word of God, though the heritage left by him to succeeding ages was sadly vitiated by the introduction of the allegorical method, which tempted nimble wits into excessive ingenuity, but, in incompetent hands, could make almost any passage of Scripture mean almost anything.

During the first 300 years of its existence Christianity, in spite of the persecution to which it was subjected, made more rapid progress than it has ever done since; yet the names of outstanding preachers, after the death of the apostles, are so few that it cannot have been by this means that success was gained. It was rather by a kind of preaching which has been too little practised in subsequent centuries, but will have to be rediscovered if the world is to be fully evangelized. At the first the gospel was so intense a blessedness that no one who heard it with faith could keep the secret to himself. Neighbour told it to neighbour, slave to fellow-slave; the sailor carried it to every shore visited by his ship, and the soldier communicated it even to the enemy whom he had conquered on the field of battle. Justin Martyr, after becoming a Christian, continued to wear the philosopher's cloak, because this gave him access to those to whom he 'talked' the gospel, and the verb 'to talk' is a good name for preaching in the NT.

2. The Middle Ages.—When, at the beginning of the 4th cent., Christianity was adopted as the religion of the Roman empire, there immediately took place a great revival and extension of preaching; for it was no longer necessary to confine such testimony to the places where the myrmidons of persecution could not find the worshippers, but, under imperial auspices, Christian places of worship, of growing size and magnificence, rose all over the empire. The first Christian emperor himself set an example of preaching, like a well-known imperial figure of the present day; and, as at least one of his efforts has come down to us, we can judge of their quality for ourselves. It is by no means bad preaching for an emperor. Even the apostate Julian, who attempted to restore heathenism, betrayed his consciousness of the importance of preaching by exhorting his priests to make sermons with the pagan myths for texts and by setting an example himself. But his attempt was very soon at an end; and in the courts of the Christian emperors by whom he was succeeded preachers and preaching held a conspicuous place. The more famous became as much topics of conversation at court as favourite charioteers or actors had been before; and in the sunshine of imperial favour preaching attained to a notable development. The 4th and 5th centuries contain many outstanding names, the greatest of which in the East is that of Chrysostom, in whose hands the homily was transmuted into an oration, which the hearers applauded in church, as they might a speech in a political meeting. In the West the greatest preacher was Augustine, whose sermons, being addressed to audiences of fishermen, were more simple and practical. But the first impression made by even the greatest sermons of that age is, how much the long continued exegesis of the Scriptures through the Christian centuries has benefited congregations; for, in explaining the book of Acts, *e.g.*, the humblest preacher has now within easy reach materials far more true to the text and useful to the people than were at the command of even a genius like Chrysostom, who has left lectures on this book of Scripture.

Many other names of the period could be mentioned, such as Gregory and Basil in the East and Ambrose and Hilary in the West, to show that this was a great age for preaching; and it has another sign of distinction in the appearance of books on the preacher's art, both Chrysostom and Augustine having produced examples of this species of literature. But it was not long before the descent of the barbarians from the north, and then the pressure of Muhammadanism from the east, nearly squeezed the life out of the Church, and preaching, like the other functions of her life, was reduced for centuries to the lowest terms. Yet this was the time when monasticism arose and spread with extraordinary rapidity over the Church, occupying territory from which it has never since been wholly dislodged; and in the monasteries and nunneries preaching obtained a new sphere of influence. Monks and nuns must often, in the centuries that followed, have been unusually intelligent and sympathetic hearers, and the opportunities thus opened up to a spiritual and gifted preacher may be inferred from the relation of Staupitz to the youthful Luther; for this worthy, who was inspector of monasteries in the district of Thuringia, must have made use of preaching as one of his ordinary activities. A still more attractive aspect of the preaching of the Dark Ages is that of the missionaries; for, in spite of its repellent features, this was one of the great eras of missionary progress, when, issuing from the monasteries of Great Britain and Ireland, the

heralds of the Cross not only evangelized the tribes who had occupied the countries of S. Europe, but carried the gospel to the inhospitable regions of the north out of which the invaders had come. Names like those of St. Columba and St. Patrick, St. Columbanus and St. Gall, are worthy of everlasting remembrance, and in the remains of St. Boniface, in some respects the greatest of them all, we can still see for ourselves the kind of message with which they operated. It was a message of realism and terror; for the conditions were very rude with which the missionaries had to deal. Sin was then the chief theme of the pulpit, because there was abounding iniquity in the world; and it was not for centuries yet that preaching learned to deliver in its fullness the gracious message of deliverance from sin.

It was in the reaction from Muhammadanism that the sound of a new era of preaching began to be heard in the atmosphere of Europe. Peter the Hermit 'preached' the first Crusade; and the preacher of the second was no less a personage than St. Bernard, usually reckoned the greatest preacher of the Middle Ages, although the sermons for which he is most famous—those on the Song of Solomon—belong not to popular oratory but to the preaching of the monastery. The tendency, however, to consider the multitude had, as well as the romanticism of the Crusades, a place in the movements with which the names of St. Francis and St. Dominic are identified. Preaching was one of the principal instrumentalities made use of by both of these reformers; and even in our time, in Roman Catholic countries, it is a red-letter day in the history of a country congregation when a stranger in the graceful garb of the Dominican order rises in the pulpit, as a visitor, to occupy the place of the ordinary incumbent. Among the Franciscan preachers Antony of Padua and Berthold of Regensburg are the foremost. The matter of preaching was adapted for presentation to the general mind through the labours of the Schoolmen, not a few of whom were themselves famous preachers; and, after these had had their day, the hardness of their doctrine was softened in the atmosphere of the mystics, who gave to the pulpit some of its very greatest names, such as Eckhart and Tauler. The chapters of the *Imitatio Christi* preserve the exquisite blossom and flower of monastic preaching at its best.

3. The Reformation.—Immediately before the Reformation preaching suffered in most parts of the Church a sad decline. In many quarters there was hardly any preaching at all, the Christian religion being reduced to a mere pagan round of forms and ceremonies, pilgrimages and penances. In vain did councils summon the clergy to their duty; for the higher clergy, who presided in such assemblies, were themselves the most remiss in the discharge of this function, and the lower clergy were too deeply sunk in ignorance to be equal to the task. The description of the preaching of the time given in Thomas McCrie's *Life of John Knox* is not exaggerated, and it may be applied without hesitation to the rest of Christendom.

'It is difficult for us to conceive how empty, ridiculous, and wretched those harangues were which the monks delivered for sermons. Legendary tales concerning the founder of some religious order, his wonderful sanctity, the miracles which he performed, his combats with the devil, his watchings, fastings, flagellations; the virtues of holy water, chrism, crossing, and exorcism; the horrors of purgatory, and the numbers released from it by the intercession of some powerful saint; these, with low jests, table-talk, and fireside scandal, formed the favourite topics of the preachers, and were served up to the people instead of the pure, salutary, and sublime doctrines of the Bible' (*The Works of Thomas McCrie*, new ed., Edinburgh, 1855, i. 11).

It is in the writings of Erasmus that we see most clearly both the ludicrous and the deplorable aspects of the preaching of the time; but, in *Ecclesiastes*, one of the worthiest of his books, this great Humanist exhibited the image of what, in his opinion, a preacher ought to be. The Reformers before the Reformation, especially Wyclif, Hus, and Savonarola, revealed popular talent in the pulpit, and in the last-mentioned especially the gift rose to the prophetic strain.

The Reformation was a crowning era in the history of preaching. Innumerable abuses were pushed aside, which had been preventing the pulpit from having its chance. The Word of God was exalted above all other authorities, and it was not only heard with new fullness and force from the pulpit but put into the hands of the common man, in his own tongue, so that he could bring what he heard to the judgment of the law and the testimony. The Reformers had themselves passed through the great experiences of the soul, and they spake that which they knew and testified that which they had seen. Among the people there was the most extraordinary appetite for the new message, the more prominent among the preachers being called on to preach every day, and no limit being put to length. In Luther there were accumulated all the elements of a great preacher—learning, experience, knowledge of men, humour, homeliness, indignation, spirituality. To this day the best of his discourses have not lost the freshness of their prime, and everywhere in them the music of free grace sounds like the tinkle of a hidden well. Zwingli was more of the orator, bringing into the new movement the treasures of the Renaissance, but his testimony to the new truth is also clear and strong. Calvin excelled in the exposition of the Scriptures, and his great dogmatic work, the *Institutes*, swelled, in the course of his lifetime, to five times its original size just because he crowded into the successive editions the best things gathered from the Word through incessant preaching and lecturing. John Knox applied the examples of the Bible to the problems of the passing hour; and the English ambassador, in a letter to Queen Elizabeth's Chief Secretary of State, bore to him this testimony:

'I assure you, the voice of this one man is able in one hour to put more life in us than five hundred trumpets continually blustering in our ears' (McCrie, *Life of Knox*, p. 178).

In all the countries in which the Reformation took any hold there arose preachers of power, whose names are cherished to this day as household words, and in many cities and towns men of the second or the third rank arose, who directed the course pursued by their fellow-citizens and left a name still identified with the scenes of their labours. The pulpit had the making of the people's convictions, the moulding of their manners, the direction of their education; and this continued for generations, in some places more and in others less visibly.

4. The Puritan era and after.—In England, in spite of such early names as Hugh Latimer, Nicholas Ridley, and John Hooper, the effective Reformation was long in commencing; but, when it began, it produced the same appetite for preaching; and there were not wanting those capable of satisfying this spiritual hunger. In the Long Parliament it was quite an ordinary practice to set time apart for the hearing of sermons, and days of humiliation or thanksgiving were frequent, in which not only sermons an hour long but even prayers of like extent were the order of the day. To satisfy such a critical assembly can have been no ordinary responsibility; but, if ever there was a dynasty of great preachers in England, it was in this age. On the Puritan side were such names as Thomas Cartwright, Richard Sibbs, Richard Baxter, John Owen, John Bunyan, John Howe, Thomas Goodwin, and Thomas Adam; and for

intellectual grasp, mastery of Scripture, spiritual analysis, and constructive skill these men have never been surpassed. He who is in search of the substance of Christian truth can turn to their works still with the certainty of finding in abundance that which he is seeking. But, with few exceptions, they were as defective in literary form and grace of utterance as they excelled in solidity. What, however, was lacking in them was supplied in abundance by their rivals — the Cavalier preachers of the period, such as Richard Hooker, John Donne, Joseph Hall, Thomas Fuller, and Jeremy Taylor. Whether it was that these had audiences to preach to less hungry for the bread of life than those who listened to the Puritans, or whether it was due to a marked difference of natural endowments, it is undeniable that these are as exuberant in all the graces which make style and literature as the others are deficient in them; and yet it cannot be said that there is any lack of substance in their discourses. On the contrary, although the ornamentation is sometimes excessive, the Cavalier divines, as well as their rivals, were great exponents of Christian truth and experience.

So great a revival of religion as Puritanism could not be confined to the British Isles; and on the Continent the stirring of the dry bones first appeared in Holland, where the signal of the new movement was the emergence of what is called the Federal Theology. This is usually fathered on Cocceius, a native of Bremen and a professor at Franeker and Leyden; but it is certain that the conception of revealed religion as a series of covenants belonged earlier to the Puritan thinkers, as, indeed, it is developed in the documents of the Westminster Assembly, which were in existence before the publication of Cocceius' renowned treatise on the subject. From Holland the revival movement spread to Germany, where its principal representative was Philipp J. Spener, court preacher successively at Dresden and Berlin; but it is known that he was influenced in youth by Puritan authors, especially by Richard Baxter, whose *Reformed Pastor* has been an inspiration to preachers and pastors in all parts of the Christian world. Spener was only the most outstanding of many preachers of the Pietistic order, the names of some of whom, like A. H. Francke, J. A. Bengel, and J. J. Rambach, have taken their places among the worthies of the Church universal. Out of the Pietistic movement issued directly the Moravian Church, whose founder, Count von Zinzendorf, and his successor, A. G. Spangenberg, were noted preachers who have communicated their inspiration to many successors in their small but active community. To the Moravian Church John Wesley owed his experience of the gospel; and the same may be said of his coadjutors, Charles Wesley and George Whitefield. These were preachers who shook not only England but America to the heart, and they have transmitted the sacred fire to innumerable successors not only in the denominations founded by them but far beyond. Though the Established Church was not able to retain their services, there arose within it many who imitated their methods and reproduced their spirit; and the succession of Evangelical divines, reaching from John Newton down through Charles Simeon to the shining lights of this section of the Church at the present day, may all be looked upon as derived from this source. An original step on the part of Wesley and Whitefield was preaching in the open air; and, in the churches founded by them, lay-preaching has been a prominent feature, with memorable effects not only on the community but on the character of the preachers themselves (cf. also art. LAITY, § 7).

Charles II. was not without a taste for preaching, and a curious letter has survived in which, before a visit to Cambridge, he lays down the law that the university preachers must refrain from reading their discourses, as the extempore style, to which he had been accustomed whilst living abroad, was more in harmony with the royal mind. But the recoil from Puritanism soon became so universal that anything like enthusiasm in the pulpit was looked upon as vulgar, and the quenching of the fire soon proceeded from form to substance, the tone of belief becoming lukewarm and the distinctive message of the gospel being forgotten. Preachers formed their style on that of Addison, and many a sermon hardly attained to the warmth of an article in the *Spectator*. The model preacher of the time was Archbishop Tillotson, and even in the chapels of the Dissenters cold respectability held sway, although there were not wanting figures like Isaac Watts and Philip Doddridge to keep alive the memory of a better time. The Latitudinarianism of England had its equivalent in the Moderatism of Scotland, whose apostles were such men as William Robertson, Hugh Blair, and 'Jupiter' Carlyle, as well as in the rationalism of Germany, which was represented in the pulpit at the one extreme by the vulgarity of K. F. Bahrdt and at the other by the eloquence of J. L. von Mosheim.

5. The 19th century.—(*a*) *Britain.*—All historians of preaching are agreed that the 19th cent. has been an epoch of unsurpassed maturity and productiveness. It has been a period when the human mind has blossomed in every direction, and preaching has both enriched itself from the progress of investigation and discovery and risen to the demands coming from every side. The most native impulse has been that of the Evangelical Revival, and this has been visible in its purest form in Scotland, where, at the beginning of the century, the movement was received into the mighty mind of Thomas Chalmers, taking on there a form of singular benignity and dignity, which has never since ceased to hold the heart and mind of his fellow-countrymen. Indeed, at the end of a century it is more in possession than ever, there being hardly any preachers of note at present who do not look up to Chalmers with veneration or are not proud of the name of Evangelicals. Chalmers' own eloquence was believed by the best judges of the time to be not inferior to that of the very greatest masters of the oratorical art in any age; and his coadjutors in the ecclesiastical conflict, such as R. Murray McCheyne, Robert S. Candlish, Thomas Guthrie, Robert Buchanan, were all preachers possessed of popular gifts and spiritual power. The Establishment from which these seceded, however, continued to produce preachers of eminence, such as Norman Macleod, John Caird, George Matheson, and James MacGregor. The United Presbyterian Church, which had originally sprung from the gospel preaching of the brothers Erskine, had such outstanding names as John Cairns, Robertson of Irvine, John Ker, and W. M. Taylor, who, however, rendered his principal service in America. The English Presbyterian Church, in spite of its limited size, was rich in gifts, having such names as Edward Irving, James Hamilton, J. Oswald Dykes, and W. G. Elmslie.

In England there was much more variety. The Evangelical school in the Church of England had a nursery for talents in the Church of Simeon at Cambridge; and in the Keswick Movement it has produced speakers whose messages have been carried to all parts of the world. The same views have had much more powerful intellectual representation in such Congregational preachers as Thomas Binney, R. W. Dale, and Joseph Parker.

The Methodists had such distinguished names as Richard Watson, Jabez Bunting, W. M. Punshon, J. H. Rigg, and W. B. Pope. But the Baptists, for their number, were the most fruitful of all, with such celebrities as Robert Hall, Alexander Maclaren, and C. H. Spurgeon, who held an archiepiscopal position during the latter half of the century among the Dissenters of the world. In sharp distinction from the Evangelical school rose the Broad Church at Oxford; and, although its predominance did not last long, it yielded some fine fruits in the pulpit, such as A. P. Stanley, Charles Kingsley, and, above all, F. W. Robertson of Brighton, whose sermons were probably the most widely read in the last half of the century, while in the 20th cent. they are obtaining a new lease of usefulness through having been translated into German. With the Broad Church preachers may be mentioned a very eminent Unitarian, James Martineau. The Broad Church was succeeded by the High Church school, which has to a large extent superseded it and is still in process of expansion. It was by a sermon of John Keble's, preached at the assizes in Oxford, that the movement was started, and its best known representative, John Henry Newman, would be esteemed by many the greatest of modern preachers on account of the intensity of his convictions, his power of probing the conscience, the nimbleness of his wit, and the perfection of his style. But another of the same school, J. B. Mozley, seems to not a few of the discerning to indicate the high-water mark of Anglican preaching; and the school had a noted orator in H. P. Liddon.

Wales is a land of preachers. Nowhere else are favourite preachers more beloved or better remembered; and it is no wonder that the Welsh people have invented a name for the *je ne sais quoi* which makes preaching effective. This is the *huil*, which is a combination of nature, art, and grace. It is the happiness of the preacher; it is the thing that grips the hearer; and it expands and culminates like the rising tide. The present writer has heard Cyndyllan Jones, secretary of the Welsh Calvinistic Methodist Church, do it to perfection in an hour's discourse, the tide setting in about a quarter of an hour before the end. But the effect can be attempted and missed; and then the preacher feels 'deserted,' and the people complain of the absence of the Spirit of the Lord. Among noted Welsh preachers the Anglicans have had Henry Thomas Edwards, the Wesleyans John Evans, the Baptists Christmas Evans and William Jones, the Congregationalists William Williams, Herber Evans, and John Thomas, and the Calvinistic Methodists John Elias, John Jones, Henry Rees, Edward Mathews, Edward Magan, and many of the name of Edwards, including two principals of theological colleges, of enormous influence in their day. The Irish pulpit has had its own share of both the Celtic fire and the spiritual power of the Welsh, and among the names that are household words are E. H. Plumptre, J. H. Bernard, and William Alexander (Episcopalians), and Henry Cooke and Fleming Stevenson (Presbyterians), while none of the smaller denominations has been without preachers of power, remembered with affection and reverence in a more limited circle.

(*b*) *The Continent.*—If the impulse of the Evangelical Revival was predominant in Great Britain, it was still more obviously so in some of the Continental countries. A visit to Geneva of a Scotsman, Robert Haldane, who had come powerfully under this influence was the occasion of a revival, which spread through the churches of Switzerland and brought to the surface such preachers as César Malan, Merle d'Aubigné, Alexander Vinet, Frédéric Godet, and, much later, Gaston Frommel. The same evangelist, who was not himself a clergyman, was the means of initiating a similar movement in France, issuing from the college of Montauban and giving rise to the labours of such eminent preachers as Adolphe Monod, one of the most perfect sacred orators of all time, E. D. de Pressensé, and E. A. F. Bersier. In neither of these countries, however, was the gift of eloquence confined to men of one school; and in France especially Timothée Colani and the Coquerels, father and son, must be mentioned as belonging to the less Evangelical tendency.

In Germany in the 19th cent. everything in religion and theology dates from Schleiermacher, and preaching is no exception; for this second Luther both excelled in the art and expounded the theory of preaching to such a degree that great and small have in both respects been affected by him since. Many volumes of his sermons have been preserved, and they exhibit him as an original and daring thinker, a close interpreter of Scripture, and a Christian of spiritual power. A sermon by Schleiermacher usually begins where the sermons of other preachers end; that is to say, he takes for granted all the commonplace and ordinary remarks, and then inquires what else there is in the text. Sometimes what he finds left may be paradoxical, and not infrequently he leads for a considerable distance through a pathway which is obscure; but it is seldom that he does not at last come out on some height from which there is a wide and rewarding view over the fields of truth. The only German preacher since Schleiermacher who can be called a rival, as regards either the excellence of his own productions or the extent of his influence on subsequent generations, is F. A. G. Tholuck, who has also written, in the form of a preface to his collected sermons, an incomparable disquisition on the preacher's art. Tholuck is as infallible as even Robertson of Brighton in discovering something in the psychology of the hearer to which to attach the message that he brings; he has the same gift of unfailing interest; and he has an even stronger hold on the essentials of Christian truth. These two leaders have had a long and distinguished line of successors, exhibiting great variety and yet not forsaking the type. Among the more outstanding names may be mentioned L. F. F. Theremin, Klaus Harms, W. Hofacker, K. I. Nitzsch, F. W. Krummacher, J. F. Ahlfeld, G. C. A. von Harless, C. E. Luthardt, J. K. W. Löhe, and Karl Gerok. The court of Prussia has for generations been careful to attract distinguished preachers to Berlin. When one heard Rudolf Kögel, the chief court-preacher in the days of Prussia's greatness, it seemed impossible to conceive of any one more fitted for his position and his work; yet, when one was listening to Emil Frommel, who was preaching in Berlin at the same time, this divine seemed to have more genius for the business in his little finger than Kögel had in his whole body. The Ritschlian movement in theology has not failed to produce eminent preachers giving currency to its views. Among recent names may be mentioned E. Dryander, B. Dörries, C. Geyer, and F. Rittelmeyer.

In the neighbouring countries of Holland and Denmark there have been similar currents of opinion at the same time; and among preachers whose renown has passed into other lands may be mentioned J. J. van Oosterzee, C. E. van Koetsveld, and A. Kuyper for the one country; and N. F. S. Grundtvig, S. A. Kierkegaard, and H. L. Martensen for the other. For Norway may be added the names of W. A. Wexels, O. A. Berg, C. Knudsen, and J. G. Blom; and for Sweden J. O. Wallin, S. L. Oedmann, C. P. Hagberg, J. H. Thomander, and F. O. Nillson.

(c) *America.*—In no part of the world has preaching been a greater power in the 19th cent. than in America. The energy of the surrounding life has communicated itself to the pulpit also, and not infrequently have great preachers been the leaders of public progress, their names becoming so identified with the places in which they have been settled that the mention of the city still suggests the preacher or the mention of the preacher the place. Certain bodies, like the Methodist and the Baptist, have accompanied the pioneers on their westward way, suiting their ministrations to the stage of culture and the spiritual aspirations of those under their charge, and they have had their reward in the phenomenal development which these denominations have attained in the newer States. Preaching has been a very conspicuous social force, and preachers have occupied a commanding position and exercised unusual influence. Nowhere else has talent been surer of recognition, and the demand has called forth the supply. Not only has every variety of preaching been exemplified, but the art itself has been thoroughly studied and taught; and books on the subject have been produced in exceptional numbers and of high quality. At Yale University the Lyman Beecher lectureship on preaching has been established since 1872, and in the successive issues every phase of the subject has been handled by experts from both the Old and the New Worlds. A similar lectureship now exists at Union Seminary, Richmond. The countless sects into which Christianity is divided in the United States have all had men of spiritual power, whose names are warmly cherished within a limited circle; but it will be possible to mention here only those who have attained something like a world-wide reputation.

Here again the beginnings were Puritan and Evangelical. The Pilgrim Fathers carried to the shores of New England the convictions of the age of Cromwell, and these were powerfully reproduced in the pulpit by Jonathan Edwards and the other leaders of New England theology, such as Joseph Bellamy, Samuel Hopkins, N. W. Taylor, Samuel Harris, and E. A. Park. The piety of the country was deeply affected by revival movements, which emerged from time to time and in no small degree affected the character of preaching. Among the more noted revivalists may be mentioned C. G. Finney and D. L. Moody. But some of the denominations which kept apart from revivalism produced distinguished preachers nevertheless, the Unitarians having in W. E. Channing and Theodore Parker representatives of very opposite types, and the Episcopalians, besides producing many distinguished preachers such as S. H. Tyng, H. C. Potter, F. D. Huntington, and W. S. Rainsford, having in Phillips Brooks a pulpit representative of the first rank, whose Yale *Lectures on Preaching* may be characterized as the finest product of the kind yet given to the world by America, while the big humanity of the man, his spiritual power, and his literary charm will long keep his memory green.

The Congregationalists had many names of great eminence, and reached a supreme preacher in Henry Ward Beecher, who possessed in the highest degree almost every gift of the pulpit orator, and who was the first of the Yale lecturers on preaching. Among the Baptists, while the names are very numerous, the greatest is perhaps that of John A. Broadus, in the south, who not only illustrated the best qualities of the preacher in his practice, but wrote on both the theory and the history of the subject with distinguished success. The Presbyterians have not been behindhand, as the names of the Hodges and Alexanders at Princeton testify, as well as those in the south of M. D. Hoge at Richmond and B. M. Palmer at New Orleans. In Canada the Anglicans have had Bishop Baldwin and J. de Soyres; the Methodists George Douglas, Potts, and C. L. Stafford; the Baptists E. A. Crawley, Denovan, and R. A. Fyfe; the Congregationalists H. Wilkes and P. S. Henson; and the Presbyterians G. M. Grant, D. H. MacVicar, and Barclay.

6. The Roman Catholic pulpit.—Protestants are apt to overlook the history of preaching since the Reformation among Roman Catholics; but these have had their own tradition and have embodied their practice both in books and in prelections on sacred eloquence in their seminaries. The prominence given to the Mass and other ceremonies tends to eject preaching from its lawful place; on the other hand, the arrangements for the observance of the Christian Year afford special opportunities for preaching on the greatest themes of the Christian system, and men possessed of oratorical gifts are trained to deliver courses of sermons at Lent and other seasons, which often attract very large audiences. There has been one scene of extraordinary development in the art of sacred oratory since the Reformation. This was the court of Louis XIV., during whose long reign a succession of orators was maintained, embracing the names of Bishop Bossuet, Louis Bourdaloue, Esprit Fléchier, Archbishop Fénelon, and J. B. Massillon. These lights of the pulpit were accounted among the principal ornaments in the court of the Grand Monarque; their merits and performances were compared and contrasted by the courtiers in the same way as the dramas of the poets and the books of the men of letters; and the stimulus of the cultivated audience excited the speakers to the utmost exercise of their powers. The sermons were expected to be lengthy and to deal with great themes in a great way; and in some respects the discourses thus produced remain as imperishable models of the art. Some of the greatest of them were on the death of princes, and the vanity of human things was a constant theme, as if the frivolity and the extravagance of the courtiers required this foil to make their enjoyment complete. The memory of this brilliant period has never died out in France, and from time to time there have been more or less successful attempts to revive it, as by J. S. Maury in the French Revolution and J. B. H. D. Lacordaire, F. A. P. Dupanloup, and Père Hyacinthe (=Charles Loyson) in the 19th century. In other parts of the Catholic world there have been striking personalities in the pulpit, such as J. M. Sailer and Martin Boos in Germany, Theobald Mathew, Tom Burke, and T. J. Potter in Ireland, and N. P. S. Wiseman and H. E. Manning in England. In the United States such names are mentioned as Bishop England, Archbishop Spalding, Archbishop Kenrick, and Cardinal Gibbons.

LITERATURE.—There are books of the past on preaching which may be called classical, such as Augustine († 430), *de Doct. Christ.* iv.; Alanus ab Insulis († 1203), *Summa de Arte Prædicatoria*; Bonaventura († 1274), *Ars Concionandi*; Erasmus († 1536), *Ecclesiastes*; Melanchthon († 1560), *Rhetoric*; Hyperius († 1564), *De Formandis Concionibus Sacris* (republished, Berlin, 1901, by E. C. Achelis and E. Sachsse as *Die Homiletik und die Katechetik des Andreas Hyperius*); J. Wilkins († 1672), *Ecclesiastes*, London, 1646; P. Doddridge († 1751), *Lectures on Preaching and the Ministerial Office*, do. 1804; G. Campbell († 1796), *On Pulpit Eloquence*, do. 1807; F. Theremin († 1846), *Die Beredsamkeit eine Tugend*, Berlin, 1814; A. Vinet († 1847), *Homilétique*, Paris, 1853, Eng. tr., Edinburgh and New York, 1858. But the modern books are better, as they not only include whatever was of value in their predecessors but address themselves to the tastes and requirements of the present day. Valuable to the practitioner are C. H. Spurgeon, *Lectures to my Students*, two series, London, 1875–77; H. W. Beecher, *Yale Lectures on Preaching*, 3 vols. in one, New York, 1881; R. W. Dale, *Nine Lectures on Preaching*[4], London, 1882; A. Phelps, *Theory of Preaching*, do. 1882; H. Bassermann, *Handbuch der geistlichen Beredsamkeit*, Stuttgart, 1885; Phillips Brooks, *Lectures on Preaching*, New York, 1881; W. Boyd Carpenter, *Lectures on Preaching*,

London, 1895; J. A. Broadus, *The Preparation and Delivery of Sermons*[26], ed. E. C. Dargan, New York, 1905; A. E. Garvie, *A Guide to Preachers*, London, 1906; P. Kleinert, *Die Homiletik*, Leipzig, 1907; P. T. Forsyth, *Positive Preaching and Modern Mind*, London, 1907. Preaching holds a place of course in works on Practical Theology, such as those of K. I. Nitzsch (*Prakt. Theologie*, 3 vols., Bonn, 1859–68), A. E. Krauss (*Lehrbuch der prakt. Theologie*, 2 vols., Freiburg, 1890–93), E. C. Achelis (*Prakt. Theologie*, Tübingen, 1903), J. J. van Oosterzee (*Practical Theology*, Eng. tr., London, 1878), as well as in series of books on the same subjects, like H. Hering's *Sammlung von Lehrbüchern der prakt. Theologie*, 50 vols., Berlin, 1895–1908, which includes both history and theory, in a series edited by himself. In the same way the subject is included in works on Pastoral Theology, such as those by K. Harms (*Pastoraltheologie*[3], Kiel, 1878), P. Fairbairn (*Pastoral Theology*, Edinburgh, 1875), W. G. Blaikie (*For the Work of the Ministry*, London, 1896), J. O. Dykes (*The Christian Minister*, Edinburgh, 1908). Choice books, worthy of mention by themselves, are George Herbert, *A Priest to the Temple, or the Country Parson*, London, 1652; W. Loehe, *Der evangelische Geistliche*, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1852–58; John Watson, *The Cure of Souls*, London, 1899; and H. van Dyke, *The Gospel for an Age of Doubt*, do. 1899. On the history of preaching there are an excellent work by Broadus (*Lectures on the Hist. of Preaching*, New York, 1876) and a small but characteristic one by John Ker (*Lectures on the Hist. of Preaching*, London, 1888); but the best work in the English language is an American one, by E. C. Dargan (*A Hist. of Preaching*, New York and London, 1905–11), vol. iii. of which, dealing with the preachers of America, it is to be hoped will not be long delayed. The two volumes already published trace the theme from the beginning to the present day, and they are characterized by learning, insight, and vigour. In German there exist voluminous works on the history of both preaching in general and German preaching in particular, some of the outstanding names being R. Rothe (*Gesch. der Predigt von den Anfangen bis auf Schleiermacher*, Bremen, 1881), A. Nebe (*Zur Gesch. der Predigt, Charakterbilder der bedeutendsten Kanzelredner*, 3 vols., Wiesbaden, 1879), K. H. Sack (*Gesch. der Predigt in der deutschen evang. Kirche*[2], Heidelberg, 1875), C. G. F. Schenk (*Gesch. der deutsch-protestantischen Kanzelberedsamkeit*, 1841), C. G. Schmidt (*Gesch. der Predigt in der evang. Kirche Deutschlands*, Gotha, 1872). Of writers on French pulpit eloquence there are many, among whom may be mentioned E. Boucher, *L'Eloquence de la chaire*, Lille, 1894; A. de Coulanges, *La Chaire française au 18me siècle*, do. 1901; A. Vinet, *Hist. de la prédication parmi les réformés de France au xviie siècle*, do. 1860; P. Stapfer, *La grande Prédication chrétienne en France*, do. 1898. On the history of preaching in Holland and Denmark there are works by J. Hartog (*Geschiedenis van der Predikkunde in de Kerk van Nederland*, Utrecht, 1887) and V. L. Nannestad (*Portrainer fra Kirken-Bidrag til en Karakteristik of dansk Prædiken*, Copenhagen, 1899), and on the same in Italy by U. Micocci (*Antologia della sacra eloquenza moderna*, Turin, 1897), and F. Zanotto (*Storia della Predicazione*, Modena, 1899). J. E. Kempe has edited two volumes on the *Classic Preachers of the English Church* (London, 1877–78), and J. C. Ryle published a volume entitled *Christian Leaders of Last Century* (Edinburgh, 1869). O. Jones has written on the great Welsh preachers (*Preachers of Wales*, London, 1885), while to the Scottish pulpit the same compliment has been paid by both W. G. Blaikie (*The Preachers of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1888) and W. M. Taylor (*The Scottish Pulpit*, London, 1887). Under the title of *Representative Modern Preachers*, New York, 1904, L. O. Brastow published elaborate essays on nine preachers belonging to different countries. Finally may be mentioned collections of sermons, of which by far the greatest is that of J. P. Migne (Paris, 1844–66) in no fewer than 86 volumes. H. C. Fish's well-known *Hist. and Repository of Pulpit Eloquence*, New York, 1856–57, is modestly limited to two volumes and a supplement (*Pulpit Eloquence of the 19th Century*, do. 1857). Recent publications in America are *The World's Great Sermons*, 10 vols., ed. G. Kleiser, Chicago, 1910, and *Modern Sermons by World Scholars*, 10 vols., ed. R. Scott and W. Stiles, New York, 1909. JAMES STALKER.

PREACHING (Jewish).—The word 'preach' is derived from Latin *prædico* (Gr. πρόφημι), and means to foretell or to announce (in public). Generally speaking, the term conveys the idea of making a proclamation on behalf of God. The notion of preaching is based on many passages in the OT, such as Is 29[21], Am 5[10], etc. The Biblical prophets are, therefore, to be considered as preachers in the literal sense of the word. In Dt 31[12] the injunction is laid upon the king to read the Law before the assembled people once in seven years. Such public readings are recorded in 2 K 23[2], Neh 8[3-8], and in the Mishnāh *Sōṭāh*, vii. 8. A kind of model sermon may also be seen in Pr 1[20-23].

During the second Temple, and some time after, preaching retained its spontaneous character. Whoever felt called upon to preach stepped forward and spoke. The Mishnāh (*Ta'anīth*, ii. 1) states that in times of prolonged drought the community, in deep contrition, gathered in the open and were addressed in stirring words by the oldest member present. John the Baptist preached (ἐκήρυκε) in the wilderness of Judæa (Mt 3[1]), and Jesus preached in the synagogues. Preaching seems at that time to have been a regular feature of the Sabbath service. It grew out of the reading of the lessons from the Tôrāh, and consisted of the interpretation of the passages read and exhortations connected therewith. Since the people could not be trusted to follow the Hebrew text when read out, the latter was accompanied by a translation into the Aramaic vernacular, known as the Targum. The translator (*methurgemān*) was bound to be a person well versed in the original text. As a literal translation of many passages was impossible or impracticable, the translator frequently resorted to paraphrastic rendering, introducing into it elements of the Haggādāh as well as of Hālākhāh. Instances of homiletic translation in the so-called Targum of Onqelos are Gn 49[3-4, 10f.], Dt 32[38f.], which contain expressions of comfort, hope of speedy delivery and the rebuilding of the Temple, also admonitions to observe the Law and to study the Tôrāh. Broader still are the homiletic additions to the other Targumim, but it seems that these were meant for private rather than public reading.

The Greek-speaking Jews proceeded in a similar way, using the Greek language for their religious lectures. We are in possession of two Greek sermons and the fragments of a third ascribed to Philo.[1] He is himself credited with having acted as preacher, and Freudenthal is probably right in regarding his allegorical writings in the light of public lectures actually delivered.[2]

The transformation of these rather informal lectures into sermons proper, based on Biblical texts, proceeded gradually. Their promoters were the heads of the Sanhedrin, who were distinguished by the title *darshānim* ('interpreters'). As interpretation was the main feature of the lecture, the preacher 'opened' (פתח) his sermon with a quotation from the weekly portion, or *haphtārāh*, or from any part of the Bible in some way connected with the occasion. These occasions were not only Sabbaths and festivals, but also marriages (Talmud *Bᵉrākhôth*, 600) and funerals (*ib.* and *Mᵉgillāh*, 600). The specimens of introductions of funeral sermons given in these passages are in pure Biblical Hebrew, which is a sign that the preachers were highly trained persons who bestowed great care on their sermons. The ordination of rabbis was also solemnized by homiletic allocutions (*Sanh.* fol. 14vo). A large number of such introductions (פתיחות) are to be found at the beginning of the Midrāsh on Lamentations and the *Pᵉsīqtās*, together with the names of the preachers, each paragraph giving either a complete sermon or the nucleus of one.

As a rule the sermon was spoken in the vernacular, Hebrew or Aramaic in Palestine and Babylon, and, correspondingly, Greek, Persian, and Arabic. Of the use of Arabic we have direct evidence in Muslim tradition. There existed a Bēth 'Midrās' in Medīna, where the Jews interpreted the Tôrāh in Arabic.[3] The preacher (also styled the *ḥakhām*) often did not address the people direct, but spoke to the *methurgemān* (or *amōrā*), a paid official who translated his words

[1] Ed. J. B. Aucher, Venice, 1826; see J. Freudenthal, *Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift über die Herrschaft der Vernunft*, Breslau, 1869, p. 9 ff.

[2] P. 7.

[3] Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, ed. L. Krehl and T. W. Juynboll, Leyden, 1862–1908, iii. 198; see also H. Hirschfeld, *New Researches into the Composition and Exegesis of the Qorān*, London, 1902, p. 28.

aloud to the congregation. From this it follows that the *methurgemān* himself must have been a man of some learning. He had to add explanations and to answer questions, and the latitude allowed him is probably reflected in many passages of the Targumim and Midrashim.

Whilst the ordinary sermon was delivered in the synagogue, lectures on Hălākhāh, which demanded some preliminary knowledge, were left to the school hall (Beth Hammidrāsh). There was not, however, any fixed rule for such an arrangement, especially where the school hall was also used as a house of worship. On certain occasions, especially on Sabbaths preceding festivals, the public had to be instructed on certain duties and prohibitions, and the sermon assumed a mixed form. This custom is still observed in most communities. The natural place of the sermon was immediately after the reading of the lesson from the Pentateuch and the *haphtārāh* from one of the Prophets. We read in *Massēkheth Sopherîm*, xii. 7: 'On Sabbath the Targumān or Preacher (דורש) recites the *haphtārāh* from the Prophets.' A passage in the Midrāsh *Yalqūt* (92*a*) states that, when a person wakes from his sleep, he goes to the synagogue, reads the *Shᶜma'* and the *Tephillāh* ('Eighteen Benedictions'), and listens to the Tōrāh and to the elder (preacher). There are many passages in the Midrashim containing similar statements. Occasionally, when the morning service exceeded its limits, the sermon was delivered before the termination of the afternoon service. In some places this custom is observed even in modern times.

The Gaonic period saw some changes. Whilst the preacher was honoured by the title *ḥākhām*, *darshān*, or *zāqēn* ('elder'), the *methurgemān* became a mere precentor, and the Midrāsh marks the contrast between the two by applying to them the verse Ec 7[7]. The latter embellished the service by his melodious voice, but contributed nothing towards the uplifting of the congregation. The liturgy became fixed. The function of the translator was either abolished or greatly restricted. Relics of the same, however, still exist in congregations of Sephardic rite, where during the service of the Fast of Āb the Aramaic Targum of the *haphtārāh* is read in an enlarged Spanish version. In Oriental congregations Arabic versions of the Targum are read of the Blessing of Jacob, the Song of Moses, the Decalogue, the *haphtārāh* of the first and last days of Passover, and similar pieces.

Even the function of the preacher did not escape the vicissitudes of time. During the persecution of the Middle Ages many synagogues were closed, the 'public' service was banned to secret places, and expulsions made an end of many congregations. Another cause which affected the sermon, chiefly in 'German' congregations, was the enlargement of the liturgy, by the insertion of *piyyuṭim*, *i.e.* unofficial poetic compositions. The large Haggādic elements which they contained in some measure replace the homily, and sermons were delivered in intervals or on special occasions. The names of famous preachers in France and Germany are, therefore, comparatively few. A list of them is given in Zunz's *Gottesdienstliche Vorträge der Juden*[2] (Frankfort, 1892, p. 435 ff.). Spain, prior to the expulsion, offered a more fertile soil for pulpit eloquence, probably on account of the simplicity of the rite. Only on one Sabbath in the year and the minority of festival days are some *piyyuṭim* recited. This country, therefore, produced a large number of renowned preachers. Of those not mentioned by Zunz[1] must be named Jonah of Gerona[2] († Toledo, 1340), who was one of those who joined the movement against Maimonides' philosophy, Nissim b. Reuben Gerondi (1350),[1] and Asher b. Jeḥiel († 1340). A great preacher of the 15th cent. was Joseph b. Shem Ṭōb. From a note prefacing a collection of his sermons[2] we gain some interesting information. It was in June 1452, when Prince Enrico arrived at Andalusia, that the Jews of Segovia dispatched a complaint to him concerning a persecution which had taken place on Christmas day. The prince sent Joseph with a written order to the authorities of the town commanding peace, and in another letter he assured the Jews of his protection. On the following Sabbath Joseph preached in the synagogue *after the reading of the lesson*. Subsequently he preached three more sermons in the same place. In Italy there were Abraham Farissol and Obadiah Sforno, both in the 15th cent., and David Zaccuth, who left a collection of 300 sermons.[3] In the 16th cent. we find Joseph Taytazak of Salonica.

The following two centuries were not favourable to any further development of the spiritual life of the Jews, and this circumstance also affected public preaching. There exists a rather extensive literature of sermons produced in Italy, the German lands, and Poland, but, as they were written in Hebrew, it is doubtful whether they were actually delivered. In the Sephardic communities of Holland and England, where the Jews lived in comparative safety, sermons were delivered in Spanish and Portuguese. In other countries, with the exception of perhaps Italy, the vernacular was lost to them. In German-speaking countries the Jews could converse only in the Jewish-German dialect, whilst the use of pure German was almost regarded as rank apostasy. This condition lasted till Mendelssohn inaugurated a reform. The beginning of the 19th cent. brought the revival of the sermon. Its effect made itself felt all over Europe, and the old-fashioned *derāshāh* was gradually replaced by its modernized substitute.[4] It has not died out entirely, and travelling and resident *maggīdīm* are listened to by large congregations in E. and W. Europe.

Even the modern form of sermons has undergone some modification in the direction of curtailment. The rather ponderous lecture, with its three (or more) points, which was fashionable fifty years ago is now a thing of the past, and is generally replaced by an address of about half-an-hour. A competent preacher can find sufficient scope for edification even in this short space of time, as long as he remembers that the sermon owes its origin to the exposition of the Law.

LITERATURE.—See works mentioned throughout, and L. Philippson, *Die Rhetorik und jüdische Homiletik*, Leipzig, 1890; S. Bäck, *Die jüdischen Prediger, Sittenlehrer und Apologeten in dem Zeitraum vom 15. bis Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Trèves, 1895, 'Die Darschanim vom 15. bis Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts,' in Winter and Wünsche, *Gesch. der jüd. Litt.*, Leipzig, 1892–95, ii. 609–696.

HARTWIG HIRSCHFELD.

PREACHING (Muslim). — **1. The pulpit.**—The pulpit is designated in Arabic by the Ethiopic word *minbar*, literally 'seat,' or 'throne,' ecclesiastically the bishop's throne, in Greek καθέδρα, whence the French *chaire*. In early times the Arabic synonym *majlis* seems to have been occasionally employed in lieu of *minbar* (Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Cairo, 1312, i. 107). Such a throne was introduced into the Prophet's mosque at Medīna before his death; it was of tamarisk wood, and

[1] P. 443 ff

[2] ספר היראה (1430?).

[1] רישות, Constantinople (?) 1530.

[2] MS Cod. Montefiore 166; see H. Hirschfeld, 'Descriptive Catalogue of the Hebrew MSS of the Montefiore Library,' in *JQR* xiv. [1901–02], xv. [1902–03], no. 61.

[3] See Benjacob, *Ozar Ha-Sepharim*, p. 122, *s.vv.* דרוש and דרשה.

[4] For a selected literature of sermons see S. Maybaum, *Jüdische Homiletik*, Berlin, 1894; see also M. Kayserling, *Bibliothek jüdischer Kanzelredner*, 2 vols., do. 1870–72.

was mounted by two steps. The traditions concerning the occasion and purpose of its introduction are contradictory, but the name indicates that it was conscious imitation of what was seen in Abyssinian churches; according to a tradition, the Prophet said that his purpose in introducing it was to enable the congregation to see how he performed the *ṣalāt* ceremonies. Of these, however, the prostration could not be performed on the *minbar*, whence it was eventually used only for the sermon, which was probably delivered by him standing, though there is some doubt about the matter. In 50 A.H. the Umayyad Mu'āwiyah contemplated removing this pulpit to the mosque of his capital, Damascus, but was prevented (it is said) by an eclipse of the sun, which was supposed to mark divine disapproval of this scheme; Mu'āwiyah accordingly disavowed this project, and instead raised the height of the pulpit by six additional steps. The eclipse is apocryphal. Several of the later Umayyads had the same idea, but they were all dissuaded (Ṭabarī, *Chronicle*, Leyden, 1881, ii. 92). Peculiar sanctity naturally attached to this pulpit, which, since perjury by it was thought to bring terrible punishment, was used for the settlement of disputes. It is said to have lasted till 654, when the mosque was burned (ʿAun al-Ma'bud, on the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd, Dehli, 1323, i. 421).

Pulpits were after a time erected in the mosques of the cities occupied or founded by the Muslim conquerors. Thus we hear of Mu'āwiyah, when governor of Syria, exhibiting the relics of the murdered Khalīfah 'Uthmān on the *minbar* of the mosque in Damascus. The material is properly wood; hence 'the beams' is often used as a synonym for *minbar*. In the more elaborate mosques it is richly ornamented; specimens of such *manabir* are to be found in the South Kensington Museum.

2. The preacher.—The orthodox law-books prescribe that the preacher shall be properly clothed, without specifying the mode; the Shī'ite manual (A. Querry, *Droit musulman*, Paris, 1871–72, i. 86) ordains that he shall wear a turban and a striped Yemen cloak; the Umayyad Khalīfah Walīd II. used to robe himself in white when preaching (*Aghānī*, vi. 141); but in 'Abbāsid times it would seem that the preacher wore a black gown (Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿah, i. 274; A. von Kremer, *Culturgesch. des Orients unter den Chalifen*, Vienna, 1875–77, i. 137). In a description by Ibn Jubair (ed. M. J. de Goeje, London, 1907, pp. 222, 15) the preacher uncovers his head; the covering of the head was doubtless more usual, though the illustration cited by von Kremer (*loc. cit.*) perhaps refers to a special occasion. He should lean on a staff, bow, or sword, held in his left hand, 'indicating that this religion is maintained by the use of weapons' (Sherbini, *Comm. on the Minhaj*, Cairo, 1308, i. 286),[1] while his right hand rests on the pulpit-edge; and he should face the congregation, turning neither to the right nor to the left (Shāfi'ī, *Umm*, Cairo, 1321, i. 177). The sermon (*khuṭbah*) is of two parts, between which the preacher should sit down;[2] if, however, bodily infirmity render it necessary, he may sit throughout, or even maintain a recumbent posture. Some authors recommend an elaborate ceremonial (so Rashid Pasha, *Dini Mubini Islam*, Constantinople, 1328, ii. 145–147). The preacher (*khaṭīb*) was in early times the sovereign, *i.e.* the Prophet and his successors; various authors profess to reproduce discourses pronounced by the Prophet himself (Shāfi'ī, i. 179; Jāḥiẓ, *Bayan*, Cairo, 1232, i. 165; Ya'qubi, ed. M. T. Houtsma, Leyden, 1883, ii. 98; Bukhārī, i. 108), but these are very clearly spurious; Jāḥiẓ produces others by early Khalīfahs, and in the *Nahj al-balāghah* there are several supposed to have been delivered by the Khalīfah 'Alī. Outside the metropolis the preacher was the Khalīfah's representative; the historian Abu'l-Maḥāsin (ed. T. W. Juynboll, Leyden, 1852, i. 81) reproduces a sermon of 'Amr ibn al-'Ās, governor of Egypt for 'Umar I. During Umayyad times the Khalīfah continued to deliver it; 'Abd al-Malik declared that his hair had been whitened by the fear of making a mistake in his Arabic when preaching (*Fakhri*, ed. W. Ahlwardt, Gotha, 1860, p. 148). In 'Abbāsid times it would seem that the duty began from an early period to be delegated; the preaching of the Khalīfah Rāḍī in 324 A.H. is mentioned as exceptional (Miskawaihi, ed. H. F. Amedroz, in the press, i. 334). As late as 987 A.H. the emperor Akbar tried to deliver a sermon at Fathpur; but the experiment was a failure. An official called the *khaṭīb* was ordinarily appointed by the sovereign to discharge this function, and it was normally held that the sermon should be delivered only in cities, and in each city only at the official mosque. Where (as was the case with Baghdād) the city was bisected by a river, it might count as two cities. In the Shī'ite manual it is suggested that the mosques in which it is pronounced should be at a distance from each other of not less than three miles.

3. The sermon.—The occasions on which the law prescribes a sermon are before the mid-day prayer on Fridays, and after prayer on the feast-days, and in the services at times of eclipse and drought. Sermons are also delivered at weddings and on many public occasions. The language, according to the orthodox law-books, should be Arabic; the Zaidis, however, permit the use of Persian or any other language understood by the congregation (*Muntaza' al-Mukhtar*, Cairo, 1327, i. 221), and some other authorities permit this, though use is rarely made of the leave on the prescribed occasions.

Orthodox jurists enumerate the elements of the sermon as five: the words 'Praise be to Allah'; a blessing on the Prophet; an admonition to piety, of which the minimum amount is the phrase 'Obey Allah'; a blessing on the believers; and a lesson from the Qur'ān, not less than a complete verse. The fourth belongs to the first part of the address, and the fifth to the second. This list fails to include the prayer for the reigning sovereign, which is prescribed in the Zaidi law, the legitimate sovereign to be named or not according to the needs of the time. Although an innovation, the practice is so general throughout Islām that orthodox jurists advise its observation, for fear of giving offence (ʿAlī al-'Adawi, *Comm. on Sidi Khalil*, Cairo, 1307, i. 432); but it is not quite clear when it was introduced. Shāfi'ī (*c.* 200 A.H.) disapproves of prayer either for or against any individual being made part of the *khuṭbah* (i. 180); yet by 324 the prayer for the sovereign had become so regular a part of the Friday sermon that the Khalīfah, having undertaken to deliver it, required expert advice as to his treatment of this passage (Yāqūt, *Dictionary of Learned Men*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, London, 1913, ii. 349); and omission of it on the part of a preacher was at this time regarded as a sign of rebellion against the sovereign (Miskawaihi, ii. 90). Some writers assert that the practice was introduced by the Prophet's cousin, Ibn 'Abbas, when governor of Baṣrah (Aḥmad Rasim, *Manaqib Islam*, Constantinople, 1326, ii. 437); the historian Ibn al-Athīr states that the first person for whom this prayer was offered in

[1] The orator's staff is an institution far earlier than Islām.

[2] Possibly this practice was suggested by the Christian sermon following the reading of Scripture (F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, Oxford, 1896, Index).

Baghdād was the Buwaihid Sulṭān 'Aḍud al-Daulah in 367 A.H.; his meaning probably is the first person other than the Khalīfah.

If the introduction of a prayer for the sovereign was late, the practice of cursing public enemies from the pulpit was early; the second Khalīfah is said to have so cursed a man who was guilty of what was thought an immoral practice (*Mabsūṭ*, Cairo, 1324, xxiv. 20), and in the first civil war 'Alī and Mu'āwiyah introduced imprecations on each other into their sermons. The cursing of 'Alī in the Friday discourse was continued till the end of the 1st Islāmic cent., when the pious 'Umar II. put an end to it; as late as 321 A.H. there was a question of re-introducing the cursing of Mu'āwiyah (Miskawaihi, i. 260).

On the question whether the audience should be greeted at the commencement of the discourse there is a difference of opinion between the schools.

The Prophet is said to have recommended brevity to preachers, and the discourses attributed to him are of 'ten words,' *i.e.* a few sentences. The early discourses recorded by Jāḥiẓ (ii. 25 ff.) are somewhat longer than the minimum permitted, but are still very short. Some of them are partly in rhymed prose, and this style at a later time became normal. The cultivation of the sermon as a branch of literature may have been stimulated by the work of Jāḥiẓ († 255 A.H.), but the classical collection of sermons belongs to the 4th cent., and is the work of 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. Muḥammad, known as Ibn Nubātah († 374). The best edition of these is that published at Beirūt, 1311 A.H. They are throughout in rhymed prose, and occupy on the average five minutes in delivery. The subjects with which they deal are such as are natural in homilies; owing to the preacher's patrons being princes who fought against the Byzantines, many of them are exhortations to the Sacred War. Probably from the time of their publication it became the practice of those official preachers who had no talent for their vocation to learn them by heart, and they are still largely used in the mosques of Egypt and perhaps elsewhere. In Turkey a collection by various authors is now ordinarily used for this purpose (Rashid Pasha, ii. 149, where one of these sermons is given in full with Turkish translation). The famous poet and sceptic Abu'l-'Alā al-Ma'arrī composed several collections of homilies (see *Centenario della nascita di M. Amari*, Palermo, 1910, i. 230), but they had little popularity. The polygraph Shamīm al-Ḥilli (601) informed Yāqūt that his own collection of sermons had superseded those of Ibn Nubātah in popular estimation (*Dict. of Learned Men*, v. 130), but this boast was not justified.

4. Unofficial preaching.—Besides the formality of the Friday service many persons felt a call to encourage their fellows to virtue and piety, to propagate the Islāmic religion by exhortation, or to spread particular opinions. The name usually applied to discourses of this kind is *majlis*, 'sitting,' *'aqada majlisa'l-wa'ẓ*, 'he held assemblies for the purpose of preaching,' being the phrase employed to describe this form of activity. Jāḥiẓ (iii. 86) speaks of Thursday as a natural day for such assemblies. Ṭabarī (ii. 507) gives a specimen of a sermon delivered in 65 A.H. by the most eloquent preacher of the time in the interest of the Prophet's house; it is partly in rhymed prose, but the artifice is irregular and the language on the whole simple. Most of the famous Ṣūfīs were powerful preachers, and their effects on the audiences are described in the hagiologies; at a meeting held by Muḥāsibī († 243 A.H.) the company sat in silence after evening prayer until midnight; then some one propounded a question, whereon the preacher began to discourse, 'the audience listening in rapt attention, some weeping, some groaning and some shrieking' (Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*, Cairo, 1324, ii. 39). The crowds which gathered to hear these orators roused the curiosity of Jews and Christians, some of whom were moved by the sermons to embrace Islām (*Asrār al-Tauḥīd*, ed. V. A. Zhukovski, Petrograd, 1899, i. 169). With the growing fashion of erecting religious buildings of various sorts which characterizes the 5th cent. of Islām the chronicles pay more attention to the presence of influential preachers in Baghdād; the ground occupied by the male audience of the preacher Ardashīr b. Manṣūr, who came to Baghdād in 486 A.H., was 175 cubits by 120, and the female audience was yet larger (Ibn al-Athīr, *Chronicle*, *ad. ann.*). The pulpit of the Nizāmiyyah College in this city was occupied by famous preachers in this and the following century; the sermons of 'Abd al-Raḥīm al-Qushairī († 524) delivered here led to riots between the Ash'arites, whose cause he supported, and the Ḥanbalites, in consequence of which the preacher was exiled to Nisabur (Ibn Khallikān, tr. de Slane, Paris, 1842–71, ii. 154). The arrival in Baghdād of powerful preachers belonging to these respective sects is recorded by Ibn al-Athīr for the year 516; the sermons of the Ash'arite were attended by the Khalīfah himself, who presented him with the headship of one of the royal monasteries. For the middle of the 6th cent. we possess a volume of sermons by the famous Ṣūfī, 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī († 561), called *al-Fatḥ al-Rabbānī* (Cairo, 1302), some of whose discourses are also incorporated in the biography of him called *Bahjat al-Asrār* (Cairo, 1304); they were delivered on various days of the week, chiefly Sundays, Tuesdays, and Fridays (before the mid-day service) in different buildings of Baghdād, and would generally occupy about five minutes. They are in ordinary prose, but undoubtedly eloquent and spiritual; he claimed to have made 500 converts to Islām, and to have reformed more than 100,000 criminals (D. S. Margoliouth, 'Contributions to the Biography of 'Abd al-Qadir,' *JRAS*, 1907, p. 304). His personal character appears, however, to have left something to be desired, and it is to be observed that the authors of the *Maqāmahs* (a word which properly means 'addresses' or 'sermons') place affecting homilies in the mouths of notorious evil-livers; and the success of the historical preachers at times led to their amassing great fortunes and maintaining *harīms* of a colossal size. The traveller Ibn Jubair, who visited Baghdād in 580 A.H., notices the preaching of Baghdād as its one favourable characteristic:

> 'Scarcely a Friday passes without a discourse by a preacher, and those among the inhabitants who are specially favoured pass their whole time in meetings where such are delivered (ed. de Goeje, p. 219). He describes a Friday service at the Nizāmiyyah College, where after the mid-day prayer the shaikh Qazwīnī ascended the pulpit; chairs were placed in front of him for the Qur'ān-readers, who chanted elaborately, after which the shaikh delivered a powerful discourse; questions were then addressed him on strips of paper and he replied forthwith to every one. The historian Jamāl al-din Ibn al-Jauzī held services at this time every Saturday, and his eloquence also greatly impressed the traveller. The results were similar to the phenomena at times seen at revivalist meetings; many in the congregation sobbed and fainted, and crowds of penitents thronged to touch the preacher. 'It would have been worth while to cross the sea to hear one of these sermons' (p. 222). On Thursdays this preacher's gatherings were held in a private court of the palace, from which the Khalīfah and his family could hear them. The text was a verse of the Qur'ān which ended in *nās*, and the preacher maintained this rhyme throughout his discourse. Into the sermon he introduced compliments to the Khalīfah and his mother and prayers for them; he further recited many verses, some encomia on the sovereign, others of the Ṣūfī erotic style, which affected the audience powerfully.

This anecdote is of interest as indicating that the difficult artifice which characterized the

sermon was at the time unusual; we find it practised in a volume of sermons by a preacher of the 8th cent., Shu'aib al-Ḥuraifish († 801; *Al-Rauḍ al-fa'iq*, Cairo, 1280), which closely resemble the style which affected Ibn Jubair so vehemently. These are interspersed with erotic verses or hymns, which appear to be the preacher's own compositions, and are much more lengthy than the sermons of 'Abd al-Qādir; the time which their delivery would occupy is probably from twenty minutes to half-an-hour, or in some cases considerably more. They are clearly intended to work on the feelings of the audience, and to produce something resembling ecstasy. The narratives introduced are highly imaginative, though they are often attached to historical names.

The style which has prevailed since seems to resemble that of Ibn Nubātah more nearly, when his discourses are not actually reproduced. A collection published in Damascus in 1909 by Muḥammad al-Qāsimī contains sermons extracted from volumes of the years 653, 772, 873, and 1079 A.H., intended to be delivered at the Friday service and on the feast-days; the time which they occupy rarely exceeds five minutes; the continuous rhyme is carried on through the opening sentences, but does not usually extend beyond the first third of the sermon. The *Majālis* of the official preacher of Baghdād, Ālūsī-Zādah (*Ghāliyat al-Mawā'iz*, Cairo, 1911), resemble in length and to some extent in artifice those of Ḥuraifish; the verses introduced are not, it would seem, original. It is said that the Islāmic preachers have in places where there are Christian missions modified their theory of the sermon in order to provide something as attractive as the Christian discourses; the reproduction of Ibn Nubātah has had to give way to a style more closely related to the spiritual needs of the time.

LITERATURE.—This has been cited throughout the article.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

PRECEPTS (Buddhist).—The early Buddhists had very naturally quite a number of injunctions, precepts, short sentences on ethics or conduct, popular texts, or short verses current in the community. European writers call these 'precepts.' The Pāli word thus rendered is usually *sikkhā-pada*. *Sikkhā* is 'training'; *pada* is ambiguous, meaning either 'foot-step' or 'quarter verse,' and both meanings were called up by the word. Hence *sikkhā-pada* is either 'first steps in self-training' or 'textlets of training.' The basic idea is an influence from within, not an injunction or command from without.

An anecdote will show how such rules were looked upon by the new community. There came to the Buddha a *bhikkhu* of the sons of the Vajjians, and he said: 'Lord, it is more than a hundred and fifty precepts that are intoned to us every fortnight. I cannot, Lord, train myself in all these!' 'Could you train yourself, brother, in three—the higher morality, the higher intelligence, the higher wisdom?' was the reply. He said that he could. And he did. And thereby he put away lust, ill-will, and stupidity (*i.e.* reached *nirvāṇa*), and all the lesser matters were gained at once.[1] So also it is related of the Buddha that on his death-bed he told the order that they could revoke, if they chose to do so, all the minor and subsidiary precepts.[2]

In both of these cases the 'precepts' are for full members of the order. Another group consists of ten precepts for novices. It is often referred to in European books, but is found as a group only in the latest portions of the *Nikāyas*[3] and in the *Vinaya* (i. 83). In this group the novice takes upon himself in succession ten precepts. These are: (1) not to destroy any living thing, (2) not to steal, (3) to be celibate, (4) not to lie, (5) to abstain from strong drink, (6) not to eat save at the right time, (7) not to frequent variety shows with dances, songs, and music,[1] (8) not to wear garlands or to use perfumes, (9) not to use luxurious beds, (10) not to receive gold or silver. Each of the ten occurs in different groups and in different order in earlier parts of the Canon—eight of them, *e.g.*, in a different order, in the *Sutta Nipata*, one of the earliest documents.[2] But the above are the number and order that have survived in the use of all those Buddhist communities which adhere to the older tradition. It should be added that no one of them is exclusively Buddhist. What is Buddhist is the selecting—the omission, *e.g.*, of any precept as to obedience, or as to belief in any particular doctrine. But we need not here make any comparison between this list of 'first steps for the Buddhist novice' and similar lists for the novice in European or non-Buddhist Indian orders.

Of the many moral precepts for the use of ordinary Buddhists, not members of the order, it will be sufficient to refer to the well-known *Dhamma-pada*, an anthology of such precepts in verse gathered from the extant early books and other sources now lost. They are there arranged in groups of about 20 verses each on 26 selected subjects. Where the verses deal with ideas that are common ground to ethical teachers in Europe and India, the versions are easily intelligible and often appeal strongly to the Western sense of religious beauty. Where any verse is based on the technical terms of the Buddhist system of self-culture and self-control, none of the numerous translations is able to convey the real sense of the Pāli. The best translation is by Sīlāchāra.

There is a pretty custom that was current from very early times among the Buddhists in India, and is still current in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. A layman (or laywoman), moved by some religious influence or emotion, will formally 'take upon himself,' for some definite period, the observance of the first five of the above ten precepts for novices. This is done by kneeling with clasped hands before a member of the order, and solemnly repeating after him, usually in Pāli, the words of each of the five precepts. This is called in Ceylon 'taking *pan-sil*,' *i.e.* taking the five moral precepts. It is not known when or where the custom originated.

LITERATURE.—*Aṅguttara Nikāya*, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, PTS, 1885–1910; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899–1910, *Buddhism*[22], London, 1910; *Khuddaka Pāṭha*, ed. H. Smith, PTS, 1915; *Vinaya Piṭaka*, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879–83; *Dhamma-pada*, ed. Sūriyagoḍa, PTS, 1916, tr. Sīlāchāra, London, Buddhist Society, 1915.

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PRECEPTS (Christian).—See COUNSELS AND PRECEPTS.

PRECIOUS STONES.—The first difficulty in considering the opinions of earlier times regarding gems is that of realizing the standpoint before modern chemistry had revealed the nature of matter. Only 140 years ago the editor of Theophrastus, Sir John Hill, was publishing entirely futile classifications, lumping together as varieties of sapphire such different materials as ruby, topaz, emerald, hyacinth, garnet, carbuncle, amethyst, chrysolite, and prase, and assigning the mixture which caused the colours of each, because 'we know the ingredients which give their colour by experiments in colouring glass' (*Theophrastus's History of Stones*, London, 1774, p. 286). Long classifying of spars and earths follows, which has no more reality than the epicycles of planets. All this was an advance on Pliny and earlier observers, yet it has been extinguished by modern chemistry,

[1] *Aṅguttara*, i. 230, cf. *Saṃyutta*, iv. 251.
[2] Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, ii. 171.
[3] *E.g.*, *Khuddaka Pāṭha*, i.

[1] This is sometimes rendered 'concerts or plays'—wrongly, for at that time in India they did not exist. See Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 7, note 4.
[2] See Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*[22], p. 139.

so that we can hardly realize the ancient confusion of thought. To understand the ancients we must set aside all chemical ideas, and regard stones only in their colour and hardness. Such a position must confound together materials entirely different, and divide identical substances which differ in colour. Thus the Egyptians had but one word, *mafkat*, for turquoise and malachite, a phosphate of alumina and carbonate of copper.

The questions about the ancient names and their modern equivalents are difficult to settle owing to the confusion of substances which look alike. The actual ancient usage of materials must be the guide, as it is impossible to connect with ancient names any gems that were then unknown. For the equivalents of the Biblical names see art. 'Stones, Precious,' in *HDB*.

1. Egypt.—In Egypt several stones are named anciently with specimens, and some others are named as the material for amulets which are regularly of one material. Thus we can be certain of *sef*, white quartz; *sef tahen*, amethyst; *khenem*, red jasper, or sard; *hersed*, carnelian; *khesdeb*, lazuli; *qesonkh*, a variety of lazuli; *nemehen*, jade; *qo* or *qada*, hæmatite; *neshen* or *mafkat neshen*, green felspar and beryl; *mafkat* of Syria, malachite; *mafkat* of Amen, turquoise; the last two may be perhaps reversed. The use of some stones was almost constant for certain amulets—carnelian or sard for the leg, hand, name-badge, and serpent-head; jasper, or imitation in red glass, for the girdle of Isis and the sacrificial cow; diorite for clothing; green felspar or beryl for the papyrus sceptre and the writing tablet; lazuli for figures of goddesses and the cartouche; hæmatite for the head-rest, square and level; obsidian for the double feather and *sma* sign of union. The reasons for such usage can be guessed in some cases: the green stones symbolized verdure and growth; the red jasper is called 'the blood of Isis'; the weighty hæmatite is for the repose of sleep or of levelled building; the flesh-coloured carnelian for the hand and leg. Some of these amulets are ordered to be made of such materials in the directions in the *Book of the Dead*.

2. Italy.—Italy is the land of which we know most regarding amulets, anciently from Pliny, recently from Bellucci. The ancient ideas attaching to stones are: diamond for poison or delirium; hæmatite for success in petitions or to reveal treachery; siderites (black hæmatite or meteorite) to cause discord in law-suits; brown hydrous oxide of iron (limonite) for pregnancy; quartz crystal for parturition; amethyst and emerald for intoxication, against spells, hail, and locusts, and for access to kings; agate against scorpions; jasper for public speaking; blood jasper for invisibility; black jasper for taking cities and fleets; yellow quartz against jaundice; amianthus against spells; serpentine against headache and serpent-bites; white steatite for increase of milk; malachite for preserving infants; amber for throat affections, and against fevers; ammonite for prophetic dreams.

In modern Italy pyrites is used to preserve the eyes; red hæmatite stops bleeding; black hæmatite is for the evil eye; limonite for pregnancy; sapphire is for headache, and promotes contentment; quartz crystal for evil eye; white chalcedony for milk; red chalcedony for bleeding; agate eyestone for evil eye; blood jasper to stop bleeding; black jasper against lightning; staurolite against witchery; nephrite for kidney disease; garnet for widows, and comfort in misfortune; serpentine against reptiles; malachite for the evil eye; dendrite against venom; selenite for increase of milk; amber against witchery; white coral for increase of milk; red coral for menstruation and evil eye; madrepore against witchery and worms. Obviously the use of a large part of these is due to 'sympathetic magic,' or, as it may better be called, 'the doctrine of similars.' A considerable revival of fancy beliefs about gems has occurred in recent times among the ignorant and superstitious of wealthy classes in Europe and America. There is little or nothing collected as to traditional beliefs about stones in other lands outside of Italy.

3. Motives for use of gems.—An examination of subjects engraved upon gems throws some light on the purposes for which they were worn. For this inquiry the number of occurrences of a subject in Furtwängler's great catalogue may be taken, supplemented by a few published in Petrie's *Amulets*.

Strength and love seem to have been the great motives, Herakles and Eros each occurring 173 times. Far below these come wisdom, with 75 of Athene and Minerva; Seilenos (66) for good living; Hermes and Mercury (63) for trade; Apollo (61) for music; and Daimon (53) for propitiation of evil; Dionysos (53) for mysteries; Nike and Victory (53) come next; and, strangely, Aphrodite comes as low as 52. Of the lesser classes are Gorgoneia and Medusa (45), Psyche (31), Artemis (29), Mænad and Bacchantes (28), Bes (18), Siren (17), Zeus (16), Perseus (15), Isis (14), Nereid (14), Ares and Mars (13), Bonus Eventus (11), Serapis (11), Pan (10), Nemesis (9), Cerberus (8), Eos (6), Harpocrates (6), Helios (5), Leda (5), Fortuna (5), Tyche (5), Asklepios (4), Dioscuri (4), Triton (4), Ganymede (4), Hephaistos (3), Hera (3), Hekate (3), Agathodaimon (3), lion-headed serpent (3), Ceres (2), Abundantia (2), Europa (2), Thanatos (2), and one each Adonis, Orpheus, Osiris, Anubis, and Set.

It is surprising how popular some deities were, nine surpassing Aphrodite; while Zeus, Asklepios, Fortuna, and Ceres were strangely neglected.

LITERATURE.—Pliny, *HN*; G. Bellucci, *Amuleti italiani contemporanei: Catalogo della collezione*, etc., Perugia, 1898, *Gli Amuleti*, do. 1908, *Il Feticismo primitivo in Italia*, do. 1907; A. Furtwängler, *Die antiken Gemmen*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1906; W. M. F. Petrie, *Amulets*, London, 1914.

W. M. F. PETRIE.

PREDESTINATION.—I. *IDEA AND PARTS.*

—1. Idea. — The idea of predestination bulks largely in the history of religious thought. Recently it has grown in interest. It has come down to us in two connotations, the one more strictly theological, the other more purely philosophical; and in both references severer definition demonstrates the reasonableness of its essential truth.

(*a*) As a technical term in theology the word stands for that voluntary act of the divine will whereby God predetermines or foreordains whatsoever comes to pass, and in particular the destinies of the good and evil.[1] The inclusion of the reprobation of the wicked has lent the term an ill savour. Shorn of this part, the dogma remains, the divergences of the schools in other points appearing less firm under the pressing practical and social needs of the modern Church. The predominant tendency is to identify this, the redemptive, aspect of predestination with election (*q.v.*), and to use the three terms—'predestination,' 'foreordination,' 'election'—as synonyms.

(*b*) In its philosophical character the word stands for a conception much more comprehensive and profound, viz. that original all-inclusive definite purpose of God and act of His all-holy will to manifest His glory in self-revelation, which self-revelation takes effect by stages in time, appearing not only in redemption, but in creation and providence as well. Here the idea is not given immediately in experience, but emerges in reflexion upon it and has in consequence to vindicate its rational validity. It has won favour under the ægis of the modern discipline of the philosophy of religion, its subject-matter furnishing one of the indispensable problems of that important science, where its claims are strengthened by several currents of the deeper thought of the age,

[1] The *Westminster Confession* used 'predestination' only 'to eternal life,' 'foreordination' 'to eternal death.'

the philosophy of nature and of history, comparative religion, the higher mysticism, man's tragic experience of life. The history of theism, moreover, shows predestinarianism to be an invariable concomitant of that form of religious thought, and to be as fundamental to theism as its other features. As theistic reconstruction proceeds, the idea of predestination correspondingly gains.

Note on the term.—The term 'predestination' has long been in disrepute, and for three reasons: etymologically it is unscriptural, theologically it is depraved in meaning, and philosophically it is not sufficiently distinctive. The word is not in the Bible. The verb and noun come from the Patristic period; the verb through the Vulgate won its way hesitatingly into the AV; in the RV its place is taken by 'foreordain.' The Latin *predestinare* translates the Greek προορίζειν—a better translation is *præfinire*. Then, in meaning, two declensions have occurred: προορίζειν does not include 'reprobation,' while *predestinare* has come to include it; on the other hand, popularly the term has lost the larger reference to the totality of divine self-revelation other than that in redemption. Further, the speculative understanding finds the theological controversial taint of the term repugnant, and prefers to argue for the idea under other names.

Is this disparagement wise? Three considerations may help to a negative answer. (1) Both Hebrew Wisdom and Christian theology worked out a large conception of God's relation to the world and to man as part of the world, which it was found difficult to embody in a single word. Accordingly, in both developments there occur a number of terms each of which conveys some special *nuance* of the general idea, for that is how the religious consciousness works. The philosophic consciousness, on the other hand, desiderates a term for the idea in its largest breadth; that is its nature. In Hebrew probably the nearest equivalent is חָכָם. In Greek in the NT there is none; hence Patristic thought coined 'predestination' precisely as in the case of another doctrine, that of the Person of Christ, is coined ὁμοούσιος.

(2) If 'foreordination' be interpreted in a purely religious sense as the equivalent of election, referring to man's salvation from sin by grace, then it is not adequate to the whole idea intended in 'predestination.' God gathered His own in His electing will; but He has other activities in creation and providence, and, if these have a relation to redemption, they also have independent relations to God and each other, and, as such, have their ground in the divine will—a fact unrecognized in 'foreordination,' which, even if it be of wider compass than 'election,' embracing the reference of the divine predetermination of the works of creation and providence to that of redemption as its preparatory stages, is still inadequate to the whole idea of 'predestination.'

(3) The philosophical demand for stricter definition is not due simply to prejudice; there is a real need in the interests of truth to separate clearly the facts of religious experience from inferences deducible from them. The speculative impulse and the religious instinct move in different spheres and speak best each in its own tongue. The above contention is corroborated by the history of predestinarianism. The three greatest protagonists are St. Augustine, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards (*qq.v.*). The special worth of these three is to have combined in an unusual degree the religious and intellectual powers; they all feel the need of this term 'predestination.' It is noteworthy in this connexion that, in those forms of pure philosophy in which the spiritual aspect of existence has justice done to it, idealism becomes predestinationism—as, *e.g.*, in the German succession from Kant, through Schelling and Krause, to Lotze; and that those forms of theology in which philosophy finds a constituent place exhibit the same tendency—as, *e.g.*, in the theosophy of F. X. von Baader[1] or the ethics of R. Rothe.[2]

2. **Parts.**—The predestination idea comprises two parts: (*a*) prescience, and (*b*) prevenience.

(*a*) *Prescience.*—'Foreknowledge' (πρόγνωσις) is a necessity of God's omniscience. It is involved in His knowledge of Himself and of His own will, and the immutability of His knowledge; for He sees all things future in the mirror of His will, and has never at any time been ignorant of what He was to do and what would be the consequences. Foreknowledge of the actions of free agents has sometimes been excluded from the idea of God's omniscience on the ground of its alleged inconsistency with human freedom,[3] and indeed the difficulty of explaining how actions are free yet ordained has never been solved. But that God has perfect foreknowledge of all events and that man has free agency, implied in moral responsibility, are truths supported by sufficient and appropriate evidence, although we may not be able to compose their harmony until our knowledge is such as God has. His foresight need not lessen man's freedom, if freedom be understood not as simple self-will, but as the growing faculty of co-operating with the divine purpose. That purpose is working out a higher thing than can be wrought between precise forecast and exact fulfilment; it is rather the evolution of men's free intellectual and emotional life, adapting them to their environment and improving their conditions. We can conceive of God influencing His whole creation in this way, persuading every grade of living things to assimilate more and more of His life-force, and go forward in the full tide of progress, while they are still free to close their pores, so to say, to His wisdom and life that encircle them as an atmosphere.

Such a purpose etches itself out against a background of much that seems purposeless, where much happens that is not His will but the will of an autonomous creature not yet won by His persuasive agency. As the divine knowledge is intuitive, not inferential, free, not necessitated, we are bound to assign to it the prescience of all things and all relations of things, of all actions and all conditions of actions.[1]

(*b*) *Prevenience.*—Again, the premotion[2] of God is a necessity of His omnipotence. Predestination is no mere idea in God—not simply His resolve to enter on modes of self-revealing activity; it is also action creative of creaturely destinies and productive of His eternal purpose; it is the actual acting upon His resolve, action whereby He is the immanent spirit in all nature, history, life. We note, further, that God's prescience and prevenience exclude the deistic and naturalistic formulations of His relation to the world, since both deny His active presence in it, as certainly as they exclude the pantheistic formulation which regards the world as illusion, emanation, or self-evolution of God. Thus it will be seen that in the predestination idea lies the thought that all the works of God form one whole and move to one goal, that all find their ground in His attributes, their cause in His will, that all are the issue of one presupposition in the divine nature. How do we affirm this? Religious experience postulates it as the basis of its certainty (predestination in redemption); philosophical reflexion postulates it as the integral ground of its view of the world and man's history (predestination in creation and providence). The word 'predestination' sums up both postulates and witnesses to secret affinities between the natural and revealed wills of God, wherein the realities both of reason and of faith find their ultimate reconciliation.

II. *SOURCE AND ISSUES.*—1. **Source.**—Here two points require to be noted. Predestination has its origin in the divine nature alone, and there alone in the divine attributes. God's act of resolving to enter upon the various modes of His self-revealing activity is a free yet responsible act

[1] *Spekulative Dogmatik*, pt. i., Stuttgart, 1828, pts. ii.–v., Münster, 1838–39.

[2] *Theologische Ethik*, 5 vols., Wittenberg, 1867–71. For this and the above English readers may consult O. Pfleiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*, London, 1885–88, vols. i.–iv.

[3] *E.g.*, by the Socinians, Rothe, Martensen, etc.

[1] This excludes the celebrated distinction of *scientia media*, the proper discussion of which falls in connexion with the divine omniscience. It was invented by the Jesuits, defended and propagated by the Molinists, assailed by the Spanish Dominicans, and at a conference in Rome convened by Pope Clement VIII. was condemned. The agitation continued. The Arminians of Holland spread the view among the Reformers. In England it spread widely in the 16th century (see J. Strang, *De Voluntate et Actionibus Dei circa peccatum*, Amsterdam, 1657). The hypothesis of *scientia media* is untenable. There can be no such intermediate knowledge, all knowledge being either necessary or free. Again, as inferential knowledge it cannot worthily be ascribed to God, whose knowledge is intuitive. He knows all the relations of things, but does not reason out those relations in the act of knowing.

[2] The favourite term in Scholasticism for 'prevenience.' St. Thomas Aquinas discusses it with fullness. Cf. also the controversy of Malebranche with Boursier.

to which He is determined by nothing outside of Himself, or alien to His nature, and by nothing in the way of an internal necessity of His being, or of any defect in His being, except the insistence of His own gracious character and good pleasure. There is no life outside the divine life. The life of God is inclusive of all life. It is a life with Himself alone and within Himself alone. In the vastest area of being there are no reaches beyond His boundless being or beyond the causation and control of His will. The whole actual and possible universe is at the last a monistic system, centring in a single truth to which everything in it may be referred. That truth is the one and absolute Being, who comprehends all being, the substance of all existence, God. God thus is not one side by side with others, whether like Him or unlike, co-equal or prepotent, relationship with whom He is bound to recognize and consider in His own action. He is God; and 'beside Him there is none other.' To be Himself is the sublimest glory conceivable. To go forth continually in self-manifestation is His constant good pleasure or will. Such a Being, overflowing with the sense of His beauty and infinite blessedness, must communicate Himself in love in every form and degree possible through which the features of His life may shine. His self-exhibition and self-communication are the only and original necessities of His action, and these reside in His own nature.

From that fact it follows that those original necessities operate in accord with the divine attributes and with nothing else—power, justice, wisdom, holiness, love. God is not all-powerful in the sense that He can do anything. He does what He likes, but He likes only what is according to His character, that which is true, just, holy. There can be no caprice in His action, for His will learns from His wisdom and works out what is just. His power is at the service of an idea which gives to His endeavour stability and worth. There can be no question here of His predetermining any thing or person to what is contrary to His character. The attributes of God, since they alone regulate His action, are the basal principles of existence and the supreme categories of thought, which takes origin in their exercise. All finite existences through which He designs to manifest and to bestow His life, founded in the qualities of His nature, find their real principles, their *ratio essendi*, there, and represent each one or more of those divine qualities. All life is rooted in the divine Being, is in Him an organic whole, and includes the life of nature, of history, of humanity, in which He displays His power, wisdom, righteousness, truth, goodness, and love, and no attributes opposed to these. All these lives are independent unities within their own spheres, yet related to one another in the all-embracing whole, which is neither identical with God nor separate from Him, but in which He is so present (and it in Him) that He is not merely the cause of it and all its parts, but is its and their immanent and active ground, so that they truly appear as His finite expression and image through a series of ascending stages in an organic process which tends to His honour and glory.

2. Issues.—Such is the divine design. The method of accomplishing it science and philosophy unfold. To their investigation nature, history, and man are all separate if related economies, susceptible of distinctive analysis—a task to which the modern spirit has addressed itself with eagerness. Here we are concerned only with an inductive generalization of broad results. These would appear to be three: (1) God works towards an end through means; (2) He employs means in a graded succession in time; (3) the character of the end displays the principle of the whole and motives the effort of progress towards it. If these results be kept in view, we shall be led in the path of a true theism and a right predestination. The universal dualism deeply seated in the entire constitution of things cannot be denied; it raises the problems. There are speculative systems that easily set it aside, in the way of logic joining opposites that are held to be originally one; but by such logical redemption no strength is given to human thought or moral aims. Theistic monism cannot thus proceed; it must show the dualism overcome in the way of historical fact and moral process, such that God is seen to be all in all, realizing Himself in His attributes in finite forms through the free play and independent life of their internal forces.[1] The steps of the proof are clear. The physical creation, operating freely within limits imposed only by its own material, is an orderly system working out its special end in man. Man is the living synthesis of nature, which in all its parts prefigures him, and in its functions aspires to what is only satisfied in him. History is characterized by the same independent interplay of all her forces and moves on under laws which reduce the acts of the countless conscious subjects who make events to a world of order, the progress of which is the evolution of the spiritual man. Man himself, granted that he is by nature a divided and complex being, is nevertheless in the healthy personality one. Aim, will, resolve, make him a complete unit; as mind or will he is a whole; and the more he advances in intelligence and ethical power, the better he is fulfilling the ideal of his own life, and responding to the preparatory movements beneath the human sphere which have gradually disclosed it. Humanity is thus the final cause of the world, history, human nature. Now, as it belongs to the nature of God to actualize Himself in humanity, the human spirit, as it descends into the depths of its own being, recognizes itself to be divine in principle. The perfect consciousness of this we see in Christ, and owe to Him. He made known to man his inborn divinity. His incarnation exhibits the unity of the divine and human. That consciousness comes first in a single individual, in isolated form, a present divine fact, serving to stimulate the human spirit to new life. The last consideration is of the highest importance. It contradicts all ideas which resolve the revelation of God in Christ into a general fact belonging to the phenomenology of spirit, and implies the personal God communicating Himself in dynamic force in positive historical form. Man has not grown into the consciousness of his own divinity; it has been revealed to him. Revelation is not simply an extension of the knowledge of God; it brings in an actual economy of grace as actively employed in the redeeming of men. Only by a sum of saving acts, unfolding His mind and will, can the living God become fully unveiled. In this sense Christianity alone is the revelation of God's redemptive love, since the whole person of Christ—His words, works, death, resurrection, exaltation—serves to bring into actual view the will of God as concerned in the salvation of men. Not through Christ merely, but in Him, in the undivided whole of His personality and history, as 'Head over all things to the Church,' God was reconciling the world to Himself. The Christological element leads us to regard the will of God for our salvation not as abstract, but as personal and positive in His Son. That, however, could not have happened haphazard in the divine mind; as it was essential

[1] The first thinker clearly to expound this position was the Italian G. B. Vico; cf. his 'La scienza nuova,' in *Opere*, ed. G. Ferrari, Milan, 1835–37; R. Flint, *Vico*, in Blackwood's 'Philosophical Classics,' Edinburgh, 1884.

to the setting forth of His glory, it was 'before the foundation of the world,' by His determinate counsel; and it determined the foundation of the world and the subsequent fortunes of all therein. Predestination is by the will of God, in an organic process,[1] in Christ who is its primal and final principle.

III. *SIGNIFICANCE.*—**1. For the idea of God.**—The predestination idea safeguards three factors in the relation of God to the world: (*a*) His free agency and responsibility in His activities, (*b*) His co-operation with His creatures in their true life, and (*c*) His efficiency in the fulfilment of His purpose.

(*a*) *Arbitrariness* has been associated with God's predestination. Yet predestination forbids arbitrary caprice on His part. The great advocates of its truth know nothing of arbitrary acts of God. The acts of God, they argue, are consistent with the character of God; the nature of God is prior to His laws, and His nature and character are of the absolute and perfect good. *Inscrutability* has been associated with predestination, as a cover for any injustice that may emerge in its issues. Now, while on any theory of the universe the last reasons of the constitution and course of things must always be sought for in the council of an eternal wisdom which it is beyond our capacity to fathom, and therefore inscrutable, in the inscrutability there can be no injustice or partiality; for those reasons are the outcome of an eternal wisdom, righteousness, love. God's action here can never be that of a selfish man. He acts according to His glory, which cannot be dissociated from His nature as absolute good. In that character His moral perfection implies an absence of arbitrary or unjust act. *Indeterminism* has been associated with predestination. But God cannot act as an indeterminate power. He is intrinsically and necessarily good—not by necessity, but freely, because He wills the freedom which lends His action its ethical character. The necessity which keeps Him from evil is moral—conformity to love, goodness, holiness.

In contradistinction from these, the divine predestination is an act of *sovereignty*, in the exercise of which God shows only mercy and goodness. Sovereignty is not simple supremacy; it is the sphere of divine freedom whence issues only blessing,[2] for there divine procedure is not limited by considerations of man's excellences or sins.

(*b*) God's blessing us is His co-operation with us to cultivate in us His life. As in Him, so in man, true life is attained by a combination of necessity and freedom. Man everywhere, as he ascends in intelligence, is inwardly conscious that He is able to do right. He is also convinced that God is on the side of the right. The tendency to excellency of life indicates God's will. It grows in man by his response which he makes in his freedom as he directs himself more perfectly towards God. Yet it is not simply by his desire and aspiration and the efforts born of these that he ascends, but also by their satisfaction in the answering care and recreative energy of creative love. These experiences point to the transcendent truth that creation was with God from all time, came from God, is in part turning of its own will towards God, is in part ever turning more and more consciously towards Him, and becomes at last completely, self-consciously, at one with God in will—the doctrine of the Logos, the hope of the eschatologist, the dream of the mystic.

(*c*) Is it but a hope and a dream? Can God's purpose fail? Our conception of *omnipotence* must be modelled on what we know of finite power, though not limited by it. In our experience the secret of power lies in the ability to conceive the end in view and to regulate action towards that end. Those are not absent from God. For the creation of the finite He is responsible. He has chosen to create it not a passive thing, but a life with a way of its own. Why should we not believe that it is only the possibility, not the actuality, of evil that is necessary? If the end which God has in view is a form of life produced by the ability to co-operate with or to resist Him, it must be part of His omnipotence to be able to give the ability to resist Him. The resistance would be evil. In so far the Creator is responsible for the possibility of evil and its attendant risks. On the other hand, the divine prescience cannot be conceived as dim or vague, or the divine blessedness as uncertainly fluctuating with the uncertainties of men's choices, as Calvin asks, 'How can the contingent affect the First Cause on which it entirely depends?' The possibility of future failure on His part must, therefore, be limited. God must be credited with provision against the results of all possible disaster. Is not fatherhood the best symbol of omnipotence? His creation must not finish in itself, but must go on to recreation—a consummation visible in Christ and Christian humanity, in whom 'the whole world is reconciled to God.'

God, then, has willed all men to be saved. He has predestinated all men and things in His Son. Creation is prelude to incarnation, and was never designed to furnish occasion for irreformable sinners. In the foreordination as in the judgment God might say, 'I never knew you sinners.' He has contemplated all in Christ; He has foreknown all in Christ; He has loved all in Christ; He has elected all in Christ; and by the one same act. He has taken every possible means to fulfil that act with success. Through creation, history, redemption, He has gradually exhibited and communicated His life to men, to raise men to its likeness step by step. Respecting his liberty God forces no man, yet presciently and preveniently seeks to persuade men. He reserves also the right to intervene by His omniscience and omnipotence in order to avert thoroughgoing disaster. Both courses He takes in the exercise of His sovereignty, which is the field of His freedom. That 'preferential action'[1] of His can fail only if the infinite resourcefulness of His nature fails—a result inconceivable.[2]

2. For the idea of man.—The predestination idea yields two precious assurances for man's conviction along with a grave warning: (*a*) the certainty of his practical freedom of will, (*b*) the ability to attain his destiny, (*c*) the fact of failure as both possible and permissible.

(*a*) *Necessity* has been associated with predestination. The problem that it raises is perennial. Its reproach no system can roll away from itself. As the divine Being is a harmony of necessity and freedom, so they run through all His handiwork inclusive of man's life. In themselves they are not antitheses, and they are but crudely conceived when opposed. A theistic predestination excludes their opposition and leaves the vindication of necessitarianism to 'the wisdom of this world' as in materialism and idealism—in men of science like Huxley, Spencer, etc., in men of speculative idealism like Hegel and others more pronouncedly pantheist, who assert that they see in all things the working out of an eternal necessity. Philo-

[1] The first philosopher clearly to recognize the organic process of the divine purpose was St. Augustine.

Calvin terms the opposed doctrine 'frigid and jejune' (*Inst.*, iii. 1).

[1] Martineau's phrase.

[2] The foregoing excludes three positions: (*a*) the notion that God predestinates fixed numbers, (*b*) the notion that God predestinates to evil, and (*c*) the notion that God predestinates, 'by permission,' eternal consequences of evil.

sophers of the type of Schelling, Lotze, and others are truer guides. History, they urge, is characterized by a union of freedom and necessity, the product of a freedom somehow pervaded by necessity, composed of the acts of countless conscious subjects which yet form a world of order.[1] How can this be?, they ask. Only through the operation of a principle superior to both in which they are one—God. History is the evolution of that principle. It reveals itself through the free play of individual wills, and could not be were those wills not free so that they are fellow-workers with it. Free will is incapable of rigid objective presentation; it is best exhibited by a process corresponding to the development of freedom itself. What is freedom? It is only in terms of experience that it can have any meaning at all. So with necessity. They are two constantly alternating poles of our experience. The only solution is a repeated appeal to the subject. The freedom which we at once oppose to and collate with necessity is subordinate to the higher freedom of consciousness on which the distinction rests. Thus modern psychology. In the metaphysical reference the difficulties arising from finite freedom may be met by the contention that, while the total possibilities, however far back we go, are fixed, yet within these, however far forward we go, contingencies arise,[2] and the best is reached only by living through the less good.

(*b*) *Fatalism* has been associated with predestination. Calvinism is alleged to be specially chargeable with the error in Christian times. Unquestionably paganism furnishes abundant traces. The popular misunderstanding of foreordination is fate. Predestination, however, is not fate. Fate is a conception for which there is no foothold in the Christian system. Belief in one's fate or star or fortune is apt to characterize both great men and small, and to prompt both to trust in their strongest qualities, which may not be their best. In so far as a man is possessed by a blind feeling of being an instrument of destiny used by an irresistible force he knows not to what end, his belief is a weakness. It bears no likeness to the Christian idea, which has two features: it makes a man rationally conscious that he has a mission to accomplish, and it impels him when he learns the divine will to be humbly submissive to its dictates. 'I will do God's will and what I choose,' said General Gordon. The Calvinistic 'fate' is incentive to heroic effort, a challenge to play the man. God's predestinations are moral inspirations.[3] What God ordains man realizes. Yet withal there is more. Calvinism in its severer aspect embodies something additional. It is often neglected in Christian thought; it was seldom absent from the pre-Christian conscience. In India and Greece, among the old Teutons, in many Christian sects and not a few of the noblest Christian minds it found impressive expression, viz. man's profound sense of the radical obscurity and deep underlying tragedy of human existence—the *Weltschmerz* of modern pessimism. It centres in that suffering in which the subject is victim. It is the tragic mystery of the world, something piteous and fearful; not emergent merely from external forces nor from human acts, not the moral order nor yet a mere fate cruel and indifferent; but something inscrutable and inevitable outside all these which bears on man's life and assails it. It is a demonic force, ready to spring, when circumstances or character or both give occasion, upon its victims to wreak upon them a dire doom, in the drawing down of which motives are nothing, circumstances nothing; the motives may have been aflame with goodness, the circumstances such that any other course was impossible, yet with sharp and swift consequence the stroke descends out of the place where dwell the Nornir (Teutonic), the Hathor (Egyptian), the Erinyes (Greek), the 'divine jealousy' (Hebrew), and all such as 'work woe to mortal man.' It is this almost universal dark instinct more than the Pauline election that is responsible for the horror of much Christian eschatology and Calvinistic gloom; it inheres in the natural man. Early Greek dramas, Shakespeare's tragedies, Maeterlinck's essays, cover a stretch of many centuries and represent widely divergent civilizations, yet in this they are one. It is an insistent sense in all thought which has these two grievous wants: the lack of personality in the Deity and the lack of reality in the world. It is the great merit of Christian thought to remedy both defects and to lift in some measure the awful burden from human hearts. It does so by teaching the unity of the physical and moral spheres, the organic character of all existence in God. It agrees that these spheres do not exhaust the content of reality nor enable us to grasp the depths of being, and so cannot be erected into the working powers of the world or made the complete expression of the divine will. But what is beyond them is not dark, cruel, vengeful, jealous of men, eager to slay, but an order far deeper and richer than that which we know in time and space, where God's will alone abides unchanged and unchangeable, working itself out not only in spite of but even by means of all opposed to it; and it is a will of good to man.

(*c*) Opposition there is. It is vital; so real and serious as, not indeed finally to thwart, yet grievously to hinder, the fulfilment of the divine purpose, and at the same time completely disintegrate its own spirit-power. God cannot fail; individual men may. The forces adverse to Him are autonomous, and the autonomy is real; hence all may not 'work to will and to do of His good pleasure.' His workmanship is not merely mechanical, infallibly realizing His conceptions. He has His conception and also its completion before Him, as every purpose must; but the first has to reach the second not forcibly but freely through the material in which it seeks to be expressed. That material may never move against Him in the mass, but it may in the individual; for the individual is not wholly moved by the mass and may use the energy that is his own at variance with the force of the whole. When this is so, what then? Are there refuges, reservoirs of latent self, for the rebels? The energy of life-force which they misuse, is it transformable? Perhaps; by lapsing into the universal life, there to be re-formed.[1] At any rate, it may utterly fail in its present form.

[1] F. W. J. von Schelling, 'Philosophische Untersuchungen über die menschliche Freiheit,' in *Philosophische Schriften*, Landshut, 1809; R. H. Lotze, *Microcosmos*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1885.

[2] This is Martineau's solution, accepting it from Dugald Stewart; cf. *A Study of Religion*, bk. iii., 'Determinism and Freewill.' It is the position gradually but cogently won through the succession from Kant to Lotze. Science, as distinct from metaphysics, has also in recent years begun to vindicate 'freedom' as rational; with the activistic and vitalistic philosophies of Eucken and Bergson it has entered on a new era. In a recently published letter of more than ordinary interest Bergson writes: 'From all this [the contentions of his three works, *Essay on the Immediate Facts of Consciousness*, *Matter and Memory*, and *Creative Evolution*] there clearly emerges the idea of God, Creator and Free; the generator at once of matter and of life, whose creative efforts as regards life are continued through the evolution of species and the constitution of human personalities.'

[3] Cf. J. Orr, *The Progress of Dogma*, London, 1901, lect. i. Calvin and Knox in their treatises strenuously deny that predestination is fate. Sir W. Scott credits Montrose with the ditty:

> 'He either fears his fate too much,
> Or his deserts are small,
> That dares not put it to the touch,
> To gain or lose it all.'

[1] Cf. the Biblical figure of God as 'the potter.'

Individual tragedy is too frequent here to render it improbable or impossible hereafter,[1] unless, within the reaches of the divine resourcefulness and the possibilities of the organic life of the race, there be means of conversion and renewal at which we cannot even guess. Men must 'give all diligence to make their calling and election sure.'

IV. *HISTORY*.—1. Ethnic.—Predestinarian conceptions arise at a certain stage of religious reflexion of necessity; and kindred conceptions are to be found in all religions which have been influenced in their development by speculative thought. Even polytheism adumbrates them in divine personifications of Destiny.

(*a*) *Greek*.—The best instance of this we find in the Greek poets and tragedians, with whom the belief passed through a variety of forms: *φθόνος*, *ἄτη*, *μοῖρα*, *νέμεσις*, *Ἐρινύες*. These are less intellectual solutions of the problem than deifications of experience; and they are remarkably comprehensive. At first, as in Herodotus, Pindar, and Theognis, envy and caprice characterize the Olympic gods in their dealings with men. Men are the restless rivals of the gods, and must be taught their proper place. Occasionally a righteous purpose governs the divine dealings; occasionally also defects of character in men bring on their misfortunes. But such features do not manifest themselves in force till we come to the great themes of Æschylus and Sophocles, whose tone is vastly superior. The caprice of the gods is by them modified in an ethical direction. Personal calamity is a judicial act pronounced by a moral governor on men's follies and crimes. 'Divine Justice displaces the divine Jealousy.'[2] The mental and moral clouding gives way to the notion of events baffling human foresight and so leading to unconscious crimes. Even the dark power of Moira is part of the moral order, designed to incite man to resistance, in making which he may fall, but in his fall he is greater than if he had never met the challenge. Within increasingly broad limits, too, man's freedom is recognized. In Sophocles there is the mature idea that suffering is not always final, but is foreseen in the counsels of the gods as part of the permitted evil which is a condition of a just and harmoniously ordered universe. It is not inconsistent with this that epic poetry gives more prominence to circumstances and external forces in the determining of character; for such is the nature of epic as distinct from drama. Thus there is little justification for the common theory[3] that in the Greek drama everything is foreknown and develops inevitably from the beginning. Tragic fate needs a tragic trait in the victim. Cf. art. FATE (Greek and Roman).

(*b*) *Roman*. — Nothing like the same subtle sensitiveness is found in the Roman early theology. The citizens of Latium and the surrounding parts were a more secular and political race; and destiny with them amounts to little more than a belief in their own genius and the enterprise that renders it effective. The deity Fortuna embodies this faith. Destiny is seldom regarded as personal doom; it is rather racial mission. Nor does it often occur to the Roman thinker to inquire into the origin of the special genius of his people. The metaphysical and ethical implications of the belief were not canvassed. Cf. art. FATE (Greek and Roman).

(*c*) *Teutonic*.—Remarkable is the contrast in the Teutonic idea of destiny. It forms a prime element in an elaborate mythology whose foci are Odin and Urdr, divinity and fate. It is difficult to delimit the respective jurisdictions of these two; but the lion's share of power falls to Urdr (Vyrd). She is the goddess of fate, and also of death—a significant conjunction. She is the dispenser of life and death, with her maids the Norns (arbiters of life) and the Valkyries (arbiters of death), who dwell with her under the world-tree (Ygdrasil), which stands forever green, watered by her gold-cased fountain. The might of Odin standing behind is no relief; he wields a lawless power, with a loveless will. He stands for blind, arbitrary, elemental will—will cut off from wisdom, a brute, blundering, pitiless, eccentric will (with the single bright feature that it chooses the warriors for Valhalla), which surrounds human passion and affection with a tragic cloud against which the heroic figure is shown off. A deep pessimism pervades the Eddas. It is as if the cruel and dismal climate of the North, the huge terror of storm and sea, the high courage of reckless hearts crushed by the irresponse of apathetic deity, were all gathered up in a vast and bitter gloom — that general spirit which for modern understanding has been so powerfully portrayed in the romantic operas of Richard Wagner.[1] Cf. art. DOOM, DOOM-MYTHS (Teutonic).

(*d*) *Indian*. — On a higher plane, turning to ancient India, we find a definite theistic development in the later stages of the *Upaniṣads*, in the *Kāṭhaka* and the *Śvetāśvatara*, where there occurs the clear idea that 'only by the man whom he chooses is God comprehended—to him the *ātman* reveals his essence.' In the Buddhistic teaching prominence is accorded to the law of *karma* (*q.v.*), according to which the soul in its successive transmigrations has each stage irrevocably determined by its conduct in the previous stage—a suggestion of ethical necessitation which even in its fullest expression remains vague. Apart from express teaching, Hindu life and ideas are predominantly fatalistic, unfree, unenergetic. The drama is full of *deus ex machina*; the actors seldom rely on their own will. The religion, largely a ritual, shows the divine wrath ready to burst out on the most trivial occasions and for the most trifling offences.[2] Cf. art. FATE (Hindu).

(*e*) *Chinese*.—In ancient China there is the great law of *Tao*, circumscribing the course of human life in a cosmos of omnipresent order. It overrules the entire animation of the universe in both its aspects of light and darkness, life and death, good and evil. It never deviates or diverges. It metes out justly and equitably to all men, by means of the spirits or gods rewarding the good, by means of the spectres punishing the bad, with perfect impartiality. Blessing comes to those who conform to its laws, hurt to those who violate them. The fear of the spectres is very great; there is an all-pervading demonism, counteractives to which make up a large proportion of Chinese religious practice.[3] The evil spectres may interfere at any moment with human business and fate, favourably or unfavourably. These spectres are the instruments of retributive justice. *Tao* is

[1] Granted this, it follows that the total effect of individual tragic failure hereafter on the whole world-plan may be dealt with as in the case of individual failure in this life's progress. The Creator's method, righting what goes amiss, here may indicate His method in the hereafter. What is that method? Briefly nature's desire is to rid itself of defects; if defects persist, the cause is not in them, but in the progressive organism of life in which they are survivals. But the primal and final plan of God can have no inherent defects.

[2] S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*[3], London, 1904, p. 162.

[3] Schiller's so-called reproductions of Greek dramas illustrate this popular but erroneous idea.

[1] Cf. on this paragraph V. Rydberg, *Teutonic Mythology*, Eng. tr., London, 1889, §§ 61-64.

[2] P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906, pp. 172-179. Consult on the subject generally N. McNicol, *The Religious Quest of India: Indian Theism*, Oxford, 1915; Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, do. 1915.

[3] J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religion of the Chinese*, 4 vols., Leyden, 1892, bk. i. p. 935 f., bk. ii. ch. ii.

both the creation and the creator, the motive force of the universe and the free determiner of its agency, spontaneously working from all eternity. His favour, won by obedience to his motions, may be secured by faithful observance of them in the actual movement of the world and life. Having no superior or co-equal, he secures it that human destiny is neither dark nor cruel; it is clear and orderly as himself. Cf. art. FATE (Chinese).

(*f*) *Egyptian.*—In ancient Egypt the moral conditions of character and destiny are similarly conspicuous. Egyptologists are divided as to the characteristics of primitive Egyptian religion, whether they are those of a polytheism or those of a monotheism. But even that school which asserts its polytheistic character agrees that underneath the multiplicity of deities there is always the feeling of their unity; and, whenever that unity is at all recognized, it carries with it the further concept of the spirituality of the divinity in things[1]—a spirituality that is righteousness. The goddess Hathor, the patroness of joy and happiness, is also the cosmic principle, the personification of the great universal power of nature perpetually creating and maintaining all things, great and small; she is further in the judgment a foremost figure on the bench. In 'The Precepts of Khensu-hetep' (F. J. Chabas, in *L'Egyptologie*, Paris, 1876–78, ch. vi.) the explicit references to *sekher neter* show a clear and definite idea of divine providence,[2] by whose goodness men subsist. To the supreme being who is thus regarded is attributed at the same time the creation of the world and all things; and, as he is righteous, his plan is righteous. We owe it to this religion that it emphasizes the fact that the guilty suffer, the penalty being exacted at the time of the wrong-doing, not deferred to a later day or generation.[3] Cf. art. FATE (Egyptian).

2. **Jewish and Muhammadan.**—The OT and NT ideas are given *in extenso* in the art. ELECTION. There all in creation, history, redemption, is referred back to the divine sovereignty. The special features of that relationship as experienced in vital religious activity alone are set forth; the general idea never gets beyond its most general expression. The same speculative reserve characterizes later Jewish thought. Its particular interest is not high; except in the case of individual rabbis, nothing further is ventured than the statement of a comprehensive dependence of all things and all persons on the divine supremacy, and an insistence, always in subordination to God's sovereignty, on man's free will. Intellectual problems are evaded as beyond human solving. Of the Jewish sects in the time of Christ Josephus is responsible for making the Pharisees material predestinationists, the Essenes absolute predestinationists, and the Sadducees hostile to all forms of predestination, since they traced all events to chance. Material predestination limits the divine decree to this material life; an example from *Ḥul.* vii. 6 is to the effect that a man does not hurt his finger in this world unless it has been decreed. It is a peculiarly Judaic idea, and belongs to the main stream of Rabbinic conviction. Other currents represented in Rabbinism are the two familiar to Christian controversy—the one emphasizing man's freedom, the other divine overrule. According to the one, the decision rests with man, whose conduct determines his destiny; the spirit's prime endowment is freedom. According to the other, God directs and foreknows all. A representative utterance is that of R. Akiba (*Ābhōth*, iii. 15): 'All is foreseen yet freedom is granted'—a position whose last eminent apologist was the renowned Maimonides.[1]

Muhammadanism teaches an absolute predestination, to both good and evil, happiness and misery. God is conceived of as absolute will, operating by rigid law, moulding the material by whose instrumentality it works, after the manner of Oriental despotism. Muhammadan philosophers expound it in a more extreme way than it is set forth in the Qur'ān until the doctrine has become practically pernicious. The reaction set in by the Mu'tazilites, who assailed the orthodox view with keenness, made room for free will, but was eventually overcome by orthodoxy.[2] Cf. art. FATE (Muslim).

3. **Christian.**—Predestination holds a large place in the history of the Christian Church. It has fanned burning controversies, and generated popular fear; it has fostered stern ideals, and moulded strong natures. In its largest sense the finest intellects of the Church have been attracted to it, and those periods that have been most fruitful in reconciling the development of Christian ideas with the growth of culture have been indebted to it above all for inspiration. The epochs of its progress are marked by these periods.

(*a*) *First stage.*—The first stage is signalized by the conflict of the Greek Fathers with Gnosticism, the conquest of the Greek mind by Christian theology. The problems of Gnosticism are in the main two: (1) the nature of the Absolute, and the method whereby He can be the creator of matter, and (2) the origin of evil. The Gnostic solution is found in an endless succession of æons or emanations of the Absolute which serve to span the gulf between Him and creation. Gnosticism, in establishing its theory, had to deny free will. It is a solution metaphysical and necessitarian. The Greek Apologists and Fathers, addressing themselves to the problem, reached a solution ethical and personal. They know nothing of unconditional predestination; they teach free will. Believing in the sovereign efficacy of reason and conscience, they interpret the Absolute in terms of them. Their contribution combines four points, viz. (α) the Absolute requires mediation; (β) the mediator is the Logos; (γ) through the Logos the Absolute is creator; (δ) freedom is the mark of man.

All schools at that period held an abstract notion of God. The central quest was after an appropriate medium of communion between the Supreme Being and the world. The Gnostic attempt failed before the magnificent doctrine of the Logos (*q.v.*)—the issue of the controversy and its end. The doctrine of the Supreme as Creator through the Logos, and the activity of the Logos in nature, history, and man, are the primary ideas of Patristic theology, set forth partially in the Apologists, with fullness and learning in Clement and Origen, and preached by Chrysostom. It is essentially a new Gnosis, summing up the divine design of cosmic history.

(*b*) *Second stage.*—The second stage opens with the Latin Father, St. Augustine († 430), and the fall of imperial Rome. That event gives the *motif* to his profoundest thought that history is the history of two antagonistic cities, so that he can compare the ordered series of the centuries to an antistrophic hymn pervaded by an antithetic parallelism which turns on the call of God and the response of man (*de Civ. Dei*, xi. 18). Into his particular opinions on religious predestination we need not enter (see AUGUSTINE, ELECTION). His

[1] Cf. C. P. Tiele, *Hist. of the Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1882, pp. 216–230.

[2] Cf. E. A. W. Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians; or Studies in Egyptian Mythology*, 2 vols., London, 1904, i. 125.

[3] Cf. on this E. Naville, *La Religion des anciens Egyptiens*, Paris, 1906, pp. 150–175.

[1] F. Weber, *System der altsynagogalen palästinischen Theologie*, Leipzig, 1880.

[2] E. Sell, *Faith of Islam*², London, 1896; D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology*, London, 1903.

positions are not always superficially consistent. But his great merits are clear. He distinguishes prescience from predestination, and aids to a better analysis of the latter. He expounds a richer idea of will than the inherited views of the Greeks and the Pelagians; and initiates a discussion from the main position of which Christian thought has never since withdrawn, viz. that the unregenerate will is not free; freedom is growth in the power to do right.[1] Great as these services were to the progress of truth, they are not his chief contribution to the predestination idea. That concerns itself with the nature of the divine purpose the *motif* of which is referred to above. He unfolds his ideas in his main book, *de Civitate Dei*, called forth by the decay of the Roman State. The underlying principle of that masterly exposition is the organic character of the divine purpose. It is pervaded by his deep sense of the continuous evolution of the divine purpose in all things. It sums up his conviction of a life's study. Throughout his life he was intent on reducing to a consistent unity the varied elements of nature, history, and revelation, as they presented themselves in believing consciousness. So successfully has he vindicated that principle that subsequent developments have proceeded upon it, always the more clearly to demonstrate its essential truthfulness. The controversies that ensued, directed against St. Augustine, assail details—in particular the doctrine of 'predestination to evil' or the reprobation of the impenitent wicked. Rabanus Maurus († 840), Hincmar († 882), and others argued the inconsequence of that doctrine by Scripture proof, John Scotus Erigena[2] († c. 877) its inconsequence metaphysically—both legitimate corrections. The Augustinian doctrine in its general drift worked on with increasing cogency throughout mediæval Christendom, quickening an extraordinary ferment of ideas, creative of new impulses in every direction, religious and disciplinary, political and social. Into the stream of religious and general culture there entered currents widely dissimilar, deriving from the study of Aristotle and of Dionysius the Areopagite, really alien to the Latin genius. The pregnancy of St. Augustine's philosophy succeeded in acclimatizing rich elements in both in the atmosphere of Western theology.

(*c*) *Third stage.*—Of this the constructive intellect was that of St. Thomas Aquinas (*c.* 1227–74), who quells the maelstrom of mediæval thought. In him we see St. Augustine pruned of his many verbal and logical inconsistencies and his view of the world and history so presented with a logical thoroughness and developed on different sides as to exhibit a proper system, or *summa*. Of specific value is Aquinas's discussion of prevenience or premotion, and the grace of natural virtues—features of Augustinianism that have obtained a secure lodgment in Romanist theology, but not in Reformed. The whole effort of Aquinas results in a fusion of the best culture and most spiritual faith of his age. The Augustinian spirit pervading it is in his work definitely incorporated with the official teaching of the Roman Church. St. Thomas inspired the Decrees of Trent (1545–63), which, while affirming several Scotist positions, define a mild Augustinianism.[3] The Augustinian principles are three: (α) God is absolute master by His grace of all determinations of the will; (β) man remains free under the action of grace; (γ) the reconciliation of these two truths rests on the manner of the divine government. The Tridentine formulæ reaffirm original sin and man's need of grace as against Pelagianism (sess. vi. can. 2), the freedom of man and the ability of doing good and evil even before embracing faith (vi. 6. 7) as against the Protestants. Trent further, with St. Thomas, teaches the universal offer of salvation and divine provision of the means of grace. The problem of harmonizing grace and freedom is left undefined; the brief of Benedict XIV. (1748) gives liberty to all schemes of reconciliation—the strict Augustinian, the Thomist, and the Molinist.[1]

(*d*) *Fourth stage.*—The fourth stage came with the Reformation and the awakened moral conscience. The absorbing interest of the 16th cent. was religious, not speculative. No commanding intellect of the comprehensive order of an Origen, Augustine, or Aquinas arose to offer the new synthesis of faith and culture which the times imperatively demanded, and little progress was made in the growth of the predestination idea. Luther and Erasmus, Zwingli and Calvin, with minor divergences, agree in reverting to St. Augustine on the main issues and in the supposed interests of evangelical piety; but none of them had adequate philosophical equipment to formulate anew the problem in consistent and convincing form. Hence Western Christendom remained divided. Its continuance in disruption was due as much to the absence of a first-rank philosopher as to the presence of a fiery Reformer; for fresh religious feeling is less divisive than stale religious dogma, and the speculative reason of the Reformers made but indifferent flights. The proper contribution of that age lies elsewhere, in the fresh emphasis set on the doctrine of election as the believer's ground of certainty of salvation as against the Church and its machinery of grace. Polemical motives against Roman ideas of authority impelled the Reformers to give election a paramount place in their system, with the result that its philosophical counterpart, predestination, assumes, not only in general theory, where it is relevant, but also in theological construction, where it is not, the position of basal principle controlling the entire system. The *Institutes* of John Calvin († 1564) is representative. It asserts the double predestination, to life and death quite irrespective of merit. The central idea[2] is that of an independent and immutable decree of God, in which foreordination and foreknowledge are inseparable. Beza, Calvin's successor at Geneva, is the father of 'high,' or supralapsarian, Calvinism. The common view of the Reformed Confessions, confirmed alike by the Synod of Dort (1618–19) and the Westminster Assembly (1647), is infralapsarian. The infralapsarian (*infra lapsum*) theory of predestination, or the decree of predestination viewed as subsequent in purpose to the decree permitting man to fall, represents man created and fallen as the object of election. The supralapsarian theory designates the view which supposes that the ultimate end which God proposed to Himself was His own glory in the salvation of some men and the damnation of others, and that as a means to that end He decreed to create man and to permit him to fall. Strict Calvinism subsequently found mitigations in the 'Federal Theology,' expounded by Cocceius (1603–69), professor at Leyden, who introduced the idea that God's judicial charging

[1] Augustine's denial of freedom is really denial of capricious choice—the assertion of self determination along the lines of one's true character.

[2] Erigena's contention, 'no predestination to evil' because 'that would imply a duality in the divine nature, or else the existence of some power above God determining His will, is acute (cf. his tractate *de Predestinatione*). It undermined for the future the recurring idea of God as the author of evil.

[3] Loofs's statement, 'the history of Catholicism is the history of the progressive elimination of Augustinianism,' we regard as a gross exaggeration.

[1] Cf. a valuable account by E. Portalié, in *CE*, *s.v.* 'Augustine.'

[2] Ritschl, Sneckenburger, etc., have denied the centrality; Schweizer proves it fully. M. Schelbe (*Calvins Prädestinationslehre*, Halle, 1897) describes the religious motives underlying Calvin's construction.

of the guilt of Adam's apostasy to his descendants was racial, and not personal; and in the contemporary Saumur school of Cameron, Amyraut, and others in France, who attempted a combination of particular election and universal salvation (subterlapsarianism). Bold opposition was offered by the Remonstrants led by Arminius, professor in Leyden from 1602 to 1609. A year after his death his disciples, as an organized party, presented a Remonstrance to the States of Holland pleading for toleration, and, for the sake of defining their position, presented soon afterwards five Articles expressing their views. This is the origin of the famous 'Five Points' in the controversy between Calvinism and Arminianism. Of Calvinism the 'Five Points' are unconditional predestination, particular election, efficacious grace, divine reprobation of the wicked, and final perseverance of the elect. Of Arminianism the opposed points were conditional predestination on foreseen merit, universal salvation, resistible grace with the provision of means sufficient for salvation, preterition of the wicked, and possible lapse of the justified from grace. Later, Methodism came with a synergistic solution which is logically indefensible, but has proved serviceable for piety. The Calvinistic victory was one of logic only; even the victors felt that, if not handled with special prudence and care, the doctrine would be the reverse of helpful to morals and piety. The Calvinistic Synods restate old positions—Dort with relentless rigour, Westminster a little more cautiously. They contribute nothing new to the theology of the subject. The work of the Protestant scholastics was one of systematization for civil and religious reform rather than of inspiration to spiritual or apologetic progress. It had unquestionable merits. It demonstrated the political potency of the predestination idea in common life, when men are found to believe implicitly in the absolute will of God and to range themselves submissively under its behests in simple obedience. It established as never before the religious principle as the controlling principle of civilization, taught the civil power definite ethical function, laid thereby the only workable basis of free democracy, and thus, when the unity of the world's life and knowledge had been shattered by the break-up of the mediæval Church, pointed to fresh sources of cohesion which prove the more efficient the more they are tested in the complexities of modern growth. Whatever criticism may be urged against Calvinism as a religion and a theology, it is certain that as a polity it has been a triumphant success, as the maker not indeed of kings—the claim of the mediæval Church—but of what is much greater, States.

The most commanding Calvinistic intellect appeared where there was obvious relief from the political pressure, in New England. Jonathan Edwards (1703–58) draws into the system somewhat of the wider expanses of the New World that gave him birth. He sets forth the Calvinistic view of the world with a masculine strength and rich insight of rare excellence, and in face of the most imposing critical antagonism which Calvinism has ever encountered—New England Unitarianism. He prepared the way for the final outfit of the predestination idea for its modern task; and he did so by having greater confidence in reason than his contemporaries. Edwards was no reactionary. In the widely prevailing scorn of human reason he dived deeper into its depths and achieved two superlative results—the reconciliation of the divine decrees and free will, and the exposition of the divine motive for predestination as resting in the divine glory. Regarding the former he argued that the law of causality is universal; that, while every man is free to act in accordance with his will, his power to will is controlled by causes outside of himself, so that ultimately the will must obey the behests of a power independent of its own purposes. Regarding the latter he argued that God's freedom is exercised in 'self-exhibition' and 'self-communication'—a self-communication which is creative in man of 'the religious affections' (the form that union of man with God takes) which display the reality of predestinating grace. His work is a distinct advance towards overcoming the dualism in the Calvinistic position, leading directly to the idea of God as moral personality, the controlling principle of modern theology. In the Catholic theology God is construed as substance; and in Scotist, Socinian, and Arminian theology as will. The Reformers conceived God as the embodiment of the moral law, bound by His own nature to punish sin and to uphold the eternal principles of righteousness. The conception, however, was not clear; and side by side with it we find the old conception of sovereignty as arbitrary will. Calvinism reconciles the two by distinguishing between the nature and will of God: nature is the sphere of necessity, will of freedom; justice belongs to the one, mercy to the other. Edwards makes 'the love of being' his controlling principle — lying behind both justice and mercy, containing them within itself. It is but a step from the divine self-love to the divine Fatherhood—the idea which fresh experience of the redemptive love of God in Christ (the discovery of the modern Church) revealed.

(*e*) *Fifth stage.* — Under the influence of the renewed study of the life of Christ modern theology has brought into fresh prominence the ethical and spiritual qualities which were central in Jesus' thought of God. For the abstract Absolute of the earlier theology and the arbitrary will of the later it substitutes the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and seeks to show that in His wise, holy, and loving character we have the ultimate reality of religious truth. In this attempt it receives aid from two quarters. Through a better understanding of the nature of the will modern psychology makes it possible to overcome the supposed opposition between freedom and law, while philosophy, through its renewed emphasis upon the immanence of God, opens a way for the conception of God which shall include the concrete features essential to Christian faith. So far as the first is concerned, we are coming to see that it is not will, but character, that is fundamental for our idea of personality. That man is most truly free whose will is most completely dominated by a consistent moral purpose and whose acts—given a knowledge of that purpose—we can most certainly predict. Character denotes to us such consistency of moral purpose; and law, so far from being a limitation of freedom, is its most effective means of expression. In Christ, then, we can fill up 'the mere good pleasure' of historic Calvinism with the inner constraint of redemptive love. Not less significant is the help from modern philosophy. We are seeing that the ultimate reality, instead of being the most abstract, must be the most concrete of all conceptions. We do not explain the world by thinking away all that is most characteristic in experience into a colourless residuum, but rather by studying experience to discover, amid the infinite variety which it contains, the elements of permanence. Life is to be interpreted by its highest forms, not its lowest, and the qualities which Christian faith finds central in God become those most needed for an explanation of the actual facts of life. The main outline of the historical growth of the pre-

destination idea is thus evident. In ethnic religion, lower, we have the instinct of fatality predominant; in ethnic religion, higher, we have the dawn and gradual growth of the instinct of freedom. In Hebraism there is a definite conviction of the general idea of predestination, combining the two features of divine sovereignty and human liberty. Judaism, on the whole, conserves the same general idea. Muhammadanism reverts to fatality. Christianity, primitive and Patristic, preserves and defends predestination as received from Hebraism along ethical lines. The mediæval Church deepens the idea, and develops its definition by setting in strong relief the absolute supremacy of grace over nature in St. Augustine and the congruity of grace with nature in St. Thomas. The Reformation Church deepens the idea, and develops its definition by setting in strong relief the absolute spirituality of grace as resting in God's mercy (in the Reforming leaders) and its finality as resting in God's glory (in Jonathan Edwards). The modern Church, relying on modern philosophy, which has gathered up the results of the modern sciences, of nature, history, and man in a broad synthesis centring in the Supreme Being as moral personality, accepts the vindication of the harmony of divine sovereignty and human liberty, thus closing the most prolific source of conflict concerning this subject. The two foci of the predestination doctrine are both true, and every theory exalting one at the expense of the other has had to give place to the more adequate formula. The stubborn protest of orthodox common sense, which has never in any age lapsed, has been justified. The facts of the religious consciousness have availed to beget the theory, not the theory the facts.

V. *THE MODERN TASK.*—The supreme desideratum of modern religion is strong individuality, with its enterprise, romance, ever-fresh experience, and transforming impulses. It may be secured by that enlarged conception of the divine will regulating man's destiny to which every vital pulse of the modern spirit points. It will include a larger theism, a freer society, a richer soul.

1. A larger theism.—The antitheisms of the age are not wholly in error. They are popular because of the meagreness of the current theism. They are attempts to do justice to factors to which the prevailing theism does scant justice or even violence. They are not negative; their negations proceed from a positive faith; and in their positive contribution to thought they correct one another and enable us to discern the lineaments of an impressive philosophy. Superficially regarded, they all seem to lead to determinism, apparently absorbing the individual in the whole. Pantheism, materialism, socialism, secularism, naturalism—they look like the deification of the finite world. But only in the popular or semi-popular intelligence. Take, *e.g.*, pantheism. It is a term to which the vaguest and most contradictory meanings are attached, the clearest being that which identifies the world with God and regards man as part of the world. Yet that is a notion destitute of historical foundation and, indeed, of any rational meaning. How can pantheism say that the finite world is the infinite? We may say that it represents the infinite, but not that it is the infinite; and that is the precise opposite of the deification of the finite. It implies not the divinity, but the nothingness, of the world of sense and sight. The formula which expresses it is not 'All things are God,' but 'God is all in all'; or, in the comprehensive phrase of Indian philosophy, 'There is but one Being, no second'; or the Christian conception, 'There is one God, beside Him no other.' Do not materialism and naturalism, when their real significance is seen, imply the same truth? They are eager to exalt the cosmic life-force as the dominating world-force. But how do they interpret it? Not abstractly, but from detailed observation of the actual phenomena of the world; hence its general conception is not untrustworthy; it is the concrete content of the abstraction of pantheism. And what is the contention of socialism ultimately but this, that no individual stands alone, that his perfection can never accrue in isolation, that, as the attraction of physical particle for particle causes every material body to retain its form and relations, so the self that will separate from the influence of other selves is on the sure path to disintegration? Together these antitheisms in their essential pleas urge that God is the only reality in the universe, that the life-force of creation is one, that man's safety and perfection rest in right relation with them. God's immanence in the world is the modern understanding of the eternal reality of its process and progress. Such conceptions are as profound as they are novel. They arise directly out of the minutest investigation into the facts with which science and history deal. They appeal to the theological mind to be drawn up into the idea of God and His relation to the world and man to enrich our apprehension of His transcendence and divine purpose. They teach us definitely concerning that purpose in the world that we know, and of Himself standing above it working out its ends. On the foundation of that knowledge we are summoned to build up convictions of the character and will of Him who thus acts and of the destiny of all His actions.[1]

2. A freer society.—Social theory is as multiform as antitheism. Anarchism, communism, socialism, nationalism, imperialism, are imperfectly understood apart from the ideal and emotional impulses prompting them. They are preparing the physical basis, the material conditions of large advances in human liberty. They are adversely criticized for doing the very opposite. But surely in their broad spirit they are operating to restrain those who need restraint within the attainments of human progress already won, in order that human welfare may enter on higher achievements. Social pressure, law, is not the foe of liberty; it is its nursing mother. Life depends on environment. A 'fullness of time and place' must be before fresh growth can come. Conditions must be organized if new life is to be generated. It is from lower forms that the higher arise as the appropriate *métier* of their life is secured. The social and industrial unrest of the times implies the bringing to birth of a fresh life of humanity. The new quality of life cannot live except with new social advantage. Here we note two facts of modern psychology: (*a*) social integration promotes individual independence, and (*b*) personality is enhanced by progress in material conditions. The individual is conditioned by his environment; that is the basis of all sound sociology. As a machine cannot work in an atmosphere that freezes its oils, or a plant flower in beauty in the Arctic zone, so man cannot grow to his full stature in a world of squalor, sin, and disease. This is the modern rendering of the ancient 'fate,' yet with what a difference for human hope! A large share of man's destiny is sealed by his birth and surroundings. On the one hand, while a certain power of choice remains his, his moral endeavour and moral vision are due quite as much to the community which produces him as to himself. On the other hand, it is a fact as well that this is for man's benefit; it is the grace of the universe to his growth. A man is, first of all, a unity; and his nature as such prevents his easy descent into

[1] Cf. R. Flint, *Agnosticism*, Edinburgh, 1903, last chapter.

the mass or dissolution into weakness. The more that unity of his is preserved and pressed, the stronger rises the outflow of original force of character, the result of social amelioration. Is this the mode of operation of the divine will upon the human? 'Our wills are ours to make them Thine'—have we here the method of discipline? Here once more is a summons to revise that harassing perplexity of foreknowledge and free will; here too a mightier incentive than before conceived for material progress and Christian enterprise.

3. A richer soul.—The practical experience of that old doctrine, the mystical union with Christ, has almost died down. It is well worth revival. The time is opportune. The stream of mysticism runs with a strong current in the modern conscience. It will enter theology as a power for good. Modern mystics are training us in their way of experience, and teaching the sacramentalism of nature; they are renewing our confidence in the validity of both in grace. Redemption is an economy like nature and providence; its spirit can be known and felt equally with theirs. The ordinances of Christ's appointment which sum up His saving acts to represent, seal, and apply their benefits, are its proper medium of communication, conferring 'God's essence and His very self' on believers. There is a spirit in creation; there is a spirit in history; there is a spirit in grace. These three are *not* one, but the experience of the first prepares for the last, in which their partial union with the divine life is consummated in perfect union. That union feeds the spirit of man, for the simple reason that the spiritual nature of man is not some special faculty or out-of-the-body ecstasy, but the conversion and sustenance of his ordinary powers. It is because we confine our union with the divine Being to communion with Him by our ordinary powers that our religious life is so pulseless. But the fault rests, not in the powers, but in the method of using them. We commit two blunders. We use our powers in analysis, not in synthesis; and the result is that the self is not offered to the divine life for its unfolding. The self is more than the collection of its faculties; and we have to realize that there is no end to the spiritual treasure latent in it when God has access to it. Then, again, we think God rather than experience God. But a thought God is abstraction; a lived-with God is power—action and passion. We have to learn that in the infinite personality there is no end to such action and passion. These recognitions, of our own deeper self and of the divine self, open the way for inflows from God constantly increasing unto perfection. Within our self God speaks and to our self; there is no identity, for identity would close intercourse. In this—the fine principle of the higher mysticism of our day—lies the sure hope of further spiritual advance.

But now every increase of living experience of this sort brings with it an increase of power to understand what God's will is, what it is doing, and by what method He is doing it. Those ideas, the divine immanence in the world, the social solidarity of the race, the enhancement of self-conscious life, have as yet no place in theological system.[1] The divine transcendence idea and predestination idea have been drawn deductively from data that are abstract; we must now build them up by induction from what we have seen are the data alone intelligible to the modern mind. They will then assume their proper position as the controlling principles in a scientific theology fitted to enlist the finest sympathies of modern culture and to effect its greatly desired harmony with modern faith.

[1] Fragmentary essays in that direction have been forthcoming during the latter half of the 19th century. Modern theology has moved away from the old moorings; partial reconstruction is proceeding apace; the comprehensive synthesis still lags. Yet the most fruitful interpretation still of the divine nature is that of will, motived by love, showing that in its general decline the heart of Calvinism, like that of Shelley in the ashes of his funeral pyre, remains entire.

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PRE-EXISTENCE. — **1. Definition.** — Pre-existence, from being a general term, has come to have a limited, technical application in the philosophy of religion. It is used in stating the doctrine that the human soul has already been in being before the beginning of the earthly life, *i.e.* prior to the time of its union with the body. The precise character and conditions assigned to the pre-existent state cannot be brought out in a general definition, as these vary in different systems of religion. Where this belief appears it is generally

held in conjunction with belief in transmigration, but in a strict sense it has reference to a state of being prior to any incarnation. The reference is to the human soul. For the pre-existence of the divine nature of Christ see the art. JESUS CHRIST (cf. also art. LOGOS). Doctrines regarding the pre-existence of the souls of animals and plants are treated, for the most part, in connexion with transmigration (*q.v.*).

2. Origin of the doctrine.—The origin of belief in pre-existence is obscure. Man has difficulty in conceiving himself as non-existent, but experience familiarizes him with the facts of birth and death. When he reaches the conception of a soul in distinction to the body, his thought turns not only to the future but to the past. What is its origin? Among the answers which suggest themselves is this, that it has already existed before its union with the body. The inquiry may not proceed beyond the thought of previous incarnations, and of this we have many examples in the more primitive religions. But in other cases the inquiry has been pushed beyond this, or has advanced independently, to the thought of the existence of the soul in a spirit-world previous to its embodiment on earth, and a definite doctrine has been formulated. If we cannot for the present discover more exactly the origin of the doctrine, or the precise influence which one people exercised on another with regard to it, we can in some cases trace its development and observe the extent to which it has prevailed. It is found in a well-developed form in Greek religion and philosophy, in Judaism, in the early Christian Church, in the religions of India, and to a very considerable extent associated with modern thought in the West.

3. Greek and Roman doctrine.—Belief in the pre-existence of the soul prevailed widely among the Greeks from an early date, and at a later time became a theory of their philosophers. The influence of Greek thought in this respect was strongly felt in the early Christian Church, and is still apparent to some extent throughout the whole of Western civilization. To gain a knowledge of the subject it is well, therefore, to begin by observing its place and character in the Greek religion and philosophy. Regarding the origin of the doctrine among the Greeks there is no reliable evidence that, in the early stages, Egyptian or Oriental thought had any considerable influence. It appears to be of native origin and to have two distinct sources: (1) the early religious ideas of the people which found expression in certain ceremonies and myths; and (2) the philosophic principles which were gradually formulated in the schools, and from a statement of which this doctrine followed as a corollary; but, even in the latter case, religious pre-possession was not without its influence.

To the Greeks, as to many other peoples, the soul is air or breath (πνεῦμα, ψυχή), or an essence of a similar nature. It departs with life; it comes at the beginning of life. What is its origin? Homer and Hesiod do not give us much help, but the answer of the Orphic religion is that it is divine. The direct testimony as to what was taught in the Orphic religion as early as the 7th cent. B.C. comes from a later date.

Plato speaks of it as an ancient doctrine that the souls of men, 'having gone there from here subsist, and return hither again and are produced from the dead' (*Phædo*, 70 C). Philolaus states that 'the ancient theologians and soothsayers bear witness that the soul is joined to the body by way of punishment and as it were buried in it' (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iii. 433A; cf. Plato, *Phædo*, 62 B).

The statement of Plato and even of Philolaus may refer only to transmigration, but their testimony must be taken in connexion with the evidence of the Orphic tablets, on one of which the soul declares, 'A child of Earth and of starry Heaven am I; but of Heaven is my race.' There is also the strongest probability that Pythagoras derived his views on the soul's pre-existence from Orphic sources. The egg used in the Orphic ritual was a symbol of the cosmic egg from which sprang the principle of all life. We have here indications of an ancient religious belief that had already taken definite form. At a later time it gained precision of statement at the hands of the philosophers who adopted it, and became an integral part of their theories of the universe. The pre-Socratic philosophy prepared the way for the dogma. Some unifying principle was being sought. Thales found in water the principle of all things; Anaximander in undetermined, unlimited matter; Democritus in atoms which are indestructible; the Pythagoreans in number. The Eleatic school accounted for the phenomenal world by the principle of eternal, immutable being; Heraclitus by continual change, becoming; and the Atomists by an attempt at combining those two principles. The thought of the indestructibility of atoms involved that of the pre-existence of the constituents of the soul; and, as already in the Orphic religion, its transmigration was taught by Pherecydes and Pythagoras (*c.* 540 B.C.). The distinction between soul and body is worked out by Anaxagoras (*c.* 470 B.C.). He introduces into his philosophy the thought of a world-forming mind (νοῦς) that is absolutely separate from matter and that acts upon it. This matter-forming mind is immanent in different degrees as an animating soul in plants, animals, and men. The human soul is thus a portion of the world-creating mind, and existed in it prior to its manifestation in the body. In his treatment of the νοῦς, however, the conception of immateriality is not yet made clear.

Plato (*c.* 387 B.C.), developing the teaching of Socrates, turns his attention in the first instance, not, like the earlier philosophers, to the investigation of external nature, but to reflexion on the mind itself, its essential qualities, its endowments and activity, and in this way arrives at his theory of ideas. The idea is not a mere abstraction, but is a real archetypal essence and is eternal. The highest idea is the idea of the good, and this idea of the good Plato seems to identify with God who existed from eternity. Matter also existed eternally, but without quality or order. At the beginning of time God appears as the world-builder or demiurge, and out of the ideal world and the germs of the material world forms the soul of the world. The chaotic matter is reduced to order and fitted to this world-soul as its body, which it animates and rules. The universe, which is the result of this creative work, is fashioned for the sake of what is good only, in beauty and harmony, after the model of the eternal ideas. Of this universe man is a part. He consists of soul and body, and in the embodied soul there are three elements: (1) the cognitive soul, which has its seat in the head, and sways and controls the body but at the same time is debased by association with it; (2) the appetitive soul—the lower, sensuous faculty; and (3) the courageous soul, which in man forms a link between the other two. The relation of the last two to the first resembles that of two steeds to a charioteer. Sometimes Plato seems to think of the whole soul as pre-existent and immortal, but in general it is the cognitive soul alone that is thus represented. This rational soul, as distinguished from the irrational and mortal elements, is of the same nature and character as the world-soul. A certain definite number of souls have been created by God, and this number is neither increased nor diminished.

Before the terrestrial life begins, the soul, with true personality, exists in a state of purity so refined that it is difficult to conceive its original estate from beholding it, as we now find it, marred by its abode in a mortal body. It has knowledge of the divine and eternal, and enjoys a life of bliss in contemplating the ideal world. From this state of purity, for the sake of completing the world-order, the soul is brought into union with a mortal body. Its higher nature is still shown, when incarnate, by love of wisdom and by a yearning for the divine to which it is akin. The soul is indestructible, but in the conflict of the earthly life, if it is overcome by the sensuous, it migrates at death into another human body, or even into a lower form of existence; if it maintains its purity, it returns to its original state of bliss, from which, however, it will again become incarnate. Through all these changes the continuity of its life is maintained. The soul in any particular body may, apparently, be undergoing its first or any subsequent incarnation. In the *Phædo* a proof of pre-existence is found in the doctrine of 'reminiscence,' the meaning of which is illustrated in the *Meno*. It is shown that in mathematical and philosophical learning the knowledge of universals is not acquired by direct experience or by teaching, but is drawn out of the soul; that the gaining of knowledge is an awakening of the memory which has become dulled through the soul's embodiment, the recollection of ideas with which it was familiar before the present terrestrial life began.

Aristotle (335 B.C.) regards the soul as an organizing principle, manifesting its activity in plant, animal, or man. The human soul is a microcosm, uniting in itself all the faculties of the lower grades of organic being with the additional faculty —reason. This reason, which is divine and immortal but not subject to transmigration, is the only element in the soul that exists before the body. His statements are, however, conflicting and his reference may be merely to the universal reason.

For the Stoics (from 310 onwards) the soul is an inborn breath pervading continuously the whole body. It is an emanation from the deity or a part separated from him. The fiery breath or germinative reason which pervades the whole world appears in man as a rational soul. This purest portion of the central fire outlives the body, but at the end of the world-period at longest it returns to its source.

Stoic teaching, as well as Platonism, Pythagoreanism, and Oriental mysticism, had its influence on Greek and Jewish speculation at Alexandria from before the Christian era, and the thought of emanations was given a prominent place. This thought was taken up and developed by the Neo-Platonic schools which arose from the teaching of Ammonius Saccas (*c.* A.D. 210). Besides its influence in Alexandria the Neo-Platonic movement gave rise to Roman, Syrian, and Athenian schools. The most notable exponent of Neo-Platonism is Plotinus, the mystic who founded the Roman school in A.D. 224. In the system of Plotinus the Absolute One or the Good is not merely, as with Plato, the highest of the ideas, but 'is greater than all we call being, greater and better than reason and intelligence and sense, though it is that which gives them whatever reality they possess' (*Enn.* v. 3, 14). The ideas are emanations from the Absolute One and the soul is an emanation from the ideas. As the sun emits rays, the One, through its very perfection, overflows and sends forth an image of itself; and this image in turning to behold its source becomes the νοῦς, or pure intelligence. In like manner the soul, an immaterial substance, is an emanation from the νοῦς of which it is an image. The ideas, endowed with true being and life, are immanent in the νοῦς. As the νοῦς exists in the One, so the soul exists in the νοῦς and thus partakes of the divine. The soul has a generative power which enables it to produce and fashion its material environment. Of souls the highest is the world-soul. It occupies the lowest stage of the ideal world and produces the world of matter and change. Other souls are not mere parts of the world-soul; but, although they are included in it, they have a distinct existence. The life of the human soul, derived from the universal intelligence, is prior to its union with the body and is independent of it as regards power of thought, memory, and even sensuous perception. It is in itself indivisible and permeates the body as fire permeates the air, or, rather, we ought to say that the body is in the soul. Its union with the body is the result of a fall from its original state. In its self-will it has revolted and has sought to be something for itself; it has chosen the unrest of time instead of the peace of eternity. In consequence of its own act it is shut out from the universal life of reason and joined to a mortal body. It has forgotten its dignity and its divine origin, but it has not lost its freedom; it can attain to consciousness of its own nature; by a faculty higher than discursive reason, by ecstatic feeling, it can rise into contact with God and partake of the truest bliss.

Except in so far as they adopted Greek ideas, the Romans do not appear to have formulated any theory of pre-existence. Where the influence of Greek speculation concerning the soul is apparent in the writers of the classical period, the interest generally centres in transmigration, as we see by the references of Ennius, Persius, Horace, Lucretius, and others; and, when inquiry is made into the soul's origin, the answer is mythological, or is given in a pantheistic sense, as by Virgil, or in other terms suggested by the theories of the Greeks. Cicero thinks of the human soul as an essence of a divine nature, a portion of the divine and rational principle. The Sextians favoured the Pythagorean doctrines, and Marcus Aurelius, although he is vague on this point, speaks of 'the divinity within a man' (*Meditations*, iii. 6, 16, v. 10). Later came the Neo-Platonic doctrine, elaborated by Plotinus and maintained by his disciples Amelius and Porphyry in pagan circles when Christianity was spreading at Rome.

4. The doctrine in Judaism.—According to the teaching of the OT, the soul had no previous existence apart from the body. The representation of man's origin excludes the idea. In the case of the first pair there is a direct creation (Gn $5^{1f.}$ etc.). When the other works were finished, man was not yet made (Gn 1^{26}), and in the statement 'God created man in his image . . . male and female' (v.^{27}) the same verb is used as in v.^{1}, where the object is 'the heaven and the earth,' and in v.^{4}, with object 'sea-monsters.' The account in 2^{7} is more in detail: the dust is fashioned and man becomes a living soul (*nephesh*) by the divine inbreathing. The life of the soul or of the body is not contemplated apart. With regard to other individuals of the race, there is nothing to suggest the view that the soul existed before the joint life begins on earth. The few passages most frequently quoted as favouring pre-existence are to be explained otherwise.

In Job 1^{21}, 'Naked came I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I return thither,' 'mother's womb,' on account of 'return thither' in the parallelism, has been taken to mean the deep bosom of mother earth, Sheol, in which the soul previously dwelt. This is a strained interpretation, and it makes the 'I' identical with the soul. 'Mother's womb' is to be taken in its natural sense (cf. $3^{10f.}$ 16 $10^{8ff.}$); then in 'return thither' there may be an abbreviated comparison between this and the depths of mother earth (cf. Sir 40^{1}); or, less pre-

cisely, the state after death is thought of as being similar to the conditions in the womb whence man issues when life begins. Another passage is Ps 139[15], 'When I was made in secret, curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth.' The term 'lowest parts of the earth' is elsewhere used of the realm of the dead (Ps 63[9]), and it is suggested that it means here the abode of the soul before birth; but two things are against this application: (1) the whole passage (vv.[13-16]) is a description of the growth of the embryo, and (2) the reference is explicit in v.[15a] to 'my bones' (RV 'my frame'). We have here, therefore, a poetical comparison of the 'mother's womb' of v.[13] with the deep, mysterious recesses of the earth. In Job 38[21] the context shows that the words are used in an ironical sense: 'Thou knowest; for thou wast then born' (LXX 'I know then that thou wast then brought forth'); *i.e.* Job was old as the first dayspring. The reference is to birth. It is only by a fanciful interpretation that passages like 1 S 2[6], Dt 29[14f.] can be thought to have any bearing on the subject.

Outside the Hebrew canon, however, we have early traces of the doctrine, and in Hellenistic circles and in later Judaism we find it fully developed. The idea of a disembodied soul, with an individuality of its own, had already become familiar to the Jews through their contact with Persian and Greek thought. The question of the disciples (Jn 9[2] [see below]) shows that theories of pre-existence were known to the Jews of Palestine in the time of Christ. Josephus tells us that it was a doctrine of the Essenes that souls are immortal and continue for ever; that, when they wander forth from the most subtile ether, they are drawn down by a kind of natural allurement and entangled in bodies as in prisons (*BJ* II. viii. 11). Whether his account is exact or not, the idea was familiar to him. The Essenes were probably influenced by the Pythagorean views that spread with Hellenism. Parsi and Buddhist influences are also suggested.

Among the Jews of Alexandria the doctrine was held before the Christian era, as we see from the statements of Philo and from the Apocryphal writings (Wis 8[19f.], 'Now, I was a child of parts, and a good soul fell to my lot; nay rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled'). He speaks first as if his personality was distinct from his soul (so, too, Wis 15[8], where man at death 'is required to render back the soul which was lent him' [RV]), but then he corrects this and speaks of the soul which pre-existed as being the real self. He implies, further, that there is a distinction between souls, as being pure or corrupt prior to union with the body (cf. *Slav. Enoch*, xxiii. 5, 'All souls are prepared to eternity, before the formation of the world'; *Syr. Apoc. Baruch*, xxx. 2 and 2 Es 4[35], sometimes quoted, are not to the point). Philo the Jew, at the beginning of the Christian era, developed this doctrine under the influence of Plato's idealism, and fitted it into his allegorical method of interpreting the OT. Man is composed of soul and body. The soul consists of two parts, the rational and irrational principles. It is only in speaking of its functions that he adopts the Platonic tripartite division. The irrational part of the soul, like the soul of animals, rises by generation, and, being material in its origin, is mortal. The rational principle, which is the true soul, is pre-existent and immortal. It is an emanation from the Deity; and, although Philo makes a distinction between the Supreme Source of all things and the world, he speaks of the human soul as 'a fragment of the Soul of the universe' (*Mutat. Nom.* 39), and as 'a fragment or a ray' of the divine reason (*de Mundi Opificio*, 51). Of incorporeal souls, which are emanations from the Deity, there are two classes, and these have their abode in the air and the heavens. The higher class, called 'dæmons' in philosophy and 'angels' in the Scriptures, do not descend into bodies and are incorruptible; but the other class, viz. the souls of men, being nearer to the earth, are attracted by the body, and by their union with it become corruptible. The soul finds in the body its prison-house or tomb, from which it escapes at death to enjoy its true life.

In the Talmud and the Midrash the pre-existence of souls is clearly taught. They are created by God and given a distinct existence as living beings. There are variations in the statements regarding details such as the time of their creation and their abode. In *Bᵉrēshîth Rabbāh*, 8, God is represented as taking counsel with the souls of the righteous before He created the earth. According to *Tanhūmā*, 3, all souls which were to enter human bodies were formed during the six days of creation and were in the Garden of Eden. Before their descent to earth the souls are kept in the seventh heaven (*Ḥagīgāh*, 12*b*) or in the storehouse (*Sifrē*, 143*b*), and it has been said that the Messiah will come when all the souls in the *gûph* have passed through the earthly life (*'Abōdāh Zārāh*, 5*a*; cf. *Yᵉbāmôth*, 62. 1). It is not settled whether the soul comes to earth at the time of conception or after the embryo has taken form (*Sanh.* 90*a*). The doctrine appears in great detail in the Ḳabbālā literature. According to the book of *Zôhār* (13th cent.), the soul in its essence is derived from the Supreme Intelligence, the Universal Soul. When the Holy One purposed to create the world, it was brought before Him in His will, and He formed all the souls that were to be given to men; they were there made in the exact form in which they were afterwards to appear as children of men on the earth; they were created pure, but He saw that some of them would afterwards corrupt themselves in the world (*Zôhār*, i. 96*b*). They are sent into their bodies that they may be educated by taking their part in the universe and by contemplating creation. The doctrine was further developed and rendered popular by Isaac Luria (16th cent.) and his school. All souls destined for the human race were created together in Adam. They had their place in different parts of his body—the brain, the eye, the hand, etc.—and, as there are superior and inferior organs and members, there are corresponding differences in the qualities of souls. As every human soul is a spark from Adam, all bear the taint of his first sin. These theories of the Ḳabbālists are put forward in connexion with an elaborate system of transmigration (cf. Luria, *Sēfer Haggilgûlim*). At present the doctrine, as taught in the Talmud and the Midrash, is part of the creed of the Jews (cf. Prayer Book, *passim*), whilst the Ḥasîdîm, who constitute perhaps half of the race, adopt in addition the Ḳabbālistic views. In the Morning Prayer in the Synagogue the form of expression, 'the soul which thou hast given me,' is similar to that used in Wis 8[19], but it is understood in the sense made explicit in v.[20] (cf. above).

5. In the Christian Church.—Pre-existence is not taught in the NT. When the disciples asked the question, 'Who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?' (Jn 9[2]), they probably had the doctrine of pre-existence in mind; but this would merely show that it was current in Palestine at the time, and that they may have still held it at this stage of their discipleship. Through the influence of Hellenistic philosophy and the Zoroastrian and Buddhist religions, it soon made its appearance among certain sects who derived part of their teaching from Christianity, notably the Mandæans (*q.v.*), originating in Palestine in the 1st cent.; the Gnostics (*q.v.*), spreading from Antioch and Alexandria in the 2nd cent.; and the Manichæans (*q.v.*) from Persia in the 3rd. It is involved in their theories of emanation and of the inherent evil of matter, by association with which spirit is defiled. An illustration may be given from the

speculations of the Valentinian Gnostics. From the dust of the earth and the pneumatic seed which Achamoth had conveyed into it the Demiurge formed man and breathed into him psychical life. He placed him in the lower heavens, but in consequence of disobedience banished him to the earth, and clothed him in a material body. Men multiply and the best of them—those with pneumatical natures—have an innate longing to return to the Pleroma. With the Manichæans the soul is a particle of the heavenly light imprisoned in matter, from which it may, at death or after further purification, return to the realms of light.

Under the influence of Greek philosophy many of the Church Fathers made a theory of pre-existence part of their system of doctrine. As early as the middle of the 2nd cent. it was taught by Justin Martyr, who, being a Platonist before his conversion, allowed his philosophy to colour his views of Christian doctrine; but its most influential advocate was Origen, who works it out in a clearly defined form in his great dogmatic treatise, *de Principiis*. Origen was familiar with the Alexandrian philosophy, being a fellow-student of Plotinus at the school of Saccas. Fundamental to the system of Origen is the thought that God is immutable and spirit indestructible. Among the spirits which God has created from all eternity are the spirits of men, and these were made in the image of God. All created spirits are endowed with freedom, and in the exercise of that freedom the spirits of men have fallen. The material world was subsequently created for the discipline and purification of spirits who have misused their freedom. The fallen spirits of men are banished into bodies in this material world. Man has a threefold nature: body, soul, and spirit, the material body and the rational soul or spirit being united by the animal soul. The rational soul is the immortal and eternal part which has suffered the premundane fall. Origen was followed in this teaching by Pierius, John of Jerusalem, Rufinus, Nemesius, and others. Jerome at one time believed in it, and Augustine acknowledged himself in doubt. It was opposed by Methodius and Gregory of Nyssa, and condemned by a decree of Justinian in A.D. 543, and by a synod at Constantinople in the same year; but in the Western Church it maintained itself in some quarters till the time of Gregory the Great at the end of the 6th century. Since that time it has been commonly held that the existence of all men was present to the foreknowledge of God and that it is part of the divine purpose; but a definite statement of actual pre-existence has not had a place in the acknowledged creed of any of the great Christian Churches. Still, individual theologians are to be found who have explicitly maintained it.

A particular phase of this doctrine occurs with regard to the person of Christ. It was taught by Origen and held by his followers that, like the souls of men, the *human* soul of Christ was created by God from eternity. It did not, like the others, suffer a premundane fall. The divine nature of Christ united with this undefiled soul and through it with the body. Among modern writers Isaac Watts (1747) adopted this theory. Cf. also Julius Müller.

6. In Indian religions.—The doctrine of pre-existence has a place in some form or other in most of the religions of India—Buddhism and Islām being the chief exceptions. Whether it was brought there by the Aryan invaders or afterwards originated among them, or was adopted by them from the pre-Aryan inhabitants, has not yet been determined. The significance of the doctrine is conditioned by the varying conceptions of the Deity which have been current in different periods and in different religious systems. The prevailing mode of thought is pantheistic, but in the Vedic hymns it sometimes shades off into polytheism; and sometimes—as is the case also in the later codes of laws—it aproximates to monotheism. In Buddhism it becomes practically atheistic; whilst the pantheism of Brāhmanism becomes blended with polytheism in Hinduism.

In the Rigveda the mother Aditi, 'immensity,' is conceived of as the substratum of all existences; she is 'what has been born, and what will be born.' The teaching—already a part of Brāhmanism—becomes clear in the *Upaniṣads* (*c.* 500 B.C.) and in most of the systems of philosophy founded on them, as well as in the codes of law. The doctrine is common to all these writings that the soul (*puruṣa*, or 'the self,' *ātman*) is eternal. It has always existed and it always will exist. In the case of man the soul, when united to the body, is brought into bondage and endures the misery of an earthly life. Of the various modes of presenting the doctrine only examples can be given here. According to one representation, all organized existence, material and immaterial, develops out of a primal substance, *prakṛti*, in virtue of its own inherent energy. In the earliest *Upaniṣads* this view is set forth in such a way as to involve a materialistic monism, but in the Sāṅkhya philosophy the basis is dualistic. According to the last theory, besides the *prakṛti*, there are individual souls existing eternally and indestructible, and it is to unite with these that the *prakṛti* energizes itself. There is no supreme soul, for all souls are equal; but the modifications of the *prakṛti* with which they unite produce differences in the earthly life. When the soul comes to recognize its distinction from matter, it can free itself from it and regain its liberty. There is another way of presenting the theory in the *Upaniṣads* and worked out in the Vedānta philosophy which is essentially idealistic and involves a pantheistic view of the universe. One principle of life animates man and nature. It is the *ātman*, or self. It appears in nature as air or ether and in man as breath. The individual soul (*jīvātman*), which has its abode in the heart, is part of the supreme soul (*paramātman*), but has an independent existence of a practical, experimental kind. The consciousness of separate existence is, however, illusion, ignorance of its real nature, and true knowledge consists in recognizing itself as identical with the supreme *ātman*.

A doctrine of pre-existence cannot be said to find a place in Indian Buddhism (which denies the *ātman*), but it appears in a distinct form in the closely related system—Jainism. The Jains believe that the world is eternal; all animate beings are composed of soul and body; the soul has always existed and always will exist, but during the earthly life or series of lives it is in bondage through its association with matter.

The two most prevalent forms of religion among the Hindus are Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, although the sects which represent these have been subjected to almost endless subdivision. The materials for their creeds are derived chiefly from Brāhmanism but partly also from ancient ideas, Aryan and aboriginal, that were independent of Brāhmanism. Vaiṣṇavism has the greatest number of adherents, and among most of its sects the influence of the Vedāntic idealism, as expounded by Saṅkara, is apparent, although as time went on dualistic conceptions became more common. Sometimes Kṛṣṇa, one of the incarnations of Viṣṇu, is represented as being alone real, the absolute being in human form, and the consciousness of independent

existence in men is the product of his deceptive magic; but in the teaching of the Pāncharātras individual souls are emanations from the Supreme Being and, till they are absorbed in him again, enjoy a real and distinct existence. The followers of Rāmānuja, who are numerous both in N. and in S. India, attribute a distinct but finite reality to individual souls; and the followers of Ānandatīrtha in the south regard individual souls as having an eternal existence distinct from matter and from God. The Sikhs—in some respects deists—follow the Vedāntic teaching on this subject.

In Saivism, which is more closely related to the deism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, the distinction of the soul from God on the one hand and from matter on the other is made clear. While the soul is united to matter, it is subject to error and sin; it is separated from God, held back as by a chain which the faithful should earnestly seek to have broken. There is, however, a branch of the Śaivite religion, represented chiefly by ascetics in Benares and in the Deccan, in which a pure idealism is adopted. God is regarded as the only substance, and objects, including the individual ego, as His ideas.

These notices are far from an exhaustive enumeration of the modifications of the doctrine to be found in the Indian religions; but from them we see that pre-existence has been part of the teaching of all the great religious systems of the Hindus except Buddhism; that it is still a definite part of the teaching of that Hinduism, whether the cult adopted be that of Viṣṇu or that of Śiva, which is now the religion of more than 200,000,000 of the people of India, as well as of the smaller communities of the Sikhs and the Jains.

7. In other religions.—The belief in previous incarnations common to many primitive religions—among N. American Indians, Australian aborigines, African tribes, and elsewhere—is discussed under the title INCARNATION; here we are concerned with the origin of the soul previous to any incarnation. On the other hand, it is probable that pre-existence was believed in among some races whose religious system was more developed, but where direct evidence is now wanting. This is probably true of the Celts of the Druidic period, who believed in transmigration. The references to the cosmic egg in Teutonic legends, in the Orphic mysteries, and in Indian myths show that all these had certain ideas in common regarding world-origin. Among the ancient Egyptians there was a belief that one element in man—the *khu*—is a god-like essence, a spark of the divine intelligence. It comes down from heaven and forms part of the human soul, or *ka*, from which it is separated at death and, rising again to heaven, becomes a spirit. The Pharaoh was regarded as an incarnation of the sun-god and subordinate princes as incarnations of various gods. Chuang Tse (*c.* 300 B.C.), the opponent of Confucianism and the expounder of the philosophy of Lao-tse, the founder of Taoism, teaches that the soul is an emanation from God; that life on earth is a misfortune, involving a breach of the partnership with God, to whom the soul returns at death. Some forms of Buddhism, through contact with native religions outside of India, have developed a doctrine of pre-existence. Among certain Arab philosophers the Neo-Platonic teaching was revived, notably by al-Fārabi of Baghdād († A.D. 950).

8. In modern philosophy and general literature.—In modern times and within the bounds of Western civilization belief in pre-existence has been shown by various philosophers, poets, and other writers. In some cases it is accompanied by a pantheistic faith or undefined views tending towards pantheism, and in others by belief in a personal God. There are many varieties in the form of the doctrine, and all that can be done here is to refer to typical instances. In Spinoza it occurs in a pantheistic sense, the individual finite forms being *modi* in which the Infinite Substance particularizes itself. In Hegel's philosophy finite persons are differentiations of the Absolute Spirit, who is the sum of reality. God is the One-and-All of which every man is a part. 'The whole is in every part, and every part is essential to the whole' (J. M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge, 1901, p. 243 f.). For Leibniz human souls are monads of a high rank. They have existed since the beginning of things and have been in the ancestors since Adam's time. They have been, however, merely sensitive souls possessed of perception and feeling, and are endowed with reason at the time of generation by a kind of transcreation. From the beginning they have the imperfection inherent in finite things. Kant is generally referred to as teaching pre-existence in discussing the origin of evil, but the statement of his position requires care. Man at his birth has an innate bias, which Kant calls 'radical evil.' This bias is referred to the will, and (as *peccatum originarium*) is itself an intelligible act, cognizable only by reason, performed by the individual, not in the phenomenal world but in the supersensible sphere. He does not, however, represent this act as taking place in a pre-existent state. The act is timeless (*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, ii. [*Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1900–13, vi.]). The thought thus darkly suggested by Kant was given more definite form by subsequent philosophers. Schelling, postulating pre-existence, conceives of man as falling at the beginning of all things from absolute to self-dependent existence, in which state he remains till birth. Variations of a theory of pre-existence on a basis of idealism or of realism are to be found in Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, I. H. Fichte, Herbart, and many others. Julius Müller presents the doctrine in a clearly-defined form. A threefold primitive condition is assigned to man—his primitive state in the eternal ideas, in the extra-temporal existence of every ego, and in the temporal beginning of his earthly development. Believing in trichotomy, he regards the ψυχή as being generated with the body, and the πνεῦμα as being the element that is pre-existent. The πνεῦμα of every individual, except Christ, became involved in a condition of primitive sinfulness in the extra-temporal stage of existence. Among recent philosophers J. M. E. McTaggart thinks that pre-existence can be proved in a directly metaphysical way. He believes in a plurality of lives both before and after the present life. Henri Bergson, developing his theory of creative evolution, speaks of souls as being continually created, which, nevertheless, in a certain sense pre-existed. William James, in explaining his transmission theory of the function of the brain, thinks of our consciousness as being continually derived from something mental (a mind or minds) that pre-existed — from a consciousness that exists, behind the scenes, co-eval with the world. The direction in which the minds of many writers are turned is shown by the frequent use of such terms as 'oversoul,' 'soul-stuff,' 'mind-stuff,' 'subliminal self,' and Fechner's 'psycho-physical threshold.'

Belief in pre-existence is expressed by several English poets and by other writers. Vaughan has it in *The Retreate* (1654), the leading thoughts of which are borrowed and amplified by Wordsworth in his *Ode on the Intimations of Immortality*. In the treatment in both cases there is an echo of

Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, with this difference that it is the child in its earliest days that has the clearest recollection of the heavenly world and the impression becomes dimmed as life advances. Rossetti, in *The House of Life*, assumes pre-existence to account for his familiarity with a strange place, and for the bond that binds two lovers. Browning represents Cristina as feeling that 'ages past the soul existed' (cf. *La Saisiaz*). Tennyson expresses it in *Early Sonnets*, i., and in *Crossing the Bar* (cf. *The Two Voices*). Of course in poetry it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the statement of a conviction and the play of poetic fancy or what is spoken in character. Jules Michelet, in *L'Oiseau* (1856), whilst not advocating transmigration in the ordinary sense, speaks of birds as embryo souls, candidates for the life to which the human soul has attained. Edward Beecher is an advocate of pre-existence in *The Conflict of the Ages*. A. B. O. Wilberforce, in *The Hope That is in Me*, says, 'I believe we have all been in being prenatally.' The evidence of a similar belief can often be seen in recent Russian literature. Among modern theosophists the belief is common that the conscious spirit is an eternal entity, a unit from eternity.

9. Summary.—By referring to the particulars given above it will be seen that belief in pre-existence prevailed very widely in ancient times, especially in the more developed ethnic religions. To what extent borrowing occurred has not been determined, but the probability is that in several cases the belief originated independently. It is held at present by most of the Hindus, by most Jews, and by many philosophers and other writers in Christian countries. There seems to be a tendency to revert to it in philosophic arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul. The doctrine appears in at least three distinct forms, each of which has several variations. (1) In the pantheistic form the soul pre-existed only in the Deity, and in the present life it continues to be merely a manifestation of the Deity. The Vedāntic philosophy, Spinoza, Hegel, and many others may be cited. It ought to be noted that in strict pantheism the same theory applies to the body as to the soul. (2) Another form is where the soul is thought of as having a distinct independent existence during the present life, and as having existed previously, but not as a soul. Manichæism and some of the Hindu systems supply instances. (3) In the other form the pre-existing soul is a distinct individual entity. The degree of consciousness ascribed to it varies, but the present life is a continuation of that which went before. The soul is an emanation from or is created by the Deity, or is eternally existent. It is in one of the varieties of the last form that the doctrine generally appears. The conditions in which the pre-existent soul lives are seldom described with any attempt at exactness, but generally it enjoys a state of bliss or at least of freedom from distress exceeding anything known on earth. This is the doctrine of the Essenes, Plato, Philo, and the Śaivites. In many cases pre-existence is simply postulated, but attempts have also been made to justify belief in it. It has been regarded as more easily credible than any other account of the soul's origin—than either creationism or traducianism; as accounting for the feeling of familiarity that one sometimes has with a place never visited before, and the affinity that certain persons discover to each other at their first meeting (so in modern poets); as accounting for innate ideas (Plato), for original depravity (Müller). Origen derives it from the nature of the soul and regards it as the correlative of immortality; the idealists from the conception of existence. McTaggart hopes (1915) to justify his belief by a discussion of the fundamental nature of reality. None of the arguments advanced is convincing, and the phenomena observed can be better accounted for on other grounds.

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R. MOORE.

PREFERENTIAL DEALING. — 'Preferential dealing' has been defined (*e.g.*, in the Christian Social Union paper on *Preferential Dealing*) as 'the practice of purchasing goods only from tradesmen who observe the standard regulations for each trade'; and 'standard regulations' are taken to mean 'the best that can be secured at a given time in a particular locality,' whether the result of an agreement between capital and labour or of an award by an arbitrator. In this sense of the term preferential dealing was first applied by the C.S.U. in 1896.

An attempt had been previously made in England to organize a movement on similar lines under the title of a 'Consumers' League,' but no definite results seem to have been obtained by this method. It should be noted, however, that in America the 'National Consumers' League' has established a permanent position, with a wider scope of action, including the promotion of legislation by the various States in regard to the early closing of shops, the limitation of the hours of work for women and children in factories, etc. At an earlier date the principle of preferential dealing had been publicly recognized in England by the 'Fair Wages Resolution' passed by the House of Commons in 1891, requiring the payment of 'standard' or 'current' wages under all Government contracts.

As initiated by the C.S.U., this practice was described at first as 'exclusive dealing,' but this negative term was soon replaced by the positive term, 'preferential dealing.' It was found that the mere suggestion of an organized attempt to exclude tradesmen from public custom, for any

reason however just and valid, was liable to legal action as being in restraint of trade, whereas it was quite legitimate to offer preferential custom to those who were willing to adopt the standard regulations for their respective trades.

To give practical effect to this purpose, lists of tradesmen who observe the standard regulations (commonly called 'white lists') have been circulated, to be used by ordinary consumers at their discretion. Such a list may be published (*a*) by a Trade Union, dealing with a single trade as organized throughout the country—*e.g.*, the Typographical Association; (*b*) by a Trades and Labour Council, including many trades in a particular locality—*e.g.*, at Leeds; (*c*) by a society like the C.S.U., primarily for its own members—*e.g.*, a joint list of tailors in London, Oxford, Cambridge, Liverpool, Exeter, Eton, and Rugby; or (*d*) by a C.S.U. branch, giving a list of local trades—*e.g.*, at Oxford. It should be noted that, so far as the C.S.U. is concerned, it assumes no responsibility either for the code of rules or for their observance. The code is taken to be a mutual agreement between capital and labour, and it is assumed that it is the duty both of the Masters' Associations and of the Trade Unions to see that the standard regulations are faithfully obeyed. All that the C.S.U. supplies in this respect is an educated conscience ready to act on information given.

The ethical basis of preferential dealing was enunciated by the bishops of the Anglican Communion at the Lambeth Conference in 1897, when it was declared that Christian opinion ought to 'press upon retail purchasers the obligation to consider not only the cheapness of the goods supplied to them, but also the probable conditions of their production.' It has also received support from modern economists; *e.g.*, W. Smart of Glasgow University wrote:

'The producing man is, essentially, the servant of the consuming man, and the final direction of industry lies with the consumers. . . . There are two distinct responsibilities which must not be confused: one is responsibility for the conditions under which goods are made; the other is responsibility for their being made at all. A slight awakening of the public conscience has induced some to ask, if it is not possible to demand some guarantee that the goods we buy are made by workers paid decent wages and working under healthy conditions' (*Studies in Economics*, pp. 265, 268).

LITERATURE.—See *Preferential Dealing*, *Commercial Morality*, *List of Tailors*, etc., papers published by the Christian Social Union, Oxford, 1897-1912; J. G. Brooks, *The Consumers' League*, Cambridge, Mass., n.d. [1897]; *Work of National Consumers' League* (American Academy of Political and Social Science), Philadelphia, 1911; W. Smart, *Studies in Economics*, London, 1895.

J. CARTER.

PREGNANCY.—1. Ignorance of the cause of conception.—Among the Arunta and other tribes of Central Australia conception is regarded as the result of the entrance of an ancestral spirit individual into the woman.

'They have no idea of procreation as being directly associated with sexual intercourse, and firmly believe that children can be born without this taking place.'[1]

Similar ideas are found among other Australian tribes,[2] and the belief that conception can take place apart from sexual intercourse is found sporadically elsewhere, though perhaps not always with the same ignorance of the real cause of it. Examples of this have been found in New Guinea, in Melanesia, formerly among the Baganda, and in the Niger and Senegal regions.[3] Folklore and mythology show that conception might take place by more or less magical means, but in many instances this is in addition to actual cohabitation.[1] Some writers have maintained that ignorance of the cause of conception must once have been widely spread, and possibly at one time in the history of early man was general. The reasons alleged for this ignorance are several: conception is found not to result from the wide-spread practice of cohabitation before puberty; why then should it follow it after puberty? Premature intercourse tends to impair fertility. There is again a disproportion of births to acts of sexual union. And even where the cause is known, it is not regarded as invariable and indispensable.[2]

In spite of all this, it may be doubted whether the belief in virgin-birth has ever been wide-spread. In most cases where conception is due to a god or spirit these are envisaged in very material and human aspects.

Among the Sinaugolo (British New Guinea) pregnancy is thought to result from frequent cohabitation. Conception begins in the breasts (from signs of pregnancy seen in them). Later the child drops to the abdomen. There is no idea of an intra-abdominal organ.[3] Among the Yakuts the woman is thought to have a greater share in procreation than the man, who therefore takes no responsibility for monstrosities.[4]

2. Averting barrenness and securing male children.—As the possession of some children at least is regarded as a necessity with savage peoples as well as at higher levels, many devices are made use of to avert barrenness.

The Eskimo woman of Behring Straits goes to a shaman, who gives her a kind of doll over which rites have been performed. She sleeps with this under her pillow.[5] This is a piece of mimetic magic, and may be compared with a Japanese method in which the woman is put through a form of delivery with a doll at the phallic festival.[6] Various practices with a doll-like image occur elsewhere—among the Battas, in Torres Straits islands, among the Maoris, the Huichol Indians, the Basutos and other African tribes, etc.[7] Among the Bahima women are thought to be barren or fruitful at the will of the clan deity. The husband who wishes a child prays to him and commits his wife to the god's care during her pregnancy.[8] In the Congo region barrenness is supposed to be cured by entering the *ndembo* secret society, when the entrant gets a new body.[9] Among the Awemba barren women wear two tiny horns in hope of bearing children, the reproach of barrenness being the worst insult.[10] In E. Central Africa the woman provides a black hen, which is tied to her back, and there fed as if it were a child.[11] In Egypt barren women pass seven times under the stone on which the bodies of decapitated criminals have been washed, and then lave their faces in the polluted water. Others step over the body of a decapitated man.[12] Bathing in or drinking the waters of a sacred well or spring is often resorted to for the cure of barrenness in various regions, and some legends tell of girls becoming mothers after doing so.[13] In modern Muhammadan districts favourite places of resort are the tombs of saints, where prayers and an offering are made—a practice found also in Christian countries. Contact with fixed rocks or boulders or megalithic monuments is often believed to be effectual for the removal of barrenness—the spirit of the stone or of the dead buried there perhaps being supposed to assist the rite or even to be reborn of the woman.

Sometimes special ceremonies occur to ensure that the expected child will be a boy.

In Sabai, Torres Straits, the expectant mother nurses the image of a male child made by her husband's sister. Or, to obtain a male child, the woman presses to her abdomen a fruit like the male organ in shape and then gives it to another woman who has only male offspring.[14] In Japan the expectant mother puts on part of her husband's dress, and, having gone round a well three times, looks at her face in the water. Without looking behind, she repeats, 'Woman is unlucky, man is lucky.' Then for three days she leaves the cover on the well, which is a

[1] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 330; cf. p. 150 ff.; Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 123 f.; W. B. Spencer, *Introd. to the Study of certain Native Tribes of the Northern Territory*, Melbourne, 1912, p. 6.

[2] W. E. Roth, *N. Queensland Ethnography*, Brisbane, 1903, p. 22; other instances cited in *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 153 ff.

[3] R. Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1911, iii. 26; W. H. R. Rivers, *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 173 f.; J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 46 f.; M. Delafosse, *Haut-Sénégal-Niger*, Paris, 1912, iii. 171.

[1] Instances in E. S. Hartland, *LP* i. 71 ff., *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1910, *passim*; H. de Charencey, *Le Folklore dans les deux mondes*, Paris, 1894, p. 121 ff.

[2] Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, i. 106, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, i. 155 ff., iv. 40 ff.; Hartland, *Prim. Paternity*, ii. 249 ff., 275 ff.

[3] C. G. Seligmann, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 300.

[4] W. G. Sumner, *ib.* xxxi. [1901] 80.

[5] *18 RBEW* [1899], pt. i. p. 435.

[6] W. G. Aston, *FL* xxiii. [1912] 187.

[7] Examples in *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 70 ff.

[8] Roscoe, *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 110. [9] *FL* xxi. [1910] 467.

[10] J. H. West Sheane, *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 154.

[11] *FL* xv. [1904] 73.

[12] E. W. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, London, 1846, ii. 79.

[13] D. McKenzie, *FL* xviii. [1907] 271; J. A. MacCulloch, *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 196.

[14] A. C. Haddon, *JAI* xix. [1890] 389 f.

domestic god.[1] In India a low-class mother of daughters only has been known to kill a neighbour's girl as a sacrifice in order to procure a son.[2]

3. Tabus during pregnancy. — The expectant mother and sometimes also the father are the subjects of various tabus, for the mother usually connected with food, for the father with that also, but more usually with his actions or pursuits. The woman in pregnancy is generally herself in a tabu state, since her condition is associated with those sexual crises which are so mysterious to and so much feared by savage man. Some of the tabus imposed on her or her husband may arise out of direct observation of ill-effects following the eating of some particular food; others are the result of mal-observation or superstition; others are purely arbitrary. Only a few typical examples need be given here.

Among the Australian tribes food restrictions are general for the woman, less so for the man, for fear of hurting the child or causing its death.[3] In Murray Island birthmarks are attributed to the mother's eating a certain fish, the juices of which touched the child.[4] With the Sinaugolo of British New Guinea, lest the child should be deformed, certain species of yam and fish are forbidden to the mother, who often tabus her own food.[5] Among the western tribes of Torres Straits no woman may eat of a certain pigeon till past child-bearing.[6] In Halmahera the woman is not allowed to eat the remains of her husband's food, for that would cause difficult labour.[7] In Assam one of the *gennas*, or tabus, is that the woman must not eat many specified articles of food for fear of harm to the child.[8] With the Wawanga (E. Africa) the woman must not eat meat called *ivechi*, if it has been placed in her hut over night uncooked. If she does, her child will be sickly, and, when it begins to crawl, its hair will fall out, and sores will come on its scalp.[9] Among the Bageshu, while there are no special tabus, precautions are taken against eating foods which might do the child harm. The husband must not take violent exercise or climb trees, rocks, or the house-roof, lest a miscarriage occur.[10] The father is prohibited from eating certain foods among the Bangala, and may not hunt or fish unless the wife has certain ceremonies performed over her by the *nganga* (medicine-man). The husband is said to be in a state of *liboi*. Tabu is also placed on certain foods for the woman by the *nganga*, but not the same for all.[11] With the Baganda sickly or delicate children are kept away from the woman, who is forbidden to eat several kinds of food, lest the child be still-born or delicate.[12] Among S. African tribes there are several restrictions prescribed by custom, but no evil consequences are thought to follow departure from these.[13] In ancient Persia the woman was forbidden to eat dead matter under pain of death, and she could not be purified from this pollution.[14] A final instance may be taken from the Indians of the Issa-Japura district, S. America: foods are much restricted—*e.g.*, paca flesh, lest the child's skin be spotted, capybara, lest it have teeth like that animal's, etc.[15]

A further tabu is seen in the very general avoidance of sexual connexion between husband and wife either during the whole period of pregnancy or during part of it, especially towards the end. Sometimes a definite reason is given for this—*e.g.*, lest the child be deformed (Sinaugolo, British New Guinea),[16] or lest the hunting and fishing of the father should be bad and the child sicken or die (Bangala).[17] Such avoidances are the result of the belief that any time of sexual crisis is dangerous. Examples are found in many parts of the world.[18]

[1] Aston, *FL* xxiii. 192 *f.* [2] R. C. Temple, *ib.* x. [1899] 392.
[3] Many examples in Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 614.
[4] A. E. Hunt, *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 11.
[5] C. G. Seligmann, *ib.* xxxii. 301.
[6] A. C. Haddon, *ib.* xix. 309.
[7] J. G. F. Riedel, *ZE* xvii. [1885] 79.
[8] T. C. Hodson, *JAI* xxxvi. 97; cf. *ERE* iii. 31 for Burmese instances.
[9] K. R. Dundas, *JRAI* xliii. [1913] 33.
[10] J. Roscoe, *ib.* xxxix. 184.
[11] J. H. Weeks, *ib.* pp. 444, 456.
[12] Roscoe, *JAI* xxxii. 29.
[13] J. Macdonald, *ib.* xix. 267.
[14] *Shâyast lâ-shâyast*, ii. 105 (*SBE* v. [1880] 272).
[15] T. W. Whiffen, *FL* xxiv. [1913] 45.
[16] Seligmann, *JAI* xxxii. 301.
[17] Weeks, *JRAI* xl. [1910] 367.
[18] Kagoro (A. J. N. Tremearne, *JRAI* xlii. [1912] 172); Wa-Giryama (W. E. H. Barrett, *ib.* xli. [1911] 22); tribes of British C. Africa (H. S. Stannus, *ib.* xl. 310); Ba-Yaka (E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, *JAI* xxxvi. 51); Lower Congo tribes (Weeks, *JRAI* xl. 367; the mother would have no milk and the child would die); Maoris (E. Tregear, *JAI* xix. 103); Coroados, Coropos, Puri (J. B. von Spix and C. F. P. von Martius, *Travels in Brazil*, Eng. tr., London, 1824, p. 247).

In British Central Africa a man will not commit adultery during the pregnancy of his wife because he would be accused of it if she died.[1]

In connexion with this subject of tabus certain Hindu rules are worthy of notice. The pregnant woman must be given food before the householder and even before guests;[2] way must be made for her;[3] no toll is taken from her at a ferry;[4] she is not fined for committing a nuisance;[5] a Brâhman must not eat in her house;[6] the crime of killing her is equal to that of killing a Brâhman.[7]

Other tabus are of a precautionary nature, though the link between them and the unborn child or the process of birth is of a magical kind.

One of these is that no knots may be tied during pregnancy by the woman or sometimes also by her husband. The reason of this was that delivery would be difficult—the woman being thus herself apt to be tied up, or the child constricted.[8] This is akin to the custom of unlocking all locks in the house at child-birth, lest the womb should be locked up, or to the German superstition that a pregnant woman should not creep through a hedge.[9] So, too, Ainu men should not spin or twist ropes when their wives are pregnant, lest the child's intestines should be entangled, and Roman women praying to Lucina were to loosen their hair, so that she might loosen their wombs.[10] For similar reasons a pregnant woman should not sit with legs crossed, nor should her husband do so, nor any one sitting near her; nor should they sit with clasped hands. Lucina sat by the house with legs crossed and hands clasped at the birth of Hercules; hence his mother travailed with him seven days.[11] In Sumatra the woman must not stand at the door or on the top rung of the house-ladder, lest she have difficult labour; and among the Torajas standing or loitering on the ladder is forbidden to every one for the same reason.[12] In India an eclipse is thought to have its dangers for the expectant mother. No work must be done—*e.g.*, locking or unlocking a door—lest the child be deformed, nor any sewing or cutting, lest it have holes in its flesh or a hare-lip.[13] An ancient Parsi regulation was that no toothpick should have the bark left on it. This was dead matter, and, if a woman stepped on it, her child would come to harm.[14] In India no one should step over a fallen broom, lest he cause suffering to a pregnant woman.[15] The woman herself in the W. Indies should not step over a rod or small branch, and in Fife folklore stepping over a hare's form causes the child to suffer from hare-lip.[16]

In some instances charms are worn to prevent any mischief which might happen to the woman or the child, or to give an easy delivery.

Among the Bangalas in the later weeks of pregnancy pigments are painted by a medicine-man on the woman's breast, abdomen, shoulders, etc., and she wears charms to cause easy delivery.[17] After her marriage a Nandi woman collects pieces of their dress from unmarried girls in the neighbourhood and wears them as a charm to ensure pregnancy taking its normal course. After birth they are returned and a feast takes place.[18] With the Awemba the woman wears necklaces of little wooden balls with fetish-medicine inside to avert dangers of pregnancy and cause easy delivery. They are made by the medicine-man.[19] Muhammadan women in the Panjâb wear charms or a cowry on the navel. They are procured from a priest, who blows upon them.[20] See also CHARMS AND AMULETS, and for other instances A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, p. 9.

Pregnant women being in a state which renders them liable to the attacks of evil spirits, various precautions are taken against these. The charms so often worn probably form one of such precautions.

[1] Stannus, *JRAI* xl. 305 (Yao).
[2] *Institutes of Viṣṇu*, lxvii. 39 (*SBE* vii. [1900] 216).
[3] *Baudhâyana*, ii. iii. 6. 30 (*SBE* xiv. [1882] 243).
[4] *Institutes of Viṣṇu*, v. 132 (*SBE* vii. 36); cf. *Laws of Manu*, viii. 407 (*SBE* xxv. [1886] 325).
[5] *Laws of Manu*, ix. 283 (*SBE* xxv. 283).
[6] Âpastamba, i. v. 19 (*SBE* ii. 59).
[7] *Institutes of Viṣṇu*, xxxvi. 1 (*SBE* vii. 133).
[8] Many instances from the E. Indian and Malaysian region, from Lapland, and among European peasantry, will be found in *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 294. Cf. art. KNOTS.
[9] See LOCKS AND KEYS, § 3; *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, pp. 294–295, 297; J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, p. 1812, no. 859; C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 153.
[10] *Anthropos*, v. [1910] 763; Ovid, *Fasti*, iii. 327.
[11] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, pp. 295, 298; Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 59; Ovid, *Met.* ix. 285.
[12] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 114.
[13] W. Crooke, *PR* i. 22; H. A. Rose, *JAI* xxxv. [1905] 277 *f.*
[14] *Sad Dar*, xvii. (*SBE* xxiv. [1885] 278).
[15] *FL* xiii. [1902] 237. [16] *Ib.*
[17] Weeks, *JRAI* xxxix. 100.
[18] C. W. Hobley, *JAI* xxxiii. [1903] 345.
[19] J. H West Sheane, *JRAI* xxxvi. 154.
[20] H. A. Rose, *JRAI* xxxv. 279.

Among the Sinhalese the woman is protected from devils by *mantras* for charming each day's first food and drink.[1] Among the people of Nias spirits of murdered infants cause miscarriage. The woman is protected at night by an idol, which is connected with a second by a chain of palm-leaves, while before the latter a small banana-tree is placed. The spirits, seeing the first idol, run along the chain in fear and then leap on the tree, mistaking it for the woman.[2] With the ancient Parsis fire was maintained in the woman's house, the reason being that such a fire protected Zoroaster's mother when attacked by demons.[3] Among the Nagas, pregnant women being exposed to attack from evil spirits, the river-spirit and also the Python are worshipped to cause easy delivery.[4] Protection of the woman against *jinn* is effected in Tlemsen by keeping a black fowl in the house from the seventh month onwards. After delivery it is let loose in the Jews' quarter, carrying the *jinn* with it.[5] Among some of the Veddas the aid of the *yakus* (spirits) is invoked, and a religious dance performed as soon as pregnancy is diagnosed.[6] Prayer is also made by the woman's father for her safety. For a Bavenda goddess of pregnant women cf. *ERE* ii. 364b.

Sometimes the pregnancy rites are of a more elaborate nature than those which have just been described.

In Java in the seventh month husband and wife go to a river or well. Banana-leaves are fastened round the upper part of the woman's body. Through an opening in front of these the husband drops a weaver's shuttle, which an old woman catches, pretending that it is a child. An egg, emblem of the afterbirth, is then passed through, and a cut is made at the opening in the leaves in imitation of cutting the navel-string. The purpose of this ceremony is to facilitate delivery.[7]

Most elaborate of all are the rites followed in India, of which, as practised by Hindus and Muhammadans, a detailed description has been given by H. A. Rose.[8]

These rites vary from tribe to tribe, and consist of ceremonies in the 3rd, 5th, or 7th month or in all three, or in the 8th or 9th month. There is an interchange of presents between the woman and her mother. Offerings are made to the spirits. The woman is bathed and dressed in new clothes—not worn before the performance of the rites. The kinsfolk assemble, and gifts of food or fruit are placed in her lap. She and her husband adore the gods. The Muhammadan rites are analogous to these, but without the worship of the gods.

The Khatris, a Panjāb tribe, perform funeral rites for the father in the 5th month, while the parents are remarried after the birth.[9] This goes back to the belief found in the *Laws of Manu* that, after conception by the woman, her husband becomes an embryo and is reborn from her.[10] He dies when his son is quickened; hence the funeral rites.

4. Power of the pregnant woman.—The condition of the pregnant woman is often thought to have magical power, especially for fruitfulness.

Corn ground by her is used to fertilize the growing crops among the Zulus.[11] She eats of the food at the feast held among the Minang of Sumatra when a rice-barn is built, in order to increase the fruitfulness of the rice.[12] In the Nicobar Islands gardens are made more fertile by her presence in them or by her planting fruit there.[13] Similar ideas are wide-spread among savages and survive in European folklore. Probably for similar reasons pregnant cows were sacrificed at the Roman *Fordicidia* to the earth 'pregnant with the seed,' the unborn calves burned, and their ashes used at the *Parilia*.[14]

It may be noted here that in Lancashire gypsy belief a pregnant woman protects a man from hurt by mortal hands.[15]

On the other hand, pregnant women being more or less in a tabu state,[16] their influence on the crops may be dangerous, as examples from New Guinea and elsewhere show.[17]

In British Guiana, again, if a pregnant woman eats of game caught by hunting dogs, it is thought that they will never hunt again.[1] In the Panjāb it is held that a snake becomes blind if the shadow of a pregnant woman falls on it.[2] Parsi texts say that, if a dead pregnant woman is carried by two men, both must be cleansed by the *bareshnûm* rite.[3]

5. Determination of sex, etc.—Many methods are adopted to discover whether a woman is with child, its sex, and the like.

If a Kagoro woman is in doubt as to her condition, she goes to a medicine-man, who, after washing his eyes with a magic drug, looks into a calabash of water and tells what is to happen.[4] In Banks' Island divination consists in pinching a leaf cup full of water. If the water squirts out, a boy will be born; if not, a girl.[5] Sex is determined among the Veddas by the position of strips of bast as they fall on the woman's head in the dance already referred to. If they fall over the face, a girl will be born; if on the occiput, a boy.[6] In Japan, if some one calls a pregnant woman who is walking southwards and she looks back from the left, the child is a boy; if from the right, a girl. Another method of determining sex is to add together the years of the father's and mother's ages and divide by nine; if the remainder is odd, a girl will be born.[7] Among Muhammadans in the Panjāb it is thought that, if the woman's milk before birth is thin, she will have a boy; if, when it is put in a shell and fire is applied, it dries up, she will have a girl.[8] According to the *Saddharma Puṇḍarika* (xviii. 34 f. [*SBE* xxi. (1884) 344]), a preacher of the law (Buddhist) can discern if a woman is pregnant of a dead child or if she will have a healthy child. He discerns by the odour whether the child will be a boy or a girl.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited, see H. Ploss and M. Bartels, *Das Weib*[8], Leipzig, 1905.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

PREMONITION.—See PRESENTIMENT.

PRESBYTER.—See MINISTRY.

PRESBYTERIANISM.—The name 'Presbyterianism' may be applied in a general sense to that theory of the Church which aims at realizing its visible unity through government by presbyters, clerical and lay, such presbyters being set apart by their peers with popular consent, being all of equal status, and being organized for purposes of ecclesiastical administration into Church courts, which rise one above another in an ascending scale, from the congregational to the national. In a sense more particular 'Presbyterianism' is used to denote the concrete effort after the realization of that idea which, originating in the work of John Calvin, was elaborated by those who followed him into a definite form of Church organization, with a distinctive type of doctrine, morals, and ritual, and which in one form or another counts perhaps 100,000,000 adherents to-day. Presbyterianism seeks to avoid, on the one hand, the absolute subjection of individual congregations to government from without and above, and, on the other, their absolute independence of all restraint. Of the three great types of Church government it is therefore the middle one, between Congregationalism and Episcopacy.

I. *EMERGENCE OF THE CALVINIST PRESBYTERIAN SYSTEM.*—**1. The NT basis.**—Serious Presbyterian scholarship is long past the stage of the crude 'jure divino' defence of Presbyterianism, as if it were the only form of Church government expressly sanctioned by the Word of God and the institution of Christ. During the first phase of the famous controversy between Puritans and Anglicans the Puritans claimed divine sanction for their ecclesiastical system, or, at least, divine disapproval of that of their opponents, as against the Anglican argument from the expediency of the episcopate; but in the later stages of the conflict the two sides reversed their rôles. The controversy died down about A.D. 1700 after the battle over the Ignatian Epistles; and the whole question as to the primitive form of Church government only revived under the stimulus of modern histori-

1 W. L. Hildburgh, *JRAI* xxxviii. [1908] 185.
2 F. Kramer, *Tijdschr. voor Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde*, xxxiii. [1890] 489.
3 *Shayast la-shayast*, x. 4 (*SBE* v. 316).
4 T. C. Hodson, *FL* xxi. 310.
5 E. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, Algiers, 1908, p. 451.
6 C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 247 f., 250.
7 C. Poensen, cited in *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 72.
8 *JAI* xxxv. 271 ff., 279 ff. 9 *FL* xiii. 279.
10 *Laws of Manu*, ix. 13 (*SBE* xxv. 329); cf. FIRST-BORN, § 3.
11 D. Kidd, *Savage Childhood*, London, 1906, p. 291.
12 *GB*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 140.
13 *Inter. AE* v. [1892] 193; *Census of India*, 1901, Calcutta, 1903, iii. 206.
14 Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 629; cf. EARTH, § 6. Similar sacrifices also occur in Greece (W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum*, Leipzig, 1898, no. 615).
15 *FL* xvi. 326.
16 Instances in A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, pp. 9, 54.
17 *GB*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 141.

1 E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 233.
2 *PR* ii. 143. 3 *Shayast la-shayast*, ii. 6 (*SBE* v. 247).
4 A. J. N. Tremearne, *JRAI* xlii. 172.
5 W. H. R. Rivers, *FL* xxi. 46 f. 6 Seligmann, p. 250.
7 Aston, *FL* xviii. 193. 8 Rose, *JAI* xxxv. 281.

cal scholarship, with new methods, and under a new form. It is now realized by impartial critics that no one form of Church government is to be definitely discerned in Holy Writ more than another. While Calvin, therefore, and others of his day believed themselves the restorers of primitive Christianity, freed from the errors and corruptions of Romanism, modern scholarship cannot absolutely subscribe this opinion. Even if the Reformers had possessed the necessary critical insight to construct a clear picture of the NT Church, they must have found it impossible to reproduce with perfect faithfulness a primitive creed and polity which later had been in successive contact with the Græco-Roman and barbarian worlds; conversely, such a reproduction of primitive institutions would be a poor guarantee for their success in modern times. A living organism is necessarily subject to change, and the attempt to ignore a millennium of ecclesiastical history could not but fail. So far, then, as the advocate of Presbyterianism makes use of the NT to-day, he must claim to reproduce the spirit and intention of the primitive Church, and not its mechanism; he will draw his main arguments rather from considerations of expediency. He will show how Presbyterianism has proved itself particularly suited to the genius of its adherents; how it has played a prominent part in the political development of those peoples who have worked out systems of representative government; how it has produced a unique and admittedly worthy type of character; and, if these and other possible contentions savour to some extent of pragmatism, he may reply to this criticism that Church government can be, as an actual fact, traced in all ages—the NT age included—to motives of expediency, and that one of the fatal errors which have helped to rend the Church has been the injudicious elevation of government into the region of dogmatics.

Although the conditions prevalent in the early Church are inconsistent with the possible existence of either Presbyterianism or Episcopacy as we understand them, we find both presbyters and bishops mentioned in the NT; and the problem of their relationship, which has given rise to endless controversy, cannot be passed over. Whether we argue with Jerome that bishop and presbyter were originally identical, and hold with Lightfoot that the episcopate was developed from the presbyterate by elevation; whether we contend, with Harnack, that the offices were distinct from the beginning; or whether, with Lindsay and Loofs, we hold that πρεσβύτερος was the official name, while ἐπίσκοπος described the function, the problem remains the same, viz. How did the bishop come to overshadow the presbyter, and finally reduce him to a definitely inferior position? The most feasible explanation yet suggested seems to be that which is founded upon the bishop's connexion with the Eucharist, a connexion indicated by practically all the sub-apostolic literature.

2. Sub-apostolic development.—While the ἀγάπη still existed, the official in charge of the celebration would enjoy a distinctive place, not only in the Church itself, but in the eyes of outsiders. As the ἀγάπη fell into disuse, and the sacramental aspect of the Eucharist gained prominence, the bishop's pre-eminence would develop with it. The crux of the entire episcopal development seems to lie here; and, once the bishop had definitely asserted his special position among the officials of the Church, circumstances favoured his steady elevation. Roman imperialism and Jewish nationalism were in deadly conflict about the close of the 1st cent.; Jewish Christianity was rapidly disappearing; and all the conditions were in favour of the Gentile ἐπίσκοπος and his function being recognized as against the Jewish πρεσβύτερος and his function. The *Didache* is the most valuable document for this transition period; and in Ignatius we first find the threefold ministry, with the supremacy of the bishop, clearly set forth as the divinely-appointed form of Church government.[1] It is difficult, at this time of day, to accept Ignatius's own view that he received this theory by divine revelation; and the brief interval of time between him and Clement of Rome shows that his theory cannot have been extensively in practice when he wrote; but his martyrdom 'barbed and fledged' his teaching, and gave undue weight to his ecclesiastical expedient. Moreover, the Church was faced in times immediately following by heresy within and hostility without, and the concentration of power in as few hands as possible proved of great value. The forming of a creed, and of a collection of Holy Scriptures upon which to base it, was logically followed by the need of an authoritative interpretation for both. The bishop, already prominent, naturally if not logically became the authoritative mouthpiece of the Church in matters of the faith; and apostolic succession followed in due course. Irenæus, *e.g.*, definitely connects the theory of the apostolic succession of the episcopate with the necessity of maintaining sound doctrine; and the bishop thus emerges from the comparative obscurity of earlier times with a status in matters of the faith equal to that which he had previously enjoyed in matters of administration. Cyprian's position introduces a new factor. By his time creed and canon had attained a position of greater certainty, and the sacerdotalism of the Church under OT and also pagan influences had been intensified, so that apostolic succession is now a guarantee not so much of sound doctrine as of the validity of the priesthood. The evolution of territorial from congregational episcopacy was completed by the gradual assimilation of the ecclesiastical system to the imperial. The fall of the Empire, the transference of barbarian respect from it to the Church, the conversion and absorption into the Church of the northern peoples, all assisted in the process of closer organization; and so by degrees grew up the great mediæval hierarchy—the feudal system being theoretically crowned by the twin summits of a papacy supreme in spiritual affairs and an empire supreme in temporal.

3. Mediævalism.—Superficially considered, the whole history and tendency of mediævalism might seem designed to bury ever deeper the very idea of any but monarchical Church government; and the Reformation systems might seem so sudden and complete a contrast to previous developments as to justify Calvin's theory of a reversion to primitive Christianity by the ignoring of mediævalism. But nothing ever makes its appearance in history without preparation; and, while we cannot eliminate the genius of Calvin and the rest by explaining their systems out of any or all of their antecedents, we may discern certain mediæval tendencies which led up to their work. Presbyterians may find the beginnings of their history either in the NT or in the book of Exodus, if they will; but the mediæval continuation of it has been too much neglected. Although the practical needs and problems of mediævalism served to exalt the ecclesiastical society at the expense of the individual, and to sacrifice the intellectual and homiletic interests of the Church to the organizing and sacerdotal tendencies, yet the homiletic, intellectual, and individual element never completely perished. Practical exigencies might favour the creation and maintenance of a rigid monarchical system, which deprived the individual of all political or intellec-

[1] This episcopacy was congregational, not diocesan.

tual scope; but the mastery of the system was never wholly undisputed, and the essential Christian truth of the worth of the individual before God never fell completely out of sight. Throughout the growth of ecclesiasticism we can discern a continuous process of revolt against it, which, manifesting itself primarily in the form of Montanism (*q.v.*), was suppressed, but, in its essence, defied extinction. Athanasius was faced by Arius, Augustine by Pelagius, Bernard by Abelard, Aquinas by Scotus; the slavery of intellect was always incomplete. But it is in monasticism (*q.v.*) that we can see most clearly the opposition of individualism to the tyranny of the institution. The impulse which, in the successive forms of Montanism, Novatianism, and Donatism (*qq.v.*), succumbed to the need for closer organization persisted in the form of monasticism, and established an unbreakable hold upon Western Christendom. From the beginning of monastic history the conversion, the education, and the civilization of N.W. Europe were almost entirely the work of monks; and, while the episcopate succeeded in forcing the monks into the priesthood, monasticism conquered by forcing celibacy on the Western clergy and emancipating the orders from episcopal control. The opposition between the secular clergy and the monks runs throughout mediævalism; and the monastic side of the opposition represents the preparation for the Reformed Churches. Whereas the secular clergy obeyed a monarchic bishop, the monks obeyed a presbyter-abbot. Their vow of poverty gave expression to the truth that a man is of value apart from his property, their vow of celibacy destroyed the feudal fetish of family prestige, their vow of obedience was that of free-will obedience to a superior in whose election they had a voice, and in making this vow a man left a society in which he was a mere irresponsible cog accidentally placed in a machine for one into which he entered voluntarily. Thus, while, as A. V. G. Allen puts it, 'every direct specific purpose of the monk seemed in the long run to have been reversed, or to have proved a failure,'[1] yet there was 'a deeper purpose which could not be defeated,—the accomplishment of individual personality.'[2] It is in this presbyterial, as we might call it, conception of Christian organization that we discern the germ of the Reformation. Moreover, whereas the secular clergy and the episcopate had all along represented sacramentarianism in worship and rigid solidarity in government, the monastic system, on the whole, had stood for the homiletic aspect of worship and a form of organization at once more elastic and more representative of the popular voice. Of course, each side reacted upon the other. The monks were often the stoutest champions of orthodoxy, and their services were often most highly ritualistic; on the other hand, the Church was democratic enough to make it as possible for the most obscure Churchman to ascend to the papal throne as it is for any citizen of the United States to become President; and the semblance, at least, of representative government was retained in the election of bishops by the cathedral chapters and the choice of the pope by the conclave. But, in essence, the difference which afterwards became open in the Reformation between Catholic and Protestant subsists throughout the Middle Ages between the episcopate and monasticism; and it only required favourable circumstances to set on foot the process of disruption.

4. Decline of papacy and the Reformation.—The decisive factor in the final separation of the 16th cent. was the weakening of the papacy, which was the only power capable of holding together the opposed sides of ecclesiastical life. The fate of Boniface VIII. marked an era in the decline of the papal monarchy, which had ruined the Empire, only to find a new and more vigorous opponent in the growth of European nationalities; the Babylonish captivity of the Avignonese popes weakened the papal grip upon England and Germany. Early in the 14th cent. William of Occam and Marsiglio of Padua outfaced the pope in the interest of Louis of Bavaria. Marsiglio's fully-developed democratic idea of Church and State is a sign of the times; the fact that the Fraticelli were deeply involved in the anti-papal revolt is another; and the whole incident has been well named the Miniature Reformation. The work of Wyclif in England is a manifestation of the same spirit, which, passing from England to Bohemia and John Hus, remained active there far into the 15th century. These various movements combined projects both of political and of ecclesiastical reform—they attacked the dogma as well as the organization and morals of the Church. To the growing distrust of the papal monarchy and the whole system with which it was bound up the Great Schism contributed in no small measure; and the conciliar movement, while it represents in essence the struggle between the aristocratic episcopal form of Church government and the autocratic papal form, helped to pave the way for democracy by asserting the responsibility of rulers to those whom they affected to rule. With the close of the Council of Basel in 1447 the papacy secured an illusory victory over its foes, but not even the splendour of the Renaissance period could blind the eyes of serious men to the moral and financial corruption of the Curia. The rise of European nationalities, the inventions of printing and of gunpowder, revolutionary discoveries both geographical and scientific, contributed to the general ferment. Moderate men might desire a reform of the Church on the existing basis, but others were driven by the monstrous indifference of the Curia towards its own corruption to consider the evil as inherent in the system itself, and to desire a more radical reformation. In particular, the New Learning, by exposing the hollowness of many ecclesiastical pretensions, by weakening the belief in transubstantiation and sacramentarianism generally, and by reviving the interest of Europe in the teaching and homiletic side of Church activity, helped to relax the hold of the papacy upon the Church, and to set free the monastic side of its life from the long alliance with the episcopal. Finally, in the hands of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, the crisis came—divergence matured into division—and monasticism achieved its independence in the Reformation. It is no accident, but the result of a profound historical necessity, that the lands which remained in the Roman obedience were precisely those which had been fully Christianized in pre-monastic days, whereas the lands in which monkish missionaries, especially of the Iro-Scottish type, had laboured went over to the Reformation side.

From one point of view, the Reformation represents revolt and the rending of Christendom in pieces; but the pieces into which the Church fell correspond, with some definiteness, each to some previous tendency within mediævalism; and, from another standpoint, the Reformation is the substitution of spiritual unity under the headship of Christ for external, mechanical unity under the papal monarchy. The democratic constitution proposed for the churches of Hesse, *e.g.*, was the work of Lambert, a Franciscan monk, and recalls the Benedictine organization. Lutheranism reminds us forcibly of the Augustinian order; and

[1] *Christian Institutions*, Edinburgh, 1898, p. 178.
[2] *Ib.* p. 175.

the Presbyterian type of constitution under Calvin and his followers calls to memory the organization of the great monastic orders of later mediævalism, wherein many houses were affiliated into one great society. Point for point, this parallel between mediæval tendencies and Reformation facts could be worked out in much detail. It will suffice, however, to note that Presbyterianism, like other ecclesiastical systems, was no new phenomenon suddenly entering about 1550 on a career totally unprepared for, but was the emergence into freedom of a tendency many centuries old. Substitute Christ for the pope as the head of the Church, and spiritual for corporeal unity, and you have at once the explanation of our Protestant divisions, and the antidote to much of the alarm which they cause in unreflecting minds.

5. The question of government.—When we consider the great importance which by and by came to be attached to the question of Church government—so that the form of organization adopted by Presbyterianism became, in time, its chief differentia from the rest of Protestantism, and 'jure Divino' arguments went hand in hand with armed force to resist any encroachment upon its rights—it is curious to reflect that, in the early days of Protestantism, the question of government was a secondary consideration. The Reformers, following the monastic lead, were more concerned with teaching than with administration; and, provided they got rid of the papal headship and could secure the safety of great truths like that of justification by faith, they kept a reasonably open mind on the question of organization. The salvation of the individual through the direct mediation of Christ was the vital point; other matters were subsidiary. Being in revolt against over-organization and all the loss of individual Christian liberty which that implied, Luther, Calvin, and the rest could scarcely make a virtue of ecclesiasticism.

Ecclesiastical organization was perhaps the least important activity of Martin Luther and the Lutheran Church. In common with the Calvinists, this Church recognized the priesthood of all believers and the parity of ministers, but, unlike the Calvinists, did not harden this into a fixed principle of organization. In the Scandinavian countries, where kings and bishops co-operated in the work of reformation, the episcopate was retained, though in a modified form; in the German principalities the *jus episcopale* was delegated to the civil power, which in turn delegated it to Consistories, and the persistence of civil government and patronage in the Church prevented Lutheranism from ever attaining to the firm representative organization which has become a feature of Presbyterianism. The attitude of Melanchthon, who would have recognized either bishops or a pope if they could have been shown to be of real use, has remained typical; the small crop of Lutheran Free Churches has resulted mainly from doctrinal objections to the union of Lutheran and Reformed a century ago in Prussia and allied states, and at least one such body seceded on the question of whether government was an essential feature of the Church at all.

The Calvinist bodies were prevented by circumstances from any such indifference to the form of Church government; for, whether by accident or by necessity, they found themselves situated either in republics or in principalities and kingdoms where the absence of a sympathetic ruler rendered the Lutheran plan impossible, and where the opposition of the bishops sooner or later demanded the repudiation of episcopacy. As has now been shown, the retention of episcopacy in some Reformation lands and its rejection in others was no accident, but a logical consequence of the attitude assumed by the bishops and the civil authorities towards the Reformation.

II. *SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT.*—i. DOCTRINE.—In the dogmatic sphere two great doctrines mark off the Calvinist system from all others.

(*a*) The first of these is the doctrine of *the absolute sovereignty of God*, which is the keynote of all the other Calvinist developments. This carried with it the doctrines of election and predestination (*qq.v.*), which, in their rigid Supralapsarian form, denied man any participation whatever in the work of saving himself, and, in their milder Infralapsarian form, left him only a very minor part to play in it. This dogma, harsh as it may seem to the more lenient spirits of to-day, is not to be dismissed off-hand as if it were a mere negation of man's free will. The 'mere good pleasure' aspect of the doctrine is not the vital part of it. In the days when Calvin promulgated it the agony of a dying age and the birth-pangs of a new might well seem to renew the circumstances under which Augustine had set it forth, and to force upon men anew the conviction that God was all and man was nothing; to depend absolutely on the sovereign will of God for salvation was better than to depend upon the arbitrary will of a corrupt decaying papacy and an ignorant, evil-living priesthood; the folly of too much freedom was demonstrated by the excesses of Anabaptists and other irresponsible sectaries, and Lutheranism hesitated between universalism and the predestined release of certain elected men from the consequences of a totally depraved and enslaved human will. Calvin's doctrine of election was not so much a gloomy and pessimistic denial of human freedom as the joyous proclamation that man lived in an ordered universe where the sovereignty of God removed from the region of doubt the salvation of the true believer. It is an attempt to recognize necessity and order in the world of God's creation—to see temporal things, in Spinoza's immortal phrase, 'sub specie eternitatis.' This teaching runs throughout the Calvinist Confessions; and, though the settling down of modern civilization has induced in many quarters a revival of the softer Semi-Pelagian ideas, it still remains the official belief of Presbyterian Christendom.

(*b*) The other doctrinal differentia of Calvinism is found in connexion with *the sacraments*. It differs from Lutheranism in regard to baptismal regeneration and the ordinary necessity of baptism; but the chief difference is in regard to the Lord's Supper. The Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation fell into disfavour as vitally connected with the ideas of priesthood and organization against which Protestantism was an avowed revolt; and the Lutheran idea of consubstantiation, with its insistence upon the corporeal presence of Christ in the sacrament, seemed to more radical Reformers to differ so little from the Catholic notion as to be an insufficient guarantee against the reintroduction of a tyrannical priesthood using unscrupulously a magical key by which they could open or close heaven to the rest of mankind. On the other hand, Zwingli and his following, by denying any real presence at all and reducing the sacrament to a mere memorial, seemed to many to go too far in the other direction. In actual fact the difference between Luther and Zwingli seriously divided the Reformers. Calvin's theory of the sacrament occupies a position between these extremes: it substitutes for the corporeal presence of Christ a spiritual, though quite real, presence; for the magical *opus operatum* of Roman Catholicism it substitutes an operation of the Holy Spirit whereby the believing communicant really feeds upon Christ; it professes to find in the real presence a mystery too profound to be explained by

the simple mechanical theory of Catholics and Lutherans or to be explained away by the equally simple denial of Zwingli; and, while the mediating position of the Calvinist theory has brought it under the suspicion of being an εἰρηνικόν cunningly devised in the interest of ecclesiastical and political union among the Reformers—the work of a Presbyterian politician rather than a philosophic theologian—so far as is known, no scrap of evidence exists to show that Calvin had any such deliberate purpose. It fits in quite articulately with the rest of his theology, and is the natural result of an effort on the part of one who was not an extremist to devise a theory of the sacrament which would retain the real presence of Christ without degrading it into the mechanical production of a priest with a formula. If it has served to hold together a great mass of Protestant opinion upon a subject so vital, that is not so much the result of any definite political design as a tribute to its innate reasonableness and moderation. It remains yet a feature of confessional Presbyterianism.

ii. POLITY.—The most characteristic aspect of Presbyterianism, however, is its evolution as an ecclesiastical polity. It is a natural inference from the doctrines of justification by faith and of the sole sovereignty of God that all men are equal before their maker, and the status of the clergy as a special caste wielding the powers of spiritual life and death was thereby destroyed. The ecclesiastical organization was looked at no longer from above but from below: the call of the people and the approval of his peers replaced episcopal consecration in the making of a minister; the laity received a share in the government of the Church, and the responsibility of officials to the general body became a recognized feature of ecclesiastical organization. Thus, behind all the formal shapes assumed by Reformed Church constitutions, an essentially democratic spirit is discerned. All was, at first, experimental; definite and rigid systems were evolved only by degrees. A 'jure humano' episcopacy did not frighten Calvin; and Knox, the founder of national Scottish Presbyterianism, approved, before his death, the reintroduction of bishops for certain specified purposes and on a basis of responsibility. But the fundamental ideas of the Reformed Churchmen had sealed the doom of the old type of episcopate, and, before long, the dangers involved in the preservation of even its outward form rendered a definitely Presbyterian theory and system inevitable. Circumstances forced upon Melville and others a greater rigidity of view and practice than had been found necessary by Calvin and Knox; and the conception of ministerial parity as an essential feature of the true Church was forced upon the Calvinist communions by ecclesiastical and political strife. The effusion of blood, as well as ink, in its defence caused the Presbyterians to set a great, perhaps an exaggerated, value upon their theories of Church government, for which they have suffered and fought, as other men for their faith.

The starting-point of any inquiry into the nature and history of Presbyterian Church government is necessarily found in Calvin's *Institutes* and especially in bk. iv., which deals with the doctrine of the Church. According to Calvin, a Church and ministers are necessary as external helps to the true believer, for whose edification the ministers at public worship expound God's Word. A careful distinction is drawn between the invisible Church known only to God and the visible Church which is discerned 'wherever we see the Word of God sincerely preached and heard, wherever we see the sacraments administered according to the institution of Christ' (bk. iv. ch. i. § 9). This very simple idea of the marks of the true Church renders the independence of many various bodies consistent with the essential requisite of true spiritual unity; taken in connexion with the idea of an invisible Church known only to God, it renders secession, except for the weightiest reasons, wicked and frivolous. Calvin will not even go so far as to unchurch Rome, though he contends that the insignificance of the remnants of a true Church contained in it abundantly justifies men in repudiating the Roman communion. 'We behoved to withdraw from them in order to draw near to Christ' (bk. iv. ch. ii. § 6).[1]

In the Church God uses men for the useful and honourable office of the ministry, and in Holy Scripture, the touchstone of all his ideas, Calvin finds only two permanent orders of ministry—the pastor and the teacher—though temporary offices, such as those of apostle, prophet, and evangelist, existed in NT times for special purposes, and might profitably be temporarily renewed on sufficient occasion. Of the permanent officers the pastor roughly resembles the apostle, whose function he localizes. 'What the apostles did for the whole world, every pastor should do for the flock over which he is appointed' (bk. iv. ch. iii. § 6). His office entitles him to preach, to administer the sacraments, to exercise discipline, to admonish, and to exhort; and, while this is ordinarily to be done for a special church to which he should be restricted, Congregationalism is avoided by the qualification that the pastor should move by public permission or be moved by public authority when the public good demands it. The idea of ministerial parity, which later became a rigidly defined principle of the Presbyterian system, comes out in the contention that, in Scripture, bishop, presbyter, pastor, and minister are interchangeable terms for the same ecclesiastical office. Calvin's later correspondence serves to show that he had no objection to episcopacy in so far as bishops might be useful and expedient; but his doctrine of the Church leaves them no essential place in it. Historically he regards the ancient bishop as a mere chairman of presbyters; and, with him, Jerome's famous dictum as to the original equality of bishop and presbyter, which raised no controversy in Jerome's day, and yet was never forgotten, became at length the basis of a Church polity.

The teacher, who corresponds roughly to the prophet and evangelist, is restricted to a purely educational function. Among the offices mentioned in Ro 12 and 1 Co 12, two are recognized as permanent—government and the care of the poor; and the secondary position of government, in Calvin's eyes, is shown by the admission of the laity to a share in these. Elders assist in the government of the Church, and deacons are divided into two classes according as they care for the poor and sick or deal with almsgiving. The permanent officials of the Church therefore are: pastors, teachers, elders, and deacons. The essentials for the making of a minister are: the call of God, examination as to life and doctrine, the call of the people, and a solemn setting apart to his office. Calvin almost goes out of his way to defend the people's right of electing their minister, but recommends that, in the interest of peace and common sense, other ministers should preside over the election. In the above conception of the Church we have in essence many of the features of present-day Presbyterianism—*e.g.*, the equality

[1] It is not surprising that, in time, Catholicism came to regard Calvinism as the arch-enemy. The Calvinists, *e.g.*, were excluded from the Peace of Augsburg (1555), and were only recognized in the Peace of Westphalia as late as 1648. How far the feeling had become mutual may be gathered from the fact that, as late as 1647, the stately and balanced Westminster Confession cannot refrain from abuse of the pope (xxv. 6).

of ministers, their election by the people, the share of the laity in Church government, and so on. But so far nothing unique is present, except perhaps the unusually vigorous defence of popular rights. The determinative feature of Calvin's system, however, appears on consideration of his theory concerning the relations between the civil and ecclesiastical powers. The Church, according to him, has a threefold power: (1) she can declare and interpret dogma, though she has no right to invent new dogmas not found in Scripture; (2) she can legislate for the Church, but she has no right to force purely human expedients and ceremonies upon her members to the prejudice of their consciences; thus he frees men from the Roman type of bondage to tradition and custom, and reduces the spirit of Church government to the observance of mutual charity and edification; (3) —and here the most distinctive feature of Calvinism is reached—he insists upon retaining for the Church a certain sphere of jurisdiction. Unlike Luther and Zwingli, who freely surrendered the administrative and disciplinary power of the Church to the civil authorities, whether princely or republican, Calvin attempted to mark off for the Church a sphere of spiritual jurisdiction distinct from the civil; and on the determination of his followers to define and preserve this sphere, irrespective of all difficulties, hangs much of the trouble that fell to the lot of Presbyterianism in later years. Spiritual government, in his view, was as necessary to the Church as civil government to the State; and the two jurisdictions, though mutually helpful rather than antagonistic, were quite distinct. The Church could not surrender, voluntarily or compulsorily, the power of the keys; she claimed no right to inflict civil punishment, but only to admonish and, if necessary, to excommunicate, for the purpose of producing repentance in offenders—a purpose in which the civil procedure frequently failed. This useful power of ecclesiastical discipline for spiritual evil-doers was to be in the hands of a Consistory 'of elders which is in the Church what a council is in a city'; and the basis of its judgments upon individuals was of course to be Christian doctrine. The error of the Roman Church lay not in the claiming of this power, but in the abuse of it for unworthy and worldly ends through the agency of corrupt and irresponsible individuals. Calvin does not seek to interfere with or to minimize in any way the scope of the civil power. He calls the magistrates 'ambassadors of God,' 'vicegerents of God,' and says that God considers their office an honourable one; and, while he indicates his personal preference for aristocratic government tempered by democratic consent, he holds that it is the duty of all Christian men to obey whatever lawful rulers have dominion over them. The only circumstances under which resistance, active or passive, is justifiable arise when the commands of rulers clash with the commands of God. Conversely, it is the duty of rulers to preserve public peace and happiness, and their first care must be for religion and morals. Their co-operation is due to the Church in this regard,

'provided this is done to preserve, not to disturb, the order of the Church, to establish, not to destroy, discipline. For, seeing the Church has not, and ought not to wish to have, the power of compulsion (I speak of civil coercion), it is the part of pious kings and princes to maintain religion by laws, edicts, and sentences' (bk. iv. ch. xi. § 16).

While thus fully recognizing the civil jurisdiction, Calvin holds that it should not interfere with the ecclesiastical, unless by direct invitation or necessity; and in this effort to define the respective limits of Church and civil power, to secure civil co-operation while keeping spiritual jurisdiction and liberty inviolate, he stands alone among the Reformers. The forms of procedure set forth in bk. iv. ch. x. are of only secondary importance. The point of his system which is distinctively characteristic of Presbyterianism consists in his determination to keep ecclesiastical discipline in ecclesiastical hands.

Such, in brief, are Calvin's ideas of Church government; but he lacked a field in which to test them, until, overwhelmed by the 'formidable obtestation' of Guillaume Farel, he consented to settle in Geneva. In that city there had long been an unstable equilibrium of three forces—the vicedominus of the house of Savoy, the bishop, who was often a member of the same house, and the people; and, when Calvin arrived in the city in 1536, the people had just won their freedom, after a contest in which independence and the new faith had played an equal part. But a state of confusion had supervened; and Farel the Reformer knew that no one in the city was capable of reducing the chaos to order. Accordingly, he persuaded Calvin to relinquish his project of further study for the work of organization. The system of Church government introduced was naturally Presbyterian: not only did Calvin's own ideas run in that direction, but the attempt to continue episcopacy would have had scant hope of success in a city which had just shaken off the tyranny of a bishop. Nevertheless the people hated the bishop less as a Roman Catholic, or a corrupt Churchman, or an official without NT warrant than as an interferer with their liberty, just as they afterwards hated Calvin and the rest for the same reason. Trouble began almost at once. In a memorandum of 15th Jan. 1537 Calvin asked the Council for a body of incorruptible men to exercise Church discipline up to and including excommunication. But the civil authorities did not like Calvin's request that the Church might have a disciplinary authority which neither Luther nor Zwingli had asked for it, and many citizens feared for their personal freedom. In 1538 a majority of the new Council consisted of Calvin's opponents. Strife began, and grew so keen that the ministers were forbidden to preach politics. Disgusted by this, and angered by the attempt to force upon them the observance of the Bernese usages, the ministers finally revolted openly at the Council's command to exclude no one from communion, and on 21st April they brought matters to a crisis by refusing to dispense the sacrament. They were banished, and all mediation was rejected by the Council. This refusal to accept dictation from the civil power on a matter vital to the welfare and liberty of the Church, and the choice of banishment before surrender, are a new departure in Protestant history, and are determinative of Presbyterianism.

Calvin's first experience of Geneva, however, did not deter him from returning, though reluctantly, three years later; for no city in France was safe, and no city in Germany politically free, and in Geneva alone could he hope to find a sphere of operations. Within twenty-four hours of his return he was at work; and the *Ordonnances* were the final outcome of his labours. He wished to embody the distinction between civil and spiritual jurisdiction, to secure the independence of the Church within her own sphere, to obtain the acceptance of a creed based on Holy Scripture alone, and to tune up Genevan morals to a NT pitch. The difficulty was that he must gain the consent of the civil powers to his solution of a problem which had hitherto been solved very differently, and must induce them to relinquish a great part of their authority. At the same time the enforcement of a NT standard of morals was distasteful to many citizens. Accordingly the *Ordonnances*,

while Calvin's sole work, do not represent his ideal. Four classes of official are recognized in the Church—pastor, teacher, elder, and deacon. The ministers were chosen by those already ordained after an examination as to life and doctrine. The civil power then approved of them; finally the people heard them, and they were ordained without laying on of hands. The democratic idea of this became aristocratic in practice; for, in actual fact, the people accepted, rather than elected, their ministers. The ministers were to meet once a week in conference and once in three months for mutual criticism; in this 'venerable company,' which did not, except by censure and moral weight, interfere in civil affairs, we discern a germ of the Presbytery. The teachers were purely for educational purposes. The ruling elders were in the Church what the magistrates were in the city. Their function was purely spiritual, confined to the judging of spiritual offences and the infliction of spiritual penalties, the aim being to secure the repentance of the offender. But, though Calvin, in accordance with his general principles, attempted to mark off this eldership, with its ecclesiastical sphere of action, quite distinctly from the magistracy, with its civil functions, he could not quite secure what he wanted, and had even the worse of the compromise which followed. He was unable to secure the election of the elders by the Church alone, or on the pure ground of spiritual and moral fitness. The Council, besides fixing the number of elders at twelve, decreed that two must be chosen from the Little Council, four from the Sixty, and six from the Two Hundred. The twelve, in the first instance, were really civil functionaries, and a committee of the Council; only secondarily and nominally did they form part of a Church court. Calvin may have had a paramount influence in that court, but his influence was a purely moral one, and he never presided. Indeed, in spite of the presence of these twelve councillors in the Consistory, along with the ministers, Calvin had much ado to secure for it the right of excommunication. It was agreed that, if no repentance resulted from judgments up to and including excommunication, the persistent offender should be handed over to the civil power. As this applied to doctrinal as well as moral cases, it really amounted to a declaration of the right of persecution; here at least Calvin is not in advance of his age, and his readiness to admit the interference of civil power, so long as it is not opposed to him, weakens his position as against hostile interference. The deacons discharged the functions already indicated in the *Institutio*, but were not organized, as recommended therein, into two classes. Calvin's machinery for the doctrinal and moral regeneration of Geneva, therefore, consisted of a verbally inspired Word of God, ministers to expound the same, a Consistory to enforce it, and the Council to deal with recalcitrants. A great deal of petty and almost ridiculous business came before the Consistory, but it accomplished its main purpose of raising the undoubtedly low standard of Genevan morals. Even to hold what he had got cost Calvin a long and bitter struggle. He was opposed by many old Genevans who had taken a prominent part in the liberation of their city and resented foreign intrusion, however salutary; and by that section of the citizens who resented the strictness of his moral control. His gains were not secure for over a decade; and not till he received the citizenship of Geneva in 1559 did he attempt to define more clearly the distinction between Church and State, in a series of demands which were practically all granted by the Council. Before his death in 1564 he had vastly bettered Genevan morals, given the city a splendid educational system, and made it a refuge for the oppressed of Europe, and he had the satisfaction of knowing that in France, in Scotland, and elsewhere his ideas of Church government and of the relation of Church and State were being extensively put into practice. The Presbyterian Church as a distinct and definite ecclesiastical body had entered upon its honourable career.

iii. History in Europe.—1. **Scotland.**—Presbyterianism, in its national form as an established Church, is best exemplified in the case of Scotland, where, after an eventful history of three centuries and a half, it still retains a powerful grip upon the people. The Scottish Reformation, in the Lutheran form, was already so far advanced in 1525 as to call for stringent government interference; but, when it became strong enough to dominate the nation forty years later, it had assumed the Calvinist form, and it was the Calvinist type of theology and polity that received official recognition in 1560. The great protagonist of the movement was John Knox, who was called to the ministry at St. Andrews by popular acclamation during the period of excitement which followed the murder of Cardinal Beaton (1546). Knox was made prisoner when the French fleet captured St. Andrews castle in 1547, and spent two years as a galley-slave. After his release he remained in exile till 1559. Part of this period was spent in England, where he more than once refused preferment, part in Frankfort, where he and others vainly attempted to set the Church upon a Puritan basis, and part in Geneva, where he was enabled to see at work opinions and ideas which he had independently drawn from Scripture. His views were moulded and confirmed rather than created by his Genevan experience. Returning finally to Scotland in 1559, he became at once the head and front of the Reformation movement; and, if any confirmation of his Presbyterian convictions was necessary, he found it in the opposition of regent and bishops. By the middle of 1560 the Treaty of Edinburgh marked the triumph of Protestantism and English influence over Catholicism and the French interest, and the religious influence of Knox held the field in Scotland. The Confession of 1560 is thoroughly Calvinist, and is conspicuous for a wise moderation, which is unfortunately less apparent in the conflicts of later times. The first Book of Discipline embodies an essentially Presbyterian conception of the ministry. The differences from the Genevan organization are exactly what we might expect from the differing ecclesiastical needs of a nation and a city-state; the differences from the modern Scottish organization may be explained from the different circumstances of the age. Knox and his coadjutors were faced by the difficult problem of an abundant harvest and a lack of labourers; they had to find 100 ministers where Calvin had to find one. The first General Assembly, *e.g.*, contained only six ministers; accordingly, the ministerial office was supplemented in two directions. The reader's office was added to fill the gaps in the ranks of the regular ministry, the temporary nature of the expedient, however, being fully recognized. Readers were expected and encouraged to justify by their work eventual promotion to the regular ministry; persistent incapacity to do so was followed by exclusion from office. The scarcity of ministers also implied the necessity of making the best possible use of those available, and the country was therefore divided into ten dioceses, each in charge of a superintendent, who had to see that kirks were planted at the proper strategic points, to help the ministers in their work, and generally to exercise supervision. Some of these were laymen. The contention that these superintendents were virtually bishops cannot be upheld

—still less the almost fantastic contention that they were intended in time to be superseded by fully-qualified bishops. In this connexion we may note a curious and instructive parallel to the Scottish system of 1560 in the Canadian organization of to-day. There, similar needs have called forth similar expedients. The difficult problem of Church extension in the rapidly-filling West has called into being the office of superintendent without any afterthought of episcopacy. Divinity students in full standing and lay missionaries who look forward to ordination after a special course correspond to the readers of 1560. Knox's doctor is represented by the professor, the lay elder by his kind, and the deacon by the manager. The parallel is strikingly complete.

In the Church of 1560 the germ of the later Presbytery is discerned in the weekly meeting of local ministers in the towns, the Synod is foreshadowed by the superintendent's Council, and the General Assembly, irregularly constituted as yet and with uncertain powers, met at frequent intervals. The fully articulated system of later times grew only by degrees. Knox and his fellow-workers took substantially the same view as Calvin regarding the relation of the civil and ecclesiastical powers; indeed, though his own views on the point were independently matured, Knox had consulted Bullinger and Calvin on it during his exile; and the struggle of Geneva was repeated on a national scale in Scotland. The return of Mary Queen of Scots from France in 1561 ushered in a period of strife. The Reformers mistrusted Mary's good intentions towards the new Church, and resented the withholding of recognition from certain of their standards; she, on her side, was piqued by ministerial interference in her private concerns, and saw in the Church a formidable obstacle to her scheme of Roman Catholic reaction. Politics and the greed of the nobles went hand in hand with ecclesiastical strife to make difficult the way of the new Church; and civil war at length broke out, as a result of which the unhappy queen was driven from Scotland (1568) and the Roman Catholic power in the country was finally broken. But the defeat of the Roman Catholic party and the establishment of the Protestant succession in the person of the infant James VI. did not bring peace to the Church. The ministers found it nearly impossible to secure their stipends in terms of the agreement come to with the civil authorities; and, after some discussion, bishops were re-introduced into the Church by the Concordat of Leith (1572). To this expedient Knox consented before his death, recommending, however, that such bishops should be responsible to the General Assembly. The experiment proved a disastrous failure. Not only did the new episcopate escape ecclesiastical control, but they also rendered the clergy poorer than ever, by becoming the cat's-paws of the nobles in their seizure of ecclesiastical revenues, instead of the pay-masters of the unhappy clergy. The contemptuous name of 'tulchans' applied to the bishops of 1572 shows the estimation in which they were generally held, and the contemptible part which they played in the history of the time was a severe blow to the cause of Episcopacy in Scotland. In 1574 Andrew Melville returned to Scotland from Geneva, and proceeded to uphold the view that the office of bishop was unscriptural and by no means to be tolerated in a pure Church. Circumstances assured his success. By 1580 the 'tulchans' had disappeared; and in 1578 the second Book of Discipline was prepared, to be endorsed by the General Assembly in 1581. The first Book had grown out of the circumstances of the time, and found its best sanction in contemporary needs; the second Book, on the other hand, aimed at the deduction of general principles from the NT. *E.g.*, the offices of superintendent and reader were excised as episcopal and unscriptural; and, whereas the first Book had set up no Church courts, the second supplied the omission, but, strangely enough, left out the most characteristic court of all—the Presbytery. Presbyteries, however, were coming rapidly into existence; and the Assembly which adopted the Book erected several in 1581. Of the offices mentioned in the Book, the doctor and the deacon have practically disappeared; minister and elder alone remain with their original functions. The second Book of Discipline, with its determined attempt at a closer organization than that of 1560, never secured, in its entirety, the sanction of the civil power.

From the time of Melville's return to Scotland a determined struggle raged in the country for a century. On the one side we have Melville and those who followed him, holding the most rigid views concerning the parity of all ministers and the divine necessity of Presbyterian Church government; on the other, the determined Episcopalianism of the Stuart kings. Parallel to this divergence of view, and vitally connected with it, ran the question of the relation between Church and State, which became acute in every state where the Reformed Church had trouble with the authorities. Melville, on his side, believed in the double jurisdiction of Christ and the temporal king, and strenuously resisted any interference with the Church within her own inviolate sphere; James VI., on the other side, believing in the Divine Right of kings, saw in the Church's claim to spiritual independence as great a menace to the royal power as the papal jurisdiction had been. Moreover, as his succession to the English throne became more and more assured, the king was moved by a sense of the risks attendant upon the maintenance of two differing ecclesiastical polities within his dominions, and his consistent aim was to conform Scotland to Anglicanism. By means of episcopacy he could best hope to maintain control over the Church. Throughout the long struggle absolutism by Divine Right, episcopacy in the Church, and royal supremacy over all causes were banded together against limited monarchy, Presbyterian Church government, and ecclesiastical supremacy in spiritual affairs.

The details of the struggle need not be closely followed. The king, on his part, aimed at the complete subordination of Church and people to his views; the Church, on her part, resisted royal interference in spiritual matters. But the Church founded all her activities, beliefs, and claims ostensibly on the Word of God; and, as the ministers alone had the right to interpret that, no practical limit could be set to the claims of the Church, except by effective intervention on the part of the civil power. The king, as it turned out, would concede nothing, and the ministers claimed too much; and there is some truth in the thesis that Scotland had to choose between the tyranny of a king and the tyranny of a ministry self-constituted as the interpreters of an infallible Bible. But, on the whole, the Church represented the popular will, and served the popular cause. The ministers were chosen by popular election, they educated the people to the best of their ability, and sought to win their confidence; and there is no doubt that during the 17th cent. the General Assembly was a more representative body than the subservient Scottish parliament. Presbyterianism won a victory in 1592, when it secured from king and parliament what has been called its Magna Charta; but Episcopacy was re-introduced

in 1610, and the next opportunity of the Presbyterians came in 1638, when the injudicious and obstinate interference of Charles I. and Laud with the liturgy caused a wave of feeling to inundate Scotland that made the National Covenant possible. The Glasgow Assembly of that year swept away Episcopacy; and the king, whose hands were tied by difficulties in England, was powerless to save the bishops. Four years later civil war broke out in England between king and parliament. Now at length the long opposition culminated in an appeal to arms, and by the Solemn League and Covenant the Scottish Church and the English parliament were united in the cause of representative government and religious freedom.

2. **England.**—It will be convenient at this point to refer to the history of English Presbyterianism, which in 1643 found itself allied with its Scottish neighbour. The growing rigidity of ecclesiastical arrangements during Elizabeth's reign stimulated nonconformity into life both within and without the State Church. Of the nonconformists within the Church one party agreed on the whole with the Anglican establishment, but wished to see certain Romanist survivals purged away; another party, taking up the Presbyterian attitude, disagreed entirely with existing arrangements. Of the fortunes of the former party little need be said—they varied with the degree of persecuting zeal exercised by the authorities. But both parties have their essential connexion with Scotland from the beginning; for the troubles of the English congregation at Frankfort, in which John Knox was involved, were in fact a struggle between Anglicanism and Puritanism, and the first really Puritan congregation was John Knox's in Geneva. To that city, therefore, may be traced, not only the genesis of Scottish Presbyterianism, but also the beginnings of Presbyterianism and Puritanism in England. English nonconformity was largely the result of what the Marian exiles had seen and done abroad.

The movement of repression was well under way in 1561, by which time Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity and other measures were in operation against nonconformity. A second Act of Uniformity followed in 1563. About 1565 Parker declared that Presbyterianism was the Church's most threatening foe—and certainly it was the most definite and concrete form of opposition to existing ecclesiastical arrangements. About 1570 Cartwright, a Cambridge Divinity professor (later deprived for his anti-ecclesiastical views), brought Presbyterianism into prominence by his activity; and in 1572 the propaganda evolved into the 'Admonition to Parliament.' The 'Admonition' consisted of two manifestoes which never reached the stage of presentation to parliament. It is fanatically Presbyterian in tone, and aims at the substitution of presbytery for episcopacy in English Church government. In the same year the first English Presbytery was erected at Wandsworth. Cartwright was forced to flee the country, but maintained from his exile a vigorous literary defence of Presbyterianism against Whitgift. Other writings in defence of presbytery, such as that of Travers in 1574, continued to appear; and in 1583 enough Presbyterians existed in England to make possible the issue of a *Directory of Church Government*; but after that date the Presbyterian movement, having flourished for a decade, began to decline. Whitgift, though he did not, like Bancroft, insist on the divine right of episcopacy, was sternly set against nonconformity; and, by means of an ecclesiastical commission, forced from all ministers the admission that episcopacy was at least not contrary to Scripture. In 1584 the Presbyterians failed to introduce into parliament a bill in favour of their discipline; the Marprelate Tracts of 1588–89 roused Whitgift to a fresh access of persecuting zeal; the incident of the Armada in 1588 helped to confound in men's minds the ideas of nonconformity and political disaffection. Thus, though about 1590 there were some 500 Presbyterian ministers in England, the Act of 1593 ended meanwhile all effective opposition to the State Church. Presbyterianism found itself in especial difficulties when subjected to persecution, because, unlike Independency, it could not realize its ideal except by means of an elaborate organization, and so could not retire into hiding till the storm blew over, without relinquishing essential principles. Driven by the Act of 1593 to exile, or silence, or the assumption of the cloak of Puritanism, Presbyterianism languished for a time; and the hopes raised by the Hampton Court Conference (1604) proved illusory. But, as time went on, the ideas of James I. and Charles I. concerning Divine Right gradually drove into alliance the causes of civil and religious liberty, and the consistent harshness of Laud towards nonconformity helped to precipitate the great crisis of the Civil War. About the time when the Long Parliament met (1629) Presbyterianism had begun to raise its head. London was strongly Presbyterian, and Presbyterianism was widely diffused throughout England. In 1630 appeared Alexander Leighton's *Sion's Plea against the Prelacie*, for which the author was severely punished. Other incidents of the same nature occurred; and, while the Long Parliament, to begin with, merely desired to abate the overweening pretensions of the bishops, there were many who desired more, and their ideas gradually prevailed. Scottish commissioners were in London, preaching frequently, writing, holding conferences. In 1641 appeared *Smectymnuus*, a plea for Presbyterianism which recalled the days of Cartwright. The Root and Branch petition of Dec. 1640 and the ministers' petition of Jan. 1641 were on the same lines. Parliamentary defeats in the early part of the Civil War rendered the Presbyterian alliance necessary, and the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643 ushered in the period of Presbyterian ascendancy, which lasted till 1648. Charles I. had now combined against himself all the elements of ecclesiastical and political revolt in the British Isles; and Presbyterianism was meanwhile the dominating religious factor in the combination. The decision of battle went against the royalists, who were decisively beaten at Naseby in 1645; and Presbyterianism enjoyed its triumph. The terms of the Solemn League and Covenant show how far short Presbyterianism yet was of learning from its own sufferings the lesson of toleration. One of the avowed aims of the treaty was to force all the British Isles into Presbyterian conformity; and, though the English Presbyterians were less narrow and fanatical than their covenanted Scottish brethren, and though the Independents, a growing body, were still more set on liberty of conscience, the Scots had their way. The Westminster Assembly was overwhelmingly Presbyterian in sentiment and policy, and adorned the few years of the Presbyterian ascendancy with those classics of English-speaking Presbyterianism which almost make us forget the narrow spirit of the time and are the fine flower of Calvinist dogmatics.

The Westminster Confession of 1647, still the official Confession of English-speaking Presbyterians, is a noble monument to its authors and to the age which gave it birth; in its stately and balanced style, in the completeness with which it sets forth the Calvinist theology, in its pointed avoidance of what is merely controversial, it is the model of a Confession for a great body of Christian believers who are conscious enough of

their own worth in the world to refrain from speaking evil of others. The same Assembly of divines sent forth the *Form of Church Government*, the *Directory for Public Worship*, and the Longer and Shorter Catechisms; and of them all, whether we judge by its intrinsic excellence or its long and widely-diffused influence, the Shorter Catechism is undoubtedly the best. A new version of the Psalms also appeared in due course; and the sacrifices made to the cause of union by the Scottish Church consisted in the repudiation of Knox's Psalms for the new version, in the adoption of the King James Bible in place of the Genevan, in the dropping of Knox's liturgy, the Book of Common Order, and the Confession of 1560.

3. Wane in England and Scotland.—But, even while the Presbyterians rejoiced in the creation of an imperial Presbyterianism and in the consent of parliament thereto, their power was on the wane. Independency was growing in the army, and men like Cromwell and Milton were already on the Independent side. Independency was gradually preparing to play the chief part in the religious situation; and 1646 may be taken as the high-water mark of Presbyterianism. After that date, except in London and Lancashire, a thoroughly Presbyterian organization ceased to exist in England; and, when Charles I. escaped to Carisbrooke, and made promises which turned the Presbyterians royalist, Presbyterianism fell with the falling cause. The Scots made a desperate effort to save the situation. Parliament, in defiance of the General Assembly, who thought Charles's concessions insufficient, entered into the 'Engagement,' and the 'Engagers' invaded England, to suffer a crushing defeat at Preston (1648). Cromwell was now master of the situation, and Pride's Purge and the execution of Charles I. rapidly followed. But the Scots were not yet crushed. After the disastrous failure of the 'Engagers' the Covenanters seized the reins of government, excluded all non-Covenanters from official positions by the Act of Classes, and offered Charles II. the crown only on the most rigid and humiliating terms. Nevertheless they did offer him the crown, and prepared to fight for him, but stultified their efforts by first purging the army of 80 uncovenanted officers and several thousand uncovenanted men. The defeat of Dunbar in 1650 brought them to their senses; but even then the excluded soldiers were re-admitted to the army only under humiliating conditions, and the repeal of the Act of Classes rent Scotland with the strife of 'resolutioners' and 'protesters.' Cromwell's final victory at Worcester (1651) involved both in a common disaster; yet, though the General Assembly was dismissed in July 1653 after the manner of the English parliament, the minor Church courts continued to exist and the antagonism of resolutioner and protester rent Scotland during the rule of Monk.

In England also the régime of Cromwell was tolerant. The Rump Parliament having failed to touch the religious question, Cromwell had finally to take it up himself; and, as the Presbyterians outnumbered their colleagues in the ministry, Presbyterianism still existed in a shadowy way. The minimum of ecclesiastical machinery that continued to exist was Presbyterian; but what was left was the ministry rather than the system. In 1660 Monk set up Presbyterianism once more, but not for long; it was the calm before the storm let loose under Charles II.

(*a*) *England.*—To take England first: Charles would doubtless have tolerated Presbyterianism, if he could have secured for Roman Catholicism a share in the toleration; but the anti-Catholic and anti-Presbyterian sentiment of Commons and country was bound to prove too much for the easy-going king whose chief desire was to avoid further exile. The reluctance of the parties themselves foiled his efforts to secure a working agreement between presbytery and episcopacy. Bills introduced into parliament were of no avail; the Commons concluded a series of proceedings hostile to nonconformity generally by passing the Act of Uniformity, which became law on 19th May 1662, and signified the defeat of English Presbyterianism. About that time the rise of a latitudinarian school in the English Church which included such men as Benjamin Whichcote, John Moore, John Tillotson, and Edward Stillingfleet, and which based episcopacy on no higher ground than that of expediency, might have held out hopes for Presbyterianism; and Charles himself made various attempts to gain for the Presbyterians by the use of his royal prerogative what parliament refused to grant. But parliament pursued its course by passing the First Conventicle Act (1664), the Five Mile Act (1665), and the Second Conventicle Act (1670), and when Charles, on his own initiative, declared an Indulgence in 1672, parliament forced him to withdraw it within a year. The Test Act supervened in 1673. Neither the use of the prerogative nor occasional personal generosity on the part of the king arrested the fall of Presbyterianism; and the efforts of James VII. and II. produced no better result. The Presbyterians distrusted Indulgences which showed Roman Catholicism an equal kindness with themselves. On the accession of William III. they could not secure ascendancy nor even a working compromise with Episcopacy, but only toleration. Between 1660 and 1690 Presbyterianism and Congregationalism had drawn together in the wilderness of persecution—a movement apparent in local working agreements and in a lowering of Presbyterian Calvinism. Socinianism became rife; and in 1727 the ministers of the 'Three Denominations' (Presbyterian, Congregationalist, and Baptist) formed an organization. The Presbyterians who remained steadfast were few except in the north. During the time of nonconformist revival about the middle of the century the Presbyterians were of more intellectual than spiritual account, and they played a conspicuous part in the struggle for religious liberty about 1780. Before 1843 there were in England Presbyterians connected with the Established and with other Churches of Scotland—the first of these bodies retains its affiliation up to the present, while the others in 1876 united into the Presbyterian Church of England, which has 12 Presbyteries and nearly 400 congregations with missions in China.

(*b*) *Scotland.*—Turning now to Scotland, we find that the theocracy which had existed in 1638—a narrow theocracy with presbytery and the covenant in place of Christianity, hating alike prelacy and prelate, false faith and false believer, episcopacy and independency—had received a rude shaking at the hands of Cromwell. Worse was to follow under Charles II. The Restoration fell heavily upon Scottish Presbyterianism, as upon English. In 1661 the servile Scottish parliament enacted the royal supremacy in all causes, and in 1662 passed the Act Rescissory, which, by undoing the legislation of the previous twenty-seven years, destroyed at a blow all the work of the Covenanting period. The Presbyterians discovered all too soon how easily Charles II. could sacrifice his promises to his inclination or interest. Episcopacy was re-established in 1662; ministers were outed and replaced by curates, whose characters, in many cases, as ill fitted them as their scholarship to take the places of those who had been deprived. The outed ministers and their flocks took to holding conventicles; the system of dragooning them into

compliance began, and, as feeling on both sides was exasperated, the situation in Scotland grew steadily worse. Previous experience made the Presbyterians chary of attempted compromise, and such Acts of Indulgence as were passed did little to mollify the growing bitterness. On the one hand, we have Test Acts and the like, abuses of justice, persecution of the most odious kind, the doings of a Claverhouse in the field and a Mackenzie in the forum, torture, imprisonment, proscription, death. It is little wonder if we find, on the other, wild fanaticism and rebellion mingling with a singleness of purpose and an endurance that sometimes rise to the sublime. After the unsuccessful rebellion of 1679, when the victory of Drumclog was eclipsed by the defeat of Bothwell Brig, dissensions broke out among the persecuted Covenanters, and the fanatical societies came into existence with their Apologetic Declarations, their fondness for the OT as a guide to the treatment of enemies, and their desperate anticipation of what the English Revolution achieved ten years later. In the last few years of Charles's reign the persecution grew so fierce that the name of 'Killing Times' has been applied to the period; but the triumph of the Presbyterians came not long after, when James VII. and II. was deposed in favour of William III. Even then the issue hung in the balance for some time; but the sensitiveness of William III. to public opinion, coupled with the influence of Carstares, decided the establishment of Presbyterianism in Scotland. Since 1690 no Scottish Presbyterian has ever been called upon to suffer for the name. It would be easy to exaggerate the sufferings of the period from 1662 to 1690. Much of the country remained quiet; Kirk-Sessions, Presbyteries, and Synods continued to function under the bishops; the old Creed and worship were little interfered with; the bishops did not err on the side of worldly pomp; and a large proportion of the people had no objection to some features of Episcopacy. But where real antagonism existed, as in Galloway and in Fife, persecution steadily rendered it worse; incidents like the murder of Archbishop Sharp and the punishments which followed it could not be forgotten; the Covenanting and anti-Erastian element was too severely antagonized ever to be reconciled; and the sufferings under Charles II. have scored their mark deep upon the religious history of Scotland. To this day the suspicion with which the old Scottish Presbyterian looks upon anything that savours in the least of Episcopalianism remains a heritage from Covenanting times.

After the establishment of Presbyterianism the question of jurisdiction as between Church and State continued to be a source of strife, but the political sense of William III. rendered easier the smoothing over of difficulties. The last martyr to die the victim of opposed religious convictions was Aikenhead in 1697; the same year saw in force for the first time the educational ideas of the Scottish Reformers — the educational fruits of Episcopal enterprise under an Act of Parliament of 1633 having fallen into decay under Charles II. Presbyterianism by degrees justified its establishment in Scotland, its victory being largely helped by the contrast of its loyalty in the 'Fifteen' and the 'Forty-five,' with the undoubted Stuart sympathies of its Episcopalian and Roman Catholic rivals. Moreover, a better feeling grew up between the opposing bodies, so that Archbishop Denison of Canterbury, in a debate in the English House of Lords on the Act securing Scottish Presbyterianism, could say that

'he had no scruple against ratifying, approving, and confirming it within the bounds of Scotland; he thought the narrow notions of all Churches had been their ruin, and he believed the Church of Scotland to be as true a Protestant Church as the Church of England though he could not say it was so perfect' (W. Carstares, *State-papers*, Edinburgh, 1774, 759, 760).

The Toleration Act of 1712 lent the sanction of law to the new spirit of peacefulness; but the successful issue of the struggle with Episcopacy did not, any more than the victory over Roman Catholicism, end the troubles of the Scottish Church, for, in the same year, the Patronage Act introduced a new cause of discord which rent the Church in pieces. The first Book of Discipline had advocated the popular election of ministers; patronage, with the General Assembly as the final court of appeal in disputed cases, was decreed by parliament in 1567. Patronage was abolished in 1649, restored in 1660, abolished in 1690, and now restored in 1712—from which time onwards this ancient cause of strife assumes the position of chief disturber of the peace of the Church of Scotland. From time to time also the old question of civil and spiritual jurisdiction is raised. The result is to make the Church history of Scotland for the past two centuries a perfect kaleidoscope of separating and re-uniting sects. During all that period the Church remained singularly free from doctrinal troubles of any sort; the 'Marrow' case about 1720, the Simson case of 1729, and the Leechman case of 1744 represent all the heresy troubles of the Church until very recent times; but already in 1733 secession was at work. Troubles arose over the working of the Patronage Act—troubles encouraged by the indefinite practice of a perfectly definite law—and the strife between patron and people tended always to be fought out on the higher ground of spiritual *versus* civil jurisdiction. The Erskines, after taking the definite step of constituting the 'Associate Presbytery,' refused the concessions made to them by the General Assembly of 1734, and would not re-enter the Church which thus sought to make amends for their ejection; their final ejection by the General Assembly of 1740 confirmed their secession. Previous to this their 'Judicial Testimony' of 1736 had recalled all the old Covenanting bitterness; and, after the Cambuslang 'Wark' and the visits of Whitefield in 1741 and 1742, they produced 'The Declaration, Protestation and Testimony of the Suffering Remnant of the anti-Popish, anti-Lutheran, anti-Prelatic, anti-Whitefieldian, anti-Erastian, anti-sectarian, true Presbyterian Church of Scotland,' etc.—a document whose character is sufficiently indicated by its title. In 1746, when the 'Forty-five' had definitely failed, the Associate Synod itself split in two over the question of taking the Burgess Oath, and burgher and anti-burgher excommunicated each the other in 1747.

Meanwhile the question of patronage continued to agitate the Church of Scotland, which divided into the 'moderate' and 'evangelical' parties. Both objected to patronage; but the moderates believed in the enforcement of the existing law, while the evangelical party attached greater importance to the popular call. Disputed settlements resulted, often attended by painful scenes, and, as a consequence of one such disputed election, Thomas Gillespie, who had been deposed for refusing to assist at the ordination of an unpopular presentee to Inverkeithing, formed with Thomas Boston and Thomas Collier in 1761 the 'Presbytery of Relief.' Another sect was thus launched upon its career, but the kindly attitude of Gillespie towards the Establishment and his desire to get back to it contrast most favourably with the determined hostility of the Erskines. The moderates had the best of the battle within the Church; but their ascendancy was purchased at the cost of increased dissent; for, in 1764, there were 120 meeting-houses in Scotland, served by ministers

for whom the people had forsaken unpopular presentees and parish churches, and the rigid enforcement of the patronage law seemed of set purpose to aggravate the popular opposition. The moderates certainly pacified the Church, and put an end to the painful scenes only too common at unpopular settlements; by 1770 the people had learned either to submit quietly or to secede quietly, but secession was more frequent than submission. William Robertson, who led the moderate party to victory, was one of a group of brilliant men who adorned the Church of Scotland at that time; among others may be named John Home, the author of the tragedy of *Douglas*, George Campbell, who answered Hume, and Thomas Reid, who answered Locke. One result of the labours of the moderates was an improvement in the literary quality of Scottish pulpit work.

Towards the end of the century the burghers split into two—the Old Lights and the New Lights—over the question of the Covenant and the powers of the civil magistrate; the anti-burghers also divided into two Synods over the question of the civil magistrate; and, as the Cameronians, in their new Macmillanite form, contrary to expectation, remained aloof from the secession, forming the 'Reformed Presbytery' in 1743 and renewing the Covenants for the last time in 1745, the Church in Scotland was torn in pieces by the end of the 18th century.

The end of that century witnessed important changes—the slackening of the anti-popish spirit, the beginning of debates concerning creed-subscription, the shifting of population with the resultant need for new churches, the rise of a missionary spirit and of a sentiment of greater catholicity. Roman Catholic emancipation in 1829 and the Reform Bill of 1832 were symptoms of a wave of liberalism, which had its effect on the Church of Scotland. The Church's sore was still patronage, and from 1832 onwards overtures began to pour in from Presbyteries, asking for the restoration of the Call to its old place. The General Assembly of 1833 threw out the Veto Act, which conferred upon the majority of heads of families in any church the power to veto the appointment of any presentee on reasonable grounds—and this in spite of the powerful support of Thomas Chalmers. But this was the last victory of the moderates, who could not prevent the passing of the Veto Act and the Chapels Act the following year. Ten years of strife supervened. A number of *causes célèbres* brought the Assembly and the Court of Session into violent conflict, and the question was raised as to the competence of the Assembly to pass such Acts. The Claim of Right of 1842 took very high ground in regard to spiritual independence, and nothing less than total abolition of patronage, with complete independence of the civil power, became the claim of the extreme 'non-intrusionist' party. The quarrel over patronage had developed into the old quarrel over jurisdiction, and in 1843 occurred the great secession known as the Disruption. Out of 1203 ministers, 451 left the Church. In 1874 patronage was abolished; but the Churches in Scotland still continue their separate existence, though the signs of the times point to better things. Indeed, the tendency of nearly a century past has been, on the whole, towards the re-union of the broken fragments of the Scottish Church. To take the more important examples, in 1820 the two bodies of Old and New Lights coalesced into the United Secession Church; and, by the union of that body with the Relief Synod in 1847, the United Presbyterian Church was brought into existence. Thus the Secession Church became the pioneer of union; and in 1900 was consummated the wider union of United Presbyterian Church and Free Church into the United Free Church of Scotland. A remnant refused to enter the new Church, and was declared after an appeal to the House of Lords to be the legal Free Church. The latest statistics show that the Church of Scotland has 16 Synods, 84 Presbyteries, 1442 parish churches, 53 chapels with ordained ministers, 201 mission or preaching stations, 718,719 communicants, 2149 Sunday Schools with 19,662 teachers and 218,702 scholars, adult classes numbering 59,091 scholars, and a Christian liberality of £555,116, 16s. 10d. per annum. The United Free Church has 12 Synods, 64 Presbyteries, 1565 congregations, and 18 congregational missions with ordained ministers; communicants number 512,003, Sunday Schools 2224 with 24,055 teachers and 223,559 scholars, adult classes 2018 with 77,666 pupils; and the annual income is £1,046,049, 8s. 4d. In addition the Church of Scotland has a Synod in England, a Presbytery in British Guiana, and missions in Africa, India, and China, while the United Free Church has Presbyteries in the Italian and Iberian peninsulas and missions in India, Manchuria, Africa, and the W. Indies. The Free Church of Scotland has 4 Synods, 13 Presbyteries, and about 160 congregations (many of them vacant) with a mission in Africa. Of the smaller bodies, the Reformed Presbyterian Church, which is in full communion with the Reformed Presbyterian Churches of America and Ireland, has 11 congregations, and the Synod of United Original Seceders has 4 Presbyteries, 26 congregations, and a mission in India.

4. Ireland.—Presbyterianism in Ireland took its rise among the colonists who were settled in Ulster after the abortive rebellion of the early 17th century. These settlers were mainly of Scottish birth; and, as Episcopacy was just then enjoying one of its brief triumphs in Scotland, Ireland received her fair share of exiled Scottish ministers. Thus the spread of Presbyterianism was rapid. The Anglican Churchmen, poorly supported from England, could not in any case have made effective opposition; as it was, following the lead of Archbishop Ussher, they welcomed the Scottish ministers, and for a time Presbyterian and Anglican worked amicably together. Under the new conditions the original evil repute of the Ulster colonists was gradually lived down; but the growing success of Presbyterianism at length aroused the antagonism of the bishops, who, forsaking the spirit of Ussher for that of Laud, secured, for the time being, the suppression of Irish Presbyterianism. The process was complete by 1636. Five years later Scottish troops were sent into the country to aid in the suppression of a rebellion; and, as the completion of their task demanded a prolonged stay in Ireland, the chaplains of the force were able to re-introduce Presbyterianism. A Presbytery was formed at Carrickfergus on 10th June 1642, and within twenty years the Church numbered 5 Presbyteries, 80 congregations, and 70 ministers. This brief period of rapid expansion was followed by a century of persecution, which was interrupted by a short space of toleration and the institution of the Regium Donum under William III., only to be resumed under Queen Anne by the Test Act of 1704. The results were made apparent in a steady stream of American emigration, which drained Ireland of vast numbers of her best citizens; but not till near 1800 was the obnoxious Act of 1704 cancelled; and even since then Irish Presbyterianism has enjoyed freedom rather than privileges.

Two controversies have agitated the Church. The first of these gathered round the New Light movement, which, beginning in 1709 as a revolt against creed-subscription, resulted in a wide-spread

laxity of doctrine. The movement was not decisively checked till about 1750, when the arrival from Scotland of a sufficient number of rigidly orthodox seceders turned the tide. The Arian controversy broke out in the early half of the 19th cent., and, after a ten years' battle, Henry Cooke, a prominent figure on the orthodox side, forced matters to a decision in 1829. The secession of only 17 ministers was a sufficient proof of the triumph of orthodoxy. There followed in 1840 a union between the Secession Synod and the Synod of Ulster, and gradually the scattered congregations of the south and east came in, till, in 1854, there was only one Presbyterian Church in Ireland. From that time onwards progress has been rapid in every department of Church work. The Regium Donum was discontinued in 1869; but the loss has been more than balanced by the addition of a Sustentation Fund to the interest on the commutation of life-interests. The Irish Church has been of great influence, especially in Ulster, where powerful opposition has had to be faced, but also wherever Ulstermen have congregated abroad. It numbers at present 36 Presbyteries, 562 congregations, 653 ministers, and over 100,000 communicants.

5. **Wales.** — Alone among the Presbyterian Churches of the British Empire, the Welsh Church owes nothing to Scotland. Its formation resulted from an evangelical movement within the Anglican Church, which was begun by Howell Harris in 1735. As the movement grew and spread, societies were formed, and the treatment meted out to those societies by the Established Church at length drove them to separatist courses. The unwillingness of the episcopate finally forced the societies to seek ordination for their pastors elsewhere; and, after they had adopted the practice of ordination by presbyters (1811), the society organization speedily developed into a strong Presbyterian Church which has nearly 200,000 members to-day. There is also a Welsh Presbyterian Church in the United States of America with over 13,000 communicants.

6. **France.**—Early in the 16th cent. a movement of reform had begun in France under the impulse of the New Learning. Francis I., an enthusiastic patron of the Renaissance, was keenly interested, and the movement was fostered by men of weight and learning like Jacques Lefèvre, Briconnet, and Guillaume Farel, and by women of position like Margaret of Navarre. The prospects of reform were bright enough, until the outbreak of Martin Luther alarmed the Church in France as elsewhere. Francis passed over to the side of the enemies of reform, and from 1535 Protestantism was proscribed. Yet, during the persecutions under Francis I. and Henry II., Protestantism continued to make headway in France; and, as this was due mainly to the influence of the exiled Calvin, who, from Geneva, poured into his fatherland a steady stream of letters and messengers, it was the Calvinist form of Protestantism that gradually diffused itself throughout the country. In 1555 La Ferrière, a noble Frenchman, who desired baptism for his child, but could not visit Geneva for the purpose, succeeded with difficulty in persuading his immediate circle of friends to elect La Rivière, one of their number, as pastor, and thus form a congregation. So rapidly was this example copied that, in the three years following, 2000 congregations were formed throughout France. Church and king had hitherto seen in Protestantism no more than religious nonconformity; they now began to discern in it a political menace as well, and persecution was redoubled. On the other hand, as the result of a discussion at Poitiers, the Reformed Church in Paris summoned delegates from all over France to a meeting in the capital; and 150 delegates, assembling in due course in a private house in the Faubourg St. Germain, constituted themselves the First National Synod of the Reformed Church in France (26th May 1559). They adopted a Calvinist Creed (the Confessio Gallica), and, with such changes as the different conditions rendered necessary, reproduced in their constitution the polity of Geneva. Each congregation had a pastor, elders, and deacons; but the Genevan practice was departed from by regarding the diaconate as a spiritual office, and admitting the deacons to a seat in the Consistory which directed congregational affairs. The first set of these officials in each church was chosen by popular election, but subsequently such gaps as might occur were filled by the Consistory; and this 'aristocratic' method of election was long maintained in the face of popular opposition. To bind the congregations together, provision was made for a gradation of Church courts. Provincial Synods, composed of all the pastors within the bounds, with one elder or deacon from each congregation, were to meet twice a year, in order to decide upon appeals from congregations, to arrange and effect the translation of pastors, and generally to administer all competent affairs. General Synods, representing the whole Church, and composed of delegates from all the Consistories, were to be held as need arose. As time revealed defects in the system, means were devised to remedy these. A Colloque—the analogue of the Presbytery—was inserted between the congregational Consistory and the Provincial Synod; and, by the additional arrangement that delegates to the National Synod should be commissioned by the Provincial Synod instead of the Consistory, the Church was provided with a compact conciliar organization, which fitted it to play a part in the political sphere.

The Church had now a definite constitution; its members came to be known by the name 'Huguenots' ([*q.v.*] probably *Eidgenossen*, 'oath-companions'), and it found itself definitely linked with the party whose chiefs were Anthony, King of Navarre, Louis, Duke of Condé, and Admiral Coligny, as against their political and religious opponents, headed by the Guises, Duke and Cardinal. Henry II. died in 1559, the year of the first National Synod; and Francis II., the husband of Mary Queen of Scots and the tool of the Guise faction, did not live long enough to do serious mischief. During the minority of his successor, Charles IX., the regency was in the hands of Catherine de Medici, who pursued the policy of playing off the two parties in the realm one against the other. The Colloque of Poissy (1561), at which Beza pleaded the cause of Protestantism with an eloquence that drew a reluctant tribute from his opponents, was a consequence of this policy; and the result of the conference was the tolerant Edict of St. Germain (1562). But in March of that year a massacre of Protestants, inaugurated at Vassy by the Duke of Guise, transferred the issue from the council-chamber to the camp, and in the course of the next thirty years France was torn by no fewer than eight civil wars. The Roman Catholic party enjoyed almost invariably the military superiority, but the Huguenots were always formidable enough to extract good terms even from defeat and to renew the contest as need or opportunity arose. Sometimes, indeed, the Crown seemed about to lend them definite support, as, *e.g.*, in 1571–72, when Coligny was all-powerful at court, and the English marriage project and the union actually arranged between Henry of Navarre and the king's sister were devised to cement the alliance between Protestantism and the Crown. But the regent feared undue Protestant influence no less than the undue preponderance of the Guises; and the reaction from this brief period of friendli-

ness took the shape of the massacre of St. Bartholomew (24th Aug. 1572). Except in Rome and in Madrid this horrid butchery excited universal disgust; and, as a result of it and of the renewed civil war which followed, a large moderate party began to form in France. Toleration, however, had the same effect upon the extreme Roman Catholics as persecution upon the Protestants, viz. an increase of zeal; and war, conducted by leagues on the one side and on the other, each affiliated with sympathetic foreign powers, continued to distract the unhappy country. At length, in 1588, Henry III., seeing in the Guises the chief disturbers of the peace and the chief menace to the royal power, took the desperate step of having the duke and the cardinal assassinated; and the support of the Crown might, as a consequence, have passed speedily and definitely to the Protestant side, but for the assassination of the king in his turn by a fanatical Jesuit emissary (1589). Henry of Navarre, leader of the Huguenots since the death of Coligny in the great massacre, was now king; but, while he could and did win victories in the field, he could not, so long as he remained Protestant, conquer so definitely as to pacify France. Accordingly, he turned Roman Catholic (20th July 1593) and, after the peace of Vervins had ended a war with Spain which united all France for a common object, the Edict of Nantes (1598) was issued. The Protestants were given the right of public worship, except in Paris and a few other places; they still had to recognize the establishment of Roman Catholicism, but their own members had full civil and political rights; and they were given, besides an annual grant, full control of such towns and fortresses as had been in their possession the year before the Edict. In many ways the Reformed Church had suffered during the civil wars: the absence of many members in the field had woefully reduced the livings of the clergy, the number of congregations had shrunk from 2150 to 763, the influence of Henry of Navarre as leader was in sad and unspiritual contrast to that of Coligny. But the constitutional framework of the Church had been well looked to, and altogether 15 National Synods had been held during the wars. At one of these, held in La Rochelle (1571) under the moderatorship of Beza, the Creed and constitution of 1559 had been revised and renewed, and Presbyterian government formally adopted during the brief sunshine of royal favour. Thus, though the growth of the Reformed Church was checked, owing to many of the Huguenot nobility and gentlemen following the king's lead and turning Roman Catholic, a strong body remained staunch, and the growth of the Church's wealth was some compensation for its slower increase in numbers. The grant of 43,000 crowns per annum was devoted to the foundation and upkeep of theological colleges at Montauban and Saumur, and the independence of the French Church was rendered complete. After Henry's death in 1610 his work as a statesman was taken up by Richelieu, but Richelieu's fear of the Huguenots as a possible menace to the royal power gave his religious policy a reactionary character. An expedition was sent against Béarn, which had been a Protestant stronghold for sixty years, and a massacre of Protestants resulted in the re-establishment of Catholicism. In 1623 it was decreed that a royal commissioner must be present at all meetings of the National Synod to ensure that none but strictly ecclesiastical matters should be discussed. The policy culminated in a demand for the surrender of La Rochelle, which was refused; but the city was forced to capitulate after a year's resistance (1628), and, with the capture of the sadly-reduced stronghold, the political power of the Huguenots disappeared. Thereafter the Provincial Synods were suppressed; and the consequent removal of all organization told heavily upon the individual congregations. The Huguenot nobles were tempted with offices and political preferment, the pastors were tempted with higher stipends; and many yielded to these temptations. Under Louis XIV. and Mazarin the process was carried on: Colloques were suppressed in 1657, and in 1659 the Synod of Loudun was informed by the royal commissioner that Synods would be held in future only if the king considered it expedient — which of course the king never afterwards did. Yet, up to the death of Mazarin in 1661, the Huguenots continued to be numerous; for their commercial honesty enjoyed no less repute than their commercial skill, and, realizing their economic value to the nation, Mazarin did not push them to extremity. But he had deprived them of their last shred of organization, and, after his death, the king fell under the influence of Roman Catholic bigots, who used the opportunity to destroy the Huguenots. Bribery again did its work, backed now by the exclusion from office of all Huguenots; converts to Protestantism were banished, while converts to Catholicism were held in honour, and their former pastors forbidden even to speak to them. Protestant children were kidnapped in great numbers by Catholic priests, to be reared in the Catholic faith, and their parents had no redress. About 1681 the practice began of converting Huguenots by quartering upon them troops of dragoons, whose iniquities and licence were connived at. The desperate Protestants at length took to emigration as a relief from their troubles; but, after about 50,000 had got away, a royal edict stopped even that loophole of escape. Finally on 22nd Oct. 1685 the Edict of Nantes was formally revoked. All Protestant ministers were to leave France within fourteen days, all Protestant churches and schools were to be closed, and the children, after baptism by Roman Catholic priests, to be brought up in the Catholic faith. If any of the unhappy people were caught in the attempt to flee the country, the men were sent to the galleys and the women to prison, for life; seven months later the penalty was altered to death. Nevertheless, some 250,000 made good their escape to Holland, England, Germany, and America, and by forcing them to flee France committed economic suicide. In Toulouse, *e.g.*, only one-tenth of the skilled silk-workers remained, and, from first to last, 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 of France's best citizens were lost to her by senseless persecution. A small remnant held out in the Cévennes, where, as in the case of the Scottish Covenanters, the hard, uncertain life and the lack of educated pastors gave rise to wild fanaticism. Like all fanatics, these Camisards (*q.v.*) endured and fought well; with a total strength of 10,000 desperate men they held out during a three years' war against all the troops that France sent against them, and not till 1715 did the royal power feel justified in saying that persecution had done its work. But persecuted heresy dies hard, and in the same year began the work of Huguenot reorganization under Antoine Court. He was finally forced to flee the country when his growing success attracted attention; but from Lausanne he continued to send trained pastors and to direct operations. Persecution hindered the work, but could not stop it; the Huguenots increased in numbers, and spread their organization far beyond the Cévennes. Finally, when Voltaire had made religious indifference the fashion, the Protestants received their civil rights in 1787, and the Revolution shortly afterwards restored their religious rights as well; but very soon the orgy of secularism

which supervened drove Catholic and Protestant alike into the wilderness. Robespierre's death, however, brought saner counsels, and Protestantism received in 1795 the full measure of liberty which she has since enjoyed. Napoleon, from the absolutist standpoint, greatly modified the Presbyterian constitution of the Church in his enactment of 8th April 1802. Congregational Consistories and National Synods were abolished. Congregations were grouped into consistorial churches, each consisting of 6000 souls, and the Consistory for each was composed of all the pastors in the group, together with 6 to 12 elders, who were chosen from among the principal tax-payers. Five such consistorial churches were grouped into a Synod circle, and these Synods were made up of one pastor and one elder from each congregation; they required State permission to meet, and a State functionary had to be present at their meetings. Indeed, so many were the restrictions that, during Napoleon's reign, none of those Synods met; and no Church court intervened between the consistorial church and the minister of culture. The Reformed Church, thus hampered, fulfilled government expectations by giving no trouble, but she suffered from lack of organization.

Yet Protestantism grew in the country, and amid the excitement of 1848 a great national gathering, with representatives present from 89 out of the 92 consistorial bodies, ventured to meet and make an effort at re-organization. They set up the old Presbyterian system once more with the complete machinery of Church Consistories, General Consistories, Provincial Synods, and General Synods, and would, no doubt, have secured State sanction for their proposals, had not a secession occurred among them. During the long period of disorganization differences had grown up unchecked; and friction immediately resulted from the effort at closer organization, becoming acute over the question of theological belief. The representatives of the old theology, under Monod of Montauban, seceded, sacrificing State connexion and State grant, and setting up on a voluntary basis the Union of Evangelical Churches. Their organization is a mixture of Congregationalism and Presbyterianism; and, though their numbers remain small as compared with the parent body, they have increased to some extent and are notable for their evangelical zeal. The parent body obtained, within three years, all that they asked for except the National Synod; even that they obtained in 1872. But the concession was followed almost immediately by a dispute over the framing of a new Confession; and the government took away from the General Synod all legislative power. Nevertheless, the body continues to meet once every three years, and, if it does no more, it at least represents the unity of the Reformed Church, and crowns its organization. All along the Protestant Church in France has wielded an influence out of proportion to its numbers; and its divorce, in common with all the other Churches, from State connexion should not impair its future usefulness. It has always, like other Reformed Churches, been on the side of civil as well as religious liberty, and it would be interesting to investigate how much suppressed Huguenot aspiration found vent in the French Revolution. Huguenot refugees have been the best of citizens in every land of their adoption, and the martyr Church of France is entitled to occupy a place of pride among its Reformed neighbours. Between them, the two Evangelical Churches of France count about 80,000 members, of whom about 95 per cent are in the parent body.

7. The **Netherlands.**—The situation of the Netherlands on the borders of both Germany and France, together with the comparatively advanced state of education and independence of character among the Netherlanders, favoured the spread of the Reformation in that country. As early as 1st July 1523 the martyrdom of Henry Voes and John Esch at Brussels testified to the progress of the movement, which, Lutheran at first, but later markedly Calvinist, found from the outset a determined opponent in Charles V. The excesses committed by the Anabaptists during a rising in 1534 gave the authorities an excuse to intensify the persecution; the Inquisition was introduced into the land, and in 1550 the anti-Protestant movement culminated in a barbarous Edict against the possession of Protestant books, the reading or discussion of Scripture, and all connivance at such offences. If a man convicted of such offences repented of them, he met death by the sword; a woman in similar case was buried alive; any one persisting in error was burned. In spite of this climax to the measures of persecuting zeal, and the death in all of 30,000 victims during the reign of Charles V., Protestantism grew to such an extent that the need of a Creed and constitution began to be seriously felt, especially in the south. In 1559 Guido de Brès, who had been trained in Geneva and England, drew up a Creed modelled on the French Confession of the same year. This Creed, revised by Francis Junius, developed into the Confessio Belgica; in 1563 a Synod at Antwerp adopted a Presbyterian constitution, and later, when the southern provinces had relapsed into Romanism, this Creed and Confession were accepted in the northern provinces. Meanwhile Charles V. had abdicated (1555); but the accession of Philip II. brought no relief to the Protestants. Philip increased the number of Roman Catholic bishoprics in the Netherlands from 4 to 14, made merciless use of the Inquisition, drafted troops into the country, and began to interfere with the civil liberties and privileges of the people. These aggravations of the 1550 Edict gradually identified in the popular consciousness the causes of civil and religious liberty, and Protestantism developed from a party into a national movement. A goodly number of the younger nobles formed a league, and approached the regent—the Duchess of Parma—with the request that the Inquisition and the Edicts might be withdrawn. Pending the arrival of a rescript from Spain, the regent relaxed the severity of the laws; and a great wave of Protestant enthusiasm forthwith swept the land. Huge crowds, thousands in number, assembled to hear the Protestant ministers, and the resultant enthusiasm found vent in an outbreak of iconoclast fanaticism, which was responsible for the wrecking of some hundreds of churches, but fortunately avoided the reproach of bloodshed. Philip retaliated by sending the Duke of Alva into the country with 10,000 fresh troops, and he employed the most barbarous means to end the revolt. His Council of Disturbances, by the severity of its sentences, soon earned for itself the name of the Council of Blood. In three months nearly 2000 executions took place, and the incipient organization of the Protestant Church was broken up by the death or exile of the pastors. At this stage William of Orange, hitherto a Roman Catholic and a loyal supporter of Philip, was moved to change his religion and his allegiance together, and then began in earnest that struggle for independence which issued in one of the most obstinate and bloody wars known to history—a war which lasted, with brief intermissions, till 1609. In the course of the struggle the southern provinces were won over to Catholicism; but in 1579 the seven northern provinces, by the Treaty of Utrecht, banded themselves together, declared their inde-

pendence, and launched the Dutch Republic upon its career, electing William of Orange their first Stadtholder. The organization of the Protestants had been shattered at Alva's first onset, but a number of the exiled pastors had met at Emden in 1571 and framed a set of Calvinist articles against the day of their return. They took up *inter alia* the question of the relation of Church and State, which they solved after the usual Calvinist fashion. But, when the improved situation in Holland soon after permitted their return, and they renewed their Emden Articles at the Synod of Dordrecht (1574), the Stadtholder and Council refused to recognize these. Lutheran and Zwinglian elements had played their part in the moulding of the Dutch Reformation; and, while the Calvinist theology was generally accepted, there were many, William of Orange among them, who were not prepared to concede to the Church the measure of independence demanded by Calvinism. William had set before himself the ideal of toleration, and he believed that this could best be secured if the State were supreme. Accordingly, he submitted to the Church in 1576 a set of proposals which combined a Presbyterian constitution with State control. But the Church rejected his proposals in their turn, and counter-proposals from the Synods of Dordrecht (1578) and Middelburg (1581) also failed to secure agreement. The situation was further complicated by the ecclesiastical independence of the seven provinces and the consequent diversity of views. Finally, the problem was solved by the omission of a National Synod from among the courts of the Church, which was organized under seven independent Provincial Synods. These Synods were made up of representatives from all the 'Classes,' the 'Classis' being a body which had the characteristics partly of a Kirk-Session, partly of a Presbytery. The civil power was dominant over all.

Although war went on till 1609, this settlement of the Dutch Church was followed by a marvellous outburst of intellectual activity. Between 1575 and 1650 five universities were founded—at Leyden, Franeker, Groningen, Utrecht, and Harderwyk—and the Netherlands speedily became the chief theological school of the Reformed Church. This intellectual activity disclosed itself in two great controversies—the Arminian and the Cocceian. Arminius combated the Calvinism of his day, as Pelagius 1200 years before had attacked the Augustinian theology. In 1603 he set forth the thesis that Christ died, not for the elect only, but for all, and that grace was not irresistible. This protest against the harsh doctrine of unconditional election was vigorously counter-attacked by Gomarus from the Calvinist standpoint, and interest in the controversy rapidly spread to all ranks of society. Nor was the battle merely doctrinal, for the Calvinists still held out for spiritual independence, while the Arminians were ready to accept a large measure of State control. The political situation added a third element to the complication. While the majority of the States favoured Arminianism, Maurice of Orange, who was suspected of aspiring to the supreme power, took the opposite side. Even after the death of Arminius in 1609 the trouble continued. In 1610 the Arminians, chief among whom were Grotius the theologian and Barneveldt the statesman, issued the Remonstrance; disquieting incidents occurred in various quarters, and finally, in 1618, the Synod of Dort was assembled to settle the matter. At this Synod were present 28 foreign delegates—from Germany, England, Scotland, etc. Early in the discussions the Arminians were ruled out of the house because they would not submit to the rules of debate; thereafter their positions were condemned under five chief heads. A persecution followed. Many of their pastors were exiled; Grotius was seized, but escaped; and Barneveldt, who was less fortunate, was executed. After the death of Maurice of Orange the exiles were permitted to return, and were given complete liberty of speech and action. They founded the dissenting Remonstrant Church, which, though it has produced some eminent theologians, has remained so weak in numbers as to confer a pragmatist sanction upon its Calvinist opponents. Even to-day it has not more than 5000 members.

The second great controversy—the Cocceian—was so named from its originator Cocceius, a professor at Franeker, who sought to save the Calvinist theology from traditionalism and scholasticism. He contended for a Biblical theology, and held that Scripture should be its own interpreter. Working along these lines, he arrived at the Federal Theology, with its doctrine of the OT covenant of works, which had been superseded by the NT covenant of grace. This Covenant Theology (*q.v.*) was vigorously opposed by Voëtius and others; but the spirit of the age was on the side of Cocceius, whose type of doctrine was accepted by the English Puritans, embodied in the Westminster Confession, and speedily became dominant in the Calvinist churches.

During the whole of the 17th cent. Holland was a refuge for oppressed Presbyterians from other lands, notably from Scotland. Many Scottish ministers were trained in Dutch universities; Scottish congregations flourished in many Dutch towns; and the influence of Dutch theology spread thus to Scotland, and to all the colonial Churches that own the Church of Scotland for their mother. This was also the century of Dutch colonial expansion, and Presbyterianism flourished in all the Dutch colonies.

Up to about 1800 the only interference with the old Presbyterian system was in the direction of more efficient ministerial supervision—an object secured by the appointment of a visiting committee in each Classis. But about 1800 the Netherlands was attacked by the prevalent disease of constitution-mongering, and the Church shared in the general disorganization for about two decades. The return of the House of Orange to power in 1813 brought the trouble to an end; and the Church constitution, as renewed in 1816, was thoroughly Presbyterian, the organization, moreover, being completed by the addition of a National Synod. The State supremacy, however, remained, and it was further strengthened by a decree of 1827 authorizing a permanent committee of the National Synod. This committee was composed of 7 members, chosen by the Crown, out of 14 nominated by the Synod. In 1852 the State adopted the policy of the concurrent endowment of all churches, and, except for the endowments, all connexion between Church and State has since been at an end. For the last century rationalism has been a marked feature in the Dutch Church. In 1816 the Synod sanctioned a change in creed-subscription whereby the subscriber accepted any doctrine, not *quia*, but *quatenus* it was contained in Holy Writ. The result was soon evident in a wide-spread relaxation of Calvinist rigidity; and the fear of this laxity on the part of the more orthodox Presbyterians has given rise to two important secessions (1837 and 1886). These have seriously weakened the parent Church in point of numbers, so that in times comparatively recent many of her pulpits were vacant; but a return to greater orthodoxy, coupled with a gratifying increase in the number of Divinity students, holds out a brighter hope for the future. The Reformed Protestant religion is professed by the Dutch

royal family and by about three-fourths of the Protestant population, and at the end of 1912 the Dutch Reformed, Walloon, English Presbyterian, and Scottish Churches had between them 1 Synod, 10 provincial districts, 44 Classes, 1362 parishes, and at least 700,000 communicants. Branches of the Reformed Church also exist in the E. and W. Indies.

8. Other Continental Churches.—By their sanguinary initial struggle for existence, and their widespread influence, the Churches in France and Holland have earned their title to pre-eminence among the Presbyterian Churches of the Continent. But other Presbyterian or partly Presbyterian Churches exist in Europe, which, by reason of persecution, politics, or geographical situation, have remained isolated until the recent creation of a General Presbyterian Alliance. Indeed, some are isolated still. The National Evangelical Church of Germany combines Lutheran and Presbyterian elements. The Decree of Augsburg (1555), by its adoption of the principle 'Cujus regio, ejus religio,' introduced into Germany a fruitful cause of religious hardship and ecclesiastical discord. In 1559 Frederick III., an enthusiastic Calvinist, succeeded to the sceptre of the Rhine Palatinate, and, in terms of the treaty, began the endeavour to make Calvinism the religion of his dominions. His methods, which were not above suspicion, failed in the Upper Palatinate, but were successful in the Lower; and, where they did succeed, he prevented the introduction of Presbyterianism in its entirety by keeping in his own hands a large measure of ecclesiastical control. The Presbyterianism of the Palatinate has made for itself an enduring monument in the Heidelberg Catechism, the work of Olevianus and Ursinus, which, intended originally for local use, speedily won ecumenical significance as a Calvinist standard. The Catechism softens the rigidity of Calvinism with regard to predestination and some other points, and is remarkable for its general moderation of tone. Among the duchies of the Lower Rhine Presbyterianism was planted by refugees from Holland, France, and Britain; Alva's persecution drove Dutchmen over the border in thousands, and the influx gradually changed the prevailing type of Protestantism from Lutheranism to Calvinism. Presbyterian Church government replaced the consistorial system, and the Presbyterianism of the district allied itself with that of the Palatinate. Synods were held, notably that of Emden (1571), when the Calvinist and Presbyterian Emden Articles were adopted. But the civil authorities have prevented Presbyterianism from ever fully realizing itself. When the map of Europe was readjusted after the fall of Napoleon in 1815, these Presbyterian provinces fell to Prussia; and 1817, the tercentenary of the Reformation, appealed to Frederick William II. as a favourable occasion for uniting the two Protestant Churches in his dominions. The united Church was called the National Evangelical Church of Prussia, and the Prussian lead was followed by most of the other German States. Each of the two uniting Churches retained its own standards and its own system of government, but modifications introduced from time to time have rendered it necessary for the stricter adherents of both Churches to secede. The Lutheran theology and ritual have made serious inroads on the Reformed Church, but the Presbyterian form of Church government has been equally successful in the invasion of the Lutheran body. The civil power, however, maintains its firm hold upon the Church organization as a whole.

In Bohemia a modified type of Presbyterianism existed long before John Calvin ruled in Geneva. The intestine wars of the Hussites (*q.v.*) about the middle of the 15th cent. led to the forming of the Unitas Fratrum, who, abhorring the idea of strife, repudiated both the warring sects, and contented themselves with a life of simple piety, seeking guidance from the Bible alone. A constitution essentially Presbyterian, embodying the eldership and the diaconate, was adopted in 1496, and testified to the presence in the Church of a strong lay element. But a distinctive feature was introduced into the government of the Church by placing the presidency of each Synod in the hands of a bishop elected by the pastors. In 1557 the Church was strong enough to assemble no fewer than 200 pastors in one of its Synods. It had indeed achieved the status of a national Church, and in Reformation times the most cordial relations were inaugurated and maintained between the Bohemian Church and John Calvin. At the beginning of the Thirty Years' War the abortive rebellion of the Protestant nobles and the crowning of Frederick V. the Elector Palatine by the rebels gave to the persecuting zeal of Ferdinand II. an excuse for increased severity, and his victory was followed by the ruthless suppression of Protestantism in Bohemia. Joseph II.'s Edict of Toleration (1781) gave the persecuted Church the first opportunity of renewing its activity, and, even after a century and a half of repression, the submerged Protestantism of the country soon blossomed forth into vigorous life and development only to be crushed again by the measures of a reactionary successor. A better constitution was granted in 1861; but the State, by means of its ecclesiastical Council, still keeps a firm hold upon the organization of the Church, and rules over its Synods and superintendents to the detriment of a complete Presbyterianism. The Church in Bohemia and Moravia continues small in numbers;[1] but its heroic past and its present zeal for Home Mission work and education hold out the hope that a more liberal policy on the part of the State may usher in a more prosperous time.

In Hungary, as in many other lands, Calvinism superseded in time the original Lutheran form of the Reformation, and, whereas a Synod at Erdöd in 1545 adopted the Augsburg Confession, the Synod of Debreczen (1567) made the Heidelberg Catechism and the Second Helvetic Confession the standards of the Church, which has since faithfully adhered to them. When Hungary fell into two separate political entities about the middle of the 16th cent., Transylvania came under the rule of Reformed or tolerant princes, and the Church grew unchecked till 1602, when Rudolf of Hungary conquered the principality, and began to persecute the Protestants. But the Treaty of Vienna (1606) restored Transylvanian independence and ushered in a period of seventy years' peace. The Church prospered till 1677, when Leopold I. of Hungary again subdued Transylvania, and persecution, marked by the imprisonment, exile, enslavement, and even death of Protestant pastors, plunged Protestantism into misery once more. The century of humiliation which followed ended only with the Toleration Edict of Joseph II. (1787), which conferred upon the Protestants a new lease of life. The Protestant Church has become strongly identified with the political aspirations of Hungary, and has been greatly benefited by the comparative independence which Hungary enjoys within the Dual Monarchy. Congregations to the number of 2000 and a membership of over 500,000 testify to the strength and prosperity of the Church. Up to 1881 the old territorial division of the Church was retained, but in that year the organization under five independent provinces was unified by the Synod of Debreczen. In her isolation this Church

[1] About 67,000 in 1912

has developed distinctive features in her government. Each Tractus, or Church county, the body corresponding to our Presbytery, is presided over by a senior elected by the pastors, and a coadjutor curator elected by the elders. Similarly, each province has a clerical superintendent and a lay curator. This arrangement combines the benefits of Episcopal supervision with those of Presbyterian parity. The Church has been chiefly remarkable for its educational work; and its organization of parish schools, high schools, and colleges vividly recalls the 'devote imagination' of John Knox concerning Scottish education. In a land hemmed in by circumjacent Catholicism the work done by the Church in maintaining single-handed its army of some 5000 teachers with 300,000 pupils is of immeasurable importance for Protestantism.

The cantonal system of Swiss government has served to restrict the honour of Calvin in the land of Calvin's adoption. All the cantons except three —Geneva, Vaud, and Neuchâtel—favoured the Zwinglian rather than the Calvinist form of Church government; and in the three cantons named the Church remained isolated and quiescent till the beginning of the 19th century. The period of renewed activity which was then inaugurated had been characterized by secessions and divisions. In Geneva, on the occasion of a visit paid by the Scottish preacher, Robert Haldane, in 1817, a revival of evangelical zeal began. C. H. A. Malan, J. H. M. d'Aubigné, and others took up the movement, and the Church showed its resentment by deposing Malan. A separate ecclesiastical community at once began to gather round him. In 1832 d'Aubigné and others founded the Evangelical school of theology, and were deposed in their turn. At the same time the State was engaged in an attempt to destroy the independence of the Church; and the agitation finally issued in the formation of the Free Evangelical Church (1849). This Church is still weak in numbers, but it withdrew sufficient strength from the national Church to leave it at the mercy of the State, and since 1874 the national Church has really become Zwinglian.

In Vaud the famous theologian A. R. Vinet advocated the policy of separation between Church and State; and, when the State, as in Geneva, attempted to subordinate the spiritual to the civil power, 100 ministers seceded in 1845, forming the Free Evangelical Church of Vaud, which has been remarkable for its missionary zeal. The national Church is now controlled by the State, but not too rigidly.

In Neuchâtel a similar effort by the State to assume control of the Church resulted in a secession under F. Godet in 1873.

In Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium 16th cent. Protestantism was strangled in its infancy; and only in the last century have more liberal ideas permitted the rise of a Reformed Church in those countries. The Italian Church, the descendant of the Waldensians, began its work in Piedmont in 1849, received an additional impetus when the unification in Italy under a constitutional government took place in 1861, and now exercises its semi-Presbyterian government over a membership of more than 20,000. In Spain the work was begun by Scotsmen in 1852. Persecution and exile followed in 1860, and the refugees, meeting at Gibraltar, took over the Westminster Confession, and adopted Presbyterian Church government. The revolution of 1868 permitted their return, and their work has since centred mainly in Seville and Madrid. This Church owes a great debt to the support forthcoming from Scotland and Ireland.

Belgium has recently become possessed of two Reformed Churches, each about 7000 strong, one of which has laid claim to a historic succession by adopting the Confessio Belgica. Small Reformed bodies also exist in Denmark, Alsace-Lorraine, Austria, Greece, and Poland; and, if we are justified in regarding democracy as the type of future government, we may confidently assume the present to be only the day of small things, and anticipate a great future for this sanely democratic variety of Church organization.

The total number of Presbyterian communicants in Europe is now well over 3,000,000—more than half of them in the British Isles.

iv. HISTORY OUTSIDE EUROPE.—When we come to consider Presbyterianism elsewhere than on the continent of Europe—*e.g.*, in America—we reach a new phase of Presbyterian history, in which petty obstruction takes the place of sanguinary persecution, in which battles and martyrdoms are replaced by slow development and construction; and, whereas in the heroic days of early European Presbyterianism the leader often bulked larger than the cause, in other continents Presbyterian progress was, on the whole, a triumph of principles rather than of individual men.

1. **America.** — To American Presbyterianism England, Holland, France, and Germany have all made their contribution, as is seen below; but the contribution of the Church of Scotland has been greatest of all. Episcopacy arrived in Virginia with the early colonists of 1604, and in 1620 the Pilgrim Fathers (*q.v.*) laid the foundation of Independency in America; but not till near 1700 did Presbyterians begin to arrive in considerable numbers, and not till after 1700 was the first Presbytery organized. The Presbyterian wing of English Puritanism was represented from the beginning, but its adherents were at first too scattered to make organization possible or profitable, and only when the persecutions under Charles II. began to drive men from Scotland and Ulster to the colonies did numbers to be organized and minds to organize them make their appearance in the American colonies. Emigration from Scotland was encouraged during the persecution, and from 1660 to 1688 a steady stream poured out of the country — often in compact bands of several hundreds. These settled mostly in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and the first church was built at Freehold, N.J., in 1692. By 1700 there were over 30 congregations—half of them in the two States above named; indeed, Presbyterianism soon became a feature in the life of the middle colonies. Francis Makemie, a licentiate of the Presbytery of Lagan in Ulster, had been sent out in 1683 in pastoral charge of a band of emigrants; and, combining in the land of his adoption the callings of itinerant trader and evangelist, he found in the country a sufficient number of Presbyterians to make organization worth while and enough Episcopalian opposition to make it expedient. In 1699 he was called to the charge of Snowhill in Maryland, and in 1706 seven ministers, with Makemie as leading spirit, founded the Presbytery of Philadelphia. Thereafter a rapid development took place. Appeals were made to Scotland, Ulster, Dublin, London, and considerable assistance was forthcoming, notably from the Synod and the University of Glasgow. While the home churches supplied ministers, the operation of Test Acts at home supplied the Church with a steady influx of emigrant members, and in 1716 she was strong enough to combine her four Presbyteries into the Synod of Philadelphia. The need of a Creed and a constitution soon made itself felt, but, when the Presbytery of Newcastle, alarmed at the lax doctrine of some of the incoming ministers, ordained in 1724 that all its future licentiates must subscribe the Westminster standards, and overtured

the Synod to make this rule general, the discussion in the Synod revealed the existence of two parties in the Church. In New England elements of Independency had been at work, and the native-born New England clergy looked askance at the more rigid Presbyterianism of Scots and Ulstermen. The resultant controversy lasted some years, and it was mainly the tact of Jonathan Dickinson that ended it in 1729. In that year a compromise was effected by the passing of the Adopting Act, whereby the Westminster standards were taken over as embodying in essence a sound system of doctrine and government, and their observance was enjoined upon the Church as far as circumstances might allow or Christian prudence direct. By this wise measure the Church was enabled to retain its historic connexions, to avoid Congregationalism, and to secure a degree of flexibility fitting it to deal with the conditions prevalent in a new and growing country. A fresh controversy soon arose over the question of ministerial education. The supply of ministers, both from the colony itself and from overseas, fell so far short of the demand that a lowering of the standard was hard to avoid. William Tennent, a Dublin emigrant, attempted to meet the case by founding a seminary, later known as the Log College; but his students frequently possessed more zeal and piety than education or culture, and filled the older Presbyterians with dismay. The visit of Whitefield in 1739 was followed by an outbreak of revivalism, and at length the un-Presbyterian methods of the Tennent school moved the Synod to insist upon Presbyterian discipline and a standard of education for all its ministers. A disruption resulted in 1745, when the Church split into the Synod of Philadelphia, or old side, and the Synod of New York, or new side. But the new side were quite alive to the benefits of education, and the old side not less alive to the blessings of evangelical zeal: and a sense of duty, combined with mutual esteem and a common interest, secured re-union in 1758. The cause of missions to the American Indians, which had been in operation since 1741, was warmly espoused by the re-united Church, which also interested itself deeply in the New Jersey College. When the Revolutionary war broke out in 1775, the Presbyterians of the middle colonies, who had not forgotten the history of their Church at home, took the colonial side almost to a man, and their devotion to the Revolutionary cause earned for the Church the lasting respect of the nation. John Witherspoon, who had come from Scotland in 1768, was the principal actor in the completion of the Church's organization, when, in 1789, 13 Presbyteries, meeting by their representatives at Philadelphia, constituted themselves the first General Assembly of the Church. They organized the Church on Scottish lines, and adopted the Westminster standards, making determinative the principle that 'God alone is Lord of the conscience.' At this stage the Church numbered 4 Synods, 13 Presbyteries, 186 ministers, and 419 congregations. About the end of the 18th cent. 'unions' and 'federations' were the order of the day; and in 1801 the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches drew up the 'Plan of Union,' which was really an effort to secure external and operative unity by ignoring the differences between the Churches. As a result the Presbyterian Church increased rapidly in numbers, but became thoroughly leavened with Congregationalism. Members poured in at the rate of 10,000 to 20,000 per annum; but the younger churches became lax in their adherence to Presbyterian doctrine, discipline, and tradition. A test case came at length in 1830, when Albert Barnes, a Congregational minister called to a Presbyterian charge in Philadelphia, was vetoed by the Presbytery on account of his known laxity of doctrine. This breach of the 'Plan of Union' ushered in seven years of ecclesiastical strife, which ended in the repudiation of the Plan in 1837. A disruption of the Church into old school and new school followed in 1838, and endured for thirty-two years. Feeling ran high in both schools over the slavery question; in 1857 the northern half of the new school repudiated their brethren of the south, and in 1861 the southern portion of the old school seceded. This fresh dismemberment drew the two northern bodies together, and they re-united in 1870. During the separation the two Churches had been vigorously engaged in Home Mission work, having sent out between them no fewer than 25,000 missioners; and the united Church followed up the work with enthusiasm. Foreign Missions had been inaugurated in 1810 as the result of undenominational activity, but in 1838 the Church took over her own. Early in the period of separation the new school reverted to the original plan, but in 1854 she resumed control of her own missions; and now the Church has missions in Mexico, Brazil, Africa, Syria, Persia, India, and China. With over 9000 ministers, almost 1,500,000 members, 300 missionaries, and a dozen seminaries, including such famous schools as Princeton and Union, this Church is, in point of size, the greatest single Presbyterian organization in the world.

Of the other Presbyterian bodies of British origin in the United States little need be said. The Presbyterian Church in the United States (South) was formed in 1861 by the union of the old and new schools in the southern States. It possesses missions in Mexico, Brazil, and India, but its principal mission work has naturally been among the emancipated negroes. This Church has upheld the conservative tradition of the South. Since the end of the Civil War it has become increasingly friendly with its northern neighbour, but re-union has not yet taken place. It has over 1700 ministers and nearly 300,000 communicants.

The Cumberland Presbyterian Church, which, with its Coloured Branch, numbers about 150,000 members, had its origin in the Kentucky revival at the end of the 18th cent., when doctrinal and ecclesiastical vagaries increased to such an extent that at length the General Assembly intervened, forbidding the Cumberland Presbytery to ordain illiterate men to the ministry. The consequent secession gave birth to the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, which retains the Presbyterian polity, but has lowered the standard of ministerial education, and has relaxed some of the severer Calvinist doctrines. The United Presbyterian Church of N. America represents the main stream of 18th cent. dissent in Scotland, and its membership is over 100,000 strong. It remains very strict in its adherence to old standards, but is notable for its great evangelical and missionary zeal.

Among the Presbyterian Churches in the United States which trace their origin to continental Europe it will suffice to mention two. The Reformed Church in America (*q.v.*), which till 1867 retained its historic name of the Dutch Reformed Church, enjoys the distinction of being the oldest Presbyterian body in the United States. The first congregation, with Jonas Michaelius as pastor, was formed in 1628 in what was still the town of New Amsterdam, and the Church grew and flourished under Dutch rule till 1664, when the colony passed into English hands and became New York. The English authorities confined the activities of the Church to the Dutch inhabitants of the colony; and by this restriction, which remained in force till about 1700, its expansion was checked. Thereafter the Church itself hampered

its own growth by the exclusive use of the Dutch language in its services and by retaining its affiliation to the Classis of Amsterdam. But in 1764 the use of English in the services was permitted, and in 1785 the Church declared its independence of the Amsterdam Classis as the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church in America. Since then it has grown slowly and steadily to the number of 100,000 members. The Dutch element and influence in it have naturally decreased, but the old doctrine, government, and ritual are still adhered to, and the doctrinal standard, the Heidelberg Catechism, is expounded weekly in every congregation, the complete exposition covering a period of four years. Foreign missions in India, Japan, and China constitute an important feature of the work of this Church; and the efforts of the Scudder family have made Arcot (S. India) a perfect model of what a mission ought to be.

The German Reformed Church was founded by emigrants, chiefly from the Rhine Palatinate, about the end of the 17th century. These settled mostly in Pennsylvania, and in 1747 M. Schlatter and four other ministers formed the first Coetus or Synod under the Classis of Amsterdam. Schlatter paid a visit to Europe in 1751, and secured substantial help from Holland, England, and Scotland. The Church declared its independence in 1773, and since then it has grown to such an extent that it now numbers about 300,000 members. It is estimated that of the German immigration to America during the last century two-thirds have found their way into the Lutheran Church, and the remaining third into the Reformed Church. The German Church has retained its native language much more tenaciously than its Dutch neighbour. The Heidelberg Catechism remains the doctrinal standard, and German customs and ritual are strongly adhered to, particularly in connexion with the great festivals of the Christian year. The six Churches already spoken of represent well over 95 per cent of American Presbyterianism.

Presbyterianism stands third in order of numbers among the Protestant Churches of America—a very creditable position, considering the comparative smallness of Presbyterian immigration and the restriction that the Church has placed upon her expansion by her insistence upon an educated ministry. Her membership is increasing over 50 per cent faster than the population of the country; and in culture, influence, wealth, and catholicity of spirit she calls no American Church her superior. The huge sphere of labour presented by the United States prevents the overlapping caused by denominationalism in smaller countries, and this, together with the friendly rivalry that exists between the various bodies, is a happy augury for a prosperous union at some future date.

The history of Presbyterianism in Canada presents two main features—enthusiasm for unity and tenacity in the face of opposition. The Huguenots first attempted to lay the foundations of Presbyterianism in Canada, and, while the tradition of Henry of Navarre persisted, they were not unsuccessful; but the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) made an end of their work and turned Canada into a Jesuit preserve. The second impulse began from Britain in the latter half of the 18th cent., and, since then, Scottish characteristics have been well to the front. The increase of immigration early presented a difficulty, which was solved by seeking for outside help, and all the home Churches, as well as the American, did what they could. In this connexion the work of the Glasgow Colonial Society in Nova Scotia is especially worthy of mention. In the early part of the 19th cent. Episcopal opposition had to be faced in Canada as elsewhere. One-eleventh of the unceded lands in Upper and Lower Canada had been set apart for the maintenance of a Protestant clergy, and it cost the Presbyterian Church twenty years of struggle to wrest its share from the grip of the Episcopalians. The battle raged from 1817 to 1840, at the end of which time the Presbyterians obtained a third of the 3,000,000 acres of 'clergy reserves.' In 1832, feeling the need of a training college, the Church applied to the government to endow additional chairs in King's College, Toronto; but, Episcopal opposition proving too strong to be overcome, the Church herself founded Queen's University in 1841.

The Disruption of 1843 aroused echoes in Canada, and this, with the territorial divisions obtaining till 1867, kept the Canadian Church divided. In 1845 there were seven principal bodies of Canadian Presbyterians; but mutual goodwill speedily developed, and in 1860 a succession of unions began. By 1875 only four separate Churches were left, and these united on 15th June of that year to form the Presbyterian Church in Canada. At present a scheme is afoot to bring about a wider union of Presbyterians, Methodists, and Congregationalists. The General Assembly approved the basis of union in June 1916, but a considerable minority left the house; and so far the matter is incomplete.

The Church does excellent work among the French Roman Catholics, but her finest and most productive activity has been along the line of Church extension in the West, where, especially since the opening of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1885, a notable work has been done in what is practically a new nation.

The Church at present has 70 Presbyteries, 2336 congregations, 1769 ministers, and about 300,000 communicants.

2. Australia.—Four-fifths of Australian Presbyterianism is concentrated in New South Wales and Victoria. The Presbyterian Church of New South Wales came into existence as the original population was outnumbered and absorbed by the respectable immigration of later times. The first Presbyterian minister in the colony was John Dunmore Lang, who went in 1823 and some years later was instrumental in founding the Presbytery of New South Wales. In course of time certain ministers resented Lang's virtual dictatorship, and tried to end it by insisting upon punctilious observance of the rules of the Church of Scotland. Lang and his following, who considered such rigidity injurious to the prospects of a new Church in a new land, seceded in 1838. Union was restored in 1840, only to be broken by a similar secession in 1842. The Scottish Disruption produced a further split in the colonial Church. She did her best to remain neutral, but her dependence upon Scotland for men to fill her pulpits produced the inevitable division in 1846. At length, however, her growing independence, and the problems which she was called upon to face, paved the way for union; and since 1865 all sections have been united.

In Victoria the gold rush, and the situation created by the rapid influx of a certain type of population, brought about union in 1859; and by 1870 all the remnants had come in. Since 1886 there has been a federal union of the original six Australian Churches, with an annual Federal Assembly. Its 44 Presbyteries, over 600 congregations, and about 60,000 members witness to the strength of Presbyterianism in Australia.

3. New Zealand.—The first Presbytery of what became in time the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand, occupying the north island and half of the south, was founded at Auckland in 1856. The personnel was largely drawn from the Church of Scotland, but comprised Irish and other elements. Since its early days this Church has done splendid

Home Mission work, and has grown with the growth of the colony. The Presbyterian Church of Otago and Southland resulted from a resolution of the New Zealand Company to ask the co-operation of the Free Church of Scotland in the settlement of the new colony. The Free Church accepted the proposal, and the experiment of founding a model colony was tried at Otago. The first batch of emigrants arrived in 1848, with a nephew of Robert Burns as their minister, and in 1854 the first Presbytery was founded. The gold rush of 1861 presented the Church with a problem which has been very satisfactorily solved. The united strength of the Church in New Zealand now totals 17 Presbyteries, 230 congregations, and 40,000 members.

4. S. Africa.—There was a Dutch Reformed Church in Cape Colony from 1652; but, in spite of the steady stream of Dutch immigration and an influx of Huguenots about the end of the 17th cent., the Church had practically no history for the first century of its existence. After British rule began in 1806, better days dawned for the Church; and a Synod was organized in 1824. A Dutch law of 1804 had given the Church a constitution, but had left the supreme ecclesiastical power in the hands of the State. Ministers of a later date found State control irksome, and agitated to such purpose that the obnoxious feature was abolished in 1843; in 1875 State support also was withdrawn. The mutual animosity of Briton and Boer caused great Boer treks, and the Presbyterian Church in S. Africa was split into a number of territorial fragments. The various Dutch Reformed Churches have a communion-roll of about 200,000, and the British Church numbers over 11,000 communicants.

Leaving out of account the spiritual, ethical, intellectual, political, and economic influence of its splendid history, and regarding it from the point of view of mere statistics, we may allow the following figures, reported to the last General Council, to vouch for the progress of Presbyterianism and to bear testimony to the fact that the seed planted in Geneva has become a great tree overshadowing the world.

Continent of Europe	1,451,423	communicants.
United Kingdom	1,615,492	,,
Asia	223,838	,,
Africa	281,715	,,
N. America	2,713,064	,,
S. America	12,234	,,
W. Indies	16,101	,,
Australasia	104,147	,,
Total,	6,418,014	,,

As the total for 1888 was only 3,721,680, it will be seen that the communion-roll of Presbyterianism has nearly doubled itself within the last thirty years—a happy earnest of further increase.

III. *Nature and Working of Presbyterian System.*—All forms of Church government are ultimately reducible to three—Prelatic, Congregational, and Presbyterian. The Prelatic type of government, exemplified in the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches, is characterized by the gradation of ministerial rank, by the institution of the diocesan episcopate, and by the emphasis laid on the distinction between clergy and laity. The Congregational type recognizes neither gradation of ministerial rank nor gradation of Church courts; it places all ministers on an equal footing, and makes of every congregation an independent judicature. It is the boast of Presbyterianism that it avoids the dangers of both its rivals; on the other hand, it has sometimes been charged with combining the evils of both without any admixture of their advantages. As opposed to prelacy, the Presbyterian type of government rests upon the equality of ministerial status, and seeks to give ecclesiastical power to the members of the Church instead of to clerical individuals or councils; as opposed to Congregationalism, it seeks to realize the unity of the Church, by entrusting to a carefully devised system of graded Church courts legislative, executive, and judicial, not merely advisory, powers. This distinction between the three main types of Church government turns, of course, purely upon questions of ecclesiastical polity, and Presbyterian Church government is not the necessary concomitant of Calvinist doctrine, any more than it implies any definite and particular type of Church worship. Examples occur even of ecclesiastical polities which combine features drawn from more than one of the three chief types mentioned above. It will be noted that in such cases the operation of some factor external to the Church, such as the civil power, has generally to be taken into account. Indeed, in the last resort, any given form of Church polity must logically be based upon some definite doctrine of the Church, and any such doctrine of the Church is bound, in its turn, to form part of some articulated and unified dogmatic system. Thus we find that, on the whole and in spite of exceptions, Calvinistic doctrine, Presbyterian Church government, and a simple type of service which lays great stress upon the homiletic aspect of worship go together; and, in most cases, these exceptions can be traced to some extraneous influence working against the free self-development of the Church. Presbyterianism is characterized by the attempt to combine in its organization the following three features: (*a*) parity of the clergy; (*b*) government of the Church by its membership as represented by presbyters or elders, ordained to rule; (*c*) unity of the Church, so far as the conditions of nationality, language, space, and numbers will permit of organization. It will thus be seen that we have here the attempt to steer a middle course between Prelacy, which has made much of the doctrine of office in the Church, and Congregationalism, which is given over to individualism.

In support of the theory and practice of Presbyterian Church government the *jus divinum* argument has been largely made use of. At the height of the controversy between Presbyterianism and Prelacy which divided Britain in the 16th and 17th centuries the argument was pushed to the extreme of identifying Presbyterianism in detail with the ecclesiastical polity of the NT—a position untenable under the conditions of modern historical research, which would prefer to find the justification of any ecclesiastical system in considerations of expediency or of development. Yet the Presbyterian still clings to the *jus divinum* in a modified form. He holds that the NT, which sets forth the basis of the Christian faith, must necessarily supply the basic ideas concerning the institution which has sought to embody Christianity and to mediate it to the world; and he contends that in the fundamental ideas and principles of Presbyterianism the spirit and ideas of the NT are more faithfully reproduced than in any other polity. He would no more lay claim to a divine succession of presbyters than to an apostolic succession of bishops; the laying on of hands by presbyters has for him no more significance than episcopal consecration as a kind of mechanical device for the transmission of ministerial grace; he would find the true apostolic succession in the successive possession of the apostolic spirit by generations of faithful Christian pastors. His idea is of the *jus divinum* as belonging to an institution which is spiritually the successor of the NT Church, seeking on the whole to retain its offices and its general type of organization while modifying them to meet new requirements in a different age.

The Presbyterian form of polity in modern times is based on the Calvinist doctrine of the Church. According to this view, the Church is a fellowship of believers which aims at realizing the fellowship of each member with the others and of all with Christ. Such an essentially spiritual idea of the Church renders it impossible for the Calvinist Presbyterian to unchurch any professed believer or body of believers on merely external grounds. The true Church is invisible, known only to God; and the mechanical exclusion of any man from salvation by reference to some fixed ecclesiastical theory is a presumption. In fact, evangelical Protestantism must place first the true preaching of the Word and the proper administration of the sacraments, and all Church government is justified only as a means to that end. Up to this point Presbyterianism and Congregationalism are agreed; they differ only as to the means by which the Church can best serve those ends and express her mind to the world. Presbyterianism recognizes more fully than Independency that, in order to secure the three general ends of true preaching, true administration of the sacraments, and true discipline within an orderly and united body of believers, a certain amount of organization is unavoidable, even if of secondary importance, and the founders of Presbyterianism went to the NT for their models. In so far as they attempted or claimed to effect an exact and mechanical reproduction of the NT Church, they were mistaken, but they may at least claim to have worked out a system as nearly like it as anything that can hope to adapt itself to modern times.

1. **Ecclesiastical offices and officials.**—In order to grasp the significance of ecclesiastical office it is no less important to see the connexion of 'gift' and 'office' than to distinguish between them. At first the ministry of gifts that prevailed in the primitive Church rendered office unnecessary and even impossible, but it was not long before the failure or the capriciousness of gifts rendered office inevitable in the growing community, and offices and officials were undoubtedly existent in NT times. Gifts, on the other hand, were the basis of office, the holding of which originally signified a recognition on the part of the Church that the official possessed eminent gifts. As the Church grew in numbers, and had to face heresy within and persecution without, officialism naturally assumed a position of ever-growing importance. Montanism, *e.g.*, was, from one point of view, a protest against the growth of officialism in the Church, and the reaction against Montanism fostered the very growth against which it protested in vain. Ordination—at first simply the setting apart to a special task of a man with special gifts for it—became a more formal thing; the ritualism of the act came to surpass in importance the prayer which was originally its essence; and gradually the right to confer ordination, from being a distinction between clergy and laity, became a distinction between superior and inferior orders of clergy. The whole tendency of mediævalism was in the direction of this growing sacerdotalism, the original freedom and spontaneity of the Church were crushed rather than preserved as the machinery of it became perfected, and the Reformers aimed at getting behind this perfection of lifeless mechanism to the simpler ideas and organization of primitive times, the earlier among them recoiling even from such harmless symbolism as the laying on of hands in ordination. The Calvinist and Presbyterian wing of the Reformation distinguished in the NT certain offices which were intended to be ordinary and permanent from certain others which were of an extraordinary and temporary character. These permanent offices were (*a*) the ministry of the Word, (*b*) ruling and discipline, (*c*) the care of goods, their distribution in needful cases, and the care of the poor and sick. Doctrine, discipline, and distribution were the distinguishing features of the three types of permanent official. Or a twofold classification might be made, into (1) elders, (*a*) teaching and (*b*) ruling, and (2) deacons. In the earliest times the Church modelled itself on the Synagogue rather than on the Temple, and the ruling body would naturally be the elders, the recognition of whom as a body of men possessed of special gifts of ruling soon became that of a body of men possessed of office. But, as some of them would be better teachers than others, and the need of sound teaching soon became apparent, the distinction between the teaching and the ruling types of presbyter is clearly marked at an early stage of ecclesiastical development. The needs of the Church, the disappearance of charisms, the rise of official doctrine and official books, fostered the need of competent teaching; such teachers would naturally be sought in the eldership, and the presbyter capable of teaching gradually assumed a position of greater distinctiveness—a distinctiveness emphasized by the fact that teaching power and business gifts form a sufficiently rare combination in the individual. Finally there comes about a clear distinction between the office of preacher and teacher and that of ruling elder; we find in Cyprian, *e.g.*, a clear recognition of the difference between teaching and ruling presbyters. The modern Presbyterian Church has always made a point of this distinction, which is very clearly brought out in the theory and practice of ordination. If ordination, as some have contended, admitted merely to order, then no special new ordination would be required to transform an elder into a minister. But the Presbyterian system regards ordination as admitting, not to order, but to office, and the requirement of a special ordination for a minister is a recognition of the different offices of teacher and ruler. Yet there has always been a certain confusion in the mind of Presbyterianism with regard to the exact relationship between the minister and the elder, the teaching and the ruling presbyter. Some, like John Calvin, followed by Gillespie, interpret 1 Ti 5^{17} as if preaching and ruling presbyters had held distinct offices from the very beginning; others, like Campbell, have considered the ruling elder simply as a lay coadjutor and councillor of the minister, his spiritual work being only such as might be done by any other pious member of the kirk; a third and more sensible group of thinkers hold that the distinction of office has arisen naturally out of a distinction of gifts in a Church faced by the problems of growth and maturing age. It is, in fact, better to consider the office of presbyter from the practical than from the theoretic and Scriptural point of view. The ruling elder, at the least, discharges the useful function of representing lay needs, ideas, and interests, and of keeping the minister in touch with the general life of the Church; and his tenure of an office which renders him of equal status with the minister as a member of any Church court is of immense practical value to the Church. Both offices declined in the Middle Ages, that of the ruling elder vanishing altogether. But at the Reformation the removal of the crushing burden of sacerdotalism caused both to revive. The minister as pastor, preacher, and teacher came into his own again, and, in the Presbyterian Church among the rest, he has ever since retained the highest place in the esteem of the membership. The office is ministerial, not sacerdotal, and, whatever 'presbyter' may be etymologically, it is certainly something quite different in practical

content from 'old priest writ large.' Regarding episcopacy and the episcopal office as a late development, unscriptural and unjustifiable, the Presbyterian reformers have always insisted upon the parity of the clergy, whose functions are preaching, the administration of the sacraments, and the exercise of discipline; and the sacerdotal side of the office has always been carefully kept in the background, lest the minister, in the guise of priest, should stand between God and men. The ruling elder disappeared, as has been said, in the Middle Ages; the attempt to trace him back to the Waldensian movement has not been successful; nor did he reappear in the Lutheran Church. From the beginning the need of a body of men to exercise Church discipline was recognized by the Reformers, who felt that, while the *jus episcopale* ought to be transferred, it must not be allowed to lapse. But the question at once arose as to whether these men should be chosen by the Church or by the civil authorities, and the first to see quite clearly that the Church ought to choose them was John Calvin. In this he differs from both Luther and Zwingli, who left the exercise of Church discipline to the civil power, and, alone among the Reformers, he insisted upon the exercise of discipline by means of an eldership, chosen by the people, founded upon the NT, and possessed of spiritual office for the discharge of a spiritual function. With this is bound up the theory of the relation between Church and State. It may be noted that the very alliance between Church and State in Geneva which realized one side of his ideal baulked him in the realization of its other half, viz. the maintenance of a distinct and separate sphere for both. In France, however, the hostility of the State reversed the case: alliance was impossible, but the Church was therefore free to develop along her own lines. And the same state of affairs obtained in Scotland. In these two countries, therefore, the Presbyterian eldership came to its full development, and the office is distinctive of Presbyterianism. The elders are chosen by the general body of the membership, and specially ordained to their office. At first they held office only for a limited period, and then resigned, usually by rotation, to make room for other representatives of the popular voice; but in later times the office has come to be held 'ad vitam aut culpam,' and Presbyterian Church government is by representation rather than by direct reference to the popular will. The elder is recognized as a spiritual functionary; and, while he is debarred from the ministry of the Word and sacraments, he has the right to assist in the administration of discipline and in the government of the Church, in whose courts his vote is of equal value with that of the minister. The work of the diaconate, since the decline of that office, has largely fallen to the eldership; and the assistance of a competent body of elders is invaluable to the minister.

Early in the history of the Church it was found advisable to take the work of almsgiving off the shoulders of men otherwise too busy to attend to it, and thus originated the office of deacon. It is an open question whether the 'Seven' of the Acts of the Apostles were the first of those to be chosen at all, whether we have here the first instance of their work being formally recognized by the Church as the work of ecclesiastical officials, or whether these seven were then chosen in the Gentile interest, because those already in office did not command Greek confidence. The Presbyterian deacon, so far as the office still exists, is a more faithful copy of his prototype than the deacon either of Roman Catholicism or of Anglicanism. The office was never generally regarded as a spiritual one, implying any spiritual function, though the French Church originally took that view; all that is implied in it is the application of spiritual principles to certain secular affairs. The originally unspiritual nature of the office may be gauged from the fact that, in spite of the disabilities of women for public speaking and the like, deaconesses were very early at work in the Church. Yet the deacon is more than a mere member of a managing board. He holds an ecclesiastical office to which ordination is necessary. We may describe the deacon of Reformation times as a secular Church official. The office has largely fallen into abeyance, especially where State connexion has eased the financial affairs of the Church, and the passing of the diaconal functions in such cases into the hands of the elder has done much to secularize the eldership.

Minister, elder, and deacon are the three ordinary and permanent officials recognized by Presbyterianism, but Calvin and the rest held that NT precedent would authorize the temporary use of extraordinary offices to meet special circumstances. The internal needs of the Church herself or the pressure of outside factors determined the nature and use of such special offices. In the earliest days of the Reformed Church, *e.g.*, there existed the office of teacher, as distinct from that of minister, an office which has quite naturally disappeared; for, with a growing knowledge of Reformed doctrine on the part of the people, and after the issue of Catechisms for the instruction of the young and comparatively ignorant, the special work of the teacher became unnecessary. Similarly, in John Knox's day the difficulty produced in Scotland by the inadequate supply of ministers to meet the national need gave rise to the two special offices of superintendent and reader, both of which disappeared as the ecclesiastical situation became settled. The chairmen of General Assembly committees and the Divinity students who spend their spare time in mission work represent the nearest survival of those two offices to day; but it is noteworthy that, in Canada, a problem similar to John Knox's is responsible for the existence of superintendents at the present time, and for the use made of special-course men, who are virtually equivalent to readers. We have seen also that special officials exist in the Bohemian and Hungarian Churches, and, though a strict Presbyterian might, on the ground of these special offices, call in question the really Presbyterian nature of these Churches, it is interesting to find that the state of affairs in the Bohemian Church, *e.g.*, raised no qualms in the breast of John Calvin. Undue State interference has in many cases caused modifications in the Presbyterian theory and practice with regard to office; but the offices of minister, elder, and deacon are alone recognized or required as permanent in a thoroughgoing Presbyterian system, and even the deacon tends to disappear when the Church is prospering.

2. Church courts.—By the organization of her officials into a carefully graded system of Church courts Presbyterianism seeks to give expression to the unity of the Church. These courts exercise a threefold function: (*a*) legislative: they frame laws for the purpose of securing discipline, and for the proper control and dispatch of ecclesiastical business; (*b*) executive: they give effect to these laws; (*c*) judicial: they inflict and remove ecclesiastical censures; and the higher courts review the proceedings of the lower. The basis of these activities is, of course, the constitution of the Church, but the claim is made that both the constitution and the activities of the Church are ultimately based upon Holy Writ. In the Presbyterian Church the holding of a spiritual office is a necessary qualification for a seat in any of the

Church courts. Thus only teaching and ruling elders are eligible for membership, and the membership of any court must be composed of both. Congregational Church government is probably more directly popular in its nature, but Presbyterianism is also vigorously democratic; for both ministers and elders are popularly elected, and represent, in the last resort, the will of the people; nor is it more difficult to deduce the representative form of Church government from the NT than to deduce any other. In actual practice, even where the eldership of the Church is theoretically added to by co-optation, popular consent and approval form the basis of election; they are always aimed at, even if they are not considered indispensable.

All members of any ecclesiastical court are equal *qua* members; *e.g.*, it is open to lay elders to consider judicially even the most abstruse theological problems. In legislative work as well all members of any Church court have equal deliberative and voting power. But in the executive sphere there are certain duties which can be discharged only by an ordained minister—such as the pronouncement of censure or of its removal; and herein lies the explanation of the apparent anomaly that in a system of Presbyterian equality only ministers can normally preside over Church courts, and that the presence of at least one minister is therefore necessary to a quorum. This does not render the presiding minister a man of special rank; he is only temporarily *primus*, and even then a *primus inter pares*; and his primacy deprives him for the time of his deliberative vote.

In the Presbyterian system the courts of the Church are graded, the lowest being congregational in their representation and the scope of their activity, the highest national. The essential courts are the Kirk-Session, Presbytery, and Synod; if the Church is very large, a National Synod, General Synod, or General Assembly crowns the edifice. In this way the rights of the individual congregation are neither exaggerated nor minimized. The higher courts supervise and review the work done by the lower; and the distinctive feature of Presbyterianism lies in giving to its higher courts authoritative control over its lower, and not merely advisory powers. Moreover, it has now become the practice of the Church that these courts shall meet at regular intervals, and not merely when occasion seems to demand it. The idea of gradation can be justified from Scripture and is, besides, of so great practical value that Independency even follows it to the extent of giving the association power to cast refractory congregations out of fellowship. The grading of Church courts frees the individual from the fear of local prejudice, and at the same time serves to impress upon him the idea of the unity of the Church. Of course, the gradually matured and elaborate organization of Presbyterianism renders inevitable a certain externalism; but, so long as this does not drive men to mistake ecclesiastical sameness for Christian unity, no harm is done.

Of the various courts of the Presbyterian Church and their respective functions only a general outline can be given, which may be taken as broadly characteristic of the Presbyterian system. We need not enter in detail into exceptions.

(*a*) *Kirk-Session.*—At the foot of the scale of the Presbyterian Church courts comes the Kirk-Session, which consists of the ministers and elders of the individual congregation. Its numbers vary with the size and needs of the congregation, but they should be sufficient to secure efficient working; and, if the congregation is too small to provide a quorum for the dispatch of business, it is in the power of the Presbytery to attach an elder or elders for the purpose. The jurisdiction of the Kirk-Session extends over its own congregation, but it must act within the limits of the constitution, and its acts can be revised by a higher court. Subject to these limitations, it is a kind of parochial Presbytery. The Session supervises the congregation, takes charge of the communion-roll, and is responsible for its correctness. If necessary, it censures members, its findings being declared and its sentences executed by the moderator.[1] It is responsible, too, for admission to ordinances. The work of the minister is also looked after by the Session, which, if it sees fit, may bring before the Presbytery any matter connected therewith. In certain cases the Session also sees to the proper distribution of ecclesiastical goods.

Where a Deacons' Court exists, the last-named function naturally falls to it. The functions of the Deacons' Court are not of a spiritual nature; it is responsible directly to the Presbytery.

(*b*) *Presbytery.* — The Presbytery — otherwise known under the various names of Classis, Colloque, Tractus, etc.—is the unit of the Presbyterian system and the means of realizing Church unity upon the smallest scale. This court is a distinctive feature of Presbyterianism. The extent of its bounds and the number of individual congregations within its jurisdiction are matters of convenience. On the Presbytery are represented all the Kirk-Sessions within the bounds, the representation consisting of all the ministers, together with one elder for each Session. Thus, as the moderator, who is always a minister, has no deliberative, but only a casting vote, it may quite well happen that, if there are no collegiate charges within the bounds, the lay element will command a steady majority. Formerly a doctrinal discussion or the study of a portion of Scripture might form part of the proceedings of a Presbytery, but such study or discussion would take place now only under very special circumstances, and, for the most part, the court confines itself to purely business matters. This court has the power to grant licence and ordination, and also to take them away—subject, of course, to the laws of the Church and the revision of superior courts. It has in its hands the oversight and the refilling of vacant charges. The superintendence and review of the proceedings of lesser courts also belong to it—*e.g.*, in Scotland since 1639 it has been the practice of the Presbytery annually to examine the books and records of Sessions within its bounds—and it hears references and appeals from these courts. The Session as a body, individual elders, or ordinary members of a congregation may petition the Presbytery concerning a moderator of Session. In the ordinary way the proceedings of Presbytery are regularly submitted to the Synod of the province. But it is in the power of any Presbytery to submit a suggestion direct to the General Assembly by means of what is called in Scotland an 'overture'; and the converse of this appears in the Barrier Act of 1697, which forbids any General Assembly to pass an act affecting the constitution of the Church until it has submitted the proposal to all the Presbyteries, and their opinions on it have been received by a later Assembly. In the act of ordination only the ministerial members of Presbytery take part.

(*c*) *Synod.*—The Synod—in some cases called the Coetus—is of the nature of a larger Presbytery. It is composed of the sum of its Presbyteries, together with a minister and elder from each of any neighbouring Synods as corresponding members. As the court intermediate between the Presbytery and the supreme court of the Church, the Synod has a comparatively narrow range of functions. It reviews the proceedings of Presby-

[1] 'Moderator' is the name applied to the president of any ecclesiastical court.

teries, examines their records, can overture the supreme court, can call the attention of any Presbytery to errors and omissions of duty, and is directly responsible to the supreme court. Those three are the necessary courts of the Presbyterian system; and, where there is nothing higher, the Synod would, of course, have extended powers.

(*d*) *General Assembly.*—In all Churches of more than provincial extent the highest court is the General Synod, National Synod, or General Assembly. The General Assembly has unlimited power—subject to the constitution of the Church, the constitutional rights of inferior bodies, and the law of the land. Its aim is to be representative of the whole Church; but, while Kirk-Sessions are represented in the Presbytery and Synod, Presbyteries are represented in the General Assembly. The proportion of elders to ministers varies in the various Churches. In the Church of Scotland the scheme is as follows:

By an Act of Assembly, A.D. 1694,
- (*a*) from Presbyteries of 12 or fewer parishes, 2 ministers, 1 elder;
- (*b*) from Presbyteries of 12 to 18 parishes, 3 ministers, 1 elder;
- (*c*) from Presbyteries of 18 to 24 parishes, 4 ministers, 2 elders;
- (*d*) from Presbyteries of 24 or more parishes, 5 ministers, 2 elders.

By an additional Act of A.D. 1712,
- (*e*) from Presbyteries of 30 or more parishes, 6 ministers, 3 elders;
- (*f*) by a rule of Assembly enacted in 1893 every Presbytery sends one minister for every four ministers on roll of Presbytery and for a part of four, and one elder for every six ministers and for a part of six;
- (*g*) 67 town council elders from royal burghs, and two from the city of Edinburgh;
- (*h*) a representative from each university.

The Free Church simply took one-third of each Presbytery (ministers and elders alike); and every Church has its own scheme of representation. The personnel of General Assemblies necessarily varies much more than that of inferior courts from one meeting to another; and, as a consequence, any given Assembly may differ widely in its opinions from its predecessor. But the judicial findings of one Assembly cannot be reversed by another; *e.g.*, if the Assembly of 1889 has suspended a minister, that of 1890 may think its predecessor wrong, but can alter the decision of 1889 only by finding that the suspension has already been long enough to satisfy justice, or express its disapproval by coming to an opposite conclusion on a similar case. On the other hand, legislation passed by a previous Assembly—any act, indeed, which is not a judicial decision — can, subject to the usual limitations, be reversed, although, up to the time of its reversal, it is binding upon the Church. If the constitution of the Church is affected by any proposal, the Barrier Act prevents hasty action.

It will be seen from the above that in the lowest court, the Kirk-Session, the lay element must predominate; that in the next lowest, the Presbytery, it may; and that in the Synod the same state of affairs will prevail as in the sum of the Presbyteries. Not until we come to the highest court of all can a clerical majority ever be theoretically certain, though, as a matter of fact and practice, the ministerial element does usually predominate in every court higher than the Session. Still, when we consider that all ministers and elders eligible for a seat in any court of the Presbyterian Church are originally elected by the people, and must therefore, in the main, reflect popular opinion, and when we consider that such devices as the Barrier Act stand in the way of hasty and irresponsible decisions even on the part of the highest court of all, we cannot deny the right of Presbyterianism to be called a thoroughly democratic form of Church government.

The Presbyterian system did not spring suddenly into being full-grown, but is the result of long development, patient study, and long resistance to opposition. On the general lines above indicated it is in use in Great Britain, the colonies, and N. America; but differences occur in various Continental Churches, due either to their smallness or to undue interference by the civil power.

3. Difficulties of the system.—The comparatively elaborate organization of the Presbyterian Church is, on the whole, an advantage; but it has its disadvantages as well. When English Presbyterianism was subjected to persecution which it was unable to withstand, it could not, like Independency, simply go into hiding till the storm blew over. It had either to remain organized, in which case it became obvious and was crushed by force, or to sacrifice its organization and so cease to be Presbyterianism. On the other hand, when the successors of Richelieu set themselves to crush French Presbyterianism, they began by suppressing its organization, and the result justified their scheme. This is merely to say that close organization is an advantage in times of strength, but an inconvenience in times of weakness.

From the beginning the political influence of the Reformed Churches has been on the side of popular government, as has been noted in the case of France, Scotland, and Holland, where the Church found itself in conflict with the established ecclesiastical system and the civil power, and under the necessity of fighting for its existence. The action of the existent authorities in each case contributed to identify in the general mind the causes of civil and religious liberty; and modern democracy owes a heavy debt to the religious impulse of the Reformation. It is noteworthy, *e.g.*, that the American War of Independence found the Presbyterians practically solid for the colonial cause—a circumstance due as much to their settled belief in representative government as to their memory of past wrongs on the other side of the Atlantic. In the case of Geneva the people had already won their civil liberty, and were prepared to recognize the Church, so that events took another turn; and in certain Continental states the civil power, while recognizing the Church, has felt itself under the necessity of putting pressure upon Presbyterianism in the interests of its own supreme authority. Indeed, in every land where Presbyterianism has made good its footing the question of the relation between Church and State has arisen in a more or less acute form. Calvin's ideal was that the State and the Church ought to be in alliance, but that there should be no confusion between them. Each should have its own separate, clearly defined sphere of action: the State should not interfere with spiritual affairs, nor the Church with secular matters. But a Church member, who enjoys in that sphere a great measure of religious liberty and a share of ecclesiastical government, will not long be content with less in his civil capacity, and a king who believes in Divine Right, or an aristocracy clinging desperately to its privileges, cannot but look askance at a democratic Church. John Knox and Mary Stuart, Andrew Melville and James I., the Dutch and Philip II., must sooner or later find peace impossible; no theory of the independent spheres of Church and State could discount the truth, from his own point of view, of James I.'s shrewd saying, 'No bishop, no king.' But, even when that phase of the conflict is over, and the position of the Church secured, the difficulty remains of defining the respective limits of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, a difficulty increased by the very fact that friendly relations exist between Church and State. For alliance without mutual interference is hard to secure; the members of the Church are in

another aspect the members of the civil community, and it is constantly hard to mark off a definite boundary between the secular and the spiritual. The same problem as vexed mediævalism on a European scale has recurred on a national scale in Presbyterian lands, and has been a fruitful cause of trouble and division. In Geneva Calvin experienced this difficulty of keeping alliance free from a confusion and conflict of interests; and in Scotland, where a fairly successful solution of the problem has at length been arrived at, this has been accomplished only at the cost of prolonged conflict and wide-spread secession. In spite of Calvin's desire for the alliance of Church and State, the modern tendency of Presbyterianism has rather been towards separation in the interests of peace and concord.

4. Educational activity. — The Reformers in general and the Calvinists in particular were from the first deeply impressed with the need for popular education; for a democracy must educate its citizens in the interest of sane self-government. Moreover, the Reformers believed themselves to be possessed of a system of doctrine so near to the absolute truth that it could challenge comparison with any other, and had only to be fully known in order to be accepted by intelligent and educated men. They therefore believed that an educated public was the best guarantee of a successful propaganda. Their doctrine and polity were new, and even among their own adherents many required some detailed and definite instruction in addition to the general considerations that had induced them to adhere. From the beginning, too, an educated ministry was one of the deepest desires of the Reformed leaders. To them the chief thing of all was that the Word of God should be properly expounded and properly understood. In this exposition and understanding, which called alike for an educated ministry and an educated people, lay the best hope, not only for the expansion of their Church, but also for the saving of souls. For all these reasons the Reformed Churchmen were ardent educationists. The school of Geneva, under Calvin's care, soon became famous throughout Europe; the first use that the French Church made of Henry IV.'s annual grant was to found and endow colleges; the settlement of the Dutch Church was followed by an amazing outburst of intellectual activity; and the destruction of John Knox's splendid scheme for Scottish education was a blow from which his country took long to recover. Knox advocated a scheme whereby every parish should have its school, and every considerable town its grammar school, and the scheme was to be completed by the maintenance of universities in certain important cities. The passing of likely pupils from the lower institutions to the higher should be in the public care, and, if need be, at the public expense. Knox shrewdly advocated compulsory education for the children of the very rich and the very poor; he seems to have trusted to the common sense of the middle class. One-third of the confiscated funds of the old Church was to be applied for purposes of education, but the greed of the nobles ruined the project, which became in sad fact a 'devote imagination'; and only in recent times, with her system of primary schools, secondary schools, and universities, with free and compulsory education as far as possible, and bursaries to help the needy scholar, has Scotland reached a stage of educational development resembling that devised by her great Reformer three-and-a-half centuries ago. It must not be forgotten that the educational schemes of the Reformers were devised in the religious interest. Knox, in his enthusiasm, even recommended that likely men should, if need be, be forced into the ministry. But, as time went on, the educational horizon widened; and, though for a time the Church became the victim of a scholasticism as deadly as the mediæval type, the principle of free inquiry, upon which the Reformation itself rested, could not for ever be denied. The Church, with her doctrinal system fixed and hardened, has not infrequently been unsympathetic and even cruel towards her intellectual offspring; but modern science, with much else that has been attacked by the Church, owes a greater debt to the underlying principles of Presbyterianism than is superficially apparent. Even the much-abused Higher Criticism is a truer spiritual child of the Reformation than the rigid orthodoxy which opposes it, for the Reformers were the higher critics and revolutionary Biblical students of their day; and there are encouraging signs that the Church, on the whole, is coming to see this. It is all to the credit of the Church that, having set on foot educational systems and institutions, she has been content to see other authorities take them over in their maturity, secularize them, and use them in a wider interest than the ecclesiastical, while she herself undertakes the religious education of her own. No part of the work of the Presbyterian Church does her more honour than her efforts on behalf of education.

5. Morality.—The morality which accompanies the Presbyterian form of Church government and the Calvinist form of doctrine is quite distinctive. It might be logically expected that a profound belief in the sovereignty of God, in election and irresistible grace, would fill the individual with a deep sense not merely of his insignificance but also of his helplessness, and would conduce to a fatalism destructive of all energy and activity. But in Calvinism we find the same paradox as in early Islām, viz. that a creed apparently inimical to all human activity has animated men to the most prodigious efforts. Calvin and Knox, and others of the same faith, when they considered themselves merely as men, were the humblest of creatures, giving God the glory for all that they did and were; but, when they considered themselves as instruments in the hands of God, they were filled with a sense of their usefulness in the world that made them marvels of energy and even of arrogance. Like Paul, they valued themselves little, but they magnified their office. This combination of personal modesty with diligence and fiery energy has always been characteristic of the best Calvinist morality. The Calvinist morality has generally been a little hard and unsympathetic, tending rather to the concealment and repression than to the consideration of personal feelings, and sometimes the Church's sense of official duty has driven her into tyrannical and inquisitorial interference with the private affairs of men; but a certain probity, a sturdy independence, a reluctance to act except from real conviction, a stiff-necked insistence upon just dealing, and the energetic will to make the best of any given situation have characterized Presbyterian morals throughout, and have made of the Presbyterian a sound and trustworthy business man, an excellent colonist, a soldier to be feared—indeed, a man to be reckoned with in any walk of life. Considering his creed, which makes the almost arbitrary will of God everything and man nothing, the Calvinist's fervency in prayer is as paradoxical as his energy and activity, but is equally a fact.

6. Conclusion.—It has frequently been made a reproach against the Reformation that it broke in pieces the unity of Christendom; and for this rending of the vesture of Christ the Reformed Churches have had to bear their share of the blame. But, as has already been pointed out, divergences existed in the Roman Catholic Church

before the Reformation which that crisis only brought to light, and, to a great extent, what occurred was really the substitution of spiritual unity under the headship of Christ for mechanical unity under the headship of the papacy. Moreover, the breaking up of the mediæval Church into national Churches was an inevitable result of the growth of nationalism in Europe; and, while Calvin and those who followed him were deeply impressed with the great truth of the unity of the Church, they found that circumstances prevented its realization in the meantime on any wider scale than the national. Yet, even when this is said, it must be admitted that the overscrupulous conscience of Presbyterianism has led to further divisions which are less justifiable, and not in the same degree necessary. The history of Scotland since 1700 affords abundant illustration of the truth of that statement. It must, however, be noted that, for the last century at least, the general tendency of Presbyterianism has been towards union and reconciliation, as the truth has been increasingly realized that the things which are common to the Churches are more important than the things which divide them. Apart altogether from the schemes which are now afoot in various quarters to unite Presbyterianism with other denominations, in Scotland, America, Canada, and elsewhere, the different Presbyterian bodies have been uniting and are pursuing the policy of union on a wider scale. In 1884 a significant Assembly took place, when for the first time the effort was made to hold an Ecumenical Council of Presbyterianism. Since that time ten such Councils have met in various centres, and one by one all the representatives of Presbyterianism in the world are being gathered in. The alliance has no authoritative control over the various independent Churches, but at least it serves to provide Presbyterians throughout civilization with a sense of the unity of the great Church to which they belong. The statistics collected become more and more full and accurate as time goes on, and it may be that the increasing influence of this pan-Presbyterian movement, and the increasing encouragement afforded by the results of its work, will one day lead to something closer by way of a bond between all Presbyterians the world over.

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PRESCIENCE.—See PREDESTINATION.

PRESENTIMENT. — By 'presentiment' is meant a more or less vague anticipation or apprehension of an event, which befalls the individual himself or some one in whom he is interested; as a rule also it is implied that there are insufficient, if any, grounds in his conscious mind for the anticipation; and it is usually implied that the event is an evil, a misfortune. A vague apprehension is one in which the details, the particular mode of the event, are not consciously thought of; *e.g.*, a 'presentiment of death' implies that the manner of the death is not foreseen; it may be merely a feeling of depression, which suggests the idea, more or less definitely, of some unfortunate happening.

The Society for Psychical Research and corresponding bodies in other countries have investigated a large number of cases in which an individual, either in normal waking or sleeping state or in a hypnotic trance—either without apparatus or by means of a mirror, a crystal globe, a pool of ink, etc.—has been said to be aware of, and to have reported, an event about to happen to himself or to a relative, a friend, or even a stranger, which, after the report was recorded, took place as it had been described. The correspondence between the anticipation and the reality varies from the representation in the former merely of the emotional element of the latter, 'something terrible about to happen,' or of its central fact, 'A is going to die on the voyage,' up to the complete representation of date, place, and circumstances.

One of the most famous examples of this class is Williams' dream of the murder of the Prime Minister, Perceval, in 1812, more than a week before it occurred (*Proc. Soc. Psych. Research*, v. [1889] 324, and at the end of Spencer Walpole's *Life of the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval*, 2 vols., London, 1874). Another is the painter Segantini's vision of his own death, thirteen days before it happened, which he represented in his last picture; a third, Countess Toutschkoff's dream of her father announcing to her the death of her husband at Borodino (Maeterlinck, *The Unknown Guest*, pp. 112, 158; *Memoirs of the Life and Labours of Stephen Grellet*, London, 1860, i. 434), three months before it occurred, that place being unknown both to her husband and to herself at the time. A case of simple presentiment is that of a lady who dreamt that 'something terrible' was going to happen to a friend, with various circumstances in the dream which were afterwards verified, along with the fact, not visualized in the dream, that the daughter of the person in question became insane.

It does not belong to this article to discuss the many problems that arise in connexion with this branch of psychical research. The question of evidence is all-important, and it may be said that in none of the cases is the evidence such as would satisfy the rigorous requirements of natural science; obviously the prevision, presentiment, or premonition must be fully recorded, before the event to which it refers occurs; the event must be such that it could not have been anticipated or inferred as probable, at least in its details, by the seer; even then we should have to exclude mere coincidence (*e.g.*, dreaming of a person's death, and the death occurring within, say, a week afterwards, would not be a premonition to a person who frequently had such dreams, but not, except in this one case, followed by the death of the person in question). Again, we must exclude cases in which there is a possibility that the presentiment or the dream has led to its own fulfilment—where, *e.g.*, nervousness caused by the presentiment of failure in a difficult or dangerous undertaking is itself a cause of such failure; in more extreme cases the death of the individual may be brought about by a belief, however caused, that it is going to take place on a given date at a given hour (*e.g.*, the death of C. C. Brooks, *Proc. S.P.R.* v. 291). Supposing, however, that all chances of error are excluded, and that either one perfect and unassailable case or a multitude of imperfect cases compels

us to assume the possibility of prevision, different explanations will still be available: (1) spiritualism: it is suggested that spirits, whether of the dead or of higher beings, have clearer vision and deeper intelligence than the living man, and therefore can anticipate more accurately what is to occur, and that they may transmit this knowledge by vision or otherwise to human beings in whom they are interested; (2) telepathy from one living mind to another, as when A dreams of an event happening or about to happen to B, the conditions leading to this event being present in B's mind and transmitted to A's without the intervention of the ordinary senses; and this view may be extended: facts of which B is only latently aware (whatever that may mean) may be transmitted to A and enter his consciousness as a dream or vision; (3) if there occur cases in which a future event, of which the conditions are not and cannot be present to any living mind, is yet foreseen, we must assume a power, perhaps in our subconsciousness, in the subliminal self, of reading the future in the present. The future, in this interpretation, exists in the present, as the present in the past; time, like space, is unreal; and to the perfect vision of God, of which perhaps our higher unconscious self may have partial glimpses, past, present, and future are seen in one glance. It is obvious that this mystical interpretation explains nothing; neither spiritualism, nor telepathy, in the sense defined, nor the supposed powers of the subconscious self, nor the possibility of seeing the future by any other means than the imperfect ones of inference and analogy can be admitted without evidence far more thoroughly tested and far more overwhelming than that which at present exists. Meanwhile we are left with three much less heroic and less attractive suggestions: (1) slight impressions which are felt, but not noticed in our waking life—*e.g.*, the onset of a disease—may force their way into fuller consciousness, in dramatic form, in a dream; we may then in the dream have a vision of what actually occurs, in the future, but through causes which are perfectly natural and normal; (2) we may be conscious at a given time of certain facts, without drawing from them the conclusion which they bear as to the outcome of the situation that they represent; the conclusion may be drawn subconsciously—*i.e.* in dissociation from our conscious personality, which it then affects either as a mere feeling with a vague sense of coming disaster or as dramatized into an actual vision of the conclusion realized; or (3) the conclusion may have been reached unconsciously, by a sort of summary intuition, by putting together a number of apparently disconnected facts; it may have been forgotten, and yet, again in dissociation from the self, may influence the latter as a presentiment or as a premonition, in any of the possible forms.

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J. L. McINTYRE.

PRESTER JOHN.—The story of Prester John is woven of the fact and fancy of the Middle Ages, the fact warped by the varying aspects of European policy, the fancy coloured by Oriental imagination and tradition.

Until the 14th cent. the evidence points to Asia as the home of Prester John. In the 15th cent., after the conquest of Timur and the overthrow of Christianity in Central Asia, the African claim took hold of the popular imagination. But the true claim of Asia has never lacked support in the writings of explorers and scholars.

Prester John is no mythical personage, though myth and legend have gathered round his name. The simple uncoloured report of Friar Johannes e Monte Corvino in 1305 is historical evidence of the first order, and it is supported by many witnesses of the 12th and 13th centuries. This evidence supports the conclusion reached by J. B. Bury in his note to Gibbon (ch. lxiv.):

'Sir H. Howorth has shown very clearly (*Hist. of the Mongols*, i. p. 696 *sqq.*) that the Karaits were Turks, not Mongols. Their territory was near the Upper Orchon, between the rivers Selinga and Kernlen. They were Christians. Their chief Tughril received the title of Wang ("king") from the (Manchu) Emperor of Northern China for his services in 1193 against the Naiman Turks of the regions of the Altai and Upper Irtish. Chingiz also took part in this war, and his services were recognised by the title of Dai Ming, "high Brightness." For an account of Prester John—the name by which the Karait khans were known in the west—and the legends attached to him, see Howorth, i. cap. x. p. 534 *sqq.*' (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ed. Bury[2], vii. 2, n. 3).

I. *ASIA.*—1. **Otto of Freisingen (1145).**—In 1145 Prester John first appears as an Eastern priest-king who had established a wide dominion in Central Asia. This rests on the *Chronicle* of Otto of Freisingen (vii. 33, sub anno 1145 [*MGH* xx.]). The bishop of Gabala (Jibul in Syria) visited the papal court in 1145, and stated that not many years before a certain John, king and priest, who dwelt beyond Persia and Armenia, a Christian but a Nestorian, had made war on the kings of Media and Persia, the Samiard brothers, and had captured Ecbatana, the seat of their kingdom. He had then marched to the relief of the Church of Jerusalem, but was stopped at the Tigris. He was said to be one of the ancient race of the Magi, and had a sceptre of solid emerald.

2. **The letter of Prester John (1165).**—The letter was presented by the ambassadors of Prester John to the Greek emperor Manuel I. and the Western emperor Frederick Barbarossa (Albericus, in *Chron.* 1168).

In it Prester John, 'by the power and virtue of God and the Lord Jesus Christ King of Kings,' claims to be the greatest monarch under heaven. He desires to visit the Holy Sepulchre, and to fight against the enemies of the Cross. Seventy-two kings were under his rule. His empire extended over the three Indias, including Farther India, where lay the body of St. Thomas. In his dominions were the unclean nations whom Alexander the Great walled up among the mountains of the north, and who were to come forth in the latter days. Among the marvels of his territory were monstrous ants that dug gold, fish that gave purple, the Fountain of Youth, pebbles that gave light, the Sea of Sand, and the River of Stones. When he went forth to war, thirteen great crosses were borne before him, each followed by 10,000 knights and 100,000 foot. His palace was built after the model of that erected by St. Thomas for the Indian king Gondophoros. He was waited on by 7 kings and 365 dukes; 12 archbishops sat on his right hand, and 20 bishops on his left, besides the patriarch of St. Thomas, the proto-pope of the Sarmagantians, and the proto-pope of Susa, where the royal residence was.

This letter enjoyed great popularity in the West. Zarncke (*Der Priester Johannes*) refers to 100 MS copies of it, 8 in the British Museum, 10 in Vienna, 13 in Paris, and 15 in Munich (*EBr*[11] xxii. 304 f.).

(1) The exaggerated style of the letter, the work of Nestorian imagination, was an appeal specially to the Byzantine court. The brilliant fêtes and tournaments of Manuel I. were renowned throughout Europe as the most magnificent spectacles of the kind ever seen (G. Finlay, *Hist. of the Byzantine and Greek Empires*, Edinburgh, 1854, ii. 179). There were also political reasons for the reception given to the embassy. The Seljûk Sulṭân of Iconium, Khilidy-Arslân II., was consolidating his power in Asia Minor, while the Greeks were steadily losing ground during the reign of Manuel (*ib.* p. 234). The Latin principality of Edessa had fallen in 1144 to the arms of Omad ed-din Zengi, the *atabeg*, or ruler, of Mosul. His son, Nur ed-din (1146-74), united the Muhammadan powers, added the kingdom of Damascus to that of Aleppo, and waged a long and successful war against the Christians of Syria. The Latins and Greeks alike looked favourably at the promise of Christian help against their foe (Gibbon, ch. lix.).

(2) The reference in the letter to Alexander the Great points to the influence of the Alexander romance in the colouring of the story. This romance is attributed to Callisthenes. It arose in Egypt about A.D. 200. It spread in Latin translations to the West, and in Armenian and Syrian versions to the East. These would be known to the Nestorian ministers of Prester John. It became very popular in the West in the 12th cent. through the

epic of Alberich of Besançon and the *Alexanderbuch* of the German 'Pfaffe' Lamprecht (*Chambers's Encycl.*, *s.v.* 'Alexander the Great').

(3) Two further references in the letter witness to the Asiatic origin of the story. The Three Indias are traceable in the geographical conceptions of the 12th century. The earliest MS of the *Ravenna Cosmography*, itself a work of the 7th cent., is of the 13th cent. (*Ravennatis Anon. Cosmogr.*, ed. M. Pinder and G. Parthey, Berlin, 1860), and is the source of the Three Indias (pp. 40, 44 f.).

(4) The reference to the Sea of Sand, taken in connexion with the Three Indias, points to the Great Desert of Central Asia, and not to the Sahara.

3. The letter of Alexander III. (1177).—Alexander III. was in the midst of his quarrel with Barbarossa when the embassy of Prester John was received by the emperors. The reconciliation between them took place at Venice on 24th July 1177. Alexander remained at Venice until Oct. 1177; it was there that he gave audience to an embassy from Prester John. Philip, a physician of the papal court, had travelled to the Far East and visited the court of Prester John. He had put forward the claims of the Western Church and had returned to Italy with letters from Prester John to Alexander. These letters are lost, but the letter from Alexander to Prester John is preserved in several English Chronicles. The best text is that of J. Brompton (Pagi, *Critica Historico-Chronologica*, in Baronius, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, iv. 650). Prester John not only had asked for instruction, but had requested to have a church in the city. This was conceded to him, with the right of an altar in the church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (*Chron. Joh. Brompton, ap.* R. Twysden, *Hist. Angl. Scriptores X.*, London, 1652, col. 1132 f.). The letter was entrusted to Philippus, who was commissioned to return to the East and deliver it to Prester John.

4. The conquest of Jenghīz Khan (1202).—The realm of Prester John was one of the first to fall before the conquering hosts of Jenghīz Khan. It was then ruled by his son David. Pagi gives three authorities: (1) the *Chronicle* of W. de Nangiaco, sub anno 1202; (2) Marinus Sanutus (lib. iii. 'Fidelium crucis,' pt. xiii. ch. iii.); and (3) the older authority, Vincentius Bellovacensis (*Spec. Hist.* ch. lxix.). They agree in assigning a wide dominion to Prester John before the conquest of Jenghīz; and Gibbon, on their testimony, states:

'The boldest chieftains might tremble, when they beheld, enchased in silver, the skull of the khan of the Keraites, who under the name of Prester John had corresponded with the Roman pontiff and the princes of Europe' (ch. lxiv.).

5. The letter of Philip to Gregory IX. (1237).—On the death of Jenghīz Khan in 1227 his son, Ogotai, was proclaimed Great Khan, or emperor, of the Moguls and Tatars. In the year 1237 a long report was received of the successful missions of the Dominicans among the Jacobites and Nestorian Christians in Asia. Matthew Paris (*Hist. Angl.*, sub anno 1237, ed. W. Wats, London, 1674, p. 372) speaks of it as 'jucundus rumor de Terra Sancta.' The report was sent to Gregory IX. by Philip, provincial of the Dominicans in the Holy Land, and was forwarded by Godfrey, the papal penitentiary, to the Dominicans throughout England and France. William of Montferrat with two others had studied the languages of Central Asia, and had received a promise from the archbishop of the Nestorians to submit to the unity of the Catholic Church. It is important to note, in view of the African claim, that Friar Philip had sent also to the patriarch of the Jacobites of Egypt, who had made the like promise. Matthew Paris adds:

'Huic subdita est minor India, Aethiopia et Libya cum Aegypto. Sed Aethiopes et Libyi non sunt subjecti Saracenis.' The realm of Prester John is not therefore in Ethiopia, but in the Far East.

6. The report of Johannes e Plano Carpino (1246).—The annals of Matthew Paris between 1238 and 1245 record the ravages of the Tatar hosts under Batu and the terror which they inspired in the West. They were stayed at Neustadt in Austria by the valour of the Franks. In the winter of 1242 they withdrew to the east. This was in part due to the death of the Great Khan Ogotai in 1241. He was succeeded by his son, Kujuk.

Meanwhile the letter of Philip had stirred up the interest in the West, and the missions to the Nestorians opened the way for missions to the court of the Great Khan. This may also have been favoured by the policy of the Venetians, who were on good terms with the Mongols in the Crimea (Bury's note to Gibbon, vii. 15, n. 42).

Johannes e Plano Carpino was present at the enthronement of the new khan, and states that he was well-affected to Christianity and had many Christians in his service. There was a Christian chapel before his tent (Raynaldus, *Ann. Eccl.*, sub anno 1245, xiii. 595).

7. The mission of Friar Ascelinus (1247).—The hostility of the other leaders is illustrated by the mission of Friar Ascelinus to the Tatars of Persia. He had an audience with the Khan Bajothnoy in the Tatar camp. After suffering much ignominy, he returned with letters from Bajothnoy to the pope, Innocent IV. (*ib.* xiii. 642).

8. The Tatar embassy to Louis IX. (1248).—The Tatar embassy to Louis IX. at Cyprus throws much light on the position of the Great Khan and his relations to Prester John and the Christians of Central Asia. The embassy was sent by a Persian khan named Ercalthay, who had been for many years a Christian, but was not of the royal blood. David, the chief ambassador, had been baptized the year before. The Great Khan of Tartary had been baptized with his eighteen sons and many of his magnates three years before (*c.* 1245). The king asked many questions of the ambassadors. He was told that Ercalthay was anxious to join hands with the Christians against the enemies of the Cross, and that Bacho, the khan who had insulted the ambassadors of Innocent IV. in Persia, was a pagan and had Saracen councillors. They also reported that Quiothay, the mother of the present khan, was a daughter of Prester John (G. de Nangiaco, *Gesta S. Ludovici, ap.* A. Duchesne, *Hist. Francorum Scriptores*, Paris, 1636–49, v. 349, 354).

9. The mission of Rubruquis (1253).—In the narrative of Rubruquis the title of 'King John' is assigned to Kushluk, king of the Naimans, who had married the daughter of the last lineal descendant of the Gur Khans. Kushluk was son of a powerful king of the Naimans, whose name, Ta-Yang-Khan, is precisely 'Great King John' in Chinese. It is evident that Rubruquis supposed this king of the Naimans to be the original of this widely spread legend (Yule, *EBr*[11] xxii. 306[a]). Bury says that a new edition of Rubruquis is wanted. Gibbon (vii. 6) refers to the first volume of Hakluyt. Yule gives, among the chief points in the narrative of Rubruquis, the relation between the rulers of the Naimans and the Keraite khans and the habit of exaggeration common among the Nestorian writers.

10. The journey of Marco Polo (*c.* 1270).—The travels of Marco Polo brought him from Yarkand past Cherchen and Lob Nor to Tenduc. This is placed near the point where the Great Wall crosses the north-east portion of the great bend of the Hwangho. To the north and north-west lay the country of the Keraites with their old capital of Karakorum on the north edge of the desert of Gobi, on the bank of the upper reach of the Orchon river. It is here that he speaks of Prester John, whose kingdom, though still ruled by a

member of the same family, is tributary to the Great Khan of Tartary (*Travels*, i. 64, *ap.* Pagi, iv. 649).

11. The mission of Johannes e Monte Corvino (1292–1305).—Kujuk, the son of Ogotai, died in 1248. He was succeeded by his cousins Mangu and Khubilag, the grandsons of Jenghīz Khan. On the death of Mangu in 1257 Khubilag became the Great Khan, and on the conquest of N. China removed the royal residence from Karakorum to Peking (Cambaluc). It was here that Marco Polo met him, and it was at his court that the Minorite friar Johannes e Monte Corvino established his mission-centre in the Far East. The letter written to Clement V. in 1305 is valuable testimony to the successors of Prester John and to the realm which was still ruled by them as tributary to the Great Khan (Raynaldus, sub anno 1305, xv. no. 19 f.).

12. The evidence from 1145 to 1305.—The evidence for Prester John from Asiatic sources is continuous for 160 years, and the report of the last writer points to the old capital of Karakorum as being the seat in the early 14th cent. of the tributary kings of the dynasty. It is difficult, therefore, in the face of this evidence, to follow Yule in his statement:

'However vague may have been the ideas of Pope Alexander III. respecting the geographical position of the potentate whom he addressed from Venice in 1177, the only real person to whom the letter can have been sent was the king of Abyssinia. Let it be observed that the "honourable persons of the monarch's kingdom" whom the leech Philip had met with in the East must have been the representatives of some real power, and not of a phantom. It must have been a real king who professed to desire reconciliation with the Catholic Church and the assignation of a church at Rome and of an altar at Jerusalem' (*EBr*[11] xxii. 306[b]).

The Prester John of the 12th and 13th centuries was not the king of Abyssinia, but the name by which the Keraite khans were known in the West. It would seem to have shrunk from the wide rule of the Gur Khans in 12th cent. to the tributary rule of the khan of Karakorum in the early 14th century.

13. The Tatar mission from 1308 to 1370.—(1) The work of Friar Johannes was recognized by Clement V. in 1307 by the constitution of the archiepiscopal see of Cambaluc (Raynaldus, sub anno 1307, no. 29).

(2) In 1318 John XXII. took a further step in the organization of the Church among the Tatars by the founding of the archbishopric of Sultania for the empire of the Ilkhans of Persia. Sultania was situated south-west of Resht on the Caspian Sea, and north-west of Kazvin. Friar Francus of Perugia, a Dominican, was appointed to the see with six suffragans. His jurisdiction was to extend over Chagdo and India and Ethiopia (*ib.* sub anno 1318, no. 4). The juxtaposition of Ethiopia and India under the authority of the archbishop of Sultania is of importance in the development of the story of Prester John. It is to the work of this mission-centre that the transposition of the story from India to Ethiopia may be traceable.

(3) Raynaldus states that it was the policy of the West to favour the frequent exchange of letters and embassies to the Tatar khans as a check on the encroachments of the Saracens (sub anno 1322, no. 41).

(4) In 1326 Andreas de Perugia sends a report of his work in the Far East to the Father Guardian of Perugia. He states that, after many dangers by land and by sea, he reached Cambaluc in 1308, and consecrated John as archbishop. He stayed there for five years. Gerard was appointed bishop of Zaitun in Fukien. He was succeeded by Peregrinus, on whose death in 1322 he himself became bishop of Zaitun. Four of the brothers were martyred in India by the Saracens.

(5) Yule gives a further reference to Prester John about the same year (1326):

'Friar Odoric, about 1326, visited the country still ruled by the prince whom he calls Prester John; "but," he says, "as regards him, not one-hundredth part is true that is told of him"' (*EBr*[11] xxii. 306[a]).

(6) Johannes e Monte Corvino died in 1333. John XX. appointed as his successor another Minorite friar, Nicolaus. He wrote letters not only to the Great Khan but also to Secede Chigista, king of Corum, who may be a descendant of the Georgius referred to in 1305 (Raynaldus, sub anno 1333, no. 35).

(7) The last mission was in 1370. Urban V. in this year appointed the Minorite friar Guillelmus to the archiepiscopal see of Cambaluc. There are letters to the Great Khan and the people of Tartary (*ib.* sub anno 1370, no. 91).

The curtain then falls. The great conqueror Timur ascended the throne of Zagatai, and was crowned at Balkh in April 1369 (Gibbon vii. 46). Bury adds in a note to Gibbon:

'As the Mongol power in China was overthrown about the same time by the revolution which set the Ming dynasty on the throne (A.D. 1370), this period marks a general decline of Mongol influence in Asia' (*ib.* vii. 68, n. 74).

The conquests of Timur meant the overthrow of Christianity and the triumph of Islām in Central Asia.

II. *AFRICA.*—In the 15th cent. after the overthrow of the Christian missions in Asia by the conquest of Timur and the consequent difficulties of the land-routes to India, it seems that the Indian traditions of Prester John filtered into Europe through Aden and the African coasts of the Red Sea. India, in the popular imagination, lay behind and beyond Egypt and Ethiopia. But there is evidence also in the 14th cent. that the same tendency was taking place perhaps, as has been suggested (I. 13 (2)), through the grouping of India and Ethiopia under the jurisdiction of the archbishop of Sultania.

1. The 14th cent. evidence.—Yule definitely states that the assertion of Ludolf in his *History of the Ethiopians*, that the ascription of the title Prester John to the Christian kings of Abyssinia was an invention of the Portuguese, is a mistake. He brings the following evidence to support his statement:

(1) The earliest witness that Yule gives is Friar Jordanus.

'Friar Jordanus "Catalani," who returned from the East before 1328, speaks of the emperor of the Ethiopians "quem vos vocatis *Prestre Johan*"' (*EBr*[11] xxii. 306).

Is this an example of the original source of confusion? In 1330 John XXII. wrote to the Nascarines of S. India, commending to them the Dominican friar Jordanus, whom he had consecrated bishop of Columbo, and the Dominican and Minorite friars who were associated with him in the mission. In a letter written the same year to John of Core, archbishop-elect of Sultania, the bishop of Columbo is referred to as one of his suffragans (Raynaldus, sub anno 1331, nos. 51, 57).

(2) Yule gives two witnesses *c.* 1350.

John Marignoli, apostolic legate in Asia, speaks of Ethiopia where the negroes are, and which is called the land of Prester John. And a Spanish work of the same date by an anonymous Franciscan states that the emperor 'Abdeselib, which means "servant of the Cross," is a protector of Preste Juan, who is the patriarch of Nubia and Ethiopia, and is lord of many great lands, and many cities of Christians' (*Libro del conocimiento de todos reynos*, Madrid, 1877).

(3) A fourth witness is Simone Sigoli.

He visited Cairo in 1384, and speaks in his *Viaggio al Monte Sinai* of 'Presto Giovanni' as a monarch dwelling in India, but it is the India which is conterminous with the dominions of the soldan of Egypt and whose lord is master of the Nile, to close or open its discharge upon Egypt (*EBr*[11] xxii. 306[a]).

It is on this evidence that Yule states that the title 'Prester John' had been used long before the name had ceased to be attached to the descendants

of the kings of the Keraites. The juxtaposition of India and Ethiopia under the archbishop of Sultania and the filtering in of Asiatic tradition through Aden at the close of the 14th cent. appear an adequate explanation of the difficulty.

2. The Ethiopian embassies of 1441.—Eugenius IV. in the previous year had sent the Minorite friar Albert on a mission to reconcile the Jacobite Christians of Ethiopia. In 1441 Andrew, abbot of St. Antony, and Peter the Deacon were sent to Italy as ambassadors to the pope on behalf of Constantine, king of the Ethiopians. They were received at the Council of Florence, and a 'form of union' was agreed upon. They then went to Rome with a letter of introduction to the canons and chapter of St. Peter's to allow them to see the Veronica. In this letter the title of Prester John is given to the emperor (Raynaldus, sub anno 1441, no. 2). In the same year another embassy from the Ethiopians was conveyed to Italy by Angelus Maurocenus. On their return Eugenius IV. gave to them a letter of commendation in which he again used the title (*ib.*).

On the occasion of these missions an oration was made before the council by the abbot Nicodemus, who presided over the Ethiopians residing in Jerusalem. In his address he alludes to the remoteness of their country as almost beyond belief, and distinctly asserts that their separation from Rome is due not only to this, but to the negligence of the popes for 800 years (*ib.* no. 3).

3. The map of Fra Mauro (1459).—Yule states:

'From the 14th century onwards Prester John had found his seat in Abyssinia. It is there that Fra Mauro's great map (1459) presents a fine city with the rubric, "Qui il Preste Janni fa residentia principal"' (*EBr*[11] xxii. 306[b]).

4. The Roman diary of Jacobus Volterranus (sub anno 1481).—Raynaldus refers to a mission to the Roman court under Sixtus IV. in 1481, on the authority of the journal of Volterranus. He speaks of it as a mission from Ethiopia, but says that the writer gives to Prester John the title of 'King of India' (Raynaldus, xix., sub anno 1481, no. 40 f.). Muratori publishes the *Diarium* from a MS in the library of Ferrara. There is nothing in the MS to indicate the country represented by the mission, no mention either of India or of Ethiopia. There is, however, a lacuna in the MS which may betoken some doubt in the writer. The brief record shows the interest aroused in Rome by the strange character of the mission (*Jacobi Volterrani Diarium Romanum*, sub anno 1481, *ap.* L. A. Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Script.*, Milan, 1723–51, xxiii. 156).

5. The quest of Prester John (1486).—John II. of Portugal made many attempts to get into communication with Prester John, hoping to form an alliance with him. Among other missions is that of 1486 entrusted to Alphonsus Paiua and Johannes Petreius. They travelled as merchants and at last reached Aden. There they heard of a Christian king in Ethiopia, but had doubts as to his identity, because they had been instructed that Prester John was a Christian king of India. It is clear from this doubt that the Asiatic tradition of Prester John still maintained its hold among the more educated circles in the West. To solve this doubt they thought it best to separate. Petreius sailed to India and left Paiua to await him in Egypt. The quest of Petreius was successful. He found among the Nestorians of S. India the tradition of the Prester John whose power had been overthrown by the Mongols (Raynaldus, sub anno 1486, no. 67)

6. Prester John of Ethiopia (*c.* 1500).—The quest of 1486 proves that in 1486 positive and negative evidence alike pointed to Prester John of Asia. The two travellers asserted that the king of Ethiopia did not correspond with the Prester John of history in dominion, in name, or in priestly office, and Petreius in India found the tradition of the Prester John whose power had ended with the Mongol conquests. But the 15th cent. in Spain and Portugal was an age of romance, and the fable of popular imagination triumphed over the facts discovered by the travellers of 1486. In Portuguese writings of the last years of the 15th cent. and the opening years of the 16th cent. the history of Ethiopia and Abyssinia is the story of Prester John. He is synonymous with the emperor of Ethiopia.

7. Christopher Marlowe (1587).—In the earliest English drama when Prester John takes his place in English literature he is Prester John of Africa, not of Asia. In the second part of Marlowe's *Tamburlaine the Great*, Techelles, king of Fez, relating his conquests to Tamburlaine, says:

'And I have marched along the river Nile
To Machda, where the mighty Christian priest,
Called John the Great, sits in a milk-white robe,
Whose triple mitre I did take by force,
And made him swear obedience to my crown'
(pt. ii. act i. sc. 3).

The drier facts of history have to stoop at times to the romantic claim of literature. Marlowe has given his authority to the African story, and the Prester John of literature still lives as an African priest-king in John Buchan's romance of *Prester John* (London, 1910).

LITERATURE.—E. Gibbon, *Hist. of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury[2], London, 1900–04, v. 149, vii. 2, 15; C. Baronius, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, 12 vols., Rome, 1588–1607; O. Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, 9 vols., do. 1646–77; A. Pagi, *Critica Historico-Chronologica*, in Baronius; H. Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, 2 vols., London, 1866, and in *EBr*[11]; F. Zarncke, *Der Priester Johannes*, Leipzig, 1876–79; G. Oppert, *Der Presbyter Johannes in Sage und Geschichte*[2], Berlin, 1870; M. P. d'Avezac, *Recueil de voyages et de mémoires publié par la Soc. de Géogr.* iv. [Paris, 1839] 547–564; H. Howorth, *Hist. of the Mongols*, London, 1876–88, i.

THOMAS BARNS.

PRIDE.—As a self-regarding passion or sentiment of self-love, pride is associated in popular speech with several related qualities of the selfish disposition such as arrogance, conceit, vanity, and egotism. Conceit or self-conceit is an exaggerated form of self-satisfaction; arrogance is an attitude of presumption manifested in temper and act and calculated to arouse resentment or disgust in others; vanity, as a showing off of one's supposed superiority, seeks the praise or good opinion of the world; and egotism is a habit of self-consciousness or self-regard which affects mind, manner, and speech, as in the case of the hero of George Meredith's *Egoist*, while the same writer's portraiture of Alvan in the *Tragic Comedians* is an exposure of vanity. On the other hand, in pride there is frequently no idea of a comparison or competition with the rest of the world. Pride is a habit of self-isolation or conscious independence, a perversity of will which is indifferent to the opinions and favours of others. It repudiates all idea of obligation. Cf. the hero of Scott's *Bride of Lammermoor* as a typical example.

'Pride, unlike vanity, does not involve belief in one's own superiority to others. The most deeply rooted pride may be connected merely with the conception of independence or equality and may be manifested mainly by a refusal to accept favours or to be under an obligation' (see *DPhP* ii. 339, *s.v.* 'Pride').

The distinction between arrogance and pride may be illustrated by the phrase, 'toujours arrogant, jamais fier,' which has been applied to the demeanour of the Prussian officers in defeat (see *Times Literary Supplement*, no. 740 [23rd March, 1916], p. 135, quoting G. Lenôtre, *Prussiens d'hier et de toujours*, Paris, 1916).

Again, pride as a self-regarding sentiment is to be differentiated (cf. W. McDougall, *Introd. to Social Psychology*[5], p. 191 f.) from 'self-respect'

by the fact that the latter is susceptible to the pressure of outside opinion or authority. Pride, on the other hand, is without this negative self-feeling, and, as a law unto itself, lives on the deference and admiration of others, while at the same time it is indifferent to moral praise or blame. One of its worst features is indifference to the sufferings of others (cf. J. S. Mill, *Essay on Liberty*, London, 1859, ch. v., who speaks of 'the pride which derives satisfaction from the abasement of others'). It is self-love opposed to due respect for humanity and based on a fixed sentiment of satisfaction with one's qualities, actions, views, powers, social status, and reputation. It is capable of elation when the verdict of others coincides with its own preconception and of resentment when this is otherwise. But it is of the essence of pride to be moved by scorn or ridicule rather than by moral censure.

'Pride desires from others an honour it refuses to them and shows, therefore, a spirit which is really abject and mean' (E. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, ii. 391).

There is a pride of race, a pride of birth, a pride of position; a pride of goodness, a pride of evil; a pride of ignorance, a pride of learning; a pride of eccentricity, a pride of conventionality, and so forth. The forms of self-satisfaction are innumerable. On the one hand, we have Sir Percivale in Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* (see *The Holy Grail*[1]) exhibiting the pride of monastic repression and holiness, to which the highest vision is denied; and at the other extreme in R. L. Stevenson's *Master of Ballantrae*, the hero personifying the pride of wickedness as a man who 'entirely loved all the parts and properties of himself: a sort of imbecility which almost necessarily attends on wickedness' (ch. ix.).

It may be useful to classify chronologically the treatment of pride and to discuss its place in ethical thought.

1. In pre-Christian ethics. — In Aristotle's famous characterization of the high-minded man (μεγαλόψυχος) in the *Nic. Ethics* (iv. 3, ed. Grant) we have a species of pride described as inseparable from this type of excellence. The high-minded man is not only worthy of great things, but holds himself to be worthy of them. His estimate of his own merits is independent of the verdict of others. If he holds himself to be worthy of great things when actually unworthy of them, he is vain (χαῦνος), while he who underestimates his own worth is mean-spirited. High-mindedness, then, is a mean between vanity and want of spirit. It is, in fact, a lofty type of pride which is its own star. It is without the sense of duty or moral obligation. Its motive is honour (τιμή) and it owes nothing to the instinctive sense of right. External honour is the best thing that the world can give to the high-minded man. He is glad to confer a benefit, but ashamed to receive one. If he does receive a benefit, he will wipe it out by doing a greater; he will remember those whom he has benefited, but not those by whom he has been benefited; he will be in want of no one; he will serve any readily; he will be proud (μέγας) to the great and prosperous, and lenient towards the lowly. He will not aim at the common objects of ambition; only for great honour or deeds will he strive; he will be open in friendship and hatred, disdaining timid concealment, contemptuously straightforward, really truthful, but reserved and ironical towards the common people. Indifferent to the praise and censure of others, he will bear no malice and be no gossip. On the whole, vanity is better than mean-spiritedness, which is to be condemned for its lack of energy. Aristotle mentions one thing that will provoke the resentment of the μεγαλόψυχος, and that is ὕβρις—calculated, if irrational, insolence. This is a form of pride much less subtle than the peculiar self-consciousness described by Aristotle in the above picture and more familiar to the Greek mind.

[1] Cf. the lines beginning:

'O son, thou hast not true humility,
The highest virtue, mother of them all.'

'Insolence or ὕβρις . . . has its root in want of reverence and want of self-knowledge . . . [and] is the expression of a self-centred will recognising no power outside itself, and knowing no law but its own impulses. . . . This Insolence in the Greek tragedy is the deepest source of moral evil. . . . It is opposed to both αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη' (S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*[3], London, 1904, p. 109).

In the *Antigone* of Sophocles the tragedy centres in the ὕβρις of Creon, the author of a cruel and stern decree which outrages the laws of humanity and results in the sacrifice of Antigone, who defies the decree at the bidding of sisterly love; while in the *Prometheus Vinctus* of Æschylus it is the ὕβρις of revolt or self-assertion of the human intellect against the supreme deity.

Theophrastus of Eresus (374–287 B.C.), the successor of Aristotle as the head of the Lyceum, gives us in his *Characters* a picture of the ὑπερήφανος, or arrogant man, defining arrogance as 'a certain scorn for all the world beside oneself.'[1] In the Stoic and Epicurean ethics there appears to be no distinctive treatment of the passion of pride as such. But the moral independence of the Stoic sage, his αὐτάρκεια (see art. CONTENTMENT) and his equality with Zeus in all but non-essentials (cf. Seneca, *de Prov.* 1) indirectly illustrate the defects of the self-regarding temperament. On the other hand, the tendency of Epicurean ethics favoured the cultivation of the social virtues and helped to tone down the exclusiveness of ancient manners by its emphasis on friendliness, beneficence, and gratitude.

In the OT, especially in the Wisdom literature, we find frequent condemnations of pride in the sense of self-exaltation as manifested by the wicked or foolish (cf. Pr 11^{2} 13^{10} 14^{3} 16^{18} 29^{23}), while the prophets inveigh against national pride—the presumptuous and scornful sense of power (cf. Is $2^{11.\,12}$ 16^{6}, Jer 13^{9} 48^{29}, Zec 9^{6} 10^{11}), though the context occasionally suggests mere 'excellency' or 'greatness' without the implications of moral defect. In the later Wisdom literature the warning against pride recurs (see esp. the essay in Sir 10^{6-28}). Perhaps, however, the evil of pride is most clearly revealed in the character of outstanding individuals like Saul, Absalom, Joab, Rabshakeh, and others. As J. H. Newman says,

'[Saul's] temptation and his fall consisted in a certain perverseness of mind, founded on some obscure feelings of self-importance, very commonly observable in human nature, and sometimes called pride' (*Oxford University Sermons*, new ed., London, 1890, serm. 'Wilfulness, the Sin of Saul,' p. 158).

2. In Christian ethics, early and mediæval.—The Christian ethic shows a great advance on the highest Greek thought in its valuation of such virtues as humility, meekness, and reasonableness. The NT conception of love in association with the doctrine of the divine Fatherhood and in its supreme revelation of the humanity of Christ gave a new significance to the moral defectiveness of pride. In 1 Co 13^{4} love is stated to be free from both arrogance and self-conceit. In Ro 1^{30} we find ἀλαζονεία, or proud speech, and ὑπερηφανία, vainglorious disposition, classed among the sins of paganism; but it is in the human character of Jesus as one who did 'not strive nor cry,' as 'meek and lowly of heart,' that we find a fresh and unique criterion of the sin of pride. Christianity is the apotheosis of self-surrender; and the Christian character cultivates an outlook upon the world entirely free from 'the pride of life' (1 Jn 2^{16}) or

[1] La Bruyère renders ὑπερήφανος by 'un homme fier superbe,' untitling the section 'De l'Orgueil'; cf. *Les Caractères ou les mœurs de ce siècle*, Paris, 1688.

the valuation of earthly possessions which disregards their transiency and insufficiency. Jesus is no respecter of persons, condemns the Jewish self-righteousness (cf. the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican) and exclusiveness, has no sympathy with the national prejudice against Samaritans, and in His conception of the brotherhood of mankind invests the claims and rights of one's neighbour with a new dignity. The soul of the individual has an intrinsic and eternal worth. Hence His emphasis on the laws of mercy and forgiveness, which are the foundation of His ethical teaching, His inculcation of ἐπιείκεια, or a gentle reasonableness, His eulogy of 'the poor in spirit' and of the voluntary surrender of power, His proclamation of self-repudiation as the condition of moral greatness, His warnings against self-assertion and self-advertisement. Pride is obviously a contradiction of the Christian ideal of unselfishness and stands condemned by the general spirit of the Christian ethic as well as by its positive precepts.

So deeply had these aspects of the teaching of Christ and His followers sunk into the consciousness of Christendom that Dante gives pride the first place in his seven sins. Earlier than Dante, Augustine had defined the unpardonable sin as a state of mind consisting of 'a desperate and impious obstination in sin, with a proud refusal to humble oneself before God' (*Epistolæ ad Romanos Inchoata Expositio*, § 23, quoted in W. Montgomery, *St. Augustine*, London, 1914, p. 198). Moreover, he had linked *superbia* with *voluptas* and *curiositas* in his analysis of the causes of sin (*Conf.* x. 36). But Dante derived his 'moral topography' from the *Summa Totius Theologiæ* of Thomas Aquinas (see *Summa*, II. ii. qu. 162, artt. 5–8), who regarded pride as a mortal sin and, further, as the first and most serious of all the sins. It is the first sin because every kind of sin springs from it, and the most serious because it involves non-subjection to God. It is most difficult to avoid because it takes occasion from our very virtues, so that some people are proud of their very humility. In art. 7 he asserts:

'Aversio a Deo quae formaliter complet rationem peccati, pertinet ad superbiam per se, ad alia autem peccata ex consequenti.'

Dante classes pride with envy and anger as sins of the spirit, and again follows his master in tracing it to that disordered love from which all moral evil flows.[1] In the first terrace (*Purg.* x.–xii.) Dante meets with those who represent respectively the pride of birth, the pride of intellect, and the pride of dominion. They are depicted as being pressed down by terrible weights and reciting a paraphrase of the Lord's Prayer for themselves and those whom they have left behind on earth. Others follow, drawn from mythology and history, sacred and secular. The poet describes them as sick in mental vision, putting trust in backward steps, and, in spite of their soaring thoughts, but insects and worms. Celestial voices chant, 'Beati pauperes spiritu,' the sin of pride is expiated, and Dante passes on his upward way.

3. In modern ethics.—Pride in its many phases is naturally a theme for moral reflexion, and it finds a place in the discourses of the essayists from Montaigne onwards. Montaigne (see *Essayes*, tr. J. Florio, London, 1603, bk. ii. 17, bk. iii. 9) has disquisitions on 'Presumption' and 'Vanitie,' while Bacon treats of 'Vain-glory' in his 54th essay. The English translators or imitators of Theophrastus, such as Joseph Hall (*Characters of Vertues and Vices*, London, 1608), Thomas Overbury (*Characters or Witty Descriptions of the Properties of Sundry Persons*, do. 1614), and John Earle (*Microcosmographie*, do. 1628, [6]1633), with the exception of the last-named, are not wholly successful as analysts of human nature.

Overbury, *e.g.*, 'in his chapter on *A Proud Man* has confused the characteristics of Haughtiness and Vanity which could hardly exist in such a union as he depicts' (see preface to Theophrastus, *Characters*, tr. R. C. Jebb, new ed. by J. E. Sandys).

Of the English ethical philosophers, Hobbes is the first to give a special moral value to pride. He regards it as an offence against 'the lawes of Nature,' which 'are immutable and eternal' (*Leviathan*, xv.). He repeats this in a subsequent chapter (xvii.):

'The lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy and (in summe) doing to others as wee would be done to, of themselves, without the Terrour of some Power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our Naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge and the like.'

But Hobbes's 'psychological egoism' was rejected by Shaftesbury, who sought to establish a harmony or balance of the various impulses or affections as conducive alike to private and social good. In his *Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit* he states:

'If there be found in any creature a more than ordinary self-concernment or regard to private good, which is inconsistent with the interest of the species or public, this must in every respect be esteemed an ill and vicious appetite, and this is what we commonly call selfishness and disapprove so much in whatever creature we happen to discover it' (*Characteristics*, 2 vols., ed. J. M. Robertson, London, 1900, i. 248).

Pride would naturally fall into his class of 'self-affections' or 'self-passions' which, while aiming at private good, become harmful to society at the point where they are harmful to the individual. Butler follows Shaftesbury in recognizing the general good as the aim of conduct, but clearly regards 'reasonable self-love and conscience' as the chief regulative principles of human nature. Where self-love and conscience are in conflict, the obligation of duty has to supersede that of self-interest. Pride therefore, as a natural or deliberate form of self-love, falls under the condemnation of conscience as being opposed to the happiness of society. But there is no detailed analysis of pride in these writers comparable with the study of it in David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge[2], Oxford, 1896; see bk. ii., 'Of the Passions,' pt. i. § ii. p. 277 f.). He calls pride an 'indirect' passion—*i.e.*, it proceeds from the same principles as the direct passions (such as desire, aversion, grief, joy, fear, etc.), but by conjunction of other qualities. The indirect passions have the same object, namely self, which is not their cause. For the cause we have to distinguish between quality and subject, the latter being something related to us; *e.g.*, in a beautiful house beauty is the quality and house the subject which must be our property or contrivance. In such passions as pride in country, in friends, in family, in riches, etc., the relations of contiguity and causation are required. Pride is a pleasant feeling; consequently it is derived from the double relation of impressions and ideas. Hume further suggests that the transition from pride to love is not so easy as that from love to pride. He finds in contempt or scorn (see art. CONTEMPT) so strong a tincture of pride that hardly any other passion is discernible; whereas in esteem or respect love and humility are the prominent ingredients. Finally, he asserts that nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and vanity. It is to be noted that the psychological analysis of the affections had also engaged the attention of Hume's predecessor, Francis Hutcheson, who had divided the affections into the 'calm' (or extensive) and the 'turbulent' (or narrow). The Scottish school of philosophy represented by Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown continued the study. The latter, in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, arranged the emotions under the heads of immediate, retrospective, and prospective. The first he subdivided into those passions which do

[1] See Aquinas, *loc. cit.* art. 5: 'Superbia semper quidem contrariatur dilectioni divinae'; and cf. Dante, *Purg.* xvii. 112–118

not involve moral affections, such as wonder, melancholy, etc., and those which are distinctive of virtue and vice, such as love and hate, pride and humility. It is clear from a study of the history of ethical thought that the individual treatment of the affections is coloured by the philosopher's ethical standpoint, whether utilitarian or intuitional. The hedonistic ethic of Hume, *e.g.*, is in violent contrast with the Kantian theory that the ends at which duty has to aim exclude all consideration of personal happiness—a theory which has powerfully influenced all subsequent schools of thought, Hegelian, neo-Hegelian, and Pragmatist alike. Kant places all inclinations and desires under the single term 'self-regard,' distinguishing between *philautia*, excessive fondness for oneself, and *arrogantia*, satisfaction with oneself (see *DPhP*, *s.v.* 'Pride').

It remains to add that in most of the great modern dramas of the soul pride has a prominent place as a passion destructive of the moral order. Both the Satan of Milton's *Paradise Lost* and the Mephistopheles of Goethe's *Faust* are incarnations under different phases of the pride of the evil will, the former taking the form of an obstinate hostility to good which will not brook defeat, the latter that of a conscious versatility in evil suggestion which is utterly scornful of the weakness of its instruments. If we pass from dramatic creation to actual history, we shall be reminded of the popular estimate of the character of Napoleon as one who was the embodiment *par excellence* in modern times of Dante's pride of dominion. Nor can it be denied that, as the result of scientific progress and our increasing control of the forces of nature, a pride of efficiency has developed in the civilized nations. Pre-eminently is this the case with Germany, whose consciousness of power, fostered by the philosophies of Nietzsche and Treitschke on the intellectual side and on the material side by an era of unexampled prosperity, is at the root of the militarism which plunged Europe into war in 1914. Scientific efficiency need not be divorced from ethics; but the progress of the war has shown that civilization is no safeguard against a recrudescence of barbarism when pride of power dominates the ideals of a nation. To sum up, pride, whether in an individual or in a nation, is an anti-social passion which disregards the rights of humanity.

LITERATURE.—There is a useful art. *s.v.* in the *DPhP* (see also bibliography under 'Emotion and Feeling,' vol. iii. pt. ii. p. 1040 ff.), and reference may be made to the *DAC* for an article on pride as treated in early Christian literature. The following works, some of which have been quoted in the course of the art., may be consulted: A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*[2], 2 vols., London, 1866; Theophrastus, *Characters*, tr. R. C. Jebb, London, 1870, new ed. by J. E. Sandys, do. 1909; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Totius Theologiæ*; E. G. Gardner, *Dante*[3], London, 1903; W. Boyd Carpenter, *The Spiritual Message of Dante*, do. 1914; J. Butler, *Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel* (esp. x. 'Upon Self-Deceit'), do. 1726; Lord Shaftesbury, *Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit*, do. 1711; F. Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, do. 1728; D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3 vols., do. 1739–40; D. Stewart, *The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1828; T. Brown, *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, 4 vols., do. 1820; I. Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, Riga, 1788, tr. T. K. Abbott, London, 1879; E. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Glasgow, 1889, esp. bk. ii. ch. vii. p. 390 f.; W. McDougall, *Introd. to Social Psychology*[5], London, 1912.

R. MARTIN POPE.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD.

Primitive (G. LANDTMAN), p. 278.
Babylonian (T. G. PINCHES), p. 284.
Buddhist (A. S. GEDEN), p. 288.
Chinese (H. J. T. JOHNSON), p. 290.
Christian.—See MINISTRY.
Egyptian (A. M. BLACKMAN), p. 293.
Greek (W. J. WOODHOUSE), p. 302.
Hebrew (H. P. SMITH), p. 307.
Hindu (A. B. KEITH), p. 311.
Iranian (E. EDWARDS), p. 319.
Jewish (H. HIRSCHFELD), p. 322.
Mexican (L. SPENCE), p. 325.
Muhammadan (D. S. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 325.
Roman (G. J. LAING), p. 325.
Teutonic and Slavic.—See ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 42 f.
Ugro-Finnish (U. HOLMBERG), p. 335.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Primitive). — Priesthood among uncivilized races includes not only the priests proper, who conduct the religious rites and communicate with the gods, but also magicians, sorcerers, etc., who practise magic, *i.e.* utilize impersonal supernatural forces acting in accordance with certain fixed rules. 'Priests' or 'magicians' of some kind or other appear among all peoples of whom we have adequate knowledge, and also among those of a very rude type (Australians, Bushmen, Hottentots, Andaman Islanders, Veddas, Fuegians, etc.). The origin of priesthood therefore goes back to a very early stage of social evolution; the first indications of a priest's or sorcerer's office can be traced back almost to the very origin of religious and magical practices. When comparing the origin of priesthood with that of social ranks generally, we become aware that priests and sorcerers everywhere differ from the mass of the population at an earlier period of culture than any of the lay classes: priests and sorcerers are, as a rule, found among all peoples, whereas among a number of peoples at a low stage of development no distinction whatever of social ranks exists.

1. The need of mediators with the supernatural world. — Priesthood, broadly speaking, owes its origin to the universal need felt by mankind of superhuman assistance in the struggle of life. Among all peoples the belief exists that, under certain circumstances, advantages of some kind or other are obtainable from the supernatural world. Man endeavours to influence by propitiation the powers which govern the universe, or to control the course of events by magical means. Not all the benefits supposed to be obtainable in either of these ways consist of positive blessings; on the contrary, they may in the first place imply the prevention of an evil. The desire for guidance in these matters has given rise to the various kinds of religious and magical practitioners among savage peoples who are to be considered as pioneers of an organized priesthood. But even among civilized peoples surviving traces of the same need characterize the authority of the priesthood. In spite of the universal belief in the existence of more or less infallible means of influencing fortune, certain persons are, as a rule, supposed to possess greater knowledge and power than others to secure the proper results. These appear to us in the form of priests and magicians.

In many cases savages think themselves unable to communicate directly with the gods. Acknowledging their inferiority in this respect, they regard the priests as the only mediators between them and the supreme powers. The priests are their only protectors; without them the ignorant population would be abandoned to the misfortunes

arising from the anger of the gods or from witchcraft (instances from the Kafirs, some American Indians, Eskimos).

The principal duty of the priests is to administer, or give advice as to, the worship of the gods. As all gods do not stand in the same relation to men, the assistance of the priests must often be called in to point out the special deities to whom the people should offer their sacrifices. Very generally the gods are believed to bear ill-will to men, and therefore it is also the duty of the priests to give directions as to the proper offerings. It is all the more necessary to know how to please the gods, as they are among certain peoples held to be very particular about the form of prayer and sacrifice (tribes in E. Russia and Siberia, Lapps, natives of Nias).

In short, the need of priests appears in the most various respects: they are required to influence the wind and rain, to cause good growth, to ensure success in hunting and fishing, to cure illness, to foretell the future, to work harm upon enemies, etc.

2. The first types of priests.—The worship of deified men is confined, as a rule, to the kindred group, and in the first place to the separate families. Owing to the exclusive character of ancestral gods in this respect, a regular priesthood, in the sense of universally acknowledged mediators with the gods, hardly occurs on the basis of mere family-worship. The authority of that member of the family who conducts the worship for his nearest relatives does not extend beyond the group worshipping the god to whom he is related, viz. the family itself.

Deification of ancestors, however, is not confined to families. Whole tribes also frequently worship the spirits of departed men, but in such cases the ancestral gods tend, in a way, to amalgamate with other classes of generally worshipped deities.

Whilst ancestor-worship originally tends to centralize the cult within families, or kindred groups, no such tendency is manifested by worship of gods in nature. Depending on the more or less general occurrence of the phenomena which give rise to the belief in gods of nature, such gods are likely to be worshipped within larger or smaller divisions of mankind, with little or no precedence given to certain kindred groups. Therefore the origin of the priesthood connected with the gods of nature is not influenced by any regard to family ties. These two forms of religion, however, are intermingled to a very great extent among most peoples.

In the earliest history of cult no proper priesthood existed. Although various kinds of priestly practitioners belong to a very early period of religious evolution, all conclusions point to the rule that originally everybody invoked the gods each for himself. Cult therefore existed in some form or other before there were any professional men entrusted with the duty of conducting the different religious observances. Among some peoples every individual still performs his religious or magical rites for himself without the assistance of professional priests (certain Papuans, Melanesians, Australians, and many more).

Among the people who in the early ages attempted to interpret the wishes of the gods and practise magical art the more expert who managed to gain the confidence of their fellow-tribesmen seem, in the course of evolution, to have attained a certain pre-eminence. Some men, more fortunate and more cunning in their predictions, acquired a local celebrity in the art; such men would soon be consulted by their neighbours, pupils or apprentices would be attached to them, and thus would be gradually formed a special class, which would assume the functions of intermediaries between the people and the gods.

Within the separate families, in which, as has been pointed out, ancestral gods are particularly worshipped, one member is generally invested with the duty of sacrificing for the whole family. As a rule, the priestly functions are put into the hands of the paterfamilias, and the reason seems to be that he is the oldest and most experienced male member of the family, who is generally believed to stand in closer communication with the ancestors than the other members (tribes in India, Africa, and Polynesia). Sometimes the oldest female member of the family may also officiate as priest (Serers in W. Africa). Among the Barais in India the deities are worshipped only by that member of the family who is under the influence of the special divinity—a fact shown by his getting into a state of ecstasy and uttering oracles. Among some lower Dravidian tribes the family-worship is conducted either by the head of the household or by the son-in-law or the brother-in-law. In the Tarawa and Apamama islands, of the Kingsmill group, every family that has a tutelary divinity has also a priest whose office may be filled by any young man of free birth able to recite prayers.

As regards the first appearance of priests, we can distinguish among some peoples certain classes of men who, owing to their unmistakable priestly affinities, seem to be forerunners of a regular priesthood.

(1) One group of persons who occasionally exercise priestly functions without being priests are those who, when in a state of ecstasy, are believed to be inspired by the gods. During their convulsive fits such persons are sometimes interrogated by the people as to the will of the gods, future events, etc., and the gods are believed to speak through them. These ecstatic individuals thus act as mediators with the supreme powers (peoples in India and Polynesia). From the idea of occasional inspiration it is an easy step to the conviction that certain persons are able to put themselves into communication with the gods whenever they like. On the whole, facts show that in the early ages of priesthood men often retain the office only for a specified time or with intermissions. Among some rude tribes, we are told, the priests take up their office and leave it, as they like (Todas, Khotas, Bodos and Dhimāls, Dophlās, Munda Kols).

(2) Another beginning of priesthood may be seen in the observance of 'sacred places' or other kinds of sanctuaries which, for some reason or other, are held in high veneration by the peoples in the neighbourhood. As a rule, they are thought to be the abodes of a god, and the men charged with guarding the sacred rooms naturally tend to become mediators between the people and these gods (Gonds in India, natives in Madagascar and Yap, certain Arabs, certain priests in ancient Greece).

(3) We have further to regard as a kind of forerunners to a regular priesthood the 'holy men' who, without being real priests, exercise a certain religious authority among some peoples. This class of men make themselves renowned by occasional miracles, or acquire the religious veneration of the people by their eccentric habits (Muhammadan peoples).

In early stages of cult the rites are naturally very simple, and consequently almost any one is able to undertake the performance of the priestly functions. In general a simple cult and a superficially-instructed, mutable priesthood seem to go together. And it is clear that, where every one is qualified to assume the priestly office, priesthood as such is not likely to be held in great veneration.

Of many peoples we are told that the priests do not form any distinct class, and that almost any man may become a priest (Maoris, tribes in India and Madagascar, Galla, some American Indians).

As ritual observances and magical practices gradually became too complicated for the average man to master, a professional priesthood became necessary. When the people were uncertain about the proper ceremonies, they applied to the more experienced practitioners, asking them to perform the ceremonies on their behalf (Cheremisses). Kindred customs seem to be one reason for the old men officiating as priests and sorcerers among several tribes (Kiangans in Luzon, tribes in India, Africa, and Australia). Certain facts show how, especially on important occasions, the task of performing religious or magical ceremonies seems to have been put into the hands of priests, or of those possessing most experience in the tribe; at the same time every one was supposed to know how to sacrifice for ordinary private purposes (Kafirs, Ostyaks, Lapps, ancient Teutons, and Finns).

The authority of the first semi-priests and semi-sorcerers evidently varied to a great extent. While some exercised only a local influence, the more fortunate and cunning among them gradually extended their fame over wide districts. In this way a class of priests and sorcerers common to whole tribes originated (tribes in Africa and Siberia, certain Eskimos and American Indians).

It is a remarkable fact that among many peoples the sorcerers of neighbouring races are held in greater awe than those of their own tribe. Whole tribes are in certain regions known as powerful wizards, whose services are frequently sought after by their neighbours. E. B. Tylor's[1] explanation is that nations with some education, who, however, believe in the reality of the magic art, cannot shut their eyes to the fact that it more essentially belongs to races less civilized than themselves. This theory, interesting as it is, does not explain the cases where, *e.g.*, certain tribes attribute to each other reciprocally a superior power of magic. The superstitious fear in which peoples in many parts of the world hold other tribes seems also to be connected with a universal belief that the secret powers of strangers are greater than those of well-known people.

3. King-priests.—A remarkable feature in the history of priesthood is the combination of priestly functions with royal authority. Instances of king-priests are met with throughout Polynesia and Melanesia, in India and other Asiatic countries, among many Negro and American Indian tribes, and in ancient Europe. J. G. Frazer[2] thinks that the priestly king has developed out of the public magician, the latter being a personage of such influence that under favourable circumstances he may easily attain to the rank of chief or king. When once a special class of sorcerers has been segregated from the community and entrusted by it with the discharge of duties on which the public safety and welfare are believed to depend, these men gradually rise to wealth and power, till their leaders blossom out into sacred kings. We may add that ancestor-worship also tends to invest the king or chief with sacerdotal authority. Similarly, as patriarchs of families conduct the worship on behalf of the family, so patriarchs of villages and provinces are the persons likely to perform the sacred offices on behalf of their respective clans or tribes. In the opinion of their followers they are often more intimately connected with the gods than any other individuals, being their nearest living relatives, and therefore all the more naturally can mediate between the gods and men.

[1] *PC*[2] i. 128 ff.
[2] *GB*[2], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 375.

Besides the union of a royal title and priestly offices there are instances of kings being worshipped as gods, which indicates the highest potentiality of the sacerdotal character of rulers. Frazer has called attention to various instances in which the divine king or priest is put to death by his worshippers, which he explains in the following way.[1] Primitive people sometimes believe that their own safety and even that of the world is bound up with the life of one of these human incarnations of the divinity. They therefore take the utmost care of his life. But no amount of precaution will prevent the divine king from growing old and feeble and at last dying. And, in order to avert the catastrophe which may be expected from the enfeeblement of his powers and their final extinction in death, they kill him as soon as he shows symptoms of weakness, and his soul is transferred to a vigorous successor before it has been seriously impaired by the threatened decay. But some peoples appear to have preferred to kill the divine king while he is still in the full vigour of life. Accordingly, they have fixed a term beyond which he may not reign, and at the close of which he must die, the term fixed upon being short enough to exclude the probability of his degenerating in the interval. E. Westermarck[2] has a somewhat different explanation, according to which the new king is supposed to inherit, not the predecessor's soul, but his divinity or holiness, which is looked upon as a mysterious entity, temporarily seated in the ruling sovereign, but separable from him and transferable to another individual. See, further, art. KING (Introductory).

4. Qualifications for priesthood.—Priesthood is generally a hereditary institution, although the rules of inheritance can rarely be strictly followed (Polynesians, Melanesians, Australians, peoples in the Malay Archipelago, India, Siberia, Africa, and America). Among certain peoples who have a hereditary priesthood the sacerdotal dignity is not assumed by the son of a priest; one generation is passed over, and the grandchildren are selected (Kafirs, tribes in W. Africa). Of other peoples we learn that priesthood is hereditary, but that the aspirant must in addition be qualified by certain necessary endowments. Thus the faculty to 'see the spirits' and converse with them is in some cases a further condition (Tlingits, Sioux); and the like power is often required of the priests where priesthood as a strictly hereditary institution is not heard of.

As the principal duty of the priests is to mediate between mankind and the higher powers, so the chief qualification requisite for entering the priesthood is the faculty of communicating with the gods. This faculty, however, may be proved in different ways. Thus, when certain wonderful things happen to a person—especially when he falls into a state of ecstasy—the people may think that he is under the influence of some spirit; and such a man is competent to become a priest (Kafirs). Among other peoples the supposed connexion between the priests and the spirit-world appears more particularly in the belief that the priests have one or more tutelary deities of their own, who always give them assistance when required. In some cases it is even stated to be a necessary qualification for priests to have such gods at their disposal (Eskimos, Algonquian Indians).

As the faculty of conversing with the gods is so very generally confined to the priests (other people being excluded from communication with the spirit-world), it is an easy step to the conclusion that the gods themselves have selected their repre-

[1] *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 9 ff.
[2] *MI* ii. 607.

sentatives among mankind. In conformity with notions of this kind, many peoples believe that the gods confer divine powers upon certain men, and that the only way in which a person can become a priest is by being chosen by the gods (Eskimos, American Indians, Kafirs, tribes in Siberia, India, Borneo, Australia). Generally the gods communicate the necessary secrets to the priests in dreams (Australians, Sea Dayaks, Tunguses), but there are various other means by which the gods are believed to choose their favourites for the priestly vocation. Sometimes they intimate their wishes in a more or less peculiar way.

The Moxo in Brazil think it necessary that the aspirants to the priestly office should have been attacked and wounded by a jaguar, this animal being the visible object of their worship; they believe that he sets his mark upon those whom he chooses to be his priests. The Buriats in Siberia regard men who have been killed by lightning as chosen by the gods, who have thereby conferred a certain distinction on the family of the dead man; he is considered a shaman, and his nearest relative enjoys the right to shamanhood. In ancient Peru and among the Apache we meet with a kindred idea regarding lightning. The Munda Kols find out the proper *pahan*, or priest, to perform their sacrifices by such means as watching a frightened bull which stops before a certain house. When an additional priest is wanted in a village on the Gold Coast, a general meeting of the inhabitants is held, and a number of young men and women are made to stand in a circle. The fetish-priest, after weird and gruesome ceremonies, places on the head of each candidate a bundle of herbs and leaves. In most cases it happens that one or more of the youths and girls fall straightway into a kind of fit and appear to be possessed by some strange influence. This is taken as a sign that the fetish has spoken, and that the deity has chosen the person or persons so affected for his service.

Among the endowments requisite for aspirants to priesthood a very important one is the faculty of wonder-working. We are told in fact of many peoples that the would-be priests are expected to perform miracles, and that the candidate has to manifest his powers in that respect before he is admitted to the sacerdotal order. A person ambitious to become a priest will, *e.g.*, profess to have been told of future events by some spirit; should any of his predictions relating to something which greatly interests the people happen to come true, he is regarded as a duly inspired priest (Fijians, natives of the Isle of Pines, Mālers in Bengal, Siberian tribes, Greenlanders).

Some peoples judge from mere outward signs that certain persons possess mysterious powers and are able to act as sorcerers or priests.

Among the Ojibwa Indians individuals gain a reputation for witchcraft without making any pretensions to the art, merely because they are deformed and ill-looking; all esteemed witches or wizards among these Indians are, as a rule, 'remarkably wicked, of a ragged appearance and forbidding countenance.'[1] The Congo natives are said to number dwarfs and albinos among the priesthood.

Outward peculiarities in children are in certain cases believed to denote that they are bound to become priests—*e.g.*, being born with the eyes open (Australians), or bleeding at the nose or mouth (Tunguses in Siberia).

The mental disposition which is supposed to qualify a person for the priestly office reveals a very important feature of early priesthood. Among a great number of peoples the priests must display a considerable excitability of temperament; consequently certain qualifications of a pathological and psychological nature generally characterize the priests and sorcerers of uncivilized races. From several parts of the world we are informed that individuals of an eccentric disposition are considered to be specially apt for the sacerdotal vocation.

The Siberian shamans are recruited from a class of men distinguished by their habits of contemplation and insight into mysteries as well as by their ardent imagination, and their qualifications for shamanhood are further thought to appear in frequent fits of giddiness and fainting, besides other signs. Certain tribes in those parts believe that the influence of the evil spirit which compels a person to become a shaman makes itself known by continual yawning, shrieking, and leaping round, etc. The incipient shaman begins to see visions, endeavours to throw himself into the water or fire, and seizes knives to hurt himself, after which he declares that the spirits have ordered him to become a shaman. See artt. POSSESSION (Introductory and Primitive), SHAMANISM.

Instances of similar ideas are furnished by Polynesian, American Indian, and African tribes.

Among certain peoples the mere faculty of falling into convulsions or into a state of unconsciousness seems to be almost all that is required for becoming a priest.

It is stated, *e.g.*, of the Fijian priests that the power of receiving inspiration and of announcing the will of the deity during a violent fit of muscular or nervous shaking, supposed to betoken the possession of his body by the spirit, is a necessary qualification for the priestly office. Before a Fijian is acknowledged as priest, he has to undergo a trial and is required to show publicly that the spirit is entering into him. The proof of this is supposed to lie in shiverings, which appear to be involuntary, and in the performance of which none but an expert juggler could succeed.

Statements to the same effect refer to native tribes in Australia, Africa, S. America, India, N. Asia, etc.

The great importance attached to ecstasy as a symptom of divine visitation also appears in the numerous cases when priests before or at their initiation reduce themselves by special means (such as fasting or narcotics) to a state of delirium or trance which is supposed to indicate their sacred calling.

Would-be priests among the Eskimos, several American Indian tribes, as well as peoples in Africa, Asia, and Oceania, withdraw for a longer or shorter period to a solitary place, where they subsist without food until they begin to 'see into futurity.' Of narcotic or fiery drugs Siberian shamans use the fly-bane (*Amanita muscaria*), while the medicine-men of certain Indians in Guiana drink potions of strong tobacco-juice. The sorcerers of the Guarani Indians during their period of preparatory retirement live on pepper and roasted maize only.

It is natural to the savage mind to ascribe ecstasy to spiritual agency. The convulsive gestures and incoherent utterances of the inspired seem to show that his own will is absent, and that some strange being has taken possession of his body. A spirit or god is therefore supposed to speak through his mouth and to command his actions. This faculty of falling into an ecstatic condition is all the more necessary for would-be priests, as among savage peoples manifestations of a prophetic or divine delirium do almost universally accompany religious ceremonies.

The observation that an ecstatic disposition is universally associated with priesthood draws attention to the fact that in many cases insane persons are looked upon with superstitious awe. The main distinction between insanity and ecstasy seems to be that the former is generally ascribed to a permanent, the latter to a more casual, possession by a spirit. Some people believe the insane to be under the influence of demons, while others assume that they are inspired by good spirits. In conformity with the latter idea, great veneration is paid to the insane, who are also sometimes thought to possess the spirit of prophecy (Arabs, natives of Celebes, Polynesians, Melanesians, certain American Indian and Siberian tribes).

5. Initiation of priests.—As a rule candidates for the profession of priest or sorcerer have to undergo a preparatory instruction which is imparted by an expert practitioner (African, Siberian, Polynesian, American Indian, and Eskimo tribes). Not always, however, is instruction necessary, and it seems that those who have been inspired by the gods are less in want of information than those who are self-chosen. Among some tribes people assume the office of fetish-man after suitable training, but the priestly order is said in addition to be augmented by persons who can prove that the spirits have suddenly seized upon them (certain tribes in Africa, India, Siberia, Australia, and N. America).

[1] P. Jones, *Hist. of the Ojebway Indians*, London, 1861, p. 145 f.

The preparation of the novices in many cases begins at an early age.

Among the Eskimos and Aleuts the priests are brought up to their calling from their infancy. The Ojibwa Indians encourage their youths from the age of ten to manhood to fast, for in this way they obtain the favour of the gods. Boys destined to be *piaces* among the Panama Indians are taken at the age of ten or twelve to be instructed in the office.

Similar examples come from the Apurina Indians, and tribes in W. Africa and Borneo. It seems to be the rule that, where the priests are subjected to a regular course of instruction, the preparatory period commences early in life, whereas the more impulsive assumption of priesthood, with little or no previous training, is liable to take place at any age.

As a rule we can draw a distinction among most peoples between two different phases of the priestly education. (1) During one period the novice is generally under the care of some experienced priest who imparts to him the necessary religious instruction and initiates him into the practices of the profession. (2) Another phase of the preparation includes a course of self-training, during which the aspirant has to place himself in proper correspondence with gods.

(1) As regards the knowledge imparted to the candidates, mere theoretical learning is little thought of; according to our scanty reports, most importance is attached to practical knowledge which may be of use in the magical and religious performances.

In Greenland the teacher seeks, in the first place, to make the pupil entirely fearless and to direct his mind towards the spirit-world, to the horrors of which he must be rendered insensible. In the Mosquito tribe of Central America the sorceresses, during their preparation for the office, learn various tricks from their predecessors, such as allowing poisonous snakes to bite them, and handling fire. The priestly novice among the Indians of British Guiana is taught the traditions of the tribe, the medical qualities of plants, and to find where game is to be had. During his novitiate the medicine-man of the Bororo in Brazil has to learn certain ritual songs and the languages of birds, beasts, and trees. The priests of the Kukis in India first of all seem to have been taught the secret language which they have among themselves, while the rest of their knowledge is probably picked up during their practice. The instruction of the priests among some African tribes is said to comprehend a good deal of empirical knowledge and other secrets of the craft.

(2) The self-training of a candidate for the priestly office evidently has for its object the preparation of his mind for intercourse with the gods. During this period he generally lives for a longer or shorter time in retirement, whilst in some cases a rigorous asceticism is also prescribed, such as fasting or subsisting on a scanty diet. In certain tribes the novices are required strictly to refrain from connexion with the opposite sex.

With the Eskimos this phase of the priestly education consisted in strict fasting and invocation of the deity while dwelling alone in solitary places, until the soul became independent of the body and of the external world; finally the god appeared and provided the novice with a helping or guardian spirit.

Of a similar description is the self-preparation of the priests among certain American Indians as well as tribes in Africa, Australia, Siberia, and India. In some cases the neophytes use narcotics or stimulants in order to work themselves into a passion of excitement, during which they are supposed to hold converse with the spirits.

Among certain peoples candidates are admitted to the sacerdotal order through a special initiatory ceremony (Negroes, Waraus Indians, Siberian tribes, Laplanders). It is also stated that in certain cases the consecration of a priest takes place several times in succession as he rises from lower to higher degrees of the order (Buriats in Siberia, Moxo Indians).

6. The social position of the priest.—One circumstance which has powerfully tended to distinguish the priesthood from the community at large has been the fact that the priests and sorcerers are, as a rule, recruited from the most intelligent elements of their peoples. The scanty learning of savage races is almost exclusively confined to the priests, who are generally the only preservers of tribal traditions; they alone possess the knowledge of certain useful arts, and the whole character of their functions tends to develop their intellectual powers and to give them a superiority over their fellow-tribesmen.

It is frequently reported that the priests distinguish themselves from the rest of the people by a more or less considerable knowledge of certain natural phenomena, by means of which they secure the popular confidence in their powers. They have studied the use of medicines, the properties of herbs and other plants, the changes of weather, and the habits of animals; and this knowledge materially assists them in the maintenance of their authority (Negroes, Hottentots, Dayaks, Tahitians, Araucanians, Eskimos).

In order to preserve the faith of the people in their prophetic powers the priests often collect all kinds of information, and whatever they learn in this way they ostentatiously foretell as future events. In many cases they are also said to act in collusion with each other, in keeping the people under their influence (tribes in W. Africa, American Indians, etc.). When the priests exercise the precarious art of prophecy, great significance is attributed to their utterances. Hence we often hear that, in order to ensure that their predictions shall prove true, they make them sufficiently ambiguous or uncertain to admit of a variety of interpretations (tribes in Africa, some American Indians). If, in spite of all precautions, they fail to produce the effects promised by them, they generally have recourse to various excuses. The non-success is attributed, *e.g.*, to some defect in the medicine, or the applicant is labouring under the displeasure of the gods, who refuse to be appeased unless renewed and richer offerings are made (certain American Indians, Negroes, Hawaiians). A very general excuse is the counteracting influence of some demon (Dayaks, Oceanians, natives of Victoria, Hottentots). No less frequently priests and sorcerers who fail in performing miracles save their reputation by accusing other persons of having, by secret necromancies, frustrated their endeavours (tribes in N. S. Wales, India, N. America).

The respect which the priests and sorcerers enjoy is increased by the mystery in which they generally envelop their proceedings. They do their best to inspire the people with fear, if they think such a course necessary for the strengthening of their power. Thus they may threaten to send the spirits or some magic substance into those who disbelieve them (Tlingits, natives of Victoria), or in some other way let the spirits avenge even the slightest neglect or disobedience (Tahitians, Fijians). The bizarre external appearance of most priests among savage races also serves to a great extent to impress the popular imagination. By painting their bodies in all colours and dressing themselves in the most fantastical manner they inspire their tribesmen with feelings of mystery and awe, and sometimes this effect is expressly sought (Indians of Virginia, Siberian tribes). It is likewise beyond dispute that a strong impression of fear is produced upon the people by the ecstatic orgies which so often form an essential part of the rites of savage priesthood. The gestures and other morbid manifestations of the priests, vivid descriptions of which are given by numerous eye-witnesses, necessarily strike the bystanders with awe and terror. It is in this connexion interesting to note that the religious and magical rites of savages very generally take place in the dark, and in some cases darkness is even repre-

sented as a necessary condition for success. The Siberian shamans perform their ceremonies in some gloomy place and generally at night, in order to appear more mysterious and terrible in the darkness; and the same is said regarding the sorcerers of the Eskimos, Waraus Indians, Congo natives, etc.

Among certain peoples the priests strengthen their authority by attaching themselves to the kings and noble classes in a community, while at the same time they are said in return to support the ruling system (Polynesians, Khonds in India, Kafirs, certain American Indians).

One of the most important methods by which the priests increase their influence is by convincing the people of their supernatural endowments through various miracles. There are reports from many peoples that confidence in the priests and sorcerers depends upon their supposed faculty of performing miracles—one successful instance often causes all previous failures to be forgotten. Priests and sorcerers strengthen their reputation through delusive demonstrations of their invulnerability—*e.g.*, by stabbing themselves with knives in different parts of the body (Ostyaks), by throwing themselves into the fire or seizing live coals with their hands (certain Tatar tribes), by allowing poisonous snakes to bite them, etc. (Mosquito Indians). How essentially the influence of the priesthood depends on their presumed power of wonder-working is shown by the fact that among several tribes priests who fail in their efforts, or otherwise lose the confidence of their people, at the same time forfeit their office and sometimes are subject to punishment (tribes in India and Africa, Andamanese). They are even liable to be killed by the enraged people; this may be due to the idea that worthless priests are of no use and therefore cannot hold the sacerdotal office, but, as they possess dangerous powers, they must be made away with. There are also grounds for connecting the killing of priests with the killing of the divine king.

The methods by which the priests and sorcerers of savage races acquire confidence and reputation among their countrymen raise the question whether, on the whole, we are to look upon them as a class of impostors or not. The opinion predominant in theoretical literature is that we cannot suppose that the priests and sorcerers of the uncivilized races are, generally speaking, impostors (Lord Avebury, J. G. Frazer, A. Réville, R. de la Grasserie, Julius Lippert). The opinions of travellers, again, are divided, but many of them have considered the question from different points of view. There is no reason to condemn the priests and sorcerers as deceivers because their proceedings seem meaningless to European observers, or because some travellers have ascertained, by experiments, that the savage mystery-men are not endowed with those miraculous powers which they claim to possess. The principal point is whether they believe in their own powers or not; this they very generally seem to do, although, on the other hand, impostors are undoubtedly met with among the priests at all stages of early beliefs. Cf. art. POSSESSION (Introductory).

7. Observances, etc., distinguishing priesthood.—Numerous practices and observances are among many peoples obligatory upon the priests and tend to separate them from the rest of the community, as they cannot in general be combined with the circumstances of ordinary life.

(1) There are certain ascetic regulations which apply to sexual life. The fact that persons devoted to religion are often obliged to live a single life has been ascribed to the notion that there is something impure and sinful in marriage, as in sexual relations generally. Among many peoples the members of the priesthood are forbidden to marry, and must keep themselves pure (several American Indian tribes, Kalmuks, Todas, etc.). Celibacy and chastity are, however, by no means universally required of the priests; on the contrary, they seem in some cases to be distinguished from the people as a whole by extraordinary liberties in sexual respects. The *ius primæ noctis* accorded to the priesthood among certain peoples exemplifies the sexual privileges which are sometimes enjoyed by the sacerdotal order. Among certain peoples the priestesses must not marry, for the reason that, belonging to the god, they cannot become the property of a man. But this prohibition extends to marriage only, and a priestess is not debarred from sexual commerce (tribes in W. Africa).

(2) Other ascetic regulations concern fasting and prohibited articles of food. Fasting generally seems to be observed when a person wishes to put himself in correspondence with the spirits performing some religious rite (Santals, Siberian tribes, some Melanesians and American Indians), and sometimes for the same purpose the priests reduce themselves by artificial means to a state of mind which is supposed to indicate their close communion with the supernatural world. Food restrictions of various kinds are imposed upon the priests.

(3) Among many peoples the priests are distinguished by a special costume and also by the colour of their dress.

The priests of the Sinhalese and in Siam are clothed in yellow; and in the Malay Peninsula the priestly magician shares with the king the right to make use of cloth dyed the royal colour, yellow. The priestesses of the Manipuris in India dress in white. Among the Peruvians the priest wore white when invoking the gods. The ordinary dress of the Zapotec priests was a full white robe, that of the Toltec priests a long black robe, and the common Totonac priests wore long black robes of cotton. In ancient Mexico a class of priestesses called 'maids of penance' ordinarily wore a habit all white.

(4) It is rather a general custom for priests to distinguish themselves by the length of their hair (certain tribes in N. America, India, and Africa). Frazer explains the custom of sacred persons leaving their hair long by referring to the dangers which, in the primitive view, beset the cutting of it.[1] Such dangers are common to all, but sacred persons have more to fear from them than ordinary people; the simplest way of evading peril is not to cut the hair at all.

(5) A remarkable fact is that the priests almost universally distinguish themselves from the community at large by means of a separate language which they use in the divine service or in intercourse with each other.

The *angakoks*, or priests, of the Greenlanders have a peculiar language, altogether different from the ordinary tongue of the country, and words of the general language they use in an opposite or metaphorical sense. This particular idiom they make use of only at their practices of witchcraft and when they are consulted by the people.

Similar reports are given of the priests among several tribes in N. and S. America, Africa, India, the Malay Archipelago, and Oceania.

8. Classification of priests.—Of the two classes of supernaturalistic practitioners the priests are those who represent the religion of a people; they exercise the duties incumbent on them by invoking the aid of the supernatural beings, and their power consists in influencing the will of the latter. Magicians, on the other hand, act independently of the supreme rulers, with whom they have no communication in the sense in which the priests have. By their magic they are themselves able to bring about the desired results, and the same means of coercion may be applied by them even to the gods.

But, although theoretically separated, the types of priest and sorcerer among uncivilized and semi-

[1] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 258 ff.

civilized peoples almost inextricably blend into one another. Communication with supernatural beings is in no way confined to the 'priests,' nor do the 'sorcerers' monopolize the practice of magic. Very frequently it happens that practitioners in whom the priestly type preponderates have recourse to magic also, and that representatives of the type of sorcerer maintain a religious communication with spirits.

Certain writers associate the difference between priests and sorcerers with the occurrence of a benevolent and a malevolent class of priests among many peoples, the one group of functionaries helping the people, the other exercising a pernicious influence (Eskimos, certain American Indians, Kafirs, Buriats). There is on the whole a tendency to identify priests with protectors of the people, whereas magicians or sorcerers are represented as evil-doers who endeavour to inflict distress upon others. Facts go to prove, however, that the distinction between well- and ill-disposed classes of priests is often very arbitrary; sometimes 'priests,' *e.g.*, forfeit their sacerdotal dignity and are transferred to the class of 'sorcerers,' merely because they have lost the popular confidence in their goodwill (American Indians, Eskimos, tribes in Central Africa).

In a few cases distribution of function makes the types of priest and sorcerer distinct from each other. Thus weather-doctors, fortune-tellers, exorcists, and physicians, who form special professions of their own among certain peoples, also supply, in some cases, instances of the typical magician. Examples of such practitioners acting solely by magical means are, however, extremely rare—which can also be said of the occurrence of the unadulterated priestly type.

To a certain extent the numerous functions are performed by special classes of priests. Although the regular priests almost universally also practise divination, yet among many peoples the diviners form a distinct profession within the priesthood, and in a great number of such cases the performance is stated to take place through other means than consulting the gods.

In the Kafir tribes the *amatola*, who practise augury by burning certain roots, are distinct from other classes of the priesthood. In Uganda the *bahumu*, who foretell the future from the entrails of fowls, constitute a separate class of diviners. Among the Malagasy there is a class of men called *panandro*, 'astrologers,' who calculate and declare unlucky days and hours and foretell the destiny of children. The natives about the Altai mountains in N. Central Asia, besides shamans and weather-makers, have four separate classes of augurs distinguished from each other by different names and different methods of procedure.

Instances of a similar kind are given by the Kirghizes and several American Indian tribes.

The priests and physicians are very generally the same men, but cases of physicians forming a profession of their own in association with the priesthood are not rare among uncivilized races (Polynesians, Melanesians, tribes in India, Negroes, American Indians).

Weather-making is among the lower races universally associated with priesthood, although it is sometimes difficult to ascertain when this function refers to the regular priests and when to a special class of individuals. Among certain peoples, however, the weather-doctors are clearly identical with the priests (Greenlanders, some American Indians, Negroes, and Siberian tribes). In other cases the profession of a weather-maker is kept distinct from ordinary priesthood.

Among the natives of the Altai district there is a special class of shamans who profess to manage the weather by means of a magic stone. The Kirghizes have a class who not only foretell the weather but also have the power to cause or avert rain, wind, and lightning. Among the Yagas in Congo the *semplii*, or rain-makers, form an inferior class under the *ganaus*, or fetishmen. The Okanda Negroes have priests to whom the people apply for producing rain when a bad year is impending, and these have a special name. The rain-doctors of the Ganguelas in S. Central Africa are pronounced distinct from other classes of the priesthood. Among the Apache and certain other Indian tribes, weather-making and other priestly functions are distributed among different classes of the priesthood. A few peoples even make a distinction between different branches of weather-making as represented by different groups of priests (Maoris).

To the offices associated with the priesthood belongs the judicial authority with which its members are often invested. As a rule the rights of the priests in this respect are closely connected with their religious duties, their supernatural endowments being called into requisition for the administration of justice in the various communities. From the Congo, Loango, and other African countries, as well as from Hawaii, we hear that on such occasions the priests are the chief officiators at ordeals. Similarly, when a person is accused of practising witchcraft, the priests are the most competent to conduct the case (Greenlanders, E. African and Congo tribes). Thieves and other evil-doers are often detected by the assistance of the well-informed priests (Apache, Tlingits, E. African tribes). In a few cases the priests are entrusted with a regular judicatory dignity, as, *e.g.*, in Hawaii, where some appearance of judicial forms was preserved in cases of litigation.

Among the Badagry in Guinea 'the fetish-priests are the only judges of the people, and the statutes of their country are recorded in their own breasts only,' yet the people are said never to murmur against their decisions.[1]

From almost all parts of the world where uncivilized peoples live come reports that women also officiate as priests and sorcerers; in general no very great distinction seems to be made between the sexes as regards their qualification for priesthood. Often, however, men take precedence in the sacerdotal profession. Female priests or sorcerers are met with among the Greenlanders, American Indians, Negroes, some Siberian tribes, Fijians, Dayaks, etc. From some peoples we learn that all the great ceremonies must be conducted by men, or that the women are not admitted to the priesthood at all (certain Siberian tribes, Chippewa Indians, Andamanese, Australians).

The priestly offices to which women seem principally to devote themselves are foretelling the future (certain American Indians, Kamchadales) and healing diseases (Negroes, American Indians, Papuans). It is a widely-spread notion that women are endowed with mysterious powers in a much higher degree than men (Arabs, Negroes, tribes in India, Australians). Such ideas of the spiritual propensities of women account for the inclination displayed by many peoples to attribute witchcraft particularly to the female sex (Eskimos, certain American Indians, Hottentots, Siberian tribes, Arabs). In a few instances some peoples who have both male and female priests confine special classes of priestly functions to one or other of the two sexes exclusively.

LITERATURE.—W. W. Baudissin, *Die Gesch. des alttestamentl. Priesterthums*, Leipzig, 1889; J. G. Bourke, 'The Medicine-men of the Apache,' in *9 RBEW* (1892), p. 451 ff.; A. W. Howitt, 'On Australian Medicine Men,' in *JAI* xvi. [1886-87] 23 ff.; G. Landtman, *The Origin of Priesthood*, Ekenaes, 1905; J. Lippert, *Allgemeine Gesch. des Priesterthums*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1883-84; S. Maybaum, *Die Entwickelung des altisraelit. Priesterthums*, Breslau, 1880; A. Réville, *Hist. des religions*, 3 vols., Paris, 1883-85; H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, London, 1893-96, vol. iii. pt. vi. 'Ecclesiastical Institutions.'

GUNNAR LANDTMAN.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Babylonian).—In view of the great antiquity of their religion, going back, as it does, to over 4000 years before Christ, there is no doubt that the priesthood of the Babylonians, in most if not all of its numerous orders, was very ancient. It is impossible, however, to

[1] R. Lander, *Records of Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa*, London, 1830, i. 281.

estimate the dates of the institution of these orders, the more especially as they must have grown up rather than come into such sudden existence as founding by any power of the State or the people would imply. There seems to be no doubt that the remote antiquity of the Babylonian priesthood had brought to its members great influence and wealth, as well as the veneration of the people.

The number and the nature of the priestly offices and orders in Babylonia were determined by the requirements of their religion. Theology, mythology, legends of the gods and heroes illustrating their faith, and temple history were probably taught by the scribes (*ṭupšarru*), or by such of them as had been educated at and received orders through the temple schools. But the superstitions contained in their creed necessitated not only a full staff of sacrificial priests, conductors of special ceremonies, etc., but also numerous conjurors, soothsayers, magicians, etc., each with his special domain, which, however, in case of need, overlapped the others. The sacrificer, therefore, might perform incantations, and the spell-maker might interpret a dream.

1. Priests in general.—In all probability the most usual term for 'priest' in Babylonian was *šangū*, possibly a nasalized form of the Sumerian (non-Semitic) *sag*, 'head.' The Sem. plural was *šangê*, though the plural for professions of men, *šangūti*, was probably not excluded. The last would coincide in form with the abstract *šangūtu*, 'priesthood' in general—*i.e.* a man's priestly character, as in the case of a Babylonian or an Assyrian king, or the priestly body to which a man might belong. The Sem. form, *šangū*, seems to have been borrowed by the Sumerians, who attached it to the character *mes*, 'hero,' 'man of worth.'[1] It is this root that is found in the Sem. rendering of the Sum. *pa-te-si*, namely, *iššakku*, from the Sum. *ig-sag*, 'he who is at the head,' a word often rendered by 'priest-king.' Though probably often a priest, the *iššakku* was generally a kind of viceroy, under a royal ruler (*lugal-šarru*, 'king'), and took his title from the place which he governed, as *Gudea patesi Lagaš*, 'Gudea, viceroy of Lagaš.'

2. The high-priest.—Several words which may be thus rendered are known. A *šangū rabû* (so L. Delaporte), 'great priest,' is shown on the cylinder-seal published in his 'Cylindres orientaux' (*AMG* xxxiii. [1909]). This object, which is a talisman rather than a seal, shows Aššur-nimeli, the personage in question, standing before Ištar. His costume is that of an Assyrian of the higher class, and he wears wig and beard.

In what way the *šangū rabû* differed from the *šangū dannu*, 'mighty priest,' and from the *šangū-maḫḫu*, 'supreme priest,' is uncertain. In the Šurpu-series of incantations[2] (V./VI. 173) the last-named is spoken of as kindling the fire and the brazier, and throwing therein the means of loosing the spell. He is also spoken of as the holy libation-priest (*ramku êllu*) of Êa, and the messenger of Merodach. As a result of this and similar acts, the man on whose behalf the ceremony was performed would be saved and freed from his sin that very day. Evidently these high-priests had not the power of releasing a man from the effects of his sin, and uttering words of pardon, without these magical ceremonies.

During the period of the Sumerian dynasty of Ur the high-priest, or a similar temple magnate, was called *en*, 'the lord,' and was seemingly appointed by an oracle and invested by the king. Thus the 11th colophon-date of King Dungi records the proclamation of the lord true prince (*en nir-zi*) of Anu and the lord (*en*) of Nannar (the moon-god).[1] These two temple officials were invested two years later (*The Amherst Tablets*, London, 1908, vol. i. p. xiv). Other examples of similar investitures are Dungi's 31st and 46th dates, as calculated by H. Radau, and Bûr-Sin's 4th, 5th, 8th, and 11th, etc. *En* was apparently Semiticized as *ênu*, fem. *êntu*, written in Sum. *nin-dingir*, 'lady of the god' = 'priestess.'

3. The subordinate orders.—Unfortunately no trustworthy list of these exists, so that their rank and consequently their order of precedence are difficult to determine. Certain priests were attached to the palace of the Assyrian king, but, as their order does not coincide with what is given elsewhere, this list is of doubtful authority. We find in it seers, incantation-priests, magians (?), and, apparently, 'inquirers.' Another short list in a letter mentions the *aba*, probably 'temple scribe,' and then 'secretary' in general; the seers; the incantation-priests; the *âsê*, or 'physicians'; and the *dagil iṣṣurê*, or 'bird-prognosticators.' Here the order of their importance seems to be roughly indicated.

4. The priests' clothing, and the perfection of their persons.—Though the priests shown in the early cylinder-seals wear dresses practically identical—a fringed cloak reaching to the feet, leaving the right arm uncovered and therefore free, with bare feet and (generally) shaven head—there seems to be no doubt that distinctive clothing was worn. Thus the British Museum letter K. 626 (R. F. Harper, *Assyrian and Babylonian Letters*, Chicago, 1910, no. 24) describes the *mašmašu* as wearing a red robe and a mitre of the same colour (Behrens, *Assyrisch-babylonische Briefe kultischen Inhalts*). Details as to priestly clothing are meagre, but apparently the right garments had to be used, or the ceremony would be a failure. A list (*WAI* v. 28) gives the words *puliamu-têdiq bêli*, 'robe of a *bêlu*' (chief priest, Sem. for *en*, above), *ṣubat nikî*, 'dress of the sacrifice,' etc.

To appropriateness of dress was added, at least in the case of the higher orders, the highest perfection of birth and of person. He who aspired to the office of seer (*bārû*) and who was of the everlasting seed of Enweduranki (Euedoreschus, *ERE* vi. 642[b]), 'the king with the woollen garment of Šamaš,' should be the offspring of a parent whose forbear was holy, and he himself should likewise be perfect in form and feature. Such a one only might approach the presence of Šamaš and Adad (the sun-god and the wind-god), the place of the vision and the oracle. One not being thus holy and perfect, defective as to eyes (? squint-eyed), wanting teeth, mutilated of finger, with earth-grey flesh, filled with leprosy, etc., could not be keeper of the decrees of Šamaš and Adad, approach the place of Êa, Šamaš, Merodach, or Nin-êdina, or join the brethren at the decision of the seers. They could not reveal to him the word of the oracle, and he could not hold in his hand 'the cedar beloved of the great gods.'

5. Consecration and tonsure.—There are many references to priestly consecration, but nothing is known as to the distinctive marks which the priests bore. The seal-impressions show that they were often clean shaven, and it seems certain that this was part of the rite of consecration, which was performed by the priestly tonsure-cutter, *šui* (Sum.) or *gallābu* (Sem.). His work was probably performed before the statue of the deity to whom the

[1] 'Priest' also seems to be expressed by the simple word *âwêlu*, 'man'; cf. Assurbanipal's Cylinder A (col. vii. 48), where Nabû-qâtâ-šabat is called *âwêl Sîn*, 'man (priest) of the moon-god.' Awel-Marudak (Evil-Merodach) and many similar names may express the same idea.

[2] H. Zimmern, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis der bab. Religion*, pt. i., 'Die Beschworungstafeln Šurpu,' Leipzig, 1896.

[1] For a parallel cf. the use of the Heb. כהן in Gn 14[18] etc.

neophyte was to be dedicated (*PSBA*, 1893, pp. 417–420). The importance of the ceremony is indicated by the fact that even the king might perform it:

'At the beginning of the tonsuring,[1] according to what was their command, (as for) the priest of the house of the junior food-distributor, Sennacherib tonsured him (*ugdallib-šu*)' (Letter K. 122, Harper, no. 43).

This was apparently followed by the giving of the priestly tiara. In another inscription Aššur-banî-âpli, after referring to the appointment of his eldest brother, Šamaš-šum-ukîn (Saosduchinos), to the kingdom of Babylon, states that his younger brother, Aššur-mukîn-palêa, was consecrated to be *uru-gallu* before Aššur, and his third brother, Aššur-êtil-šamê-êrṣiti-balāṭi-šu, to the same office before the god Sin. The word used is *ugdallib*, 'I (or he) tonsured.'

6. **The priesthood and the king.**—All the higher priests were naturally in close communication with the court, as many documents, especially the Babylonian and Assyrian letters, show. As has been foreshadowed in § 1, the king himself was (perhaps always) the great high-priest. His position as head of the State, however, must have prevented him from fulfilling many of his priestly functions, except those which had to do with his royal position. Specialists among the various orders of priests had naturally to instruct him with regard to the things which he could not go into thoroughly—lucky and unlucky days, celestial and terrestrial omens, the tablets to be used at the various ceremonies, and the time required for the performance of the rites, which sometimes extended over many days. The tall tiara which the king wore, and the cord behind, which, arising from its highest point, descended, in the case of the Babylonian rulers, to the hem of his robe, were also, probably, priestly signs or necessary portions of their dress. The cord probably has some analogy to that worn by the Parsis under their clothing.

7. **The priesthood and the people.**—Not less important was the connexion of the priesthood with the people, who were not only its justification, but also its main support. As intermediaries between the gods and the people, in sacrifice, propitiation, penitence, prayer, and oracle, they were the interpreters of all the religious texts, expounders of omens, and indicators of lucky and unlucky days and seasons. It is uncertain whether the judges were of priestly rank or not, but the priesthood had also much to do not only with the interpretation of moral and religious law, but also with many of the civil enactments.

That laymen, and even slaves, could take part in the temple services is shown by Harper's Letter no. 368, where we read that Ninqaya, the handmaid of the king's mother, is not suitable for the service (worship):

'She shall not enter (therein). As the mother of the king, my lord says, let her open the (money-) chest, let her perform the service.'

In other words, she had money, and could make a gift; let her do so, and then take part in the worship. Another letter asks the king whether certain women might enter the temple and take part in the worship, and, if so, would the king's instructions apply to a slave-woman who was with them. It seems probable that the ordinary citizen was merely a tithe-payer, and that the very poor and the landless gave labour. It is not impossible that certain of the more intelligent of the laity were initiated into the mysteries which the tablets show to have been common in the higher orders of the priesthood.

Besides offering sacrifices, the priests conducted the services, and arranged the *lectisternia*, or tables of offerings to the gods. It was also the duty of some of them to receive the tithes, and to certify that they had been paid (the tablets referring to these are very numerous during the early period). Some of them looked after the temple itself, while others arranged for the services and the processions. What proportion of the offerings the priesthood took for itself is uncertain, but, as the temples became enormously rich, there is no doubt that the priests who served them lived on the fat of the land, and even grew very wealthy. In their position, however, the possession of private means must have been a matter of indifference for all but the most avaricious, but many passed on what they could not use themselves to their family, relatives, or friends (cf. Bel and the Dragon, 19[5]).

8. **The mâšu and maśmašu.**—That these two classes of priests were closely allied is proved by the fact that the Sum. *maš* and *maśmaš* were both reproduced by the Sem. simple form *mâšu*. The *maśmašu* was the priest who had especially to do with ceremonies and ritual. He anointed the king's head, consecrated his couch, and drove forth the evil which had made its home in the royal abode. After this ceremony a procession was formed, in which torches and a lamb for sacrifice were carried, and it was the custom on these occasions to offer likewise many natural products. After the sacrifice came the purification of the palace. It was also the duty of the *maśmašu* to pronounce numerous incantations on these ceremonial occasions. The order seems to have been classed with that of the *bārē*, 'seers,' and the *âsē*, 'physicians.'

In Letter no. 23 of Harper a *maśmašu* is referred to as not having taken the tablets of the series 'the unpropitious day, the day not good: hand-raising,' *i.e.* 'act(s) of prayer.' These were apparently documents which he should have used in certain ceremonies. In Letter no. 118 *maśmašē* seem to be spoken of in connexion with the instruction of certain persons in the ceremonies. The writer, Arad-Gula, may have been a member of this order.

9. **The ašipu.**—Like the *mâšu* and the *maśmašu*, the *ašipu* was also one of the most important priests of the Babylonian hierarchy. The duty of the order was to make incantations, either for imposing a spell or for releasing a man therefrom. The latter is referred to in the book of the Babylonian Job, 'Lidlul the Sage,' and from the same work it seems that he was able to diagnose in cases of illness (Jastrow, *Die Rel. Babyloniens und Assyriens*, ii. 129. 5)—an indication that he belonged to the physician class. Another form of his name, apparently, is *išippu*, from the Sum. *išib*, and under that title the tablets refer to the *išippu ša ašnan*, 'grain- (or wheat-) magician.' The incantation-series Šurpu seems to indicate that there were priestesses of this class (*sal išib* = *âšiptu*, viii. 52). The lists indicate that the *ašipu* was also a *pašišu*, 'anointer,' as well as a *bārû*, 'seer.' *Ašipu* is represented in Heb. by אָשֵׁף, *aśśāph*, from the same root (Dn 1[20], etc.). See *HDB* iii. 210.

10. **The uru-gallu.** — As this word translates the Sum. *maśmaś*, which is also rendered *mâšu*, the priest indicated seems to have been one of the same class. The meaning of the word is 'great protector,' and it seems to indicate several groups. A portion of his duties (those connected with the New Year festivities) had to be performed during the night:

'In Nisan, day 2nd, for an hour (double hour) of the night, the *uru-gallu* shall rise up, and shall pour out the waters from the river (the Euphrates). He shall enter before Bel (Merodach). He shall let down the curtain (*gadalulu*) he shall utter this prayer before Bel.'

[1] *Gallubu*; but perhaps this word here means the whole ceremony, in which case the rendering would be 'consecration.'

Here follow the words of the supplication, in couplets, the first line Sumerian, and the second Babylonian in each case (see *ERE* vii. 3[a]). As priest of the temple of Belus (Ê-sagila, Merodach's temple), the *uru-gallu* glorified this god as 'the fortunate king, lord of the world, glorying in his strength,' etc. He ends his prayer by asking the god's favour on his city Babylon, and on E-sagila, his temple. As indicated above (§ 5), Aššur-banî-âpli's younger brother, Aššur-mukîn-palêa, was appointed to the position of *uru-gallu* of (apparently) the god Aššur.

11. The ša'ilu.—There is much doubt as to the real meaning of this word. Interpretations given are 'man of god' and 'man of the spell.' In both cases, however, a phrase like *âwēl ša'ili* would be expected, at least for the second alternative. Another word for this priest was *ensi* (Sum. and Sem.), rendering the characters *en-me-gub*, 'lord of the holy incantation,' or the like. His special province seems to have been the interpretation of dreams (see Zimmern, *ZA* iii. [1888] 233). His duties, however, as indicated by Lidlul the Sage, included offerings:

'The *ša'ilu* did not bring forward my cause by an offering.'

Modifications of the ideographic writing expressed the Sum. *engima* and *endib*, translated by *ša'ilu* and a word which Zimmern completes as *nuḫatimmu* and translates 'baker.' This, however, is doubtful, the more probable rendering being 'food-distributor,' or the like. The feminine is *ša'iltu*.

12. The pašišu.—This was the 'anointing priest,' though the duty of anointing was apparently not confined to any one class. That early type of Noah, Zi-ûsuddu (Σισυθης in Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, xii.), is described as having belonged to this order, as did Adapa (*ERE* vi. 644). Jensen renders the word as 'the anointed one,' but there is no doubt that the real meaning is 'anointing priest,' or the like.[1] Divine priests of this class were regarded as dwelling in the Abyss (*pašiš apsī*, 'anointers of the Apsû'). As it was the custom to cleanse with oil the foundation-memorials of the Assyrian kings when restorations of buildings were made, the king himself, to judge from the inscriptions, acted as anointer, and may have been regarded, like the pre-historic rulers, as belonging to this same priestly order. Whether the *pašišu*, who was not of royal race, anointed the palace foundation-stones or not is uncertain and unlikely.

The above deals with the Sum. group provisionally read *aḫ-me*, but *pašišu* also renders the Sum. *laḫ* and *mar-maḫ*. *Laḫ* (*laḫḫa*) apparently means 'cleanser,' and then also 'anointer' for the purpose of producing some undesirable effect on a person believed to be hostile (see K. L. Tallqvist, *Die assyr. Beschwörungsserie Maqlû*, Leipzig, 1895, vi. 102 ff., 110 ff., where the fem. *pašištu* occurs). These, however, were probably not the priestly anointers, but belonged to the sorcerer class.

13. The sukkallu. — This word, which comes from the Sumerian, is generally translated 'messenger' or 'minister' (of a god, etc.). There were many classes of *sukkallu*, with duties correspondingly various. As the ideograph expressing this office is *laḫ*, his work may have been originally analogous to that of the *pašišu*, and, for this reason, he was regarded as an 'anointer.' The Babylonian physician, *âsû*, also called himself *sukkallu*, probably because anointing formed part of the medical treatment. In the sense of 'minister,' numerous gods bore the title or the name of Sukkallu (see § 23, below).

In W. Hayes Ward's *Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Washington, 1910, no. 52b, Uru-Nannar appears as the *sukkal-maḫ* of the Babylonian (Urite) king Su-Sin (*c.* 2500 B.C.). The seal shows him shaven, thus indicating his priestly position.

[1] An 'anointer,' however, would probably be himself 'anointed' at (it may be supposed) his consecration.

14. The kisal-laḫ.—Semiticized as *kisal-laḫḫu*, this may be classed among the minor orders. The etymology of the word is *kisal*, 'oil-place,' and the above-named *laḫ*, 'to cleanse.' His duties must therefore have been similar to those of the *pašišu* and the *sukkallu*, and he may have assisted the king on the occasion of his official building-consecrations.

15. The surru.—Priests bearing this title apparently belonged to one of the most important of the Babylonian sacerdotal classes, and might even aspire to the high-priesthood, as is indicated by the fact that the *sura-maḫ* is once rendered in Bab. as *šangamaḫḫu*, 'high-priest' (see § 2). The lists give also the word *sura-gal* (Sum.), 'great *surru*' (*WAI* ii. 21. 41, 46, 47c). The *surru* probably belonged to the highest class of the musician priests, as represented by the *kalû* (see § 16). Though read *šangamaḫ(ḫ)u*, it is really the *suramaḫu* who is spoken of as kindling the fire and the brazier (§ 2). In the list of priests, *WAI* ii. 32. 9, either as *suramaḫu* or as *šangamaḫu*, he is mentioned between the 'libationer' (*ramku*) and the *mašmašu* (see § 8).

16. The kalû.—A Semiticized form of the Sum. *gal*, dialectic *mulu*, this, like *surru*, stood for a variety of offices. From the inscriptions and the bilingual lists it is clear that he was, like the *surru*, a singer, a worker (? of ceremonies, *ga-ga*, dialectic *ma-ma*), an utterer of lamentation (*ir*), Anu's (or god's) fortress (*bad ana* or *bad dingira*), and the invoker of the oracle (*nunuz-pû = tamû pirišti*). *Kalû* also explains the Sum. groups *sura* and *sura-gal*, 'great *surru*' (see § 15).

Besides being the temple singer, the *kalû* wrote astrological reports, with, probably, the forecasts derived therefrom; and the ceremony of making offerings was also part of his duty. In connexion with his musical duties, it is noteworthy that the god Êa, as patron of their order, bore the name of Lumḫa, the ideogram expressing which is regarded as a wedge-formed picture of a musical instrument, the lyre.

17. The nâru. — This was apparently the musician-priest *par excellence*. The god Êa is said to have had a special *nâru* of his own named Ḫasisu, 'the wise one,' and as the god of the *nârē* Êa bore the name of Dunga. They seem to have joined in the lamentations, and thus were classed with the mourners.

For representations of priests of this class (they were shaven), see Earl of Southesk's *Catalogue of Collection of Antique Gems*, London, 1908, ii. 64, and L. de Clercq, *Catalogue*, Paris, 1887 ff., no. 101. The *nârē* and *nârāte* of the historical inscriptions, like those sent to Sennacherib by Hezekiah, were evidently not connected with the temple services. See MUSIC (Babylonian).

18. The gallābu.—For the work of this priest see § 5, from which it would appear that the rite performed by him, which formed an essential part of priestly consecration, was sometimes, either wholly or in part, undertaken by the king. The *gallābu* and the *âsû* carried the implements of their profession in cases of skin or leather (*WAI* v. 1. 2 ff.).

19. The bārû.—This was the most important or one of the most important of the orders of seers. Their duties are indicated shortly by Lidlul the Sage:

'The *bārû* forecast not the future by soothsaying.' 'The *bārû* has taken my forecasts away' (Jastrow, ii. 125, 169, 129, 4).

The Sum. corresponding word is *gaššu*, attached to a character with the general meaning of 'to pierce,' 'to open.' The bilingual lists give, as the groups which may express this word, the Sum. *uzu*, *azu*, 'physician'; *azu*, *zalzu*, *mezu*, meaning respectively 'water-knowing,' 'oil-knowing,' and 'voice-knowing,' the last referring, probably, to supernatural vocal revelations. Another group

means 'he who explains an oracle (or vision).' As indicated by Lidlul, his duty was to direct men by visions—*bārû ina biri ul uštêšir-šu*, 'the seer has not directed him (the troubled one) by a vision' (*WAI* iv. 22, 42b). To all appearance the *bārû* corresponds with the 'seer' of the Hebrews (*ḥozeh*, *roeh*).

The above descriptions of his duties corresponded with those of the חַרְטֻמִּים, *ḥarṭummim*, of the OT (Gn 41[8], etc.), but he had other duties of greater importance and dignity. Thus Martin's *Textes religieux* pictures him to us in the assembly of the other members of the order, when, raising a branch, he intoned the incantation beginning

'Šamaš and Adad, arise. In my supplication, the raising of my hands, whatever I do, let the invocation which I offer be the truth.'

When the presages were not satisfactory, and the god did not answer, he had to perform the ceremony of 'washing the mouth,' pronouncing afterwards the following prayer:

'Šamaš, lord of judgment, Adad, lord of the oracle, I bring you, I offer you, a pure fawn, the young of the gazelle, whose eyes are bright, face perfect, hoofs without defect.' (Here follows a list of the innocent pleasures which the fawn has enjoyed.) 'He does not yet know the stag's desire, and I offer him to you.

Samaš, Adad, arise, and in my supplication, in the raising of my hands, whatever I do, let the invocation which I offer be the truth.'

Priestly supplication was generally accompanied by the lifting of the hands. They seem not to have been raised on high, but simply to the level of the face, with the finger-tips approaching.

The rites accompanying the duties of the *bārû* were very numerous, as might be expected from priests of such ancient origin and important functions.

20. The abarakku.—Closely connected with the functions of the *bārû* were those of the *abarakku*, of whom, however, very little can be said. The word is written with the same character as is used for *îttu*, 'sign,' 'omen,' and the like, and was pronounced in Sum. *isikim*. A mutilated explanation implies also that it was rendered by *bārû*, 'seer.'

Abarakku is probably the אַבְרֵךְ, *abrek*, of Gn 41[43], and, if so, the proclamation made by the Egyptian heralds did not mean 'bow the knee,' but 'the (great) seer,' or the like. The existence of the word in Hebrew is due to Babylonian influence. It is doubtful whether the similar word *abriqqu*, from the Sum. *abrig*, has anything to do with this; but it may be noted that the last is expressed by the characters *nun-me-du*, 'prince (divine), command bringing,' or the like.

21. The âsû.—There may be some doubt as to this being a priestly order, but the leech in ancient times was so important that the Babylonian priesthood can hardly have failed to include the professors of the healing art among them. Nevertheless, in Ḫammurabi's Code, they came under the severest clauses of the *lex talionis*—a fact which may be taken to show that priests in general were not a privileged class before the law.

The etymology of *âsû* is interesting, as it comes from the Sum. *azu*, meaning, probably, 'water-knowing,' either from the medical 'waters' that he used or from the knowledge that he was supposed to have of the fluids of the body. Other Sum. words translated by *âsû* were *nizu* or *zalzu*, 'oil-knowing,' and *mešu* or *ušbzu*, 'voice-knowing' or 'incantation-knowing' (see § 19). As *azu* also stands for *bārû*, 'seer' (§ 19), it is clear that he belonged to the same class of temple-official.

The severity of the *lex talionis* under which they practised proves that a knowledge of surgery was expected of them (see *ERE* iv. 259 f.). Herodotus (i. 197) says that the Babylonians made no use of physicians, as the people trusted to the advice of those who had already suffered from the maladies which afflicted them. The inhabitants of the capital at least therefore seem to have had unsatisfactory experience of their healing powers. The Assyrians, however, had not come to this conclusion, as many tablets (some of them letters) show. *Âsû* has passed into Heb.-Aramaic as אָסָא, *âsâ*, with derivatives.

It is possible that the *mugu* was also a physician (Harper, no. 108, rev. 3). The *rab-mugi* is probably the *rab-mag* of Jer 39 (Gr. 46)[3].

22. Other priestly classes.—Whether the *aba*, which is a similar formation to *azu*=*âsû*, was a priestly class or not is uncertain. It might be translated 'water- [*i.e.* medicine-] giver.' As a rule, he was a scribe or secretary (in Harper's 33rd Letter he heads a short list of priests). It is probably on account of his apparently secretarial duties that he has been regarded as one of the classes of scribes, *ṭupšarru*, the *ṭipsar* of Jer 51[27] and Nah 3[17]. Notwithstanding their various secular occupations, the scribes were often priests. Considerations of space prevent notice of various other priestly titles, but it is necessary to add to the list the temple-officials designated by the Sum. *tu-ê*, 'temple visitor,' or the like (*tu*, 'to enter'+ *ê*, 'house' or 'temple'). They had apparently considerable power, but it is not known in what their great influence originated. One of these, Nabû-šum-ukin, attached to the great temple of Nebo at Borsippa, married Gigîtu[m], daughter of Neriglissar (see *RP* II. iv. [1890] 101 ff.).

23. The heavenly hierarchy. — Though the priestly titles of the gods of the Babylonian pantheon were imitated from those of their earthly priesthood, it is probable that the Babylonians regarded the reverse as being the case. Thus Engur, mother of Êa, was the true *abrakkatu* (§ 20) of the heavenly (and the earthly) *ê-kura*, or temple; Nin-šah was the supreme messenger or minister (*sukkal-maḫ*) of Anu, the god of the heavens; Eninna-ni-zi was the *sukkallu* of En-Urta ('Ninip'), one of the gods of healing; Azaga-sud was the *sura* (§ 15) of Enlilla, etc. All, or nearly all, of the great deities had their *sukkalê*, and Šamaš, the sun-god, had several—he of the right, he of the left, the one who was supreme (*maḫ*), and two *sukkal ša-kuššu*, 'heart-resting.' He had also a *gallābu* (§ 18), one who shore him (of his rays), either when he set or when he was eclipsed. The name of this deity was Engana, 'lord of repose,' or the like.

The great god of the various orders of priests seems to have been Êa, who was patron of the *kalê*, 'chanters,' *nârê*, 'musicians,' *âšipê*, 'incantation-makers,' *bārê*, 'seers,' *ṭupšarrê*, 'scribes,' *âsê*, 'physicians,' and *gallābê*, priestly tonsure-cutters.

The abode of Ereš-ki-gal or Allatu[m], goddess of the under world, was regarded as similarly organized. Namtar, or 'Fate,' was the goddess's *sukkalu*, and she had, as well, a divine (? and priestly) food-distributor (*mu* or *mu-ḫaltimmu*). The lists of gods also give certain divine titles, which may be priestly, but are not represented on earth.

LITERATURE.—Morris Jastrow, *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1905–12; E. Behrens, *Assyrisch-babylonische Briefe kultischen Inhalts*, Leipzig, 1906; and the special lexical articles in F. Delitzsch, *Assyrisches Handwörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1890; and W. Muss-Arnolt, *Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, Berlin, 1905. As the subject is a very extensive one, notes on priestly titles are scattered throughout recent Assyro-Babylonian literature, the most noteworthy being F. Martin, *Textes religieux assyriens et babyloniens*, 1st ser., Paris, 1903.

T. G. PINCHES.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Buddhist).—For all purposes, ecclesiastical and social, the priesthood in Buddhism is conterminous with the order of monks (Saṅgha). Every ordained member of the Saṅgha is qualified to act as priest, and to perform those duties which in Buddhism may be considered to attach to the office. Of priestly function, however, in the narrower, more restricted sense of the term with which Western ecclesiastical

history is familiar, Buddhism knows nothing. The monk or priest, in so far as he has obligations and duties towards the laity, is the servant of all, for their edification and conversion. His relation to them is that of a minister to their religious necessities, and a confidant and guide on all the critical occasions of life, as they on their side serve his temporal needs and provide him with the requisite minimum of food and clothing. In neither of the great schools of the North and the South is there any suggestion of the thought that through a human intermediary man may or must approach unto God; and Buddhism has no order or ritual of sacrifice to require the services of an officiating priest with expert knowledge of the modes and significance of the rites. Whether, as in the Hīnayāna, in theory at least a man must rely solely upon his own endeavours and virtues to achieve salvation, or, as in the Mahāyāna, upon the merits and assistance of powerful *bodhisattvas* to sustain his faltering and wayward steps and to bring him to his goal, in neither case is deliverance through or by a human priest.

This was the view consistently adopted and enforced by Gautama Buddha himself, if the Pāli books rightly interpret the tenor of his directions and teaching. After his death the Law which he had given to his disciples was to be their guide. Each man might gain a knowledge of the truth by his own insight and exertions, as the Buddha himself had done; and there was no other road to emancipation and rest. If, however, the Mahāyānist teachers are right in maintaining the fundamentally mystical and esoteric character of his later instructions, he himself made provision for effectual external aid to be at the disposal of all who sought deliverance from suffering and wrong; but that deliverance was from a superior divine source and not mediated through a man.

The offices, therefore, which the Buddhist priests undertake for the laity are chiefly those of reading and exposition of the Scriptures. In most of the monasteries also, especially in Burma, instruction is given by the older monks or those appointed for the purpose in the elements of secular learning and the simpler doctrines of the faith together with narrative of the life or lives of the Buddha. In this service the Buddhist priests have been for many centuries the national schoolmasters; and in most Buddhist countries, except as undertaken and forwarded by European government authority or missionary enterprise, no other teaching has been available. On all important occasions, moreover, in the private life of the people, at marriages and births and especially in cases of sickness, the priest is summoned to perform ceremonies and prophylactic rites, to pronounce incantations, and by recitation of sacred texts to expel and keep at a distance evil influences. In some instances simple remedies may be applied. For the most part it is only in Vassa that formal exhortations or orations are made. The practice varies, however, in the different lands in which Buddhism prevails. Usually also the sermons or discourses are delivered not in the temples, which the laity are not expected to frequent for that purpose, but in private houses or in halls erected or lent for the occasion. The preaching work of the early itinerating monks seems to have been done to a large extent in the open air; but this practice obtains little if at all at the present day.

The services within the temples themselves can hardly be said to call for the exercise of any priestly function. They consist for the most part of invocation and recitations, in which all the resident members of the monastery share, but the laity are not present, unless as accidental spectators. The latter frequent the temples for worship and to present their offerings individually or in small groups. There are no general assemblies or combined devotional services. At the principal service of the day the senior monk or another to whom the duty is delegated will deliver a sermon or exposition on Buddhist doctrine or ethics; he acts, however, less by virtue of his position or office as priest than on account of the superior knowledge with which he is credited. From him the junior monks may expect to receive instruction in the right way of life. In his private capacity also the priest will give advice, and receives confessions.

The most elaborate ceremonial and suggestive ritual is to be found in Tibet. Here, at a service that has derived some at least of its main features from Christian example and the commemorative observance of the Last Supper, the Buddhist Lāma officiates as priest. Formal Buddhism, however, owns no doctrine of sacrifice or propitiatory offering. The Lāmaism of Tibet is Buddhist in little more than name, and the Lāma priest of high rank is endowed with more of priestly function and consideration than the Buddhist monk of other lands. The services in the temple include formal and elaborate liturgies, in addition to the ordinary recitations and instruction. At the frequent festivals the ritual observed is often intricate as well as highly ornate. Extra services also are held at the request of laymen, for which payment is made in the form of gifts to the monastery, the merit of which accrues to the donor. To a considerable extent these practices have been derived from the West through the agency of early Nestorian missionaries. The monks also visit the houses of the laity to perform ceremonies and to read portions of the Buddhist sacred books.

Among the various peoples professing the faith there is no great difference in the offices thus undertaken by the Buddhist priests. Recitation of the Scriptures and more or less formal and regular discourses in the temples on the topics of the Buddhist religion form the larger part of their recognized duties. Moreover, in all the northern countries at least Buddhist usage and ceremonial have been to a considerable extent modified, as in Tibet, by indigenous beliefs and practices. With this one exception the process has advanced farthest perhaps in China, where Buddhist and Taoist priests interchange facilities and mutually officiate in the temples of either faith. Chinese monks conduct the services and perform their duties in a very perfunctory manner. The Japanese priests, on the contrary, are alert and intelligent, often well-read and interested in the history and doctrines of their sect, and punctiliously observant of the duties that are incumbent upon them. In some sects they add to their other services that of an active missionary propaganda in defence of the faith. Between the Shintōist and Buddhist priests no interchange of ministry or office takes place at the present time, and the demarcation in manners and appearance, as in duty and ceremonial, is complete. The relations formerly must have been much more intimate and friendly, and Buddhism has taken over from the national faith functions which would seem to be entirely incompatible with its principles and creed. At funerals especially Buddhist priests are summoned to officiate; on the other hand, at marriages and births, on the more joyous occasions of the family life, the services of the Shintō clergy are in request. In the presentation of the ancestral offerings also the Buddhist priesthood takes an active and recognized part. The equipment and dress of the monks is similar to that found in China, and the same practice of branding at initiation into the order prevails. Whereas,

however, in China the branding is upon the shaven head, in Japan the mark is made upon the arm of the monk.

It is in Korea that the priesthood holds a position of least prominence, having maintained little authority or dignity. It was otherwise in the earlier centuries of the history of the country, when Buddhist priests took a leading part in the political as well as in the religious control of the people. More recently their influence diminished, and for a long time they have had little interest or concern in the national life. Their numbers do not increase, they live apart from the people, and are little honoured or consulted.

The service of the priest or monk therefore in Buddhism has been closely determined by the origin and early history of the faith, and, except where other conditions have been imposed by its environment, has not travelled beyond those limits. The absence of a doctrine of sacrifice, or of any recognized belief in a future life beyond this world, has necessarily placed a hindrance in the way of the development of a priestly office, and has retarded or altogether checked the growth of any felt need for the ministry of the priest. Notwithstanding, the Buddhist priest, although to a less extent than in Christianity or Hinduism or some other faiths, has a real place among his people, and his office carries with it prerogatives and an influence that are of much importance. It is true that the honour paid to his office has not always, any more than in other countries, been transferred to his person; and the order is sometimes recruited, as in China, from the lower classes of the population. There can be little doubt, however, that the ascendancy of the priest or monk has been a real and perhaps decisive factor in the history and development of the Buddhist religion.

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A. S. GEDEN.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Chinese). — The statement, which is so commonly made, that there are three religions in China is apt to convey a very misleading idea of the religious state of that country. Setting aside the members of the various Christian churches, and the adherents of Judaism and Islām, and perhaps the Buddhist monks and nuns, it would be hard to describe the average Chinaman as being an exclusive adherent of any of the three systems which are usually called the three religions of China—Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. It would scarcely be too much to say that the basis of his religion is practically the same as that of his ancestors in the days before any of the three teachers from whom these systems professedly derive their origins had been born. As a clearly defined physical type of man has been in occupation of Eastern Asia since pre-historic times, so certain elements in the religious stratification of that area appear to have remained unchanged for an immense period. These elements are shamanism (*q.v.*) and ancestor-worship (see art. COMMUNION WITH THE DEAD [Chinese]). When we first meet with the Chinese, we find them practising shamanistic rites and paying honour to their ancestors, though in addition there appears to have existed belief in a supreme being. Under the Chou dynasty (1122–249 B.C.), when we are beginning to touch firmer ground, there appeared two remarkable ethical teachers, Confucius (551–478 B.C.) and Lao tse, his elder contemporary, and a somewhat more shadowy personality, whose teaching exercised a great influence on the subsequent development of Chinese religion. It became separated into two currents: Confucianism, which is more correctly described as a moral than as a religious system, becomes the basis of the state cultus (for the sacerdotal functions performed by the emperor before the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1912 see art. CONFUCIAN RELIGION); and Taoism, the more popular current, becomes to a large extent identified with the shamanistic substratum of Chinese religion, which de Groot terms 'universal animism,'[1] or the worship of the *shen*, departmental spirits animating the various parts of the universe. In the 1st cent. of the Christian era Chinese religion became profoundly modified by the advent of Buddhism, which now became influential in its northern form, the Mahāyāna, or 'Great Vehicle,' during the reign of the emperor Ming-ti (A.D. 58–76), though the first missionaries of the Indian faith may have reached China as early as 217 B.C. From Buddhism the national religion of Taoism borrowed the conception of monasticism, which now became acclimatized on Chinese soil by the votaries of the two faiths.

1. Primitive shamanistic priesthood.—From the earliest times there appear to have existed in China persons of both sexes credited with the possession of *mana*, or spiritual power (see art. MANA), of a kind found all over the world, which enabled them to wield extraordinary powers in the spirit-world. These shamans are for the most part to be identified with the *wu*, exorcists, mentioned in very early literary records. From the *Shu king*, or 'Canon of History,' it appears that they were entirely possessed by spirits of *yang* material, which represents the principle of light and warmth, according to the primitive dualist philosophy of the Chinese (see art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Chinese]). Their functions appear to have been threefold: (*a*) invocation of the spirits of the dead for the purpose of inducing them to partake of offerings; (*b*) prophecy by means of knowledge obtained from the possessing spirits; (*c*) exorcism of all evil; this they accomplished in virtue of the *yang* power which resided in them and enabled them to neutralize the *yin* element, or element of darkness. In this capacity they would accompany potentates when entering a house of death. Ch. xii. leaf 46, of the *Li ki*, or 'Treatises on Ceremonial Usages,' says:

'When a ruler goes to the funeral rites of a minister, he has with him a *wu* and an invoker, holding respectively a piece of peachwood and reeds.' (The peach-tree was believed to be a source of terror to ghosts, and the bundle of reeds has a magical significance, being employed for the purpose of sweeping away evil.)

The *Cheu li*, or 'Book of Institutions of the Cheu Dynasty,' ch. xxv. leaves 30 and 39, says:

'When the sovereign pays a visit of condolence, the invoker for the funeral rites marches in front of him, in company of the *wu*'; and 'the male *wu* on the same occasion walks ahead of him with the invoker.'

In the time of the Shang dynasty (1766–1122 B.C.) these *wu* appear to have been a kind of order of singing and dancing dervishes. They danced at sacrifices to secure rain.

'At the altars raised to pray and sacrifice for rain,' says de Groot, 'the priestesses, representing the Yin or female part of the Universal Order, to which clouds and water belong, performed dances; and when disasters prevailed, they conjured the gods by means of chants expressive of grief and distress.'[2]

The early texts appear to suggest that the *wu* were the Chinese representatives of a primitive animistic priesthood found all over Asia, such as the dervish of Muhammadan countries, the Indian *faqir*, and the shaman of the Siberian aborigines. When 'possessed,' they suffer convulsions and distortions. The possessing spirit is believed to endow them with the power of second sight and of

[1] *The Religious System of China*, vi. 1188. [2] vi. 1190.

exorcizing spectres. Some ancient texts refer to the male *wu* as *hih*. They also mention a class of persons called *chuh*, *i.e.* invokers or conjurers. In texts of the Han dynasty (*c.* 200 B.C.–A.D. 200) the expression *wu-chuh* occurs, thus indicating that the functions of the two classes had become assimilated. The *wu* were frequently employed by the emperors of this dynasty. Since disease was popularly ascribed to demoniacal possession, the *wu*, being exorcists, were much sought after as physicians. In this capacity they were employed in the 4th cent. A.D. to chase away foxes and lizards, which were believed to bring disease. What gave the *wu* their greatest influence, however, appears to have been the fact that in their mediumistic capacity they claimed to reveal to their clients the wishes of their departed ancestors. The southern provinces have always been the great stronghold of *wu*-ism. Its influence with women was enormous, and probably in early times there were more female than male *wu*. Any woman, married or unmarried, who felt herself capable of becoming a medium could do so. A state of ecstasy was induced by dancing, and perpetuated by monotonous music and the beating of drums. At certain periods *wu*-ism constituted a grave political danger, and, under the influence of its representatives, mandarins were induced to plot against the emperor. Its social influence was, moreover, so great that it led to the complete transgression of the canons of Confucian morality, by which women were forbidden to appear in public in the presence of men. Repressive edicts against *wu*-ism were therefore not infrequent. The *wu* were often employed as exorcists by the Tatar dynasty of Liao, but under the Ming dynasty which succeeded it (1368–1643) vigorous measures were adopted against them. Texts of the Ming period make it clear that the *wu* had temples and images of their own gods, to whom they offered sacrifice. They were no doubt the same as the thousands of village-temples existing in China at the present day. In all ages the *wu* appear to have been paid for their services in employing spells, and also for the crime of 'life-plucking,' *i.e.* dismembering a living body for the purpose of sorcery. At the present time their functions fall into three classes: (1) clairvoyance and soothsaying; (2) exorcism; (3) sacrificial work, with invocation and conjuration. Formerly there existed a division of labour, one class exercising each of these three functions separately, and this condition still exists in the province of Fukien and on Amoy Island. All over China, however, there is found a class of so-called *sai-kong*, which is almost exclusively occupied with sacrificial work and magical exorcism. In popular estimation this class is the most important branch of the *wu*-ist priesthood. The *sai-kong*, who are permitted to marry, wear no distinctive costume. Their houses are indicated to clients by sign-boards, on which are written the characters, 'There is a Taoist altar here,' showing that they regard themselves as Taoist priests.

In practice the *wu*-ist priesthood is more or less hereditary; it is usual for every *sai-kong* to design one of his sons for his own profession, as he does not like to initiate strangers into its *arcana*.

Before initiation the prospective *sai-kong* undergoes a fast or vigil. When the hour for the ceremony arrives, attired in clean underwear beneath a sacrificial robe, and with bare feet, he is carried on some one's back to the temple in which it is to take place. The reason for his being carried is that the earth is a great repository of *yin* substance, and contact with it might therefore be dangerous, as it might neutralize the *yang* substance within him. The ceremony of initiation is performed by a *wu* of advanced age, who is known as a *kao tsa*, 'chief of religion.' The chief portion of the ceremony of initiation consists in the candidate undergoing the ordeal of climbing a *to t'ui*, or ladder which has swords with the blades placed upwards for its rungs. While he undergoes this ordeal, a bundle of baby-clothes and some paper charms are fastened on his back; the latter he throws down when he reaches the top of the ladder, and the former are restored to their owner at the conclusion of the ceremony. After the ordeal of ladder-climbing is over, the neophyte kneels before the chief to receive the joyful news that he is now a fully qualified *sai-kong*. His influence will be proportionate to the number of rungs which he has mounted.

No *sai-kong* may adopt more than one pupil to succeed him in his profession. Each has a State diploma granting him permission to exercise its functions. This must be registered by the prefect and a fee must be paid. In Amoy the *sai-kong* belong to a club to which each member is bound to contribute, and has the privilege of drawing upon it in time of illness. A *sai-kong* will call himself a *tao shi*, or Taoist doctor, and most of his ritual is Taoistic in character. The work of the *sai-kong* is the propitiation of the gods, who constitute the *yang* part of the universe. The line of demarcation between *wu*-ism and Taoism is ill-defined. It was from the *wu* that the *tao shi* derived the art of exorcism.

'The difference between the tao shi and the wu class,' says de Groot, 'was finally effaced entirely when the older part of the function of the tao shi, viz. assimilation with the Tao by mental and bodily discipline in seclusion, was discarded, being incapable of being maintained by them against the competition of Buddhist monasticism, and against the oppression of ascetic and conventual life by the Confucian State.'[1]

A respectable *sai-kong* accepts what his employer offers him in the shape of money or kind in return for his professional services, but never demands payment. In officiating at religious ceremonies the *sai-kong* wears a square silk garment, resembling a chasuble in being without sleeves, and embroidered on the back. It is of magical significance, representing the shape of the earth according to primitive Chinese philosophy, and invests the wearer with the power of the order of the world or *Tao*, and enables him to restore that order. It is called *tō pō*, 'gown of the *Tao*.'

There exists also a class of youths known popularly as *ki-tong*, 'divining youths.' They are believed to possess *shen*. They usually acquire it at a religious ceremony in a temple, at which they suddenly begin to hop and dance, making strange gestures. When a youth behaves in this way, the bystanders realize that he has become 'possessed.' The case is investigated by a *sai-kong*, and the possessed youth begins to form a clientele, who employ him as a medium. The *ki-tong* are employed as exorcists. When an epidemic prevails, they are organized into processions, in which, stripped to the waist, and covered with blood flowing from self-inflicted wounds, they indulge in frantic dancing. They have even been seen carrying heavy pewter lamps, fastened to hooks thrust through their arms. Female *wu* are frequently mentioned in Chinese texts subsequent to the Han dynasty. De Groot knows of no female *sai-kong* in the Amoy district. Women, however, participate in other kinds of *wu*-ist work.

2. The priesthood in the State religion.—We learn from the *Cheu li* that at the time of its composition the *wu* were not the only priesthood in China; there was also a body of officials charged with the performance of rites and ceremonies, among which those connected with the State religion were the most important.

'Under the direction of a Minister, entitled Ta tsung poh or Superintendent of the Ancestry, . . . those officers had to direct the erection and conservation of the temples and altars of the State and the mausolea and tombs of the reigning House, furthermore, the celebration of sacrifices with music and dances, victims and implements, besides the funeral rites in the royal family, divination and auguration, etc. This ministerial department was undeniably a priesthood of Universal Animism, the gods whose worship they had to maintain and regulate being the shen which animate Heaven and Earth and their constituent parts and phenomena, as also the spirits of the dead.'[2]

[1] vi. 1254. [2] De Groot, vi. 1188.

This priesthood was in its inception an official creation, not a spontaneous development of the animistic substratum of Chinese religion.

It was probably the prototype of the *li-pu*, 'board of rites,' which in later ages supervised the ceremonial aspects of the State religion. The board of rites was the fifth in order of precedence among the eighteen boards to which the administration of the empire was entrusted prior to the Revolution of 1911, when it was suppressed, its functions being absorbed into those of the ministry of the interior. The *Cheu li* (xvii.–xxvii.) gives a list of the officials who served under the ministry of rites, with a description of their functions. They include the superior of the sacred ceremonies and his assistant, a master of the sacrifices, an officer in charge of the vases containing the libations and of the preparation of the sweet-smelling wine, an officer charged with providing the sacrificial cocks, an official who sets in their places the cups containing the libations at sacrifices, one to set in order the mats, a keeper of the ancestral hall of the imperial family, a keeper of the seals, a keeper of the imperial wardrobe, annalists and imperial secretaries, musicians, a grand augurer, invokers, and sorcerers. The last were the *wu*, who were already at that period incorporated into the State religion. The board of rites cannot, however, be regarded as a priesthood, since it was charged with the supervision of the State sacrifices merely, and was not a body charged with the task of mediating between God and man.

3. The Buddhist priesthood.—There is not in Buddhism any clearly marked distinction between the priest and the monk as in Catholic Christianity. In the latter religion the priest is one whose duty it is to officiate at the holy mysteries, while the monk is one who seeks to sanctify his soul by a life of retirement from the world, it being unusual during the earlier period of Christian monasticism for monks to be priests. In Buddhism, however, there is only one type of religious official whom we may call priests or monks, some of whom live in communities and some of whom do not. In the earliest form of Buddhism, which was agnostic, the idea of mediation was of necessity completely absent. In the first two and a half centuries after the introduction of Buddhism into China Buddhist monks were all foreigners, as it was not till the 4th cent. A.D. that Chinese subjects were permitted to adopt the monastic life. At the present time Buddhist monasteries in China are usually situated outside the cities in the open country, the ideal situation being a wooded height. Their inmates are for the most part recruited from the ranks of children, who are frequently sold to them by a necessitous mother after the father's death. Hackmann mentions a case in which twenty-five Mexican dollars (40s.) were paid for a child.[1] Only a few monasteries receive any appreciable number of adult novices. When in their seventh year, these children begin to be initiated into their religious duties. Their heads are completely shaved, and a special teacher is appointed to each. When the final consecration takes place, the novice is branded on the head as a sign of his willingness to endure hardship. Sometimes this branding is voluntarily repeated in later life. Nine vows are usually taken—to abstain from taking life, stealing, adultery, slander, reviling, lying, and feelings of jealousy, hatred, or folly. Sometimes other are added. Devotional exercises, which consist of invocations, praises, and the reading of extracts from the scriptures, usually take place three times a day. They are frequently accompanied by a sacrifice, in which the oblation usually consists of rice or tea. Meditation, both ambulatory and sedentary, is still continued in some monasteries, but it has widely fallen into desuetude. A moderate-sized community consists of about thirty to forty members. There is a well-organized domestic economy. All owe obedience to the abbot (*fang-chang*). The community is divided into an eastern and a western half. The eastern deals mostly with secular matters. It includes a book-keeper, guest-master, commissioner of stores, superintendent of field labour, superintendent of water-supply, overseer of the kitchen, manager of the clothing department, another for giving out tea, superintendent of repairs, and others. The western division deals with the religious side of life, and includes sacristans, chanters, lectors, and monks, who expound the sacred science to laymen. Chinese monks wear trousers, stockings, and shoes, besides an undergarment extending from the waist to the knees, and a garment covering the whole body. A wide garment is worn over this for full equipment. Poverty has ceased to be enforced, and monks freely accept gifts. The average monk has no real knowledge of the Buddha's teaching. Penalties are imposed on those monks who commit ritual offences, but moral offences often go unpunished. Punishment is generally administered by flogging on the naked back by lay-brothers. The monks are for the most part at a low stage of intellectual culture, though a thousand years ago, when Europe was in the Dark Ages, the monasteries of China were filled with philosophers and scholars. A person of good family rarely becomes a monk. When he does so, however, he speedily attains to abbatical rank. Immorality is wide-spread, and this led to the suppression of all the monasteries in Fuchow in the years 1830–40. It is, however, unwise to generalize on this point, as the reputations of individual monasteries vary very greatly; that of the celebrated monasteries of Chiu-hua and Puto stands high. The use of opium is also prevalent among the monks. Individual monks of ascetic life are found, and even in recent times a monk has sometimes been voluntarily burnt alive on a funeral pyre. Monks are usually cremated at death. Besides the cœnobitical communities, Buddhist hermits are found in China. They dwell in poor huts or in holes in the mountains, and are maintained by alms or by a neighbouring monastery. The hermits do not shave their heads, but wear their hair long. Some who are more ascetic than their fellows live in small mountain caves, into which the sunlight never penetrates. When such a one dies, his body is embalmed in a special manner, and, after being painted and gilded, is set up in a temple as an object of veneration. There is no supreme authority over all the monks in China, each monastery being self-contained. The government has, however, bestowed an official status on some of the abbots, who act as intermediaries between it and the monasteries. These abbots are responsible to the government for the conduct of the monks. Any ordained monk may move at will from one monastery to another, on showing a pass issued by his abbot, or he may adopt an itinerant mode of life. Buddhist monks are usually known as *bonzes*, a Japanese term introduced into China by Roman Catholic missionaries.

4. The Taoist priesthood. — The indigenous religion of Taoism, which, though it professes to be founded on the ethical teaching of Lao-tse, nevertheless in some of its manifestations appears to merge imperceptibly into the popular animism of the country, began under the influence of Buddhism to evolve an organized priesthood and ritual soon after the opening of the Christian era. At

[1] *Buddhism as a Religion*, p. 218.

present there are two orders of Taoist priests, one celibate and one married, the latter, however, being composed of priests married before ordination. They reside in their own dwellings and wear the ordinary dress of the country. The Taoist priests do not shave the head like the Buddhist ones, but bind the hair on the top of the head. Many lead an itinerant life, and derive a livelihood from the sale of charms. They are for the most part as ignorant of the teaching of Lao-tse as are the Buddhists of the teaching of Sākya-muni. They study instead the pseudo-sciences of astrology and alchemy. Candidates for the Taoist priesthood study for five years. Before initiation they fast for three days, and bathe in water scented with orange-leaves; then, going into the presence of an image of Lao-tse, they seek his blessing. A licence has then to be obtained from a mandarin. The abbots of Taoist monasteries are called *sze-sze*. At the head of the Taoist Church is a patriarch who lives in the temple known as Shang-ch'ing-kung, on the Dragon and Tiger mountains in Kiang-si. He is descended from Chang-ling, a noted healer, who flourished in the province of Sze-ch'wen under the Han dynasty. His cures obtained for him a great reputation, and he healed a number of sick persons by inducing them to write down a confession of their sins on paper and swear not to sin again. When this had been done, he threw the confessions into the water. Chang-ling's cures attracted a great number of followers to him, and he instituted a semi-clerical caste, which appears to have been the genesis of the Taoist priesthood. His work was continued by his son Heng and his grandson Lu. It is said that the patriarch is chosen in the following manner. When one dies, all the male members of the clan assemble, and the names of each are engraved on pieces of lead, which are deposited in an earthenware vessel full of water. Priests then invoke the deities of the Taoist triad, to cause the piece on which the name of him whom the gods have chosen is inscribed to float to the top.[1] The services of the Taoist and Buddhist clergy are for the most part made use of quite indiscriminately by the population. The late empress-dowager once employed Buddhist priests to pray for rain at one altar and Taoists at another. At the funeral of Li Hung Chang priests of both religions officiated. Owing, however, to the elaborate eschatology evolved by Buddhist theologians, the priests of this religion rather than the Taoists are generally employed for the purpose of offering sacrifices to alleviate the sufferings of the departed.

5. **The clergy and the State.**—The monastic ideal was naturally alien to the Chinese temperament, with its deep inbred respect for the ties of family life, and this antipathy showed itself in the hostility of official Confucianism towards Buddhism on its arrival in the country. In A.D. 714 a fierce persecution broke out, during which 12,000 religious of both sexes were compelled to return to the secular state, while in a still more bitter persecution in the following century 4600 religious houses were closed and 200,000 monks and nuns were secularized. Buddhism, however, survived these persecutions and was very powerful in the 10th and 12th centuries. The Taoist church also felt the hand of the State, celibacy being enforced upon its clergy by the first emperor of the Sung dynasty. The legislation affecting the convents and clergy is embodied in the *Ta Ts'ing luh li*, 'Fundamental and Supplementary Laws of the great Ts'ing Dynasty.'[2] Many of the laws contained in this work are also found in the Ming code. It provides that, if any Buddhist or Taoist priest is ordained without a State diploma, he shall receive eighty stripes with a long stick. No abbot may administer the rite of ordination without governmental permission. Since this has been frequently refused, there has grown up a large body of unconsecrated clergy, who wear clerical dress. A Buddhist or Taoist priest is permitted to adopt one pupil on attaining the age of forty.

Hung-Wu, the founder of the Ming dynasty, who ascended the throne in 1368, ordained that all the clergy demanding State recognition should pass a competitive examination in the Confucian classics, thus creating an intellectual link between them and the national culture. Various edicts were issued by the Manchu emperors, restricting the growth of the clergy, though their services were often made use of during the rule of that dynasty. In the southern provinces Buddhist priests have frequently been employed by mandarins in rain-making ceremonies and in exorcizing swarms of locusts. Of late years, however, monasticism has declined rapidly, and the clerical profession is universally despised. A census taken by the Peking police in 1908 revealed the fact that there were in the capital only 1553 Buddhist and 133 Taoist priests. It seems most probable that one of the chief causes which have operated in checking the growth of a powerful sacerdotal caste in China has been the system of making admission to public offices dependent on the results of competitive examinations.

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H. J. T. JOHNSON.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Egyptian).[1]—I. *INTRODUCTION.*—All the numerous communities that occupied the Nile valley just before the dawn of history possessed their respective local divinity or divinities.[2] Civilization had already so far advanced that the members of each political group would have been severally engaged in agricultural, industrial, or administrative occupations. Consequently the task of performing the services which every community as a whole owed to its gods would have devolved upon, or been deliberately deputed to, a special body of men. An Egyptian priesthood, therefore, may be described as a body of men separated from the rest of the community for the service of a god. At the head of the local priesthood or priesthoods was the local chief, members of whose family held all or some of the more important priestly offices.

This is presumed from what we know to have been the prevailing practice of the historic period, in accordance with which the nomarch, or chief official in a district, seems *ipso facto* to have been 'superintendent of the prophets' (*imy-r' ḥmw-nṯr*) of the local divinities.[3]

II. *THE POSITION OF THE KING.*—1. **The king as high-priest.**—In historic times, under the strongly centralized form of government instituted by Menes or his immediate successors, all the religious functions of the local chiefs, along with their political functions, were united in one person, the king. Thus the king became in theory the high-priest of all the local divinities. The

[1] Gray, *China*, i. 103.

[2] The Manchu dynasty, which gained possession of the throne in 1644.

[1] The writer of this article is indebted to Dr. A. H. Gardiner for many valuable suggestions and references.

[2] J. H. Breasted, *A Hist. of Egypt*, London, 1906, p. 30 f.

[3] *E.g.*, K. Sethe, *Urkunden des ägyp. Altertums*, i. (Leipzig, 1903) 24 ff. (=J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905-07, i. 213 ff.); P. E. Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, London, 1893, i. 12; F. Ll. Griffith, *The Inscriptions of Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, do. 1889, pl. 3 ff.; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 787.

current beliefs about the divine nature of the king facilitated his assumption of all the high-priesthoods. He was not merely looked upon as the earthly representative of the god Horus, who, originally the local god of Buto, was early identified with the sun-god Rē' of Heliopolis,[1] but he was actually regarded as a form or manifestation of that god.[2] The king was therefore a god, and indeed was commonly spoken of as the 'good god.'[3] Moreover, by the time of the Vth dynasty the king was believed to be the physical son of the sun-god, the State god of Egypt.[4] The king was thus the natural mediator between the gods and mankind—he was in fact the high-priest *par excellence*. In this capacity he built the temples; and in the reliefs which adorn their walls he alone is depicted as worshipping the gods and making offerings to them.[5] But it was impossible for the Egyptian king, who was the responsible head of a highly complex system of government, to exercise his high-priestly functions except on rare occasions; he accordingly was obliged to depute them to the heads, or higher members, of the various local priesthoods,[6] who were conceived of as the Pharaoh's representatives, or else to special emissaries.[7]

(*a*) The foregoing statement explains why a priest of Ḥarshef of Herakleopolis Magna is called 'king of Upper Egypt' (*nysw̓t*).[8] One of the formulæ used in the daily service in the temple distinctly states that the officiating priest represents the king: 'I am a prophet (*ḥm-nṯr*), the king has sent me to behold the god.'[9]

(*b*) The king always appears to have retained the right to appoint the high-priest of the temple, who was his deputy in a special degree (see § XII. 1).

2. The king as son of the divinity.—The king, as we have seen, was Horus, and also the son of Rē', the State god. Many of the local gods, in order to enhance their prestige, were identified with Rē'.[10] Hence the king would not only be the high-priest of these local gods but also be regarded as their son. This idea of the sonship of the king would soon affect the relationship of the king with all divinities, male or female.[11] The living king, according to the characteristic theological conception of him, was Horus. But Horus was son of Osiris (=the dead king). Under the influence of the Osiris myth the relationship of the king with any god or goddess was conceived of as that of Horus with Osiris; accordingly every divinity was an Osiris for cult purposes.[12] The high-priests, or leading members of the local priesthoods, were, as we have seen, the king's deputies, and as such impersonated the king in the temple services. Occasionally, therefore, as will be seen in the two following sections, the priest appeared in the rôle of the son of the god whom he served, or he displayed some of the characteristics of sonship.

III. *THE PRIEST AS SON OF HIS GOD.*—1. **The 'son whom he loves.'**—A priest with the title 'son whom he loves' figured in the 'Opening of the Mouth,' a ceremony performed on behalf of statues in what the Egyptians called the 'House of Gold,' *i.e.* the sculptor's studio.[1] The 'son whom he loves' represents Horus,[2] while the statue from the ritual standpoint is Osiris. At a very early date the use of this ceremony may possibly have been restricted to the statue of a dead king (=Osiris). In such a case the 'son whom he loves' would naturally have been the living king (=Horus). When the use of the ceremony was extended to all statues, the office of 'son whom he loves' necessarily devolved upon a deputy.

Thus Seḥetepibrē', a high official under Sesostris III., informs us that he 'acted as son whom he loves in the procedure of the House of Gold' at Abydos—*i.e.*, he took the part of the king at the consecration of a new statue of Osiris.[3] So also Ikhernofret, who was commissioned by the same king to superintend the making of a statue of Osiris and other accessaries of the Osirian cult.[4]

The fact that the *sem*, a title of the high-priest of Memphite Ptaḥ, plays a prominent part in the 'Opening of the Mouth'[5] suggests that the ceremony originated in the sculptors' workshops, which, from an early date, were closely connected with Memphis and the great temple of Ptaḥ.[6] The *sem* figures not only in the 'Opening of the Mouth' but in all the funerary ceremonies (see § XIV. [*e*]), which, as is now generally recognized, were originally performed on behalf of the kings of the Memphite dynasties.[7]

'Son whom he loves' was also a title of one of the priests of Ḥarshef, the god of Herakleopolis Magna.[8] It was not a distinctively high-priestly title, for it was held by a *wē'eb* of Ḥarshef.[9] Herakleopolis, it should be remembered, was the seat of the IXth and Xth dynasties, the successors of the feeble kings of the VIIth and VIIIth dynasties, who were Memphites.[10] That probably accounts for the presence of a 'son whom he loves' and a 'king of Upper Egypt' (see § II. [*a*]) among the priests of the Herakleopolitan god Ḥarshef.

For the mortuary priest as Horus, son of Osiris, see below, § VI. 2.

2. The iḥy priest of Ḥaṯhor.—Ḥaṯhor, the goddess of music and dancing, is often depicted with a small boy rattling a sistrum in front of her. This boy is her son, Ḥarsamtowi the child, also called 'Iḥy or 'great 'Iḥy.'[11] The king, in the capacity of Ḥaṯhor's son, similarly rattles a sistrum in front of her and is called 'goodly 'Iḥy of the golden one of the gods,' *i.e.* of Ḥaṯhor.[12] Like the king whom they represented, Ḥaṯhor's priests also impersonated her son Ḥarsamtowi, for *iḥy* occurs in the list of titles of the priests of Ḥaṯhor of Dendereh.[13] A variant form, *iḥwy*, is applied to priests of Ḥaṯhor, represented as dancing and clattering castanets, in the tomb-chapel of a Cusite nomarch[14] and in that of a Theban official.[15] The inscription attached to a similar scene in another tomb-chapel at Meir clearly shows that the *iḥwy*-priests there depicted belonged to the temple of Ḥaṯhor of Cusæ.[16]

IV. *THE PRIEST EXERCISING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOD.*—In human families the functions of the parent often descend to the son. Does that

1 Sethe, *Zur altägyp. Sage vom Sonnenauge das in der Fremde war*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 5 f.

2 A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1907, pp. 35, 37; Sethe, *Zur Sage vom Sonnenauge*, p. 5 f.

3 Erman, p. 36 f. 4 *Ib.* p. 37 f.

5 *Ib.* p. 52 f.

6 *Ib.* p. 53; N. de G. Davies and A. H. Gardiner, *The Tomb of Amenemhēt*, London, 1914, p. 87 f.

7 E. g., H. Schäfer, *Die Mysterien des Osiris in Abydos unter König Sesostris III.*, Leipzig, 1904, p. 10 ff.; see also § III. 1.

8 H. Brugsch, *Dictionnaire géographique de l'ancienne Égypte*, Leipzig, 1877–80, p. 1377; Sethe, *ZÄS* xlix. [1911] 33. The title of a priest of Min in the Dendereh list (Brugsch, p. 1376) which looks as though it were *ḥty*, 'king of Lower Egypt,' is probably, in view of W. M. F. Petrie, *Koptos*, London, 1896, pl. vi., line 7, the word generally determined with the seal sign ⬭ and translated 'treasurer' or 'chancellor.'

9 A. Moret, *Le Rituel du culte divin journalier en Égypte*, Paris, 1902, p. 42 f., and cf. p. 55. Cf. also Davies-Gardiner, p. 87 f.

10 Erman, p. 57. 11 *Ib.* p. 52.

12 *Ib.* p. 45; see also art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § V. 4.

1 Davies-Gardiner, p. 57 f. 2 *Ib.* pp. 56, 59.

3 Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 746.

4 Schäfer, p. 15 f.; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 667.

5 E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of Opening the Mouth*, London, 1909, i. 155 ff.; Davies-Gardiner, p. 59 f.

6 M. Stolk, *Ptaḥ: ein Beitrag zur Religionsgesch. des alten Aegyptens*, Berlin, 1911, pp. 12, 21.

7 Davies-Gardiner, pp. 56, 87.

8 Brugsch, pp. 1361, 1377; Schäfer, p. 16.

9 F. Ll. Griffith, *Catalogue of the Demotic Papyri in the John Rylands Library*, Manchester, 1909, iii. 83, 108.

10 Breasted, *History*, p. 147.

11 E. Naville, *The Temple of Deir el Bahari*, London, 1898–1908, pt. iv. pl. cxv.; C. R. Lepsius, *Denkmäler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien*, Berlin, 1849–59, iv. pls. 33, 40, 52, 69*a–c*, 76, 79*c*.

12 Lepsius, iv. 11*b*; cf. A. M. Blackman, *The Temple of Bigeh*, Cairo, 1915, p. 25.

13 Brugsch, p. 1375.

14 A. M. Blackman, *The Rock Tombs of Meir*, London, 1914–15, i. 22 ff., pl. li.

15 Davies-Gardiner, p. 94 ff., pl. xix. f.

16 Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, ii. p. 24 f., pl. xv.

account for the titles of the high-priest (*a*) of Ptaḥ of Memphis, (*b*) of Rē'-Atum of Heliopolis?

1. The high-priest of Ptaḥ.—Ptaḥ was the craftsman of the gods[1] and the patron of craftsmen.[2] His high-priest was entitled 'he who is great at directing the craftsmen,' *wr ḥrp ḥmwt*; one of his duties was to supervise the work of the royal craftsmen, who were closely associated with the Ptaḥ temple.[3]

2. The high-priest of Rē'.—The chief title of the high-priest of Rē' was 'he who is great at seeing,' *wr m;;*. He was also described as being 'over the mysteries of heaven,' or as 'he who sees the mysteries of heaven.'[4] A. H. Gardiner has suggested to the writer that the sun-god's high-priest bore these titles not because he was permitted to gaze upon the god, but because the god's function of unrestricted vision was transmitted to him as deputy of the king, to whom, as 'son of Rē',' this and other functions and qualities of Rē' were frequently assigned.[5]

V. *HONORIFIC PRIESTHOODS.*—A somewhat similar conception to that discussed in § IV. lies, perhaps, at the back of the honorific priesthoods of the Old Kingdom,[6] the holders of these priesthoods reflecting in their functions the character of the divinity whom they served. Thus the 'prophet of the great morning-god,' *ḥm-nṯr dw;-wr*,[7] seems to have been the king's barber, the god in question being the royal beard personified.[8] The 'prophet of Mē'et,' the goddess of righteousness and truth, was a judge;[9] the 'prophet of Ḥike',' magic personified, a magician;[10] the 'prophetess of Ḥathor,' the goddess of music and dancing, a dancer.[11]

VI. *IMPERSONATION OF DIVINITIES BY PRIESTS AND PRIESTESSES.*—Egyptian priests and priestesses not merely exercised the functions of divinities; they sometimes actually impersonated them.

The classic example of this is of course the Pharaoh himself. The primitive kings of Buto and Ombos were originally no doubt high-priests of their respective local gods, Horus and Seth. The historic Pharaoh actually *was* Horus and Seth (see above, § II.),[12] and his queen is called 'she who sees Horus and Seth.'[13] Similarly the king is the embodiment of the Upper Egyptian vulture-goddess of El-Kab and of the snake-goddess of Buto, and as such is called *nbty*, 'the two mistresses.'[14]

1. Iun-mutef, 'pillar of his mother,' as is clearly shown by a number of inscriptions, is a name for the young god Horus.[15] Most of the representations of Iun-mutef, however, depict not the god, but a priest impersonating him.[16] Iun-mutef is always associated with the king, and he seems to represent Horus in the rôle of tutelary god[1] of the Egyptian Pharaohs.[2] In this capacity he officiated at the coronation,[3] and at the jubilee, or *sed*-festival,[4] walked in front of the king in the procession to the temple,[5] and acted as intermediary between the king and the gods.[6]

(*a*) The divine status of Iun-mutef is strongly emphasized in his relations with the dead king, in whose presence he is often seen pronouncing the *ḥotp di nisut*[7] formula and making offering. Since Iun-mutef was Horus and the dead king Osiris, the latter would naturally be expected to appear in the rôle of the former's father. The reverse, however, is the case, and the dead Pharaoh is spoken of as Iun-mutef's son.[8]

(*b*) Iun-mutef represents Horus as a youth in Khemmis,[9] the supporter and protector of his widowed mother Isis. Iun-mutef, therefore, generally wears the side-lock of hair. Compare the name 'pillar of his mother' with the expression 'staff of old age,' used of a young man who is associated in office with his aged father in order to lighten the burden of his responsibility.[10]

2. In the funerary ceremonies as originally performed[11] in the early Memphite age the parts of Osiris and his son Horus were duly filled by the dead and the living king. Since the king could not possibly officiate in the funerary temples of all his dead predecessors, the part of Horus the son would be deputed to the chief mortuary priests[12] (cf. §§ II. 2 and III.). When the funerary rites came into general use and all dead persons were identified with Osiris, every mortuary priest, when making offering to the dead, impersonated Horus.[13] Again, the embalmer (*wt*) impersonated Anubis—the god who embalmed Osiris, and hence the prototype of all embalmers—and accordingly often wore a jackal mask.[14]

(*a*) A funerary priest is therefore actually entitled 'Anubis the embalmer,' '*Inpw wt*.[15] The same title is also borne by Defaiḥap, ruler of the Lycopolite nome of Upper Egypt,[16] at whose capital Asyūṭ there was a temple of Anubis as well as one of Upwawet.[17] Defaiḥap held this title in his capacity of high-priest of Anubis, whom, in certain religious performances, he must have impersonated. In a funerary scene in a tomb-chapel at Meir a priest, instead of being labelled *wt*, 'embalmer,' is called 'he who presides in the god's booth,' a regular epithet of Anubis.[18] Similarly a priest, who seems to have officiated at the 'Opening of the Mouth' (see above, § III. 1), is entitled on his friend's stele[19] 'Anubis in the House of Gold.' Another priest (mentioned in the same stele), who was 'chief of the lectors in his town,' bears the appellation 'Anubis in the Good House,' *i.e.*, this priest impersonated Anubis in the embalmer's workshop (see below, § XIV. *b*).

(*b*) The officiants who wash the corpse during the process of embalming impersonated Horus and Thōth.[20]

3. (*a*) Two priests, impersonating Horus and Seth, or Horus and Thōth, and wearing appropriate masks,[21] sprinkled the king with water before he officiated in a temple.

[1] *E.g.*, Naville, *Das ägyp. Todtenbuch*, Berlin, 1886, i. ch. clxxii. line 32; Stolk, p. 13.
[2] Stolk, p. 13.
[3] Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 211, 239; A. Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 290 f., *Handbook*, p. 53 f.
[4] A. Mariette, *Les Mastabas de l'ancien empire*, Paris, 1882–89, p. 149; Erman, *Life*, p. 290; cf. A. H. Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlvii. [1910] 92, pl. 1, line 1. For other titles of the high-priests of Rē' of Heliopolis see G. Daressy, *Annales du Service*, xvi. [1917] 193 ff.
[5] *E.g.*, Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 747 = H. O. Lange and H. Schäfer, *Grab- und Denksteine des mittleren Reichs im Museum von Kairo*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1902–08, no. 20538, ii. line 11 f.; *Pap. Anastasi*, iv. 5, line 6 ff. = *Select Papyri in the Hieratic Character from the Collections of the Brit. Mus.*, London, 1844, pl. lxxxvi.; art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § V. 1 (*c*); cf. Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 141 ff.
[6] Erman, *Handbook*, p. 53. [7] Mariette, p. 366.
[8] See art. PERSONIFICATION (Egyptian), 9 (*g*), 4.
[9] Erman, *Life*, p. 290.
[10] A. H. Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxvii. [1915] 261, xxxviii. [1916] 129.
[11] Erman, *Life*, p. 290; Davies-Gardiner, p. 94 ff.; see also § VI. 4.
[12] Sethe, *Zur Sage vom Sonnenauge*, p. 5.
[13] Sethe, *ap.* J. Garstang, *Maḥâsna and Bêt Khallâf*, London, 1903, p. 23.
[14] Sethe, *Zur Sage vom Sonnenauge*, p. 11.
[15] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. [1905] 157 = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 138; E. L. Lushington, *PSBA* vi. [1878] 527; J. Capart, *ZÄ* xli. [1904] 88 f.; A. Mariette, *Abydos*, Paris, 1869–80, i. pls. 28*a*, 31, 33, 34, ii. 54, 55; Lepsius, iii. 202 f., 206*e*.
[16] An exception, perhaps, is Lepsius, iii. 123*a*.

[1] Sethe, *Zur Sage vom Sonnenauge*, p. 5.
[2] Cf. Lepsius, iii. 129, text behind Amūn, line 5.
[3] Naville, *Deir el Bahari*, iii. pl. lxiii.; D. Randall-MacIver and C. L. Woolley, *Buhen*, Philadelphia, 1911, p. 52, pl. 20; cf. Lepsius, iii. 53.
[4] Lepsius, iii. 36.
[5] Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pl. 31; Lepsius, iv. 71*a*; Blackman, *Temple of Bigeh*, pl. xxvi.
[6] Lepsius, iii. 123*a*; Naville, *Deir el Bahari*, pl. lix.
[7] See Davies-Gardiner, p. 79 ff.
[8] *E.g.*, J. F. Champollion, *Monuments de l'Egypte et de la Nubie: Notices descriptives*, Paris, 1844–89, ii. 436; Mariette, *Abydos*, i. pls. 28*a*, 33.
[9] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 157; Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912, p. 29 f.
[10] Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlvii. 94; F. Ll. Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri from Kahun and Gurob*, London, 1898, p. 30.
[11] Davies-Gardiner, pp. 55, 87. [12] *Ib.* p. 88.
[13] Cf. Sethe, *Die altägyp. Pyramidentexte*, Leipzig, 1908–10, p. 11*a*.
[14] Davies-Gardiner, p. 58; Naville, *Das ägyp. Todtenbuch*, pl. 11 f.
[15] Lange-Schäfer, i. no. 20558, I. line 3.
[16] Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 4, line 23, pl. 10, line 1.
[17] *Ib.* pl. 8, line 305.
[18] Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, iii. 28, with note 12, pl. xxi.
[19] Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20457.
[20] G. Möller, *Die beiden Totenpapyrus Rhind*, Leipzig, 1913, I. vi. 1 ff.; see art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § V. 2 (*e*).
[21] Mariette, *Dendereh*, Paris, 1869–80, i. pl. 10; Blackman, *The Temple of Deir*, Cairo, 1913, pl. xlii.; Lepsius, iii. pl. 124*d*; see also art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § V. 1 (*d*).

(*b*) Atum and Month, or Rē'-Ḥarakhte and Amūn, may have been similarly impersonated by priests at the purification of the infant heir to the throne.[1]

(*c*) So probably also was the god Yaḥes, who officiated at the coronation.[2]

4. The priestesses of Ḥathor, who danced in her honour, consciously impersonated her.[3] They partook in consequence of the nature of the goddess, and were able to impart her qualities to her devotees.[4]

5. Two female mourners, called the 'great kite' and the 'little kite,' impersonated Isis and Nephthys in the funerary ceremonies.[5]

In two passages in the *Pyramid Texts* Isis and Nephthys are spoken of as two birds—the form which they assumed when they set out to seek for the missing corpse of the murdered Osiris.[6]

VII. *FURTHER RELATIONSHIPS OF PRIESTS AND PRIESTESSES WITH DIVINITIES.*—**1. 'Father of the god.'**—The relationship of the priest with the god could be other than that of son. A very common priestly title in the New Kingdom and subsequent age is 'father of the god,' *ỉt nṯr*; the holders of this title, in the enumerations of priests of those periods, come between the prophets and *wē'eb*-priests.[7]

The appellation 'father of the god' primarily belonged to the king's father-in-law.[8] As a priestly title it probably meant that the holder had one or more daughters in the god's *ḥarīm*.[9]

2. The god's concubines.—Human concubines were assigned to certain gods—*e.g.*, Amūn of Thebes,[10] Onuris,[11] Iun-mutef;[12] also possibly Upwawet of Asyūṭ[13] and Khnum of Hermopolis.[14] These concubines are in a special degree a feature of the cult of Amūn, probably owing to his markedly sexual character; they are frequently referred to in the texts of the New Kingdom and subsequent period.[15]

It should be noted that the name of the great temple at Luxor is 'southern *ḥarīm* of Amūn,'[16] and that the inscription on the statue of Ibe[17] mentions Amūn's *ḥarīm* of concubines (*ỉp'ỉt·f n ḥuryt·f*).

At the head of Amūn's concubines was the wife of his high-priest, her title being 'chief concubine of Amūn.'[18] The concubines were doubtless the female musicians (*šm'wt*)[19] who were attached to his, as apparently to every other, temple (see below, 3 [*b*], and § VIII. 3 [*d*] i.). The view that the female musicians of Amūn formed his *ḥarīm* is further supported by the fact that in one instance the wife of a high-priest of Amūn, instead of the regular title 'chief concubine,' bears that of 'singer (*ḥnt*) of Amūn.'[1]

3. 'The god's wife.'—(*a*) From the Vth dynasty onwards[2] the king was regarded as the physical offspring of the sun-god (*s' R' n ḥt·f*, 'son of Rē' of his body').[3] According to the scenes and inscriptions in the XVIIIth dynasty temples of Deir el-Baḥri and Luxor,[4] Amūn, then identified with the sun-god,[5] assumed the form of the reigning Pharaoh,[6] had intercourse with the queen, and so begot the heir to the throne. The queen was therefore called 'the god's wife,' with the additional title of 'votaress of the god.'[7]

Possibly the union of Amūn and the queen was supposed to take place in Luxor temple, 'the southern *ḥarīm* of Amūn' (see above, 2);[8] that would explain the presence in this temple of the scenes depicting the birth of Amenophis III., by whom the greater part of the present building was erected. A statuette in the Cairo Museum[9] represents 'the god's wife,' 'the god's votaress,' Amenirdis, sitting on Amūn's lap; the pair mutually embrace.

(*b*) 'The god's wife' acted as chief priestess of Amūn,[10] and her duties, as we know from inscriptions, consisted in rattling the sistrum 'before his beautiful face.'[11] In performing this service she would be assisted by the concubines,[12] over whom she presided in her capacity of Amūn's legitimate consort.[13] The concubines, as we have seen, were probably the female musicians of Amūn (*šm'wt n 'Imn*), who are specifically stated to have been attached to the house of 'the god's votaress.'[14]

Perhaps the statement in Herodotus, i. 182, about the woman who 'lies in the temple of Theban Zeus,' refers to 'the god's wife' or to the chief concubine of Amūn.[15]

(*c*) 'The god's wife' is first mentioned in inscriptions of the early XVIIIth dynasty.[16]

After the fall of the XXth dynasty Thebes became a spiritual principality ruled by the high-priests of Amūn. But from the reign of Osorkon III. of the XXIIIrd dynasty to that of Psamtik III. of the XXVIth, Thebes was governed, not by the high-priest of Amūn, but by a succession of five 'god's wives.' 'The god's wife' was now no longer the queen, but a daughter of the ruling house, and she had to *adopt* a daughter to succeed her.[17]

(*d*) While Thebes was governed by these sacerdotal princesses, the high-priest of Amūn was merely a religious figure-head, all power being vested in the hands of individuals of minor sacerdotal importance, such as Menthemhēt,[18] who was only fourth prophet of Amūn. Finally, upon her adoption by 'the god's wife,' Nitokris II., the first prophetship (high-priesthood) of Amūn was bestowed upon Psamtik III.'s daughter, 'Enkhnes-neferibrē'.[19]

[1] A. Gayet, *Le Temple de Louxor*, Paris, 1894, pl. lxxv.; Naville, *Deir el Bahari*, iii. pl. lvi.; art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § V. 1 (*a*).

[2] Naville, *Deir el Bahari*, iii. pls. lxiii., lxiv.; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 262; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 99.

[3] Davies-Gardiner, p. 95.

[4] Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, i. 23 ff.

[5] Lepsius, ii. 101b; J. J. Tylor and F. Ll. Griffith, *The Tomb of Paheri at el-Kab*, London, 1894, pl. vi.; Davies-Gardiner, p. 49; cf. Naville, *Das ägyp. Todtenbuch*, i. pl. iii.

[6] Sethe, *Pyramidentexte*, 1255 ff., 1280 ff.

[7] Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlviii. [1911] 94.

[8] L. Borchardt, 'Der ägyptische Titel "Vater des Gottes" als Bezeichnung für "Vater oder Schwiegervater des Königs,"' in *Berichte der philologisch-historischen Klasse der königl. sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*, lvii. [1905] 253 ff.

[9] *Ib.* p. 266 ff.

[10] Erman, *Life*, p. 295 f., *Handbook*, p. 72.

[11] J. Capart, *ZÄ* xli. 89.

[12] *Ib.*

[13] Griffith, *Siut and Dêr Rîfeh*, p. 113, line 29 f.; H. Brugsch, *Hieroglyph.-demot. Wörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1867–82, Suppl. 938.

[14] Lange-Schäder, i. no. 20025, *a*, line 7.

[15] W. Wreszinski, *Die Hohenpriester des Amon*, Berlin, 1904, p. 10 and *passim*; A. Mariette, *Catalogue général des monuments d'Abydos*, Paris, 1880, no. 1137; *Annales du Service*, v. [1904] 95 f.; Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlv. [1909] 127, note 2.

[16] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 409; see Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlv. 127, note 2.

[17] *Annales du Service*, v. 96; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 958 f.

[18] Wreszinski, *loc. cit.*; Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlv. 127, note 2; Erman, *Handbook*, p. 72.

[19] Erman, *Life*, p. 295 f., *Handbook*, p. 72.

[1] Wreszinski, p. 9.

[2] Breasted, *History*, p. 121 ff., *Anc. Records*, ii. 187 ff.

[3] Lepsius, iii. 4*c*, 5*d*, and *passim*.

[4] Naville, ii. pl. xlvi. ff.; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 215 ff.; Gayet, *Temple de Louxor*, §§ 62–68, and 75; see also Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 187 ff.

[5] Erman, *Handbook*, p. 57 f.

[6] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 219, line 11 = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 196.

[7] Erman, *Handbook*, p. 72, *Life*, p. 296; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 521, 942 f., 958*c*.

[8] See also E. Chassinat's remarks in *Bulletin de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire*, x. [1912] 191 f.

[9] G. Legrain, *RTr* xxxi. [1909] 139 ff., *Statues et statuettes de rois et de particuliers*, Paris, 1907–14, iii. no. 42199.

[10] Cf. Brugsch, *Dict. géogr.* p. 1361.

[11] *Ib.*; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 943; *Annales du Service*, v. 91 f.; cf. Schafer, *Urkunden*, iii. 105, line 3.

[12] Cf. Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 958 L.

[13] Erman, *Life*, p. 296.

[14] Abbot, *Papyrus*, 3, 17 = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 521; see also Erman, *Life*, p. 296.

[15] See Legrain, *RTr* xxxi. 139 ff.

[16] *E.g.*, Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 26 = W. M. F. Petrie, *Abydos*, London, 1902–04, iii. pl. liii.; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 29 = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 110; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 34 = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 344; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 396 = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 360–362; see also Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 77, Champollion, *Notices descriptives*, i. 505; Erman, *Handbook*, p. 73.

[17] Erman, *ZÄ* xxxv. [1897] 28 ff., *Life*, 165 f.; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 935 ff., 988 A ff.

[18] Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 957; Maspero, *Annales du Service*, v. 89 f.

[19] Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 988 D.

4. 'The god's hand.'—Below 'the god's wife' in rank, but above the chief concubine, was the priestess called 'the god's hand,' *ḏrt nṯr*.[1]

The fact that 'the god's hand' was also called 'the daughter of Amūn of his body, whom he loves,'[2] suggests that this title was perhaps originally assigned to a daughter of the queen.[3] Both titles were borne by 'Enkhnesneferibrēʿ, a 'god's wife' in the Saitic period. Since, however, 'god's hand' comes last in her titulary,[4] it was possibly the title which she bore as the adopted daughter of Nitokris[5]—*i.e.* before she became 'god's wife' at Nitokris' death.

VIII. *THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRIESTHOOD.*—**1. The general term for 'priest.'**—In ancient Egypt purity was considered to be essential in all persons and things associated in any way with the cult of the gods (see art. PURIFICATION [Egyptian], § V. 1, 5–8). Accordingly the general term for 'priest' is *wʿb*, 'pure person.' The word was retained in Coptic to denote the Christian priest, and is written ⲟⲩⲏⲏⲃ; hence *wʿb* is to be vocalized *wēʿeb*. The verb *wʿb*, 'officiate as *wēʿeb*,'[6] is used also to denote the service of the highest grades in the hierarchy.[7]

2. The two main classes of the priesthood.—The priesthood consisted of two main classes—the prophets, *ḥmw-nṯr*, being the higher, and the *wēʿeb*-priests, *wʿbw*, the lower.

(*a*) The word *ḥm-nṯr* (Coptic ϩⲟⲛⲧ),[8] which, after the Greek custom, is usually rendered 'prophet,' literally means 'servant of the god.'[9]

(*b*) *Wēʿeb*, besides being the name for a member of the lower class of the hierarchy, was also, as already stated, a general term for 'priest'[10] (cf. the general application of the verb *wʿb* discussed above). Ḏefaiḥap, a nomarch of the Lycopolite nome, and a 'superintendent of the prophets,' in an address to the governing body (*ḳnbt*) of the temple of Upwawet,[11] asserts that he is the son of a *wēʿeb* like each one of them, though Ḏefaiḥap's father and the fathers of some of the members of the *ḳnbt* almost certainly must have belonged to the higher order of priests.

(*c*) From the time of the New Kingdom onwards the members of the priesthood were roughly classified as 'prophets, fathers of the god, and *wēʿeb*-priests.'[12] The 'fathers of the god' are to be regarded as belonging to the same class as the 'prophets,' the title 'prophet' being reserved for the higher members of that class. As Gardiner[13] points out, the rare titles, 'first father of the god' and 'second father of the god,' are synonymous with 'first prophet' and 'second prophet.'[14]

(*d*) The *Decree of Canopus* (hieroglyphic text, line 2 ff. = Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 126) gives the following correspondences between the Egyptian and Greek titles of priests: 'the superintendent of the temple' = ἀρχιερεύς,[15] 'high-priest';[16] 'the servants of the god,' *ḥmw-nṯr* = προφῆται, 'prophets';[17] 'those who are over the mysteries,' *ḥryw-sšt;* = στολισταί;[18] 'the learned scribes of the god's book' = πτεροφόροι καὶ ἱερογραμματεῖς, 'feather-bearers and sacred scribes';[19] while 'the fathers of the god and the *wēʿeb*-priests in their entirety' = οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερεῖς, 'the rest of the priests.' For the παστοφόροι, 'shrine-bearers (?)' = Egyp. *wnw*, '(shrine) -openers,'[20] who were functionaries below the class of *wēʿeb*-priests,[21] see Otto, i. 96 f.

(*e*) A priest had to begin his career as a *wēʿeb*, becoming a 'father of the god' before he passed on to the rank of 'prophet.'[1] Even a king's son had to serve as a *wēʿeb* before he could be appointed to a prophetship.[2]

[1] See G. Legrain and E. Naville, *L'Aile nord du Pylône d'Aménophis III. à Karnak*, Paris, 1902, pl. xi. B.

[2] Brugsch, *Wörterbuch*, p. 1665.

[3] But the title 'god's wife,' not 'god's hand,' was borne by Nefrureʿ, daughter of Ḥatshepsut, herself a 'god's wife' (Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 406).

[4] Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, iii. no. 42205, p. 14; *Annales du Service*, v. 90 ff.

[5] Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 988 A ff.

[6] *E.g.*, Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, ii. no. 42155, *c*, line 2.

[7] *E.g.*, Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 25 f.; probably also *Hieroglyphic Texts from Egyptian Stelæ, etc., in the British Museum*, London, 1911–14, i. pl. 54; cf. Davies, *The Rock Tombs of Deir el-Gebrâwi*, London, 1902, pt. i., pl. vii.; Davies-Gardiner, p. 86.

[8] G. Steindorff, *ZÄ* xlv. [1909] 141.

[9] Erman, *Life*, p. 289.

[10] *Ib.*

[11] Griffith, *Siûṭ and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7, line 268.

[12] Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlvii. 94; Erman, *Life*, p. 293 f.

[13] *Ib.*

[14] See also Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 483, 527.

[15] Cf. *ib.* ii. 153.

[16] W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenist. Ägypten*, Leipzig, 1905–08, i. 38 ff.

[17] *Ib.* i. 81.

[18] *Ib.* i. 38; the στολισταί could act as prophets, and they clearly belong to the class *ḥmw-nṯr* (see B. P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt, and E. J. Goodspeed, *The Tebtunis Papyri*, London, 1902–07, ii. p. 61 f.).

[19] Otto, i. 87.

[20] Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. p. 55, note 5, p. 214, note 5; F. Ll. Griffith and U. Wilcken, *ZÄ* xlv. 105.

[21] Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, p. 79 with note 6.

3. The staff of the temple.—The priesthood in each temple was called the 'staff (*wnwt*, lit. 'service') of the temple,' *wnwt nt ḥt-nṯr*. The *wnwt* seems to have included the 'prophets' as well as the *wēʿebs*. We find mention of the *wnwt* of royal mortuary temples.[3]

The word *wnwt* means 'regular service.'[4] According to the generally accepted view,[5] the *wnwt* consisted of 'lay priests.' But Ḏefaiḥap of Asyûṭ speaks of the members of the *wnwt* as *wēʿeb*-priests;[6] moreover the expression 'the entire staff (*wnwt*) of the temple' often sums up a preceding enumeration of priests among whom are prophets and *wēʿeb*-priests.[7]

(*a*) *The phylæ, or courses, of priests.*—The temple staff with one or two exceptions (see below [*b*]) was divided into four courses (Egyp. *s;w wnwt*, 'courses *or* gangs of the service'), or, as the Greeks called them, φυλαί.[8] The priests of royal mortuary temples were also divided into phylæ.[9] Each phyle served one lunar month on end by rotation; thus every priest had an interval of three months between two periods of service.[10]

This system, probably already established under the Old Kingdom,[11] remained unaltered, except for the addition of a fifth phyle in the reign of Ptolemy III.,[12] till the middle of the 3rd cent. A.D., and probably till the fall of paganism.[13]

(i.) In the small temple of Amūn at Teuzoi each phyle consisted of twenty priests.[14] In Græco-Roman times each phyle in the comparatively small temple of Soknopaios numbered thirty-one members.[15]

(ii.) Middle Kingdom papyri from Illahūn show that every outgoing phyle drew up an inventory of the temple property; this was handed over to the ingoing phyle. Both parties verified the list, and the members of the incoming phyle appended their names to the document in token that it was found correct.[16]

(iii.) Over each phyle, in dynastic as in Græco-Roman times,[17] there was a phylarch, who changed every month with the phyle.[18] In the XIIth dynasty the phylarch was called *mty n s;*, 'regulator of a phyle.'[19] In the New Kingdom the usual term for 'phylarch' is *ḥr s;*, 'over a phyle.'[20] In the *Decree of Canopus* the phylarch is called 'great one of the phyle.'[21] The office of phylarch could be held by a prophet,[22] a *wēʿeb*,[23] or even the high-priest himself.[24] According to the *Decree of Canopus*,[25] the phylarch must be a prophet. We have therefore good grounds for supposing that, in dynastic as in Græco-Roman times, the priests both of the higher and of the lower grades belonged to the phylæ.[26]

(*b*) *The permanent officials of the temple.*—From a Middle Kingdom papyrus found at Illahūn we learn that the 'superintendent of the temple' of Anubis (like the ἐπιστάτης of the Græco-Roman period)[27] and the 'chief lector' were permanent functionaries and not members of a rotating phyle.[28]

[1] Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlvii. 94; Erman, *Life*, p. 294; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 565; see also Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, ii. no. 42155, *c*.

[2] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 157, line 9.

[3] Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 277.

[4] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 36, line 14 = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 234; R. Weill, *Les Décrets royaux de l'ancien empire égyptien*, Paris, 1912, pp. 15, 33, 68, 70.

[5] Erman, *ZÄ* xx. [1882] 163 ff., *Life*, p. 291; Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. [1899] 89 ff.; Breasted, *History*, p. 171.

[6] Griffith, *Siûṭ and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6, lines 269 f., 281 f.

[7] *E.g.*, Lange-Schäfer, i. no. 20153, ii. no. 20775; Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, iii. nos. 42211, *j*, 42218, *d*; see also Lange-Schäfer, i. no. 20093, and Legrain, iii. no. 42207.

[8] Otto, i. 26.

[9] *E.g.*, H. Schäfer, *Priestergräber . . . von Totentempel des Nē-User-Rēʿ*, Leipzig, 1908, pp. 34, 57, 82.

[10] Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 89 ff., xl. [1902–03] 113 ff.; Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 90, note 5; Breasted, *History*, p. 171.

[11] Cf. Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 13, line 2, 14, lines 1 and 12, 36, line 15.

[12] Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94; Otto, i. 26.

[13] Otto, i. 30 f.

[14] Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 90, note 5.

[15] Otto, i. 36.

[16] Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 97; Erman, *Ägyp. Chrestomathie*, Berlin, 1904, p. 143 f.

[17] Otto, i. 25 f.

[18] Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94.

[19] Lange-Schäfer, no. 20432; Schäfer, *Priestergräber . . . von Totentempel des Nē-User-Rēʿ*, pp. 57, 82; R. Engelbach, *Riqqeh and Memphis*, vi., London, 1915, pl. xxvii.; Newberry, i. 12.

[20] Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, ii. nos. 42189, 42217, 42218; Wreszinski, p. 11; cf. Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri*, p. 32.

[21] Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 36, line 11.

[22] Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, ii. nos. 42189, 42217, 42218.

[23] Wreszinski, p. 11; Schäfer, p. 34.

[24] Newberry, i. 12.

[25] *Loc. cit.*

[26] Otto, i. 23 f.

[27] *Ib.* i. 38 ff.

[28] Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94, xl. 114.

The superintendent of the temple apparently often was identical with the high-priest (cf. ἐπιστάτης καὶ ἀρχιερεύς),[1] who also frequently held the office of chief lector or lector.[2]

Minor officials, such as the door-keepers and the temple-sweeper (*k'wty*),[3] were also permanent.[4]

(*c*) *The governing body.*—(i.) *During the Middle Kingdom.*—The administration of an Egyptian temple at this time seems to have been in the hands of a small committee. The temple of Upwawet at Asyūt, *e.g.*, was administered by a body of ten priests called the *ḳnbt*[5] *nt ht-nṯr*, 'governing body of the temple,' at whose head was the nomarch in his capacity of high-priest or 'superintendent of the prophets.'[6]

(1) The members of this governing body are given their administrative, not their priestly, titles,[7] so that we do not know whether they were all prophets, or whether included among them were priests of the rank of *wē'eb* only. But they were certainly members of the priesthood.[8] Compare the list of members of an incoming phyle,[9] in which each individual is denoted not by his priestly rank, but by his special priestly function.

(2) The governing body of the XIIth dynasty might be compared with the committee of councillor priests (βουλευταὶ ἱερεῖς) of the Ptolemaic period,[10] who assisted the superintendent of the temple or high-priest (ἐπιστάτης καὶ ἀρχιερεύς) in the administration of the temple. The councillors, who changed every year, belonged to the phylæ of priests, by whom they were elected, each phyle contributing five members.[11] We have no information as to how the governing body of the temple was chosen in the Middle Kingdom.

(ii.) *Under the Empire.*—During the New Kingdom the high-priest had supreme control of the often great wealth of the temple, and was responsible for the administration of its estates, for the care of its buildings, and for the erection of new ones. He had a great host of officials of all grades serving under his almost autocratic rule.[12]

(iii.) *In the Roman period.*—Though there were still superintendents of the temples (ἐπιστάται) in the Roman period,[13] the temple administration generally was in the hands of the college of πρεσβύτεροι or ἡγούμενοι, who, like the βουλευταὶ ἱερεῖς, changed every year.[14] After A.D. 202 the temples lost all that still remained of their once specially privileged position and were placed under the administration of the municipal senates.[15]

(*d*) *Priestesses and the position of women in the temple.*—Women played a by no means unimportant part in the worship of the Egyptian divinities, and the assertion of Herodotus[16] that no woman could serve as a priestess is incorrect, and indeed does not agree with his own statements elsewhere.[17]

(i.) *Musician priestesses.*—All temples, apparently, had a number of priestesses attached to them, at the head of whom was a chief priestess with a special title,[18] followed by the attribute 'playing with the sistrum in front of him (her),' *i.e.* the divinity.[1] The chief priestess was doubtless in most cases the wife of the high-priest.[2] Evidently the principal duty of these priestesses was to rattle sistra and to dance and sing in honour of the deity whom they served.[3]

The musician priestesses in the Middle Kingdom were called *ḫnwt*, var. *ḫnyt*,[4] but from the New Kingdom onwards generally *šm'wt*; both words mean 'musicians.' In the New Kingdom women of all classes, from the highest to the lowest, were musicians at some temple or other.[5]

The functions of the priestesses of the Ptolemaic and Roman periods were doubtless mainly musical.[6] *The Decree of Canopus* (hieroglyphic text, line 33=Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 151) gives the title *wē'eb* to musician-priestesses (*šm'wt*), in the light of which, perhaps, are to be explained the *w'bt* of Upwawet[7] and the *w'bt* who was the wife of a soldier.[8] Ἱερεῖαι are commonly mentioned in Græco-Roman documents.[9]

(ii.) *Prophetesses.*—In the Old and Middle Kingdoms women of important families often bear the title 'prophetess.' It was nearly always the goddesses Ḥathor and Neith[10] that they served in this capacity.[11] Occasionally during the Old Kingdom we meet with prophetesses of a god or king; *e.g.*, the queen Meres'onkh was a prophetess of Thôth.[12] The royal acquaintance Ḥetpḥeres was prophetess of King Kheops.[13] Upon a certain Nitemḥē, the wife of a priest who lived in the XXVIth dynasty, was bestowed 'the share of the prophet of Khons.'[14] Griffith,[15] referring to Herod. ii. 35, presumes that Nitemḥē did not act as prophet of Khons, but that 'she only received the stipend while the duty would be performed by her husband.' But in the Vth dynasty we find the sons and daughter of a noble and high-priest all serving as prophet of their local divinity,[16] by rotation, and apparently exercising exactly the same functions.[17] In the reign of Psamtik III. the first prophetship (high-priesthood) of Amūn was held by the sacerdotal princess of Thebes (§ VII. 3 [*d*]). In the Ptolemaic period we meet with the daughter of a 'father of the god' who is described as a *wē'eb*-priestess of Amūn and a prophetess of Zēmi.[18]

(iii.) *Phylæ of priestesses.*—In the New Kingdom the musician priestesses, like the priests, were divided into phylæ with a priestess as phylarch.[19] The phylæ of the priestesses are often mentioned in Ptolemaic and Roman documents.[20] A priestess who married a priest remained in her original phyle.[21]

IX. *PAYMENT OF PRIESTS.*—The priests derived their incomes from two sources—the temple estates,[22] and 'all that enters the temple,' *i.e.* the daily and incidental offerings.[23]

1. **The temple estates.**—The revenue produced by the lands belonging to the temple of Amūn at Teuzoi was divided into 100 equal portions. Twenty portions, a fifth of the whole revenue,[24] went to the chief prophet, while one portion was assigned to each of the 80 priests who served under him.[25] These stipends seem to have been paid yearly.[26]

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[1] Otto, i. 38 ff.; Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 126, 153; Erman, *Life*, p. 292. See, on the other hand, Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, ii. pl. xv. p. 24.

[2] *E.g.*, Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6, line 268, pl. 10, line 12; Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, i. 18, ii. 2, iii. 2; Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 78, 120; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 542.

[3] J. Capart, *Bulletin critique des religions de l'Egypte*, 1904, Brussels, 1905, p. 39.

[4] Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94, xl. 114.

[5] The word *ḳnbt* is also applied to the Pharaoh's chief ministers of State (*Pap. Petersburgh*, 11163 *recto*, line 2=A. H. Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, i. [1914] 101). It is likewise used of a 'board' or 'bench' of judges (Erman, *ZÄ* xvii. [1879] 72).

[6] Erman, *Life*, p. 291 ff.; Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7, line 283 ff.

[7] Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 550.

[8] See Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7, line 288.

[9] Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 97.

[10] Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 136. [11] Otto, i. 37 f.

[12] Erman, *Life*, pp. 104 f., 294; *ZÄ* xliv. [1908] 31, 33; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 564, 619, 627.

[13] See Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 306.

[14] U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 127; Otto, i. 50; cf. F. Krebs, *ZÄ* xxxi. [1893] 25; Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 298.

[15] Wilcken, p. 115. For the working of these local senates see B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, London, 1898–1915, ch. 29 ff., esp. p. 29, note on lines 1–3 of papyrus no. 1412; see also p. 134, introd. to no. 1449.

[16] ii. 35. [17] p. 54, 56, 171, 182; cf. i. 182.

[18] The antiquity of these titles is attested by the fact that the title of the chief priestess of Ḥathor of Cusæ was the same in the Old Kingdom as in Ptolemaic times (A. Kamāl, *Annales du Service*, xv. [1915] 214, 238; Brugsch, *Dict. géogr.* p. 1361).

[1] Brugsch, *Dict. géogr.* pp. 1361, 1368; Erman, *Life*, pp. 291, 295 f.; Lange-Schäfer, i. no. 20026, *c*, 9.

[2] *E.g.*, Wreszinski, p. 9 f., and *passim*; Kamāl, *Annales du Service*, xv. 214, 238; cf. p. 201. In the last instance Tiḥnt, who bears the title of the chief priestess of Ḥathor of Cusæ, is the *mother* of the high-priest mentioned here, but she was probably the wife of the previous high-priest.

[3] G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 272 f.; Brugsch, *Dict. géogr.*, pp. 1361, 1368; Erman, *Life*, pp. 291, 295 f., *Handbook*, p. 72 f.; Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, i. 22 ff., ii. 24 f.; Davies-Gardiner, p. 94 ff.; Schäfer, *Urkunden*, iii. 105; Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 150 f.; see also § VII. 2, 3 (*b*).

[4] Blackman, ii. 24 f.; Lange-Schäfer, i. no. 20026, *c*, 9.

[5] Erman, *Life*, p. 295. [6] Otto, i. 92 ff.

[7] Mariette, *Mastabas*, p. 162; Lepsius, ii. 100*b*.

[8] Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri*, text 21, 32. [9] Otto, i. 92 f.

[10] The wives of the Beni Ḥasan princes (Newberry, i. 14, 43) are prophetesses of Pakhet (P'ḥt).

[11] Erman, *Life*, p. 290; Newberry, i. 14, 43.

[12] Mariette, *Mastabas*, p. 183. [13] *Ib.* p. 90.

[14] Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 84. [15] *Ib.* note 6.

[16] Perhaps the woman was on the same footing as the men because the divinity in question was a goddess—Ḥathor.

[17] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 24 ff.

[18] Griffith-Wilcken, *ZÄ* xlv. 110.

[19] Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, i. no. 42122, *d*, line 11.

[20] Otto, i. 35, 92.

[21] R. Reitzenstein, *Zwei relig.-geschichtl. Fragen*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 19.

[22] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 25=Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 217; Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 98 ff.; Wilcken, *Grundzüge*, p. 94 f.; cf. *Hieroglyphic Texts from Egyptian Stelæ, etc.*, in the *British Museum*, i. pl. 54.

[23] Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7, line 284 ff.; Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 25; Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 45 (the last-mentioned enumerates the varied assortment of commodities forming the income of a prophet in the Saitic period).

[24] Cf. Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 294, line 12.

[25] Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 65, note 4, 90, note 5.

[26] *Ib.* p. 65.

In Roman times the temple estates became Crown property, which the priests could hold on lease from the State.[1] The temples were also supported by taxes and voluntary contributions.[2]

2. The offerings.—The offerings, or, as in the temple of Anubis at Illahūn (see below), a portion of them, seem to have been divided every day[3] among the priests proportionately according to their status.[4] On this principle the chief prophet of the temple of Ḥathor of Reōnet (Tehneh) received as his share a tenth of 'all that enters the temple.'[5]

The priest's daily rations consisted of bread, beer, and meat.[6] According to Herodotus,[7] they included 'a great quantity of beef and geese' and also wine. With this agrees a document of the Saitic period.[8] In the above-mentioned temple of Anubis at Illahūn the greater part of the daily offerings of bread and beer, 'after the gods were satisfied with them,'[9] was handed over to the *ka*-servants (see § XIV. [*a*])—of course in return for adequate remuneration[10]—for presentation to the dead, the priests getting what remained over.[11]

3. Other sources of income.—The priests could increase their incomes by performing periodical or daily services for the dead.[12]

4. Special perquisites of the high-priest.—In addition to receiving the largest annual stipend and daily rations, the high-priest of a temple evidently had special perquisites.

At Asyūṭ, *e.g.*, the superintendent of the prophets of Upwawet was entitled to a roast of meat for every bull slaughtered in the temple and a *sḏ*-measure of beer for every *ds*-vessel of beer offered on a day of procession.[13]

5. Stipends of the wives and daughters of priests.—According to the *Decree of Canopus* (line 35=Sethe, *Urkunden*, ii. 152 f.), an allotment from the temple revenue was due to the daughters of priests from the day of their birth. The same authority also informs us that the wives of priests received an allowance of bread.

X. *PRIESTLY PRIVILEGES.*—**1. Immunity from forced labour.**—The fact that a man was a *wē'eb* did not necessarily bring him exemption from compulsory State labour, such as work in the quarries or on the dykes and canals.

Thus the phylæ of *wē'eb*-priests of the Hermopolite nome are among those depicted dragging the colossal statue of Ḏhuthotp from the quarries of Ḥatnub to its appointed resting-place.[14]

Perpetual immunity from all such labour was granted to the priests of certain temples by special royal decrees.[15]

In the later Ptolemaic period the priests seem to have been immune from all compulsory State service. In Roman times they forfeited more and more of their old privileged position, being sometimes taken off by force for the cultivation of Crown land.[16] Only priests of important temples (λόγιμα ἱερά) enjoyed immunity from compulsory labour.[17]

2. Immunity from taxation and imposts.—In the Old Kingdom the temples were liable for imposts, such as the furnishing of government officials with supplies.[1] It appears that in the Saitic period the 'great temples of Egypt' at least were exempt both from the above-mentioned imposts and from taxation.[2]

Under the Ptolemys the majority of the temple estates were liable to taxation. Only the estates made over as a gift to the god and administered by the priests themselves were immune.[3] For the position of the temple estates in Roman times see § IX. 1.

3. Immunity from poll-tax.—The priests were free from poll-tax under the Ptolemys.[4] Under Roman rule all but a specified number of priests at each temple had to pay this tax.[5]

4. Right of asylum.—All temples possessed the right of asylum in the later Ptolemaic period.[6] Under Roman rule this right was severely curtailed.[7]

XI. *ADMISSION TO THE PRIESTHOOD.*—**1. Tendency of the priesthood to become hereditary.**—The priestly status, *i.e.* that of *wē'eb*, seems in some cases[8] to have been hereditary as early as the XIIth dynasty. But there are no grounds for supposing that then, as in Roman times, the priesthood was denied to all but persons of priestly descent.

(*a*) In the Middle Kingdom numbers of *wē'eb*-priests appear to have been the sons of non-priestly parents.[9] As late as the XXth dynasty we find that out of six sons two are priests and the rest officials.[10]

(*b*) It is not till after the XXth dynasty that the purely priestly families seem to have begun to come into being.[11]

(*c*) By the time of the early Ptolemys admittance to the priesthood seems to have been restricted to persons of priestly descent.[12] Possibly this restriction was already in force in the Saitic period.[13]

2. Tests for admittance to the priesthood.—In Roman times these were very strict.

(i.) No one could be admitted unless it was satisfactorily demonstrated that the applicant belonged to a priestly family;[14] he had to show that both his father and grandfather were priests.[15] It may here be noted that a priest the purity of whose birth had been challenged was considered to have satisfactorily proved his claim by being able to read a hieratic book produced by the ἱερογραμματεῖς.[16]

(ii.) An aspirant to the priesthood had to be free from all bodily defects as well as of priestly birth.[17] Cf. perhaps the instructions of Psamtik I. with regard to the appointment of Peteēsi as *wē'eb* in various temples: 'Let Peteēsi be priest in them if it were fitting.'[18]

(iii.) By a law of Hadrian only priests might be circumcised.[19] If a candidate proved his priestly descent and his freedom from blemish, permission was granted to circumcise. Until he had been circumcised, no person could exercise the priestly office.[20] For full particulars of the procedure to be followed in order to obtain permission to circumcise see Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 292, p. 58 f. See also art. CIRCUMCISION (Egyptian).

(iv.) It is probable that admission to the priesthood entailed circumcision as far back as the Old Kingdom, for even *ka*-servants, who probably were not as a rule *wē'eb*-priests (see

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1 Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 302, note on line 8 and p. 88.
2 *Ib.* no. 298, p. 75, and p. 81, note on line 34.
3 Not every month, as Borchardt wrongly asserts.
4 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xl. 114. 5 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 26.
6 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xl. 114; Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 26; Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7, line 286; cf. Petrie, *Koptos*, pl. viii. lines 6, 11.
7 ii. 37. 8 Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 45.
9 Cf. Erman, *Handbook*, p. 47; *Egyptian Stelæ in Brit. Mus.*, i. pl. 47, line 3.
10 See Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7, line 286.
11 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xl. 114.
12 Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6 ff.=Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 538 ff.; Davies-Gardiner, p. 79 f.; T. E. Peet, *Annals of Archæology and Anthropology*, vii. [Liverpool, 1916] 82 f., pl. xv. line 9 f. (contract with the lector Intef); cf. Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 25, 27 f.
13 Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7, line 302 f.=Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 568 ff.
14 P. E. Newberry, *El-Bersheh*, London, n.d. [1905], i. pl. xv.
15 *E.g.*, Petrie, *Abydos*, ii. pl. xviii.; J. Capart, *Bull. critique des religions de l'Egypte, 1904*, p. 39 f.; Weill, *Décrets royaux*; A. H. Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxiv. [1912] 257 f.; A. Moret, *Chartes d'immunité dans l'ancien empire égyptien*, i. (Extrait du Journal asiatique, Juillet-Août 1912), Paris, 1912, ii. (Extrait du Journal asiatique, Mars-Avril 1916), do. 1916.
16 Wilcken, *Grundzuge*, p. 129. 17 *Ib.*

1 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 131, line 6; cf. Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 109.
2 Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 80, 108 f.
3 Wilcken, p. 95 with note 5; cf. Davies-Gardiner, p. 87, § 6, on the question of temple land-tenure in dynastic times.
4 Wilcken, p. 94.
5 *Ib.* p. 128; Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, pp. 61, 74 f.
6 Wilcken, p. 94. 7 *Ib.* p. 114.
8 Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7, line 288=Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 552.
9 *E.g.*, Lange-Schäfer, i. nos. 20074, 20142, ii. nos. 20432, 20712. Cf. also no. 20545, according to which in the same family-group some members are *wē'eb*-priests and some minor officials.
10 Lepsius, iii. 231*a*.
11 *E.g.*, Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, ii. nos. 42138, 42188, 42189, 42211, 42215; *RTr* xxvii. [1905] 73 ff.
12 *Decree of Canopus*, hieroglyphic text, line 14 f.
13 See Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 80 f., 83 f., 97.
14 Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 293, lines 17–22, 291, and the editors' statements on pp. 55 f., 58 f., and 61; Reitzenstein, p. 5; Wilcken, p. 218.
15 Reitzenstein, p. 17 f.
16 Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, ii. no. 291, lines 40–53.
17 Wilcken, p. 128.
18 Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, no. ix. 8/18. 19 Otto, i. 214.
20 Wilcken, p. 128; Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 293, lines 19–22.

§ XIV. [*a*] i.), were circumcised.[1] Griffith suggests that the descriptive label attached to one of the two groups in the scene in question, viz. *sbt hm-k*ʾ, should be rendered: 'qualifying the *ka*-servants by circumcision.' For a full discussion of the circumcision of Egyptian priests see art. CIRCUMCISION (Egyptian).

With the scene in the temple of Khons at Karnak,[2] depicting two mothers presenting each a son to be circumcised, we might well compare Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, ii. no. 292.

(v.) We learn from the *Decree of Canopus* (hieroglyphic text, lines 14, 34 f.), that it was the king who admitted new priests. This seems to have been the custom also in Saitic times.[3] We know nothing about the regulations for admittance to the priesthood in the earlier periods.[4] In Roman times it was the ἰδιολόγος, or high-priest of all Egypt (the representative of the emperor in all religious matters), who, after the necessary particulars had been laid before him, granted permission to circumcise the candidate and then admitted him to the priesthood.[5]

(vi.) In Roman times a new priest, on being admitted to the priestly order, had to pay a fee to the State called τὸ τελεστικόν.[6]

XII. *APPOINTMENT TO PRIESTLY OFFICES.*—**1. High-priesthoods.**—High-priests seem regularly to have been appointed to their office by the king.[7] See below, 2 (*f*), and above § II. 1.

(*a*) When the central power was weak, the high-priesthoods, along with the local governorships, tended to become hereditary;[8] and in all periods, too, the high-priesthoods of certain famous temples seem frequently to have become vested in one family for several generations.[9] But even so the actual appointment to the high-priesthood seems still to have rested with the sovereign.[10]

(*b*) We have two instances of the high-priest of Amūn of Thebes being chosen by an oracle of the god himself.[11] In the first case the king confirmed the choice of the god; in the second we may presume that the king ratified the choice, as the new high-priest was his son.

2. Priestly offices below the rank of high-priest.—Such offices could be (*a*) assigned by the king, or (*b*) by his representative, the local governor and high-priest, (*c*) purchased, (*d*) conveyed by deed of transference, (*e*) bequeathed to descendants.

(*a*) A king of the XVIIIth dynasty promoted a certain Amenemhēt from the rank of *wēʿeb* to that of 'father of the god.'[12] He was perhaps later appointed prophet by the king.[13]

(*b*) The local governor and high-priest, as Pharaoh's representative, seems to have appointed persons to vacant priesthoods.[14]

(*c*) Priesthoods were bought and sold from the earliest times onwards.[15] Appointments to priestly offices in Roman times were usually obtained by purchasing them from the government.[16]

(*d*) Priesthoods could be conveyed by the holder while living to another person by deed of transfer.[17]

(*e*) Priestly offices were frequently obtained by inheritance.[1] In the case of mortuary priesthoods it is often specifically stated in the deeds of appointment that the offices are to be transmitted to the children.[2]

(*f*) In Roman times a person, on entering upon a priestly office, whether obtained by inheritance or otherwise, had to pay to the government a tax called τὸ εἰσκριτικόν.[3] This tax suggests that perhaps even in the dynastic periods all such appointments had to be ratified by the State—*i.e.* the king (cf. [*a*], [*b*]).

3. Investiture and installation of priests.—Ramesses II., on appointing Nebwenenef to the high-priesthood of Amūn, invested him with two gold signets and a gold (*ḏʾm*) staff.[4] At the installation of the chief priestess (*iḥyt*) of Amūn of Napata a silver pail for libations of milk[5] was placed in her right hand and a silver sistrum in her left.[6] Perhaps on his appointment or at his installation the high-priest of Ptaḥ of Memphis was invested with his curious chain of office.[7]

At the installation of 'the god's wife' and high-priestess of Amūn, 'Enkhnesneferibrē', 'the prophets, fathers of the god, *wēʿeb*-priests, lectors, the staff (*wnwt*) of the temple of Amūn, were behind her and the great companions were in front thereof, performing for her all the customary ceremonies of the induction of the god's votaress of Amūn into the temple. The god's scribe and nine *wēʿeb*-priests of this house fastened on for her all the amulets and ornaments of the god's wife and god's votaress of Amūn.'[8] The newly-appointed prophet of Amūn of Teuzoi had to 'anoint the hands' at his induction.[9]

XIII. *THE FUNCTIONS OF THE TEMPLE PRIESTS.*—The temple was the 'house of the god,' *ḥt-nṯr*, and the priesthood in certain aspects was regarded as domestic service.[10] The word *ḥm-nṯr* (Coptic ϩⲟⲛⲧ),[11] which we, following the Greeks, render 'prophet,' means 'servant of the god.' Similarly the tomb was the 'house of the *ka*,' *ḥt-kʾ*, and the mortuary priest was the '*ka*-servant,' *ḥm-kʾ*.[12]

1. Accordingly in the daily services the priest sprinkled the god with water—a ceremony derived from servants bathing their master[13]—fumigated him with incense,[14] clothed and anointed him,[15] applied cosmetics to his eyes,[16] and arrayed him in his various ornaments.[17]

(*a*) The formulæ that were repeated during the performance of these ceremonies are full of allusions to the legendary tales about Osiris and Horus, and brought every one of the priest's manual acts into relation with some episode in the Osiris myth.[18] The god was regarded as Osiris, and the priest (= the king) as his son Horus.[19]

(*b*) The daily duties of the prophet, or, as the chief daily officiant was sometimes called, the 'great *wēʿeb*,'[20] involved opening the doors of the shrine containing the god's statue and taking the statue out of it.[21] He is therefore described as 'entering in upon' such and such a god or goddess, 'seeing him[22] or

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[1] W. Max Muller, *Egyptological Researches*, Washington, 1906, p. 61 f.; J. Capart, *Une Rue de tombeaux à Saqqarah*, Brussels, 1907, pl. lxvi.

[2] F. Chabas, *Œuvres diverses*, Paris, 1899–1905, ii. 115 ff. (vol. x. of 'Bibliothèque égyptologique,' ed. G. Maspero, Paris, 1893–1909).

[3] Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, pp. 83, 81, note 8.

[4] The statement of Amenemhēt, high-priest of Amūn in the XVIIIth dynasty—'I was admitted to hear what the *wēʿeb*-priests hear' (A. H. Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlvii. 93)—apparently does not refer to his admission to the priesthood, but to some special promotion that came to him after he had been a *wēʿeb* for many years.

[5] Wilcken, p. 128; Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, ii. no. 292.

[6] Otto, i. 212; Reitzenstein, p. 10.

[7] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 26, 84 f., *ZÄ* xliv. 30 ff.; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 565 [7]; Brugsch, *Thesaurus Inscriptionum Aegyptiacarum*, Leipzig, 1883–91, pp. 908 f., 942.

[8] Breasted, *History*, p. 126; Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, i. 9 ff.; Petrie, *Koptos*, pl. viii. lines 6, 12; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 787 ff.

[9] Sethe, *ap.* L. Borchardt, *Grabdenkmal des Königs Śaḥu-reʿ*, Leipzig, 1910, ii. 162; E. Schiaparelli, *Cat. del Museo archeologico di Firenze: antichità egizie*, Rome, 1887, p. 201 ff.; Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, p. 889 ff.; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 61 ff.; Brugsch, *ZÄ* xvi. [1878] 11 f.

[10] Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. 57 ff. = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 622 ff.; Petrie, *Koptos*, pl. viii. lines 6, 12 = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 778 ff.; Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 84; Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, pp. 906 f., 942.

[11] Sethe, *ZÄ* xliv. 30 ff.; Erman, *ZÄ* xlv. 4.

[12] Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlvii. 93. [13] *Ib.*, line 15 f. of text.

[14] Egypt. Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 26; Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, pp. 81 ff., 96 f.; cf. perhaps Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 620.

[15] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 12, 36; Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri*, pl. xvi. line 19 ff.; *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 44 ff.

[16] Wilcken, p. 127 f.; Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, nos. 294, 297; Wilcken and Griffith, *ZÄ* xlv. 103 ff.

[17] Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri*, 22 pl. xi. line 10 ff.; *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 97 with note 2, 102; Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 12, 36.

[1] Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 624–626, 753 f.; Moret, *Rituel*, p. 105; Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, iii. no. 42230, *a*; Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 294, note on line 2; Herod. ii. 37.

[2] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 12, 36; Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6, line 269 ff.; cf. Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. pl. xxv. line 99.

[3] Reitzenstein, 10, note 5; Grenfell, Hunt, and Goodspeed, no. 294, note on line 20; Wilcken, p. 128.

[4] Sethe, *ZÄ* xliv. 33.

[5] Cf. H. Junker, *Das Götterdekret über das Abaton*, Vienna, 1913, p. 9 ff.

[6] Schafer, *Urkunden*, iii. 105.

[7] Erman, *ZÄ* xxxiii. [1895] 22 f.; M. A. Murray, *Saqqara Mastabas*, London, 1905, i. pls. i., xxxvi.

[8] G. Maspero, *Annales du Service*, v. 85 ff.; cf. Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iv. 958 D.

[9] Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 97 with note 1, 238 with note 5; cf. Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlvii. 93 [8].

[10] Erman, *Handbook*, p. 46 f., *Life*, p. 275.

[11] Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 45, note 4; G. Steindorff, *ZÄ* xlv. 141.

[12] Davies-Gardiner, p. 78 f.; Erman, *Handbook*, p. 39.

[13] See art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § III. 1; Moret, *Rituel*, p. 171 ff.

[14] Moret, *Rituel*, p. 176 ff.; cf. art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § III. 1.

[15] Moret, *Rituel*, pp. 179–199. [16] *Ib.* p. 179 f.

[17] *Ib.* p. 258 ff.

[18] Erman, *Handbook*, p. 45 f., *Life*, p. 274 f.; see also art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § V. 4.

[19] See above, § II. 2. [20] Moret, *Rituel*, pp. 7, 42.

[21] Erman, *Handbook*, p. 45; Moret, *Rituel*, pp. 35 ff., 167.

[22] 'Her' in the actual inscription quoted, as the divinity in question is Ḥathor.

his beauty,'[1] and 'performing the ceremonies for him with the two arms.'[2]

(*c*) Another duty of the priests was to carry in procession the image of the divinity, placed in a boat-shaped shrine, on the occasion of a festival.[3]

2. The temple priests, in addition to the ordinary appellations prophet, father of the god, and *wĕ'eb*, which denoted their rank in the hierarchy, bore a number of titles,[4] many of which convey very little meaning to us or are quite unintelligible. These additional titles denote special administrative or special religious functions.[5]

(*a*) *Scribe of the temple.*—A very important functionary in each phyle was the scribe of the temple, who, during his term of office, kept all the temple accounts and made all the entries in the temple day-book.[6] He was certainly of priestly rank.[7]

(*b*) *Lector* (*ḫry-ḥb*).—There were 'ordinary lectors' (*ḫryw-ḥb 'š;w*) and a 'chief lector' (*ḫry-ḥb ḫry-d;d;*) on the temple staff.[8] The chief lector was on the permanent staff; ordinary lectors were members of the rotating phylæ.[9]

(i.) The chief lector ranked third on the staff of the Middle Kingdom temple of Anubis at Illahûn, only the phylarch coming between him and the superintendent of the temple, *i.e.* the high-priest.[10] The office of high-priest was often combined with that of lector or chief lector.[11]

(ii.) The priestly grade of the ordinary lectors seems generally to have been that of *wĕ'eb*.[12] A lector could also be a phylarch.[13]

(iii.) The duty of the lector was to recite the formulæ, to the accompaniment of which the rites in the temples were performed.[14]

(iv.) For the lector as a mortuary priest see under § XIV. (*c*); as a magician, see art. Magic (Egyptian), § 9, and Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxix. [1917] 31; as a physician, see under § XVI.

(*c*) *Dancers and musicians.*—Probably male as well as female dancers and musicians were attached to all temples;[15] they seem to have figured especially at festivals.[16] In the Middle Kingdom many of them were foreigners—chiefly Aamu—[17] and perhaps slaves.[18]

(*d*) *Door-keepers, etc.*—The temple staff included minor functionaries such as door-keepers and sweepers.[19] In the temple of Anubis at Illahûn these were permanent functionaries, not members of phylæ.[20] But a temple door-keeper could be a *wĕ'eb* and a second prophet of the endowment of the altar.[21]

XIV. *THE MORTUARY PRIESTS.*—The cult of the dead in many respects resembled that of the gods (see above, § XIII.). The officiants most commonly represented as performing the services required by the dead bear the titles '*ka*-servant,' 'embalmer,' 'lector,' 'chief lector,' 'treasurer of the god,' *sem*, *imy-khant*.

(*a*) *Ka-servant* (*ḥm-k;*).—The *ka*-servant was responsible for the maintenance of the services (daily or periodical) performed on behalf of the dead in the tomb-chapel or 'house of the *ka*,'[1] as was the prophet, or 'servant of the god,' for those performed on behalf of a divinity in a temple;[2] and the same methods were employed to secure the services of both.[3] The daily or periodical services consisted mainly in the pouring out of libations, the burning of incense, and the presentation of offerings of food and drink to the deceased.[4] 'It is a man's *ka*-priest,' says Ḏefaiḥap, 'who maintains his possessions (*'iḫwt*)[5] and his offerings.'[6]

(i.) Not unnaturally *ka*-servants were on the staff of the temple of Osiris at Abydos[7] and of Anubis at Illahûn;[8] but the impression gained from the majority of texts is that the *ka*-servants formed an organization distinct from the temple priesthood, as did the *choachytæ* (χοαχύται) of the Græco-Roman period.[9]

(ii.) The *choachytæ* (= Egyp. *w;ḥ-mw*, 'water-offerer')[10] fulfilled in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods the same functions as the *ka*-servants in earlier times. They were responsible for the upkeep of the tombs and for the safety of the mummies within them.[11] As their name shows, one of their chief duties was to pour out libations to the dead,[12] the ancient funerary offering having degenerated into little more than a periodical libation accompanied by the repetition of the prescribed formulæ.[13]

(iii.) Like the *choachytæ*,[14] the *ka*-servants were divided into phylæ,[15] and were under the direction of 'superintendents' and 'inspectors.'[16]

(iv.) Judging from the determinatives of *ḥmw-k;* (*ka*-servants) in Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 11 ff., 36 (cf. 27 f.), the *ka*-servants, in the Old Kingdom at least, seem, like the *choachytæ*,[17] to have been of both sexes.

(v.) Both *ka*-priests and *choachytæ* were in the habit of disposing of their offices and the attached emoluments by will (or deed of transference) or by sale.[18] In Old and Middle Kingdom documents it is sometimes stipulated that the *ka*-servants are not to dispose of the endowments by sale or by will (*imyt-pr*)[19] to any people, but are to transmit them (of course with their attendant responsibilities) to their children.[20] Or, again, the *ka*-servant is to choose one particular son as his heir, and that son in his turn is to do the same.[21]

(*b*) *Embalmer.*—The embalmer (*wt*) is a familiar figure from the earliest times in the representations of funerals and other mortuary ceremonies.[22] The laboratory in which he exercised his art was called the 'place of purification' (*w'bt*),[23] or 'good house,'[24] or, more fully, the 'place of purification of the good house.'[25]

(i.) From the inscriptions accompanying a series of scenes in the tomb-chapel of Pepi'onkh at Meir,[26] the embalmers in that locality seem, like the *paraschistæ* and *taricheutæ* of Græco-Roman times, to have formed an organization or gild of their own under the direction of one or more 'inspectors' (*sḥḏ- wt*) and a superintendent (*imy-r; wt*). In the temple of Anubis at Illahûn, however, each phyle of priests appears to have contained one embalmer,[27] who therefore must have been at least a *wĕ'eb*.

(ii.) In the Ptolemaic and Roman periods the embalmers were called *paraschistæ* (παρασχισταί) and *taricheutæ* (ταριχευταί), the former making the necessary incisions, etc., in the corpse, the latter carrying out the embalming and wrapping.[28] At

1 Cf. Moret, *Rituel*, p. 55.

2 Kamāl, *Annales du Service*, xv. 213; Lange-Schäfer, no. 20359. For further descriptions of the priest's daily duties see Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 564; Lange-Schäfer, nos. 20359, 20530; cf. Schäfer, *Die Mysterien des Osiris in Abydos*, pp. 18, 19 with note 1.

3 Erman, *Life*, p. 275 f., *Handbook*, p. 49 f.; cf. Griffith, *Siûṭ and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6, line 274 f. = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 540 f. (see also iii. 622).

4 See M. A. Murray, *Index of Names and Titles of the Old Kingdom*, London, 1908; Lange-Schäfer, i., ii.; Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, i.–iii.; Stolk, p. 35 ff.; Wreszinski, *Die Hohenpriester des Amon*; Chassinat, *Annales du Service*, xvi. 193 ff.; A. H. Gardiner and A. E. P. Weigall, *A Topographical Catalogue of the Private Tombs of Thebes*, London, 1903, p. 43 f.

5 *E.g.*, Schäfer, *Priestergräber . . . vom Totentempel des Nē-User-Rē'*, p. 34 (Schäfer's explanation is wrong; 'Inḥtp was, of course, superintendent of the fishers and fowlers on the temple estates); Erman, *Life*, p. 291; Griffith, *Siûṭ and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7; Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94, xl. 114.

6 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94.

7 *E.g.*, Griffith, *Siûṭ and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 7; Legrain, *Statues et statuettes*, i. no. 42078, *e*.

8 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94; Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri*, pl. x. note on line 2; Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, iii. pl. xxiii. 2.

9 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94.

10 *Ib.*

11 § VIII. 3 (*b*).

12 Erman, *Life*, p. 294 with note 1; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 470; Wreszinski, p. 11; Erman, *ZÄ* xvii. 72.

13 Wreszinski, p. 11.

14 Erman, *Life*, pp. 289, 294; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 261 (= Breasted, *Anc. Records*, ii. 239); Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 506, iv. 958 D; H. Junker, *Die Stundenwachen in den Osirismysterien*, Vienna, 1910, pp. 5, 33, 38, *passim*; cf. Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, ii. pl. ix., iii. 29, 32, pl. xxii. f.

15 *E.g.*, Lange-Schäfer, no. 20026; Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri*, p. 59 ff.; Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, ii. 24; Davies-Gardiner, p. 94 ff.; N. de G. Davies, *The Rock Tombs of El-Amarna*, London, 1903–08, i. 31, pl. xiii.; see also under § VI. 4, § VII. 2 f.

16 Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri*, p. 59 ff.

17 *Ib.* p. 60.

18 *Ib.* pls. xii. line 10, xiii. line 15, xxx. line 35.

19 Capart, *Bulletin critique des religions de l'Egypte, 1904*, p. 39.

20 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94.

21 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 30.

1 See A. M. Blackman, in *Journ. of Egyptian Archæology*, iii. [1916] 250 ff.

2 Davies-Gardiner, p. 73 f.

3 Cf. Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 25 with i. 11 f., 36 f., and see Griffith, *Siûṭ and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6, line 269 ff.; Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. pl. xxv. line 86 ff.; Erman, *Life*, p. 323 f., *Handbook*, p. 123 f.; Peet, *Annals of Archæology and Anthropology*, vii. 81 ff.; *Egyptian Stelæ in Brit. Mus.*, i. pl. 54; see also § IX. 1.

4 Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. pl. xxv. line 84 ff.; A. Moret, *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres*, Paris, 1914, p. 543; Davies-Gardiner, p. 73 ff.; Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, ii. pl. x., iii. pls. xxi.–xxiii.

5 Or perhaps 'repasts' (H. Grapow, *ZÄ* xlvii. 106, note 37); but see *Sinuhe*, B 240.

6 Griffith, *Siûṭ and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6, line 269.

7 Lange-Schäfer, i. no. 20093, ii. no. 20748.

8 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xl. 114.

9 Otto, i. 99 ff.

10 Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. pp. 16, 55, note 5.

11 Otto, i. 100.

12 *Ib.* i. 99–101.

13 See Blackman, in *Journ. of Egyptian Archæology*, iii. 33.

14 Otto, i. 103 f.

15 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 13 f., 36.

16 Murray, *Index of Names and Titles of the Old Kingdom*, pl. xxiii.

17 Otto, i. 102; Griffith-Wilcken, *ZÄ* xlv. 104.

18 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 12, 36; Griffith-Wilcken, *ZÄ* xlv. 103 ff.

19 *'Imyt-pr* also means 'deed of transference' (see Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri*, p. 29 f.).

20 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 12, 36.

21 Griffith, *Siûṭ and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6, line 272.

22 *E.g.*, Lepsius, ii. pls. 4 f., 25, 35, 101*b*; Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, iii. pls. xvii., xviii. 2.

23 Davies-Gardiner, p. 45, note 3.

24 Lange-Schäfer, nos. 20088, 20457; F. Ll. Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, Oxford, 1900, p. 29.

25 Davies-Gardiner, p. 45, note 3.

26 See Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, i. 6; Davies-Gardiner, p. 45, note 4.

27 Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94.

28 Otto, i. 105 ff.

Memphis they and the *choachytæ* were united in one large group and their functions were interchangeable.[1]

For the embalmer's impersonation of Anubis see § VI. 2.

(*c*) *Chief lectors and lectors.*—These figure as prominently in the funerary as in the temple services. As mortuary officiants their duty was to direct the ritual of the embalmer's workshop and of the tomb-chapel, and to recite the accompanying formulæ. The functions of the lector and embalmer were not sharply differentiated. Thus a chief lector is described as being 'over the mysteries of the good house,'[2] and an ordinary lector is entitled 'Anubis in the good house, chief of the lectors'[3] or 'treasurer of the god, Anubis the embalmer.'[4]

This explains, perhaps, why Diodorus calls the chief embalmer a scribe, γραμματεύς,[5] and why the Greek rendering of *ḥry-ḥb*, 'lector,' is ταριχευτής, 'embalmer.'[6]

(*d*) *'Treasurer of the god.'*—The presence of a functionary bearing this title at funerary ceremonies[7] is a legacy from the time when they were performed for the Pharaoh only.[8] The 'treasurer of the god' was closely associated with the acquisition of precious commodities[9] such as turquoise,[10] the produce of Byblos and Punt,[11] stone from Hammamat for monuments,[12] incense, etc., from the Sudān;[13] he would naturally, therefore, play an important part in the royal obsequies, for he would have to supply many of the articles required for the embalming and burial of the king. 'Treasurer of the god,' as a mortuary title, could be combined with those of 'lector' and 'Anubis the embalmer.'[14]

(*e*) *Sem-priest.*—The funerary officiant with this title represents, of course, the high-priest of Ptaḥ of Memphis.[15] That ecclesiastic naturally pronounced the offering formula,[16] and burned incense and offered libation,[17] at the burial of a Memphite king. As was to be expected, the *sem* was the chief officiant in the 'Opening of the Mouth'[18]—a rite originally performed, perhaps, on royal statues,[19] and therefore in early times a function of the Memphite high-priest in his capacity of chief artificer, *wr ḥrp ḥmwt* (lit. 'great in directing the craftsmen').[20]

(*f*) *Imy-khant* (*imy-ḫnt*).—This priest is frequently figured in representations of funerary ceremonies, especially those of the Middle and New Kingdoms.[21] Sethe[22] thinks that *imy-ḫnt* means 'festival priest.' Connected with the Osiris cult at Abydos there was a 'great *imy-khant*' who was also entitled 'prophet' and 'great *wē'eb*.'[23]

XV. *PRIESTS OF THE REIGNING KING.*—The *wē'eb* priests and prophets of the reigning Pharaoh[24] were a prominent feature of the Old Kingdom priesthood. We also meet with them later.[25]

XVI. *PRIESTS AS DOCTORS.*—The professions of physician and priest (*wē'eb* or lector) were often combined.[26]

A *wē'eb* who is also a physician (*swnw*) pronounces the sacrificial victim pure.[27] Priests of the goddess Sakhmet were regarded as especially skilled in the art of medicine.[28] The business of the priest of Sakhmet depicted with cattle in a scene in the tomb-chapel of a Cusite nomarch at Meir[29] was thus evidently to decide whether they were fit for sacrificial purposes or not. There was apparently a medical school at Sais attached to the temple of Neith. It was restored in the reign of Darius by a 'chief prophet of Neith' who was also styled 'great in medicine' (*wr swn*).[1] In a Ptolemaic bilingual an embalmer, ταριχευτής, is termed *syn*, 'physician,' in the Demotic version.[2]

XVII. *PRIESTS AS MAGICIANS.* — See art. MAGIC (Egyptian), vol. viii. p. 268; supplemented by A. H. Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxix. 31 ff.

XVIII. *PRIESTS AS JUDGES.*—Priests acted in this capacity in the New Kingdom. Of a board (*ḳnbt*) of ten judges who sat on one day, six were prophets (including the high-priest of Amūn, who presided), and three *wē'eb*-priests. Only one, a scribe, was a layman.[3]

XIX. *PURIFICATION AND PURITY OF PRIESTS.*—See art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § V. 7.

XX. *CLOTHING, ETC., OF PRIESTS.*—See art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), § V. 7 (*g*), (*h*).

XXI. *THE PRIESTHOOD AS A CIVIL FUNCTION.*—The higher priestly offices were sometimes evidently civil appointments; *i.e.*, the holders of them were not professional priests.[4]

Defaiḥap, *e.g.*, a Middle Kingdom ruler of the Lycopolite nome and therefore *ipso facto* high-priest (superintendent of the prophets of the local divinity),[5] cannot have exercised his priestly functions for a considerable part of his career, as he was resident governor of the newly acquired territory in the Sudān, the administrative centre of which was the modern Kerma.[6] The same may be said of a local prince like Ameny of Beni Ḥasan, who, in addition to being very active as civil administrator of the nome, went on military and mining expeditions.[7] Similarly Seti, an important official in the reign of Ramesses II., combined with a number of important civil and military appointments several priesthoods, which must surely have been sinecures.[8] Cf. also the case of Peteēsi, a busy civil servant of the Saitic age, to whom was assigned 'the share of the prophet of Amūn of Teuzoi and his ennead of deities,' but who, apparently, never once officiated in this capacity.[9]

The offices of *sem*, 'son whom he loves,' and *sm*? (?), in the case of Ikhernofret, were practically civil appointments, and were doubtless only temporarily held by him in his capacity of special envoy and representative of the king;[10] he was, as we can see from his titles,[11] not a professional priest. The same may be said of Seḥetepibrē';[12] also of Menthḥotp,[13] who, though he bore several priestly titles,[14] was vizier and chief justice,[15] and held several other posts of secular administration.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the article. AYLWARD M. BLACKMAN.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Greek) (ἱερεύς, ἱέρεια, ἱερωσύνη).—I. **General characteristics.**—The Greeks did not possess a priesthood, in the sense of a sacred caste or class of men through whose medium alone the gods could be approached. Priests and priestesses existed everywhere among them in great numbers, but their significance is quite other than that of a sacred order, such as was seen among the most highly developed of the surrounding nations. It is true that there are in Greece also considerable traces of ideas of a kind that might have led to similar hierarchic institutions. For the Greeks were familiar with the idea that certain individuals or classes of people possessed some inherent capacity for particular sacred functions—that women, *e.g.*, were the chosen medium of communication between gods and men at certain oracular seats, or that some men possessed inherent mantic powers, and the like; but this does not greatly affect the general Hellenic attitude, which was on the whole to refuse to define any department of life as tabu, but on the contrary to throw open all its possibilities to any and every individual claiming the name of citizen. This is true also of the Homeric

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1 Otto, i. 105–107. 2 Lange-Schäfer, no. 20088.
3 *Ib.* no. 20457.
4 *Ib.* no. 20538, I. *d*, line 8; see also § VI. 2. 5 Otto, i. 105.
6 Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 122, note 8.
7 *E.g.*, Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, iii. pl. xxiii. 2; Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. pls. xx., xxxv.
8 Cf. § III. 1, and see Davies-Gardiner, pp. 55, 87.
9 Erman, *Life*, p. 96. 10 Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 342.
11 *Ib.* §§ 351, 361. 12 *Ib.* §§ 297 ff., 388. 13 *Ib.* § 336.
14 Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20538, I. *d*, line 8; see also Otto, i. 105.
15 See Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, p. 3 ff.; Stolk, p. 35.
16 *E.g.*, Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. pls. xvii., xxxv.; Davies-Gardiner, p. 21; Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 2.
17 *E.g.*, Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, i. pl. iii.; Junker, *Stundenwachen*, p. 5.
18 Davies-Gardiner, p. 59; Budge, *The Book of Opening the Mouth*, i. 155 ff.; cf. Schäfer, *Die Mysterien des Osiris in Abydos*, p. 18.
19 Davies-Gardiner, p. 57; see § III. 1.
20 Stolk, p. 13; see § III. 1.
21 *E.g.*, Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, iii. 22, 33, pls. xiv., xxiii. 2; Davies, *The Rock Tombs of Deir el-Gebrâwi*, ii. pl. vii; Davies-Gardiner, pp. 52, 54; Davies, *Five Theban Tombs*, London, 1913, pl. vi.; Borchardt, *Grabdenkmal des Königs Śa'ḥu-rē'*, ii. pl. 19.
22 *Ap.* Borchardt, *Grabdenkmal des Königs Śa'ḥu-rē'*, ii. 96.
23 Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20514. See also K. Dyroff and B. Portner, *Aegyptische Grabsteine und Denksteine aus süddeutschen Sammlungen*, Munich, 1902–04, ii. 2 ff., pl. ii. = W. E. Crum, *PSBA* xvi. [1894] 132 f.
24 Erman, *Life*, p. 290.
25 *E.g.*, Borchardt, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 94.
26 See art. MAGIC (Egyptian), vol. viii. p. 268; Kamāl, *Annales du Service*, xv. 244.
27 J. E. Quibell, *The Ramesseum*, London, 1898, pl. xxxvi.
28 Wreszinski, *Der Papyrus Ebers*, Leipzig, 1913, i. 99, 2 f.
29 Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, iii. pl. iii.

1 Schafer, *ZÄ* xxxvii. 72 ff.
2 Griffith-Wilcken, *ZÄ* xlv. 107
3 Erman, *ZÄ* xvii. 72; see also Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 64 f.
4 See Erman, *Life*, p. 292.
5 Griffith, *Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, pl. 6.
6 G. A. Reisner, *ZÄ* lii. [1914] 43.
7 Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. 21 ff.; Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 519 ff.
8 Breasted, *Anc. Records*, iii. 542.
9 Griffith, *Demotic Papyri*, iii. 82, 84, 92.
10 Schafer, *Die Mysterien des Osiris in Abydos*, pp. 10, 15, 18 ff.
11 *Ib.* p. 10. 12 Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20538.
13 *Ib.* no. 20539. 14 *Ib.* side i. lines 13–17.
15 *Ib.* side i. line 1.

poems, which, while admitting the claim of, *e.g.*, Kalchas to special mantic endowment (*Il.* i. 72), and indicating the high honour in which priests of various deities were held (*Il.* v. 78: *θεὸς δ' ὡς τίετο δήμῳ*; cf. xvi. 605), exhibit Nestor sacrificing to Athene with the assistance of his sons only, no priest being mentioned, and none, so far as we can see, finding any place in the ceremony (*Od.* iii. 430 f.). This accords with the facts of historical times. Priests and priestesses alike throughout the Greek world enjoy considerable social and civic distinction, which tends to increase rather than to diminish as Greek civilization develops, yet Isocrates can say, with but slight exaggeration, that any man might be a priest (ii. 7: *ὅτι βασιλείαν ὥσπερ ἱερωσύνην παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι νομίζουσιν*).

Whatever may have been, among the Greeks, in the ages below the historical horizon, the relations existing between priest, king, and community, in historical times the priesthood, like everything else, has had to submit to the all-embracing sway of the idea of the State, and has become to a very considerable degree secularized and is regarded almost purely from the politico-social point of view. This is clearly and emphatically asserted not only in regard to the administrative activities of the priest, but also in regard to his purely sacerdotal functions (Æschin. iii. 18: *διδάξω δ' ὑμᾶς πρώτον ἐπὶ τῶν παραδόξων, οἷον τοὺς ἱερεῖς καὶ τὰς ἱερείας ὑπευθύνους εἶναι κελεύει ὁ νόμος, καὶ συλλήβδην ἅπαντας καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστους κατὰ σῶμα, τοὺς τὰ γέρα λαμβάνοντας καὶ τὰς εὐχὰς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχομένους, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἰδίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινῇ τὰ γένη*; cf. Dem. *in Neair.* 116; Plut. *Quæst. Gr.* 38). Only the actual sacred rites which priests perform escape from this secular control, simply because, being traditional, they dated from an age anterior to the birth of the historical State itself, and owed much of their force to that very fact. Hence the so-called *leges sacræ* are found to be confined to regulations touching qualifications for office, priests' perquisites, the establishment of additional ceremonies, etc.—just such details as fell to be regulated in connexion with purely secular offices; they teach us nothing of the details of ritual. In this sense, then, it is not incorrect to describe the Greek priest as in some sort a State official. The ultimate authority in a question concerning *τὰ ἱερά* is not a synod of priests, but the council and the assembly (Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 43).[1]

The Greek priest or priestess, then, is one who is charged with certain specific religious functions or ritual acts, directed godwards, in the due performance of which the State, either as a whole or through its organic groups (*gentes*, phratries, families, etc.), is vitally interested. These functions, based as they were mainly upon a traditional ritual, demanded a certain, often a high, degree of professional or technical knowledge, just as did many other departments of civic life; the priest is simply one who is 'skilled in the rules of sacrifice, prayer, and purification.'[2] Practically, therefore, the *ἱερεύς* implied the existence of a temple or some form of holy place dedicated to the particular deity in whose service he ministered. For the Greek priest was always the servant of a particular deity, and that at a particular shrine,[3] and at none other. There was no such thing as a priest with a general competence of sacerdotal functions at any and every shrine, or as minister to any and every deity, simply by virtue of his priesthood as such. For there was in fact no general or universally applicable use or style of worship, notwithstanding the large common element in the manner of making prayers and offerings.[1]

The existence of a priesthood, however, by no means abrogated the religious functions exercised by, and as a matter of course demanded from, laymen, such as magistrates of the State, heads of families or other organic groups within the State. It was, in fact, hardly possible to say where the layman stopped or the priest began. Nor, on the other hand, did the holding of a priesthood necessarily involve the surrender of all other occupations and interests on the part of the priest. Certainly this was not the case with many of precisely the highest and most distinguished priesthoods. In this respect there seemed, indeed, some room for improvement, as a matter of mere civic organization, and Aristotle proposes that one and the same individual citizen shall assume successively the functions of soldier, statesman, and priest, according to his time of life—the priesthood thus tending to be regarded as a dignified sinecure for men no longer able to serve the State in a more active capacity (*Pol.* iv. [vii.] 9. 4 f. = 1329 A).

The combination of sacerdotal functions with royal authority is as familiar as it was normal in the ancient world. In Homer the king with his own hand strikes the victim on behalf of the whole people (*Il.* iii. 249 f., 271 f.). In this sense the king was head of the State religion, as being capable of and responsible for the proper performance of the ritual acts designed to secure the favour of the deities that were in the strict sense national. Thus in Sparta, almost the only purely Greek State retaining monarchical government in historical times, all State sacrifices were offered by the kings, as descendants of the god (Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 15. 1: *ἔθηκε γὰρ θύειν μὲν βασιλέα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἅπαντα, ὡς ἀπὸ θεοῦ ὄντα*; Ar. *Pol.* iii. 14. 3 = 1285 A: *ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν*), one of the two kings holding the priesthood of Zeus Lakedaimon, the other that of Heavenly Zeus, with the usual perquisites (Herod. vi. 56; cf. Hom. *Od.* iv. 65). Sometimes, on the decay and abolition of the royal office, the descendants of the old kings were allowed to retain these immemorial sacred functions and privileges, and even at times also the honorary title of king (*e.g.*, Ephesus [Strabo, p. 633], Cyrene [Herod. iv. 161]). Or, again, the title and the functions might pass to one or other of the republican magistrates. Thus in Athens the second archon was called king (*βασιλεύς*), and his wife queen (*βασίλινα*), both with religious functions, the king archon superintending the Eleusinian mysteries and the Lenaian Dionysia, there being assigned to him, as Plato says, 'the most solemn and most truly ancestral rites of the ancient sacrifices' (*Pol.* 290 E; cf. Dem. lix. 1370; Lysias, *Andoc.* 4: *ἂν . . . λάχῃ βασιλεύς, ἄλλο τι ἢ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ θυσίας θύσει καὶ εὐχὰς εὔξεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*).[2]

Within the family itself, which had been in fact its starting-point, this primitive coincidence of sacred function (*θυσίαι πάτριοι*) and physical or legal headship continued undisturbed,[3] and was reflected in the larger groups, of phratries and *gentes*, which purported to be merely the family 'writ large,' and, indeed, in every sort of organization within the State, by the institution of priests of the particular association, that is to say, by the endowment of certain of its members with religious functions; for all such corporations had a religious as well as a political or social aspect,

[1] This is true even in cases where reference was made to an oracle, for such reference could be made, in a matter of State, only by properly accredited representatives; nor was such reference absolutely essential, though it was in harmony with Hellenic, and especially Athenian, sentiment to refer such matters to Apollo (cf. Plat. *Rep.* 427 C: *οὗτος γὰρ δήπου ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητὴς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται*).

[2] Stob. *Ecl. Eth.*, ed. Gaisford, ii. 562: *τὸν γὰρ ἱερέα εἶναι δεῖν ἔμπειρον νόμων τῶν περὶ θυσίας καὶ εὐχὰς, καὶ καθαρμοὺς, καὶ ἱδρύσεις καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*. Perhaps the best definition is given in Plato, *Pol.* 290 C: *καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱερέων αὖ γένος, ὡς τὸ νομιμόν φησι, παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεὰς θεοῖς διὰ θυσιῶν ἐπιστήμον ἐστι κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις δωρεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἐκείνων ἡμῖν εὐχαῖς κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν αἰτήσασθαι· ταῦτα δὲ διακόνου τέχνης ἐστί που μόρια ἀμφότερα*.

[3] Cf. Plat. *Laws*, 759 A: *λέγωμεν μὲν δὴ τοῖς μὲν ἱεροῖς νεωκόρους τε καὶ ἱερέας καὶ ἱερείας δεῖν γίγνεσθαι*. Large temples would have more than one priest, but one was the rule; cf. Diod. i. 73. 5: *οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, εἷς ἀνὴρ ἢ μία γυνὴ τὴν ἱερωσύνην παρείληφεν, κτλ.*

[1] Though traces are not wanting of the tendency towards such universalism or panhellenic use. Cf. Ar. *Pol.* viii. (vi.) 8. 20 = 1322 B: *ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας, ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἑστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμήν· καλοῦσι δ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντας τούτους, οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις*. For the sacred functions of the Athenian archons see Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 56–58.

[2] We merely mention here the curious religious polities found in Asia Minor in the Roman age, ruled by hereditary high-priests, or by royal and hierarchical families, sometimes of a not very religious type—*e.g.*, Komana (Strabo, pp. 559, 574). For these see J. P. Mahaffy, *The Greek World under Roman Sway*, London, 1890, p. 225 f. They, of course, fall outside the purely Hellenic institution here treated, just as the deities worshipped in such communities were Asiatic in character, though called by Greek names.

[3] Strictly taken, Plato's language (in *Laws*, 909 D: *ἱερὰ μηδὲ εἷς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτήσθω· θύειν δ' ὅταν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἴῃ τινί, πρὸς τὰ δημόσια ἴτω θύσων, καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσί τε καὶ ἱερείαις ἐγχειριζέτω τὰ θύματα, οἷς ἀγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής*) would indicate a desire to abolish these domestic worships. See W. L. Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, i., Oxford, 1887, p. 179.

and had their special deities, rites, and religious observances.

Perhaps this very multiplicity of individuals invested with priestly or quasi-priestly functions did as much as anything to check the rise of a definite priestly class, the conception of sacerdotal function being too inextricably intertwined with that of civic life in general. Undoubtedly, also, much was due to the general sanity of Greek institutions, from which it resulted that the rites performed by the priesthood were, as a rule, not of such sort as to enthral the intellect by extravagant claims to a specially recondite or mysterious character. It was, in fact, partly by way of reaction against this somewhat threadbare simplicity that Orphic and Dionysiac mysteries won such vogue. A further powerful factor making against the rise of a priestly caste was the fact that temple funds were, as a rule, not controlled by the priests of the temple themselves; and at the same time the interpretation of sacred law was almost entirely beyond their control, being, at Athens, in charge of a special secular board of interpreters (ἐξηγηταί [see P. Ehrmann, *De iuris sacri interpretibus Atticis*, Giessen, 1908]). The significance of the last feature can hardly be overrated in this connexion. It meant that nothing of the nature of a school or course of training for priesthood could arise.

2. Qualifications for priesthood.—Plato, following doubtless the universal requirement, lays it down for his ideal State that a priest must be sound and perfect in body, and of pure and genuine civic pedigree (*Laws*, 759 C: δοκιμάζειν δὲ τὸν ἀεὶ λαγχάνοντα πρῶτον μὲν ὁλόκληρον καὶ γνήσιον, κτλ.). No alien could hold an Athenian priesthood or perform its rites—a rule that was probably general.[1]

The tendency was not to be content with this, but to put priesthoods into the hands of men of leisure and substance (just as, in Athens, the State services, or leitourgies, naturally fell to the same class). So Aristotle would have no husbandman or mechanic appointed, but only citizens, who, in his scheme, would be the sole landed proprietors (*Pol.* iv. (vii.) 9. 9 = 1329 A: οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε βάναυσον ἱερέα καταστατέον· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς. Cf. Paus. VII. xxvii. 3: κατὰ δόξαν γένους μάλιστα αἱρούμενοι, at Pellene; D. 594. 10: ὠνείσθω δὲ ὅς κα ᾖ ὁλόκλαρος καὶ ᾧ δαμιοργίας μέτεστι, at Chalkedon). At Halicarnassus the priestess of Artemis Pergaia must be of full citizen pedigree on both sides for at least three generations (D. 601. 6: ἀστὴν ἐξ ἀστῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἐπὶ τρεῖς γενεὰς γεγενημένην καὶ πρὸς πατρὸς καὶ πρὸς μητρός). Good looks were a recommendation, in some cases an essential (Paus. VII. xxiv. 4 [the boy νικῶν κάλλει, priest of Zeus at Aigai]; cf. IX. x. 4 [Thebes]). Notorious vice naturally disqualified,[2] and Plato insists upon purity from the stain of blood and the graver offences. On the whole, the insistence is upon somewhat external or formal qualifications, identical with those demanded of candidates for purely secular offices; no great stress is laid on moral, and none at all apparently on intellectual, qualifications. In regard to the last point, it is to be remembered that a Greek priest was not called upon to deliver ethical teaching of any kind or to handle any problems of interpretation.[1] The case of the Delphian priesthood and that of the priests of certain great oracular healing shrines are somewhat special and do not affect the general validity of what is here said.

There was naturally great variety in the special qualifications for priesthoods of the different cults. These special qualifications are hardly referable to general principles. The hierophant at Eleusis, *e.g.*, must, in the time of Pausanias at any rate, be celibate; not so the hierophant at Phleious, although the latter mysteries professed to be based upon the Eleusinian (Paus. II. xiv. 1: λαμβανων, ἣν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ γυναῖκα· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν διάφορα τῶν Ἐλευσῖνι νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ἐς αὐτὴν τὴν τελετὴν ἐκείνων ἐστὶν ἐς μίμησιν). The foremost place here must be assigned to ceremonial purity, especially chastity. In its strictest form the demand is for absolute virginity,[2] the priesthood being held by παῖδες or παρθένοι. There is no attempt to violate nature, as in the eunuch priesthoods of Kybele and the Ephesian Artemis and other Asiatic cults, which do not call for further consideration here. 'The same end was more wisely pursued by the selection either of the age when the passions are yet dormant, or that in which they have subsided' (C. Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, London, 1835–47, i. 204). Examples are the priestess of Herakles at Thespiai (Paus. IX. xxvii. 6: ἱεράται δὲ αὐτοῦ παρθένος ἐστ' ἂν ἐπιλάβῃ τὸ χρεὼν αὐτῆν); of Poseidon at Kalaureia (*ib.* II. xxxiii. 3: ἱεράτα ἰδὲ αὐτῷ παρθένος, ἐστ' ἂν ἐς ὥραν προελθῃ γάμου); of Athene at Tegea (*ib.* VIII. xlvii. 3: ἱεράται δὲ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ παῖς χρόνον οὐκ οἶδα ὅσον τινά, πρὶν δὲ ἡβάσκειν, καὶ οὐ πρόσω, τὴν ἱερωσύνην). Or, again, chastity during the term of office might be held sufficient, and this could be secured with care (cf. Plut. *de Pyth. orac.* 20: νομίζεται τὸν ἱερώμενον ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ γυναικὶ μὴ ὁμιλεῖν· διὸ καὶ πρεσβύτας ἐπιεικῶς ἱερεῖς ἀποδεικνύουσι—at the temple of Misogynos Herakles in Phokis). So Artemis Hymnia in Arcadia was served by a priestess ὁμιλίας ἀνδρῶν ἀποχρώντως ἔχουσα, a temple legend accounting for the change from a priesthood held by a κόρη παρθένος (Paus. VIII. v. 12; cf. what is told about the Pythia, Diod. XVI. xxvi. 6). Yet another form of this qualification is found in the condition that no woman more than once married could be priestess of Gē at Aigai (Paus. VII. xxv. 13—a curious test, by drinking bull's blood, applied to candidates). What proportion of Greek cults demanded a celibate priesthood, as compared with those which permitted marriage, is not known. It is to be remarked that the requirement of chastity stands in no sort of relation to the nature of the divinity, as is clear by comparison of *IG* ii. 550, married priestess of Athene, and Paus. II. x. 4, virgin priestess of Aphrodite of Sikyon (whose νεωκόρος also may no more παρ' ἄνδρα φοιτῆσαι). Nor, again, is there any necessary argument from the sex of the divinity worshipped to that of the minister (*e.g.*, Paus. II. xxxiii. 3 [παρθένος priestess of Poseidon], VIII. xlvii. 3 [boy priest of Athene]).

3. Regulations concerning age.—These were, of course, closely connected with the foregoing, and there is no general rule. Some cults demand ripe age in their ministers, especially in the case of priestesses (Paus. VI. xx. 2: πρεσβῖτις ἡ θεραπεύουσα in temple of Sosipolis at Olympia). In many temples the priesthood was held by a girl, until she reached an age for marriage (*ib.* II. xxxiii. 3 [Poseidon at Kalaureia], VII. xix. 1 [Artemis Triklaria], xxvi. 5 [Artemis at Aigeira]), or by a boy, up to the age of puberty (*ib.* VIII. xlvii. 3 [Athene at Tegea], IX. x. 4 [Apollo at Thebes], X. xxxiv. 8 [Athene Kranaia, near Elateia]). In such cases the functions of the holder of the priesthood must have been purely ceremonial, carried out under the guidance of a permanent temple staff which controlled also the administration of the temple. Under such a system abuses would be possible. Hence in a decree of Kos a stipulation of a minimum age is found (*Leges Græcorum Sacræ, e titulis collectæ*, ed. I. de Prott and L.

[1] Cf. Dem. lix. 1369: εἶδεν ἃ οὐ προσῆκεν αὐτὴν ὁρᾶν ξένην οὖσαν. W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Græcarum*², 3 vols., Leipzig, 1898–1901 (hereafter cited as D., followed by a number to indicate the running number of inscriptions quoted), 565. 3: μὴ ἐξεῖναι καταρχεσθαι εἰς τὸ Ἡραῖον ξένον μηδένι (Argos). Herod. vi. 81: βουλόμενον δὲ αὐτὸν θυσιν ἐπι τοῦ βωμοῦ ὁ ἱερεὺς ἐπηρεύετο, φας οὐκ ὅσιον εἶναι ξείνῳ αὐτοῦθι θυειν—of the Spartan king Kleomenes at the Heraion of Argos. Foreign cults and religious associations authorized by decree would, one supposes, be served by their native priests (cf. inscr. from Pergamon [A. Wilhelm, *Jahreshefte der Oest. Arch. Inst.* v. (1902) 127: ἐπειδὴ τὸν ἥρωα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον δεδωκότος τοῖς θρησκευταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἔθνων τὴν ἐγκτησιν καὶ τὴν ἵδρυσιν τοῦ ἱεροῦ, κτλ.).

[2] Cf. Æschin. i. 188: καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἱερωσυνην μεν ὁσιον θεοις κεκτησεται, ὡς οὐκ ὢν ἐκ των νομων καθαρος τὸ σωμα, κτλ.

[1] Cf. F. de Coulanges, *La Cité antique*[11], Paris, 1885, p. 195: 'La doctrine était peu de chose; c'étaient les pratiques qui étaient l'important.' It should also be noted that there must have been a tendency, especially on the part of priests of limited tenure and priests by purchase, to lean upon the knowledge and experience of the permanent temple staff, just as the head of a government department must rely upon the trained experience of the civil service. This in part, doubtless, explains the importance of the neocorate in Asia Minor, where purchase of priesthoods was in vogue.

[2] No doubt this demand was reinforced by the idea, in some cults at any rate, that the priestly function implied in some sense union (συνουσία) with the divinity. Cf. Ar. *Ath. Pol.* iii. 5, for the marriage of the wife of the Athenian king archon with Dionysos.

Ziehen, pars altera, fasc. i., Leipzig, 1906, no. 133):[1] *ἁ δὲ πριαμένα ἔστω ὑγιὴς καὶ ὁλόκλαρος καὶ μὴ νεωτέρα ἐτῶν δέκα· ἱεράσεται δὲ διὰ βίου*; cf. 135, also of Kos, where the minimum age is laid down at fourteen years). It is to be remembered that this was not a matter of caprice, but that in many cases youth, and sometimes extreme youth, on the part of the priest or priestess was demanded by the cult itself (cf. the demand for a *παῖς ἀμφιθαλής* as essential in certain ceremonies). Often, no doubt, the temple legend would profess to explain such regulations, but these legends have mostly perished. Plato, naturally, has no patience with all this, and, going to the opposite extreme, would have all priests to be not under sixty years of age, and would allow them to hold office for a year only (*Laws*, 759 D).

4. Modes of access to priesthood.—(*a*) *Inheritance.*—Originally, perhaps, all cults were family worships, whether or not they were all cults of dead ancestors. In historical times many cults which have come to be national are demonstrably still closely connected with particular families,[2] which retain their priesthoods as a hereditary possession guaranteed by an appeal to legend. Some are perhaps really cases of blending, so that several families or clans maintain their representatives side by side, though not all on the same level, as hereditary cult officials (cf. Paus. IV. xv. 7, I. xxxvii. 1).

Such hereditary national priesthoods can be seen in the making. Thus the family of Gelo of Syracuse claimed to be hereditary hierophants of Demeter and Persephone at Gela because their ancestor Telines had originally possessed the sacred symbols (*ἱερά*) of the cult (Herod. vii. 153). So Maiandrios of Samos proposed to lay down his sovereignty on condition of his family being allowed to retain in perpetuity the priesthood of Zeus Eleutherios, whose cult he founded and endowed (*ib.* iii. 142; cf. the Battiadai at Cyrene [*ib.* iv. 161]). Inscriptions furnish examples of private foundations of this type (*e.g.*, the will of Epikteta of Thera [*CIG* ii. 2448, § 5: *τὰν δὲ ἱερατείαν τᾶν Μουσᾶν καὶ τῶν ἡρῴων ἐχέτω ὁ τᾶς θυγατρός μου υἱὸς Ἀνδραγόρας, εἰ δέ τί κα πάθῃ οὗτος, ἀεὶ ὁ πρεσβύτατος ἐκ τοῦ γένους τοῦ Ἐπιτελείας*—the latter her daughter]).

How succession was arranged within the family itself in respect of these hereditary priesthoods is not always clear. Obviously, the ordinary rules of inheritance might sometimes give an unsatisfactory result. An inscription of Halicarnassus (D. 608) shows us that the priesthood of Poseidon had passed from brother to brother, thence to sons of the eldest brother in succession according to seniority, and so to sons of the next brother, and back again to grandsons of the eldest brother. Naturally, a priesthood arranged on principles of hereditary succession was just as liable as any other property to give rise to disputes. Such in Athens were settled in the court of the king archon (Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 57: *κάν τις ἱερωσύνης ἀμφισβητῇ πρός τινα· διαδικάζει δὲ καὶ τοῖς γένεσι καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσι τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν ἁπάσας οὗτος*). The oldest cults seem in general to retain this method of filling their priesthoods. The tenure under this system was naturally for life, subject to the proviso of sanity and a conduct that did not flout public opinion.

(*b*) *Election.*—Possibly the earliest example of this method occurs in Homer, where it is said of Theano that the Trojans had 'made' her priestess of Athene (*Il.* vi. 300: *τὴν γὰρ Τρῶες ἔθηκαν Ἀθηναίης ἱέρειαν*)—but the inference is not very rigid. The mutilation of the inscription D. 911. 5 instituting a priestess of Athene Nike (460–446 B.C.) *ἐξ Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων* does not allow us to say whether pure election was employed in that instance. More commonly the practice was to elect by means of the lot (cf. D. 558.9: *ὁ εἰληχὼς ἱερεὺς Ἀσκληπιοῦ καὶ Ὑγιείας*, at Athens; and often in inscriptions). Often a mixed method, of election and lot, is used, the sortition being preceded by a selection from among the candidates (cf. Dem. lvii. 1313: *προκρίθην ἐν τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις κληροῦσθαι τῆς ἱερωσύνης τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ*. For Syracuse, Cic. *Verr.* ii. 126: 'lex est de religione, quae in annos singulos Iovis sacerdotem sortito capi iubeat, quod apud illos amplissimum sacerdotium putatur; cum suffragiis tres ex tribus generibus creati sunt, res revocatur ad sortem'; cf. Paus. VII. xxv. 13). In some cases a method of election seems to have replaced the older hereditary priesthood—*e.g.*, in the great inscription of Andania relating to the mysteries (D. 653), where the representative of the old sacerdotal family seems to have surrendered his rights to the State. In course of time lack of suitable candidates for election led to a partial revival of the older method (cf. D. 592 [priesthood of Asklepios of Pergamum confirmed to Asklepiades and his seed for ever by decree of the people]; *L.S.* 56 [decree of Gythion confirming the priesthood of Apollo to Philemon and his son and their descendants—*εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἱερεῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ἐκγόνους αὐτῶν ἀεὶ διὰ βίου καὶ εἶναι παραδόσιμον τὸ προγεγραμένον ἱερὸν τοῖς ἐκγόνοις αὐτῶν ἀεὶ διὰ βίου*, in recognition of their munificence in restoring the cult and temple fallen on evil days]).

Even when reliance was placed upon the lot alone, it is probable that, in Athens at any rate, its frequent use, and perhaps not infrequent manipulation, in connexion with secular official life much impaired its significance as an indication of divine will, though that way of looking upon it might linger in formal expression (*e.g.*, Plato, *Laws*, 759 C: *τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἱερῶν τῷ θεῷ ἐπιτρέποντα αὐτῷ τὸ κεχαρισμένον γίγνεσθαι, κληροῦν οὕτω τῇ θείᾳ τύχῃ ἀποδιδόντα*—but, he continues, the successful candidate must [subsequently?] be duly approved as ceremonially pure and of proper age, and the like; that is to say, in the eyes of Plato also the priesthood is on all fours with any ordinary secular office).

Under this method limited tenure was usual (cf. D. 609, 610), a year being the general term. Longer tenures, short of a life tenure, are found (*e.g.*, five years [Paus. x. xxxiv. 8: *τὸν δὲ ἱερέα ἐκ παίδων αἱροῦνται τῶν ἀνήβων, πρόνοιαν ποιούμενοι πρότερον τῆς ἱερωσύνης ἐξήκειν οἱ τὸν χρόνον πρὶν ἢ ἤβησαι· ἱεροῦται δὲ ἔτη συνεχῆ πέντε*—boy priest of Athene Kranaia]). Such longer tenures are probably in all cases connected with the festival cycle of the particular deity, as is expressly asserted of the priesthood of Demeter at Keleai (Paus. II. xiv. 1: *ἱεροφάντης δὲ οὐκ ἐς τὸν βίον πάντα ἀποδέδεικται, κατὰ δὲ ἑκάστην τελετὴν ἄλλοτέ ἐστιν ἄλλος σφίσιν αἱρετός*—the celebration taking place *δι' ἐνιαυτοῦ τετάρτου*, every third year).

(*c*) *Purchase.*—This method was especially in vogue in the coast cities of Asia Minor and in the islands.[1] The earliest examples belong to Miletos, the home of Ionic free-thought; but it is unknown in Athens, the reputed mother of the Ionic colonies. The method does not necessarily imply the abandonment of older methods (*e.g.*, at Halicarnassus the priesthood of Poseidon Isthmios is held *κατὰ γένος* [D. 608; see above]). Possibly it is not unconnected with the general financial distress of the age after Alexander, though its origin undoubtedly lies much farther back.[2]

A long list of priesthoods sold at Erythrai, with the prices paid for each, is extant (D. 600; 3rd cent. B.C.), distinguishing several varieties, showing that the method was carefully organized from both a fiscal and a legal point of view. Three species are recorded—*ἱερατεῖαι πραθεῖσαι*, priesthoods sold as then vacant, with immediate possession; *ἱερατεῖαι ἐπιπραθεῖσαι*, eventual succession upon death of the existing occupant; *διασύστασις*, where the priest in occupancy purchases the right to appoint his own successor, that is to say, generally his own son. Prices show great variety, the highest being that paid for the priesthood of Hermes Agoraios, probably because it carried with it a claim to market dues (4610 dr.; the lowest price is 10 dr., for the priesthood of Gē; several run to over 1000 dr.). It is clear that purchase of a priesthood was simply one method of making an investment for a livelihood, or provision for one's family, with a sound title. Inferences as to a general decay of

[1] Hereafter cited as *L.S.*, followed by the number of the inscription.

[2] An excellent example of the process involved is afforded by *L.S.* 112, of the 4th cent. B.C., a decree relative to the transference of the *ἱερά* of the Klytidai of Chios—*τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ κοινὰ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν οἰκιῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν οἶκον ἐνεγκεῖν*; cf. Ar. *Pol.* viii. (vi.) 4. 19=1319b: *φυλαί τε γὰρ ἕτεραι ποιητέαι πλείους καὶ φρατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα καὶ κοινά, κτλ.*; see Newman, iv. 524.

[1] Proved, by inscriptions, for Erythrai, Miletos, Sinope, Chios, Priene, Magnesia, Mylasa, Chalkedon, Halicarnassus, Kos. It is to be observed that the vendor is always the State itself, which consequently takes a certain percentage (*ἐπώνιον*) of the purchase money, according to a sliding scale.

[2] The inscription given by Otto, in *Hermes*, xliv. [1909] 594 f., from Miletos, belongs to the 5th cent. B.C., or at latest to the beginning of the 4th cent., and certainly refers to the purchase of priesthoods. Nor is this the only example to be referred to a date before that of Alexander. Whether the origin of this traffic lay in Eastern, non-Hellenic influences cannot as yet be determined, but it seems likely.

religious sentiment are beside the mark. Naturally, under this system the tenure was for life (cf. D. 595, 603, and many examples).

5. Duties of priests.—These were partly liturgical, partly administrative. The Greek priest was in no sense a teacher, or expounder of dogma. His duties for the most part began and ended within the precinct of his own temple. Firstly, he must conduct, or at least superintend, the sacrifices and other ceremonies offered by the State or by private persons, making or indicating the proper prayers and invocations as being the duly appointed expert (cf. the parody in Aristoph. *Birds*, 865 f.: *ἱερεῦ, σὸν ἔργον, θῦε τοῖς καινοῖς θεοῖς, κτλ.*; D. 594, 601. 9: *θυσει τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἰδιωτικά*).[1] Secondly, the priest, like the dean of a cathedral nowadays, was personally responsible for the care of the fabric of the temple and the cultus image and contents of the shrine, and for conservation of the precinct (cf. D. 594. 24: *κοσμεῖν δὲ τὸν ἱερῆ τὸν ναὸν κατ' ἀμέραν· ἐπιμέλεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τᾶς στοιᾶς τᾶς πὸτ τῷ Ἀσκλαπιείῳ ὅπως καθαρὰ ᾖ*—at Chalkedon). Where there was a *νεωκόρος* the priest's duties would be lightened (cf. D. 589. 6: *καὶ ἐπαναγκάζειν τὸν νεωκόρον τοῦ τε ἱεροῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*). Illicit use of the precinct by trespassing stock, and mutilation of the trees within it, evidently caused much trouble (cf. D. 568; Paus. II. xxviii. 7). The priest was also responsible for decent and orderly conduct on the part of visitors to his temple,[2] and for observance of its special regulations (D. 592. 24: *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐκοσμίας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν πάσης τὸν ἱερέα ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ καλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ὁσίως*, *i.e.* he is empowered to make by-laws. Cf. Herod. v. 72 [priestess of Athene Polias at Athens forbids the Spartan king Kleomenes to enter her temple—*οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν Δωριεῦσι παριέναι ἐνθαῦτα*], vi. 81 [a similar scene at the Argeian Heraion]). In the smaller temples and country shrines the financial administration also fell to his care (Ar. *Pol.* viii. (vi.) 8. 18 f. = 1322B), but in general this belonged to State officials or boards (*ταμίαι, ἱεροποιοί, ἐπιμεληταί*, etc.). These took over most of the active administrative functions that once perhaps had been solely in the hands of the priests—repairs, provision of victims and accessaries, disposal of skins and offal, disbursements from the temple treasury, etc.[3]

Just as the administrative competence of the priesthood was much diminished in historical times, so also its ritual side in certain respects survived only in a somewhat mutilated form. In certain festivals it was still the duty of the priest or priestess of particular cults to don the garb and mask and to impersonate the divinity (cf. Paus. VII. xviii. 12 [priestess of Artemis impersonates the goddess in the procession in honour of Artemis Laphria at Patrai—*ἡ ἱερωμένη παρθένος ὀχεῖται τελευταία τῆς πομπῆς ἐπὶ ἐλάφων ὑπὸ τὸ ἅρμα ἐζευγμένων*], VIII. xv. 3 [priest wears mask of Demeter at Pheneos]). Sometimes also the priest must resume his primitive character as magician, and work spells, especially for rain (*ib.* II. xii. 1 [wind spells at Titane], VIII. xxxviii. 4 [rain spells by the priest of Zeus on Mt. Lykaion]). Both these occasional rôles are survivals of the primitive conception and the once normal duties of the priesthood.

A similar gradual narrowing of functions is observable when we consider more definitely what it was that the priest actually did in connexion with the act of sacrifice and worship.

In historical times his participation does not appear to have been essential on purely religious grounds, so as to make the sacrifice ritually effective; for many inscriptions specifically guard against the practice, not infrequent on the part of economical worshippers, of performing the ceremonies without invoking the assistance of the priest, in order to save his perquisite (cf. *L.S.* 33. 6: *μηδὲ καθαρμοὺς ποιῶσιν μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς βωμοὺς μηδὲ τὸ μεγαρον προσίωσιν ἄνευ τῆς ἱερέας*; *ib.* 41. 7: *παραβῶμια δὲ μὴ θυειν μηδένα ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ*—a fine being imposed for breach of this regulation). He would, in the larger shrines at least, use his own discretion about participation, whether invited or uninvited, according to the importance of the occasion. In Herondas, 4, where two women offer the poor man's offering of a cock in the Asklepieion of Kos, we hear nothing of the priest, but only of the *νεωκόρος* (cf. *L.S.* 65 [Oropos]). The perquisite, however, must always be given.

Originally, there is no doubt, the priest must actually have performed the sacrifice, slaying the victim with his own hand and dismembering it for offering, assisted by the worshippers and the temple servants. So in Hom. *Il.* iii. 271 f. the king both initiates the sacrifice by the ritual cutting of hair from the victims' heads (*τρίχας ἀπάρχεσθαι*) and subsequently himself slays them (so also in *Il.* xix. 252 f.; Eur. *El.* 791 f., where Aigisthos performs the sacrificial slaying, but by way of compliment invites Orestes to show his skill in flaying and dismembering the animal. Cf. Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 40: *κατάρχομαι μέν, σφάγια δ' ἄλλοισιν μέλει*, and 623 f.: *ὁ δὲ σφαγεὺς τίς; . . . εἴσω δόμων τῶνδ' εἰσὶν οἷς μέλει τάδε*, where the poet seems at pains to explain a departure from normal procedure). In the smaller temples the priest perhaps continued to perform this office; in others there were apparently special slaughterers (Paus. VIII. xlii. 12: *ἱεροθύται*, at Phigaleia; D. 553. 19: *τοῦ λητουργοῦντος θύτου τῇ πόλει*, at Magnesia).

The special function of the priest was thus reduced, it seems, in general, to the preliminary ceremony of dedication by cutting the hair from the forehead of the victim, and to the formal prayer or invocation (*κατευχή*) and the placing of the parts of the sacrifice in due ritual manner upon the altar (cf. Æschin. iii. 18, already quoted; Herond. iv. 79 f.). The temple law of the Amphiareion at Oropos in fact thus expressly defines the duty of its priest (*L.S.* 65. 26: *κατεύχεσθαι δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν ἐπιτιθεῖν ὅταν παρεῖ, τὸν ἱερέα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παρεῖ, τὸν θύοντα, καὶ τεῖ θυσίει αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῖ κατεύχεσθαι ἕκαστον, τῶν δὲ δημορίων τὸν ἱερέα*).[1]

6. Privileges of priests.—Greek priests do not seem to have been able to claim any special privileges simply by virtue of their office, but such were freely bestowed. The inscriptions on the extant seats in the theatre of Dionysos (Athens) illustrate the grant of *προεδρία*; for special place in religious processions cf. D. 653. 29: *ἐν δὲ ταῖ πομπαῖ ἀγείστω Μνασίστρατος, ἔπειτεν ὁ ἱερεὺς τῶν θεῶν οἷς τὰ μυστήρια γίνεται μετὰ τᾶς ἱερέας, κτλ.* Freedom from taxes (*ἀτέλεια*; cf. D. 592. 20), from war-service (D. 603. 14), right of *σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ*, were some of the more highly prized privileges that might be bestowed upon particular priests.

[1] How far a priest had an exclusive right of sacrifice and prayer in his own temple is not quite clear; on the whole it would appear that he had no right of exclusion, as a rule, against ordinary decent people, subject of course to such by-laws as were locally in force. A worshipper would always be well advised in inviting the co-operation of the recognized expert, under pain of finding his private sacrifice vitiated through neglect of some ritual detail (cf. D. 633. 8: *καὶ μηθένα θυσιαζειν ἄνευ τοῦ καθειέρυσαμενου τὸ ἱερόν· ἐὰν δέ τις βιάσηται, ἀπρόσδεκτος ἡ θυσία παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ*—where note the absence of any sanction). In 396 B.C. Agesilaos of Sparta, on his way to Asia, attempted to sacrifice to Artemis at Aulis (Plut. *Ages.* 6: *καὶ καταστεύας ἔλαφον, ἐκέλευσεν ἀπάρξασθαι τον ἑαυτοῦ μάντιν, οὐχ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν Βοιωτων τεταγμένος*). The Boiotarchs sent men to forbid it (*ἀπαγορεύοντες τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ μὴ θυειν παρα τους νόμους καὶ τὰ πατρια Βοιωτοῖς*), and scattered his sacrifice from the altar. Here the ritual was confessedly irregular; and political considerations also came in—the Boiotians had no very tender conscience in regard to Panhellenic sentiment in this domain (cf. Thuc. iv. 97: *παραβαινοντες τα νόμιμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων*) in 424 B.C.

[2] On the other hand, in the case of the temple of Aphrodite Pandemos in Athens this duty fell upon the *astynomoi* (D. 556); but there the circumstances were naturally somewhat special.

[3] For inscriptions relative to Athenian administration of temples see E. L. Hicks and G. F. Hill, *Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, new ed., Oxford, 1901, p. 88 f. (Delos), p. 124 f. (inventories of the Parthenon treasures, of which here there is an almost complete series extending from 434 to 404 B.C.). The financial management of great temples like that of Delos, with their vast accumulations of capital, was a matter of great importance; see W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, London, 1911, p. 34 f.

[1] In Homer the two designations of a priest are *ἱερεύς*, as sacrificer, and *ἀρητήρ* (*Il.* i. 11, v. 78: *ἀρητὴρ ἐτετυκτο, θεὸς δ' ὡς τίετο δῆμῳ*) as invocant, showing the importance of the latter aspect. So these two functions are pitched upon by Plato in his definition quoted above from *Pol.* 290 C.

Even more substantial, and more universal, were the rights of perquisite (*ἱερώσυνα, γέρα*).

These are carefully defined and enumerated in a large number of inscriptions. In general, the priest had a right to a leg (*σκέλος* or *κωλή*) of each victim, and very often to the skin;[1] to the skin not always, even in private sacrifices (cf. D. 601. 14), and in the case of the great State sacrifices, in Athens at least, the *δερματικόν* was an important item of State revenue (cf. D. 620). In some instances the priest receives also, from the worshippers, a small fee at each sacrifice, probably to cover incidental expenses,[2] for wood, oil, etc.—all of which small accessaries it was his duty to provide for those who wished to sacrifice (cf. Paus. v. xiii. 2 f. of the *ξυλεύς* at Olympia; D. 734. 39 [Kos]: *παρεχέτω δὲ καὶ ξύλα ποτὶ τὰν θυσίαν*). The priests of certain cults had also the right of *ἀγερμός*, street collection of alms (D. 666: *ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ ἱερεὺς τῆς Ἴσιος ἔθετο τὴν ἱκετηρίαν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ ἐγνώσθη ἔννομος εἶναι ἀξιῶν τῇ θεῷ καθότι καὶ πρότερον ἀγείρειν, κτλ.*—evidently a case of appeal against restricting legislation: cf. Plat. *Rep.* ii. 364 B, and 381 D: *Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν*). This was mainly an Eastern custom which received little encouragement among the Greeks, and is somewhat strictly regulated—*e.g.*, in the case of the cult of Artemis Pergaia at Halicarnassus (D. 601. 26: *ἐν ᾧ δὲ μηνὶ ἡ θυσία συντελεῖται ἡ δημοτελής, ἀγειρέτω πρὸ τῆς θυσίας ἡμέρας τρεῖς ἐπ' οἰκίαν μὴ πορευομένη· ὁ δὲ ἀγερμὸς ἔστω τῆς ἱερείας*).

As a salaried office the priesthood is known in very few cases, notably in that of the priestess of Athene Nike in Athens, who receives fifty drachmai a year, together with the usual perquisite (*L.S.* 11; D. 911; Hicks and Hill, p. 59 f.). How far, if at all, the priest enjoyed the income from the temple endowment of lands, etc., is not known. The variety of the sources of wealth open to priests, as revealed to us from inscriptions, is very great (cf. Paus. I. xxxviii. 1). This, of course, gave them the means of enhancing the pomp of their processions, and of spending large sums upon the adornment of their temple, for which liberalities they were duly honoured, as appears from numerous decrees (*e.g.*, D. 558).

7. **Minor points.**—(*a*) *Tabus.*—These apparently did not differ from those imposed upon all who would use the temple—avoidance of impurity from contact with the dead (cf. Paus. IV. xii. 6 [Messene]; law of Kos, in *ARW* x. [1907] 400 f.), and avoidance of certain foods, either permanently or for a season (cf. D. 633. 3: *καθαριζέσθω δὲ ἀπὸ σκόρδων καὶ χοιρέων, κτλ.* See the curious regulation forbidding the priestess of Athene Polias to eat fresh Attic cheese [Strabo, p. 395: *τὴν ἱέρειαν τῆς Πολιάδος Ἀθηνᾶς χλωροῦ τυροῦ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιχωρίου μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, ξενικὸν δὲ μόνον προσφέρεσθαι, χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῷ Σαλαμινίῳ*]; cf. Porphyr. *de Abstin.* iv. 5; *τοῖς τοίνυν ἱερεῦσι τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζῴων πάντων, τοῖς δέ τινων πάντως προστέτακται ἀπέχεσθαι βορᾶς, ἄν τε Ἑλληνικὸν ἔθος σκοπῇς, ἄν τε βάρβαρον*). The priest of Poseidon at Pylos might not eat fish (Plut. *Quæst. Conv.* viii. 8. 4), nor might the priestess of Hera at Argos eat red mullet (Plut. *de Sollert. Anim.* xxxv. 11; cf. the reluctance of the Homeric Greeks to eat fish [*Od.* iv. 368 f., and J. G. Frazer, *Comm. on Paus.* vii. 22. 4]). Probably similar tabus were operative to a much greater extent than is revealed by our literary sources. Yet regulations of the severity imposed upon the priest and priestess of Artemis Hymnia (Orchomenos) do not seem to have been in accord with general Hellenic practice, apart from the imported cults (Paus. VIII. xiii. 1).

(*b*) *Dress.*—Priests and priestesses wore no uniform distinctive dress, except that priests seem all to have worn the long ungirdled *χιτών* that once had been the ordinary civic dress (Thuc. i. 6; cf. sculpture, and especially vase-paintings). Fillets and chaplet were also probably worn by all, at least when officiating. Of the numerous titles borne by priests, according to the local usage, those of Stephanephoros and Daphnephoros are derived from distinctive accessaries (Paus. IX. x. 4: *ἐπίκλησις δὲ ἐστὶν οἱ δαφναφόρος· στεφάνους γὰρ φύλλων δάφνης φοροῦσιν οἱ παῖδες* [*sc.* the priest of Apollo Ismenios at Thebes]). The wreath, however, was as much a mark of the magistrate as of the priest. White was the usual colour of the dress, but purple is not infrequent—white being held appropriate for the heavenly powers and purple for chthonian deities (Plato, *Laws*, 956 A: *χρώματα δὲ λευκὰ πρέποντ' ἂν θεοῖς εἴη καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν ὑφῇ· βάμματα δὲ μὴ προσφέρειν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολέμου κοσμήματα*). So the archon at Plataiai, who was also a priest, always wore a white dress, and was forbidden to touch iron, but exchanged his white for purple, and a sword, on the day on which he offered the great sacrifice to the spirits of those who fell in the Persian war (see Plut. *Arist.* 21 for the very striking ceremony). For various interesting regulations concerning dress see the Andania inscription (D. 653; cf. 939). The hair was worn long (Herod. ii. 36: *οἱ ἱερέες τῶν θεῶν τῇ μὲν ἄλλῃ κομέουσι, ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ ξυρῶνται*; cf. Plut. *Arist.* 5).

(*c*) Something of the nature of an enthronement, with accompanying festivities, seems to be alluded to in D. 594. 22: *ἐπεὶ δὲ κα ταν τιμὰν πασαν καταβάλῃ, ἀνατεθησεῖται· τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ ἐς τὰν ἄνθεσιν παρεξεῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ*, but we know nothing further of any ceremony of consecration or inauguration.

LITERATURE.—A. Boeckh, 'De sacerdotiis Græcorum,' in *Philological Museum*, Cambridge, 1833, ii. 449 f.; E. Curtius, 'Das Priesterthum bei den Hellenen,' in *Alterthum und Gegenwart*, Berlin, 1882, ii. 38 f.; P. Foucart, *Des Associations religieuses chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1873; J. Martha, *Les Sacerdoces athéniens*, do. 1882; H. Herbrecht, *De sacerdotii apud Græcos emptione venditione*, Strassburg, 1885; W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Ägypten*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1905–08; P. Stengel, *Opferbräuche der Griechen*, do. 1910; W. Otto, 'Kauf und Verkauf von Priestertümern bei den Griechen,' in *Hermes*, xliv. [1909] 594 f.; I. de Prott and L. Ziehen, *Leges Græcorum Sacræ, e titulis collectæ*, fasc. i. 'Fasti sacri,' Leipzig, 1896, fasc. ii. 1, 'Leges Græciæ et insularum,' do. 1906; C. T. Newton, *Essays on Art and Archæology*, London, 1880, p. 136 f. (from epigraphic material).

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Hebrew).—**1. Date of institution.**—Those portions of the OT which are most priestly in tone are latest in point of time. When we lay these aside and try to get a historic view, we discover that the earliest legislation[1] does not mention priests at all. It may be said that, where firstfruits and festival offerings are spoken of,[2] a priest is implied; but this is not necessarily the case. The earliest offerings, including tithes and firstfruits, were brought directly to the Divinity and presented to Him in a feast in which the worshipper and his family, with their invited guests, consumed the whole. For sacrifice it was not deemed essential to have any official. Many passages of the OT show that the ritual was familiar to every adult male of the clan and that any man could perform the ordinary acts of worship.

It does not follow, however, that priests were unknown even in the earliest stages of Israel's religion. For other purposes than sacrifice a priest is implied even in the earliest documents. When the Covenant Code provides that cases of dispute shall be brought before God,[3] it thinks of the sanctuary as a place where the will of the Divinity is made known. But this clearly implies that there is some person to interpret that will to men. When the narrator speaks of the perplexed Rebecca going to 'seek Jahweh,'[4] he has in mind an oracle and its interpreter. From this point of view we understand the primitive priesthood.

2. Designations.—The Hebrew word for 'priest' is *kôhēn*, and the corresponding Arabic word (*kâhin*) means 'a soothsayer'—more exactly, as we learn from the Arabic lexicographers, one who has a familiar spirit to tell him things otherwise unknown. This 'priest' is the familiar friend of a god or demon, and his interpreter to those who seek him.

The priestly caste, however, is designated by another word in Hebrew, the explanation of which is not so easy. To understand it, we must think of the many sacred places in the land which offer an asylum to fugitives or criminals. It would easily happen that the broken man, who was outlawed by his kin, one who had survived the massacre of his family, would settle in such a place under the protection of the god as his client. Gradually he would become acquainted with the customs of the place; if susceptible, he would receive intimations of the god's will in dreams of the night or visions of the day, and would serve as guide to strangers who resorted to the place. Thus the man would become an attaché of the

[1] So in Sparta the kings receive as perquisite the skins of all State sacrifices (Herod. vi. 56: *τῶν δὲ θυομένων ἁπάντων τὰ δέρματά τε καὶ τὰ νωτα λαμβανειν σφέας*. Cf. Hom. *Od.* iv. 65).

[2] In D. 591 (Kos) certain categories of worshippers apparently receive the privilege of paying a lump sum of five obols to cover all such incidental charges — *πέντ' ὀβολὸς διδούσαις ἀπολελύσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλωμάτων πάντων*.

[1] The Covenant Code, Ex 20–23.

[2] Ex 23[19]; the occurrence of tithes in the story of Bethel (Gn 28[22]) is parallel.

[3] Ex 22[7ff.].

[4] Gn 25[22f.].

place, a slave of the god, as he would doubtless delight to call himself. The Hebrew word for 'one attached to another' is *lēwî*, which we translate 'Levite,' but which originally meant one 'joined' to a person or place.[1] The Levite is the priest viewed as an attaché of a sanctuary; the *kôhēn* is the same person ministering as the interpreter of the oracle.

We may illustrate the state of things in Israel 3000 years ago by what is found in Syria to-day. That country, we are told, is full of local shrines dedicated to saints—Christian or Muhammadan. Each shrine has one or more attendants who are supported in part at least by the sacrifices, generally receiving the hide and one of the quarters of the slain animal. The office is usually hereditary, though cases are known where a boy is given to the saint and becomes his slave. Holy men connected with the shrines claim prophetic power.[2] So priests and prophets were both found at the sanctuaries in Israel. Samuel was a boy who was presented to the Jahweh of Shiloh, and he would have succeeded to the priestly office had the sanctuary not been destroyed. At the same time he developed prophetic powers which made him the vehicle of the divine will, though not bound to any one place.

Of the two Hebrew words *lēwî* and *kôhēn*, one came to designate the man qualified to act in divine things, the other described him as officiating at a sanctuary. This is well brought out by a narrative in the book of Judges (ch. 18).

Here we read of a man named Micah who had an idol of precious metal. At first he set apart one of his sons as its attendant. But one day a stranger announced himself as a Levite from Bethlehem. Micah recognized his opportunity and engaged him. The way in which he congratulated himself on having a Levite for priest shows the light in which the professional was looked upon. There was nothing illegal in the ordination of the layman who had first undertaken the office, but it was in every way better to have a man who belonged to the gild.

If we may argue from this case, the Levite was often obliged to seek his living by entering the service of strangers, and we can see how the decline in the popularity of a sanctuary might force its attendants, or some of them, to emigrate.

3. Functions.—The earliest priests, then, were not sacrificers, but guardians of the sanctuary and its treasures—gold or silver images or utensils would need such—and interpreters of the oracle. The last point must be borne clearly in mind. It comes out in the story of Micah, for, when the Danites came to the house of Micah, they asked a response from Jahweh. So favourably were they impressed by this experience that they carried off image and priest and settled them in their new possession. In the history of Saul we find a priest with an ephod in the camp,[3] and no step was taken without the approval of the oracle. When the priests of Nob were massacred, the one who escaped brought the ephod to David and gave him counsel in the same way.[4] Whatever theory we may adopt concerning the ephod, we must recognize in it the instrument by which the priest ascertained the divine will. The ephod remained the property of the priest down to the latest time, as did the Urim and Thummim, which we know to have been the sacred lot.

The technical name for the instruction given by the priest is *tôrāh*. From the earliest to the latest period of Israel's history, it is assumed that *tôrāh* belongs to the priest. The severe arraignment of the priests by the older prophets specifies their neglect of the teaching function as their most serious crime.[1] The priests of other nations were supposed to have the same duty as those in Israel. When the Philistines were at a loss how to treat the Ark, they consulted their priests, who told them the proper method.[2] Jeremiah speaks of the priests as those who handle *tôrāh*, and, when Haggai wants to know about a matter of ritual cleanliness, he seeks *tôrāh* from the priest.[3] Even the Priestly documents, which lay stress on the sacrificial duties of the priest, speak of imparting *tôrāh* as one of his offices. The activity of the priest at the examination of the leper and at the ordeal of jealousy[4] is therefore in line with his earliest duties. From giving responses in answer to such legal questions as were brought before him, the priest easily assumed the office of judge. Both Deuteronomy and Ezekiel indicate that the priests act as judges, and the earliest picture drawn of Moses shows that he was as much priest as prophet in making known the decisions of Jahweh.[5]

4. Priestly and prophetical ideals.—The Levites early traced their origin to a common ancestor. Whether there was a clan or tribe that bore the name 'Levi' before the rise of the priesthood is a question on which scholars are not agreed. (*a*) In the *Testament of Jacob*[6] we find such a tribe spoken of in terms used of its brother tribes. It is coupled with Simeon in a denunciation which ends with the threat to scatter them in Israel. Of Simeon we know that he was ground to pieces in the struggles between Israel and the frontier Bedawīn. It is natural to think of Levi as scattered in a similar way. But this is not a necessary inference. The author of the poem, living in the time of Solomon, may have inferred the threat from the scattered condition of the gild—a fact which must attract attention from its singularity.

(*b*) The next mention of Levi shows a considerable advance in the esteem in which the tribe was held. It is contained in the poem called the *Blessing of Moses*. Here we read:

'Thy Urim and thy Thummim belong to the man of thy friendship
Whom thou didst prove at Massah,
For whom thou didst strive at the waters of Meribah;
Who says of his father and his mother: I have not seen them;
He does not recognize his brothers and does not know his sons;
For they keep thy word
And they guard thy covenant;
They teach Jacob thy judgments
And Israel thy *tôrāh*;
They bring fragrance into thy nostrils
And whole burnt-offerings upon thine altar' (Dt 33^{8-10}).

The change of tone between this and the preceding must be evident. Here the tribe or gild is said to be isolated because its members have chosen to ignore father and mother, brothers and sons, for the sake of Jahweh. The priesthood is the reward of this disregard of the ties of kindred. And the great leader and prototype of this calling is Moses, who was tried at Massah and Meribah. We recall that Moses was an outcast for the sake of his devotion to his mission, and that he was priest as well as prophet. One thing more comes into view in this poem. This is that the Levites are now the ministers of the altar. They not only teach the *tôrāh*, but also burn the sacrifices. It is not asserted that they have an exclusive right to do this, and in fact it is very doubtful whether an exclusive right could have been established in the face of early example. The earliest legislation makes it the duty of every Israelite to erect a

[1] The writer of Nu 18^{2-7} and 3^{9-10} is aware of the original meaning of the word *lewi*, and plays upon it (see A. Kuenen, *National Religions and Universal Religions* [*HL*], London, 1882, p. 82 f.).

[2] S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Sem. Rel. To-day*, New York and London, 1902, p. 144 f.

[3] 1 S 14^{18}, see RVm.

[4] 1 S 22^{20} 23^{6} *et al.*

[1] Hos 4^{1-10}; cf. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, p. 138.

[2] 1 S 6².

[3] Jer 2⁸, Hag 2¹¹.

[4] Lv 13, 2 Ch 26^{20}, Nu 5.

[5] Kuenen, p. 90; also Ex 18^{15} 33^{7-11}.

[6] Gn 49; see vv.5-7.

plain altar of earth or unhewn stone in every place where he discovers traces of God's presence, and there to offer his sacrifices. The exclusive right could hardly have been established where this law was distinctly in mind. But it is clear that at the more conspicuous sanctuaries the ritual would, as it became more complicated, fall more and more into the hands of the official ministers.

(*c*) The *Blessing of Moses* was written some time after the division of Israel into two kingdoms. It shows that at that time the Levites were regarded as an organism, and that to them belonged preferential rights to minister at the altar as well as to manipulate the sacred oracle. The next document of importance is the book of Deuteronomy. To understand its position we shall have to recall the sharp polemic of the prophets against the popular worship. These preachers of righteousness believed that the cultus was useless because Jahweh required something very different, viz. righteousness between man and man; or else they believed it to be an abomination to Him because it was really offered to another divinity. In the condemnation which the prophets so emphatically utter the priests have their full share. The sanctuaries are represented as centres of moral corruption, and the priests are active fomenters of what by their calling they ought to oppose. The people perish for lack of knowledge, because the priests, whose business it is to teach the will of God, neglect their duty. This state of things is not confined to the northern kingdom. In Judah also we hear of priests who are drunken, ignorant, profane, violent, and addicted to lying.[1] Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah are the witnesses to these charges.

The author of the book of Deuteronomy was a practical man. He was in sympathy with the prophetic ideas, but he saw that the cultus could not be dispensed with. Vested interests were on its side, and the craving of the heart for religion needed the traditional ordinances. His book therefore represents a compromise between prophets and priests. We learn from him that all priests belong to the class of Levites and that all are entitled to the same rights and privileges. In fact he usually speaks of them as 'Levite-priests.'[2] Although in some cases he uses the simple term 'Levite,' he nowhere intimates that there was any difference of function between a Levite and a Levite-priest. The Levites are called carriers of the Ark (the carrying of the Ark is elsewhere assigned to the priests); the Levite-priests have charge of the curious expiatory rite over the body of a man found slain; disputes are to be brought to the central sanctuary, there to be decided by the Levite-priests, such decision being, as we have seen, a distinctively priestly function. In a passage in Jeremiah, which is in the tone of Deuteronomy, we learn that the Levite-priests shall have the privilege of offering burnt-offerings and of performing sacrifice for ever; and in the same connexion we find the Levites described as the priests who minister to Jahweh.[3]

The thing that comes prominently into view in reading this author is the poverty of the class as a class. While we may suppose that the great sanctuaries, especially those which had kings for their patrons, gave an adequate support to their officials, the mass of the Levites connected with the village high places were dependent on the charity of their neighbours. They are mentioned along with the widow and the fatherless, and commended to the benevolence of the people. The Levite is to be invited to the family feast, for 'he has no portion or lot with thee.' Tithes and free-will offerings are to be shared with the Levite, and every third year the tithe is to be wholly distributed among the needy, the Levite being expressly mentioned. This care for the Levite extends to the time when, as the author intends, the country sanctuaries shall be done away in favour of the exclusive right of the Jerusalem Temple. The privation that will thus be inflicted on the priests of these shrines is in the author's mind, and he directs in so many words that the deprived Levites shall be admitted to the service at Jerusalem on the same terms as the priests already in possession. This provision was never carried out, but the enactment shows what now interests us—that the author knew no difference between priests of one sanctuary and those of another.[1]

(*d*) As Deuteronomy exerted a great influence by its union of priestly and prophetic ideals, so the next step was taken by a man who united the two offices in his own person—Ezekiel, a priest by birth and a prophet by calling. He was fully possessed by the idea of the earlier prophets that the calamity which had overtaken Israel was the punishment for sin. But his priestly training made him look upon sin as a trespass upon ritual requirements. Ritual and ethical transgressions were alike violations of the holiness of Jahweh. The problem of the future was to prevent the intrusion of either on the isolation in which the Deity lives. The problem was solved in the programme drawn up by the prophet, the foundation principle of which is that only consecrated persons and consecrated things shall approach the place of worship.

The distinctness with which this matter is formulated shows that Ezekiel was conscious of introducing something new. In fact, the kings of Judah had been accustomed to have the inferior offices of the sanctuary performed by slaves of foreign origin, whom they presented to the Temple or to the priests. Ezekiel's statement and his correction of the abuse are combined in the following passage:

'Enough of all your abominations, house of Israel, that you have brought foreigners uncircumcised of flesh and uncircumcised of heart into my sanctuary to pollute it when you offered my bread, the fat and the blood, and broke my covenant by all your abominations! You did not keep guard over my sacred things, but set *them* as guards over my sacred things in your stead. Therefore thus says Jahweh: No foreigner uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh shall enter my sanctuary. . . . But the Levites who departed from me when Israel wandered away after their idols—they shall bear their guilt; they shall be in my sanctuary, serving in the place of sentinels at the doors of the House and serving the House. They shall slay the burnt-offerings and the sacrifices and shall stand to serve them. . . . They shall not approach me to act as my priests to approach the most sacred things. . . . But the Levite priests, the sons of Zadok, who kept watch over my sanctuary when the sons of Israel wandered from me, they shall come near to serve me, and they shall stand before me to present fat and blood, says the Lord Jahweh. They shall come into my sanctuary, and they shall approach my table to serve me' (Ezk $44^{6\,16}$).

The innovations which are thus made part of the new law are two. (1) The entrance of any but consecrated persons into the Temple is strictly prohibited; even the worshipping Israelite is debarred, as we learn elsewhere. (2) The consecrated persons are divided into two classes. For the first time the family of Zadok receives special duties and privileges. Below them stand the Levites, who are to have the menial offices once in the hands of the Temple-slaves. With regard to the promotion of the sons of Zadok, we may say that Ezekiel only sanctioned a *status quo*. This family was in hereditary possession of the Jerusalem priesthood. The book of Deuteronomy had

[1] Hos 4^{1-12} 6^{9}, Zeph 3^{4}, Is 28^{7}, Jer 2^{8} 6^{13} 8^{10}.

[2] Dt $17^{9.\ 18}$ 24^{8}; cf. Jos 8^{33}, Jer 33^{18}.

[3] Cf. Dt 31^{25}, where the Levites are called carriers of the Ark, with Jos 3^{3}, 1 S 6^{15}, 2 S 15^{24}; further, Dt 21^{5}, Jer 33^{17-22}, and Dt 18^{5}.

[1] Dt 18^{6-8} $12^{12.\ 18f.}$ $14^{27.\ 29}$ $16^{11.\ 14}$ 26^{11}.

demanded that the Levites from the country sanctuaries be admitted on an equality with those already in possession. But the most that the immigrants had been able to secure was admission to the lower offices. Ezekiel gave the stamp of his authority to this arrangement and thus introduced a new period of ecclesiastical history.

(*e*) What took place in Jerusalem in the time of Darius at the rebuilding of the Temple is not very well known to us, but one thing stands out distinctly: the chief priest at once assumed a prominent position in the community. This was inevitable, because the unity of the Jews was no longer political but ecclesiastical. There are, indeed, indications that Joshua, the chief priest, was the object of enmity on the part of some—whether rival claimants to the office or defenders of the rights of the secular authority cannot distinctly be made out. While Zerubbabel, a scion of the house of David, was civil governor, the community seems to have cherished the hope that the civil and ecclesiastical powers would work harmoniously[1] for the introduction of the Messianic kingdom. Perhaps for this very reason the Persians thought it unwise to retain Zerubbabel in office. His removal left the chief priest the highest Jewish dignitary in the country, and there was no check to the growth of his influence. This prominence of the chief priest was quite apart from Ezekiel's thought, for he makes no mention of such an officer.

(*f*) Nevertheless the ideas of Ezekiel did work. The evidence is found in the two documents which are dominated by the priestly ideal—the Priest Code, now embedded in the Pentateuch, and the books of Chronicles. They differ from Ezekiel in that he located his ideal commonwealth in the future, while they place theirs in the past. The divergence of their picture from the one drawn by earlier historical writers did not trouble them. They were not writing history, even when they seemed to themselves to be doing so; they were embodying an idea. That idea was Israel, not as a political community, but as a Church whose only business was to carry on the worship of God.

The central object in the wilderness wandering is therefore the Tabernacle, and the Tabernacle as nearly like the historic Temple as a movable building could be like one of stone. Its plan was exactly the same as that of the Temple, the dimensions being reduced one half. In ornamentation it was not inferior, for the imagination of the author was able to furnish gold and gems and the finest stuffs even in the desert of Sinai. This dwelling of Jahweh in the midst of His people is exactly the ideal of Ezekiel, though Ezekiel did not suppose it had been actual in the past. What immediately concerns us is that the staff of attendants assigned to this sanctuary also realizes Ezekiel's idea.

The Tabernacle has the whole tribe of Levi assigned to it to care for it, and the tribe is divided into the two classes of priests and Levites. In the representation made by the author the historic process is exactly reversed; *i.e.*, instead of the whole tribe being taken and then the family of Aaron being separated to their special duty, the family of Aaron is first consecrated to the priesthood and then the rest of the tribe is assigned to this family as helpers. The enormous number of Levites finds an ostensible justification in the necessity of taking down the Dwelling and transporting it. Yet the discrepancy between the three priests and the 22,000 Levites remains surprising and even grotesque.

Ezekiel ordains that the Levites shall camp about the Temple; so our author makes them camp around the Dwelling in the desert. The importance of having consecrated persons in this position to guard the sanctuary from the danger of pollution is seen in the consecration of the Levites. They are purified by the triple rite of sprinkling with holy water, washing of clothes, and a purificatory sacrifice. Thus prepared, they are 'waved' by Aaron in imitation of the presentation of a sacrifice. The significance of the whole is to indicate that the Levites are given to Jahweh by the Israelites, and by Him in turn given to Aaron and his sons to assist in the service.

The priesthood is the prerogative of Aaron and his sons. How Aaron came to take the place of Zadok, to whom Ezekiel gave the office, is still a mystery. Earlier indications are that Aaron was connected with the calf-worship of Bethel. Between Ezekiel and the time of the Priestly writer some influence of the northern kingdom must have made itself felt in Jerusalem. The fact stands out quite clearly that in the Priest Code Aaron and his sons are fully established in the priesthood. The whole responsibility for the service is theirs; they bring the blood of the sacrifice to the altar, burn the fat, offer the unbloody gifts. It is their duty to light the lamp in the sanctuary, to eat the 'bread of the presence,' and to burn incense within the Dwelling. For them the ritual of the great festivals and of the daily offerings is laid down.[1] For them also the author includes in his book the so-called Holiness Code[2]—a body of regulations drawn up in the Exile for the government of the priests in their daily life.

It will be seen that the office of the priest has now become mainly sacrificial. But the old theory of his duty as interpreter of the will of God still remains in such cases, *e.g.*, as the inspection of leprosy. Here the priest appears as examiner and judge of the kind of infection, and director of what is to be done for the ritual restoration of the afflicted person to the community. The difference between the present system and the earlier administration of the oracle is that now everything is laid down in a book by which the official must be guided. The result of thus formulating the cultus is to deprive it of its old character as an expression of joy and gratitude on the part of the worshipper, and to emphasize it as an *opus operatum* by which alone the relation between Jahweh and His people is kept intact.

The prominence of the chief priest in the post-Exilic community has already been spoken of. In the Priestly document his position is made sure by divine appointment. In him, in fact, the culmination of the sacerdotal system is found. It is he who represents the people before God, and whose ministration secures them the divine grace. He it is who once a year goes alone into the Most Holy place to restore the purity of the dwelling and of the people. No part of the OT is more familiar to Christian and Jewish students than the ritual of the great Day of Atonement. Its solemnity indicates the intercessory value of the high-priest. But the sacerdotal head of the community is also in this writer's mind the political head. His vestments are regal, and they are meant to be so. He wears a tiara which cannot be distinguished from a kingly crown, a robe of royal purple, gold and gems of untold value. In the theory of the code there is no one above him in rank. Moses, indeed, may be said to be his superior, in the sense in which the king-maker is above the king. But this is because Moses was the necessary inaugurator of the new state of things—a special organ of divine grace, who is to have no successor. The civil ruler in his relation to the high-priest is represented by

[1] Zec 3 and 4; cf. 6[10f].

[1] Lv 1 and 2; Nu 28 and 29.

[2] Lv 17–26, based no doubt on earlier tradition.

Joshua in his relation to Eleazar, and it is plainly one of inferiority.[1]

The book of Chronicles is wholly of the mind of the Priest Code in recognizing the difference between priests and Levites. But the author, who was perhaps himself a Levite, takes great interest in the lower clergy. In a part of his work we find (perhaps under the influence of tradition) the post-Exilic community divided into Israel, priests, Levites, Nethinim, and the sons of Solomon's servants. In another place the door-keepers and singers are found between the Levites and the Nethinim.[2] The Nethinim (*q.v.*) we know to be descendants of those Temple-slaves to whom Ezekiel objected, and the sons of Solomon's servants were one particular class of the same order. Ezekiel's regulation had not been able to overcome the traditional claim of these men to a place in the hierarchy. What actually took place was the absorption of all classes of lower clergy into that of the Levites. The Chronicler shows a purpose to defend this absorption and establish its legitimacy. This he does by dating the organization of the Levites (into gilds of singers and door-keepers) in the time of David.[3] His desire to magnify the office of the Levites leads him to vindicate for them the function of teaching the Law. He pictures them also as having in charge the sacred vessels of the Temple as well as preparing the shew-bread and the sacred ointment.[4]

The Levites never assumed the importance in actual life which they had in the system of the scribes. The inferior offices fell into the hands of the priests, while the high-priestly family formed an aristocracy which arrogated the higher functions to itself. In Maccabæan times and later we hear of higher and lower orders of priests, but scarcely any mention is made of Levites. The reason for this is not far to seek. The income of the Temple was never sufficient to support the large body of attendants provided by the Law; and what came to it was seized by the higher orders of the clergy. The economic situation is revealed by the list in the book of Ezra, which gives one in seven of the population of the restored commonwealth as priests. It was impossible for a poor people, who had to pay taxes to the Persian power, to support so large a body of Temple-servants.

5. Revenues.—In conclusion a word must be given to the matter of priestly income and support. In the earliest times there was no fixed income for the priest. Some portion of the sacrifice was given to him by the offerer, and the hide of the slain animal came to him from the nature of the case. Deuteronomy goes so far as to legislate on this as on some other subjects. It gives the priest the shoulder, the cheek, and the maw of the sacrifice.[5] In this book we also have mention of the firstfruits and the tithe. These were not given to the priest directly, but were brought to the sanctuary, where they were consumed in a joyful feast by the one who brought them—the priest being invited to share, no doubt. Every third year, however, this author directs that the tithe be distributed to the needy classes, among which the Levites were counted, as we have seen.[6]

The advance in ideas is seen in the Priest Code, which ordains distinctly that a tenth part of the produce of the land is to be given the Levites for their support. The firstfruits are also disposed of in the same way, the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings become the property of the priests, and a yearly tax of half a shekel is laid upon each male Israelite for the support of the sanctuary.[1] In fact the provision, if carried out, would have given adequate support to the whole sacerdotal caste. But the difficulty in collecting so heavy a tax must be evident. The theory of the Law gave the priests a tenth of the tithes collected by the Levites, and logically the high-priest would receive the tenth of what came to the priests, but this is nowhere enjoined.

A purely ideal construction is the assignment of cities with pasturage, though without farms, to the Levites, a certain number of them going to the priests. Almost all the towns of importance in the country are thus given to the Levites by the Priestly writer. The earlier historical writers know nothing of any such arrangement, and in fact to them the most striking mark of Levi is that he received no territory at the conquest and settlement of Canaan.

LITERATURE.—An enormous literature exists on this subject. The older view is to be found in J. H. Kurtz, *Sacrificial Worship of the OT*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1863; K. F. Keil, *Handbuch der bibl. Archäologie*[2], Frankfort, 1875, pp. 166–196; and A. Köhler, *Gesch. des AT*, Erlangen, 1875–85, i. 375–385. The critical view is indicated by J. K. W. Vatke, *Die Religion des AT*, Berlin, 1835, and is more fully developed by A. Kuenen, *The Religion of Israel*, Eng. tr., London, 1873–75, ii. 202–307. The best discussion is that of J. Wellhausen, *Proleg. zur Gesch. Israels*[6], Berlin, 1905, Eng. tr., *Prolegomena to the Hist. of Israel*, Edinburgh, 1885, pp. 121–164. More elaborate, but not more convincing, is W. W. Baudissin, *Die Gesch. des alttest. Priesterthums*, Leipzig, 1889. A. van Hoonacker attempts to establish an unhistorical view in a work of great learning entitled *Le Sacerdoce lévitique dans la loi et dans l'hist. des Hébreux*, Louvain, 1899. Mention may be made also of S. Maybaum, *Die Entwicklung des altisr. Priestertums*, Breslau, 1880; and the *Hebrew Archæologies* of W. G. H. Nowack (2 vols., Freiburg, 1894), and I. Benzinger (2do. 1907). Special points are treated by J. Braun, *Vestitus Sacerdotum Hebræorum*, Amsterdam, 1680; J. Selden, *De Successione in Pontificatum Ebræorum*, London, 1636; S. I. Curtiss, *The Levitical Priests*, New York and London, 1877 (a reply to Kuenen); further, a discussion on the origin of the Aaronite priesthood by R. H. Kennett and A. H. McNeile in *JThSt* vi. [1904–05] 161–186, and vii. [1905–06] 1–9. Recent discussions are luminously reviewed by Kuenen in an essay entitled 'Die Gesch. des Jahwepriestertums und das Alter des Priestergesetzes,' in his *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur bibl. Wissenschaft*, tr. K. Budde, Freiburg, 1894. The Jerusalem priesthood in the time of Christ is described by A. Edersheim, *The Temple: its Ministry and Services as they were at the Time of Jesus Christ*, London, 1874, pp. 38–78; and by E. Schürer, *GJV*[3] ii. 224–305, Eng. tr., *HJP* II. i. 195–272.

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Hindu).—**1. Rigveda.**—As a collection of sacred poetry covering in all probability the period from 1200 to 1000 B.C., the *Rigveda* cannot be expected to afford any complete picture of the actual position occupied by the priests in the age in which the hymns composing it came into being. It represents only the priestly activity of a limited number of families among a certain body of Vedic tribes settled for the most part in the country later known as Madhyadeśa, and there is no probability that it completely mirrors that activity on all its sides. But the information which it does afford is consistent and, so far as it goes, gives a clear picture of the sacerdotalism of the period.

The priestly function appears to have lain entirely in the hands of a special class, to which appertained the duty of acting as the instrument of securing the divine favour. There is nothing in any hymn of the *Rigveda* to suggest that it was composed by a man of other than the priestly class, though of course it is impossible to prove that the authors were all priests. Later tradition[2] indeed asserts that the author of one hymn (x. xcviii.) was Devāpi Ārṣṭiṣeṇa, a prince of the Kuru family, but the hymn itself makes no such statement, and Devāpi appears in it in a purely priestly capacity. The tradition of the *Brāhmaṇas* treats occasionally as of royal origin great priests of the *Rigveda*, such as Viśvāmitra and the more

[1] Nu 27^{18} ff.; cf. Jos 21^{1}.
[2] Neh 11^{3} 10^{28}; cf. 1 Ch $9^{17.\ 33}$. [3] 1 Ch 23^{27}.
[4] Neh 8^{4} f., 1 Ch 9^{25} f. The Levites even appear in this history as judges (1 Ch 26^{29} 23^{4}, 2 Ch $19^{8.\ 11}$ 34^{13}, Neh 11^{16}).
[5] Dt 18^{3}. [6] Dt 12^{17-19} $14^{22.\ 29}$ 26^{12}.

[1] Nu 18^{21-24}. [2] Yāska, *Nirukta*, ii. 10.

mythic Pṛthī Vainya, and, still later, tradition ascribes several hymns to royal authorship, but none of these traditions has any support in the actual text of the *Saṁhitā*. On the other hand, the collection is full of references to the activity of the priests under the generic title of *brahman*, and to several different kinds of priests, and the hereditary character of the priesthood is attested by the word *brāhmaṇa*, 'descendant of a *brahman*.' Moreover, there is abundant proof in the *Saṁhitā* itself that, as in the immediately following period, the *brahmans* worked in the service of kings or wealthy nobles, whose generosity in sacrificial gifts is celebrated in the *dānastutis* appended to several hymns; the amounts of the gifts recorded are too great to be accepted as genuine records, but they at least prove that the priests already set upon their services the highest value. Side by side with these praises of the generosity of patrons and with broad hints to others to follow their example in the form of encomia on generosity, there are many proofs of the extremely good opinion of themselves entertained by the *brahmans*, though it is not clear in any passage that they had yet arrogated to themselves the description of gods on earth which they claimed shortly afterwards. They seem to have adhered as strictly as possible to their own occupation; if priests like Vasiṣṭha and Viśvāmitra appear as assisting their princes in battle, doubtless it was by their priestly power, not by their prowess in arms. But the priestly sphere included in all probability medicine, for one poet declares (IX. cxii.) that his father is a physician—an occupation in which, to judge from all analogy, the use of spells would be of the highest importance. Naturally enough, the *Rigveda* contains very little of this side of priestly activity, but in its tenth and latest book there are found certain spells which touch on the medical art, one against the disease Yakṣma (X. clxiii.) and two to preserve the life of a man lying at the door of death (X. lviii., lx. 7 ff.). These hymns, with a few others, containing spells to procure offspring, to destroy enemies, and to oust a rival wife from a husband's affections, constitute, in conjunction with the funeral and wedding hymns, practically the only sign in the *Rigveda* that the activities of the priests extended to the ordinary affairs of human life, the domestic ritual which is of so great importance in modern India. It is probable that, as in the next period, the activity of the priests was confined in the main to the greater sacrifices and to such only of the domestic rites as had begun to assume special importance; the wedding hymn (X. lxxxv.) bears clear marks of comparatively late origin and is not primitive in character, and the funeral hymns exhibit a decidedly complicated and refined religious belief.

It has proved impossible to trace to the *Rigveda* the full sacrificial liturgy of the following period, but the hymns abundantly prove that there already existed much complication of ritual and subdivision of function among the priests. The main subject-matter of the *Rigveda* is clearly the *soma*-sacrifice, and it was precisely in this sacrifice that the greatest number of priests was required. In one passage (II. i. 2) to the god Agni are assigned the offices of *hotṛ*, *potṛ*, *neṣṭṛ*, *agnīdh*, *praśastṛ*, *adhvaryu*, and *brahman*, as well as that of the lord of the house for whom the sacrifice is being performed. We hear also of an *upavaktṛ*, who is doubtless to be identified with the *praśāstṛ*, as his business is to give directions to the *hotṛ*, of an *udgrābha*, and a *grāvagrābha*, and of two *śamitṛs*. The latter are doubtless the slayers of the victim, who in the later literature rank merely as attendant priests, their function of killing probably having tended to lower them in rank compared with the ordinary priests, while the two former, whose functions, to judge from their names, must have been the drawing of the water and the taking of the pressing stones required for the sacrifice, disappear as special priests from the later ritual. There are also mentioned *sāman*-singers in general and the *prastotṛ* and *udgātṛ* in particular. These various priests fall clearly into three divisions, according as their main business was the recitation of hymns to accompany the offering, or the actual manual acts of sacrifice, or the singing of songs. It is probable enough that the original ritual was of simpler character, and that the actual sacrifice and the uttering of prayer were entrusted to one priest; this conclusion, based on *a priori* grounds, is strongly supported by the fact that the name for the reciter of hymns is *hotṛ*, a term which denotes the 'offerer' of the oblation, but the evidence of the Avesta agrees with that of the *Rigveda* in showing a multiplicity of priests, so that it is fair to conclude that the specialization of the ritual is prior to the separation of the Iranians and the Vedic Indians. At any rate in the *Rigveda* the *hotṛ* is the reciter of hymns celebrating the feats of the gods who are to partake of the offerings, and to him also we must assign the verses to accompany the actual offering, series of which occur in the *Saṁhitā*. Closely associated with the *hotṛ* was the *praśāstṛ*, at whose instigation the *hotṛ* recited his litanies; doubtless it is he who is meant when in the *āprī* litanies of the animal sacrifice the two *hotṛs* are referred to. The *brahman* of the *Rigveda* is probably the name of the priest later called *brāhmaṇāchchhaṁsin*, an assistant of the *hotṛ*. Of the second group of priests the *adhvaryu* is in the later ritual, and probably enough in the *Rigveda*, already the chief of the officiants at the actual sacrifice; the *potṛ*, or cleanser, is paralleled by the Avestan *āsnatere*, the *agnīdh* by the *ātarevakhsha*, who, like him, is charged with the care of the sacred fire, while the *neṣṭṛ*, or leader, may already have had the function from which he, later at least, derives his importance as the leader up of the wife of the sacrificer to play her part in a fertility ritual in the course of the *soma*-sacrifice. The *sāman*-singers had even in the *Rigveda* a double duty: on the one hand, they had to recite the addresses to Soma Pavamāna which are collected in the ninth book of the *Saṁhitā*, and, on the other, they had to sing songs addressed to the deities to which the *hotṛ* recited the hymns. The singing of *sāmans* was doubtless, in the form in which it occurs in the *Rigveda*, a much elaborated form of the ritual, and it is worthy of note that the list of priests given in II. i. 2 does not include any singer.

In addition to those priests who were engaged in the performance of special sacrifices for which they were selected by the sacrificer as occasion required, the *Rigveda* mentions the *purohita*, the domestic priest of the king or of some wealthy noble. It may be assumed that he himself performed the domestic ritual of the king, but at the great sacrifices he probably merely superintended the whole rite. There is, however, clear evidence that he might act as the chief of the priests, the *hotṛ*. Agni is both the *hotṛ par excellence* and the *purohita*; the two divine *hotṛs* of the *āprī* litanies are also called (X. lxx. 7) the two priests—the *purohitas*. Unlike the other priests, the *purohita* was not merely in the constant and intimate service of the king, but he was closely concerned with the king in his more worldly functions. Viśvāmitra, Vasiṣṭha, and others appear to have taken part in their priestly capacity in the wars of their kings, and the hymn X. xcvjii. records the activity of Devāpi for his master Śantanu and its success. It was rather from the *purohitas* than from the

ordinary sacrificial priests that the high claims of the *brahmans* to priority in the State proceeded.

Great as the position of the priest clearly was in the Vedic community, he does not claim as yet to be powerful enough to constrain the gods to his will; it is probable enough that in his own view and that of the people he was possessed of magic powers; we have indeed in the *Rigveda* (x. cxxxvi.) the mention of a *muni*, one of those divinely inspired ascetics who figure in all the life of India. But on the whole the relation of the priests of the *Rigveda* to the gods is that of devout worshippers who seek by skilful song and well-paid offering to win the favour of the god for the sacrificer, in whose service they are.

2. Brāhmaṇas.—In the *Brāhmaṇa* literature, which covers the period up to the 6th cent. B.C., the priesthood appears quite definitely as a separate class, contrasted with the Kṣatriya, or warrior class, the Vaiśya, representing the main body of the people whether engaged in agriculture or trade, and the servile Śūdras. The priesthood was normally hereditary, but the class system at this period and much later still allowed marriages between priests and women of inferior castes, and, though priests might be despised, as were Kavaṣa Ailūṣa and Vatsa, for descent real or alleged from slave-girls, still they would not thus necessarily be regarded as excluded from priestly functions. Nevertheless, much stress is laid on descent from a *ṛṣi* and on purity of origin, and certain ceremonies could be performed only by priests who fulfilled the prescribed condition of birth in a family which for a number of generations had practised the rite. On the other hand, there are assertions (*e.g.*, *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, xxx. 1) that what matters is not descent but learning, and we actually hear in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (IV. iv. 4) of Satyakāma Jābāla, who was allowed to be taken as pupil, though his parentage was uncertain, his mother being a slave-girl who had been connected with several men. This evidence, however, merely shows that the class was not absolutely closed by the rule of heredity. Nor was the practice of priestly functions absolutely restricted to the members of the priestly class. The legend which treats Viśvāmitra as a king of the Jahnus (*Pañchaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*, XXI. xii. 2; *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, VII. xviii. 2) is supported by the occurrence in the *Brāhmaṇas* of the terms *devarājan* and *rājanyarṣi*, referring to a seer of royal origin; all the stories which mention such kings are of a legendary character, but that does not alter their significance as evidence that the view of the priestly class of the time did not see any impossibility in kings composing poetry for the sacred rites.

As in the period of the *Rigveda*, the sacrifice is carried out for the profit of an individual, even in the case of the horse-sacrifice, which is formally an offering of the king alone, although intended to secure the prosperity of all classes of the people. To this rule the only exception is in the case of a *sattra*, or sacrificial session, which might last from twelve days to any number of years, and of which the most important form is the *gavāmayana*, lasting a whole year; in that offering all the participants must be consecrated and thus made for the time being priests, and the sacrifice is for the benefit of all and not merely of the sacrificer. The *sattra* is known as early as the *Rigveda*, and it is possible that we may have in it a trace of an earlier period when the sacrifice was a clan sacrifice, but of that we have no proof. As in the *Rigveda*, the sacrifice is conducted by priestly families, but the separate traditions of these families, though they are often recorded, are of relative insignificance in comparison with the general uniformity of the sacrifice throughout the texts, which indicate that a steady process of assimilation of customary usage was in progress. This assimilation was doubtless helped by the lack of temple worship and by the absence of any close connexion between the State and the cult, such as is so marked in the growth of early Greek religion.

The number of priests mentioned is greater than in the *Rigveda*, and more specific information as to those required for each type of offering is given. The *adhvaryu* alone is required for the *agnihotra*, the daily offering to Agni; for the *agnyādheya* and the new and full moon offerings the *agnīdh*, the *hotṛ*, and the *brahman* are required besides the *adhvaryu*; for the four monthly offerings also the *pratiprasthātṛ*, and for the animal offering, in addition to the *śamitṛ*, who does not rank as a priest in the full sense, the *maitrāvaruṇa*. In the *soma*-sacrifice the number rises to sixteen, classified in the ritual texts as *hotṛ*, *maitrāvaruṇa*, *achhāvāka*, and *grāvastut*; *adhvaryu*, *pratiprasthātṛ*, *neṣṭṛ*, and *unnetṛ*; *udgātṛ*, *prastotṛ*, *pratihartṛ*, and *subrahmaṇya*; *brahman*, *brāhmaṇāchchhaṁsin*, *potṛ*, and *āgnīdhra*. To this list the Kauṣītakin school added a seventeenth—the *sadasya*, who was charged with the duty of general surveillance of the sacrifice. The arrangement of priests does not, however, correspond to their actual employment in the ritual, in which the three assistants of the *brahman* and the *neṣṭṛ* are really assistants of the *hotṛ*, and not of the *brahman* and the *adhvaryu*. Of the priests the *maitrāvaruṇa* is identical with the *praśāstṛ* or *upavaktṛ* of the *Rigveda*, and bears his name because of his reciting litanies to the gods Mitra and Varuṇa: the *achhāvāka* is clearly a later addition, the *Brāhmaṇas* themselves (*Aitareya*, vi. 14; *Kauṣītaki*, xxviii. 4–6) emphasizing his exceptional character. The functions of the *unnetṛ* and *subrahmaṇya* are unimportant. On the other hand, the *brahman* is a priest of great importance, whose task it is to take charge of the whole rite and by his silent presence to make good any errors which may be made in the carrying out of the sacrifice. He is actually declared to be as important for the sacrifice as all the other priests put together, and the tendency to multiply the priestly functions evidenced in his appointment is curiously indicated by the addition by the Kauṣītakins of the *sadasya*, who would seem to have merely duplicated the work already performed by the *brahman*. The existence of the *brahman* in this capacity has been seen[1] even in the *Rigveda*, but the evidence for this view is extremely doubtful, unless perhaps in one of the latest hymns (x. cxli. 3). On the contrary, the evidence of tradition supports the view that the *brahman* as a special priest was an innovation of a comparatively recent period in the history of the ritual by the Vasiṣṭha family, and that for a time only one of that family could perform the duties of the office, doubtless because such a priest alone would be in possession of the special knowledge which constituted the characteristic of the post.

At the same time, the *purohita* steadily increased in importance; even the *Brāhmaṇas* are sufficient to show that he had become in temporal matters the constant adviser of the king; in some cases at least the same *purohita* acted for two or even three tribes, which placed him in a position of quite exceptional consequence and influence. The relation between king and *purohita* is most effectively described in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (viii. 27), where the formulæ of appointment are given; they are based literally on those of the marriage ceremonial; the *purohita* thus becomes for practical affairs the *alter ego* of the king, and

[1] See R. Pischel and K. F. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, Stuttgart, 1888–1901, ii. 144 f.

the duty of the *purohita* is made out to be the defeat of the king's enemies and the securing of the prosperity of the realm. The importance of the aid of the *purohita* in war is indicated by the fact that the gods in their struggles with the *asuras* repeatedly are worsted until they are able to summon to their aid Bṛhaspati, who is *par excellence* the *purohita* of the gods. The *Atharva-veda* (iii. 19) shows us the *purohita* engaged in a spell for success in battle. When a king, as often, is sent into exile by his people, it is his *purohita* who is expected to extricate him from his misfortune. In one respect, however, there is a change in the position of the *purohita* from that occupied by him in the earlier period: when in a sacrifice he takes the part of any special priest, it is not, as formerly, that of the *hotṛ*, but that of the *brahman*, as is proved by the concurrent testimony of two texts (*Taittiriya Saṁhitā*, III. v. 2. 1; *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, vii. 26)—a fact which stands in accord with the clear indications that the *hotṛ* has ceased to be the chief priest in the ritual.

The *Brāhmaṇas* claim for the *brahmans* high privileges. A priest deserves respectful reception and hospitable entertainment wherever he goes, and no limits are set to the amounts of the gifts which should be made to him at the several rites or portions of rites, one specially excellent sacrifice being that in which a man bestows all his wealth upon the sacrificial priests. On the other hand, the value of their services was maintained by the rule that no priest could accept gifts which another priest had rejected. The sacrificial offerings also fell to be consumed by the priest, as he alone was holy enough to partake of them; even in the royal consecration the king cannot partake of the *soma*, but only of a special drink prepared for the purpose. The priest also claims to be superior to the royal jurisdiction; when the king is proclaimed to the people, the proclaimer adds that the king of the *brahmans* is Soma. The king may not censure a *brahman*; when he gives away all the earth with what is in it, still he cannot include in that gift the property of a *brahman*. The crime of slaying a *brahman* is the only real form of murder, and it can be expiated only by the expensive horse-sacrifice. The fine for an insult to him is 100 cows or coins; for a blow, 1000. In a civil case the arbitrator must give his decision in his favour as against a non-*brahman*. But there is evidence in the *Pañchaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa* (XIV. vi. 8) that a treacherous *purohita* might pay for his sin with his life, and it appears from the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (vii. 29) that, as regards his place of abode, the priest was not exempt from the general power of the king to remove his subjects from their settlements at pleasure.

In return for their special position the priests were expected to show such qualities as kindness and gentleness, devotion to duty, and knowledge of the ritual. Intellectually their outlook on the sacrifice with which they were busied has undergone a profound change since the period of the *Rigveda*, and presents a curious admixture of magic and speculation. The principle of the sacrifice is not merely that of giving in expectation of a return; the priests assume that the return is compelled by the gift, and that they are complete masters of the universe through the mechanism of the sacrifice, if only that is duly performed. This power enables them not merely to assure to the sacrificer for whom they act what he desires, but at their pleasure, by the slightest error in the rite, to bring him to ruin. They are powerful by the sacrifice to heal dissent between the people and their princes; they are equally powerful to produce such dissent—a fact which explains clearly enough the rise of their influence in the land. On the other hand, the priests are theosophists, and find in the sacrifice the explanation and cause of the universe, which is daily renewed in the performance of the piling of the sacred fire, and from this speculative side of their efforts comes into being the priest of the schools which oppose themselves to the sacrificial ritual.

3. Upaniṣads, Buddhism, and Jainism.—From the time of the earliest *Upaniṣads*, dating about 600 B.C., a new function of the priest comes clearly into view, which differentiates him more and more from the sacrificial priest. The sacrifice ceases to be for some priests the chief object of their interest, which centres in the attempt to explain the nature of the universe and its relation to the self. The philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* is not in any sharp manner differentiated from the philosophy which commences with the doctrine of the unity of the universe in the sacrifice, but it is carried far beyond its first beginnings and to a certain extent the earlier *Upaniṣads* in particular hold aloof from the study of the Veda and the sacrifices; the former is shown not to be the true means of knowledge; thus in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (vii. 1) Nārada confesses that all his Vedic learning has not taught him the true nature of the self, and in the same text (vi. 1) Śvetaketu, despite his study of the Veda for the prescribed period, is merely conceited and not well instructed. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* contains (I. iv. 10, III. ix. 6, 21) several distinctly hostile references to the sacrifice, and the same spirit may be traced more faintly in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (i. 10 f.). At the same time, these *Upaniṣads* show no complete approval of the rival method of holiness, which undoubtedly existed at this time and was much in favour—asceticism. For the sacrifice, for Veda study, and for penance they substitute knowledge as the all-important thing, and the life of the *brahman* becomes concentrated upon study on the one hand and the teaching of pupils on the other. Stress is also laid on the fact that knowledge can be gained from others than *brahmans*; if the stories which ascribe the teaching of *brahmans* to kings like Janaka, Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, Aśvapati Kaikeya, and Ajātaśatru cannot be pressed into proof of the derivation of the doctrines of the *Upaniṣads* from the Kṣatriya class, as has been maintained, still they do show that intellectual activity was encouraged by free discussion, and the mention of women in the *Upaniṣads* as taking part in such discussions reveals a new feature in religious life; the sacrificial ritual knows of no woman priest, and the functions permitted to the wife of the sacrificer are even more limited than his own. The later *Upaniṣads*, however, show a distinct attempt to reconcile the claims of the study of the Veda, the sacrifice, and asceticism with the search for true knowledge, and, without making these things adequate means of discovering that knowledge, they treat them as a useful or necessary propædeutic. The same view is in effect already enunciated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (IV. iv. 22), where we find the germ of the theory of the four *āśramas*, or stages of life, which an Aryan or at least a *brahman* should follow: the first is study of the Veda, the duty of the *brahmachārin*; the second sacrifice and almsgiving, the lot of the *gṛhastha*, or householder; and the third is asceticism, the lot of the *vānaprastha*, which later ingenuity unjustifiably divides into two states—that of the forest-dweller and that of the wandering and homeless beggar, *bhikṣu* or *parivrājaka*. The *Chhāndogya* (II. xxiii. 1) carries the matter a little farther: it ranks as three branches of duty sacrifice with Vedic study and the giving of alms, asceticism, and studentship with a teacher, and

then sets over against them the abiding in *brahman*, which is later developed into the fourth *āśrama*. The *Kena* (33) and the *Kaṭha Upaniṣads* (I. ii. 15) are equally clear in their recognition of the value of study and asceticism, and the *Kena* also mentions sacrifice expressly as a condition of true knowledge. The significance of these requirements is clear: in face of the tendency of the day to resort to asceticism and to abandon the use of sacrifice, which indeed in the Buddhist texts is regarded with much contempt, the Brāhmans were anxious to find due place and room for the different sides of human activities, even if their doctrines of the nature of the *ātman* were such as logically to deny all value whatever to Vedic study, asceticism, and sacrifice.

It is clear that great importance attached to the relation of pupil and teacher, especially as the doctrines of the philosophical schools were held to be specially sacred, such as could indeed be imparted in some cases only in the seclusion of the wild, whence the title *Āranyaka*, 'Forest Book,' for portions of the philosophic literature. The teacher is bound to impart all his knowledge to the pupil, who stays with him, and in return the pupil is bound to afford all possible assistance in the affairs of daily life to the teacher—to tend his cattle, to collect fuel, to guard the sacred fire, and to beg. The giving of payment for teaching is not approved by the texts, but the practice seems to have grown up under which at the termination of his studentship, which might extend over any period, twelve years being a common time, the pupil took leave of his teacher by presenting him with a gift proportioned to the pupil's means. Not only Brāhmans might go as pupils; the *Sūtras* formally contemplate members of the Kṣatriya and the Vaiśya class studying, but doubtless these cases were comparatively rare, just as the normal ascetic was the Brāhman, not one of the other two classes. The teacher was expected to perform for his pupil the formal rite of initiation by which his spiritual training commenced—an event which is the refined form of the puberty rites of new birth which are found wide-spread throughout the world. The relation of pupil and teacher is of special interest, as it forms the root of the Hindu veneration and deification of the *guru*.[1]

The relationship of the pupil and teacher doubtless led in many cases to the formation of schools of thought in which the views of a distinguished teacher gradually spread and attained considerable vogue, as we may judge from the frequent reference to teachers such as Āruṇi or Yājñavalkya. In two famous cases, however, the influence of the teacher has far surpassed normal limits, and given rise to the formation of a sect which has created a form of religion differing in essentials from Brāhmanism. The older and the more closely akin to Brāhmanism is undoubtedly Jainism, which represents a definite tendency to develop systematically the ascetic side of Indian views of life. The ideal is to reach the condition of perfection, which is the end of existence, by means of rising superior to all the needs of the ordinary life of man, and by laying aside all the passions which man feels. Hence the regulations which applied in the Brāhmanic system, and which enjoined abstinence from the taking of life, honesty, chastity, and the speaking of the truth, appear in Jainism in forms exaggerated out of all reality. The doctrine of *ahiṁsā* was a natural enough revolt from the absurd prodigality of life in the ordinary sacrifice, and its growth can be traced in the Brāhmanic literature; in Jainism it degenerates into an objection to the destruction of even the most infinitesimal insect life, which compels the most ridiculously minute precautions to be taken against harm to such life or even to the air itself. The doctrine against the taking of another's property is carried by Mahāvīra to a prohibition of attachment to any object or person, which counts as the fifth of the great vows of the priesthood. The Digambara sect of the Jains go farther, and carry out the principles of the school to the logical conclusion, which seems to have been adopted by Mahāvīra, of wearing no clothes.

It was inevitable that the success of Mahāvīra and the spread of his doctrines among a far wider class than the followers of any particular Brāhman teacher should lead to the formation of a community with some distinctly original features. Such a community followed the lines of the pre-existing system of pupilship; a formal initiation by a priest of the order acts as a preliminary to the adoption of the life of the Jain monk, who then becomes a homeless wanderer like the Brāhman ascetic, forbidden to possess any property, and compelled to beg his food, to live on what he thus obtains, to wear at most the rags that he can gather, and to avoid dwelling long in any one place save in the time of the rains. The necessity for fixed dwellings during the three or four months of the rainy season gave the impulse to the development of the quasi-monastic life, more or less permanent dwelling-places, though of the simplest kind, being allotted to the monks by the kindness of laymen. But the rule of wandering is still applicable. The essential duty of the monk is meditation and spiritual exercises, life being supported by begging, but in the course of its development the intellectual part of the discipline has become of less importance than the devotion of effort to avoid the destruction of life, and the provision of food. Moreover, from an early date, perhaps as early as the 2nd cent. B.C., a definitely Hindu element has been introduced in the form of idol-worship, accepted by both the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara sects, but rejected by the reforming sect of the Sthānakavāsī from the 15th cent. onwards. The introduction of this new element has added to the duties of the Jain monk a temple worship, consisting in the main of mental devotion and contemplation of the idol of the Tīrthaṅkara, accompanied by the singing of hymns in his honour. There has also arisen a temple priesthood, who in the case of the Digambaras must be Jains, and who perform to the idol the ordinary Hindu rites of washing, dressing, and adorning it, the waving of lights before it, the burning of incense, and the giving of offerings of fruit, sweetmeats, and rice. The Jain priest does not, however, eat the food thus presented, differing in this from the Brāhman priest and the Hindu temple-priest. In the temples of the Śvetāmbaras men who are not Jains, even Brāhmans, may be employed.

Besides the monks the Jains recognize an order of nuns, subject to the same general rules of life as the monks, and, what has been of the first importance for the persistence of the faith, orders of lay male and female adherents, *śrāvakas* and *śrāvikās*. This recognition gives the laity definite duties and obligations, based upon but modified from those binding on the monks and nuns. Among the vows undertaken by the laity are those of from time to time observing for a brief period the full restrictions incumbent on the *sādhu*, and of constantly helping the monks by gifts to them of the food and other articles which they are allowed to have, and the lending of such articles as they may not take for their own. Probably from the first these adherents have been largely of the mercantile class—a result contributed to by the fact that the Jain restrictions on the taking of life shut many avenues of profession even to the lay community (cf. art. MONASTICISM [Hindu]).

[1] See K. Glaser, *ZDMG* lxvi. [1912] 1-37.

Tradition, probably correctly, ascribes Mahāvīra to a Kṣatriya family, and the Buddha was undoubtedly not of Brāhman birth. Moreover, in the eastern country in which he preached there is evidence[1] that the Brāhmanical system was much less rigidly determined than in the west, and that the practice of Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas becoming ascetics was far more widely spread. But the Buddha in his precepts of life for his followers differed essentially from Mahāvīra in laying stress on avoiding extremes of asceticism, such as the religious suicide encouraged by Jainism; greater freedom was accorded to the monks to receive the aid of the laity, and no attempt of any kind was made to organize the laity into a community formally dependent on the order of monks. The admission of women as a special order of nuns was only grudgingly conceded, and subjected to such restrictions that the spiritual effect of the community of nuns on the faith cannot be discerned. But from the death of the founder there entered into the duty of the pious monk the obligation of paying reverence to the four places of special importance in his life—that where he was born, that in which he obtained enlightenment, that in which he decided to set going the wheel of the law, and that in which he entered *nirvāṇa*. The actual reverence of the relics of the departed Buddha was perhaps at first reserved to the lay adherents, but it passed naturally enough into that idol-worship which assimilated the worship of Buddha to that of a Hindu god. Moreover, the doctrinal development of Buddhism in the Mahāyāna school displaced the historical Buddha as the centre of Buddhism by mythological figures essentially divine.

In one important point both Buddhism and Jainism agreed—the introduction of the formal confession of sin as an essential part of the duty of the monk and in Jainism also of the laity. In both cases the fortnightly gatherings and the great yearly meeting of the monks were the specially fit occasions for the confession, but great stress was laid in Jainism on immediate confession to the *guru* in order to avoid by repression the accumulation of *karma*. For such systematic confession there was no place in Brāhmanism with its lack of defined tenets, though the importance of confession for certain ritual purposes was recognized. In these formal assemblies there was the possibility of the development of an ecclesiastical organization, but such an organization never developed itself any more than Hinduism has been able to produce a regularly organized hierarchy.

The Indian ascetic, whatever his religious belief, is credited with the attainment of magical powers of every kind, and this is true of both the Jain and the Buddhist—indeed in even a higher degree of the latter faith, for one of the four rules for monks in that belief is not to boast of the possession of such powers as they do not enjoy. This is the better side of the magical powers which ordinary Indian belief ascribes to the priest, and of which so much is made in the Brāhmanical literature.

4. Early Hinduism.—The two great epics of India, the *Mahābharata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, taken in conjunction with the early law-books and with the Buddhist and Jain scriptures, present us with a form of religion and custom to which the name of Hinduism can fairly be given as distinguishing it from the doctrines of the *Brāhmaṇas*. The religion of these texts is only in part the natural development of the religion of the *Brāhmaṇas*; it contains many elements of faith, doubtless as old as that religion, but appealing to different sections of the people; it is essentially a more popular faith than that which was concerned with the sacrificial ritual and the speculations arising out of it. Hence the priest of the sacrificial ritual is of less prominence, while the *purohita* comes forward. The priests of the epic may be divided into the ordinary priests, whose life is spent amid simple surroundings in the performance of their functions, and the spiritual advisers of the kings, who of course were often also the spiritual teachers of their youth. The office was one which tended to be hereditary in the same degree as the monarchy, and the mere fact that a priest might be at once the *guru* of the king and his *purohita* naturally exalted the claims to importance of the latter office. The boast of the *Brāhmaṇas* that the priests are the gods on earth is repeated with increased force; the gods are made out to be dependent on the priests, who, if need be, could create new gods. The power of the king is really derived from the priests, and they have the power to destroy a king who proves unwilling to meet their demands for gifts which have now grown beyond all measure; cows and land are expected as matters of course and even villages and districts, *i.e.* the revenues derived from these places. The assembly of the people, which is a real thing in the *Rigveda* and still seems to have lingered on in the age of the *Brāhmaṇas*, disappears in the epic, passing through the forms of the council of warriors and of priests, and finally becoming in effect the secret conclave of the king and the priest, who gradually was able to persuade the king that his advice was worth much more than that of the people or even of the warriors. Naturally enough, this view of the comparative value of the two elements for the purposes of State affairs was not accepted always by the warriors; the legends of disobedient kings like Viśvāmitra and Nahuṣa show, indeed, the terrible fate of those who were bold enough to question the position of the priests, but also indicate that there were kings impious enough to doubt the all-sufficiency of the priesthood. Naturally enough, the claims of immunity to punishment made by the priests are of the most wholesale character; even for the gravest crimes they insist that no corporal punishment of any kind can be inflicted on a priest, though, as in the *Brāhmaṇas*, kings seem to have felt themselves entitled to punish treachery by death. In return for this privileged position, the priests were evidently conscious of the need of providing themselves with all the learning possible to help them in the guidance of the king in his administration of justice and his executive government, as well as in the conduct of his sacred duties of sacrifice; the horse-sacrifice, as especially an imperial sacrifice, revealed the value of the skilled assistance of the priests. A priest, however, might also actually perform feats of arms, though the general rule is opposed to any active participation in fighting by the priest; of this there is a classic example in Droṇa, who combines, with the greatest success in each, spiritual and warlike functions, while his son, who was a warrior of no small fame, was taunted with impropriety in bearing arms against the rule of the priesthood. But it was not only by the legitimate arts of statesmanship that the *purohita* commanded so fully the obedience of the king; he was an expert in astrology and a soothsayer and magician, all of which features are given prominence in the tales of kings and their *purohitas* narrated in the *Jātakas*. Further, his position at court lent itself to intrigue of every kind, as is evidenced by the semi-mythical account of Chāṇakya's relations to his sovereign.

It is probably to this period that we must attribute the beginning of the division of the Brāhman class into different sub-classes divided by occupa-

[1] See Fick, *Die soziale Gliederung im nordöstlichen Indien*, p. 117 ff.

tion, though probably as yet still theoretically and in feeling one. The Buddhist texts show us Brāhmans as agriculturists, as engaged in pastoral occupations and in trade, and the *Dharma-sūtras* (*Āpastamba*, I. vii. 20. 12; *Gautama*, vii. 1 ff.) confirm this account to the extent of permitting these occupations, in certain circumstances of pressure, to the Brāhmans. It is possible also that in the eastern country, such as Magadha, Brāhmans went farther and undertook professions of a class never approved by the stricter schools: in the *Jātakas* (iv. 361 ff.) we find suggestions that they could act as hunters, and fulfil other menial tasks. It does not appear that Brāhmans who occupied themselves in these unpriestly functions at the same time devoted themselves to any priestly offices, whether sacrificial or intellectual; and we may therefore see in this adoption by priests of other than their appropriate functions the beginning of the breaking up of the unity of the class into castes determined in the main by hereditary occupation.

The attitude of the priesthood towards the gods as depicted in the epic is what might be naturally expected as the outcome of the theorizing of the *Brāhmaṇa* period. The priests then degraded the gods from all real importance except in their connexion with the sacrifice, and the priests of the epic have likewise no real respect for or belief in the minor deities of the pantheon, and to this rank even Indra and Varuṇa have sunk. The great gods of the epic are in the first place Viṣṇu, and in the second place, as the result of later working over, Śiva; both these gods are of essentially popular origin, but in the epic that popular worship has been overlaid by the philosophic pantheism which is most congenial to the temperament of the Brāhman. Even the devotion of the worshipper to the divinity, which was clearly prevalent in some sects, as reproduced in the epic, is overlaid with pantheistic elements.

5. Mediæval and modern India.—The priest of the middle age of India as revealed in the *Purāṇas* and in the classical Sanskrit literature presents essentially the same features as the priest of modern times. The chief distinction between this period and the epic age is that of the growing complexity of life and the progressive Hinduization of the centre and south of India. As a result the priestly class becomes split up more and more into different subdivisions which in effect constitute castes within the main class, between which there is no marriage possible and sometimes not even complete freedom of intercourse and commensality. The tendency of the Brāhmans to adopt very diverse modes of life, of which there are only traces in the earliest period, becomes more and more marked, and, combined with geographic differences, this fact has contributed to the growth in the number of the castes. Further support has been given to the development by the practice by which aboriginal deities have been taken over bodily into the Hindu pantheon, doubtless, at least in some cases, together with the priesthood attached to the deity, just as the ruling family of the tribe was taken into the rank of the Kṣatriyas. Hence arose innumerable subdivisions among the ten great divisions into which the Brāhmans are popularly divided—the Sārasvatas, Kānyākubjas, Gauras, Utkalas, and Maithilas north of the Vindhya range; and the Mahārāṣṭras, Andhras or Tailaṅgas, Drāviḍas, Karṇātas, and Gurjaras south of that range. But of these castes many have no priestly functions at all, and have devoted themselves to occupations of the most diverse type, ranging from the learned professions to the humblest duties of agriculture, and even trade. Even within the sphere of religion the differences between the different classes of Brāhmans is most marked. At the lowest level stands the village-priest, who is, however, of great importance in the life of the village, as his presence is requisite for the due performance of the religious ceremonies which make up so great a part of the life of a Hindu; at initiation, at marriage, at birth, and at death his presence is essential, even if other priests may be allowed to take part in the more important of these functions; and in return for his services he receives a fixed allowance of grain, with special presents on important occasions. The village-*purohita* is often also the astrologer, who prepares horoscopes, predicts the days for sowing and reaping, tells fortunes, and often as a magician averts disease and controls evil spirits. The important science of omens is also in the hands of the astrologer. Other Brāhmans, again, are engaged in the performance of the temple worship, though many of the functions of that worship are performed by men of lower caste. In its normal form the ritual of a great temple is mainly centred in the ceremonial treatment of the idol of the god whose temple it is. The daily round involves the awaking of the god from slumber, his dressing and undressing, bathing, anointing, and painting, and frequent feeding; the priests partake of the food, which through its consecration by the eating of it by the god is holy, and which is therefore sometimes given or sold in part to the people. Further, incense is burned, lights are waved, bells are rung, and flowers and other offerings as well as food are presented. During these performances Brāhmans often recite texts taken from the holy books of the religion of the god in question, mainly, in the case of Kṛṣṇa, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, in the case of Śiva, the *Liṅga Purāṇa*, Śiva's most potent representation being in the form of a *liṅga*. The priests, however, while they superintend and control the performance of the temple ritual, do not claim for themselves the sole power to perform the acts of which it consists. The layman, on payment of the due fees, may be permitted to perform most if not all of the acts of worship.

As opposed to the Brāhmans who concern themselves with the temple worship, a far higher intellectual rank is occupied by those who are members of one of the religious schools, the abundance of which is attested throughout the period. These schools have naturally undergone numerous changes in the course of time; the devotees of the sun, who appear to have flourished in the time of Śaṅkara (9th cent. A.D.), have disappeared, and the Vaiṣṇava sects have attained much greater prominence since the revival of Vaiṣṇavism by Rāmānuja in the 11th cent. A.D. In the Vaiṣṇava schools the traditional respect for the teacher, which is seen in the claim of the Brāhmans in the Vedic age to be gods on earth, reveals itself in its highest form in the sect of Vallabhāchārya, in which the *gurus* are even in life treated as living embodiments of the god, and receive the formal marks of respect which are accorded to the images of the god whom they serve. But, even in the sects that carry the process of deification of the *guru* less far, the greatest importance is placed upon him, as he is the source from which alone the saving knowledge which will procure the heaven of bliss open to Vaiṣṇavas can be derived. The Sikh *guru* baptized the disciple and taught him the name of Hari, which alone can procure him salvation, and in return demanded and received the implicit obedience which raised the Sikh to so high a pitch of military power when its bent was definitely turned under Govinda to warfare with the Muhammadans. Common again to all sects of Vaiṣṇavism is the stress laid on the sacramental meal, which is decidedly a development of the

giving or selling of the sacramental food by the temple priests to outsiders, and which is the most definite sign of the belief, more or less clearly held by the Vaiṣṇava teachers, that caste divisions were not ultimately in accord with the principles of their faith. Both in the practice of the sacramental meal and in the respect paid to the *guru* there has been seen the influence of Christian doctrines, but in the latter case at least the supposition is gratuitous, the respect being a natural Indian development.[1]

The teaching of the schools is not normally antagonistic to idol-worship, which it allows as a mode of approaching the divinity; even the Sikhs, who are in theory opposed to idolatry, make a fetish of the *Granth*, the sacred book of their scriptures, and guard it in a shrine, paying to it the same rites as are offered to Hindu idols. There is therefore no necessary incompatibility in the combination of the duties of priest in a temple and spiritual teacher, and the two functions are sometimes united. This is essentially the case with the priests of the Tantric rites, who themselves take a part in the performance of the rites which they approve, and to which they give in their theoretic teaching a symbolical signification. These priests are reckoned as gods by their followers, for their command of *mantras*, or spells, makes them superior to the gods, on whom again the whole world depends. The possession of magic power by the priest is a commonplace of later as of earlier Indian belief, but it is carried to its farthest extent in Tantrism, which in this aspect is closely allied to the Yoga philosophy. Another side of the same element of priesthood is seen in the varied classes of ascetics, who undergo severe penances of all kinds in order to produce ecstatic states, and many of whom are doubtless connected in origin with the ascetics of whom we hear in the Buddhist texts. The better side of asceticism shows itself in the persistence of the practice by which, after the performance of the duties of life as a householder, in old age the Brāhman, be he priest or politician, ends his days in the meditation of the *sannyāsin*.

In one respect there is a clear distinction between modern and epic and, still more, Vedic India. The Vedic sacrifice is all but extinct at the present day, and has clearly been moribund for centuries; in its place have come the temple worship on the one hand and the great popular festivals on the other. These festivals, such as the Makarasaṅkrānti, the Vasantapañchamī, the Holī, and the Dīpālī, are of essentially popular origin, and traces of them can be seen in the Vedic ritual, but in that ritual they have been deprived of their original nature and brought into the scheme of sacrifices performed by and for the profit of the sacrificing priests and their employers only. Doubtless outside the Brāhmanical circles they persisted in their simpler form, which can often be recognized in the ceremonials of the present day, though many elements of sectarian religion have found their way into these.

A certain distinction in the religious methods adopted by the priesthood may be observed between this and the earlier periods. In place of the schools of the Brāhman ritual or the wandering monks of the Buddhists or the Jains, we find the wandering monk of the type of Saṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, who go here and there challenging others to discuss the new theories of the *Vedānta Sūtra* which they have to propound, and retiring from time to time to a monastery for study and literary composition; these are obviously in spirit and in method a natural development of the philosophers of the *Upaniṣads*, but with their intellectual activity definitely directed by the authority of the *Vedānta Sūtra* and of the *Upaniṣads*. A very different method of religious propaganda appears in the Tamil south, at an undefined but certainly early date, in the shape of the itinerant poet, devotee, and musician, who wanders hither and thither with a large retinue, singing his own compositions in the vernacular in honour of the god whose shrine he frequents; this is a type of priest corresponding to the conception of *bhakti* and differing entirely from the type of theologian produced by the Brāhman schools, and of more popular origin. Rāmānanda, to whom is due the spread in N. India of the doctrine of Rāmānuja and the more definite rejection of the importance of caste, introduced the type, at once intellectual and popular, of the wandering theologian who could dispute with the most learned opponents, but was anxious to preach in their own tongue to the people and to express in vernacular verse the tenets and principles which he sought to inculcate. An attempt to strengthen this appeal to the popular mind was made by Chaitanya at the beginning of the 16th cent. by introducing from the south its ecstatic religious dancing and singing. The older method of Rāmānanda was, however, followed by Nānak (A.D. 1469–1538) and Tulsī Dās (A.D. 1537–1622); both of these were married men, as opposed to Rāmānanda, who was a monk—a fact which distinguishes the adherents of the *bhakti* cults from the Buddhists or Jains.

Since the beginning of the 19th cent. the influence of Christianity has produced considerable effects in the Hindu conception of priestly methods and ideals. Apart from the effects on doctrine, the general result of this influence has been, on the one hand, to create for Hinduism a feeling of unity and individuality hitherto not to be discerned; there has even been created a society, the Bhārata Dharma Mahāmaṇḍala, for the defence of Hinduism as such. It is, however, characteristic of the nature of Hinduism that no effort has been made to create a controlling spiritual centre, such as would assimilate Hinduism to the great Churches of the West. On the other hand, the minor reforming bodies have some conception of church organization, and in practically all aspects of Hinduism a strong impulse has been given to the priesthood to undertake the direction and support of various forms of social service.

6. Animistic tribes.—The primitive tribes have from the beginning of Indian history been continually falling under the influence of the higher culture of the tribes among them, and their conceptions of priesthood have been affected by the views and practices of these tribes. There are still, however, abundant traces of a more primitive view in which the priest is mainly a medicine-man, whose strength lies in his magical powers and his ability to become the subject of divine possession. In this view the priesthood is not, as in Vedic India, a hereditary profession based on sacred learning and knowledge of tradition, but a spiritual exaltation which betrays possession by the divinity. Thus among the Kols, when a vacancy occurs in the office of village-priest, the next holder of the office is determined by a process of divination. A winnowing-fan with some rice is used, and the person who holds it is dragged towards the man on whom the office of priest is to be conferred. A similar practice is observed among the Orāons. In N. India in addition to the professional exorcists there are others who do not learn their work from a *guru*, as do the professionals, but are naturally inspired by a spirit. In accordance with this view is the practice of the semi-Hinduized Dravidian tribes of the Vindhya range, who often worship Gansam or Raja Lakhan. The shrine of the god is in charge of the village-*baiga*, who is

[1] See R. Garbe, *Indien und das Christentum*, Tübingen, 1914, p. 27.

invariably selected from among some of the ruder forest tribes such as the Bhuiya. Much of the work of the *baiga* is sorcery pure and simple, and for this purpose no doubt the most uncivilized person is the best adapted, as being in closer touch with the spirits in nature. Similarly the Kurumbas in the Nīlgiri Hills are employed by the Badagas, who are much above them in culture, for the sake of their special powers. So it is with the ordinary axe carried by the dweller in the jungle that the victim is slain at the shrine, the *baiga* then taking as his share the head, while the rest of the meat is consumed by the male members of the tribe. When the *baiga* in villages of the hill-country south of the Ganges desires to exorcize a disease-ghost, he attains the necessary divine possession by beating himself with the iron chain which hangs from the roof of the shrine of the village-god, and which among the Gonds is considered to be in itself divine. The same principle of divine possession is exhibited in the worship of Bhiwāsu, the regular Gond deity, who is identified with Bhīmasena, one of the Pāndavas; once a year a special feast is held in his honour, at which the god inspires the priest, who, after leaping frantically round, falls in a trance. In an analogous manner throughout S. India priests in fantastic attire, often with masks human or animal, dance in order to cause the entry into themselves of some spirit, possessed by whom they can predict the future for those who make inquiry. Moreover, even the sacrifices in which the priests take part in large measure are obviously mere fertility-charms, as in the case of the famous human sacrifices of the Kandhs. The cult which they performed was simple in the extreme; the elaborate temples and formal worship of the Hindu gods is unknown in aboriginal religions, where the temple is often of the simplest possible formation, consisting merely of a heap of stones, while even in more advanced communities at most a small hut forms the abode of the priest of the god, who is aniconic. Of the development of higher religious conceptions among the aboriginal priesthoods we have no clear proof, as the occasional appearance of what may be considered higher beliefs may easily be explained by borrowing from the surrounding tribes which have fallen under Hindu influences. Among the Kandhs there are priests who have no other occupation than their sacred functions; others, again, can engage in other employments, but are forbidden in any event the profession of arms, just as in theory this profession was closed to the Brāhman. The Todas in the south have a celibate priesthood, but it is uncertain whether this conception is borrowed from Hinduism or is merely one instance of the superiority of the celibate for the exercise of functions connected with divinity, of which there are traces in the Vedic period itself, though the principle is not carried very far. In many cases, however, the penetration of Hindu practice goes very far; thus the out-caste tribe of the Tiyas in Malabar have since A.D. 1890 created for themselves a temple worship modelled on the ordinary Hindu type but served by non-Brāhman priests. A much older example of the same principle is probably to be seen in the growth of the Lingāyat (*q.v.*) sect of Śaivas in S. India, whose priests, *jangamas*, are not Brāhmans, but may belong to any other caste.

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A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Iranian).—**1. Pre-Zarathushtrian times.**—That the religious beliefs and practices of the Iranians before the reform of Zarathushtra necessitated and actually commanded the services of a priestly class scarcely admits of any doubt, though, in the absence of direct records, the proof of this, as of so many other facts relating to the early life of the Iranians, rests upon indirect evidence. In the Avesta we find that the generic term for 'priest' is *āthravan*, clearly derived from *ātar*, 'fire'—a fact which is significant alike of the early origin and of the principal function of the sacerdotal office in Īrān. That reverence for fire was a marked feature of the religious life of the Iranians in the most primitive period is well established;[1] and, when taken in conjunction with the fact that the word *ātharvan* in the *Rigveda* has, among other related senses, the same connotation as the Iranian form *āthravan*, the inference becomes irresistible that both the office and its Avestan name are derived from Indo-Iranian days. Moreover, although *āthravan*, as the common appellation of the priests, suggests that they had as their chief care the maintenance and guardianship of the sacred fire, nevertheless it can hardly be supposed that even in the pre-Zarathushtrian period their duties were not more extensive. The old Iranian pantheon enshrined other highly venerated divinities,[2] whose cults would naturally require the mediation of priests. The cult of Haoma, to name only one, involving, as in all probability it did, in the earliest times a somewhat elaborate ritual, would afford a special opportunity for priestly intervention. Later tradition also, as reflected in *Ys.* ix. 1 f., lends support to this contention. In that passage the poet describes Haoma approaching Zarathushtra in the morning while he was chanting the *Gāthas* in the presence of the sacred fire, and entreating the prophet to pray to him, to consecrate his juice for libations, and praise him as the other sages or priests were praising him. Nor can there be any doubt that prayers, invocations, and sacrifices offered to all their gods at this period were mediated by their priests.[3]

Regarding the organization of the priesthood and the relation of the priests to the laity and to other classes in society at that period, we have but little data from which to draw any conclusions with absolute certainty. Although Firdausī's attribution of the establishment of the three orders of priests, warriors, and husbandmen to Yima belongs to the sphere of legend rather than to that of history, still the division itself represents an early stage in the development of the Iranian commonwealth. Moreover, the position of the priests at the head in every enumeration of these orders in the Avesta, suggesting the venera-

[1] See art. ALTAR (Persian), vol. i. p. 347, with the references.
[2] See art. GOD (Iranian), vol. vi. p. 291.
[3] Cf. Herod. i. 132.

tion in which they were held, is in perfect accord with what we know of the deep moral earnestness and marked religious susceptibilities of the ancient Iranians.[1] There is no evidence, however, that the *āthravans* of Īrān were regarded or claimed to be regarded with the same superstitious awe and reverence as the Brāhmans of India arrogated to themselves. No superiority as regards descent or higher nature was ascribed to or demanded by the priests of Īrān. That priestly families[2] existed at this period, who handed down to their descendants the secrets of correct sacrificing and the approved forms of invocations, may very well have been the case, though nothing in the nature of a close priestly caste resulted in Īrān—at least during the period now considered. The high regard in which agriculture came to be held at an early period and the constant dependence of the community for its defence upon the warrior-class would in themselves militate against the development of castes in Īrān.[3] Moreover, the fact that, according to the Avesta,[4] Zarathushtra was the first priest, warrior, and agriculturist indicates that tradition at least did not regard the gulf between those classes in the earliest times as an impassable one.

2. The Zarathushtrian reform.—In the nature of things it was very unlikely that the great spiritual movement which is associated with the name of Zarathushtra should leave the priesthood unaffected. What its influence actually proved to be, so far as it is ascertainable, must be learnt from its reflexion in the hymns, or *Gāthas*, of the Avesta. In those hymns the *āthravans* are not once mentioned by name. In one passage,[5] it is true, the prophet applies to himself another old Aryan term for 'priest,' namely *zaotar* (Skr. *hotar*), which may serve to show that, however insignificant the sacerdotal element in the new movement proves to have been, he did not entirely renounce priestly functions. But the character of his reform helps to account for the recession of the *āthravans* into the background. It was a change in the basal truths of the religion more than in its external symbols. It was a question not of the manner of expressing their devotion to the deities, but rather of the object to whom their worship should be directed. It was a great prophetic and religious revolution, not a priestly transformation. New and more spiritual conceptions of deity were born, which were only afterwards to be clothed and expressed in ritualistic forms.[6] Still, no doubt the *āthravans* of the old religion, at least those of them who yielded themselves to the great reform, found a place in the religious life and ministry of the new Mazdæism; for the sacred fire continued to burn and was jealously guarded during the new and more spiritual epoch, even if it found a higher meaning and significance in the reformed religion. That all the old Iranian priests did not conform, as might naturally be expected, can be proved from the frequent references to the bitter opposition of the *kavis*, *usij*, and *karapans*.[7]

It should be observed that all that has been said so far has application, in all probability, to only eastern Īrān, our knowledge of the religious institutions of the west during this period being practically nil. On the other hand, in reference to the succeeding periods, matters are entirely reversed.

3. The Magi and the Iranian priesthood.—When we turn to Greek and Latin authors, the other important source for Iranian history, we find no evidence of any acquaintance whatsoever, on their part, with the priesthood under any equivalent of its Avestan name.[1] According to all the classical writers from Herodotus to Agathias, the sacerdotal office in Īrān was occupied by a tribe or caste of Medes called Magi (Old Pers. *Magu*, Gr. Μάγος, Lat. *Magus*); and no suggestion is given that any other sacerdotal class shared with them the priestly functions at that period, or that they were the heirs of an earlier order of priests. But it should be observed that these writers speak mainly, if not exclusively, of Iranian religious rites as they existed among the Medes and Persians, or, speaking geographically, as they were found in western Īrān. Furthermore, with the exception of Herodotus, the classical authors in question wrote of events and at a date posterior to the condition of things represented by the earlier part of the Avesta.

Nevertheless, an additional explanation of the difference of nomenclature in the Avesta as compared with the writers of Greece and Rome is felt to be necessary when it is remembered that much of the so-called Later Avesta was written under the influence of, and probably by, the Magi themselves, and at a period contemporary with several of the Greek authors.

In this connexion it is to be remembered that even in late Achæmenian times the Magi had not outlived the prejudice which had become associated with their name in the mind of Persians since the revolt of Gaumata, and hence they had a strong motive to avoid the use of the term *magus* under all circumstances; while the preservation of the old term *āthravan* throughout the Avesta, besides being a convenient substitute for the offensive ethnic designation, may have been prompted by the desire to further establish the claim of the Magi to the succession of the ancient *āthravans* in the Iranian priesthood.

That the Magi were the recognized priestly order in western Īrān in the earliest Achæmenian times (and, probably, in pre-Achæmenian days, *i.e.* during the ascendancy of the Medes) cannot be doubted. What influence or authority they achieved and exercised later in eastern Īrān as a result of the conquests of Cyrus in Bactria we have no means of determining; and for the remainder of this article, therefore, *magus* and priest will be convertible terms,[2] and Īrān, in the main, coincident with Media and Persia.[3]

4. The organization of the Magian priests in late Avestan and post-Avestan times.—It is sufficiently established that the priesthood during this period possessed a more or less definite inner organization, though probably varying much in character and completeness at different epochs. Even in Achæmenian days the Magi seemed to have recognized a chief or head of their order. Diogenes Laertius,[4] quoting Xanthus the Lydian, speaks of a long succession (διαδοχή) of Magi between the time of Zoroaster and that of Xerxes, and names Ostanes, Astrapsychus, Gobryes, and Pazates. These, there can be little doubt, were among the chief priests who stood at the head of the sacerdotal order during that period.[5] In his succinct account of the Magi Ammianus Marcel-

[1] See W. Geiger, *Civilization of the Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times*, tr. D. P. Sanjanâ, London, 1885-86, ii. 158.

[2] See M. W. Duncker, *Hist. of Antiquity*, tr. E. Abbott, London, 1877-82, v. 186; cf., however, J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, do. 1913, p. 194.

[3] For other reasons supporting this contention see F. Spiegel, *Erân. Alterthumskunde*, Leipzig, 1871-78, iii. 546 ff.; also Geiger, ii. 76 ff.

[4] *Yt.* xiii. 88 f.

[5] *Ys.* xxxiii. 6.

[6] See Moulton, p. 118.

[7] Cf. *Ys.* xliv. 20, etc.

[1] The one probable exception is Strabo, who says (xv. iii. 15) that in Cappadocia the Magi were also called *Pyraethi* (Πυραίθοι), which is, there can be little doubt, a Greek rendering of the Iranian *athravanô*.

[2] Cf. Apuleius, *de Magia*, xxv.: 'Persarum lingua Magus est qui nostra sacerdos.'

[3] See art. MAGI, vol. viii. pp. 242-244.

[4] *Procem.* ii.

[5] It should be stated, however, that Pliny (*HN* xxx. 1 f.) regards these, and others whom he mentions, merely as distinguished teachers and not necessarily superior in priestly rank.

linus[1] says that the Magi tribe was at first a small one, and that the Persians, who were politically in the ascendancy, availed themselves of their services for the conduct of public worship. Gradually they increased in number and founded an exclusive class, with a special area for their dwelling-place and a proper constitution.

But the Later Avesta itself contains clear indications of the existence of a priestly organization, although there is much uncertainty as to the time to which they have reference. In *Ys.* i. 3–7,[2] where the names of the *gāhs*, or divisions of the day, are mentioned, the priestly writer proclaims his purpose to bring offerings at each *gāh* to a special divinity, and also to the *fravashi*, or spirit of a chief or holy person. One of the chiefs whose spirit is invoked is the *zarathushtrotema*[3]—*i.e.* the one most like Zarathushtra, or the successor of Zarathushtra. Now, the *zarathushtrotema*, as we learn from other passages,[4] being the spiritual (and, in Ragha, also the secular) head of the community, the Pahlavi commentators have inferred that the other chiefs whose *fravashis* are associated with the other *gāhs* also represented members of the same organization. These were *daqyuma*, or lord of the province; *zantuma*, or lord of the tribe; *vīsya*, or lord of the village or clan; *nmaniya*, or lord of the house. The interpretation is no doubt entirely fanciful, but it has served a valuable purpose in that it has preserved for us some vestiges of the organization of the priesthood as it seems to have existed at least in Sasanian times. At the head, according to the tradition embodied in this interpretation of the *Yasna* passages, we have the *zarathushtrotema*, who was a kind of supreme pontiff at Rai. Under him each satrapy or province (*daqyum*) had, as Darmesteter surmises, a superintendent of the cult, or *andarzpat*.[5] In each district (*zantu*) there was a bishop—*rat* or *ratu*; in each borough (*vīs*) a *mobed* or *magupat*.[6] Beneath the *mobeds*, and yet belonging to the priestly race, were the civil judges (*dātōbar*, Mod. Pers. دادور). We know that the priesthood underwent a thorough re-organization under the Sasanians and at that period attained its fullest development.[7] Another classification of the priests is known to the Avesta,[8] not according to social or ecclesiastical rank, but according to their functions in regard to certain parts of the Mazdæan ritual. On this basis they were divided into eight classes, and their names for the most part indicate their special functions. The *zaotar* (now called *zōt* or *zōti*) had the supremely sacred duty of reciting the *Gāthas*. The *hāvanam* pressed out the juice of the *haoma*-plant, which was such a marked feature of the ritual in all ages. The *atarevakhsha* had as his primary charge the nourishing of the sacred fire, but in addition he was responsible for the washing of three sides of the fire-altar and making the responses to the *zaotar*. The *frabaretar*, besides his duties of preparing and handing the utensils to the *zaotar*, washed the fourth side of the fire-altar. To the *asnatar* was assigned the work of filtering and washing the *haoma*, while the *rathwiskare* made the mixture of *haoma* and milk. The *aberet*, in keeping with his name, brought the water necessary for all the priestly ceremonies. He bears also the name *dānazvāza*.[1] The eighth was the *sraoshavarez*, who seems to have superintended the whole ceremony. At the present time the functions of these eight priests are all performed by only two: the *zōt*, who has much the same functions as in earlier times (see below also), and the *rāspī* or *rathwī* (Pahl. *rāspīg*), who is in attendance upon the *zaotar*, while discharging the duties devolving upon the seven ancient assistant priests. Though taking his name from the Avestan *rathwiskare*, his chief functions correspond more nearly to those of the *atarevakhsha*.

This great reduction in the personnel of the priesthood resulted, there can be little doubt, in the first instance from the Arab conquest in the 7th century. The change is reflected in the tone of the *Bahman Yasht* and the *Dātistān-ī-Dīnīk*.

5. The functions of the priesthood.—The principal functions have already been touched upon incidentally. Performing the sacrifices, so long as they were practised,[2] mediating the offerings and all public worship, constituted the central and most characteristic parts of the priestly duties. No sacrifice, Herodotus[3] tells us, could lawfully be made without the presence of a Magus. Still the extent of the priestly intervention at these sacrifices, on the one hand, and of the lay-assistance[4] at these and other parts of ritual, on the other, seems to have varied at different epochs in Iranian religious history. In the days of Herodotus the part of the Magus in the sacrifice was confined to merely chanting the theogony or hymn; the person who brought the sacrifice both prepared it and disposed of the flesh after the ceremony. In Strabo's days the priestly duties at such sacrifices were more extended.[5]

The purifications constituted another primary function of the priesthood, and formed the most fruitful source of their revenue. Duncker maintains that even the purifications could be performed by a layman.[6] It is expressly stated in the *Vendīdād*,[7] however, that none could perform these ritualistic cleansings unless they had learnt the law from one of the purifiers or priests. It is scarcely probable that the priests would impart to many laymen the qualification which would enable them to share with themselves their already slender means of subsistence. It becomes very clear from the *Aērpatastān*[8] that the priestly revenue did not suffice to maintain the whole of their tribe, and as a result the participation in secular pursuits was legalized. It is true, their fees were substantially augmented by what they obtained from the practice of medicine. The art of healing was a priestly function in very early times in Irān, and, if not originally, yet ultimately fixed dues were attached to such services.[9] The priesthood, as we have already stated, was intimately associated with judicial functions in the Iranian commonwealth. 'To the Magians,' Duncker says,[10] 'belonged the judicial power.' It is quite legitimate to infer that the *zarathushtrotema's* position at Ragha, referred to before,[11] would entitle him to high legal authority among his other prerogatives. During the ascendancy of the Arsacids the Magi together with the members of the royal race formed the Council of the Empire,[12] and during the Sasanian period the Grand Magian performed the coronation of the kings.[13]

[1] xxiii. 6. [2] Cf. *Ys.* vii. 5–9.
[3] *Tema* is the superlative suffix. Spiegel, iii. 562, cites Lat. *maritimus* and *finitimus* as parallel instances.
[4] Cf. *Visp.* ix. 1, etc.
[5] Armenian writers of the Sasanian period attest the existence of this dignitary; see J. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta* (=*Annales du Musée Guimet*, 21, 22, and 24), Paris, 1892–93, i. 31; *JA*, 6th ser. vol. vii. [1866] p. 114 f.
[6] *Magūpat* (Mod. Pers. *mobed* or *maubad*), as meaning 'head of the Magi,' indicates the existence of degrees in the priestly ranks. The name does not occur in the Avesta.
[7] See Duncker, p. 59 f. [8] *Vend.* v. 161.

[1] *Fragments of Nasks*, vi. (*SBE* iv. [1895] 355).
[2] See art. ALTAR (Persian), vol. i. p. 348. [3] i. 132.
[4] According to the *Aērpatastān* (ed. Bulsara, ch. iii. f.), even women and children were considered eligible to assist at the ritual.
[5] xv. iii. 13–15. [6] P. 189. [7] ix. 47–57.
[8] *Loc. cit.* [9] See Geiger, tr. Sanjānā, i. 215–218, ii. 59 f.
[10] P. 60. [11] *Visp.* ix. 1, etc. [12] Duncker, p. 56.
[13] See Agathias, ii. 26.

6. Qualifications and symbols of the priestly office.—However much or little at different periods racial or tribal descent may have counted as affording a right to exercise the priestly functions, the primary qualifications clearly and strongly insisted upon in the Avesta were of a moral and spiritual character. According to the *Vendīdād*, the priest must be patient, contented, satisfied with a little bread, and should eat what is offered to him.[1]

'Call him a priest, O pure Zarathushtra, who enquires of the pure intelligence the whole night of the wisdom which purifies from sin and makes the heart wide. . . . He who sleeps the whole night without praising, or hearing, or reciting, or learning, or teaching—call not such an one a priest.'[2]

The *Aērpatastān* speaks in the same tenor:

'Which member of the house shall proceed to the sacred calling? He who has the greatest thirst after righteousness, that is, he who is the truest friend unto the soul whether he be great or humble.'[3]

Diogenes Laertius,[4] after Sotion, says that the Magi were forbidden to wear ornaments or jewellery; their resting-place was the ground; vegetables, a little cheese, and bread their food. Nevertheless they possessed certain outward symbols of office. The first was the *paitidāna* (Parsi *penōm*), a cloth or napkin[5] with which they covered, and still do cover, the lower part of the face as they recited the Avesta and especially when tending the sacred fire, lest perchance any pollution of the fire should result therefrom. Secondly, they had the *khrafstraghna*, a leathern thong or strap with which they killed insects and other unclean creatures. They also carried the *urvara*, or staff, and the *astra mairi*, or knife, with which to kill snakes. But perhaps the most characteristic symbol was the *baresma*, or *barsom*, a bundle of slender rods or twigs of a specially sacred tree, but now substituted by a bundle of metal wires, which are held before the face at the prayers and sacrifices (see art. BARSOM, vol. ii. p. 424 f.; cf. Ezk 8[17]).

7. The priesthood in modern times.—To-day the priesthood is a hereditary privilege, though it does not seem always to have been so.[6] All priests in India at the present time claim to be descended from a single priest, Minuchihr, who came from Persia with the first settlers in the 7th century. The unity of the priesthood is a cardinal doctrine among the Parsis. Every son of a priest, however, is not *ipso facto* himself a priest able and entitled to officiate. Although no consecration can make a layman a priest, still every acting member of the priestly family must pass through a series of symbolic actions to initiate him into the different grades of the sacerdotal office. There is in India a preliminary function called *nōzūd* (really meaning 'new *zaotar*'), which, although not a door to any stage of actual priestly grade, is essential to every aspirant to such dignity, and by which he becomes a recognized member of the Zoroastrian church or community—a *bihdin*, a status corresponding to full membership in Christian churches, or, as Darmesteter observes, a בר קיימא among the Jews. In Persia this ceremony is called *sudrah va kūsti dādan*, *i.e.* the investing with the *sudrah*, or sacred shirt, and *kustī*, or holy girdle, which are the outward distinctive marks of the Zoroastrian. The term *nōzūd* is employed by the Zoroastrians of Persia for the ceremony termed *nābar* by the Parsis of India, and is the function that makes a *mobed's* son into a priest of the lower grade called *herbed*[1] (Avestan *aithrapaiti*) and qualifies him for performing the ceremonies of the second grade. Before he is allowed to perform the *nābar* ceremony the candidate must have completed his fourteenth year, and must know by heart all the texts and formulæ connected with the sacrifices of the *Yasna*, *Vispārad*, and *Khurda Avesta*. He twice undergoes the great purification of nine nights called *bareshnum*, after which he is conducted to the temple by a *dastūr* and his patron, followed by his friends and other guests. He carries the *gurz i gavyānī*, or club, a reminder of that which was in the hand of Faridun, and a symbol of spiritual authority over the demons. The head of the assembly asks if they admit him as a candidate for the holy office, and, taking their silence for assent, he enters the *Izāshnah Gāh*, where he celebrates the *Yasna*—the *zōt*, or head priest, who initiates him, acting for the time being as his *rāspī*, or ministering priest. He performs the purification of *nīrang* and water for four successive days, and on the fourth day he has attained the degree of *herbed*, with a right to celebrate all the ceremonies of the *Khurda Avesta*. For exercising the more important ceremonies of the *Vendīdād* together with that of initiating other candidates to *nābar* it is essential that he should be a *mobed*, or fully qualified priest. To attain the *mobed*-ship he must have passed through the ceremony called in India *marātib* (pl. of Arabic مرتبت, meaning 'grade' or 'degree'). This consists of another nine nights' purification. On the morning of the succeeding day he performs the *Yasna* with a fully qualified priest. On the following or second day again he performs the sacrifice of the *fravashis* or that of the *srosh*; at midnight the *Vendīdād* is performed and henceforth the candidate is a *mobed* and entitled to all the privileges of a fully qualified priest.

Another frequent designation of the chief priest in India is *dastūr*. The name and office probably arose, as Darmesteter observes,[2] after the Arab conquest of Persia. The origin of the term is not altogether clear.[3] It is used in the translations to render the Avestan *ratu*. In the *Shāh-nāmah* it sometimes denotes a high ecclesiastical functionary; at other times a minister of State. To-day in India many *mobeds* assume and are accorded the title without any real or moral right to it. But it is frequently applied as a title of honour to a learned *mobed* who knows his Zend or Avestan and Pahlavi. But it specially and more correctly designates the priest attached-in-chief to a fire-temple of the highest order, *i.e.* an *ātash i bahrām*. The office is generally hereditary, but not necessarily so, inasmuch as the patron or founder of such a temple may choose his own *dastūr*. See, further, artt. SACRIFICE (Iranian) and WORSHIP (Iranian).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works referred to in the article the following may be consulted: Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1771, ii. 529–619; A. Rapp, 'Die Religion und Sitte der Perser und übrigen Iranier,' in *ZDMG* xx. [1866] 68–77. Much further additional material may be found in the *Aêrpatastān*, ed. S. J. Bulsara, Bombay, 1916, which could not be included in the compass of this article. Darmesteter's excellent Introduction to vol. i. of his *Le Zend-Avesta* already referred to, to which in the treatment of the modern period this article is greatly indebted, may be further profitably consulted.

E. EDWARDS.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Jewish).—1. Exclusiveness of the priesthood.—According to the Levitical code, the Hebrew priest is born, not made. This principle has always been so rigorously upheld that, after the return of the Jews from the Babylonian captivity, all those who

[1] viii. 126–129.
[2] xviii. 11–17.
[3] Ch. i. p. 4 f., ed. Bulsara.
[4] *Proœm.* vi.
[5] In Strabo's time we read that the Magus's headgear consisted of a high felt turban reaching down on either side of the face so as to cover the lips and cheeks (xv. iii. 15).
[6] D. F. Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, London, 1884, ii. 235, says that the Parsi religion does not sanction the hereditary character of the priesthood, 'which is, indeed, contrary to the ancient law. The custom is merely derived from usage.' Duncker also (p. 159) strongly contends that the priesthood was not a closed caste in earlier Iranian times.

[1] *Herbed* did not originally designate a priest of inferior as opposed to one of superior degree, but only the master or instructor as opposed to *hāvishta*, or disciple. See *Dātistān*, xlv. 4.
[2] *Le Zend-Avesta* (= *Annales du Musée Guimet*, 21, p. lv).
[3] See Spiegel, iii. 596.

claimed priestly rank but were unable to produce documentary evidence of their descent from Aaron were disqualified (Ezr 2^{62}, Neh 7^{64}). In order to safeguard the purity of lineage for future generations, the Biblical laws regulating priestly marriages were not only strictly enforced, but also strengthened in various directions. Priests were forbidden to marry a *ḥalūṣāh* (childless widow whom the brother of the deceased husband had refused to marry), or a woman who had spent some time in captivity, or a freed slave, or the daughter of a proselyte, unless the mother was of Jewish descent (Mishnāh, *Bikkûrîm*, i. 5). The high priest was bound to be wedded to a pure virgin, who, however, was allowed to be of lay origin. These restrictive regulations, added to ancestral pride, gradually converted the priestly class into an exalted theocracy which, from the nature of public affairs, at the same time formed the social aristocracy. The priestly family of the Hasmonæans acquired royal dignity. Later the high priest was the president of the Sanhedrin. Thus power, both spiritual and temporal, and wealth accumulated in some priestly families.

2. Classification.—(*a*) The principal duties of the priests were those connected with the sacrificial service of the Temple in Jerusalem. It was also their business to prepare and kindle the 'perpetual lamp' daily and to arrange the shewbread on the golden table every Sabbath. From Biblical sources we know that the number of priests had in the course of time increased to such an extent that only a limited number could be employed in the Temple at the same time. The four clans mentioned by Ezra (2^{36-39}, Neh 7^{39-42}) numbered more than 4000 male members. It was, therefore, necessary to fix a rota of attendance, in order to give every priest an opportunity of discharging his duty at the service. For this purpose the whole priestly tribe was divided into 24 companies, probably irrespective of the 22 families mentioned in Neh 12^{1-7}. At what time this division was first made is uncertain, but the most reliable tradition seems to be that preserved in the Tôseftā (*Ta'anîth*, ii. 1; *Talm. Jer.* fol. 68*a*) to the effect that the classification was undertaken by the prophets. As both Jeremiah and Ezekiel were priests, it is not unlikely that they, especially the latter, had a voice in the constitution of the priestly order. Each section was called upon to do duty in the Temple for one week. Each company, officially called 'watch,' or *mishmār*, was again subdivided into several 'houses of Fathers,' each of which was probably composed of the members of one family. The *mishmār* was presided over by a 'head,' and the 'house' by the eldest member. Besides these there was a number of officers, but much uncertainty prevails as to their status and functions. In the older sources (Mishn. *Shekalîm*, v. 1; *Yômā*, ii. 1, iii. 1; Tôs. *Shek.* ii. 14) they are described as *mᵉmunnîm* (sing. *mᵉmunnēh*). One of them superintended the daily morning offering, determining by lot the share which each priest had in the ceremony. He also gave the signal for the beginning of the morning prayer. Others were keepers of seals, keys, stores, vestments, tapisserie, overseers of the manufacture of shewbread and perfume, musicians and choirmasters, criers and constables. Their number was 15, but not all of them seem to have held equal rank. Thus *mᵉmunnēh* is a general description of office-holder rather than a fixed title.

(*b*) *'Amarkelîm.*—Of somewhat higher status seem to have been the seven *'amarkelîm* (*Shek.* v. 2; Tôs. *ib.* 15). The exact meaning of the word is doubtful, but it seems that they were the keepers of the keys to the sanctuary itself. The Targum uses the term for the translation of the 'keepers of the door' in 2 K 12^{9} and similar passages. The Tôseftā remarks that all seven *'amarkelîm* had to be present when the door was opened. We might infer from this that each one had a different key, so that the door to the Temple could never be opened without a certain amount of publicity, strict control being kept over every one who wished to enter. As the word is also employed in connexion with secular supervisors, it does not really describe any priestly function, although the officers who bore this title were priests. Together with the *'amarkelîm* are mentioned three *gizbārîm*, or treasurers, who were probably responsible for the golden vessels and the Temple funds.

(*c*) *Sᵉgan.*—One of the highest offices was that of the *sᵉgan*, commonly believed to have been the high priest's lieutenant. Here, however, it should be noted that the Mishnāh (*Yômā*, i. 1), when speaking of the appointment of a deputy high priest for the Day of Atonement, does not use the term *sᵉgan*, but simply says 'another priest.' Other passages (*Yômā*, vii. 1; *Sôṭāh*, viii. 7 f.) have it that the *sᵉgan* stood next to the high priest and handed the scroll of the Law to him. The Talmud (*Yômā*, fol. 39vo) records a tradition on the authority of R. Ḥanīnā, himself a *sᵉgan*, that, if the high priest was suddenly disqualified from ministration on the Day of Atonement, the *sᵉgan* took his place. Now this Ḥanīnā is always called '*sᵉgan* of the priests' (in plural), which cannot mean that he acted as deputy to a priest of lower rank, or to one high priest only. It seems rather that he did duty to several high priests either by fixed appointment or by re-election. It stands to reason that at a time when many high priests were ignorant or neglectful of their duties an experienced assistant had to be near at hand to prevent them from making mistakes. The frequent change of high priest was most likely of less importance as long as a tried *sᵉgan* looked after the proper execution of his duties. He was probably also meant to be in constant attendance on the high priest in order to give greater dignity to his office. According to the Mishnāh (*Tāmid*, vii. 3), one of his duties was to assist the high priest whenever the latter ascended the staircase to burn the perfume. Then he took the flags and gave the Levites the signal to start singing.

(*d*) *High priest.*—The office of the high priest is characterized by his title. He was the spiritual head of the people, but since the period of the Hasmonæans he added the regal crown to the ecclesiastical mitre. His participation in the sacrificial duties during the year was left to his discretion, but he was supposed to act as offering priest on the Day of Atonement. There is no reason to assume that even on this day he nominated any other priest for his work, as otherwise the Mishnāh would have had no cause to describe the preparations which began a week beforehand, when he had to make himself familiar with the details of his task for the holy day. Even an emergency wife was appointed for the event of his wife's sudden death. His evening meal was restricted, and sleep was denied him entirely. Before entering the Temple hall he was solemnly warned by the lay heads of the Sanhedrin not to alter anything of the Pharisaic teachings. The service itself, which claimed his undivided attention and included the fast, five baths, and ten lavings of hands and feet, must have made great demands on his physical strength. When we add to this the anxiety not to commit a mistake, we can understand the Mishnāic allusion to the satisfaction expressed at the close of the day (*Yômā*, vii. 4) which is reflected in the glowing tribute given to the high priest by an eye-witness

in the person of Ecclesiasticus (ch. 50). Poetic descriptions by various authors form an integral part of the present liturgy for the Day of Atonement.

3. Rules for the priesthood.—There was one condition which all priests, high or low, had to fulfil, viz., they must be free from bodily defects, and the rules were as elaborate as their enforcement was strict. It made no difference whether the blemishes were chronic or temporary (Mishn. *Bekhōrōth*, vii.). The Mishnāh even forbade a priest whose hands were stained with dye to pronounce the blessing over the people (*Mᵉgillāh*, iv. 9). A careful compilation of these blemishes (amounting to 140) is given in Maimonides, *Mishnēh Tôrāh* (*Hilkhōth bi'ath hammiqdāshih*, viii.). Needless to say, the Biblical prohibition against drinking wine or any other intoxicant was most strictly enforced. The Talmud (*Ta'anîth*, fol. 17vo) strengthens these rules considerably for the company whose turn it was to attend the Temple service. A similar rule holds good for the present time as far as the public blessing is concerned.

4. Remuneration.—As the priests were allowed no share in the land (Nu 18^{20}), the Levitical law (vv.$^{8-19}$) assigned certain emoluments to them in compensation. These originally formed their sole source of income. On the basis of the passages just mentioned, the Tôseftā (*Ḥallāh*, ii. 7 f.) enumerates 24 classes of priestly 'gifts,' viz., 10 to be partaken of in the Temple premises, 4 within the precincts of Jerusalem, and 10 within the borders of the Holy Land. These 'gifts' consisted in the first instance of the flesh of sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, which was eaten by such male priests as were not debarred from so doing by Levitical uncleanness. None of it could be eaten outside the Temple. The officiating priests were also entitled to the skins, including those of the burnt-offerings. In view of the large number of 'heavy' sacrifices, the income derived from the skins must have been considerable. Of the lighter kind of sacrifices, such as peace-offerings and festival-offerings, the priests received only the breast and the right shoulder. These not only could be eaten within the boundaries of the holy city, but also could be shared with women, children, and even slaves. Another source of revenue was the cereal offerings, viz., the part of the meat-offerings which was not burnt on the altar, the shewbread, the *'omer*, etc. Priests who lived in the provinces were recipients of the *tᵉrûmāh*, the gift of fruits from field and garden. From the Levites they claimed the tithe of the tithes due to them from the people. To these were added the firstfruits and first-born domestic animals suitable for sacrifices. First-born sons had to be redeemed by the payment of five shekels, which belonged to the priest who performed the ceremony. The first-born of unclean animals were likewise subject to redemption according to the priest's estimate. To these were added gifts of the 'first dough' of wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye, and of the first cut of wool from a flock consisting of at least five sheep. All these regular imposts were occasionally supplemented by vows and free gifts either in kind or in the form of money. Lastly must be mentioned things 'devoted' (*ḥerem*), which no layman was allowed to touch.

Such was the income of the ordinary priest. If he was free from any physical blemish, he shared the emoluments of the sacrificial service twice a year. Priests who lived in Jerusalem benefited by the influx of the people for the celebration of the three festivals of pilgrimage. It may be assumed therefore that the majority of priests lived in or near the holy city, as the care of their families forced them to be in touch with clients who bestowed dues and gifts on them. In the nature of things there must have been a great disparity of income, and the social status of priestly families must have varied. The greater number probably remained poor. Many, as alluded to above, were obliged to practise some trade, in spite of the fact that the imposts seem to have been regularly paid (Neh $10^{35\,ff.}$). This is vividly illustrated by the Mishnāh (*Bikkûrîm*, iii.), which gives an account of the cutting and conveying the first-fruits to the Temple. Rich and poor joined in the festival procession, every one carrying his basket, and even the king, probably Agrippa I., handing his gift in person to the officiating priest, whilst reciting the prayer prescribed in Dt 26^{5-10}.

The revenue of the high priest was placed on a different level. His position demanded that he should be wealthy. If he came from a poor family, it was the duty of his brother priests to make him rich. Josephus (*Ant.* XX. viii. 8, ix. 2) speaks of the violent conduct of some high priests who sent their servants into the threshing floors of the people to take away the tithes so that their poorer brethren died from starvation. Unfortunately he mentions no names, but attaches this remark to the paragraph in which he tells of the appointment of Ismael b. Phabi II. as high priest. This, however, is the priest of whom the Mishnāh (*Sōṭāh*, ix. 15) relates that with him the lustre of priesthood came to an end. It is therefore probable that the censure of Josephus (who was himself a priest) was meant for Ismael's predecessor, the avaricious Ananias, son of Nedebaios, who was removed from office, and later met with a violent death at the hands of the people.

5. High priest's legal status.—Notwithstanding his exalted position, the high priest did not stand above the law, at least in theory. Both the Mishnāh and Tôseftā point out that, in the event of his committing breaches of the religious or moral laws, he was liable to be called before the court. No such case is recorded in the sources. High priests were occasionally removed from office, but for personal and political motives rather than for religious ones. In flagrant cases of defiance of the traditional teaching the people acted independently. The Mishnāh (*Sukkāh*, iv. 9) relates that one high priest (whose name is not given) who endeavoured to introduce Sadducean practices during the ceremony of pouring out water on the Feast of Tabernacles was done to death by the people, who pelted him with their citrons.

6. Decline of the priesthood.—The destruction of the Temple by the Romans not only put an end to the sacerdotal service, but also deprived the priests of their chief source of income. Although the laws connected with land-tenure remained in force, the Jewish population was so reduced in numbers and so impoverished that their tithes and gifts could not have amounted to much. The priests living in the Diaspora were reduced to a number of empty privileges, and only the redemption of first-born sons, which is practised to this day, preserved a remnant of monetary gift due to them. In the storm and stress of the times the real control of priestly pedigrees has been irretrievably lost, and is replaced by family tradition. Certain family-names, some of them being of considerable age and literary renown, carry an indication of the priestly descent of the bearers with them. In modern times the claim of priesthood has lost its title to social distinction. The religious duties of priests are limited to pronouncing the blessing (Nu 6^{24-26}) over the people during the public worship on festival days. The ancient rules of disqualification are still in force, with the exception of the preservation of Levitical cleanli-

ness, since the means of re-establishing the same no longer exists, and are merely intimated by the ceremony of washing of hands with the assistance of Levites. The prohibition of coming in contact with a dead person or a grave, with the exceptions mentioned before, is likewise still in force. There is still one privilege specified in the Mishnāh (*Hōrayôth*, iii. 8) to be mentioned, viz., the precedence of the priest over a Levite or an ordinary Israelite in every religious ceremony, especially in the order of persons 'called' to the reading of the lessons from the Pentateuch during public worship. The same paragraph holds up to contempt those high priests who held office not by virtue of learning and piety, but from worldly motives. It places them beneath the *mamzēr* in the Rabbinical sense (Mishnāh, *Yᵉbhāmôth*, iv. 13). The historical background of this is undoubted.

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H. HIRSCHFELD.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Mexican).—In ancient Mexico the priestly office had arrived at a condition of high complexity, the various grades of the priesthood being sharply differentiated. At first the priest was merely the tribal medicine-man, and in nomadic times had charge of the tribal god, the image of which he carried from place to place. The temporal and religious authorities were never quite distinct, the *tlatoani*, or king, being necessarily a man conversant with hierophantic as well as military practice. In the Mexican hierarchy proper, as apart from those of the surrounding and subject peoples, were two chief priests, each of whom was entitled Quetzalcoatl (the name of the god who was the founder of religious orders), but who were distinguished from one another by the titles of *totec tlamacazqui* and *tlaloc tlamacazqui*, and who were respectively the leaders of those castes which especially served the gods Huitzilopochtli and Tlaloc. These pontiffs were equal in grade and held their positions in virtue of their piety and general fitness. Occupying a lower rank was the *mexicatl teohuatzin*, head of the *calmecac*, or priestly college, and interpreter of ritualistic difficulties, in which duties he was assisted by the *huitznauac teohuatzin* and the *tepan teohuatzin*, the latter being executive educational officer. The rank and file of the priesthood consisted of two grades—the *tlañamacac*, or upper grade, and the *tlamacazqui*. Beneath these were the *tlamacazton*, or neophytes. The first grade included many special functionaries who served various deities or performed definite rites.

The costume of the priesthood in general consisted of a black mantle, the body being painted black, relieved, in some cases, with yellow designs. The hair was allowed to grow long, and the ears were torn and ragged from the practice of penitential blood-letting. The priest who performed the act of human sacrifice was garbed in red.

The offices of the Mexican priesthood were numerous; and, besides sacrifice, the care of the temples, and ritualistic labours, they were employed in astrological observation and divination. The *amamoatini*, a special class, were engaged in the preparation of the painted MSS which served the Mexicans as written records; and others were employed as singers and dancers. Ritual practice, however, occupied most of their time, especially incense-burning, which was performed several times a day. The education and preparation of a priest were severe. The neophyte commenced his priestly life at about the age of seven by sweeping the temple buildings and preparing the body-paint for the priests from pine-soot, gathering aloe spines for blood-letting, and making adobe building bricks. Later he made night pilgrimages to a holy mountain in the vicinity as a test of austerity.

The Mexican priests were, however, above all, diviners, and their practice in this respect is minutely outlined in the works of Sahagun. The basis of their calculations was the astronomical calendar known as the *Tonalamatl* ('Book of Days'), from which they cast horoscopes and foretold lucky days and seasons (see DIVINATION [American], CALENDAR [Mexican]).

LITERATURE.—B. de Sahagun, *Historia General de las Cosas de Nueva España*, 3 vols., Mexico, 1829; J. de Torquemada, *La Monarquia Indiana*, Madrid, 1723; F. S. Clavigero, *Storia Antica del Messico*, Cesena, 1780, Eng. tr. *Hist. of Mexico*, 2 vols., London, 1787; L. Spence, *The Civilization of Ancient Mexico*, Cambridge, 1912; T. A. Joyce, *Mexican Archæology*, do. 1914.

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PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Muhammadan).—In the Muhammadan system there is properly no caste, class, or profession which monopolizes the performance of religious rites; when these were at first performed in public, the leader was properly the chief of the community, and the name *imām*, 'leader in prayer,' is therefore used for 'sovereign,' 'chief authority,' and the like. Taking the lead in the religious service of the mosque was therefore the duty of the sovereign in the capital and of his representative in the provinces; but in 'Abbāsid times we find the *ṣalāt*, or 'public prayer,' occasionally separated from the governorship and combined with another office—*e.g.*, the judgeship (Ṭabarī, *Chronicle*, Paris, 1867–74, iii. 378 [anno 156], 458 [anno 158]) or the headship of police (*ib.* iii. 469 [anno 159]). As mosques multiplied it became customary to make provision for an *imām*, and, if there was a Friday sermon, for a *khaṭīb* ('preacher'). Such a man was supposed to be of good character (*Aghānī*, Būlāq, 1868, xvii. 11), and of course had to possess sufficient learning to discharge his functions.

The legal aspect of the matter is treated by Mawerdi, *Constitutiones Politicæ* (ed. M. Enger, Bonn, 1853, pp. 172–185). A distinction is there made between royal and civil mosques; in the former the minister must normally be appointed by the sovereign, in the latter by the congregation; if there are more than one candidate, a majority are to appoint; if votes are equal, the sovereign is to do so. The founder of a mosque has not the right to lead prayer in it himself, but on this point there is a difference of opinion. Prayer may not be led by a woman, if there are any men in the congregation.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Roman).—Under the old Roman monarchical system the office of king included religious as well as secular functions. The ruler was both king and priest. But on the establishment of the Republic a line of cleavage was drawn, and, although religion remained a branch of the general State administration, all its technical phases were assigned to priestly organizations. The relation of the priestly colleges to the secular authorities was one of the characteristic features of Roman religion. The powers of the priests were not co-ordinate with those of the senate and the magistrates, but were subject to their control. They performed the routine duties of their office without special instructions, but, when unusual circumstances arose, it was only at the command of the State authorities that they became active. Neither *pontifices* nor *haruspices* took measures in

regard to prodigies until the senate had ordered them to do so; the *quindecimviri* were not permitted to inspect the Sibylline books except at the express command of the senate.

Of the numerous priestly organizations (*sacerdotes*[1] *publici populi Romani Quiritium*) four were of special importance (*sacerdotum quattuor amplissima collegia*): the *pontifices*, the *augures*, the commission in charge of the Sibylline books and of all ceremonies conducted 'ritu Graeco' (*quindecimviri sacris faciundis*), and the college which supervised the sacred banquets (*septemviri epulones*). Next to these in rank came the priestly *sodalitates*: the *fetiales*, the *sodales Titii*, the *sodales* of the *divi imperatores* (modelled on the *sodales Titii*), the *Salii*, and the *fratres Arvales*. There is evidence that the rank of the *fetiales* and of the *sodales Augustales* approached very closely that of the four great colleges; of the relative ranking of the *Arvales*, *Titii*, and *Salii* we have no definite indication. The runners of the Lupercalia (the *Luperci*) were inferior to the others. The *sodales Augustales* were founded A.D. 14; but all the other priesthoods mentioned, with the exception of the *septemviri epulones*, go back to the regal period. This fact is significant of the conservatism of the Roman national religion. Moreover, the *septemviri epulones* were organized (196 B.C.) merely for the purpose of relieving the *pontifices* of one of their functions; the priesthood did not represent any new religious ideas. There were, however, some minor priesthoods organized during the Republic to take care of the rites of some god or gods belonging to communities which the Romans had assimilated (*sacerdotes Lanuvini*, *sacerdotes Tusculani*, etc.). The Greek and Oriental cults introduced during the Republic and the Empire brought their own priests with them.

The qualifications for membership in any of the priesthoods were free birth, Roman citizenship, an unblemished civil record, and a physique free from infirmities. Originally, with the exception of the *quindecimviri*, all the old priesthoods were limited to patricians. But in the course of time this exclusiveness passed away, except in the case of the *rex sacrorum*, the *Salii*, the three great *flamines*, and later the *flamines* of the deified emperors. By the *lex Ogulnia* (300 B.C.) five of the nine places in the colleges of the *pontifices* and the *augures* respectively were reserved for the plebeians, while the four others were open to both orders. Wissowa[2] suggests that in all probability it was the *lex Ogulnia* that opened to the plebs the other priesthoods also. From the beginning of the Empire a new classification prevailed: senatorial and equestrian priesthoods. To the former belonged the four great colleges, the *sodales* of the *divi imperatores*, *sodales Titii*, *fetiales*, *fratres Arvales*, and *Salii*; to the latter the *Luperci*, the minor *flamines*, the minor *pontifices*, and the *sacerdotes Tusculani*, *Lanuvini*, etc.

The extent to which the accumulation of priesthoods in the hands of one man was customary varied with the kind of priesthood and with the period. As regards the combination of two of the four great priesthoods, we find examples in the earlier Republican period, but not in the later until the time of Cæsar, who was both *pontifex maximus* and *augur*. Moreover, the accumulation of priesthoods of this class did not become common till the 3rd and 4th centuries, except in the case of the emperors and other members of the imperial family. There was less objection to the combination of one of the great priesthoods with one or more of the *sodalitates*, and many examples occur. The *Salii*, however, could not hold any other priesthood. If they joined another, they ceased automatically to be *Salii*. Whether a *flamen* could hold any other priestly office is doubtful.

Priests were allowed to hold civil and military offices. This probably was not intended in the readjustment of civil and religious offices that took place after the expulsion of the kings, but gradually it became the regular practice. There were, however, exceptions. The *rex sacrorum* could not hold any civil or military office, and the *flamen Dialis* was virtually prevented from doing so by the numerous tabus which hampered his actions.

In the early Republican period the usual method of choosing members in the priestly colleges and *sodalitates* was that of co-optation, but in the year 103 B.C. the *lex Domitia* was passed, by which vacancies in the four great colleges were filled by election at the *comitia sacerdotum*, which consisted of seventeen (that is a minority) of the tribes, chosen by lot. The nominations to the sacerdotal *comitia* were made by the respective colleges, which after the election went through the form of co-optation. In the case of the *sodalitates* the old system of co-optation remained. Under the Empire the influence of the emperor in the appointments both to colleges and to *sodalitates* was almost unlimited. Appointment to a priesthood was generally for life. The Vestals and the *Salii* were exceptions.

The priests were provided by the State with funds for the maintenance of the various cults and for the performance of the duties of their office, and with attendants and slaves (*apparitores*, *lictores*, *tibicines*, *viatores*, *servi publici*). Some of them were furnished with residences—*e.g.*, the *rex sacrorum* and the Vestals. They had the privilege of wearing the *toga prætexta*, and, if they cared to take advantage of it, exemption from civil and military duties (*vacatio militiæ munerisque publici*).

I. **Collegium pontificum.**—(*a*) *Pontifices.*—While the old derivation of *pontifex* from *pons* and *facere* is probably sound, it is not possible, with the data available, to determine precisely the original significance of the term. It is not even known positively that *pons* here means 'bridge,' though scholars once more tend to interpret the word in that way, finding an explanation in those religious associations of bridge-building which are known to have existed in ancient times. The priesthood was not peculiar to Rome, but existed also in other places in Latium—*e.g.*, Præneste and Tibur.[1] According to the tradition, the *pontifices* were originally five in number. Including the king, however, who doubtless performed the functions which under the Republic fell to the *pontifex maximus*, there were six. Subsequently the number was increased to nine (300 B.C.), and later by Sulla to fifteen.

With the *pontifices* were closely connected certain other priests or priestesses: the *rex sacrorum*, the *flamines*, and the Vestals. So close was the association that from the beginning of the Republic all these were regarded as belonging to the college of *pontifices*. Towards the close of the Republic the *pontifices minores*[2] were also members of the college (cf. Cic. *de Har. Resp.* vi. 12).

The *pontifex maximus* was the president of the college and represented its authority. But it is a mistake to suppose that the other *pontifices* consti-

[1] We find this word used of the whole body of Roman priests as in this phrase, but it is not applied to the priests of individual Roman gods, with the exception of the municipal groups, *sacerdotes Lanuvini*, etc. It is used, however, of the priests attached to various Greek cults.

[2] *Religion und Kultus der Römer*², p. 492 f.

[1] See indexes to *CIL* xiv.

[2] The title of *pontifices maiores* was applied to the regular *pontifices* only towards the end of the 3rd cent. after Christ. The title was used to distinguish them, not from the *pontifices minores*, but from the *pontifices Solis*, the priesthood founded by the emperor Aurelian to supervise the worship of his sun-god.

tuted merely an advisory body. A question submitted by the senate was discussed by the whole college, and the opinion of the majority prevailed, even if the *pontifex maximus* held a different view.[1] But along many lines he could act without reference to them. In the earlier period especially his power was very great; *e.g.*, he originally appointed the *rex sacrorum*, the *flamines*, and the Vestals, even against the wishes of the appointees. Later this power seems to have been modified, and in the case of the *rex* (Livy, XL. xlii. 4) and the *flamines maiores* (Tac. *Ann.* iv. 16) he made his appointments from a list of candidates nominated probably by the college, while Vestals were chosen by lot from a list of twenty whom he nominated (Aul. Gell. I. xii. 11). He had also the power to punish these priests: the *rex* and the *flamines* he could fine, and under some circumstances dismiss from office; in the case of the Vestals he had the right of corporal punishment, and originally of inflicting the death penalty.

It was the duty of the *pontifices* to conserve the body of Roman religious tradition. They were primarily theologians, professors of sacred law. They were the final authority on all questions pertaining to the old Roman gods, and on the proper methods of maintaining satisfactory relations with them. It was a fundamental belief in Roman religion that a benevolent attitude on the part of the gods could be secured only by scrupulous attention to all the minutiæ of ritual. With these minutiæ the *pontifices* were familiar. They knew not only the names of the gods, but also their attributes and the formulæ by which they should be addressed. They were consulted not only by the magistrates in regard to matters which concerned the State, but also by private citizens who found themselves under the stress of some religious problem.

They were not, however, merely authorities on sacred law. They themselves took an active part in religious services, and their sacerdotal functions are clearly indicated by the insignia of their office, which include the bowl for libations (*simpulum*), the sacrificial knife (*secespita*), and the axe (*securis*). It was, moreover, with special reference to their duties as officiating priests that, at least in the earlier period, they were subject to tabus similar to those which persisted with so much more rigour in the case of the *flamen Dialis*: they could not look at a corpse or mount a horse. The *pontifex maximus* in particular was not permitted to absent himself from Rome, or at any rate from Italy, for a period of any length. They officiated at the most important ceremonies in the public worship of Vesta and the *penates* as well as at those of the Capitoline triad, for with these cults, which embodied some of the oldest and most sacred of Roman religious ideas, they, as members of the ranking priesthood of the State, had especially close associations. They had the rare privilege of entering the inner sanctum of Vesta; the *regia*, the official headquarters of the *pontifex maximus*, was adjacent to the house of the Vestals, and he stood 'in loco parentis' to them. When Augustus became *pontifex maximus* (12 B.C.), he built a temple of Vesta close to his own residence on the Palatine. The cult of the Capitoline deities had an equal claim on the attention of the *pontifices*. They supervised the monthly sacrifices offered by the *rex* and the *flamen Dialis* on the kalends and the ides. On the ides of September and November the college celebrated a sacred banquet (*epulum Iovis in Capitolio*), till in the year 196 B.C. this function was transferred to the college of the *epulones*. Furthermore, the *pontifices* officiated at the ceremonies held in connexion with cults which, though recognized by the State, were not provided with special priests. And it was they who, in order to prevent the complete disappearance of the worship of certain ancient divinities like Angerona, Carna, Acca Larentina, and others who were fading out of Roman religious life, made annual libations and sacrifices in their honour. Moreover, they were in charge of certain ceremonies belonging to the category of lustration, as, *e.g.*, the Fordicidia on 15th April. They also took part in the rites of the *Argei* (in March and May).

On all these occasions the *pontifices* either officiated in person or were represented by subordinate priests. But there were many important ceremonies in which they participated merely as the advisers or assistants of the magistrates—*e.g.*, when vows were made on the outbreak of a pestilence or at the beginning of a war, or on the occasion of the annual vows on 1st Jan., which were pronounced by the consul or other magistrate, who repeated the words after the *pontifex maximus*.[1] When relations with the gods were endangered by a flaw in a ceremony, the *pontifices* were consulted and charged with the supervision of appropriate expiatory rites; when a prodigy (*monstrum, prodigium*) was reported to the senate, that body consulted the *pontifices*, who gave their opinion as to the best methods of placating the gods of whose anger the prodigy was regarded as a manifestation. At a comparatively early date, however, the *pontifices* relinquished for the most part the care of prodigies to the *haruspices* or to the priests in charge of the Sibylline oracles, reserving for themselves the expiation of certain ones only (*e.g.*, showers of stones, speaking oxen, etc.), in regard to which the efficacy of their methods had long been established. Moreover, the ceremony of consecration (*consecratio*) was performed by the pontiffs; *e.g.*, a new temple or altar was dedicated by the magistrate who had vowed it, or, if he was no longer in office, by a committee appointed for the purpose (*duoviri ædi dedicandæ*), but was consecrated by the *pontifices*. By the act of dedication the magistrate gave it up to the god; by the consecration the *pontifex maximus* or one of his colleagues declared it to be the property of the god (*res sacra*). To the *pontifices* also belonged the act of *consecratio capitis et bonorum*. A husband who had sold his wife, a son who had killed his father, or some other equally reprehensible offender could, after adequate investigation, be expressly consigned by the *pontifex* to this or that divinity or group of divinities ('Sacer esto'); and one who had been pronounced *sacer* could be killed with impunity by any one of those whom his crime had injured. In historical times, however, the punishment of one upon whom the sentence of 'Sacer esto' had been passed was left to the tribunes. Another ceremony in which the participation of the *pontifices* was indispensable was that known as devotion (*devotio*). The words in which the commander of an army, in the hope of extricating himself from a perilous position, devoted himself, or one of his countrymen, or the army of the enemy to the gods of the lower world were pronounced first by a *pontifex*; the commander repeated them, phrase by phrase, after him. Again, the *pontifices* supervised both the making of the vow of the sacred spring (*ver sacrum*) and, if necessary, its fulfilment. Through another activity they not only were brought into contact with political life, but sometimes influenced it to a very considerable degree. This was their supervision of the calendar. Besides providing for

[1] A case is cited for the year 200 B.C. by Livy, XXXI. ix. 7.

[1] Livy, IV. xxvii. 1: 'Dictator, praeeunte A. Cornelio pontifice maximo . . . ludos vovit,' XXXVI. ii. 3: 'id votum in haec verba, praeeunte P. Licinio pontifice maximo, consul nuncupavit.'

the proper observance of the festivals—a duty which was incumbent on them as the representatives of the rights of the gods—they had charge of the intercalations, and there is evidence that they sometimes manipulated them to further the aims of political leaders or parties.

In the early period of Roman society law and religion were inextricably intermingled, and so we find that the *pontifices* were authorities in the former as well as in the latter field. Even in later times, when the legal system had attained to independent development, the *pontifices* still retained functions that belonged to the sphere of law—*e.g.*, their participation in the marriage rite of *confarreatio*, in the kind of adoption known as *arrogatio*, and in the making of wills, as well as their control of burial, of sepulchres, and of the whole cult of the *manes*. In the case of an arrogation or the making of a will they convoked the people in the *comitia calata* in order to secure their approval of the act.

The archives of the college were in the *regia*. These included the formulæ which had to be used in appealing to the gods (*indigitamenta* [*q.v.*]); the forms for vows, dedications, etc.; the directions for the proper observance of all the details connected with sacrifices; the necessary instructions for the performance of expiatory rites, or, where the offence could not be expiated, for the infliction of the penalty; the calendar (*fasti*); and the annual transactions of the college (*annales maximi*), which, on account of the connexion of the *pontifices* with the political administration of the country, became so important an element in Roman historiography. But the archives contained other documents of even greater importance, namely the decrees and responses which the college formulated on questions submitted to them by magistrates or by the senate. These decrees dealt with the new problems which were constantly arising in regard to vows, dedications, sacred sites, festivals, the cult of the *manes*, and other phases of Roman religion which fell within the scope of the activity of the *pontifices*. These decrees formed a growing body of pontifical law.

(*b*) *Rex sacrorum.*—On the establishment of the Republic, while most of the spiritual activities of the king devolved upon the *pontifex maximus*, some of them were assigned to a priest whose office was instituted at that time, and who was given the name of *rex sacrorum*.[1] While the office, as we see from the name and know from other sources, was one of great dignity, it was vastly inferior to that of the *pontifex maximus* in power and influence. The *rex* could not hold any political office, and it is clear that appointment to the office was regarded as equivalent to political extinction. The incumbent was honourably but effectively shelved for the rest of his life.

He officiated at the *regifugium*, the ceremony held in the *comitium* on 24th Feb.; and the calendars show the notation *Q.R.C.F.* ('quando rex comitiavit, fas') on 24th March and 24th May. At the *regifugium* the *rex* sacrificed a victim as a sin-offering, and immediately after the sacrifice took to flight, apparently with the idea of escaping the taint.[2] The old explanation, by which the name of this rite was referred to the expulsion of the kings, is wholly without foundation. Equally unsatisfactory is the explanation usually given in regard to the functions of the *rex* on 24th March and 24th May. It is generally said that these two days were especially appointed for the making of wills (*testamenti factio*) and that on them the *rex* presided at the *comitia calata* convened for the purpose. No adequate evidence has ever been adduced to establish this theory, and in all probability, as Rosenberg[1] contends, *comitiavit* here means 'has come to the *comitium* (and sacrificed there),' and the ceremony in each case was, like that of the *regifugium*, of an expiatory character. The *rex* also made an offering on the Capitol on the nones of each month, when he announced the festivals to be held during the rest of the month (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 28). Macrobius (I. xv. 9) tells us that in the early period the *rex* made sacrifice on the kalends, after the *pontifex minor* had announced to him the appearance of the new moon. But this ceremony apparently was given up. In fact the evidence of its ever having taken place is somewhat flimsy.

The *rex* was the special priest of Janus, and we have record of the offering which he made to that god in the *regia* on the occasion of the *agonium* on 9th January. It is partly in his capacity as priest of Janus, who presided over all beginnings, though partly also in recognition of his position as a representative of one phase of the royal power, that the *rex sacrorum* is given first place in the old ranking of Roman priests: *rex sacrorum, flamines Dialis, Martialis, Quirinalis, pontifex maximus.*

(*c*) *Flamines.*—The *flamines*[2] were special priests attached to the service of individual gods, and charged with the duty of officiating at sacrifices and other ceremonies in their honour. The name of the god is regularly indicated by an adjectival form: *flamen Dialis, flamen* of Jupiter, *flamen Martialis*, of Mars, and so forth. Only one exception is cited to this system of designation, namely the title of the *flamen* of the deified Septimius Severus: *flamen divi Severi*. The best attested form of the name of the office is *flamonium*, but *flaminatus* is also found.

The most important of the *flamines* belonged to the college of *pontifices*, and were fifteen in number: three *flamines maiores*, the *flamen Dialis, flamen Martialis*, and *flamen Quirinalis*, and twelve *flamines minores*, ten of whom are known to us: *flamen Carmentalis, Volcanalis, Portunalis, Cerialis, Volturnalis, Palatualis, Furrinalis, Floralis, Falacer, Pomonalis*. The *flamines maiores* were always patricians. This was true of the *flamines minores* also in early times, but later this office became plebeian. Under the Empire *flamines minores* were frequently members of the equestrian order.

In regard to the *flamen Dialis* we are reasonably well informed. He was chosen by the *pontifex maximus* out of three candidates, nominated by the college of *pontifices*, only those born of parents married by *confarreatio*, and themselves married by that rite, being eligible. He had many prerogatives (the right of the *toga prætexta*, of the *sella curulis*, and the services of a *lictor* and heralds), but was subject to galling restrictions and a long list of tabus. Although in the old list of priests his title appears before that of the *pontifex maximus*, and he had precedence over him at the priestly banquets, he was, so far as all the duties of his office were concerned, completely under his control. In the early period he was not allowed to spend a single night away from Rome, and even in later times his absence from the city was limited to two and afterwards to three nights. From the year 200 B.C. he was eligible for political office, but the rule that required his continuous presence in the city acted as a bar to his holding any office which required residence in the provinces.

[1] This is the form of the title attested by inscriptions. Latin authors use *rex sacrificulus* frequently. Livy, IX. xxxiv. 12, has *rex sacrificiorum*.

[2] Cf. the *poplifugia* (5th July), where, from a similar motive, the people fled from a sin-offering.

[1] Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.*

[2] The derivation is uncertain. It has been connected with *flare*, 'blow' (from kindling the altar fire; Marquardt), with *flagrare*, *flamma* (Curtius, Corssen, Usener); with the Skr. *brahman*, 'priest' (Meyer).

The numerous tabus by which he was bound show the degree of sanctity associated with his office.

He could not touch, approach, or name any animal or object with which in Roman religious consciousness an idea of uncleanness was associated: a corpse, a bier, raw meat, beans, a dog, a goat, or a horse. He was forbidden to hear the sound of the flutes played at a funeral. In a word, he was excluded from every possible contact with death or with anything connected with the cult of the dead.[1]

Moreover, there was another series of tabus, which, while indicating the freedom of the *flamen* from the usual ties of human society, emphasized the extent to which he belonged to his god. He could not come in contact with anything that was tied or knotted,[2] or with a ring or chain. If he wore a ring, it had to be a broken one. His garments could be fastened only by safety pins (*fibulæ*), or some other device lacking continuity. He could not touch or name ivy on account of its tangled and intertwining fibres; he could not walk under a trellis or in a vineyard. If a man in fetters entered his house, he was immediately released and the chains, in order to prevent the pollution of the house, were thrown out through the *compluvium*. A slave could not touch him, and only a free man was allowed to cut his hair. He could be shaved only with a bronze razor. Furthermore, for him every day was a holy day, and he was not permitted to see any kind of work. On his walks an attendant always preceded him to warn workmen to desist from their labours while he was passing.

One of the chief duties of the *flamen Dialis* was to officiate at the sacrifice of a sheep to Jupiter on the ides of each month (*ovis idulis*). He himself laid the entrails of the victim on the altar fire. He officiated at the sacrifice of a lamb to the same god at the beginning of the vintage. His services, however, were not confined to Jupiter, for we find him participating in rites that pertained to the worship of other gods; *e.g.*, he took an important part in the expiatory ceremonies of February. It was from him that the *pontifices* received the materials which they used in the purification of the houses. He presided at the Lupercalia, and he officiated at the celebration of weddings by *confarreatio*. In short, he seems to have been not merely high priest of Jove, but, so far as actual participation in sacrificial and other rites is concerned, high priest of the whole national religion.

Like the *flamen Dialis*, the *flamen Martialis* was a patrician married by *confarreatio*, and the son of parents who had been wedded by the same ceremony. In the early period, when the power of Mars was not limited in men's thoughts to the operations of war, it is quite possible that the part of the *flamen Martialis* was an important one, but in historical times it seems relatively insignificant. He was not subject to the tabus which have been mentioned in connexion with the *flamen Dialis*, though originally some of them at least had applied to him. His comparative freedom from restrictions enabled him to hold political offices even in the provinces. Of his sacerdotal duties almost nothing is known. Curiously enough, he had very little to do with the numerous festivals of his god which were held in March.

In the case of the *flamen Quirinalis*, the requirements in regard to birth and marriage were the same as those of the other two *flamines maiores*. Though he ranked below the *flamen Martialis*, he is more frequently referred to as officiating at sacrifices. He sacrificed a dog to Robigus on the Robigalia (25th April); on 7th July and 21st Aug. he sacrificed at the subterranean altar of Consus in the Circus; on 23rd Dec. he made an offering at the tomb of Acca Larentina in the Velabrum. These functions are not so disconnected as at first sight they seem. Quirinus seems originally to have been a spirit of vegetation, and the ceremonies in which his *flamen* has just been described as taking part were connected with agriculture.

Of the other twelve *flamines* we know little more than their names. In some cases it is only a chance reference to the *flamen* that has preserved the name of the god.

The insignia of the *flamines*, besides the *toga prætexta*, were the *læna*, a short red cloak worn over the *toga*, and especially the *pileus* or *galerus*, a conical cap, on the top of which was a small spike-shaped piece of olive wood, covered with wool. This was the *apex*, though the term is sometimes applied to the whole cap. The cap was provided with strings so that it could be tied under the chin, and would be less likely to vitiate a ceremony by falling off. It was made from the hide of an animal killed in sacrifice, and in the case of the *flamen Dialis* was white (*albogalerus*). The *apex* was not confined to the *flamines*; it was sometimes worn by *pontifices* and other priests, but was most closely associated with the *flamines*, and especially the *flamen Dialis*.

The *flamines* of the deified emperors (*flamines divorum*) also were attached more or less loosely to the college of *pontifices*. Down to the 3rd cent. a *flamen* was appointed for every emperor enrolled among the gods.

There were other *flamines* in Rome, who were not connected with the college of *pontifices*—*e.g.*, the *fratres Arvales* had a *flamen* (*flamen Arvalium*), and so too had each of the *curiæ* of the city (*flamen curiæ*).

The wife of the *flamen Dialis* (*flaminica Dialis* or merely *flaminica*) participated in the sacred duties of his office. She was not the priestess of Juno, as Plutarch supposed.[1] There is no evidence, for historical times at any rate, that the wives of the other *flamines* had sacerdotal functions.

(*d*) *Virgines Vestales.*—The Vestal virgins, six[2] in number, were attached to the public cult of Vesta. They were chosen by lot out of a list of twenty compiled by the *pontifex maximus*. At first they were drawn from patrician families, but later the daughters of plebeian houses were eligible, and under the Empire we hear of daughters of freedmen being admitted. Only those whose parents were both living were eligible. A candidate who had been chosen was formally accepted by the *pontifex maximus*.[3] She was then conducted to the house of the Vestals (*atrium Vestæ*); her hair was cut off[4] and hung on a lotus-tree, and she assumed the garb of the order. She was from six to ten years of age when she entered, and the term of service was thirty years. After its completion she was at liberty to leave the order and marry.[5] The thirty years of service were divided into three decades, in the first of which the priestess learned her duties, in the second practised them, and in the third instructed the novices. The eldest Vestal was the head of the order (*virgo Vestalis maxima*).

Like many others, the cult of Vesta, goddess of the hearth-fire, had begun in the family, but had subsequently become a State-cult also.[6] It was the duty of the priestesses to keep up the sacred fire. Once a year only was it allowed to go out and be rekindled (1st March). If it went out at any other time, the incident was regarded as a *prodigium*, and the Vestal on watch was liable to punishment. The fire could be rekindled only by the primitive method of the friction of sticks. The priestesses also brought water from a spring or running stream, with which they sprinkled the temple. They made daily offerings of simple food to the goddess, and each day prayed for the safety and prosperity of the people. Besides these daily duties the Vestals had others, some of them connected immediately with the cult of Vesta, but

[1] The *flamen Dialis* Merula, before committing suicide, laid aside the insignia of his office, on the ground that it was technically inconceivable for a *flamen* to die in his costume.

[2] Aul. Gell. x. 15: 'nodum in apice, neque in cinctu, neque in alia parte ullum habet.'

[1] *Quæst. Rom.* 86.

[2] In the days of King Numa, according to the tradition, four, but increased to six before the end of the regal period.

[3] Aul. Gell. i. xii. 14, 19; the words of the *pontifex maximus* were 'Te, Amata, capio.'

[4] The hair was an offering. The cutting was not repeated. The Vestals whose statues we have had long hair.

[5] The number of cases in which this happened is very small.

[6] For an interesting account of the Vestals see *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 199 ff., where the author retracts the theory advocated by him in *JPh* xiv. [1885] 154 ff.

some pertaining to ceremonies not primarily or definitely belonging to that goddess. Chief among the former was the festival of Vesta on 9th June (Vestalia). At this season (from 7th to 14th June) the *penus Vestæ*[1] was open to matrons, who with bare feet thronged to the temple to ask a blessing on their households; offerings of food were sent to the temple; offerings of sacred salt-cakes (*mola salsa*) were made by the Vestals; the millers and bakers had a holiday, and donkeys and mills were adorned with garlands. On 15th June the temple was cleaned. In regard to the activities of the Vestals that seem to be outside the cult of Vesta proper it may be pointed out that it was they who kept the blood of the October horse and the ashes of the unborn calves sacrificed at the Fordicidia, giving them to the people for use in the ceremonies of lustration held on the occasion of the Parilia (21st April). They were present at the sacrifice of the sheep to Jupiter on the ides of each month.[2] On 15th Feb. they provided the *mola salsa* used at the Lupercalia. On 1st May they offered prayers to the Bona Dea. On 15th May they took part in the ceremonies of the *Argei*. On 21st Aug. they participated in the Consualia; on 25th Aug. they, together with the *pontifex maximus*, attended the secret sacrifice to Ops Consivia in the *regia*. Fowler (*Roman Festivals*, p. 149 ff.) has pointed out the connexion between these ceremonies and the food-supply, with which the Vestals from the earliest times were closely associated.

The Vestals enjoyed many privileges. A *lictor* attended them when they went out on the street, and even the highest magistrates had to make way for them; on certain occasions they could use a carriage in the streets of the city; if a criminal on his way to execution caught a glimpse of them, he could not be put to death; places of special honour were reserved for them at the public games; they could be buried within the city. But, on the other hand, the life was an exacting one. They were subject to discipline at the hands of the *pontifex maximus*, who could have them beaten for any negligence in their religious duties. It was he too who, in case of violation of the vow of chastity by any member of the order, pronounced the sentence by which she was buried alive in a chamber-tomb on the Campus Sceleratus near the Porta Collina.[3]

2. **Augures.**—The derivation of *augur* is as uncertain as that of *pontifex*. Ancient etymologists connected it with *avis* and *garrire*,[4] with *avis* and *gustus*,[5] with *avis* and *gerere*,[6] or with *augustus*.[7] Nor do modern scholars agree on the question. The present drift, however, is to see *avis* in the first part of the word (cf. *auspex*=*avi-spex*, a derivation about which there is no doubt), whatever may be the significance of the latter part.[8]

The kind of divination which the Romans called *disciplina auguralis* seems to have existed in Italy prior to the foundation of Rome. Its purpose was a narrower one than that of reading the future; it was intended merely to determine the attitude of the gods towards some action that was contemplated or even in process. The *augures* were authorities on the significance of the various signs by which the gods manifested their favour or disfavour.

The college of *augures* is attributed by some ancient writers to Romulus, by others to Numa—traditions that have no value except in the fact that they are indications of a general belief in the antiquity of the institution. From three the number of members was increased to six, afterwards to nine, and then by Sulla to fifteen.[1] Membership in the college was always highly esteemed, and the roll of members included many of Rome's most distinguished citizens. The presidency of the college was vested in the oldest *augur*, and the respect paid to seniority is attested by Cicero (himself an *augur* from 53 B.C.) in his *de Senectute*, xviii. (64).

The most weighty measures in Roman political life were undertaken only after the auspices indicated that the gods were favourable. The election of magistrates, their assumption of office, the beginning of a military campaign, the passing of laws by the assembly of the people, and other acts of a similar nature were all subject to this rule. The omission of the auspices or any irregularity in the procedure of the magistrate taking them nullified the act. The *augures* did not take the auspices, at any rate in the older period. That was the duty of the magistrates. But irregularities, on being reported to the senate, would be referred by that body to the college of *augures*. They, after investigation and discussion, drew up a reply (*responsum*, *decretum*) and sent it to the senate. If the reply established the presence of a flaw (*vitium*), the senate annulled the act. It should be noted that the response of the *augures* did not carry with it the annulment of the act. This took place only as the result of a *senatus consultum*, although the latter was based on the reply of the college. We do not know that the senate invariably followed the recommendation of the college, but it is certain that they generally did so.

A preliminary to the taking of the auspices was the marking off of the *templum* or place of observation. Then the magistrate, after announcing the *leges auspicii* (*i.e.* the rules that would govern his observation of the signs), stationed himself at that point of the *templum* prescribed by augural law, and, addressing Jupiter or other gods, asked for a certain, definitely specified sign or signs of the divine approval of the proposed action. Signs that were specifically asked for were called *auguria* or *signa impetrativa*, while signs that appeared without being asked for were known as *signa oblativa*. Quite apart from this classification, five different kinds of signs were recognized: from birds, from thunder and lightning, from animals (*signa ex quadrupedibus*), from the sacred chickens (*signa ex tripudiis*), and from incidental occurrences of evil omen (*diræ*). The birds were, in the language of augury, either *alites* or *oscines*. The former gave signs by their manner of flight, the latter by their songs or cries. Among the *alites* were the eagle and the vulture as well as the osprey (*avis sangualis* or *ossifraga*), the *buteo* (a kind of hawk), and the *immusulus*. In the list of *oscines* were the raven (*corvus*), the crow (*cornix*), and the owl (*noctua*).[2] Some birds were included in both lists, and we hear of some that as *oscines* were believed to give favourable, but as *alites* unfavourable, signs, and *vice versa*.

The *signa ex cœlo* (thunder and lightning) belong to a very early stage in the development of augury.

[1] The store-room of the house.

[2] Horace's words (*Od.* III. xxx. 8) may refer to this occasion: 'dum Capitolium scandet cum tacita virgine pontifex.'

[3] J. E. Harrison sees in this custom the survival of a ritual marriage to secure fertility for the crops (*Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 144). Her theory is criticized by E. T. Merrill, *Classical Philology*, ix. (1914) 317.

[4] Fest. p. 2: 'ab avium garritu.'

[5] Suet. *Octav.* 7: 'ab avium gestu gustuve.'

[6] Fest. *loc. cit.*: 'Augur ab avibus gerendoque dictus, quia per eum avium gestus elicitur'; Serv. *Æn.* v. 523: 'Augurium dictum quasi avigerium quod aves gerunt.'

[7] Ovid, *Fast.* i. 469.

[8] See discussion by Wissowa, in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.*

[1] Dio Cass. xlii. 51 speaks of a sixteenth member added by Cæsar.

[2] Cf. Festus, p. 197; Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 76; Pliny, *HN* x. 43; Cic. *de Div.* i. 53 (120).

Their precise interpretation involved a consideration not only of all the details connected with the appearance itself, but also of the nature of the occasion in regard to which the gods were being asked for a sign. The most favourable of the *signa ex cœlo* was a flash of lightning passing from left to right of the observer. Yet even this sign, though generally auspicious, was unpropitious for a meeting of the *comitia*, and its appearance would prevent the holding of the meeting, or, if business had already begun, would result in its discontinuance. *Signa ex cœlo* were used at a comparatively early date in the *auspicia* of the magistrates, not only as *signa oblativa* but also as *impetrativa*. By the end of the Republic they were practically the only *signa* that were used by the magistrates. It was not so much that they had crowded the others out as that in the general decay of the augural system they survived as the most convenient. Moreover, it was no longer regarded as essential that the magistrates themselves should take the auspices. A subordinate official, the *pullarius*, whose original function had been the care of the sacred chickens, could do so. The phrase 'servare ex cœlo,' which we find used of this official's observation, is an indication of the kind of sign of which he was supposed to take cognizance. There is, however, abundant evidence that his announcement of a favourable sign had very little to do with any actual appearance. The auspices had become a mere form, and the nature of the announcement in regard to them was dictated by political exigency.

Of the other signs, the *signa ex quadrupedibus* never seem to have been very much used as *signa impetrativa*, though, when occurring as *oblativa*, they could not be left out of consideration. They had to do with the behaviour of animals appearing within the bounds of the *templum*.

The *signa ex tripudiis* were the signs derived from the sacred chickens. By the end of the Republic these were practically the only auguries that were observed by military authorities. They came to have in the camps a place similar to that which the *signa ex cœlo* had in civil life. This was largely owing to the convenience of the method.

The chickens were brought in cages, and, after the general who was to take the auspices had placed himself at the door of the tent within the bounds of the *templum*, they were let out. He observed their manner of walking and especially the way in which they ate the food that was thrown to them. The most favourable omen that they could give (*auspicium solistinum*) was to let pieces of food fall from their beaks. When such an omen was wanted, it was easily obtained either by giving the chickens crumbly food or by starving them before they were liberated and so causing a degree of haste in eating that resulted in numerous manifestations of the kind desired.

The *diræ* were unexpected events of an untoward nature which occurred either during the taking of the auspices or afterwards during the action itself. The fall of some object, the sudden illness of some one present, the gnawing of a mouse, etc., belonged to the category of the *diræ*. All *diræ* were deterrent.

With all the possibilities involved in the numerous auguries mentioned above, it is easy to see that the magistrate taking the auspices would frequently find himself at a loss in regard to the proper interpretation. Moreover, till a comparatively late date the *augures* were not present to assist him. The statement made by some ancient authorities that he had assistants does not imply that these were members of the augural college. To be sure, the difficulties of his position were to a certain extent modified by his announcement of the signs for which he was watching. But *signa impetrativa*, which of course were always favourable, might be counteracted by the appearance of unfavourable *signa oblativa*, and the possibilities of conflict were endless. If he made a mistake or if he deliberately ignored manifest indications of the disapproval of the divine powers, there was danger of the business transacted being subsequently annulled by a decree of the senate. It was on this account, doubtless, that during the last century of the Republic the custom grew up of having *augures* present to help the magistrate with their professional advice at the taking of the auspices before the holding of the *comitia*. Whether they ever actually took the auspices themselves is not certain.[1]

The inauguration of persons and places was another important function of the *augures*. They themselves conducted this ceremony, and the evidence advanced in support of the theory that on the occasion of an inauguration they acted merely as assistants to the *pontifex maximus* is, as Wissowa has shown in his article in Pauly-Wissowa, wholly inadequate. After the expulsion of the kings the only persons who were inaugurated were priests. We have definite record of the inauguration of the *rex sacrorum*, of the *augures* themselves, and of the *flamines* of Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, and the deified Julius. There is no record of the inauguration of *pontifices*, and probably the Vestals were not inaugurated. Livy (I. xviii.) describes the ceremony.

It took place on the *arx*. The *augur*, after indicating with his wand (*lituus*)[2] the regions of the sky within which he would make his observations, laid his right hand on the head of the candidate, and asked the god to show by a *signum ex cœlo* whether the candidate was acceptable to him.

In regard to the places that had to be inaugurated, we find that the list includes all those intended for business which could be transacted only after the auspices had been taken. Among them we find many temples, and such places as the *rostra* and the *curia*. Moreover, the city itself was inaugurated as well as the land just outside the walls, as far perhaps as the first milestone. To this district the term *ager effatus* was applied. There were other *loca effata*, as we know from Varro (*de Ling. Lat.* v. 33), who gives the following list of five additional kinds of territory which were inaugurated so as to make possible the taking of auspices by magistrates absent from Rome: the *ager Romanus*, *Gabinus*, *peregrinus*, *hosticus*, *incertus*. The term *templum* in its technical sense is applicable only to an inaugurated place or building that is rectangular in shape. The city of Rome and the various territories referred to were not *templa*, strictly speaking, but *loca liberata et effata*,[3] in which also auspices could be taken. We know very little about the ceremonies with which places were inaugurated, beyond the fact that a star-shaped piece of metal was brought in as a sign of the completion of the inauguration.

Other ceremonies in which we find the *augures* officiating independently of the magistrates are the *augurium salutis*, the *vernisera auguria*, and the *augurium canarium*. The last-mentioned took place every year in midsummer, and was intended to gain the protection of the gods against the action of the heat on the crops. The ceremony was accompanied by a sacrifice of red dogs. The *vernisera auguria* probably had to do with the agricultural operations of the spring. In regard to the *augurium salutis* there is a good deal of uncertainty. Apparently the purpose was to procure from the gods some assurance of a continuance of the safety and prosperity of the nation. It could be held only when there was no Roman army in the field. Tacitus[4] speaks of its being celebrated in A.D. 47 after an interval of seventy-five years.

[1] Possibly they sometimes did in the last period of the Republic. Cicero (*de Leg.* ii. 20) apparently makes a claim to this effect.

[2] 'Baculum sine nodo aduncum' (Livy, I. xviii. 7).

[3] *I.e.* freed by the formulæ spoken by the *augur* from all previously existing religious associations.

[4] *Ann.* xii. 23.

The archives of the *augures*, which were kept in the *auguraculum* on the *arx*, consisted of *fasti* (a list of members past and present), *acta* (the record of the transactions of the college), and, most important of all, the *libri* or *commentarii* in which all the lore of the craft was contained. Both terms, *libri* and *commentarii*, are used indiscriminately of the traditional material and of the numerous accretions consisting of the responses given to questions submitted by the senate.

3. Quindecimviri sacris faciundis.—The third of the great priestly colleges is the *quindecimviri s(acris) f(aciundis)*. Originally it was a commission of two members (*duoviri s.f.*), and it was not till 367 B.C. that it became a *collegium* of ten, of whom five were patrician and five plebeian. In Sulla's time the number was increased to fifteen. Cæsar made it sixteen, and under the Empire others were added *supra numerum*. In the time of Augustus the college was administered by a group of five *magistri*[1] (chosen annually by the college from its own membership), later by one.[2]

While the priesthood is less ancient than the *pontifices* and the *augures*, it goes back as far as the Tarquin dynasty, and its foundation is one of the indications of the foreign influences at work in Rome during that period. Its activity was confined to the Sibylline books, to the cults introduced in accordance with their oracles, and to the ceremonies performed, after consultation of the books, to avert the wrath of the gods. But, as the Sibylline books were Greek oracles, the cults introduced through them were Greek, except in such a case as that of the Great Mother, which came from Pessinus in Asia Minor. The result of this was that the *quindecimviri* bore to all cults which were conducted according to Greek forms of ritual (*ritus Græcus*) a relation analogous to that of the *pontifices* to the cults whose ceremonies adhered to Roman tradition (*ritus Romanus*).

The Sibylline books contained the oracles of the Sibyl of Cumæ, to which perhaps some others from different sources were added from time to time.[3] When brought from Cumæ, they were placed in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline, where they remained till the year 83 B.C., when they perished in the fire that destroyed the temple. A commission was sent to Greece to make a new collection, and returned with 1000 verses, which were deposited in the new temple of Jupiter that had been built on the Capitol. They were left there till Augustus moved them to the temple of Apollo which he had erected on the Palatine. Augustus made a careful inspection of the oracles and rejected such as bore evidence of having been introduced into the collection for political reasons. Tiberius subjected them to a similar inspection, and there are other indications that the books were sometimes manipulated in the interests of political factions.

No one had access to the books but the *quindecimviri*, and even they could not consult them except when authorized by the senate. Moreover, it was only on the occurrence of prodigies which seemed to be of special importance that the senate gave the order for the inspection. When the *quindecimviri* had consulted the oracles, they made a report to the senate, stating by what sacrifices or ceremonies the gods could be appeased. The senate then decreed the performance of these rites under the supervision of the *quindecimviri*.

The clearest indication of the nature of the activity of the *quindecimviri* is furnished by the list of divinities whose cults were introduced as the result of an inspection of the oracles. Among these are the cult of Apollo (with whom the oracles are most closely connected), Ceres, Liber and Libera (Demeter, Dionysus, and Kore), Mercury (Hermes), Neptune (Poseidon),[1] and Hercules.[2] At a later date came Æsculapius, Dis, and others. The *quindecimviri* did not themselves perform the sacrifices or rites, for the Greek cults had their own priests; but they supervised them. They had a similar supervision over *lectisternia*, *supplicationes*, and other ceremonies ordered by the books in expiation of prodigies. That Oriental cults were not regarded as lying outside the field of their activities is shown by the fact that they were in charge of the cult of the Great Mother (see art. MOTHER OF THE GODS), introduced in 204 B.C. in accordance with a Sibylline oracle. Their connexion with this cult was especially close. They actually participated in some of the rites,[3] and from the latter half of the 1st cent. after Christ they were thought of in two capacities: priests of the Great Mother and custodians of the Sibylline books.

4. Septemviri epulones.—This priesthood was instituted in 196 B.C., and to it was assigned the administration of the sacred banquets of Jupiter on the ides of September in connexion with the *ludi Romani*, and on the ides of November on the occasion of the *ludi plebeii*. The theory held by Marquardt[4] and others, that at the time of the organization of the priesthood the only banquet to Jove was that held in connexion with the *ludi plebeii*, and that the *epulum Iovi* at the *ludi Romani* was established much later, is highly improbable. The *epulum* of the *ludi Romani* is in all likelihood an old institution.[5] These banquets, though they were wholly independent of the *lectisternia* in origin, were doubtless strongly influenced by them.

At the banquets a *triclinium* was set up in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol. An image of Jupiter reclining and images of Juno and Minerva seated were placed at the table, and food was put before them. The senators attended the banquets as representatives of the State, and had places at *triclinia* set up in front of the temple. In a word, this *epulum Iovis* was not merely an offering to the god; it was a communion of the god with his people. The practice of holding sacred banquets increased in frequency. They were given not only on the ides of September and of November, but on the occasion of triumphs, dedications, games, etc. Not only the senators but also the people in general participated in them, being accommodated at tables that were set up throughout the entire length of the *forum*. The strictly religious element in the institution receded into the background. They became great public banquets, but remained under the supervision of the *epulones*.

Before the institution of the *epulones* the *pontifices* had had charge of the *epulum Iovis*. It was the burden of their other duties that compelled them to relinquish this function, and the *epulones*, though an independent college and forming one of the four great priesthoods, were always regarded as supplementary to the pontifical college and to a certain extent subject to its influence.

When first instituted, the college had three members (*treviri epulones*). This number was subsequently increased to seven (*septemviri epulones*) and still later (by Cæsar) to ten. But even after this increase the college was known as

The emperor himself was one.

When this office was held by the emperor, a deputy (*promagister*) was also appointed.

There is no real evidence that the *Carmina Marciana* formed part of the collection.

[1] Before 399 B.C.

[2] The cult of Hercules 'in circo Flaminio.'

[3] As in the laving of the sacred stone of the goddess, and during the 3rd and 4th centuries in the *taurobolium*.

[4] *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, iii. 349.

[5] Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, p. 217

the *septemviri epulones*. An individual member of the college was called *septemvir epulonum*.

5. **Sodales fetiales.**[1]—The *fetiales* were the authorities on the *ius fetiale*, the sacred forms that should be observed in international relations. To them the senate or magistrates appealed in regard to questions pertaining to demands for redress, declaration of war, or conclusion of peace. It was they who served as the emissaries of the State to the country with which the negotiations were being carried on. In the discussion of problems submitted to them by the senate the whole *sodalitas*, which consisted of twenty members, took part. On the missions to foreign countries, however, a smaller number went. When the purpose of the embassy was the making of peace, the number of *fetiales* was two;[2] when redress was demanded, four were employed. That the *sodalitas* was a very ancient one is seen from the use of the stone (*silex*) in killing the victim. It was in fact an old Italic institution, for we hear of *fetiales* not only at other places in Latium but also among the Æquians, the Faliscans, and the Samnites. At Rome the priesthood ranked next to the four great colleges; and in A.D. 22 an effort, which, however, failed, was made to place it on an equality with them.[3] Its members were men of distinction during both the Republic and the Empire. Augustus himself was a *fetialis*, as were later emperors.

In Livy, I. xxiv., we are given some details in regard to the appointment and procedure of a deputation of *fetiales* on a peace mission.

The *verbenarius*[4] asks the king to authorize him definitely and specifically as the envoy of the Roman people.[5] The king formally gives the authorization requested. Then the *verbenarius* asks for the sacred herbs (*herba pura, verbenæ, sagmina*) and is instructed by the king to gather them on the *arx*. These herbs are the symbol of his office. The *verbenarius* then chooses another of the *fetiales* as *pater patratus*,[6] touching his hair with the herbs. The *pater patratus* is the plenipotentiary and spokesman of the deputation, and it is he who carries the sacred stone and the sceptre. The treaty is made in the presence of the commanders and of the armies by the *patres patrati* of the two nations. After the terms have been read, the *pater patratus* of the Romans, holding his sceptre and calling to witness the people present as well as the gods Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus, swears that his nation will keep the treaty.[7] Then he kills a pig with the sacred stone, calling upon Jupiter, if the Roman people shall be the first to break the treaty, to treat them as he treats the victim. After the sacrifice he throws away the stone, saying: 'Si sciens fallo, tum me Diespiter salva urbe arceque bonis eiiciat, ut ego hunc lapidem.'[8] When the same ceremony has been performed by the other *pater patratus*, the treaty is signed by both.[9] The fact that the stone is thrown away is distinctly favourable to the theory that it is nothing more than a primitive weapon that has survived from the stone age, and not, as W. Helbig[10] has suggested, a symbol of the god of lightning.

In the case of injury at the hands of citizens of some foreign power, *fetiales* were sent to demand redress.[11]

The *pater patratus* goes to the boundary of the enemy's territory and states his country's case, swearing to the justice of the claims which he makes.[12] Then, crossing the border, he repeats the claims to the first native of the country whom he meets. He repeats them again at the gate of the capital and in its *forum*. If the offenders are given up, he departs as a friend. If the nation addressed asks time for further consideration, he grants thirty days, publicly repeating his claims at the end of each ten days. After the expiration of this time, if satisfaction is not given, he solemnly calls the gods to witness, and, returning to Rome, reports the circumstances to the senate. If the senate decides on war, the *pater patratus* is dispatched again to the boundary, and in the presence of three adults throws into the enemy's territory a spear smeared with blood and charred at the end. Under the fetial law only a war declared in this way is *pium*.

Just as it was the duty of the *fetiales* to demand from another people those who had committed an offence against their nation, so also it was their duty to give up similar offenders among their own people.[1]

Octavian declared war against Cleopatra in 32 B.C. according to the fetial rite; the emperor Claudius concluded treaties (Suet. *Claud.* 25) as *pater patratus*; Marcus Aurelius declared war against the Marcomanni in this way. But it had long since become a symbolical act. In the war with Pyrrhus a piece of land near the Circus Flaminius at Rome had been legally conveyed to a captive. This was declared enemy territory, and into it the *pater patratus* flung the spear from the *columna bellica* near the temple of Bellona.

6. **Fratres Arvales.**—See art. ARVAL BROTHERS.

7. **Salii.**[2]—There were two groups of *Salii* in Rome, the *Salii Palatini* whose headquarters were in the *curia Saliorum* on the Palatine, and the *Salii collini*, or *Agonenses*, of the Quirinal hill. The former were the dancing priests of Mars, the latter of Quirinus. Each organization consisted of twelve members and had a *magister*, a *præsul*, and a *vates*. The *magister* was in general charge, the *præsul* was the leader of the dance, and the *vates* of the singing.

The period of their greatest activity was the month of March, with its many festivals in honour of Mars. Although the calendars specifically record only three days of the month (the 1st, 9th, and 24th) on which the *Salii* took down the sacred shields,[3] their processions seem to have taken place every day from the 1st to the 24th. Their dress consisted of *tunica picta* and *trabea*. On their left arm they carried the shield, which as they danced they struck with a spear or club held in the right hand. The dancing took place at certain sacred places in the city at which the procession paused. Each evening they halted at one of the *mansiones*, erected for the purpose, where the shields and other paraphernalia were kept till next morning. There also the priests dined together, their banquets being proverbial for their luxury. Next day the procession was resumed, and in the evening a halt was made at another *mansio*. After 24th March there was no procession of the *Salii* till 19th Oct., the *armilustrium*, when they danced on the Aventine. This ceremony corresponds to the *quinquatrus* of 19th March, which was originally a festival of lustration. After the *armilustrium* the shields were replaced in the *sacrarium*, and were not moved again till 1st March. The significance of this institution of dancing priests is variously explained. Wissowa claims that Mars was from the beginning nothing but a god of war, and in the shields and other equipment of the *Salii* he sees merely an appropriate costume for the priests of the war-god. The dance, he thinks, was a war-dance, and it was given in March and October because these two months were most closely associated with the beginning and the end of the annual campaign. On the other hand, those[4] who regard Mars as a spirit of vegetation classify the dance of the *Salii* among the warlike and noisy demonstrations which are frequently adopted by primitive peoples for the

[1] The Roman grammarians connected the word with *fides* (Varro), *fœdus* (Servius), *ferire* (Paulus); Lange derives it from an old substantive *fetis* (cf. *fateri, fari, fas*); Weiss compares the cult-title of Jupiter Feretrius.

[2] Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*², p. 551, thinks that the number was afterwards increased to four, but his reasons seem inadequate.

[3] Tac. *Ann.* iii. 64.

[4] *I.e.* the bearer of the sacred herbs (*verbenæ*). How he was chosen is not known.

[5] 'Iubesne me, rex, cum patre patrato populi Albani fœdus ferire?'

[6] Wissowa plausibly derives this word from *patrare*, 'to make a father.' On this theory *pater patratus* is a father artificially created as opposed to a natural *pater familias*.

[7] The formulæ are given in Livy, I. xxiv. 7.

[8] Paul. p. 82 (Thewrewk de Ponor). [9] Livy, IX. v. 4.

[10] *Die Italiker in der Poebene*, Leipzig, 1879, p. 92.

[11] Livy, VII. vi. 7, xxxii. 1, X. xlv. 7.

[12] On the ethical element in the fetial rite see Tenney Frank, in *Classical Philology*, vii. [1912] 335.

[1] Livy, VIII. xxxix. 14. [2] From *salire*, 'leap,' 'dance.'

[3] It is not certain whether the shields (*ancilia*) were kept in the *curia* on the Palatine or in the *regia*.

[4] Mannhardt, Roscher, Frazer, Fowler.

purpose of frightening away the evil spirits that might harm the sprouting crops or interfere with the transmission of the vegetative principle from year to year.

8. Sodales Titii.—Of this priesthood we know almost nothing. Tacitus (*Hist.* ii. 95) tells us that it was organized by Romulus for the worship of the Sabine king, Titus Tatius.[1] Dionysius (ii. 52) makes a similar statement. It seems to have been defunct at the end of the Republic, but was revived by Augustus and lasted till at least the end of the 2nd century. The members belonged to the senatorial order or to the imperial house. We have no information in regard to its activities.

9. Luperci.—In the case of the *Luperci* we have a priesthood whose activity was confined to a single day of the year, 15th Feb., the date of the celebration of the Lupercalia. There were *Luperci Quinctiales* and *Luperci Fabiani*.[2] In 44 B.C. a third group, *Luperci Iulii*, was added in honour of Julius Cæsar, and of these Antony was *magister*. But this group did not last long, and it was omitted on the reorganization of the priesthood by Augustus. Membership in the order of the *Luperci* did not carry with it a distinction equal to that of the other priestly *sodalitates*. It was an equestrian, not a senatorial, priesthood. The festival lasted into Christian times, not being abolished till the pontificate of Gelasius (A.D. 494).

The meaning of the title *Luperci* has been the subject of a long discussion. Till recently the prevailing view was that the word meant simply 'wolves,' like *hirpi* (in the Sabine language 'wolves'), the name applied to the priests of the god (Soranus pater) worshipped on the top of Mt. Soracte; and it was claimed that we had here another manifestation of the vegetation-spirit, which often turns up in the shape of animals.[3] But this theory seems too fantastic for serious consideration, and the author of the latest detailed investigation of the cult (Deubner, *ARW* xiii. 482 ff.)[4] has returned to the old etymology (Serv. *Æn.* viii. 343) by which *Lupercus* is derived from *lupus* and *arceo* and means 'one who keeps off wolves.' Deubner's reconstruction of the festival is ingenious and in regard to many points very plausible.

The most important features of the celebration were as follows: (1) goats and a dog were sacrificed (perhaps to Faunus, though this is by no means certain); (2) two young men[5] were smeared on the forehead with the blood of the sacrifice, which was then wiped off with wool dipped in milk, whereupon they laughed; (3) the *Luperci*, in two bands, naked except for goat-skins stripped from the victims about their loins, ran round the base of the Palatine hill, and as they ran struck with strips of the same goat-skins all those (mostly women) who threw themselves in their way.

We have in the Lupercalia traces of a pastoral festival (implied in the protective measures against wolves), of a lustration of the community (seen in the encircling of the hill), and of a rite for fertilization (for which the striking with the thongs of goat-skin furnishes the evidence). According to Deubner, the course around the hill goes back to the early days of the Palatine settlement, when it was actually necessary to protect the sheep-folds from wolves, and individuals from certain families were appointed *luperci*, 'those who keep off the wolves.' The practice was not at that time connected with the worship of any god, but later was brought into relation with Faunus. The other elements in the festival, the striking with thongs and the wiping off of the blood, were, according to Deubner, subsequent additions, the latter belonging to the period of Augustus' reforms. That this is a final solution of the *Luperci* cannot be positively asserted, but that it is a more plausible theory than any that has hitherto been advanced may be confidently affirmed.

10. Sodales Augustales.—When Augustus died (A.D. 14), he was deified by senatorial decree, and a priesthood (*sodales Augustales*) was founded to pay the honours due to him as a god (*divus*). The *sodalitas* was organized on the analogy of the *sodales Titii*. It consisted of twenty-one regular members from the senatorial order and four[1] honorary members from the imperial family. This number, however, does not seem to have been rigidly adhered to, for there are references which indicate that in later times the membership was as high as twenty-eight. The *sodalitas* was administered by three *magistri*. It had charge of the games held in honour of Divus Augustus and of the ceremonies conducted in the temple erected to him near the north-west corner of the Palatine. Moreover, it took over the ancestral shrine of the Julian *gens* at Bovillæ and once a year held services and games there. At Bovillæ also the archives of the priesthood were kept, and we may assume that its official headquarters were there. When the emperor Claudius was declared *divus* by the senate, his cult was assigned to the same *sodalitas*, which, however, was now called *sodales Augustales Claudiales*. The close relations between the Julian and Claudian *gentes* justified such an arrangement. But a new situation arose on the deification of Vespasian, who belonged to the *gens Flavia*, and another priesthood was accordingly organized, the *sodales Flaviales*. This *sodalitas* also took care of the cult of Vespasian's son Titus when he was deified. It is probable that there was no change in its title during Domitian's reign, and that it was only after his death, when there was a recrudescence of the popularity of Titus, that the designation *sodales Flaviales Titiales* was used.[2] A third *sodalitas* was founded on the deification of Hadrian (*sodales Hadrianales*) and a fourth on that of Antoninus Pius (*sodales Antoniniani*). To the last were assigned the cults of all the subsequent emperors who became *divi*. For the empresses and princesses who were deified (and the number, especially in the first 150 years of the Empire, was considerable) special *sodalitates* were not instituted. Their worship was for the most part conducted by the *sodalitas* pertaining to their *gens*—*e.g.*, the cult of Livia by the *sodales Augustales*, that of Domitilla by the *sodales Flaviales*, and so forth. In addition to the *sodales* each *divus* had a *flamen*. It is probable that the *flamen* was not one of the *sodales*. Special priests were assigned also to some of the *diuæ*.

11. State priests of municipal cults. — There were also, in addition to the *collegia* and *sodalitates* that have been discussed, some minor State priesthoods. These were organized to take care of the sacred rites belonging to certain Latin communities that had been absorbed by Rome. The incumbents were Roman citizens. The ceremonies took place sometimes in Rome, sometimes at the original seat of the worship. The list consists of the following: *sacerdotes Cabenses* (Caba), *sacerdotes Cœninenses* (Cœnina), *Albani* (Alba Longa),

[1] Tacitus' own information on the subject seems to have been somewhat vague, for in another passage (*Ann.* i. 54) he says that the priesthood was instituted by King Tatius for the purpose of keeping up the religious rites of the Sabines.

[2] It is generally assumed that the former represented the Palatine community, the latter the inhabitants of the Quirinal. But Fowler (*Roman Festivals*, p. 320) points out that this is inconsistent with the fact that the running of the *Luperci* was always around the Palatine only.

[3] W. Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte*², Berlin, 1905, p. 318 ff., *GB*³, pt. ii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, ii. 14 f.

[4] See also Fowler, *Religious Experience*, p. 478 ff.

[5] Perhaps the *magistri* of the *Luperci Quinctiales* and *Luperci Fabiani* respectively.

[1] Tiberius, Germanicus, Drusus, Claudius.

[2] This point seems established by a recent art., 'The Date of the Arch of Titus,' by D. McFadyen, in *Classical Journal*, xi. [1915] 140.

sacerdotes Lanuvini (Lanuvium), *sacerdotes Laurentes Lavinates* (Lavinium and Laurentum), *sacerdotes Suciniani* (Sucinia?),[1] *sacerdotes Tusculani* (Tusculum).

In the municipalities throughout the Empire there were, besides the local priests, *sacerdotes publici* modelled on those in Rome: *pontifices*, *augures*, and for the imperial cult *flamines* as well as the organizations of the *seviri Augustales*. More important than any of these municipal priests was the provincial priest, *sacerdos*[2] *provinciæ*, who was elected by the provincial assembly, generally for a year, and who was the chief priest of the imperial cult in the province or group of provinces to which he belonged.

12. Haruspices.—Although the *haruspices* never became State priests, they played a part of considerable importance in Roman religion from the time of the war with Hannibal.[3] They were of Etruscan origin, and the field of their activities was threefold: (1) the scrutiny of the *exta* of sacrificial victims, (2) the explanation of portents, and (3) the interpretation of lightning. None of these was new in Roman religion. Examination of the *exta* of victims was made by members of the regular Roman priesthoods, portents were cared for by the *pontifices*, and the interpretation of lightning was included in the lore of the *augures*. But the *haruspices* supplemented the work of the Roman priesthoods, and along many lines showed a degree of specialization and an elaboration of detail which went far beyond that attained by the Roman priests; *e.g.*, the examination of the *exta*[4] by Roman priests was not intended to do more than to determine whether the god to whom the offering was made was propitious or not, but the *haruspices*, by means of a complicated system, one element in which was the charting of the liver in sixteen different parts,[5] claimed to read not simply the mind of one god on the subject, but the secrets of the future. In dealing with a portent they undertook to show what its meaning was. Their science of lightning transcended in detail and complexity that of the *augures*. The division of the liver into sixteen parts is obviously to be connected with the division of the heavens into sixteen regions upon which their interpretation of lightning was largely based.

The science of the *haruspices* was traditional in the noble families of Etruria, and so important was it considered by the Romans that in the 2nd cent. before Christ they took measures to assure its continuance in the chief cities of that country. For the *haruspices* whom the senate consulted were regularly brought from Etruria. Distinct from them were the *haruspices* who resided in Rome, and who were of two classes: (1) those attached to the service of officials and forming the *ordo haruspicum LX*,[6] and (2) private *haruspices* resorted to by citizens for advice on domestic problems. The status of these, especially the latter, was distinctly inferior to that of the *haruspices* summoned from Etruria.

Recent researches tend to show that the system practised by the *haruspices* in the examination of the *exta* is derived from Babylonia, and that its use in Rome constitutes an important channel of Oriental influence.

[1] This is a conjecture. No city of this name is known with certainty to have existed in Latium. See J. Toutain, in Daremberg-Saglio, iv. 948.

[2] In the East called ἀρχιερεύς, in the West *sacerdos* (in the three Gauls and elsewhere), or *flamen* (Spain, Gallia Narbonensis, Africa, etc.).

[3] There is no satisfactory evidence of the Roman Government having called in *haruspices* at an earlier date.

[4] While the term includes all the large internal organs, the science of the *haruspices* dealt chiefly with the liver.

[5] A bronze liver, found at Piacenza, shows this division.

[6] The earliest reference to this *ordo* is an inscription belonging to the end of the Republic (*CIL* vi. 32439).

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PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Ugro-Finnish).—The priests among the Ugro-Finnish people did not form a separate social class. Their importance in the community, generally speaking, was evident only at the sacrificial feasts. The office of priest was regarded as an honour, and usually brought no remuneration. We can best study the observance of the pagan sacrifice in the home among the Votyaks, who retain the relics of a sacrificial feast observed in the old native hut (*kuala*). Here the father of the family was the natural sacrificial priest. That dignity descended to his eldest son, and, in the absence of male lawful issue, to the nearest male relative. Besides the family sacrifice, we find a tribal sacrifice held in common by several families in a tribal hut called a 'great hut' (*budzim kuala*). These sacrifices were performed by a descendant of the progenitor of the tribe—an eldest son, if possible. One and the same Votyak thus belongs to two *kuala*-families, a smaller and a larger.

Sacrifices were also offered in sacred groves. Groves were dedicated both to underground spirits —*i.e.* the great men, princes, etc., of a community —and to great nature-gods. If a family, for some reason or another—usually when a great misfortune had befallen them—dedicated a grove to some great man who was dead, it was deemed right that the sacrifices should be continued in that group by his posterity. When the priestly office did not pass by inheritance, a priest was chosen from among the members of the family or tribe concerned. Nature-gods might be worshipped in a grove set apart by one particular village community, or in a common sacrificial place belonging to a number of communities—sometimes as many as twenty-five. For both, sacrificial priests were chosen. As a condition of appointment, the priest was required to have the respect of the community and also to be skilled in prayer. Often the sacrificial priest remained in office all his life.

When several animals were to be sacrificed at the same time, as many priests took part in the service as there were animals offered. In the groves used by several communities the service was usually performed by the priests of the larger towns or villages of the district. When several priests took part in the service, the people occasionally called the oldest among them the 'great priest'; and his duty was to supervise the 'small priests' in the discharge of their functions. The most general appellation for a priest was 'old man.' He had always one or more colleagues, to whom special duties in connexion with the sacrifices were entrusted. When an individual wished to sacrifice in the grove of his village, he summoned the priest to hold a service for him. The seer could also sometimes appoint the priest to make the sacrifice.

In earlier times, when shamanism prevailed, it was the duty of the shaman to attend to the sacrifices. The shaman priest was held in very high esteem among his people. It was said, *e.g.*, of the

Lapps that they always gave the shaman the best seat in the house, set before him the daintiest viands, and presented him with valuable gifts; indeed, sometimes they even paid tribute to him; and his opinion and advice were always highly esteemed.

It is uncertain whether the Ugro-Finnish priest wore a special sacrificial robe. It is known that he had to wash before every service, and to put on a new, or at least a perfectly clean and, if possible, white robe. Fasting before the sacrifice may also have been customary. Women, as a rule, could not take part in the sacrificial service, and were deemed unworthy of the priestly office.

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UNO HOLMBERG.

PRIMITIVE METHODISTS.—See METHODISM.

PRIMOGENITURE.—See FIRST-BORN, INHERITANCE.

PRINCIPLE.—1. Philosophical.—The word 'principle,' reproducing the Latin *principium*, is a translation of the Greek philosophical term ἀρχή. This term designated two very different kinds of facts—principles of knowledge and principles of reality (cf. Aristotle, *Met.* 995^{b}7). This double application of the term runs through English philosophical literature. Not only the axioms of logic — *e.g.*, the Law of Contradiction — to which Aristotle refers in the passage cited, but the fundamental truths of any body of doctrine are called its principles (cf. the title of the work *Principles of Mathematics*, by B. Russell). Sometimes by a redundancy of expression these are called 'first principles'—*e.g.*, in Herbert Spencer's work of that name.

Again, anything fundamental in the nature of things may be called a principle. Thus, when T. H. Green talks of 'the spiritual principle in nature,' or B. Jowett, translating Plato (*Dialogues*[2], Oxford, 1875, iv. 229), mentions 'a principle which is above sensation,' they refer to a real existent.

A principle in the sense of a principle of reality may be conceived of either as a cause or as a constituent. It is in the latter sense that water is the principle of all things in the philosophy of Thales. But, even when a principle is conceived of as a constituent, other things are usually supposed to be in some way causally dependent on it.

To be fundamental is the essential notion of a principle, of whatever sort that be. If we ask, How fundamental?, the answer is, Logically; the principle is that which comes first in the order of explanation, whether we are explaining the nature of a demonstration or the nature of a concrete fact. Thus, if the principle of the universe is spiritual, it is the existence of spirit that explains all other facts. On the other hand, the principles of morality are the truths about moral relations on which depend all our explanations of particular moral phenomena (cf. T. Fowler, *The Principles of Morals*).

2. Popular.—'Principle' has various popular significations which are directly derivative from the different philosophical uses of the term.

(1) We constantly speak of the 'poisonous principle' or 'bitter principle' in substances, meaning by that something concrete which is the source or origin of the definite character which these things possess. These are not far removed from such more philosophical expressions as the 'vital principle' or the 'spiritual principle in nature.'

(2) On the other hand, when we talk about the 'principle' of the steam-engine or of the electric motor, we mean the truth which gives the explanation of their working. Principle is here the formal and not the material cause of a fact. At the same time, while in this case principle means a scientific premiss for logical explanation, the use of the term is not wholly dissimilar from that which it has in the previous instance. By a principle is here meant the ultimate and simple truth which stands at the beginning of our explanation. Again, the fact expressed in our ultimate premiss is held to be the actual cause of the phenomena explained.

(3) Principles of conduct stand on a somewhat different footing. They are generalized rules of good conduct which form the logical starting-point when we deliberate upon the rightness and wrongness of a particular action. A 'man of principle' (cf. Carlyle, *Cromwell*, speech iv.) is one whose conduct is regulated by the agreement of his projected acts with the general laws of moral action. By a 'man of good principle' we mean little more, for it is assumed that, when a man regulates his conduct by testing its agreement with general maxims, he employs maxims which are morally excellent. A 'man of no principle' is one whose conduct is not regulated by being compared by him with a moral law. Regard for principle in politics is strictly analogous to what it is in the case of morals. It means the regulation of action by noting its agreement with a general rule which has been established as a law of social well-being, without taking into account the immediate advantages which the infringement of that rule might bring.

LITERATURE.—T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883; H. Driesch, *The Hist. and Theory of Vitalism*, London, 1913; B. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, do. 1903; T. Fowler, *The Principles of Morals*, Oxford, 1886-87.

G. R. T. ROSS.

PRISCILLIANISM.—The Priscillianists or Priscillians were a heretical sect charged with Manichæan and Gnostic opinions, which made its appearance under this name in Spain towards the end of the 4th cent., and, after exercising considerable influence in S.W. Europe, was confined within ever narrower limits until it disappeared after a history of about two centuries.

The sect took its name from Priscillian, its reputed founder, but it is very doubtful whether he is justly made responsible for the views which were held by his followers. The conditions of this problem have been altered since the discovery in 1885 and the publication by G. Schepss of the extant works of Priscillian. The other primary authorities are very scanty (a letter of Ambrose, a notice in Jerome, and a reference in Pacatus), but they support rather than contradict the evidence to be drawn from Priscillian himself, by which the witness of secondary authorities must be controlled.

Priscillian was a layman of good family, of fair education, and of considerable wealth, born probably at Merida, in Lusitania, shortly before the middle of the 4th century. He was attracted by that wide-spread movement of thought which found approval and safety when it went to the extreme of monasticism, but was exposed to the dangerous hostility of the ecclesiastical authorities when it gave itself to the cultivation of piety and an austere life apart from and not without criticism of the offices and officers of the Church. S.W. Europe had many groups of ascetically disposed Christians, known in some quarters as 'Abstinentes,' who nourished their faith not only on the canonical Scriptures but also on 'apocryphal' writings, such as the *Acts of Andrew*, *of Thomas*, and *of John*. In these it is probable that Manich-

æan ideas and ascetic practices found a common root (see Babut, *Priscillien et Priscillianisme*, p. 231 ff.). One of the earliest works of Priscillian, the *Nonaginta Canones in Pauli Epistolas*, a series of contents-headings prefixed to groups of cognate sections of the Epistles, shows him in general sympathy with this movement, emphasizing those elements in St. Paul which look towards dualism and asceticism (canons 33 and 57), the 'carnal' character of the Law (can. 77), and the virtue of 'beata voluntaria paupertas' (can. 37). The first tendency of the movement was schismatic rather than heretical, and the fact that it captured several of the Spanish bishops—*e.g.*, Salvianus and Instantius—alarmed Idacius, bishop of Merida, who, after consulting Pope Damasus on the matter, summoned a synod at Saragossa for its consideration (A.D. 380).[1] No individuals were condemned by this synod, nor do its decisions and anathemas contemplate errors in doctrine of any kind; they are concerned with practical matters such as fasting, the use of the Eucharist, and the frequenting of conventicles. Priscillian took up the challenge thrown down by this synod, and, by accepting the bishopric of Avila, at once put himself in the forefront of the movement, and entered the lists against Idacius. Idacius proceeded to obtain from the emperor Gratian a rescript condemning in general terms 'pseudo-episcopos et Manichæos,' and authorizing the expulsion of all heretics from Spain. This he then applied to Priscillian in a circular to other bishops in Spain, and also in a letter to Ambrose. Through the latter an unfavourable reception was provided for Priscillian when he proceeded to Italy in company with the bishops Salvianus and Instantius 'cum uxoribus,' to lay their case before Damasus and Ambrose in turn. His *Liber ad Damasum* contains his apology, in which he repudiates every kind of heresy, and especially that of the Manichæans. Damasus probably refused to interfere, but an appeal to the emperor met with better success: the rescript was cancelled, and Priscillian returned to his diocese in peace (382).

The next two years formed a period of great and successful activity for Priscillian. Most of his tracts (iv.–ix.) were now produced, and the important *de Fide et Apocryphis*, in which the note of independence is distinctly heard.

The quotations made by Priscillian supply valuable evidence as to the pre-Hieronymian text of the Latin Bible. 'Le texte biblique de Priscillien présente tous les caractères des textes "italiens": il semble former la transition entre ces textes du ive siècle et leur rejeton, le texte "africain de basse époque" que nous retrouvons regnant à la fin du ve siècle dans l'empire des Vandales' (S. Berger, *Hist. de la Vulgate*, Paris, 1893, p. 8). The 'comma Johanneum' (1 Jn 5 7) has what is probably its earliest witness in Priscillian, tract. i. (ed. Schepss, p. 6). The *Canons* of Priscillian, often under the name of Peregrinus, and possibly modified in some respects by him, had a considerable vogue for several centuries in Provence and Spain (see Berger, p. 26 ff.).

The progress of the sect may be described in Babut's words:

'The government supported them, their adversary Ithacius was in flight, their influence was extending. The triumph of the spiritual and ascetic reform might well appear to them assured' (p. 167).

The swift disaster which overtook Priscillian and the whole movement was closely connected with the successful revolt of Maximus and the fall and death of Gratian. Ithacius (bishop of Ossonoba) had fled to Trèves, and there claimed the assistance of Maximus in suppressing the 'Manichæan' heresy in Spain. Maximus seized the opportunity of acquiring credit for orthodoxy. There was another possible motive in the wealth of the 'heretics,' reputed to be very great. The first step was to summon a synod at Bordeaux, before which Priscillian and Instantius were arraigned as prisoners. To the charge of heresy was added that of gross immorality and the practice of magic. According to Sulpicius, who is probably following the *Apology* of Ithacius, Priscillian refused to plead, and appealed to the emperor. Condemned by the synod, the accused were transferred to Trèves. There Priscillian, though still a bishop, was put to the torture, and the confessions so extorted from him were sufficient to condemn him then and ever since. Ambrose happened to be in Trèves on an embassy at the time, and was so indignant at the spectacle of bishops demanding the death of another bishop that he refused to communicate with Idacius and Ithacius, and was dismissed from Trèves in consequence (Ambrose, *Ep.* xxiv. 12). Having received from Maximus permission to proceed to a capital sentence, Evodius the prefect ordered Priscillian and his companions to be beheaded, and thus they perished—Priscillian, two of the clergy, Armenius and Felicissimus, Latronianus, a poet, and Euchrocia, the widow of Delphidius, the first heretics to be sent to the scaffold by the Church.

The execution of Priscillian was followed first by a reaction and then by a counter-reaction. The horror which was felt throughout the Church was marked by the indignant protests of St. Martin of Tours, the excommunication by a Spanish synod of Ithacius, the forced resignation of his bishopric by Idacius, and the sentence of exile pronounced upon both bishops by Theodosius. On the other hand, Latinius Pacatus pronounced a panegyric on the victims in the presence of the emperor; their remains were removed with all honour to Spain, and their names were inscribed on many sacramental lists there as martyrs. In Galicia the clergy and the people were almost wholly adherent to the movement.

Of the counter-reaction which followed we have no satisfactory record, beyond that which is indirectly given in the accounts of Priscillian and his followers which were circulated by Orosius and Turribius, and the judgment, probably based on Orosius, which was passed by Augustine. Councils held at Toledo (400 and 447) and at Braga (448 and 563) successively dealt with the Priscillianists. After the latter date they disappear. Isolated and persecuted, it is likely that they fell into heresy of the Manichæan or Gnostic type, but the evidence on which the movement in its early stage is labelled with either of these names is precarious. Much turns on the authenticity of a quotation from Priscillian given by Orosius (*Commonitorium*, 2 [*CSEL* xviii. 153]). Its genuineness has been taken for granted by most writers, and is maintained by Künstle and Lezius; but the searching criticism to which it has been subjected by Babut (p. 279 ff.) lays it under serious suspicion. All the other evidence points in the other direction—the silence of the synod of Saragossa, the express and repeated statements of Priscillian himself, the cautious judgment of Jerome, the protest of Ambrose, and the championship of St. Martin. The case was soon found to be weak, and the evidence of Priscillian himself turned against him by the assertion that he held and taught the duty of perjuring oneself in order to conceal dangerous views. This Augustine believed of him on the authority of Dictinnius, which is the authority of one who, having left the Priscillians and been reconciled to the Church, was seeking to demonstrate the completeness of his conversion.

LITERATURE.—i. *SOURCES.*—*Priscilliani quæ supersunt*, ed. G. Schepss (*CSEL* xviii.), Vienna, 1889; Jerome, *de Vir. Ill.* 121; Sulpicius Severus, *Chronica*, ii. 46–51 (see J. Bernays, *Die Chronik des Sulpicius Severus*, Berlin, 1861); Orosius, *Commonitorium* (*CSEL* xviii.).

ii. *CRITICISM.*—G. Schepss, *Priscillian*, Würzburg, 1886;

[1] See Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio*, iii. 635; *Priscilliani*, ed. Schepss, p. 35: 'nemo e nostris reus factus tenetur, nemo accusatus'; Sulp. Sev. *Chron.* ii. 47. 1.

A. Hilgenfeld, in *ZWT* xxxv. [1892] 1–84; F. Paret, *Priscillian, ein Reformator des 4. Jahrhunderts*, Würzburg, 1891; F. Lezius, in *PRE*[3], *s.v.*; K. Künstle, *Eine Bibliothek der Symbole* ('Forschungen zur christl. Lit.,' i. iv.), Mainz, 1900; E. C. Babut, *Priscillien et le Priscillianisme* (*Bibl. de l'École des hautes études*, clxix.), Paris, 1909.

C. A. SCOTT.

PRISONS.—The one essential quality of every prison, ancient, mediæval, and modern, for untried and for convicted prisoners, for those confined for a fixed period or for life, a dungeon of the Inquisition or a modern establishment conducted on the most humane and enlightened principles, is that it is a place of detention, where the inmates are deprived of that personal liberty and volition which men and women, civilized and uncivilized, have risked life itself, in all ages of the world, to secure.

The vital importance of this obvious fact is generally ignored even by experts. Edmund F. du Cane, chairman of the Prison Commissioners for England and Wales, an eminent authority on prison history and management, wrote in a description of Elmira Reformatory in New York State:

'The prisoners enjoy a luxurious dietary, and many indulgences are granted to induce them to work, so that the penal element of a sentence of imprisonment is entirely absent.

If du Cane had opened the prison doors, he would have found that a cage is a cage, although the bars are gilded; not one inmate of luxurious Elmira, however miserable his circumstances outside, would have remained. To be under ocular inspection every hour of every day (door-knockers are unknown, but there are peep-holes in every cell door); to be compelled, in strict obedience to printed rules and verbal orders and on pain of punishment, day after day, month after month, year after year, to rise up and sit down, to eat, sleep, speak, listen, work, walk, read, write, and receive letters and visits, even from wife and children, at the will of another—such treatment, if long continued, permanently unfits a human being for membership of a free community; and all this in the most depressing surroundings—eating, day after day, the same kind of food, wearing the same clothes, seeing the same official or degraded people, and doing, without substantial remuneration and for the benefit of others, the same uninteresting tasks. It is more than difficult, it is impossible, for a free man to realize what it means to be distinguished not by a name but by a number; to be lost to the outside world, and its news and activities, nature's sights and sounds excluded with perverse ingenuity; to be deprived of all social intercourse or family life, receiving no acts of kindness and unable to do any.

A convict (the kind of man that the newspapers, the novelists, and the playwrights make copy of as 'a hardened ruffian') burst into tears when a prison visitor suddenly shook hands with him. 'I beg your pardon, sir,' said the man, 'but nobody has shaken hands with me for ten years.'

With initiative, self-respect, and self-reliance diminishing day by day, no wonder there come the prison look, sullen, apathetic, or furtive, like a hunted animal, and the prison manner, half abject and half defiant; no wonder that the released prisoner finds himself unfit to work, if indeed he can get anybody to employ him. Disqualified for re-absorption in the community, a useless machine, and a social alien, he turns to drink and vice to drown and divert his misery, and drifts through crime back again into prison.

John Howard's *State of Prisons in England and Wales, with an Account of some Foreign Prisons and Hospitals* was published at Warrington in 1777, but until early in the 19th cent. the treatment of criminals and the punishment of crime by Church and State had scarcely a point of contact with Christianity or civilization; it was not even consistent with the instincts of ordinary humanity. The sentence pronounced in 1630 upon Archbishop Leighton's father, a physician and divine, for writing against Prelacy in terms no more extravagant and not less honest than those employed by his accusers against Presbytery, was an extreme instance, in degree, but not in kind. It ran as follows: (1) to be twice publicly whipped, (2) to be pilloried in Cheapside, (3) to have an ear cut off, (4) to have the nose slit, (5) to have both cheeks branded with the letters 'S.S.' ('Sower of Sedition'), (6) to pay £10,000, and (7) to be imprisoned for life.

How long old ideas survive may be inferred from the Children Act of 1908. By sections 102 and 103 of that great statute it is solemnly enacted that, in Great Britain and Ireland, no child (a child is defined as a person under the age of 14 years) shall be imprisoned or sent to penal servitude or the gallows. England obtained a Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907. But in Scotland, while a question of property of trifling value, tried in the civil courts, may be the subject of two, in some cases three, appeals, there is as yet, except in a case of conviction for habitual criminality, no appeal from the verdict of a jury, disposing, in the criminal courts, of a citizen's life or liberty.

For the system, the trail of which still impedes prison reform, a false theological view was partly responsible, along with an inadequate estimate of the sacredness of life and liberty. Lunacy and criminality were looked upon as works of the devil, to be exorcized by death, starvation, fetters, or the lash. That the State, by its own shameful neglect and its iniquitous laws, was itself largely responsible, along with the cynical indifference of the community, for both crime and lunacy was an idea as new as that insanitary conditions, permitted by the State, were the chief cause of disease. Original sin was an easy explanation of all abnormal conduct. So thought Mr. and Mrs. Squeers in *Nicholas Nickleby*.

'"That young Pitcher has had a fever." "No," exclaimed Mr. Squeers, "damn that boy, he's always at something of that sort." "Never was such a boy I do believe," said Mrs. Squeers, "whatever he has is always catching too. I say it's obstinacy, and nothing shall ever convince me that it isn't. I'd beat it out of him"' (ch. vii.).

Neither the pictures of Hogarth nor the arguments of Jeremy Bentham, neither the disclosures of John Howard, Mrs. Fry, and Thomas Fowell Buxton nor the eloquence of Samuel Romilly had much practical effect till the reform of Parliament in 1832. In the beginning of the 19th cent. Acts were passed abolishing gaol fees, ordering the appointment of chaplains, the erection of sanitary prison buildings, the classification of prisoners, the separation of the sexes, and the appointment of female warders for female prisoners. Yet, writing in 1812, James Neild, who followed in Howard's footsteps, said:

'The great reformation produced by Howard was merely temporary. . . . Prisons are relapsing into their former horrid state of privation, filthiness, severity and neglect' (*State of the Prisoners in England, Scotland and Wales*, London, 1812).

The movements for the amendment of the criminal law and the reform of prisons dated from the American and French Revolutions; and they were both connected with the growth of democratic ideas and institutions.

The importance of the subject, its human interest, and the difficulties which it presents cannot be exaggerated. There is no more difficult question, unless it be the labour question, the housing of the people, or the liquor question, with all of which the subject of crime is vitally connected. Unfortunately, most critics of present methods are purely destructive. Some ignore the responsibility of the community, and others seem blind to the large share played by poverty and unemployment, drink, gambling, and vice in the production of crime. The index to du Cane's *Punishment and Prevention of Crime* (London, 1885) does not contain the word 'poverty' or the word 'drink'; and J. Devon's original and interesting

study, *The Criminal and the Community* (London, 1912), breathes a spirit of despair. The subject has been canvassed at national and international congresses; and, in the United Kingdom, it has been considered by Government Commissions, royal and departmental, whose reports have resulted in a large number of valuable Acts of Parliament and prison regulations, each one advancing more and more in the direction of the treatment of prisoners as human beings, and not as things. Under these statutes and regulations the penal side of prison life has been diminished, and the reformative side increased, not, as sometimes ignorantly asserted, to gratify a sentimental humanitarianism, but in the best interests of the community, outside and inside the prison. Reformation is cheap at any price. It is a moderate estimate that a thief costs the community £150 a year, while at liberty. It is significant that in no single instance has there been any return to former less humane methods. Two hundred years ago, Montesquieu wrote:

'As freedom advances, the severity of the penal law decreases' (*Esprit des lois*, Paris, 1833, bk. vi. ch. ix.).

While prisons should not be beds of roses, neither should they be torture-chambers.

Experts have written on prisons and prison reform in every European language. Ex-convicts have described their experiences, with little value for the cause of prison reform, including aristocrats like Lord William Nevill, members of parliament like Michael Davitt, financiers like Jabez Balfour, ladies of fashion like Mrs. Maybrick, and literary men like Oscar Wilde. No subject is more in favour with the novel writer; it is staged by the playwright and discussed on the platform, in the pulpit, and in the press. Too often the case for reform is prejudiced by gross exaggeration. As in Oscar Wilde's powerful *Ballad of Reading Gaol* (London, 1898), pictures are drawn which depend for their point on hardships and cruelties no longer anywhere to be found. It is of little practical benefit to denounce present-day administrators. The question is one of system; it can be solved only by experiment on a large scale and over a prolonged period; and such experiments are being carried on by governments, by communities, and by individuals in the United Kingdom, the United States, and many European countries. Happily for the future, many prison problems will solve themselves, by the diminution and ultimate disappearance of persons requiring penal treatment, through the gradual removal of the chief causes of crime, namely, (*a*) unemployment and irregular employment, with attendant idleness, the formation of bad habits, lack of energy, and starvation; (*b*) drunkenness, one of the chief causes of poverty and crime, and likewise one of their most common and dehumanizing concomitants and effects; and (*c*) the failure to seclude the mentally deficient, the habitual drunkard, and the habitual criminal, so as to prevent the perpetuation of a degenerate race. It is no exaggeration to say that the greater portion of crime in this country is due to economic, rather than to directly moral, causes.

I. *PAST AND PRESENT-DAY PRISONS.*—Down to the beginning of the 19th cent. the time-honoured methods of dealing with criminals made the question of prisons and prison-management of small practical importance. Prisons were places in which the accused awaited trial and the condemned awaited execution. The old plan of getting rid of crime was to get rid of the criminal, as distinguished from the modern endeavour to reform him and to prevent crime by stopping the manufacture of criminals. This is obvious from a bare enumeration of the methods formerly in use: (*a*) capital punishment, (*b*) mutilation, (*c*) flogging, (*d*) the pillory, the stocks, and branding, (*e*) compensation payable to the injured or fines payable to the State, and (*f*) compulsory exile. Under the Jews, Greeks, and Romans, as also among the Saxons and Germans, the chief and usual punishment of crime consisted in the enforcement of compensation to the injured. For this rational procedure the feudal barons and the Church of the Middle Ages substituted imprisonment, torture, mutilation, and death.

By degrees, partly through the writings of men like Cesare Beccaria in Italy and Jeremy Bentham in England, partly because a greater value came to be put on human life, and partly through the necessities of colonization, while the judges continued to pass capital sentences for trifling as well as serious offences, the executive, especially in the case of young offenders, frequently remitted the extreme penalty. People may be better than their creed; and legislators and administrators have often been more humane than the laws which they enacted and executed.

These causes led to the system of transportation, which was introduced in the reign of Charles II. Criminals whose death-sentences were commuted were sent to the American colonies, along with those who were directly sentenced to transportation.

The old system, thus modified by transportation, continued till the loss of the American colonies in 1776, when ships, called 'hulks,' were established for convicts in the Thames, and at Portsmouth and Chatham. The first hulk was opened in 1778, and the system was not finally abandoned till 1857. Concurrently with the hulks a fresh field for transportation was found, in 1787, in the Australian colonies. In 1834, 4920 convicts were transported to W. Australia. The system of transportation continued till 1867, when the last batch of convicts sent to any British colony was prevented by the colonists from landing in W. Australia. Both systems, transportation and the hulks, were attended with misery, cruelty, disease, and loss of life, avoidable and unavoidable. In the hulks 'the inmates were herded together in unchecked association.' Vice, profaneness, and demoralization prevailed (du Cane, *Chambers's Encyclopædia*, *s.v.* 'Prisons,' viii. 418). It appears that about a fourth of the deaths in the hulks were due to a deadly, but preventable, malady called 'hulk fever.' Transportation was condemned in a Government report of 1838 in these terms:

'The system of transportation is unequal, without terrors to the criminal class, corrupting to both convict and colonist, and very expensive' (quoted by du Cane, *The Punishment and Prevention of Crime*, London, 1885, p. 139).

Yet, in view of the importance of emigration for those in danger of falling into crime, it is important to remember that many transported convicts, in new surroundings, away from old companions and temptations, and freed from poverty and idleness, became industrious and respectable citizens, and that some of their descendants overseas now occupy responsible positions in Church and State.

The next phase, concurrent for a time with the maintenance of transportation and the hulks, was the cellular prison and convict settlement, with the accompaniment either of solitary confinement by night and day or of solitary confinement by night and association at work and at meals during the day, but in both cases with silence by day and by night. It is doubtful whether England, Italy, or the United States is entitled to the credit or discredit of the origination of the cellular system, which had been advocated by John Howard as early as 1776, always, however, with the accompaniment of work, instruction, and moral and religious influences.

The cellular system, so far as involving isolation at night and continuous silence while the prisoners are in association, still remains in almost universal use in all European countries. But in the United Kingdom the accompaniment of solitary confinement during the day, except as a punishment for offences committed in prison, was abandoned in 1899 for prisoners with short sentences; it has also been abandoned in Scotland in the case of convicts, and reduced in England in 1910 to one month. So far as the present buildings and surrounding ground will allow, the prisoners work, eat, and exercise in association, but in silence.

1. Kinds of modern prisons.—The various kinds of prisons which, in the United Kingdom, have superseded the single prison of the past may be divided into seven classes; but it is not meant that there is any hard and fast distinction, so far as buildings are concerned.

(*a*) *Local prisons*, for those sentenced to not more than two years' confinement, are vested in and managed by three bodies of Prison Commissioners for England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively, created by the Act of 1878. There had been great waste of money, and also, except in a few cases of exceptional local interest and intelligence, great abuses, due to want of any uniform system of treatment, to inhumane or incompetent officials, to antiquated and inadequate buildings, and to the existence of a large number of small and unnecessary prisons. The differences in prison treatment were so great that criminals were known to select for their operations the locality of the gaol with soft beds, generous diet, and lax rules. The Prison Commissioners have always been hampered by want of funds in introducing humane and reformative methods; they have done much to minimize the disastrous effects of prison life, and their annual reports do not disguise their dissatisfaction with much that is done, and much that is left undone, under their administration. These reports show a progressive realization of the compatibility of humane and reformative treatment with good discipline.

(*b*) *Convict settlements*, for prisoners sentenced to what is called 'penal servitude' (first introduced in Great Britain by the Penal Servitude Act of 1853), that is to say, any period of imprisonment from three years up to a life sentence. There are three periods in a convict's sentence: (1) the first month, when he works alone in his cell, (2) the remainder of his period of detention, during which he works in association with other convicts, but in silence, and (3) the balance of his sentence, when he is outside on a ticket-of-leave, liable to be re-apprehended if he fails to report himself or breaks any of the other conditions of his licence. Penal servitude involves so much more food and so much more open-air work, in association with others and not in solitary confinement, that many 'old hands' prefer a sentence of three years' penal servitude (to be served in a convict settlement, such as Dartmoor in England, where the convicts are employed reclaiming ground and in farm-work, or at Peterhead in Scotland, where they quarry granite and build a harbour) to one of imprisonment for two years in an ordinary prison.

Comparative statistics of criminal offences and criminals require to be dealt with cautiously, and with intimate knowledge of the whole field, if one age or one country is to be fairly and accurately compared with another. The comparison between transportation and the hulks, on the one hand, and penal servitude, on the other, is not a complete one; but, subject to all deductions, it is encouraging that, whereas in the days of transportation there were, in 1837 (when the population of England and Wales was some 15,000,000), about 50,000 convicts, in the colonies or at home in the hulks, in 1869 the total number of convicts under sentence of penal servitude was only 11,660, of whom 9900 were men and 1760 women. This number under penal servitude was reduced in 1891 to 4978 (4654 men and 324 women), and in 1903 to 2799 (2669 men and 130 women). Taking local prisons and convict settlements together, it seems to be established that of first offenders about three-fourths never return, while of those convicted for the third time about three-fourths re-appear as prisoners in local prisons or convict settlements.

(*c*) *Preventive detention prisons*, or departments of prisons, established under the Prevention of Crimes Act of 1908 for convicts who have received a sentence of penal servitude, and who have also been proved to have been 'habitual criminals' at the time the offence was committed, engaged in no occupation except that of crime. These are the 'recidivistes' of France, the 'revolvers' of the United States. The period of preventive detention, which begins when the sentence of penal servitude ends, instead of being unlimited, as it ought to be and as was proposed in the original bill, is limited to a maximum of ten years. In the discretion of the Prison Commissioners the convict may have to serve the full period of preventive detention named in the sentence or he may be liberated at any time on probation. This useful Act requires amendment, because the 'old hands,' when out of prison, even while truly pursuing a life of crime, take care to do just as much work as will make it impossible to convict them, under the definition in the statute, of being 'habitual criminals.'

(*d*) *Criminal inebriate prisons*, established under the Criminal Inebriates Act of 1898, to which habitual drunkards, falling into crime, may be sent for lengthened periods. It was recognized that the short sentences usually inflicted on the habitual drunkard were worse than useless, and that to send a man or a woman to gaol for a day, a week, or a month on, say, their 200th appearance is to make a laughing-stock of legal procedure. Such short sentences, while long enough to rehabilitate the drunkard for further excess, are too short to afford any opportunity for his or her permanent reform. Hitherto the results of the treatment in criminal inebriate prisons as a reforming agency have been disappointing. Legislation is wanted to enable these institutions to deal with criminals whose offences are directly connected with drink, but whose moral sense is not so obliterated as to make reform practically impossible. The unreformable habitual drunkard must be shut up for life.

(*e*) *Criminal lunatic prisons*, where prisoners convicted of crime, who were insane at the time the offence was committed, or when they were tried, or who become insane in prison, are confined 'during His Majesty's pleasure.' When deemed advisable by the Home Office or Secretary for Scotland, an inmate may be transferred to an ordinary lunatic asylum. On complete recovery from insanity, he may be handed over to his relatives, under proper precautions and guarantees.

(*f*) '*Borstal*' *institutions*, established under the Prevention of Crimes Act of 1908, pt. i., for persons between 16 and 23. Du Cane says that most habitual criminals have begun their malpractices before 20 years of age, and 60 per cent under 15 (see art. JUVENILE CRIMINALS).

(*g*) *Reformatories* for boys and girls under 16, convicted of crime, to be detained for not less than three or more than five years, of which there are 38 in England, 7 in Scotland, and 2 in Ireland (see art. JUVENILE CRIMINALS).

2. Differences between the prisons of the past and the prisons of the present in the United King-

dom.—(*a*) *Ownership and administration of prisons.*—The possession, or assumption, of judicial powers, and the use of dungeons attached to their castles and monasteries, formed one of the chief sources of the power of the landed classes, titled and untitled, and of the Church in the Middle Ages. After imprisonment by private persons was rendered illegal, there came the system of small prisons, which, while inadequately inspected by Government officials, belonged to, and were maintained and managed by, local bodies. In 1818, in 59 of the 518 prisons in the United Kingdom women were not divided from men, and in 445 there was no work of any kind for the prisoners to do. Some of these prisons were described as scenes of abandoned wickedness. In 1813 Mrs. Fry, on her first visit to Newgate, found 300 women, tried and untried, with their children, crowded together, in rags and dirt, and with nothing but the floor, without bedding, to sleep on. The Act of 1878 already referred to, which vested all prisons in Prison Commissioners appointed by the Crown, effected large savings in cost as well as improvement in the buildings and treatment, without sacrificing the benefit of local inspection.

(*b*) *Prison management.*—A writer (M. F. Johnston) in the *Fortnightly Review*, new ser., lxix. [1901] 560, says:

'The improvements which have been effected in recent years in prison management are of so radical a nature that they practically amount to a change of attitude towards the offender. . . . It has come to be recognised that hardships imposed for the sake of the suffering they entail do not act as a cure. They rather tend to brutalise the subject, and serve to intensify the anti-social instincts which led him, in the first instance, to raise his hand against his fellow-men.'

The old class of official and prison administrator not unnaturally, in view of his training, considered only what would maintain perfect prison discipline, and was not influenced by the fact that, while flogging and 'the black hole' undoubtedly crushed the prisoner into sullen and revengeful submission, these methods rendered him unfit, on release, to be re-absorbed into the decent part of the community. From every relaxation of the last century the old-time official has prophesied disasters, which have in no case occurred. He did so when it was proposed that the use of 'the black hole' should cease, with the crank (denounced by Charles Reade in *It is Never too Late to Mend*) and the treadmill; that windows should be increased in size and dim glass removed so that at least the sky, if not the earth, might be visible; when an effort was made to substitute for oakum-picking interesting and educative work; when flogging ceased, except for mutiny or gross violence on warders, and then only when authorized by a visiting magistrate or a Prison Commissioner; when work in association was introduced; when libraries were started; when, instead of everything being done to weaken the family tie (perhaps the only remaining motive for reform), prisoners were allowed to have their children's photographs in their cells; when a little bit of mirror, to promote tidiness, was fastened into the walls of their cells; when it was proposed to lay wooden floors over the miserably cold cement of which cell floors are constructed; when Swedish drill for women and ordinary drill for men were introduced, instead of, or in supplement to, the weary pacing round a circle in the prison-yard; when work in the fields was tried in connexion with local prisons; when a variety of food was substituted for the eternal 'skilly'; when good conduct marks, carrying a money value, were introduced; when magic-lantern lectures, which have been found a valuable aid to discipline, were first started. It is only fair to say that he has, in most cases, admitted that his fears were unfounded; to his amazement he has found that discipline can be maintained better by the stimulus of moderate rewards, judiciously given, than by the deterrence of the most severe punishment. In 1868, in English prisons, there were 61,000 ordinary punishments; in 1884, under the so-called 'humanitarian' methods, the numbers had fallen to 37,000—a figure which has been since steadily reduced. Convicts on whom the terrors of the lash or the dark cell produce no effect will stop their bad behaviour if they know that perseverance will deprive them of the magic-lantern lecture or cut off the right, recently conferred upon them, of spending a small portion of their earnings on margarine or confectionery. The old class of official still clings to the stereotyped prison in or near towns and within high walls, although he has to admit that reformatories for juvenile and Borstals for juvenile-adult criminals, not to speak of such startlingly successful experiments as George Montagu's Little Commonwealth in England, are conducted successfully in the country, without high walls, and with only a manageable number of attempts to escape.

Prison management is in the hands of the following officials:

(1) *Governor and matron.*—Prison rules are uniform all over the country; but the humanity and reasonableness of their execution depend on the head of the prison; the executive staff take their tone from him or her more than from the Prison Commissioners or from the chaplain or medical officer. No absolute rule can be laid down for the selection of governors and matrons. Admirable appointments have been made by promotion from the rank of warders; in other cases conspicuous success has been achieved by governors who have been in the army or in civil life, and by matrons who have had experience and acquired fitness in other employments, such as nursing. The modern governor and matron are as efficient in the routine part of their work, and they are more ready to make allowances for special weakness, mental and physical, and more anxious to secure the prisoners a fair chance for well-doing after their release. For the difficult duties of a governor or matron there are wanted a keen intelligence, shrewd judgment of character, a personal knowledge of the social conditions of the masses of the people, and a sympathetic heart.

(2) *Chaplain.*—In 1814 the legislature made the appointment of prison chaplains compulsory. Previously, and for some time after 1814, their chief work consisted in ministering to the prisoners under sentence of death and attending them to the scaffold. Till 1868 that spectacle continued to be a public disgrace, denounced by Dickens, but successfully upheld by Samuel Johnson.

'Tyburn itself,' Johnson said, 'is not safe from the fury of innovation. . . . The old method was most satisfactory to all parties. The public was gratified by a procession; and the criminal was supported by it. Why is it all to be swept away?' (quoted by du Cane, *Punishment and Prevention of Crime*, p. 22).

Nowadays the right kind of chaplain becomes the prisoners' friend, and keeps in touch with them after their release. Realizing acutely the share of responsibility of the community for their undoing and misdoing, he is at the same time fully alive to the prisoners' own share of blame. The present writer knows a convict settlement where nominally Protestant convicts have entered themselves as Roman Catholics in order to have the services of a particularly friendly priest. The chaplain, Protestant or Catholic, is not readily gullible, as the public believe. His disappointments do not arise from the prisoner's insincerity, but from his weakness of will, his want of friends, and the temptations which the State licenses or permits. Prison-effected reformation may be quite

genuine at the time; but it is generally too tender a plant to stand the storm of temptation. Chaplains used to be appointed for life; short terms, which may be renewed, undertaken by local clergymen, are now found to secure greater freshness. The chaplain has in many cases the supervision of the educational work of the prison and of the library, and he organizes prison lectures. More money is spent on education and the prison library than formerly. Education does not make men and women moral or religious, but it prevents them from becoming criminal. In prisons persons of good education are almost as unknown as total abstainers. The library is one of the few things in a prison which preserve a prisoner's individuality. In Mountjoy Prison in Dublin the writer was told that Dickens is the favourite author among the men, and Annie Swan among the women.

(3) *Medical officer.*—The prison doctor's most important duty used to be to certify, in cases of hanging, that life was extinct, and, in cases of flogging, to see that death did not ensue. Now his observations of the mental condition of a man charged with murder may determine whether the accused is fully responsible and can be held to account as a normal human being, or whether, as to a certain extent mentally defective, he may have his crime, if proved, treated as one of manslaughter or culpable homicide and not of murder, or whether he is in such a mental condition that he is incapable of instructing a defence and must be committed to a criminal lunatic asylum. Every prisoner is seen at short intervals by the doctor, inside or outside the prison hospital; the doctor, particularly under Scotch administration, has a free hand in the increase or decrease of the prisoner's diet and in regulating his work; moreover, he soon acquires marvellous skill in detecting malingerers. Prison doctors have opportunities of studying medico-legal questions of scientific and practical importance, including the proportion of prisoners who have been from birth, or whose habits have made them, mentally and morally defective—a question which has an obvious bearing on punitive as well as reformative treatment.

(4) *Warders, male and female.*—

'The officer who has charge of prisoners has such power, for good or evil, over his fellow-men, that I do not think there are many positions more responsible. Nor are there many in which the officer is exposed to more temptation to neglect his duty, or abuse his trust' (du Cane, quoted by W. Tallack, *Penological and Preventive Principles*[2], London, 1896, p. 278).

The warders' daily routine, spent in an atmosphere of repression and degradation, is not favourable to the development of human sympathy; but in the general case no complaint can be made of the fairness of their treatment of prisoners. Instances of favouritism are due rather to the good conduct of the prisoners favoured than to any improper preference. As in lunatic asylums, cruel treatment by prison officers, which cannot be entirely prevented even under the best system of selection and supervision, is associated almost invariably with grievous provocation. Attempts in prison to commit suicide, which are seldom successful, are the fault of the system, not of those who administer it.

(5) *Prison visitors.*—It was not till the Act of 1899 that lady visitors were ordered for all local prisons where there are female prisoners. Religious and philanthropic visitors, who ought in all cases to have a special knowledge of the conditions of the classes from which prisoners come, are now welcomed to local prisons, under suitable regulations.

The English Prison Commissioners' report for 1915 'heartily endorses the praise bestowed on ministers of religion, lady visitors, [illegible] workers, secular and religious, who work day by day with patience and undiminished hope, for the rescue and reinstatement of the criminal of both sexes, and of all ages. . . . It is to this organized effort of charity and goodwill, which has been specially directed with increasing force during recent years to the visitation and after care of prisoners, that the yearly improvement of our criminal records, especially with regard to the young offender, is due' (p. 21).

Devon writes:

'The visits to prisoners on the part of people from outside are of great benefit; anything is that helps to break the monotony of the day, and give opportunity for conversation. They must have preserved many from desperation, and even insanity. They do something to keep up self-respect and to show the prisoner that he is not considered an outcast, impossible of redemption' (p. 237). As to prison lectures, 'anything that prevents prisoners from sinking into apathy, from brooding on the petty incidents that go to make up their lives in prison, from beating against the bars of their cage, is beneficial' (p. 241).

(6) *Prison work.*—The provision of work in prisons, which is a cardinal principle in the Prisons Act of 1898, is attended with great difficulties, if it is to be (1) sufficiently interesting to preserve the prisoner's humanity, (2) educative, (3) remunerative, or at least not productive of loss, (4) not competitive with philanthropic institutions, like blind asylums, and (5) not hostile to trade union rules and the legitimate interests of free labour. In connexion with the present European War, the writer has noticed with what increased industry, and even enthusiasm, work of a patriotic kind has been done by prisoners, toiling extra hours without remuneration other than the much-esteemed privilege of having the war news of the day read to them.

In connexion with prisoners working in association, the question of classification presents great difficulties. An effort is made to keep so-called 'first offenders' separate from so-called 'hardened criminals.' But in many cases the 'first offender's' act of fraud, or assault, is not his first offence, but only the first case which has been reported to the police or in which there was evidence to convict; and there are so-called 'hardened criminals,' more sinned against than sinning, whose moral nature is by no means totally depraved. It is a widespread and pernicious delusion that an assault implies normal quarrelsomeness or brutality, and that an indecent attack implies normally ungovernable lust; in both cases, apart from any question of provocation, the disgraceful conduct which has converted a respectable citizen into a felon may be the direct result of drink taken to such an extent (which may be far short of 'drunkenness') as to destroy self-respect and respect for the rights of others.

The difficult question of the universal enforcement of silence among ordinary prisoners in our local prisons and convict settlements remains for consideration. The difficulty consists in reconciling in practice the two principles, 'It is not good for man to be alone,' and 'Evil communications corrupt good manners.' In this important respect our prisons and convict settlements are more dehumanizing than transportation and the hulks in old days or than modern Siberian and Turkish prisons. But, then, it is said that suppression and not supervision is necessary, because conversation, however carefully regulated, is unavoidably subversive of discipline, and prisoners would abuse the privilege, if not for the concoction of plans of escape, at all events for corrupting communications about past and future villainies expressed in blasphemous and obscene language. The difficulties are admitted, but the rule might be relaxed in the case of well-conducted prisoners, furnished with the ordinary material for carrying on decent conversation, by access to newspapers as well as books after the day's work is over, as is done with good results at Borstals, among female convicts in England, and among male convicts undergoing preventive detention. The hardships as well as the pernicious effects of the present system are

so much felt that the writer knows at least one governor who, when dealing with prisoners' marks, does not count those bad marks which have been caused by a prisoner passing a harmless observation to his neighbour.

It is right to add, in regard to prison management generally, that no prison administrators, unless the most old-fashioned, are satisfied with the present system and its results. Therein lies the hope of the future.

(7) *Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies.* — If efforts to reform are to be of permanent avail, the prisoner must, before release, be gradually prepared for approaching freedom, and must also, on leaving the prison, have work found for him and be otherwise befriended. More might be done in both directions, even under the present system. It is not enough to allow the prisoners to grow their hair of a normal length for a few weeks before their release. Additional relaxations would not be abused, because abuse would mean forfeiture of gratuity and of the period of remission. Opportunity is needed to overcome the shyness and nervousness and the reluctance to face the world which prolonged seclusion produces.

An Act of 1792, enlarged by the Gaol Act of 1823, made provision for discharged prisoners out of public funds. In 1802 the first Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society, 'The Hampshire Society,' was founded. Others followed; but it was not till 1862 that these societies obtained statutory recognition. Since 1887 every prison of any size has had a Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society working in connexion with it. In 1898 the Prison Commissioners issued schemes for the guidance of these societies, containing provisions as to grants in aid to their funds; and when, in 1899, lady visitors were appointed to all local prisons containing female prisoners, this was stated to be with the special object of aiding in the reformation of the prisoners and finding employment for them. In 1900, 39,413 discharged prisoners passed through the hands of 62 Aid Societies, of whom 2000 were found unworthy and 1100 refused assistance. These societies are doing admirable work despite inadequate funds and an insufficient number of voluntary helpers.

(*c*) *Prisoners with special privileges.*—The modern prison contains two classes of inmates who should not be confined in the same building as those convicted of actual crime, namely (1) untried prisoners, who are entitled to furnish their own rooms, wear their own clothes, provide their own food, carry on correspondence with persons outside, and receive visits from their friends, and (2) debtors (now, happily, under modern legislation, few in number), who have somewhat similar privileges. In the case of convicted prisoners in good health there is little respect of persons, in either accommodation, food, dress, or work. It was not so in former days. Just as, in mediæval warfare, all officers were, if possible, captured alive, that they might be made a source of profit to the captors, so imprisonment was then used as a means of obtaining what would now be called blackmail but was then known as ransom. In old days the wind was tempered in many ways to the *woolly* lamb, clerical and secular. The so-called 'benefit of clergy' was greatly abused; but, on the whole, like the right of sanctuary, it acted beneficially for the community, for it preserved the only cultured class from the brutal treatment to which secular persons were exposed. But for the benefit of clergy and the right of sanctuary, both history and literature would be poorer. The mediæval Church rivalled the State's brutal treatment of all prisoners, lay or clerical, charged with heresy; but its treatment of non-heretical prisoners was, on the whole, much more humane. Sometimes it was more than humane, if we can judge from Archbishop Bliss's *Constitutions* (dated in 1357):

> 'They are so deliciously fed in prison that the prison, intended for a punishment for their crimes, is turned into a refreshment and delicious solace, and they are pampered in their vices by ease and such inducements.'

(*d*) *Prisoners in modern prisons who were absent from old prisons.*—These are long-sentence prisoners. Long sentences were originally the outcome of the false theological view of sin already referred to. But it does not follow that prolonged imprisonments must cease. Under totally different conditions, they will continue in the case of the reformable, until the offender has shown that he may be released with safety to the interests of his fellow-citizens. In the case of those who have been proved, by repeated and prolonged trials, to be unreformable imprisonment for life will be substituted for the present absurd system, under which a prisoner, who has shown after a short period that he may safely be released, has to be maintained in prison, and his family in the poorhouse, at the public expense to the end of a fixed sentence; and a prisoner is released at the end of a fixed sentence, even although he openly boasts that he means, on liberation, to resume his Ishmaelitish trade, his hand against every man.

(*e*) *Prisoners in old prisons who are not to be found in modern prisons.*—(1) Children convicted or untried. For centuries prisons were nurseries of crime. Children, some of them born and brought up in prison, were sent, for trifling offences, to the gallows, to Botany Bay, or to prison. In prison they became accustomed to the prison atmosphere and indifferent to it, and they left it 'gaol-birds,' with the prison-brand on them figuratively, and in some cases literally. The establishment of industrial schools for children under 14 in danger of falling into crime, and of reformatories for children under 16 who had been convicted of crime, and the marked success of these establishments had gradually reduced the number of children in our prisons. But, as already pointed out, it was not till the passing of the Children Act in 1908 that it was declared illegal to send any boy or girl under 14 in any circumstances to prison; and it was provided by the same statute that no sentence of imprisonment, except in a very limited class of cases, could be imposed on any offender under 16.

(2) Debtors. Literature has made great use of the abuses connected in old days with debtors' prisons, especially in England. The whole iniquitous system was terminated by the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt Act, 1880. The number now imprisoned for debt is negligible. They consist, in England, of debtors who are able to pay, but will not, and, in Scotland, of debtors for Crown taxes and for aliment, these cases forming exceptions in the English and Scottish statutes abolishing imprisonment for debt in the two countries.

(3) Prisoners waiting for trial. In England it used to happen that the king's judges would not visit the place of trial for several years, during which prisoners languished in prisons, usually of the most insanitary kind, and their families, being deprived of their bread-winners, starved. Now, if a prisoner is not tried within a short time after apprehension, he is entitled to release.

(4) Prisoners acquitted of the offences for which they had been apprehended, but unable to pay the gaoler's fees, which were always extortionate, and often illegal. Now all gaolers' fees are abolished, and instant and unconditional liberation follows a verdict of acquittal.

(*f*) *Security of modern as distinguished from old prisons.*—In former times the facility of escape

from prison helped to explain some of the practices mistakenly quoted in evidence of our ancestors' brutality. Nowadays the safety of the community can be attained without taking away the criminal's life or mutilating him by blinding or by cutting off a limb, and, at the same time, punishment can be inflicted by imprisonment in place of the old sentences of flogging, the pillory, the stocks, or branding—either on the hand or on the face, as the statute of William III., passed in 1699, ordered. It was attempted to attain security by confinement in subterranean chambers, like the pits of Jeremiah and Joseph, and Daniel's den, or by thick walls, small and heavily-stanchioned windows, high above the ground, ponderous doors, and weighted fetters. It is now achieved by properly constructed buildings, constant personal supervision, and reliable warders. Our ancestors should not be blamed for practices which were forced upon them by necessity.

(*g*) *Hygienic conditions.*—Until the 19th cent. these were bad, beyond our power to realize. The inmates were starved, housed in a manner inconsistent with health and with decency, and they were in the absolute power, constantly abused, of keepers of brutal habits. In Henry Brinklow's *Complaynt of Roderyck Mors*, written about 1542, the monastic author says:

'I see also a pytyful abuse for presoners. Oh Lord God, their lodging is too bad for hoggys, and as for their meate, it is evyl inough for doggys, and yet, the Lord knoweth, they have not inough thereof!' (ed. J. M. Cowper, Early English Text Society, London, 1874, p. 27).

In the third edition of his great book, published in 1784, John Howard says:

'Many, who went in healthy, are in a few months changed to emaciated dejected objects. Some are seen pining under diseases, "sick, and in prison," expiring on the floors, in loathsome cells, of pestilential fevers and the confluent smallpox' (p. 4).

Gaol fever was one of the commonest as well as most deadly maladies.

Lord Bacon (quoted by du Cane, p. 43) spoke of 'the smell of the gaol the most pernicious infection next to the plague. When prisoners have been long and close and nastily kept, whereof we have had in our times experience twice or thrice, both judges that sat upon the trial, and numbers of them that attended the business, or were present, sickened upon it or died.'

Nowadays gaols are models of sanitation; prisoners are well fed; the death-rate is below that of the outside population; and the old moral evils, arising from the absence of separation between the sexes, are unknown. The outward reforms for which John Howard and Elizabeth Fry and their coadjutors worked have been thoroughly accomplished, and the crying abuses, physical and moral, which they denounced have been removed. Great attention has been paid to the cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter. But whether the proportion of prisoners who leave our prisons more inclined and better fitted to lead law-abiding lives than when they entered is greater or smaller than under the brutal systems of the past is by no means so clear. Dickens exaggerated the disastrous effects of the separate cell, and, since his day, it has been ameliorated by good libraries, the friendly visits of the chaplains and prison visitors, and in other ways, but it still remains true that in their dehumanizing effect modern prisons, with all their vast cost, their perfect discipline, and the good intentions and endeavours of the Prison Commissioners and the officials who manage them, are little better than whited sepulchres.

(*h*) *Reformatory methods.*—The modern definition of punishment by imprisonment is founded on the idea (1) of discipline so severe as to act as a deterrent, and (2) of such reformatory influences as religious and moral teaching, and good example and training in self-control, promoted by offering advantages to industry and good conduct, as well as punishment for the reverse. However inadequate this conception may be, it is at least a great advance on old ideas and methods. At first employed only for detention, imprisonment became one of many methods of punishment, and, ultimately, the only method of punishment, except hanging, flogging, and fining. What is said by F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland applies to the usages of all European countries:

'Imprisonment occurs in the Anglo-Saxon laws only as a means of temporary security. . . . Imprisonment would have been regarded in these old times as a useless punishment; it does not satisfy revenge, it keeps the criminal idle, and, do what we may, it is costly' (*Hist. of English Law before Edward I.*, Cambridge, 1898, i. 49).

H. de Bracton, who wrote in 1268, expressly states that prisons were to confine and not to punish:

'Carcer ad continendos et non ad puniendos haberi debet' (*de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ*, London, 1569, fol. 105).

Persons were often kept in prisons for lengthened periods and even for life, not as a punishment, but as a means of avoiding the prisoner's right to trial or in order to compel payment of fines or ransom, or to elicit testimony.

It must not be supposed that the idea of deterrence, which, along with expiation, is at the root of our modern system, was unknown in former times. Indeed, the principle of deterrence must have a place, large or small, in every criminal system and in all schemes of prison management. But its importance is usually exaggerated. Tested by the criminal records of all ages and in all countries, even the most savage punishments are conclusively proved inadequate either to stop the supply of offenders or to turn criminals into law-abiding citizens. On crimes of passion deterrence has not time to operate; in cases of deliberate crime the fear of detection and punishment only makes the criminal more wary. The question in the end must be, Are the results worth the expenditure, as our prisons, even the best of them, are at present carried on, that is to say, under a system so identified with exploded theories of punishment that the reformative elements which have been engrafted on to it do not have a fair chance of success? No doubt, persons who would be dangerous to the State if at large are withdrawn for periods more or less extended. On the other hand, thousands are housed, fed, clothed, and doctored by the State who, if at large, would be supporting themselves and their families, and adding by their work to the productiveness and wealth of the State. Some are benefited by good influences under which they come in prison, but, for one of these, there are scores who are brutalized by prison life and who come out worse than they went in. There are cases where, in their results, notwithstanding the best endeavours of their managers, our prisons may come under the condemnation pronounced by Mirabeau on the Old Bicêtre, which he called 'a prison to propagate crime and a hospital to propagate disease.'

It may be said that these are grave statements to be made by an administrator of the present system; but they are in accord with a growing section of expert opinion.

'It must be at once admitted,' writes A. G. F. Griffiths, H.M. Inspector of Prisons, 'that the system of isolation has produced no remarkable results. Solitary confinement has neither conquered nor appreciably diminished crime. . . . Cloistered seclusion is an artificial condition quite at variance with human instincts and habits, and the treatment, long continued, has proved injurious to health, inducing mental breakdown. A slow death may be defended indeed on moral grounds if regeneration has been compassed, but it is only another form of capital punishment' (*EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Prison,' xxii. 363).

In 1895 a Departmental Committee reported:

'The great, and, as we consider, the proved danger of this highly centralized system has been, and is, that, while much attention has been given to organization, finance, order, health of the prisoners, and prison statistics, the prisoners have been

treated too much as a hopeless, or worthless, element of the community, and the moral, as well as the legal, responsibility of the prison authorities has been held to cease, when they passed outside the prison gates. The satisfactory sanitary conditions, the unbroken orderliness of prison life, economy, and high organization are held and justly held to prove good administration. But the moral condition, in which a large number of prisoners leave the prison, and the serious number of recommittals have led us to think that there is ample cause for a searching enquiry into the main features of prison life' (p. 7).

II. *THE PRISON OF THE FUTURE.*—The word 'prison' is used in this title. But in the criminal institutions of the future many of the features associated with the word will be eliminated. In the Children Act of 1908 'places of detention' (not 'prisons') are, by sections 102, 106, and 108, to be provided for certain classes of juvenile offenders. The criminal institutions of the future will be places of detention and reformation for the reformable, and places of detention for the unreformable. But this can be done only by the reconstruction, generally on new sites, of existing prisons, which were built to carry out erroneous ideas by methods now discredited. Instead of being situated in the country, with ample ground inside the bounds for the erection of workshops as occasion may demand, and ample ground outside for farm work and for exercise, existing prisons are generally situated in or near towns; the ground, originally insufficient, has been gradually encroached upon for the erection of workshops and other buildings to meet in some small measure the demands of prison reformers; and the only exercise possible is in Indian file, round and round a circle marked by stones on the ground—a ghastly travesty, euphemistically referred to in an English prison report as 'the prisoners enjoying exercise in the open air.'

It is true that there are important respects in which the prison of the future cannot hope to excel the prison of to-day. The large areas of ground that will be required and the ampler buildings will make the initial expense greater than the continuance of the present system; but thereafter, when the reformative methods get a fair chance to tell, the expense will rapidly lessen, until the premises are used only to detain those who, after repeated trials, have proved themselves hopelessly unable to be at large with safety to the community. The future prison will be less rather than more secure against escape, although the motives prompting escape will be materially lessened. No ingenious devices will be employed to prevent the inmates catching even a passing glimpse of earth and sky and sea; but in cleanliness, heating, and ventilation its buildings cannot improve on those at present in use. The prisoners of the future will not work for the benefit of the State, but for those whom they have defrauded and for the support of their own wives and children. There will be greater variety in food, but there can be no possible advance on the quality of the excellent, but unvarying, diet which at present prevails. The prisoners' clothes may be rougher than the present uniform, but they will not be such as to prevent any man with a shadow of self-respect from allowing his wife and children to visit him. The discipline may be less mechanically perfect, but it will not prevent such conversation as is necessary to keep the inmates human, nor will it be thought essential, in every ordinary interview between husband and wife, to interpose two sets of iron bars between the visitor and the visited, with a warder sitting in the intervening space. The discipline will not be lax, but it will allow some opportunity for the exercise of volition and initiative, the complete stifling of which under the present system renders prisoners on release unfit to stand alone and fight their own battles. Generally speaking, discipline will be maintained by just treatment and human kindness. 'Even a donkey will go farther after a carrot than when driven by a stick.'

The essential difference between the present prison and the prison of the future may be thus stated: in the prison of to-day the system is not wholly directed to detention and punishment, as it was immediately before Howard's time, yet it is primarily punitive and hardening, and only secondarily and remotely reformative, whereas, in the prison of the future, the whole effort will be directed to secure that, when the offender is released (if he ever is released), he shall be at least so far reformed as to make it safe that he should return, under friendly supervision and help, to be a free member of the community. Whatever be the precise system, it must be based on the comparatively modern discovery that a healthy open-air life, interesting and educative work, and wholesome moral and religious influences are the chief panaceas for human maladies—physical, mental, and moral. A Dutch proverb was a favourite of John Howard, 'Make men diligent, and you will make them honest.' Griffiths' well-known epigram is subject to the qualifications to which all epigrams and generalizations are exposed; yet there is some foundation for his statement that half the inmates of our prisons should never be let out and the other half should never have been let in.

There are certain classes of persons at present forming part of our prison population who will not be found in the prisons of the future, but in separate establishments:

(*a*) Persons accused of crime who have been either refused, or who have been unable to find, bail.

(*b*) Persons for whose offences fines are deemed sufficient, and who are, under the present system, sent to prison in default of payment. By recent legislation time is now given for payment of fines, and part payment of fines can be made, thereby reducing *pro tanto* the period of imprisonment. The result has been to lessen greatly the number of prisoners of this class. Such prisoners, whose offences, generally speaking, are not crimes, but only breaches of social discipline, are really detained for non-payment of debt; and, so far as it is necessary to deprive them of liberty, they ought not to be kept in an ordinary prison, but in an institution in which they could earn, by their work, the balance of the fine imposed upon them, without being branded for life as criminals.

(*c*) Mental defectives. These are now sent to prison because judges have to deal with all criminals, except lunatics and imbeciles, on the false basis (1) that they are normal, physically, mentally, and morally; (2) that they have had, and have made, a deliberate choice between good and evil; and (3) that they were in a normal condition when the act was done, the fact generally being that they were more or less under the influence of drink, which, like other drugs, can, during the time of its operation, completely transform the most law-abiding disposition. These persons are unable, with the facilities and temptations authorized for them by the State at their doors, and with their wretched surroundings, to refrain from drink, and they are unfit to earn an honest livelihood. The report of the Departmental Committee of 1895 says:

'Weak-minded persons spend their lives in circulating between the prison, the asylum and the workhouse' (p. 34).

When there is risk of injury to themselves or others, they ought to be confined in asylums; when there is neither homicidal nor suicidal tendency, their proper place is in farm colonies,

where, while prevented from committing crime and from perpetuating their degenerate stock, they will be saved the needlessly rigorous treatment to which they are at present subjected. Much in our present system contravenes the maxim that 'all unnecessary pain is cruelty.'

(*d*) Those whose cases can be met by placing them on probation under the supervision of probation officers, in accordance with the Probation of Offenders Act, 1907. This is known as 'conditional liberty, on probation,' first introduced in Massachusetts, as distinguished from the 'conditional liberation' accorded to prisoners after serving part of their sentences, but without any adequate provision for looking after them. Although the system has as yet been worked only imperfectly, it has already saved this country large sums of money, which would have been spent in maintaining offenders in prison and their families in poorhouses, and the country has had the benefit of the offenders' continued labour. The probation system is capable of great developments; and sooner or later the State will find it economical to employ, and adequately remunerate, probation officers. If people can be got to take charge of lunatics, it should be possible, for adequate remuneration, to provide for the guardianship, outside of prisons, of criminals who are sane. In England, among those who are known as juvenile-adults—those between 16 and 21—the commitments fell from 12,178 in 1900 to 3663 in 1915. Before long all committals to prison of persons under 21, when the offence is trivial and the antecedents of the offender are good, will be avoided by the extension of the system of supervision.

(*e*) Those who receive short sentences. The Borstal Committee for Wakefield Prison, reporting in 1915, state:

'There is not a single redeeming feature in a short sentence. It carries with it all the social stigma and industrial penalties of imprisonment, with no commensurate gain to the offender, or to the community. If there still survives in the minds of administrators of justice the obsolete and exploded theory that prison is essentially a place for punishment—and for punishment alone—for the expiation of offences in dehumanizing, senseless tasks, and arbitrary discipline, truly there could be devised no more diabolical form of punishment than the short sentence oft repeated' (*English Prison Commissioners' Report for 1915*, p. 18).

Yet, in spite of such views, which represent the opinion of all criminologists, there were in England, in 1914, 1106 sentences of one day.

Whatever improvements may be effected in the future in the system and methods employed to deal with crime in prison and to reform the criminal during detention there, to the extent at least of making him on his release a safe member of society, it must never be forgotten that these are merely palliatives to reduce the effects of a disease. It is an undoubted fact that the present system and the present methods have failed, and are failing, to rid the country of crime. If it is also true that no effective system of reformation is compatible with the conditions necessarily involved in imprisonment—because effectual reformation, to be permanent, requires retention of individuality, and retention of individuality involves innocent and wholesome social intercourse, which is practically impossible in prisons—then the claim for preventive, in preference to curative, measures becomes all the more manifest and urgent.

There is much to be said for that view, and, if it is sound, the main effort of the statesman and the philanthropist must evidently be to go to the fountain head and to cut off the supply.

'Adopt, so far as possible, other means than imprisonment for the repression of crime . . . The best economy of preventive and repressive effort must be that which reduces incarceration to the lowest extent compatible with public security, and which seeks its objects through influences to be applied outside the gates of prison, rather than within them. . . . Even the best prisons are in a certain sense evils. One of the chief aims of a wise Penology is to devise means for advantageously and safely dispensing with them' (Tallack[2], p. 299).

Every movement calculated to improve the social well-being of the people is a step to empty prisons and convict settlements and to reduce and extinguish crime. So far as trivial offences go, it is better not to punish at all than to send to prison. If prisons are to be emptied and crime is to be prevented, it must be done by the State securing (1) that no citizen shall, without fault or physical or mental feebleness on his part, be unable to earn a continuous living wage for himself and his family; (2) that every citizen shall be able to obtain such housing and surroundings as shall make it possible for him and his family to live decent law-abiding lives; (3) that every child capable of education shall receive an efficient physical, mental, and moral training; and (4) that, whether or not, in the interests of personal, social, and national efficiency, the sale of alcohol, like the sale of opium, should be prohibited except for medicinal use, the existing temptations to use alcohol either in moderation or in excess—such temptations being often found at the maximum where the power of resistance is at the minimum—shall be ended.

An eminent criminologist has said:

'The immense majority of cases that pass through our Courts arise out of sheer need, or wretched education and surroundings, and would disappear with the establishment of decent social conditions' (Edward Carpenter, *Prisons, Police, and Punishment*, London, 1905, p. 5).

Judges have often declared, as the result of long and varied experience in dealing with criminal cases coming from all parts of the United Kingdom, urban and rural, that but for the use of alcohol (although not necessarily to excess in the ordinary sense of the word) certain classes of crime would cease to exist, and all classes of crime would be greatly reduced.

If the State does its duty in these essential particulars, the Christian Church will not be slow to avail itself of the opportunity, which it has never yet had, of bringing to bear the power of the gospel of Christ, without the hindrances and pitfalls which at present, to so large an extent, render nugatory the best efforts of religion and philanthropy. The present generation will not see it; but the day will come when no member of any civilized community will be able to say to any judge what a criminal, young in years but old in crime, once truthfully said, before sentence, to the writer of this article, 'My lord, I never had a chance!'

LITERATURE.—See the works cited throughout the article.

CHARLES J. GUTHRIE.

PRIVATE JUDGMENT.—'Justification by faith' and 'the right of private judgment' are the two watchwords of the Reformation. Neither, of course, was new, but each expressed an old truth in a new way. And what gave them their power to open a new chapter in man's history came through the personality of Luther, from whose fiery soul faith burst forth as the destroyer of hierarchical religion. Paul and Augustine had felt before him the same urgency towards the assertion of the ultimate autonomy of the individual, but it remained for Luther to reap where they had sown. Pfleiderer[1] has expressed the relationship of the three in the remark that Augustine was a Romanized and Luther a Teutonized Paul. But Paul, in his turn, was a Christian individualist partly Judaized and partly Hellenized.

The two tyrannies which pressed on the religious man of the 16th cent. were those of the practical system of religion controlled by the hierarchy and of the scholasticism (*q.v.*) which had

[1] *Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 229.

been adapted from Aristotle to serve the theoretical ends of the Church's dogmatic system. The weight of these became more and more intolerable when the civil power allied itself with the hierarchy against all who claimed liberty to judge for themselves in matters of religion. It is true that in no century were there wanting men and groups of men who to some extent sought to think and speak with freedom. The names of Abelard (*q.v.*), Wyclif (*q.v.*), Roger Bacon, John of Goch, John of Wesel, John Hus (see HUSSITES), Jerome of Prague, and the Brethren of the Common Life (*q.v.*) will at once come to mind. Moreover, the protagonists of another movement, mysticism (*q.v.*), contributed perhaps even more than all others to the formation of a deep subconscious belief in the inherent right of the individual to formulate his religion for himself. Of the predecessors of the Reformation men like Hus and Savonarola assailed current ecclesiastical practice; John of Goch, Gerson, and John of Wesel devoted themselves to theological thought, while mystics such as Ruysbroek, Eckhart, Tauler, and Suso aimed directly at transcending in individual experience all the externals of religion, while treating these as convenient expressions of the independent life that they lived immediately with God.

In Martin Luther (*q.v.*) these three streams ran into one. A student of St. Paul and Augustine, he early became aware of the cleft between their doctrine and the scholasticism which had trained him. As an Augustinian he knew and practised the austerities associated with the monastic life; in Rome he performed all the exercises appropriate to pious pilgrims; Tetzel with his indulgences set the match to his latent zeal for reform. And Tauler and the *Theologia Germanica* taught him what spiritual power mysticism could exercise. The result of the three influences thus brought to bear on him was the assertion of the Christian principle of 'justification by faith'—a phrase which was but a theological variant of the philosophic principle of 'the right of private judgment' (see *ERE* vii. 619).

It is not in the realm of physics alone that the law of the equality of action and reaction holds good. In the forces which constitute history it also asserts itself. A powerful hierarchy and an authoritative dogmatic system had set themselves in the Middle Ages to crush all spontaneity of individual thought and practice which might seem dangerous to the ecclesiastical system. Luther thereupon did but give expression through his forceful personality to the inevitable reaction for which the minds of all in different degrees were ready. And in doing this he builded more wisely than he knew. The three factors which had gone to make him what he was again separated when his work was done. One gave the principle that lies explicitly or implicitly at the heart of all the Churches of the West which are out of communion with the pope, and is the source of the idea of the democratic State. The second has been the fruitful mother of all later science and philosophy, and has profoundly influenced theology. The third reappears in the lives and writings of all subsequent Christian mystics. But it is one and the same principle that appears in all three—'the right of private judgment.' A few words will suffice to set out the filiation.

1. Social polity.—The chief difference in the conceptions of the basis of all social order which ruled before and after Luther is that in the former the individual was the passive recipient of rights at the hand of the authority which ruled him *jure divino* in Church and State alike, while in the latter he is their active creator. Nor is the distinction more than obscured by the fact that to establish his rights he must co-operate with his fellows, for such co-operation is only a means to an end, and that end is the establishment of the principle that through the right of private judgment alone man attains his proper good. In all Protestant Churches and in all liberal States this principle has now 'stormed out into reality.' It is true that it did not triumph all at once; that Luther himself did not always give it its dominant position; that the substitution of the authority of the Bible as the written Word of God has for three centuries been every whit as tyrannical in its application as the older Inquisition (*q.v.*); that autocratic empires are but now being got rid of at the hands of democratic peoples; that the ideal of a free Church in a free State is not fully actualized; and that democracy is yet on its trial. But in spite of these short-comings the principle has so far triumphed that a return to the mediæval ideal is to the modern mind unthinkable, and survives only in relatively obscure coteries which are of the nature of atavistic survivals in bodies under the otherwise undisputed sway of the principle of the right of private judgment. 'A people's bible, then, a reading people, a preaching ministry'—these are characteristic of the modern Church.[1] 'One man, one vote,' and 'manhood suffrage' form their civic equivalent. Robert Browne's *Treatise of Reformation without tarying for anie* (Middelburg, 1582) is an early land-mark of the principle in English religion (see BROWNISM). The hanging of two men at Bury St. Edmunds in 1583 for circulating it was the counter-blow of the civil government, which had assumed the opposite principle of the papal court. The doctrine of the 'Manchester school'—the theory of *laissez faire, laissez passer*, in economics and politics which from 1845 to 1875 dominated political thought—shows the extent to which the principle of private judgment has swayed the minds of men.

2. Modern thought.—Though the free thought of to-day was prepared for by events prior to Luther, such as the invention of the printing-press, the rediscovery of Greek, and the opening up of the New World, yet to Luther still falls the credit of bringing to its support the forces of religion. The survival of mediæval dogmatism in the churches of the New Learning only serves to show how much harder would have been the progress of thought towards freedom had not Protestant Churches appeared to counteract the Catholic reaction known as Jesuitry. Milton states the case fairly when he says that it is a general maxim of the Protestant religion that 'no man, no synod, no session of men, though called the church, can judge definitively the sense of scripture to another man's conscience.'[2] Hence, where the right of private judgment is explicitly maintained, heresy is impossible, and a trial for so-called heresy is at bottom merely an action for breach of contract. In the room of the inquisitor now sits the schoolmaster.

Erasmus, in his controversy with Luther on the question of free will, asserted caustically that 'where Lutheranism flourishes the sciences perish.'[3] This could hardly be maintained to-day, especially of Luther's fatherland. Rather should we have to say that where Luther's principle of private judgment obtains there is the door opened for the full life of science and philosophy. Not that thought was inactive through the earlier period. The great Schoolmen were no mean thinkers, but they thought in blinkers. The end of their journey was prescribed at the start, and hence free thought was denied them. And thought

[1] T. H. Green, *Works*[5], iii. 285.
[2] *Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes*, p. 13.
[3] *Diatribe*, p. 4.

which is not free runs the risk at least of not being thought at all. It may under the guise of thought deliver us over to the 'double truth'—that of philosophy and that of theology—or rest in a delimitation of boundaries which is made by the assertion that dogma is not contrary to reason, but above reason. But the principle of the right of private judgment cannot stop short of the demand that 'faith and reason,' 'religion and science,' shall resolve their antinomies at the bar of reason and extend the right of reason to autonomous judgment over the whole domain of faith.

How far we have travelled along the road of private judgment, and with what difficulty, may be conveniently seen by comparing a declaration of 1633 with another of 1900. The Congregation of Prelates and Cardinals ruled in the case of Galilei that 'the doctrine that the earth is not the centre of the universe, and is not immobile, but is moved with a motion that is daily, is not only an absurd proposition but false in philosophy, and theologically considered at least erroneous in faith.'[1] On the other hand, Karl Pearson makes the assertion (*Grammar of Science*[3], London, 1900, p. 366), while deprecating its one-sidedness and exaggeration, that 'the chief motor of modern life with all its really great achievements has been sought—and perhaps not unreasonably sought—in the individualistic instinct.' And, though this instinct may need to be balanced by those of socialism and humanism, yet each of these, even while striving to promote individual or national co-operation in the place of competition, does so avowedly in the interest of the highest good of the individual, of all individuals.

It must not be assumed, however, that the right of private judgment, when asserted, triumphed at once or even in a short time. At first the civil power stepped into the place of the papal, and adopted its spirit. 'Where the individual appealed to the powerful (individual) spirit within him, Luther would have none of it. Further, in politics nothing was heard of save the good of the State, or the general weal.'[2] The National Church sought to clothe itself with the autocracy of the rejected Roman Church; little respect was paid at first to the rights of individual persons or individual communities. This transition spirit persisted in philosophy until Descartes (*q.v.*), by rejecting all authority and starting *de novo* from the thinking Ego as the basis of all philosophy, became the founder of all philosophy that is entitled to call itself modern. While philosophies are in conflict from generation to generation, they are agreed on one point, and that is, that the appeal of all philosophy is in the end to reason speaking through the individual thinker. In philosophy the right of private judgment is irrefragable. The most striking proof of this is given indirectly by the long sway of the political theories of Bentham and by his maxim that the end of government is to ensure the greatest good of the greatest number. Society exists to perfect the individual, and, if the individual is called on from time to time to sacrifice himself to society, it is only that he may find his life enriched by losing it.

3. **Mysticism.**—This third element has not enjoyed in modern times the same popular vogue as empiricism or rationalism, and indeed it may be questioned whether it ought not to be regarded as the inspirer of thought rather than as an independent and co-ordinate factor. In philosophy indeed it has its definite exponents in More and Cudworth. In religion it underlay Quakerism and the Wesleyan and Evangelical movements. It emerges in literature in poets such as Wordsworth and Shelley, and in writers such as Novalis, Amiel, Emerson, Walt Whitman, and Coventry Patmore. It inspires the pre-Raphaelites, and art-symbolists of every sort, and Henri Bergson and the pragmatist schools of thought. It is paramount in thinkers like Schlegel (alike in his 'ironic' stage and in his later, where he treats the individual as insufficient to himself, but progressing towards divinity), in Schelling (especially in his 'fourth period'), in the 'Scottish school,' which identified philosophy with the observation of the facts of consciousness, in Rousseau, in the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments* of Reimarus, in Jacobi, and in Jacob Boehme.

Finally, it should be observed that private judgment is properly or directly concerned not with matter of fact but with values. The discussion of matter of fact belongs to science, where private judgment has no legitimate place, but the values of things, whether partial or ultimate, are values for the individual. Interest in them is personal, and hence private judgment must in them assert itself. A good, to be a good to me, must be a good *for* me. But this is not to say that my private judgment is self-originated or self-sufficient. The social whole and the activities of nature play a large part in supplying the content of that self-consciousness of which private judgment is an inevitable expression. The perfect correlation, however, of the individual and the society remains one of the gravest problems which man has yet to solve.

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W. F. COBB.

PROBABILIORISM. — Probabiliorism is a form of probabilism (*q.v.*). The principle may be stated thus: the *opinio minus tuta quæ libertati favet* may be followed to the detriment of the *opinio tuta quæ legi favet* when the former is more probable than the latter although it is not quite certain, *i.e.* when the reasons and the scholars militating in its favour have more weight than those militating in favour of the *opinio tuta*. There have always been probabiliorist casuists, but probabiliorism was peculiarly in favour during the first half of the 19th century. Among its defenders may be mentioned Thiels and Billuart. Thiels wrote a treatise in which he refutes the so-called reflex arguments upon which mainly the partisans of simple probabilism rest, viz. (1) 'lex dubia non obligat,' (2) 'lex dubia invincibiliter ignoratur,' (3) 'melior est conditio possidentis.' Billuart, after severely condemning simple probabilism and equiprobabilism (*q.v.*), declared himself in favour of probabiliorism with the help of arguments drawn from reason and from Pope Alexander VIII.'s condemnation of the following proposition: 'non licet sequi opinionem probabilissimam.' If we can follow the *opinio probabilissima*, which always implies a minimum of doubt, it follows, according to him, that we can also follow the simply *probabilior opinio* without the doubt which it leaves in existence sufficing to render it suspect. He demands, however, that the reasons for probabiliority should be very genuine. The resolutions of the assembly of the French clergy in 1900 also seem to him favourable to

[1] See Karl von Gebler, *Galileo Galilei und die romische Curie*, Stuttgart, 1876, p. 248.

[2] Erdmann, *Hist. of Philosophy*, ii. § 204, p. 6.

probabiliorism. In the matter of the sacraments he leans towards tutiorism. During the second half of the 19th cent. probabiliorism was gradually forsaken. Gousset is inclined towards it, although he does not debar probabilism.

We cannot include in the number of probabiliorists the theologians who demand probabiliority only in certain cases—*e.g.*, when the doubtful law is a natural law, or a very important one—or those who, like Gury, demand it only 'ubi de solo honesto agitus,' *i.e.* in order that an action may be thought honourable, not when it is simply a question of 'licito vel illicito,' *i.e.* whether it is permissible or not. The only purpose of this distinction between the *honestum* and the *licitum* is to limit simple probabilism in appearance, by leaving consciences in reality free to adopt it.

The probabiliorists apply this principle only to the question of law, not to that of fact. In theory, we may follow the *opinio minus tuta* because it is more probable than the *opinio tuta*, but in order to make sure whether the concrete conditions, under which alone the surplus of probability exists, are realized or not, more than probabiliority is needed, viz. certainty; *e.g.*, the law forbids the eating of meat during Lent; nevertheless the contrary is more probable, viz. that in certain circumstances I can eat meat even then; from that time I can admit in principle that in these circumstances I can eat meat during Lent; I cannot, however, do it in a given case unless I am absolutely sure that I am in these circumstances.

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E. EHRHARDT.

PROBABILISM.—By probabilism is signified the moral system according to which, when there are divergent views as to the lawfulness of an action, for each of which solid arguments may be advanced, then, provided the lawfulness be alone in question, we are under no obligation to follow the more probable of the two views, but are equally free to adopt either course.

It is the teaching of all theologians that no one may do any action which he is not sure is right. If a man acts with a doubtful conscience—not knowing whether the thing he is doing is right or wrong—that alone suffices to make his action sinful; for it proves that he is willing to do it even though it should be wrong. He is deliberately exposing himself to the risk of committing a sin. And to expose oneself to the risk of sinning mortally is by common consent a mortal sin. Yet in the conduct of life cases are constantly arising in which we are uncertain whether a given course is forbidden or not. The problem, then, is to determine the conditions in which, notwithstanding this uncertainty, a man may act as though no prohibition existed, with full assurance that his action is morally right. The various moral systems, tutiorism (or rigorism), probabiliorism, equiprobabilism (*qq.v.*), probabilism, and laxism give the different answers to the question. Since immediate and direct certainty as to the lawfulness of the act is not to be had, each system appeals to some principle of morals to provide the required assurance. In this connexion these are termed principles of reflex certainty or, occasionally, 'reflex principles.'

In all the cases which we are considering there is said to be, on the one hand, a probable opinion in favour of the law, and, on the other, a probable opinion in favour of liberty, the respective probability of the opinions being determined according to the weight of the reasons which can be advanced on either side. In order to avoid misconceptions it seems desirable here to call attention to the fact that the meaning of the word 'probable' in theology differs somewhat from that now commonly attached to it. In the present sense of the term a thing is said to be probable only when it can claim a greater likelihood than the other alternatives. These are not said to be probable at all. Moreover, the idea suggested is in many minds linked up with the mathematical theory of probabilities (*i.e.* chance-happenings). In theology, on the other hand, the word is used in its etymological sense. An opinion is probable which commends itself to the mind by weighty reasons as being very possibly true. The idea of chance is altogether absent. Confining our attention, then, to the three systems which alone can be said to have had any actual importance in the theological schools, the probabiliorist theologians hold that we are free to follow the opinion in favour of liberty when and only when it is the more probable of the two. According to the equiprobabilists, in order that we may take this course it is necessary that the two opinions should have at least an equal degree of probability. The probabilist system teaches that, should there be a solid reason to suppose the action not prohibited, then we are free to follow that opinion, even though the reasons on the other side are more weighty, provided that the difference is not such as to render the existence of the law not merely probable, but morally certain.

Before giving the arguments on which the system is based, it will be well briefly to explain two points of importance: (1) what constitutes solid probability, and (2) the limits within which the system of probabilism is applicable.

(1) An opinion is said to possess *intrinsic* probability when the grounds on which it is based are such as to have serious weight with men of competent judgment. Moreover, the grounds must be such as to retain their value even in face of the reasons which can be adduced on the other side. By this it is not meant that they must be equally cogent. But they must be such that the opponent arguments do not render them nugatory. When the arguments on the two sides are drawn from different, and even from disparate, considerations, it will often be the case that those advanced for the less probable cause are in no sense invalidated by those which support the more probable. *Extrinsic* probability is that which belongs to an opinion by reason of the authorities who can be cited for it. Ordinarily speaking, it is held that, if five or six writers of recognized weight in the theological school can be reckoned as independently supporting a view, that view may be safely followed. The condition that the authorities quoted must be theologians of real weight is to be noted. An opinion does not acquire extrinsic probability because it is found in a few works which at one time or another have enjoyed some popularity.

(2) There are certain well-defined spheres of human activity in which probabilism has no place. If we are under obligation to ensure the validity of some act, it would be altogether unlawful to adopt means which will only probably be efficacious, should a safer course be open to us. In such a case we are bound to take the surest means at our disposal. Thus, probabilism is excluded (save in a few exceptional cases) in regard to the administration of the sacraments. If, *e.g.*, a man had some doubt as to whether there was not an ecclesiastical impediment of affinity to the marriage he was intending to contract, he would be bound to procure the necessary dispensation to proceed. The mere fact that there was a sound probability

against the existence of the impediment, and that the question would certainly never be raised, would constitute no justification for neglecting to take the precaution. So, also, probabilism is inapplicable where the rights of another person are concerned. We are under strict obligation not to wrong our neighbour, and it is unlawful to put ourselves in danger of so doing. There may be excellent reasons for thinking that a match thrown at random over the hedge will not fire the hayrick on the other side. But a man would be acting wrongfully if on the strength of those reasons he should take the chance of causing the damage. Finally, probabilism may not be employed when there is question of some end that one is absolutely bound to attain. No man may use merely probable means to ensure his eternal salvation; he is bound to take measures which he knows to be sufficient. It would be erroneous to speak of these as exceptions to probabilism. Probabilism is applicable only where the obligation itself is dubious. In all these cases, although there is a doubtful element in the situation, the obligation is certain.

The argument for probabilism can be stated very briefly. Whenever there is a solid reason for questioning the existence of a law, that law is *ipso facto* doubtful. But a doubtful law imposes no obligation on the conscience ('lex dubia non obligat'), and may therefore be treated as non-existent. This principle, that a doubtful law has no binding force on the conscience, seems scarcely to require proof. But two considerations may be advanced in its support. In the first place, a law binds only in so far as it is known. If, therefore, after taking all reasonable means to make certain, a man still does not know whether a given law exists, he is not yet under any moral obligation in its regard. For practical purposes, he is in the same position as a man who has never heard of it ('lex dubia invincibiliter ignoratur'). Secondly, it is urged that an obligation is always to be viewed as a restriction on a previous state of liberty. Liberty is in possession till the obligation is imposed. Since this is so, and since 'melior est conditio possidentis,' unless the obligation is absolutely certain, a man remains free. But in the cases which we are considering the obligation is not certain but dubious.

These reasons, it is urged, are conclusive, and put the validity of probabilism as a moral system beyond question. Hence, whenever there is a reason for doubt as to the law, a man may adopt the opinion in favour of liberty with absolute assurance that he is justified in doing so, even though there be greater probability on the opposite side.

Probabilism, it is manifest, is concerned solely with what is of obligation, not with what is the most perfect course of action. In other words, it belongs to moral, not to ascetical, theology. It is of no little importance to avoid confusing the two issues. A man is not bound to adopt the more perfect course in all his actions, and the attempt to impose what is most perfect as a matter of obligation always results at last in the total rejection of the moral law, as being too burdensome for flesh and blood. It seems necessary to call attention to this point, as probabilism has often been attacked on the ground that it proposes a low standard of perfection. The fact is that it is in no way concerned with perfection. The study of Christian perfection belongs to ascetical theology.

The first to enunciate clearly and to defend the principles of probabilism was the Dominican, Bartholomew de Medina, in his *Expositio in 1am 2ae D. Thomæ* (Salamanca, 1577). The rules given by previous moralists—*e.g.*, Navarrus—to enable a man to form a safe conscience for himself in doubtful cases were somewhat more stringent; but all were agreed that a confessor was bound to absolve penitents who should announce their intention of following a probable opinion, even though he himself should be aware that this opinion was the less probable of the two. In such a case the confessor had no right to tell the penitent that he was guilty of sin in not following the more probable view. Medina carried the principle to its logical issue in maintaining that a man is always free to adopt a probable opinion as a basis of action. His teaching found general acceptance in the schools, as being in full accordance with admitted principles; and from 1600 to 1640 it was, with a very few exceptions, the universal doctrine of moral theologians. Towards the middle of the century a change took place. The leading Jansenists were advocates of tutiorism in its extreme form, maintaining that in all cases of doubt a man was bound to put himself on the safe side by acting as though the law actually existed. They attacked probabilism as immoral; and, inasmuch as the Jesuit theologians had been extremely active in opposing their doctrinal novelties, they held the order up to obloquy because of the support accorded by its writers to this system. In 1657 Pascal, at the instance of Antoine Arnauld, composed his *Lettres provinciales* in the interests of Jansenism. The mordant caricature of probabilism contained in this work, remote though it was from the truth, was a controversial success of the first magnitude. It brought the system into disrepute for many decades, and, among those who know little of the points at issue, still passes current as a satisfactory account. From 1650 to 1750 the majority, perhaps, of theologians inclined to some form of probabiliorism, though there was always a succession of moralists of real eminence who were faithful to the probabilist solution. From the beginning of the 19th cent. nearly every name of real note may be reckoned among the probabilists—*e.g.*, Génicot, Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Ojetti, and Slater. A few authors still defend a mitigated equiprobabilism; but there is little practical difference between the two standpoints.

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PROBABILITY.—There are certain phenomena of such a nature that their antecedents, being extremely complex, cannot be adequately comprehended by observation, however searching it may be; nor can they be subjected to any analysis that will disclose the causal elements to which the effect in question is due.

In the throwing of dice, *e.g.*, the antecedent shaking of the box and tossing the dice upon the table is about the same each time—at least the difference cannot be determined—and yet the results vary with each successive throw. The causal determination in each case is so complex as to be beyond computation; the initial position of the dice, the force of their ejection from the box, the height of the box above the table when they leave it, the inequalities of the table itself, a variation between the physical and geometrical centres of gravity of the dice, etc.—all make the antecedent so complex that a slight variation in any one of these conditions will affect the result. We find, therefore, double sixes at one time, a three and a four at another, and so on indefinitely.

Again, it sometimes happens that with perfect sanitary conditions an infectious disease will appear that has always been regarded, and that correctly, as due to imperfect sanitation, whereas an entire disregard of sanitary requirements and of all the laws of health may yet give rise to no disease of special moment. Certain conditions of temperature, atmospheric pressure, velocity and direction of the wind, may one day bring storm and rain, and, as far as observation can detect, similar conditions may again bring fair weather. So also the rise and fall in stock and money markets is extremely susceptible to the varying conditions of indefinitely complex forces wholly beyond all powers of determination or of prediction.

Such phenomena present a problem with which the methods of inductive inquiry cannot deal. Observation is not far-reaching enough to provide the data for the solution of the problem, and, even if it were, our methods of computation and determination are not adequate to solve problems of so many terms and of so complex a nature.

The causal connexion may be established beyond all reasonable doubt, and yet the cause obtains in the midst of so complex a setting that the problem is really this—to determine whether a cause, whose exact nature may be known or unknown, will prove operative or inoperative. The cause may be always present and even its exact nature may be known, and yet the complex circumstances attending it may be of such a character that one alone, or two or more combining, may neutralize the operation of the cause, and, on the other hand, a slight variation of the combined circumstances may promote and even accelerate the operation of the cause in question. The problem then is to determine how often the event happens, and how often it fails of happening, the complex and indeterminate antecedent being present in all the instances examined.

When we begin to count instances, we are reminded that we must be in the neighbourhood of the sphere of enumerative induction. Enumerative induction treats instances by noting the number of observed coincident happenings of the antecedent and consequent under investigation, no attempt being made to analyze their respective contents or to determine a causal connexion more definitely by means of any one or more of the inductive methods of research and verification. The result of such an investigation may be formulated in a proposition of the form, 'Every A is B.' This, strictly interpreted, has the force of 'Every A that has been observed is B.' There are cases, however, in which observation leads to a twofold result—a set of instances in which it is observed that the A's are B's, and another set of instances in which the A's are not B's. These instances are of such a nature that the observed A is an antecedent so extremely complex that the element within it, which is a cause capable of producing B, either may be absent without producing an appreciable change in the general nature of A or, being present, may be neutralized by some other element of A itself. The result gives a basis for a probable inference only; and the nature of that inference will depend upon the preponderance of the observed happenings or of the failure of the event under investigation.

The probability attached to such an inference, however, is different from the probability which characterizes the nature of enumerative induction. In the latter, when the observation has been widely extended and no exceptions noted, it is usual to say that the result expressed in the proposition, 'Every A is B,' has the force of a high degree of probability. But in the instances whose investigation shows the result that some A's are B's, and some not, and yet where the former far outnumber the latter cases, it may be inferred that the A's which in future we may meet will probably be B's; and the degree of probability expressed in such a proposition is commensurate with the preponderance of the number of observed affirmative instances over the negative. Here the probability refers to the validity of an inference concerning certain *particular* instances, be they many or be they few, which lie beyond the sphere of our present knowledge; in enumerative induction the probability is attached to the *universality* of the proposition affirmed as a result of observation that has not so far detected an exception. In the former case the question of the universality of the result is conclusively answered in the negative; there can be no universal proposition possible, as some instances give A and B together, others give A with the absence of B; and the question of probability that here arises, therefore, refers to individual cases not yet examined, as to whether they severally will more likely correspond to the set of affirmative or to that of the negative instances already noted.

The comparison of the number of happenings with that of the failures of an event affords a basis for several kinds of inference, all of them in the sphere of probability.

We find in such a comparison a basis for the calculation of the probability of a particular event happening when there is a repetition of the circumstances which, in former cases, have sometimes produced the event and sometimes failed to produce it. If, according to former observation, the event has happened, let us say, seven times, and failed three, the probability, expressed numerically, of its happening again is $\frac{7}{10}$. The rule is: to express the probability of an event, take as numerator the number of times which the event has been observed to occur, and as denominator the total number observed, both of happening and failure; the fraction thus expressed will represent the probability of the event happening. The counter-probability may be represented by the number of observed failures of the event divided by the total number of cases observed. The counter-probability *plus* the probability evidently is equal to unity. If, therefore, the probability is unity, the counter-probability will equal zero; *i.e.*, the probability in that case has merged into certainty. Zero, therefore, represents absolute impossibility. All fractions between the limits zero and one represent varying degrees of probability, from impossibility at one extreme to certainty at the other.

Not only may there be this inductive basis for the calculation of probability, arising from actually observed instances; there may be also a deductive calculation of probability based upon the known structure or nature of the phenomena themselves in advance of any observation as to their actual behaviour.

We say, *e.g.*, that the probability of a penny turning up heads is $\frac{1}{2}$. Knowing the form of the penny and that there are but two possibilities, heads or tails, and there being no reason why one is more likely to turn up than the other, we say that there is one chance favourable to heads against the two chances which represent the total number of possibilities under the existing circumstances. With a die, in the form of a perfect cube, we say there is one chance of its turning up the face marked 1 against the six chances represented by the six faces—the total number; here the probability is $\frac{1}{6}$. Thus the basis for the calculation of probability may be a theoretical as well as an empirical one.

In the estimate of the probability of an event in the actual conduct of affairs we seldom express that probability numerically; we express a degree of probability adverbially rather than numerically; *i.e.*, we say an event is *quite* probable, *very* probable, or *extremely* probable. The fact is that, as regards most phenomena, we do not keep an exact or even approximate memorandum of the number of happenings compared with that of the failures. We rather classify our observations in terms of more or less. Certain circumstances that we observe produce about as many failures as happenings of an event, other circumstances produce far more happenings than failures, others far less, and so on. Consequently we receive certain psychological impressions of varying degrees of intensity according to the preponderance of happening over failure, or *vice versa*; this impression becomes the basis for estimating the probability in question, and the degree of that probability is commensurate

with the intensity of the original psychological impression arising from concepts of more or of less. In such a sphere, however, as that devoted to the interests of betting, gambling, pool-selling, book-making, etc., probabilities are estimated according to observations and theoretical considerations whose conditions are expressed numerically; and the amount risked in each case is strictly estimated according to the exact ratio of probability to counter-probability under the existing circumstances.

The estimation of probability in terms of a greater or less degree is, however, more usual, and applicable to the conduct of human life generally (for the theory of probability as the guide of life see art. BUTLER). It has special force and utility as a mode of inference when the observed instances so far outnumber the exceptions as to create an impression of such a high degree of probability as to approximate practical if not theoretical certainty.

It has been noted over a wide field of observation that a second attack of scarlet fever is extremely rare. Exceptions have occurred and, therefore, by enumerative induction it is impossible to generalize the universal proposition that a second attack will never occur. It is, however, possible to assert with somewhat positive assurance that it is highly probable that a person will be exempt from a second attack.

The comparison of failure and happening of events based upon observation or theoretical considerations of structure and nature leads also to inferences concerning large numbers of instances considered together. If a memorandum is kept of the number of times an event has happened and of the number of times it has failed, and the total number of instances examined be sufficiently great, then the resulting ratio of favourable instances to the total number will be found approximately repeated if a second set of an equal number of instances be likewise examined. There is a law of tendency whereby Nature seems to repeat herself even when the attendant circumstances of an event are most complex and beyond all powers of accurate determination.

As the result of observations extending over thousands and thousands of instances, it is affirmed that about ¼ of the children born in the world die before the age of sixteen. In a group of 10 children the ratio would perhaps be deviated from very materially; in a group of 100 the deviation is apt to be less; in a group of 1000, still less; and in a group of 100,000 the ratio as above given would be substantially realized. The approximation would be so near that the error would be insignificant as compared with total number of cases.

The following law, therefore, expresses this tendency—that, while in a small number of instances there is irregularity in the observed ratio between the number of times a given event has happened and its failures, still in a large number of instances this ratio tends towards a constant limit.

This is clearly seen in the pitching of a penny: 10 throws might very possibly result in 7 heads and 3 tails; in 100 throws, however, the ratio expressing the result as to heads and tails observed will be much nearer ½ than in the former case; while, if 1000 or 10,000 throws be observed, the result will approximate the ratio ½.

The comparison of observed cases with the number given by the calculation of the probabilities in question has been made by Quételet, and also by Jevons. Their results are most significant and interesting.

Quételet made 4096 drawings from an urn containing 20 black balls and 20 white. Theoretically, he should have drawn as many white as black balls, 2048 each; the actual drawings resulted in 2066 white balls and 2030 black. Jevons made 20,480 throws of a penny; the theoretical result should have been 10,240 heads; the actual result was 10,353 heads.

The tendency towards a constant ratio in aggregates containing a considerable number of instances is strikingly illustrated in the record of baptisms taken from an old parish register in England. The number of male baptisms registered to every 1000 females ran as follows for the respective years from 1821 to 1830: 1045, 1047, 1047, 1041, 1049, 1046, 1047, 1043, 1043, 1054. We see with what surprising accuracy the constant ratio was repeated substantially year after year.

A like regularity seems to pervade every department of life. The total number of crimes is approximately the same, year after year; the annual death-rate, the apportionment of deaths, moreover, to the several diseases as their evident causes, the number of missent letters each year, the annual number of suicides, of divorces—all these diverse events indicate a regularity in the long run, as regards their numerical estimate.

The results which are thus attained regarding aggregates cannot be stated as probable results. If a sufficiently large number of instances are taken, the result will be certain within a very small, and in many cases an insignificant, margin. In estimating the probability of a single event the question is whether it will happen or not happen, and the element of uncertainty is therefore prominent. In dealing with aggregates, however, no such element of uncertainty enters; the question is not whether or not there will be certain results, but concerns rather the degree of exactness with which the results will approximate a definite ratio. And the law of tendency is that the larger the number of instances, the greater will be the approximation of an accurate and definite result.

This is especially illustrated in the numerous insurance companies whose business is conducted upon the basis of an approximately constant death-rate. The general procedure is somewhat as follows:

Suppose 10,000 persons insure their lives at £200 per individual, and the annual death-rate observed over a wide extent of territory, and including a very large number of instances, amounts to 200 persons out of 10,000. The losses then to the insurance company will amount annually to £40,000 on such a basis. These losses, distributed among the 10,000 insuring in the company, would amount to £4 apiece. The company, therefore, has a numerical basis for calculating the amount which each person must pay in order to cover the annual losses and to provide an assured revenue for the company.

The problem has been stated in round numbers merely to illustrate in general the principle involved; the actual calculation is more complicated, because, in each particular case, the age of the individual and the varying death-rate for different years must be taken into account. The substantial standing of the innumerable insurance companies in our country bears witness to the fact that these enterprises are based upon a practical certainty regarding death-rates when applied to large aggregates. Chance is thus eliminated almost entirely; that which would be a serious risk as regards an individual is substantially void of all risk when large numbers are concerned.

Moreover, phenomena indicate a marked departure from the ratio of frequency as determined by prior observation or by theoretical considerations; then it is ordinarily inferred that a new cause has become operative, not before existent, or, if present, with its effect neutralized.

We would naturally expect a die to show the face 3, on an average, about once in six throws. But, if it repeatedly turns up 3 in succession, and if no other number appears, or appears but rarely, we are warranted in inferring that the die is loaded. The number of homicides in the United States in 1894 far exceeded the annual number observed for the several years preceding. This discrepancy is easily accounted for by the fact that the natural number was swollen by the deaths caused by the strikers and rioters in the month of July of that year. So also a marked departure from the annual death-rate of a large city is at once an urgent suggestion to the public health authority to start investigations that will unearth the hidden cause that one is constrained to believe must be present. Such causes as defective drains, prevalence of epidemics, etc., are again and again found to accompany an increase of the average death-rate.

Under such circumstances the method of investigation which should be pursued, when practicable, is to endeavour to break up the total into smaller groups of a specific nature. Thus, if the death-rate for the year is appreciably increased, examine the death-rate per month. See if any month shows a marked departure from the average. If so, this will suggest a careful investigation of the circum-

stances and characteristics of the month in question. Or it may be possible to make a geographical distribution of the total over different sections of the city under investigation. Some special locality may indicate an unusually large death-rate. Investigation, therefore, at that point may reveal a lurking cause of disease, otherwise unnoticed.

By similar considerations it is often possible to distinguish between a chance coincidence and a determinate cause which has produced the event in question. For, if the possibility of some one definite cause is considered out of the question, and if the origin of the event is found among complex phenomena of such a number and variety that they may form an indefinite number of combinations only one of which can possibly produce the event in question, then the probability that the event has actually been produced by such a chance combination is extremely small. We are then thrown back upon the other hypothesis, that, instead of one out of many possible combinations, there is some one determinate cause operative in the case. Its nature may not be definitely indicated, but at least the possibility of its presence is suggested.

This line of reasoning is illustrated in the following account of the discovery of the existence of iron in the sun, in the researches of Bunsen and Kirchhoff:

'On comparing the spectra of sunlight and of the light proceeding from the incandescent vapour of iron, it became apparent that at least sixty bright lines in the spectrum of iron coincided with dark lines in the sun's spectrum. Such coincidences could never be observed with certainty, because, even if the lines only closely approached, the instrumental imperfections of the spectroscope would make them apparently coincident, and if one line came within half a millimetre of another, on the map of the spectra, they could not be pronounced distinct. Now the average distance of the solar lines on Kirchhoff's map is two millimetres, and if we throw down a line, as it were by pure chance, on such a map, the probability is about $\frac{1}{4}$ that the new line will fall within one-half millimetre on one side or the other of some one of the solar lines. To put it in another way, we may suppose that each solar line, either on account of its real breadth, or the defects of the instrument, possesses a breadth of one-half millimetre, and that each line in the iron spectrum has a like breadth. The probability, then, is just $\frac{1}{4}$ that the centre of each iron line will come by chance within one millimetre of the centre of a solar line, so as to appear to coincide with it. The probability of casual coincidence of each iron line with a solar line is in like manner $\frac{1}{4}$. Coincidence in the case of each of the sixty iron lines is a very unlikely event if it arises casually, for it would have a probability of only $(\frac{1}{4})^{60}$ or less than one in a trillion. The odds, in short, are more than a million million millions to unity against such a casual coincidence. But on the other hypothesis, that iron exists in the sun, it is highly probable that such coincidences would be observed; it is immensely more probable that sixty coincidences would be observed if iron existed in the sun, than that they should arise from chance. Hence, by our principle, it is immensely probable that iron does exist in the sun.'[1]

This principle is also illustrated in instances of circumstantial evidence. In such cases the observed combination of so many diverse circumstances, even as regards an indefinite number of minor details, precludes the hypothesis of casual coincidences, and suggests some one definite cause that will prove a unifying principle of explanation of all the attendant circumstances. As Bullen says:

'A presumption is very often more convincing and more satisfactory than any other kind of evidence. It is not within the reach and compass of human abilities to invent a train of circumstances which shall be so connected together as to amount to a proof of guilt without affording opportunities to contradict a great part, if not all of these circumstances.'[2]

In the various illustrations which have been given we find that the theory of probability provides a method of dealing with phenomena which cannot be subjected to the ordinary inductive methods. The phenomena are so complex that a specific cause cannot be determined, for the real cause in question is a correlation of many diverse forces, and, if only a few instances are examined, no causal connexion will be disclosed; it is necessary, therefore, to deal with large numbers, statistical averages, etc., in order to detect an emerging relation of a causal character, expressed by a constant ratio. This ratio once determined, it becomes a further test, as we have already seen, when the results widely depart from it, to suggest the presence of a new force outside of the combinations to which the effect would be naturally referred according to the indications of the probability-ratio. The latter mode of inference is akin to the method of residues, for the inference in question is based upon the fact that the probability-ratio will account for only a certain frequency of occurrence of the event under investigation; a marked excess must be accounted for by positing a definitely operative cause. And, if an antecedent of such a nature is known to be present, the suggestion at once arises in our thought that this in all probability is the cause producing this excess in the results.

[1] W. S. Jevons, *The Principles of Science*[2], London, 1900, p. 244 f.

[2] *Famous Cases of Circumstantial Evidence*, New York, p. xv.

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PROBATION.—One of the most obvious and striking aspects of experience, one which forces itself upon a man's mind as soon as he begins to reflect at all, is its incomplete and fragmentary character. In the pursuit of truth he finds himself confronted sooner or later with unanswerable questions, face to face with insoluble mysteries. Knowledge may be real as far as it goes, but finality is not to be found. In the pursuit of the good, again, there is a perpetual discrepancy between the actual and the ideal, a constant failure of achievement. And the passion for the beautiful is never really satisfied, though its hunger may be partially stayed. In all these directions neither the mind nor the heart of man ever finds absolute satisfaction; his capacity finds neither limit nor adequate response.

The questions, then, are inevitably thrust upon us: Why is aspiration so far in advance of attainment? Has it always been so? Will it always remain so? The incomplete, the inadequate, the fragmentary, is abhorrent to us, æsthetically and spiritually, and we cannot 'sadly and soberly acquiesce' without at least attempting to find some explanation of this character of the given.

The theory of probation is an attempted answer to the above questions. We have seen that experience does not satisfy, that this world is not adequate to the complete realization of our desires. There is no doubt about that. But how if it was not meant to satisfy? How if its incompleteness and fragmentariness and apparent illusion were not errors and defects in the character of the world, as we are first inclined to think, but just those very qualities which give it such value as it

has? The world, as we perceive it, may be only a part of a larger universe; our temporal existence may be but a phase in an experience that is not to be numbered by years; in a word, this present world may be but a period of probation, a period, that is, whose explanation and justification lie beyond itself in the idea of an end to which it may serve as means, of a purpose of which all 'the change and chances of this mortal life' may be so many ways of fulfilment.

Now the probation of which this life is the scene is to be conceived not as a process that goes on impersonally, as it were, but as the direct work of the God and Father of mankind. The theory presupposes, then, that there has already been formed the conception of a personal God, with whom the spirit of man is in immediate contact. For probation is a teleological concept, and a purpose or end is the expression of the will of a person, and cannot have its source in a mere 'tendency, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness.' Hence it is an idea that seems very closely bound up with the belief in a personal God. Probation is a distinctively religious, not only a moral or philosophical, theory.

The ideas of discipline and purification are to be found in any religion which has any ethical quality at all, but that of probation does not seem to have been fully developed except among the Jews, of whose theology it is an important element, and whose history is interpreted by the prophets in the light of it. The history of the Jews, broadly speaking, is the history of a people whose high calling, to be in a special sense the medium of Divine revelation and blessing to the world, was equalled only by their failure, as a nation, to discern its import and to rise to its fulfilment. For this fulfilment all the vicissitudes of their history, as that of a 'chosen people' *par excellence*, were meant to fit them; all was meant, in Scripture language, to humble them, and to prove them, whether they would keep God's commandments or no (cf. Dt 8[2]). 'Elect peoples,' it has been said, 'have tragic careers,'[1] and the tragedy is never more deep and complete than when the nation is spiritually blind to the meaning of its destiny, which is throughout recognized, by those who have eyes to see, to be of Divine appointment and plan. It was the unique relation of the nation to a personal God, known as such, that is, as a Being of moral nature, that gave their failure the further character of sin.

To regard this world as the scene of probation is to regard it from a point of view that throws light on much that is otherwise hopelessly obscure and inexplicable in experience; for instance, some such conception as probation, that is, of life as a time of testing and training the will rather than of complete moral achievement, seems the only possible direction whence the nearest approach to a solution of the problem of evil could come; it is along these lines only that we can justify the twofold deliverance of the religious consciousness, that evil and sin are temporally real, and yet that God is good and that He is almighty. The only justification for even the temporary existence of evil would lie in its being an essential condition of the attainment of an end which is of supreme value. If we may attempt to define the end for which this world was called into being as the realization of the conscious communion of every soul with the God and Father of that soul, then it at once becomes plain that from the beginning the possibility of evil must have been recognized, and recognized as worth while. For man can attain the Divine likeness and become in the fullest sense partaker of the Divine nature only by a process of probation, in which temptation plays an essential part. Character is an acquired product; no virtue or goodness is assured which has not been put to the test in some way or another, and such trial or probation is accomplished through an experience in which the necessity of a choice between good and evil is constantly presented. One of the most profound truths embodied in the OT narrative of the Fall is that man, though originally innocent, *i.e.* ignorant of the distinction between good and evil, can attain holiness only through such a process of probation and temptation.

'Goodness as a moral experience is for us the overcoming of experienced evil. . . . So, in the good act I experience the good as my evil lost in goodness, as a rebellion against the good conquered in the moment of its birth, as a peace that arises in the midst of this triumphant conflict, as a satisfaction that lives in this restless activity of inner warfare. This child of inner strife is the good, and the only moral good, we know. . . . No genuine moral goodness is possible save in the midst of such inner warfare. The absence of the evil impulse leaves naught but innocence or instinct, morally insipid and colourless. Goodness is this organism of struggling elements' (J. Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Boston, 1885, pp. 452, 456, 459).

Goodness is not forced upon us; we make it our own by willing identification of our will with the good. Hence probation implies freedom, power to 'choose the good and refuse the evil.' This is not the place for a discussion of the interminable Free Will *versus* Determinism controversy. It is enough to point out what will be denied by none, that those who regard this life as a period of probation make the implicit assumption that man is free—an assumption which receives most emphatic confirmation from the witness of the moral consciousness. It would be futile to speak of the 'probation' of a being who could not be otherwise than unfailingly regular in the performance of duty; in fact, such an one could scarcely attach any meaning to the word. Freedom, as Kant pointed out once for all, is a fundamental presupposition of morality, and the belief in probation lays great stress on this side of truth. Hence probation is not consistent with determinism, Calvinistic or otherwise. This world is no scene of probation for *Johannes Agricola in Meditation*.[1]

If this life is a period of probation, it makes a constant appeal to the will to 'take sides with a cause not yet won'—that is the testimony of the moral consciousness, while yet the religious consciousness possesses the fundamental assurance that the victory is already accomplished. God's will shall be done; that cannot fail. But then arises the question as to the attitude of the individual, whether he will co-operate in its fulfilment or not. The constant pressure of this question is his probation.

And, just because the probation to which man is subject is an appeal to his willing spirit, it is no merely theoretic experiment to see what he will or can do, but is essentially practical, leading to definite issues for conduct, which can then be dealt with by way either of correction or of confirmation. It is a test or experiment not simply to increase the knowledge of the one who makes it, but continually carried on to affect the nature of the subject. This leading to a definite issue, whether for good or for evil, is an important aspect of probation. Indifference, neutrality, lukewarmness calls for the remedy of 'a piercing pain.'[2] Acts may be forgiven, but not even God Himself can forgive the hanger-back. 'At every instant, at every step in life, the point has to be decided, our soul has to be saved, heaven has to be gained or lost.'[3] Hence probation, even though it may

[1] A. B. Bruce, *Providential Order of the World*, London, 1897, p. 186.

[1] Browning, *Poems*.

[2] R. L. Stevenson, *Poems*, 'The Celestial Surgeon'; cf. also Rev 3[14-22].

[3] R. L. Stevenson, *Lay Morals*, ch. iii.

result for the time in the choice of evil, is the first step of the way that leads through purification towards perfection.

The belief that this is the divinely appointed way for man finds its classic expression in the words of Job: 'He knoweth the way that I take: when he hath tried me, I shall come forth as gold.'[1] It may be objected that, in the case of Job at any rate, we see an instance of probation for purely theoretic interests. The drama represents Job's trials as being sent to supply an answer to the cynical question, 'Doth Job fear God for nought?' Here mere knowledge seems the end in view. But this is not really so. Two things must be remembered. First, Job's real devotion to, and trust in, God were practically tested, and the issue of his probation was a far higher, more deeply rooted, type of goodness than was possible to the merely prosperous, God-fearing man who is first depicted. His choice of the good becomes a perfect passion for right. Besides, 'the more righteous the man, the more urgent the demand for a testing experience.'[2] And, secondly, even if the testing had been unnecessary for Job himself, the results are never limited to the individual. 'Piety and prosperity must sometimes be dissociated, if it were only to let piety have an opportunity for evincing its sincerity,' and to 'silence doubt as to the reality of goodness.'[3] And the effects go even further than this, as the language of St. Paul makes abundantly clear.[4]

We have seen, then, that this life is meant to be a stage in the progress towards perfection, through probation and purification of the will and character.

'It looks as if this strange life of ours were made only for character. . . . For all other purposes—the making of fortune, the enjoyment of pleasure, the securing of worldly wealth or position or fame—this is a life ill-adapted. The flux of things, the uncertainties of fate, the varied unforeseen combinations of circumstances adverse to or destructive of health or wealth or happiness—all these make life a place obviously not formed primarily for these ends, the attempt to gain which is so easily and often thwarted, and which, even when gained, are held on so uncertain a tenure. This is really not the world for worldliness. But . . . all these conditions—this flux, this risk, this uncertainty—are the very conditions that help to form character. They make just the discipline by which a man may become tender and spiritual, patient and humble, unselfish and loving. The circumstances of life may defeat all other ends, but they cannot defeat, and they even must contribute towards, this end' (P. Carnegie Simpson, *The Fact of Christ*, London, 1900, p. 82 f.).

But we do not yet see probation taking effect in the complete purification of character, much less in its perfection. 'Life, as we know it, does not give full scope for the working out of individuality, ethical or intellectual.'[5] The gradual perception that this is so leads to two alternatives: either to a form of pessimism which stops short with the conviction that

'All my life seems meant for fails,'

or to a belief in immortality—a belief that is due not to a selfish desire to 'call into being a new world to redress the balance of the old,' or to a mere craving for continuance, but a belief that is seen to be not so much a postulate as a positive implication of morality. A spiritual being cannot be a mere temporary phenomenon. And probation, taken in its deepest implication, seems essentially a process that demands a sphere of completion. We can scarcely conceive that it should stop short with the bare judgment that the subject of the testing, having failed to discern its true meaning, is useless and unfit for the purpose it was meant to serve, and is therefore to be left as a 'castaway.' It is possible, of course, that the probation of a nation does stop short at such a point. But the case of the individual is scarcely parallel; here we do not judge that his value consists only in his capacity to be an instrument, and that, if at a given point he is a failure in this respect, no further effort will be made by his Creator. The relation of man to God is not exhausted by the category of the clay and the potter. Each individual is in himself of inestimable worth to God, at least from the Christian point of view. Probation, then, demands a future life for its completion, both for those in whose case the results are already evident and for those who as yet are still blind to spiritual issues. But, even with regard to such, 'life beyond death holds hope, the hope that under other conditions, through other experiences, the awakening may come, evil be renounced, and good chosen.'[1]

Such speculations, such deepest hopes, only serve to emphasize the supreme significance of that probation which is the key to temporal experience. After all, it is first for its illumination of the present that the theory has value. The belief is a marked characteristic of Browning's philosophy of life. A brief analysis of the argument of a poem, *Easter Day*, which is typical in this respect may help to throw some light on the doctrine itself.

'How very hard it is to be
A Christian!'

is the exclamation which opens the dialogue. In the admitted hardness lies the test; were it easy to be a Christian, easy to the flesh, to the mind, or to the spirit, it would be comparatively valueless. The difficulty is to see vividly and acutely, to grasp once for all, the relation between the finite and the infinite. Hence the need for faith. Now faith demands, not proof, but probability; it is satisfied

'So long as there be just enough
To pin my faith to, though it hap
Only at points: from gap to gap
One hangs up a huge curtain so,
Grandly, nor seeks to have it go
Foldless and flat along the wall.'

But the 'faith' that is a mere balancing of probabilities and choice of that which in the long run may prove to be the most profitable is by no means the true faith consisting in that strenuous attitude of will which is demanded by the facts of life as we find it. It is not to elicit a merely intellectual and cold selection of 'the safe side' that we are set in the midst of all that the world has to offer. To one who can penetrate beneath 'the shows of things' issues the most profound disclose themselves. To the purged eyesight it becomes a marvel

'why we grudged
Our labour here, and idly judged
Of heaven, we might have gained, but lose!'

Such an one recognizes, in a moment of sudden, intense illumination, that the failure to choose heaven means choice of the world, that the refusal to renounce the finite and transitory is the rejection of the Infinite and Eternal, of which they are the shows and symbols.

'This world,
This finite life, thou hast preferred,
In disbelief of God's plain word,
To heaven and to infinity.
Here the probation was for thee,
To show thy soul the earthly mixed
With heavenly, it must choose betwixt.'

He finds that neither nature, nor art, nor culture, nor even love itself, taken as complete in itself, is enough to satisfy the spirit's hunger. The infinite hunger of a soul cannot be satisfied with the things of sense.[2] God alone is great enough to satisfy the heart of man. As St. Augustine says, 'Tu fecisti nos ad Te, Domine, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te.' But God does not force this truth on any one; He sets us here to learn it for ourselves, through a manifold experience, upheld by the confidence that He is dealing with us as with sons.[3]

'And so I live, you see,
Go through the world, try, prove, reject,
Prefer, still struggling to effect
My warfare; happy that I can
Be crossed and thwarted as a man,

[1] Job 23^{10}.
[2] A. B. Bruce, *Moral Order of the World*, London, 1899, p. 239.
[3] *Ib.* p. 241.
[4] Cf. 1 Co 4^{9-16}, 2 Co 1^{6} 4^{5-12}, Ph 1^{12-14}, Col $1^{23.24}$.
[5] E. M. Caillard, *Individual Immortality*, London, 1903, p. 65.

[1] Caillard, p. 92.
[2] Henry Jones, *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher*, Glasgow, 1912, p. 83.
[3] Cf. He 12^{7}.

Not left in God's contempt apart,
With ghastly smooth life, dead at heart,
Tame in earth's paddock as her prize.'

This constant silent process of insight, of judgment, of appreciation and choice, is our probation. To be alive to its reality and significance is to interpret experience from the point of view of the man who judges the finite 'sub specie æternitatis.'

LITERATURE.—This has been cited throughout the article.

F. R. SHIELDS.

PROCESSIONS AND DANCES.—I. *PROCESSIONS.*—In the history of social ritual the procession occupies an important place. The most cultured and the most primitive society known to us alike lay stress on what is in the first instance merely the act of moving a body of the people from one place to another—a social mobilization or route-march, conducted with solemnity or in accordance with the emotions expressed by the purpose of the movement. Similarly, the return home is of a ceremonial character—a recession. Using the term 'worship' in the wide sense of all solemn social action, we may regard procession as being in itself an act of worship.

Besides the primary use of procession as a means to an end—the celebration of a particular ceremony—procession may have virtue in itself, and express a particular emotion or idea, or produce a particular effect. Again, it may serve to do honour to a person or thing carried in procession, or to exhibit to society the actual persons engaged. But these purposes cannot always be distinguished, and in many cases they are combined.

1. Types of procession.—Procession being employed for practically all social ceremonial, it is unnecessary to enumerate every ceremony served by it, but some types may be mentioned in which procession as such is emphasized.

Ceremonies which bind the individual life to the social, by making solemn the various physical crises, usually accompany in all cultures circumcision, marriage, burial, and the like. The lowest cultures, however, such as that of the Central Australians, do not celebrate these to any considerable extent, if at all. But at the stages represented by the ancient Hebrews, Greeks, and Italians, mediæval Europe, and modern Egypt, these and other occasions are emphatically celebrated, and the procession is an important feature. Some of these peoples may be said to live processionally. Very complete examples may be seen among the Chinese and the modern Egyptians.[1] Among funeral processions that of the ancient Roman *nobiles* is remarkable. The dead man was accompanied by all his ancestors, represented by persons resembling them in form and stature and wearing wax portrait masks (*imagines*). In Western civilization the funeral and the wedding processions survive in some completeness, while those celebrating other life-crises are more or less obsolete.

As social organization develops, the solemnity of the procession is applied (1) to the economic operations on which the existence of man depends—agriculture, owing to its sedentary character, being conspicuous for this feature of celebration—and (2), as social operations are gradually differentiated, to the various subdivisions of activity—religious, legal, social, royal, and even athletic.

2. Earlier processional forms. — The earlier forms of these applications throw light upon the meaning and purpose of procession. To expel the demon of cholera, a Chinese population marches in procession, with music and dances.[2] In such a case the idea is probably that of a demonstration in force, to show the strength of the community. In a more elaborate form we have the procession of the Roman *Salii*. The priests of this college were armed with peculiar helmets, shields, and staves, and their processional ritual was obviously a military pantomime, intended to overawe the demons of blight and infertility.[1] The processions of the *Perchten* in Austria were of a similar character.[2] It is possible that, besides their minatory aspect, such mobilizations of the people were intended to disseminate the virtue of vegetation-spirits, who may have been represented by certain of the performers.[3] Many processional rites have the object of exhibiting sacred things and distributing their potency.

Thus, in the ancient Greek world, the 'gardens of Adonis,' a vegetation-charm, were carried in procession.[4] In Egypt at the festivals of Osiris women carried in procession phallic images of the god, perhaps as 'a charm to ensure the growth of the crops.'[5] Greece and India have similar phallic processions.

But the meaning of the symbol may be simply minatory.

The human sacrifice of the Khonds of Orissa, the *meriah*, is clearly an agricultural charm, and his virtue was distributed to the inhabitants in solemn procession.[6] What Frazer terms 'the form of communion in which the sacred animal is taken from house to house, that all may enjoy a share of its divine influence,' is well illustrated by the rite of the Gilyaks. The sacred bear is taken in procession 'into every house in the village, where fish, brandy, and so forth are offered to him. . . . His entrance into a house is supposed to bring a blessing.'[7] The Hebrew Ark of the Covenant carried in procession served both as a protection and as a blessing.

The carrying of sacred sheaves, trees, and other innumerable symbols of corn and wine is a regular practice of agricultural ritual, which Frazer has abundantly illustrated.

3. Civic and religious processions.—The processional 'beating of the bounds' seems to have had primarily a purificatory intention. Processions of a disciplinary character, to inspire respect for law and custom, and so forth, are frequently combined with pantomime and mask-performance—*e.g.*, by such 'societies' as the Duk-duk and Mumbo-jumbo. In such cases as the fall of Jericho in early Hebrew story there seems to be implied a belief that procession round an object not only hems it in but also dominates it. The converse idea, illustrated by some uses of the magical circle (*q.v.*), is that procession round an object protects it. This idea may perhaps exist in the customs of beating the bounds and of civic processions round the city area. Of this character are mayoral shows, though originally derived from gild-processions, celebrating both the gild and its patron, and the Panathenaic procession of ancient Athens, in which the sacred *peplus* of Athene served as the sail of the ship carried or drawn on rollers through the city, perhaps symbolizing the maritime power of the Athenian empire. Magnificent processions of athletes, horses, and chariots introduced the performance of the great 'games' of Hellas; and the modern revival of Olympic games includes the procession. When crime was still expiated in public, a procession attended the malefactor to the place of punishment and execution. In this case there was a striking contrast between the outlying rabble and the procession itself, which should be 'an organized body of people advancing in a formal or ceremonial manner.'[8] In modern times the procession is retained to dignify the law, royalty, parliament, civic and municipal functions, and is a special

[1] See J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1892 ff., *passim*, and E. W. Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, London, 1895.

[2] De Groot, vi. 981 f.

[1] *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, pp. 245 ff., 250.

[2] *Ib.* p. 233. [3] *Ib.* p. 250.

[4] *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 236 f.

[5] *Ib.* ii. 112.

[6] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, i. 246.

[7] *Ib.* ii. 190, 192, 316.

[8] *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Procession,' xxii. 414.

instrument of public appeal by bodies with a grievance or desirous of demonstrating this or that political view. Friendly Societies and similar bodies make great use of it, and it is one of the chief instruments of the Salvation Army.

Procession is a simple means either of honouring or of degrading a person. The triumphal entry of Jesus balances the procession to Calvary. The 'triumph' of Roman generals was a very elaborate procession, including captives and spoils. It was remarkable for some peculiarities, which, in the opinion of Frazer, constitute an impersonation by the victor of the Jupiter Capitolinus to whose temple he was borne in procession. He wore the robes of the god, and his face was painted with vermilion. The custom survived the regal period into the republican.[1]

4. The procession in Roman Catholic ritual.—The procession and the recession, as modes of proceeding to and receding from a ceremony, and also as acts of worship in themselves, have always been of great importance in the organized religions. An exception is the Churches of the Reformation, which practically abolished, along with other ritual, every procession but the funeral,[2] and this is more or less extempore, and not arranged by the clergy. Ever since Christianity, as early as the 4th cent., adopted the procession from the existing religions, pagan rather than Jewish, and primarily for the funeral, the Roman Catholic Church has exploited it thoroughly. *Litaniæ, rogationes,* and *supplicationes* were processional functions.[3] After the time of Gregory the Great the processional entry of the celebrant and the procession to the station became regular. In processions to the stations of the Cross the Saviour's route to Calvary is represented and symbolized. The procession of the blessed sacrament is an old Roman Catholic function.[4] The rulings of the *Rituale Romanum* (tit. ix.) must be noted, as showing the continuity of processional ideas.

There are: '(1) *processiones generales*, in which the whole body of the clergy takes part; (2) *processiones ordinariæ* on yearly festivals, such as the Feast of the Ascension of the Virgin, the procession on Palm Sunday, the *litaniæ majores* and *minores*, the Feast of Corpus Christi, and on other days according to the custom of the churches; (3) *processiones extraordinariæ*, or processions ordered on special occasions—*e.g.*, to pray for rain or fine weather, in time of storm, famine, plague, war, or in *quacunque tribulatione*—procession of thanksgiving, translation of relics, the dedication of a church or cemetery. There are also processions of honour—*e.g.*, to meet a royal personage, or the bishop on his first entry into his diocese.'

5. The 'pardon' of Brittany.—Processions of a special character or unusual interest are numerous. Purificatory processions through fire, or in which the people walk upon fire, occur in agricultural ritual.[5] To the same sphere belong the processions of giant figures, carried to the burning, processions to the midsummer bonfires, and those in which torches are waved over the gardens and fields.[6] The carnival processions of France and the pardons of Brittany are remarkably developed. The latter play an important part in the religious and social life of the people.[7] In Normandy such festivals are rare; in Flanders they survive partially in the *Kermesse, e.g.*, of Brussels. It has been suggested that the Breton pardon is a survival of pagan feasts of the dead. But in the most famous, that of Notre Dame de Bon Secours at Guingamp, held about midsummer, there is certainly a connexion with the agricultural ritual of fire, the central act of the night procession being the lighting of a huge fire in the chief place of the town.[1] The pardon aptly links together pilgrimage and procession. It illustrates equally well the early connexion of religion with all spheres of social life. Fairs of all kinds are held during the pardon, and merry-making is interpolated between solemn functions.

'From far and wide the people crowd to this festival' (the Pardon of Guingamp). The chief procession is by night; 'down every dark street flowed a double file of lights, each casting a bright reflexion on the face of the person who bore it. Thus, most of the pilgrims being in black and their bodies not distinguishable from the darkness, it seemed a procession of white-capped white-winged cherubs of various ages, floating in mid-air, while in their midst appeared rich banners, reliquaries, statues of favourite saints, and finally Madame Marie de Bon Secours herself, in embroidered satin and sparkling jewelled crown.'[2]

Each parish procession is accompanied by its clergy, who lead the singing of ancient canticles. The several processions, as many as can be accommodated in the available space, halt round the great wood-pile, which is solemnly set alight by the priests.[3] The Godiva procession and the Bezant procession of mediæval England seem to be developments of the 'ridings' or 'watches' connected with agricultural worship.[4]

6. Procession and the drama.—Before referring to the accessaries of procession and its development by aid of the drama into such complex forms as the pageant or *trionfo*, some details of method may be noted. The most elementary forms of ceremonial procession perhaps are supplied by the performers in the *altherta* (corrobborees) and *intichiuma* dramas of the natives of Central Australia. They march in single file, chanting. On certain occasions they trot, using a curious high action of the knee.[5] Perhaps the most artistically dignified of processions were those in which the *κανηφόροι* maidens of Hellas figured as bearers of sacred things.[6] Such processions as those of the Greek Mænads and Thyiades may be regarded as among the most emotional.[7] The chorus of the Greek theatre came on the stage in procession (*πάροδος*), and left it in recession (*ἔξοδος*). Mediæval village festivals have been divided, as regards method, into two classes: (1) the processional dance (*e.g.*, in beating the bounds—this is the 'country dance'), and (2) the 'ronde,' or round movement round a worshipped object, such as the Maypole. Variation in the latter method was produced by moving either with or against the sun or clock, *deasil* or *withershins*.[8] The term of 'limping dance,' or halting rhythm, mentioned in the OT, was characteristic of Hebrew procession; hence the term *hajj* applied to pilgrimage,[9] which in essence is a prolonged procession.

A typical order is supplied by the *Rituale Romanum* (tit. ix.):

'Those taking part in procession are to walk bareheaded (weather permitting), two and two, in decent costume, and with reverent mien; clergy and laity, men and women, are to walk separately. The Cross is carried at the head of the procession, and banners embroidered with sacred figures—these banners must not be of military or triangular shape. Violet is the colour prescribed for processions, except on the Feast of Corpus Christi. The officiating priest wears a cope, or at least a surplice with a violet stole.'

It was probably the lack of great theatres capable of accommodating the whole population, such as those of ancient Greece, that led the mediæval peoples to make the 'mysteries' processional through the streets. The scenes were staged on moving platforms.[10] Another reason was the

[1] *GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 174 f.
[2] *EBr*¹¹ xxii. 416ᵇ.
[3] Du Cange, *Glossarium*, Niort, 1886, *s.v.* 'Processio.'
[4] H. Thurston, in *CE*, *s.v.* 'Processions,' xii. 447 ff.
[5] *GB*³, pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, ii. 4.
[6] *Ib.* ii. 33, i. 107, 110, 113 ff., 184 ff.
[7] The term 'pardon' is an application to the whole festival of a particular detail, not necessarily the primary feature, viz. the absolution obtained after pilgrimage to the shrine of the saint.

[1] A. Le Braz, *The Land of Pardons*, Eng. tr., London, 1906, p. 22.
[2] F. M. Gostling, *The Bretons at Home*, London, 1909, p. 23 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 25.
[4] E. K. Chambers, *The Mediæval Stage*, Oxford, 1903, i. 118 f., 222.
[5] Spencer-Gillen[3], pp. 173 ff., 618, and *passim*.
[6] See L. R. Farnell, *CGS* v. 159.
[7] *Ib.* pp. 153 f., 156.
[8] Chambers, i. 164 f.
[9] E. G. Hirsch, in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Dancing,' iv. 424 f.
[10] C. Weatherly, *EBr*¹¹, *s.v.* 'Pageant,' xx. 450.

natural tendency to make processions dramatic. Two converse causes thus helped to unite the procession and the stage. The 'ridings' on St. George's Day and other occasions were 'glorified' by these pantomimic representations or dumb-show pageants.[1] These culminated, or rather reached an artificial climax, losing their folk-interest, when Elizabethan artists elaborated the pageant and the Italians the *trionfo*. A conspicuous example of such processional exhibitions, though the scenes were not apparently always acted, is the dance of death, *danse macabre*, *Todtentanz*, *trionfo della morte*. Cars, draped in black and white, were drawn through the streets. On these were the Angel blowing the last trump and Death with his scythe. Before and behind marched men robed in black and white, and wearing 'death masks.' Choirs chanted the *Miserere*.[2] This dance of death, and the possible origin of the Breton pardon in the funeral, taken with the fact that the earliest Christian procession was funeral, while it is to-day the latest to survive, show the funeral procession to be the most constant expression of the religious march.

II. *DANCES.*—Dancing and procession are sometimes confused terminologically—a result partly due to the existence of processional dances, or the enlivening of the procession by the dance. The heretic Albigenses called dancing the procession of the devil.[3] The bear dance (ἀρκτεία) of Athenian girls was probably processional rather than choric.[4] The 'dances' of the old Roman *collegia*, such as that of the *Salii*, were dignified processions with some variety of movement.[5]

1. Physical and psychical aspects.—Dancing[6] is an instinctive mode of muscular expression of feeling, in man and many animals, especially birds. In the social life of the human race it has played a part which touches every activity of the individual and society. Dancing may be described as 'play' in its absolute form. Rhythm is inseparable from its movements, as it is from any bodily function, and therefore belongs to it without saying. It is in the middle stages of culture that dancing is seen at its highest development. Here it is much more, and also less, than a 'poetry of motion,' or the 'silent poetry' of Simonides. It is rather life expressed in muscular movement. The human instinct of play is closely connected with the human love of excitement. The dance satisfies both, and its rhythmical character also makes it suitable for the expression of the most solemn and controlled emotions. It is at once the servant of Apollo and of Dionysus.

Dancing, in the proper sense, consists in rhythmical movement of any part or all parts of the body in accordance with some scheme of individual or concerted action. As Aristotle remarked, dancing is imitative; and in all its forms it is an artistic imitation of physical movement expressive of emotions or ideas.

In its simplest terms it has been described as 'merely the voluntary application of the rhythmic principle, when excitement has induced an abnormally rapid oxidization of brain tissue, to the physical exertion by which the overcharged brain is relieved.'[7]

The social importance of dancing depends on its instinctive causation and its results. It has been noted that the physiological effects of dancing are identical with the physiological results of pleasure.[1]

'Muscular movement, of which the dance is the most complex expression, is undoubtedly a method of auto-intoxication of the very greatest potency.'[2] 'A girl who has waltzed for a quarter of an hour is in the same condition as if she had drunk champagne.'[3]

With regard to the muscular movements involved, the following has been observed of Kaffir dancing:

'The perfection of the art or science consists in their being able to put every part of the body into motion at the same time.'[4]

Sergi notes that it 'touches every vital organ.'[5] Of the Marquesan girls Melville writes:

They 'dance all over, as it were; not only do their feet dance, but their arms, hands, fingers, ay, their very eyes seem to dance in their heads. In good sooth, they so sway their floating forms, arch their necks, toss aloft their naked arms, and glide and swim and whirl.'[6]

'Primitive dancing . . . embraces all movements of the limbs and body expressive of joy or grief, all pantomimic representations of incidents in the lives of the dancers, all performances in which movements of the body are employed to excite the passions of hatred or love, pity or revenge, or to arouse the warlike instincts, and all ceremonies in which such movements express homage or worship, or are used as religious exercises.'[7]

Groos speaks of the 'self-created world of the dance,'[8] in which the dancer realizes himself in a physical improvisation. 'The sensation of motion,' says Kline, is 'a pleasure-giving sensation,' and Aristippus defined pleasure as a 'gentle motion.'[9] On the physiological side dancing develops energy and releases it; it promotes tumescence and effects detumescence.

'I have seen a young fellow's muscles quiver from head to foot and his jaws tremble, without any apparent ability on his part to control them, until foaming at the mouth, and with his eyes rolling, he falls in a paroxysm upon the ground.'[10]

In both individual and social functioning the dance is thus a translative engine of emotional energy. Philosophy has noted this, and Pythagorean mysticism found in it a replica of the movements of the stars in their courses, 'when the morning stars danced together.' Folk-lore has it that the sun dances on Easter Day. John Davies elaborated such fancies in his poem *Orchestra* (London, 1596).[11]

The dance is thus a natural method of celebrating anything, and of expressing individual or social emotions or ideas. Primarily mere physical play, it has developed in many spheres, gymnastic and artistic, as a pastime, and as a sexual stimulus; but in social evolution its main applications are the ceremonial and the dramatic, which of course may include various other functions of the dance. Thus, in the mimetic dances of the simpler cultures there are combined worship, drama, exercise, excitement, pastime, play, art.

2. Range of movements.—The range of movements in dancing is naturally very considerable, connecting on the one side with marching steps, 'parades,' and on the other with the gestures of the hands used in conversation. Metrical terms in versification are frequently derived from choric steps. In modern dancing as a pastime, movement is practically confined to the legs. But in earlier stages the rest of the body and especially the hands are employed.

1 Chambers, i. 221, ii. 165 ff.
2 C. G. Herbermann, in *CE*, *s.v.* 'Dance of Death,' iv. 617.
3 W. C. Smith and A. B. F. Young, in *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Dance,' vii. 7[illegible]
4 *CGS* ii. 42[illegible] ff
5 Livy, i. 20; Quintilian, i. 2. 18; Seneca, *Epp.* 15; Macrob. *Sat.* ii. 10.
6 R. Voss, *Der Tanz und seine Geschichte*, Berlin, 1869, devotes twelve pages (9–15) to cited definitions of dancing.
7 *EBr*[11] vii. 7[illegible]

1 G. Sergi, *Les Emotions*, Fr. tr., London, 1901, p. 330.
2 F. Lagrange, *Physiology of Bodily Exercise*, Eng. tr., London, 1889, ch. ii.
3 *Ib.*; H. H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, iii., *Analysis of the Sexual Impulse*, Philadelphia, 1903, p. 44 f.
4 Ellis, *loc. cit.*, citing W. C. Holden, *Past and Future of the Kaffir Races*, London, 1866, p. 274.
5 Sergi, p. 288.
6 Ellis, iii. 46, quoting H. Melville, *Typee*, London, 1903.
7 *EBr*[11] vii. 7[illegible].
8 K. Groos, *Die Spiele der Menschen*, Jena, 1899, p. 112.
9 *AJPs* x. [1898] 62.
10 Mrs. French-Sheldon, in *JAI* xxi. [1892] 366 f.
11 W. W. Skeat, *Etym. Dict.*, Oxford, 1910, defines dancing 'to trip with measured steps.' This definition ignores all the body except the lower limbs. The word is connected with O.H.G. *tansen*, 'to draw or drag forcibly,' 'to trail along.'

The typical Malay movements are shuffling of the feet and swaying of the hands.[1] An old Roman writer speaks of the 'eloquent hands' of a pantomime dancer.[2] The funeral dancing in ancient Egypt included a curious outward twisting of the hands raised above the head.[3] The dancing of the Indians of Guiana 'consists chiefly in stamping on the ground, and staggering in different attitudes as if intoxicated.[4]

Movements of the trunk are conspicuous in ancient and primitive dancing. National and racial differences in method are not fundamental, and the use of music and of paraphernalia, such as weapons and scarves, is an obvious aid to physical expression.

Most of the ancient Greek ball-games were dances. In a Malay dance the performers carry sheaves of areca-palm flowers, to which their movements give the appearance of being alive.[5]

In some of its aspects artistic dancing borders on the acrobatic and the juggling arts. The majority of social religious dances, on the other hand, are more akin to the procession, and consist largely of processional dancing, evolution, or pantomime.

That dancing is a development of physical play is shown by the familiar fact that some animals, especially birds, dance, not only as a method of courting, but at other times, as an individual expression of play, often combined into social dancing.[6] The dance of the argus pheasant, the 'waltz' of the ostrich, the bowing and scraping of the penguin, are well known. It has been observed that animal dancing is very human-like in appearance.[7] Insects and birds perform air-dances, and fishes water-dances. Dancing on skates is man's use of another element.

A dance of the Timagami Algonquins will typify the ordinary pastime dance of the simpler peoples and of peasantry generally.

'The common Round Dance is an outdoor performance generally performed at the camp. One man sings any one of a set of tunes, which seem to be mostly improvisations in which humorous passages are often introduced, accompanying himself upon a drum which is suspended from the branches of a tree. The dancers form a circle, generally with the men at the head of the line, some carrying rattles. Then they begin trotting around to the left quite close together, in time to the music. There is very little form to the dance. It seems to be for the most part merely a form of amusement in which women and children join for the sake of excitement. At irregular intervals the dancers may face right about and circle in the opposite direction a few turns.'[8]

This and other dances of the Timagami were still being performed in the ordinary course at the time of writing.

3. Auto-intoxication and ecstasy.—The powerful neuro-muscular and emotional influence, leading to auto-intoxication, is the key both to the popularity of dancing in itself and to its employment for special purposes, such as the production of cerebral excitement, vertigo, and various epileptoid results, in the case of medicine-men, shamans, dervishes, prophets, oracle-givers, visionaries, and sectaries even in modern culture. The similar results attainable by the normal person indicate that the dance with its power of producing tumescence was the 'fundamental and primitive form of the orgy.'[9] The effect of dancing 'among the spinning Dervishes or in the ecstatic worship of Bacchus and Cybele amounted to something like madness.'[10] It is probably due to some instinctive appreciation of these effects, as well as to the similar desire to retain self-possession and dignity, which is one of the chief causes of aversion from intoxication generally, that the ancient Greeks and Romans and many Oriental peoples confined dancing to professionals. Socrates danced for exercise only. Cicero observes that no gentleman dances unless intoxicated or mad: 'Nemo fere saltat sobrius nisi forte insanit.'[1]

The Bororo medicine-man, by dancing and singing for several hours and by incessant smoking, works himself up into a state of ecstasy.[2] In European folk-lore it was believed that witches danced unholy dances.[3] The Hebrew prophets often availed themselves of this method of inducing inspiration.[4] The spinning of the dancing dervish is paralleled by the 'dancing manias' of the Middle Ages and the performances of the Shakers in more recent times. The howling dervish would cut himself with knives and eat live coals. He was 'unconscious of the acts of his body.'[5] Russian sectaries, such as the Khlysti, produce religious excitement by wild dancing.[6] To induce possession it is a favourite method among all classes of shaman; and it was practised for this purpose by African kings.[7]

4. Courtship and dancing.—Just as the male bird of several species parades and dances before the female, with the object of producing tumescence both in himself and in her, so to the savage dancing is the chief means of courting a woman, and for the same reason. In both bird and man the 'intention' is unconscious; it is prompted and engineered by instinct. The 'showing off' of modern youth is equally instinctive. The dancing of the modern ball-room is of course one of the recognized means of bringing young people together. It is a refined form of stimulus, though, when the waltz was introduced into England about a century ago, it caused much popular indignation,[8] due mostly to the detail of mutual clasping by the dancers, practically unknown till then in social dancing. It is stated that the waltz was originally the closing act of a dramatic dance representing the 'romance of love, the seeking, and the fleeing.'[9]

In New Guinea courtship no words are spoken. The suitor, on convenient occasions, dances before the girl, making athletic bounds, and going through the movements of spearing and the like.[10] Conversely, the Minnetaree girl dances and then taps on the shoulder the man of her choice.[11] In Torres Straits, as elsewhere, a good dancer is admired by the women.[12] Here, as in masculine admiration for women-dancers, may be seen an example of how art and sex interact. The Australian natives, like many primitive peoples, celebrate with dancing various social ceremonies and solemn meetings.[13] This is often in group-formation, men and women *vis-a-vis*. Licence generally follows. Many peoples perform such dances at ceremonies celebrating sexual crises—*e.g.*, the Kaffirs at circumcision and marriage.[14] It is significant that intercourse of the sexes also follows group-dancing in Australian celebrations of peace.[15] In pastime dances for purposes of courtship or artistic dances for the excitement of spectators appropriate movements are naturally employed in the earlier societies. The Nias women emphasize the curves of the body, and undulate the flanks. A sarong is wound and unwound over the face and breast.[16] This is a typical basis for many such dances among various peoples. The *hula-hula* of Tahiti and the *danse de ventre* of N. Africa are well-known examples.

5. The war-dance.—The primary aim of the war-dance seems to be the development of physical excitement, and consequently courage, in the dancing warriors, and, secondarily, as magical ideas attach themselves, the aim of frightening the enemy by a demonstration of violence is added. But, throughout, the practical but unconscious result for the savage regiments is drill and a rehearsal of attack. The latter meaning also takes on the notions of imitative magic. In the same way a modern peasant soldier, rehearsing an

1 W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 459.
2 L. C. Purser, in Smith's *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq.*[3], *s.v.* 'Pantomimus,' citing Cassiodorus, *Var.* iv. 51.
3 Lilly Grove (Mrs. J. G. Frazer), *Dancing*, London, 1895, p. 16.
4 W. H. Brett, *Indian Tribes of Guiana*, London, 1868, p. 349.
5 Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 466 f.
6 Grove, p. 16, referring to Darwin and W. H. Hudson; Ellis, iii. 23 ff., 29–34, citing authorities.
7 Ellis, iii. 34.
8 F. G. Speck, in *Geol. Survey of Canada*, Ottawa, 1915 (*Museum Bulletin*, no. 18, p. 70).
9 Ellis, vi., *Sex in Relation to Society*, Philadelphia, 1910, p. 222.
10 *EBr*[11] vii. 795[a].

1 *Pro Murena*, vi. [13].
2 *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 72.
3 *Ib.*, pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 162.
4 E. G. Hirsch, in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Dancing,' iv. 425; cf. 1 S 10[10f.] 19[20-24].
5 H. B. Tristram, *Eastern Customs in Bible Lands*, London, 1894, pp. 207–210; D. B. Macdonald, in *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Dervish,' viii. 75 f.
6 *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 408.
7 *Ib.*, pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, ii. 192 f.
8 Byron, *The Waltz*, London, 1813. 9 Ellis, vi. 48.
10 R. E. Guise, in *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 209, 214 f.
11 E. James, *Expedition to the Rocky Mountains, 1819–20, under Major Long*, London, 1823, i. 337.
12 A. C. Haddon, in *JAI* xix. [1890] 394.
13 E. J. Eyre, *Journals of Expeditions into Central Australia*, London, 1845, ii. 235; W. Marsden, *Hist. of Sumatra*, London, 1783, p. 230; *JAI* xxiv. [1894] 174.
14 Holden, p. 192. 15 *JAI* xxiv. 174.
16 E. Modigliani, *Un viaggio a Nias*, Milan, 1890, p. 549.

attack or practising with the bayonet, may imagine that he is actually fighting the spiritual forms of the enemy or some vague ghostly foe. There can be little doubt that the war-dances of barbarous peoples and even those of the ancient Spartans were, unconsciously, rehearsals of battle.[1]

War-dances are performed also for the purpose of combating supernatural influences of any kind.

The Arunta of Australia, after returning from an expedition of vengeance, dance an excited war-dance, by way of repelling the ghost of the man whom they have executed.[2]

In agricultural ritual the evil influences of blight, bad weather, and general infertility with its various causes are often assailed by a war-dance or similar demonstration.

Thus, in ancient Italy, 'the dancing priests of the god [Mars] derived their name of Salii from the leaps or dances which they were bound to execute as a solemn religious ceremony every year in the Comitium. . . . Similar colleges of dancing priests are known to have existed in many towns of ancient Italy.'[3] But their dancing was a war-dance with curious weapons (see above), more potent, doubtless, for expelling demons of infertility[4] than their high leaps were for making the corn grow high. The natives of French Guinea prepare the fields for sowing, thus: 'Fifty or sixty blacks in a line, with bent backs, are smiting the earth simultaneously with their little iron tools, which gleam in the sun. Ten paces in front of them, marching backwards, the women sing a well marked air, clapping their hands as for a dance, and the hoes keep time to the song. Between the workers and the singers a man runs and dances, crouching on his hams like a clown, while he whirls about his musket and performs other manœuvres with it. Two others dance, also pirouetting and smiting the earth here and there with their little hoe. All that is necessary for exorcising the spirits and causing the grain to sprout.'[5]

A remarkable Greek parallel to this is the agricultural ceremony of the ancient Magnetes and Ænianians termed καρπαία. Men ploughed and sowed, but acted as on the alert against robbers. The drama ended in a conflict and the repulse of the enemy.[6] The old English morris-dancers wore bells fastened to their legs to frighten away evil spirits.[7]

6. Agricultural dances. — In many such ceremonies at the operations of agriculture the movements of the performers may be supposed to stimulate, by the action of imitative magic, the growth of the crops, or the performers may be supposed themselves to represent the spirits of vegetation, and by their presence to disseminate virtue and fertility. It is not impossible that such ideas should have been combined. Many European cases are thus explained by Frazer:

They are 'intended both to stimulate the growth of vegetation in spring and to expel the demoniac or other evil influences . . . and these two motives of stimulation and expulsion, blended and perhaps confused together, appear to explain the quaint costumes of the mummers, the multitudinous noises which they make, and the blows which they direct either at invisible foes or at the visible and tangible persons of their fellows.'[8]

Where, however, the operations of agriculture are ceremonially imitated, the stimulation is probably not so much from the supposed presence of the corn-spirits or from any precise action of imitative magic as from the actual, practical result of a rehearsal, the instinct to which comes naturally from the human tendency to imitate and dramatize —in simpler terms, to play. Among the later developments of this instinct into 'magical' applications the most important seems to be the production of movement (or growth) in nature, following upon the movements of man. Many 'sympathetic' rites are explained by this idea, which is derived straight from the psychology of the dance.

[1] On war-dances see F. de Ménil, *Hist. de la danse à travers les âges*, Paris, 1905, pp. 217–235.

[2] Spencer Gillen[2], p. 493 ff.

[3] *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 232. [4] *Ib.* p. 234

[5] O. de Sanderval, *De l'Atlantique au Niger par le Foutah-Djallon*, Paris, 1883, p. 230, quoted in *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 235.

[6] G. F. Marindin, in Smith's *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq.*[3], s.v. 'Saltatio,' p. [illegible]

[7] *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 250 f. On morris-dancers see E. K. Chambers, i. 195, where the most probable derivation of 'morris' is given, from Morisco, a Moor, in reference to the blackened faces of the mummers.

[8] *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 251 f.

Thus, appointed, though ceremonial, overseers may very practically inspire the workers and instruct them in the details of their work. In modern slang, they cause not only nature but the workers also to 'get a move on' by themselves moving.

The Cora Indians of Mexico at their sowing-festival depute two old women to represent the goddesses of sowing; they imitate in dancing the operations of digging and placing the seed.[1]

This kind of description may fairly represent the belief of the informants at the time, but, in view of the previous considerations and of others to be stated, it is probably one of the late sophistications of which folk-lore is full, and which obscure the natural origin of many social customs and ceremonies.

The Motu of New Guinea dance that 'there may be a large harvest. If the dancing is not given, there will be an end to the good growth.' These people hold that every dance has some material result; 'no dances are useless.'[2] The Kayans of Borneo dance in order to bring to the fields from its distant home 'the soul of the rice.'[3]

Simple folk have not always a reason to give for their instinctive acts, nor is it possible always to assign a reason except instinctive reaction to this or that desire. But the cases just cited fall in with others, which may be described as merely persuasive in intention. The dancer seems to be saying, 'I am energetic and am proving it; I pray thee, do likewise.' The idea that to be busy oneself will inspire other persons or things to be the same is the psychological explanation of many of these 'magical' processes, especially the 'sympathetic.'

In Scotland the farmer's wife danced at the harvest festival with 'the sheaf' on her back.[4] In the Danzig district the people dance round 'the Old Man' (the last sheaf), or the woman who bound it dances with 'the Old Man.'[5]

Dancing at agricultural festivals round a sheaf, tree, or pole, the May tree and the like,[6] is the commonest of those folk-dances which combine ritual with pastime. Dancing round an object may apparently have an honorific intention. The following is a type of a large number of agricultural dances:

To ensure a tall crop of hemp, it is the custom among the peasants of Franche Comté, Transylvanian Saxony, Baden, and Suabia to dance with high leaps. So in the case of flax and various cereals.[7] In such customs as this the notion that the higher the jumping the taller will be the crop is probably an after-thought.

There are numerous rites in which the sexual activity of human beings is supposed to assist the fecundity of nature. Sexual processes are often imitated in the dance, and may lead to magical ideas.

Thus, the natives of N.W. Brazil imitate in dance the act of procreation and 'are believed to stimulate the growth of plants.'[8]

Such dances seem to be in origin rather celebrations of the season or its work than magical charms, and, when the magical meaning is added, it is probably only half-serious. The permanent and original element is the vigour and movement of the dancers, representing the workers.

At the Matabele festival of the new fruits the soldiers danced round the king, who sometimes joined in. 'When he did so, the medicine-men and their satellites, armed with thorn-bushes, rushed about among the dancers and incited them to fresh efforts by a vigorous application of the thorns to the bodies of such as seemed to flag. The king's wives also sang and danced before him in long lines, holding the marriage-ring in their right hands and green boughs in their left.' Similarly at the Kaffir corn-festivals generally; in one of these the king dances 'in a mantle of grass' or 'of herbs and corn-leaves. This mantle is

[1] *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 238, quoting K. T. Preuss, *Die Nayarit-Expedition*, i., 'Die Religion der Cora-Indianer,' Leipzig, 1912, pp. xcviii f., 61 ff.

[2] J. Chalmers, *Pioneering in New Guinea*, London, 1887, p. 181 f.

[3] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, i. 186.

[4] *Ib.* i. 160. [5] *Ib.* i. 219.

[6] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 47, 52, 55, 65. [7] *Ib.* i. 138 f.

[8] *Ib.*, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, i. 111.

afterwards burnt and its ashes are scattered and trodden into the ground by cattle.'[1] Here the king acts as master of the ceremonies in a celebration of harvest. It is unnecessary to suppose that he definitely represents a corn-spirit; his costume is naturally adapted to the occasion.

7. Magical dancing.—The notion that dancing by reason of its vigorous movement can induce movement in the environment is illustrated by curious customs employed for rain-making.

In Morocco ball-games of the hockey type are played for this purpose; the rapid movements of the ball and the players are supposed to induce movement in the clouds.[2] Another case of ceremonial movement (which is of the essence of magical dancing) is that of the rain-maker of the Australian Arunta. To produce a shower of rain, he goes through a curious process of quivering in his body and legs, while his assistants chant in time with his movements. At day-break he makes a final and exhaustive effort.[3]

It has been suggested that the crane-dance (γέρανος) of Greek mythology records a magical dance for assisting the progress of the sun. This case is complicated.

'When Theseus landed with Ariadne in Delos on his return from Crete, he and the young companions whom he had rescued from the Minotaur are said to have danced a mazy dance in imitation of the intricate windings of the labyrinth; on account of its sinuous turns the dance was called "the Crane."'

In various parts of the world, pantomimic dances have imitated the flight of birds. This may be the case here. A similar dance was practised by the Romans, as 'the Game of Troy.' The maze-scheme for dancing evolutions, however, is quite common, and would easily attach to itself famous names and exploits. Frazer suggests that the intention of both was to imitate, and so to assist, the sun's progress through the sky.[4]

The data are insufficient to analyze such cases as that of the king of Onitsha, on the Niger, who danced annually before his people, possibly to show his physical fitness.[5] But, certainly, throughout what may be called the positive applications of dancing, personal vigour is demonstrated and invites attention. In many customs it may be said both to compel attention and to invite imitation.

Some applications of the dance are 'sympathetic' in the natural sense, without being necessarily magical.

Thus, it is recorded of old Madagascar that, 'while the men are at the wars, and until their return, the women and girls cease not day and night to dance. . . . They believe that by dancing they impart strength, courage, and good fortune to their husbands.'[6] So Yuki women danced continuously that their men might not be weary.[7] These very natural practices, such as children would instinctively develop, are not primarily magical. On the Gold Coast, when a battle is expected, the women at home have a kind of sham fight, in which they cut to pieces green gourds, as if they were the enemy.[8] The wives of soldiers, in all ages, have shown a fundamental desire to be fighting by the side of their husbands.

Dancing very frequently accompanies the funeral, and no less frequently is performed at or round the death-bed. These customs are still found to-day among the peasantry of Spain, France, and Ireland, as well as among such natives as those of the E. Indian islands, and N. and S. America.[9] Various beliefs attach to this application of the dance.

The Gauchos dance to celebrate the dead person's entrance into heaven.[10] In 1879 the congregation of a coloured church in Arkansas danced for three nights round the grave of their dead pastor, trying to bring him back to life.[11]

[1] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 70 f., 66 ff.
[2] E. Westermarck, *Ceremonies and Beliefs . . . in Morocco*, Helsingfors, 1913, p. 121 ff.
[3] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 189 ff.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 75 ff., quoting Plutarch, *Theseus*, 21; Julius Pollux, iv. 101.
[5] *Ib.*, pt. ii., *Taboo*, London, 1911, p. 123.
[6] E. de Flacourt, *Hist. de la grande Isle Madagascar*, Paris, 1658, p. 97 f.
[7] S. Powers, *Tribes of California*, Washington, 1877, p. 129 f.
[8] A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, London, 1887, p. 226.
[9] Grove, pp. 4, 15, 19, 41, 61 f., 75–79, 116 f., 185, 275, 291, 329.
[10] R. B. Cunninghame Graham, in *Sat. Rev.*, Christmas suppl., 1896, p. 17.
[11] *JAFL* i. [1896] 83.

8. The religious dance.—Dancing as a form or part of religious worship is a natural phenomenon, whatever may be the precise meaning or application of the particular occasion. In early Christianity bishops led the faithful in the sacred dances both in the churches and before the tombs of the martyrs. The practice was forbidden by the Council of 692, but the prohibition was ineffective. Centuries later the Liturgy of Paris included the rubric, *le chanoine ballera au premier psaume.* As late as the 18th cent. dancing by the priests on saints' days was practised in French provinces.[1]

The various ideas connected with dancing will be found latent in the religious dance. When David danced before the Ark, the act no doubt meant something more than the desire to honour the sacred object. In some cases where the intention is certainly to 'move' the deity, the vigorous movements of the dancer make the dance a real form of prayer. The following example is suggestive:

The Tarahumare Indians of Mexico hold that 'the favour of the gods may be won by what for want of a better term may be called dancing, but what in reality is a series of monotonous movements, a kind of rhythmical exercise, kept up sometimes for two nights. By dint of such hard work they think to prevail upon the gods to grant their prayers. . . . The Tarahumares assert that the dances have been taught them by the animals. . . . Dance with these people is a very serious and ceremonious matter, a kind of worship and incantation rather than amusement.'[2]

The honorific element pervades many customs. In some cases it is direct.

Thus, among the Timagami Indians the feast-dance is 'a celebration in honour of someone who has provided a feast for the camp. The guests are invited in the afternoon, and the food is shared from a common place where it has been spread upon the ground, each guest being provided with his eating utensils. Tobacco is distributed after the feast. When evening comes on, the chief performs the feast-dance in honour of the donor. He wears some extra apparel and carries a drum in his hand to accompany his singing. . . . While singing the feast-song, inserting a few words at times in honour of the feast-maker, and drumming, he dances before the assembly. Soon he threads his way in and out amongst the people, continuing his song, and when he has gone through the ranks of the spectators he dances back to the feast-ground and ends his dance.'[3]

9. Pantomimic dancing.—From the point of view of æsthetics dancing may be described as muscular music. Like music, it expresses primarily itself; secondarily it expresses whatever is within the scope and material of the art. In this secondary function dancing is pantomimic.

The pantomimic has the longest history of all forms of dancing. It is highly developed in the lowest cultures, such as the Australian, and it is popular in the highest civilizations of to-day. Like other forms, it is applied to various purposes and on various differing occasions. Many other forms (see examples cited above) are pantomimic. Practically all the ceremonial of the Arunta and other Australians is pantomimic, and special ornamentation and dress are usual accessaries.[4]

A good deal of mysticism is attached to the masked dances or pantomimes which have had so remarkable a development among the natives of N.W. America. They represent incidents in the lives of the guardian spirits of the tribe.

'The gift' of a dance 'means that the protégé of the spirit is to perform the same dances which have been shown to him. In these dances he personates the spirit. . . . The obtaining of the magical gifts [*e.g.*, the 'death-bringer,' and the water of life, as well as the dance itself] from these spirits is called *lokoala*, while the person who has obtained them becomes *nauaiaku*, supernatural, which is also the quality of the spirit himself. The ornaments of all these spirits are described as made of cedar bark, which is dyed red in the juice of alder bark. They appear to their devotees only in winter.'[5]

In so far as any worship is connected with such animal-dances, they will involve various religious emotions.

[1] *Sat. Rev.*, 18th Jan. 1896, p. 52.
[2] C. Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, London, 1903, i. 330 f.
[3] Speck, p. 27 f.
[4] Spencer-Gillen[ab], *passim.*
[5] F. Boas, in *Report U.S. Nat. Hist. Mus. for 1895*, Washington, 1897, p. 396.

Thus, if no reason is given, we assume that, when the Yuchi Indians in some of their dances imitate the movements and cries of their totem-animals, they are doing them honour.[1] The Zuñi dance before sacred tortoises may be 'to intercede with the ancestral spirits, incarnate in the animals.'[2]

The secret societies of the Nass River Indians possess as heirlooms ceremonial dances in one of which the performers practise cannibalism; in another they eat dogs; in a third they break objects with a long club, paying for the destroyed property with property of higher value.[3] The last detail is akin to the system of potlatch.

In the bear-dance of the Timagami Indians the men and women form a large circle, with a leader to direct operations. 'The circle of dancers led by the chief, who carries a drum and sings the bear-dance song, then starts around counter-clockwise. The leader sometimes dances backwards, turns around, stoops, and in other ways imitates the bear. . . . The circling keeps up until the song is finished. The idea of this dance seems to be to honour the bear by imitating him.'[4] In another dance of the same people, the duck-dance, the movements of a flock of ducks and drakes are represented by the evolutions of the dancers, in swerving chain-figures. It is curious to note that such a dance is interlarded with European steps—'a modern waltz turn or two is introduced' between the movements. At the close the performers quack two or three times. 'This is purely a pleasure-dance.'[5]

Pantomime is recognized as an educative process in elementary schools to-day, simple operations, such as sowing and reaping, being represented by appropriate movements.[6]

A good illustration of the pantomimic dance as fine art with a touch of superstition remaining, or revived for artistic effect, is found among the Malays. In their monkey-dance pantomime represents the spirit of a monkey entering the girl-dancer as she is rocked in a cot. Then she imitates the behaviour of a monkey, and performs some remarkable tree-climbing.[7]

In pantomime itself the drama is more important than in pantomimic dancing, as it is, *e.g.*, in the ceremonial dances of the Australians and American Indians. The representation of a dramatic story in dumb show, with more or less of dancing movement, is the ballet of Europe and the pantomime of ancient Rome. Under the Roman Empire this form of dancing attained extraordinary popularity, superseding other shows, and with it remarkable artistic excellence. The *fabulæ salticæ* used plots from old mythology, a love-motive being the favourite. The best poets of the day were commissioned to write the scenarios, which seem at times to have been drawn from contemporary life. The modern cinema picture-drama is a close parallel, but in the *fabula saltica* an explanatory recitative was sung by a chorus accompanied by an orchestra.[8]

In another form, parallel to modern skirt-dancing, the dancer represented all the action of the various characters by the movements of his body and the manipulation of a long cloak.[9]

The modern ballet, in common with artistic dancing generally, dates from the 15th century. The great Renaissance included a new birth of dancing. Probably the tradition of the Roman *pantomimi* assisted the institution. From Italy the ballet passed to France, where it was perfected as the *ballet d'action*.[10]

[1] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 76.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 179.
[3] E. Sapir, *Geol. Survey of Canada*, Ottawa, 1915 (Bulletin 19), p. 28.
[4] Speck, p. 28. [5] *Ib.* [6] See Ellis, vi. 74.
[7] Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 465.
[8] L. C. Purser, in Smith's *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq.*[3], *s.v.* 'Pantomimus,' ii. 334 f. See Sueton. *Nero*, 54, *Tit.* 7, *Calig.* 57; Macrob. ii. 7; Ovid, *Ars Am.* i. 595; Lucian, *de Saltatione*.
[9] Purser, *loc. cit.*
[10] *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Ballet,' iii. 269 f. It is there defined as 'a theatrical representation in which a story is told only by gesture, accompanied by music, which should be characterized by stronger emphasis than would be employed with the voice.' The etymology of *ballet*, *ballad*, *ball*, etc., is doubtful. Skeat and the *OED* refer them to L. Lat. *ballare*, 'to dance'; the former favours a connexion with the Sicilian Gr. βαλλίζειν, 'to dance,' but the origin of βαλλίζειν (? βαλλειν) is uncertain. Some derive from *balla* (ball) 'on the alleged ground that in the Middle Ages tennis was accompanied with dancing and song' (*OED*). Neither of the classic authorities on tennis (Julian Marshall, in *The Annals of Tennis*, London, 1878; J. J. Jusserand, *Les Sports et jeux d'exercice dans l'ancienne France*, Paris, 1901) corroborates the musical accompaniment of tennis. E. B. Tylor thought that these words came from the Græco-Roman ball-dance.

10. Dancing as a social pastime.—Artistic and dramatic dancing has frequently and among various peoples been placed under a social ban, in the same way and for the same reasons as the drama. More rarely this has been the case with dancing as a social pastime. Apart from ceremonial dancing in religious worship, Greeks and Romans and most Eastern peoples, while encouraging dancing as a form of entertainment—*e.g.*, at banquets—have refused to admit it as a social pastime. There is thus a professional class. The Malays never dance themselves, but will pay well for good professional dancing.[1] Roman dancers were *infames*.[2] But as a professional class they had an important though unofficial status, like that of the *bayaderes* of India, the *geishas* of Japan, or the *almehs* of Egypt. Even religious dancing developed a professional class, if the *qᵉdhēshôth*, *e.g.*, of Hebrew sanctuaries may be so described.[3]

In the history of the world's art the great dancing geniuses, such as Taglioni and Pavlova, are entitled to a position only second to that of great singers and musical composers.

The use of dancing as a social pastime is comparatively modern. Plato was in favour of boys and girls dancing together. The only approximation to this was the δρμος, in which boys and girls danced in counter-formation.[4] The 15th cent. renaissance of dancing in Italy passed to France, which has been termed 'the school' of the art of dancing, and Spain its 'true home.'[5] It is outside the scope of this article to discuss the development of this form of dancing, which belongs to the sphere of pastime. But it may be noted that the evolution of the art throws much light on the evolution of society and the individual, and in a more clear-cut manner than the evolution of music. For, in the case of dancing, the whole system is involved. As in music, so in dancing, stages of evolution, 'schools,' have developed a method, to be superseded by another. Among typical movements may be mentioned the *pavane*; its character was processional. The minuet has been described as the 'fine flower of the art.[6] But actually it expresses merely an artificial code of courtesy. The type of pair-dancing is the waltz, a dance of uncertain origin.[7]

When in contact with European culture, native peoples throughout the world soon assimilate European dances; *e.g.*, the people of Ceram (E. Indies) have adopted the waltz.[8] Conversely, the higher cultures assimilate the dances of the simpler peoples, and the ephemeral popularity of the tango and 'ragtime' serves to illustrate the continuity of human physical evolution.

LITERATURE.—The authorities quoted in the article supply satisfactory data, but there are no treatises written on any scientifically comprehensive lines.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS.—I. *INTRODUCTORY*.—1. Interpretation of prodigies.—

What fortune or misfortune the prodigy portends is determined for the individual by the culture to which he belongs. Its origin in the culture is properly matter of historical research, for the same interpretation may have had different origins, and different interpretations may have the same objective cause, the respective similarity and difference representing the varied reactions of the cultures in question. Were the interpretations given by differ-

[1] Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 458.
[2] C. L. Souvay, in *CE*, *s.v.* 'Dancing,' iv. 619.
[3] *JE* iv. 425.
[4] G. E. Marindin, in Smith's *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq.*[3], *s.v.* 'Saltatio,' ii. 594; Plato, *Legg.* vi. 771.
[5] *EBr*[11] vii. 798[a]. [6] *Ib.* 797[b].
[7] *Ib.* 799[b]; French *volte*, from the *Volta* of Provence; German has *walzen*, 'to revolve.'
[8] J. G. F. Riedel, *De Sluik- en kroeshaarige rassen tusschen Celebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, p. 130.

ent cultures wholly arbitrary, they would not present such thoroughgoing, or even such partial, resemblance. Some of the resemblances may be attributed to cultural diffusion, where the phenomenon is really continuous in development, overflowing, as it were, the cultural bounds within which it orginates. The classical cultures are good instances, for here we have historical proof of the diffusion, such proof, in the nature of the case, being very difficult to obtain in primitive society, where tribal tradition is an unsafe guide. The spontaneous effect of the phenomena upon the mind is, however, in some cases such as, if not to rule out diffusion, at least to make this supposition superfluous. The eclipse and the earthquake, *e.g.*, never portend good. The reason is not far to seek: earthquakes never effect any good, and frequently leave disaster in their train; the completion of what the eclipse partly effects, in bringing about a diminution of light, would be the culmination of disasters; darkness has ever been the harbinger of evils which the garish light of day dissipates.[1]

In many other instances the prodigy points its own moral, though one largely determined by the predisposition of the people who interpret it (as, *e.g.*, Napoleon's 'sun of Austerlitz'). Whether or not the inference made is historically true, the following passage shows that the suggestion of the interpretation grows out of the nature of the event:

'At the time of the amplification and enlarging [of the village from which Milan grew] by Bellonesus there happened a very strange accident, which gave occasion of the denomination. For when it was new building, a certaine wilde Sow that came forth of an olde ruinous house very early in the morning, hapned to meet some of those that were set aworke about the building of the city. This Sow had halfe her body covered with hard bristly haire as other Pigges are, and the other halfe with very soft and white wool: which portentum, Bellonesus took for a very happy and ominous token, so that he caused the city to be called Mediolanum from the halfe-wooled Sow. What his reason was why he should esteem this strange spectacle for such a luckie token I know not but I conjecture it might be this: perhaps he supposed that the bristly haire might presage strength and puissance in his subjects, and the wooll plenty of necessary meanes that might tend to the clothing of their bodies.'[2]

2. The realm of the unknown.—The unknown is highly charged with mystic power. Many peoples, like the Thonga, have added faith in foreign medicines just because they come from a distant land.[3] For this reason the Bakongo seldom engage the medicine-man of their own village.

'They know too much about him to waste their money on him. They flout him and send for the medicine-man of another village of whom they know little or nothing.'[4]

In the skill with which iron is worked there is something mystical. Among the Bakongo, as among many of the tribes of Africa and of India, the blacksmith holds an honourable position, or is despised and feared. Similarly, the forge is often regarded as a sacred place, and respect is shown towards the anvil and the fire.[5]

In the Middle Ages this superstitious fear and dread attached to the higher learning and superior skill.

A good instance of this tendency is the attitude taken towards Michael Scot, an Irishman of the 13th cent. who narrowly escaped being an archbishop over the see of Cashel. 'He was so widely renowned for his varied and extensive learning that he was credited with supernatural powers; a number of legends grew up around his name which hid his real merit, and transformed the man of science into a magician. In the Border country traditions of his magical power are common. Boccaccio alludes to "a great master in necromancy, called Michael Scot," while Dante places him in the eighth circle of Hell'—all because his learning was beyond the comprehension of his fellows. In the 14th cent. similar magic powers were attributed to Gerald, the fourth earl of Desmond, solely on account of his learning.[1] In Ireland, during the witchcraft superstition, many women were put to death on the charge of using black magic solely because of their skill in simples and their knowledge of the medicinal value of herbs—just such skill and knowledge as have given rise to our present pharmacopœia

The realm of the unknown is peopled by many monstrous beings. This is especially true of the celestial regions and what are, for the people in question, the remoter parts of the earth. In the moon and on parts of the earth, say the Eskimos, are manlike creatures without head or neck, but having a broad mouth, armed with sharp teeth, across the chest.[2] Many tribes in Africa have similar beliefs. They prevailed in Europe until a century ago.[3] In fact, the disposition to make monsters out of the distant and poorly-known is as old as history. The early Babylonians reported an attack by a strange people who had the bodies of birds and the faces of ravens, whose dwelling-place was in the mountains to the north of Mesopotamia.

3. The psychology of prodigies.—(*a*) *Recognition of events as prodigious.*—What phenomena are recognized as prodigies and what importance attaches to them depends upon the state of mind, social and individual. The wise man, as Seneca[4] has expressed it, is not moved with the utmost violences of fortune, nor with the extremities of fire and sword, whereas a fool is afraid of his own shadow, and surprised at all accidents, as if they were all levelled at him. As Pliny[5] says, the Romans could not be sure of anything, not even that a person was dead; there are, in fact, many examples of the dead returning to life, in some cases after the funeral pyre had been lighted and the flames had proceeded too far to permit rescue. There are critical moments when the mind, group and individual, is especially liable to harbour hallucinations and to magnify the ordinary into something prodigious. Intense expectancy gives exaggerated proportions to every event which is extraordinary, and heightened anticipation leaps forward into supposititious realization. The politico-religious fervour of the down-trodden Jews affords many illustrations.

Prior to the revolt in Judæa which broke out in A.D. 66 this expectancy gave life and permanency to a host of terrifying rumours, which, in turn, fanned the fervour into greater vagaries. 'Men dreamed only of signs and omens; the apocalyptic hue of Jewish fancy stained everything with a bloody halo. Comets, swords in the sky, battles in the clouds, light breaking forth of itself from the depth of the sanctuary, victims at the moment of sacrifice bringing forth a monstrous progeny,—these were the tales told with horror from mouth to mouth. One day the vast brazen gates of the Temple had flown open of themselves and refused to close. At the Passover of A.D. 65, about 3 a.m., the Temple was for half an hour lighted as bright as day; some thought that it was on fire. Again, at Pentecost, the priests heard a sound as of many persons in the interior, making hasty preparations as if for flight, and saying to one another, "Let us depart hence!" The great disturbance of mind was itself the best of signs that something extraordinary was about to happen.'[6]

The devil you know is better than the devil you don't know, and the latter always excels in power and malignity.

An observer of the Iroquois has declared that no Iroquois lives who would not in the night-time quail at seeing a bright light the nature of which he did not understand.[7] The Jesuits who visited the Huron in 1653 found them entertaining 'a superstitious regard for everything which savored a little of the uncommon. If, for instance, in their hunt they had difficulty in killing a bear or a stag, and on opening it they found in its head or in the entrails a bone, or a stone, or a serpent, etc.,

[1] Cf. F. Ratzel, *The Hist. of Mankind*, Eng. tr., i. 49.
[2] T. Coryat, *Crudities*, London, 1611, i. 114.
[3] H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912-13, ii. 414; R. M. Lawrence, *Primitive Psycho-therapy and Quackery*, London, 1910.
[4] J. H. Weeks, *Among the Primitive Bakongo*, London, 1914, p. 285.
[5] *Ib.* p. 93.

[1] St. John D. Seymour, *Irish Witchcraft and Demonology*, Dublin, 1913, p. 52 f.
[2] E. W. Nelson, in *18 RBEW* [1899], p. 442.
[3] See, *e.g.*, Lord Monboddo, *Of the Origin and Progress of Language*, Edinburgh, 1774-92, i.; *PC*[3]; Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*.
[4] *Quæst. Nat.* vi. 1.
[5] *HN* vii. 53.
[6] E. Renan, *The Anti-Christ*, Paris, 1876, ch. x.
[7] *2 RBEW* [1883], p. 68.

they said that such object was an *oki*, that is, an enchantment which gave strength and vigor to the animal, so that it could not be killed; and they used it as the superstitious do reliquaries, in order to be always prosperous.'[1]

In many parts of England and of America a crowing hen is considered very unlucky and can by no means be permitted to strut and fret with impunity:

'A whistling woman and a crowing hen
Always come to some bad end.'

The Australian is somewhat afraid of the unique and weird 'Ha! ha!' and 'Hoo! hoo!' of the laughing jackass.[2] The Ainus find it wise not to imitate the cry of any unknown bird, for strange birds are often sent by the devil and carry about the seeds of disease.[3] Double fruits in bananas, nuts, etc., being somewhat out of the ordinary, are believed in N. Queensland to be made by certain invisible beings. The Romans were similarly impressed with the presence of a double 'head' of the liver of a victim, as also by the absence of a 'head.'[4]

When the devout Brāhman ascetic heard the elephant talking to a tree, he exclaimed in amazement, 'Ha! what is this wonder, that an elephant should speak with an intelligible voice, and that I should understand him?'[5]

Those trees are regarded as sinister and are considered inauspicious which are never propagated from seed, and bear no fruit.[6] It portends evil when the cultivated olive changes into the wild, and the white grape or fig becomes wild. It was an evil portent when, upon the arrival of Xerxes at Laodicea, a plane-tree was transformed into an olive and sank into the earth shortly before the civil wars of Pompeius Magnus began, leaving only a few of the branches protruding from the ground. The Sibylline Books were consulted, and it was found that a war of extermination was impending, which would be attended with greater carnage the nearer it approached the city of Rome. Another kind of prodigy is the springing up of a tree in some extraordinary and unusual place—*e.g.*, the head of a statue, an altar, or another tree. A fig-tree shot forth from a laurel at Cyzicus, just before the siege of that city; in like manner, at Tralles, a palm issued from the pedestal of the statue of the dictator Cæsar, at the period of his civil wars. So, too, at Rome, in the Capitol, in the time of Perseus, a palm-tree grew from the head of the statue of Jupiter—a presage of impending victory and triumphs. This palm having been destroyed by a tempest, a fig-tree sprang up in the very same place, at the period of lustration made at a time at which, according to Piso, 'an author of high authority,'[7] all sense of shame had been utterly banished. 'Above all the prodigies that have ever been heard of, however, we ought to place the one that was seen in our own time, at the period of the fall of the Emperor Nero, in the territory of Marrucinum; a plantation of olives, belonging to Vectius Marcellus, one of the principal members of the Equestrian order, bodily crossed the highway, while the fields that lay on the opposite side of the road passed over to supply the place which had been thus vacated by the olive-yard.'[8]

The fear of ghosts is universal.

When the supposedly dead Geraint, hero of the *Mabinogion*, rose up and slew one of the assembled company, 'all left the board and fled away. And this was not so much through fear of the living as through the dread they felt at seeing the dead man rise up to slay them.'[9] It was natural for Teigue O'Neill, the Irish blacksmith, when he discovered that the rider of the horse was a ghost, to 'recoil with a terrified prayer.'[10]

This fear is not a fear of physical injury, but a fear far transcending this. In this territory all natural restraint breaks down.

Horror was on the faces of the friends of a certain John Browne of Durley when, as he lay dying in the year 1654, they saw a great iron triple-locked chest, which stood at the foot of the bed, 'begin to open, lock by lock, without the aid of any visible hand, until at length the lid stood upright.'[11]

Horror would be on our faces too, if we accepted the fact that there was no natural explanation. There is no other attitude to take in the presence of events that shatter our every-day working categories.[12]

(*b*) *Religious aspect.*—The concepts and emotions that harbour prodigies, and find in them a wealth of mystic meaning, have much in common with the religious attitude. Disasters of all kinds are recognized as the inflictions of an angry god. Pindar's remark, 'I ween there is no marvel impossible if gods have wrought thereto,'[1] is profoundly true. The divine nature of the ruler himself was, from the time of Alexander the Great to that of the Roman emperors of the 1st cent. and even longer, evidenced by oracles, portents, and supernatural displays of various sorts.

The Christian army of Ferdinand of Spain, when besieging the Moors in the stronghold of Mochling, near Granada, discharged from their guns inextinguishable combustibles. 'One of these, which passed high through the air like a meteor, sending out sparks and crackling as it went, entered the window of a tower which was used as a magazine of gunpowder. The tower blew up with a tremendous explosion. . . . The Moors, who had never witnessed an explosion of the kind, ascribed the destruction of the tower to a miracle. Some who had seen the descent of the flaming ball, imagined that fire had fallen from heaven to punish them for their pertinacity. The pious Agapida, himself, believes that this fiery missive was conducted by divine agency to confound the infidels; an opinion in which he is supported by other Catholic historians.'[2] Thus each interpreted the event in a way that fitted in with his intellectual background, while both parties found in its superhuman and, for them, supernatural character something of the divine. When, later, the Spanish forces had suffered a year of discouraging reverses with scarcely a bright spot in all their campaigns against the Moors, the unusually severe storms which swept the land seemed to have a sinister meaning, and suggested visitations from on high. High winds prevailed and rains deluged the land, overflowing the valleys, undermining the houses, and drowning the flocks. '"A vast black cloud moved over the land, accompanied by a hurricane and a trembling of the earth. Houses were unroofed, the walls and battlements of fortresses shaken, and lofty towers rocked to their foundations. Ships, riding at anchor, were either stranded or swallowed up; others, under sail, were tossed to and fro upon mountain waves, and cast upon the land, where the whirlwind rent them in pieces and scattered them in fragments in the air. . . . Some of the faint-hearted," adds Antonio Agapida [the Spanish chronicler], "looked upon this torment of the elements as a prodigious event, out of the course of nature. In the weakness of their fears, they connected it with those troubles which occurred in various places, considering it a portent of some great calamity, about to be wrought by the violence of the bloody-handed El Zagal and his fierce adherents."'[3]

A like interpretation was given by the inhabitants of Constance, in Switzerland, of a terrific storm of rain and hail which came upon some encamped soldiers, on a Sunday night (8th May 1642), when 'all the tents were in a thrice blown over. It was not possible for any match to keep fire, or any sojor to handle his musket or yet to stand. . . . Our sojors, and some of our officers too (who suppose that no thing which is more than ordinarie can be the product of nature) attributed this hurrikan to *the divilish skill of some Irish witches*.'[4]

The catastrophic drives men to their wits' end, and even beyond the bounds of reason. He who is deterred by no clearly apprehended danger becomes panic-stricken in the face of mysterious forces. The feeling of human inability to cope with the situation intensifies the individual's helplessness. There is nothing to do but cringe and hope.

'For what can one believe quite safe,' asks Seneca, 'if the world itself is shaken, and its most solid parts totter to their fall? Where, indeed, can our fears have limit if the one thing immovably fixed, which upholds all other things in dependence on it, begins to rock, and the earth lose its chief characteristic, stability? What refuge can our weak bodies find? Whither shall anxious ones flee when fear springs from the ground and is drawn up from the earth's foundations? If roofs at any time begin to crack and premonitions of fall are given, there is general panic: all hurry pell-mell out of doors, they abandon their household treasures, and trust for safety to the public street. But if the earth itself stir up destruction what refuge or help can we look for? If this solid globe which upholds and defends us, upon which our cities are built, which has been called by some the world's foundation, stagger and remove, whither are we to turn?'[5]

When there is public alarm through fall of cities, burying of whole nations, and shaking of earth's foundations, what wonder that minds in the distraction of suffering and terror should wander forth bereft of sense? Indeed, on no occasion will one find more instances of raving prophets than when mingled terror and superstition have struck men's hearts. The Malakand tribes that attacked the British in 1897, under the leadership

[1] *Jesuit Relations*, ed. R. G. Thwaites, Cleveland, U.S.A., 1896-1901, xxxix. 25.
[2] R. Brough Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, London, 1878, i. 25.
[3] J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folklore*, London, 1901, p. 126.
[4] *HN* xi. 73.
[5] F. W. Bain, *The Ashes of a God*, London, 1911, p. 3.
[6] *HN* xvi. 45. [7] *Ib.* xvii. 38. [8] *Ib.*
[9] T. Bulfinch, *Age of Chivalry*, Philadelphia, 1900, pt. ii. ch. vii.
[10] Seymour, p. 72 ff. [11] *Ib.* p. 104.
[12] See W. D. Wallis, *AJRPE* v. [1912] 257-304, vi. [1913] 228-272, vii. [1914] 206.

[1] *Pyth.* x. 49 f.
[2] Washington Irving, *Chronicle of the Conquest of Granada*, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1829, ch. xliii.
[3] *Ib.* ch. lxix.
[4] Seymour, p. 99, quoting T. Fitzpatrick, *The Bloody Bridge*, Dublin, 1903, p. 127.
[5] *Quæst. Nat.* vi. 1.

of the Mad Mullah, are one of many examples of a people assailed by supernatural terrors and doubts, lured by hopes of celestial glory, and taught to expect prodigious events.[1]

II. *HISTORY.*—1. **The Greek view of prodigies.**—According to Empedocles, the various parts of animals had a separate existence. Heads grew supported by no necks, arms wandered about detached from shoulders, and disembodied eyes pierced the solitudes. These several parts united, forming in some cases normal creatures, but, because of their vagarious juxtaposition, in some cases monstrosities, such as man-headed oxen. The normal ones, being better adapted to the conditions of life, survived, while the monsters perished because of their maladjustment.

The stress of the times always heightened the interest in prodigies. Thus, during the Peloponnesian War there were earthquakes unparalleled in their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous than are recorded to have happened in any former age, if we are to believe Thucydides.[2] Again, while Xerxes was leading his army into Greece, prodigies of his defeat were not wanting: a mare gave birth to a hare, signifying, says Herodotus, that Xerxes would return fleeing for his life, and a mule brought forth a colt with the organs of both sexes.[3] Again, when the Persian army approached the temple at Delphi, numerous prodigies appeared: the sacred arms transported themselves outside the temple; thunder struck two crags above the heads of the barbarian force and brought them down upon the foe with considerable mortality.[4] Two days after the olive-tree in the Erechtheum had been burned down, a shoot a cubit long had sprung up from the stump.[5] Salt fish that were being fried leaped from the pan; this signified that the deceased Protesilaus would leap from the dead and avenge himself on the one who had wronged him.[6]

By reading the horoscope Greek astrologers were able to predict the birth of monstrosities. If there was disjunction (*ἀσύνδετα*) between all or most of the recognized proper positions of the planets, a monstrous birth might be expected. It would not be of human birth if the planets in question were in the sign of one of the animals.[7]

2. **The Roman view.**—The speculations of Empedocles found place in the philosophy of the Romans. The earth in the beginning produced various monsters that sprang up with wonderful faces and limbs. But these 'prodigies and portents' were generated to no purpose, for nature abhorred and prevented their increase.[8] Pliny[9] speaks of races having but one eye, and that in the middle of the forehead—veritable Polyphemoi. Some had their feet turned backwards; they could proceed with wonderful velocity, and wandered about indiscriminately with the wild beasts. Some peoples were partly male and partly female. Some had only one leg, but with a foot so large that they could lie down in the shade of it. Some had no noses, some no mouths, subsisting upon odours, and needing neither meat nor drink. Some lived to be 400 years old.

Livy relates three prodigious births: at Frusino, a lamb with a sow's head; at Sinuessa, a pig with a human head; among the Lucani, a foal with five feet.[10] Women gave birth to elephants, to serpents, to hippocentaurs.[11] The birth of more than three children at one birth was looked upon by the Romans as portentous. During the reign of Augustus the birth of four children at one birth was quickly followed by a famine.

In the troublous times following immediately upon Nero's reign, and inaugurated by it, there appeared through the Roman world loathsome spectres, monsters born of slime, and prodigies of every sort. Prominent among these were monstrous births, especially cases where several heads were possessed by the progeny. To the Roman mind each of these represented an emperor. Real or pretended hybrids were given a similar interpretation. A hog with claws like a hawk's was accepted as a perfect image of Nero.[1]

Bright lights sometimes proceeded from the heavens during the night-time, as though the day had suddenly ventured to intrude; a burning shield was seen to dart across the sky at sunset, from west to east, scintillating. In one case a spark fell from a star, increasing in size as it approached the earth, until it attained the magnitude of the moon, shining as through a cloud. It afterwards returned into the heavens and was converted into a *lampas.* Stars moved about in various directions.[2] A bow, or a circle of red, might suddenly appear about the sun.

In ancient Rome it rained milk, blood, a flesh which did not putrefy, wool, iron, and baked tiles. During the war with the Cimbri, and at other times, the air was filled with the rattling of arms and the sound of trumpets. Armies were seen marching, countermarching, and fighting, and the heavens themselves were seen in flames.[3] In the district of Mutina two mountains rushed together, falling upon each other with a very loud crash, and then receding; in the daytime flame and smoke issued from them. There was the usual great crowd of witnesses. All the farmhouses were thrown down by the shock, and many of the animals in them were killed. This heralded the Social War, which was even more disastrous for Italy. Near Harpasa, in Asia, was a large rock which could be moved by the finger, but not if the entire body was applied to it. Near the river Indus a certain mountain had such attraction for iron that, if shoes containing iron were placed on it, they could not be withdrawn, while another repelled iron to such an extent that the foot within a shoe containing iron could not rest upon it. In several places things pushed into the ground could not be pulled out.

Prodigies might appear at any time, but they were especially frequent in time of political or national danger or disaster. In the year in which Fabius Maximus was for the third time elected to the consulship the sea appeared on fire; at Sinuessa a cow brought forth a colt; the statues in the temple of Juno Sospita, Lanuvium, sweated blood, and a shower of stones fell in the neighbourhood of that temple.

'On account of this shower the nine days' sacred rite was celebrated, as is usual on such occasions, and the other prodigies were carefully expiated.'[4]

Prodigies announced from many places while Hannibal was threatening Rome augmented the terror. In Sicily several darts of the soldiers had taken fire; in Sardinia the staff of a horseman who was going his rounds upon a wall took fire as he held it in his hand; the shores were frequently ablaze; at Præneste two shields sweated blood; at Arpi red-hot stones fell from the heavens; at Capena shields appeared in the heavens, and the sun fought with the moon; two moons rose during one day; the fountain of Hercules flowed with spots of blood; in Antium bloody ears of grain fell into the basket as the people were reaping; at

[1] W. L. S. Churchill, *Story of the Malakand Field Force*, London, 1898, p. 38.
[2] i. 23. [3] Herod. vii. 57. [4] *Ib.* viii. 37-39.
[5] *Ib.* 55. [6] *Ib.* ix. 120.
[7] A. Bouché-Leclercq, *L'Astrologie grecque*, Paris, 1899, p. 399 f.
[8] Lucretius, v. 837. [9] *HN* vii. 2.
[10] xxvii. 37, xxxi. 12.
[11] *HN* vii. 3; Val. Maximus, vi. 5. i. 6.

[1] Tacitus, *Ann.* xii. 64; Phlegon, Περὶ Θαυμασίων.
[2] *HN* ii. 29-37. [3] *Ib.* ii. 29-34, 57-59.
[4] Livy, xxiii. 31.

Falerii the heavens appeared cleft as if with a great chasm, and from the cleft came a vast light; the prophetic tables suddenly diminished in size, and one fell out, on which appeared the inscription, 'Mars shakes his spear.' The statue of Mars at Rome, on the Appian Way, sweated at the sight of images of wolves; at Capua the heavens seemed to be on fire, and the moon appeared to be falling amid the rain. This must, indeed, have been good preparation for smaller wonders.

'After these,' says Livy, 'credit was given to prodigies of less magnitude: that the goats of certain persons had borne wool; that a hen had changed herself into a cock; and a cock into a hen; these things having been laid before the senate, as reported, the authors being conducted into the senate-house, the consul took the sense of the fathers on religious affairs. It was decreed that these prodigies should be expiated, partly with full-grown, partly with sucking, victims.'[1]

Later, in the Punic War, another flood of prodigies aroused new fear to supplement the old. Crows had torn some gold in the Capitol with their beaks and had eaten it; at Antium mice gnawed a golden crown; an immense quantity of locusts, coming apparently from nowhere, filled the whole country around Capua; at Reate a foal with five feet was born; at Anagnia scattered fires appeared in the sky and were followed by a meteor; at Arpinum the earth sank into an immense gulf, in a place where the ground was level; the 'head' of the liver was absent from the first victim immolated by one of the consuls. These prodigies were expiated by offerings and sacrifices.[2]

A circle of stars near the moon was visible when Augustus entered Rome, after the death of his father, to assume the name by which he was afterwards known.[3] Shakespeare is following ample precedent in announcing the ominous appearance of five moons immediately after the death of Prince Arthur.[4]

3. The early Christian view.—The spirit of evil, typified by the Roman power or by the violent party of Jerusalem, as the case may be, is a dragon which pours out a flood of water to sweep away the Church (Rev 12[13-15]). The concept is possibly of Babylonian or Egyptian origin,[5] though it is found also in Mazdæism.[6] The false prophet or Antichrist is especially liable to representation as some prodigy. The 'false prophet' whom the writer of the Apocalypse represents as an ally of Nero is a wonder-worker who causes fire to fall from the sky, graven images to live and speak, and who puts the 'mark of the beast' upon men (13[14-17] 16 19). Elsewhere (13[11]) the false prophet is a monster, speaks like a dragon, and has 'two horns like a lamb.' Nor are there lacking elements of the prodigious in that hated Antichrist, the emperor Nero, whose life has been likened to the discordant cries of a grotesque witches' revel.

In the bloody troublous days of Nero meteors and celestial signs received heightened attention.

'Comets, eclipses, mock-suns, northern lights, in which appear crowns, swords, and streaks of blood, fantastic forms of clouds in time of heat, with traces of battles or strange beasts,—drew eager attention and seemed never to have been so vivid as in these tragic years. All the talk was of showers of blood, of wonderful thunder-bolts, of rivers flowing up-stream, or of bloody torrents. A thousand things never noticed in ordinary times came to have a high importance in the feverish excitement of the public mind.'[7]

Christ Himself had prophesied that nation would rise against nation, kingdom against kingdom; there would be earthquakes, terrors, famines, pestilences on all sides, and great signs in the sky (Mt 24[6-8], Mk 13[7-9], Lk 21[9-11]). The prophecy had its ample fulfilment in the near future. The famine came in the year 68; inundation from the Tiber in 69 and from the sea along the coast of Lycia; the pestilence visited Rome in 65, carrying off 30,000 inhabitants; Lyons was swept in the same year by a devastating conflagration, and the Campania by scarcely less destructive cyclones and tornadoes; tempests spread terror broadcast, and nature seemed everywhere perverse. It was a prevalent belief that portents, hiding of the sun and moon in darkness, brandishing of swords in the sky, were to usher in the Messianic kingdom.[1] This view—that calamities were signs of the Messiah's approach—was in vogue among the Jews for many centuries after the time of Christ.[2]

Similar interpretations, inherited no doubt from Rome, were rife as late as the 9th cent., and persisted through the Middle Ages. It was during a wild storm that Cromwell passed away; for had not the devil come to carry off his soul? Numerous and more terrible were the omens heralding the death of Charlemagne, recounted by his contemporary and biographer, Eginhard:

There were frequent eclipses, both solar and lunar, and a black spot appeared for seven days on the sun, during the last three years of his life; the gallery between the basilica and the palace fell suddenly in ruin; accidental fire consumed the wooden bridge over the Rhine at Mayence—both gallery and bridge had been constructed by Charlemagne; during his last campaign into Saxony a ball of fire fell suddenly from the heavens with a great light. 'It rushed across the clear sky from right to left, and everybody was wondering what was the meaning of the sign, when the horse which he was riding gave a sudden plunge, head foremost, and fell.' His javelin was struck from his hand with a violence that sent it twenty feet away. The palace at Aix-la-Chapelle frequently trembled, the roofs of whatever buildings he tarried in kept up a continual crackling noise, the basilica was struck by lightning, and the gilded ball that adorned the pinnacle of the roof was shattered by the thunder-bolt and hurled upon the bishop's house adjoining.[3]

III. *ANIMALS.*—**1. Divination.**—Divination is by no means confined to the classical cultures.

It is practised by means of lice in the Torres Straits, and on the island of Mer is a divinatory shrine where omens are taken from the movements of insects, lizards, and other animals.[4] The Kirghiz divine by means of the shoulder-blade of a sheep; the Buriats use the shoulder-blade of a sheep or a goat in divining the cause of disease or for the discovery of a thief. A written law was given by God to the chief tribal ancestor of the Buriats, who, on his way home to his own people, fell asleep under a haystack. A ewe came to the stack and ate up all the law as well as the hay, but the law remained engraved on the ewe's shoulder-blade.[5] The Kayans of Borneo cast bears' teeth as dice by way of divination, and the Igorot resort to divination with chickens. Before going to battle the Samoans observe the movements of a lizard in a bundle of spears. If it runs about the points of the spears and the outside of the bundle, it is a good omen; if it works its way into the centre for concealment, it is a bad omen. If a lizard comes down on the bare post rather than on the matting which partly covers it, this is a bad portent; similarly if it crosses the path of a man going to battle.[6] The Thonga preserve, as useful for divinatory purposes, the astragalus of a smaller animal found in the stuhls of a hyena—'a most uncommon discovery.'[7]

See, further, artt. DIVINATION.

2. Omens.—Omens likewise are common among primitive people.

The flocking of vultures denotes impending war, it being the habit of these birds to prey upon the bodies of the slain.[8] The snake portends death to a Bushman.[9] Among the Thonga it is a bad omen for a mole to cross one's path.[10] The screech of the eagle informed the Takelma that some one would be killed

[1] xxii. 1. [2] *Ib.* xxii., xxx.
[3] *H V* ii. 28; Seneca, *Quæst. Nat.* i. 2; Vell. Paterculus, ii. 59.
[4] *King John*, act iv. sc. ii.
[5] C. Clemen, *Primitive Christianity*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1912, pp. 137-147.
[6] S. Soderblom, *La Vie future d'après le Mazdéisme*, Paris, 1901, p. 278.
[7] Renan, ch. xiv.

[1] G. F. Fisher, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Edinburgh, 1878, p. 250; Clemen, pp. 137-139.
[2] Renan, ch. xiv.; Mishnáh, *Sôṭáh*, ix. 15.
[3] *MGH*, tr. S. E. Turner, New York, 1880, p. 72; see, further, *DCG*, *s.vv.* 'Wonders,' 'Earthquake,' and *DAC*, *s.v.* 'Dreams.'
[4] *Camb. Anth. Exped. to Torres Straits Reports*, Cambridge, 1901-12, v. [1904] 361; *Ethn. Coll. Brit. Mus.* 139.
[5] *JAI* xxiv. [1894] 99.
[6] G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 47.
[7] Junod, ii. 499.
[8] A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, London, 1894, p. 119.
[9] W. H. I. Bleek, *A Brief Account of Bushman Folk-Lore*, London, 1875, p. 20.
[10] Junod, ii. 321; see also R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, London, 1904, pp. 194-200; D. Kidd, *The Essential Kafir*, London, 1904, pp. 272-274.

by an arrow. When a snake crosses a person's path, it is a sign that one of his relatives will die; if a rattlesnake bites a person's shadow, it is a sign that he will vomit.[1] The Yana declare it a bad sign if a fox 'talk' before daybreak.[2] If the rail-bird flies before a Samoan war party, it is a good omen; it is a bad omen if seen to fly in any other direction. If a certain fish swims rapidly, the Samoans go to battle cheerfully; but, if it turns round now and then on its back, the party would not dare to proceed.[3] The flight of the owl is a good or a bad omen according to the direction taken. If the cuttle-fish is close to shore when the party is about to set out, it is a good sign; if far away, a bad sign. Evil is portended when the sea-eel is driven upon the shore—as often happens after a gale—and the event creates a commotion throughout that locality. If the heron flies before the war party, it is a good sign; but, if it flies across the path, this is a bad omen. The appearance of the creeper-bird in the morning or in the evening means that one's prayers are accepted, while its failure to appear means that the god is angry. If the teeth of the sperm-whale, after being placed in position, lie east and west, it is a good omen; while, if they point towards the north or south, it is a bad omen. A war party will return if a lizard is seen crossing its path.[4]

In Borneo an expedition, prepared by months of labour, will turn homeward if bad omens are observed—*e.g.*, if a particular bird calls on a certain side or flies across the river in some particular fashion; and a newly-married pair will separate if on the wedding day the cry of a deer is heard near the house. Similar beliefs prevail among the Todas.[5]

In Holland, as early as 1611, the presence of a stork upon a house was looked upon as a good omen, and its leave-taking as a bad omen.[6]

3. The crow and the raven.—The English rustic who pronounces a curse on the ill-betiding croak of the crow might well be considered the inheritor of the Roman belief that the crow is a bird of ill-omened garrulity and especially inauspicious at the time of incubation, *i.e.* just after the summer solstice. In the Shetlands the raven is believed to keep close to a house in which there is a corpse, and in Northumberland the cry of the raven is an omen of ill-luck. In rustic England the raven has generally been considered a bird of ill omen. A similar belief is current on the west coast of Africa, where the white-breasted raven is called a man-eater, and magic medicine is manufactured from it. No rain falls when it lays its eggs—the exact contrary of the belief prevailing in the western part of the United States. Its flocking portends impending war.[7] Pliny declares that ravens are most direfully ominous when they swallow their voice, as if being choked. They are unique among birds in having a comprehension of the meaning of their auspices. When the guests of Medus were assassinated, all the ravens departed from the vicinity of Attica and the Peloponnesus. Both Alexander and Cicero were warned of approaching death by the raven. In some instances, however, the presence of the raven betokened divine favour.[8]

4. The owl.—In *Hiraṇyakeśin Gṛhyasūtra* the owl that flies to the abode of the gods is addressed with the words:

'Flying round the village from left to right, portend us luck by thy cry, O owl!'[9]

Striges, 'screech-owls,' was the Roman appellation for witches. The horned owl was especially funereal and greatly abhorred in all auspices of a public nature. Its appearance in the city was a dire omen, though its perching on a private house portended no ill. During the consulship of S. Palpelius Hister and L. Pedanius one entered the very sanctuary of the Capitol, in consequence of which the city was purified on the nones of March in that year, as also again in the consulship of L. Cassius and C. Marius (A.U.C. 647).[10] The note of an owl heard on the left annuls the auspicious note of other birds.[11] The note of the *strix* and the presence or cry of the *bubo* bode ill.[1] The Ainus say that the owl can bewitch people by its hoot, and its cry must not be imitated. The eagle owl is especially respected. To imitate its cry would be nothing short of blasphemy, though the bird is regarded as benevolent. Among the titles given it are 'divine little bird,' 'servant of the world,' 'mediator of the world.' When about to sacrifice one of them, the Ainus offer the following prayer:

'Beloved deity, we have brought you up because we loved you, and now we are about to send you to your father. We herewith offer you food, *inao*, wine, and cakes; take them to your parent, and he will be very pleased. When you come to him say, "I have lived a long time among the Ainu, where an Ainu father and an Ainu mother reared me. I now come to thee. My father, hear me, and hasten to look upon the Ainu and help them."'[2]

In one Samoan village the god was said to be incarnate in the owl. If an owl flew ahead of a party going to fight, it was regarded as favourable; but, if it flew across the road or towards the rear, it was unfavourable.[3] Among the Yao the owl was a favourite companion of the witch, and Thessalian women used its feathers as a magic ingredient. In Shetland the old women say that a cow will give bloody milk if it is frightened by an owl, and will fall sick and die if touched by it. Screech-owls are ghosts among the Arapaho, and in many American tribes the owl is regarded as a bird of ill omen or of magic power, as, notably, in the south-west area. With the Navaho it is a sort of bugaboo used to frighten children into submission.

IV. *Natural phenomena.* — **1. Aurora borealis.**—The Mandans say that the northern lights are occasioned by a large assembly of medicine-men and distinguished warriors of several northern nations who boil their prisoners and slain enemies in huge cauldrons. The Eskimos say that they are the ghosts of the dead playing football with a walrus skull.[4] To the Malecite they represented blood and portended war. The Tlingit share with the Eskimos the belief that the northern lights are the spirits of the dead at play,[5] while the Saulteaux say they are the spirits of the dead dancing.[6] The *aurora borealis* heralded the defeat at sea of the Lacedæmonians and the loss of their influence in Greece. This 'flame of a bloody appearance (and nothing is more dreaded by mortals) which falls down upon the earth'[7] appeared again when King Philip was harassing Greece. Pliny is inclined to interpret it as due to natural causes, but does not deny its association with untoward events:

'They have indeed been the precursors of great events, but I conceive that the evils occurred not because the prodigies took place, but that these took place because the evils were appointed to occur at that period. Their cause is obscure in consequence of their rarity.'[8]

2. Earthquakes. — According to Pliny,[9] the Babylonians attributed earthquakes to the influence of the stars when in a certain conjunction with the sun or with one another. The Greeks attributed thunder and earthquakes to one and the same cause, the former to agitation of the air above the earth, the latter to disturbances in the air beneath the earth. Yet, in spite of the scientific theories, such as we find in Aristotle[10] or Herodotus,[11] an earthquake was a portent by which

1 *JAFL* xx. [1910] 49.
2 E. Sapir, *Yana Texts* (*Univ. of Pennsylvania Museum Publications*), Philadelphia, 1910, pp. 22 f., 221–223.
3 Turner, p. 34.
4 Cf. *11 RBEW* [1894], p. 477 f.
5 W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, pp. 201, 273.
6 Coryat, i. 38.
7 R. F. Burton, *Mission to Gelele*, London, 1864, ii. 246 f.
8 *HN* x. 15.
9 I. v. 17. 3 (*SBE* xxx. [1892] 183).
10 *HN* x. 16 f.
11 Lucan, v. 295.

1 Tibullus, I. v. 51; Seneca, *Herc. Fur.* 688; Statius, *Theb.* iii. 510 ff.; Ovid, *Met.* vi. 431 f., x. 452 f., xv. 791; Silius Ital. viii. 637; Ovid, *Ibis*, 223. See E. W. Martin, *The Birds of the Latin Poets*, *s.vv.* 'Bubo,' 'Spinturnicium,' 'Strix,' *ap.* Leland Stanford, Jr., *Univ. Publications Stanford Univ.*, California, 1914, pp. 43–46, 200–203.
2 Batchelor, pp. 408–429.
3 Turner, pp. 24–26.
4 E. W. Hawkes, *The Labrador Eskimo* (*Anthropological Series of Geological Survey*, no. 14), Ottawa, 1916, p. 137.
5 *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 452.
6 *Coll. Minn. Hist. Soc.*, Minneapolis, 1886, i. 233.
7 *HN* ii. 27.
8 *Ib.*
9 *Ib.* ii. 81.
10 *Meteorology.*
11 vi. 98.

the deity intimated to men the evils that were about to befall them. During the 2nd cent. of our era, when earthquakes were both frequent and frightful in their destruction of cities, the Stoic philosophers, feeling the old explanation insufficient to account for such disasters, attributed them to the displeasure of the gods—a view which later Christian theology welcomed and made popular. The earthquakes which were so prevalent in the region of the Bay of Naples in the 1st cent. A.D. were interpreted by Christians as signs of divine wrath visiting deserved punishment upon the wicked and licentious Romans; and the latter also regarded them as supernatural. Lucretius, following Epicurus, Democritus (water and air), and Anaxagoras (fire and air), ascribes earthquakes to the fall of great substances beneath the earth as well as to air escaping from subterranean caverns. Seneca attributes them to escaping air.[1]

Earthquakes occurring during the day or a little after sunset are heralded by a long thin cloud extending over the clear sky. The water in wells is more turbid than usual and emits a disagreeable odour. Birds settle upon vessels at sea and give the alarm. Yet so ominous are earthquakes that Pliny, who is inclined to find their cause in subterranean winds, declares that the city of Rome never experienced a shock which was not the forerunner of some great calamity.[2]

The Japanese once held that the magnet loses its power during an earthquake or even immediately prior to one. They attributed earthquakes to movements of a tortoise, on which the earth rests, or to the flapping of a large subterranean fish, which, when it wakes, wriggles about and causes the vibrations. During a severe earthquake masses of people can be seen, robed in white, some of them on their knees, attempting to appease the wrath of the gods or demons who are responsible for the disturbance.[3] The Indians of the south-western part of the United States have a similar belief. They say that the shaking of the earth is caused by the wriggling of a large subterranean serpent or dragon. The Tlingit attribute them to Old-woman-underneath.[4] This is almost identical with the belief prevalent in Melanesia and Polynesia. The Arabs regard an earthquake as the will of Allah and resign themselves to it calmly, not anticipating any greater calamity. The Caribs attribute earthquakes to a subterranean people.[5] The natives of Bali and of the Pagi Islands attribute them to evil spirits, as do the Mao Naga. With these peoples, as also among the ancient Hindus and in ancient Rome, a tabu was placed on all ordinary occupations; a Brāhman might not read the Veda. Earthquakes were so common in Rome in the year 193 B.C. that all public business was blocked, and during the following year shocks lasting thirty-eight days called for a total cessation of business. As late as the time of the emperor Claudius an earthquake was always followed by the appointment of a holiday for the performance of sacred rites.[6] After the occurrence of an earthquake during a battle Earth would be appeased.[7] In the first centuries A.D. the pagan Romans usually attributed them to displeasure towards the Christians.[8] In the 8th cent., Bede[9] attributes earthquakes to the leviathan in his subterranean prison, who, in his indignation, shakes the earth. Aristotle's view was generally championed by the later mediæval theologians (as by Cardinal d'Ailly, *Concordia astronomicæ veritatis cum theologia*, Paris, 1483); yet in 1580, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, earthquakes were generally considered by the clergy as evidence of God's wrath—a view popular in the New England States as late as the last half of the 18th cent., and revived on the Pacific coast after the earthquake of 1906 which destroyed San Francisco.

[1] *Quæst. Nat.* vi. 5-32. [2] *HN* ii. 83.
[3] R. B. Hubbard, *U.S. in the Far East*, Richmond, Va., 1899, p. 168; W. Tyndale, *Japan and the Japanese*, New York, 1910, p. 151 f.
[4] *Ib. RBEW*, p. 452. [5] *Ib. RBEW* [1915], p. 378 f.
[6] Livy, i. 31, iii. 5, vii. 28, xxi. 62, xxv. 7, *et al.*
[7] Florus, *Hist.* i. 19
[8] See W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*[8], London, 1888, New York, 1910, i. 408
[9] *de Nat. Rer.* xlix. (*PL* xc. 275)

3. Eclipses.—The Chaldæans explained eclipses on the supposition that one half of the moon was bright, the other half dark. When she suddenly turned the bright side away from men and presented to them her dark visage, they had evidence of her displeasure. Some event of importance—a pestilence, a famine, a war, an earthquake—followed hard upon each eclipse. For the Greeks, similarly, an eclipse boded no good. It signified the turning aside of the face of the god and the approach of a dire crisis. The moon hid the sun, and the sun fell into a swoon, or ἔκλειψις (*défaillance*). The moon, assisted by the other planets, then provided the energy which the sun temporarily could not supply.

'Xerxes [remarking an eclipse of the sun] was seized with alarm, and, sending at once for the Magians, inquired of them the meaning of the portent. They replied: "God is foreshowing to the Greeks the destruction of their cities; for the sun foretells for them and the moon for us." So Xerxes, thus instructed, proceeded on his way with great gladness of heart.'[1]

An eclipse caused Cleombrotus to bring his army home.

'For while he was offering sacrifice to know if he should march out against the Persian, the sun was suddenly darkened in mid sky.'[2]

In 585 B.C. a sudden eclipse of the sun caused the fighting Medes and Lydians to lay down their arms and hastily make peace; and the Athenian expedition which was about to depart from Syracuse in 413 B.C., after ignominious defeat, was delayed by an eclipse of the moon which filled the soldiers with fear. Thales was reputed able to predict an eclipse of the sun and to account satisfactorily for the phenomenon. Pythagoras likewise explained eclipses as natural phenomena, as did Aristotle and Pliny. The Egyptians also attempted to explain them as part of normal celestial occurrences and to predict them.[3] Lucretius explains eclipses of the sun and moon in the modern way,[4] as do Seneca[5] and Livy.[6] Livy says that Caius Sulpicius Gallus, military tribune, 'lest they should any of them consider the matter a prodigy,' foretold to the army an eclipse of the moon on the following night. He refers also to the custom of making a din during an eclipse of the moon, presumably to frighten away the beast that is devouring it.[7] Pliny admits, with his prevalent inconsistency of reason and superstition, that many eclipses are portentous, especially such as are unusually long. This was the case when Cæsar was slain, as in the war against Antony, when the sun remained dim for almost an entire year. Driving away an eclipse by beating drums and cymbals is referred to by Tacitus.[8] The inhabitants of Turin long continued this practice.[9]

The Armenians believed eclipses of the moon to be caused by the interposition of a dark body between it and the earth during the earth's revolution about the moon.[10] Orthodox Hindus look upon an eclipse as the arrest of the sun by his creditors, Rāhu and Ketu. They accordingly

[1] Herod. vii. 37. [2] *Ib.* ix. 10.
[3] Bouché-Leclercq, pp. 43-49, 246, 333, 354, 581; H. R. Hall, *Ancient Hist. of the Near East*, London, 1907, p. 18; *HN* ii. 7.
[4] vi. 753. [5] *Quæst. Nat.* i. 12.
[6] xxxvii. 4. [7] xliv. 37, xxvi. 5, xxii. 1.
[8] *Ann.* i. 28.
[9] R. Cellier, *Hist. gén. des auteurs sacrés et ecclésiastiques*, Paris, 1858-69, xiv. 607.
[10] *ERE* i. 797b.

give alms and observe a fast during the eclipse. There is another belief to the effect that it is caused by a demon, called Svarbhanu.[1] This is similar to the Chinese belief that the sun or moon is being swallowed by a dog or other beast. They accordingly beat gongs to rescue it by frightening away the devourer.[2] Since an eclipse of the sun portends some awful and mysterious event, the natives of Ceylon observe a fast on that day.[3] The Todas fire off guns and send up rockets to frighten away the snake that is trying to eat the hare in the moon, and accompany these demonstrations with shouts. They observe a fast also.[4] Shintō religion ordained that, at the time of an eclipse, certain jewels, regarded as amulets, should be suspended from the highest branches of the sacred *cleyera*, their brilliance being suggestive of the light of the sun which it was desired to restore.[5] The lighting of fires, doubtless for the same reason, will dispel an eclipse, and so will the crowing of cocks, as they are the usual heralds of the sun's return. The penultimate *sūrah* of the Qur'ān contains a spell designed to ward off the evil influences that normally accompany an eclipse.

Pierre Bayle argues in some detail that comets and eclipses do not presage ill. He refutes the doctrine of the ancients and that of his contemporaries, by showing that no more misfortunes came after the appearance of certain comets of his day (17th cent.) than before them.[6]

On the west coast of Africa an eclipse of the moon is attributed to the shadow of the sun, which is constantly in pursuit. The natives throng the streets, shrieking and shouting, 'Leave her! Be off! Go away!'[7] But Junod[8] declares that the Thonga are not much impressed with eclipses, being more struck with wonder at the supernatural knowledge of the white people than with fear of the phenomenon itself.

For the Maori an eclipse of the moon presages the fall of the enemy's fortress.[9] The Tahitians it filled with dismay. They supposed it under the influence of some evil spirit which was about to destroy it. They accordingly repaired to the temple and offered prayers for the release of the moon. Some said that the sun or moon, as the case might be, was swallowed by a god whom, through neglect, the celestial body had offended. Liberal presents were offered to induce the god to abate his anger and eject the luminaries of day and night from his stomach. The Tonga Islanders are content to explain the eclipse of the moon as due to a thick cloud passing over it.[10] The N. Queensland natives attribute an eclipse to the anger of spirits;[11] and the Sandwich Islander says that the moon is bitten, pinched, or swallowed.[12]

The Bellacoola believe that during an eclipse the moon paints her face black. At this time the moon performs one of the most sacred ceremonies of the *lsusuit*, which are thought to be very dangerous to the performers. The black paint with which her face is covered is supposed to be a protection against these dangers. Aialilaaya, the guardian of the moon, restores her to her full size, and cleans her face after an eclipse.[1] The Dakota discharge their rifles in the air to drive away the demon or evil spirit that is causing the eclipse.[2] The Eskimos of the Lower Yukon believe that a subtle essence or unclean influence descends to the earth during an eclipse. If any of it should be caught in utensils, it would produce sickness. To avert this, at the commencement of an eclipse every woman turns all her pots, wooden buckets, and dishes upside down.[3] The Navahos say that an eclipse is caused by the death of the orb, which is revived by the immortal bearers of the sun and moon. During an eclipse of the moon the family is awakened to await its recovery. Similarly, a journey is interrupted and work ceases during an eclipse of the sun. Songs referring to the *hozhojī*, or rite of blessing, are chanted by any one knowing them; otherwise the passing of an eclipse is awaited in silence. It is not considered auspicious to have a ceremony in progress during an eclipse of the sun or moon, and a ceremony is often deferred on this account. The rising generation, however, pays little or no attention to this custom.[4] The Tlingit say that the sun and moon are hiding their faces during eclipse, and they blow their breath towards them in order to blow away the sickness which the eclipse is bringing.[5]

4. Hail.—Hail was formed by the freezing of an entire cloud (Posidonius). At Cleonæ, according to Seneca,[6] were hail-guards appointed by the State to notify the people of the approach of hail. Upon such notification the people offered sacrifices, some a chicken, some a lamb. If these were not to be had, they pricked the finger with a well-sharpened stile and made atonement with their own blood.

Aristotle considered hail and snow the same in formation, differing only in size and shape.[7] For Pliny it was merely frozen rain, probably caused by the winds; but the star Arcturus scarcely ever rises without accompanying storms of hail.[8] Lucretius leans towards a similar interpretation, but his views of its formation are not clearly expressed.[9] Hail is the result of frozen rain-drops, said Bede;[10] but the *Lex Visigothorum*, the earliest Teutonic code, provides a penalty for those who, by incantations, bring hail-storms upon the fields and vineyards.[11]

Hail is often personified in N. American mythology, but the phenomenon is seldom regarded as of any special significance. Among the Nandi no work was permitted during the twenty-four hours following a hail-storm.[12] The Kafirs permitted no field work on the day following a hail-storm, for this would bring down more hail.[13]

5. Lightning and thunder.—Thunder, especially on a cloudless day, was the great omen of Zeus.

[1] H. Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879, p. 351.
[2] E. H. Parker, *John Chinaman*, London, 1901, p. 346; Lady Susan Townley, *My Chinese Note Book*, do. 1904, p. 284 f.
[3] M. E. Stewart, *Everyday Life on a Ceylon Cocoa Estate*, London, n.d., p. 39.
[4] Rivers, p. 593.
[5] *ERE* viii. 297 f.; *Kojiki*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain², Tokyo, 1906, p. 64.
[6] *Pensées diverses, à l'occasion de la comète de 1680*, Rotterdam, 1682.
[7] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples*, London, 1890, p. 65 f.; A. Le Hérissé, *L'ancien Royaume du Dahomey*, Paris, 1911, p. 258.
[8] ii. 282.
[9] E. Tregear, *The Maori Race*, London, 1905, p. 336.
[10] W. Mariner, *Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*³, ed. J. Martin, Edinburgh, 1827, p. 342; W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*², London, 1832–36, i. 331.
[11] A. C. Bicknell, *Travel and Adventures in N. Queensland*, London, 1895, p. 102 f.
[12] W. Ellis, iii. 171.

[1] F. Boas, *The Myth. of the Bella Coola Indians* (= *Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* ii.), New York, 1898, p. 31, *Jesup N. Pacif. Publ.* i.
[2] D. C. Poole, *Among the Sioux of Dakota*, New York, 1881, p. 91.
[3] Nelson, *18 RBEW*, p. 430 f.; for Labrador Eskimos see Hawkes, p. 156.
[4] The Franciscan Fathers, *An Ethnologic Dictionary of the Navaho Language*, Saint-Michaels, Arizona, 1910, p. 41.
[5] *26 RBEW*, p. 452 f., *29 RBEW* [1916], p. 46, *30 RBEW*, p. 254 ff. For tabus imposed during eclipses see Hutton Webster, *Rest Days*, New York, 1916, pp. 42, 50 f., 99, 134 f., 152 f., 259. Greek, Roman, and Christian conceptions are described by Andrew D. White, *A Hist. of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*, New York, 1910, i. 172 f.; and by Lecky, i. 67; see also J. Brand, *Observations on the Popular Antiquities of Great Britain*, ed. London, 1908, iii. 152.
[6] *Quæst. Nat.* iv. 6 f.
[7] *Meteorology*, i. 11.
[8] *HN* ii. 39, 61.
[9] *De Rer. Nat.* vi. 107, 157 ff.
[10] *De. Nat. Rer.* xxxiv.
[11] Bk. vi. tit. 2, 4.
[12] A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi*, Oxford, 1908, pp. 17, 20, 100.
[13] Ratzel, i. 56.

If heard on the right, it was favourable, and therefore unfavourable to the foe, who would hear it on the left. The thunderbolt was cast by Zeus.

'All night Zeus the counsellor meditated evil against them, thundering terribly. And pale fear seized them and they poured wine from their cups upon the ground, nor did any one dare to drink before he had poured a libation to the exalted son of Kronos.'[1]

The Pythagoreans believed that lightning was intended to terrify the damned in Tartarus. The Persians considered it a missile of divine wrath.

Said Artabanus, the adviser of Xerxes, 'Thou seest how the Deity strikes with thunderbolt those beasts that tower above their fellows, but the little ones worry him not; and thou seest also how his missiles always smite the largest buildings and trees of such kind; for God loves to truncate all those things that rise too high. Thus, too, a large army may be ruined by a small one, when God in his jealousy hurls a panic or a thunderbolt, through which they are shockingly destroyed; for God permits none but himself to entertain grand ideas.'[2]

For the Romans thunder predicted the good or evil fortune attendant upon an undertaking, and might itself be compelled or invoked. According to an Etrurian legend, thunder was invoked when the territory of Volsinium was laid waste by the monster Volta. To perform the ceremonies improperly was to court death from the lightning—a punishment visited upon Tullus Hostilius for such shortcomings. Thunder on the left was propitious, for the not very enlightening reason that the east is on the side of the heavens. It is very propitious if the thunder proceeds from the north to the east and then returns to the north. The remaining quarters of the heavens are neither so propitious nor so much to be dreaded. When Marcellus was about to enter upon the duties of consul, it thundered. The augurs were summoned and declared the election invalid, whereupon the fathers spread abroad the report that the gods were displeased because of the election of two plebeians as consuls.[3] Seneca finds marvellous effects in lightning, which leave no doubt that a subtle divine power is inherent in it. But he discountenances the prevailing view that lightning has the sovereign power of destroying the force of other portents, and also the view of Cæcina that, when something is simmering in one's mind, the lightning-stroke either urges it or deters from it. The truth is, if one has a design, then the lightning that occurs counsels; but, if one has no such design, it warns. Nor does he agree that the bolt which occurs first after entrance on an inheritance, or when a city or an individual has entered upon a new phase of existence, embraces in its prognostication the series of events through the whole subsequent life. Sometimes it portends nothing, or at least nothing that we can discover—*e.g.*, if it strike in the sea or in the desert.[4] The Stoic Attalus, according to Seneca,[5] recognized a class of lightning portending nothing that concerns us, and a class intimating what does concern us. Of the significant lightning there are several varieties—a favourable, an unfavourable, and a neutral. The unfavourable portents may be (*a*) unavoidable, (*b*) avoidable, (*c*) such as may be mitigated, or (*d*) such as may be delayed. If benefits be foretold, they may be (*a*) abiding or (*b*) transient.

In violent storms at sea stars seem to settle on the sails. This is accepted as aid from Castor and Pollux. It is, says Seneca,[6] really a sign that the storm is breaking and the wind subsiding; otherwise the stars would flit about without settling. When Glyppus was on the voyage to Syracuse, a star appeared resting on the very tip of his lance. At other times stars rested on the points of the Roman spears.[7]

[1] *Iliad*, viii. 478–481.

[2] Herod. vii. 10, 5; see *HN* ii. 53, xxviii. 5; Cicero, *de Divin.* ii. 29; Suetonius, *Caligula*, 5; *Cod. Theod.* lib. ix. tit. xvi. 1, 3; Eusebius, *HE* v. 5.

[3] Livy, xxv. 3, 31.

[4] *Quæst. Nat.* ii. 32–34, 39–49.

[5] *Ib.* ii. 50, 59.

[6] *Ib.*

[7] *Ib.*

The Mission Indians of California personify ball-lightning, which they generally regard as possessing malign power.

In the belief of the Saxons thunder on Sunday of a certain year betokens great bloodshed in some nation; on Monday, that a royal child shall be put to death; on Tuesday, failure of crops; on Wednesday, the death of the field labourers; on Thursday, the death of the women; on Friday, the death of sea animals; on Saturday, the death of judges and bed-fellows.[1]

The thunderbolt, according to mediæval belief, was of diabolical origin and eccentric in its workings. It would strike the sword in its sheath, gold in the purse, the foot in the shoe, leaving the respective coverings unharmed; it would consume a human being internally and leave the skin unscathed; it would destroy nets in the water, but not on land. This is in keeping with the belief that the thunderbolts with which the leaders of the Iapygians were stricken down were for a long time afterwards visible.[2]

The belief in thunder-stones, usually the stone implements of previous and forgotten peoples, is almost world-wide.[3] Bushman philosophy declares that it is the rain that lightens. The Bakongo say that thunder is the voice of a great fetish and the lightning the fetish itself.[4]

On the north-west Pacific coast of N. America the thunder-bird, which is associated with the thunder, plays an important part in mythology, in art, and in initiation ceremonies.

The Tlingit say that 'the thunder bird causes thunder by flapping its wings or by moving even a single quill. When it winks, lightning flashes. Upon its back is a large lake, which accounts for the great quantity of rain falling during a thunder-shower. . . . The thunder bird keeps on thundering and the sky continues cloudy until the bird catches a whale.'[5]

The Tewa say that 'lightning is produced by *'ōk'uwa*, who throw it from the clouds'[6]—a view prevailing throughout the Plains area, as also in Guiana.[7] The Mewan of S. California say that thunder is caused by two personages who entered the heavens in the form of birds. Another account attributes its origin to Mother Deer and Coyote-man, who made thunder by shaking the dry skin of the bear, while lightning was made from the eyes of boy fawns. To the northern Mewuk thunder is a prototype of the valley bluejay living down below to the west, in the San Joaquin valley, where the clouds are. The rumblings that come from him when he is angry are called thunder by human beings.[8] The Takelma caused thunder to cease rumbling by pinching dogs until they barked. Probably the dog's bark was supposed to frighten away the racoon-like animal whose drumming was the source of the thunder.[9] The Mandans attribute thunder to the flapping of the wings of a huge bird. When the bird flies softly, as is usually the case, it is not heard; but, when it flaps its wings violently, it occasions a roaring noise. It has two toes on each foot, one pointing ahead, the other behind. It dwells on the mountains, and builds nests there as large as one of the forts. It preys upon deer and other large animals, the horns of which are heaped up around the nest. The Hidatsa, similarly, attribute thunder to the flapping of the wings of a large bird which causes rain,

[1] T. O. Cockayne, *Leechdoms, Wortcunning and Starcraft* (Rolls Ser. xxxv.), London, 1864–66, iii. 169.

[2] Athenæus, xii. 24.

[3] See esp. White, i. 266 ff., 320 ff.; Brand, iii. 316 f.; John Evans, *Ancient Stone Implements of Great Britain and Ireland*[2], London, 1897; W. Y. E. Wentz, *The Fairy-Faith in Celtic Countries*, do. 1911.

[4] Weeks, p. 287; Bleek, pp. 395–397; Ratzel, i. 56.

[5] *26 RBEW*, p. 454.

[6] *29 RBEW*, p. 59.

[7] *30 RBEW*, p. 269 f.

[8] C. H. Merriam, *Dawn of the World*, Cleveland, Ohio, 1910, pp. 173, 199, 223.

[9] E. Sapir, *Takelma Texts* (*Univ. Penn. Anthrop. Pub.*), Philadelphia, 1910, p. 95.

the glance of its eye when seeking prey giving rise to the lightning.[1]

The Australian native alleges that thunder causes tortoises to come out of the water and lay their eggs.[2]

6. Meteors, meteoric stones, and comets.—Meteors were generally portentous among the Greeks and Romans, and meteoric stones were venerated by them. In the Gymnasium at Abydos was a meteoric stone which Anaxagoras was said to have predicted would fall in the middle of the earth. Another was at Cassandria, formerly Potidæa, 'which from this circumstance was built in this place.'[3] Pliny reports seeing one which had been brought from the fields only a short time before, in the country of the Vocontii (modern Dauphine). He regards meteors as stars which are visible only when falling.[4] Alexander, in Lemaire,[5] gives the following definition:

'Meteora ista, super cervices nostras transeuntia, diversaque a stellis labentibus, modo aerolithis ascribenda sunt, modo vaporibus incensis aut electrica vi prognata videntur, et quamvis frequentissime recurrant, explicatione adhuc incerta indigent.'

The Aleuts and the Eskimos use meteoric stones as amulets, and the Dakota consider them imbued with mystic power. In Pechili and Manchuria they are worshipped because they come from heaven. In some parts of China they are supposed to originate from thunderbolts, and the fall of one is an evil omen.[6] In Japan meteorites were given over to the priest and were kept in the temple. They were offered annually to Shokujo on her festival, the seventh day of the seventh month. They were said to have fallen from the shores of the Silver River, Heavenly River, or Milky Way, after being used by the goddess as weights to steady her loom.[7]

It is not stars but fire that falls from heaven, declares Bede:

'It springeth off the heavenly bodies as sparks do from fire. In fact there are as many stars still in heaven as there were at the beginning when God created them.'[8]

The Chaldæans explained comets as special thunderbolts, flaming torches hurled by the thunder-gods. The Greeks held, among other views, that they were rockets formed of particles thrown off by the earth and set on fire in the higher regions of the sublunary world. Here they were consumed, and afterwards fell back to earth.[9] Aristotle held the much more advanced view that they were the result of a certain juxtaposition of the stars.[10] Pliny adopts in large part the classification of comets inherited from the Greeks:

There are the Crinitæ, 'as if shaggy with bloody locks, and surrounded with bristles like hair; the Pogoniæ, having a mane hanging down from their lower part, suggestive of a beard,' etc. 'There is also a white comet, with silver hair, so brilliant that it can scarcely be looked at, exhibiting, as it were, the aspect of the Deity in a human form. There are also some that are shaggy, having the appearance of a fleece, surrounded by a kind of crown.'[11]

The rising of a comet does not convey a threat of wind and rain in the immediate future, as Aristotle says, but casts suspicion over the whole year. Hence it is plain that the comet has not derived prognostications from its immediate surroundings to reveal them for the immediate future, but has them stored up and buried deep within by the laws of the universe. The comet which appeared in the consulship of Paterculus and Vopiscus fulfilled the anticipations of this kind entertained by Aristotle, and, for that matter, by Theophrastus; for there were everywhere prolonged storms, while in Achaia and Macedonia cities were overturned by earthquakes.[1] A meteor as big as the moon appeared when Paulus was waging war against Perseus. A similar portent appeared about the time of the death of Augustus, when Sejanus was executed, and before the death of Germanicus.[2] For the Roman sailor many shooting stars were the sign of a storm.

Shooting stars are the embers thrown down from the fires kept by spirits of the dead.[3] They are usually unpropitious. The Spartan ephors might depose a king at the end of eight years, if, during their vigil on a clear and moonless night, they saw a meteor or shooting star. Frequently they portend some important event:

'When beggars die, there are no comets seen;
The heavens themselves blaze forth the death of princes'
(Shakespeare, *Julius Cæsar*, act II. sc. ii.).[4]

7. The Milky Way.—The Jews thought of the Milky Way as a river flowing through the heavens, proceeding from the throne of God—an idea derived in its general conception from Babylonia.[5] The Japanese say that the River of Heaven or the Milky Way is a vast river in the sky, whose overflow is represented by the Yangtse. Across this river is neither bridge nor ferry, but once a year, on the seventh day of the seventh month, Kasapagi, an immense jay, comes to it and spreads its wings across. Over this bridge meet Kengin, the neatherd, who presides over arms, and Shokujo, the weaver, who presides over weaving and other feminine arts.[6]

A tradition current among the Micmacs states that the Milky Way was formed when the Virgin Mary, returning across the heavens with a pail of milk, stumbled and fell. The Tlingit say that the Milky Way was made by the culture hero Lq'ayak when journeying across the heavens.[7] The Tewa call it the backbone of the Universe Man.[8]

8. Perihelion.—The perihelion was explained by Aristotle as due to refraction from the sun,[9] and by Seneca as the reflexion of the sun in the heavens.[10] To the Romans it portended rain, and often some considerable misfortune. The Tlingit say that, if a mock sun goes down with the sun, good weather is portended; if it goes away before sunset, bad weather.[11]

Bishop Latimer in 1552 speaks of rings about the sun as signs of the approaching end of the world.[12]

9. Rainbow.—The Catawba (as also the Tlingit) call the rainbow the 'dead people's road.'[13] The Teton Dakota will not point at the rainbow with the index-finger, though they can point at it with the lips or elbow. Should one forget and point at it with the fore-finger, the bystanders laugh at him, saying, 'By-and-by, O friend, when your finger becomes large and round, let us have it for a ball bat.'[14] The Hopi and the Thompson Indians of British Columbia have a similar tabu. The Hidatsa call the rainbow 'the cap of the water' or 'the cap of the rain,' and attribute its formation to the claws of a red bird. The Mandans say that it is a spirit accompanying the sun.

The 'great snake of the underneath' is the rainbow-god of the Yoruba. It comes up at times to

[1] A. P. Maximilian, *Travels in the Interior of N. America*, Eng. tr., London, 1843, p. 399.
[2] J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, Melbourne, 1881, p. 96.
[3] *HN* ii. 59. [4] *Ib.* ii. 25.
[5] *Poetæ Latini minores*, Paris, 1824–26, i. 302.
[6] E. H. Parker, *Ancient China Simplified*, London, 1908, p. 269; Thomas Wright, *Travels of Marco Polo*, do. 1854, p. 304; C. J. L. de Guignes, *Voyage à Pékin*, Paris, 1809, i. 195–250.
[7] *TASJ* x. [1882] 199 f. [8] Cockayne, iii. 271.
[9] Bouché-Leclercq, p. 357 ff. [10] *Meteorology*, i. 4.
[11] *HN* ii. 22.

[1] Seneca, *Quæst. Nat.* vii. 3, 11, 1, 27, 2. [2] *Ib.* vii. 15.
[3] Swanton, *26 RBEW*, p. 452 (Tlingit).
[4] For an excellent account of the mediæval and later Christian view of meteors see White, i. 171 ff.; also Lecky, i. 367–369; Brand, iii. 241.
[5] Clemens, pp. 102, 167. [6] *TASJ* x. 199.
[7] *26 RBEW*, p. 452. [8] *29 RBEW*, p. 41.
[9] *Meteorology*, iii. 2, 3. [10] *Quæst. Nat.* i. 11–13.
[11] *26 RBEW*, p. 453.
[12] *Sermons*, Second Sunday in Advent, 1552 (*Sermons and Remains*, Cambridge, 1845).
[13] *JAFL* xxvi. [1913] 330. [14] *11 RBEW* [1894], p. 467.

drink water from the sky. A variety of the python is the messenger of this god.[1]

Pliny gives a purely naturalistic explanation of the rainbow, denying that it is either wonderful or ominous, yet he admits that it means either war or a fierce winter which will make an end of men's work and injure the sheep.[2] Seneca tells us that a rainbow in the south portends a heavy fall of rain; one in the west, a dew or light rain.[3]

To the Arawaks the rainbow heralds the approach of white people from that quarter in which it appears. When the Caribs see it at sea, they accept it as a good omen, but, if it appears while they are on land, they hide in their homes, considering it a strange and masterless spirit which is seeking to kill somebody.[4]

10. Volcanic activity.—For the Romans volcanic activity presaged dire calamities.[5] Avernus, in Italy, was commonly thought the entrance into the infernal regions.

The old crater in Ceylon contained salt water which was considered the residue of the tears of Adam and Eve, who retreated here after their expulsion from paradise and for one hundred years copiously bewailed their sin.[6] Gregory the Great[7] saw the soul of Theodoric going down a volcano on the island of Lipari.

11. Waterspout.—The waterspout took the form of a great animal and was much dreaded by the Roman sailor.[8]

12. Will o' the wisp.—The Yorkshireman can elude a will o' the wisp by putting a steel knife into the ground, handle upwards. It will run round this until the knife is consumed, thus providing the pursued an opportunity to escape. The mysterious power of attraction which it possesses can be escaped by twining one's apron. In 16th cent. England many superstitions were associated with this phenomenon.[9]

Among the Micmac, as also among the Dakota, the word for will o' the wisp means also ghost. Both tribes believe that it will pursue one. The Dakota have a medicine which will protect the wearer from such pursuit. The Micmac elude it by putting a pin point upwards in their tracks; this the *skedégamutch* will not go past.[10] In Maryland the superstitious Whites believe that it is the evil eye pursuing them.[11]

V. *PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIC PHENOMENA.*—**1. Albinos.**—The albino person or animal is often the object of religious reverence. The sudden and mysterious appearance of the white buffalo was the 'sign' for which the Fox Indians waited.[12] For many of the American tribes the white buffalo or the white deer portended some extraordinary fortune. The skin of the white buffalo cow was an eminent fetish with the Mandan and Hidatsa, worn on rare occasions and sometimes used as a sacrifice. The Crow have a superstitious fear of the white buffalo cow. When they meet one, they address the sun with these words: 'I will give her to you.' They then attempt to kill the animal, but leave the flesh untouched, saying to the sun, 'Take her; she is yours.' They never make use of the hide of such a cow.[13]

1 Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, p. 81.
2 *HN* ii. 60.
3 *Quæst. Nat.* i. 3-10; cf. White, i. 330, 388.
4 *RBEW*, p. 268.
5 *HN* ii. 110, quoting Theopompus; Verg. *Æn.* vi. 126 ff., 273 ff.
6 Jürgen Andersen, *Reisebeschreibung*, Amsterdam, 1669, ii. 132.
7 *Dial.* iv. 36. 8 *HN* ii. 50; Lucretius, vi. 425.
9 See F. E. Hulme, *Myth Land*, London, 1886, p. 122 f.
10 *Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc.* ii. 153.
11 Cf. Brand, pp. 395-411.
12 M. A. Owen, *Folk-Lore of the Musquakie Indians*, London, 1904, p. 67.
13 Maximilian, p. 310.

Throughout the Lower Congo an albino or the hair of an albino person is necessary to supply the needed magical power for the Ndembo society.[1] On the West Coast the albino is regarded as a sacred person, and is *ipso facto* a candidate for the priesthood.[2]

The white dog was sacred among the Iroquois and was sacrificed. In Siam the white elephant or white monkey was sacred and might not be killed—an inconvenient restriction to those who 'had a white elephant on their hands.' A white horse, a white pig, and a white cock were among the offerings at harvest-time prescribed by Shintō ritual. By virtue of such gifts the diviners obtained from the god of harvest the secret of a magical process which enabled them to save the imperilled crop. The white horse also served to establish the ruling house:

'As this white horse plants firmly his fore-hoofs and his hind-hoofs, so will the pillars of the Great Palace be set firmly on the upper rocks and frozen firmly on the lower rocks; the pricking up of his ears is a sign that your Majesty will, with ears ever more erect, rule the Under Heaven.'[3]

In the book of *Enoch*[4] the Messiah, at the conclusion of the world drama, appears under the figure of a white bull, and in this guise secures the respect and fear of all the heathen, who, thanks to this apparition, are converted to righteousness. He is feared by all the beasts. When all the other animals have become white, He changes into a buffalo with black horns.[5]

Xerxes sacrificed white horses and young men that the gods might give him victory.

2. Birth.—(*a*) *Supernatural birth.*—To assure the divine nature of the ruler, and as a logical result of his alleged divinity, his origin was attributed to some other than natural birth.

'It seems to me that a hero totally unlike any other human being could not have been born without the agency of the deity,' said the biographer Arrian, when discussing the parentage of Alexander the Great.[6] 'He to whom the gods themselves reveal the future, who impose their will even on kings and peoples, cannot be fashioned by the same womb which bore us ignorant men,' said the Augustan writer Arellius Fuscus in his discussion of astrologers.[7]

In N. America the concept of a supernatural origin is frequently held with regard to the culture hero or heroine, who often originates from a blood-clot or from menstrual blood.[8]

(*b*) *Twins.*—The Navaho accept twins as a divine gift, though the advent of twin colts is viewed as an evil omen and both mare and colts are killed. Many primitive peoples, however, consider twins uncanny and may kill one or both of them. Most of them regard triplets unfavourably, though in some instances they are welcomed.

3. Dreams.—The prophetic nature of dreams and their use as auguries are familiar themes to the student of Greek and Roman culture.[9] Prometheus, says Æschylus,[10] was the first to teach men what sort of dreams were destined to prove realities. In obedience to dreams the great emperor Augustus went through the streets of Rome begging.[11] Incubation was practised there as in the temples of China at the present time.[12] Pliny doubted the mind's knowledge of the future, when in sleep,

1 Weeks, p. 159. 2 Cf. Wallis, *AJRPE* vi. [1913] 263.
3 *Kojiki*, ed. Chamberlain[2], pp. 54, 58, 113.
4 xc. 37 ff.
5 R. H. Charles, *The Book of Enoch*, London, 1893, p. 258.
6 *Anab.* iii. 3, iv. 9, vii. 8.
7 *Ap.* Seneca, *Suas.* iv. 1.
8 Cf. E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1910, i. 110.
9 Xenophon, *Anabasis*, iii. 1; *Iliad*, i. 62 f., ii. 8 ff.; *Odyssey*, xix. 541, 562; A. G. Keller, *Homeric Society*, London, 1913, p. 150 f.
10 *Prom. Vinct.*, 442 ff.
11 Suetonius, *Augustus*, xci.; see, further, Cicero, *de Divin.* i.; Val. Max. i., vii.; Pliny the Younger, *Ep.* i. 18. For Persian interpretation of dreams see Herodotus' description of the dream of Xerxes (vii. 12 ff.).
12 J. L. Nevius, *China and the Chinese*, New York, 1869, p. 192 f.; Mary Hamilton, *Incubation*, St. Andrews and London, 1906.

but in spite of his amazing credulity he was an advanced sceptic.[1]

Muhammad, according to tradition, said:

'A good dream is of God's favor, and a bad dream is of the devil's; therefore, when any of you dream a dream which is such as he is pleased with, then he must not tell it to any but a beloved friend; and when he dreams a bad dream, then let him seek protection from God both from its evil and from the wickedness of Satan; and let him spit three times over his left shoulder, and not mention the dream to any one; then, verily, no evil shall come nigh him.' 'The truest dream is the one which you have about daybreak.'[2]

Specific and conventional interpretations are often given to dreams.

In Persia 'seeing bees in a dream indicates riches. To dream of eating grapes presages sorrow and flowing tears. To dream of buffaloes fighting means that the angels will come for the soul of some member of the family.'[3]

In Northumberland to dream of a hare means that you have an enemy; if one crosses your path, it is an omen of ill-luck. To see many eagles is to be warned of plots and intended assaults. If it be bees carrying honey, you will earn money from wealthy people. If the bees sting you, your mind will be tormented by foreigners. If bees fly into the house, the house will be destroyed. To dream of many fowls together is a sign of jealousy and chiding.[4] Any dream on the first night of the moon's age is a good omen, while the second and third nights are neutral. The following two nights betoken good. The dream of the sixth night should not be forgotten. That of the seventh is sure to be fulfilled. Whatever is dreamed on the eighth and ninth nights will become public. If it is unpleasant, turn the head towards the east and pray for mercy. Similarly, birth has its fortune embodied in the days of the lunar calendar, and each month, from the first to the thirteenth, has its particular portent.[5]

Dreams play an important part in the lives of most primitive peoples, and usually betoken something in harmony with their content. Among the Dakota to dream of the moon is unlucky. It is lucky to dream of hawks, but unlucky to dream of bears, for the latter are slow and easily wounded. A dream about snakes will be the result of killing one, and no good comes from snakes, they say (the Menominee have the same beliefs). As among all the Plains tribes, in the dance associations of the Eastern Dakota dreams play a prominent part. In the Buffalo society of the Santee only those who had had visions of the buffalo, or the sons of such, were entitled to membership.

'One man might dream that he was a buffalo and had been shot with an arrow so that he could barely get home. The arrow continued to whirl round in his body. He dreamt that the only way to recover was to go into a sweat-lodge. First he asked for one of four different kinds of earth to mix with water, drank the mixture inside a sweat-lodge, and then recovered. Such a man painted himself vermilion to represent the trickling down of blood. Another man dreamt of being shot with a gun. Such a one would act out his dream during a Buffalo dance. A third man dreamt that a bullet pierced his eye and came out at the back of his head. He announced his dream, and shortly afterwards was actually shot in that way. Still another man announced a dream to the effect that he was shot through his temples, and this also came true. While dancing, dreamers would call on outsiders to bear witness to the truth of their statements about such experiences. Once a *heyoka* (a Clown) challenged a dreamer's account, saying that no man could recover from a wound of the kind described. Straightway the dreamer offered to be shot by the Clown, who sent a bullet through him. The wounded man staggered off, went to a sweat-lodge, and actually recovered within a few days.'[6]

Among the Arapaho dreams were revelations. To the Omaha the moon would appear, having in one hand a burden strap, in the other a bow and arrows, and the man would be bidden to make a choice. If he reached for the bow, the moon would cross its hands and attempt to force the strap on him. If he should wake before taking the strap, or if he should succeed in capturing the bow, he would succeed in escaping the penalty attached to the dream. If he failed and the strap was taken, he would become like a woman, follow her vocations, and adopt her dress. Instances are reported in which the unfortunate dreamer, unable to ward off the evil influence, has resorted to suicide as the only means of escape. To the Menominee a dream about the moon brings long life, but a life that will end in misery. Such people are strong when the moon is full, weak and sickly when it is on the wane.[1] To the Huron the dream gives voice to the soul's desires.[2] Among the Hidatsa only those dreams that follow prayer, sacrifice, or fasting are portentous;[3] while for the Mandan dreams are always prophetic or ominous. A Mandan dreamt of fire-arms, and soon afterward the Whites arrived with them. They dreamt of horses in similar manner before they obtained any. For the fasting youth to dream of a piece of cherry-wood, or of any animal, is a good omen. The Thonga profess to be disgusted when any dream is fulfilled,[4] but this must depend somewhat on the nature of the fulfilment. The Kafir medicine-man acquires his powers through dreams, and the expectant mother learns by this medium the sex of her unborn child.[5] Similar predictions were made from dreams by the Maoris, by whom much attention was paid to the dreams of the war-chief or of the principal priest, especially on the night before an engagement. They were guided by the omens of which the dream was an index.[6]

The Japanese recognize a creature by the name of *baku*, whose particular function is the eating of dreams. The male *baku* has the body of a horse, the face of a lion, the trunk and tusks of an elephant, the forelock of a rhinoceros, the tail of a cow, and the feet of a tiger. The picture of the *baku* hung up in the house will secure the protection of the animal. The Chinese character representing its name used to be put in the lacquered wooden pillows of lords and princes. By virtue of this character on the pillow the sleeper was protected from evil dreams. When a man awakes from a nightmare, or from any unlucky dream, he should quickly repeat three times the invocation, 'Devour, O *baku*, devour my evil dream!' The *baku* will then eat the dream and change the misfortune into good fortune and rejoicing.[7] The Vedic texts direct one who has had an evil dream to wipe his face in order to get rid of its malign influence.[8] This is more simple than the Navaho remedy, which may call for a 'renewal' ceremony.

4. Epilepsy.—Many peoples attribute epilepsy to possession by a demon. This was the view held by the Hindus, and in the Vedic texts a ritual ceremony is prescribed for its exorcism. Its uncanny nature has generally been recognized. From the time of Edward the Confessor to that of Queen Anne epilepsy was considered curable by royal touch.[9]

5. Liver.—The liver has long been considered an unusual organ of the human body, and unusual qualities have been attributed to it.[10] In ancient Greece goose liver was used as being efficacious in medical

1 *HN* x. 98.
2 I. Adams, *Persia by a Persian*, London, 1906, p. 450.
3 *Ib.* p. 446.
4 Cockayne, iii. 169–177, 199–215; see also Mrs. Gutch, *County Folk-lore*, ii. London, 1901, pp. 202–208.
5 Cockayne, iii. 150–167, 177–197.
6 R. H. Lowie, in *Anth. Papers Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xi. [1913]; J. O. Dorsey, *11 RBEW*, pp. 479, 500.

1 A. Skinner, *Anth. Papers Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xiii. pt. i. p. 80.
2 *Jesuit Relations*, xxxix. 17 ff.
3 Dorsey, p. 516. 4 Junod, ii. 341. 5 Kidd, p. 156.
6 Tregear, pp. 338 f., 208, 40; E. Shortland, *Maori Religion and Mythology*, London, 1882, p. 36.
7 L. Hearne, *Kottō*, New York, 1910, pp. 245–251.
8 *ERE* viii. 318a.
9 See White, ii. 46–49, and authorities there cited.
10 See Morris Jastrow, 'The Liver as the Seat of the Soul,' in *Studies in the Hist. of Religion, presented to C. H. Toy*, New York, 1912, pp. 143–168.

treatment;[1] the liver of the lizard would impart peculiar powers to the eater.[2] The Lushais eat the witch's liver in order to destroy the witchcraft,[3] and the Cochin-Chinese express their deepest hatred of a person by saying, 'I wish I could eat his liver.'[4] In ancient Arabia Hind, the wife of al-Fakih, inspired by similar motives, gnawed the liver of her arch-enemy Ḥamza,[5] while a modern Arab will eat the liver or heart of a snake in order to acquire an understanding of the language of birds. In N. Morocco the Jbâla bride and bridegroom partake at the wedding ceremony of the liver of a sheep, to make them 'dear to one another'; and in Andjra the bridegroom, though not the bride (for no woman may eat of it), partakes of the liver of the bullock.[6] Arabian influence may be reflected in the Apocryphal account of the evil spirit who loved Sarah and was exorcized by flames arising from the heart and liver of a fish which Tobit, by the instruction of the angel, burned on the evening of his wedding.[7]

Similar attribution of unusual powers to the liver of a person or an animal is wide-spread. The Veddas of Ceylon chew the dried liver of a man in order to imbibe his virtue, and the Sinhalese have a tradition to the effect that they formerly followed the same practice.[8] In Erub (Torres Straits) the liver, 'presumably of a deceased male,' was cut up and distributed among the young male members of the family to make them plucky.[9] The Koita of British New Guinea allowed only girls to partake of the liver of the wallaby, the virtues of this animal affording no enhancement to males.[10] In Australia the virtue elsewhere usually attributed to the heart or the liver resided in the fat around the kidneys.[11] The Maoris gave the liver of the *kalawi*-fish to a nursing child as a cure for flatulence. The liver is the seat of the affections, as also among the Greeks; and a piece of the liver of the first man slain must be offered, along with a piece of the heart and the scalp, to the goblin god, Whiro. So acute is the power of the liver that the Maoris call one of their implements for cutting wood the *kotiate*, 'liver cutter.'[12] The Tonga Islanders believe that turtle has a peculiar effect upon the liver and they will not eat it, fearing the enlargement of the liver which indulgence in this food will produce. The liver is the seat of courage, and therefore the largest livers pertain to the largest men. They have found also that in left-handed people it tends to shift to the left side, and in the ambidextrous it is in the median line of the body.[13] The Kayans of Borneo knew that the omen was bad if the under side of the liver of the pig was dark, good if it was pale.[14] So general was haruspication among the Borneans that W. Warde Fowler is convinced that its origin is common with that derived by the Romans from the Etruscans.[1] But, as the phenomenon is so common to savage culture, any theory of the connexion of the divination rites of the natives of Borneo and those of ancient Rome will have to take account of this fairly wide distribution of similar and related things in the larger world of savagery. The supposed uniqueness of the phenomenon does not exist, and the historical hiatus must be bridged by data that show the probability of actual contact between the two in the past.[2] Geographical proximity as well as early historical contact makes Africa a much more probable land of origin for Etruscan influence, especially since the ancient Arabians entertained such beliefs, and they are common among African tribes. Leo Frobenius[3] has attempted to establish the African origin of Etruscan culture, but the argument remains unconvincing to those who feel the need of historical demonstration.

Several tribes of Central Africa attribute special virtue to the liver—in some cases to the liver of the alligator.[4] It is the seat of the soul, and to eat of it is to enhance one's own spiritual being, though, as often happens, this beneficence is denied to women.[5] Accordingly, the Bakongo drink the blood and eat the liver of those killed in a fight.[6] For similar reasons the Kagoro (of Nigeria) evil-wisher will catch one's soul or take one's liver.[7] The pottery-makers of the Thonga (at least those dwelling near Morakwen) may not eat the liver of any animal. In the ceremonies and superstitions of this region the gall-bladder plays an important part, as does also the liver of the ox. When two parties not within the permitted relationship wish to marry, they must break the tabu by a ceremonial eating of the raw liver of this animal. They must first tear it out with their teeth, for it is tabu to cut it with a knife, and then eat it. 'You have acted with strong *shibindji*,' they say to those who are eating their way to matrimony, 'Eat the liver now!' (*shibindji* means both 'liver' and 'determination,' a history of the interdependence of the two).[8] When an ox is killed by the headman of the village for distribution among the villagers, the liver is given to the 'grandfather' and the old people, 'because it is soft and they have no teeth to gnaw the bones,' but doubtless, also, because it imparts, more than does any other portion, the strength of the animal.[9] The Ovaherero, of Damaraland, attribute their black complexion to the eating by their ancestors of the black liver of an ox killed when the first people emerged from the tree that gave them birth.[10] A Matabeleland native who wished to learn sorcery paid a big price to one of the recognized medicine-men in order to induce him to accompany the candidate to the grave of a recently buried person, unearth the body, cut it open, remove the liver, and, by its help, inculcate the desired instruction.[11] The Bechuana find effective, in their prescription designed to defeat the enemy, the gall of a black bull whose eyelids have been sewed up, the animal then being allowed to wander for three days. If they find little gall in the gall-bladder of an animal, they say that some ancestral spirit has previously sucked it out. A man often cleanses himself with the gall of an ox, and a chief will

[1] Mary Hamilton, p. 52.
[2] W. R. Halliday, *Greek Divination*, London, 1913, pp. 88, 101, 168, 193-204; see DIVINATION (Greek) and (Roman).
[3] J. Shakespear, *The Lushei Kuki Clans*, London, 1912, p. 109.
[4] G. H. von Langsdorf, *Voyages and Travels*, Eng. tr., London, 1813-14, i. 148.
[5] W. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, new ed., London, 1903, p. 296.
[6] E. Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco*, London, 1914, pp. 101, 126.
[7] Tob 8.
[8] C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 128, 190, 207.
[9] Haddon, in *Cambridge Anth. Exped. to Torres Straits Reports*, vi. [1908] 111.
[10] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 139.
[11] Reference to this belief will be found in G. C. Wheeler, *The Tribe, and Intertribal Relations in Australia*, London, 1910, p. 156.
[12] A. Hamilton, *The Art Workmanship of the Maori Race*, Dunedin, 1896, p. 150; Tregear, pp. 219, 472, 496, 48.
[13] Marett, p. 424.
[14] A. Nieuwenhuis, *Quer durch Borneo*, Leyden, 1904-07, pp. 171-182; C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 64 ff.

[1] *JRS* ii. [1912] 269 f.
[2] See Wallis, 'Divinations in Borneo and in Ancient Rome,' *The Classical Journal*, ix. no. 6 [1914], 272-274.
[3] *Und Afrika sprach*, Berlin, 1912.
[4] H. H. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, London, 1897, p. 81.
[5] *PRSE* xiii. [1884-86] 218 f.
[6] Weeks, p. 38.
[7] A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Tailed Head-hunters of Nigeria*, London, 1912, pp. 171 f., 195.
[8] Junod, i. 245, 336, ii. 52, 96.
[9] *Ib.* i. 299.
[10] A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, new ed., London, 1899, i. 171.
[11] *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 533.

drink it to acquire strength to withstand his enemies. During the initiation ceremonies the boys eat a portion of the liver of an ox killed for that purpose, and thereby acquire courage and intelligence. Yet any one who eats a certain tongue-shaped lobe of the liver (the *lobus Spigelii*) will forget the past, and this is given only to the old women, who thus enter into forgetfulness of their sorrows.[1]

The liver—sometimes the heart—is spoken of by the Kafir as the seat of courage, the gall being the fluid that contains its very essence.

'Arbousset declares that the Basuto consider the gall to represent the anguish of death; but it seems problematical whether the natives have any conception of such an abstract thing as the anguish of death. The gall is regarded in most tribes as the seat of courage and boldness. When the natives wish to describe the bravery of a great man they say that he has a large liver. Perseverance, that elemental faculty in human nature, is coupled in the native mind with perspiration; and, as the first place this is seen is on the skin of the forehead, they frequently consider that its seat or "centre" (as physiologists would say) is there. Intelligence or enlightenment is also sometimes considered to reside in the liver; but I fancy the sort of intelligence that is referred to is that which is displayed in battle. . . . The man who is capable of enduring hardness is said to have a hard liver.'[2]

The Chukchis of Siberia, in order to bring sickness upon a murdered man's kindred, eat the liver of the corpse, and the Eskimo practised a similar rite that the dead man's relatives might not possess the courage to avenge his death.[3] Moreover, by eating the liver of the murdered man, they deprive the ghost of the power that he would otherwise have of rushing upon them.[4] A story given by Rink shows the importance attaching to the liver:

'At last there was silence; and during this, one of the two brothers stood forth, and, taking a bit of dried liver (this being exceedingly hard), raised his voice, saying, "I have been told that I have an enemy in Niakunguak." At the same time he tried to crush the piece of liver he held in his hand; but failing to do so, he again put it by. Silence still prevailed, when Niakunguak's son advanced, and, taking up the same bit, crushed it to atoms with his fingers, so that it fell like dust upon the floor. All were utterly amazed, and not a word was spoken.'[5]

Here some special significance seems attached to this crushing of the liver in the manner portrayed. It seems probable that liver was associated with magic power.

'They thus entered, and saw all the brothers stretched out at full length on the ledge, only their feet visible on its outer edge (a sign of wrath). They were treated to some frozen liver in an oblong dish; but when they had got only half through with it, the frozen roof fell in and covered the dish with turf-dust.'[6] 'When she had ended, Habakuk went closer to them, saying, "Well, take the skin of my seal with blubber and all, and the liver besides."'[7]

An *angakok* gave the liver of a seal caught by a lucky hunter to one who was unlucky, and the latter acquired the desired luck by slowly chewing and swallowing the flesh. In Greenland the mother giving birth to her first child might not eat the liver of any animal; in Labrador she might partake of a portion of it.[8]

The *chenoo* of Micmac mythology, an ogre, representing, not improbably, Eskimo influence, showed a special liking for the liver of a conquered foe.[9] The Chippewas were long ago admonished by the Crows to leave them the liver of the animal as part of their portion, and this custom is followed to-day.[10] The Siouan tribes of the Plains area attach great importance to the liver of the buffalo and, in some instances, to that of the dog. The Omaha eat the liver of the buffalo raw. It gives a man a clear voice and imparts courage.[1] Accordingly, the youth who has shot his first buffalo eats the liver with the gall over it as a potent dressing.[2] The Plains Cree warriors also, when they killed a bison, ate its liver raw.[3] The Northern Shoshone imparted additional power, and, in this case, malign power, to the liver by placing rattlesnake heads on hot coals in a hole in the ground. The liver was that of a wild animal and was covered with the gall. The liver absorbed the poison from the fangs and was then carefully preserved in a little buckskin bag carried by the owner.[4]

A society of 'Liver Eaters' is found among the Crow,[5] and members of the Bear clan of the Teton Dakota (Oglala division) sometimes eat the liver of the dog raw. A male must not eat the liver of a female dog, nor a female that of a male dog. Sores will break out on the face of an offender.[6]

The 'Dog-Liver-Eaters' Dance Association' is one peculiar to the Eastern Dakota.

It 'takes its name from the fact that the raw liver of the dog is eaten by the performers. It is not often performed, and only on some extraordinary occasion. The performers are usually the bravest warriors of the tribe, and those having stomachs strong enough to digest raw food.

When a dog-dance is to be given, the warriors who are to take part in it, and all others who desire to witness it, assemble at some stated time and place. After talking and smoking for a while, the dance commences. A dog, with his legs pinioned, is thrown into the group of dancers, by any one of the spectators. This is dispatched by one of the medicine-men, or jugglers, with a war-club or tomahawk. The side of the animal is then cut open and the liver taken out. This is then cut into strips and hung on a pole about four or five feet in length. The performers then commence dancing around it; smacking their lips and making all sorts of grimaces; showing a great desire to get a taste of the delicious morsel. After performing these antics for a while, some one of them will make a grab at the liver, biting off a piece, and then hopping off, chewing and swallowing it as he goes. His example is followed by each and all the other warriors, until every morsel of the liver is eaten. Should any particle of it fall to the ground, it is collected by the medicine-man in the palm of his hand, who carries it around to the dancers to be eaten and his hands well licked.

After disposing of the first dog, they all sit down in a circle, and chat and smoke a while until another dog is thrown in, when the same ceremonies are repeated, and continued so long as any one is disposed to present them with a dog. They are required to eat the liver, raw and warm, of every dog that is presented to them; and while they are eating it, none but the medicine-men must touch it with their hands. Women do not join in this dance.

The object of this ceremony is, they say, that those who eat the liver of the dog while it is raw and warm, will become possessed of the sagacity and bravery of the dog.'[7]

The Ainu have the custom of cutting up the liver of the bear, which is one of their sacred animals, and of eating it raw. If a Pima woman ate liver, her child would be disfigured by birth-marks.[8] The Zuñi hunter takes the liver from his captured game, and, while eating it, exclaims, 'Thanks!'[9] The Aztecs practised a well-developed system of haruspication, reading omens from the liver or other organs of the slaughtered animal, and the Araucanians of Chile were given to related practices. They dissected the body of a person of distinction in order to examine the liver. If it was found to be in a healthy state, the death was attributed to natural causes; if inflamed, malign magic had caused the death. The gall is extracted, placed in a magic drum, and, after various incantations, taken out and put over the fire in a carefully covered vessel. If, after sufficient roasting, a stone is found in the bottom of the pot, it is known to have been the cause of death.[10]

1 Kidd, pp. 310, 273, 258, 23.
2 *Ib.* pp. 278–280.
3 D. Crantz, *Hist. of Greenland*, London, 1820, i. 193.
4 H. Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1875, p. 366.
5 *Ib.* 6 *Ib.* p. 369. 7 *Ib.* p. 400.
8 *Ib.* pp. 54–56; Hawkes, p. 9.
9 C. G. Leland, *Algonquin Legends*, Boston, 1885, p. 244.
10 Lowie, in *Anth. Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xi. [1913] 185.

1 A. C. Fletcher and F. La Flesche, *27 RBEW* [1911], p. 332.
2 *3 RBEW* [1884], p. 291 f.
3 A. Skinner, in *Anth. Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xii. [1914] pt. vi.
4 Lowie, *Anth. Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* ix. 230.
5 *Anth. Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xi. 164.
6 *11 RBEW* [1894], p. 496.
7 H. R. Schoolcraft, *The Indian Tribes of the U.S.*, Philadelphia, 1853–57, ii. 79 f.; Lowie, *Anth. Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xi. 110.
8 *26 RBEW*, p. 185. 9 *2 RBEW*, p. 37.
10 E. R. Smith, *The Araucanians*, London, 1855, p. 236.

Roman ideas have persisted to the present day. Vesalius recognized a natural spirit emanating from the liver, as a vital spirit came from the heart and an animal spirit from the brain. Mediæval belief attributed to the eating of the liver of a goat good sight after dark, for the goat could see as well during the night as during the day. In *Macbeth* the liver of a 'blaspheming Jew' is one of the concoctions used by the witches.[1] There was a curious belief to the effect that the liver of the mouse increased and decreased with the waxing and waning of the moon. The Saxons attributed many complaints, and some of them rightly enough, to disorders in the liver. Blood that was thick and saturated was spoken of as 'livery,' *i.e.* such as flows through the liver. They cured stomach and intestinal troubles by the application of a burned goat's liver 'rubbed somewhat small and laid on the womb,' or stomach.[2] In Italy at the present day a fresh human liver, especially that of a woman, is believed to confer magical powers upon the one who eats it.[3] This may be directly related to the belief recorded by Pliny that the liver of the weasel will cure pains in one's own liver.[4]

6. Sneezing.—From time immemorial the sneeze has been deemed worthy of notice and has usually elicited some form of salutation from bystanders or some expression from the agents. The phrase, 'not to be sneezed at,' has behind it an importance attaching to the act of sneezing to which the whole human race bears witness. Even children notice it as something peculiar and have sayings of their own, such as 'Scat!' or 'Shoo!' The origin of the importance attaching to sneezing is thus a question of psychological import as well as one of culture diffusion.

'It is,' as W. R. Halliday has remarked, '*per se* a startling phenomenon to find the body, which in normal action is the slave and instrument of its owner's will and intention, behaving in a way independent of his desire or volition. Simply because it is involuntary, the twitching of the eyelid or the tingling of the ear must be miraculous. And primitive man finds a significance in everything which attracts his notice, particularly in cases where there is no obvious cause.'[5]

This is good psychology, and ample facts could be adduced to support it. The superstitions connected with sneezing and the omens drawn from it are noticed in art. NOSE, vol. ix. p. 398, and need not be repeated here.

7. Miscellaneous. — Many of the American Indian tribes attach some significance to belching, crackling of the joints, ringing in the ears, twitching of the eye-lid or arm or leg. Thus the Navahos frequently omit or postpone a journey if the one intending it belches or has a ringing in the ears; a Micmac, however, considers belching a sign of good luck in hunting—the hunter will soon find game. European peoples, likewise, often attach some prophetic meaning to such bodily involuntary disturbances.

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the article. See also the *Encyclopædia of Superstitions, Folklore, and the Occult Sciences of the World*, Milwaukee, 1903, *s.vv.* 'Crow,' ii. 608–610, 'Owl,' ii. 670–675, 'Raven,' ii. 684–686, 'Earthquakes,' ii. 939 f., 'Eclipse,' ii. 940–943, 'Hail,' ii. 954, 'Ignis Fatuus,' ii. 951–953, 'Lightning,' ii. 956 f., 'Thunder,' ii. 1019–1023, 'Milky Way,' ii. 957, 'Rainbow,' ii. 979 f., 'Phenomena,' ii. 971 f., 'Mysterious Omens,' iii. 1299–1310, 'Volcanoes,' iii. 1032 f., 'Dreams,' i. 221–256, 'Itching,' etc., i. 257–345, 'Monsters,' iii. 1357, 'Moon Dates,' iii. 1675, 1675, F. Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, Eng. tr., London, 1896, i. 56–59, 302–309.

W. D. WALLIS.

PRODUCTION (of wealth).—The contact of ethics and economics is more directly at the distribution (*q.v.*) and the consumption (*q.v.*) of wealth than at its production. Because it put production before them, the classical or formal economics has often been called soulless. But it was natural at that time to put stress on the increase of capital, and on the great merit of saving. And it was easy for readers to slip wrong meanings into the terms 'productive' and 'unproductive spending' and 'productive' and 'unproductive labour.' Nor did economists wrong the actual system; it, too, made production the measure of prosperity, regarded wages as the means of keeping labour efficient, and saw in high interest and profit the best guarantee for the upkeep of capital. Neither the economists nor the system were without good reason; for, whatever the best use and distribution of wealth, these are limited by the amount of it, and by the efficiency that can be given to the three agents that produce it—nature, capital, and labour.

It is through labour that the efficiency of nature and capital is discovered and made real. Capital is its product; and, while nature does all the work, it needs directing. One has only to compare the unimproved value of nature in land and beast, plant and mineral, heat and electricity, with the value that only minds can give. Hence two ethical topics are traditional in the text-books, when they are dealing with labour as producer. One concerns its quantity, the other its quality. The first is connected with the doctrine of Malthus (see MALTHUSIANISM), the second with education, and not merely technical education, but even more with its product in grit and conscientiousness. The two questions have now a unanimous answer from ethics and economics.

When, however, we ask about the fitness not of the labourer for the economic system, but of the system for the labourer, the question becomes critical. The division of labour that is essential in the system may mean to the man monotony, ill-health, and loss of the market for his skill. All the books, since the *Wealth of Nations*, discuss the advantages and disadvantages, but the only practical question now is how to meet the disadvantage from the gain. This has been the work of factory and other labour legislation. At first the argument for higher wages, for shorter hours, and for better health was their economy as measured by the work done. Labour, however, does not rely on this argument; it claims a better share on the ground of justice; it refuses to abide by the open market measure of its price. And it is still true, though less than before, that the harder and more debasing the labour, the worse it is paid. The reason is that the lower the grade, the greater the competition. There are two ways of reducing the competition: one by combination, the other by moving some of the stress from lower to higher grades. The latter is the perfect way. It has been universal in economics since the death of the iron law of wages; the doctrine that cheap labour is necessary has come so near its end that it has disappeared from press and platform; and the right way tends to make itself permanent and easier. But progress on it must be slow, and its results are mainly enjoyed by the next generation. And so, though it would be even more necessary in a socialistic system than in the present one, there is nothing like a militant spirit on behalf of it, as there is for the other way.

Here too the quarrel between ethics and economics has been settled. But one far more serious has opened between them, on the one side, and the actual working of the industrial system. It did not appear in the early days of capitalism, when competition was unchecked. This made for the greatest production of wealth, and to ethics it seemed that the rude justice of the market could be made more and more equitable by equalizing

[1] Hulme, pp. 16, 177.
[2] Cockayne, ii. 161–163, 198–217, 235, 251, 309.
[3] Evans, in *Popular Science Monthly*, xlviii. [1896] 82.
[4] *HN* xxx. 16; White, ii. 58.
[5] P. 175.

opportunity. Thus it was both the moral and the economic policy of the 19th cent. to keep the course open and see fair play. It was a new policy in that it deserted regulation for competition. But competition has become more and more regulated from within. The advantage of one large over many small units of production has led to aggregations of capital that give virtual monopolies; and the advantage of collective bargaining has brought an aggregation of labour, and another of employers to meet it. The original notion was that competition would give the best form of co-operation; it was a child-like faith that one hates to surrender. But the competition has come to a state of war in which the morals of war play havoc; and they do it without remorse, because a class conscience has made itself superior to private scruples and regret.

The concentration of capital has not in itself been prejudicial to production, for it seeks to regulate rather than limit the output; it obviates the waste and dislocation of too many plants and shops, and the advertising and other costs of commercial rivalry; and there is plenty of scope for competition within. The evils have been notorious: in company promoting, in crushing rivals, in controlling prices as buyer and as seller. And mere size may prevent the coming of a competition that would be healthy. But the best course is to accept the natural development from competition to amalgamation, and to meet the evils by developing regulation, from which, indeed, monopoly was never made exempt. Co-operation is always the final word. Competition is only a means, and a better means the less it is a jostle, and the more it is a directed course, where there is no loss in the struggle.

Unlike the concentration of capital, the concentration of labour easily becomes prejudicial to production. To over-time, piece-work, all speeding-up and labour-saving, there is opposition; and no measures are taken, as by the old gilds, to prevent fraud and incompetence. This is only another instance of the division of function, and nothing to condemn. But, again, it is a competition that has broken away from co-operation. The hostile relation of master and man is thought to be not incidental, but inevitable and permanent. The men see that it is the interest of the management to use as little labour as possible, and they think that the owners are an incubus, and dividends a tax on their wages. As well, therefore, try to instruct a nation at war in the arts of peace as point to the injury they do and the loss they suffer; they think the injury to be deserved, and the loss to be a sacrifice for their class. To many of them the crimes of syndicalism are no more criminal than machine-breaking was at an older day. There are several things that keep the war civilized; but the main consideration is failure or success; and in either event the damage to the oppressor is always a pleasure. In times of peace a union is always preparing for war; men who are not members are denied the right to work; and others of the old natural rights and duties are made subordinate. It has been futile to insist on them, for an unnatural system is thought to make right wrong.

The contentions against the system are often ignorant, but, as a rule, they are honestly urged; and so, as in the days of slavery, it is the system itself that holds the centre in an ethical view of industrial life. It is a late system, and the forces within it have always prevented it from resting where it is. But they may be directed, and it may grow, in either of two ways that have a very different moral value. The root of the system, and the directions in which it grows, may best be seen from its origin, and as a stage in the history of industry. The older forms are never quite superseded, and they may all be seen to-day.

In the earliest system the family was an industrial unit supplying nearly all its wants; there was a division of labour according to sex and capacity; with slaves and officials the unit grew large, but kept its unity even when the slaves were hired out, or were employed in producing for a market. When a family became too large for its land, it was natural for some members to learn skill in a trade, and to confine their labour to it, working for other families, often living with them till the job was finished, or having the work brought to their forge, oven, or loom. Thus came the formation of artisan families; and tools, skill, and custom passed down like the land. So far the payment is almost all for labour. At a later stage, when the workman began to keep a stock of raw materials, his profit included interest as well as wages; and he had apprentices and hired labour. The first great split in the industrial system was complete—the separation of the workman from the soil. Industrial capital increased, but there was not yet capitalism, for the owner took little risk of producing on the chance of a market; the customer was still the employer. Capitalism came when the risk was definitely undertaken. The *entrepreneur* was sometimes the manufacturer, oftener the merchant; but the work of those two —the work of making, moving, and selling the product—can be distinguished from the more invisible work of ordering it and finding a market. This is the work of the *entrepreneur* or business man. In the art. DISTRIBUTION it is explained how the business man is the pivot of the system, guarantees to all the other agents of production their share in the price, and pays himself from the residue.

Thus the second great separation of labour from the other agents was the separation from capital. It is often held that both separations were by dispossession, and that they were an evil. But no one looks for peace by undoing either—by replacing men on the land, or by giving them the capital that employs them, that each may employ himself. Nothing would give greater stability than for workmen to be shareholders in the enterprise that employs them, or in others; and it would be the best kind of revolution if unions tried to establish themselves in business. But the great majority of owners must always lend their capital instead of using it themselves. And, if we look from the owner to the real user, we find that the emphasis is on him, the acting capitalist, and not on the capital. Just so it is on the sculptor and the inventor, though nature does all the work that is done by the invention, and though the statue is all in the marble.

The process of production has become more and more roundabout; an ever greater distance has separated producer from consumer. The workman is bewildered by the number of intervening agencies; and to his divorce from land and capital he adds, for a general source of inequity, that the system allows many parasites to live on his product. He has been taught that the real value of a product comes from the labour spent on it, and he sees that, besides rent and interest—the extortions of the idle ownership of land and capital—money and middlemen lay hold on his work, and make a better living out of it than he does. He does not see that the production of a commodity is not complete—its value is not produced—till it is in the hands of the consumer. If advertising, drumming, and commissions do not help to sell it, they will not be employed. Useless measures of commerce are no more secure than labour that is made useless by a machine. It is through economy in

marketing, no less than in manufacturing, that large capital has its advantage. Everything useless and predatory tends to be expelled; for everything must be demanded by an employer, if it is to get its price; and, provided there is publicity and knowledge enough, he pays no more for it than he must. It is natural for those whom he employs to think his profit an extortion from them, and that 'what is somewhere gotten is somewhere lost.' But the profit of an enterprise is like the royalty from an invention, which gives more than it gets. Interest is different; it is like the royalty paid for mere ownership, and simply a burden. W. Smart thought that 'the community gets its employing done for it more cheaply than it gets any other service' (*Distribution of Income*[2], London, 1912, p. 159 f.).

If a system of production were more moral and progressive the more it crushed incompetence, again the present system could well defend itself. Its path of progress is by curtailing cost, and employers are driven on it by the competition of one with another, or with the consumer, who is the final employer. It is a precarious position for a working man, and the thing that really threatens the life of the system. He cannot but want to be a civil servant, and have his future a charge on the community instead of at the necessity or the mercy of competing employers. He is in the majority; and, however little we like it that the lives of men should centre on his livelihood, he has been given the power to bring that about. Wages-boards and courts of arbitration are useful, but they add evils of their own; animosity remains and preparation for war. To co-partnership and often to co-operation (*q.v.*) the war-spirit is actively hostile. The moral situation on the other side is no better; there it is thought that socialism must come, but that everything should be done to resist and postpone it. And both sides think that they are acting in the highest human interest, and that this consists in giving the freest scope that can be given to our spirit.

It is something that they make the same appeal, for so far the dispute becomes a question of means. The question breaks into two, one about the best management of the forces of production, the other about their ownership. The best management of an enterprise is from within; the bane that weakens a public enterprise is interference from without. Democracy has kept some of its self-denying ordinances fairly well, but it is far easier to refrain from interfering with the bench or the navy, where there are no profits and the voters are few, than with the conduct of a railway, and with industries that are less subject to mechanical regulation. If there were as little interference as that of the shareholders in a going concern, and if the same price were paid for ability, the efficiency and even the enterprise might be as great. Assuming the best in regard to management, would it be well to pool the stocks of every enterprise, and pay the owners a uniform rate of interest? This is what socialism recommends, because it assumes that there must be an annual surplus for the ordinary shareholder, the tax-payer.

A rapid change to such a system would intensify the moral chaos of the present; if it has any chance of working well, it must come gradually and through a long apprenticeship in the joint-stock system. And then, no doubt, the single amalgamation of socialism would lose its attraction. But the demand for it will persist in embittering the present relations of owners and workmen unless the number of owners is greatly increased. The best way to retain the freedom and efficiency of the present system is by such increase. It is a form of co-operation like that of the co-operative distributing societies, and, like them, would be far more effective than co-partnership and the co-operative ownership by workmen in the same enterprise; and it would give these a fairer field. If the thing were easy, it would have come long ago; but it was never less difficult than now; and it could be made easier. It would offer a stronger impulse to thrift than the fear of a rainy day has proved. The forecast of such a development is at least as historical as that of a single amalgamation, which is the hope and the fear now confounding every effort at amelioration; but it will not come of its own accord.

LITERATURE.—The general text-books on economics all devote a main division to production, and P. H. Gastberg, *Production*, London, 1907, shows that nearly the whole subject may be seen from this point of view. The earlier books dealt mainly with the three agents of production, the later with their organization. This is naturally approached through its history, and C. Gide, *Political Economy*, tr. C. H. M. Archibald, New York, 1914, well illustrates the closing of the old division between deductive and historical economics. The history of production from the point of view of organization can be read in C. Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, tr. S. M. Wickett, New York, 1907, and can best be studied in the increasing literature of economic history which deals with particular periods, and publishes contemporary records. Recent collections are *Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century*, 1801–20, ed. W. Smart, London, 1910, and *English Economic History, Select Documents*, compiled and ed. A. E. Bland, P. A. Brown, and R. H. Tawney, do. 1914.

W. MITCHELL.

PROFANITY.—1. Meaning and use of the term.—In popular usage the term 'profanity' is frequently limited to a verbal reference and identified with 'profane swearing.' It is perhaps unnecessary to say that such a limitation cannot be justified by historical and etymological investigation. It is undoubtedly true that an unfitting and frivolous use of certain verbal symbols has been almost universally included in the class of practices condemned as profane. The names of the gods in primitive religions and the name of the one God in more advanced religions have been considered as too sacred to be ordinarily employed, and even the sacred usage has been restricted to certain privileged persons. 'Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain' is one of the commandments, and the OT writers constantly warn the people against 'profaning the holy name' of Jahweh. Sacred formulæ have been, in all religions, rigorously safeguarded, and the employment of them by other than authorized persons at the proper time and place has been regarded as constituting the sin of profanity. It is true also that, by investigating those prohibitions having a verbal reference, we may approach an understanding of the ideas underlying the disapproval of the profane. The words which must not be carelessly used refer to a world which is separated by a wide and deep gulf from the world of the ordinary, and the fact that verbal formulæ are of a somewhat artificial origin indicates that the separation is to be maintained not so much by a recognition of rational distinction between the two worlds or an appreciation of the inherent superiority of the sacred as by elaborated and external regulations. Yet, notwithstanding all this, the term 'profanity' includes far more than mere indifference to the distinction in verbal matters, and the wider meaning must be clearly kept in view.

The etymology of the word 'profane' (lit. 'before *or* in front of the shrine') may give us a certain amount of guidance because of its spatial suggestiveness. There immediately arises in our minds the idea of a walled or fenced enclosure within which only peculiarly precious objects and specially privileged persons may remain, and outside of which there is a world of rigorously excluded persons and things having lesser assigned worth than those within. The same kind of suggestion comes to us from a consideration of the Greek

words, βέβηλος and βεβηλόω, which are used to indicate profanity in the NT, and which introduce the idea of 'threshold' — a threshold strictly guarded, which should not be crossed, but yet which is crossed by those to whom the epithet 'profane' applies. Such persons properly belong to the world outside the sacred edifice, but they illegitimately enter in.

2. The idea of artificiality.—As we consider these spatial implications, we arrive, first of all, at the idea of artificiality. There is no intrinsic reason why one particular place should be more sacred than another. If the temple had been founded a few yards away from its actual position, the ground which is now profane would have been rendered sacred, and that which is now sacred would have retained its common or profane character. In primitive religions the location of the sacred and, contrariwise, of the profane depends very frequently upon chance. The importation of reason for the distinction comes entirely from the outside. We are thus not surprised to find that, *e.g.*, in certain Australian religions the totemic animal or thing which is worshipped has no intrinsic value entitling it to special reverence. Profanity lies in a failure to recognize an imposed rather than an actual value. The sacred object has not such a position in a universal scheme as will entitle it to permanent reverence. It has not within itself a power of protection sufficient to guard its sacredness. It follows, more generally, that the religions which most commonly avail themselves of the distinction between the sacred and the profane are not those which have attained to the highest level of security. They are still at the stage of struggle. Their gods have still to compete with the gods of other tribes, and the people who worship the particular gods, and who thus acquire something of their sacredness, have to be preserved by external means from the infiltration and pollution of other tribes. Even in the OT the disapproval of profanity is closely connected with the giving of worship to other gods, as, *e.g.*, participation in the rites of Molech (cf. Lv 20^3). The house of Israel is profaned among the heathen because the people have disregarded the restrictions upon which the exclusiveness of the nation depended (cf. Ezk $36^{20.\ 22}$). The stage has not yet been reached at which it is recognized that all people may be sacred, and that there *are* no other gods who can come into rivalry with the God of Israel. It is therefore easily intelligible that the distinction between the sacred and the profane is based originally, for the most part, upon definite injunction and prohibition. The religion or the body of sacred things has to be zealously guarded by law, and the profane person is the man who transgresses the law protecting the sacred ideas and rites. Of course, in the more advanced religions these ideas and rites acquire a greater degree of intrinsic value, but within the region of thought, where the distinction between sacred and profane is most intensely regarded, such value either has not yet been recognized or has been forgotten, and we may use the word 'artificiality' in order to draw attention to this dependence of the distinction upon external support.

Perhaps the most striking illustrations of artificiality are to be found in connexion with the verbal formulæ, prescriptive of rite or expressive of doctrine, to which we have already referred. The connexion between the sacred character which they now possess and their inherent meaning is exceedingly weak, and it is just where this meaning is most completely overlooked or forgotten that the disapproval of an unauthorized use of the formulæ is most intense. The more elaborate a system of ceremonies is, and the more clearly it bears upon it the marks of artificiality, the more numerous are the injunctions against profanity. The more complex the rite, the stricter is the priestly monopoly regarding it. The danger of profanity seems to be regarded as in inverse proportion to the degree of intelligibility possessed by that which is liable to desecration.

Among the Australian tribes it is an act of profanity to speak the names of some of the totems, and even the men of certain tribes have a sacred name besides their ordinary name which must not be made known to women and children, and must not be used in every-day life. In Vedic times in India we find the doctrine of 'secret names' of the gods, and these names were so sacred that it would have been considered profanity to reveal them to the vulgar. In the same land also, even at the present day, it is considered a disgraceful thing for a wife to utter the name of her husband, and ceremonies of initiation are accompanied by the giving of a sacred formula, or *mantra*, which has value rather as given by the priest than as understood by the initiate, and which the initiate is forbidden to reveal to others if he wishes to escape the sin of profanation of sacred things.

3. The idea of separation.—Another idea, related to the foregoing and also suggested by the spatial etymology of the word 'profane,' is that of absolute, abrupt, and rigorous separation between the sacred and the profane. The sacred enclosure is definitely separated by wall or some other effective protection from the profane world, and access from the one world to the other is only through a rigorously-guarded portal. The dominant characteristic of the two worlds is their heterogeneity. The close connexion between the ideas of artificiality and separateness is obvious. It is the fortresses without natural strength that require the broadest and deepest moats. Risks of contact between the sacred and the profane must be avoided at all costs, and the mind of the worshipper must be kept constantly alive to the dangers of the profane.

(*a*) *Place.*—An exceedingly large class of prohibitions against the profane have reference to separateness of place. In many of the primitive religions we find emphasis upon the profanity of entering the place where the sacred emblems of totem-worship are deposited, and all ordinary work within the sacred enclosure is forbidden. We find the same attitude also in connexion with OT worship. Ezekiel, *e.g.*, prescribes elaborate measurements in order 'to make a separation between the sanctuary and the profane place' (42^{20}), and by the same prophet a certain portion of the city land is called 'profane' to distinguish it from the portion assigned to priests and Levites. One of the chief arguments brought against St. Paul by later Jewish orthodoxy seems to have been that he had profaned the Temple by bringing into it men of an alien or unprivileged race.

(*b*) *Time.*—Very commonly also profanity is held to consist in disregard of a strict division of time. The ordinary world is so separate from the sacred that the occupations of the former have to be altogether given up when the latter is entered. The time which is assigned to the sacred must be characterized by rest from the regular forms of labour. If at such a time work has to be carried on at all, this work must have an essentially religious character and be freed from connexion with utilitarian considerations. If it bears any resemblance to ordinary work, it can be redeemed from profanity only by the fact that it is performed by privileged persons. In Mt 12^5 the priests are said to be without blame when they profane the Temple, because, though performing on the Sabbath actions similar to those of ordinary life, they are yet absolved by reason of their sacred office from the sin of Sabbath desecration. This failure to observe the sacredness of the Sabbath and of other special times and seasons is, in the Jewish religion generally, one of the most frequent grounds for the accusation of profanity (cf. Neh $13^{17ff.}$, Ezk 22^8 23^{38}).

(*c*) *Tabu.*—An intense desire to keep the profane

at a distance is clearly seen in connexion with tabu (*q.v.*) and the religions in which this conception is important. The word connotes exclusiveness (being derived from a root *ta*, 'mark,' and *pu*, an adverb of intensity). It is opposed to *noa*, the general or the common. It is from this idea of tabu that the distinction between sacred and profane arises in many communities, and the rigour of the distinction owes much to the awe which the tabu inspires. Profanity is a grievous sin and at the same time more frequently possible where the transition from the ordinary world to the profane is made as difficult as possible. The constant demand is that all actions and interests belonging to the ordinary world must be left behind by the would-be initiate. Literal contact is of course forbidden, and the prohibition extends to the contact involved in the taking of food. The food of the profane must not be eaten by the initiated, and, contrariwise, the food of the priests must not be eaten by the profane. The latter must not even have the degree of contact which is implied in the sight of the sacred objects. In some communities certain instruments of worship are profaned if, *e.g.*, women catch the faintest glimpse of them. The whole idea of asceticism has originally a very close connexion with this idea of absolute separation. Everywhere also elaborate ritual is accompanied by the most zealous care for the separation of the priestly class from the ordinary community. Many of the uses of the word 'profane' in the OT have reference to this withdrawal. The priests are to symbolize their separateness by changes of garments 'when they enter into the inner court.' They are to avoid ordinary food and the ordinary forms of family relationship, and in many other ways prepare themselves to teach the people 'the difference between the holy and profane' (cf. Ezk 44^{17-25}). The erring priests are those who have themselves 'put no difference' (22^{26}).

4. Profanation of sacred doctrine.—The danger of profanity also attaches itself to an incautious use of the body of sacred doctrine. This is often regarded as the exclusive property of certain privileged classes. The ancient sacred scriptures of India, *e.g.*, are profaned if they are read or taught to people outside the prescribed classes. In various parts of the literature terrible penalties are announced for those who venture to teach the doctrines of the Vedas to a Śūdra.

'The ears of the Sudra who hears the Veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac' (Śaṅkarācharya, Commentary on *Vedanta-Sutras*, I. iii. 38 [*SBE* xxxiv. 228]), and, if he dares pronounce them, 'his tongue is to be slit.'

Occasionally the idea is that the sacred doctrine is also to be kept strictly separate from other truths or opinions which are of lesser value. To mingle sacred and other knowledge is in itself profanity. Perhaps there is a lingering trace of this idea in the use of the word 'profane' in the First Epistle to Timothy. Timothy is urged to 'refuse profane and old wives' fables' and to avoid 'profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called' (1 Ti 4^{7} 6^{20}). The idea of a strict line of demarcation certainly persists in the mediæval distinction of sacred and profane learning.

5. Reasons for distinction between sacred and profane. So far we have been content with noticing the character and the breadth of the distinction between the sacred and the profane. If we go farther and ask for reasons for the distinction—reasons which lie deeper than mere artifice—we shall find these partly in belief in a divine revelation and partly in tradition and the social custom and pressure enshrined in such tradition. Though we have emphasized the artificial character of many of the defences of the sacred, it does not follow that these may not have previously involved a clearer consciousness of the inherent value of what is regarded as sacred. The original reason for the consecration of certain experiences and disapproval of unauthorized incursions into the sphere which they occupy may have been a sense of a divine revelation, even though that reason may now have been forgotten. The sanctuary at Bethel may have, in later times, become a home of priestcraft, but none the less it was the vision of the angels of God ascending and descending that gave it originally a sacred character. Even in religions where a divine revelation is not recognized the artificial character of the interdictions against profanity is not the whole of the matter. These interdictions are not of recent growth; they enshrine tradition, and in this tradition we may perceive the embodiment of a social consciousness. The totem-animal is protected from profanity because it symbolizes the spirit of the clan and represents a social pressure which the individual recognizes as superior and authoritative. Among men more religiously-minded or more enlightened this law of the community is regarded as the law of God, and the profane person is one who transgresses the ordinance of God and deserves, like the prince of Tyre, to be 'cast as profane out of the mountain of God' (Ezk 28^{16}). But whether the divine origin of the law and its reference to an all-comprehensive divine community be recognized or not, the anti-social character of profanity seems to be an unmistakable reason for disapproval of it. The profane person is the anti-social person who refuses to recognize the code of the community, and therefore one upon whom the law falls. Esau is called a 'profane person' seemingly for the reason that he sold his birthright or despised his connexion with the community (He 12^{16}). In India the person who has broken through caste regulations becomes at once profane and a source of pollution for those who remain within the caste. The anti-social character of profanity is also illustrated by the frequency with which accusations of profanity are brought against those who indulge in magical practices. It is no doubt possible to speak of profaning a magical rite in the sense of doing it in an unaccustomed and ineffective manner, but, for the most part, magic as a whole is itself condemned as profane just because it indicates a separatist procedure and a contravention of the regularized and socially approved worship of the community. Otherwise it is difficult to see why magic rites, which have a considerable resemblance to religious rites, should be regarded with such horror as profane in those communities, at least, where a social worship has been firmly established.

6. An inadequate differentiation. — We have emphasized certain inadequacies in the distinction between the sacred and the profane, arising from the artificial and abrupt character of the distinction. But this must not blind us to the elements of enduring value associated with these conceptions. Among primitive peoples the idea of tabu has often been the foundation of morality, and in the more advanced communities the rigorous protection of the priests from possible profanation may indicate a regard for personal purity as well as for privilege. The development of the social consciousness which underlies the abhorrence of profanity has been an ethical asset, and the asceticism by which the heterogeneity of the sacred and profane worlds may be transcended has often been a first step towards personal holiness.

Yet it must be admitted that the distinction between sacred and profane, as it is usually applied, does not belong to the highest level of thought. It still betrays the dominance of merely spatial categories; it is still influenced by the idea

that the divine is limited in the sphere of its operation, that God sets a seal upon certain persons, places, and times, relating them with special closeness to Himself, and leaving the rest of the world to be reckoned as common and profane. We must transform the distinction if we are to retain its underlying value. We must be permitted to honour as sacred the whole of the world which God has made, and encouraged to condemn as profane, not certain specified places, things, or persons, but the spirit of the dweller, whether in the temple or in the street, whose vision is narrow and whose aim is low, who fails to recognize that the way to the Holy of Holies lies along the path of the good citizen, and that even in the lonely wilderness he may find 'the very gate of heaven.' See, further, artt. HOLINESS.

LITERATURE.—Cf. E. Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Eng. tr., London, 1915; *EBrⁱⁱ*, *s.vv.* 'Taboo,' 'Totemism'; W. S. Urquhart, *The Upanishads and Life*, Calcutta, 1916; J. M. Baldwin, *Genetic Theory of Reality*, New York and London, 1915, p. 132 ff.; V. R. Lennard, *Our Ideals*, London, 1913, p. 39 ff.

W. S. URQUHART.

PROPERTY.—See WEALTH, INHERITANCE.

PROPHECY.

American (L. SPENCE), p. 381.
Christian (E. K. MITCHELL), p. 382.
Hebrew (E. KÖNIG), p. 384.

PROPHECY (American).—Among both the semi-civilized and the savage aboriginal peoples of the American continent prophets were held in peculiar veneration, and on many occasions they have moulded the destinies of tribes and nations. The advent of the white man in America, we are informed by many authorities, was heralded by numerous prophecies, but in most cases the authentic character of these is open to the gravest doubt. The vision of Papantzin, sister of Mocteuzoma, Tlatoani of Tenochtitlan (Mexico), is a case in point. This princess, it is said, fell into a death-like trance, on emerging from which she said that she had been led by a spirit through a field littered with dead men's bones to a place where she had seen strange, bearded, white men approach the coast of Mexico in large vessels. Another prophecy appears to have been current in Mexico in pre-Columbian times, to the effect that Quetzalcoatl (a god whose worship differed in certain of its characteristics from that of the other native cults, and who had come from the Land of the Sun and had been driven from Mexico by hostile deities) would one day return. The coming of Cortes and his comrades was regarded by the Mexicans as a fulfilment of the prophecy, and the title of Teule ('godlike being'), conferred by them upon the Spaniards, is proof that the tradition really existed.

Among the Maya of Central America prophecies were delivered by the priests at stated intervals. Writings which profess to incorporate some of these are to be found in the so-called books of Chilan Balam (*q.v.*), and these also deal with the advent of Europeans. There are not wanting statements to the effect that in Incan Peru prophecies were current about the coming of white strangers, but the events alluded to in at least one of them are not in accordance with known facts.

In modern times numerous prophets have arisen among the N. American Indians, usually in periods of crisis in the history of the tribe. In 1675 **Popé**, a medicine-man of the Tewa (Pueblo Indians) near San Juan, New Mexico, was charged along with others with the crime of witchcraft. He preached the doctrine of independence from Spanish rule and the restoration of Indian customs, and instituted a wide-spread conspiracy to drive the Spanish colonists from the country. Popé, along with his disciples, Catiti, Tupatú, and Jaca, set apart 13th Aug. 1680 as the day of massacre. Extraordinary precautions were taken to ensure that no European should learn of the intended revolt, but the news leaked out, and Popé had perforce to strike three days before the time. Four hundred Spaniards were massacred and Santa Fé was besieged, but a successful sortie ended in the rout and discomfiture of the Indians. The Spaniards were, however, forced to abandon the town and to retreat to El Paso. Popé washed with a native preparation those of his followers who had been baptized into the Christian Church, burned the churches, and obliterated every remaining mark of Christianity. But his rule became so despotic and was followed by such misfortunes that he was finally deposed. He was re-elected, however, in 1688, and died in 1692.

Tenskwatawa ('open door') was a famous prophet of the Shawnees and a twin brother of Tecumseh. An ignorant and drunken youth, he was one day engaged in lighting his pipe when he fell back in a state of trance. His friends, believing him dead, were preparing for his funeral when he revived and stated that he had paid a visit to the spirit-world. In 1805 he assembled his tribesmen and their allies at Wapakonita, now in Ohio, and announced himself as the bearer of a new revelation from the Master of Life. He declared that, whilst in the spirit-world, it had been granted to him to lift the veil of the future and behold the blessedness of those who followed the precepts of the Indian god and the punishments of such as had strayed from his path. He vehemently denounced witchcraft and medicine practices, the drinking of 'fire-water,' the intermarriage of Indian women with white men, the wearing of European clothing, and all White customs and institutions. If these things were eschewed, the Master would receive the Indians into favour once again. He further announced that he had been granted the power to cure all diseases.

These statements caused great excitement among the people of his tribe, and those who dealt in witchcraft were boycotted. From time to time Tenskwatawa announced further wonderful revelations to his followers from his abode near Greenville, Ohio. He predicted an eclipse of the sun which took place in the summer of 1806, and this greatly enhanced his reputation as a prophet. His apostles travelled from tribe to tribe disseminating his doctrines, and a belief arose that within four years all those who did not credit his predictions would be overwhelmed in a great catastrophe. Shortly before the war of 1812 a confederacy was entered into for the purpose of driving out the Whites, but Harrison's victory near Tippecanoe destroyed both the faith and the movement connected with it. Tenskwatawa received a pension from the British Government. Although of somewhat forbidding appearance and blind of an eye, he had great gifts of fervour and personal magnetism.

Kanakuk, the prophet of the Kickapoos, received inspiration from the career of Tenskwatawa. In 1819 the Kickapoos ceded their extensive territory

in Illinois to the United States, and were assigned a reservation in Missouri. This region, however, was occupied by the unfriendly Osages, so that the Kickapoos were unable to take possession of it. Kanakuk exhorted his people not to abandon their territory and preached a moral code which forbade superstition, the use of alcohol, and internecine quarrels, promising them that, if they recognized it faithfully, they would in time inherit a land of plenty. He became chief of that remnant of them which remained in Illinois. He was in the habit of displaying a map or chart of the true path through which the virtuous must proceed, beset with fire and water, did they desire to attain the happy hunting-grounds, and he furnished his disciples with prayer-sticks engraved with holy symbols. Ultimately the tribe was removed to Kansas, but Kanakuk remained its chief until his death from smallpox in 1852.

Tavibo ('white man'), a Paiute chief and medicine-man, when his tribe was forced to retreat before the Whites, went into the mountains to receive a revelation, and prophesied on his return that the earth would swallow the Whites and that their possessions would be given to the Indians. But his followers were unable to entertain the idea of an earthquake that would discriminate between the Red Man and his enemies. He therefore sought a second vision, which revealed to him that, although the Indians would be engulfed along with the Whites, they would rise again and would enjoy for ever an abundance of game and provisions. Followers flocked around him and, when they became sceptical, he had a further revelation, which told him that only those who believed in his prophecies would be resurrected. He died in Nevada about 1870.

Wovoka, the son of Tavibo, was responsible for the 'Ghost-dance' religion and prophecies, perhaps the most important from a political point of view in the history of the relations of the Whites and Indians. This creed he nurtured among the Paviotso of Nevada about 1888. It spread rapidly until it embraced all the tribes from the Missouri to the Rockies and even beyond them. Wovoka (who was known to the Whites as Jack Wilson), like other native prophets, declared that he had been taken into the spirit-world, where he had received a revelation from the god of the Indians to the effect that they would be restored to their inheritance and united with their departed friends. They were to prepare for this event by practising song-and-dance ceremonies given them by the prophet. During these dances many of the Indians fell into a condition of hypnotic trance, and intense excitement usually prevailed. The movement led to an outbreak in the winter of 1890–91. It has now degenerated into a mere social function.

Smohalla was the originator of a religion current among the tribes of the Upper Columbian River and the adjacent region. The name (Shmoqula) means 'preacher,' and was conferred upon him after he had attained celebrity. In his boyhood (he was born about 1815 or 1820) he frequented a Roman Catholic mission, from which he appears to have derived certain of his religious ideas. Beginning to preach about 1850, he quarrelled with a rival chief, left his tribe, and wandered south as far as Mexico. On returning, he declared that he had visited the spirit-world, whence he had been sent back to deliver a message to the Indians. The substance of this was that they must return to their aboriginal mode of life and eschew the Whites, their teachings, and their customs. Smohalla found many adherents, and the sect which he instituted, known as 'The Dreamers,' and possessing an elaborate ceremonial, has maintained its religious organization.

The mysterious sect or secret society known in Central America as **Nagualists**, which had for its object the destruction of Christianity, numbered several prophets among its priests and adherents. Jacinto Can-Ek, who led a Maya revolt at Valladolid, Yucatan, in 1761, prophesied the destruction of the Spaniards. Maria Candelaria, an Indian girl, headed a similar and previous revolt, and likewise falsely prophesied the Spanish downfall.

See also COMMUNION WITH DEITY (American), § 5, and SECRET SOCIETIES (American).

LITERATURE.—D. G. Brinton, *Nagualism*, Philadelphia, 1894; L. Spence, 'Magic and Sorcery in Ancient Mexico,' *Occult Review*, xxii. [1915] 145–152, *The Myths of Mexico and Peru*, London, 1913, pp. 6–9; J. Mooney, *14 RBEW* [1896], p. 670 ff.; J. G. Bourke, *9 RBEW* [1892], p. 451 ff.

LEWIS SPENCE.

PROPHECY (Christian).—**1. Primitive form.**—The opening of the Christian era was signalized by a remarkable awakening of the spirit of prophecy, and this was accepted by all believers as the fulfilment of Jl $2^{28f.}$ (Ac $2^{17f.}$). Moreover, our Lord Himself had seen in His own equipment and ministry the fulfilment of the promise of the Spirit (Is $61^{1f.}$, Lk $4^{17f.}$). And 'to the people he was a prophet, strong in action and in utterance' (Lk $24^{19f.}$; cf. 13^{32} 7^{16}, Mt 13^{57} etc.). Earlier still John the Baptist had attracted the multitude by the declaration that the baptism of the Spirit was at hand (Mk 1^{8}). And Zacharias and Simeon, Elisabeth, Mary, Anna, and many others who were 'looking for the consolation of Israel' had borne witness a generation earlier to the presence of the Spirit and His fuller advent as heralding a new era of divine grace (Lk $1^{5ff.}$ $2^{25ff.}$). Furthermore, the whole Jewish Apocalyptic literature of the period testifies to the general expectation of the dawning of 'the last days' and the bestowal of the spirit of prophecy.

The demonstration of the Day of Pentecost was the opening of a new era in the religious history of mankind (Ac $2^{16f.}$). Tongues were loosened, and the impulse to prophesy spread like wild-fire among the converts to the new faith. This was natural and indeed inevitable under the circumstances. Believers were at once impelled and compelled to account for to themselves and to explain to others the things that were happening among them and what was about to come to pass. For the Day of the Lord had dawned, and they were all eager to know what it meant to themselves and to the world. Looking back over the history of Israel, they sought to trace the purposes of God, and they then projected them into the future in the light of the fresh dispensation of grace. This was Christian prophecy in its primitive form, and the apostles were its first exponents. But other voices were soon heard explaining the ways of God and expounding the gospel of salvation. Stephen arraigned the Jewish leaders for resisting the Holy Spirit, killing the prophets, and murdering the Son of man (Ac 7^{51}).

2. Spiritual gifts differentiated.—The persecution which followed the stoning of Stephen scattered the disciples widely and multiplied the number of those who sought to interpret 'the signs of the times.' It thus came about that each little community of believers had those among them who 'spoke as the Spirit gave them utterance' and were accounted as prophets of the Lord. Many were no doubt often overwrought and distraught and promised things that failed of fulfilment; but the fittest survived and held high rank among those who set themselves 'to minister unto the saints.' The freedom that prevailed everywhere in public assembly encouraged each disciple to exercise whatever gift the Spirit had bestowed upon him for the upbuilding of the brotherhood.

As time went on, these gifts became distinguished from one another and more sharply outlined (1 Co $12^{28f.}$).

It is St. Paul who gives us the first clear classification of 'spiritual gifts' and announces that they have been bestowed for the common good. 'God has set people within the Church,' he says, 'to be first of all apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, then workers of miracles, then healers, helpers, administrators and speakers in tongues of various kinds' (1 Co $12^{28f.}$; cf. $12^{1f.}$, 1 Th 5^{20}, Ro 12^{6-8}, Eph 2^{20} $4^{11f.}$, 1 Ti 1^{18} 4^{14}, 2 Ti 1^{6}). And yet these gifts were not bestowed singly and to the exclusion of all the others. For the apostles prophesied, taught, governed, and exercised their manifold ministry. And the prophets also taught and sometimes spoke in a tongue, wrought miracles, and healed. But the individual became classified by his most conspicuous gift, and each little community of believers looked to this one or that for the performance of his chosen function. Certain gifts, however, from their very nature, were unstable and intermittent—*e.g.*, speaking in a tongue, working miracles, healing, and even prophesying. On the other hand, there were gifts that were naturally stable and continuous—*e.g.*, teaching, administering, and governing. The intermittent, unstable gifts were liable to lapse in any given community. There were not enough accredited prophets, healers, or speakers in a tongue to go round; and, where genuine inspiration failed, the pretender often came to the front. St. Paul found it necessary to advise restraint and moderation in speaking in a tongue (1 Co $14^{2f.}$); and he also warns against unrestrained prophecy: 'Let only two or three prophets speak, while the rest exercise their judgment upon what is said. Should a revelation come to one who is seated, the first speaker must be quiet. . . . Prophets can control their own prophetic spirits' (1 Co $14^{29f.}$).

3. The Church and 'false prophets.'—The freedom of the early years gradually came under the restraint of the general judgment of the Christian communities and their accredited leaders. The stable continuous functions in the life of the Church grew in influence and power. The apostles themselves saw to it that the churches were supplied with permanent leaders, such as presbyters and deacons, who should direct the affairs of the brotherhood and guard the purity of its life and teachings (Ac $6^{1f.}$ $11^{27f.}$ 14^{23} $15^{2f.}$ $21^{10f.}$, 1 Th $5^{20f.}$, Gal $2^{2f.}$, 1 Co $14^{37f.}$, Eph 2^{20}, Col 2^{18}, 1 Ti 1^{18}). They were careful, however, not to put the ban on the exercise of any God-given power or to restrain any genuine effort to minister in the name of the Master. For every disciple was a member of the 'body of Christ' and under obligation to contribute to the welfare of all; to his own Lord he stood or fell. And yet abuses of freedom were sure to arise, and did occur. Not all saints were sanctified, and impostors and pretenders appeared here and there. The apostles began to recall that Jesus had warned them against false prophets (Mt $7^{15f.}$ $24^{4f.}$). And His forecast was soon fulfilled (Ac $20^{29f.}$, 2 Th $2^{2f.}$, Col $2^{4, 18}$, 1 Ti $1^{19f.}$, 2 Ti $2^{16f.}$ $3^{1f.}$, Rev 2^{20} and often, 1 Jn $4^{1f.}$). The appearance of these false prophets, pretending superior wisdom, ere long created distrust and aroused the churches and their leaders to the dangers that threatened their welfare. But as yet there was no recognized 'form of discipline' adequate for the suppression of those would-be spokesmen and pretentious revealers of the secret counsels of God. There were no specific standards by which to test and try those 'spirits.' Standards, however, were sure to be found, and, if not found, then created, by the churches for their protection from vagaries in doctrine and aberrations in life. The apostles, whether in common councils or as individuals, were the first court of appeal. They based their judgments on the words of the Lord and the mind of Christ. Then the appointment of bishops (*i.e.* elders or presbyters) and deacons supplied the place of an apostle when he was absent. Letters were a substitute for personal presence. The disappearance of the apostles and the first disciples tended to leave the churches, now widely scattered, open to the invasion of presumptuous claimants to leadership, and the words of the Lord were not often specific enough to meet the case. And who could claim to have the 'mind of Christ'?

4. Warnings of the early fathers.—The rise and development of the monarchical episcopate was here and there favoured and fostered in the interests of sound doctrine and as a restraint against new-fangled notions, foreign to the faith. Hermas, *Pastor* (*Mand.* xi. and xii.), and Ignatius (*Eph.* vii., ix., and xvi., *Mag.* viii., *Tral.* vi., *Phil.* ii., iii., *Smyr.* iv., vii., *ad Pol.* iii.) are full of warnings and admonitions against false prophets and teachers; and Ignatius especially exhorts to obedience of the bishop. This was his hope for the maintenance of sound doctrine. Clement likewise relies upon the bishops (*i.e.* presbyters) for the preservation of the unity and purity of the Church (*1 ad Cor.* xlii.–xliv.). Prophecy, however, was not yet suppressed, but only repressed and somewhat regulated by the rising officials in the Churches. The *Didache* informs us that prophecy was still free and in good repute in Syria (or Egypt), although often counterfeited and condemned (xi. 7–12). Its days, however, were numbered, for it was soon to share the general distrust and opposition towards all extravagant claims to divine wisdom. The Gnostics and Marcion had prophets as well as the churches, and they were sometimes indistinguishable from each other (see artt. GNOSTICISM, MARCIONISM). Then the rise of Montanism (*q.v.*) was in some respects but a resurgence of prophetism. It was an effort to revive primitive Christian conditions where each believer was free to exercise his God-given gift.

5. Disappearance of the prophetic office.—The churches were now put on the defensive and they soon sought to co-operate in the maintenance of their apostolic heritage. Joint action in councils was the most effective means at hand. This brought the bishops together and greatly increased their prestige and power. The appeal to the words of Christ was enlarged to include an appeal to the teaching and writings of the apostles, and the use of the OT as a book of discipline and standard of doctrine grew in favour. The Law and the Prophets had sufficed for Israel, and the Old Covenant needed only to be supplemented by the New with its apostolic guarantees. Prophecy was thus placed under the restraint of written records, and it was considered more important to interpret the old prophecies than to utter new ones. All the unstable, intermittent spiritual gifts shared the fate of the prophetic. Tongues, miracles, healings waned; and by the end of the 2nd cent. they were all, including prophecy, under the restraint of the regular officials of the respective churches and subordinated to them. Prophecy as well as the rest was not denied its theoretic claims, but it must keep within the bounds of Holy Scripture and the standards of discipline. The pressing primitive need of interpreting the 'signs of the times,' however, seemed to have passed away. Men were now trying to adjust Christianity to its place in the world. There were sporadic efforts to reinstate prophecy as a special function in the life of the Church, but it had served its day (Iren. *adv. Hær.* ii. 32; Eus. *HE* v. 7). Its most important and essential element was absorbed by

the teachers and preachers, and the office practically disappeared.

LITERATURE.—A. Hilgenfeld, *Die Glossolalie in der alten Kirche*, Leipzig, 1850; G. N. Bonwetsch, 'Die Prophetie im apost. und nachapost. Zeitalter,' in *ZKWL* viii. [1887] 408 f., ix. [1888] 460 f.; A. Harnack, *Die Lehre der zwölf Apostel*, Leipzig, 1884, pp. 119–131, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums*[2], Leipzig, 1906, i. 296 ff.; H. Weinel, *Die Wirkungen des Geistes*, Freiburg, 1899; J. Armitage Robinson, *s.v.* 'Prophetic Literature,' in *EBi* iii. 3883 ff.; E. C. Selwyn, *The Christian Prophets*, London, 1900.

E. K. MITCHELL.

PROPHECY (Hebrew).—**1. Soothsaying and prophecy.**—According to Cicero (*de Div.* i. 18), there were, traditionally, two kinds of divination, the one based upon an art or theory (*ars*), the other lacking such basis. The former consisted in the application of certain rules which earlier generations believed to have been drawn from the observation of occasional coincidences between certain appearances and certain subsequent occurrences; thus the Greeks (looking to the north) regarded a bird appearing on the left as of evil omen, and one seen on the right as a harbinger of good fortune (cf. Hom. *Od.* xv. 159, 173 f.; so 524, as contrasted with xx. 242), while the Romans, looking towards the south, saw a favourable sign in an *avis sinistra*. Those, again, who cultivated the second main type of divination are described by Cicero as perceiving the future beforehand by means of a certain agitation (*concitatio*), or unconstrained and free movement of the mind. The two modes of seeking to foretell the future are now usually distinguished as divination and prophecy. Now the historical writers of the OT, who have of late been frequently accused of suppressing the truth, do not conceal the fact that in almost every age the first type of prediction had a considerable vogue in Israel.

Thus (*a*) *'ōnēn* is forbidden in Lv 19[26], Dt 18[10], 2 K 21[6], Mic 5[12], Jer 27[9], Is 57[3]; the term seems to have denoted the observing of cloud-formations and of the weather in general, and certainly the practice of observing the configuration and colouring of the clouds played an important rôle among the Babylonians and Assyrians (cf. C. Bezold, *Ninive und Babylon*, Bielefeld, 1903, p. 85). Again, (*b*) the practice of rhabdomancy is deplored in Hos 4[12]; this form of divination, according to Herodotus (iv. 67), was found among the Scythians, and Tacitus (*Germ.* x.) describes the way in which it was practised among the Germans (see *ERE* iv. 827[a]). Further, (*c*) there were people in Israel who believed that they had a connexion with an *'ôb*, most probably 'one who returns' (cf. Fr. *revenant*), *i.e.* a spirit that could not rest in the grave, and might bring tidings from the under world; the pl. *'ôbôth* is used in Is 8[19] as a parallel of *mēthîm*, 'the dead,' and the word may be derived from Arab. *'âba*, '*rediit*' (cf. the form *qôm* instead of the regular *qām* [2 K 16[7]]; the *ô* may have been used also to distinguish the word from *'āb*, 'father'). Those who were believed to be connected with such a spirit imitated its supposed weak voice by hollow tones (Is 29[4]), like those of the ventriloquist, whence LXX sometimes gives ἐγγαστρίμυθοι.

This whole species of prediction, working with objects or persons as its media, was called *qesem*, the agent being the *qôsēm* (Is 3[2] etc.). The term is connected with Arab. *qâsama*, lit. 'to cut in pieces,' then 'to part,' and *qesem* would thus be what gives a decision regarding the future. The representatives of the lawful religion, however, were convinced of their superiority to the *qôsēm* in every respect (1 S 28[8], Is 3[2], Jer 14[14], Zec 10[2] etc.); and it was a principle of that religion that there was no *qesem* in Israel (Nu 23[23]), *i.e.* among those who were faithful to the lawful religion. The true religion of Israel nevertheless countenanced the second type of divination noted by Cicero, and actually traced its origin to those who bore the title *nābî'*—the meaning and history of which we must now investigate.

2. The vocation of the Hebrew prophet.—The nature of the prophetic calling can best be studied by starting from the name *nābî'*, pl. *nᵉbî'îm*.

The word means 'speaker,' being formed from the verb נבא, *nâbâ'*, which corresponds to the Arab. *nâba'a*, signifying 'to announce'; so, too, the Assyr. *nabu*, 'to call,' 'inform,' 'command'; cf. Nabû—Nebo (Is 46[1]), identified with Ἑρμῆς (Ac 14[12]), and the Eth. *nabâba*, 'to speak.' It is true that many scholars (*e.g.*, Kuenen, Wellhausen, Stade) connect *nābî'* with נבע, *nâba'*, 'to well forth,' 'to bubble up,' but this theory ignores the difference between the final gutturals, and severs *nābâ'* from its Semitic cognates; moreover, if *nabî'* meant 'bubbling up,' a 'prophet' would hardly have been blamed for 'boiling over' (*pahdzuth*, Jer 23[32]; cf. Zeph 3[4]); while Kuenen's assertion (*De Profeten*, i. 50) that the sense of 'bubbling up' may have developed into that of 'speaker' still leaves it open that the *nᵉbî'îm* were 'speakers' from the outset. The rendering 'speaker' is supported also by the fact that one's *nābî'* is sometimes styled his 'mouth' (Ex 4[16] 7[1], Is 30[2], Jer 15[19], 2 Ch 6[4]), and that a *nābî'* of God is also called His *mēlîṣ*, 'interpreter,' 'ambassador' (Is 43[27]). Cornill's interpretation of the word is but relatively different from that maintained here; from the Arab. *nâba'a* he infers that *nābî'* means 'authorized speaker'—wrongly, as the present writer thinks, since *nâba'a* signifies, not simply 'to speak,' but 'to inform,' 'to announce.' J. A. Bewer (*AJSL* xviii. [1901] no. 2) proposes to connect *nābî'* with Assyr. נבא, 'to carry off,' and to give it the sense of 'one who is carried away,' 'transported' (by a supernatural power), but Babylonian-Assyrian usage does not give the slightest hint of such a derivation; the divine name Nabû points rather to the derivation from the Bab.-Assyr. *nabâ*, 'to name,' 'to call.'

While the *nᵉbî'îm*, accordingly, were 'speakers,' we must of course understand that they were such in a unique sense, *i.e.*, that they were heralds or messengers in the highest sphere of human interests, viz. religion. They were not, *e.g.*, legal counsel or advocates, as is asserted by H. Winckler (*Religionsgeschichtlicher und geschichtlicher Orient*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 23 f.); for the preparation of 'written contracts,' to which he refers, required not a speaker but a writer, and, while 'writers' are mentioned, as in the admittedly ancient Song of Deborah (Jg 5[14]), we never hear of a *nābî'* as spokesman or counsel in any record of judicial proceedings (Ex 18[13f.], Jos 7[19ff.], 1 S 22[12ff.], Ru 4[1ff.]; cf. 2 S 15[3f.]). In the Code of Ḥammurabi, moreover, we find the *šîbu*, 'elder,' 'assessor' (cf. *zᵉkēnîm*, Ru 4[1ff.]), and the *daiânu*, 'judge,' but there is no mention of the *nabiu*. We infer therefore that the Hebrew *nābî'* was the 'speaker' in the religious sphere, thus corresponding to the Greek προφήτης, originally 'the interpreter of the oracle,' and thus 'the expounder of divine revelation,' so that neither term at first connoted the idea of prediction.

If the Hebrew prophets, accordingly, were 'speakers' in the religious sphere, it is obvious that they were neither priests (*kōhānîm*) nor 'judges' (*shôphᵉṭîm*). It may not be quite so clear, however, whether they were poets, as they have recently been often called. The present writer would here refer to the conclusion at which he arrived in his *Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik in Bezug auf die bibl. Litteratur* (Leipzig, 1900, p. 308 ff.), viz. that, while the Hebrew prophets occasionally introduce lyrics (cf. Is 5[1-6] 23[16]), and often involuntarily break into the rhythm of the dirge (*e.g.*, Am 5[2]), they were otherwise speakers or orators. Further, the author of Ps 74, writing in the Maccabæan period (cf. 1 Mac 4[46] 9[27] 14[41]), could never have said (v.[9]) 'There is no more any *nābî'*,' had he—a poet—regarded himself as one; while, again, the poetic books of the OT are, in the Hebrew arrangement, kept quite apart from the prophetic writings. For similar reasons the *nᵉbî'îm* cannot be classed as philosophers. The Hebrews too had their philosophers, the *ḥākhāmîm*, or 'wise,' whose literary productions are found, *e.g.*, in Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes; but no prophet of the OT ever calls himself a *ḥākhām*—Isaiah (29[14]) indeed positively differentiates himself from the class—and in the Hebrew order of the OT books the *nᵉbî'îm* and the *ḥākhāmîm* appear in different divisions.

3. The rise of Hebrew prophecy.—The present writer would begin here by giving the conclusion to which his own investigations have led him, viz. that prophecy was from the first, so to speak, the heart-throb of the lawful religion of Israel. This is just what we might expect, and, besides, it agrees with the testimony of the Pentateuchal

source E, which, while some scholars regard it as at least second in point of age, the present writer and others believe to be the oldest of all (cf. E. König, *Einleitung in das AT*, Bonn, 1893, pp. 200, 203 f.); thus E in Gn 20[7] calls Abraham a *nābî'* (as in Ps 105[15] the name is given to the patriarchs generally, and in Dt 18[15], Hos 12[13] to Moses). And, if other religions found a voice in some form of prophecy, why should this not have been the case from the first with the lawful religion of Israel?

A somewhat different view is taken by Cornill, who inclines to think that Arabia was the native soil of *nabî*-ism (*Der israelitische Prophetismus*[5], p. 12). He seeks to support this theory by pointing to the fact that the basal form of the verb corresponding to *nābî'* is not found in Hebrew. But Hebrew has many nouns that have no corresponding verb at all, as, *e.g.*, *dām*, 'blood,' *ṣaphta'*, 'dung,' and these words certainly did not connote foreign or imported concepts. Moreover, while *kihhēn*, 'to act as priest,' the verb corresponding to *kōhēn*, is as much a mere *verbum denominativum* as *nibbā'* or *hithnabbē'*, 'to prophesy' (from *nābî'*), no one would ever deny that the priesthood was an ancient and indigenous institution among the Hebrews. Yet some scholars go even farther than Cornill; thus Wellhausen (*Die israel.-jüd. Religion*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 20) asserts that prophecy arose in Israel in the agitated period before the outbreak of the Philistine war. At first sight this view seems to find support in 1 S 9[9b]: 'the prophet (*nābî'*) of to-day was formerly called the seer' (*rō'eh*). The present writer is of opinion, however, that in the exposition of this passage certain points have not been fully taken account of.

(1) Samuel bears both titles—*rō'eh* in 1 S 9[11. 18f.] (cf. 1 Ch 9[22] 26[28] 29[29]), *nābî'* in 3[20]; and we need not attach much importance to Cornill's statement (p. 13) that he is always called 'seer' in the earliest source, for he is there also styled 'man of God' (9[6-8. 10]). Moreover, Hanani (Asa's reign, *c.* 900 B.C.) is still called a seer in 2 Ch 16[7. 10], and there, accordingly, it is not implied that the two terms belonged to different periods. In point of fact, the man of God might be described either as one who perceived, or as one who proclaimed, religious truth, so that the *nābî'* was subsequently also called *rō'eh* (Is 30[10]); and the prophet's act of reception or perception is always (from Am 7[1] onwards) denoted by the verb *rā'āh*, of which the *rō'eh* of 1 S 9[9b] is the active participle. Hence Wellhausen's idea of an absolute distinction between 'prophet' and 'seer' is unfounded.

(2) We must take into account the purpose of 1 S 9[9b], that purpose being to explain why Saul chose the term *rō'eh* (v.[11]), which is not used of Samuel in the previous part of the chapter. It seems very probable, therefore, that the LXX has here preserved the true reading (ὅτι τὸν προφήτην ἐκάλει ὁ λαὸς ἔμπροσθεν, ὁ Βλέπων); for (*a*) the Hebrew here presents a difficulty, and, even if we read *lin^ebî' hayyōm*, this would mean 'the prophet of to-day'; (*b*) the adjunct *hayyōm* is never found in the many other references to changes of designation (cf., *e.g.*, Gn 17[5]); *hayyōm* might easily arise from *ha'am*, 'the people,' which is precisely the reading of the LXX, and certainly other passages (*e.g.* 1 K 3[2]) seem to speak of 'the people' in the special sense of 'the multitude.' Thus the statement that the *nebî'îm* appeared in Israel shortly before the Philistine wars finds but frail support in 1 S 9[9b].

That statement, moreover, is confronted by the fact that in the historical consciousness of Israel there had been *nebî'îm* long before the period indicated, as may be inferred from Gn 20[7] (already noted as belonging to E), from Nu 11[25f. 29] (J), from reminiscences of the prophetic function of Moses (Dt 18[15], Hos 12[13]), and from Jeremiah's utterance regarding the unbroken prophetic sequence from the Exodus (Jer 7[25]). Notwithstanding all this, however, the statement in question has been amplified by the assertion that prophecy in Israel was derived from the Canaanite religion. It was Kuenen (*De Profeten*, ii. 227 f.) who formulated the theory that in the closing period of the Judges the Canaanite phenomena of *geest-verrukking* ('ecstasy') passed over to the worshippers of Jahweh, and that Samuel placed himself at the head of the movement. This theory won the approval of Wellhausen and others, including W. R. Harper (*ICC*, 'Amos and Hosea,' Edinburgh, 1905, p. lv). (*a*) It is to be noted, however, that Harper himself (p. liv) does not deny that prophecy was indigenous to other Semitic religions, and it would be strange that Israel should be an exception. (*b*) It is extremely unlikely that the Israelites should borrow an institution from a religion which they despised and to whose gods and orgiastic practices they were bitterly hostile (Ex 20[3] 23[13] 34[12ff.], Dt 23[18f.] etc.). (*c*) Had the Israelites, in the period of the Judges, not possessed the institution which constitutes the deepest source of their religious power, then the Canaanites, with their superior external culture and an alluring form of religion, would almost certainly have absorbed them. (*d*) The statement of Wellhausen and his successors, viz. that prior to Samuel's time there was a whole host of *nebî'îm* in Israel, and that Samuel simply put himself at their head, finds no support in the sources. We read of no religious movement before Samuel's day, for we can hardly think of Samson in this connexion, while in Eli's time the Ark itself was not guarded against capture by the enemy (1 S 4[11]). Far from there having been a multitude of prophets before Samuel's day, we read that 'the word of the Lord was rare in those days; vision was not widely spread' (3[1]).

The actual situation, as it appeared to the historical consciousness of Israel, was, in contrast to the foregoing views, rather as follows. The fervour of faith in Jahweh as supreme among the gods (Ex 15[11] 18[11]), which had been kindled by the deliverance from Egypt, never wholly died out (Jos 24[31], Jg 2[10]); on the contrary, clear-sighted representatives of the true religion, such as Deborah (Jg 4[4]), and God-fearing men like Gideon (8[23]) had striven to maintain it. Nevertheless, the national and religious life sank to a very low level, and, in particular, the nation seemed about to be overwhelmed by the Philistines, who were constantly being reinforced from Crete (A. Noordtzij, *De Filistijnen*, Kampen, 1905, pp. 39, 123 f.). Even the high-priestly family fell into a state of complete degeneracy in Eli's sons, Hophni and Phinehas; the ancient symbol of the divine covenant was captured by the enemy; and a daughter-in-law of Eli, heart-broken at her people's calamity, gave her child the name Ichabod, 'dishonour,' 'ignominy' (1 S 4[19-22]). It was in this extremity that Samuel stood forth on behalf of his people; speaking as a messenger of his God, he brought them to repent, and to turn to Jahweh (7[3-12]). It was Samuel who once more raised the standard of religion and nationality, and this standard was then seized and carried far and wide by others. It is only after his great victory, which he commemorated by setting up the stone called Eben-ezer ('stone of [Jahweh's] help,' 7[12]), that we find traces of the 'prophetic companies' (10[5]).

4. The development of Hebrew prophecy.—(*a*) *Companies of the prophets.*—We would note here, to begin with, the operation of the general law according to which the great figures in the prophetic field draw round them numbers of emulative disciples. Thus Moses has satellites in Miriam, the prophetess, who led the women in their chant of victory at the Red Sea (Ex 15[20ff.]), and the elders who received a portion of his spirit (Nu 11[25ff.] [J]).[1] In a similar way those who had been moved by the religious and patriotic spirit of Samuel drew round him as their leader. Such prophetic bands—often, though less correctly, called 'schools of the prophets'—come once more into special prominence in the struggle between Ba'al and Jahweh, when Elijah and Elisha stood forth as champions of the legitimate religion of their people. Even Amos (*c.* 760 B.C.) makes reference to 'sons of the prophets,' as such disciples or scholars could be called in the Hebrew idiom (Am 7[14]; cf. 1 K 20[35]). The status of the prophets Samuel, Elijah, Elisha, and Amos, in relation to the members of the prophetic companies, may to some extent be made out from the following references: the latter prophesied before Samuel (1 S 19[24]), or sat before Elisha (2 K 4[38]), and, as this mode of expression finds a parallel in the well-known affirmation of Elijah, 'the Lord, . . . before whom I stand' (1 K 17[1] etc.), we infer that they were the agents or pupils of the greater men; moreover, they addressed Elisha as 'man of God' (2 K 4[40]); and Elisha treats one of them as his servant (6[15-17]; cf. also 9[1]). In Samuel's time, again, we see the bands of prophets marching in procession to the sound of harp and timbrel, and from this fact, as from other references in the sources, we infer that the part which they played in the religious development was of a threefold kind: (1) they disseminated the ideas of men like Samuel, Elijah, and Elisha among the people (in 2 K 8[5] Gehazi recounts the great deeds of Elisha); (2) in chants expressing the great historic memories of their people they sounded forth the praise of God to the accompaniment of musical instruments; (3) in all probability they recorded the history of

[1] On the trustworthiness of the earlier strata of the Hebrew historical record cf. E. König, *Gesch. des Reiches Gottes*, p. 12 ff.

Israel in the spirit of the prophetic religion; and accordingly it would doubtless be in their circle that the book of Jashar (Jos 10[13], 2 S 1[18]), the book of the wars of the Lord (Nu 21[14]), and especially the many other prophetic writings mentioned as sources (1 Ch 29[29] etc.) were composed. As regards the inner relationship between men like Samuel and these prophetic societies, we may say that, while the former were vehicles of revelation, the members of the latter were derivative or reproductive prophets. But a more important mark of distinction is the fact that, while these derivative prophets caught the excitement of the times and in their vehement movements would throw themselves half-naked (*'ārôm*, Is 58[7] etc.) upon the ground (1 S 19[24]), such enthusiastic and ecstatic behaviour is never ascribed to Samuel, Elijah, or Elisha; hence Stade, in attributing such action to the leading prophetic figures as well (*Bibl. Theologie des AT*, Tübingen, 1905, § 64), is speaking entirely without authority. Thus, to sum up what the sources tell us regarding a possible first step in the development of genuine Hebrew prophecy, we may say that the leading representatives became centres of groups or circles of emulative disciples who sought—sometimes, doubtless, in ways not wholly commendable—to spread the true light. This view contrasts with the genetic theory advanced, *e.g.*, by Wellhausen. This scholar speaks of the members of these prophetic unions (1 S 10[5ff.]), somewhat disparagingly, as 'swarms of prophets' (*Prophetenschwärme* [p. 20, etc.]), compares them to the modern dervishes of the East and to the Thracian Bacchantes of Greece, and regards them as having provided the raw materials from which the prophetic function of a Samuel or a Nathan was developed by a process of refinement. This now widely accepted theory (propounded also by K. Marti, *Gesch. der israelit. Religion*, Strassburg, 1907, p. 139), however, stands opposed to the statements of the sources. For (i.), as was shown above, Abraham and Moses were thought of as having been prophets, and Samuel is expressly called a *nābî'* (1 S 3[20]). (ii.) None of the later prophets who occupied an independent position is ever described as having been previously a member of a prophetic society; thus Elisha was called from the plough (1 K 19[19]), and Amos plainly declares that he was not the son (*i.e.* disciple) of a prophet, but a herdsman and a dresser of sycamore trees, the Lord having called him from following the flock (7[14f.]). (iii.) It seems probable that the members of the prophetic companies, by reason of their national and more material points of view, became the popular prophets referred to in the passage of Amos just cited and in Is 3[2] etc. Thus the theory of Wellhausen conflicts with the actual data, and in point of fact it rests upon the evolutionary hypothesis, which so many scholars of the present day treat as an axiom.

(*b*) *False prophets.*—A further distinction among those who claimed to speak for Jahweh was that between true and false prophets. A concrete illustration of this distinction will be found in the scene in which Ahab and his ally Jehoshaphat seek to ascertain the possibilities of an attack upon the Syrians (1 K 22[5ff.]). Four hundred prophets assured them of victory, but another, Micaiah the son of Imlah, predicted a different issue, and went to prison rather than keep silence regarding the defeat which his prophetic consciousness divined. Here, then, we find a cleavage which affected not merely the rank but also the spirit of the prophets. Other representatives of the class to which the four hundred belonged are those with whom Amos contrasted himself (Am 7[14a]), those whose removal was predicted by Isaiah (Is 3[2] etc.), and those who were denounced by Micah (Mic 3[5ff.]); cf. also the collision between Hananiah and Jeremiah (Jer 28[1ff.]).

How are we to explain the rise of this inferior type of prophet? It is not adequately accounted for by the desire of court favour or of material gain (cf. Am 3[5ff.]). The true explanation lies rather in the fact that the conception of God set forth by Samuel, Nathan, Elijah, Amos, etc., was unwelcome to many in Israel. Thus, while these greater prophets represent God as the stern patron of justice and the avenger of wrong-doing, and therefore as one who must often threaten retribution, others ventured to regard the Deity as a weakly indulgent being. These, accordingly, fawned upon the rulers and upon all who were inclined to violate justice within the State (cf. Is 28[7] 'they reel in wine . . . they stumble in judgment'). From the period of the Assyrian invasion of Palestine (*c.* 733 B.C.), again, there emerged a fresh element of differentiation among the prophets of Jahweh. About that time the prophet Isaiah arrived at the conviction that it was not the task of those who had received the true religion to emulate worldly states in political undertakings or in amassing munitions of war. But, while Isaiah accordingly denounced alliances with Egypt and other countries (30[1ff.]) and reprimanded the boastful display of military stores (39[2ff.]), there were other prophets who sided with king and people and whom the people called their 'wise ones' (29[14. cf. 10]). It was the habit of these counsellors to paint the horizon of external politics in the brightest colours (cf. Jer 6[14] 'saying, Peace, peace; when there is no peace').

Now it can scarcely be doubted which of these classes represented the true Israel. For, while Harper (p. cx) says that the adversaries of the OT prophets should not be called 'false prophets,' this was precisely the designation applied to them by the characteristic representatives of the nation, who found the true prophets of Jahweh, *e.g.*, in Moses, not in Balaam; in Micaiah, not in the four hundred partisans of Ahab; in Isaiah, not in those who joined the wealthy in their dissipations (Is 28[7]); in Jeremiah rather than in Hananiah (Jer 28[1ff.]). That Moses and his successors were given the pre-eminence appears from the fact that their words were preserved among the treasures of the national literature, and this procedure finds absolute justification in the circumstance that in the face of the people (who were acquainted with both classes) Isaiah stigmatized his opponents as drunken, and Micah (3[11]) his as diviners 'for money' (cf. § 9). Our conclusion, accordingly, is that the prophets whose writings appear in the OT represent the true type of Hebrew prophecy, while their opponents were a degenerate species.

(*c*) *Idolatrous prophets.*—Not a few prophets among the Hebrews rendered homage to the cults of Ba'al and Astarte, personifications respectively of the sun and the moon; such were those who enjoyed the patronage of Jezebel (1 K 18[19.26], 2 K 10[19], Jer 23[13]). Other phases of the development are of less moment, and are discussed below.

5. **The aim of the true prophets.**—(*a*) The aim of the true prophets was not, as has recently been asserted (Wellhausen, p. 15; E. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstamme*, Halle, 1906, pp. 82, 84, 136), the realization of the so-called 'Bedawî ideal.' The hypothesis is all the more inconceivable because there was in Palestine a non-Israelite clan, viz. the Rechabites (*q.v.*), whose great object it was to maintain the Bedawî mode of life, and who sought to honour their ancestral tradition by not building houses or planting vineyards (Jer 35[6f.]). But none of the Hebrew prophets adopted this principle, and even Elijah did not always live in the desert or in caves (1 K 17[9ff.]);

on the contrary, the genuine prophets appreciated the efforts and achievements of human culture, and accordingly we read in the OT that man is to subdue the powers of nature (Gn 1^{28}), and that he is permitted to enjoy the products of the land (Ex 3^{8} etc.), as well as the gratifications of adornment (Gn $24^{22ff.}$ etc.) and of the arts (Ex $15^{20f.}$ etc.). The 'Bedawī ideal' is surely something very different from the prophetic hope that in the coming age 'they shall sit every man under his vine and under his fig tree' (Mic 4^{4}). Nor did the prophets stand aloof from the common life of their fellows, or from their duties to the nation. As a matter of fact, their patriotism was one of their most characteristic qualities, as is shown by what we read of Abraham (Gn 14), Moses, Deborah, and Samuel. Isaiah identified himself so closely with his people that it wrung his heart to have to prophesy calamity (Is 6^{11}), and how sorely, with other prophets, did he mourn the political disruption of the nation (Is 11^{13}, Jer 3^{18}, Ezk $37^{15ff.}$, Hos 1^{11} 3^{5})! Jeremiah in particular was second to none in the intensity of his patriotic feeling (cf. Jer 4^{19} 9^{1} etc.).

(*b*) The real aim of the true Hebrew prophecy was to uphold the religion of Jahweh as the Eternal God, and to supply spiritual guidance to the nation which had been chosen to be the earliest focus of that religion. The function of the prophets, accordingly, was to perform a task in the highest sense religious, and to work for the loftiest ideals of human civilization.

6. The means employed.—(*a*) *Actions.*—It was natural that the Hebrew prophets, especially in the earliest times, should seek to reinforce their words by actions. In point of fact, Abraham, the herald of what became the recognized religion of Israel, championed it almost exclusively by his conduct, and his greatest service to it was his obedience to the impulse that led him to abandon his polytheistic neighbours (Gn 12^{1}, Jos 24^{2}) and to found a new home for his faith in a strange land. Moses himself was a man of deeds rather than a 'man of words' (Ex 4^{10}), and we note a similar energy of action in prophetic personalities like Deborah (Jg $4^{4ff.}$) and Samuel. The prophetic work of Elijah and Elisha (1 K 17–2 K 13^{14}) likewise consists almost entirely of actions. Now, while many features in the records of these actions may be regarded as later embellishments—for Hebrew history cannot claim to be free from what is a characteristic of all human tradition (cf. König, *Gesch. des Reiches Gottes*, pp. 7 ff., 37 ff.)—yet, before rejecting the marvellous deeds ascribed to the prophets, we should bear in mind the following points: (1) the Hebrew historical books contain many remarkable indications of trustworthiness (*ib.* p. 15 ff.); (2) the narratives regarding the patriarchs are free from the miraculous element; (3) we find Isaiah offering to King Ahaz an evidential sign from the upper or the under world (Is 7^{11})—here, therefore, a man of most discerning mind (cf. $5^{20ff.}$) thinks it not impossible that the Supreme Spirit should overcome other cosmic powers; (4) it is easier to accept the theory that the marvellous deeds have been embellished than to reject the substratum of the records relating to these deeds; there can be no husk without a kernel. The kernel in question here, however, consists in the deepest convictions of a whole people—a people, moreover, that stands at a relatively high stage in the development of human culture and was compelled by a destiny of the sternest character to test the objective validity of its religious position.

A link between deed and speech as media of the prophet's work is found in the symbolic action. Moses, during a battle with Amalek, holds up his rod towards the sky, thus pointing to the true source of help (Ex 17^{11}). Samuel pours oil upon the head of Saul (1 S 10^{1}), and so indicates the lamp of the sanctuary, which was fed with oil and symbolized the knowledge that streams from God. The prophet Ahijah, in meeting Jeroboam, rends his garment in twelve pieces in order to show that God is about to divide the kingdom (1 K $11^{30f.}$). In 1 K $20^{35ff.}$ we read that one of the sons of the prophets asked one of his fellows to strike him, so that by his wounds he might concretely depict the punishment which Ahab had incurred. Another action of a symbolic character is mentioned in 22^{11}, and still another perhaps in Am 9^{1}.

A peculiar group of such actions is furnished by the following passages from the Prophets: Hos 1. 3, Is 20^{2-4}, Jer 13^{1-11} 18^{1-6} 19. 25^{15-31} etc., Ezk $4^{1ff.}$ $5^{1ff.}$ $12^{3ff.}$ $21^{6.\ 14.\ 19-23}$ $24^{3ff.}$ $37^{16ff.}$, Zec $11^{4ff.}$. A key to the solution of the problem presented by these passages may perhaps be found in the narrative of Jer $25^{15ff.}$. Here the prophet is commanded to make a whole group of nations drink from the cup of God's fury—a command which could not of course be literally carried out, although the story runs as if it had been. Jeremiah's words would therefore simply imply that he had been prompted by his divine monitor to perform the action indicated, and that he performed it in his own consciousness; and the real aim of the narrative is to depict the corresponding determination of God in the clearest way (full discussion in *HDB* v. 174–176).

Another type of symbolic action brings us closer still to the distinctively prophetic media. This is found in the instances in which a symbolic name is given to a person or thing, as, *e.g.*, when Isaiah calls one of his sons Shĕ'âr-jāshûb, 'a remnant shall return,' in order that, when this son should pass through the streets of Jerusalem, he should be a silent yet eloquent witness to the hope that at least a minority of Israel would return to their God (Is 7^{3}; cf. 8^{3} 7^{14} $8^{8.\ 10}$ 30^{7}, Zec 11^{7}).

(*b*) *Speech and writing.* — The earlier Hebrew prophets, or 'prophets of action' (J. G. Herder, *Vom Geist der ebräischen Poesie*, in *Werke*, Carlsruhe, 1820–27, II. ii. 135), whose utterances consisted mainly of brief oracles, may be clearly distinguished from the 'literary prophets,' the authors of the distinctively prophetic literature that took its rise (*c.* 760 B.C.) in the composition of the primitive Obadiah (cf. König, *Einleitung*, pp. 360–362). The grounds of the literary development have been found mainly in one or other of the following factors: (1) the injunction to make a permanent written record of prophetic utterances (Is 8^{1} 30^{8}, Hab $2^{2f.}$, Jer 30^{2} 36^{2}), as was urged by Oehler (*Theologie des AT*, Tübingen, 1873–74, § 180); as a matter of fact, however, more than one book of prophetic discourses was extant prior to Is 8^{1}; (2) 'the more ethically reformative efforts of the prophets of the 8th century' (so Kuenen, *Einleitung in das AT*, Germ. tr., Leipzig, 1885–94, § 48. 1)—a theory that seems questionable in view of the powerful defence of morality made by men like Nathan and Elijah; while, again, the connexion between the reformative efforts of the prophets and the recording of their speeches is far from clear. The present writer's view is that the change was due not to a religious development at all, but to the general progress of civilization. As noted above, the utterances of the earlier prophets are of the nature of isolated sentences, and light is thrown upon this by the fact that, while the words of Balaam are described as *mᵉshālîm* (Nu 23^{7} etc.), the word *māshāl*, in this sense, never occurs in the prophetic books. Prophetic utterance, however, would naturally share in the progress which raised Hebrew literature in general to a higher level. At a time when such methodical and yet plastic historical works as J were being composed the

simple oracle of the prophets gave place to more elaborate discourses, and some prophets were now indeed writing books of their own.

7. Period and chronological sequence. — The chronological succession of the literary prophets as well as their actual date is a matter of great importance, since the historical background of the discourses furnishes the best commentary upon them. The chronological succession may be made out from certain indications both in the form and in the contents of the books. (1) Linguistically, we note, *e.g.*, that the ratio in which *'ānōkhî* and *ănî*, the two Hebrew words for 'I,' occur in Samuel is 48 : 50; in Kings 9 : 45; and in Chronicles 1 : 30; and, again, that in Amos it is 10 : 1, in Hosea 11 : 10 (owing perhaps to a mid-Palestinian colouring of the work); in Isaiah (1–39) 5 : 8; in Micah 1 : 2; in Jeremiah 37 : 53; in Ezekiel 1 : 138; in Haggai 0 : 4; in Zechariah 1 : 8; and in Malachi 1 : 5. Here we notice that in the prophetic books, as thus arranged, the use of the form *'ănî* constantly increases. Now, as the three historical works named by way of example doubtless came into being successively in different centuries, it follows that these prophetical writings, running parallel to them in their linguistic character, must also have arisen in the order given.[1] (2) Still clearer indications of the date of a particular prophet are to be found in the political conditions to which he refers. Thus the discourses of Amos allude to a number of still independent states lying around Israel—Damascus (1^{3-5}), Gaza, *i.e.* Philistia (6^{8}), Tyre ($^{9f.}$); while Samaria too is still independent ($7^{9ff.}$). Further, Amos (5^{27}) and Hosea (9^{3} 10^{6} 12^{2}) make but cursory allusion to Assyria as the power which was to execute judgment upon the unfaithful portion of Israel. In Isaiah ($7^{20ff.}$ $10^{5ff.}$ etc.), however, the allusion is quite unmistakable; Assyria, in fact, has now trodden Damascus (732 B.C.) and Samaria (722) under foot (10^{9}); in 20^{1} mention is made of Sargon, the Assyrian monarch who, according to the cuneiform chronology, reigned 722–705 B.C.; and in the later discourses of Isaiah Judah is the only kingdom that still preserves its independence ($28^{5ff.}$). In Nahum and Jeremiah, again, we see the fall of Assyria and Babylonia's advance to the hegemony of W. Asia. The Exile, which Jeremiah had predicted (25^{11} etc.), was a fact of experience for Ezekiel ($1^{1f.}$ etc.); and, finally, Haggai, Zechariah (1–8), and Malachi refer to the Persian king, or to the viceroy (Mal 1^{8}) who now ruled in Jerusalem.

The mass of the prophetic literature, accordingly, arose in the period 760–460 B.C.; and, in the present writer's opinion, a group of five books (Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Nahum) represents the golden age of Hebrew rhetoric, while other three groups (Jeremiah, Joel, Zephaniah, Habakkuk; Ezekiel, Deutero-Isaiah [40 ff.], Jonah; Haggai, Zechariah [1–8], Malachi) may, in view of their tendency to pleonasm and their less metaphorical style, be assigned to the silver age. The concluding portion of 'Isaiah' (55–66), while containing perhaps some literary remains of the prophet, will then, in its present form, probably be the work of a disciple (cf. 8^{16}); and 'Daniel' will be a recast of traditions and expectations connected with a historical Daniel (Ezk $14^{14, 20}$ 28^{3}), circulated during the Maccabæan wars with a view to exhorting the weak and comforting the godly (cf. Dn $8^{17f.}$, and König, *Einleitung*, §§ 78–82).

Recently, it is true, the theory has been hazarded that the writings of all the Hebrew prophets were composed in the period 300–200 B.C. (so, notably, M. Vernes, *Essais bibliques*, Paris, 1891, p. ix, etc.)—a theory which demands some examination in view of the fact that certain scholars (Duhm, P. Haupt, etc.) assign portions of the prophetical literature (Is 24–27, Hab.) to the 2nd cent. B.C. Now (*a*) the type of Hebrew written *c.* 300 B.C. is found in Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah. It is true that Vernes (*Précis d'histoire juive*, Paris, 1889, p. 802) believes that the editor of these three books lived *c.* 150 B.C.; the latest hand in the composition of Nehemiah, however, closes the genealogy of the high-priestly family with Jaddua (Neh $12^{11, 22}$), a contemporary of Alexander the Great (Jos. *Ant.* XI. viii. 7), so that we must still assign the books in question to *c.* 330–300; and hence the prophetical writings, reflecting an older stage in the development of Hebrew, must be products of an earlier period. (*b*) It is easy to see why Hebrew contemporaries of Nabu-kudurri-uṣur (604–562 B.C.), king of Babylon, should reproduce his name in the form Nebukhadreẓẓar, which occurs 27 times in Jer. (21^{2} etc.) and is the only form found in Ezk. (26^{7} $29^{18f.}$ 30^{10}). If Jer. and Ezk., however, were written in the 3rd cent. B.C., *i.e.* some 300 years after the time of Nabu-kudurri-uṣur, the form Nebukhadreẓẓar is by no means so intelligible, quite apart from the fact that in Hebrew works which really date from the post-Exilic period the form Nebukhadneẓẓar is used. (*c*) It is surely mere caprice to say that the kingdoms of Damascus and Israel, Nineveh, the Babylonian monarchy, and the Persian empire would be made the historical background of books written (according to the theory) at a time when these political magnitudes were no longer in existence (for a full discussion of the theory cf. König, *Einleitung*, § 59).

8. What the true prophets actually accomplished.—(*a*) They upheld the lawful religion of their nation. We see this in Samuel, who by his appeal for loyalty to Jahweh moved the people to express their penitence by a common symbolical action (1 S 7^{6}). We see it in Elijah, who at a critical moment stood forth as the champion of the ancestral religion (1 K 17^{1}). We likewise find it in Amos, when, in his very first discourse, he presages a divine retribution upon Damascus for the evils which it had wreaked upon Israel (Am 1^{3}). Amos here assumes that the Disposer and Judge of all will act on Israel's behalf, and makes it clear, as by a lightning flash, that the nation was connected with the Eternal God by an ancient bond which it is the prophet's one aim to maintain. It was with the same conviction in their hearts that Hosea (11^{1} etc.), Isaiah ($1^{2f.}$), and the other representatives of true prophecy came upon the scene. Hence the prophets of the 8th cent. B.C. were in no sense creators of a new era in religion, as is so widely held to-day—a view that reappears in Wellhausen (p. 23), while Marti (*Die Religion des AT unter den Religionen des vorderen Orients*, Tübingen, 1906, Eng. tr., London, 1907) finds three successive periods in the spiritual history of Israel, those namely of the 'Bedawī religion,' the 'peasant religion' (beginning with Israel's arrival in Canaan), and the 'prophetic religion' (from Amos onwards). This quite modern hypothesis, however, rests upon a misconception of the permanent and fundamental character of the lawful religion of Israel. This, even on the lowest estimate, comprises the following elements: (1) belief in the existence of a God who is not, like the Babylonian or Greek deities, a product of the cosmic process (Gn 1^{1} 2^{4b}, Is 31^{3}); (2) a thoroughgoing monotheism, involved in the universal scope of the religion that began with Abraham (Gn 12^{3b}, from an ancient Jahwistic source); (3) the thought of God as purely spiritual—there being at first no trace of an idol in the history of the earliest patriarchs (Gn 12^{1}–25^{18}); (4) the rejection of magic and soothsaying (Ex 22^{18}, Nu 23^{23}), etc. The supporters of the modern hypothesis assert that Amos made the idea of justice the main element in the conception of God. But, besides the fact that Amos himself says nothing of any such radical change and adopts no new divine name to signalize it, it must be remembered that the God of the prophets had all along been the patron of justice and law. Was it not in the name of this God that the great principles of justice found in the Decalogue were promulgated, that Moses instituted courts of law (Ex 18^{13-26} [E]), and that even royal transgressors were arraigned (2 S 12, 1 K 18)? All that can be said of Amos in this regard

[1] The distinctive linguistic characteristics of the prophets are fully discussed in the present writer's *Einleitung*, § 59.

is that he strongly emphasized the divine justice by proclaiming that the Eternal God would not pass over His own people when His day came (Am $5^{18ff.}$). What Amos did with reference to the justice of God was in fact precisely what, a little later, Hosea did with reference to God's love (cf. Hos $1^{2ff.}$ 11^{1}), and Isaiah with reference to His holiness ($6^{3ff.}$; as a sanction for universal righteousness, 1^{4} $5^{16.\ 24}$ etc.). Nevertheless, the prophets of the 8th cent., in thus emphasizing individual attributes of God, were certainly not the founders of a new religion.

(*b*) The prophets directed the affairs of the Kingdom of God. Originally and in principle God Himself was to be the sole ruler, and could be represented only by those who were filled by His spirit. When at length an earthly kingdom was sanctioned, the prophets still retained their religious jurisdiction, and acted as the conscience of the nation. This explains Samuel's conflict with Saul (cf. König, *Gesch. des Reiches Gottes*, pp. 133 f., 199 f., 202 f.); and even to a David prophecy in the person of Gad had to make clear that the king's part in external politics was to maintain the independence of the country and to avoid wars of offence (2 S 24). Solomon's political and religious obliquities were denounced by Ahijah the Shilonite (1 K $11^{29ff.}$), and Shemaiah and Elisha likewise intervened effectively in national affairs (1 K 12^{22-24}, 2 K 9^{1}). The most important factor here, however, was Isaiah's great utterance, 'In quietness and in confidence shall be your strength' (Is 30^{15}), and his assertion that by political alliances and material preparations for war Jahweh's people were only trying to rival the Gentile nations (v.^{16}, and the contemporary passages Zec $9^{9f.}$, Hos 2^{20}). The chosen nation must keep to its mission of being a light to mankind (Is 42^{6} $49^{5f.}$); and, if it had but obeyed this prophetic injunction, it would not only have preserved its existence as a state, but would have discharged a supremely great function in the world's history.

On similar lines the Hebrew prophets solved the related problem of their attitude to foreign nations. As was said above (§ 5 (*a*)), the true prophets were ardent patriots. Isaiah identifies himself fully with his guilt-laden nation (cf. 1^{9} 3^{12}), and Micah can but wail and howl for its calamities, deserved though they were (1^{8}). True patriotism, however, does not consist in pandering to the natural instincts of the masses—instincts but too easily directed to the conquest and exhaustion of alien peoples. The genuine patriot, on the contrary, must ever keep in mind the higher ideals of his nation. Hence the Hebrew prophets, with their unparalleled gifts of a spiritual leadership, brought all things under the moral and religious point of view, and it is this too which regulates their attitude to the great monarchies of their time. The prophet might hold over his own people the doom of foreign invasion, but the invader himself was only an instrument in the hands of the Supreme Disposer. Thus the Assyrian was the rod of God's anger (Is 10^{5}), and the evils which he wreaked upon Israel were an element in the retribution to which the majority of Jahweh's people were rightly liable by reason of their unfaithfulness. Similarly, foreign rulers are sometimes even called the 'servants' of God (Jer 25^{9} 27^{6} 43^{10}, Ezk 26^{7}). But, when such rulers in mere ruthlessness pass beyond the limits of their divinely appointed work of retribution, the prophet threatens them with judgments of the sternest kind (Is 10^{5} 'Woe to Asshur, the rod of mine anger!' [RVm], Jer $50^{7.\ 11.\ 17.\ 33}$, Ezk $38^{16f.}$, *Enoch*, lxxxix. 69).

In view of the actual facts, it is strange that the old charge of unduly favouring the Chaldæans should recently have been once more brought against Jeremiah in particular (H. Winckler, *KAT*[3] [1903], p. 170 f.). We can but repeat, however, that, as the sources make absolutely clear, Jeremiah demanded the submission of Israel to an alien domination only by reason of his divinely inspired conviction that God had so decreed it in order to punish the unfaithful majority (so, *e.g.*, K. H. Graf, *Der Prophet Jeremia*, Leipzig, 1862, and others, as cited in König, *Gesch. des Reiches Gottes*, p. 260 f.).

(*c*) A third phase of the prophets' activity appears in their preserving, expanding, and spiritualizing the Law. (1) That they loyally defended the legislative basis of the Jahweh religion scarcely requires proof. In view of certain modern theories, however, it may be well to state that Amos accused his people of rejecting God's Law and not keeping His statutes (2^{4}); and Hosea bitterly denounces the same evils (4^{6} 8^{12}). But, without adducing further testimony, we may affirm that what the prophets did with regard to the divine commandments was, in the first place, to guard the long-inherited religious and moral ideals of the community. They were primarily reformers, and their demand for repentance could never have appealed to the conscience of their contemporaries except upon the common ground of a recognized law. (2) That the prophets also expanded the Law, though not quite so obvious, is nevertheless distinctly shown by the following incidents: at the institution of the human kingship Samuel defined 'the prerogative of the kingship,' *i.e.* some kind of constitution, and deposited it 'before the Lord,' *i.e.* in the most holy place of the chief sanctuary of the time (1 S 10^{25}); in Hosea (2^{16}), again, we find the injunction that the designation 'Ba'al' (lit. 'owner,' 'husband') shall no longer be applied to Jahweh, the implication being that, in the critical days of the conflict between the Ba'al cult and the worship of the Eternal, the people must avoid what had previously ranked as an adiaphoron; once more, the law in Deuteronomy (23^{1} [Heb. ^{2}]) by which eunuchs were excluded from the community of Jahweh is repealed in the closing (Exilic) division of Isaiah (56^{3-5})—the result of a deepening sense of the ultimate universality of God's Kingdom. (3) The prophets spiritualized the Law by the emphasis which they laid upon religion and morality as the all-important factors in human life. This appears from a long series of prophetic utterances which begins with Samuel's great saying, 'To obey is better than sacrifice' (1 S 15^{22}), and is continued in the question of Amos (5^{25}), 'Did ye bring unto me sacrifices . . . in the wilderness forty years?' Devotion to God can find expression without sacrifice—a truth that is even more strongly insisted upon in Hos 5^{6} 6^{6} 8^{13} 14^{3}, Is 1^{12} 29^{13}, Mic 6^{6-8}, Jer $7^{22f.}$. Nor does even Ezekiel in any degree depart from this attitude. He severely reproaches his people with their impiety and immorality; he calls Israel 'a rebellious house' (2^{5} etc.); he insists above all things upon an inward transformation (11^{19} 36^{25-27}); he is anxious to prevent disloyalty in every form ($37^{15ff.}$); his zeal for the rebuilding of the Temple was a means of making Israel ashamed of its past transgressions (43^{10} $44^{6f.}$ 45^{9-15}); and one of his great aspirations was the benevolent treatment of aliens ($47^{22f.}$). If Ezekiel was also concerned for the ceremonial law, it was simply in order that by means of a regular order of worship the impious might be warned against a repetition of their former disloyalty. The prophets, moreover, sought to spiritualize the Law positively; thus, in contrast to the ordinance regarding fasting (Lv $16^{29ff.}$ etc.), we read in the prophets: 'Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bonds of wickedness,' etc. (Is $58^{6ff.}$; cf. Zec 7^{5-10}), while, in place of the rending of garments as a symbol of mourning (cf. 2 S 3^{31}), Joel (2^{13}) bids the people rend their hearts (cf. König, *Gesch.*, p. 317 ff.).

(*d*) These three aspects of prophetic activity

with regard to the Law are now largely ignored, and the main emphasis is usually laid upon what the prophets say about the future. Here, however, it is to be noted that they were much less concerned with prediction (of concrete occurrences) than with true prophecy, *i.e.* the verbal portrayal of the great regulative lines of the future course of things. Sometimes, no doubt, they foretold special events, such as the fall of Shebna (Is 22[15ff.]), the withdrawal (29[16f.]) and the destruction (31[8]) of the Assyrians, the death of Hananiah within the year (Jer 28[16f.]; cf. also Am 7[9], Jer 34[6. 8] [2 K 25[7. 27]], Zec 7[3]). In the main, however, prophetic utterances regarding the future were designed to set forth the fundamental lines upon which the divine kingdom would evolve.

The vistas of the future thus opened are manifold and glorious; a notable instance is the vision of the nations flocking exultantly to the Temple of Jahweh (Is 2[2-4] ‖ Mic 4[1-3]). Still, these unveilings of times to come could not, in view of human guilt, but be sometimes full of menace, and it was only in rarer moments that the prophets could depict the splendours of the final consummation. It must be remembered, of course, that the more ominous forecasts were given conditionally, as Jeremiah (18[6-10]) realized in the potter's house, though this conditional character extends no doubt to the promises as well. The conditional nature of prophecy is a fact of the utmost significance, for it serves as a preliminary explanation of that non-fulfilment or only partial fulfilment of certain prophecies which has led some recent scholars to disparage OT prophecy in general (cf. *e.g.* Kuenen, *De Profeten*, i. 114 ff., with König, *Der Offenbarungsbegriff des AT*, ii. 374 ff.). There are other explanations, no doubt, and the most important of them lies in the supreme achievement of the prophets in the distinctively prophetic sphere, viz. the *spiritualization of prophecy* relating to the future of the divine kingdom.

Of this spiritualizing process we may trace the following main indications. (1) The relation between the divine kingdom and its earthly sphere is more and more relaxed. The noteworthy circumstance that the patriarchs had no permanent possession in the Land of Promise except a burial cave (Gn 23[20] etc., 47[30] 49[29]) seems to presage the later historical development—the restriction of the Davidic dynasty to the lordship of Judah and its immediate neighbourhood (*c.* 937 B.C.), and the final overthrow of that dynasty (*c.* 586 B.C.). Prophecy is often an eloquent commentary on these facts. Isaiah (11[1]) had said that the perfect governor of the divine kingdom would spring from the root (not the top) of the Davidic tree, and Micah (5[2]) added that he would be born in the ancestral village (not the capital) of the dynasty, while in the post-Exilic section of Isaiah (esp. 55[3-5]) the Davidic line recedes into the background, and Malachi (3[1]) makes no reference to the Davidic descent of the coming messenger. (2) Other indications of the growing spiritualization of prophecy are found in the increasing clearness with which the following truths were realized: the superhuman gifts of the coming leader (Is 9[6f.] 11[2], Mal 3[1]); suffering as an element in his work (Is 11[1], Mic 5[1], Zec 9[9] 12[10], Is 53), and finally his priestly function (Ps 110[4], Zec 6[13]); inward change as the necessary condition of salvation (Jer 31[33ff.], Ezk 36[26], Mal 3[20] [4[5f.]]); the universalistic tendency of the divine kingdom (Zec 8[23], Mal 1[11]). For a more detailed account of this process cf. König, *Gesch.*, pp. 267–278.

Notwithstanding these lofty ideals, the Hebrew prophets have in recent times been charged with one-sidedness and partiality, more especially by Kuenen, who (*De Godsdienst van Israel*, Haarlem, 1869–70, ii. 257 f., Eng. tr., *Religion of Israel*, London, 1874–75) exclaims: 'We will not let ourselves be robbed of the conviction that God rules in all history.' (1) This protest, however, does not really affect the design by which, according to the prophets, the human race was to be disciplined and redeemed. A father who permits his son for a time to go his own way cannot be accused of indifference regarding that son's welfare. So may the providence of the Heavenly Father encompass even the peoples whom He suffers 'to walk in their own ways' (Ac 14[16]), and He actually does more: He instructs the husbandman (Is 28[26]); in the heavens He manifests His glory to all (Ps 19[1]); He instructs the nations and teaches man (94[10]). (2) Nor do the destinies of Israel violate the justice of universal history. In Israel the law of equipoise as between rights and duties was maintained with remarkable strictness; here it held good that 'mighty men shall be mightily tormented' (Wis 6[6]), and here were enforced the principles that 'to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required' (Lk 12[48]; cf. Ro 2[12]) and 'many shall be last that are first' (Mt 19[30]). Exultation in the covenant with God is often stifled by sorrow for the frequent violation of that bond and the attendant penalties. (3) Friedrich Delitzsch (*Babel und Bibel*, Leipzig, 1903, ii. 38) asserts that in OT prophecy the history of the ancient world is looked at from a most oblique visual angle. Here, however, Delitzsch not only overlooks the facts just adduced, but ignores the universalism that forms the sublime element in the historical design unfolded by the prophets. He quotes Gn 12[3a], but omits [3b] (repeated in 18[18] 22[18] 26[4] 28[4]): 'in thee [or 'in thy seed'] shall all the families of the earth be blessed.' He likewise leaves out of account the excellence of the laws relating to aliens, in which the OT surpasses both the Code of Hammurabi and the Hellenic attitude to 'barbarians.' Nor has Delitzsch any real understanding of that lofty stage of culture from which sprang a passage like Is 2[2-4] ‖ Mic 4[1-3] (see above). Our rejoinder to his strictures must therefore be that, on the universalistic side of OT prophecy, the history of the ancient world is surveyed from a pre-eminently ideal point of view.

The consummate achievement of OT prophecy, however, lies in the idea of the *new covenant*—a covenant which is to secure the effacement of human guilt, in which the fundamental law of acknowledging God is alone to prevail, and which is to be observed in hearts renewed by gratitude. This idea first emerges in Jer 31[31-34], and nothing could more clearly indicate the aspiration towards a higher stage in the development of the divine kingdom. The work of the Hebrew prophets thus culminates in a prospect which corresponds at once to the highest longing of the human heart and to the most perfect conception of God.

9. The inner sources of prophecy.—In the discourses of Micah (3[8]) that prophet says, 'I am full of power, even the spirit of the Lord' (RVm), so expressing his conviction that his prophetic gift came from a superhuman source. Similarly Isaiah (8[11]) says, 'The Lord spake to me with strength of hand' (RVm), implying that he felt himself profoundly influenced by something outside the range of ordinary forces. A like impression, as from the wave-beats of some 'immortal sea,' was known also to Jeremiah (23[23]); and the Psalmist (Ps 104[29f.]) interprets these throbbings as the pulsations of a heart at the centre of things, and sees in them the source of cosmic movement. Now, reflexion upon the origin of this cosmic movement (πρωτη κινησις) really brings us, as far as the present writer can judge, to the conclusion that—in agreement likewise with Aristotle—the truth that 'God is Spirit' (Is 31[3], Jn 4[24]) contains the only reasonable solution of the primordial riddle of the universe. But, if we admit the possibility of an abnormal impulse proceeding from this focal energy, may not the consciousness of the prophet have been affected by it in an abnormal way? May not his power of spiritual vision have been peculiarly intensified? As a matter of fact, if the prophet's conviction of his being influenced by an unwonted spiritual impulse has a basis of reality, this increased sensitiveness is psychologically quite intelligible. Even in the sphere of ordinary experience, sense and memory may be strangely quickened by some unusual impression; thus, in moments when a man is suddenly brought face to face with the peril of death, scenes long forgotten will pass before his mental vision, and he may make discoveries that at ordinary times seemed beyond him. Hence it is in no sense incredible that a

soul, receiving, as it believes, an impression from a region otherwise unknown, should thereby be endowed with a capacity for a knowledge beyond the range of wonted experience.

The prophets also affirm that they are granted visions of what lies behind the ordinary process of events. This is implied in their repeated use of the expression 'I saw'—an assertion all the more significant because it is always expressed in a special way (over 30 times; Am 7[8] etc.). Thus the true prophets, when speaking of their abnormal visions, use the verb *rā'āh*, the Hebrew word for simple ordinary seeing, whereas, when referring to those who falsely claimed the title of prophet, they expressly denied that such could 'see' (*rā'āh*), saying of them that they 'follow . . . what they have not seen' (Ezk 13[3]), and ascribing to them at most a certain power of 'beholding,' 'looking at' (*chāzāh*), *i.e.* a purely sensuous faculty, and not 'seeing' in the proper sense at all. That the true prophets were able to speak of others in this way argues a remarkable degree of conviction regarding their own powers of prophetic vision.

It may be asked, however, whether the prophets were not simply men like Swedenborg, who, *e.g.* (as we shall not deny, and as is admitted by Kant [*Werke*, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1838–39, x. 453 f.]), 'saw' a conflagration in distant Stockholm, a letter in a secret drawer, etc. But Swedenborg's clairvoyance (parallels to which may be found, *e.g.*, in Ezk 8[14] 11[13] 24[21]) falls short of the true prophetic faculty of prescience. The prophets claimed to foretell new things before they sprang forth (Is 42[9]), and they actually did foretell them. The prophecy, sometimes associated with the characteristics given on p. 390, anticipated the course of events, as shown in signal fashion by Is 55[3-5]. Thus, too, Isaiah amazed his fellows by his conviction that Jerusalem would be delivered from the Assyrian beleaguerment in 701 B.C. (Is 29[7-9]); he also foretold that the Assyrian host would be destroyed by a 'not-man' (31[8]), *i.e.* a superhuman power, as actually took place on the Egyptian frontier (37[36]; Herod. ii. 141). Similarly Ezekiel (33[21f.]) knew of the fall of Jerusalem the day before it took place.

These examples suffice to furnish us with a principle that governs the relations of history and prophecy (cf. König, *Der Offenbarungsbegriff des AT*, ii. 278 ff.), viz. that, while the discourses of the OT prophets run parallel to history in form and matter (§ 7 above), history is not their source. Thus Jeremiah's conviction that he was called to a great religious task doubtless came to him during the Scythian invasion of W. Asia (*c.* 628 B.C.; Herod. i. 103–106); his work as a prophet, however, was not causally connected with that invasion, but is simply concurrent with it. The historical events of his day merely supplied him with imagery (Jer 1[13ff.]), but countless utterances of the prophet show that his commission was not derived from the course of events, and could not be so derived; cf. *e.g.* 20[7] (it is Jahweh who prevails over him) and 32[36f.] (the symbolical action with the deed of sale, expressing his conviction that the departed Israelites would return).

The knowledge of the future which we find in the words of Isaiah and other prophets cannot be explained as resting upon 'the interpretation of the historical revelation of God' (F. Wilke, *Jesaja und Assur*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 96). Isaiah certainly reproaches his people with disregarding the work of the Lord (5[12]), but by that work he means the events that have already happened. His prophetic knowledge, however, was of a peculiar kind; cf. 28[22] 'I have heard,' and the fact that, when the king's counsellors were at their wits' end (29[9]), he himself knew what would happen, and was convinced of his superiority to the prophets whom the people called 'their wise men' (vv.[10, 14]). The present writer's belief that the insight of the prophets was something distinctive and exceptional is shared by such modern scholars as C. F. A. Dillmann, F. Bleek, S. R. Driver, R. Kittel, and C. von Orelli; and S. Oettli (*Die Propheten als Organe der göttlichen Offenbarung*, Berlin, 1904) puts the matter admirably when he says that 'to speak here of religious genius is merely to substitute one mystery for another.'

Here we must once more consider the judgment passed by the true prophets upon certain of their contemporaries who likewise claimed to speak in the name of Jahweh.

(1) As regards the commission of the latter, the true prophets held that it was not from Jahweh at all (Jer 14[14] etc.). The motives of these pretenders were really of a material kind (Mic 3[5, 11]), and arrogance and presumption lay at the root of all that they did (Jer 23[32], Zeph 3[4] etc.)—'they follow their own spirit' (Ezk 13[3]). (2) As regards the sources from which their utterances were drawn, these are stigmatized as 'lying visions' (Jer 14[14], etc.), 'what they have not seen' (Ezk 13[3] AVm), visions by night (Mic 3[6]), *i.e.* mere dreams (Jer 23[25, 28]), or 'their own heart' (14[14] 23[16], Ezk 13[2, 17]). As already said, these characterizations indicate a remarkable intensity of conviction on the part of the genuine prophets, all the more so because they were uttered in face of a public to which both classes were known.

The claim of the true prophets, nevertheless, is still being met with objections.

(1) It is said, *e.g.*, that Ezekiel suffered from temporary dumbness and hemiplegia (A. Klostermann, *SK* 1. [1877] 391 ff., 417 f., 422; A. Bertholet, R. Kraetzschmar [Commentaries on Ezekiel]; A. Jeremias, *Das AT im Lichte des alten Orients*[2], Leipzig, 1906). Klostermann finds symptoms of these diseases in the prophet's occasional dumbness (3[24-27] 24[25-27]) and his lying alternately on his left and his right side (4[4ff.]). But this is assuredly mere caprice; for we must not isolate these occurrences from other actions of a kindred character imposed upon Ezekiel by God. What bodily idiosyncrasy would such critics associate, *e.g.*, with Ezekiel's shaving his head and beard (5[1]), his baking with excrement for fuel (4[12]), or his withholding his tears (24[16])? (For a full discussion of the points at issue cf. *HDB* v. 175 f.; also König, *NKZ* iii. [1892] 650 ff., and J. Hermann, *Ezechielstudien*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 72.) The theory of bodily indisposition is in any case quite inadequate to account for the spiritual insight so characteristic of the prophets.

(2) A fairly common theory is that the prophets were subject to ecstasy, and a recent scholar of some eminence, F. Giesebrecht (*Die Berufsbegabung der AT Propheten*, Göttingen, 1897, p. 47), comes to the conclusion that their prophetic consciousness was in part due to the ecstatic state. The prophets in question, however—not to be confounded with the 'sons of the prophets' (§ 4 (*a*))—give no hint of any state of ecstasy, *i.e.* unconsciousness or frenzy. It is true that Jeremiah was said by one of his opponents to be mad (Jer 29[26]). Hosea, again, referring probably to himself, says that the prophet is out of his senses (9[7]); quite obviously, however, his meaning is that the iniquities of his people (cf. Is 1[2-4], Jer 2[10-13] 8[14]) were enough to derange the mind of a true prophet and patriot. It is clear, accordingly, that the theory of ecstasy finds no support in the passages cited, while we have the positive evidence that the prophets lived an ordered life in the family and the State, and that their discourses, alike in construction and diction, are the work of sane and sober minds. Moreover, even in the hour of their call, *i.e.* when most deeply moved by abnormal influences, they perfectly retain their self-consciousness and their memory; it was precisely in such experiences that Isaiah realized his own sinfulness (6[5]), and Jeremiah felt that he was too young for the task set before him (1[6]).

(3) The Hebrew prophets have also been charged with ignorance in matters of psychology. In answer to this we may recall Isaiah's severe strictures against the sophistical perversion of moral concepts (5[20]) and the remarkable precision of his own ideas and judgments. How often does Jeremiah reprove his people for 'the stubbornness of their evil heart' (3[17] etc.)! It is he too who speaks of his God as searching the heart and trying the reins (17[10]), and it is most unlikely that such a mind would mistake its own phantasies for divinely-given convictions (cf. Cornill, *Das Buch Jeremia erklärt*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 420). This may be said also of Ezekiel, who (speaking in God's name) declares, 'I know the things that come into your mind' (11[5]). Such utterances are not easily reconcilable with ignorance regarding the nature of the human spirit.

In point of fact, taking into account the precise intellectual distinctions and the delicacy of moral feeling displayed in the prophetic writings associated with the names of the prophets, we find it impossible to charge the prophets even with self-deception. Self-deception always implies some lack of discrimination and of religious and moral sobriety—the very opposite of the characteristics set forth above, to ignore which were to reject the one line of evidence that can avail in the question at issue.

Wellhausen (p. 15) has finely said that the individual upon whom the grace of God has come remains a mystery. In view of what the prophets

said and did, however, we must go beyond this and recognize that they were wrought upon by some mysterious force lying behind the veil of ordinary phenomena. Difficult as it may be for the modern mind to acknowledge this, there seems to be no other way of doing justice to the historical facts. After all, as the phenomena of life and of the human consciousness cannot be explained by reference to their antecedents, it need not seem strange that the paramount position of the true prophets in the spiritual history of the Hebrew people should defy every attempt to explain it on natural grounds.

10. Non-Israelite analogies.—(*a*) In Babylonia and Assyria divination, which was rejected by the prophetic religion of Israel (§ 1), was an organized function of the State (cf., *e.g.*, C. Bezold, *Die babylon.-assyr. Lit.*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 44 f.), the Babylonian-Assyrian religion being in this respect on a level with the religion of Egypt, Greece, and Rome, but assuredly falling far short of what we find in Israel. In Hebrew literature, moreover, we hear nothing of any person like Enmeduranki, to whom Babylonian literature traces the art of divination. But we must still ask whether, outside the recognized practice of divination in these lands, there were individuals of prophetic character who might be compared to the prophets of Israel.

A personality of this type has been found in Ḫammurabi (cf. art. LAW [Babylonian], vol. vii. p. 817 ff.), who, in a relief preceding his well-known Code, is depicted as standing before the sun-god (Shamash). From this, however, we are to infer that Hammurabi is not the pupil or prophet of that deity, as Bezold thinks (p. 3), but rather his counterpart; for in the introductory lines of the inscription we read:

'Anu and Bel called me, Ḫammurabi, the exalted prince, the worshipper of the gods, to go forth like the Sun . . . to enlighten the land,' etc. (R. F. Harper, *The Code of Ḫammurabi*, Chicago, 1904, p. 3).

Further, the particular laws are as often ascribed to Ḫammurabi himself as to the sun-god, and towards the close of the inscription we find such utterances as 'My weighty words I have written upon my monument' (Harper, p. 101), and 'My words are weighty, my wisdom (Harper, p. 103, 'deeds') unrivalled'—sayings which we cannot well imagine coming from Moses (cf. Ex $3^{11f.}$ [EJ], Nu 11^{29} [EJ] 12^{3} [EP], or from the literary prophets of a later age (cf. Is 5^{21}, Jer 23^{16a}, Ezk $13^{2.\ 17}$ etc.).

In the cuneiform literature of the 7th cent. B.C. another writer speaks of himself as follows:

'I, the servant, the prophet (?), of his lord the king, utter my prophecies for my lord the king. May the gods whose names I have enumerated accept and hear these prophecies on behalf of my lord the king; may they add to him more than his portion, and give to my lord the king! But may I, the prophet of my lord the king, stand before my lord the king, and with all my heart worship on my side (?). When my sides become weak, may I exert my power to the utmost by the power of my word. Who must not love a good lord? Surely it is said in the song of the Babylonians: "Because of thy gracious lips, my shepherd, all men look to thee"' (We follow the version of F. E. Peiser, in *MVG* iii. [1898] 257 *f.*; but the original term here rendered 'prophet' simply means 'servant,' 'worshipper.')

Winckler (*KAT*³, p. 170 f.) refers to this passage as exhibiting a Babylonian-Assyrian counterpart to the Hebrew prophet, as, *e.g.*, Jeremiah. In point of fact, however, a speaker who stands 'before the king,' and is obviously subservient to him in all things, rather suggests the 'prophets' who, while claiming to speak for Jahweh, were but the servile agents of King Ahab (1 K 22^{6}); or those who in the days of Isaiah were regarded by the ruling faction as 'their wise ones' (Is $29^{10.\ 14}$, Jer 28^{10} etc.)—men from whom the representatives of the lawful religion of Israel distinguished themselves in the most decided way (1 K $22^{20f.}$, Am $7^{14f.}$, Is 3^{2} 9^{15} 28^{7} $29^{10.\ 14}$, Mic 3^{5-7}, Jer 7^{25} 23^{1} etc.).

Winckler has also sought to disparage men like Amos and Jeremiah by speaking of them as 'political agents' (*Gesch. Israels*, Leipzig, 1895–1900, i. 95), and as the 'spies' or 'professional agitators' of the rulers of Nineveh or Babylon (*KAT*³, p. 170 f.). Thus Amos is said to have laboured on behalf of the policy of King Ahaz (Winckler, *Religionsgeschichtl. und geschichtl. Orient*, p. 38). In answer to this, however, we need only recall the fact that, when Amos was ordered by Jeroboam II. to leave Bethel, he asserted that he had been called to his religious office by God (Am 7^{15}), and in all his utterances we overhear his conviction that he is in the service of the Eternal (1^{3} 3^{7} etc.). As for Jeremiah, again, it is clear that the Monarch whom he believed himself to serve was none other than the King of kings, and that he regarded himself as belonging to that great succession which had championed the supreme interest of Israel throughout the ages (Jer 7^{25}). His patriotism and his attitude in political affairs have already been dealt with (§ 8 (*b*)). Jeremias (*Das AT im Lichte des alten Orients*², p. 35) suggests that the Hebrew prophets were the vehicles of Babylonian culture: 'Mercury is the morning-star; his name means "harbinger." Here we come upon the astral interpretation of the word *nābî'*, "prophet"; he is the harbinger or vehicle of a new age.' The Babylonian-Assyrian diviners, however, found their patron, not in Mercury, but in the sun-god (*KAT*³, p. 368), while the genuine Hebrew sources say nothing of any such connexion between their prophetism and Mercury, and in fact actually protest against divination in every form (§ 8).

If, therefore, we find in Babylonia and Assyria no direct evidence of the existence of prophetic personalities comparable to the Hebrew prophets, it remains to ask whether we have any indirect traces—such as might be afforded, *e.g.*, by the literature. Here, however, as in Assurbanipal's library, we find nothing higher than series of omen-tablets, in one of which, *e.g.*, we read:

'If in the month of Sivan (June) an eclipse occurs between the first and thirtieth day, vegetation throughout the land will lag behind.'

But where in the Babylonian-Assyrian literature do we find anything to compare with the profound religious ideas, the earnest moral exhortations, and the glowing anticipations of the future, so characteristic of the writings of the Hebrew prophets?

Attention has been directed to the following passage as indicating Babylonian visions of the future (F. Hommel, in *Glauben und Wissen*, i. [1903] 9 f.):

The god Marduk, seeing a sick person, says to his father Ea: 'My father, disease has come upon man; I know not by what means he may be healed.' Then Ea answered his son thus: 'My son, what may there be that thou knowest not? What new thing might I still teach thee? What I know, thou knowest, and what thou knowest, I know: go, my son, and break the spell upon the sick one.' Then come the directions for exorcizing the disease.

Now, while this may show that the Babylonian-Assyrian deities were regarded as ready to heal man, it is to be noted that the healing implied was only of a physical kind; and, besides, the passage is not really predictive at all. T. K. Cheyne (*EBi* iii. 3063), however, finds the predictive element in the following passage:

'Sea-coast against sea-coast, Elamite against Elamite, Cassite against Cassite, Kuthæan against Kuthæan, country against country, house against house, man against man. Brother is to show no mercy towards brother; they shall kill one another.'

But this prediction, referring probably to Ḫammurabi's triumph over the neighbouring kings, is a purely political one. It is hardly necessary to point to the contrast with Hebrew prophecy, which moved essentially in the sphere of religion, and for which the founding of a divine kingdom has as its supreme practical end the culture of the ethico-religious interest—assuredly the highest element in the life of a nation.

(*b*) E. Meyer (*Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, Halle, 1906, pp. 451–453) asserts that Hebrew prophecy was derived from Egypt, and cites a prophecy (partly from the earlier, partly from the middle, period of Egyptian literature, and recently more accurately deciphered) to the following effect:

'A wise man (or the inspired lamb) reveals to the king the future of Egypt, and then with his last word falls down dead, and is ceremoniously interred by the king. His prophecies,

however, are put on record and handed down to future ages. Their tenor is that there is coming, to begin with, a period of awful distress, in which everything in Egypt turns topsy-turvy—foreign peoples make inroads, servants become masters, people of position are slain, women enslaved, the entire social order subverted, temples plundered and desecrated, and their mysteries laid bare, while the king himself is carried away captive or forced to flee to a foreign land. Then follows an epoch in which the gods once more bestow their favour upon the country, and in which a just king, beloved of the gods and sprung from the sun-god Re', expels its enemies, restores its worship and its ancient order, subjugates the neighbouring lands, and enjoys a long and happy reign.'

Meyer maintains that this 'fixed traditional *schema*' was known to the Hebrew prophets, who, in fact, merely elaborated it in detail and applied it to the situation of the day. But there is certainly no positive evidence to show that Hebrew prophecy was based upon any such design. This *schema* was not followed even by the popular prophets, whose great watchword for the future was 'peace' (Jer 6^{14} etc.). The important point, however, is this: the distinctive features of Hebrew prophecy are that its predictions of good or evil were conditional upon the moral and religious bearing of men, and that it was concerned throughout with the founding of a peculiar divine kingdom, which was instituted in the call of Abraham (Gn 12^{1-3}) in order to establish in Israel a nursery of true religion and morality (Is 5^{1-7}), and so to open a fountain of blessing for all nations (42^{6} etc.). Egypt supplies nothing that may for a moment compare with this.

(c) Finally, as to a possible comparison of the Hebrew prophets with Muhammad, we find an OT scholar (J. Köberle, *NKZ* xvii. [1906] 202) giving expression to the view that their consciousness of their vocation loses significance when we look at Muhammad, who likewise, for that matter, regarded himself as a divine messenger. In answer to this we must carefully examine the qualities of the evidence which the Hebrew prophets themselves give regarding their mission. As the value of a witness's testimony may be measured with a fair degree of objectivity by certain of its characteristics, we shall compare the Hebrew prophets and Muhammad with reference to the following points.

(i.) *Clearness and definiteness.*—The clear conviction which underlies the utterances of men like Amos, Isaiah, etc., meets us everywhere in their works; they had distinct recollections of their call (cf., *e.g.*, Is $6^{1ff.}$), as also of a certain reluctance to respond to it (*e.g.*, Jer 1^{6} 20^{7}). Such definiteness is certainly not exceeded by the utterances of Muhammad. Moreover, scholars who, like A. Müller (*ThLZ* xii. [1887] 278 ff.), are anxious to do all justice to the latter speak of his 'indeterminate thinking,' his 'self-deception,' in that he claims a divine source for narratives which, like the 'Joseph' *sūrah* (xii.), are obviously mere plagiarisms.

(ii.) *Difficulty of the situation in which the testimony was given.*—The genuine prophets had to affirm a distinction between themselves and others who claimed to represent the same God (cf. § 9), while Muhammad had no such difficulty in what he said about himself—a contrast to which due weight has not yet been given.

(iii.) *Disinterestedness.*—The Hebrew prophets never strove for earthly honour or for material gratification of any kind; on the contrary, indeed, neither popular misunderstanding nor persecution on the part of the ruling classes turned them from their task (cf. 1 K $22^{26ff.}$, Jer $38^{4ff.}$, 2 K $21^{16ff.}$). We should also remember how, as the living conscience of their nation, they fought against the perversion of ethical concepts and against all immorality. In Muhammad, on the other hand, we find no such renunciation of worldly honours and enjoyments, or of material expedients for the furtherance of his plans. *Sūrah* xxxiii., relating the various exceptional privileges alleged to have been accorded to him in the matter of marriage, cannot but excite repugnance in any unprejudiced mind, and, as A. Tholuck (*Vermischte Schriften apologetischen Inhalts*[2], Gotha, 1867, p. 13) suggests, speaks less of a devout enthusiast than of a godless deceiver.

Even apart from the moral aspect, however, and regarded simply as an enthusiast, Muhammad still falls far below the true Hebrew prophets, in whom, as was shown above (§ 9 (2)), we find no trace whatever of fanaticism or ecstasy. So fearless a critic as Cheyne (*EBi* iii. 3854) was compelled to write:

'A *succession* of men so absorbed in "the living God," and at the same time so intensely practical in their aims—*i.e.*, so earnestly bent on promoting the highest national interests—cannot be found in antiquity elsewhere than in Israel.'

It is, moreover, a remarkable circumstance that in all that long succession no single prophet ever appealed to the words of another, while the fact that the succession came to an end all at once in the person of Malachi is another point that has not yet been sufficiently pondered.

Thus, when compared with Muhammad, the prophets of Israel still maintain their distinctive place in the history of religion, and we would summarize, in closing, the factors by which this historical position may be appraised. These are (1) the prophets' clear and definite consciousness of their vocation; (2) their unquestionable disinterestedness; (3) their achievement in the development of culture, *i.e.* their mediation of moral and religious principles which even to the present day compel the recognition of thinkers and scholars; and, finally—connected with the foregoing—(4) the relationship between their place in history and the appearance of Jesus, who nevertheless did not answer to their prophetic presentation of the future in any mechanical way, but with fresh and original power carried it to its most sublime consummation (cf. König, *Gesch.*, pp. 317–328).

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PROPITIATION.

Introductory and Biblical (C. M. KERR), p. 393.
Greek (A. FAIRBANKS), p. 397.
Roman (A. C. PEARSON), p. 398.

PROPITIATION (Introductory and Biblical).—Propitiation (Lat. *propitiatio, propitius*, 'perhaps originally a term of augury meaning flying forward [*pro*] or well; cf. Skr. *pat*, to fly, Eng. *feather*' [Webster, *s.v.* 'Propitious']; cf. Eng. 'petition') may be defined as the appeasing of the wrath of one by another in order to win his favour; or the means adopted to that end. The root ideas of the term imply that he who propitiates feels himself in some manner to be lacking or at fault, and that the favour of him who is propitiated is worth the gaining. It further implies that he who

is propitiated is more powerful than he who propitiates; else the latter would not require to implore, either by entreaty or by offering, those things which he considers necessary to his welfare. It is with propitiation in its more definitely theological sense, *i.e.* as affecting the relations between God and man, that we have here to deal.

1. The idea in primitive religion.—Religion finds its origin in the conviction of man that his life is overruled by forces other and greater than those which he finds in himself. This power man has construed, from the earliest times, and according to his light, in the terms which he applies to his own life and personality. The only difference is that those characteristics which he recognizes to be rudimentary and fragmentary in himself are conceived of as existing in all their ideal perfection in the nature of the divine. In this sense all religions, whether their development be high or low, are anthropomorphic. Again, since man, in the earliest stages of his evolution, has little self-sufficiency, and is in all things closely dependent upon Nature and her forces, even for his bodily wants, he is instinctively impelled to find this superior power in every external object or circumstance affecting him. This is the stage of animism, when worship is paid to the spirit or spirits which reside in trees, fire, wind, cloud, or sky.

Yet the mere belief in the existence of those superior powers would not be sufficient in itself to give rise to religion. It is felt also that these powers are interested in the welfare of man; and, further, that their interest can be quickened, or restored when lost, provided that proper means be adopted to achieve this result. Primitive man attributes to his god the same feelings of like and dislike, of love and aversion, of friendship and hostility, as he finds to exist between himself and his fellow-men. Hence, from the first, there are present in religion the elements not merely of thought, but also of feeling and of will. In fact, it is due to the conjunction of these that religion ever came into being. Man does not merely think of his god; since, through nature, that god manifests his power often in terrible form, he conceives of him, now with feelings of utter dependence, now with awe and fear, as of one who smites and visits him with wrath and destruction. Yet the emotion is not entirely that of fear. Fear in itself has the effect of sundering and driving farther apart. But, in point of fact, religion is the expression of an exactly contrary effect upon the will. Viewed in its practical aspect, religion is the effort on man's part, not to flee from, but to draw near to his god.

While the beginning of religion is not to be attributed entirely to fear, it is unquestionable that that emotion played a great, and even a predominating, part in the awakening of the religious consciousness. The things by which primitive man is first prompted to think of the divine are generally those disastrous to himself or to the community. Any misfortune or disaster that he cannot trace to known human or natural sources he attributes to the direct agency of his god. Since, then, in primitive times the realm of the unknown was much wider than it is now, and since also, leaving out of count man's spiritual wants, even his bodily comfort was then more open to attack, there was all the more room for the working on him of that fear of his god which is the beginning of wisdom.

But, if fear thus awakens him to a knowledge of his god, it is his instinct of self-preservation that impels him to give to that knowledge a practical turn. The aim of religion is not solely to draw near to gods, nor even to propitiate them, but to secure the worshipper's well-being and happiness. It is just because man recognizes his present happiness to be imperfect, because he feels that only through his god can that deficiency be supplied, that he ever seeks to win his favour. And the means which primitive man adopted towards this end were those which he employed in his dealings with his fellows—conciliation and petition. From this arose the ancient religious system of propitiatory sacrifice.

While the broad aim of sacrifice is thus to please the gods, the meaning and content attached to it are more clearly defined by reference to (*a*) the nature of the god who is to be propitiated and (*b*) the evil which renders propitiation necessary. It may happen that man identifies this evil not with himself, but with the essential being of his god. This god is conceived of as one who delights in violence and bloodshed, and who sends plagues, storms, and floods in order to satiate himself with the suffering of man. Man therefore offers such sacrifice as he imagines will appease this passion for blood on the part of his god, that the impending doom may be averted from himself. It is with this notion that some of the darkest rites of early sacrifice are associated. A degraded idea of the god leads to a degraded form of worship.

On the other hand, man may feel that the cause of his suffering lies not so much in the nature of his god as in his own misdoings or shortcomings. This was the idea that ultimately prevailed. Experience accumulated throughout the ages taught him that much of his misfortune was simply his own fault, and that by methods of forethought, of industry, and of hygiene he could avert many of those evils which formerly he traced solely to supernatural influence; and that which experience taught him to be true of part of his existence he came more and more to infer as true of the whole. Thus he reached the conception that, wherever his present happiness was marred, it was due not to the arbitrariness of his gods, but to his neglect to pay deference to them or to obey their commands. Once this truth emerged, the idea underlying propitiatory sacrifice assumed a new and more hopeful trend. Man aimed no longer at changing the original nature of his gods and bringing them into a temporary state of favour to himself; he sought rather to restore them to that normal condition of benevolence which, by his offence, had for the time being been disturbed. How, then, could he better accomplish this than by sacrificing a part of his goods and possessions, in order to show the gods that he valued their favour more than anything else? It is not, of course, contended that primitive man regarded his own confession as part of the propitiatory sacrifice. That idea lay as yet in the background. He still retained a mechanical conception of the relations between sin and punishment, between sacrifice and benefit. In his eyes not his repentance, but the material offering that he made, was the thing of propitiatory value as affecting his god. Yet, despite all this, in the higher sacrificial forms of primitive religion, in which man dimly confessed himself as the sinner and his god as the standard of righteousness and love, were embodied the rudiments of those truths concerning propitiation which were to receive a fuller and more spiritual meaning in ethical religions, and which at last attained to their perfection in Christianity.

2. In the OT.—In the religion of the Hebrews the intermediary stages of this evolution are clearly traceable. Man is now not merely conscious of the fact that he offends against God; that fact has taken on for him a moral significance—he is conscious of it as sin. Davidson (*The Theology of the OT*, p. 315 ff.) points out how in the OT a distinc-

tion comes to be drawn between (*a*) sins of ignorance or inadvertence and (*b*) sins done with a high hand or of purpose.

(*a*) *Sins of ignorance or inadvertence.*—To these alone do the Levitical sacrifices apply. In this there is a certain natural fitness. The idea of sacrifice in general arose at that stage in man's development when he conceived of his relations to God as being semi-mechanically rather than morally conditioned; when, too, he imagined that the Deity could be propitiated in a correspondingly mechanical fashion, by material offerings. The Hebrew priests merely carried forward this idea and gave it a greater symbolism and elaboration. In the first place, the moral sense being as yet imperfectly developed, there was in their conception of sin no element of personal guilt. The idea of sin was attached to no specific acts of which the perpetrators were conscious at the time that they were wrong; it belonged rather to the entire nature of man, as being tainted and impure. Thus sin was placed by them in that region intermediate between the purely physical and the definitely moral; *i.e.*, it belonged to the region of the æsthetic, and partook of the nature of uncleanness. Again, corresponding to this view of sin as uncleanness was their view of the manner in which it offended against God. Being not yet definitely of the moral, not yet a wilful transgression of God's law, it did not violate God's righteousness, and so did not provoke His wrath. It was rather an offence against God's holiness. These are the considerations which lie at the root of the ancient Jewish sacrificial system. They explain how the priestly offerings were regarded as atoning not for definite misdoings, but for the whole life as being imperfect or impure. They explain, too, how the symbolical 'covering,' or 'wiping out'—the root ideas of the Hebrew word כִּפֻּר, which stands at the centre of Levitical thought on sacrifice (cf. *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Propitiation,' vol. iv. p. 131)—had in itself a propitiatory value as affecting God. Since God's justice had not been offended, and His actual wrath had not been provoked, there was no need that any positive recompense should be made. There was need only that the cause of offence to His æsthetic nature, *i.e.* to His purity and holiness, should be removed. That being accomplished by the priestly sacrifices, complete harmony was established. And, lastly, though no definite explanation is given in the OT itself, these considerations may help to make clear why special emphasis was laid on the efficacy of the blood-sacrifice as a means of propitiation. Since 'the life of the flesh is in the blood' (Lv 17[11]), so the offering to God is the effort on man's part to make propitiation not for certain sins, but for the whole soul or person. Again, the blood, as it is sprinkled on the altar, symbolically wipes out, or cleanses away, impurity and uncleanness. God is thus enabled to look on the inadvertent sins of His people as covered or non-existent; He is propitiated in this negative sense, in that the stain offensive to His holiness is washed away, and His favour is restored.

(*b*) *Sins done with a high hand or of purpose.*—Just as the sense of personal guilt implies a new stage in the growth of the moral personality, so also does it lead to a higher conception of the divine nature and of the means of propitiation. The relationship between man's offence and the wrath of God is uplifted from the physical and the æsthetic to the moral and the spiritual. Material sacrifices are felt to be no longer available to propitiate God. But the need for propitiation is even more poignantly felt. This was the class of sins with which the prophets especially dealt; and for them the only remedy was for sinners to cast themselves upon God's mercy, when He Himself would cover their sins (Ps 65[3]). Here the propitiation is effected not by any offering on man's part, but by some transaction within the being of the Divine. God's mercy prevails over His justice, so that His wrath is done away. But no hint is given that this victory of God's love or mercy is won at any cost to itself. At the same time, it is dimly suggested that the self-surrender of the soul in repentance and prayer to God possesses an element of propitiation—'A broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise' (Ps 51[17]).

The last idea emerges into clearer consciousness when the intimate connexion between suffering and sin is recognized. Since sin is the cause of suffering, the thought inevitably arises that suffering may in turn have some propitiatory value. But the ethical note is not lost sight of. Thus it is essentially the sufferings of the righteous that are regarded as having expiatory value. This coupling of suffering with merit as having power, by vicarious means, or in a substitutionary sense, to propitiate God is witnessed to in the frequent OT references to the trials of Abraham and other patriarchs and prophets, and reaches its culmination in the passage describing the Suffering Servant of Is 53. Yet even there the idea is not fully wrought out. It is simply stated that 'it pleased the Lord to bruise him' (v.[10]), and that 'with his stripes we are healed' (v.[5]). Thus the relationship between the propitiatory act (the bruising) and the beneficial effect (the healing) is still regarded as in great part mechanical; and to mankind, apart from the Servant, is relegated simply the part of the passive onlooker, who reaps the results, but who himself has no vital or active part in the transaction.

3. In the NT.—It has been indicated how in the OT the idea of propitiation developed in its higher aspects along two different lines of thought: on the one hand, the consciousness of personal guilt led to the casting aside of material sacrifice and to the surrendering by the sinner of his soul to the mercy of God; on the other, the connexion between sin and suffering gave rise to the thought that suffering, and especially the suffering of the righteous, possessed a propitiatory value. Yet both these conclusions were deficient. The former certainly recognized the need for a change in the attitude of the soul; but it did not give sufficient consideration either to God's justice or to the demands of His wrath. It simply made God's mercy take the place of the Levitical sacrifice, in that the mere exercise of that mercy was sufficient to wipe out all past transgressions, even those done with a high hand. No account is taken of the fact that not merely God's holiness, but also His righteousness, has been offended, and that this violated righteousness demands a certain satisfaction before His mercy can intervene. In the latter there is a procedure to the other extreme. Emphasis is now laid upon God's just indignation, and how it is by suffering that it is propitiated. Yet this is viewed wholly in a vicarious sense, and no vital organic connexion is traced between the propitiation rendered to God and the spiritual change effected in man. It will thus be seen that the two trends of thought are in a sense complementary. The connecting link between them consists in this, that both lead up to the idea that propitiation is in itself a divine act, and consists in the interaction of certain aspects of, or certain personalities in, the godhead. Such was the truth embodied in the Incarnate Christ; and a consideration of the NT passages where He is referred to under the heading of 'propitiation' will render this clear.

(1) In 1 Jn 2[2], ἱλασμός ἐστιν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, Christ is simply stated to be 'the propitiation for our sins.'

(2) In 1 Jn 4[10] this idea is elaborated. The main thought of the passage (vv.[8-21]) is that God is love, and that God is fully Himself only when that love is completely exerted. But the realization of the divine love is checked by the presence of sin in man, which produces in him fear (v.[18]) and want of love towards God (v.[8]). Thus, though the situation or the occasion for propitiation is created by man, it is in God that the active stimulus and the felt need for reconciliation initially arise. 'Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us'; *i.e.*, it is not so much that man feels himself alienated from God as that God feels Himself alienated from man. In the same way, it is not man, but God, who not only feels the need but also provides the means or the instrument of propitiation. Here, then, is repeated the OT priestly idea of God's mercy or love 'atoning' or 'covering' the sins of His people. But it is no longer stated in bald terms that God's mercy or love simply prevails over His righteousness. That victory is effected at the cost to His love of sending His own Son. There is further this new idea, prominent in the teaching of St. John, and in many ways the dominant note of the NT, that the sending of Christ is not merely in satisfaction to God's justice, but also—and this thought received from St. John far greater emphasis—exerts a propitiatory effect upon man, in that it shows forth, or exhibits, God's love to him, and so wins him to draw near to God. By this indication of the vital, dynamic connexion between the divine propitiatory act and its spiritual effect on man does St. John supply the other deficiency in the OT theory of atonement (cf. above on Is 53). It is God's love that stimulates Him to send His Son, and this exhibition of His love in turn stimulates man to love God. Hence, for St. John the immediate propitiatory effect of the gift of Christ is not upon God, but upon man. But this is not the ultimate end of propitiation. Once this immediate effect is accomplished in the awakening of man's love through faith in Christ, then God's love assumes its proper function of bestowing upon man eternal life (Jn 3[16]). Thus God's love first treats itself as a means, in order that it may return to the normal mode of its activity, in which it is at once the means and the end of its own existence, and in which alone it realizes its complete self-satisfaction.

(3) He 2[17], πιστὸς ἀρχιερεὺς τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ. If in the second reference prominence is given to the 'covering,' or 'annulling,' of sin by God through Christ, emphasis is here laid upon the element of suffering in propitiation. According to the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the qualifications of a true high-priest are divine appointment to his office (5[1]) and 'at oneness' with his people (2[11]). To this high-priest Christ is now compared (2[17]). But Christ's appointment is ratified, and His identification with His people is sealed, by the fact that He is 'made like unto them' in undergoing the experience of suffering (2[10. 17]). Thus it is in virtue of His sufferings that Christ is qualified to make propitiation for the sins of His people. In this there is a correspondence with the thought of Is 53. But the aim of the writer to Hebrews is now to develop this thought and show how Christ's sufferings produce this effect. The underlying idea is not that suffering in itself gives satisfaction to God. For what God supremely and ultimately desires is to 'bring many sons unto glory' (2[10]). But sin is the barrier which stands in the way of this perfection, and suffering is the only means by which it can be removed (cf. 2[14]); hence, in this derivative sense, suffering does possess a pleasing aspect in the eyes of God. Again, since Christ's sufferings bring Him into greater sympathy with His brethren, and so enable Him to render them greater help (2[18]), suffering has the additional propitiatory effect upon God in that it furthers the attainment of that by which God is completely satisfied.

It has been suggested that the view taken by the writer to Hebrews regarding Christ's sacrifice may be that its propitiatory value lies not in its suffering but in its obedience (cf. W. P. Paterson, *HDB*, *s.v.* 'Sacrifice,' vol. iv. p. 345). Yet it is not necessary to place these two views in so sharp a contrast. In the interpretation of the writer to Hebrews, suffering and obedience both possess a propitiatory value, but in a different sense. The immediate purpose of suffering is not to please God. Its direct effect is (*a*) upon Christ, to teach Him obedience (cf. 2[10] 5[8]) and to create in Him sympathy towards man, (*b*) upon man, awakening his trust and confidence in Christ (4[16]). This confidence then passes into obedience; and in this way does Christ become the author of man's eternal salvation (5[9]). Thus suffering is propitiatory only as a means; but obedience—the end towards which suffering is directed—is propitiatory in itself, as being that by which God is immediately satisfied.

That this is the view of the writer to Hebrews regarding suffering is corroborated by the manner in which he relates Christ's sacrifice to sin. The class of sin for which Christ is the propitiation is not so much a wilful transgression of God's law as a state of moral or spiritual uncleanness (cf. 10[22]). Because sin, then, while it offends God's holiness, does not offend His justice, there is attached to suffering no idea of expiation, *i.e.* as satisfying the divine wrath. The death, or the blood, of Christ is interpreted rather along the line of the OT Levitical sacrifices (cf. He 9). His perfect and spotless offering suffices to sprinkle men's hearts from an evil conscience and to wash their bodies with pure water (9[14] 10[22]). That being accomplished, 'their sins and iniquities will God remember no more' (10[17]). But just as, according to the Mosaic law, there were certain sins to which the priestly sacrifices could not apply, so also, according to the writer to Hebrews, there is one especial sin for which not even Christ can atone, and that is wilful transgression after knowledge of the truth (cf. Dt 17[12] with He 10[26]). It is only when the unpardonable sin of rejecting Christ's sacrifice has been committed that God punishes man in wrath. But the suffering which this punishment involves, being not disciplinary but penal, in no way leads to any reconciliation between man and God. The sending of it is indeed in satisfaction of God's wrath; but the enduring of it by man does not tend towards the appeasing of that wrath or to the restoration of God's favour. It comes upon man only in utter condemnation—'It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God' (10[31]). Thus again it is seen that for the writer to Hebrews there is no propitiatory value in suffering except as it is borne in the spirit of obedience and leads to a further development of that virtue.

(4) Ro 3[25], ὃν προέθετο ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον διὰ πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι. In the passage Ro 3[19-26] St. Paul also takes his starting-point from the OT. But Christ is now regarded not as a high-priest, the active agent who through His suffering unto obedience propitiates, but as the passive means or place through which that propitiation is wrought, and in which God's righteousness is declared. This may be the reason why St. Paul uses the Greek word ἱλαστήριον instead of ἱλασμός. In further contrast to the writer to Hebrews, his aim is not so much to win men to accept Christ as the sacrifice as to show the necessity for that sacrifice in the nature of the godhead.

While the teaching of the writer to Hebrews concerning suffering is a great advance upon that of Isaiah in that it explains its educative value, it does not sufficiently make clear the divine aspect of suffering, as being a law immanent in the very being of God. It treats it rather as something extraneous to the divine nature, and merely imposed upon man to bring him to obedience. This defect, as is indicated above, is a consequence of the view which the writer to the Hebrews takes of sin as uncleanness and of God as essentially holy. Thus for him God is still in great part the God of the OT, who accepts the offering made by Christ, and who, at no cost to His own nature, simply pardons or forgets the sins of His people. These defects, then, St. Paul sets himself to correct. In the first place, he takes a more serious view of the nature of sin. It is not simply uncleanness, but a definitely moral disorder, and is connected with the will. In the second place, he makes the chief attribute of God's being to consist in righteousness. With these two principles alone no atonement would, according to OT theory, be possible. But St. Paul finds a way out of the dilemma by putting a new construction upon suffering. He treats it no longer as external to the godhead and operative merely upon man, but as a vital principle of the divine nature itself. Suffering, in so far as it falls upon man in consequence of his sin, is simply the working out of his condemnation. But, if that suffering be assumed and vicariously endured by one who is himself sinless, the demands of God's wrath will be appeased, and that reconciliation with God will be effected which man by his own efforts or by his own suffering cannot achieve. This is the view which St. Paul expounds. It is because Jesus Christ is the setting forth or the declaration of this truth that He is the propitiation for our sins (Ro 3[19-26]). Further, since God is the one who requires to be propitiated, and is both the provider and the offerer of the sacrifice, He is at once just to Himself, or true to His own righteousness, and the justifier of the man who believes in, who accepts, or who appropriates that sacrifice as made on his own behalf.

4. Summary and conclusion.—The form of the idea of propitiation, from its appearance in early religion to its presentation in the theology of the NT, is constant: God has been offended, and means must be found whereby His wrath may be appeased and His favour restored. It is in the content given to that form that the development takes place. Man seeks first to propitiate God by material offerings. To these, and especially to the blood-sacrifice, a symbolical meaning is afterwards attached, as representing the offering by man of his own life to God. A clearer understanding of the nature of sin then leads to the casting aside of material sacrifices and to the idea that God is pleased only with repentance and personal obedience (cf. Is 1[11-20]). Side by side with this, the connexion between sin and suffering suggests the thought that suffering may possess in itself a propitiatory value. A further stage is reached when man begins to realize that he is utterly unable of himself to make any offering sufficient to recover God's favour. Hence the idea emerges that God Himself must provide the sacrifice. But, if God is the provider of the sacrifice, it cannot be the whole of His nature which is the object of propitiation. He is no longer simply the God of holiness, or the God of righteousness; but He partakes of the complex nature of a personality. Thus it is only one aspect or attribute of that personality which is propitiated, while another aspect or attribute provides the propitiation. But this in itself would

lead to nothing further than that God becomes reconciled to Himself. Yet it is in the interests of man that God's love seeks to propitiate His righteousness; and therefore man must also be involved in the transaction. Two difficulties, however, stand in the way of his inclusion. The first is that recompense must be given for his past sins; and the second is that, since man's natural state is sinful, therefore there must be infused into him that divine life which alone can make him acceptable to God. The theories of St. John, of the writer to the Hebrews, and of St. Paul are all endeavours to show how in Jesus Christ these difficulties are met and overcome. St. Paul alone lays emphasis on the first. It is by the vicarious suffering of Jesus Christ that the wrath of God, aroused by the sin of man, is appeased. St. John and the writer to the Hebrews deal principally with the second. According to St. John, God's love, made manifest in Christ, appeals to man's love, and so induces him to lay open his heart to the inflow of the divine life. According to the writer to the Hebrews, suffering, borne in the spirit of and under the guidance of Jesus, is that which makes man perfect. It is to be remembered, however, that St. Paul also gives consideration to this second difficulty. Faith is the contribution that man must bring before the process of propitiation is finally completed. It may thus be concluded that the propitiation made by Jesus Christ acts both upon God and upon man. It acts upon man in that it is a revelation to him of the immensity of God's wrath and of the intensity of His love. It thus wins him to draw near to God in reverence and humility, yet in faith, trusting in the efficacy of the sacrifice made on his behalf. It acts upon God in that it satisfies His offended justice, and enables His love to go forth in all its fullness to the man who now has a share in the righteousness and life of Jesus Christ. Finally, just as the 'appeasing of wrath' is only the first term in propitiation in order that 'favour may be restored,' so the ultimate end of Christ's sacrifice is that God may be able to say of each of his children, 'This is my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased.'

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C. M. KERR.

PROPITIATION (Greek). — The nature of divine anger, as conceived by the Greeks, has been considered in the art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Greek); the special rites for allaying the anger of the gods remain to be treated under the present heading. Briefly stated, calamities not easily traceable to human causes are referred to the gods —failure of the crops, plagues and diseases, childlessness, disaster at sea, and defeat in battle—and, when they occur, the anger of the gods is assumed. It is necessary first to remove the causes of divine anger, and then to propitiate the gods, as in the first book of the *Iliad* Chryseis must be returned to her father, the army purified, and sacrifices offered to Apollo who had sent the plague. While the thought of possible anger and its propitiation was doubtless present in all worship, the proper sacrifices to an angry god were totally different from the normal worship to the Olympian deities. The normal form of sacrifice was the communion meal, in which the animal was consecrated to the god, certain portions were burned on the altar, and the remainder was cooked and eaten by the worshippers. This form of sacrifice (*θυσία*) was frequently described in the Homeric poems (*e.g.*, *Il.* ii. 421 f.), and with slight variations it was the typical form of worship to the greater gods of Greece. In sharp contrast with it is another type of sacrifice, called by a different name (*σφάγια*; cf. *ἐναγίζεσθαι*, *ἐντέμνειν*, etc.) and decidedly different in character. Ordinarily it took place at night rather than in the morning; the animal prescribed was often black; when its throat was cut, the blood was allowed to flow on the ground; the altar was a low mound (*ἐσχάρα*), not the structure used in ordinary sacrifice (*βωμός*); and the body of the animal was never eaten, but was usually entirely consumed by fire. Animals not suited for food, like the dog, were used for these sacrifices at times; but offerings of food as such, grain or cakes, found no place in them. These sacrifices, however, were not reduced to one definite type, but retained variations peculiar to the god to whom they were offered and the occasion of the offering. Similarly, the libations to angry gods or gods prone to anger differed from the usual libation to Olympian gods, in that wine was regularly used for the latter but never for the former; honey and milk were the more fitting to soothe angry deities (*μειλίγματα*).

According to tradition in Greece, human sacrifice was at times demanded to soothe the anger of the gods. Agamemnon, who had offended Artemis by slaying a hind in her sacred precincts, was prevented from sailing for Troy till he had sacrificed to the goddess his daughter Iphigeneia; and the death of Polyxena alone made it possible for the Greeks to start on their homeward voyage. A sacrifice of Egyptian youths was attributed to Menelaus as a means of stilling winds that prevented his voyage (Herod. ii. 119; cf. Æsch. *Agam.* 146 f.); and it seems possible that *σφάγια* offered in later times to secure favourable winds (cf. Plut. *Ages.* 6; Herod. vii. 191) were substitutes for human sacrifice. According to Plutarch (*Aristid.* 9, *Them.* 13), three captive Persians were sacrificed by Themistocles before the battle of Salamis. In myth similar sacrifices to secure success in battle were demanded by the oracle of Creon (Eur. *Phœn.* 890 ff.), of Erechtheus (Apollod. *Bibl.* III. xv. 4; Lycurg. *Leocr.* § 99), of Aristodemus (Paus. IV. ix. 2, 5), and of other heroes. It is Greek tradition that the oracle at Delphi commanded human sacrifice on the occasion of pestilence to allay divine anger. Human sacrifice is also reported as part of the regular worship of Zeus Lykaios in Arcadia, of Apollo Katharsios in Leucas, and of Apollo at the Athenian Thargelia. The explanation given (Eus. *Præp. Evang.* iv. 16, p. 156[d]; cf. Eur. *El.* 1026; Virg. *Æn.* v. 815) is that the anger of a god which threatens to destroy a whole people may perhaps be satisfied by the voluntary sacrifice of one of their number. The Greek practice, however, was to substitute an animal for the man, as a deer is said to have been substituted for Iphigeneia (cf. the calf treated like a child and sacrificed to Dionysus at Potniæ [Paus. IX. viii. 1]).

The gods who received propitiatory sacrifice regularly were not the Olympian deities, but spirits who had shown their anger or who were easily stirred to anger. Such were the Eumenides at Athens, whose very name of 'kindly ones' was a euphemism to denote the blessings which the Furies might send when propitiated (cf. Æsch. *Eumen.*, *passim*); the *θεοὶ μειλίχιοι* of Myonia (Paus. X. xxxviii. 4); Hecate, goddess of spirits of the night; the winds and in particular Boreas, the north wind (Paus. II. xii. 1; Xen. *Anab.* IV. v. 4);

gods of the sea (Arr. *Anab.* VI. xix. 5) and of rivers (I. de Prott, *Leges Græcorum sacræ*, i., *Fasti sacri*, Leipzig, 1896, p. 14, no. 5, line 36 f.). The spirits of the dead received sacrifices similar in character, doubtless to prevent evil results that might be caused by their anger (Herod. v. 47), and it was the regular method of worshipping local heroes who might send special blessings, but whose anger was terrible if they were neglected. When σφάγια were offered to Olympian deities, as not infrequently occurred, it was because of some special reason for fearing their anger. Zeus Meilichios, feared like the θεοὶ μειλίχιοι, received holocausts of pigs to allay his possible anger and secure his blessing (Xen. *Anab.* VII. viii. 4, and accounts of the Diasia at Athens), and Zeus Chthonios, a god of agriculture, received propitiatory offerings at Myconos. In Ionian regions these sacrifices were offered to Apollo to avert danger from the crops, as in general they were offered to him to get rid of pestilence (G. Kaibel, *Epigr. græc.*, Berlin, 1878, no. 1034; Paus. II. xxiv. 1, and *passim*). Before the battle they might be offered to Artemis (Xen. *Hell.* IV. ii. 20). Some of the peculiar sacrifices to Dionysus (Paus. IX. viii. 1) and Demeter (Diod. Sic. V. iv. 2, IV. xxiii.) as well as to Poseidon (Arr. *Anab.* VI. xix. 5) should also be classified as propitiatory in nature. That propitiatory sacrifice found no larger place in the worship of the Olympian gods is due to the intimate and normal relation which existed between these gods and their worshippers, a relation that found fit expression in the communion meal sacrifice.

The occasion for propitiatory sacrifice was the presence of calamity or the fear of calamity. A pestilence that attacked men, herds, or crops, or the fear of possible calamity before battle, a voyage, or any important undertaking, furnished such an occasion. These sacrifices were offered in Athens before marriage and childbirth (Æsch. *Eumen.* 835). In agriculture specific dangers threatened the crops at certain seasons, and at these times rites to avert them were performed. Finally, as dangers or blessings might at any time be expected from such spirits as the Eumenides and heroes and souls of the dead, propitiatory sacrifices to them occurred both at stated intervals and on special occasions.

The meaning of this type of sacrifice, in so far as one type is found, is clear from its form. While in the communion meal the victim was shared by god and worshippers together and the rite strengthened the actual bonds that united them, the propitiatory sacrifice assumed no such bond, but rather the opposite. The rite here seems to centre in the death of the animal, sometimes clearly the death of an animal as a substitute for a man; its life-blood is poured out to appease the gods, and it only remains to dispose of the body by burning it or casting it into the sea. When Polykrates followed the advice of Amasis (Herod. iii. 41) and threw into the sea the ring that was his most valued possession, he acted on the naive principle that too much prosperity was likely to bring calamity from the gods, and sought to propitiate them. In the Greek divine world were many powerful spirits who were easily offended, be it by too much prosperity, by neglect, or for some reason not clear to men. If their anger could be anticipated and allayed, its effects might be escaped; accordingly, propitiatory sacrifices were offered before important undertakings and even at regular intervals. It was the same principle that led men to bring votive offerings to the gods that the gods might not look with disfavour on the undertakings which they had in view. When the calamity was present, the need of propitiatory sacrifice was so much the greater. The life of the animal was given to the god, sometimes clearly as a substitute for the life of the man, in the hope that thus divine anger might be allayed. It is the peculiarity of Greek religion that ordinarily men feared the anger of other than the Olympian gods, and that therefore propitiatory sacrifice to the great gods of Greece was unusual.

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ARTHUR FAIRBANKS.

PROPITIATION (Roman).—If we accept the definition of religion as an 'effective desire to be in right relation to the Power manifesting itself in the universe' (W. Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, p. 8), propitiation in its widest sense is co-extensive with religion. Every utterance of prayer and every act of sacrifice, as being religious, is necessarily propitiatory. But it is unnecessary to make this the occasion for a general survey of the Roman attitude towards religion, more especially since the ambit of propitiation is usually confined to the placation of an offended deity, as distinguished from the effort to secure a continuance of divine good-will. On the other hand, propitiation is a religious act which assumes the personal intervention of a deity, and has nothing to do with the objects and methods of tabu or magic. Thus, certain ceremonial practices of which we have a record from historical times may be survivals from an era antecedent to the development of the national religion. Horace's *triste bidental* (*Ars Poet.* 471), the walled enclosure preventing ingress to the spot where a thunderbolt had fallen, is an example of a permanent tabu not associated with any particular cult. But a definite act of propitiation is involved in the sacrifice of two black lambs to Summanus by the Arval Brethren, which took place whenever the grove of the Dea Dia was struck by lightning at night (W. Henzen, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, Berlin, 1874, p. 146). For Summanus, though an obscure personality (Ov. *Fast.* vi. 731), was associated with Jupiter as lord of the thunderbolt, and his name appears occasionally as an epithet of that god (G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 124, n. 4). Another example may be quoted to show the difficulty of tracing the history of the most primitive Roman cults. The mysterious rite of the 14th of May, on which day 27 straw puppets known as *argei* were thrown into the Tiber from the *pons sublicius*, is sometimes interpreted as a magical ceremony whose chief intention was to serve as a spell ensuring an adequate rainfall in the coming summer (Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, p. 119). In that case it would be unnecessary to suppose that any deity was specially concerned with it. Much the same may be said of the rite of the *lapis manalis*, which is nowhere definitely associated with Jupiter Elicius (*ib.* p. 233). But the above-mentioned explanation of the *argei* is not generally accepted, and an alternative view treats the puppets as substitutes for human victims, holding that on some occasion of stress during the 3rd cent. B.C. a piacular sacrifice of foreigners (Ἀργεῖοι) was introduced on the advice of a Sibylline oracle (Wissowa, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, p. 228). We should then be in possession of a parallel to the otherwise isolated sacrifice of two Gauls and two Greeks, who were buried alive in the *forum boarium* in the year 216 (Livy, XXII. lvii. 6).

A few examples of propitiatory rites which go back to the oldest stage of the native religion may now be mentioned.

On the 25th of April, in order to remove from the crops the danger of mildew or red rust, a procession marched to the grove of Robigus near the fifth mile-stone on the Via Claudia, and a dog was sacrificed by the *flamen Quirinalis* (Ov. *Fast.* iv. 905 ff.; Pliny, *HN* xviii. 286). On the 15th of April at the Fordicidia pregnant cows (*fordæ boues*) were sacrificed to Tellus as well in the several curies as by the *pontifices* on the Capitol (Ov. *Fast.* iv. 629 ff.). The unborn calves were torn from their mother and burnt, with the object of securing the fertility of the corn then lying in the womb of the earth (Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, p. 71). Volcanus, the god of fire, had his special festival on the 23rd of August at a time of the year when the danger of fire was particularly to be dreaded for the new grain. The antiquity of his cult is shown by the existence of the *flamen Volcanalis*, but, beyond the appearance of the Volcanalia in the calendar, very little is known about it. Domitian probably followed ancient precedent when, in erecting an altar to Volcanus in commemoration of the fire in Nero's time, he ordered the sacrifice of a red calf and a boar on the day of the Volcanalia (*CIL* vi. 826). We also have the curious information that on this day it was the custom to throw living fish into the fire as a piacular offering (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 20; Fest. p. 238).

Although the institution of *flamines* marks the establishment of a State religion, the earliest cults indicate its development from a worship by the family intended to secure the prosperity of each of its members. The powers to be propitiated were spirits originally nameless, which were severely limited in the extent of their operations, and only by degrees acquired a distinct identity (Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience*, p. 117). It is noticeable, however, that there had arisen a tendency to group the divinities in pairs, a male and a female, Faunus and Fauna, Liber and Libera, Quirinus and Hora, and that there were grades of dignity among them, as is shown not only by the distinction between *flamines maiores* and *minores*, but also by the fact that piacular offerings were made to the *famuli diui* as well as to the *diui* themselves (Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*, p. 19). Even the great gods of the city, Mars, Jupiter, and Quirinus, being disconnected from any traditional mythology, were, as originally worshipped, devoid of any personal characteristics (E. Aust, *Religion der Römer*, Münster, 1899, p. 19). Thus propitiation was only in a limited sense possible for the Romans, who, apart from Etruscan and Greek influences, had no conception of anthropomorphic deities. Varro (*ap.* Augustine, *de Ciu. Dei*, iv. 23) made a very instructive comment on the spirit of the old Roman religion when he stated the remarkable fact that for a period of 170 years, that is to say, up to the time of the building of the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, the old Romans worshipped the gods without making images of them, and added that the man who first made such images for the people not only destroyed the fear of God, but introduced a source of distraction.

Whatever possibilities of spiritual growth lay in the recurring festivals of the old agricultural communities were conducted in a particular direction by the rapid development of the city-State and the increasing influence of the priestly colleges. The general tendency of Roman religion to place every department of human life under the protection of a separate *numen*, which is displayed in its most conspicuous form in the pontifical classifications of the *indigitamenta*, and the practical and utilitarian outlook of the average Roman, who desired to settle his relations to the gods upon fixed and definite terms, combined to produce that rigid system of formalism which made the *ius diuinum* a series of precise regulations adapted to secure the *pax deorum* upon every possible contingency. It has been succinctly stated that the general object of the Roman festivals was so to propitiate the gods as to forestall any hostile intention by putting them under an obligation (C. Bailey, in *EBr*[11] xxiii. 578). It was the interest of the State to see that its concord with the gods remained unbroken. This purpose was secured in particular by the periodical observance of lustrations, which served both to purify their object from all contracted stains and to ensure a renewal of divine protection against the danger of further contamination. The lustration was accomplished by symbolic acts of cleansing with water or fire, or by a procession conducting the sacrificial victim round the area which required purification. The former method was observed at the Parilia (Prop. iv. 4. 75 ff.), the latter at the Ambarvalia (Cato, *de Re Rust.* 141; Verg. *Georg.* i. 343 ff.), and both together at the Lupercalia (Plut. *Rom.* 21). Besides these annual celebrations, lustration was required on special occasions, such as the invasion of an enemy's territory or the departure of a fleet. Above all, it became necessary when special notice had been received by means of extraordinary portents that the *pax deorum* had been broken and the anger of the gods incurred. Among these signs were thunder and lightning, solar eclipses, showers of stones and of blood, and monstrous births, all of which are frequently recorded in the pages of Livy (*e.g.*, XXII. i.). On the announcement of such an occurrence the first duty of the senate was to determine whether the report was trustworthy, and, if so, whether the event had happened within the limits of the public jurisdiction (cf. Livy, XLIII. xiii.). If these questions were answered in the affirmative, the duty of *procuratio* fell to the consuls, who would take the advice of the sacerdotal authorities so far as might be necessary. Before the innovations consequent upon the introduction of the *ritus Græcus*, the usual means adopted was the *lustratio urbis* (Lucan, i. 592 ff.), *i.e.* an additional celebration of the *amburbium* annually held on the 2nd of February (Wissowa, in Pauly-Wissowa, i. 1817). Old-established tradition required that the portent of a shower of stones should be purged by a *nouemdiale sacrum* (Livy, I. xxxi. 4). The introduction of the *ritus Græcus* at the suggestion of the Sibylline oracles prepared the way for the employment of new methods in the placation of divine disfavour. The most remarkable of these was the *lectisternium*, or the symbolical entertainment of the six Greek gods, Apollo and Latona, Hercules and Diana, Mercurius and Neptunus, in some public place (Livy, XL. lix. 7) by serving a banquet before their images, each of which reclined on a sacred couch (*puluinar*). It is expressly recorded by Livy that the first institution was due to a severe pestilence in the year 399 (V. xiii. 6). After the disaster at Trasimene in 217, when the altogether exceptional consecration of a *uer sacrum* was vowed, a *lectisternium* of unusual magnificence was celebrated in honour of six pairs of deities who were identical with the twelve great Olympian gods of Greece (Livy, XXII. x.). Another method adopted for restoring the *pax deorum* in times of national crisis was the *supplicatio*. On such occasions the senate had always been accustomed to decree extraordinary *feriæ*, during which the people, clad in suitable garb, passed from temple to temple imploring the assistance of heaven (Livy, III. v. 14, vii. 7). But the systematization of the practice was a development of the *ritus Græcus*, as is shown by the regular mention of *puluinaria*, by the fact that it was usually the result of an application to the Sibylline books, and by the responsibility for its administration being given to the *decemuiri sacris faciundis* (Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*, p. 358). Among the details of the celebration may be mentioned the wearing of wreaths and the carrying of laurel branches by the participants (Livy, XL. xxxvii. 3) and the public oblation of wine and incense (X. xxiii. 1). The solemn invocation of help (*obsecratio*), a chant led by the magistrates and repeated by the people,

was the climax of the whole proceedings (IV. xxi. 5).

The portent of a monstrous birth at Frusino in the year 207 was made the occasion for a procession of maidens, 27 in number, who marched from the Carmental gate to the temple of Juno Regina, preceded by two white cows, and followed by the *decemviri* crowned with laurel and wearing the *prætexta*. Behind the maidens were carried two images of Juno Regina made of cypress wood. A halt was made in the Forum, while the maidens, all holding to a rope which passed from hand to hand, sang a hymn composed for the occasion by Livius Andronicus and accompanied their singing with appropriate dances (Livy, XXVII. xxxvii. 7-16). The Greek origin of this rite, which in certain of its details is identical with the ceremonies described in Horace's *Carmen Sæculare*, is manifest (H. Diels, *Sibyllinische Blätter*, Berlin, 1890, p. 89 ff.).

The various modes of restoring the former goodwill of the gods which have been enumerated are often described as piacular—a nomenclature which was sometimes adopted even by the Latin authorities (Livy, XL. xxxvii. 2). But, according to the strictest acceptation of the term, a *piaculum* is not a prayer for divine protection or renewed favour, but a compensation rendered for a breach of the *ius sacrum*, arising out of a fault either of commission or of omission (Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*, p. 329). Every sacred ordinance had to be carried out with the utmost precision and accuracy, and even the slightest irregularity in the ritual proceedings, however little deliberate, constituted an offence which might have serious consequences. To avoid such dangers precautions were sometimes taken before the beginning of a festival, as when a *porca præcidanea* was offered to Ceres before the gathering in of the harvest with the object of purging the celebrant from the effects of any offence which might have been previously committed by him in the performance of the funeral rites of any member of his household (Aul. Gell. IV. vi. 7 f.). The immediate result of the breach of contract was to give a claim for compensation (*postilio* [Cic. *de Har. Resp.* 20]) to the god whose interests were involved. The occurrence of a portent was a notification to the citizens that the claim must be made good. It followed as a matter of course that the celebration of the rite where even a slight irregularity had occurred became null and void, and it was essential that the whole of it should be repeated. Hence Cicero remarks in reference to the Megalesian games:

'If a dancer halts, or a flute-player suddenly stops, or if the carefully selected youth who drives the sacred car slips from his seat or drops the reins, or if an aedile misses a word or uses the wrong vessel for libation, the whole celebration becomes irregular, the mistake must be expiated, and a renewal is necessary to appease the wrath of heaven' (*de Har. Resp.* 23).

The same circumstances caused Plutarch to marvel at the scrupulousness of Roman piety:

'If one of the horses that draw the chariots in which are placed the images of the gods, happened to stumble, or if the charioteer took the reins in his left hand, the whole procession was to be repeated. And in later ages they have set about one sacrifice thirty several times, on account of some defect or inauspicious appearance in it' (Plut. *Coriol.* 25).

But the public renewal did not exonerate the individual whose fault had made it necessary. If his sin was wilful, he became *impius*, and the favour which he had forfeited could not be restored to him (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 30). If the act was inadvertent, or performed at the bidding of an inevitable need, it could be expiated by an appropriate offering, as when the sacrifice of a dog was prescribed as compensation for the performance of pressing agricultural duties during *ferie* (Colum. II. xxii. 4). The particular sacrifice necessary was generally fixed by precedent; but all cases of doubt were referred to the pontiffs for decision (Livy, XXIX. xix. 8). In this connexion it may be remarked that there was a noticeable tendency to act liberally in the matter of sacrifices required for expiatory purposes. Thus the complete offering of *suouetaurilia* was reserved for lustrations (Tac. *Ann.* vi. 37, *Hist.* iv. 53), whereas in the expiation of prodigies *hostiæ maiores* were the rule, and often in considerable numbers (Livy, XLIII. xiii. 7, XXII. x. 7). In the case of the failure of an ordinary sacrifice, a second victim of the same kind as the first was required as a *piaculum* (*hostia succidanea* [Aul. Gell. IV. vi. 6]).

LITERATURE.—J. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*, iii.[2], Leipzig, 1885; W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals of the Period of the Republic*, London, 1899; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur römischen Religions- und Stadtgeschichte*, do. 1904; W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911; C. Bailey, art. 'Roman Religion,' in *EBr*[11] xxiii. 577-580.

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PROSELYTE, PROSELYTISM.—1. Meaning of term.—The term 'proselyte' is usually employed in both a wider and a narrower sense to include one who is attracted by, and inclines less or more to, another form of faith, as well as one who has altogether come over and been incorporated. The half-proselyte, or the quasi-proselyte, who accepts a part but not the whole, is to be distinguished from the full and strict proselyte, who becomes even as one born in the faith. An extremely comprehensive use of the term is recognized by A. C. Lyall:[1]

'. . . if the word proselyte may be used in the sense of one who has come, and who has been readily admitted, not necessarily being one that has been invited or persuaded to come.'

This permits consideration of specific forms of religion whose growth is by agglomeration over and above extension by missionary zeal, and the inclusion of religions non-proselytizing in character as well as those which are admittedly proselytizing.

2. Scope of article.—The scope of this article is restricted by leaving out of account religions that are professedly missionary—*e.g.*, Christianity and Muhammadanism, which have been already treated (see artt. MISSIONS). The proselytism of sects may also be omitted as falling to be dealt with in the numerous articles under this head (see artt. SECTS). Inasmuch as the gain resulting from missionary propaganda is concurrent with loss to the religion or religions forsaken, the converse of proselytism is to be found in apostasy (see art. APOSTASY).[2]

In this way it is possible to narrow down consideration of the subject to nearly the usual limit of articles on 'Proselyte' appearing in Bible dictionaries, which have treated of proselytism solely as a feature of the Jewish faith. At the same time it is fully recognized that the religion which has given the name (proselyte) to the world has not stood alone in the practice of the thing. Within Judaism itself the period of missionary activity, during which proselytes were sought and found, is comparatively short. It is generally recognized as having ended in the beginning of the 2nd cent. after Christ, when the Jews were forbidden by the laws of Rome to make proselytes, and when they also ceased to desire additions to their number and retreated more and more upon themselves. The rise of proselytism is found in post-Exilic influences, particularly the Dispersion, and the period of its bloom is set in the age of Hellenism.

A great deal of our information regarding proselytes is subsequent to this period of activity, being stored in the Talmud and reflecting the views of the Rabbis upon the past, with or without historical basis. The distinction between 'proselytes of righteousness' and 'proselytes of the gate,' full as opposed to quasi-proselytes, was evolved by the later Rabbis, but is to be regarded as without

[1] *Asiatic Studies*, I.[2], London, 1907, p. 136.

[2] Cf. Philo, *de Pœnit.* 2, where proselytes are contrasted with apostates.

meaning for the life of the past.[1] The distinction may be still binding upon the orthodox of the Jewish faith (see art. JUDAISM, vol. vii. p. 592[b]; cf. vol. iv. p. 245[a])—although for various reasons the proselytes of the gate have ceased to be recognized in Judaism[2] — and until recently it won acceptance with most Biblical scholars. To E. Schürer belongs the credit for the discovery of the right historical perspective in this matter. With the fall of such a main prop the greater part of the superstructure collapses. 'Proselytes of the gate,' once employed as a 'convenient anachronism,'[3] is now dismissed as a 'misnomer.'[4]

In view of the restrictions imposed both from without (chiefly on account of persecution) and from within (because of insistence upon circumcision) proselytism might be regarded as almost non-existent in Judaism throughout the Christian era from the 2nd cent. onwards. A modern Jewish writer has collected the evidence for the survival of proselytism in spite of adverse circumstances, and he affirms that within the last half-century tens of thousands of proselytes have entered the Jewish fold, notwithstanding the *laissez-faire* attitude of modern Judaism towards the proselyte question.[5] The strict adherence to the traditions received from the fathers may be judged from the fact that until the last decade of the 19th cent. no official sanction was given to relaxing the bond by which the proselyte was fully initiated to the Jewish (Reformed) faith (see art. CIRCUMCISION, vol. iii. p. 664[a]). It is only in a wider sense, therefore, that proselytes have been added. Intermarriage has accounted for most of the gains,[6] yet has given occasion for some losses.[7]

3. Materials essential for the study.—Although the term 'proselyte' is now universally employed, we must still seek the materials essential for the study of proselytism in the centuries immediately preceding and following the coming of Christ to earth. An introduction is generally found in a discussion of the position of the *gêr*, the 'stranger,' or rather the 'client' (*ERE* vi. 77[b]) of OT. The LXX reproduces this word some 75 times by προσήλυτος, and in a few cases by other Greek substantives, but a detailed examination of all passages would fail to disclose a scientific discrimination on the part of the translators which might in any way be compared with the results yielded by the modern documentary theory. The term προσήλυτος seems to have been already so familiar to the LXX translators that it was made by them to do duty for nearly all occasions, even when the current sense of the term failed to suit past historical circumstances (*e.g.*, the Israelites are called προσήλυτοι in Egypt).[8] Commenting on the difference between D and P regarding the *gêr*, S. R. Driver states:

'In P the term is already on the way to assume the later technical sense of προσήλυτος, the foreigner who, being circumcised and observing the law generally, is in full religious communion with Israel.'[9]

W. C. Allen concludes[10] that in the LXX a later meaning like that of the Mishna was read into the word. But no strict law can be laid down when it is so evident that the word προσήλυτος was made to do duty for most cases, and it seems better to regard the LXX usage as on the whole dictated by the freer conditions of the Hellenistic period, when proselytes were recognized in both the wider and the narrower sense. The usage of Philo, Josephus, and NT (Acts) will be found to accord with this.

Those who were in reality but half- or quasi-proselytes are considered by Schürer[1] to be denominated by the phrase φοβούμενοι or σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν (Ac 10[2, 22] 13[16, 26, 43, 50] 16[14] 17[4, 17] 18[7]), in which opinion he stands opposed to Bertholet, who endeavours to prove at length that they are equal to προσήλυτοι in the narrower sense.[2] Apart from the question of a specific term for each, we may admit the existence of two main classes, and we then find the crucial difference to be that the one class adhered to the Jewish theological and moral code, while the other were bound by the ritual also, in particular having submitted themselves to circumcision.[3] It is conceivable, indeed, that there were not two but many kinds of proselytes, according to the degree of affiliation and the amount conceded by the one party or required by the other.

In the provinces and among the Jews of the Dispersion the proselytes, or quasi-proselytes, would have laboured under slight disability, but in Jerusalem within the Temple precincts they would have been barred, lacking circumcision. The Greeks of Jn 12[20], *e.g.*, seem to have been proselytes in the wider sense, yet they had to stand without the *chēl*, or terrace, like other Gentiles (cf. Ac 21[26ff.]).[4] It is not to be supposed that at the very centre of the faith born Jews would have stopped short at any intermediate stage in their efforts to make proselytes, yet in general their own position among the nations was such that they had to content themselves with what they were able to secure.[5] That there were Judaizers before the time of St. Paul is not to be denied; even Hellenized Jews remained Hebrews, with a zeal for the whole law.[6] Yet in the main there was a cleavage between Palestinian Judaism, a religion of law, and Hellenistic Judaism, a religion of hope, and, corresponding thereto, there were particularists *v.* universalists, legalists *v.* apocalyptists, literalists *v.* spiritualists.[7] The atmosphere of Mt 23[15] is suggestive of the one, and of Acts (see reff. above) of the other. A way of reconciling such difference has been sought by supposing that the proselyte of Mt 23[15] is a proselyte to the sect of the Pharisees, not to Judaism in general;[8] but this is against the meaning of the word προσήλυτος,[9] or at least is pressing it to an extreme.

The rivalry of the Jewish sects of the period has indeed to be reckoned with, and even the exclusive and separatist Pharisees must be credited with a zeal to win converts, who, it is true, had to come over wholly or not at all. The Essenes secured proselytes notwithstanding a strict and prolonged novitiate, and they even adopted children to ensure additions to their number (see art. ESSENES, vol. v. p. 397 f.). For the methods employed by the sects in order to gain adherents there is but slight evidence, but it is otherwise with regard to the propaganda of Judaism as a whole. The testimony of Josephus as to the outcome of

1 E. Schürer, *GJV*[3] iii. 127 ff.
2 P. Goodman, *The Synagogue and the Church*, London, 1908, p. 90.
3 J. B. Lightfoot, *Galatians*[5], London, 1876, p. 296 n.
4 A. C. McGiffert, *A Hist. of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, Edinburgh, 1897, p. 101, n. 2.
5 Goodman, p. 104 f.
6 *EBr*[11], art. 'Proselyte,' and M. Fishberg, *The Jews: a Study of Race and Environment*, London, 1911, p. 179 ff.
7 Goodman, p. 380.
8 A. Bertholet, *Die Stellung der Israeliten und der Juden zu den Fremden*, Freiburg and Leipzig, 1896, p. 260; Schürer, p. 125 n.
9 *Deuteronomy*[2] (*ICC*), Edinburgh, 1896, p. 165.
10 *Exp* x. [1894] 264–275.

1 P. 123 ff.
2 Pp. 328–334.
3 A. Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity*[2], i., London, 1908, p. 10 f.; cf. *DAC*, art. 'Hellenism,' sect. 3 (*c*).
4 *PRE*[3], art. 'Proselyten' (von Dobschütz), sect. 3.
5 Schürer, p. 122: 'Der jüdische Bekehrungseifer hat sich eben mit dem Erreichbaren begnügt.'
6 W. M. Ramsay, *The Letters to the Seven Churches*, London, 1904, p. 151.
7 W. O. E. Oesterley, in *The Parting of the Roads*, ed. F. J. Foakes Jackson, London, 1912, p. 81 ff.
8 A. Plummer, *An Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to S. Matthew*, London, 1909, p. 317 f.; A. Edersheim, *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*[4], London, 1887, ii. 412.
9 *Expositor's Greek Testament*, i. [1897] 281.

such efforts is clear,[1] while beneath the contempt in the allusions of classical writers[2] to the Jews we can detect the measure of their success in making converts. This, it must be remembered, was accomplished in spite of the obloquy to which the convert exposed himself—a point elaborated by Philo.[3]

With the exception of one short period during the Maccabæan triumph, when force was employed to bring over the Idumæans and Ituræans to Judaism,[4] the propaganda made headway through the inherent merits of the Jewish system of religion and morality. As to the ritual, Josephus specifies that both Greeks and heathen learned to copy the observance of the Sabbath, fasts, kindling of lights, and many restrictions in the matter of food.[5] These last invite comparison with certain of the decrees of the Council of the Apostles in Jerusalem (Ac 15^{20}) and with the 'Seven Noachian Laws' (see art. NOACHIAN PRECEPTS, vol. ix. p. 379[b]), but in neither case can identity be established. None of the items specified by Josephus touches the vital point, which is circumcision, and the conclusion to be drawn is that relatively few of the adherents proceeded to the utmost. The preponderance of female proselytes is taken to indicate the unwillingness of males to fulfil all that the law required of them.

According to the Talmud, three things were required of the full proselyte: (1) circumcision (*mīlāh*), (2) baptism (*ṭĕbīlāh*), and (3) sacrificial offering (*harĕṣā'ath, dāmim, ḳorbān*), all of which may be taken to have been in operation at the time of Christ. (3) fell into disuse with the destruction of the Temple, although substitutes for it were found. (1) has already been referred to as essential at all times for full proselytes. (2) would have passed unquestioned as a requirement of the ceremonial law but for the dispute which arose in the 18th cent. regarding the priority of Christian *v.* Jewish baptism (see art. BAPTISM, vol. ii. pp. 378[a], 408 f.). It may be assumed that the instruction of proselytes was a necessary preliminary to these ceremonial acts (see artt. CATECHUMEN, vol. iii. p. 256[b], n. 3; INITIATION [Jewish], vol. vii. p. 324[b]; HILLEL, vol. vi. p. 683[b]).

4. Historical sketch.—The limits of the period of missionary activity in Judaism have already been assigned. The Rabbis afterwards maintained that the Dispersion was with a view to securing proselytes, but the truth is rather that in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of the Dispersion the Jews first gained the incentive to add to the number of the faithful. The evidence for the existence of proselytes among the Jewish colony at Elephantine in Egypt (5th cent. B.C.) is doubtful.[6] The nature of the records prevents us drawing any conclusion as to the conditions among the Jews in Babylonia at the time of Ezra.[7] During the period of Hellenistic influence the development of proselytism was rapid, the influence of Jewish colonists and their synagogue worship in every place being supplemented by literary aids of many kinds: the LXX translation of OT, commentaries on Scripture, philosophical and historical books, apologies and even forgeries after the manner of the Sibylline Books.[8] The issue of all this is plainly to be seen in the many cities and towns in which proselytes are expressly mentioned as being found (see reff. to Acts already given). At the time of Christ a keen missionary spirit prevailed among the Jews, their trading proclivities going hand in hand with religious propaganda. Until the destruction of the Temple (A.D. 70) they persevered in their efforts to secure converts.[1] With the Hadrian persecution and the bitterness engendered by the subsequent revolt against Rome, the Rabbis were prompted to change their attitude towards the outside world, and henceforth the terms of conversion were made as difficult as possible.[2] The missionary epoch may be said to close with the prevalence of Gentile over Judaistic Christianity, or, from another point of view, when Pharisaism conquered Hellenism.[3]

A remarkable parallel to the general course of the history of Jewish proselytism will be found in the account given of Zoroastrian missions (see art. MISSIONS [Zoroastrian], vol. viii. pp. 749[b], 751[b]).

5. Numbers and outstanding instances.—The number of proselytes made during the centuries of missionary zeal was doubtless very large—amounting to millions, although there is reason to believe that they were mostly adherents, and not members in the proper sense.[4] Syria appears to have been the most fruitful field,[5] but it was in Jerusalem at the time of the feasts that the most striking testimony to the power and results of Jewish propaganda could be obtained (Ac $2^{9ff.}$).

Outstanding proselytes in the wider sense are to be recognized in the centurions of Lk $7^{1ff.}$ and Ac $10^{2ff.}$ and the eunuch of Ac $8^{27ff.}$. The most complete triumph of Judaism is to be seen in the conversion of the royal house of Adiabene,[6] the story of which is instructive as revealing a temporizing spirit among the leading Jews of the time on the question of the chief ceremonial requirement. Among the imperial family there have been reckoned as converts Flavius Clemens, cousin of Domitian, and his wife Flavia Domitilla (see art. JUDAISM, vol. vii. p. 592[b]), although most authorities incline to regard them as converts to Christianity.[7] A historical instance, which might be brought within the Rabbinical category of 'Esther' proselytes (whose motive in conversion was fear), is forthcoming in the Roman general Metilius.[8] Instances within the department of literature are Aquila (Onḳelos), 2nd cent. A.D., translator of the Scriptures into Greek, and (doubtfully) Theodotion.[9] Within the realm of Rabbinism are R. Aḳiba, R. Meir (son of a proselyte), and other Talmudic sages.[10]

6. The ethics of proselytism.—In judging of the motives which led the Jews to seek for proselytes during the period of their missionary zeal we must believe that they were actuated chiefly by a desire to impart to others that best form of religion which they felt they had received of God. This serves to explain their keenness as missionaries. The agents whom they sent forth to make proselytes were imbued with the same earnestness to convert the world as were the first Christian apostles. Their propaganda succeeded, they believed, because of the inherent power of their laws.[11] While they accommodated themselves so far to those whom they sought to win as to present first the most attractive features of their faith, as judged from the outside, they steadily kept in view the ultimate purpose, which was to make the converts as themselves, filled with a zeal for the whole law and willing to make sacrifice of themselves in body

[1] *BJ* vii. iii. 3, *c. Ap.* ii. 39.
[2] Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 5; Juvenal, *Sat.* xiv. 96–106; Horace, *Sat.* i. iv. 142 f.
[3] Reff. in Bertholet, p. 285 ff.; cf. F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic, and Morals*, London, 1910, p. 154 ff.
[4] Jos. *Ant.* xiii. ix. 1, xiii. xi. 3.
[5] *c. Ap.* ii. 39.
[6] A. van Hoonacker, *Une Communauté judéo-araméenne à Éléphantine* (Schweich Lectures), London, 1915, p. 24 f.
[7] S. Daiches, *The Jews in Babylonia in the Time of Ezra*, London, 1910, p. 30 f.
[8] G. J. Thatcher, *A Sketch of the Hist. of the Apostolic Church*, Boston, 1893, p. 26 ff.; Schürer, § 33.

[1] M. M. Kalisch, *Bible Studies*, London, 1877–78, ii. 95.
[2] *JE* x. 223, art. 'Proselyte.'
[3] Thatcher, p. 23.
[4] Schürer, pp. 115, 125 f.
[5] Jos. *BJ* ii. xx. 2, vii. iii. 3.
[6] Jos. *Ant.* xx. ii.–iv. etc.
[7] Schürer, p. 118, n. 53; Bertholet, p. 301; *PRE*[3], art. 'Proselyten,' sect. 3.
[8] Jos. *BJ* ii. xvii. 10; Bertholet, p. 341.
[9] Schürer, p. 318 ff.
[10] Goodman, p. 89.
[11] Jos. *c. Ap.* ii. 39.

and estate. Being of a subject race and in a hopeless minority among the nations, they were under no temptation to employ violent methods. The proselytes when made were, in theory at least, subject to no disability, save that which must ever attach to the naturalized as compared with the native born. In actual life and practice disabilities must have existed,[1] although these are not brought to light until Talmudic times, when they may no longer have been operative.

It cannot be supposed that there were not disinterested motives present in the seekers any more than in the sought. The gifts of the converts helped to swell the riches of the Temple,[2] and Josephus openly allows an instance of misappropriation by a Jew and his accomplices of purple and gold made over for this purpose by Fulvia, a Roman convert of great dignity.[3] In other ways the Jews doubtless invited others to follow them ostensibly for their soul's good, yet with an actual view to the material advantage to be reaped by themselves and their nation.

Those who were the sought were for the most part in a position to invite themselves, if they felt thus disposed. They were Roman citizens, or under the protection of the conquering power of that time, or else were inheritors of the professedly superior culture of the Græco-Roman world. Yet many of them voluntarily surrendered themselves to Jewish influence, abandoning the gods in whom they had ceased to believe, and finding in the higher morality of Judaism a refuge from the licentious spirit of the age. The latter motive is said to have had special weight with heathen women. The monotheism and moral purity of Judaism held a powerful attraction for minds of a philosophic cast in every province. Considering the obloquy to which the converts were exposed, and the persecution of a later day, which led many to profess the Jewish faith in secret, proselytism must have been attended by a greater or less measure of conviction. Josephus admits that not all who came over continued in the faith; some had not courage and departed.[4] Yet 'the vast majority of devout Gentiles certainly sought in the synagogue nothing but the true God.'[5]

On the side of the proselytes also certain unworthy exceptions must be allowed for, viz. those who came over to avoid military service (from which the Jews were exempt), those who were actuated by superstitious motives, and those who thought to secure commercial privilege or social advantage through marriage with a noble or wealthy Jewess.[6]

The judgment of the outside world upon the proselyte movement, as conveyed by classical writers (reff. above), counts for little. The most grievous charge they make, viz. atheism, has no foundation, nor yet has the scoffing dictum of Seneca:[7] 'Victi victoribus leges dederunt.' The references in NT are favourable to proselytes, with the single exception of Mt 23[15], which after all is more a condemnation of the leaders than of the followers, and that perhaps within a sect only.

The most abundant materials for forming a judgment on the ethical value of the proselyte appear to be found in Talmudic literature, but their worth is discounted by the fact that they are often contradictory (*e.g.*, stories of Hillel *v.* Shammai),[8] that they were evolved apart from actual historical conditions, and that in the main they are disparaging.

[1] Schürer, p. 133 ff.
[2] Jos. *Ant.* xiv. vii. 2.
[3] *Ib.* xviii. iii. 5.
[4] Jos. *c. Ap.* ii. 10.
[5] A. Hausrath, *A Hist. of the NT Times: The Time of the Apostles*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, i. 127.
[6] Jos. *Ant.* xx. vii. 3; cf. xvi. vii. 6.
[7] *Ap.* Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, vi. 11.
[8] Bertholet, p. 319 ff.

They 'chiefly serve to illustrate the strong animus which a large section of post-Christian Jews displayed against proselytizing and proselytes.'[1]

The judgment of the present day is determined according as one belongs to a religion which considers proselytism, in the modern sense, to be 'an essential and a sacred duty,'[2] or to a religion, such as the Jewish, which reckons that the fulfilment of its mission does not require the support of numbers.[3]

Christian opinion is largely moulded by a sense of indebtedness to proselytes, for they, in the wider acceptation, were the feeders of Christianity at the beginning. By this standard of judgment the 'God-fearers,' regarded as proselytes, are superior to those—their number relatively few—who became punctilious in observing all the ceremonial requirements of the law. In the case of these the saying, 'the more converted the more perverted,'[4] may well have been true. Proselytes in the strict sense formed no link between Jew and Gentile, and did not prepare the way for Christianity.[5] All that legal Judaism achieved over against Christianity, which came after, has been pithily summed up by Stopford A. Brooke thus:

'A few swallows do not make a summer, nor a few thousand proselytes a regenerated world.'[6]

Modern Judaism is concerned to clear itself of the reproach that by its very constitution the Jewish religion is, and has ever been, hostile to the reception of proselytes. It points to past successes in this respect, to the debt which Christianity owes to Judaism for providing it with universalistic sympathies,[7] and it further maintains that willing proselytes are still freely received, once their good faith has been proved.[8] But the missionary zeal has departed from Judaism, and indifference as to increase of numbers prevails. How great the change is between the present and the era of proselytism, which has been considered, appears to be reflected in the following condemnation of the missionary methods of Christianity and Muhammadanism:

'History and experience teach us that the proselytizing spirit, which is bred by the craving after universality, generally engenders a tendency which develops into an indirect negation of human brotherhood.' 'To the Moslem as to the Christian, questions of love or humanity were of little moment in the spread of their religion; the stranger could only become their brother-in-faith, or remain their implacable foe.'[9]

While remitting nothing from the duty to strengthen the confederation of Christians over against the world as still lying in unbelief, the apologist for Christianity is free to admit the presence and operation of an objectionable proselytism, whose root is found in particularism, not universalism.[10]

A judicial estimate of the principles and methods governing Christian and Muhammadan propaganda will be found in art. MISSIONS, vol. viii. pp. 743 f., 748[b].

LITERATURE.—*ERE*, art. 'Judaism' (H. Loewe) and other artt. quoted above; artt. *s.v.* in *HDB* (F. C. Porter), *SDB* (J. Gilroy), *EBi* (W. H. Bennett), *PRE*[3] (E. von Dobschütz), *EBr*[11] (I. Abrahams), and *JE* (E. G. Hirsch).

Of the works cited in the footnotes those by Bertholet, Schürer, Hausrath, Harnack, Kalisch, Thatcher, and Goodman (from Jewish standpoint) may be selected as giving a more or less detailed treatment of the subject, and to these may be added A. Edersheim, *Hist. of the Jewish Nation*, London, 1896, pp. 85–88, 293 f.; G. Hollmann, *The Jewish Nation in the Time of Jesus*, London, 1909, p. 15 ff. See, further, the extensive bibliography in Schürer, *GJV*[3] iii. 115 n., *HJP* ii. ii. 304 f.

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[1] *EBi*, art. 'Proselyte,' sect. 5; cf. Bertholet, pp. 339–345.
[2] Lyall, p. 141.
[3] Goodman, p. 108.
[4] *Expositor's Greek Testament*, i. 281.
[5] *HDB*, art. 'Proselyte,' sect. iv.
[6] *Christ in Modern Life*, London, 1872, p. 38.
[7] Goodman, p. 100 f.
[8] *EBr*[11], art. 'Proselyte.'
[9] Goodman, p. 110 f.
[10] H. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, iii., Edinburgh, 1892, p. 341.

PROSTITUTION.

Greek (W. J. WOODHOUSE), p. 404.
Indian (W. CROOKE), p. 406.
Roman (W. J. WOODHOUSE), p. 408.
Semitic. — See CHASTITY (Semit.-Egyptian), HIERODOULOI (Semitic and Egyptian).

PROSTITUTION (Greek).—The Greeks had but little notion of moral purity in the modern sense of the term. The virtue of chastity with them was confined within very narrow limits,[1] being obligatory upon the wife (or daughter), while the husband (or son) was required only to refrain from adultery, *i.e.* from violating the family rights of his neighbour. The husband's honour was fully protected by law, but the wife had no legal remedy against her husband's irregularities;[2] nor did public opinion, capricious and ineffective at best, supplement the law's deficiencies, except in cases of gross neglect and outrage of the forms of respectability.[3] Morally, according to the opinion of the day, this sort of indulgence was upon exactly the same plane as any other satisfaction of appetite. The question was one simply of more or less. Self-control,[4] if not itself carried to undue lengths, was, it is true, something to be admired, and by common consent must be a main element in that careful and worldly-wise balancing of competing desires to which Greek thought and practice reduced the art of correct living (cf. the saying *μηδὲν ἄγαν*).

The philosophers themselves took no higher ground than this (see, *e.g.*, Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* i. iii. 14, and *Sympos.* iv. 38, where he lays down the rule with his accustomed crudeness and simplicity). Even Plato practically goes no farther than to say that a wise man will attach no great value to these particular forms of pleasure (*Phædo*, 64 D); and in his *Republic* he would so far consult the weakness of the flesh as to allow promiscuous intercourse to both sexes when past the age for rearing children for the State—always provided that incest be avoided, and that no child be born of such unions (*Rep.* 461 B: *ὅταν δὲ δή, οἶμαι, αἵ τε γυναῖκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐκβῶσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀφήσομεν που ἐλευθέρους αὐτοὺς συγγιγνέσθαι ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλωσι, κτλ.*). In the *Laws* he hopes to be able to restrict such intercourse to persons legally married, or at least to enforce a regulation that in other cases it shall be covered with a decent veil of secrecy (*Laws*, 841). Aristotle is of the same mind (*Pol.* iv. (vii.) 16. 17 = 1335b: *τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγιείας χάριν ἢ τινὸς ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν*).

In this matter, then, the Greeks are to be pronounced not so much immoral as non-moral. Their practice was due to the simple directness with which they regarded the facts of life and human nature. There were few facts of human nature for which they felt it necessary to apologize. In a very literal sense they were naked and not ashamed. Not that they interpreted life simply in terms of animalism, though there were among them also plenty of men to whom bodily indulgence was the sole end or the chief end of life; for the average man, as for the better sort also, it meant just the sober exercise of natural faculties and the moderate enjoyment of natural pleasures. Taken in the mass, the Greeks were probably just as far from being sensualists as from being ascetics. Aristotle's somewhat mechanical doctrine of virtue as a mean expressed a deep-rooted instinct of the race.

This purely naturalistic or humanistic attitude of the Greeks towards life was reinforced not only by their ingrained selfishness but by certain facts of political and economic significance. The net result was that, from the point of view of morality and social institutions, and the place held therein by women, two distinct types of life were found among them. Without, of course, asserting an absolute and rigid distinction, we may recognize, on the one hand, a Dorian or Achæan (Æolian) type, in which women enjoyed a relatively large degree of freedom, and, on the other hand, an Athenian (Ionian) type, in which women were mostly restricted, if not to the *γυναικωνῖτις*, at any rate to the house and its precincts,[1] with but rare opportunity of mingling with external life, and none at all of social significance (cf. the question put to Critobulus in Xen. *Œc.* iii. 12: *ἔστι δὲ ὅτῳ ἐλάττονα διαλέγει ἢ τῇ γυναικί*; and his reply—*εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ πολλοῖς γε*).

Typical of the one sort are Sappho and Corinna, the latter five times the successful rival of Pindar; the spirit of the other mode breathes in the oft-quoted words put by Thucydides in the mouth of Pericles:[2] 'Hers is the greatest glory, of whom men speak least whether for good or bad' (*Thuc.* ii. 45: *μεγάλη ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἧς ἂν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος ᾖ*)—words which must surely have sounded strangely, coming from the lips of the professed lover of the most noted courtesan of the day! Within each of these types of society irregular sexual intercourse, in different forms, exercised a most profound and far-reaching influence. The actual physical facts of that intercourse were necessarily the same then as to-day, but their relation to public and private life was to a large extent peculiar to the Greek people, and has in fact never been reproduced in the world in quite the same colour. The low standard of intellectual attainment of Athenian women (due to a defective education,[3] which was itself but one consequence of a defective social system), standing as it did in startling contrast with the multifarious and hyperpoliticized interests of masculine life, no doubt partly explains and partly excuses the reluctance and inability of men to find satisfaction in the home circle. We must, however, be on our guard against attaching too much importance to this excuse, for after all it is a fact that the majority of the *ἑταῖραι* with whom a man associated were, apart from their superficial accomplishments, just as uneducated as his own wife or sisters. The sensuous appeal was, then as now, primary. The main reason for the failure of home life to hold men was that the social code did not permit a man to entertain his male friends in his own house, at any rate in the bosom of his family.

In Athens comparatively few native-born women had to earn their own living, the system of dowry and marriage making them, generally speaking, economically independent (see art. MARRIAGE [Greek]), though there were of course instances in which the ravages of war or other disaster had driven native Athenian women to rely upon their own industry.[4] The case of alien women

[1] This is so in Homer also, where Odysseus hangs his incontinent handmaids simply on the ground that their unchastity has dishonoured his family (*Od.* xxii. 418: *αἱ τε μ' ἀτιμάζουσι*; and 424 f.: *ἀναιδείης ἐπέβησαν, | οὔτ' ἐμὲ τίουσαι οὔτ' αὐτὴν Πηνελόπειαν*).

[2] Cf. Arist. *Eccles.* 718 f.: *ἔπειτα τὰς πόρνας καταπαύσαι βούλομαι ἀπαξαπάσας, κτλ.*

[3] *E.g.*, the case of Alcibiades (Andoc. iv. 14: *οὕτως ὑβριστὴς ἦν, ἐπισάγων εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἑταίρας, καὶ δούλας καὶ ἐλευθέρας, ὥστ' ἠναγκάσατο τὴν γυναῖκα σωφρονεστάτην οὖσαν ἀπολιπεῖν, ἐλθοῦσαν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας κατὰ τὸν νόμον*). It is evident from the sequel that his wife had no legal remedy.

[4] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. v. 4: *ὅμως γε οἶμαι χρὴ πάντα ἄπορα ἡγήσασθαι τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι κρηπίδα, ταύτην πρώτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευασάμενον; κτλ.* and *Mem.* iv. v. 5: *τὴν κακίστην ὁρῶ γυναῖκα οἱ ἀκρατεῖς δουλεύουσιν, κτλ.*

[1] Cf. Menand. in Koch, iii. 546: *τοὺς τῆς γαμετῆς ὅρους ὑπερβαίνεις, γυναι, | τὴν αὐλιαν· πέρας γὰρ αὕλειος θύρα | ἐλευθερῳ γυναικι νενόμισθ' οἰκεῖν· | τὸ δ' ἐπιδιωκειν εἰς τε τὴν ὁδὸν τρεχειν, | ἔτι λοιδορουμενην, κυνὸς ἐστ' ἔργον, Ῥοδῆ.* In the same strain Lykurgus, describing the panic in Athens after Chæronea, says (*c. Leocr.* 40): *ὁρᾶν δ' ἦν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν θυρῶν γυναῖκας ἐλευθερας περιφοβους κατεπτηχυίας.*

[2] Cf. Æsch. *Sept.* 182 f.: *μέλει γὰρ ἀνδρί, μὴ γυνὴ βουλευετω | τἀξωθεν· ἔνδον δ' οὖσα μὴ βλαβὴν τιθῇ*—where Eteocles is made to speak quite in the manner of a 5th cent. Athenian, and even to repeat the stock gibe at the sex in line 242.

[3] Cf. here the curious symptom of the way in which women lagged behind the intellectual standard of their men folk, in Plato, *Crat.* 418: *οὐχ ἥκιστα αἱ γυναῖκες, αἴπερ μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σῴζουσι.* See also the intolerable condescension and priggishness of Ischomachus, the model Greek gentleman (*καλός τε κἀγαθός*), in Xen. *Œc.* vii. 1 f.

[4] See the inscriptions published in *BSA* viii. [1901–02] 197 f.; Dem. lvii. 30 f.: *παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, οἱ κελεύουσιν ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ κακηγορίᾳ τὸν τὴν ἐργασίαν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ τῶν πολιτίδων διειδιζουτά τινι· ἡμεῖς δ' ἀμελουμεν καὶ ταινίας πωλεῖν, καὶ ζῆν οὐχ οὑτινα τρόπον βουλομεθα* an important passage (the speaker is a lone woman) as showing the suspicion

resident in Athens was very different. Coming, as most of them did, from Asia Minor, traditionally accustomed to a larger measure of freedom than the native-born women, they for a time bade fair to bring about a radical alteration in the attitude of Athenians towards women and the question of their place in society. Suddenly this normal development of liberalism received a rude check. The purifying Acts of 451 B.C. (Plut. *Per.* 37; Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 26. 4), rigidly defining the conditions of Athenian citizenship, had the further effect of drawing a sharp line between alien and native-born, making it impossible for the children of mixed unions to attain citizenship. This vitally affected the general relationship of alien women to Athenian male citizens, and virtually compelled a large number of women to rely upon their own physical and mental endowment as a means of livelihood.[1] From this period, then, dates the beginning of the enormous expansion and social importance of the class of *ἑταῖραι* in Athens, and through Athens in Greece generally. For the main profession henceforth open to such alien women was, in fact, that of 'companion' (*ἑταίρα*). From this time on the professional 'companion' played a definitely recognized and accepted rôle in Greek society, and one thoroughly in accord with the economic and spiritual factors of the age. Hence there is nothing surprising in the naive and striking definitions expressed by Dem. lix. 122:

τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἑταίρας ἡδονῆς ἕνεκ' ἔχομεν· τὰς δὲ παλλακὰς, τῶς καθ' ἡμέραν θεραπείας τοῦ σώματος, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας τοῦ παιδοποιεῖσθαι γνησίως καὶ τῶν ἔνδον φύλακα πιστὴν ἔχειν—

definitions which ought to preserve us from illusions as to the real nature of the demands which the class of *ἑταῖραι* existed to satisfy.

By Sappho the word *ἑταίρα* is used without any opprobrious significance (cf. the similar fate of the English word 'mistress'), just as even in the days of Athenæus (end of 2nd cent. A.D.) girls applied it to their female friends (Athen. 571 D: *καλοῦσι γοῦν καὶ αἱ ἐλεύθεραι γυναῖκες ἔτι καὶ νῦν καὶ αἱ παρθένοι τὰς συνήθεις καὶ φίλας ἑταίρας ὡς ἡ Σαπφώ*). As early as the time of Herodotus, however, it was applied by way of euphemism to a woman who followed a life of promiscuous intercourse for gain, for whom the proper word was *πόρνη* (*πορνίδιον*), 'whore' (Herod. ii. 134 f., where he sketches the history *Ῥοδῶπιος ἑταίρης γυναικός*, with whose fame Hellas rang).[2] A long list of synonyms for the class is to be gathered from Hesych. and Pollux, vii. 201. In this sense the word *ἑταίρα* had a wide range, from the concubine (properly *παλλακή*), who was wife in all but legal status (like Aspasia), through the *ἑταῖραι πολυτελεῖς* (*μεγαλόμισθοι*) to the lowest prostitute that was *κοινὸν ἅπασι*, for which the Greek language, rich in opprobrious epithets, had a great variety of terms of terrible significance. These were doubtless appropriated to infinite fine gradations of the profession.[3]

Athens, as a centre of maritime trade, was probably from the earliest times familiar with women of this class. Drakon (Athen. 569) seems to have legislated against them, but after his time the State not only tolerated and protected, but even to a certain extent exploited, them. The change was traditionally fathered upon Solon, who is said to have established State houses of prostitution, and to have built a temple of Aphrodite Pandemos from the profits:

στήσαι πριάμενόν ποτε γυναῖκας κατὰ τόπους κοινὰς ἅπασι καὶ κατεσκευασμένας (Athen. 569).

However this may have been, it is the fact that in post-Solonian Athens those who followed this profession paid a licence fee to the State, which was farmed out in the usual way to *τελῶναι* (also *πορνοτελῶναι*).[1]

The superintendence of this tax was one of the duties of the *ἀστυνόμοι*.[2] The non-existence of contagious disease for which they were responsible made the policing of prostitutes in ancient times a comparatively simple problem.

The vase-paintings of the early 5th cent., and later, indicate the great importance of the *ἑταῖραι* in the social life of the time,[3] and furnish a score of names of courtesans then flourishing (see W. Klein, *Die griech. Vasen mit Meistersignaturen*[2], Vienna, 1887, *passim*, or P. Hartwig, *Die griech. Meisterschalen*, Berlin, 1893, *passim*). Sparta naturally stood in great contrast, because her men had little time and little money to spend on such things (Plut. *de Fort. Rom.* 4: *ὥσπερ οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται τὴν Ἀφροδίτην λέγουσι, διαβαίνουσαν τὸν Εὐρώταν, τὰ μὲν ἔσοπτρα καὶ τοὺς χλιδῶνας καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἀποθέσθαι, δόρυ δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα λαβεῖν κοσμουμένην τῷ Λυκούργῳ*); and Keos boasted, or others did for her, of her poverty in this respect (Athen. 610: *ἐν ταῖς Κείων πόλεσιν οὔτε ἑταίρας οὔτε αὐλητρίδας ἰδεῖν ἔστι*). On the other hand, Corinth was notorious throughout the Greek world for her *ἑταῖραι*, most of whom were in the service of the great temple of Aphrodite there (cf. the saying, *οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐς Κόρινθον ἐσθ' ὁ πλοῦς*; see art. HIERODOULOI [Græco-Roman]).[4]

Among the Athenian *ἑταῖραι* two main classes must be distinguished. Probably by far the greater number were slaves[5] bought or otherwise obtained by owners, male and female, who as *πορνοβοσκοί* kept them in a *πορνεῖον* (also *οἴκημα*, *ἐργαστήριον*, and many other terms)[6] *ἐργαζόμεναι ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος*. These would be under the general conditions

attaching to such cases. See also the interesting experiment in domestic production, suggested by Socrates, in Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7 f.: cf. Hom. *Il.* xii. 433 f.: *γυνὴ χερνῆτις ἀληθής . . . ἵνα παισὶν ἀεικέα μισθὸν ἄρηται*, and Aristoph. *Thesm.* 445 f. (a widow with five children who earns her living *στεφανηπλοκοῦσα ἐν ταῖς μυρρίναις*).

[1] Cf. Amphis, in Meineke, *Frag. Com. Gr.*, Berlin, 1839–57, iii. 301 = Athen. 559 A (contrasting the *ἑταίρα* with the *γυνὴ γαμετή*): *ἡ μὲν νόμῳ γὰρ καταφρονοῦσ' ἔνδον μένει, | ἡ δ' οἶδεν ὅτι ἡ τοῖς τρόποις ὠνητεος | ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον ἀπιτέον*—which puts the matter crudely, as simply one of supply and demand and market competition.

[2] Rhodope (or Rhodopis), a Thracian slave at Naucratis in Egypt, was ransomed by Charaxus, brother of Sappho, who 'roundly rebuked him in a poem' (Herod. ii. 135). According to Strabo, p. 808, the name of the *ἑταίρα* to whom Charaxus fell a victim was Doricha, and, according to Athen. 596, it was Doricha whom Sappho attacked, and not her brother, Doricha and Rhodopis being two different persons. The poem first published in *Oxyrh. Pap.* i. [1898] 10 f. (see also J. M. Edmonds, in *Class. Quart.* iii. [1909] 249) must allude to this. Herodotus (ii. 135) mentions also a courtesan Archidice who became *ἀοίδιμος ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα*. He was evidently interested in the subject, and in this respect is a forerunner of a large number of writers who afterwards wrote many books *περὶ ἑταιρῶν*, or *περὶ τῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἑταιρίδων*, which were the sources from which Athenæus gathered the material of his own 13th book on 'Courtesans.'

[3] Cf. what Antiphanes says in his *Hydria*, frag. 1 (Meineke, iv. 124), speaking of an *ἀστή* turned *ἑταίρα*: *ἦθός τι χρυσοῦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν κεκτημένης, | ὄντως ἑταίρας· αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι τοὐνομα | βλάπτουσι τοῖς τρόποις γὰρ ὄντως ὂν καλόν.*

[1] Cf. Æsch. i. 119: *ἀποθαυμάζει γὰρ εἰ μὴ πάντες μέμνησθ' ὅτι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἡ βουλὴ πωλεῖ τὸ πορνικὸν τέλος, κτλ.*

[2] So also apparently in Corinth; cf. Justin xxi. 5: 'apud aediles adversus lenones jurgari.' As regards Athens there is some confusion. Speaking of the Astynomoi, Aristotle says, in *Ath. Pol.* 50: *καὶ τάς τε αὐλητρίδας καὶ τὰς ψαλτρίας καὶ τὰς κιθαριστρίας οὗτοι σκοποῦσιν ὅπως μὴ πλείονος ἢ δυεῖν δραχμαῖν μισθωθήσονται, κτλ.*, but he does not mention prostitutes. According to Suid. *s.v.* *διάγραμμα*: *διέγραφον γάρ, ὅσον ἔδει λαμβάνειν τὴν ἑταίραν ἑκάστην*, the Agoranomoi (*sic*) fixed the *tariff* of the licensed prostitutes; this must surely be a mistake (*λαμβάνειν* for *καταβάλλειν*) for the amount of *tax* to be paid by them—if, indeed, the notice refers to Athens at all. There was a similar tax in Roman Egypt (B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *Gr. Pap.* ii. [Oxford, 1897] 67 f.).

[3] Cf. Athen. 576, where Themistocles is said to have driven through the Athenian Agora with the courtesans Lamia, Nannion, Satyra, and Skione. See also Athen. 533: *οὔπω Ἀθηναίων μεθυσκομένων οὐδ' ἑταίρας χρωμένων, ἐκφανῶς τέθριππον ζεύξας ἑταιρίδων διὰ τοῦ Κεραμεικοῦ πληθυόντος ἐωθινὸς ἤλασεν*—a fact vouched for, he says, by Idomeneus, who, however, did not make it quite clear whether the *ἑταῖραι* were on the car or were themselves yoked to it!

[4] Although the information about it comes to us through Greek sources, and the practice prevailed among many who doubtless counted themselves genuine Greeks, we do not here treat of what may be called 'sacred' prostitution, in which before marriage, or for a season, respectable women must give themselves up to promiscuous intercourse (*e.g.*, in Cyprus [Herod. i. 199]; in Lydia girls earned their dowry by this means, though that was probably not the *raison d'être* of the practice [*ib.* i. 93; Athen. 515]). Cf. W. M. Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, Oxford, 1895, i. 94 f., and J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 36 f., 57 f.

[5] Hence in Aristoph. *Eccl.* 721 f.: *καὶ τάς γε δούλας οὐχὶ δεῖ κοσμουμένας | τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ὑφαρπάζειν Κύπριν.* The temple prostitutes were simply a variety of this class, for the most part—certainly all those in Corinth.

[6] Akin to these places were the taverns (*καπηλεῖα*) in which also *πόρναι* were to be found. Cf. Sanger, *Hist. of Prostitution*, p. 560. In Strabo, p. 578, at Karoura in Asia Minor *φασὶ πορνοβοσκὸν αὐλισθέντα ἐν τοῖς πανδοχείοις σὺν πολλῷ πλήθει γυναικῶν νύκτωρ γενομένου σεισμοῦ συναφανισθῆναι πάσαις.* But perhaps this was an itinerant company.

governing the institution of slavery in Athens and elsewhere (see art. SLAVERY). This class must have been largely recruited from the number of female infants 'pot-exposed,' *i.e.* cast out to their fate by fathers unwilling to rear them.[1] Of this sort, perhaps, were the seven παιδίσκαι brought up by the freedwoman Nicarete to stock her brothel (Dem. lix. 18 f.), she being δεινὴ φύσιν μικρῶν παιδίων συνιδεῖν εὐπρεπῆ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπισταμένη θρέψαι καὶ παιδεῖσαι ἐμπείρως, τέχνην ταύτην κατεσκευασμένη καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων τὸν βίον συνειλεγμένη. She called them her daughters, apparently a common deception—to enhance the price.

Often such slaves were instructed in accomplishments, and were then hired out as flute-girls, harpists, dancers, etc., at banquets, where, as we see from countless vase-paintings and literary references, ample opportunity was as a matter of course given for other services. This species of more or less educated prostitute trenches upon the second great class, and, indeed, under the conditions of Greek slave life, it was possible to rise from the one class to the other. This higher class consisted partly of freedwomen, partly of free-born aliens, more rarely of native-born Athenians,[2] who for various reasons adopted this profession on their own account. The story told by Sino in Terence (*Andria*, 69 ff.: 'ita ut ingeniumst omnium hominum ab labore proclive ad lubidinem' [77]) was doubtless as familiar then as now; and that of Corinna, daughter of Crobyle, forced by her mother into a life of shame (Luc. *Dial. Mer.* 6), perhaps not less common. These independent courtesans, again, fell into varieties—from the τριάντος πόρνη of Hesychius to the ἑταῖραι μεγαλόμισθοι (Athen. 569) at the head of the profession in the hey-day of their charms (cf. the story of Demosthenes and Lais, in Aul. Gell. *Noct. Att.* i. 8).

In spite of her would-be apologists, Aspasia (of Miletus?) the concubine (παλλακή) of Pericles, must still be taken as a type of this higher grade of ἑταίρα in the 5th century. The most absurd claims have been made on her account, both in ancient and in modern times (*e.g.*, in the *Menexenus*, generally ascribed to Plato, she is a rhetorician, instructress of both Socrates and Pericles. Cf. Xen. *Œc.* iii. 14: συνήσω δέ σοι ἐγὼ καὶ Ἀσπασίαν, ἡ ἐπιστημονέστερον ἐμοῦ σοι ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιδείξει, says Socrates, referring to the subject of female education—but surely he is speaking with his accustomed irony). She was doubtless highly gifted and highly educated, but withal an adventuress with a very practical turn of mind; but that does not imply our acceptance of the gross stories and epithets applied to her by the comedians and others (*e.g.*, Aristoph. *Acharn.* 524 f.; Plut. *Per.* 24 f.). Far more illuminating as to this whole class of what may be called 'respectable' ἑταῖραι is the conversation of Socrates with the ἑταίρα Theodote, in which he discourses with her pleasantly and quite as a matter of course upon the rationale of her profession (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 11. 1 ff.). But not all interviews with ἑταῖραι were of so innocent a sort.

It is to the 4th cent. B.C., and later, that the most famous names of ἑταῖραι belong—*e.g.*, Phryne (story of the orator Hypereides unveiling her bosom before the jury, and so securing her acquittal as τὴν ὑποφήτιν καὶ ζάκορον Ἀφροδίτης, in Athen. 590, where also are other examples of her insolence and extravagance); Thais, the evil genius of Alexander the Great at Persepolis (burning of the palace at Persepolis at her suggestion [Athen. 576]); Lamia, who for years held Demetrios Poliorcetes in thraldom; Pythonice and Glycera, who went to Babylon to Harpalus, Alexander's treasurer, who decamped with over a million and a quarter in gold; these and scores of other courtesans were, for the most part, products of Athens, who in this way repaid her long-standing debt to Asia; for in this age Athens 'became to Hellenistic potentates what Miletus and the Ionian towns had been to the Lydians and the Persians—the most popular source of their supply of "pleasure women"' (W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, London, 1911, p. 70).

'There was perhaps no business more capitalistic in its organization and international in its scope than the traffic in courtesans, so that, despite its losses, the Athenian *demi-monde* maintained its lead and its reputation' (*ib.* p. 71).[1]

Into this world of superficial accomplishment, tawdriness, vulgarity, and heartlessness, in which men and women frankly preyed upon each other for what each could offer, Athenæus in his 13th book gives us more than a glimpse. In a sense it is true that the ἑταίρα was the one free woman in Athens; moreover, it is probable that the general simplicity of ancient life was itself a check upon the *descensus Averni* which inevitably characterizes this class in modern times. The comparative feebleness, and almost non-existence, of the sense of degradation in the career of the ἑταῖραι must also have tended to keep them individually upon the social plane to which their respective intellectual and physical qualifications, that is to say, their true economic measure, raised them; so that the more terrible issues of prostitution remained unrevealed to the Greeks. To the Greek ἑταίρα Lecky's famous phrase is thus only partially applicable; 'eternal priestess of humanity' she was, it is true, but hardly 'blasted for the sins of the people' (*Hist. of European Morals*[9], London, 1890, ii. 283).

LITERATURE.—K. Schneider, art. 'Hetairai,' in Pauly-Wissowa, is very complete on the archæological side; W. W. Sanger, *The Hist. of Prostitution*, new ed., New York, 1913 (uncritical and superficial in dealing with the ancient material); W. A. Becker, *Charicles*, tr. F. Metcalfe, London, 1845, is still perhaps the most complete collection of material, outside the 13th book of Athenæus, our chief source of information. Nothing very recent seems to have been written on the general subject, which requires investigation from the point of view of economics and female industries.

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

PROSTITUTION (Indian).—1. Early history of prostitutes.—As was the case in other parts of the world, the trade of the prostitute has been practised in India from a very early period.

(*a*) *The Vedic period.*—Prostitution is found in the *Rigveda*, but its extent is disputed. Brotherless girls were frequently compelled to earn their livelihood in this way, and the putting-away of an illegitimate child is mentioned (I. cxxiv. 7, IV. v. 5, II. xxix. 1). Terms like *pumścalī*, *mahānagnī*, and *rāma* clearly mean 'harlot,' and there are unmistakable references to the trade. Expressions like *kumārī-putra*, 'son of a maiden,' and *agrū*, 'son of an unmarried girl,' point in the same direction. The *Vājasaneyi Saṃhita* seems to recognize prostitution as a profession; but the exact meaning of the references collected by R. Pischel and K. F. Geldner (*Vedische Studien*, Stuttgart, 1888–89, I. xxv. 196, 275, 299, 309 ff., ii. 120) is not certain (A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *A Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, i. 395 f., ii. 480 ff.). In the case of a widow the custom of *satī* seems to have been in abeyance; in some cases she was burned with her dead husband (*Atharvaveda*, XVIII. iii. 1), but in other cases the levirate prevailed and, as she married the brother of her late husband, this

[1] Cf. Aristoph. *Frogs*, 1190: ἐξέθεσαν ἐν ὀστράκῳ, and *Clouds*, 531: καὶ δ' ἕτερα τὶν λαβοῦσ' ἀνεῖλετο. Opinions differ widely both as to the probable number of children thus exposed and as to the proportion of those who were rescued from death as a speculation. Naturally, no conclusion at all, beyond the bare fact that such rescue sometimes took place, can be drawn from the frequency of this motive in the New Comedy.

[2] That native-born Athenians did sometimes sink into the class of ἑταῖραι is certain, from Antiphanes, *Hydr.* frag. 1 (Meineke, iv. 124): ἴδων ἑταίρας εἰς ἔρωτ' ἀφικετο, | ἀστὴς ἐρήμου δ' ἐπιτρόπου καὶ συγγενοῦς, as well as from the apologies put forward in Dem. lix. 34 f., already quoted—even if we were not told that one famous ἑταίρα, Lamia, a mistress of Demetrios Poliorcetes, was daughter of Cleanor an Athenian, and presumably therefore herself of free birth (Athen. 577).

[1] But the predominance of the courtesan in the New Comedy must not destroy our sense of proportion. It was, in part, a necessary outcome of the convention which laid the scene always in the street, into which respectable women could not venture, except under escort and upon rare occasion. Hence the plays mirror social, but not domestic, life, and work threadbare a few stock motives.

source of prostitution may have been generally closed (Macdonell and Keith, i. 488).

(*b*) *In the law-books.*—Manu (*Laws*, ix. 259) directs that harlots are to be punished, and a Brāhman is forbidden to touch food given by harlots, which excluded him from the higher worlds (iv. 209, 219). The same prohibition applies to food given by an unchaste woman, and libations of water are not to be offered to women who through lust live with many men (iv. 211, 220, v. 90).

(*c*) *In the Buddhist age.*—A Brāhman was forbidden to witness dancing or hear music, the trade of the *ĕraĭpa* (T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903, p. 185 f.). But numerous references to prostitutes in the *Jātaka* show that they were tolerated and to a certain degree held in respect. The fees paid to some of them were exceedingly high (*The Jātaka*, Eng. tr., Cambridge, 1895–1907, ii. 40, 261, iii. 283, iv. 157); 700 courtesans are found in the palace of a king (vi. 145). Sakka, after giving money to a harlot, does not visit her, but rewards her continence by filling her house with jewels of seven hoards (ii. 259 f.). One of this class is said to keep the five virtues (ii. 251). On the other hand, the roguery and rapacity of prostitutes are referred to, and it is regarded as a misfortune for a virtuous man to be reborn in a harlot's womb (vi. 117). Somadeva, who used much Buddhist material, writes:

'Thus, O King, even hetairai are occasionally of noble character and faithful to kings as their own wives, much more than matrons of high birth'; he also speaks of the famous *ĕraĭpa* of Ujjayini, Devadattā, who had a place worthy of a king (*Kathāsarit-sāgara*, ed. C. H. Tawney, Calcutta, 1880, i. 354, ii. 621).

In the Buddhist legends we read of Ambāpatā, the famous courtesan of Visala, and the princess Salawatī takes this profession (R. S. Hardy, *A Manual of Budhism*, London, 1853, p. 244). An inscription of the W. Chalukya dynasty of Bādāmi, early in the 8th cent. A.D., records gifts made by a prostitute to a temple (*BG* i. pt. ii. [1896] 372, 394).

At the present day prostitutes are tolerated in India to an extent which can hardly be paralleled in any other part of the world. It is considered lucky to meet a prostitute at the beginning of a journey, probably because she can never become a widow, whose appearance is an evil omen (E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, ii. 139). One class of dancing-girls, known as *mātangi*, are held in much respect, and among those castes in which girls are prostituted this is done after a regular session of the council (below, § 3).

(*d*) *Under Muhammadan rule.*—The Muhammadans kept prostitutes under supervision.

Under Akbar 'the prostitutes of the realms (who had collected at the capital, and could scarcely be counted, so large was their number) had a separate quarter of the town assigned to them, which was called Shaiṭānpura, or Devilsville. A Dāroghah [superintendent] and a clerk were also appointed for it, who registered the names of such as went to prostitutes, or wanted to take some of them to their houses. People might indulge in such connexions, provided the toll collectors heard of it. But, without permission, no one was allowed to take dancing-girls to his house. If any well-known courtier wanted to have a virgin, they should first apply to His Majesty, and get his permission' (Abul Faḍhl, *Āīn-i-Akbarī*, tr. H. Blochmann, Calcutta, 1873–94, i. 192).

Khāfī Khān (*Muntakhabu-l-lubāb* [H. Elliot, *Hist. of India*, London, 1867–77, vii. 283]) states that 'the minstrels and singers of reputation in the service of the Court were made ashamed of their occupation, and were advanced to the dignity of *manṣabs*. Public proclamations were made prohibiting singing and dancing. It is said that one day a number of singers and minstrels gathered together with great cries, and having fitted up a bier with a good deal of display, round which were grouped the public wailers, they passed under the Emperor's *jharokha-i-darśan*, or interview window. When he enquired what they intended by the bier and the show, the minstrels said that Music was dead and they were carrying his corpse for burial. Aurangzeb then directed them to place it deep in the ground, that no sound or cry might afterwards arise from it.'

According to Manucci (*Storia do Mogor*, ed. W. Irvine, London, 1907, ii. 9), 'in the reign of Shāhjahān dancers and public women enjoyed great liberty, and were found in great numbers in the cities. For a time, at the beginning of his reign, Aurangzeb said nothing, but afterwards he ordered that they must marry or clear out of the realm. This was the cause that the palaces and great enclosures where they dwelt went to ruin little by little; for some of them married and others went away, or, at least, concealed themselves.'

The elaborate organization of the brothels at Vijayanagar in the 15th cent. is described by Abdur-razzāk, *Matla'us-sa'dain* (Elliot, iv. 111 f.).

2. Temple-dancers.—The appointment of women as dancers and courtesans in connexion with the greater Hindu temples is not peculiar to India (*GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 57 ff.). Such women are known in India as *dēvadāsī* or *devaratiāl*, 'slaves of the gods,' or in Travancore as *kudikkar*, 'those who belong to the house.'

'The rise of the caste and its euphemistic name seem both of them to date from about the 9th and 10th centuries A.D., during which much activity prevailed in S. India in the matter of building temples and elaborating the services held in them. The dancing-girls' duties, then as now, were to fan the idol with Chāmaras, or Tibetan ox-tails, to carry the sacred light called Kumbārtī, and to sing and dance before the god when he was carried in procession. Inscriptions (*South Indian Inscriptions*, ed. E. Hultzsch, Madras, 1890–1903, ii. pt. iii. p. 259) show that in A.D. 1004 the great temple of the Chola king Rājarāja at Tanjore had attached to it 400 *talic'cheri pendugal*, or "women of the temple," who lived in free quarters in the four streets round it, and were allowed tax-free land out of its endowments. Other temples had similar arrangements. At the beginning of the last century there were one hundred dancing-girls attached to the temple at Conjeevaram[1] (F. Buchanan, *Journey from Madras*, London, 1807, i. 12 f.), and at Madura, Conjeevaram and Tanjore there are still numbers of them who receive allowances from the endowments of the big temples at those places. In former days the profession was countenanced not only by the Church but by the State. Abdur Razāk, a Turkish Ambassador to the Court of Vijianagar in the 15th cent., describes women of this class living in State-controlled institutions, the revenue of which went towards the upkeep of the police. [A similar account of the State regulation of prostitution at Golkonda is given by J. B. Tavernier, *Travels in India*, ed. V. Ball, London [1889], i. 157 f.] At the present day they form a regular caste, having its own laws of inheritance, its own customs and rules of etiquette, and its own panchayats [caste councils] to see that all these are followed, and thus hold a position which is perhaps without a parallel in any other country. Dancing-girls dedicated to the actual profession are generally married in a temple to a sword or a god, the *tāli* [gold trinket worn round the neck as a symbol of marriage] being tied round their necks by some man of their caste' (*Census of India, 1901*, xv., 'Madras,' Madras, 1902, i. 151 ff.; for full accounts of the *devadāsis* see Thurston, ii. 125 ff.; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, Eng. tr.[3], Oxford, 1906, pp. 337, 584 ff.; *Census of India, 1901*, xxvi., 'Travancore,' Trivandrum, 1903, i. 276 f.; V. Nagam Aiya, *Travancore State Manual*, do. 1906, ii. 383 ff.; R. V. Russell, *TC Central Provinces*, London [1916], iii. 374 ff.; for other references see *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, i. 61 ff.).

In W. India this class of women is known as *bhāvin* (Skr. *bhāvinī*, a handsome, wanton woman), *devlī* (Skr. *devala*, an attendant on an idol), or *nāikin*, 'mistress,' 'procuress.' They are said to be descended from the female servants of the Sāvantvādī or Mālvan chiefs, but some of them are of earlier origin, and their ranks have been recruited from the households of the chiefs—women of other Sūdra castes, besides Marāṭhas and Bhandāris, who may become *bhāvins* by pouring water from the god's lamp in a temple over their heads.

When a *bhāvin* girl attains puberty, she undergoes a form of marriage with the god, the rite being performed both at the girl's house and in his temple by the officiant (*gurav, rāul*). These and other servants of the temple go in procession to the house of the girl, taking with them a dagger and the mask of the god. The marriage rites are performed in the usual way, with the lighting of the sacred fire (*homa*), the mask taking the place of the bridegroom. The rite involves considerable expenditure, and in some cases, with a view to economy, the girl worships Gaṇapati or Gaṇeśa, god of enterprises, and goes to the temple accompanied by a party of her own caste and temple servants, taking in her hand a coco-nut and a packet of sugar. She places these things before the image of the god and bows to him. The *gurav* and other temple servants then invoke on her the blessing of the god, and the ceremony ends.

The *bhāvin* practises prostitution, and differs from common prostitutes only in being dedicated to the god. From her children she chooses two or three to succeed her as temple servants. In the social scale she ranks below the *kulāvant*, the

[1] See art. KĀÑCHĪPURAM.

higher class of courtesan, who is not allowed to sing and dance in public. Her duties in the temple are to sweep and purify the floor by washing it with cow-dung and water, and to wave a fly-whisk before the god. The male members of the caste, known as *devlī*, blow the temple horns and trumpets to wake the god from his slumbers. They are paid partly in cash and partly by a share of the offerings (*Ethnographic Survey, Bombay*, monographs 60, 92, Bombay, 1907–09; *BG* x. [1880] 128). In Mārwār a class of dancing-girls and prostitutes is known by the ironical title of *bhagtan* or *bhagtānī*, 'wives of a *bhagat*, or holy man.'

'It is necessary for a daughter among them to be nominally married before she enters on her profession, as it is considered a sin to allow their maiden girls to offer themselves to their infamous employment before the ceremony of marriage is performed. No betrothal takes place in such cases, and the girl is only nominally married to a Sādhu [one of the Hindu ascetic orders], who is always prepared to give up every connection with his bride on payment of a rupee and a half. If, however, no Sādhu is available, the ceremony of *phera* [circumambulation round the sacred fire] is performed by procuring the portrait of Ganesh, a Hindu divinity, invoked at the commencement of every affair' (*Census Report Mārwār, 1891*, Jodhpore, 1894, ii. 124).

3. Prostitutes under British rule.—Since the abolition of the Contagious Diseases Act there has been no regular supervision of prostitutes, and, as it is impossible to draw the line between those who practise the trade as profession and those who prostitute themselves in a surreptitious way, no statistics are available. At the last census they were included in the class of unproductive labour, with beggars, vagrants, receivers of stolen goods, and cattle poisoners (*Census of India, 1911*, i., 'India,' pt. ii. [Calcutta, 1913] 432). At the present day prostitutes in N. India are known as *ṭawāif* (pl. of Arab. *ṭāifa*, 'troop,' 'band'), *pātar*, *pātur*, *paturiya* (Skr. *pātra*, 'an actor'), *kanchan*, 'golden,' *raṇḍī*, 'widow,' or *kasbī* (Arab. *kasb*, 'acquiring,' 'earning'), while those who practise the trade secretly are called *khanagī*, 'those of the house,' or *harjāī*, 'gadabout.' They are often recruited from widows or women expelled from caste for immorality or other misconduct. In the port towns, like Calcutta and Bombay, they are sometimes Eurasians or foreign women, mostly French or Austrians. Native prostitutes often live in brothels managed by a procuress (*nāika*, *sāqin*, *bhangerin*) who treats her customers to tobacco and various compounds of opium or hemp (W. Hoey, *Trade and Manufactures in N. India*, Lucknow, 1880, p. 176). Many of the gypsy-like nomadic tribes in N. India prostitute their girls. Thus, the Bediyās of N. India reserve nearly all their girls for prostitution, and the men keep concubines drawn from other castes; in some places, if a man marries a girl of the tribe, he is expelled, and if he marries a girl who has been reserved for prostitution, he is fined by the council (Crooke, *TC*, Calcutta, 1896, i. 245). The Kolhātīs of Bombay are to a large extent dependent on the prostitution of their women, a girl on attaining puberty being allowed to choose between marriage and prostitution; if she chooses the latter occupation, she appears before the caste assembly, and, with the consent of its members, becomes a prostitute; the tribe is now kept under supervision, as they sometimes kidnap high-caste girls to bring them up as prostitutes. The same is the habit of the Hārnis, Berads, and Mang Gārudas of the Deccan (M. Kennedy, *Notes on the Criminal Classes of the Bombay Presidency*, Bombay, 1908, pp. 13, 122, 274, 283). The Dombar, a caste of acrobats in Mysore, are notorious for dedicating their smart and good-looking girls as prostitutes. In a troupe one girl is generally reserved for this trade.

The dedication is made when the girl comes of age, when, on an auspicious day, the caste people assemble by invitation. The girl is bathed and seated on a rice pounder before the assembled caste people. Married women or dedicated prostitutes smear her with red powder and turmeric, pour rice over her, and fill her garment with coco-nuts, rice, and other lucky substances. On rising, she bows to the elders of the caste and receives their blessing. She is then taken in procession to the temple of Anjaneya or Yallammā, a man beating a drum and the women singing. She is given holy water (*tīrtha*) by the priest, and she is again seated on a rice-pounder in the midst of her caste people. Rice is poured over her by *basavī* prostitutes and married women, and the ceremony ends with a feast. She is then made over to her first lover.

Such women are said to remain faithful to their protectors when kept as concubines, and it is asserted that they may be flogged and fined by the castemen if they prove false. A woman who does not enter into a connexion more or less permanent with a man is free to consort with other men, provided her lover be not of a caste lower than her own. A *basavī*, or dedicated prostitute, if she wishes to live a chaste life, can be married, and she then ceases to perform acrobatic feats in public. Her children born before the marriage are left with her relatives (monograph 13, *Ethnographic Survey, Mysore*, Bangalore, 1908, p. 12 f.). In the same province the Bedā, Gollā, Kurubā, Mādigā, and other castes often dedicate their eldest daughter, in a family where no son has been born, as a *basavī* prostitute; and a girl falling ill is likewise vowed to be left unmarried, with the usual result (B. L. Rice, *Mysore*, rev. ed., Westminster, 1897, i. 256).

LITERATURE.—The authorities have been quoted in the article; see also Al-Bīrūnī, *India*, ed. E. C. Sachau, London, 1910, ii. 142 ff.

W. CROOKE.

PROSTITUTION (Roman).—The difference between Roman and Greek views on this subject flows not so much from a deeper appreciation of the family[1] on the part of the former as from a deeper conception of personality and of the value of the individual citizen as such, independent of sex. Doubtless there was hence reflected back upon the family a sentiment that contributed much to the enhancement of its dignity and authority; but the primary result was to create an attitude of mind, on the part of men, towards free Roman women in general, and especially towards them as wives, entirely different in quality from that exhibited among the Greeks. This is not to say that the legal position of the Roman woman was actually very different from, though it was certainly superior to, that of her Greek sisters. Especially as wife and mother (*materfamilias*), her position was one of dignity and esteem; she was not servant, but mistress ('ubi tu Gaius, ego Gaia,' ran the old marriage formula). She was denied neither freedom of movement nor share of social intercourse, within or without the house.[2] Custom debarred her from direct access to public affairs, but her position was free from any suggestion of intentional personal abasement, though it was true that in the older Roman system she was subject in law in the strictest degree to her husband or other male *tutor* (see T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, Eng. tr., new ed., London, 1901, i. 74 f.).

The Greek influence, when it was finally brought to bear upon Roman society, proved one of its

[1] Cf. Cic. *de Off.* i. 54: 'nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae.'

[2] Cf. Corn. Nepos, *Praefat.*: 'Contra ea pleraque nostris moribus sunt decora, quae apud illos turpia putantur. Quem enim Romanorum pudet uxorem ducere in convivium? aut cuius materfamilias non primum locum tenet aedium, atque in celebritate versatur? quod multo fit aliter in Graecia. Nam neque in convivium adhibetur, nisi propinquorum; neque sedet, nisi in interiore parte aedium, quae *gynaeconitis* appellatur, quo nemo accedit, nisi propinqua cognatione coniunctus.' For freedom of social intercourse see Cic. *pro Cael.* 20: 'qui dicerent uxores suas a cena redeuntes attrectatas esse a Caelio'; cf. Plut. *Rom.* 20: 'Ἄλλα μεντοι πολλα ταις γυναιξιν εἰς τιμην ἀπεδωκαν . . . ἐξιστασθαι μὲν ὁδου βαδιζουσαις, κτλ.'; Cic. *Verr.* i. 94.

most powerful solvents, so that the tone of those grades of society which find expression in the literature of the Empire was in complete disaccord with that of the early Republic. It is, in fact, a striking phenomenon that, while the Greeks, on the one hand, made no pretensions to any loftiness of principle in reference to the intercourse of the sexes, but maintained upon the whole a high degree of outward decency, the Romans, on the other hand, whose principles, and for a long time their practice, were upon a higher plane, exhibited a declension which apparently reached a depth far below that ever attained by the Greeks, save in isolated cases. This difference must, in part, be explained by the existence in the Roman of some deep-lying coarseness of instinct, due perhaps to some early racial (Etruscan ?) infusion. A curious result was that in Greece it was the free lances of love (the ἑταῖραι) who in individual cases attained to great wealth and to social and political influence; in Rome the class of professional prostitutes remains throughout in the shadows of the background,[1] the adventuresses whose charms make them a power in politics being drawn exclusively from the ranks of free-born Roman society ladies (*e.g.*, the fascinating Clodia, the notorious sister of Cicero's enemy, P. Clodius; see G. Boissier, *Ciceron et ses amis*[7], Paris, 1884, p. 174 f.). The economic emancipation of Roman women, the relaxation of the family tie, and the vogue of the laxer forms of marriage are symptoms of a moral disintegration that has no parallel in the history of society in Greece, and one all the more grave as it was for the most part independent of economic pressure.

As a matter of strict principle, then, among the Romans prostitution was *per se* shameful (*flagitium*)—for both parties. That this was the Roman sentiment, at its best, is clear enough even from the passage in which Cicero, with his usual verbose insincerity as an advocate, denies it (*pro Cœl.* 48: 'Verum si quis est, qui etiam meretriciis amoribus interdictum iuventuti putet, est ille quidem valde severus—negare non possum—sed abhorret non modo ab huius saeculi licentia, verum etiam a maiorum consuetudine atque concessis. Quando enim hoc non factum est? quando reprehensum? quando non permissum? quando denique fuit ut quod licet non liceret?').[2] Perhaps from the earliest times there was in use in Rome a system of police registration analogous to that found now in most European countries. Women adopting the career of a prostitute (*meretrix*, *scortum*, *prostibulum*, *amica*) were required to register themselves at the ædile's office, and to take out a licence upon payment of a tax. The register gave full personal details of the licensee, with her professional name and price, etc. Once placed upon the register, the name could never be erased, but remained as a perpetual memorial of shame. That is to say, the moral turpitude of the act of prostitution itself (*quæstum corpore facere*) was felt to override completely all other aspects, so that recovery of status was for ever foreclosed. The unwillingness of the Roman mind to draw upon its own facility of legal fictions in order to open a way to repentance and recovery for the prostitute is in startling contrast to the humane and reasonable attitude of the Greeks towards this class. From this same thoroughgoing attitude of the Romans sprang also the minute regulations which imposed upon prostitutes a distinctive dress,[3] dyed hair, or yellow wig, and other civil disabilities, designed to mark them out for public reprobation and to penalize their profession.

As wealth and luxury increased, and the spiritual strength of the Republic decayed, while Greek, and especially Oriental, models of profligacy, springing from a quite different religious and social conception, poured into Italy in an ever-swelling flood, these repressive regulations were of no avail to prevent the recruiting of the ranks of open or secret prostitutes from even the upper strata of society. Amid the general depravity prostitution ranked merely as one form, and that not the gravest, of immorality. As emperor, Tiberius tried to check it by more stringent enactments,[1] but his own *libido effrenata et indomita*, real or suspected, made it impossible for him to exercise any authority over the licence of the age.[2] Caligula even exploited the registered prostitutes as a source of revenue.[3] The prostitute's tax continued to be levied until the time of Theodosius in the 4th cent., and was not finally abolished until a century later, by Anastasius I., when the old registers of the prostitutes were also consigned to destruction. Justinian, in the 6th cent., removed some of the civil disabilities of prostitutes (possibly only to enable himself to marry the reformed prostitute Theodora; see E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ed. J. B. Bury, London, 1898, iv. 215).

Probably the influence of Theodora is to be seen in the interesting experiment made by Justinian, who converted a palace on the Asiatic side of the Bosporus into a monastery as a rescue home for 500 reclaimed prostitutes of the capital. Here, to be saved from themselves, they were kept in a perpetual seclusion, to which many preferred suicide, so that the experiment was a failure. It marks, however, an approach to the modern attitude of charity and sympathy in dealing with the class, as contrasted with both its theoretical repudiation by the Romans and its frank acceptance by the Greeks. So far as our scanty knowledge goes, neither the Greeks nor the Romans had to face the problem of dealing with prostitution in the interests of national hygiene. The Roman system of registration and public supervision is of interest in that it represents practically the utmost that, as yet, appears possible in dealing with this problem. With the exception that there is no tax, and that the door to recovery is not legally closed, the procedure of most of the Continental peoples is simply a reversion to the Roman system. The object of both is the same, namely, outward control of the phenomenon in the interests of public order and decency; to this, for modern societies, the protection of public health falls to be added as a further complication, towards the solution of which the ancient procedure can offer no suggestion.

LITERATURE.—Save for incidental references, mainly upon the general subject of social morality under the Republic and the Empire, nothing dealing with this specific topic is known to the present writer.

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

PROTAGORAS.—Protagoras was the most famous of the Greek sophists of the 5th cent. B.C. (see SOPHISTS).

1. Life and writings.—Protagoras was a native of Abdera in Thrace. Plato, our best authority, tells us that he was seventy years old when he died, and that he had spent forty years in the practice of his profession (*Meno*, 91 E), and he visited Athens not for the first time after the production (in 420 B.C.) of a play by Pherecrates. With such data as we have, his birth seems to fall between the limits 490 and 480 B.C. The subjects

[1] Of course they are frequently alluded to, especially by the poets, but not in such a way as to reveal any specifically Roman details, or to make it necessary here to multiply quotations which do little more than prove the existence and wide prevalence of vice in Roman brothels and other meeting-places.

[2] When it suits his purpose, his language is very different; e.g., *pro Mil.* 55: 'ille, qui semper secum scorta, semper exoletos, semper lupas duceret,' and cf. *Cat.* ii. 10.

[3] Prostitutes might not wear the matron's *stola*, but must wear a *toga* of sad stuff (*toga pulla*); cf. Juv. *Sat.* ii. 69 f.: 'talem non sumet damnata togam'; Hor. *Sat.* I. ii. 63: 'quid interest in matrona, ancilla peccesne togata?', and cf. Cic. *Phil.* ii. 44: 'qui te a meretricio quaestu abduxit et, tamquam stolam dedisset, in matrimonio stabili et certo conlocavit.'

[1] Tac. *Ann.* ii. 85: 'gravibus senatus decretis libido feminarum coercita cautumque, ne quaestum corpore faceret cui avus aut pater aut maritus eques Romanus fuisset. Nam Vistilia, praetoria familia genita, licentiam stupri apud aediles vulgaverat, more inter veteres recepto, qui satis poenarum adversum impudicas in ipsa professione flagitii credebant'; cf. Suet. *Tib.* 35: 'feminae famosae, ut ad evitandas legum poenas iure ac dignitate matronali exsolverentur, lenocinium profiteri coeperant.'

[2] Cf. W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*[9], London, 1890, ii. 303: 'There have certainly been many periods in history when virtue was more rare than under the Cæsars; but there has probably never been a period when vice was more extravagant or uncontrolled.'

[3] Suet. *Cal.* 40: 'ex capturis prostitutarum quantum quaeque uno concubitu mereret,' etc.

that he taught included oratory, grammar and the right use of words (Plato, *Phædr.* 267 C; Diog. Laert. ix. 53), the interpretation of the poets (Plato, *Protag.* 339 A ff.), and, generally, those accomplishments which enabled a Greek to take a prominent part in the politics of his native city (*ib.* 319 A). His popularity was unbounded (*ib.* 309 C, *Theæt.* 161 C): Plato even pits him against Homer as an authority on the education and improvement of mankind (*Rep.* 600 C). At the same time, like Socrates, Protagoras incurred the dislike of certain sections of society typified by the demagogue Anytus (*Meno*, 91 B–92 C). The publication of a work on the gods is connected with the traditional story which we find in Cicero (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 63) and earlier still in Timon (Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* ix. 55–57), that the Athenians condemned Protagoras and publicly burnt all the copies of his book which they could collect; and that he saved himself by flight, but on the voyage to Sicily was drowned at sea. This account receives some slight support from the words ἀνακύψειε . . . καταδύς in Plato (*Theæt.* 171 D).

A few fragments, or at least the titles, survive of some sixteen works attributed by the ancients to Protagoras (Diog. Laert. ix. 55; H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[2], Berlin, 1906–10, p. 536). They dealt mostly with literature, rhetoric, or education. The title of the work, which contained the famous maxim that man is the measure of all things, is quoted by Sext. Emp. (*adv. Math.* vii. 60) as καταβάλλοντες (*sc.* λόγοι), but the reader of Plato is forced to infer from many allusions that the work was commonly known as the *Truth* of Protagoras (J. Bernays, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, Berlin, 1885, i. 117–121). Considering his great fame, it would be interesting to recover some specimens of his style; Gomperz conjectured that the apology for medicine, one of the tracts in the Hippocratean corpus, is by Protagoras. With greater certainty peculiarities of his stately method can be inferred from Platonic imitations (*Protag.* 316 C ff., 320 C–322 D, 333 D ff., 339 A–D, perhaps even 342 A ff., *Theæt.* 165 E–168 C) and from the unmistakable allusions of Aristophanes in the *Clouds* (112–114, 658–671, 677–679), though the sophist is not named in that play.

2. Doctrine.—In the dialogue of Plato named after him Protagoras appears as an exponent and champion of customary morality—Plato's δημοτικὴ ἀρετή. The human instincts of reverence and right (αἰδώς, δίκη) are the weapons by which helpless man has been protected against the teeth and claws of other animals (*Protag.* 322 C, 329 C). Man's history is a record of progress; the criminals of a civilized society would be virtuous if compared with downright savages (*ib.* 327 D). Hence the aim of legislators and educators is to displace harmful opinions by wholesome and profitable ones (*Theæt.* 167 A ff.). Hence, too, the aim of punishment should be to reclaim the offender and to deter others from his offence (*Protag.* 324 A ff.). Virtue is inculcated in an enlightened community by public opinion, by good laws and institutions, forces working silently (*ib.* 324 D ff.). Of the vagueness and contradictions of this unwritten code the sophist has little conception. Indeed, when the Platonic Socrates offers him a foundation in the shape of a hedonistic first principle (*ib.* 351 C ff.), he declines to accept it, and even argues against it. The same vagueness is shown in the sophist's claim to turn the 'weaker' into the 'stronger' case (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν). The desire to excel was a passion with Greeks, especially to win forensic honours; why should the pursuit of this branch of excellence impair another a scrupulous regard for right? Absolute inability to see where the Socratic elenchus will land him is a main feature of comic relief in Plato's presentation of Protagoras, as of other early sophists. Among other tendencies of his time, Protagoras took part in the protest of philosophers against the theological opinions of the poets. His famous utterance runs thus:

'Of the gods I cannot say whether they exist or not, nor of what nature they are. For there are many obstacles to inquiry, especially the obscurity of the problem and the shortness of life' (Diog. Laert. ix. 51).

Here the nature of the gods is obviously the real problem, and frank agnosticism, however provocative of odium, was in keeping with the highest thinking of an era of 'enlightenment.' The most original opinion ascribed to Protagoras is of course that man is the measure of existence and non-existence. Ever since its publication this maxim has been a subject of controversy, as Plato's *Theætetus* proves. It seems to be an affirmation of the subjective element in all experience, all thought and language. There may have been need for such emphasis in Greece, but in Rome the very forms of giving evidence (*arbitror*, *videtur mihi*) were a perpetual reminder that in the law-court, at any rate, in the investigation of facts, it was impossible to go behind the individual. Some say that the maxim amounts to a recognition of the relativity of knowledge. It should rather be 'of opinion.' There is nothing in it to forbid the conclusion that absolute knowledge is impossible, but that opinions are relatively true; and so Plato seems to have understood it. That its author never intended it to bear any destructive practical consequences is admitted by Plato (*Theæt.* 165 E–168 C). Nor would it be fair to link it up, as Plato has done, with Heraclitean doctrine—'all things are as they seem to all,' for 'all things flow like a stream'—or with a subtle theory privately imparted to disciples (*Theæt.* 155 ff.); and, though Sextus fathers this theory on Protagoras (*Pyrrh. Hypotyp.* i. 217), he cites no authoritative work, and may therefore be presumed to be drawing upon Plato. Lastly, the brilliant defence put into the mouth of Protagoras by his critic (*Theæt.* 166 C ff.) suggests that the author of the dialogue had become conscious that his handling of the maxim had been somewhat too free, and that he wished to redress the balance. Generally speaking, it is most improbable that the first framer of such a maxim could have foreseen, much less intended, all that acute metaphysicians like Plato and Aristotle have deduced from it. Even the psychological implications of the doctrine were but imperfectly understood at a time when no one could explain why perceptions of tastes and flavours were variable, while men agreed in their perception of weight. It seems safest, therefore, to make of Protagoras neither a positivist nor a pragmatist, whatever superficial analogies to these later doctrines may be ingeniously read into his maxim.

LITERATURE.—E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*[4], 3 vols., Leipzig, 1876–1903, Eng. tr., London, 1881–1903; T. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1896–1909, Eng. tr., London, 1901–12; J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., London, 1914; G. Grote, *Plato*, 3 vols., do. 1868; B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*[3], 5 vols., Oxford, 1892. From a mass of monographs may be cited H. Jackson, *JPh* xiii. (1885) 242 ff.; F. C. S. Schiller, *Plato or Protagoras?*, Oxford, 1908. See also the literature of art. SOPHISTS.

R. D. HICKS.

PROTECTION.—See ECONOMICS.

PROTESTANTISM.—**1. Derivation and definition.**—The Lat. *protestari*, a post-Augustan word found in Quintilian and frequent in law, means 'to profess,' 'bear witness (or declare) openly,' so that it is nearly equivalent to *profiteri*; in both cases the preposition adds the idea of openness or publicity to that of witness or declaration. It has no inherent negative force as a protest against

something, though it is often used in law as a declaration that the speaker's meaning has been misunderstood.

Of the cognate English words, we find 'protestation' in Hampole (*c.* 1340), and thenceforth they imply, like the Latin, an open declaration.

Thus in Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing*, v. i. 149: 'Do me right, or I will protest your cowardice'; *Macbeth*, v. ii. 11: 'Youths that even now protest their first of manhood.'

The negative meaning common in modern English came in later. Thus a bill might be 'protested' (from 1622), *i.e.* an open declaration made that it had been presented and not paid. There were also 'protestations' (later 'protests') in the Lords from 1626 and in the Civil War, though they were not common till after the Restoration. Johnson, however (1755), still defines 'protestation' as 'a solemn declaration of resolution, fact, or opinion,' though he notices the negative meaning under the noun 'protest.'

2. Theological meaning.—The word received a technical meaning in theology from the protest made by the Lutheran princes and some free cities before the Diet at Speyer in 1529. An earlier Diet at Worms in 1521 had put Luther to the ban of the Empire and ordered the suppression of heresy. But the heresy spread nevertheless, and, when another Diet met at Speyer in 1526, it was supported by strong princes, and a compromise had to be made on the principle of 'Cujus regio, ejus religio.' It was decided, and that unanimously, that, till a General Council met, every prince should be free to make religious changes if he thought fit. But by a second Diet at Speyer in 1529 the compromise was annulled; all further innovations were forbidden to Lutheran princes, and the Zwinglian doctrine was made unlawful. Hereupon (19th April) the 'protestation' was drawn up. In it the princes (of Saxony, Brandenburg, Brunswick-Lüneburg, Anhalt, Hesse) and fourteen cities (some of them Zwinglian) declare that they will not carry out the new edict or tolerate the Mass in their dominions, further maintaining that the unanimous decision of one Diet could not be reversed by a mere majority in another, and that, as they had acted according to Scripture and conscience, they could not in any case admit the right of a majority to control them. There is no question here of any particular doctrines—only an assertion of the liberty of particular churches; the actual doctrines of the princes were set forth next year in the Confession of Augsburg.

3. Lutherans and Calvinists.—Thus 'Protestants' at first meant Lutherans as opposed alike to Papists and Zwinglians. The word was convenient from a political standpoint, and came into use in spite of Luther's own dislike of it, so that it soon became the current name for Lutherans in Germany and England. Then came a double development. On one side the Romanists persisted in stigmatizing the heretics of the Reformation all over Europe as Lutherans; on the other the heretics themselves came to adopt from the Lutherans the common name of Protestants. The unifying force was the consciousness of a common cause against Rome; but it worked slowly. The breach between Luther and Zwingli in 1529 was never made up. So four of the fourteen cities presented a separate Confession (*Tetrapolitana*) at Augsburg, and Zwingli sent a third. Calvin some years later signed the Augsburg Confession of his own accord; but all through the second half of the 16th cent. Lutherans and Calvinists hated each other almost as they hated Rome. The Lutherans established their principle of 'Cujus regio, ejus religio' at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, and henceforth were (so to speak) respectable heretics, but the Calvinists had no protection. They bore the brunt of the battle with Rome, and they gained on the Lutherans in Germany. So the quarrel was bitter, and the misfortunes of the first period of the Thirty Years' War (1618–24) were in great part caused by the unwillingness of Lutheran princes to help Calvinists, and it was only under the pressure of the calamities which followed that they learned to sink their differences under the common name of Protestants.

4. Anglican usage.—In England the Lutherans had little influence after the time of Henry VIII., and their consubstantiation is repudiated in Art. xxviii. ('*only* after an heavenly and spiritual manner'). The Reformers looked to Bullinger and Calvin, rather than to Melanchthon and Chemnitz. In doctrine, then, the Church of England leaned more to Calvin; but it had a political tie with Lutheranism. Among the ever-changing phases of Elizabeth's policy in her early years was the idea of gaining something from the Peace of Augsburg, by trying to pass herself off as substantially a Lutheran ruler ordering the religion of her own people like the German princes. The strange tricks in her private chapel indicate this policy rather than any leaning to Romanism. Moreover, she appreciated the Erastian obedience of the Lutherans, and detested the ecclesiastical independence of Calvinism. Thus there was a true affinity between the Erastian church of Elizabeth and the Erastian churches of N. Germany, and English Churchmen of the official sort learned to call themselves Protestants like the Lutherans, while the Puritan section clung to Geneva, and was not forward to adopt the name. It is not found in any revision of the Book of Common Prayer, nor in Jewel's *Apology* (London, 1567), and even the Canons of 1604 only claim that the Church of England is 'a true and apostolical church.' But by 1608 we find mention of 'Papists, Protestants, Puritans, Brownists,' where the word is used strictly of the Church in opposition to Puritans as well as Romanists. In this sense it became a watchword of the Caroline divines, and was frankly adopted by Laud himself. Even Chillingworth's *Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation* (Oxford, 1638) has the Church in view, and forms a transition to a wider meaning only because the supremacy of Scripture is the doctrine of all the Churches of the Reformation. So, too, when Charles I. declares his attachment to the Protestant religion, he is disavowing Popery and Puritanism together. So also Laud. But what the Thirty Years' War did for Germany was done for England by the Puritan policy of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate and by the Romanizing policy of the Stuarts. In different ways both brought the Nonconformists nearer to the Church in a common consciousness of antagonism to the common enemy, so that they began to be known as Protestant dissenters in contrast with Popish recusants and some of the extreme sectaries. Thus Protestantism became a general name for every sect sprung from the Reformation which could be considered passably orthodox. The Quakers were included, but the claim of Socinians and Deists was more doubtful. They are not among the Protestant dissenters relieved by the Toleration Act. We find 'Protestant dissenters' in a bill of 1672, and constant mention of the Protestant religion or the Protestant interest. At the Revolution the Prince of Orange declares (10th Oct. 1688) that he comes over because the Protestant religion is endangered; Delamere in Cheshire rises in defence of it; and the Bill of Rights limits the Crown to such persons as 'being Protestants' shall make the declaration imposed on members of Parliament in 1678 denying transubstantiation and disavowing the worship of the

Virgin Mary or any other saint and the sacrifice of the Mass as 'superstitious and idolatrous.' By the Act of Settlement the sovereign must be a Protestant—perhaps a Lutheran like George I.—but he must 'join in communion with the Church of England as by law established.' So the law still remains, except that the declaration of 1678 was abolished for members of Parliament in 1829, and softened for the King in 1911, though he is still required to be a Protestant.

5. The modern view.—The word has undergone no serious change of meaning since the end of the 17th century. But, being now opposed to Romanism instead of to Puritanism, it was disliked by some of the High Churchmen a century ago, such as Alexander Knox; and it is now cordially detested by the Tractarians and their successors, not only as summing up most of the things that they chiefly hate, but even more as linking the Church of England with Churches of Christ which they count no better than unlawful assemblies. But, if we look at the general position—at things instead of words—there can be no doubt that the official doctrine of the Church of England is as definitely Protestant as it can well be. To sum up in the words of Bishop Stubbs of Oxford:

'While, however, I distinctly claim for our Church her full Catholic character unembarrassed by any such committal [to the dogmatic utterances or disciplinary machinery of any of the communities that have called themselves Protestant], I would in the strongest way condemn the idea that would repudiate the name of Protestant as a mere name of negation, as well as the notion that the maintenance of Protestant negation is the whole or the most important part of our religious work and history. I should unhesitatingly reject the theory that regards Protestantism by itself, either at home or abroad, as a religious system devoid of spiritual constructive energy' (*Visitation Charges*, London, 1904, p. 342).

LITERATURE.—It will be enough to name *OED* vii. 1504 f.; W. Wace, in *Church and Faith* (Essays on the teaching of the Church of England by various writers), Edinburgh and London, 1899; the ordinary histories of the Reformation, and for the Continent the elaborate art. by F. Kattenbusch, in *PRE*[3] xvi. 135 ff.

H. M. GWATKIN.

PROVERBS.—1. Definition.—While the formal definition of a proverb is difficult to frame, and every authority attempts to give his own, there is a general agreement as to the chief characteristics of proverbial sayings. Four qualities are necessary to constitute a proverb: brevity (or, as some prefer to put it, conciseness), sense, piquancy or salt (Trench), and popularity. Aristotle, in writing of proverbs, embodied three of these properties in defining them as 'remnants which, on account of their shortness (*συντομίαν*) and correctness (*δεξιότητα*), have been saved out of the wrecks and ruins of ancient philosophy.'[1] More modern definitions, such as 'a short pithy saying in common and recognized use,'[2] or 'much matter decocted into a few words,'[3] or 'the wisdom of many and the wit of one,'[4] set forth the same elements in slightly varying phraseology. Mere brevity, however, will not give an expression the force of a proverb; it must in every case present a serious thought, and expressions dealing with trivialities can never gain the force and prestige of proverbial sayings. By piquancy or salt we understand the wit that is embodied in a genuine adage. In its wit the proverb expresses a pungent criticism of life which frequently has a flavour of cynicism about it. On this quality depends the power of a proverb to do more than amuse the hearer. Its wit, like the barb of an arrow, makes the maxim stick in the memory. There are many sayings in all literatures which are not recognized as proverbs because they lack the element of popularity. To attain the rank of a proverb, a saying must either spring from the masses or be accepted by a people as true. In a profound sense it must be the *vox populi*. Eiselein, a German collector of proverbs, has emphasized this element in his definition: 'A proverb is a sentence coined with the public stamp, current, and of acknowledged value among the people.'[1] To put it more briefly, a proverb is a household word of the people. James Howell, an English paræmiographer, incorporated in his collection 500 proverbial sayings which he himself invented, but, as they were not coined with the public stamp, they have never been used or quoted.[2] A true proverb, then, is a spontaneous growth out of the soil of national character; it is in a sense autochthonous, and among the people who gave it birth it possesses a finality from which there is no appeal. This popular element is implied in the etymology of both the Latin and Greek terms. In the former language the term was *proverbium*, signifying 'a word uttered in public.' The synonym *adagium*, which is usually traced to the phrase *ad agendum aptum*, and from which we get our English 'adage,' besides suggesting this popular origin, also suggests a moral tone and brings out the practical nature of the proverb. The Greek correlative is similar in import, *παροιμία*, signifying a trite roadside expression.

The stamp of public approval gives proverbs a profound influence even when they convey a false morality. A genuine proverb may not embody a true ethical principle, yet it is an index to what the people regard as true, and presents their ideals of life and conduct. Certain groups of proverbs have a peculiar authority for a special, and in a sense an artificial, reason. All the sayings of the canonical book of Proverbs among Jews and Christians, those of the Vedic writings among the Hindus, and those that are embedded in the Qur'ān among Muslims have wielded a tremendous authority, on account of the inspiration claimed for these books. Many of the sayings of Jesus are in the form of proverbs, and He frequently used proverbs to make His teaching impressive. He took some from Jewish literature and others from the current speech of the people; still others He coined Himself. The authority of these and their influence on ethics and religion are due to the unique position of authority in which the Founder of Christianity is acknowledged to stand. In the sphere of religion the proverbial sayings of Jesus have exercised the widest and most pervasive influence of any group of proverbs.

2. Origin.—In discussing the origin of proverbs it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the popular proverbial saying and the literary proverb, or gnome. The latter is the product of reflexion, and its final form is likely to be the result of considerable literary polishing, while the former is naive and was originally uttered spontaneously and in connexion with some occasion or event that stirred the imagination. It is in keeping with its popular origin that the author of a genuine proverb is unknown; it is a spontaneous utterance which has been called forth by an unusual and stirring incident or experience. It originated with the people and has gained circulation and authority through universal acceptance of its

[1] According to Aristotle, proverbs are important for the following reasons: ὅτι παλαιάς εἰσι φιλοσοφίας ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνέμοισι φθορᾶς ἀπολομένης ἐγκαταλείμματα περισωθέντα διὰ συντομίαν καὶ δεξιότητα (ascribed to Aristotle by Synesius, *Encomium Calvitii*, ed. 'Turneb,' p. 59).

[2] *OED*, *l.c.*

[3] Thomas Fuller, *Gnomologia, Adagies, and Proverbs*, 2 vols., London, 1732, pp. 1728–31.

[4] Lord John Russell (1792–1878).

[1] J. Eiselein, *Sprichwörter des deutschen Volkes*, Freiburg, 1840, p. x: 'Das Sprichwort ist ein mit offentlichem Gepräge ausgemünzter Satz, der seinen Curs und anerkannten Werth unter dem Volke hat.' In this connexion the famous definition of Erasmus (*Adagiorum Chiliades tres*) may be given: 'Celebre dictum, scita quapiam novitate insigne.' The second part of this definition is not generally accepted by recent investigators.

[2] *Proverbs and Old Sayed Saws and Adages*, London, 1659.

truth. The sages of Israel may have started with the popular proverb as the basis of their work, but their finished product shows evidence of careful literary workmanship. The literary flavour of the gnome is unmistakable, and its lineage can very frequently be traced. If this distinction is maintained, the polished gems of the canonical book of Proverbs are gnomes. They are fruits of long reflexion.

The genuine popular proverb takes us back to the infancy of races and civilizations; in their origins they belong to the age which gave birth to the folk-song and the ballad. The OT reveals the manner of the genesis of the folk-proverb. An impressive event called it forth. The incongruity of the situation when Saul fell under the influence of the prophetic ecstasy produced such a profound impression on the popular mind that it led to the utterance of the proverb, 'Is Saul also among the prophets?' (1 S $10^{9ff.}$). We also know an ancient Egyptian proverb which owes its origin to some historical event. Alluding to Merenptah's fame in Libya, it runs: 'The youth say to youth, concerning his victories, "It has not been done to us before since the time of Re."'[1] Freytag thinks that many of the oldest Arabic proverbs arose in connexion with some notable event in the history of a tribe or some striking personal experience.[2] The historical occasion that gave birth to famous popular proverbs is more easily traced in the Greek and Latin literatures. With the words, 'Don't move Camarina' (μὴ κίνει Καμάριναν), the Greeks were accustomed to caution each other to give questions fraught with uncertain issues a wide berth. The allusion is historical and refers to the draining of the lake north of Camarina contrary to the advice of the oracle, thus weakening the defences of the city. The famous Latin adage, 'Romanus sedendo vincit,' sprang from the effective tactics of Hannibal's opponent, Fabius Maximus. The popular proverb, 'When you go to Rome, do as Rome does,' is an interesting instance of how an aphorism may grow out of an incident which was subsequently forgotten. Few who use it know that it had its origin in connexion with Monica, the mother of St. Augustine. As the Sabbath was a feast day in Milan according to prevailing Roman usage, but a fast at her native place of Tagaste, Monica was perplexed as to her course and her conscience troubled her. St. Ambrose settled the case of conscience by uttering this oft-quoted adage.

Another group of proverbs were derived from riddles (*q.v.*), and it may well be that many of the maxims of the OT canonical collection originated in this way. The adage of Pr 22^{1}, 'A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches, and loving favour than silver and gold,' is probably the finished form of an answer to a riddle. The riddle was probably propounded as follows: 'What is worth more than gold?'; the answer would be, 'A good name.'[3] Again, a proverb may be the condensation of a fable or parable into a single phrase. Thus arose the popular Greek adage, 'To play the fox to another fox' (ἀλωπεκίζειν πρὸς ἑτέραν ἀλώπεκα). A popular maxim even in modern times, 'Every cock on his own dunghill,' can be traced back to Seneca, who thus summed up the quintessence of one of Æsop's fables ('Gallus in suo sterquilinio plurimum').[4] This process accounts for the genesis of English aphorisms like 'sour grapes' and 'dog in the manger.'

[1] J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905–07, § 611.
[2] G. W. F. Freytag, *Arabum Proverbia*, Bonn, 1843; cf. esp. iii. 2, pp. 221–323.
[3] Cf. H. Oort and I. Hooykaas, *The Bible for Learners*, Boston, 1878–79, ii. 80.
[4] *Apocol.*

Famous proverbs which owe their popularity to their well-balanced symmetrical phraseology have long individual histories behind them. This literary development frequently cannot be traced in the languages of antiquity. But the process by which a popular saying was cut and polished into a gem by a succession of artists may be seen in the case of Sterne's famous adage, 'God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb.' Sterne found it in the writings of George Herbert (1640) in the form, 'To a close-shorn sheep God gives wind by measure'; Herbert in turn borrowed it from the French, and it has been traced back to the Latin.

3. Form.—While the folk-proverb, when it originates, may not circulate in poetic dress, yet well-established proverbs and gnomes are almost invariably expressed either in rhythmical language or in poetry proper. The Hebrew proverbs of the OT canon, as well as those of Sirach,[1] possess all the characteristic features of Hebrew poetry, the most notable of which is parallelism. Sumerian proverbs, among the most ancient that have come down to us, display the same characteristic. Arabic proverbs are couched in the various rhymes of Arabic poetry. Gnomic poetry forms a large section of the ethical side of Sanskrit literature. The Chinese proverbs are in the form of couplets. With this people it has been a favourite practice in the schools for the teacher to give one line and the scholar to furnish the second.[2] The majority of Greek proverbs are metrical in form. The Greek gnomic poets, like Theognis and Solon, did for Greek literature what unknown poets did for the Hebrew—gave many of the popular proverbial sayings a literary setting and thereby invested them with a permanent influence. The usual metres of Greek proverbs are the anapæstic, iambic, trochaic, and dactylic.[3] In modern literatures proverbs usually assume poetical form, for rhyme and alliteration lend charm not only to English proverbs but also to those of all modern nations. A few samples must suffice: 'A king's face should give grace'; 'Slow help is no help'; 'Who goes a-borrowing goes a-sorrowing'; 'Qui prend, se rend'; 'Chi và piano và sano, e và lontano'; 'Gutes Wort find't gute Statt'; 'Wie die Arbeit, so der Lohn.' A popular Italian proverb combines the three qualities of brevity, rhyme, and alliteration: 'Traduttori, traditori,' 'Translators, traitors.' Proverbs abound in certain figures of speech which add to their impressiveness. The two most characteristic of these figures are hyperbole and paradox. The forcibleness of the proverb is largely due to the employment of these figures of speech, which the Oriental especially affects. As an example of hyperbole let us cite an Arabic proverb: 'Fling him into the Nile and he will come up with a fish in his mouth,' or the German 'Wer's Glück hat, dem kälbert ein Ochs' ('The lucky man's ox calves'); as a paradoxical proverb, note 'No answer is also an answer.'

4. Occurrence.—Proverbs are of universal occurrence; there is no speech or language in which they are not found. Going back to the remotest antiquity, we discover them embedded in the literary remains of Babylonia and Egypt. The oldest are found in a Sumerian text. Rawlinson, ii. 16, is the copy of a tablet inscribed with examples for instruction in Sumerian grammar, and a number of these examples consist of ancient Sumerian proverbs. In all, this tablet has preserved eighteen proverbs and riddles, some of which are very

[1] In addition to commentaries on the Apocrypha, consult art. 'Sirach,' in *HDB*.
[2] A. H. Smith, *Proverbs and Common Sayings from the Chinese*, Shanghai, 1902.
[3] An excellent art. on classical proverbs is to be found in *Quarterly Review*, cxxv. [1868] 217 ff.

similar in structure to those of the OT.[1] Among the Egyptians the viziers Kegumne, Imhotep, and Ptahotep, of the VIth dynasty, put their wisdom into the form of proverbs. As these officials belong to the Old Kingdom, *i.e.* prior to 2500 B.C., some conception may be gained of the antiquity of proverbial literature among the Egyptians. Long before the days of Confucius the Chinese had embodied their wisdom in gnomes, and they were a favourite vehicle for moral instruction with that sage. The proverb had reached a position of commanding influence among the Greeks prior to the great gnomic poets, Solon, Phocylides, and Theognis. The great lyric poets who preceded them, and the seven so-called wise men who followed, put into literary form the popular wisdom of preceding generations. An adequate testimony to this fact is the famous anthology, *Sarngadhara-Paddhati*, of the 14th cent., containing 6000 verses culled from 264 different writers.[2] Böhtlingk collected 7613 verses of Sanskrit gnomic poetry and published them under the title *Indische Sprüche* (Leipzig, 1870–74). Aphoristic ethical poetry was zealously cultivated among the Hindus. Turning to one of the standard collections of proverbs, such as *La Sapienza del Mondo* by G. Strafforello, a monumental Italian dictionary of proverbs, we find catalogued in it proverbial sayings from every nook and corner of the world. No race, whether high or low in the scale of civilization, has been without them. Nations renowned for the cultivation of literature have treasured their proverbial inheritance and have polished their adages until they have become gems. Non-literary people, the savages of primitive culture, have had their proverbs, which have been learned only through direct intercourse with the people. The missionary and the adequately equipped traveller have collected these for us. A notable anthology of this kind is R. F. Burton's *Wit and Wisdom from W. Africa* (London, 1865). C. M. Doughty, in the classic *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (Cambridge, 1888), records a few that he heard in conversation with the Bedawīn. While proverbs are universal in their occurrence and are found to take local form and colour even in the dialects of modern languages, yet they are especially beloved by Oriental peoples, and it is among them that they were seriously cultivated. In the modern world of Europe and America the folk-proverb still wields a potent influence among the masses, while the gnomic saying which has behind it the authority of great literary genius is often quoted by the cultivated.

5. **Value and significance.**—Proverbs and gnomic literature are worthy of serious study for two principal reasons: (1) they have had a subtle and pervasive influence on popular opinion; (2) they are trustworthy witnesses to the social, political, ethical, and religious ideals of the peoples among whom they originated and circulated. Gerber says:

'The significance of the proverb in its influence on the formation and preservation of the modes of thought is to be rated very high. Its influence on the civilization of nations is exceedingly far reaching. With silent guidance it moulds public opinion as powerfully and as manifoldly as the estimate of the relations of private life, indeed even the reflections of the highly cultured' (*Die Sprache als Kunst*, ii. 405).

The greatest literary geniuses have set the seal of their approval upon popular proverbs and made them household words by quoting them or placing them in the mouths of their characters. Among the Greeks many of the earliest proverbs were responses of oracles; their poets were fond of quoting and coining maxims and proverbial sayings. All the great writers of Hellas affect them. They are found in the verses of Hesiod and Homer, among the lines of the lyrist Pindar, the gnomic poets Solon and Theognis, the great tragedians and comic poets.[1] The moral of many of the stories of the Homeric poems was summed up in a single line which gained currency as a proverb. The great Latin poets loved the proverb, and many proverbs that are common in the modern world go back to Horace, Juvenal, or Terence; *e.g.*, the Frenchman characterizes the favourite of fortune as 'le fils de la poule blanche,' a phrase which can be traced to Juvenal's 'gallinæ filius albæ.'[2] Shakespeare has given popularity and authority to many a striking sentence which has become a proverb in cultivated circles. Two may be mentioned: 'Something is rotten in the state of Denmark,' and 'All's well that ends well.' Dante's 'Lasciate ogni speranza,' Molière's 'Vous l'avez voulu, George Dandin,' and Schiller's 'Die schönen Tage in Aranjuez sind nun zu Ende' are examples of proverbial sayings which have become household words through the popularity of national poets.

The great philosophers of antiquity did not disdain proverbs. The pages of Aristotle and Plato are liberally sprinkled with terse, pithy sayings, and Cicero's writings teem with proverbs. More than this, proverbs and gnomic literature were two of the seed-plots of Greek philosophy. The political and moral philosophy of the Hellenic race had its origins in the isolated maxims and gnomes of the seven sages of Greece and the gnomic poetry of Theognis and his contemporary, Phocylides (6th century B.C.).[3]

While Greek philosophy outgrew these humble beginnings and developed into an elaborate metaphysical system, the spirit that produced the proverbs of Solomon and Sirach reached its full development within the pale of later Judaism. The number of proverbs was legion, and they were used by the learned rabbis, were current in social intercourse, and were the favourite means of imparting ethical instruction to the youth. The two Talmuds, Jerusalem and Babylonian, the Mishnāh, and the Midrāshim, as well as the Targums, are rich in proverbs and proverbial sayings. They occur both in Aramaic and in Hebrew, touch upon almost every conceivable subject, and extend over a period of more than 800 years of Jewish history, from Simon the Righteous (high priest, 310–291 B.C.) down to Rabbi Asher. The best known and most popular collection of Jewish proverbs is found in the Mishnic tract entitled *Pirqē Ābhôth* ('Sayings of the Fathers').[4] Another famous collection is the *Ābhôth de R. Nathan*. The former, usually bound with a Jewish prayer-book, contains the sayings and proverbs of 63 rabbis and teachers arranged chronologically and covering a period of 500 years, from 300 B.C. downwards. Its importance may be judged from the rule requiring a reading of one of its sections each Sabbath. The *Ābhôth de R. Nathan*, a Tôseftā or Haggādā of the Mishnic tract *Ābhôth*, consisting of 41 chapters which contain proverbs and their explanations, reached its final form in the 8th century A.D.

The Jews of this period delighted in gnomes. A quotation from the *Midrāsh Rabbāh* to Canticles will give an idea of the esteem in which they were held:

'Let not a proverb be despised in thine eyes, for by means of a proverb one is able to understand the words of the Torah (*Midr. Cant.* 1*b*).

It was all the more highly esteemed if it could be supported by a proof text from the OT. In this

[1] M. Jäger, 'Assyrische Rathsel und Spruchworter,' *BASS* ii. [1891] 274 ff.

[2] This Sanskrit work is analyzed in *ZDMG* xxvii. [1878].

[1] Menander's collection entitled *Sententiæ Monostichæ* was famous in antiquity.

[2] xiii. 141.

[3] E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, Leipzig, 1892, i. 105 ff.

[4] *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*[2], ed. C. Taylor, Cambridge, 1897.

case it was introduced by one of two formulæ: (1) 'There is for it a proof text' (יֵשׁ לוֹ מִקְרָא), or (2) 'Lo! it is a verse of the Scripture' (הָא׳ קְרָא הוּא). So popular was it, and so highly esteemed, that it was used to elucidate problems in almost every sphere and circumstance of life. Proverbs were considered efficacious in removing doubts and difficulties; they were quoted to elucidate names and obscure passages of Scripture; amid sorrow they shed comfort, and in social gatherings they increased the good cheer. With a *māshāl* it was customary to speed the parting guest, and with one a literary man found an appropriate close for his book.

In this period of Jewish history a careful distinction was drawn between the proverb of the scholar and the folk-proverb, and a distinctive formula was used to introduce each kind. To the former was prefixed one of the following formulæ: 'a proverb in the mouth of the rabbis,' 'the rabbis teach,' 'they teach,' or 'some say'; to the latter: 'according to the words of the people,' 'so speak the people,' 'the Judæans say,' 'the Galilæans say.' If the proverb happened to occur in Scripture, there was a special introductory formula: 'the proverb runs' (חַמּוֹשֵׁל אוֹמֵר). To the folk-proverb belong the maxims of the trades and gilds, for each such organization or profession had its own special proverbs; to the former belong the gnomes of the collections mentioned in the preceding paragraph. To gain an adequate idea of the scope of the topics embraced in Jewish proverbs and to form an estimate of their influence, one must turn to J. R. Fürstenthal, *Rabbinische Anthologie* (Breslau, 1835), L. Dukes, *Rabbinische Blumenlese* (Leipzig, 1844), or J. Fürst, *Perlenschnüre Aramäischer Gnomen und Lieder* (do. 1836).

It is worthy of note that, among the Chinese, proverbs and proverbial sayings enjoy a similar position of high esteem and a far-reaching influence. The classics of the Chinese abound in them, and ignorant peasants are said to coin them. We have noted above that the schoolboy is furnished with one line and, as an exercise, is required to complete the couplet. Every class of society takes delight in the proverb, from the emperor on his throne to the beggar in his hovel. There is no conceivable situation in life for which the proverbial wisdom of the Chinese cannot furnish some apposite citation.

Among the nations of the Occident gnomic poetry does not flourish, and proverbs are not used in the formal instruction of the philosophical schools, yet the popular proverb has been of importance in the formation of the standards of public morality. Proverbs like the following are valuable ethical precepts which have kept high ideals before the masses: 'A lie has no legs' (the Spaniard says: 'A lie has short legs'; the Swiss: 'It takes a good many shovelfuls of earth to bury the truth'; a Spanish parallel runs: 'Tell the truth and shame the devil'). On the other hand, there are proverbial sayings accepted by the masses as current coin of the moral realm which have been very pernicious in their influence. Trench strikingly terms them 'scoundrel maxims' (*Proverbs and their Lessons*, p. 102). They are frequently quoted to justify sin and immorality. Outstanding examples are: 'Every man has his price' (Dutch: 'Self's the man'); the German 'Einmal keinmal,' which has had a very vicious influence in defence of sin; similar to it is the Italian: 'A sin concealed is half forgiven.'

Some proverbs are distinctly Christian and reach the heights of evangelical morality: 'Love rules his kingdom without a sword' (Italian); 'The way to heaven is by Weeping Cross' (English); 'God never wounds with both hands' (Spanish); 'Every cross hath its inscription' (English).

Our investigation leads to the conclusion that among Orientals and peoples of primitive culture a gnomic literature forms the foundations of moral and political philosophy. In races of advanced civilization and culture it plays no part in the teaching of formal schools, but continues to exercise a potent influence on popular ideals of conduct and conception of character. Proverbs continue to be employed by poets and religious teachers to impress upon the minds of the masses fundamental principles of morality and noble living. The authority of proverbs is acknowledged by the people generally because they constitute the hoard of a nation's wisdom, the silent unconscious accumulation that grows up in a long lapse of time.

LITERATURE.—R. C. Trench, *Proverbs and their Lessons*, London and New York, 1905 (the best general work in English, with a valuable bibliography including a list of proverbial collections in various languages); G. Gerber, *Die Sprache als Kunst*, Berlin, 1885 (the author discusses the proverb as a literary form, ii. 397–442); Erasmus, *Adagiorum Chiliades tres*, Venice, 1508 (a great treasure-house of classical proverbs from which all subsequent writers and collectors have borrowed); G. Strafforello, *La Sapienza del Mondo*, 3 vols., Turin, 1883 (an elaborate collection of proverbs from every quarter of the globe translated into Italian); H. Bois, *La Poésie gnomique chez les Hébreux et chez les Grecs*, Toulouse, 1886. Other important works have been mentioned in the article and notes.

JAMES A. KELSO.

PROVIDENCE.—I. *USE OF THE WORD.*—The English word 'providence,' meaning by derivation foresight, is in practice applied to thoughtful preparation for future needs. As used in religion, Providence is understood in a theistic sense to denote the care of God for His creatures, His general supervision over them, and the ordering of the whole course of things for their good. There is no corresponding word in Hebrew, though the thought is present throughout the OT. In Greek *πρόνοια* is used freely in classical literature for forethought, human and divine. It is employed absolutely in Xenophon and Plutarch for the watchful care of the gods, and it forms one of the names under which Athene was worshipped at Delphi. It occurs twice in Wis (14[3]: 'Thy providence, O Father, guideth' the vessel amidst the waves, and 17[2]: lawless men are said to be 'exiled from the eternal providence'). In the NT *πρόνοια* is found twice only (Ac 24[3], Ro 13[14]), in both cases to describe human prevision. But the doctrine of the Divine ordering of the affairs of the world pervades all the NT writings. In a very wide sense some such idea would seem to be indispensable to religion, although—as in Buddhism and some forms of pantheism—the word 'providence' cannot be legitimately used as of a relation between 'God' and 'the world.' In popular parlance it has too often included superstitions and unworthy ideas of deity, which responsible teachers would not countenance.

In the more restricted area of Christian theology Divine Providence is theoretically distinguished, on the one hand, from God's preservation of all His creatures, including man; and, on the other, from His moral government. The latter is said to concern the character and education of men as moral creatures, their welfare and destiny, while Providence is concerned with the affairs and events of life and the way in which a Divine purpose is accomplished in and through them. The two are, however, almost inseparable even in thought. The Christian doctrine is one of faith, resting upon the attributes and character of God generally, but especially as made known in Christ. Providence implies a God of unbounded wisdom, power, and goodness, who unceasingly directs human affairs, great and small, for the accomplishment of the highest spiritual ends. Divine action depends on a Divine purpose; and this perfectly expresses the Divine nature and perfections. Christian faith holds that God rules and overrules all that

takes place in the universe, so as ultimately to realize His own eternal purposes. It is always to be understood, however, that such language implies a measure of symbolism. As in creation God is not a Divine 'artificer,' though the phraseology employed may seem sometimes to imply this, so in Providence He does not need to 'plan' and scheme as men do; He views all things *sub specie æternitatis*. But, allowing for the imperfection of human speech, the truth as to the relation between God and the world is best conveyed by some such phraseology.

II. *HISTORICAL.* — 1. **Introductory.** — Beliefs implying some kind of living relation between divine and human beings are found in all religions; in proportion as these die down, the character of the system changes from a religion to a philosophy. Even in fetishism, or in Caliban's description of Setebos, some kind of purpose is discernible, some measure of protection is granted to worshippers who take the steps necessary to propitiate the ruling powers. In polytheism, with its 'gods many and lords many,' such a word as 'Baalim' may stand simply for unknown forces in nature or for particular deities who quite arbitrarily reward their favourite devotees. But, as in Greek mythology, an order may be discernible in the pantheon. Such a measure of superiority may be assigned to Zeus that his decrees may run, and his rewards and punishments be distributed, as those of a kind of secondary Providence. Above him may stand, or hover, a dim figure—Μοῖρα, Θέμις, or Ἀνάγκη—so that it is often difficult to say whether the rudimentary control of all things, as thus outlined, is blind or intelligent. The Buddhist idea of *karma*—the inexorable linking of all acts with their consequences—excludes Providence. *Karma* does not indeed, as has been said, necessarily lie outside the pale of religion proper. A moral order may be bound up with it; a saviour of a sort may appear, and there may be, in other ways than by *nirvāṇa*, an end beyond the end. But in none of these cases can the word 'Providence' be applied in its usual acceptation, since this implies intelligent purpose and an end presumably good and beneficent, together with active and constant operation for the attainment of clearly conceived designs.

2. **In the OT.**—The OT conception of life is dominated by the thought of Divine Providence in some sense, but progress is discernible in the ideas entertained of God's purposes and methods and of man's relation to them. In the early stages of Israel's history these were necessarily crude and partial. Tribal and national ideas of deity prevailed, and only after the Exile was the God of Israel identified with the God of the whole earth. Without attempting in this sketch accurately to distinguish the stages of development, it may be said that, throughout the whole, God is recognized as accomplishing His purposes for men (1) in the ordinary course of nature, and (2) by means of special interventions, or miracles. Ps 104 gives a striking illustration of the belief that God in nature works for the benefit of all His creatures, making winds His messengers and flames of fire His ministers. In Jer 31^{35} 33^{20} the succession of day and night is viewed as part of a beneficent Divine 'covenant' with man, which cannot be violated or modified. The great symbolic picture of the chariot in Ezk 1 portrays the glory of sovereign Providence. Miracles are special proofs that God, who can do whatever He wills, makes all forces to subserve His designs, especially for His own people. He works, however, not as fate, nor as mere abstract law. Man's power of choice and voluntary action is presupposed; appeals are made for obedience, and disobedience will be punished. Ultimate control, however, lies with the All-Sovereign, who moulds His material as a potter the clay; in dealing with the headstrong wills of men God rules—and overrules. The story of Joseph shows how actions intended for evil were made to accomplish good. The moral of this and nearly all OT stories is summed up in Pr 16^{9} 'A man's heart deviseth his way: but Jahweh directeth his steps.'

Even where exceptions arise so serious that it would appear either that the idea of superintendence is a mistake, or that God has forgotten, or that 'my way is hid from Jahweh,' the godly man will not lose his confidence. In the later history certain standing riddles of Providence were explicitly raised—*e.g.*, the visiting of the sins of the fathers upon the children, the sufferings of the righteous, and the prosperity of the wicked. These problems were faced by the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel, in certain Psalms, and in the book of Job, more or less unsuccessfully. The book of Ecclesiastes stands by itself, and its main drift has always been disputed. Its presence in the canon is probably due to the view that the awkward knots presented in earlier chapters were cut by the sharp knife applied to them all in $12^{13f.}$ But some of the sceptical suggestions made in Qoheleth were recognized in passing moods by the writers of such Psalms as 49, 73, 77, and 88, who nevertheless did not abandon their belief in a Providence both wise and kind.

3. **In the extra-canonical writings.**—In the extra-canonical writings of the 1st and 2nd centuries B.C. Greek and other external influences are occasionally manifest, but they show no weakening of belief in God's righteous government of the world. Anthropomorphic expressions become less frequent, and the transcendence of God is emphasized, but the moral qualities of the Deity—righteousness and loving-kindness—are as fully maintained as in the canonical books. In Wis 8^{1} Divine wisdom is identical with Providence, which 'ordereth all things graciously,' and in 11^{20} the same power is said to have 'ordered all things by measure, number and weight.' Delays in the execution of judgment are due to the fact that 'Thou, being sovereign over thy strength, judgest in gentleness, and with great forbearance dost thou govern us' (12^{18}). A power of choice is given to man, for the Lord who made him 'left him in the hand of his own counsel,' so that 'before man is life and death; and whichsoever he liketh, it shall be given him' (Sir 15^{17}). The language of Josephus in a much-quoted passage is not quite clear, but he seems to ascribe to the Pharisees a belief in 'fate, which co-operates in every action,' while the Sadducees 'ascribe all evil to man's free choice' (*BJ* II. viii. 14, *Ant.* XIII. v. 9). The chief differences, however, in the Jewish doctrine of Providence during this period are due to a growing belief in a future life and in judgment beyond the grave, as well as to the general tenor of Apocalyptic teaching concerning the relation of the present and the coming age. In 2 Mac 7 the hope is several times reiterated that 'the King of the world will raise up those who have died for his laws unto an eternal renewal of life' (vv.$^{9, 36}$ etc.).

4. **In the NT.**—The NT is continuous with the OT, but its doctrine of Providence is more minute, more personal, more tender. The teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount strikes the key-note. Not the Lord of heaven and earth, mindful of Israel alone among the nations, is there celebrated, but 'your Father which is in heaven,' who clothes the lilies with beauty, and without whom not even a sparrow falls to the ground. The Lord's Prayer is addressed to a Father who can and will care for both the bodies and the souls of His children. The impartiality of the Creator

under a 'reign of law' is recognized in Mt 5[45], as well as the special response which He makes to the believing prayer of true disciples (Mk 9[23] 11[22-24]). Rash conclusions concerning the character of those upon whom grievous calamities have fallen are condemned (Lk 13[1-5]); the anomalies and inequalities of earthly conditions will be rectified at the great Judgment that is to come, by the rewards and punishments then to be allotted. The parables of the Tares, of Dives and Lazarus, and those recorded in Mt 25 are sufficient indications of this.

The Apostles in their teaching follow the lines thus laid down. St. Paul occasionally affords a glimpse into his philosophy of history, as in Ro 9–11 and 1 Co 15[20-28]. The teaching of 1 Peter on suffering, of Hebrews on the two Covenants and their issues, of 2 Peter on Divine forbearance, and of the Apocalypse on present and future judgments shows how largely the early Church in times of severe persecution found its theodicy in expectations of a coming age. The OT teaching concerning the Divine purposes in ordering the course of this world is for the most part preserved in the NT with special emphasis on the redeeming love, as well as the judicial righteousness, of God. But nothing less than a revolution was created by the revelation of a future life and the Resurrection and Second Coming of Him who had 'abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel.' Whilst the same elements are preserved in the spiritual landscape, the focus of the picture is so altered, and its proportions and values are so different, that the effect is wholly new. Problems of Providence almost disappear in the light of grace and the glory which shines into the present life from beyond the grave.

5. In Græco-Roman teaching.—Græco-Roman teaching on what corresponds to a doctrine of Providence is chiefly represented in the Stoic schools. Earlier traditions are found in popular mythologies, which present for the most part a superficial view of life and human affairs. The schools of philosophy represented by Herakleitos and Anaxagoras inculcated a belief in the Eternal Reason, while lofty views of justice and retribution appear in the great Greek dramatists. Plato stands for the supremacy of the Right and the Good, for a World-Reason, and a World-Process, the teleological character of which he maintained. But he taught no doctrine of the personal care of a personal God. Aristotle followed on similar lines, and may be said to have taught monotheism without God. He believed in order, harmony, unity of control in the course of the world, but the fact that his interpreters still debate concerning the connotation of the term 'God' in his writings speaks for itself. Cicero represents the best side of paganism when he makes Balbus say that, granted the existence of the gods, it must be acknowledged that the administration of the world is carried on 'eorum consilio' (*de Nat. Deor.* ii. 30).

Epicurus and Zeno represent opposite poles of thought. The Epicurean held that fear of the gods was servile, that those who wish to live in serenity care nothing for the gods, as the gods, if there be such, care nothing for them. The Stoic, on the other hand, emphasized the unity of life and often spoke of Providence, though without theistic implications. His doctrine was a philosophic monism, the world being a single substance, a kind of self-evolution of the Deity. God was but a mode of matter, or matter a mode of God. The resemblance between Stoicism and Christianity is superficial and largely a matter of phraseology, though the coincidence of words and phrases is often very striking. Lightfoot, in his essay on Paul and Seneca (*Philippians*[4], London, 1878, pp. 270–328), has illustrated this subject at length. Parts of Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* might be used by a theist believing in Providential government. But the God of Stoicism is synonymous with nature, necessity, fate, the all. The Stoic said 'God is spirit,' but his πνεῦμα was an etherealized form of matter, and for him the universe itself is alive. The Providence of the Stoics was a kind of causal nexus running through the whole universe. All that happens is through determination, εἱμαρμένη, that which is fixed by fate. The glorification of ἀπάθεια, which was characteristic of the school, shows that no personal interest or care was ascribed to the abstraction called God. To 'live according to nature' meant that each man formed part of a mighty and orderly system, in harmony with which it was his duty to live, submissive to that *universum* of which Marcus says:

> 'O Nature! From thee are all things, in thee all things subsist, and to thee all tend' (*Meditations*, iv. 19).

Neo-Platonism exhibits more affinity with Christianity on the mystical side, but its speculative doctrine of an ineffable and absolute deity stands diametrically opposed to such a relation between God and the world as is implied by a fatherly Providence.

6. Patristic and Scholastic.—In the Patristic and Scholastic periods of the Christian Church interest, so far as our subject is concerned, circles chiefly round the great standing problems of the existence of evil and of predestination *versus* free will. A general doctrine of Providence is assumed by Christian teachers as essential to belief in God. The Greek Fathers from Clement and Origen onwards taught human freedom and responsibility, and were disposed to explain the presence of evil in the world by describing it as negative, not a substance. The teaching of predestination in the West was in practice held side by side with a belief in Providence, Augustine furnishing a striking example of this. In a famous passage (*Conf.* bk. vii. chs. 11, 13) he describes God as the only reality, evil being at the same time 'unreal' or 'partial good' (see also *Soliloq.* i. 2 f.). But, combined with these distinctly Neo-Platonist elements, Augustine taught a clear and elaborate doctrine of Providence as controlling events in their utmost details. His treatise *de Civitate Dei* formulates a philosophy of history based on this fundamental conception. Scholasticism, by its intimate blending of philosophy and theology, did much to develop Christian doctrine on the relation between God and the world. Thomas Aquinas brought all his resources to bear on questions of this kind. His position is that of a modified predestinarianism. The Divine foreordination which he teaches leaves room—at the expense of some inconsistency—both for human free will and for a doctrine of Providence which theoretically embraces all details in human history. Roman Catholic doctrine as formulated at Trent is based on Aquinas, and exhibits God as Ruler and Guardian of men in the minutiæ of individual life, as well as in the broad outlines of national history.

7. Protestant.—Protestantism manifested little divergence on the great fundamental questions of natural theology. Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli alike understood by Providence a Divine foreordination, which included the operations of man as well as the course of nature. They believed that the actions of wicked men are so overruled by Divine wisdom and power that the presence of evil in the world is no blot upon God's character and government. Few attempted to work out these general theories in detail. The 'occasionalism' (*q.v.*) of Malebranche, which implied the continuous interposition of the Deity and treated finite things as

affording only 'occasions' for Divine operations, may be mentioned as one hypothesis. It was not accepted by many, and was obviously open to the charge of implying a kind of perpetual miracle. It made way for the more reasonable theory of 'concurrence' (see below). The rationalism (*q.v.*) of the 18th cent. produced both the *Theodicée* of Leibniz, with its picture of the world as, in spite of all its imperfections, the best of all possible worlds, and the caustic scepticism of Voltaire, who in *Candide* satirized an optimism which could accept the earthquake of Lisbon with a light heart. It was left for the 19th cent. to show that neither the faith of the optimist nor the sneer of the cynic was adequate to deal with the facts of life and history.

III. *MODERN CONCEPTIONS.* — **1. 19th cent. theology.**—The changes discernible in the course of the 19th cent. were produced in the main by the following causes, themselves more or less closely connected: (1) a change in the conception of God, which may be described as a passing from deism to theism, from a belief in a transcendent Deity, set over against the world which He originally created, to a God immanent as well as transcendent, informing and sustaining a created universe, which continues to be entirely dependent on His indwelling power; the cold rationalism which was satisfied with a mighty absentee Deity was displaced by belief in One who meets the craving of the human spirit for union and communion with the living God; (2) the influence of modern physical science, which in the first instance attempted a mechanical explanation of the universe, but which ultimately, through its doctrine of evolution, revealed the world as an organism developing under the influence of indwelling life; (3) philosophical tendencies of an idealistic type, operative mainly at the close of the century. These affected very deeply the view taken of the relation between God and the world, and consequently the meaning of Providence. As a matter of fact, in the Christian theology of the period the name 'God' covered various undefined meanings, ranging from bare theism to views which approached pantheism. The prevalent orthodox opinion was described by the term *concursus*, adapted from the Schoolmen, implying a joint activity of God and man, so that the effect of every act is produced not by God alone, nor by an independent creature. There is one efficiency of God and the creature, the evil in sinful deeds being due to man alone.

2. The crucial question of to-day.—The significance and bearings of 'concurrence' had certainly not been thought out. The scientific discoveries and philosophical activities of the 19th cent. forced upon theologians a number of questions which they were only partly prepared to answer. The worlds of theology, philosophy, physical science, and ordinary practical life had been so far apart that what may be called the necessary exosmosis and endosmosis of ideas was not effected. Such intercommunication is still far from complete, but the process has been carried far enough to show that the complex questions raised by the term 'Providence' can be answered only by a deeper understanding of the relations between God and man.

Hume, among other questions which roused men from dogmatic slumber, put this very searching one—Is the philosophy of the universe to be wholly empirical? If so, all depends on the definition of 'experience.' What are the facts on which an inquiry into Providence—in the sense of belief in an Ordeer of human life, both omnipotent and benevolent—is to be based? Physical facts are clearly insufficient. The whole experience of man must be taken into account, and mere colligation of happenings will not suffice. Their interpretation is all-important, and in the process postulates are employed concerning which fundamental differences of opinion exist. The hypothesis of blind force as the originating and sustaining cause of the universe may be read into what are called facts, as well as the hypothesis of a celestial Artificer, or of an indwelling as well as overruling Deity. Issue between them can be joined only on the question, Which of these theories best accounts for *all* the facts of human experience, and what doctrine of Providence, or the maintenance of a Divine purpose in human affairs, is warranted in the light of the best modern knowledge? Granted that the doctrine is one of faith, is the faith reasonably based upon all the facts, physical, moral, and spiritual, of human life? It is from this standpoint that the subject has been approached during the close of the 19th and the opening of the 20th century.

Does the theory of an overruling Providence, all-wise, almighty, and all-good, 'work'? That is, does it give a permanently satisfactory account of the facts of life, and result in a permanently satisfying explanation of them from a moral and spiritual point of view? If it be granted to the theist that there is a God, who operates within, as well as over, the existing order, do the facts warrant a belief that He has power and wisdom enough to co-ordinate the whole and accomplish a purpose beneficent enough to bear out the statement that He is as gracious as He is powerful and wise? No doctrine of Providence can satisfy the modern mind which cannot frankly meet this question. But the issues raised are so vast and complex, and they are so distinctly personal and ethical, rather than philosophical and scientific, that they are, as they always have been, differently determined by different inquirers.

3. 'General Providence.'—The answers given by the best representatives of modern Protestant theology may be described under two headings—general and special (or particular) Providence. Certain general principles in the ordering of human affairs which imply a controlling Deity are such as these: (1) God works by law, *i.e.* by a regular and uniform, not by an irregular and arbitrary, method; and this recognized order, while it raises serious difficulties in particular cases, is obviously advantageous to the welfare of the whole. But the Divine operation in question is exerted not upon a plastic material substance, but upon the partially independent and largely recalcitrant wills of men. Hence conflict is discernible, contradictions appear, and at best delay arises in the accomplishment of results. The principles of (2) solidarity and (3) sacrifice are also discernible. These imply that men as a race stand or fall together; that, in the family, in society, in the nation, and as time advances in the history of the race, individuals are made to realize the importance of self-denial, self-suppression, and it may be self-surrender, for the good of the whole. The relation between the parts and the whole in the organism, imperfectly understood at first, and still ignored in thought and practice by many, becomes increasingly clear as the knowledge and experience of mankind extend. And the twin principles of solidarity and sacrifice are pillars upon which any doctrine of Providence must ultimately rest. (4) While advance in the accomplishment of Divine purposes is slow and is retarded by only too obvious retrogression, progress is on the whole discernible, though the goal which by hypothesis is being aimed at can be reached only by advance of an admittedly gradual and imperfect kind. The above considerations belong to natural theology. (5) The believer in a special Christian revelation turns naturally to that as normative and determin

ative amidst the baffling complexities of human history. Faith in Christ holds a clue to the labyrinth which unaided reason disdains to use. Whether Christian faith can be proved to be in itself reasonable or not depends upon the extent to which the Christian solution, resting upon the Incarnation, the Cross, and the Resurrection, can be shown to meet the demands made upon it.

4. **'Special Providence.'** — The term 'special Providence' dates from the time of the Schoolmen, who distinguished between Providence universal, general, particular, special, and most special. Discredit has been brought upon the idea by the way in which it has been interpreted and the inferences drawn from supposed Divine intervention in particular cases. But it is obvious that the Providence which does not concern itself with *species* and *genus* as well as with *universum*, and with the individual as well as with the race, is none at all. A deity who is 'careful of the type' and 'careless of the single life' does not exercise providence in the usual acceptation of the word. The doctrine of special Providence means that God is able and willing, not only to promote general well-being, but also to secure to every one who trusts and obeys Him that all things shall work together for his true personal welfare. God does not generalize without particularizing. Such a process is as meaningless in the realm of intellect as it is iniquitous in the realm of morals. The Father in heaven makes His sun to shine on evil and good alike; He operates by general laws. But He also so orders their working in the natural and spiritual worlds taken as one whole that all things are made, sooner or later, to contribute to the abiding welfare of the faithful servant of God. In this ordered whole there is no distinction of small and great, as the words are often understood. The criterion of magnitude and importance is to be found in the spiritual world. The care for the welfare of the individual does not abrogate general laws. A doctrine of special Providence does not imply the deliverance of the individual from specific dangers or the granting to him of specific advantages. The same event has a totally different significance for different men. Opportunities proverbially come to him who is ready to use them. And all things may 'work together for good to them that love God' in a sense that is not, and cannot be, true for those who are not found in union with Himself and in harmony with His great designs.

It may be said that some belief of this kind is essential to a theistic religion. It is tested in practice by a belief in the efficacy of prayer and by a corresponding doctrine of values in personal, social, national, and racial life. It cannot be proved by *a priori* reasoning or established by a complete induction from the events of experience, especially as understood by those for whom the word 'spiritual' has little or no meaning. But it represents a reasonable faith, not a credulous or superstitious attitude towards the universe, because it is open to receive all well-attested facts and furnishes the best explanation of experience as a whole, when studied from a moral and spiritual point of view.

IV. *PROBLEMS RAISED.*—The difficulties in the way of the acceptance of a doctrine of Providence are in the main those raised against theism (*q.v.*). Theists maintain their view of God and the world in spite of the prevalence of pain, failure, death, and other factors of existence, of which under the rule of a perfectly good God only partial explanations can be given. The doctrine of Providence is the feature of theism most frequently assailed and most difficult to defend, making, as it does, the lofty claim that all human activities are subordinated to the accomplishment of the Divine will and to purposes of perfect benevolence. Some of the problems raised are metaphysical and concern the relation of the One to the many, or the compatibility of Divine foreknowledge with human free will. Others are ethical and can be satisfactorily dealt with only as parts of a complex whole (see art. GOOD AND EVIL). Others can only be described as standing difficulties, which must always attach to what Butler described with characteristic caution as 'a scheme imperfectly understood.' To relegate a portion of the problems of Providence to this category is not an unworthy evasion, because these proofs of human ignorance remain on any alternative theory of the universe and are—as the theist holds—far less satisfactorily dealt with on the hypotheses (say) of naturalism, deism, or pantheism. The essential conditions of human existence make a measure of ignorance concerning what may be called the plans and methods of Providence to be inevitable, and all reasonable theories of the universe allow for it. None the less, no doctrine of Providence can be defended, or is likely to be generally accepted, which does not find a place for great catastrophes —the earthquake of Lisbon, the eruption of Krakatoa, the Black Death, or the colossal world-war of 1914– . It does not come within the scope of the present article to do more than indicate some of the ways in which outstanding problems of Providence may be, not solved, but reasonably met.

1. **Evolution and design.**—Evolution as part of the Divine method in the genesis and history of life is not inconsistent with teleology. Mode does not exclude purpose. The study of processes need not interfere—though in practice it may often do so—with a belief in ends. The principles of evolution as traced in the lower organisms can be applied to human society only with very important modifications; but, so far as evolutionary methods are discernible, they do not interfere with design. Though they may destroy the evidence for certain separate and specific designs and ends, they help greatly in building up a conception of one vast purpose, which as yet only dimly looms in view. Man is on this planet the consummation of life, and it is quite consistent with all that is known of his development to hold that by the operation of Providence the history of mankind is being so ordered that the race may realize its highest conceivable capacity.

2. **Immanence and transcendence.**—The idea of Divine immanence, which has gained such hold of recent years, may seem to undermine belief in Providence—a doctrine essentially dependent on Divine transcendence. The theist claims to maintain both doctrines side by side. If immanence is accepted as sometimes taught, it approaches pantheism, and the possibility of Providence proportionally disappears. A professed theist, who yet ignores or denies the transcendence of a personal God, has no real belief in Providence. But even Matthew Arnold's 'The Eternal, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness' at least prepares the way for a doctrine which Shakespeare's 'divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will,' carries a stage further. Also, 'immanence' is a word only recently adopted to express, not quite happily, the fact that the Divine relation to the creature, and especially the course of human history, is not purely external. This may, and in contemporary writers frequently does, imply movement in one or more of the following directions: (*a*) a protest against undue reliance on Divine intervention from without, especially on miracle, as the chief evidence of Divine action; (*b*) the acceptance of self-limitation on the part of the Deity as beginning in creation and continuous

throughout in His relation with the creature; (*c*) hence the admission that the course of human history, whilst ordered for good, is not the best possible or conceivable. Man has a measure of power to delay, or mar, a Divine work which he cannot ultimately prevent. If the action of Providence is discernible in the destruction of the Armada or the banishment of Napoleon to St. Helena, account must also be given of the murder of Lincoln at a critical moment in the history of the United States and the cutting short of the career of the German Emperor Frederick III. and the succession of so different a ruler as William II. (*d*) Arguments for or against a belief in the Divine control of human affairs can never be satisfactorily based on isolated events. It is the power to compel all seeming and real discords into ultimate harmony that is asserted; and this by means of an indwelling life, rather than a merely external control and mastery.

3. **Divine omnipotence.**—Discussions concerning the nature of Divine omniscience and omnipotence, and the relation of these to man's freedom of choice, cannot be dealt with here (see FREE WILL, GOD, PREDESTINATION). It may be said, however, in a word that the doctrine of omnipotence has often been seriously misunderstood; that the creaturely will may be real and operative within limits without impugning the doctrine of Divine control. As Herbert puts it,

> 'Either thy command, or thy permission,
> Lay hands on all: they are thy right and left'
> (*The Temple*—'Providence').

A line in the context of the same poem puts the truth still more succinctly,

> 'All things have their will, yet none but thine.'

4. **Some moral problems.**—One large class of perpetually recurring problems arises from the constitution of nature as a whole, man forming only a part of this, and sometimes a distinctly subordinate part. The phenomena of physical pain and death fall to be considered under this heading. The theistic contention is that the facts point not to essential dualism in the order of nature, but to the development of designs which include the welfare of the human race as a whole, but as a relative rather than as an absolute end. The existence and course of moral evil in the world constitute a still graver difficulty, which is discussed in art. GOOD AND EVIL, but which does not necessitate either, on the one hand, an explanation of sin as mere negation or, on the other, a denial of the holy love of God.

5. **Immortality.**—No doctrine of Providence can be complete which does not deal with the question of immortality. If life beyond the grave is wholly denied, our estimate of human nature and the significance of human life is altogether changed. Natural theology cannot prove immortality, but it can build up a strong argument in its favour, 'since a contrary supposition is negatived by all that we know of the habits and methods of the cosmic process of Evolution' (J. Fiske, *Life Everlasting*, London, 1901, p. 86 f.). But, at the best, strong and confident hope is all that can be reached on the basis of natural theology, and hope cannot be used to establish a doctrine of Providence. If, however, the Christian revelation is to be trusted, the solution of the most perplexing problems in relation to the Divine government of the world may be postponed until the dawn of a future life illumines them. Enough if it be true concerning God as revealed in Christ that 'of Him, through Him, and unto Him are all things,' and that the 'one far off Divine event to which the whole creation moves' will be realized in the End beyond the end, when the Son has delivered up the Kingdom to the Father and God is all in all.

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PRUSSIANS.—See OLD PRUSSIANS.

PSALMODY.—See HYMNS, MUSIC (Christian).

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.—During the ages of universal belief in ghosts and spirits unusual phenomena were commonly attributed to their agency. In antiquity visions, haunted houses, and clairvoyance were, as a matter of course, referred to spirits. The old Romans practised crystallomancy and hydromancy, *i.e.* clairvoyance by gazing in crystals and at the surface of still water. They knew also the 'divining rod' in the form of the *pendule explorateur*. The forked rod has for centuries been used to discover treasures, and even to trace criminals to their hiding-places; and the belief in premonition, received in dreams or in apparitions of waking life, was current ages before Gurney's 'Census of Hallucination.'

But these and other unusual phenomena, real or alleged, readily explicable through spirits while the belief in their existence was unshaken, grew mysterious in the extreme as soon as that simple form of explanation became open to suspicion. Scepticism regarding the existence of spirits led in 1882 to the foundation of the now well-known Society for Psychical Research (S.P.R.), the purpose of which was officially expressed as the investigation of 'various alleged phenomena apparently inexplicable by known laws of nature and commonly referred by Spiritualists to the agency of extra-terrene intelligence, and by others to some unknown physical force.' And Andrew Lang could state in a presidential address that 'the Society, as such, has no views, no beliefs, no hypothesis, except, perhaps, the opinion that there is an open field of inquiry; that not all the faculties and potentialities of men have been studied and explained up to date, in terms of nerve and brain.'

The society counts among its leaders men of the first rank; in science William Crookes, Oliver Lodge, W. F. Barrett, and Charles Richet; in philosophy and letters Henry Sidgwick, William James, A. J. Balfour, Andrew Lang, and F. W. H. Myers. These names are sufficient warrant that its work is carried out with great seriousness and ability. The 27 volumes of its *Proceedings* already

issued contain extensive reports upon telepathy (thought- and feeling-transference), automatism of various sorts (divining-rod, table-moving, automatic writing, slate-writing, etc.), clairvoyance, haunted houses, premonitions, spirit-communications, and other topics.

For convenience' sake the facts studied may be roughly classified as physical and psychical. The first class includes levitation and translation (of tables, chairs, human bodies, etc.) and materialization (of ghosts and other objects), the production of noises, music, etc. To the second class belong premonitory or otherwise significant visions (crystal-gazing, apparitions), the discovery of objects by means of the divining-rod or the pendulum, slate-writing, and the alleged 'messages' from spirits expressed through a 'medium.'

The outcome of the work of the S.P.R. with regard to the physical phenomena may be conservatively summed up as the establishment of the improbability of there being anything in them but conscious or unconscious fraud—unconscious when the medium performs while in a trance. The evidence for this unfavourable verdict cannot be adequately given here. But, in order to illustrate the conditions under which the performances of 'physical' mediums are conducted, the difficulty of obtaining their consent to satisfactory test-conditions, and what happens when those conditions are accepted, we shall consider briefly the case of the latest and best studied great claimant to the possession of mysterious power, Eusapia Palladino.

Palladino, an Italian peasant woman, who had from her early youth shown mediumistic powers, became widely known by the report in 1913 of a series of sittings held in Milan before a number of distinguished scientists. She submitted thereafter to numerous investigations conducted in several countries by men of international reputation. Already, in Milan, fraud had been shown to be the probable explanation of some of her feats. Placed on a balance, she would gradually lose 17 lbs. of her weight (a more accurate balance decreased considerably the loss of weight), and then recover it, also gradually. This startling fact lost much of its mysteriousness when it was observed that, whenever her dress was prevented from touching the floor beyond the balance, no change in weight occurred.

Palladino's performance before a committee of the Institut Général de Psychologie uncovered not only a number of tricks, but also her rooted aversion to really scientific control, and the impotency to which she is reduced when she submits to conditions satisfactory to the investigators. One of the interesting discoveries of this committee was made by means of a device recording, unknown to the medium, the weight of the chair in which she sat during the table-levitation performances. It was found that, whenever the two feet of the table nearest to her, or three, or all four feet were lifted, there was an increase in her weight, corresponding to the weight of the table; and, whenever the two feet opposite the end at which she was seated were lifted, a decrease in her weight was recorded by the apparatus. This is just what would be expected on the supposition that in the former cases the weight of the table rested on her body, and in the latter she pressed upon the near end of the table in order to cause the raising of the opposite end. Her success in deflecting 'without contact' a delicate balance gave way to complete failure when it was protected in various ways. It was, moreover, discovered that a long hair and a pin were among the apparatus apparently required for the performance of this feat.

These and similarly suspicious or condemnatory tests might, it seems, have convinced the committee that they were investigating merely a very clever prestidigitator; yet their report admits the possibility of Palladino's possession of an unknown power. It is argued that deception in a medium does not preclude the possession of supernormal power, and that the detection of occasional or even frequent deception is not sufficient warrant for judging all the feats to be tricks. The answer to this argument is that a combination of frequency of deception, kinds of performance, and nature of the required conditions may be realized which would decrease to the vanishing point the probability of the presence in the medium of a supernormal force. This combination of factors is realized in Palladino's case.

Before the French investigators she operated under the following conditions. The room in which the experiments were made was darkened, and, at times, quite dark. The darker the room, we are told, the more remarkable the performance. The control of the medium's hands was theoretically secured by two persons, each holding one of hers; but in practice she insisted, when she chose, upon the right to place her hands on those of the controllers, and even, at times, to give them gentle taps instead of remaining in uninterrupted contact with them. Corresponding conditions existed as to the control of her feet. During the sittings her hands were in motion carrying with them those of the controllers. She refused to have pieces of tape seven centimetres long sewed between her sleeves and those of the controllers. She refused to allow observers to be stationed in the room elsewhere than around the table. After the first flash-light photograph had been taken, she refused to permit any to be taken without warning, on the ground that it caused her a most painful shock. She did not propose to wear dark glasses, but expressed a willingness to give the signal herself, '*Fuoco!*'

Together with these facts must be weighed two important considerations: (1) the performances in which she was not caught at tricks are of the same sort as those in which she was; (2) every one of the conditions that she maintained against the wish of the investigators favours deception. Why is it so? Why must there be a cabinet closed in front by a curtain? Why must the stand, the clay, and other objects be within reach of her hands or feet? Why the poor illumination? Why was she not willing to suffer the annoyance of an unexpected flash of light and of a safe control of her hands and feet? Were she occasionally honest, she might, it seems, occasionally dispense with some or all of these suspicious conditions. That certain requirements must be observed in order to make possible the manifestation of any power is not disputed. But why is it that those demanded here are precisely those that would afford the medium a chance to deceive?

We need not be deterred from a negative conclusion by the sitters' declaration that they cannot possibly understand how, in light sufficient for observation and with her hands and feet under control, Palladino could by normal means accomplish certain of the things which they have seen her do. Photography shows how unable they were to realize what was going on. In the only photograph taken without warning Palladino is seen actually lifting the table with her hands, while the controllers have theirs upon hers, and yet they were not aware of her action. In another photograph the stand which they thought they had seen floating freely in the air appears supported on the medium's neck and head. Their judgment as to the sufficiency of light and the occupation of the medium's hands while under control can evidently not be relied upon.

What is true of Palladino is true in substance of all mediums, so far as the production of physical phenomena is concerned. Every one of them, with the single exception of Daniel Dunglas Home, has been detected in deception. The distinguished personality of this famous medium inspired too much respect among the small and carefully selected circle before whom he performed to permit of the suspicion of trickery. He was, therefore, spared the humiliation of an investigation implying the possibility of fraud.

Certain of the wonder-exciting phenomena recently subjected to scientific study are complicated by automatism and by the possible presence in the agent of unusual susceptibility to certain sensory stimuli. It has been established, *e.g.*, that the movement of the rod which indicates the presence of water is unconsciously imparted to the rod by the dowser; and that the finding of a hidden object, by a person in contact with one knowing its location, is achieved by the 'reading' of slight unconscious movements. But automatism is only the beginning of an explanation of these phenomena. Why should the hands of the dowser move when over water, and how is it that movements seemingly too slight to offer any guidance are, nevertheless, in the experiments referred to, sufficient to lead the percipient to the hidden object? The existence in the percipient of an extraordinary delicacy of sensory perception is, in most cases of the kind, the pertinent explanation. Should cases occur which this explanation does not fit, the possibility of telepathic communication between the persons in contact, or even perchance between the percipient and some one else than the person in contact with him, would have to be considered. Neither one nor the other of these explanations is applicable to the dowser. Vision, or another kind of perception of the water or the ore, through the intervening opaque media, has been suggested as a possible explanation; but, before recourse is had to clairvoyance, it may be demanded that the fact itself be more firmly established than it now is. The doubter must, however, admit that the reported experiments (W. F. Barrett, 'On the so-called Divining Rod,' *Proc.*

S.P.R. xiii. [1897] 2–280, xv. [1900] 130–383) establish at least a presumption in favour of the possession by certain persons of a peculiar aptitude for this sort of discovery—an aptitude not dependent upon knowledge of an acknowledged kind.

The greatest achievement of the psychical researchers is the well-nigh unquestionable demonstration of occasional communication between living persons without any known intermediary (telepathy). The evidence is now of such quality and quantity that even particularly sceptical investigators find it impossible to deny its adequacy. The evidence consists of experimental and of spontaneous communications. Among the notable experiments are those conducted by Prof. and Mrs. H. Sidgwick, in which a percipient named numbers of two digits taken out of a bag by the former. Of 644 trials 133 were entirely successful—*i.e.* the two digits were correctly given; and in 14 trials the right digits were given, but in the reverse order. None of the tricks known to the professional prestidigitator could apparently find application in this, or in several other instances of the same sort.

In *Phantasms of the Living* Edmund Gurney has published over 200 well-attested instances of spontaneous communications. His 'Census of Hallucination' and the subsequent more elaborate census of a committee of the S.P.R. apparently prove that the number of veridical hallucinations is much greater than is indicated by the rule of chance (*Proc. S.P.R.* x. [1894] 393). It must, moreover, be acknowledged that, when hallucinations include several veridical incidents not logically connected, none of which is ordinary or to be naturally expected by the percipient, a small number of them seems sufficient to exclude coincidence as an explanation.

But, even were it possible to dismiss these spontaneous, premonitory hallucinations as due to coincidence, mistake, or deceit, there would yet remain the weighty experimental evidence for thought-transference. Nevertheless, the critical investigator may well stop short of complete assurance when he considers that these experiments are only sporadically successful. The only persons able to produce, whenever desired, alleged telepathic feats either are definitely known to be deceivers or are open to serious suspicion. No fact may be incorporated in any science unless the conditions of its appearance are known sufficiently to make possible either its reproduction or the circumstantial prediction of its reappearance. Conviction of the reality of telepathy will not become general among men of science until one or the other of these conditions is realized.

As to the tentative explanation of telepathy, we may say here merely that the dominant tendency is to seek for a physical explanation on the analogy of the wireless transmission of electric energy. Vibrations of some sort, produced by a brain in a particular physiological state, are supposed to be transmitted to another brain in a condition that makes it an appropriate receiver. The main difficulty in the way of this theory seems to be the distance (half the circumference of the earth) through which these waves would at times reach the receiving brain. But, until we know more about this supposititious brain-energy, there is little force in the objection that its energy is insufficient.

Clairvoyance, or, as it is also called, telæsthesia, is commonly produced by gazing in a crystal or at other polished surfaces (cf. art. CRYSTAL-GAZING). The percipient sees, often with great clearness of detail, objects and happenings at practically any distance. This very old belief has been neither placed on a secure scientific foundation nor discredited by the labours of the S.P.R. If the numerous well-authenticated reports of telæsthesia are to be accepted at their face value, we are in the presence of a problem the solution of which is clearly beyond our present knowledge. This remark is applicable also to the preposterous accuracy in the estimation of time-intervals displayed by some persons, either in the normal condition or in hypnosis (see the experiments of J. Milne Bramwell, *Hypnotism: its History, Practice, and Theory*, London, 1903, pp. 119–139).

The wonderful physical phenomena to which we have referred, the no less wonderful clairvoyance, supernormal time-estimation, and telepathy might all be what they seem, and yet the problem of survival after death remain untouched. But there is another class of phenomena—the alleged 'spirit-messages'—which are not so easily detached from the spiritistic hypothesis. The most famous of the living spirit-mediums is doubtless Mrs. Piper of Boston. No other medium has been so long and carefully studied by so many able investigators, and none has contributed so much that seems beyond the ingenuity of any one to explain. The stage-setting of these séances is somewhat complicated. The medium passes into a trance and speaks or writes automatically messages purporting to come from some spirit; but this communicating spirit is introduced and superintended by a familiar spirit called the 'control.' Mrs. Piper's reputation for honesty has never been shaken.

We need not enter into a critical analysis of Mrs. Piper's utterances, but pass on to the more decisive experiments in cross-correspondence, the latest and most promising of a settlement of the question of survival after death. The theory of cross-correspondence is that, if several persons receive messages which are singly unintelligible, but have meaning when combined, we ought, it seems, to admit—on the supposition that fraud is excluded—that these messages have been suggested to the percipients by a single mind. If, moreover, the thing communicated does not seem to have been possibly within the knowledge of any one of the percipients; and if it is discovered that some dead person possessed that knowledge when on earth; and, finally, if that person is mentioned by name as the communicator in one or several of the unintelligible parts of the message, then at least a strong presumption in favour of the existence of that spirit may be regarded as having been established.

The experiments in cross-correspondence (*Proc. S.P.R.* xx. ff. [1906 ff.]) have been conducted chiefly through three English ladies, one of them residing in India, and Mrs. Piper. Chance coincidence is absolutely insufficient to account for the results secured, and collusion is rejected by all those who know something of these persons and of the conditions of the tests. There is apparently no escape from the conclusion reached by that acute critic and tenacious sceptic, Frank Podmore:

> 'The automatists unquestionably show that they possess information which could not have reached their consciousness by normal means' (*The Newer Spiritualism*, p. 302).

Whether the explanation of these mysterious cross-correspondences will be found in telepathy acting at any distance, taken together with the well-known fact of the reappearance in certain mental states (*e.g.*, in trance-consciousness) of things once known but long forgotten, even of things of which we never had more than an imperfect knowledge and should at no time have been able to reproduce correctly, remains for future investigations to disclose. As long as we can affirm with Podmore that 'the trance personalities have never told us anything which was not possibly, scarcely anything which was not prob-

ably, within the knowledge of some living person' (p. 312), telepathy will appear the more plausible and the less revolutionary hypothesis. But who will venture to formulate the test which will mark particular messages as not within the 'possibly known' to some one living anywhere on the surface of the globe?

The telepathic hypothesis of spirit-messages receives support from the unexpected meaninglessness of the 'revelations' made by the alleged spirits regarding their state and the circumstances of their existence. They have been fairly loquacious; yet none of them, not even those from whom much could have been expected, have revealed anything at all. More significant still than the insignificance of their remarks concerning the other life is the pertinacious effort of these alleged spirits to avoid answering the many and pointed questions addressed to them on that subject. From Richard Hodgson, the late secretary of the S.P.R., nothing enlightening has been learned, despite his haste in giving sign of his existence. For several years after his death Mrs. Piper scarcely held a sitting without some manifestation of what professed to be Hodgson's spirit. Of trifling incidents which may be useful in establishing his identity he talked abundantly; but, when questioned concerning the circumstances of his existence, he either drivelled or excused himself clumsily and departed. Frederic Myers and William James have been equally disappointing.

It has been urged that the spirits may find it difficult to work with the muscular mechanism of the medium; a disincarnate soul may be inefficient in the matter of bodily control; he may also be for a time not fully conscious and muddled. The fact is, however, that spirits do communicate a great many things; it takes volumes to record their utterances! The difficulties are apparently of such peculiar nature that nothing concerning the other life, and only things that have taken place on this earth, transpire. None of the hypotheses offered accounts for this puzzling aspect of the communications—not even the latest suggestion which would shift the blame from the spirit to the medium. Here we are asked to admit that, because of the peculiar condition of spirit-existence, the spirit's mental content is transmitted whole to the medium—in a lump, as it were—instead of coming out in the organized and selected form which is ensured by normal speech. Were it so, it would be small wonder that the medium should grow confused, contradict himself, and speak irrelevantly. But why, when he knows that the sitter seeks information on things above, does the medium not succeed once in a while in choosing in the total consciousness of the spirit something which would gratify the sitter's curiosity? Why are the things picked out always trifling, meaningless, or ridiculous? To this pertinent question no satisfactory answer has ever been given. The limitation of the knowledge of the alleged spirits to earthly facts points to an earthly origin of the medium's information.

One may, perhaps, venture to quote William James as a fair representative of those among the well-informed who regard the mystery of death as unsolved. Shortly before his death he wrote:

'For twenty-five years I have been in touch with the literature of Psychical Research, and I have been acquainted with numerous Researchers . . . yet I am theoretically no further than I was at the beginning' (*American Magazine*, lxviii. [1909] 580).

As to those who regard the results of the S.P.R. as proving survival, they must admit that no amount of optimism and ingenuity in explanation can hide the repulsiveness of such glimpses of the future life as they think they have caught and its lack of the essential features of the Christian conception. In any case, then, the belief in the Christian hereafter, elaborated by humanity under the pressure of exalted desires, remains entirely unsubstantiated.

If, after thirty-four years of activity, many of the mysteries which the S.P.R. set out to explore are still unfathomed, much has, nevertheless, been explained. Thus the mischief which mystery works upon credulous humanity has been decreased by the extension of the field of scientific control. This is particularly true with regard to the various forms of automatism. But the greatest accomplishment to record is the approximate demonstration that, under circumstances still mostly unknown, men may gain knowledge by other than the usual means, perhaps by direct communication between brains (telepathy) at practically any earthly distance from each other. This dark opening is indeed portentous. It may at any time lead to discoveries which will dwarf into insignificance any of the previous achievements of science.

LITERATURE.—Among the important literature may be mentioned: *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, London and Glasgow, 1883 ff.; *Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research*, New York, 1907 ff.; E. Gurney, F. W. H. Myers, and F. Podmore, *Phantasms of the Living*, 2 vols., London, 1886; F. Podmore, *Apparitions and Thought Transference*, do. 1894, *Modern Spiritualism: a History and a Criticism*, 2 vols., do. 1902, *The Newer Spiritualism*, do. 1911; T. Flournoy, *Des Indes à la planète Mars*[4], Geneva, 1910 (a very interesting account of a case of somnambulism and glossolalia); F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality*, 2 vols., London, 1903; Oliver Lodge, *The Survival of Man*[2], do. 1909.

JAMES H. LEUBA.

PSYCHOLOGY.—I. *DEFINITION AND SCOPE.*—**1. Psychology the study of the world of experience.**—A cursory survey of the literature of this subject shows that it deals chiefly with the direct impressions of sense, such as colours, sounds, tastes, and smells; with their complex integrations, such as visual forms in one, two, or three dimensions, groups of consonant and dissonant tones, tonal intervals, melody, and the localization of these sensory experiences; with our apprehension and appreciation of space; with our perception of objects and our general notions regarding them; with memory, imagination, thinking; with feeling, emotion, and sentiment; with voluntary activity of all kinds, whether ideational or practical; and with a number of general questions arising out of these topics. It does not deal with the parts and processes of the material world, but with all our awareness of, and our activity and interest in, the world. Or, if the difficulty of separating the material objective world from our activity with it is pointed out, we may say that psychology deals with all of the world that is immediately or directly before us; or with the world in so far as it is momentarily dependent upon our own activity; if we shut our eyes, all colours and their forms and localizations vanish from us as actualities; if we cease to remember, the things of the past are no longer with us; when love takes the place of hate, the incompatibility of another person with us vanishes like a frown and there is only agreement and harmony. But we do not therefore suppose that the things that appeared coloured, or the past, or our neighbour, have momentarily vanished or have been replaced by others.

This obvious distinction between the world in so far as it is dependent upon itself and upon us is commonly expressed by saying that, whereas the natural sciences study the world of nature, psychology studies the world of experience. The objects which psychology studies are known as experiences. There are many other special sciences that deal with experiences; but psychology is the fundamental one. It holds the same place in the world of mind as physics does in the world of nature. It is the basal mental science.

In such a statement of the subject-matter of psychology as this three terms inevitably emerge into prominence: 'nature,' 'experience,' and 'self.' The world appears to us in experience. Experience is that aspect of the world that is (momentarily) dependent upon *our* activity. The world is that mass of implications of experiences that is not momentarily dependent upon our activity. We are that which, over against the fleeting medium of experience, partakes somewhat of the permanence of the world.

Now, if it is commonly admitted that the primary object of psychology is the study of experience, the further question must arise as to what concern psychology has with the relation of experience to the world and to the self.

2. Relation of experience to the world.—(*a*) *Psychology and epistemology.*—In its broadest form the relation to the world is the problem of epistemology—not, How in actual fact do we become aware of the world? (that is a purely psychological problem), but, By what right do we assert the existence of a world independent, to whatever extent, of experience (and of the self)? It might well be asserted that the only possible answer to the question of right is the correct answer to the question of fact. But an artificial distinction is often made to the effect that psychology can have no legitimate concern with truth or error. It is the business of logic to establish correct conclusions, and perhaps to classify fallacies; psychology will record and describe with impartiality the correct conclusion drawn by one man and the wrong conclusion drawn by another. Because the problem of psychology includes both the 'correct' and the 'false' process, it will make generalizations valid for both, and therefore invalid for what is logically true or rational. And in any case it requires a separate, not descriptive but normative, discipline to distinguish between the true and the false. That seems to be the line of argument taken by those who hold this view. They often give further support to their view by reference to the unconcern of natural science for truth, beauty, good, or weal. Two stars disrupt each other—it is a case of impact or tidal motion. The beauty of a rose is a problem in the minute chemistry of coloured compounds. The woe of mortal disease may be the struggle of two forms of life-force equally valid as biological energies.

That is all quite true, of course. But, though the sciences of medicine study health and disease impartially—if not indeed disease rather than health—and make generalizations valid for both, do they not also strive to win a special body of generalizations valid for health alone? Similarly, though the psychology of cognition will speak of the forms common to both truth and error, will they not also separate the variations peculiar to truth from those peculiar to error? If there is none such, how then does the other discipline proceed to distinguish between truth and error? If a general, reflective method, not regulated by the general methods of scientific procedure, can gain knowledge of the ways of truth, will not a special, introspective, experimental method that looks microscopically through the experience of single thinkers, fulfil the required task better in the end? If a man by introspection cannot discern the forms of truth, how will they ever be discerned? And, if the method is introspective, will it not be improved as much by the exact methods of psychology as other special problems of psychology have been? The discipline that distinguishes between the true and the false does not *make* or create the truth any more than it makes the falsehood or than a chemist makes or creates new organic compounds. And yet this, of course, does no prejudice to the possibility that there may be many aspects of knowledge that are much broader in their scope and relations than are the minute aspects of knowledge, such as come within the range of a few seconds' duration. These broad aspects may be studied by special broad methods, just as certain broad aspects of health are studied by certain broad (statistical) methods which ignore the single individual. But the broad aspects rest in the end scientifically upon the narrow ones in all regions.

Psychology, therefore, has full right to all that it can accomplish regarding the relation of experience to the world, and no discipline that concerns itself with that relation can afford to ignore the relevant work of psychology.

(*b*) *Psychology and physiology.*—In so far as psychology is concerned with the *proximate* relation of experience to the world—the relation to the body and specially to the nervous system of the individual—its science merges into that of psychophysics. The science which holds the other end of the relation is physiology. Much obscurity prevails regarding the relation of physiology and psychology, so that it is necessary to review it here in spite of its essential simplicity.

Psychology is the scientific study of experience, physiology that of the functions or activities of the body. Whatever asserts the existence, the time, the manner, the properties, or anything whatever, directly about an experience is an item of psychological science. Whatever asserts anything about the body or a part of it other than its topography and morphology is an item of physiological science. Consequently, the work of psychology consists in the increase of psychological science, in the increase of statements about experiences. An assertion regarding a touch-organ, an eye, an ear, or a nerve is an item of physiology, no matter how it was gathered, whether by the microscopical examination of the organ, or by inference from the observation of sensations of vision or of sound, or of loss of memory, or what not.

This obvious distinction is not in itself important in an exposition of psychology. Most people would agree to it at once. But they generally omit to draw the equally obvious deductions from it, and so to dispel their favourite prejudices. It is, *e.g.*, a common prejudice of scientists especially interested in physiology that psychology claims to be able to do what they already know they cannot yet do. It tries to show how consciousness arises, how the brain senses, feels, thinks, and acts; but with flimsy, superficial methods, such as the asking of questions, the recording of reaction times; ignoring all the while, *e.g.*, such a flagrant fact as that the occurrence of intelligence is dependent upon the proper functioning of the thyroid gland, and so on. It is in face of such a mistake that it is so necessary to point out that the fact regarding the thyroid gland belongs to psycho-physics, and that it does not add anything to our knowledge of experience as such. Many physiologists have definitely excluded any consideration of experiences from the scope of reference of their science. That is all the more reason why they should admit the scientific study of the field of experience as the task of others.

Another application: experimental psychologists are rightly highly impressed by the importance of physiology. The first foundations of the physiology of the senses are easier of access than are the foundations of a psychology of the senses. This difference of bulk and systematic coherence in the two spheres of knowledge relating to sensory life creates a prejudice in their minds, so that, when they proceed to study sensory experiences, they apply their own psychological methods to the

gathering of facts of observation, but, when they come to the problem of explanation, they are often completely diverted to the terms of physiological explanation, ignoring, it may be, altogether their duty of giving a psychological systematization of the facts gathered—in other words, a psychological explanation. This prejudice commonly governs professed psychologists even in dealing with questions relating to higher experiences, such as memory, feeling, emotion, etc. In the field of sensory experience it is almost universal.

The physiologist is correct in holding that, if he, specially active in the direct study of the functions of the body, and not ignorant of the indirect sources of physiological knowledge, cannot advance a true theory of neural action in some special department, such a theory will hardly be deduced solely or chiefly from indirect sources. On the other hand, the psychologist, who is specially active in the direct study of experiences, is more likely to be able to systematize these completely in his special department, and so to explain them psychologically, than he is to be able to deduce from them, in their unsystematized and therefore unregulated and perhaps incomplete form, a scheme for the completion of the knowledge and for the systematization of a neural field that has not been specially the object of his direct study. All this is, of course, without prejudice to the fact that one man may be equally fitted for, and may do equally complete, work in some field of both psychology and physiology. If so, he is merely formally two scientists in one, and must in both capacities work as perfectly, without prejudice, in the interests of each science as he would if he were a specialist in one only.

Psychology, then, is primarily a pure psychology, the scientific study of experiences in terms of experiences, involving their complete description, analysis, classification, and systematization. In the connecting science of psycho-physics it has equal rights with physiology. In the connecting science of epistemology it has equal rights with any philosophical discipline which may concern itself with that science—and so on for all other sciences through which psychology may be related to other sciences.

3. Experience in relation to the self.—Having dealt thus with experience in itself and in relation to the world, we have now only to deal with experience in relation to the self. But there is this difference between the world and the self, that, whereas there are highly developed sciences other than psychology that deal with the world, there is no other distinct science than psychology that deals with the self. In fact, psychology is by name the science of the soul, or self, that which is of the nature of experience perhaps, but certainly transcends the single, momentary, fleeting experience. We might, then, expect psychology to include a special field devoted to the study of the self. A survey of psychological literature, however, will hardly reveal this field. In fact, there are many who flatly deny that there is any such thing strictly as a self, distinguishable from the sum total, or field, or stream, of experiences. And, where there is no dispute as to the existence, there is frequent difference of view as to the nature, of the self.

About the popular view there is no doubt. The self is something more than the experience of any moment. Though in sleep its activity is temporarily suspended, yet it persists in consciousness of itself through years, and it is the leader of all the mind's activity. *It* thinks, observes, feels, and senses. And yet common sense in this region often gets into difficulties; it has to distinguish between the true and false, better and worse, selves. Its doubts about the independent nature of the self reveal themselves in frequent scepticism as to the survival of the self beyond the life of the organism.

The popular self, then, is quite problematical. After Hume's leading it is commonly agreed that no unitary self is distinguishable among the objects of introspection. What we mean by the self may therefore be the unity of experience in detail, or the continuous unity of it throughout life, or a certain logical or real implication of experience.

(*a*) *Self as the fount of unity.*—It is a common argument against the view that the self is to be identified either with the sum total of experience or with the stream of experience that by no conceivable means could a mere series of experiences turn into a consciousness of that series as a unity. Hence the sum total of experience simply could not exist as a sum total, unless we suppose that some miracle of unification is perpetually happening. The stream of experiences can be unified only in so far as it is a stream-for-a-self. It is only through the presentation to one self, through the common relation to one self, that the mass becomes individual.

It is true that we cannot rationalize the process of unification or synthesis that we find broadcast throughout our experience; nor can we rationalize the synthesis of atoms to a molecule, of molecules to a cell, or of cells to an organism. But, admitting that, we have the strength to perceive that a reference to one subject is impotent and irrelevant. It is irrelevant because it blandly begs the question. How do experiences ever arrive before one subject's gaze? And what is this gaze? It is impotent, because no amount of reference to one subject will explain the great variety of forms in which experiences integrate to unities, or the laws of their integration. If it is difficult to conceive of an experience by itself having an object, it is just as difficult to conceive the rationality of a subject thinking objects through experiences. In short, the hypothesis of the self as a unifying form, though it undoubtedly gives a sense of great comfort and satisfaction to many minds, is nevertheless useless. It is of no service whatever in a scientific sense, and that must be the final test in a science of psychology. Its acceptance cannot be advocated on this ground.

The doctrine is really an inheritance from Kant. The leading idea of his philosophic reconstruction of experience was the postulation, not of one single-all-important synthesis (Hume), but of a whole hierarchy of them, forming an easily exhaustible system. But Kant failed to draw the proper inferences from this idea and from what success he achieved in applying it in detail. He failed especially to see that the data of experience and the forms that emerge from them must synthesize themselves *from below upwards* according to common laws. In the search for a source of synthesis he then looked upwards in experience instead of downwards, and found the synthetic unity of apperception, the consciousness of 'I think.' The efficacy of that notion, however, is nothing but the notion of synthesis itself; and so nothing was gained by his whole procedure. At the same time, almost everything was lost. For the confusion into which Kant worked himself in his various deductions left the almost indelible impression that all such deductions are hopeless undertakings. So the very valuable idea with which Kant started was emasculated beyond further usefulness. In his successors, and especially in Hegel, it was degraded to a scheme of purely fanciful and imaginary forms, whose only claim to actuality was the vague atmosphere of logical connexion that pervaded them. At the same time, the universal function ascribed by Kant to the synthetic unity of apperception was exaggerated until the real world seemed to fade utterly away and only

the self remained in its universe of experience. Had Kant succeeded in solving the problem of the scheme of synthesis in experience from below upwards, there is no doubt that he would never have developed his phenomenalism, nor would the idealistic extravaganzas of his successors ever have been propounded.

(*b*) *The metaphysical Ego.*—So much, then, for the self as the fount of unity in experience in its details. There is, of course, just as little reason for assuming the existence of a self in order to give unity to the data of experience of a lifetime. If experience cannot raise its own unity upon its own foundations and upon the hierarchy of special integrations just discussed, no notion of self will ever inspire the data of experience, which are as the sands of the sea for number, into one coherent whole. All this mysticism of the self is nothing but a failure to grasp the problem of the system of experience positivistically and scientifically. As it stands, and is expounded still, it is a distinct barrier to proper progress in psychology. For it cannot yield any fruit of detail problems, and so it clogs the minds of those who hold it.

As to the implications of experience, they are rather the result of psychological study than a part of its subject-matter. If the psychologist is concerned to draw all legitimate inferences from his data, implications regarding the self, whether they be logical or real, will follow of themselves. There is no fear of anything being ignored here. The intensity of the individual's struggle for existence and his desire to survive indefinitely will coerce him into probing for all possible reasons for believing in the perpetuation of his self. Every possible reason, however improbable, will be hopefully contemplated and appraised.

It is, finally, sometimes said that psychology does not fulfil its duty, which is to study the self and its states, not to study the objective contents of experience, such as colours, sounds, concepts, thoughts, and memories. Quite possible; but the other things are more clearly there, and call for study. They are what most psychologists now study chiefly. If any one can develop a method of demonstrating the existence of the self, in some sense clearly distinguishable from experience and its syntheses, of studying its states, and of making our knowledge of it progressively larger, his success will surely be highly acclaimed. Thus far, however, in the opinion of the writer, no one has done so. The field of psychology, therefore, is properly described exclusively as a study of experiences in the systems in which we find them and of the relations of these experiences and their systems to the fields which in the universe surround experience or rest in part upon it. These are, apart from the biological (process) sciences already referred to, the (product) sciences of history, linguistics, æsthetics, and the like, and the social sciences of political philosophy, and economy, social economics, etc. (cf. art. CONSCIOUSNESS for fuller discussion from opposed point of view).

II. *THE SENSORY-COGNITIVE SYSTEM.* — 1. **Theories as to the constituents of experience.**—The task of psychology, as Ward has said,[1] is to ascertain the ultimate constituents of all experiences and to determine the laws of their interaction. The matter is still under dispute, but it is possible to maintain with perhaps increasing show of probability that the ultimate constituents of all experiences are sensations. Where this theory goes upon the assumption that all experiences that do not directly reveal themselves as sensations are in some subtle way aggregates of more or less obscure and attenuated sensations, we have the ancient doctrine of sensationalism. That doctrine is now commonly held either to be insufficient to account for the facts or to involve too great assumptions regarding the variability of appearance of sensations in aggregations. Obviously, too, the proof of the presence in all experiences of a complement of sensations, approximately co-extensive with the experiences discerned in aggregate—which is the chief line of proof followed by sensationalists—does not exclude the alternative theory that all experiences are either single or multiple sensations, or special integrative complexes of sensations. Here the only interest in the sensation is that it is the lowest rung on an indefinite ladder of integrative processes, one that cannot be further resolved by us.

Another line of theorists hold that there are other ultimate, irreducible constituents of experience than sensations—feelings, thoughts, etc. But this type of theory need not be taken to have proved anything more than that feelings, thoughts, and the rest are special points, units, or parts of a certain range of experience, just as cells are special and, in many senses, unique parts of the body, and are held by many to be irreducible wholly to the next lower units of matter—molecules and their laws. The burden of proof lies heavy on any school that draws such limits. For it has for its task a negative proof. The best policy for united work is obviously the plea that, while feelings and thoughts may be reducible to lower grade units, this reduction has not yet been satisfactorily accomplished. Thus all theorists may work forward together, each supplementing the other's outlook, observation, and interpretation. Whatever the outcome may be, the theoretical work of psychology may well be set up as if it would ultimately converge on the sensationalistic ideal, when that is re-animated by the substitution of integration for aggregation.

Certain other theories refuse to consider any such analytic, dissecting, and devitalizing outlook as these. They stand fast by the indivisibility and qualitative unity of experience, its ever changing and developing wholeness and completeness, which are only brought to the inert forms of the above theories by the destructive work of the abstracting intellect. In its older form this group of theories made great use of the earlier notions of the biologists. The organic unity of experience was constantly emphasized. Experience is an organism in which every part detectable by abstraction stands in living, moving interaction with every other, and is inseparable from it without the destruction of the (spirit of the) whole. Doubtless; but modern biologists are not deterred by this thought from a progressive analysis and synthetic reconstruction of the wonderful life of the organism. They do not allow themselves to be held up in their progress by the contemplative admiration of completeness and unity. A recent form of this type of theory clothes itself anew in biological terminology, taking as its prototype of action the mystic unity and the insight-without-intellect of the instinct—a very fine doctrine for those who love to linger on the hill-tops of philosophy, chanting the wonders of the stars, the clouds, the trees, and the clover, and yearning to embrace the universe in a great wave of life, and very refreshing to the tired mind, but hardly the way of progress. The world, no doubt, is full of wondrous forces; but we happen to be soldiers of the intellect and must do what we best can.

A third group of theories, which also lie somewhat aside from the main drift of psychological work, looks upon experience as not ours, not subjective or mental, coming between our self and a real world; but as really of the world, objective, physical, the same in stuff as the things that we

[1] *EBr*[11], s.v. 'Psychology,' xxii. 548[b].

call material. In a certain sense the difference is only a matter of words, and, provided such a theory has the interest to study experiences or objects in detail, the same results will emerge as are found by the more 'orthodox' psychologist, so to speak. But in its older form of objective idealism this line of doctrine acted almost as an excuse for not investigating the minute, systematic build of objects (experiences). If the alleged experiences were really objects, the study of them might well be left to the scientists. And, if there were a science that might be called experimental psychology, then that title was in a sense a misnomer; the science was really a branch of physiology, obviously not part of the work of a philosopher. In a recent form the theory shows a special interest in the minute build of objects or of the first physical data. For knowledge is required to show how these data are so directly related to, or continuous with, the material things of science as they seem to our common sense to be. This group of theorists is obviously forced into the attempt to make a special plea for, and a special study of, the self. For one can hardly solemnly go the length of asserting that there is nothing in the world but the objective, the physical, and its complexities—no self and no personal activity. These views evidently carry us back to the problem of the self already discussed. They do not yet affect the detail work of psychology (or of this new physics that the physicists do not promote). If the field of work and the drift of fact and theory are clear, psychology may leave the classificatory names to the wider comprehension of philosophy. When we have all the knowledge of fact required for exhaustive systematization and understanding, we shall hardly object seriously to any useful drawing of boundaries and naming of provinces.

2. Sensations and their attributes.—The ultimate constituents of all experiences, then, are probably sensations. Sensations are indicated in the universe of things as being the simplest experiences that are directly dependent upon the stimulation of a sense-organ or of a sensory nerve. They are familiar in the five senses of man; but the work of later years has increased that number considerably. The senses may be divided into three groups.

(*a*) *Simplest senses of the skin.*—The first contains the simplest and perhaps more primitive senses of the skin and, in an irregular way, of the viscera. They are four: pain, touch, cold, and warmth. Itch and tickling are related to pain and touch respectively. The problem of the psychological description of the simplest experiences of these senses is a useful preliminary and guide to the psychological definition of sensation in general. It is the important problem of the attributes of sensation.

There are at least six attributes. (1) *Quality* is the name for the radical difference between the sensations of different senses—*e.g.*, colour, sound, touch. And touch, pain, warmth, and cold are all qualitatively different. (2) The variant known as *intensity* is too familiar to require any indication. These two attributes have been universally admitted and are readily acceptable by all as direct properties of, or variants in, these simplest experiences.

The next most frequently admitted attribute is (3) *extensity*. A colour mass is extensive; so is the warmth felt in a bath or the pain of colic, as compared with the coldness of a drop of rain or the pain of a pin-prick. Some folk feel a repugnance of a kind to the assertion that our experiences are extended or spread out. But that is merely traditional prejudice. Thought may not be extensive, but sensations certainly are; only it is not the spatial kind of extensity that is meant, but another 'kind' or sub-class of extensity. The attribute of extensity has not always been admitted. Some have tried to derive it from groups of qualitative and intensive differences; but the attempt was never convincing; hence the gradual recognition of the primacy of extensity.

Now, those who thus admitted extensity usually proceeded to attempt to develop a further attribute of *localization* out of those three. The cover for the act of conversion involved in this attempt has been since Lotze's time the term 'local sign,' the idea being that the skin is of such different texture, etc., at different parts that a touch at one part would be distinguishable from another at another part of the total extent by its qualitative and intensive differences. But the same futility attaches to this attempt at derivation as to the previous one. The intellect can by no device convert into local signs what are after all only groups of items devoid of any sort of arrangement. These must remain what they are, unless the intellect can correlate them with a spatial order otherwise provided. And then the spatial order so obtained would not become inherent in the sensory complex, as would be required. No, mere extensity is insufficient. For it implies no definite construction, form, shape, or extent, but only extensity as a variable magnitude. If this magnitude is at the same time to have form or shape, it must be supposed to include orders implicitly or explicitly. And the magnitude cannot be definite without the help of explicit orders. This is, then, the fourth attribute—(4) *order*. It is not to be confounded with spatial order, as which it appears most definitely before our cognition in the sensory experience of the skin. It is the basis of the spatial construction. Space, as we shall see, is a form or complication of sensory order.

Two other parallel attributes are the basis of our temporal differentiation of sensory experience, namely (5) *duration* and (6) *temporal order*. The former order may be distinguished from (6) as systemic order, because it is the kind of order that depends psycho-physically upon a system of elementary sense-organs (receptors).

Another attribute has been proposed by Titchener — *clearness*. But there are great difficulties in the way of its acceptance. A sensationalistic system, of course, as already indicated, requires some primary variant to account for the apparently great difference between the higher psychical complexes and any obvious aggregates of sensations. But an integrative system, full of variously directed streams of action and of different levels, the one more remote from the other than a third, can probably account for all the facts without such a difficult attribute.

This first easy group of sensations has an appendage in the sense or senses of taste. No new primary fact is met in it.

(*b*) *Articular, muscular, and organic senses.*—The second group of senses differs from the first in offering in each case some feature of obscurity or difficulty. The senses here are the articular, the muscular, and the organic (a medley of hunger, thirst, lust, nausea, etc.). The difficulty consists in properly classifying the attributes of each and the obscurity in detecting their presence. Thus the quality of articular sensations has been generally held to be their indication of position. And a class of positional qualities has even been distinguished from a quality of movement. But the 'positional' variation must be classed as the ordinal attribute, while the difference of movement does not constitute a separate sense at all, as we shall see later. The obscurity attaching to articular sensations, on the other hand, concerns their intensity. But we can with care produce

intensive differences in this sensation, and we then recognize that the obscurity is not in Titchener's sense attributive, but is only apparent. Failing to recognize the fact that the physiological basis of intensive differences in this sense is almost lacking —from the nature of the case—and expecting intensive variations that we do not find, we call these variations obscure, just as visual presentations are when we try to read in the gloaming. We feel that we cannot detect fully all that is there. But when we cease to expect more than there is, we also drop the term 'obscure.'

(c) *Senses of sound, sight, and smell.*—The third group of senses presents very complex and very difficult cases that can be made to conform completely to the formula of attributes only after elaborate study. The senses here are sound, sight, and smell.

The present writer has given[1] a re-interpretation of the sense of sound on the basis of the formula of the six attributes which completely alters our view of this sense and brings it into perfect conformity with the psychology (and, by inference, with the physiology) of the other senses. It may be dogmatically indicated here. There is one quality in sound, that which distinguishes sight from sound. Intensity is familiar. The difference generally classed as quality—pitch—is really the attribute of order, while the extensity of sounds is apparent in their volumes, which run parallel to the pitch series, low tones being large and bulky, high tones thin and small. These volumes, however, are really extents or masses of sensation, so that tones are not the primary particles of this sense, but are well-rounded, balanced, symmetrical masses of sound, in which one (hypothetical) particle (or a few) is prominent in a central position, and is known as the pitch of the tone. Thus all audible tones may be reduced to a single series of particles of sound sensation, the lowest tone involving the whole series, and the higher ones progressively less and less of the series, the end particle on one side being common to all tones. This is only another way of expressing the fact that, as we rise in the tonal scale, the pitch series moves progressively to one side.

There is no need to attempt to reduce noises to tones. For noises are themselves masses of sound-particles. They differ from tones only in their irregularity and want of balance and in their lack of a prominent ordinal centre, *i.e.* pitch. All degrees of variation, however, from tone to noise are obviously possible.

In the sense of vision the systemic attributes of extensity and order offer no difficulty. That attaches only to the attributes of intensity and quality. We have interesting and highly developed physiological theories of vision, of which the most familiar are those of H. L. F. von Helmholtz and of E. Hering. But we have still to get a satisfactory psychological account of the elements of this sense.

The sense of smell is specially peculiar because of the fact that we seem unable as yet to give a complete survey of its qualities. We are unable to tell whether the enumeration that we already have is complete. This merely means that we have not yet got the key to the psychological analysis of this sense.

In spite of these outstanding difficulties, we may look forward to bringing the attributes and varieties of aggregation of the elements of all the senses some day finally into full agreement with one another. This solution may be expected to conform at least closely to the formula of six attributes indicated above.

3. **Modes and laws of integration.**—The other task of pure science in psychology is to ascertain the laws of the interaction of these probable ultimate constituents of experience; or, better, to determine their modes and laws of integration. The problem of these modes has been before the minds of psychologists for some time in the form of the figure-qualities described by C. von Ehrenfels. A melody, *e.g.*, must be something more than the sum or sequence of the tones that form it. For it remains the same melody even when it is raised or lowered in pitch so far that none of the tones of the first version occurs in the second. And a square is a square, whether it be given in blue colour or red, or even in tactual sensation. Similar distinctions and arguments are found in older philosophical literature. Kant's forms of sense and of understanding are essentially the same idea. They are something more than any data that they may include or synthesize; they are the mind's own work or contribution to the build of knowledge; they cannot come from without; they are, as we may say, purely integrative 'processes' of experience.

Following Kant's suggestions farther, we may think of these integrations as a hierarchy co-extensive with experience—a scheme that, as being in experience, is directly before our observation and may well be completely described by our science before very long. Moreover, it is one that should bring with its gradual discovery a sense of its own completeness and 'necessity.'

Unlike Kant, however, we cannot hope to succeed unless we can put our scheme of integrative processes into relation to the properties or attributes of the elementary data of experience—the sensations. This connexion is expressed in the following two laws. (1) The integrative product must bear a close resemblance to the lower-level product or to the attribute upon whose integration it rests. We cannot, *e.g.*, expect localizations to rest upon differences of intensity or of quality or of both, but only upon differences of order. In such a connexion there would be no inner coherence, insight, 'necessity' (Kant), or whatever it might be called, that makes our experience coherent in all its parts instead of a mere mechanical conglomeration. (2) Wherever similar attributes (or integrative products) integrate (anew), there we must expect to find products both introspectively and functionally similar to one another. Thus, if the integration of visual orders gives systemic intervals and motions, then, if pitch is really properly classified as ordinal, we must expect to find differences of pitch integrating to similar products. And these are to be found, namely, (tonal) interval and (a certain aspect of) melody.

(3) A third law states a fact that has already been referred to and is of the greatest importance, namely that the integrative product is an addition to the mass of integrating experiences, whose existence and continuance within the integrative process it in no way impairs. It is this fact that makes such a profound difference between the scheme of sensationalism and that now expounded. At the same time, this addition to experience gives a place within experience to all that has been claimed and taught regarding the creative synthesis or evolution of experience. But this interpretation or description of experience may claim to be more scientific than others, in so far as it is more positivistic. It does not gather all the creative talents of experience in a greedy hand and bestow them upon a single agent—the brain, or the soul, or apperception, or what not. It leaves them all in their places. It lets psychical creation come forth in its order, just as the natural and biological sciences set forth the order of natural creation.

4. **Scheme of integration forms.**—No proper

[1] *The Psychology of Sound.*

exposition of the different forms of sensory and of cognitive integration can be given in this short article. But a scheme of those forms may help to bring some comprehensive arrangement into the mass of data that the reader will find in the chapters of textbooks of psychology dealing with sensory and cognitive experience. Of the six attributes the chief integrating one is order. Differences in systemic order alone give systemic distance, differences in temporal order temporal distance or time interval. The unity of simultaneous and progressive differences in these two ordinal attributes is motion. These three integrates all vary in magnitude — size or speed. Distances are found in all the senses that show distinct variations in the attribute of order—touch and the other skin sensations, articular sense, sound, and sight. All senses give differences of temporal order, but some give them much better than others. So we have specially temporal, or rhythmic, senses. Obviously motion will be limited to the senses that give distance well. No other attribute than order integrates well, or even at all perhaps. An exception seems to occur in vision, where lustre is found to involve differences of brightness and seems to be a new character supervening upon these differences. It also obeys a further law of integration in that it supervenes both upon simultaneously (binocularly) and upon successively (uniocularly) presented differences. This law appears to be observed in all integrations that do not involve differences in temporal order, which, as we know them, are always successive. But the problem of lustre is not quite clear; lustre may, in fact, belong to the next level of integration, which is called bisystemic, because it involves two systems of elementary sense-organs, or two ordinal systems, of the same kind—*e.g.*, two eyes, two ears.

This bisystemic level gives, in vision, a new third dimension to the forms that are found in the plane field of vision of one eye. With two eyes simultaneously, or with one eye successively, we see solidity, *i.e.* stereoscopically. Binaural hearing is similar, but simpler. It gives a new (transverse) line of orders. The pitch series of each ear is a single (longitudinal) dimension. The combined use of these two (not mathematical, but merely narrow) lines allows of (transverse) oscillation of emphasis from one side (or ear) to the other, and so provides a basis, though a very imperfect one, for our correspondingly weak power of localizing sounds round the head.

The next level of integration is intersystemic; it holds between systems of different kinds of senses. This kind of integration is still more difficult for the individual to acquire than the preceding. We may express the problem materially by asking how the impressions of the different senses ever meet together in the vast brain, so as to form a unitary whole. Although the problem has been perpetually ignored, the same question must be asked about the (vast) mind. How do the systems of the different senses become reconciled and correlated with one another? How do the impressions of the different senses ever meet together 'in the mind'? The question becomes specially acute when we turn to examine the psychological origin of the 'object.' Take the old stock example of the 'orange.' How do the different sensations given by an orange hitch on to one another in the child's mind? Not by mere simultaneous association, for not all things that are merely together in the mind associate together. There must be a specific basis that regulates association.

A minute study of visual bisystemic integration shows that this basis is the identity or similarity of the plane forms or figures that appear in the integrating systems of the two eyes. Similarly, the systems of the different senses may be supposed to unite to form our sensory space only by the integration of their systems by means of the very similar forms and motions that are impressed upon the different senses by one and the same real object. Thus too the contributions of the different senses are brought together to form units of perception—*e.g.*, 'orange.'

The interaction of the distances and forms presented within the system of a single sense offers a rich field for study. This is most apparent in the many visual illusions (*q.v.*) now so familiar. These figures are illusions simply because their parts, when presented together, modify one another and so appear otherwise than they do when presented alone. They are chiefly illusions of distance or size, and of direction—a derivative of distance.

The scheme of sensory cognitive integrations may be summed up schematically as on next page.

5. The higher cognitive powers. — (*a*) *The psycho-physical problem.* — The cognitive work of experience thus appears as a great hierarchy, developing upwards by its own initiative from the data given by the senses—we say 'by its own initiative,' because in such a scheme we do not need to postulate any sort of developing agent to work or even to guide development. We can study the whole process positivistically, just as the physical, chemical, and biological sciences study the course of development within their spheres. We may speak of 'development' because the 'higher' unities are more comprehensive and also (we may confidently assert) *later* than the unities of the lower levels.

Thus, *e.g.*, we need make no speculative references to the brain for a basis of integration. Whether there is in the brain a parallel or preceding, real, unifying process or not is a question for the physiologist to settle. An answer to it, whether positive or negative, can in no way affect the work of psychology in the study of the integrative process as it is in experience. Whether parallelism or interaction be the true answer to the psycho-physical problem is not very important for the present, for the simple reason that it will be very long before proper material for an answer is to hand. On the other hand, a psychical agent, such as the soul, is quite useless. Even the spy-glass rôle of thought may be dispensed with. In that theory thought is held to be an indispensable accompaniment or attribute of sensation. It comes with it in some germ-like form, and over and through sensation, as it were, it spies out the object or cause of sensation. How could an experience have or know an object, if it were not so? How could it even if it were so? we may ask in reply.

The scheme propounded, on the other hand, offers a direct basis for constructive work on the 'references' of thought. An integrated state is always attached to, and so refers to, the basis upon which it is integrated. A melody is not a unity that is just present along with tones, as the title-name of the melody more or less is. It is intimately blended into the being of the tones, as it were. It is this intimacy of connexion that makes a psychologist like Titchener altogether overlook the presence of something new in the melody-total (or in a square) beyond the ultimate data of sense. In the same way in a perception each sensation which enters into the unity is equally 'it.' The colour of the orange is 'it,' and so are the taste, the smell, and the feel (of 'it'). And, on the other hand, the 'it' of the perception refers to each of these.

SCHEME OF THE INTEGRATIONS OF COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE.



The stage of perception (*q.v.*) at which the cause of a percept comes into view is certainly not the earliest form of perception, where the integrate is nothing but an it-centre of sensory experience, but a rather advanced stage in which there is some conceptual concentration of individual perceptions and some of the 'knowledge about' that then supervenes. This 'knowledge about' is not the result of an excursion or observation beyond the confines of experience, as the cause-idea might suggest, but merely the attachment to one another of experiences above the first perceptual stages by the same or similar mechanism as produced these first stages, whereby the higher integration is attained that we know as abstract knowledge or conception (*q.v.*). All these abstract units must not, however, be supposed to have to hang in the air above the sensory levels of integrations, as if they were the gases of corruption mounting upwards from them. They are attached or refer downwards to their basis through a continuous line of integration, just as the other integrative products do. And it is just this attachment which puts substance, cause, and interaction, particles or parts of various levels—atoms, molecules, and the rest—*into* the objects of perception.

(*b*) *Development in man and animals.*—The study of development (*q.v.*) is readily accessible in this way. If a certain level of integration can by indirect evidence—of conduct, learning-by-experiment, and so on—be proved to exist in any animal, we know what earlier levels of experience are implied in it. Research thus far seems to have shown conclusively that no animal other than man shows any evidence of commanding the conceptual level of integration. But recognition and, still more, perception are by no means excluded among the higher animals. The task of deciding in each particular case is very difficult, involving a great deal of very elaborate and precautious experimentation.

To the further important question why every animal that is well endowed with efficient sense-organs does not develop to as high an integrative level of experience as man, psychology is unable as yet to give a definite answer. This appears the more strange as man seems in certain respects to be possessor of senses which compare unfavourably with those of many other mammals. This is especially so in the case of smell and of hearing. In vision we are relatively efficient. But in one important respect we have a great advantage; we are possessors of mobile hands and fingers. The significance of this is that it endows us with a second highly elaborate and clear field of tri-dimensional forms, namely the tactual-articular. The other mammals, with the exception of our nearest relatives, use their articular sense almost only for the general purpose of postures and bodily movement, while their touch is imprisoned behind their masses of fur.

There can be no doubt that the possession of a plurality of tri-dimensional senses is highly important for development. For hearing is only weakly dimensional, and smell in ourselves (and possibly in the other mammals as well) is not so at all. All our other senses, apart from the visual and articular, are only vaguely dimensional, inactive, and of poor discriminatory power. But, as we have seen, the correlation and integration of active and complex dimensional senses are required for the proper development of sensory space, and that in its turn is the gateway to the higher cognitive powers. So we may maintain as probable the view that the height of development of the 'mind' depends largely upon the extent of variation given in the elementary data of the senses. And we should, therefore, expect to find that the size of the brain depends not so much upon the room required for the cerebral mechanisms of conception as upon the size of the parts required for the bi- and tri-dimensional senses of fine discrimination. Of course neural centres may also be required for all integrative levels. But these are problems which we must leave to the physiologist.

6. Memory and imagery.—With memory (*q.v.*)

another aspect of experience comes into view that is of the greatest importance. It seems clear that there can be no memory work except upon the basis of the spontaneous integrations of experience. Memory is not mechanical association of contiguous parts of an aggregate, as sensationalism is compelled to suppose. Much, if not all, has yet to be done before the springs of memory are clearly exposed. But there is a growing tendency of evidence and conviction to show that memory presupposes some form of integrative activity which makes the old form of contiguous association untenable except as a formula that presupposes but ignores this integrative activity.

But, if this is granted, there seems no doubt that association gives experiences a new grip of one another, so that, even when an integrative unity is dissolved by lapsing as an actuality, it can be reinstated from a part of its original foundations by the extra bond established before the integration lapsed. And, as we know, repetitive contemplation of the integrative complex helps to make associations more powerful and enduring. The experimental study of memory in recent years has greatly extended our knowledge of the conditions affecting strength of association. By association, too, we can extend the scope of integrations, so as to make them include a wider scope of experiences than they otherwise would spontaneously at any one moment. If integration gives height of growth to experience, as we might say, then memory gives it breadth. And the growth that can be attained in breadth by effort is enormous.

At the same time this redintegrative action of memory makes it possible for an integrative product to be revived from the side, as it were, instead of by its full conditions from below. And the revival of these lower springs does not seem to be necessary in memory work. A concept, *e.g.*, can never be got originally except from below. And yet in the fluent operations of thought, which depend so much upon the work of memory, that concept may be revived, and used as an essential link in the process of thought, without the revival of any of its sources of integration, even in the form of imagery.

And from this issue we may pass directly to the question of the value of imagery. An older evaluation of imagery considered it as a mere trace or record of previous direct impressions of sense-sensations now called up accidentally owing to the associative linking that supervened to bind it and the present reviving sensation together when both were previously present as sensations. But that view is almost certainly wrong. Imagery is revived more often because of the integrative complexes into which it was as sensation wrought up, and because it is now wanted for the redintegrative and new integrative processes of thought. Thus, when one is asked, 'Does the water-line of a ship rise or fall as it passes from fresh water to salt?', the reason why an image-scene of a ship passing from a river-mouth to the sea appears in some form or other in almost every one's mind is that such a scene presents all the material of the question in a natural and familiar scheme, each concept attached to its own peg. The memory has then to work upon the instructions given in the question and to revive what material is readily available in it, so that some of that material may perhaps cohere well with the points of the question and thus yield the answer. And, according to the drift of this work of memory and coherence (thought), so a person will even *see* the ship rising or falling in his mind's eye. Compare with that easy question such a one as this: 'John is twice as old as Mary was when he was as old as Mary is. If John is 21, how old is Mary?' Conceptually the two questions are probably equally easy; but no image is readily forthcoming in the second to hold all the concepts and their relations together in the mind and make action between them easy. When that action is easy, the answer to the question is its outcome, or rather is the verbal expression of its outcome. The thought involved in answering the question is partly the memory work, partly the trying of the concepts and the memory additions together to see if they will not give the definite complex implied by the question.

Now, one is tempted to elaborate the point and to show the question groping for its answer, like the tentacles of an octopus searching in some dark cave for what is movable and appetizing. And the reader may feel impatient at the futility of trying to make the mind work like a machine. It is the self that thinks and searches, is it not? The self is the groper that searches and sees fitness and judges? It is the self that attends, at least, for sure? It is difficult to see how one self could do so many different things. We ought at least to have the case for the self put more convincingly before us than hitherto. This will doubtless be done, if it can be done. But this much may be said, that recent psychologists in general do not seem to find that line of construction the most hopeful at the present time. Of course, very much further study by experimental and systematic methods is required if the complex field of cognitive activities is to be fully understood.

III. *Emotive aspects.* — Thus far we have dealt with the sensory-cognitive range of experience. We have now to consider the emotive aspects of it.

1. **Integrative theory of feeling.**—One of the most familiar views of feeling is incorporated in the three-aspects theory, according to which every experience has three aspects—cognitive, emotive, conative; knowing, feeling, and will. Or these three are merely one and the same experience from different points of view. Now there can be no hesitation about rejecting this theory so far as concerns feeling. Feeling is not an aspect of every experience; it is an experience definitely distinguishable from every other. Nor does it even accompany every other kind of experience regularly. Any one familiar with the experimental practice of introspection knows that he is not constantly feeling pleasure or displeasure. In fact, he will have found that he is in a state of feeling rather seldom than otherwise. Whole complexes and trains of experience pass by without any feeling of pleasantness or of unpleasantness appearing. It is for this reason that the theory of feeling as an attribute of sensation has also been rejected.

The difficulty has been at all times to know where to place feeling. The attributive theory is the only attempt that has been made to give it a definite place in the sensory cognitive range. The older sensationalists tried to work it into their field as a definite sensation or by the device known as mental chemistry. In this a group of sensations was held to turn by combination into an experience that did not at all resemble sensation, just as the gases hydrogen and oxygen combine to form the very different liquid water. So feelings might really be groups of tactual or organic sensations and yet not appear as such. That theory has been rightly rejected by everybody and has wrongly created a prejudice against every inclination to gather ideas towards the elucidation of experience from such a science as chemistry.

But even in recent times an attempt has been made to show that feeling is psychologically a sensation. It has quality—pleasantness and un-

pleasantness—and intensity; and the two problematical attributes of extensity and 'localization' (supposed in this theory to be an attribute) can be made plausible with an effort; feeling is not located at the beautiful picture and in the beautiful sound, but it seems to be spread out in the head more or less indefinitely. If no sense-organ of feeling is known, at least we may suppose that one does exist. Only it would not appear on the periphery, but would probably be concealed within the peripheral sense-organs or within the central nervous system, revealing to us how these organs are being affected, whether as usual (pleasantly) or far away from the range of their normal functions (unpleasantly).

This theory of feeling-sensations has not found many supporters—not that it has been definitely proved to be wrong; but it is too supposititious and speculative. Something as plausible and more in accord with the psychical facts is imaginable.

We need not discuss the theory that looks upon feeling as an irreducible element of experience. This view is the natural outcome of many fruitless attempts to resolve feeling into sensations or the like. But it does not preclude renewed attempts at reduction in general, and in particular an integrative theory of feeling is still a possibility.

Titchener has attempted to carry this theory of feeling as an element to its logical conclusion—a psychological definition of feeling as characterized by a different set of attributes from that peculiar to sensation. His important point is that feeling lacks the attribute of clearness possessed by sensation. We shall not renew the discussion of clearness. What we may notice now specially is the subtle difficulty of positing elements of experience of which one possesses attributes that another lacks. Besides, in this talk of the non-clearness or unclearness of feeling and of the difficulty of observing feeling are we not looking for a mare's nest, as it were? Suppose motion were regarded as a specific experience by such a theorist as Titchener. What would he say about its quality and intensity? Would they be non-existent or non-clear? And would motion, then, have only two attributes of extensity and localization? Or would it also be said to lack clearness? Probably no one is ever in doubt as to whether he is pleased or not. Where, then, is the non-clearness? Nor is he in doubt about how pleased he is. Then, if all that and nothing else is clear, probably there is nothing else in feeling to be clear about. Feeling would then be very like motion, as it appears within an integrative theory. It is just motion (its quality, if you like), and it has magnitude—speed. So feeling has quality and magnitude—intensity.

The work of an integrative theory of feeling really begins when the double basis of feeling has to be shown up, and also the difference in the parts of that basis that integrates to form feeling. There are many lines of evidence that converge to support this theory and to make it at least probable as an advance beyond the more conservative theory of feeling as an irreducible element of experience. But their exposition is too long to be given here.

2. Problem of the emotions.—We may consider briefly the other great division of the emotive life—the emotions proper. The feelings are only slight movements of the soul, as it were; emotions are rolling waves and storms whose troubles reach far down into the deep waters. And the scientific problems of emotion are equally deep and agitated.

Even the enumeration of the emotions is by no means settled. Of course about the great emotions—fear, anger, and love—there is hardly a doubt. Questions are sometimes raised about the primacy of love—the attempt may be made to attach it so closely to the sexual instinct as to endanger its dignity as an emotion—whereas there is no such introductory function of bodily origin for the emotions of fear and anger; they come upon us like the thunder-storms of summer.

This absence of a bodily preparation serves to distinguish the emotions from the instincts, which are concerned with the great functions of reproduction, nourishment, self-protection, and the like. But there are those who tack on special 'instincts' to the emotions in order to explain the typical and neurally inherited expressions of the emotions—*e.g.*, fear and the instincts of flight and concealment, anger and the instinct of pugnacity.

Other disputed emotions are sorrow, pride, humility, parental emotion, disgust, curiosity, loneliness, etc. No one would dispute the presence of an emotive state in these affections. The question rather is: Are they primary emotions or are they variant forms of a few generic emotions that differ only in the objects to which they refer?

This *object* of emotions offers as many hard problems as does the object of cognition. Not only is it hard to see how emotion comes to be directed upon an object at all—on that rock the James-Lange theory of the emotions, *e.g.*, foundered—but the peculiar individuality of the object is puzzling. Of the object of cognition we know at least that it only gradually emerges into clear view, and we can form plausible theories of the gradual emergence of a definite objective relation. But in emotion the object may appear suddenly upon the mental horizon without any sort of previous preparation, and lo! the emotion is directed upon it at once in full force. This peculiarity is found also among the instincts. Many insects seem to be born with a nervous system prepared specifically for attention to special objects. The physiological difficulty lies in the complicated process that seems required to account for the 'perception' of those special objects. Animals may 'recognize' their other sex by simple smell-impressions. But how should a wasp recognize a certain kind or size of caterpillar in that way? Hence even the possibility of innate ideas has been seriously considered to be re-admissible. But that way out of the difficulty seems to the writer intolerable in science.

Then, again, the emotions renew the psychophysical difficulty. They are held to be strange phases of the spirit, as strange and unaccountable as the sensations of red and yellow in their dependence on etheric wave-lengths. The feeling of fear is said to be an experience for which we cannot account by relating it to other experiences; it is a gift from the brain; something happens in some remote corner of that vast mechanism, some subtle neural congestion, and the colour of our mood is determined by it in accordance with unknown psycho-physical laws. This doctrine may be illustrated by an example from another region: we draw the hand away from heat because of the pain, so we think; that is an illusion; the real reason for drawing the hand away is neural mechanism; we should draw the hand away in just the same way if even pleasure were substituted for pain; and we should then think, as now, that we drew it away because of the pleasure of it.

The writer is firmly convinced that this is a doctrine disastrous to any form of psychological science and a mockery to the sense and coherence of the whole of experience. For, if it is a doctrine applicable anywhere—*e.g.*, in the emotions—it is applicable everywhere. And then, as has been so often deduced, Shakespeare's work is the accidental product of a swarm of chance variations.

As well might one truly think that, if a fount of type were cast into the air often enough, it would come down one day as *King Lear*. These reminiscences of scientific speculation carry us back to a line of thought that is far from rare, although it was probably much more universal among biologists a decade or two ago than it is now. But, as far as the outlook upon pure psychology is concerned, it has changed very little. It means, after all, only that a coherent sphere of law has not yet been recognized in experience, and that the recognition of it as such has been made very much less likely by the success of the theory of chance variations in the neighbouring sphere of biology. It is pleasant to think that such an absurd doctrine has so often been rejected by the professed philosophers of the mind.

But we must not be content with vague 'spiritual' terms and generally 'ideal' expressions. We must carry over the methods and spirit of the natural sciences into the systematic, constructive work of psychology and show how purely psychical laws will yield us a satisfactory understanding of the world of spirit, just as purely material laws give us a satisfactory knowledge of the world of matter. The evolutions and actions of the material world can be worked by no agents or guides, so far as science is concerned at least. Of course, science is only the systematic mirroring of realities in cognition. Being other than what it pictures, it can hardly repeat the inner spontaneity and being that are the essence, as against the form, of its objects. Nor can psychical evolutions and actions be worked by spiritual agents or guides, so far as the science of mind is concerned. We can only hope to find general laws of mind or of psychical stuff and to explain particular psychical phenomena properly according to them, as the ways of science demand. Then we may let matter and mind come into cognitional harmony with one another, as they undoubtedly can and will, in due course.

And a psychology on these lines of construction is in no sense a descent to a lower level, an abandonment of higher ideals. It is rather a confidence and claim in the equal primacy of the sphere of experience as a basis for the derivation of laws alongside any other part of the scientific universe. We have every right to expect that the world of experience will be as amenable to the strict ways of science as the world of matter upon which it is, as we know it, dependent.

IV. *CONATION.*—The only other sphere of experience to be mentioned is conation. In so far as that is conation within experience, as in attending, remembering, thinking, and the like, the study of it is continuous with that sketched in the preceding pages. In so far as conation involves muscular movement, we enter upon a new region of special difficulty. Here psychology is still struggling with the barest facts and first principles, as the dearth of information on the topic in any of the textbooks indicates. The reader must simply be referred to special treatises on the subject.

The primary question is an introspective one: What precisely lies before the mind's observation in the case of voluntary movement? And how can we make a coherent, systematic whole of all the facts gathered by the experimental pursuit of this problem? One of the common earlier answers to the question has been disproved. We do not necessarily anticipate our voluntary movement in a mental image of it and will movement from that basis. But the true psychological formula of voluntary movement has still to be determined. The way to knowledge is probably blocked in this, as in other regions of experience, by the confused notions left from the wrecks of previous theories. We may expect the right key to unlock the door quite easily.

The problem of conation makes possible a reference to the line of thought that distinguishes the content, or objective side, of an experience from its subjective side or the act of it. Those two sides can be distinguished in all experiences. So we have for the series of sensum, percept, concept a corresponding series of acts—sensation, perception, conception. This distinction carries us back again to the distinction of the objective aspect of experience from the self which acts experience or does it. It is in fact only a variant upon this theory. Ingenious attempts have been made to build up a science of these acts—sensing, perceiving, remembering, imagining, etc.—which deserve serious consideration. But the writer, at least, is not convinced of the validity of the results claimed or of the merits and necessity attributed to this line of construction. At the same time, he is aware that a psychology 'without a soul,' and still more without such a series of acts, may seem to many to be a wooden affair. It seems to him that the dispute is not one which as yet makes great difference to the detail work of psychology, and he inclines to think that the difficulty discussed is the appearance in psychology of the difficulty of substance and action, matter and energy, that runs throughout all the sciences of the real. Content and act are, then, rather inseparable aspects of one reality—the reality described statically by the titles of its distinguishable unities and dynamically by the titles of the chief interactions of its parts—rather than the waters of matter and the spirit that hovers over them to divide them hither and thither.

LITERATURE.—The following works will introduce the reader in detail to the methods, facts, and theories upon which this article is based: **C. S. Myers**, *A Text-book of Experimental Psychology; with Laboratory Exercises*[2], Cambridge, 1911; **E. B. Titchener**, *A Manual of Laboratory Practice*, 4 vols., London, 1901–06; **G. M. Whipple**, *Manual of Mental and Physical Tests*, Baltimore, 1910; **F. Aveling**, *On the Consciousness of the Universal and the Individual*, London, 1912; **W. McDougall**, *An Introd. to Social Psychology*, do. 1908; **A. F. Shand**, *The Foundations of Character*, do. 1914; **Titchener**, *Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention*, New York, 1908, *Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes*, do. 1909; **H. J. Watt**, *The Psychology of Sound*, Cambridge, 1917; **W. James**, *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., London, 1891; **W. B. Pillsbury**, *The Fundamentals of Psychology*, do. 1916; **G. F. Stout**, *A Manual of Psychology*[3], do. 1913; **Titchener**, *A Text-book of Psychology*, New York, 1909–10; **J. Ward**, art. 'Psychology,' in *EBr*[11]; **J. B. Watson**, *Behavior; an Introd. to Comparative Psychology*, New York, 1914; **S. Alexander**, 'Foundations and Sketch-plan of a Conational Psychology,' *British Journal of Psychology*, iv. [1911] 239–267; **McDougall**, *Body and Mind*, London, 1911; **B. Russell**, *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*, do. 1914; **Stout**, 'The Nature of Conation and Mental Activity,' *British Journal of Psychology*, ii. [1906] 1–15.

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PSYCHO-THERAPEUTICS. — This is the name employed for the processes by which man attempts to influence disease by measures acting through the mind. It is a subject which brings out more prominently than any other the close relation which has existed throughout its whole history between medicine on the one hand and magic and religion on the other. The earliest modes of healing of which we know are psycho-therapeutic, and, if the remedies of existing peoples of rude culture provide any indication of primitive modes of thought and action, psycho-therapeutics would seem to be the oldest branch of medicine. A distinction must be made, however, between the use of measures for the cure or amelioration of disease which act through the mind and the recognition of their psycho-therapeutic character. Though psycho-therapeutics may have been the earliest form of medicine, it has been the last to be brought within the scope of scientific treatment, the last to undergo that process of rational-

ization and foundation upon scientific principles which is the essential feature distinguishing medicine from those social processes with which it has been closely allied throughout its history.

A study of the behaviour of savage man towards disease shows that it consists almost exclusively of measures which, when successful, must have acted through the mind, especially by means of faith and suggestion. A leech who treats a case of headache on the assumption that it has been caused by the magical actions of a sorcerer, and either performs counter-charms or induces the sorcerer to remove his spell, is evidently acting purely through these agencies. In other cases faith and suggestion only assist a process which acts in some other way. Thus, a leech who treats a case of constipation on the assumption that the trouble is due to the presence of a snake or octopus in the abdomen will produce a good effect by the mechanical action of manipulations designed to destroy the imaginary animal, but in such a case faith and suggestion also play a great part. In most of the cases in which leaves, bark, or roots are employed by lowly peoples to cure disease we can be confident that success is due purely to faith and suggestion. The history of pharmacology reveals a process, still far from complete, in which medicaments supposed to act upon disease have failed to justify their reputation when subjected to scientific study and have evidently owed their reputation for medicinal virtue to faith and suggestion. While faith and suggestion are processes inextricably interwoven with the employment of therapeutic measures from the earliest stages of medicine down to the present time, these agencies have taken many other and more direct forms. The modern explanation of miraculous cures given by those who rationalize religion is that they act through faith and suggestion, and the systems of healing which are continually coming into existence in opposition to the orthodox medicine of modern civilized peoples owe their success largely, if not entirely, to the power and efficacy of these agencies. The large measure of success which these movements obtain in popular opinion is due to their exploitation, wittingly or unwittingly, of processes which orthodox medicine has failed adequately to recognize.

1. Scope.—It is often supposed that psycho-therapeutics, whether belonging to orthodox medicine or to some form of faith-healing, is especially applicable in cases of hysteria or similar diseases. There is, however, hardly a variety of disease for which this mode of treatment may not be useful. It is customary in medicine to distinguish between organic and functional disease, though these are, in fact, merely categories convenient for practical purposes, which pass insensibly into one another and are difficult to define. Roughly, by functional disease is meant disease for which existing knowledge does not allow us to assign any structural or chemical basis, which has been found by experience to tend towards recovery. There are other diseases, such as so-called idiopathic epilepsy, of the physical basis of which we are ignorant, which are characterized by a tendency towards permanent loss of function and death, and these diseases are not usually included in the functional category. Organic diseases, on the other hand, are those whose structural or chemical basis has been discovered. They again fall into two main groups: those which tend towards recovery and those which tend towards loss of function and death. In addition many mixed form occur. Nothing is more frequent than the occurrence of functional disturbance as an accompaniment of organic disease, the real nature of which it often conceals or obscures.

It is in the treatment of functional disease and of the functional accompaniments of organic disease that psycho-therapeutic measures are most obviously applicable, but the scope of their usefulness is far from being limited to these. When it is claimed that some psycho-therapeutic measure, employed by physician or priest, has cured a case of organic disease, it will often be found that all that has been done is to remove the functional disorders which so often accompany organic disease. Psycho-therapeutic agencies can certainly influence organic conditions themselves, though the investigation of cases like these is attended by such difficulties that the mode of action is still surrounded by much doubt. We know that suggestion, especially in the form of hypnotism, can produce changes in organic processes and especially in the circulation. If such an organic change as a blister can be produced by suggestion, it is easy to understand how other organic changes can be ameliorated or removed by similar means.

A more frequent cause of the success of psycho-therapeutic measures in organic disease depends on the fact that many forms of progressive organic disease—even so grave an illness as cancer—are liable to periods of retardation or quiescence. Disease usually depends on a struggle between some noxious agent which has found its way into the body and the mechanism of the body itself. Progressive disease is that in which the external agents have the upper hand in this struggle. Any factor which raises the efficiency of the intrinsic forces, or, in other words, which reinforces the vitality of the patient, may diminish the ravages of the destroying agent and lead to retardation or quiescence of the disease; or may even in some cases turn the balance in the direction of recovery. It is thus intelligible that psycho-therapeutic measures should be capable of the beneficial action upon organic disease so often imputed to them by leech or priest, quite apart from the mere removal of functional complications. The scope of psycho-therapy is therefore as wide as medicine itself. It is especially applicable, however, in those states which depend on diminished efficiency of the nervous system and are classified together as neuroses.

2. Basis.—Certain principles are now widely recognized as of universal application in the domain of therapeutics, while others have been put forward to support special systems.

One widely-accepted principle is that psychical disorders and bodily disorders due to psychical conditions require psychical remedies. There are, of course, limits to the application of this principle. The influence of abnormal bodily conditions upon psychical states stands beyond all doubt. If there are morbid states of the body which are capable of being treated by physical means, it is essential that they shall be put right as a preliminary or accessary to the employment of psychical measures. In many cases, however, it is far from easy to estimate the need for the two kinds of treatment. Thus, there is no doubt that the retention in the body of waste products consequent upon constipation influences mental states, but in many cases the constipation itself is largely or altogether due to psychical conditions. As in every other branch of medicine, the essential preliminary to successful psycho-therapy is a correct diagnosis. When we have estimated correctly the relative shares taken by bodily and mental conditions in the production of an illness, there will be no difficulty in deciding how far the patient is to be treated by measures acting through the body and measures acting through the mind respectively.

A second principle which is now coming to be widely accepted is that in disorders of the mind or

affections of the body due to mental conditions it is necessary to discover the causes by which this morbid state has been produced. The history of medicine has been one of gradual progress from the treatment of symptoms to the treatment of the conditions by which symptoms are produced. In this progress the treatment of disorders of the mind has lagged far behind that of bodily disease. There are many practitioners of medicine who, although fully recognizing the importance of ætiology in bodily disease, fail to recognize that it applies equally to the mind, and they continue to treat symptoms as they arise or practise a purely empirical system of therapeutics.

To those who accept the two principles which have just been considered, every case of mental disorder or of bodily disorder consequent upon mental conditions is the outcome of the mental life-history of the patient, and the conditions to which it is due can be discovered only by the investigation of that history.

A third principle, now widely accepted by workers who otherwise differ greatly from one another, is that mental disease is predominantly due to disturbance of the emotional and instinctive aspects of the mind. It is believed that in the search for the conditions which have produced an abnormal mental state it is necessary to get back to experience which has been associated with a strong emotional tone, and it need hardly be said that either this emotional tone must have been of an unpleasant kind in itself or the unpleasantness must have arisen out of consequences which the experience has brought in its train.

Closely associated with this view is that according to which the intellectual disturbance in a case of mental disease depends on a process of rationalization through which the patient endeavours to account to himself for his morbid emotional condition. The direction taken by this process of rationalization is often such as leads to the formation of those beliefs at variance with reality which we call delusions.

A principle which actuates more than one system of psycho-therapeutics, but is still far from meeting with general acceptance, is that mental disorder is predominantly due to experience which has passed out of manifest consciousness. It is customary to speak of the body of experience which does not enter into manifest consciousness as the unconscious mind which shades off into manifest consciousness through an intermediate region of subconsciousness.

Putting aside the largely verbal question whether this body of apparently forgotten experience is or is not to be regarded as forming part of the mind,[1] we are met with the far more vital problem concerned with the distinction between experience which is merely lying dormant, ready to appear in manifest consciousness whenever the suitable stimulus arises, and experience which has come to stand in that relation to manifest consciousness which is known as dissociation. A dissociated body of experience is one which has been separated from the body of experience making up manifest consciousness through some kind of active process—a process resembling in many respects that known as inhibition in neurology. Such dissociated experience is not recalled even by otherwise suitable stimuli in normal mental conditions, but requires abnormal or at least unusual conditions to bring it to the surface. A good example of such a dissociated mental state is that which occurs in the deeper stages of hypnotism. One of the most vexed problems of psycho-therapeutics turns on the question how far such dissociated bodies of experience, when accompanied by an unpleasant tone of feeling, act as the basis of bodily and mental disorder. One theory of the rôle taken by such unconscious experience in the production of mental disorder which is now especially prominent is that of Freud.

[1] Cf. *Lancet*, 16th June 1917.

Freud's theory of the unconscious.—From the point of view which concerns psycho-therapeutics, the most important part of Freud's system is his theory of forgetting. According to Freud, forgetting is not a passive process, but one which, at any rate in so far as unpleasant experience is concerned, depends on an active process of repression. It is held that unpleasant experience which has passed out of memory to such an extent that it does not enter into the manifest consciousness of everyday life has not ceased to exist, but continues to exert an influence upon the mind. It may express itself more or less continuously in the form of a phobia, a tic, stammering, dreams, etc., or, after a long period of quiescence, it may show itself under the influence of some shock or strain as a paralysis, contracture, affection of sensibility, or some form of mental disturbance. The disturbance, whatever may be its nature, is held to be the result of a conflict between a suppressed body of experience, now generally known as a 'complex,' and the general personality of the patient.

Freud has not been content merely to ascribe abnormal bodily and mental conditions to such conflict, but has put forward an elaborate theory of the mechanism by which the suppressed experience or complex produces its effects. He supposes that its modes of expression are governed by a mechanism of control which, using a metaphorical simile, he terms the 'censor.' This censorship allows the suppressed body of experience to find its way to manifest consciousness only in some indirect and often symbolic manner.

Two special features of the psychology upon which the Freudian system of therapeutics is based may be considered here: (*a*) the importance of the experience of childhood and (*b*) the rôle of sexuality in the production of morbid mental states.

(*a*) According to the earlier views of Freud, the suppressed experience of childhood forms the chief factor underlying morbid mental states, whether these express themselves explicitly in the form of mental symptoms or as paralyses, contractures, or other bodily affections. These states, he argues, depend on complexes dating back to early childhood, or even, in the more grotesque forms of the theory, to parturition or ante-natal experience. Freud has himself acknowledged the unsatisfactory character of much of the evidence upon which he originally based his belief in the importance of the experience of early childhood. The trend of modern work has been to accentuate the importance of recent traumata in the production of morbid mental states and to make of less account the experience of early life. This movement should not be allowed, however, to go too far and obscure the great extent to which early experience is responsible for the phobias, tics, and tendencies to morbid modes of thought, and still more of feeling, which form so fertile a soil for the growth of morbid mental states in later life.

(*b*) Another principle of the Freudian psychology which has led to much controversy, and has through the exaggeration of its importance gone far to wreck the immediate success of the whole construction, is concerned with the rôle of the sexual in the production of morbid mental states. Freud has come to the conclusion that the bodies of suppressed experience which he believes to underlie mental disorder invariably centre in incidents of the sexual life. So far as he himself is concerned, the form thus taken by his psychology of the morbid rests largely on an extension of the

connotation of the term 'sexual' far beyond the customary, but, in the hands of his disciples and to a large extent in his own, the theory has come to deal almost exclusively with crude sexual experience, morbid mental states being ascribed to the working of repressed sexual trends and especially of perverse tendencies. There is no question that disorder of the sexual life, especially when its nature leads to repression, takes a vast part in the causation of mental disorder and of functional affections of the nervous system. It can also be granted that Freud and his followers have made definite advances in our knowledge of the sexual life, but, following the ordinary lines of scientific progress, the importance of the sexual has been so exaggerated by its advocates that it has produced a wide-spread failure to recognize the undoubted merits of the Freudian psychology and of the system of psycho-therapeutics founded upon it.

When regarded dispassionately, Freud's theory is only an extension and systematization of a principle, now widely accepted, that mental disorder, in the broadest sense, is not merely the result of the shock or strain which seems to be its immediate cause, but is the outcome of life-long processes by which the mental life has failed to adapt itself to its social environment. Every case of mental disorder is the product of two factors—a shock or strain, on the one hand, and the body of experience making up the mental constitution of the patient, on the other hand. The main principle upon which any system of psycho-therapeutics must be based is that this mental constitution must be studied and analyzed so as to discover the elements of weakness which have allowed the shock or strain to produce a morbid effect. The great merit of Freud's theory is that it provides a scheme of mental structure which, though it will doubtless have to be greatly modified, yet furnishes a most useful hypothesis from which to start in the study of mental disorder and of the measures by which its effects may be combated.

3. Psycho-therapeutic agencies.—The measures employed by those who practise psycho-therapeutics, whether they be leeches, sorcerers, or priests, depend on belief in certain agencies, though, as a matter of fact, the vast majority of practitioners employ their remedies without definitely formulating to themselves, or even without being at all aware of, the nature of these agencies; or, if the practitioner has definite notions concerning the mode of action of his measures, the agencies upon which his success really depends are often different from those in which he places his trust. The chief agencies upon which psycho-therapeutic measures are based are supernatural agency, direct human agency, faith and suggestion, and three agencies of especial importance which may be called catharsis, autognosis, and sublimation, while more subsidiary rôles fall to reasoning, sympathy, and occupation.

(*a*) *Supernatural agency.*—The belief that supernatural beings are able to act upon disease is common to nearly all, if not all, the religions of the world. Everywhere man believes, or has believed, that beings with powers superior to his own can be induced to influence the course of disease if they are approached by suitable rites. This belief applies not only to beings who can be regarded as gods, but also to the spirits or ghosts of the dead, and especially of dead ancestors, the cult of which forms the essential element in the religious systems of most of the peoples of the earth. In the ruder forms of religion the efficacy of the rites which make up the cults of the gods, the ancestral ghosts, or other spiritual agents is universally ascribed to the direct action of these beings upon disease, but in the more developed forms of religion it is recognized more or less explicitly that the supernatural being works through some natural agency, such as faith. The modern belief that supernatural agents do not directly influence the course of disease depends on the wider belief in the universality of natural causation which is the foundation of science. This belief is supported by the experience that the more closely we examine cases in which the cure of disease is ascribed to supernatural intervention, the smaller becomes the residue which cannot be ascribed to some category of natural causation. The more highly developed the religion, the more do its leaders themselves adopt the theory of natural causation and ascribe successful results of their rites to the working of faith and suggestion.

(*b*) *Human agency.*—There is a wide-spread belief among the peoples of the earth that human beings are able to cure disease by their own powers. This is usually associated with the belief in the production of disease by magical rites, manual and verbal. In such cases the cure is effected either by inducing the sorcerer to remove his spell or by employing some other human agent, believed to be more powerful than the sorcerer, to counteract the spell or avert its consequences. In many of these cases the belief attaches in large measure to the objects or words which are used in the curative rites, and it is probable that the powers ascribed to these objects and words can often be traced back to a belief in divine or ghostly agency. It is certain, however, that efficacy is largely ascribed to the personality of the sorcerer. Some degree of confusion between personality and measures runs through the whole history of medicine. Even at the present time, and in the most civilized communities, the efficacy of therapeutic measures and of religious rites in connexion with disease is largely ascribed by the less educated members of the community to the personality of the physician or priest. Here, even more clearly than in the case of supernatural agency, the trend of modern opinion is to ascribe the efficacy of personality to the action of faith and suggestion.

(*c*) *Faith and suggestion.*—In modern writings on therapeutics and allied subjects it is not customary to distinguish between faith and suggestion, or, if they are distinguished, faith is regarded as a form of suggestion or is held to act through suggestion. This attitude is the result of a tendency to make the scope of suggestion so wide as to include nearly every process by which one mind is acted upon by another mind, by an object of the environment, or even by itself (auto-suggestion). When it is said that faith acts through suggestion, it is meant that through the process of belief, which is the main element in faith, a deity, person, or object produces a certain effect upon the mind which is classified with other effects ascribed to suggestion. Belief is an active and conative process, differing fundamentally from the condition of passive receptiveness which is the essential feature of the cases for which the concept of suggestion was originally framed. Though the two processes are poles apart psychologically, they are often combined. Suggestion often produces its effects through faith, but this is very different from explaining faith by suggestion. We could just as well, or perhaps with more justice, say that suggestion is explained by faith. The fact is that they are two distinct processes, differing essentially from one another in psychological character and producing their effects in very different ways.

Both faith and suggestion are of the greatest importance in psycho-therapeutics. It is undoubtedly to them that the remedies employed by savage and barbarous peoples owe their efficacy,

and they continue to be operative in the most modern forms of medicine where the confidence of the patient in his physician is generally acknowledged to be the first and most important step towards therapeutic success. Throughout the whole history of medicine from the stage of its close association with magic or religion to its full emergence as an independent social institution, the personality of the healer has been of predominant importance. It is through faith in this personality and its influence in directing the process of suggestion that therapeutical measures attain a large proportion of their success.

The influence of faith and suggestion pervades the whole system of treatment of the sick. Not a dose of medicine, not even a measure of diagnosis, can be used without bringing them into action. Their effect often begins even before the physician has seen his patient, and usually they are the more efficacious the more unwittingly they are employed. There are many practitioners of medicine, among both savage and civilized peoples, whose measures would lose most of their efficacy if they realized the true mode of action of the remedies in which they have so profound a faith. Here, as in so many branches of social life, it is half-measures that are especially likely to fail. A physician who understands the real nature of psycho-therapeutic activity and one who is wholly ignorant in this respect will succeed. The unsuccessful practitioner will be one who knows enough to destroy his faith in his medicaments and diatetic remedies without having acquired a sound knowledge of the processes upon which the success of these remedies so largely depends.

(*d*) *Catharsis.*—The two factors, faith and suggestion, run as manifold threads throughout the whole texture of psycho-therapeutics. They are of special importance where the mind is intact or where, more correctly, the mental disorder shows itself by some physical manifestation rather than in some overt disorder of the mind itself. The agency now to be considered is of especial importance where disorder of the mind is due to some mental injury which produces a condition of anxiety. Catharsis is the most important psycho-therapeutic agent in the process of confession, whether this form part of a religious rite or of a manifestly medical procedure. The process relieves a condition of mental tension produced by some trouble which gives cause for anxiety, grief, or other emotional state associated with an unpleasant feeling-tone. In cases where a person has nothing with which to reproach himself the relief produced by communication with others is well recognized. Where the grief due to pent-up trouble is combined with shame the relief is even greater, though the obstacles to the employment of this means of relief are greater.

The term 'catharsis' should properly be limited to the agency by which a pent-up grief, anxiety, or shame is relieved by the process of confession and that in which a mental conflict is resolved by measures which bring to manifest consciousness some element of suppressed experience.

(*e*) *Autognosis.*—Another most important element, both in confession and in the revival of forgotten experience, is that the subject learns the better to know himself. An important factor in the production of mental disorder, still more important in keeping it in being when it has already been produced, is that the patient fails to understand his condition. His whole disorder is enveloped by a sense of mystery which greatly accentuates the emotional state upon which his troubles primarily depend. The process by which the patient learns to understand the real state of his mind and the conditions by which this state has been produced forms a very important therapeutic agency which may be called 'autognosis.'[1]

Autognosis as a therapeutic agency includes a large number of processes. Owing to the ignorance of the elements of physiology and psychology which is general even in the most highly civilized communities, persons suffering from mental and functional nervous symptoms often wholly misunderstand, or vastly misrate the importance of any unusual mental or bodily experience. Thus, the more or less normal hallucinations of the state between sleeping and waking (hypnogogic hallucinations) may give rise to apprehensions of approaching insanity, or normal physiological occurrences may be regarded as symptoms of serious disease—a misconception often greatly assisted by the teaching of quacks or ill-educated medical practitioners. In such cases the process of autognosis consists in imparting elementary knowledge for which the patient should not have waited until he has become the subject of some mental stress.

Another value of autognosis depends on the wholly mistaken estimate of the gravity of offences against morality which frequently accompany states of mental disorder. It is noteworthy that those who suffer in this way are not habitual offenders, who seem to pass as a rule through periods of mental stress without suffering. The persons whose neurasthenic or melancholic state centres in some old moral delinquency are usually persons of undue sensitiveness who may perhaps have only once lapsed from virtue, or may have been only innocent partners in, or even mere spectators of, some immoral act; sometimes they have offended only in thought and not in deed. It is in such cases that the process of autognosis is especially valuable, though to have a fair chance of success it should be employed in the early stages of the malady before the condition of anxiety has become habitual and some unnatural explanation has been systematized to form a delusion. Old injuries of this kind usually produce their effect after some strain and stress which lower vitality and produce disorder of various bodily processes. The awakening of the old mental injury only serves to aggravate and perpetuate this state, thus producing a vicious circle in which the trauma brought to the surface by a pathological condition accentuates the condition by which it has been produced. By the process of autognosis this vicious circle may be broken or weakened and an opportunity given for a movement towards recovery.

Of greater interest and of more importance is the process by which the patient is led to understand how his disorder has developed. Many mental disorders are only exaggerations of tendencies towards modes of feeling, thought, and action which go far back into the life-history of the sufferer. If he can be led to see where he has strayed from normal paths and can learn to know the factors to which this straying has been due, a long step will have been taken towards recovery. If the patient learns that his disease is only the expression of an exaggeration of a wide-spread trend of feeling, thought, or action, his condition will no longer appear mysterious, terrifying, or horrible, but will assume proportions which can be faced rationally and dispassionately.

The instances of autognosis just considered are examples in which mental conditions underlying pathological states are present in a manifest form. One of the leading problems of psycho-therapeutics at the present time is to discover how far the process of autognosis can be extended to include past experience which has wholly disappeared from the conscious mental life. It stands beyond

[1] The present writer owes this term to Dr. William Brown.

all doubt that past experience which has taken so little part in the conscious mental life of a person that it seems to be wholly forgotten may reappear in consciousness during the state of anxiety following some period of physical and mental strain. Moreover, this experience, supposed to have been forgotten, may come to dominate consciousness so as to dwarf all other mental content. All gradations occur between cases in which the memory of an unpleasant experience has never long been out of consciousness and experience which has been so nearly forgotten that the patient may not remember its coming to consciousness, perhaps for years before the period of stress which again brings it to the surface. The doubtful point is whether this series can be extended to include past experience which has so wholly passed from consciousness that it can be brought to the surface only by special means, such as hypnotism, or by the process called psycho-analysis.

(*f*) *Sublimation.*—Of the agencies common to the work of physician, priest, and teacher none is more important than that to which the name 'sublimation' has been given. The process of autognosis often shows the presence of some faulty trend of thought and action which is capable of being turned into a more healthy channel. Many nervous and mental disorders depend, at any rate in part, on tendencies which are altogether anti-social, or, while suitable to one kind of civilization, are out of place in the society into which the sufferer has been born. In such a case sublimation furnishes an alternative to satisfaction or repression.

One of the chief directions which may be taken by the process of sublimation is towards religion. The specific group of sentiments and emotions which make up the psychological basis of religion can often be substituted for those associated with the anti-social trend. Less frequently the sentiments and emotions associated with art can be utilized, or the morbid energy may be directed into some other channel of activity. The great importance of religion in the process of sublimation, and in the whole field of psycho-therapeutics, is that it is able to satisfy both emotional and practical needs, its specific emotions satisfying one kind of need while its many practical activities satisfy others. An additional value which attaches to religion as a means of sublimating morbid energies is due to the fact that in their historical development modern religious systems have brought religion and moral teaching into close relation with one another, so that a definite system of beliefs opposed to various anti-social trends serves to rationalize and fortify the process of sublimation. The relative failure of art, as compared with religion, in the process of sublimation is largely due to the absence of any such association between its specific emotion and moral teaching, most followers of art explicitly denying the connexion with morality which forms so definite a part of modern systems of religion.

(*g*) *Reason.*—One of the most difficult problems of psycho-therapeutics is to assign its proper place to reason as a therapeutic agency. It is a universal experience of those who have to deal with the insane that it is useless to attempt to reason a patient out of his delusions, and this holds good also to a large extent of the obsessions and hypochondriac fancies which are so frequent a feature of the broad borderland between sanity and insanity. By such reasoning the sufferer is often driven to adopt the rôle of an advocate, so that the only result may be the strengthening of his delusion or fancy. Where reasoning does good, it is often only through the influence of faith and suggestion, in which case the reasons given by the physician or priest only reinforce processes of other kinds which act through emotional or instinctive channels. While reason is thus of little direct use, and may even be harmful, it forms a most important element in other psycho-therapeutic agencies, and especially in autognosis. Once the true emotional cause of a morbid state has been discovered and explained to the patient, the exercise of his own reason comes to form an essential element in his amendment or recovery. There is all the difference in the world between the use of reason by one who does not understand the real underlying conditions of the malady and reason exerted when these conditions have been discovered and are themselves the material from which the reasoning starts and upon which it acts. As with other therapeutic agencies reason is useless or harmful only when it is employed in ignorance of the real nature of the morbid state upon which the physician or priest is acting. Here, as in other branches of medicine, the proper use of the remedy depends on the exactness of the diagnosis.

(*h*) *Sympathy.* — The nature of the action of sympathy in psycho-therapeutics raises a problem of considerable difficulty. The sympathy of the physician is essential in gaining the confidence of his patient and is thus an important element in psycho-therapeutics, but, unless very judiciously expressed, sympathy will have a bad effect. It has long been recognized that removal from his or her ordinary surroundings is in most cases essential if a neurasthenic or hysterical patient is to have the best chance of recovery. One very important reason for this is the necessity of removal from the almost invariably injudicious sympathy of relatives and friends by which the attention of the patient towards his symptoms is accentuated. The physician himself should always be on his guard lest an excess of sympathy should increase the attitude of self-regard which is one of the main characteristics of many forms of neurosis. Cases are frequent in which at one stage or another it may be useful to act towards a patient in an apparently unsympathetic manner. In so far as sympathy can be regarded as a direct therapeutic agent, it is as capable of harm as of good. It is in paving the way towards the employment of other agencies that its importance in psycho-therapeutics is most definitely shown.

(*i*) *Occupation.* — In some systems of psycho-therapeutics work has been put in a foremost place. It has been held that the chief need in cases of neurosis is that the mind should be occupied in work of a kind which will direct the attention of the patient away from the morbid activities of his mind and body.

Since a prominent feature of many cases is abnormal preoccupation in some unhealthy trend of thought and feeling, such a course would seem at first sight to be sound, if not obvious. In practice, however, the will to work is present perhaps in excess among persons suffering from neurasthenia or other states which call for psychical treatment, while in a still larger number there is such a lack of interest or such bodily or mental weakness as to make the effort to work even harmful. In such cases it is necessary to restrain rather than encourage activity. In most cases, however, there comes a stage at which the patient is in danger of acquiring a habit of inactivity, and occupation then becomes a most important therapeutic agent. In other cases in which the process of autognosis shows the presence of sloth or misdirected energy the regulation of occupation becomes of the utmost importance in psycho-therapeutics.

4. Psycho-therapeutic measures.—The lines of treatment adopted by one who practises psycho-

therapeutics will depend on his beliefs concerning the nature of the agencies by which disease is produced and cured. If he believes in the efficiency of superhuman agency, his treatment will consist of religious rites of prayer, sacrifice, and propitiation, together in many cases with other rites, such as those of purification, confession, penance, and atonement, designed to put both patient and priest in a proper relation towards the superhuman being whose help is being sought. By some Churches these various rites have been combined so as to form organized systems in which large numbers of the sick undertake pilgrimages to places believed to have miraculous efficacy in the cure of disease.

Similarly, if one believes in human agency as the cause of disease and the means for its removal, either he will adopt measures designed to propitiate the person by whom the disease is believed to have been produced or he will employ, or induce others to employ, measures designed to neutralize those of the sorcerer to whose actions the disease is ascribed.

If the physician believes in suggestion, he will employ this agency wittingly in one of its many forms. If he believes in the value of autognosis, his treatment will consist chiefly in measures designed to bring the patient to a sound knowledge of himself and of the conditions by which his disease has been produced and can be remedied. If he believes in occupation, he will set the patient to tasks designed to turn the morbidly directed energy into this channel.

The discussion of psycho-therapeutic agencies in the preceding section will have pointed the way to other modes of treatment, but a few measures may be more fully considered.

(*a*) *Hypnotism.*—It is now generally accepted that hypnotism as a therapeutic measure is only a mode of utilizing suggestion, the chief feature of the hypnotic state being a condition of heightened suggestibility. Closely allied to hypnotism is the condition, known as hypnoidal suggestion, in which a patient is placed under conditions especially designed to enhance his receptiveness for the influence of suggestion.

A prominent characteristic of hypnotism is the production of a state of dissociation, so that, on coming out of the state, the patient has no conscious recollection of any suggestions which may have been made or of any other events which have occurred during the hypnotic state. Nevertheless the suggestions will act in the manner intended by the hypnotizer, and other events may be recalled when the patient is again hypnotized or may revive in dreams or under other conditions. In the state of hypnoidal suggestion there may also be some degree of dissociation, but the patient, at any rate in its slighter degrees, is aware of the suggestions and other experience.

Perhaps the most debated question of psycho-therapeutics is how far it is legitimate to practise hypnotism and hypnoidal suggestion. The physician who recognizes that every word that he utters may carry a suggestion will naturally utilize this agency as much as possible. The question which is disputed is how far it is legitimate to accentuate the influence of suggestion by the production of the dissociation which characterizes the hypnotic state, or to give suggestions to the patient in such a way that he is led to believe that some force with an element of mystery is being employed. One of the points on which the question turns is how far hypnotism produces a harmful effect. It is generally acknowledged that a person who has once been hypnotized can be more easily hypnotized a second time, not only by the original hypnotizer, but also by others if a definite counter-suggestion has not been given. This definite change in the character of a person can hardly be altogether for the good, to say the least. Moreover, it often happens that a definite craving to be hypnotized is set up, though it is claimed by advocates of hypnotism that this happens only when the agency is employed unskilfully. Since, however, we can be confident that, if hypnotism became a regular part of medical practice, it would often be employed unskilfully, a vista of possibilities is opened which it is not pleasant to contemplate.

These arguments are especially directed against the habitual employment of hypnotism as a remedy for minor ailments or for ailments which experience has shown to be amenable to other measures. There are certain conditions, however, long the despair of medicine, for which the success of hypnotism is undeniable. Such conditions include dipsomania, morphinomania, and other forms of drug-habit, as well as certain forms of sexual aberration. These states, being desperate, may require desperate remedies, and, when they have failed to react to other modes of treatment, it would be difficult for the most strenuous opponent of hypnotism to deny its use. A more doubtful category is that of cases of functional disease due to shock such as have been so frequent in the great European war. There is no question that symptoms can be removed, sometimes by a single hypnotic treatment. It may be argued, on the one hand, that experience has shown that these cases tend to recover quickly by other means. On the other hand, it may be argued that the cases, having been produced by a sudden shock quite foreign to the experience of everyday life, should be treated by some equally drastic remedy. We do not know enough at present of the history of such cases to allow any decisive answer concerning this problem. We must await the investigation of the after-history of the many cases in which hypnotism has been employed during the war.

The chief objection to the employment of hypnotism is not, however, its possible harmfulness or the dangers of unskilful application, but rests on the fact that the use of suggestion and hypnotism ignores a fundamental principle of medicine in that these agencies are directed towards the symptoms of disease and do not touch the morbid process to which the symptoms are ultimately due. The action of a physician who hypnotizes for headache and sleeplessness is to be classed with that of the practitioner who administers aspirin or morphia for these symptoms without inquiring into the conditions by which the headaches and sleeplessness are being produced. Both actions are examples of a slipshod and short-sighted employment of therapeutic agencies. The most recent systems of psycho-therapeutics hold that in the treatment of mental disorder, as in other branches of medicine, it is our duty to discover causes and to remove or amend symptoms by discovering and attacking the deeper and less obvious states upon which the symptoms depend. Hypnotism may be used to discover causes and may thus be an instrument in autognosis, but, as more usually employed, it merely touches the surface and ignores, or may even obstruct, inquiry by which the real nature of the malady may be revealed.

(*b*) *Psycho-analysis.*—This word has been very unfortunately chosen, for every physician who endeavours to discover the conditions which have produced an abnormal mental state must of necessity carry out a process of psychical analysis. The term is so widely used, however, for the system initiated by Freud that its use can hardly be avoided. By psycho-analysis is meant primarily the process by which the physician discovers the 'complex' or body of forgotten experience which

is believed to underlie abnormal mental states or abnormal bodily states ascribed to mental conditions. The word applies primarily to the method of diagnosis by which the conditions underlying a morbid mental condition are discovered. Since, according to the earlier ideas of the Freudian school, the diagnosis is itself sufficient to bring about a cure, its use included also a system of therapeutics. According to Freud, a complex cannot be discovered by the ordinary methods of introspection, but expresses itself in dreams, in such abnormalities of conduct as forgetting, slips of the tongue or pen, and apparently meaningless acts. The investigation of these processes forms one of the chief departments of psycho-analysis.

In addition to these more or less indirect means of analysis, two other methods have been widely employed. In one, known as the method of free association, the patient has to express freely every thought that comes into his mind in response to an idea suggested by his symptoms. In another method, which is due especially to Jung, the patient is given a number of words in succession and is asked to express as rapidly as possible the ideas that each word calls up in his mind. It is found that there is a delay, or even total failure to respond, if the given word arouses ideas in close relation with the complex; and, if a series of words is repeated, the responses on the second occasion will not agree with those of the first when the words have aroused the complex. In the method of free association the patient is put into as tranquil a state as possible and the experience succeeds the better the more the condition approaches a minor degree of the hypnotic state, in which thoughts aroused by immediate association are controlled as little as possible by volition.

The method of closed association with reaction-time has a far narrower scope and is chiefly useful in providing clues for other lines of analysis. If employed without full knowledge of its purpose on the part of the patient, it savours too much of the methods of the detective and may do harm by interfering with the state of confidence between physician and patient which is the first condition of success in psycho-therapeutics.

(c) *Re-education.* — This term is used for the body of measures which the physician employs as the result of the processes by which he has led his patient to a knowledge of himself and of the conditions which have produced his morbid state. In rare cases a patient may be so intelligent and balanced that the mere acquirement of such knowledge may itself be sufficient to enable him to shake off his morbid symptoms and set him on the path leading to a healthy mental life. This holds good, not only when the experience which he has come to understand belongs to his fully conscious mental life, but also, and perhaps still more conspicuously, in those cases in which the process of psycho-analysis has brought to light some long-forgotten experience. In most cases, however, the full therapeutic value of autognosis is brought out only through a process of re-education in which the patient is led to understand how his newly acquired knowledge of himself can be utilized. He has to be shown how to readjust his life in the light of his new knowledge and how to turn energy, hitherto morbidly directed, into more healthy channels.

The processes which have been considered in this article under the headings of autognosis and re-education are as applicable to moral defects as to those more usually held to lie within the sphere of medicine. Recent movements in psycho-therapeutics go far to bridge the gulf between medicine and moral teaching and will help us to co-ordinate and reduce to common principles the work of the physician, the teacher, the social reformer, and the priest. It is the prospect that principles of action and modes of inquiry discovered by any one of these may be helpful to the others that makes these movements so full of promise. Some of the modern measures of the physician are little more than his adoption of modes of treatment which have long been familiar, in the form of confession, to the priest. While the physician may learn much from the long accumulated experience of the priest, the priest may in his turn be helped by such a study of the psychology of confession as his special knowledge and experience allow the physician to undertake. Moreover, the experience of both priest and physician may be utilized by those who have to do with mental and moral training or with the amendment of faulty moral tendencies which have led to the commission of crime. Using the term in the widest sense, psycho-therapeutics may furnish a body of organized knowledge which can be utilized by all those who are interested in the regulation and improvement of social conditions.

The great interest of modern trends in psycho-therapeutics is that at this late stage of social evolution they seem to be again bringing religion and medicine into that intimate relation to one another which existed in their early history. We have here a typical case of social evolution in which social processes once so closely combined as to be with difficulty distinguished from one another have followed widely divergent paths only to meet again as each has come to spread its branches widely over the whole field of social activity.

Cf. also artt. BODY AND MIND, BRAIN AND MIND, FAITH-HEALING, HYPNOTISM.

LITERATURE.—P. Dubois, *Les Psychoneuroses et leur traitement moral*[3], Paris, 1908, tr. S. E. Jelliffe and W. A. White, *The Psychic Treatment of Nervous Disorders*, New York and London, 1906; J. Dejerine and E. Gauckler, *Les Manifestations fonctionnelles des psychonévroses*, Paris, 1911, tr. S. E. Jelliffe, *The Psychoneuroses and their Treatment of Psychotherapy*, Philadelphia and London, 1913; S. Freud, *Selected Papers on Hysteria and other Psychoneuroses* (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, no. 4), New York, 1912; C. G. Jung, *Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien: Beiträge zu experimentelle Psychotherapie*, i., Leipzig, 1905 ([2]1911), ii. 1910, tr. M. D. Eder, *Studies in Word-Association*, in the press, *The Theory of Psychoanalysis* (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, no. 19), New York, 1915; B. Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, Cambridge, 1912; G. Elliot Smith and T. H. Pear, *Shell-shock and its Lessons*, Manchester, 1917.

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PUBERTY.—Puberty is the period of life at which reproductive power is attained. Its commencement is marked by certain external signs,[1] and it is characterized by certain changes, structural and organic, intellectual, emotional, and moral.[2] The age at which it is reached varies considerably in the case of both sexes;[3] and these variations occur not only in different races but in different individuals of the same race.[4]

1. *INITIATION AND PUBERTY.*—It is a familiar feature of uncivilized societies that those of their members who are of the same sex, age, or occupa-

[1] Of these the most marked are, in females, enlargement of the breasts, the growth of hair on the pubes and armpits, and the menstrual flow; and, in males, the breaking of the voice, and the growth of hair on the armpits, pubes, and face.

[2] As to the changes and the disorders of mind and body to which puberty has special relation, see art. ADOLESCENCE and authorities therein cited. See also A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, p. 198.

[3] A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, p. 95 ff. These variations are due to many causes, among which may be reckoned race, climate, diet, housing, clothing, occupation, temperament, mode of life, and state of health (H. Ploss and M. Bartels, *Das Weib in der Natur und Völkerkunde*[10], i. 482 ff.).

[4] Thus, in Egypt, the average age at which menstruation begins is, according to one authority, 9–10 years, according to another 10–13 years, while, among the Somali, it is 16 years. For 584 women of Tokyo the figures were: at 11 years, 2; at 12 years, 22; at 13 years, 26; at 14 years, 78; at 15 years, 224; at 16 years, 228; at 17 years, 68; at 18 years, 44; at 19 years, 10; at 20 years, 2 (Ploss and Bartels, i. 432 ff.; van Gennep, p. 95).

tion, or who have been participants in the same rite at the same time, or who are affected by interests common to all of them, tend to form themselves into subordinate social groups, membership of which confers special rights, imposes special duties, secures special privileges, and exposes to special supernatural influences. To attain egress from or entrance into such a group requires as its necessary *prius* the observance of certain customs or the performance of certain rites;[1] and we find, accordingly, that, in many instances, admission into the ranks of the mature is restricted to those who have undergone the appropriate preparation.[2] It is a common practice to give to the rites which mark separation from childhood and entrance upon manhood or womanhood the name of 'rites of puberty.' And yet it is only to certain of those rites that the name can be accurately applied; for admissibility to the ranks of mature persons is, in many instances, determined not by arrival at puberty, but by something having no necessary connexion with it, such as attainment of a certain age[3] or possession of a certain capacity or quality.[4] Objection upon these grounds to an indiscriminating use of the name has, we venture to think, been pushed too far by van Gennep.[5] At the same time, he has done good service in insisting on the limits of its applicability; and, accordingly, we shall confine our employment of it to those rites whose celebration is determined in point of time by reference to puberty.

It is, however, to be kept in view that, in some instances, a rite which is undoubtedly a rite of puberty does not take place until full development of puberty is attained,[6] while, in others, it is postponed for reasons of convenience or by force of circumstances.[7] In cases in which initiation is spread over a long course of years it may be that none or some only of the rites are puberty rites;[8] and sometimes a puberty rite loses its original significance by being merged in a rite of another kind.[1]

II. *DESCRIPTION OF PUBERTY RITES.*—A rite of puberty is sometimes a simple rite, consisting merely of a dance,[2] a feast,[3] or a procession through the street,[4] and sometimes it is a complex rite, including within it or accompanied by subordinate ceremonies.

Thus the northern tribes of Central Australia celebrate two rites[5]—circumcision and subincision—which are obligatory on all males, and which always take place at puberty.[6] In the Urabunna tribe the novice who has undergone both operations is shown some of the sacred totemic ceremonies, and receives instructions as to his conduct. He must give a present of food to the operators; and they, by touching his mouth with a piece of meat, release him from the ban of silence.[7]

In one of the northern central tribes—the Larakia—the novice is subjected, not to any mutilation, but to hard usage such as kicks and blows, and to tests of strength, endurance, and courage;[8] and finally he is shown and given a sacred bull-roarer which he may not show to his younger brothers or any woman.[9] Among the Yuin of S.E. Australia, who practise neither circumcision nor subincision, a tooth is knocked out[10] by a medicine-man.[11] During the ceremonies the bull-roarer is frequently heard. Its sound represents the thunder, which is the voice of Daramulun.[12] The chief rite is followed by dances, pantomimic representations, and other solemnities, of which one of the most important is the mock burial and resurrection of a tribesman.[13] The novices are subjected to certain food restrictions. Charcoal dust is the appropriate covering during the ceremonies; and, when they close, it is washed off as an indication that everything connected with them is done with. The youths are painted and invested with the belt of manhood, and retire into the bush, where the men who have had charge of them during the rite instruct them and give them their totem names. The novices do not take their place as men in the community until the medicine-men are satisfied of their fitness. Then they are permitted to marry.[14]

Among some of the Victorian tribes the chief rite consists of a fight between the novices of two tribes which are at feud,

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[1] Van Gennep, p. 35 f.; H. Schurtz, *Alterklassen und Männerbünde*, p. 52 f.; artt. INITIATION.

[2] In Fiji uncircumcised youths were regarded as unclean (B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 216); and among some of the hill tribes of Central India an uninitiated person was tabued. Thus, a child who had not undergone the rites of hair-shaving or ear-piercing was treated as *bhût*, or devil, not subject to tribal restrictions as to food, etc. (W. Crooke, 'The Hill Tribes of the Central Indian Hills,' *JAI* xxviii. [1898] 246). E. J. Eyre (*Journals of Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia*, London, 1845, ii. 201) says of a S. Australian blackfellow: 'He is a stupid idiotic sort of man so that the natives have not deemed him worthy of receiving the honours of their ceremonies, and still call him boy or youth, although he is an oldish man' (see A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904, p. 530).

[3] As in ancient Rome (see F. C. von Savigny, *System des heutigen römischen Rechts*, Berlin, 1840, iii. 56; B. W. Leist, *Graeco-italische Rechtsgeschichte*, Jena, 1884, p. 65 ff.).

[4] Such as ability to carry arms (J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*[3], Göttingen, 1881, p. 413) or prowess in war or foray (van Gennep, p. 125).

[5] P. 93 ff.

[6] See the account of the ceremony of the Yuin tribe (below, II.), and W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies among the N.W. Central Queensland Aborigines*, Brisbane and London, 1897, p. 170 ff.

[7] It is postponed sometimes until a sufficient number of candidates has been collected (L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, 1880, p. 192), and sometimes until sufficient food has been procured for the feast which forms part of the ceremony (M. Krieger, *Neu-Guinea*, Berlin, 1899, p. 167; W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People: the Akikuyu of British E. Africa*, London, 1910, p. 151), or to pay the superintendent of the rite (B. T. Somerville, 'Notes on some Islands of the New Hebrides,' *JAI* xxiii. [1893–94] 5), or until the chief's son is old enough (G. McCall Theal, *Hist. of S. Africa*, London, 1888–93, ii. 205). In some instances the ceremony takes place only every four or five years (H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, London, 1912, i. 74; W. C. Willoughby, 'Notes on the Initiation Ceremony of the Becwana,' *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 229), while in others it is suspended owing to the occurrence of a calamity (Theal, *loc. cit.*), such as war, famine, or plague (L. Fison, 'The Nanga, or Sacred Stone Enclosure, of Wainimala, Fiji,' *JAI* xiv. [1885] 19).

[8] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 212 f. Among the A-kamba the children of both sexes are circumcised when about five or six years old, and a second ceremony is performed at puberty (C. W. Hobley, *The Ethnology of the A-Kamba and other E. African Tribes*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 68). Similarly, among some of the northern tribes of Central Australia the throwing up ceremony precedes circumcision and subincision (see below, II.).

[1] See below, III. 1 (*f*) note, and J. Kohler, 'Das Recht der Papuas,' *ZVRW* xiv. [1900] 361 (Tami Islanders).

[2] See S. Passarge, *Die Buschmänner der Kalahari*, Berlin, 1907, p. 101 f.

[3] E. Beardmore, 'The Natives of Mowat, Daudai, New Guinea,' *JAI* xix. [1890] 460; H. H. Bancroft, *NR*, London, 1875, i. 584 (Ceris and Tepocas). In the Marshall Islands the occurrence of first menstruation is celebrated by festivities, accompanied with singing and gifts of flowers (J. Kohler, 'Das Recht der Marschallinsulaner,' *ZVRW* xiv. 437).

[4] B. Cruickshank, *Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa*, London, 1853, ii. 193 f.

[5] Among some tribes these rites are preceded by a ceremony in which the novice is thrown up in the air and caught in the arms of the men (Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 337; cf. Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 214–218).

[6] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 328 f. Among some of the tribes of N.W. Central Queensland (Roth, p. 170 ff.) and S.E. Australia (Howitt, p. 530, note 2) the ceremonies are performed at full development of puberty, when the moustache and beard begin to show. In the case of the Narrinyeri the principal rite of admission to the ranks of men consists in plucking out the beard and moustache (*ib.* p. 674). In the Yerkla-mining tribe circumcision does not take place till about the eighteenth year (*ib.* p. 664), while among the Dieri it is performed at the age of nine or ten years, when the novice receives a new name, and it is followed some years afterwards by subincision, in virtue of which the youth becomes a 'thorough man' (*ib.* p. 656 f.). In the case of the Arunta and other tribes the rite of painting the boy and throwing him up takes place when he is ten or twelve years of age. He may be circumcised at any time after puberty (Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 214–218).

[7] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 334 f. [8] *Ib.* p. 331 f. [9] *Ib.* p. 332.

[10] Where the practice of knocking out teeth prevails among the northern central tribes, it has, at the present day at all events, nothing to do with initiation (*ib.* p. 329).

[11] In the case of the ceremony in which Howitt took part there were three novices, of whom two were fourteen or fifteen years of age, while the third was older and had an incipient moustache (Howitt, p. 531; cf. p. 530, note 2).

[12] Among some of the northern central tribes the women and children believe that the sound of the bull-roarer is the voice of a spirit who devours and subsequently restores the novice (Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 366, 501; cf. pp. 343, 499). Beliefs fundamentally the same are found in all Australian tribes (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 246, note 1; Howitt, pp. 538, 628, 631 ff.; cf. p. 596). See also Krieger, p. 167; J. Holmes, 'Initiation Ceremonies of the Natives of the Papuan Gulf,' *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 419 f.

[13] 'The ceremonies are intended to impress and terrify the boy in such a manner that the lesson may be indelible, and may govern the whole of his future life. But the intention is also to amuse in the intervals of the serious rites' (Howitt, p. 532).

[14] Howitt, pp. 556–561.

among others, of painting the novices and cutting their hair in a peculiar fashion, while, in some instances, plucking out the hair accompanies the rite of knocking out teeth.[1]

Women, while usually taking part in the preliminaries to, and accompaniments of, the rite, are excluded from its actual performance.[2]

As to the initiation of girls, we may observe that the ceremony of rubbing the breasts with fat and ochre,[3] and the operation of cutting open the vagina, followed by sexual intercourse with men who stand to them in certain relationships,[4] appear to be the equivalents of the ceremonies of throwing up in the air and subincision. Among the Arunta and Ilpirra tribes, a girl, during her first menstruation, is secluded at a spot apart from the women's camp, unvisited by men,[5] while at Upper Yarra she is, at the same period, tied with cords so tightly as to cause her acute pain. These are not removed until the flow has ceased.[6] Among the Dieri the practice of knocking out two of the lower middle front teeth is not confined to boys.[7]

III. *CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF PUBERTY RITES.* — In the preceding paragraph we have noted the main characteristics of a few of the puberty rites practised by some of the Australian tribes, and found that they included mutilations, the imposition and removal of tabus, tests of endurance, strength, skill, and courage, ceremonial painting, decorating, hair-cutting, and the like, dances and pantomimic representations, ablutions, naming anew, seclusion, instruction, investiture with a new dress, sexual intercourse, and certain other usages, which we shall now proceed to consider.

1. **Mutilations.**—(*a*) *Circumcision.*—This operation frequently serves as a rite of puberty either alone[8] or in conjunction with other rites.[9] It is employed sometimes in the case of males only[10] and sometimes in the case of females as well.[11] It takes place sometimes on arrival at puberty,[12] or full puberty,[13] and sometimes at stated intervals.[14] Occasionally it is postponed owing to special circumstances.[15]

(*b*) *Knocking out teeth.*—Among the Murrumbidgee, Murray, and Goulburn tribes two of the incisor teeth of the lower jaw are knocked out in the case of boys on arrival at puberty;[16] and among the Batoka there prevails the custom of knocking out upper front teeth of both girls and boys at the same period.[17]

(*c*) *Filing the teeth.*—In Makisar the teeth of both sexes are filed at puberty, and a five days' tabu in respect of certain foods is imposed.[1] It is said that among the Kedah Semang the teeth are filed at puberty irrespective of sex;[2] and a similar custom is practised by the Malays at or about the same time of life.[3] The custom of pointing the teeth of the Thonga girls at puberty is dying out.[4]

(*d*) *Perforating the lips or ears.*—Puberty rites in the case of girls include the boring of the lower lip for the later insertion of an ornament among the Tlingits,[5] and the piercing of the ears among the Tsimshians.[6] The ears of the Thonga boys were pierced at puberty.[7]

(*e*) *Scarification, tatuing, etc.*—Among the Ba-Mbala scars are made on the face and body of both males and females at puberty.[8] Part of the puberty rites to which the girls of the Abipones are subjected consists in pricking them with thorns, ashes mixed with the blood being rubbed into the punctures so as to render them indelible. The operation must be borne without wincing.[9] Very similar accounts are given of the rites in the case of girls among the Charruas, Minuanes, and Payaguas,[10] the Tupis,[11] and certain tribes of the Orinoco.[12] The Orāon girls, when adult or nearly so, are tatued on the arms and back.[13] In British New Guinea the completion of a girl's tatuing is a sign of her maturity;[14] and in Raiatea, one of the Society Islands, it was considered a disgrace to be without the tatu marks of puberty.[15] Among the Bushmen incisions were made on the forehead and between the shoulders, and charcoal was rubbed into them, as the final puberty rite in the case of boys;[16] and among the Ba-Ronga women tatuing seems to have connexion with marriage or, at least, nubility.[17]

(*f*) *Dilatatio vaginæ, artificial defloration.*—In the case of girls in Azimba Land, the vagina is enlarged on arrival at puberty;[18] a similar practice prevails among the Wa-yao of British Central

[1] Howitt, pp. 602 f., 610, 613.

[2] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 358. The Warramunga tribe is an exception (*ib.*); see also Roth, pp. 171, 177.

[3] Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 269, 459 f.; Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 474–476.

[4] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 133 f.; Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 92 f.; Roth, p. 174 f.

[5] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 460; Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 601.

[6] R. Brough Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, London and Melbourne, 1878, i. 65; see also p. 61 f. as to another curious practice.

[7] Howitt, p. 655. The operation takes place when the child is from eight to ten years of age.

[8] Mungo Park, *Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa*, London, 1799, p. 265 (Mandingoes); B. Thomson, p. 216 (Fijians); G. H. von Langsdorff, *Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the World during the Years 1803–07*, Eng. tr., London, 1813–14, i. 158 (Nukahiva).

[9] Routledge, p. 151 ff.; H. R. Tate, 'Further Notes on the Kikuyu Tribes of British East Africa,' *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 265 (Akikuyu); H. H. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, London, 1897 (Wa-yao); J. Roscoe, 'Notes on the Bageshu,' *JAI* xxxix. 185 f.; Junod, i. 71 ff. (Thonga); Theal, p. 205 (Kosa); D. Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches in S. Africa*, London, 1857, p. 146 f. (Bechuana and Kafir tribes); Krieger, p. 167 (Kaiser Wilhelmsland).

[10] Krieger, p. 167; Junod, i. 73 ff.; K. Endemann, 'Mittheilungen über die Sotho-Neger,' *ZE* vi. [1874] 37 f.; von Langsdorff, p. 158; B. Thomson, p. 216.

[11] Park, p. 265; Routledge, p. 154 f.; Tate, p. 265; Hobley, p. 68; S. Bagge, 'The Circumcision Ceremony among the Naivasha Masai,' *JAI* xxxiv. 167 169.

[12] Park, p. 265; Bagge, *JAI* xxxiv. 169 (girls); E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, 'Notes on the Ethnography of the Ba-Yaka,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 46; Johnston, p. 409 f.; von Langsdorff, i. 158; B. Thomson, p. 216 (Fiji; in heathen times it took place at an earlier date).

[13] J. Macdonald, 'Manners, Customs, Superstitions, and Religions of S. African Tribes,' *JAI* xix. [1890] 268.

[14] Bagge, *JAI* xxxiv. 67; Junod, i. 74 f.; Endemann, p. 37; Willoughby, *JAI* xxxix. 229.

[15] Willoughby, *loc. cit.*, Routledge, p. 151; Theal, ii. 205.

[16] Brough Smyth, i. 62–65.

[17] Livingstone, p. 522 f. A somewhat similar usage is practised by the Seri in the case of girls before marriage.

[1] J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, p. 418. As to the practice in Ceram see Riedel, p. 137, and in S. Celebes see B. F. Matthes, *Bijdragen tot de Ethnologie van Zuid-Celebes*, The Hague, 1875, p. 70.

[2] W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 33 f.

[3] *Ib.* [4] Junod, i. 183.

[5] A. Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, Jena, 1885, p. 218; A. Erman, 'Ethnographische Wahrnehmungen und Erfahrungen an die Küsten des Berings-Meeres,' *ZE* ii. [1870] 319. The Tlingits are called 'Kolushes' by Erman and other writers (T. Waitz and G. Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859–72, iii. 316).

[6] F. Boas, 'First General Report on the Indians of British Columbia,' in *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1889*, London, 1890, p. 837.

[7] Junod, i. 95 f. It may be noted that among the Incas the ears of the youths were pierced on admission to knighthood (Garcilasso de la Vega, *First Part of the Royal Commentaries of the Yncas*, ed. C. R. Markham, Hakluyt Society, London, 1869–71, ii. 176).

[8] E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, 'Notes on the Ethnography of the Ba-Mbala,' *JAI* xxxv. [1905] 403.

[9] M. Dobrizhoffer, *An Account of the Abipones*, Eng. tr., London, 1822, ii. 20 f.

[10] F. de Azara, *Voyages dans l'Amérique méridionale, 1781–1801*, Paris, 1809, ii. 10, 33, 127 f.

[11] *The Captivity of Hans Stade of Hesse, 1547–1555, among the Wild Tribes of Eastern Brazil*, ed. R. F. Burton, Hakluyt Society, London, 1874, p. 144.

[12] J. Gumilla, *Hist. naturelle, civile et géographique de l'Orénoque*, tr. from Spanish by M. Eidous, Avignon, 1757, i. 184.

[13] E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 251; see also pp. 248, 252.

[14] Krieger, p. 296.

[15] J. R. Forster, *Observations made during a Voyage round the World*, Eng. tr., London, 1778, p. 433 f.; cf. B. Thomson, p. 218; G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, do. 1910, p. 103 (Samoa).

[16] Passarge, p. 101, who thinks it probable that the marks on the forehead were tribal marks.

[17] Junod, i. 180.

[18] H. Crawfurd Angas, 'The Chensamwali, or Initiation Ceremony of Girls as performed in Azimba Land, Central Africa,' *ZE* xxx. [1898] 480. As to the practice among the Australian tribes see above, II.

Africa;[1] and in the Pelew Islands[2] the girls are frequently deflowered at or a little before puberty.[3]

2. The imposition of tabus.—(*a*) *Exclusion of women from rites, etc.*—Among the tribes of Central Australia women are excluded from the actual performance of circumcision and subincision to which the males are subjected.[4] Among the Thonga the lodge (*sungi*) where the initiatory ceremonies take place is tabu to them;[5] and, in many instances, the novice must avoid women during the rites.[6] Among the Narrinyeri he may not taste of food belonging to a woman;[7] and the Kurnai do not permit him to eat of a female animal.[8]

(*b*) *Exclusion of men from rites, etc.*—It may be regarded as a regulation of almost universal prevalence that, during a girl's ceremonial seclusion at her first menstruation, she is not permitted to see or be seen by men, or to hold any communication with them.[9] Among the tribes of the Tanganyika Plateau an exception seems to be made in favour of a father of twins.[10]

(*c*) *In relation to food.*—The novices are in many instances subjected during the rites to certain food restrictions. In some cases a certain food is forbidden,[11] while in others a special food is prescribed.[12]

(*d*) *In relation to speech.*—We have seen that among some of the northern tribes of Central Australia the novices are under a ban of silence.[13] A similar prohibition prevails at Tutu, Torres Straits,[14] in the Elema District, Papuan Gulf,[15] and among some of the Brazilian tribes.[16] Sometimes speech with certain persons only is permitted,[1] or it is confined to whispering.[2] In other cases archaic or foreign words are used during the ceremonies.[3]

(*e*) *Miscellaneous.*—Instances are to be found in which the novices are prohibited from feeding themselves,[4] scratching themselves with their hands,[5] touching the hair or face,[6] touching the ground with their feet,[7] looking upon the sun[8] or fire,[9] lighting the fire,[10] looking back,[11] washing,[12] working,[13] or sleeping.[14]

3. Tests of endurance, etc.—In many cases the novices are forced to practise a rigid fast.[15] Thus, among the Musquakie Indians, the youth undergoes a prolonged fast at puberty, wandering alone until he dreams what his medicine is to be, and, sometimes, what his vocation is.[16] Sometimes the novices are forced to remain in deep water,[17] or to thrust their heads through collars of thorns,[18] or are gashed[19] or scarified[20] or beaten[21] with supple wands[22] or stinging nettles,[23] or are exposed to the bite of venomous ants,[24] or are deprived of sleep,[25] or are bound so tightly as to suffer great pain.[26] Among the Thonga they must suffer cold, thirst, and cruel punishments.[27] Sometimes they must show their prowess by killing a man,[28] or their intelligence by deciphering picture riddles;[29] while, in some instances, austerities in the case of women are designed to serve as remedies rather than as tests.[30]

[1] Johnston, p. 410.

[2] J. Kubary, *Die socialen Einrichtungen der Pelauer*, Berlin, 1885, p. 50 f. It is very doubtful if this instance refers to a puberty rite.

[3] It has been observed that 'when marriage follows closely after puberty it is difficult to determine whether the custom really belongs to the puberty rites, or to those of marriage. . . . It will be admitted that as puberty rites gradually became simplified or altogether obsolete such a custom [as defloration] could only maintain existence as part of the marriage rites' (E. Sidney Hartland, 'Concerning the Rite at the Temple of Mylitta,' in *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 198; cf. Crawley, p. 313; G. A. Wilken, 'Plechtigheden en gebruiken bij verlovingen en huwelijken bij de volken van den Indischen Archipel,' in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie*, v. i. [1886] 441.

[4] See above, II. [5] Junod, i. 77.

[6] Somerville, *JAI* xxiii. 4; Howitt, p. 670; Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. 420 f. Holmes tells that the novices are permitted to walk abroad, but that, when they do so, they are encased in plaited palm-leaves and are under a bond of silence.

[7] Howitt, p. 674 [8] *Ib.* p. 633.

[9] S. Powers, 'Tribes of California,' in *Contributions to N. American Ethnology*, Washington, 1877, iii. 235 (Wintûn); G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, London and New York, 1904, ii. 236 (Hupa); *NR* i. 278 f. (Spokane); Krause, pp. 218, 310 (Tlingits, Haidas); Boas, in 1889 *Report of the British Association*, p. 837 (Tsimshian); C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition, 1838–42*, London, 1845, iv. 455 (Pend 'Oreilles); C. G. Seligmann, in *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901–12, v. 201 f.; Endemann, p. 38; Junod, i. 177 f.; Angas, p. 48 ff.; H. Zache, 'Sitten und Gebräuche der Suaheli,' *ZE* xxxi. [1899] 71; L. Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, London, 1898, p. 78; J. Macdonald, 'Manners, Customs, Superstitions, and Religions of S. African Tribes,' *JAI* xx. [1891] 117.

[10] C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia*, London, 1911, p. 159.

[11] C. G. Seligmann, pp. 202, 204; Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. 422; R. E. Guise, 'On the Tribes inhabiting the Mouth of the Wanigela River, New Guinea,' *JAI* xxviii. 207; Powers, iii. 85; Howitt, p. 633; Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 256; Passarge, p. 101; G. McCall Theal, *Kaffir Folk-Lore*[2], London, 1886, p. 218; *NR* i. 242; C. Hill-Tout, 'Ethnological Report on the Stsaëlis,' etc., *JAI* xxxiv. 320, 'Report on the Ethnology of the Stlatlumh,' *JAI* xxxv. 136; cf. *Census of India, 1901*, Calcutta, 1903, iii. 64 (Andamans, where the abstention is voluntary); Riedel, p. 418 (Makisar).

[12] Powers, p. 235 f.; R. H. Schomburgk, *Reisen in Britisch Guiana, 1840–44*, Leipzig, 1847–48, ii. 316, 431; R. Sutherland Rattray, *Some Folk-Lore Stories and Songs in Chinyanja*, London, 1907, p. 102; Passarge, p. 101.

[13] See above, II. [14] Seligmann, p. 210.

[15] Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. 419 ff.

[16] J. F. Lafitau, *Mœurs des sauvages amériquains*, Paris, 1724, i. 292.

[1] Roth, p. 171.

[2] J. Macdonald, *JAI* xx. 117; E. W. P. Chinnery and W. N. Beaver, 'Notes on the Initiation Ceremonies of the Koko, Papua,' *JRAI* xlv. [1915] 75; Howitt, p. 668.

[3] Junod, i. 80. [4] Seligmann, pp. 201, 204.

[5] Riedel, p. 137 f. (Ceram).

[6] Stanley Hall, ii. 236 (Hupa).

[7] Schomburgk, ii. 431 (Caribs); Lafitau, i. 292 (Brazilian tribes); Seligmann, p. 204; B. Danks, 'Marriage Customs of the New Britain Group,' *JAI* xviii. [1889] 285; Rattray, p. 103 (Central Angoniland); see *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 1 ff.

[8] Krause, p. 218 (Tlingits); G. M. Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, London, 1868, p. 94 (Ahts); F. Boas, 'Third Report on the Indians of British Columbia,' in *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1891*, London, 1892, p. 418 (Bilqula); Seligmann, p. 204 f.; Stanley Hall, ii. 236 (Hupa). According to Powers, p. 85, the Hupa girl is blindfolded; *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 18 f.

[9] Sproat, p. 94; cf. Lafitau, i. 263.

[10] Passarge, p. 101 (Bushmen).

[11] Stanley Hall, ii. 236 (Hupa).

[12] Somerville, *JAI* xxiii. 4 (New Hebrides).

[13] R. E. Dennett, *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*, London, 1906, p. 67 f. (Bavili).

[14] Junod, i. 91 (Thonga); Howitt, p. 674 (Narrinyeri).

[15] Renaud des Marchais, *Voyage en Guinée, aux îles voisines, et à Cayenne fait en 1725–27*, Paris, 1730, iv. 363; J. B. du Tertre, *Hist. générale des Antilles*, do. 1667–71, i. 371, 376; Riedel, p. 76; Garcilasso de la Vega, ii. 169. See art. FASTING (Introductory and non-Christian), § 5.

[16] M. A. Owen, *Folk-Lore of the Musquakie Indians*, London, 1904, p. 67 f. As to other tribes see Lafitau, i. 336; Hill-Tout, *JAI* xxxv. 136; G. Catlin, *Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Conditions of the North American Indians*, London, 1841, i. 36; P. F. X. de Charlevoix, *Journal d'un Voyage . . . dans l'Amérique septentrionale*, Paris, 1744, vi. 67, 69. See art. CALENDAR (American), § 3. Among the southern Californians the youth was intoxicated and harassed with questions (*NR* i. 414; see Stanley Hall, ii. 238, as to this use of intoxicants among Tuscaroras and other tribes).

[17] E. Gottschling, 'The Bawenda,' *JAI* xxxv. 372 f.; Junod, i. 177 f.; Rattray, p. 103.

[18] Gouldsbury and Sheane, p. 159.

[19] Schomburgk, i. 168, ii. 431; du Tertre, i. 376; Gumilla, i. 184; J. Lery, in J. de Bry, *Hist. Americæ . . .*, Frankfort, 1592–1602, pt. iii. ch. xvi.; Lafitau, i. 291.

[20] Seligmann, p. 215; see also Junod, i. 179; and Dalton, pp. 248, 251.

[21] Junod, i. 82.

[22] Schomburgk, ii. 316; A. R. Wallace, *A Narrative of Travels on the Amazon and Rio Negro*, London, 1853, p. 496 f.; J. Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 268; Livingstone, p. 146.

[23] *NR* i. 414.

[24] *Ib.*; des Marchais, iv. 365 f.; cf. E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 221.

[25] J. Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 268.

[26] R. Brough Smyth, i. 65; cf. Schomburgk, ii. 431.

[27] Junod, i. 82 f.

[28] J. L. Krapf, *Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours in Eastern Africa*, London, 1860, p. 147.

[29] Hobley, p. 71 f.

[30] K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, p. 197. Among these tribes menstrua-

4. Ceremonial daubing, masking, painting, etc.; ceremonial dress.—We have seen that charcoal dust is the appropriate covering during some of the Australian ceremonies.[1] It is put to a similar use in Yam and Tutu.[2] The face, shoulders, and chest of the Indian youth seeking to find his medicine are blackened.[3] So are those of the girls among the Kolushes,[4] while, among the Sotho Negroes, they are smeared with ashes.[5] The Kosa,[6] the Wanyika,[7] and other African tribes[8] daub the boys with white clay. In some instances the novice is masked,[9] while among some of the tribes of Central Australia he is painted with distinctive patterns.[10] Among the Hupa,[11] the Tlingits,[12] the Bechuanas, and the Kafirs[13] the girls—and, among the Kosa,[14] the boys—wear a distinctive dress; in N.W. Central Queensland the novices are decorated with necklets and feathers.[15]

5. Dances and pantomimic representations.—Dances are sometimes the sole ceremony at puberty,[16] and much more frequently form an important part of puberty rites.[17] Elaborate pantomimic representations take place during the Central and S.E. Australian solemnities,[18] one of the most important of which is that of mock burial and resurrection.[19] Elsewhere we find mimic combats[20] and symbolic practices representing defloration[21] and new birth.[22]

6. Naming anew.—Among the Wa-yao a new name is given at circumcision, and the old name is discarded.[23] The Andamanese girl is given a flower name after the one of the sixteen selected trees which happens to be in bloom when she arrives at puberty.[24] On the occurrence of the same event the Inca girl received a name from her chief relative;[25] and among the Jakun of Johor[26] and some of the E. African tribes[27] names are changed at puberty. Among some of the Australian tribes an individual[28] or a sacred[29] name is given at initiation; and instances of change of name at puberty might easily be multiplied.[1]

7. Seclusion.—Among the Tlingits a girl at her first menstruation was shut up in an isolated hut of boughs for a year. She might not leave it except at night nor be visited by any but her nearest female relatives.[2] Similar practices prevail among many of the Indian tribes of N. America,[3] among the Koniagas,[4] the Malemut and Unalit,[5] and the Aleuts,[6] and in some of the islands of Torres Straits.[7] Among the Caribs,[8] the tribes of the Upper Amazon,[9] the River Plate,[10] and French Guiana,[11] and the Macusis the girl's hammock is slung close under the roof, where she is exposed to the smoke, which is increased as much as possible.[12] In New Britain girls are placed in cages at an early age, and kept there until marriageable.[13] We find less rigorous forms of seclusion among the Hupa and Wintūn,[14] the Pend 'Oreilles,[15] and the Tsimshian[16] and Musquakie Indians,[17] at Ceram in former times,[18] and among many African tribes.[19]

Boys are secluded sometimes in the bush,[20] sometimes in isolated huts,[21] and sometimes in a lodge constructed for the occasion.[22]

8. Instructions. — The instructions given to novices differ in different cases in nature, scope, and value. Sometimes they are concerned with the sacred mysteries[23] or tribal legends;[24] sometimes they deal with the duties of a tribesman towards the women of the tribe, the aged, and the poor,[25] or towards the community[26]—*e.g.*, in time of war;[27] and sometimes they embrace politics and government,[28] economic regulations,[29] or matters such as tribal etiquette and decorum,[30] intercourse between the sexes,[31] or domestic duties;[32] or they inculcate such lessons as that pain must be endured,[33] and that selfishness[34] and greediness[35] must be avoided. Very frequently the duties of implicit obedience during the ceremonies and of never divulging what he sees or hears[36] are strongly impressed upon the novice.

9. The final ceremonies.—(*a*) *Investing with a new dress, ornaments, etc., ceremonial washing,*

tion is regarded as a disease; and elsewhere as the result of connexion with the moon in the shape of a young man (Seligmann, p. 206; cf. J. Roscoe, 'Further Notes on the Manners and Customs of the Baganda,' *JAI* xxxii. 39). For other explanations see Crawley, pp. 10 f., 192. 196.

1 See above, II. 2 Seligmann, pp. 202, 209.
3 Charlevoix, vi. 67; see Lafitau, i. 336.
4 Erman, p. 318. 5 Endemann, p. 38.
6 Theal, *Hist. of S. Africa*, ii. 205.
7 Krapf, p. 147. 8 Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 268.
9 Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. 419; Junod, i. 92.
10 Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 215, 221, 242.
11 Stanley Hall, ii. 236. 12 Krause, p. 218.
13 Livingstone, p. 149. 14 Theal, *loc. cit.*
15 Roth, p. 170. 16 Passarge, p. 101.
17 L. T. Moggridge, 'The Nyassaland Tribes, their Customs and their Poison Ordeal,' *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 470; Johnston, p. 409 f. (Wayao); Gottschling, *JAI* xxxv. 372 f. (Bawenda); Roscoe, 'Notes on the Bageshu,' *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 186 f.; Livingstone, p. 146 (Bechuana, etc.); Dennett, p. 69 f. (Bavili); H. Cole, 'Notes on the Wagogo of German East Africa,' *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 308 f.; *Census of India, 1901*, iii. 64 (Andamanese); Seligmann, pp. 202, 204; Krieger, p. 297 (British New Guinea); Roth, p. 171; Brough Smyth, i. 62; Powers, iii. 85, 235 f. (Hupa, Wintūn); cf *NR* i. 415.
18 See Spencer-Gillen[a], chs. vii.-xi.; Howitt, ch. ix. f.
19 Howitt, p. 554 ff.; see above, II. Similar conceptions receive ceremonial expression in certain initiatory rites, which cannot be classed as puberty rites; see Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 523 f.; Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 480 ff.; Riedel, p. 107 ff. (Ceram); L. Fison, *JAI* xiv. [1885] 14 ff. (Viti Levu); cf. G. Dale, 'An Account of the Principal Customs of the Natives inhabiting the Bondei Country,' *JAI* xxv. [1896] 188 f.
20 Roth, p. 170; Hobley, p. 70; Chinnery and Beaver, *JRAI* xlv. 74.
21 Riedel, p. 133, 'Galela und Tobelorese,' *ZE* xvii. [1885] 81 f. (Ceram and Halmahera); see Crawley, p. 308 f. Frazer (*GB*[1], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, ii. 248) takes a different view.
22 Riedel, *loc. cit.* p. 151 f. Among the A Kamba the novices are thrust through an open door and told to proceed through a new path along a new road to the forest, and to return by the same way. The door and gate are never used again (Hobley, p. 74; Frazer, *loc. cit.* ii. 248 and 254 ff.).
23 Johnston, p. 409. 24 *Census of India, 1901*, iii. 64.
25 de Molina, 'The Fables and Rites of the Incas,' in *Narratives of the Rites and Laws of the Yncas*, tr. and ed. C. R. Markham, Hakluyt Society, London, 1873, p. 53 f.
26 Skeat and Blagden, ii. 53.
27 Duff Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 126.
28 Roth, p. 154. 29 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 581.

1 See Crawley, pp. 270, 299, 300, 435.
2 Krause, p. 218; Erman, p. 318 f.
3 Krause, p. 310 (Haidas); Sproat, p. 93 f. (Ahts); *NR* i. 117 f. (Chippewas); Hill-Tout, *JAI* xxxiv. 319 f., xxxv. 136.
4 *NR* i. 82.
5 E. W. Nelson, 'The Eskimo about Bering Strait,' *18 RBEW* [1899], p. 291.
6 See art. ALEUTS. 7 Seligmann, p. 203 f.
8 Schomburgk, ii. 431.
9 H. W. Bates, *The Naturalist on the Amazons*[3], London, 1873, p. 382.
10 Lafitau, i. 263. 11 Des Marchais, iv. 363.
12 Schomburgk, i. 315 f. 13 Danks, *JAI* xviii. 285.
14 Powers, pp. 85, 235 f. 15 Wilkes, iv. 456.
16 F. Boas, in 1889 *Report of the British Association*, p. 836 f.
17 Owen, p. 70. 18 Riedel, p. 138.
19 Cole, *JAI* xxxii. 309; H. S. Stannus, 'Notes on Some Tribes of British Central Africa,' *JRAI* xl. [1910] 297; J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 80; Junod, i. 177 f.; Decle, p. 78; J. Macdonald, *JAI* xx. 116; Theal, *Kaffir Folk-Lore*[2], p. 217; Endemann, p. 38; Peschuel Loesche, 'Indiscretes aus Loango,' *ZE* x. [1878] 23; Dennett, p. 69 f.; R. M. Connolly, 'Social Life in Fanti-land,' *JAI* xxvi. [1897] 143; Gouldsbury and Sheane, p. 159.
20 Stannus, *loc. cit.*; Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 223; see above, II.
21 J. Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 268.
22 Junod, i. 76 f.; Somerville, *JAI* xxiii. 4.
23 Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 229; Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 339, 361; E. Tregear, 'The Maoris of New Zealand,' *JAI* xix. 99 f.
24 Brough Smyth, i. 64 (Victorian tribes); Johnston, p. 410 (Wa-yao).
25 Johnston, p. 410; Howitt, p. 594 (Kamilaroi); C. Hill-Tout, 'Report on the Ethnology of the Sicîatl,' *JAI* xxxiv. 32.
26 Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. 419 f.; Johnston, *loc. cit.*
27 Johnston, *loc. cit.* 28 Livingstone, p. 147.
29 *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, vi. [1908] 284 (Murray Islands).
30 Gottschling, *JAI* xxxv. 372; Gouldsbury and Sheane, p. 159.
31 Angas, p. 48 f.; Johnston, p. 409.
32 Gouldsbury and Sheane, *loc. cit.*; Livingstone, p. 149.
33 Gottschling, *loc. cit.* 34 Johnston, p. 410.
35 Hill-Tout, *JAI* xxxiv. 32.
36 Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 221; Howitt, pp. 580, 650, 668.

hair-cutting.—The Tupi girls wore cotton strings round wrist and waist to show that they were marriageable,[1] and the girls of Jap[2] and among the Herero received a special dress at puberty.[3] When an Orāon girl approaches maturity, she gathers up her hair in a knot,[4] and among the Southern Slavs a girl at the same period winds her hair under her fez.[5] Among the Musquakie Indians a girl is secluded at puberty, and at the close of her seclusion is washed and dressed in new clothes;[6] and the practice of clothing, ornamenting, and decorating the girls at the conclusion of the ceremonies is widely prevalent.[7] Sometimes the novice is marked on the forehead with a spot of blood,[8] or with the symbol of the shaman's familiar spirit.[9] In many instances the boys receive some badge of manhood on the completion of the rites, and are clothed in new garments, anointed, and decorated.[10]

In one case the novice must, after the completion of the ceremony, visit another tribe and is feasted on his return.[11]

Bathing or washing frequently forms part of puberty ceremonies,[12] especially at the final stage. Thus, among some of the Victorian tribes, the novice is given over to the women, who wash off the clay and charcoal with which he has been daubed, paint him, and dance before him. He is now a man.[13] Similar practices prevail in Kaiser Wilhelmsland,[14] at Torres Straits,[15] and among many African tribes.[16] Among the Swahili the girl is symbolically cleansed by being rubbed with powdered sandal-wood.[17]

Ceremonial hair-cutting takes place sometimes at the commencement[18] and sometimes at the close[19] of the ceremonies. Among the Narrang-ga tribe the hair and beard of the novice are plucked out on three successive occasions.[20]

(*b*) *Feasting, saturnalia.*—In many instances the end of the ceremonies is marked by feasting[21] and dancing,[1] and is frequently made the occasion of great licence.[2]

(*c*) *Disenchantment, religious service.*—Sometimes the final ceremony consists in purification[3] or disenchantment[4] by a medicine-man, or in performing a religious service over the novice.[5]

(*d*) *Sexual intercourse.* — In many instances sexual intercourse completes the rite.[6]

10. Destruction of things used during the ceremonies.—Among the Pitta-Pitta tribes of Queensland[7] and the Thonga of E. Africa[8] the enclosure used during the rites is burnt when they are ended; and the Macusis destroy everything that the novice has used during her seclusion.[9] A similar practice prevails among some of the tribes of S. Africa.[10]

11. Privileges secured by initiation. — Among the most important of these are the rights to eat certain articles of food previously forbidden,[11] to join the young men's camp,[12] to take part in the sacred ceremonies[13] and in the dances and deliberations of the men,[14] to marry,[15] and, in many instances, to assume the position of a full-grown man.[16] Frequently initiation entitles the youth to wear a distinctive dress, ornaments, or other decoration.[17]

IV. *OBJECT OF THE RITES.* — We have seen that a rite of puberty may include or indeed consist of a ceremony which is not exclusively employed as such a rite. Circumcision, *e.g.*, serves many other ends than to indicate an important epoch in the life of a member of a community. But, where it is practised as a rite of puberty, while it may and frequently does continue to serve those ends, it marks or operates a momentous change, by which the novice is severed from the things of childhood and enters upon the rights and duties of manhood or womanhood. It is easy to trace this conception in the symbolism of mock burial and resurrection, in the passing through a new gateway and along a new road, in festivities preceded by seclusion, in the washing off of a ceremonial covering of charcoal or clay, in the reception of a new name, in the investiture in new clothing or ornaments and the like. Such practices may be intended to effect purification or change of identity or purposes other than those of a rite of puberty. Still, when employed as such a rite, they express the notion of severance from the past and entrance upon a new life. In the tests of endurance, in

1 See *The Captivity of Hans Stade of Hesse*, p. 143, note 4.
2 A. Senfft, 'Die Rechtsitten der Jap-Eingeborenen,' *Globus*, xci. [1907] 142. They also have their teeth blackened and receive gifts.
3 J. Kohler, 'Das Recht der Herero,' *ZVRW* xiv. [1900] 314.
4 Dalton, p. 252.
5 F. S. Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven*, Vienna, 1852, p. 93.
6 Owen, p. 70. They, too, receive presents.
7 Riedel, p. 137 (Ceram); Seligmann, pp. 202, 204 (Torres Straits); Connolly, *JAI* xxvi. 143 (Fanti); Angas, p. 48 f. (Azimba Land); Dennett, p. 69 f. (Bavili); Gouldsbury and Sheane, p. 160 (Tanganyika Plateau); Schomburgk, i. 168 (Warraus); Nelson, p. 291 (Malemut).
8 Hobley, p. 73. 9 Hill-Tout, *JAI* xxxv. 136.
10 Howitt, p. 558; Somerville, *JAI* xxiii. 5 (New Hebrides); Seligmann, p. 211; Guise, *JAI* xxviii. 207 (New Guinea); Junod, i. 91 (Thonga); J. Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 268 (S. Africa); Garcilasso de la Vega, ii. 176 (Incas). At Rome the assumption of the *toga prætexta* was a public declaration of arrival at legal puberty (see F. C. von Savigny, iii. 59 ff.); and in China the man's hat and the woman's hairpin mark maturity (J. Kohler, 'Aus dem chinesischen Civilrecht,' *ZVRW* vi. [1886] 364).
11 J. L. van Hasselt, 'Die Noeforezen (Gewink Bay, New Guinea),' *ZE* viii. [1876] 185.
12 Stanley Hall, ii. 235 (Hupa). In the case of this tribe repeated bathing forms a principal part of the rite.
13 Brough Smyth, i. 61; cf. Howitt, p. 556 f.
14 Krieger, p. 171.
15 Seligmann, pp. 202, 204, 211.
16 Junod, i. 91 (Thonga). With his account of the Tilorela custom (p. 94) cf. A. Bastian's somewhat cryptic note (*Die Rechtsverhältnisse bei verschiedenen Völkern der Erde*, Berlin, 1872, p. 181, note 1); Angas, p. 48 f. (Azimba Land); Hobley, p. 70 (Akamba).
17 Zache, *ZE* xxxi. 71; cf. Dennett, p. 69 f.
18 Lafitau, i. 291 (Brazil); Schomburgk, i. 168 (Warraus); *Hans Stade*, p. 143 f. (Tupis); R. Brough Smyth, i. 60 (Victorian tribes).
19 Angas, p. 48 f. (Azimba Land); Junod, i. 92 (Thonga); Rattray, p. 103 (Central Angoniland).
20 Howitt, p. 674.
21 F. Boas, in 1889 *Report of the British Association*, p. 837 (Tsimshian); Krause, p. 218 (Tlingits); *NR* i. 584 (Ceris and Tepocas); Riedel, p. 138 (Ceram); Krieger, pp. 171, 296 (New Guinea); Somerville, *JAI* xxiii. 5 (New Hebrides); J. L. Krapf, p. 147 (Wanyika); J. Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 270; Theal, *Kaffir Folk-Lore*², p. 218.

1 Powers, p. 235 f. (Wintūn); Gottschling, *JAI* xxxv. 372 f. (Bawenda); J. Roscoe, *JRAI* xxxix. 186 f.; Krieger, p. 297 (British New Guinea); Schomburgk, i. 168 (Warraus); Seligmann, p. 204 (Mabuiag).
2 Among the Sotho Negroes the girls wear men's clothing, carry arms, and indulge in mad pranks and lewd conduct (Endemann, p. 38). See also Roscoe, *loc. cit.*; Theal, *Kaffir Folk-Lore*², p. 218, *Hist. of S. Africa*, ii. 206; J. Macdonald, *JAI* xx. 117. In some instances the novices are permitted during the ceremonies to steal, provided that they are not caught (Theal, *Hist. of S. Africa*, ii. 205; Seligmann, p. 204); in others sexual licence prevails during the same period (Chinnery and Beaver, p. 77; J. Macdonald, *loc. cit.*). In some cases obscene language, not permissible at other times, is used during some of the ceremonies (Junod, i. 79).
3 Hill-Tout, *JAI* xxxv. 136 (Stlatlumh); cf. Junod, i. 91 (Thonga).
4 Schomburgk, i. 316.
5 I. H. N. Evans, 'Notes on the Religious Beliefs . . . of the Dusuns,' *JRAI* xlii. [1912] 387.
6 Duff Macdonald, i. 126; Johnston, p. 410; Rattray, p. 501; Angas, p. 48 ff.; Riedel, p. 138.
7 Roth, p. 170. 8 Junod, i. 92.
9 Schomburgk, ii. 316. So, too, the Tlingit girl's old clothes are destroyed (Krause, p. 218).
10 J. Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 269, xx. 119.
11 Howitt, p. 592; Brough Smyth, i. 62; Wallace, p. 496.
12 Howitt, p. 592; Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 215 f.
13 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 328. 14 Passarge, p. 101.
15 Roth, p. 171; Howitt, p. 592; Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 330; Brough Smyth, i. 65 f.; Passarge, p. 101; Krieger, p. 171; Junod, i. 177 f.; Decle, p. 78; Schomburgk, ii. 316; Wallace, p. 496.
16 Gottschling, *JAI* xxxv. 372 f.; J. Roscoe, *JRAI* xxxix. 185; J. Macdonald, *JAI* xix. 269; Howitt, pp. 661, 639.
17 See above, III. 9 (*a*); Roth, pp. 171, 174; cf. Decle, p. 78.

some, at all events, of the mutilations inflicted, and in the instructions given we see a preparation for this new life—an attempt to form the character and educate the novice for the duties of full membership of society; and we see in the feasting, dancing, and sexual intercourse which frequently take place as the final stages of the ritual his introduction into the corporate life of the community.

LITERATURE.—H. Ploss and M. Bartels, *Das Weib in der Natur und Volkerkunde*[10], Leipzig, 1913; J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, i. 1 ff.; A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, do. 1902, pp. 10 f., 294 ff.; A. van Gennep, *Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 93 ff.; H. Schurtz, *Alterklassen und Männerbünde*, Berlin, 1902, p. 95 ff.

P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON.

PUBLICANI, or Popelicani (a corrupted form of Paulician).—This is the designation under which the Cathari (see ALBIGENSES) are frequently referred to by both French and English writers in the 12th and 13th centuries. Schmidt considers that the name, in this form, was introduced by the Crusaders, in evidence of which he cites Tudebod (*Recueil des historiens des croisades*, iii. [1866] 26) and G. de Villehardouin (J. A. C. Buchon, *Collection des chroniques nationales françaises*, Paris, 1824–28, iii. 156).

J. BASS MULLINGER.

PUNISHMENT.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

PUPPETS.—From the earliest times human effigies of a varying degree of realism have been fashioned by man which, from their character or their purpose, do not fall within the categories of idols, votive offerings, or purely artistic products. What may have been the object of the ivory and bone human figures of the palæolithic age cannot be stated with any certainty, but it is not improbable that they had a magical intent. The physical peculiarities which they exhibit, dividing them into two groups, one of which shows marked steatopygia, indicate that the aim of the artist was a realistic reproduction of the human form. In this respect the figures of the palæolithic period differ from many human effigies produced by primitive peoples which, whether from lack of skill or indifference, often show signs of little attention to accurate reproduction of form.

Among the ancient Egyptians models formed a regular feature in the sepulchral ceremonial of wealthy or important personages. These figures, representing men engaged in occupations of a menial type such as agriculture, domestic work, or baking, as well as the oarsmen of the model boat, were buried with the dead to serve as his ministers in the after life, while the *ushabti* figures were intended to take his place as labourers in the sacred fields of Osiris. They were a substitute for the slaves and other members of the household who, in accordance with primitive custom, were once sacrificed at the death of the master of the house. This substitution of a puppet or doll for human or animal sacrifice is not confined to Egypt. In the Malay Peninsula the sacrificial tray which is prepared on all ceremonial occasions for the propitiation of the spirits holds, among other offerings, coco-nut-leaf models of animals and dough models of human figures. Their intention is clearly indicated by the fact that the dough models of human beings are actually known by the name of 'substitutes' (*tukar ganti*) (W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, pp. 72, 432). In India the Lushei Kuki clans, in a very solemn, but rare, form of sacrifice to the spirits of woods and streams in cases of sickness—a sacrifice of which use is made only when other means have failed—prepare two small clay figures representing a man and a woman, which are placed on a platform; they then sacrifice a pig and make the blood run over the platform. The flesh of the victim may not be eaten in a house (J. Shakespear, *The Lushei Kuki Clans*, London, 1912, p. 74). On the Nile a doll is thrown into the river when the rise is delayed, and a similar ceremony took place on the Tiber, where a straw puppet was employed, in each case in substitution for a human being (*GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 165).

The spiritual basis of the use of models as substitutes appears in other connexions.

In cases of serious illness in the Malay Peninsula the wandering soul is charmed into a dough figure as an intermediate step to its restoration to the body;[1] or dough figures, animal as well as human, may be made the receptacle of 'mischiefs' resident in a human patient, a thread acting as the conductor under the influence of a charm (Skeat, pp. 432 f., 452 f.). Among the Achewa of Central Africa spirits of the dead wandering in the bush are supposed to annoy the living until they have been confined by the medicine-man in a receptacle consisting of a few short pieces of wood bound together with a scrap of calico in the semblance of a child's doll. Inside the figure is a box made of the handle of a gourd-cup which is the actual resting-place of the ancestral spirit (A. Werner, *Natives of British Central Africa*, London, 1906, p. 69). It is possible that a curious custom followed by the Thonga chiefs may be connected with this belief. It was their practice to carry about with them wooden images called *angoza*, representing men, women, and animals. These were little more than sticks with heads carved at one end. They were lodged in the house of the chief wife and were displayed only on special occasions. When important cases were being discussed, they were planted in the ground at a little distance, and they also accompanied the chief on a journey (*ib.* p. 68 f.). It has been suggested that they were emblems of authority. Possibly, if this were the case, they are to be regarded as an embodiment of the chief's ancestral spirits.

The association of an ancestral spirit with a doll also appears in the shamanistic cults of N. Asia. In some tribes the shaman's powers were regarded as closely connected with his shamanistic ancestors and as originating at their call. The shaman's coat was an object of peculiar reverence; it was an essential concomitant of the vocation, and in use it was both a protection and a source of inspiration (see art. SHAMANISM). Potanin records that among the Uriankhai tribes a small doll was attached to the coat which represented the shaman's ancestor (M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia: a Study in Social Anthropology*, Oxford, 1914, p. 217).

In European folk-custom the belief in the embodiment of a spirit in a puppet appears in the custom of fashioning a doll from the last sheaf at harvest-time—a belief which in various forms is wide-spread among primitive peoples (see art. HARVEST). Among the Akikúyu a sun-dried clay figure is produced at the dance following the maize-harvest (W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, London, 1910, p. 190 f.), which may with probability be regarded as the analogue of the corn-doll, the material abiding-place of the corn-spirit. This view of the custom, however, is a matter of inference, and the fact that the dancers appear to regard the figure with adoration when elevated before them would suggest that it is passing into the category of idols. On the other hand, the fetishes in human form of W. Africa owe their virtues to the medicines placed in or on them. A wooden fetish figure, *e.g.*, of Bambala origin, now in the British Museum, is said to have no supernatural value unless plastered with the special magical clay (*British Museum Handbook of the Ethnographical Collection*, London, 1910, p. 266).

How far the belief in the endowment of a puppet with a personality may be carried appears in the customs connected with the female fetish Nantaba, an appanage of the king in Uganda, which has to be provided on his accession by his father's mother's clan.

This fetish consists of a gourd in which the wind is supposed to be caught at a ceremony in which a tree is cut down and a goat sacrificed. The man who carries the fetish back to the king conducts himself as, and imitates the appearance of, a woman who is *enceinte*. The image is provided with a hut and a guardian—a wife of the king—whose duty it is to attend Nantaba and carry her into the sun when she desires it. The king's wives come and sit around her, hoping thus to gain favour and have children. At the death of the king the fetish is thrown away (J. Roscoe, 'Nantaba, the Female Fetich of the King of Uganda,' *Man*, viii. [1908], no. 74).

The relation of Nantaba and fertility can be paralleled by the use of puppets to promote fertility and well-being in other connexions, but especially in relation to the crops. One instance, that of the corn-doll and the corn-spirit, has been mentioned above.

In Liberia steatite figures are employed to promote the fertility of the farms. These figures are the relics of an earlier culture, but, when found in tumuli or elsewhere by the present natives, they are buried in their fields. Sometimes the image is placed on a platform, usually an old ant-hill, and the farmer and his household march round it, striking it with a whip and chanting an appeal for a good harvest (T. A. Joyce, 'Steatite Figures from W. Africa in the British Museum,' *Man*, v. [1905], no. 57). In S. India, when rain fails, a puppet of ashes from the potter's field figures in ceremonies performed by Kapu women; they model a small figure of a naked human being, which they carry from door to door, asking gifts and singing indecent songs. After this collection of alms, which may last for three or four days, the image, which is called Jokumara, the rain-god, is thrown away in a field. A cultivator may also make a figure himself and place it in the fields, after spreading

[1] For further instances elsewhere see *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, pp. 53 f., 62 f.

on them leaves, ashes, and flowers which he has received in return for alms from Barike women (E. Thurston, *Omens and Superstitions of S. India*, London, 1912, p. 307).

In these cases the image is one element in a whole which forms the fertility charm. It may, however, also be employed purely for protective purposes.

In S. India the crops are protected against the supposed dangers of an eclipse by images made, as in the rain-charm, of ashes from a potter's field—a material apparently regarded as peculiarly efficacious. The figures are placed on four sides of the field (Thurston, p. 44). The parallel with the *terminalia* and other protectors of the fields in Roman religion is rendered closer by certain physical peculiarities in the effigies used for protective purposes in other connexions mentioned below.

Puppets are used to ward off evil influences of various kinds.

In Car Nicobar a wooden figure is used to scare evil spirits (*British Museum Handbook of the Ethnog. Collection*, p. 77). In the case of an epidemic among the Lushei Kuki clans a village to which it is feared the disease will spread is protected by a gateway across the road on which are straw figures of men armed with dahs and spears (Shakespear, p. 76). The closest parallel to the Priapus figures, however, is found in S. India, where, at the Mangalore races, a figure of a man with enormous genitalia is carried in procession, or at the Canara races, where the procession is headed by figures of a man and woman *in coitu*, and in the indecent figures on the temple cars (Thurston, p. 114). In this district, again, the employment of puppets to avert misfortune is closely connected with the 'evil eye.' Dolls made of straw and covered with black cloth, splashed with white and black paint, sometimes representing a man and woman embracing, are hung on poles in gardens or fields near the road to scare away birds, but principally to avert the 'evil eye.' Figures of all kinds, but especially grotesque, indecent, or hideous human forms, are hung on houses or shops, particularly when in course of erection, to catch the eye of the passer-by, and distract it from the main structure (*ib.* p. 111 f.). It is hardly necessary to point to the Gothic gargoyle as an obvious European parallel to this form of the custom of averting the evil eye by some peculiarity or protective sign.

A familiar use of the doll in magic depends upon sympathetic action. The employment of the waxen image which was melted, pricked by pins, or otherwise injured was one of the commonest practices attributed to witches in European superstition. It is one of a number based on the belief in the possibility of harmful action on a human being at a distance.

In Japan nails are driven into a straw image, which is buried under the place on which the victim sleeps. In order to make a debtor pay his debts a broom, inverted, is made into a lay figure to represent him; it is then knocked down and belaboured. This will make the debtor dream of his delinquency and come to pay his debt. A wife punishes her husband for infidelity by nailing his effigy to a tree (W. L. Hildburgh, 'Notes on some Japanese Magical Methods for injuring Persons,' *Man*, xv. [1915], no. 65). Similarly, in S. India, when a Parivaram woman commits adultery with a man outside the caste, she is punished with excommunication and an image is made of her into the eyes of which thorns are driven before it is thrown away outside the village. As a protection against witches a wooden figure is made, into which nails are driven, a hole cut above the navel, into which a lead plate, with the name and star of the person and a charm written on it, is sometimes inserted, and it is cast into the sea. A favourite practice of the S. Indian magician, however, is to mould an image of a plastic material, such as dough or clay, which is buried at night in the Hindu cremation ground after thorns or nails have been driven into it, or is nailed on a tree. Sometimes the corpse of a child, which is dug up and reburied, is used instead of a figure (Thurston, pp. 245, 247, 254). The Lushei Kuki clans use bamboo splinters to drive into the limbs of clay figures, and in the Malay Peninsula wax figures are buried while powerful charms are recited (Shakespear, p. 109; Skeat, pp. 430, 569 f.).

The interest of the ceremonial and magical use of the doll has tended to divert the attention of observers from its use as a child's plaything. Not only is this use wide-spread, but it is also of great antiquity.

Among the objects which have been found in children's graves in Egypt are dolls both of animal and of human form which show some considerable degree of development; the limbs are movable and one of them apparently had an apparatus for emitting a squeak (*Guide to Egyp. Collection in British Museum*, London, 1909, p. 78). Children's dolls have also been found in the graves of the early inhabitants of Peru (T. A. Joyce, *S. American Archæology*, London, 1912, p. 147), and it has been pointed out that some peoples, such as the Zuñi of N. America, give ceremonial dolls to their children as playthings when no longer required for ceremonial purposes (see E. Lovett, *The Child's Doll: its Origin, Legend, and Folklore*, London, 1915, p. 10).

It has been suggested that the child's doll is a derivative from the ceremonial doll. In some cases, it is held further, the form would support this view.

Among the Yao of Central Africa, *e.g.*, the dolls show very little resemblance to the human form and may have been originally fetishes like the *angoza* of the Thonga chiefs already mentioned (Werner, p. 69).

On the other hand, it must be remembered that both the savage and the child indulge freely in make-believe, and indeed very few of the children's dolls show much resemblance to human beings.

In the Sûdân a piece of stick with lumps of clay for the head and the swell of the hips is dressed up in native costume (E. A. Gates, 'Soudanese Dolls,' *Man*, iii. [1903], no. 22). On the Congo a piece of firewood or a manioc root serves the purpose, and these were even preferred to more realistic European dolls (J. H. Weeks, *Congo Life and Folklore*, London, 1911, p. 350). In Australia gum cement figures are sometimes modelled to resemble women, but just as commonly pieces of forked cane with joints manipulated to imitate the limbs are carried round the neck like real babies, while pieces of grass wrapped in bark are also used (N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, London, 1906, p. 132 f.).

Even granting that the use of dolls in ceremonial may have originated the use of the doll as a child's toy, imitation and the almost instinctive desire to train for the business of life which appears in a large number of children's games is probably almost equally responsible.

On the Lower Congo a doll made of a piece of firewood or a root is washed in an old saucepan and hung out in the sun to dry by the little girls just as they themselves have been treated by their mothers. They dress them in strings of beads, hang a few charms around them, and tie them on their backs as babies are carried (Weeks, p. 350). The Boloki girls, in fact, call their dolls *bana*, 'babies' (Weeks, *Among Congo Cannibals*, London, 1913, p. 149), while the Yao name for a kind of wooden doll with the rounded end covered with scarlet seeds, fitted on like a wig, is *mwali*, 'girl' (Werner, p. 113). The Bathonga children imitate their mothers in playing with dolls made of a banana-stem or a hollowed spherical fruit fitted on a stick and with knotted string for hair (H. A. Junod, *Life of a S. African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912–13, i. 173).

In Tunis among the Hausa the use of a doll as plaything is carried further. The offerings in the medicine-house to the younger *bori*, 'the children of spots,' which cause rashes and sore eyes, consist of nuts, sugar, toys, and sweets, covered with a white cloth, to which are attached two dolls, 'the playthings of Mai-Nassara.' These *bori* in all probability are spirits of dead children (A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Ban of the Bori*, London, 1914, pp. 269, 275).

Puppet-plays resembling the *fantoccini* and *Punchinello* are not uncommon among primitive peoples. In the Indonesian area they are a constant entertainment. Leather figures are used for shadow-plays which represent historical dramas (*Brit. Mus. Handbook Ethnog. Collection*, p. 101). The *dubbo dubbo* of W. Africa is almost an exact parallel to the Punch and Judy show, presenting a number of scenes in which Kachella Dambulla, like Punch, when called upon to meet his obligations, evades payment and maltreats his creditors (D. Alexander, 'Dubbo Dubbo; or Notes on Punch and Judy as seen in Bornu,' *Man*, x. [1910], no. 85).

LITERATURE.—See the works cited throughout.

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PURĀṆAS.—1. Introduction.—The *Purāṇas* form a class of books written in Sanskrit, expounding ancient Indian theogony, cosmogony, genealogies, and accounts of kings and *ṛṣis*,[1] religious belief, worship, observances, and philosophy, personal, social, and political ordinances, and opinions about all kinds of miscellaneous matters—the whole illustrated and enforced by tales, legends, old songs, anecdotes, and fables. They present the general or popular exposition of those subjects, while the Vedic literature contains the strictly Brāhmanic thought and teaching in religious matters. The *Purāṇas* are always reckoned as eighteen in number. No *Purāṇa*

[1] The word *ṛṣi* denotes in the *Purāṇas* a holy and ascetic sage, sometimes semi-divine but, when human, generally a Brāhman. *Muni* means much the same, but is always human, and often of lower rank than *ṛṣi*.

treats of all those subjects, though some are very wide indeed in their scope, while others confine themselves to narrow limits; but, taken collectively, they may be described as a popular encyclopædia of ancient and mediæval Hinduism, religious, philosophical, historical, personal, social, and political.

The word *purāṇa* is Sanskrit and means 'ancient'; and the title *Purāṇa* signifies 'Ancient Lore,' indicating that these books profess to declare ancient lore as handed down for the most part by tradition. Its fuller form is *Purāṇa-saṁhitā*, 'Collection of Ancient Lore.' The eighteen *Purāṇas*, according to the list which occurs most often, are these—the *Brahma*, *Padma*, *Viṣṇu*, *Śiva*, *Bhāgavata*, *Nāradīya*, *Mārkaṇḍeya*, *Agni*, *Bhaviṣya*, *Brahmavaivarta*, *Liṅga*, *Varāha*, *Skanda*, *Vāmana*, *Kūrma*, *Matsya*, *Garuḍa*, and *Brahmāṇḍa*. This list omits the well-known *Vāyu*, but there can be little doubt that the *Vāyu* and *Brahmāṇḍa* were one originally and have become differentiated; for they agree, almost word for word, in the great bulk of their contents. The name *Brahmāṇḍa* then in that list must be taken to include its twin, the *Vāyu*, and the *Kūrma* calls it by both names, the *Vāyavīya Brahmāṇḍa*. The *Matsya*, *Garuḍa*, and *Vāyu* treat them as distinct, and, in order to preserve the total eighteen, omit one of the others, the *Śiva* or the *Vāmana*. Altogether, then, there are really nineteen. The *Matsya* (liii. 11–58) declares the number of verses in each *Purāṇa*, and so also the *Vāyu* (civ. 2–11), but not quite completely. They agree, or nearly agree, as regards most of them, but differ widely about the *Brahma*; and the *Matsya* alone gives the length of the *Viṣṇu*, *Agni*, and *Liṅga*; both omit the *Śiva*. These figures, however, do not altogether agree with the dimensions of the present *Purāṇas*, being generally excessive, and are merely round totals mostly reckoned in thousands. Each *Purāṇa* is constructed as a discourse delivered by some person of authority to one or more hearers; the subjects are expounded, often in the form of question and answer, and not always methodically; and into the narration are woven stories and discourses uttered by other persons—with the result that the whole often appears involved, defective in consistency, and marred by anachronisms. They are mainly in verse, which is generally the common *śloka* or *anuṣṭubh*, but passages sometimes occur in prose.

2. Origin and development.—An account of how the *Purāṇas* came into existence is given by the *Brahmāṇḍa* (II. xxxiv. f.), *Vāyu* (lx. f.), and *Viṣṇu* (III. iv., vi.); that in the *Bhāgavata* (XII. vii. 4–7) is late and untrustworthy. The great *ṛṣi* Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana divided the single Veda into four Vedas and arranged them. Hence he obtained the name Vyāsa, 'the arranger,' by which he is generally known. He lived and did that about the end of the Dvāpara age, about the time of the great Bhārata battle. He then entrusted them to his four Brāhman disciples, one to each, and thus Paila became the teacher of the *Ṛigveda*, Vaiśampayana of the *Yajurveda*, Jaimini of the *Sāmaveda*, and Sumantu of the *Atharvaveda*. Then with tales, anecdotes, songs, and lore concerning the ages he compiled a *Purāṇa-saṁhitā*, and taught it to his fifth disciple, the *sūta*, or 'bard,' Romaharṣaṇa or Lomaharṣaṇa (the two names are the same). After completing that work he composed the great epic, the *Mahābhārata*, and made Romaharṣaṇa his disciple in both the *Itihāsa* (by which is generally understood the epic) and the *Purāṇa*. Statements occur sometimes that he taught a particular *Purāṇa* to his Brāhman disciples, but these appear to be late assertions. The *sūta* Romaharṣaṇa divided that *Purāṇa* into six parts or versions and taught them to his six disciples, Sumati Ātreya, Agnivarchas Bhāradvāja, Mitrayu Vāsiṣṭha, Akṛtavraṇa Kāśyapa, Sāvarṇi Saumadatti, and Suśarman Śāṁśapāyana. The last three made each a further *saṁhitā*, or collection. The *sūta's* sixfold *Purāṇa* was called the *Romaharṣaṇika* collection (*saṁhitā*), and those of his three disciples were named after them, the *Kāśyapika*, *Sāvarṇika*, and *Śāṁśapāyanika* collections. Vyāsa's original *Purāṇa* is not further mentioned and may have been merged in the *Romaharṣaṇika*. The collections made by the *sūta* and his three disciples were regarded as the four original collections, the 'root-*saṁhitās*' as they were called. They were all to the same effect, but differed in their diction. Sāvarṇi's version was noted for the correctness of its expressions, and Śāṁśapāyana's for its stirring style. All were divided into four parts, and all except Śāṁśapāyana's contained 4000 verses. None of them is now in existence, but several of the disciples appear in some of the present *Purāṇas*. The *sūta* had a son called Ugraśravas and *sauti* Raumaharṣaṇi, 'son of the *sūta* Romaharṣaṇa,' and taught him also the *Purāṇa*. Such is the account given, and it is not improbable. The *sūta* was a bard, and the origin of the *sūtas* is placed in remote antiquity, for the first *sūta* is fabled to have come into existence at the sacrifice of a primeval king, Pṛthu, son of Vena (e.g. *Vāyu*, lxii. 137–148), whose stories are often narrated. The antiquity is, of course, genuine, because bards have existed from the earliest times. The term *sūta* was afterwards applied to denote the offspring of a father of the Kṣatriya, or military caste, and a Brāhman mother, but he had nothing to do with the original *sūtas*. It was their duty, as the *Vāyu* (i. 31 f.) and *Padma* (v. i. 27 f.) explain, to preserve the genealogies of the gods, *ṛṣis*, great kings, and famous men. These were matters of ancient tradition, for which the *Purāṇa* and *Itihāsa* would be the appropriate receptacles, and thus these works would be naturally entrusted to the *sūta* Romaharṣaṇa. His descendants had the right of reciting the *Purāṇa* for their livelihood, but the account states that the *Purāṇa* passed into the hands of his disciples, of whom five at least were Brāhmans, and was multiplied by them.

The foregoing account does not say how the present eighteen *Purāṇas* were developed, and their origin is explained by another and inconsistent statement, that there was originally one *Purāṇa*, and Vyāsa himself divided it into eighteen (e.g., *Matsya*, liii. 9 f.). This is certainly spurious, and the reason for it seems to have been rivalry between the advocates of the Vedas and those of the *Purāṇas*, the eighteen *Purāṇas* being thus made coeval with the four Vedas. Every *Purāṇa*, in fact, says that it is 'of equal measure with the Veda,' thus placing itself in the same rank as the Vedas, and indeed the *Purāṇa* is sometimes called the fifth Veda (*Vāyu*, i. 18). In the *Purāṇas* teaching of all kinds is often put into the mouth of the chief gods, so placing it beyond cavil; indeed, the *Vāyu* (i. 200) and *Śiva* (v. i. 35) aver that a Brāhman was not really wise if he did not know the *Purāṇa*. Further, the Brāhmans put forward a claim to primeval antiquity for the Vedas, and the *Purāṇas*, while acknowledging that, answered it with a claim on their own behalf to equal or prior antiquity. Thus the *Markaṇḍeya* (xlv. 20 f.) says that in the very beginning it and the Vedas issued from Brahmā's mouths; and the *Brahmāṇḍa* (I. i. 40), *Vāyu*, (i. 60 f.), *Matsya* (liii. 3), *Padma*, and *Śiva* assert that he remembered the *Purāṇa* then, the first of all the scriptures, before the Vedas issued from his mouths. Moreover, the Brāhmans claimed the monopoly of religious revelation and worship, and the *Purāṇas* outbid that

by declaring that to recite or even listen to them delivered a man from all sin, the *Mārkaṇḍeya* proclaiming that by acquiring it a man attains to a benefit superior to all the Vedas. There was thus a clear rivalry between the *Purāṇas* and the Vedas, and, in asserting priority for the *purāṇa*, or ancient, tradition over the Vedas, the *Purāṇas* were right to this extent that ancient tradition unquestionably existed before the Vedas, for the Vedic hymns allude to bygone persons and events (mentioned also in the *Purāṇas*), which could have been remembered only through tradition. Tradition has always existed from the remotest antiquity, as far back as man preserved any memories of his ancestors. This is a platitude, yet it must not be overlooked when examining the *Purāṇas*, though what value the present *Purāṇas* have in that respect is a different question (see below, § 13).

In accordance with such exalted claims, all the *Purāṇas* except three, the *Liṅga*, *Nāradīya*, and *Vāmana*, assert that they were originally declared by some god in primeval time. Those three say that they were first declared by some great *ṛṣi*. Accordingly, each *Purāṇa* had to provide a succession of persons through whom it was handed down. Most of them form the chain perfunctorily of a few links, but the *Brahmāṇḍa* (IV. iv. 58–66) and *Vāyu* (ciii. 58–66) give a long list of 29 names, which occur, partly at least, in chronological order. Apart from fabulous occasions, nearly every *Purāṇa* particularizes the occasion when professedly it was actually recited. The *Vāyu* gives this circumstantial account:

After the great Bhārata battle the Pāṇḍavas were succeeded on the throne of the Pauravas at Hastināpura (on the Ganges, north-east of Delhi) by Arjuna's grandson Parīkṣit, and he by his son Janamejaya, to whom the *Mahābhārata* was professedly recited. The *Vāyu* says that the *ṛṣis* dwelling in Naimiṣa forest on the river Gomatī (the modern Goomti in Oudh) offered a long sacrifice on the bank of the river Dṛṣadvatī (the modern Chitang approximately) in Kurukṣetra (the country 70 miles north-west of Delhi), and the *sūta* Romaharṣaṇa went there and at their request recited it to them, during the reign of Janamejaya's great-grandson Adhisīmakṛṣṇa—*i.e.* a century or rather more after the great battle (i. 12–28, xcix. 258 f.).

The *Matsya* says almost the same of itself, and the *Brahmāṇḍa* suggests much the same. The other *Purāṇas* fall off from this account, and the measure of their falling off agrees in a way with their probable posteriority. Most of the others lay the scene in Naimiṣa forest, and the late *Bhāgavata* makes the sacrifice last 1000 years. The *Nāradīya* removes the scene to Siddhāśrama on the Ganges, and the *Varāha* gives no particulars. Four *Purāṇas* drop that account altogether. The *Viṣṇu*, *Mārkaṇḍeya*, and *Vāmana* say that they were declared by the *ṛṣis* Parāśara, Mārkaṇḍeya, and Pulastya respectively, and the *Bhaviṣya* says that it was recited by Vyāsa's Brāhmaṇ disciple Sumantu to Janamejaya's son, King Śatānīka.

3. The five original subjects.—Most of the *Purāṇas* declare that a *Purāṇa* should treat of five subjects: original creation (*sarga*), dissolution and re-creation (*pratisarga*), the periods of the Manus (*manvantara*), ancient genealogies (*vaṁśa*), and accounts of persons mentioned in the genealogies (*vaṁśyānucharita*). These appear to have been the original subjects of the *Purāṇas*, and were so specially their province that the epithet 'having five characteristic subjects' was an old synonym of the title *Purāṇa*; hence religious instruction apart from these subjects was not one of their primary aims, nor do they appear to have been composed for sectarian purposes originally. Sectarian designs seem rather to have been an after-modification, except in the latest *Purāṇas*, which are frankly sectarian.

The first three of these subjects are closely connected and may be considered together. The teaching is neither uniform nor consistent, but seems to combine different schemes. Its general purport may be stated thus:

It postulates the primordial essence called *prakṛti* and *pradhāna*, spirit called *puruṣa*, and the god Brahmā (or Brahma), with whom both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are sometimes identified. *Prakṛti* contained the three qualities, goodness (*sattva*), passion (*rajas*), and darkness (*tamas*), in equilibrium. It first evolved the great intellectual principle (*mahat*) as the first stage. From this was evolved the principle of individuality (*ahaṅkāra*), and from this the five subtle elements (*tan-mātra*), sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, which became manifest respectively as the five elements (*bhūta*), ether, air, light, water, and solid matter. This was the second stage, the elemental creation (*bhūta-sarga*). In the third stage the ten organs of sense and action and the mind proceeded from the intellectual principle. These three stages were the creation from *prakṛti* (*prākṛta-sarga*). All these principles and elements, through the influence of spirit, combined and formed an egg, the egg of Brahmā, wherein he, assuming the quality of passion, became active. He brought the world into existence as the fourth stage, and through meditation originated, fifthly, the animal kingdom, sixthly, the gods, seventhly, mankind, eighthly, the intellectual notions called *anugraha*, and, ninthly, Sanatkumāra and other semi-divine mind-born sons who remained celibate, whence this creation is called *kaumāra*. In all these the three qualities existed in different states of predominance.

In the main this account follows the ideas of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, but other accounts are added which seem more primitive.

Brahmā assumed four different forms in succession and from them were produced the demons, the gods, the forefathers (*pitṛs*), and mankind; and, afterwards assuming another form, he produced from his limbs all other living beings, creatures, and vegetation. But those beings did not multiply, and he created from his mind sons, whose number is variously given as seven, nine, ten, or eleven, Bhṛgu, Marīchi, Dakṣa, etc., all known as *ṛṣis*, and also the deities called Rudras. Seven of these sons were specially known as 'the seven *ṛṣis*' (*saptarṣi*), who hold a unique and permanent position in cosmogony. The Rudras are generally identified with Śiva. Next Brahmā created the first Manu Svāyambhuva and a woman Śatarūpā. These two had two sons, Priyavrata and Uttānapāda, and a daughter. Dakṣa married her and had 24 daughters, of whom 13 were married to Dharma (righteousness) and bore Love and other personified feelings; 10 were married to the other mind-born sons and Agni (fire) and the forefathers, and one named Satī became Śiva's wife. But this account is complicated by a further story that Dakṣa was re-born in Uttānapāda's lineage as Dakṣa Prāchetasa, and then created movable and immovable things, bipeds and quadrupeds, and also begot 60 daughters, of whom 10 were married to Dharma, 13 to Marīchi's son, Kaśyapa, 27 to the moon, and 10 to others. Then Kaśyapa by his wives begot the gods, good and evil beings, animals, birds, and trees; and thenceforward living creatures were engendered sexually.

Creation naturally involves the question of the ages.

Time is divided into various great periods. A human year is a day and night of the gods, and the divine year consists of 360 human years. Of divine years 12,000, *i.e.* 4,320,000 human years, constitute a 'four-age' period (*chaturyuga*), in which the four ages (*yuga*) are, first, the Kṛta of 1,440,000 human years, then the Tretā of 1,080,000 years, the Dvāpara of 720,000, and lastly the Kali of 360,000; and each of these ages is preceded by a twilight (*sandhyā*) containing as many hundreds of years as the age has thousands, and is followed by a twilight (*sandhyāṁśa*) of like duration. This 'four-age' period repeated a thousand times is a day of the god Brahmā and is called a *kalpa*. Creation takes place and lasts during his day, and at its close the three worlds are dissolved for the same length of time, which constitutes his night. His year consists of 360 such days and nights, and 100 such years is the length of his life, which is called a *para*. Further, a day of Brahmā comprises the periods of 14 Manus (*manvantara*), a Manu being a mythical regent of his period and progenitor of life therein. Each *manvantara* thus comprises 71 'four-age' periods, with a surplus, which is due to the impossibility of dividing 1000 'four-ages' exactly by 14, and is sometimes accounted for by assigning it to the intervals between the *manvantaras*. This is the reckoning generally set out, but variations are sometimes introduced incidentally, and the terms *yuga* and *kalpa* are sometimes used loosely. While most *Purāṇas* agree about Brahmā's duration and hold that Viṣṇu and Śiva outlive him greatly, they differ as to which of these two endures longer according to their view whether Viṣṇu or Śiva is the greater.

One 'four-age' period succeeds to another. When a *manvantara* closes, an interval occurs during which life ceases in the world, and the Manus, minor gods (all save Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva), the seven *ṛṣis*, and the forefathers depart upwards to a high celestial sphere, and remain there for the duration of a Kṛta age in order to preserve life. Then they resume their activities as new persons under new names, and introduce the next *manvantara*, restoring all life in the world. So the *manvantaras* succeed one another, and at the end of the fourteenth, when Brahmā's day closes, occurs the great dissolution, called *naimittika pratisarga*. The three worlds are burnt

up by fire, and a deluge of rain dissolves everything into one vast ocean; life is reabsorbed into the god who sleeps on that ocean, and the three qualities become inactive in equilibrium; yet the seven great *ṛṣis* are said to persist in certain celestial worlds through his nights, watching him as he sleeps. Such is the close of the *kalpa*. When his night ends, he awakes and begins to create again. That dissolution does not involve the elementary principles evolved during the first three stages of creation, and as regards them a further dissolution is spoken of, called the *prākṛtā pralaya*, wherein everything evolved from *prakṛti* disappears. Half of Brahmā's life has expired, and the second half has begun in its first *kalpa* called the *vārāha*, in which six Manus have passed away, namely Svāyambhuva, Svārochiṣa, Auttama, Tāmasa, Raivata, and Chākṣuṣa; and Vaivasvata is the present Manu. The theory of the succession of the *kalpas*, *manvantaras*, and ages developed into the doctrine that succession implied repetition, that everything repeated itself in essentials in the *manvaṇtaras* and in the 'four-age' periods. Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva outlived the dissolutions, and their existence was so vast that they were regarded as practically eternal; but Indra and the other gods were subordinate and temporary, holding their deity for a *manvantara* only. Each *manvantara* thus has its own subordinate gods and its own Manu, great *ṛṣis* and kings, who all come into existence at its beginning and pass away at its end. This scheme is carried out into such detail that their names are set out, not only for the present *manvantara*, but also for the past six and the seven that are yet future.

Since the Vedas were arranged and the *Purāṇa* compiled at the end of the Dvāpara age, this theory required that the same had been done in every Dvāpara age of the 'four-age' periods, and that a Vyāsa had appeared for that purpose. Hence it was necessary to propound a list of those Vyāsas. The list (mentioned above) of the 29 persons who handed down the *Brahmāṇḍa* and *Vāyu*, reduced to 28 by combining two names at one stage, seems to have suggested the idea that 28 Dvāparas had occurred. Certainly, however, that list (e.g., *Vāyu*, xxiii. 114 ff.), with a few variations, agrees with the names of the 28 Vyāsas; and consequently 27 'four-age' periods have elapsed in the Vaivasvata *manvantara*, and we are now living near the end of the Kali, or last age of the 28th period.

Manu Svāyambhuva's son Priyavrata, mentioned above, had seven sons, who became sovereigns of the seven continents (*dvīpas*) of which the earth consists, and their progeny peopled them. Thus the subject of geography is introduced. It is not always treated fully, but the general scheme stands thus:

The earth consists of a central circular continent named Jambu-dvipa, around which the other continents form a series of concentric rings, namely, Plakṣa, Śālmala, Kuśa, Krauñcha, Śāka, and Puṣkara, the outermost; and these continents are separated by a similar series of six circular oceans alternating with them, namely, of salt water, sugarcane-juice, wine, clarified butter (*ghī*), curdled milk, and milk respectively. Each continent and each ocean is twice the size of that which it encircles. The central continent Jambu is alone subject to the law of the four ages. It was assigned to Priyavrata's son, Agnidhra, and has nine countries which were named after his nine sons. Ilāvṛta is in the middle, and is flanked on the west by Ketumāla and on the east by Bhadrāśva. Along the north of these lie Ramyaka, the Northern Kurus, and Hiraṇmaya; and along the south lie Harivarṣa, Nābhi, and Kimpuruṣa. In the middle of Ilāvṛta is the immense fabulous mountain Meru, on which are the gods' abodes, with Brahmā's in the centre. Various mountains, forests, and lakes are mentioned in those countries. The Ganges flows down Meru and divides into four great streams, which flow away, the Sītā east, the Alaknandā south, the Vaṅkṣu west, and the Soma, or Bhadrā, north. Nābhi's country was named Bhārata after his grandson Bharata, but this is a mere fancy. Bhārata again has nine divisions named Indradvipa, Kaśerumant, Tāmravarṇa, Gabhastimant, Nāgadvipa, Saumya, Gandharva, Vāruṇa, and another which appears to be India proper and is more strictly called Bhārata. The accounts then deal with India itself, its dimensions, mountains, rivers, and peoples, which some *Purāṇas* set out in copious lists. The subject of cosmogony leads, on the one side, to a notice of the nether regions with sometimes a description of the hells, and, on the other, to a description mainly mythological of the sun, moon, planets, stars, and the celestial worlds.

The remaining two of the five special subjects of the *Purāṇas* are ancient genealogies and accounts of persons mentioned therein. They profess to give ancient history as handed down by tradition, and they certainly give the only approach to connected ancient history that is to be found in Sanskrit books. They are full of interest, but lie rather outside the scope of this article, and can therefore only be touched briefly. They begin with the progeny of the great *ṛṣis*, which is mythical, and pass on to the genealogies of the chief dynasties of kings who reigned for centuries in N. India and lists of the great Brāhman families. That the genealogies are not spurious but have some historical value is proved by the fact that they (and they alone in Sanskrit books) furnish an account of how the result that is known as the Aryan occupation of India took place through the growth and conquests of a distinct race, which they call Aila, and which they suggest entered India from the north.

Of the five subjects proper to *Purāṇas* the first three concern early religion and mythology, and the other two deal with traditional history—subject, of course, to later co-ordination, restatement, and amplification in both groups. The former were the general product of speculative thought, but the latter were based on actual history, though both are now open to the doubt how far tradition has preserved early beliefs and historical facts faithfully and correctly. The former were naturally shaped out and transmitted by religious teachers for general instruction; the latter were composed by royal bards and ballad-makers, *i.e.* *sūtas*, and were handed down by them. The distinction is important. The *Purāṇas* thus drew their subject-matter from two sources. These old subjects (*paurāṇikī kathā*) provided general instruction and pleasure, and it is often said that princes and *munis* entertained themselves with their recital. The traditions found in the *Purāṇas* were not primarily borrowed from the *Mahābhārata*, for they contain old tales and genealogies which are not to be found in that epic, and the stories which appear in both are not always narrated in the same way. Both are based on the same body of ancient tradition, and the *Purāṇas* incorporated old matters independently, though probably later additions to the *Purāṇas* have been borrowed from the epic, and possibly also *vice versa*. Of the stories told about ancient kings and *ṛṣis* some appear to be ancient, but others are certainly either later fabrications or at best genuine tradition seriously corrupted. They may generally be broadly divided into two classes: those that appear to be Kṣatriya stories, *i.e.* stories narrating occurrences from the point of view of the royal and military class (which often appear to be ancient), and those that are Brāhmanical, the difference between them being similar to the distinction between tales of chivalry and legends of the saints. References to the heroes of the epic are not infrequent, but its story is not narrated except in the few cases where an abstract of it is given, as in the *Agni*, *Padma*, and *Garuḍa*, which also summarize the *Harivaṁśa*.

4. Additions, interpolations, and losses.—The *Purāṇas*, like the epic, have grown by continual additions and interpolations, as abundant evidence shows, both direct and indirect. The *Liṅga* (II. lv. 36 f.), *e.g.*, says that it contains 108 chapters in its first part and 46 in its second; this is correct as regards the former, but the latter now contains 55 chapters. Again, the *Bhaviṣya* (I. i. 103–105) says that it contained 12,000 verses and was augmented by various stories to 50,000, just as the *Skanda* was amplified. The indirect evidence is of various kinds. (*a*) Many *Purāṇas* mention the eighteen *Purāṇas*, which they could not all do unless the enumeration were an addition made after all the eighteen had become established. In the *Padma*, which professes to have been recited by the *sūta*, pt. vi. continues pt. iv., ignoring pt. v., which begins as a separate *Purāṇa* recited by the *sūta's* son. (*b*) The same matter is sometimes told more than once; thus the story of the sun is told twice in the *Mārkaṇ-*

deya and that of Jalandhara is told twice in pt. vi. of the *Padma*. (*c*) Some of the stories are manifestly late, such as the portion of the *Brahma* which dilates on the sanctity of Puruṣottamakṣetra in Orissa. (*d*) There are differences in language in some *Purāṇas*, certain passages being marked by irregularities in grammar and metre not found in the remainder of the same work. (*e*) Different and sometimes inconsistent doctrines occur in various places even in one and the same *Purāṇa*, as is noticeable in the two parts of the *Kūrma*. Addition and interpolation have been practised continually; thus the *Garuḍa* quotes from the *Mārkaṇḍeya* and Yājñavalkya's law-book; and, since the *Bhaviṣya* professes to deal with the future, the edition published lately in Bombay has boldly brought its prophetic account down to the 19th cent., besides incorporating a summary of the Biblical account from Adam to Abraham. It often happens that the same passage is found in several *Purāṇas*, so that they either borrowed from one another or borrowed from a common original. Indeed, it almost seems from many peculiarities, such, *e.g.*, as that noticed above in the case of the *Padma* and the triple structure of the *Vāmana*, as if there had been different *Purāṇas* bearing the same name, or as if a particular *Purāṇa* existed with different versions, and that they were brought together and formed into a whole. On the other hand, there have been losses, as much evidence shows. In the *Padma*, *e.g.*, pt. v. says that the *Padma* which it introduces consisted of five sections, but that part contains only the first section called the *Pauṣkaraparvan*, and the other four appear to be missing, while the entire *Padma* has six parts. Again, a comparison of *Brahmāṇḍa*, III. lxxiv. 103 f., with the corresponding passage in the *Vāyu* (xcix. 101–291) shows that about 190 verses have been lost in the former. The arrangement of the contents of the *Purāṇas* accords with these conclusions, for in several there is no logical scheme, and matters are expounded piecemeal as if by additions. On the other hand, some *Purāṇas* deal with their subject-matter on a consistent plan, such as the *Viṣṇu*, *Agni*, and *Bhāgavata*, betraying apparently a late stage, when the matter had been co-ordinated and systematized. The *Viṣṇu* is one of the best arranged, yet it hardly professes to be early, for it declares that it was compiled out of the four 'root-*Purāṇas*' mentioned above.

5. Additional subjects.—The *Purāṇas* claim to expound, besides the five characteristic subjects, the four subjects which comprise all human endeavour—righteousness (*dharma*), wealth (*artha*), love (*kāma*), and final emancipation from existence (*mokṣa*). These, with the copious religious teaching now found in the *Purāṇas*, are Brāhmanical additions to the original five subjects. Of the four ages the Kṛta was the golden age when righteousness was perfect, but it deteriorated through the Tretā and Dvāpara, until it has well-nigh perished in this evil Kali age. This is figuratively expressed in the adage that *dharma* had four legs for its support in the Kṛta age, three in the Tretā, two in the Dvāpara, and has only one in the Kali age.

6. Theology.—The theology taught is heterogeneous, and most deities that enjoyed a certain amount of popular acceptance can be found praised in the *Purāṇas*. Of the Vedic gods, Indra and Agni retain a prominent position, and Indra is the chief of the gods, *i.e.* generally of the subordinate gods, those other than Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. Varuṇa is the god of the ocean and appears at times, but Mitra has disappeared. The sun (Sūrya) holds an important position, and the names Vivasvant, Savitṛ, Āditya, and Pūṣan are freely given to him. He is highly extolled in the *Brahma*, *Mārkaṇḍeya*, *Agni*, *Padma*, and *Garuḍa*, but his worship is most fully inculcated in the *Bhaviṣya* (I. xlviii. ff.), which says that it was introduced with the sun's priests from Śākadvīpa into the Panjāb by Kṛṣṇa's son, Sāmba, who suffered from leprosy and was cured by worshipping the sun. It calls the sun's priests *magas* and *bhojakas*. The sun's children were Manu Vaivasvata, Yama, and the Aśvins, who are celestial physicians. Yama is the god of the dead, especially of the wicked dead, and holds a dread position as the punisher of sinners in his hells. Vāyu, also called Mātariśvan, is a god of some note. Soma is the moon. Bṛhaspati is the divine priest. The *gandharvas* are celestial musicians, and the *apsarases* are celestial nymphs and courtesans, who often play the part of beguiling *ṛṣis*, whose austerities (*tapas*) awakened fear in the gods. On the evil side were the *asuras*, who were demons. *Daityas*, *dānavas*, and *rākṣasas* meant in the earlier traditions hostile races, sometimes uncivilized and always hated and dreaded; hence these names took on the meaning of 'demons,' especially in passages that appear to be late, where they and also *asura* are treated sometimes as interchangeable. Midway was Kubera Vaiśravaṇa, the god of riches, whose attendants were the *yakṣas* and *guhyakas*. In late *Purāṇas* or passages local cults are commended, such as the worship of Manasā, the goddess of snakes, and the *tulasī*-plant, the holy basil; and the veneration of the cow is noticed in the *Padma* (v. xlv. 122–190).

The three chief gods are Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. Brahmā is the creator of the world, Viṣṇu its preserver, and Śiva its destroyer. Brahmā is sometimes extolled as the highest, as in the *Mārkaṇḍeya* (xlv. f.), but is generally held to be inferior to Viṣṇu and Śiva, and the relative supremacy of these two is the higher theology taught. The *Purāṇas* are sometimes classified according to their teaching on this subject and the three qualities, goodness, passion, and darkness. The *Matsya* (liii. 68 f.) says that the *Purāṇas* which extol Viṣṇu as supreme are called *sāttvika*, 'characterized by goodness'; those that extol Śiva and Agni are *tāmasa*, 'characterized by darkness'; and those that extol Brahmā are *rājasa*, 'characterized by passion'; but these distinctions are purely fanciful. It adds a fourth class, those which extol the goddess Sarasvatī and the forefathers (*pitṛs*) and which it calls *saṅkīrṇa*, 'mixed'; but no *Purāṇas* display this character, though Sarasvatī is praised here and there and a high position is assigned sometimes to the forefathers (see below, (*c*)). The *Padma* (VI. cclxiv. 81–84) says much the same, and distributes the *Purāṇas* in sixes thus—as *sāttvika*, the *Viṣṇu*, *Nāradīya*, *Bhāgavata*, *Garuḍa*, *Padma*, and *Varāha*; as *tāmasa*, the *Matsya*, *Kūrma*, *Liṅga*, *Śiva*, *Agni*, and *Skanda*; and, as *rājasa*, the *Brahmāṇḍa*, *Brahmavaivarta*, *Mārkaṇḍeya*, *Brahma*, *Vāmana*, and *Bhaviṣya*. The *Vāyu* must be understood to be included in the *Brahmāṇḍa*. But this division is only roughly true, because the *Agni*, *e.g.*, gives instruction about the worship of both Viṣṇu and Śiva. The *Padma* (*loc. cit.* 85) further declares that the *sāttvika* lead one to final emancipation from existence, the *rājasa* to heaven, and the *tāmasa* to hell; but this estimate is merely Vaiṣṇavite, for the *Śiva* (II. ii. 63), which is classed lowest as *tāmasa*, declares that a man who reads it completely and respectfully attains final emancipation even while he is alive, and that the gods attain thereto only by attaching themselves to Śiva. The Śaivite *Purāṇas* show a difference from the Vaiṣṇavite in that, though they make Śiva supreme, yet they also extol Viṣṇu highly; and they almost suggest that the exaltation of Śiva was a later doctrine imposed on that of Viṣṇu's supremacy, as appears indeed to be implied in the *Śiva Purāṇa* (I. ii. 5–11).

The rival advocacy of Viṣṇu and Śiva was carried to the farthest length, and the partisan *Purāṇas* sometimes introduce these gods themselves, each as explicitly declaring the other's supremacy. The rivalry thus reached an impasse, from which the only escape was to affirm that both were one and the same god, in different persons. This is often taught and, with the corollary that Brahmā also was one with them, constituted the highest theology inculcated—the triple manifestation (*tri-mūrti*). Thus the three were one, yet it was open to a partisan to maintain that Viṣṇu or Śiva was the true and chief person, of whom the other was a manifestation; and so a *Purāṇa* is able to extol one or the other as supreme, while affirming their unity. This monotheistic conclusion carried the teaching to the Vedānta standpoint, that God alone really exists, eternal, immutable, that He is everything, and that everything animate and inanimate is but a portion of Him. This doctrine is elaborated and enforced most in Vaiṣṇavite *Purāṇas*, and is stated fully and clearly in the *Viṣṇu*. It is essentially the same as that expounded in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, except that it does not go so far in enunciating that the whole world is *māyā*, 'illusion'—a view which is mentioned in places, but is stigmatized as Buddhistic and bad by the *Padma* (VI. cclxiii. 70). The highest religious philosophy is therefore monotheistic and pantheistic; its popular presentment is polytheistic. The doctrine of transmigration is involved in it and is thoroughly inculcated, both as a consequence entailed on all human beings by their actions (*karma*), often with elaborate and fanciful apportionments of particular evil conditions to particular sins, and as an explanation of misfortunes, serving to solve or justify distressing situations and perplexing problems.

(*a*) *Viṣṇu.*—Viṣṇu is said to have ten incarnations. The lists have some variations, chiefly as regards Buddha; but the following list is a general one. In it the first five incarnations are mythological, the next four have a historical basis, and the tenth is still future:

(1) As a fish (*matsya*), when he saved Manu Vaivasvata amid the deluge; and when the *Matsya* says it was declared by him to Manu; (2) as a tortoise (*kūrma*), when he supported the mountain Mandara at the churning of the ocean, and Lakṣmī, divine nectar, and other things were produced; the *Kūrma* says that in that form he declared it; (3) as a boar (*varāha*), when he raised up on his tush the earth that had sunk to the bottom of the universal ocean; and when the *Varāha* says he declared it to the earth; (4) as the man-lion (*nara-siṁha*), when he delivered the gods from Hiraṇyakaśipu and other demons who had vanquished them; (5) as a dwarf (*vāmana*), when he delivered the gods from the demon king Bali, and accomplished his purpose by obtaining from Bali the boon of having as much space as he could cover in three steps; (6) as the Brāhman Rāma, son of Jamadagni (sometimes called Paraśu-Rāma, 'Rāma with the axe'), who destroyed all the Kṣatriyas off the earth twenty-one times, in revenge for the murder of his father by the sons of Arjuna Kārtavīrya, king of the Haihayas; (7) as Rāma, son of Daśaratha, king of Oudh (sometimes called Rāmachandra), whose wife was Sītā, and whose story is the subject of the great epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*; (8) as Kṛṣṇa, who reigned at Dvāraka in Gujarāt over the Yādavas, the friend of the Pāṇḍavas and one of the chief figures in the *Mahābhārata*; (9) as Buddha, who founded Buddhism; (10) as a warrior, Kalki or Kalkin, who will appear at the close of this Kali age, overthrow all adversaries, and re-establish pure Hinduism.

All these incarnations are often mentioned, and sometimes described at great length. The sixth often appears in the Haihaya genealogy. The seventh is narrated in the *Agni* and *Padma* as a condensation of the epic, and the *Padma* (IV. cxii.) relates what it calls the ancient *Rāmāyaṇa*. The ninth is least often mentioned. The eighth, the story of Kṛṣṇa, is a favourite topic; his life, doings, and youthful frolics are often described at very great length; and his favourite shepherdess, Rādhā, is deified in the *Brahmavaivarta* and the *Padma*. Kṛṣṇa is completely identified with Viṣṇu—so much so that his name, his patronymic Vāsudeva, and others of his epithets are habitually used as synonyms of Viṣṇu in his purely divine character. These are the well established incarnations, but others less acknowledged are also mentioned—indeed, the *Garuḍa* and *Bhāgavata* mention 22, and add that his incarnations were really innumerable. The superlative work attributed to Vyāsa naturally created the belief that he was no ordinary *ṛṣi*, but a divine incarnation; consequently he is often called an incarnation of Viṣṇu, and so also all the other Vyāsas mentioned above; while the *Kūrma* in its second part (xi. 136 f.) makes him an incarnation of Śiva also.

(*b*) *Śiva.*—The position of Śiva differs markedly from that of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is celestial and takes no immediate part in terrestrial affairs except when incarnated, but Śiva is largely a terrestrial god. He is often spoken of as dwelling humanwise on the Himālayas or in Benares, and as practising human asceticism. Similarly with their wives. Viṣṇu's wife, Lakṣmī, is a beautiful abstraction, but Śiva's wife, Umā or Pārvatī, is very realistic. She was Satī re-born as the daughter of the Himālaya range. Śiva's wooing and wedding of Pārvatī and their conjugal life and conversation are often introduced and sometimes narrated at length, yet always in wholly human fashion. They had two sons, Skanda or Kārttikeya, and Gaṇeśa, the god of wisdom. Śiva takes part in terrestrial affairs and especially in contests between the gods and the demons, who are always terrestrial, even when the nether world is their special abode. Śiva and Rudra are synonymous. Pārvatī, especially in her terrible forms, and Skanda also join in the battles. Stories of this kind are often narrated, such as the destruction of Tripura and of the demons Andhaka, Śumbha, Niśumbha, Mahiṣa, and Jalandhara. Her victory over the demons is the theme of the *Devīmāhātmya* in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*—a gruesome story much esteemed by the worshippers of Kālī, who is identified with her; and the worship of her as Durgā is inculcated in the *Padma*, *Brahmavaivarta*, and *Garuḍa*. Śiva was worshipped as Paśupati, 'the lord of cattle,' beneath whom all the gods and all creatures ranked as mere cattle; and this Pāśupata cult is commended in Saivite *Purāṇas*, but reprobated in others. Śiva had thus no genuine incarnations, yet his worshippers propounded that he had 28 incarnations contemporary with the 28 Vyāsas, and their names are mentioned in the *Vāyu* (xxiii. 114 ff.), *Liṅga*, and *Śiva*, but they were merely *ṛṣis* who expounded *yoga*, 'ascetic devotion.' Śiva's *liṅga*, the phallus, is often mentioned and extolled, and its worship is well established in *Purāṇas* that appear to be late, and especially in the *Liṅga* (II. xlvi. 13–21), which exalts Śiva in this form as above all gods and as containing everything. Instructions are given about its construction, establishment, and worship. The female counterpart, the *yoni*, is not noticed much, and then only in late *Purāṇas*. The *Vāmana* identifies it with Pārvatī, but the *Padma* with Sītā. The *śaktis*, 'female energies,' are not often mentioned and then generally as somewhat abstract conceptions. They proceed from Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva in the *Varāha* (xc. ff.) and *Mārkaṇḍeya* (lxxxviii.); they are identified with, or related closely to, Pārvatī in the *Kūrma*. The worship of the *śaktis*, however, existed, for the *Kūrma* (I. xxx. 25) reprobates the Vāmācharins, or obscene left-hand votaries.

(*c*) *Pitṛs.*—As already mentioned, the forefathers (*pitṛ*, 'father') are accorded high dignity sometimes. This term means a man's dead ancestors, but in this connexion denotes a class, comprising seven groups, of abstract forefathers, divine yet hardly personal, for they are always spoken of

collectively. The *Brahmāṇḍa* (II. xxi., III. ix.–xii.) and *Vāyu* (I., lvi., lxxi.–lxxvi.) especially magnify them, and similar references occur in the *Matsya* (xiii., xv.), *Mārkaṇḍeya* (xcvi. f.), *Padma*, and *Garuḍa*. They are ranked with the gods and even called the earliest gods; they and the gods stand to each other in reciprocal relationship as fathers, and they are also the gods' gods, to whom the gods offer sacrifice. They and the gods come into existence with each *manvantara*, and pass upward to a high celestial world at its close, but apparently do not perish till the universal dissolution. They perpetuate in some undefined way the existence of mankind through the ages. They have a path in the sky between the sun's southern course and the star Canopus, and Yama is their king. They are particularly connected with the *śrāddha* — the sacrifice offered in honour of and for the benefit of one's dead ancestors—and thereby confer blessings on their worshippers. This teaching appears to be ancient, and is not found in the latest *Purāṇas*. See ANCESTOR-WORSHIP (Indian).

(*d*) *Heresy.*—Heretics and heretical teaching are often alluded to. Such teaching is always sharply and contemptuously reprobated, especially in the form of Jainism and more particularly Buddhism, though often without being named; and the distinction between them is not always made or observed. Books that teach heretical doctrines are called *moha-śāstras*, 'scriptures of delusion,' and are accounted for as the work of Viṣṇu or Śiva or both, or Pārvatī, intended to beguile haters of the gods and Vedas to destruction. The longest notice of such teaching occurs in the *Viṣṇu* (III. xvii. f.), but is largely fanciful, for it makes both Jainism and Buddhism originate in the Narbadā valley. The *Garuḍa* (i. 32) says that Viṣṇu became incarnate as a Jina's son named Buddha in Behār; and the *Agni* (xvi. 1–3) says, as Śuddhodana's son who beguiled *daityas*, 'demons,' to become Buddhists. The *Kūrma* (I. xvi. 117) denounces also the Pañcharātras (who are followers of Viṣṇu) and more particularly the Śaivite sects, Kāpālas, Bhairavas, Pāśupatas, and Yāmalas. The *Brahmāṇḍa* (III. xiv. 39–42) and *Vāyu* (lxxviii. 30–33) class contemptuously among 'the naked and such like' both Buddhist and Jain orders, also Brāhmans who pretentiously wore matted locks or shaved their heads, and those, too, who pretentiously observed religious exercises or uttered prayers.

7. **Dharma.**—Under the head of *dharma*, 'righteousness,' the *Purāṇas* provide a great deal of religious teaching, both popular and what is more strictly Brāhmanical. All deeds, both good and evil, produce necessary consequences, which a man must undergo. Good deeds may raise a man after death to *svarga*, 'heaven'; evil deeds certainly entail punishment. The doctrine of sin and its punishment is clearly laid down. At times lists of sins are set out, together with the penances by which they may be expiated and the specific punishments provided for them in the various hells. Also, and sometimes in this connexion, a description of the hells is given with more or less fullness and ingenuity. As regards the popular teaching, the most striking features are catholicity and the provident care to make religious practice and the acquisition of blessings easy for all. It deals with sacred places (*tīrthas*) and pilgrimages to them, religious exercises, gifts, prayers, and spells, and miscellaneous observances; many of the provisions are expressly declared to be available to women and the lowest classes, thus disregarding mere caste and personal limitations.

8. **Tīrthas, etc.**—The subject of *tīrthas* and the benefits which they confer on pilgrims occupies a very large space, being a favourite subject, for it offered absolutions and indulgences to the people and brought profit to the Brāhmans. Sometimes itineraries are set out, instructing the pilgrim what he should do at each place and what benefits he would gain thereby; and at other times these matters are woven into a discourse on some point of belief or conduct as edifying illustrations. Some *Purāṇas* deal with *tīrthas* comprehensively, while others advocate the merits of particular spots; and in connexion with each important *tīrtha* is generally narrated the tale which explained its fame and merits. The sacred places in N. India receive most attention and praise; Benares, Allahābād, and Gayā were the chief centres, while the Ganges is often pronounced supreme. But the doctrine of *tīrthas* was firmly established in the Deccan also, and many places there are extolled. The rivers Narbadā and Godāvarī attained a sanctity hardly inferior to that of the Ganges, and were crowded with *tīrthas*. The merits of the Narbadā are expounded in the *Matsya* (clxxxvi.–cxciv.), *Agni* (cxiii.), *Padma*, and *Kūrma* (II. xxxix.–xli.), and those of the Godāvarī in the *Brahma* (lxx.–clxxv.) especially. The explanatory tales are sometimes simple, with possibly a real basis, but generally are mythological or fanciful; and all the resources of Hindu mythology with its myriads of divine and semi-divine beings, together with accretions from Dravidian beliefs such as the reverence towards the monkey Hanumān, were available either for the new localization of some old legend or for the fabrication of pious fables, in order to furnish a *tīrtha* with a title to sanctity. Pilgrimages were open to every one; and, though the toil and expense may have been burdensome sometimes, yet these were far outweighed by the benefits promised. Some places conferred heavenly joys hereafter, others delivered the pilgrim from the evil of being born again, and others bestowed plenary absolution from all sin; and many shrines proclaimed their power to free even from the deadly sin of brahmanicide. Gifts also procured blessings for the donors and were lucrative to the Brāhmans. The making of gifts is warmly commended and sometimes expounded with great detail, as in the *Bhaviṣya* and *Matsya*, as regards both their manifold varieties, from the most costly munificence to simple almsgiving, and also the occasions when and the procedure with which they should be made. Further, various religious exercises (*vrata*) are lauded as procuring benefits, especially those prescribed for certain auspicious days and months, and this subject is sometimes expounded minutely, as in the *Matsya*, *Agni*, *Garuḍa*, *Padma*, and *Bhaviṣya*. Even occult practices to effect both good and harm are commended and explained, such as mystical formulæ, magical spells, and prophylactic verses, in the later *Purāṇas* such as the *Agni*, *Brahmavaivarta*, and *Garuḍa*.

The readiness displayed in all these ways to provide relief from sin and enable every one to acquire substantial future blessings was carried so far that in the *Matsya* (lxix. 2) and *Padma* (III. i. 5) the question how a man could gain final emancipation from existence with the least amount of asceticism is naively asked and soberly answered. It may well be surmised that these features of popular religion were not haphazard. Brāhmanism evidently found it expedient to smooth the path of religion for the people, and this suggests that it was outbidding other claims to popular favour. But, whether deliberately provided or not, these easy ways of practising religion and reaping blessings must have presented strong attractions, compared with the self-regimen that Buddhism required of its adherents in this life and the dreary

future existences that it announced for the ordinary man. It is probable, therefore, that all this popular teaching contained in the *Purāṇas* materially helped the Brāhmans to stem the spread of Buddhism and finally to oust it from general acceptance.

9. Caste and ritual.—The more special Brāhmanical instruction lays down the rules governing the castes. Ordinarily the castes are taken as four—the ancient theoretical number—viz. the Brāhmans, the Kṣatriyas, or military body, the Vaiśyas, or trading classes, and the Śūdras, who comprised all the lowest strata; yet the existence of other castes, whose origin is theoretically explained as the intermixture of those four castes, is noticed at times, though only in a general way. For the most part it is the Brāhman's life that is considered worthy of description, and the duties of the other castes are summed up briefly. The Brāhman's four stages, as the religious student, the married householder, the forest recluse, and the ascetic mendicant, are explained, often at much length. Directions are often given about sacrifices, purifications, sacred texts, and various rites and ceremonies, especially the *śrāddha*. Information is offered about images and their worship in the *Matsya*, *Bhaviṣya*, and *Varāha*. Elaborate instruction is sometimes set out about 'virtuous custom,' or correct behaviour in all matters, religious, social, and personal. All these subjects appear to be later additions, and are generally expounded in the encyclopædic *Agni*.

10. Kāma.—Next may be mentioned the subject of *kāma*, 'love,' in so far as it is noticed in the *Purāṇas*. It may be regarded as illustrated by many stories. Such treatment as it receives deals mainly with women. Rules are laid down about marriage, and personal characteristics are sometimes described. The care that a wife should show towards her husband and relatives is explained in the *Bhaviṣya*; and as examples of perfect wifehood are often cited Sītā, the much-tried wife of Rāma, and Sāvitrī, who saved her husband Satyavant by her devotion. The practice of *satī*—a widow's immolating herself on her husband's funeral pyre—is alluded to sometimes, but ordinarily the subject of widowhood is left untouched, as if it needed no particular notice. Lastly, rules are laid down even for courtesans, which it is said were originally given to Kṛṣṇa's wives after his death.

11. Artha, etc.—The subject of *artha*, 'wealth,' is not itself discussed in the *Purāṇas*, but the welfare of a king and his subjects falls partly under this title and partly under *dharma*, and is the subject of works called *artha-śāstras*. This is dealt with under the title of *rāja-dharma*, 'the righteous functions of kings,' and is expounded with regard to a king's personal and religious duties, civil, criminal, fiscal, and military administration, the conduct of war and peace, and the safeguarding of his realm from calamities. The *Matsya* treats the subject fully, and so also the *Agni*, as expounded by Puṣkara; while the *Garuḍa* lays down wise maxims, both generally and with special reference to kings. Here may be also noticed various other subjects that are sometimes expounded. The *Agni* and *Garuḍa* treat of medicine and veterinary science, architecture (which is also in the *Matsya*), the scrutiny of gems, astrology, and grammar. The *Agni* further treats of archery, poetry, metre, the drama, and dancing. Many *Purāṇas* (e.g., *Vāyu*, lxxxvii.) discourse on music, generally in connexion with the fabled visit of an ancient king of Gujarāt to Brahmā's court, where the *gandharvas* were the musicians.

12. Mokṣa. The fourth additional subject is *mokṣa* (*q.v.*), 'final emancipation from existence.' Transmigration was believed in unquestioningly, and every man had to experience and so consume the consequences of his actions in subsequent lives. Some shrines promised deliverance from existence, but generally religious rites and observances, pilgrimages, and such like conduced merely to amelioration of future existence. That was as much as the ordinary man was capable of, but did not satisfy earnest souls who desired to be rid of re-birth and obtain absorption into the Supreme Soul. To attain to this was the highest aim of philosophical religion, and two ways to this end were taught, namely, *yoga*, 'complete ascetic mediation on and devotion to the Supreme Soul,' and *bhakti*, 'loving faith.' Pure ascetic self-mortification (*tapas*) could enable a man to acquire and exercise superhuman knowledge, faculties, and powers; and that is often described and held up to admiration in the marvellous stories of the ancient *ṛṣis*; but there its fruit is treated rather as an object in itself, for the doctrine of final emancipation was not the highest aim of human aspiration in ancient times as it became established later. The *yoga* that achieved final emancipation was twofold: (1) *jñāna-yoga*, 'the *yoga* of spiritual knowledge,' which was exclusive, ascetic, and contemplative devotion, rejecting all works; and (2) *karma-yoga*, 'the *yoga* of works,' which consisted in the full and single-minded performance of all one's earthly duties, and was also called *Sāṅkhya-yoga*. Both kinds are taught and are contrasted sometimes, but on the whole the *yoga* of spiritual knowledge is more highly commended. The *Vāyu*, *Brahma*, *Viṣṇu*, and *Liṅga* give instruction about *yoga*, especially the *yoga* of spiritual knowledge, and the *Viṣṇu* extols it highly. On the other hand, the *Matsya* (lii.) lauds the *yoga* of works as far superior to that of spiritual knowledge, and declares that it is the *yoga* of works that produces such knowledge and the *yoga* of such knowledge, and that there can be no spiritual knowledge without it. The *Kūrma* (I. iii. 21–27), however, commends a middle course in a combination of both, because works lead on to spiritual knowledge. The other path, *bhakti*, is connected indeed with Śiva, but more especially with Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa, who are completely identified. Faith in Śiva is alluded to incidentally in various *Purāṇas*, and is inculcated in the *Liṅga* (I. viii.) and in the *Śiva* (VI. viii.), which bases it on knowledge. Faith in Viṣṇu is not only alluded to often, but is enjoined in the *Brahma*, *Brahmavaivarta*, and *Garuḍa*, is expounded in its various forms in the *Padma* (IV. lxxxv.), and is the special theme of the *Bhāgavata*. The *Brahma* (ccxxviii. 8–13) says that one rises through faith in Agni, the sun, and Śiva successively to faith in Viṣṇu, that men of even the very lowest classes can possess it, and that man fails to reach it because of Viṣṇu's *māyā*, 'illusion.' The teaching of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* on these subjects is summarized in the *Agni* (ccclxxx.), *Garuḍa* (ccxix.), and *Padma* (VI. clxxi. ff.). Faith in Brahmā also is expounded in the *Padma* (V. xv. 163–192) similarly to faith in Viṣṇu; and faith in the sun is inculcated in the *Bhaviṣya* (I. xlviii. ff.). The *Padma*, moreover, in a late allegory personifying *bhakti* as a woman, says:

> Bhakti was born in Drāviḍa, grew up in Karṇāṭaka, became worn out in Maharaṣṭra and Gurjara, sought refuge with her two sons, Jñāna (spiritual knowledge) and Vairāgya (passionlessness), in Vṛndāvana, and regained her vigour there (VI. clxxxix. 51–56); and it concludes, 'Enough of vratas, tīrthas, yogas, sacrifices and discourses about knowledge, faith alone indeed bestows final emancipation' (VI. cxc. 22).

13. Age of the Purāṇas.—The age of the *Purāṇas* is a question much disputed and quite unsettled. In a general way it is not difficult to perceive differences of age in the *Purāṇas* collec-

tively and in the component parts of a single *Purāṇa*; but the *Purāṇas* (except the latest), as they exist now, can hardly be assigned to any definite age, because additions and modifications have been made, as shown above, and they now present the combined results of many centuries. While, then, it is required that the different strata in their contents should be distinguished as far as possible, the important question is, not so much What date do the latest additions prove for any *Purāṇa*? as What dates do its earliest features indicate? Tradition says, as already mentioned, that Vyāsa, who was alive at the time of the great Bhārata battle, and his disciple, the *sūta*, compiled the first *Purāṇa*. That a collection of ancient traditions was made not long after that period receives strong confirmation from two patent facts: (1) that the royal genealogies (which are given in most *Purāṇas*) terminate at that stage, the three chief lines only being continued later in a few *Purāṇas* and then professedly as a prophetic addition; and (2) that stories of the kings mentioned in the genealogies stop short at that stage except as regards the next two Paurava kings, Parīkṣit and Janamejaya. These two facts suggest strongly that the period following the great battle was the time which determined the lower limit of ancient tradition, *i.e.* when ancient tradition was collected regarding genealogies and stories about kings—the two out of the five subjects characteristic of *Purāṇas* that admit of chronological scrutiny. Hence it is probable that the first *Purāṇa* was compiled about that time, and the four 'root-*Purāṇas*' soon afterwards. Those original *Purāṇas* do not exist now as such; the present *Purāṇas* have been developed out of them, as the *Viṣṇu* expressly asserts about itself; yet portions of those *Purāṇas* may survive embedded in existing *Purāṇas*, and there is no good reason to doubt that the royal genealogies and their incidental notices of kings mentioned therein are really ancient matter. *Purāṇas* are cited as authorities, and a *Bhaviṣyat* in particular, in the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, which is not later than the 3rd cent. B.C. and may be nearly two centuries older. Moreover, epigraphic evidence, in the shape of verses quoted in land-grants which are dated, shows that even *Purāṇas* which do not appear to be early must have been in existence in the 4th cent. A.D. at the latest. On the other hand, some *Purāṇas* are no doubt later still, and the *Bhāgavata* (probably not before 8th cent. A.D.) is the most striking instance of such. Further, whatever the age of any *Purāṇa* may be substantially, it has undoubtedly been augmented and modified later than the 4th century. Various points which touch the relative age of the *Purāṇas* have been noticed in the course of this article, but, until the *Purāṇas* have been studied far more carefully than they hitherto have been (and they deserve such study), it is impossible to affirm anything positive about their ages. A preliminary estimate of the older matter, however, may be offered thus. The oldest appear to be the *Brahmāṇḍa* and *Vāyu*, and the *Matsya* also, though it has large later additions. The latest seem to be the *Brahmavaivarta*, *Śiva*, *Vāmana*, and *Bhāgavata*, the last of which may be called 'the Bible of the worshippers of Viṣṇu.' The others appear to be intermediate, and among them an early place may probably be assigned to the *Mārkaṇḍeya* and *Brahma*, the last often styled the *Ādipurāṇa*, 'original *Purāṇa*,' though a large part of its contents is certainly not ancient. The *Padma* has old matter in so far as it has affinities with the *Matsya*, but the bulk of it is late, and some of its tales show a stage of transition to the moral fables of the *Pañchatantra* and *Hitopadeśa*.

14. Upapurāṇas.—Besides the *Purāṇas* proper there is a class of similar but later and inferior works called *Upapurāṇas*, 'minor *Purāṇas*.' They also are said to be eighteen in number, and their names are given thus in the *Kūrma* (I. i.), *Garuḍa* (ccxv.), and *Padma Purāṇas* (IV. cxi.) *Sanatkumāra*, *Nārasiṁha*, *Skanda*, *Śivadharma*, *Durvāsas*, *Nāradīya*, *Kāpila*, *Vāmana*, *Uśanas*, *Brahmāṇḍa*, *Vāruṇa*, *Kālikā*, *Māheśvara*, *Śāmba*, *Saura*, *Parāśara*, *Mārīcha*, and *Bhārgava*. The *Kūrma* and *Garuḍa* say that these were declared by the *munis*, but the *Padma* attributes them to Manu to give them spurious antiquity. Some of them have been published, but they have not been studied.

LITERATURE.—Mainly the *Purāṇas* themselves. See also H. H. Wilson's tr. of the *Viṣnu Purāṇa*, ed. Fitzedward Hall, 5 vols., London, 1864–70, preface; *Le Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, ed. E. Burnouf, Paris, 1840, i., preface; M. Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*, London, 1875, pp. 489–501; A. Holtzmann, *Das Mahābhārata und seine Theile*, Kiel, 1892–95, iv. 29–58; A. A. Macdonell, *Hist. of Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1900, pp. 299–302; M. Winternitz, *Gesch. der indischen Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1909, i. 440–483.

F. E. PARGITER.

PURGATORY.—See STATE OF THE DEAD.

PURIFICATION.

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PURIFICATION (Introductory and Primitive).—**1. Introductory remarks.**—Among the more prominent factors both in the regulation of primitive life and in the determination of the character of religious ritual are the conception of the state of purity and the attendant ceremonies requisite for the preservation of that state, and for its recovery should it be impaired. It must be noted, however, that purity as conceived by the primitive mind has a wider significance than is usually attached to the modern use of the term among civilized peoples, in which emphasis is laid on the positive side of its meaning, purity being almost regarded as the equivalent of continence or chastity. The difference is sometimes expressed by applying to the primitive idea the epithet 'ceremonial,' and further by pointing out the non-ethical character of ceremonial purity or 'ceremonial uncleanness.' But, apart from the question whether it is correct to deny the term 'ethical' to any body of rules governing conduct, it would be more correct to describe ceremonial purity as pre-ethical in that, as will appear, in certain respects it provides the basis for higher moral codes.

Owing to the emphasis on the negative and

inhibitory aspect, which is generally characteristic in primitive rules of conduct, it is as a negative state rather than a positive ideal that purity governs primitive action, while purificatory ceremonies have as their object protection from harmful influence rather than the attainment of righteousness even of a ceremonial kind. The state of purity would be defined by the primitive savage as one which resulted from such a course of action that defilement, whether by intentional or by inadvertent act, had been avoided.

Ceremonial purity is closely bound up with the class of ideas and rules of conduct described by the generalized term 'tabu.' Infringement of tabu, whether voluntary or involuntary, renders the individual subject to spiritual influence or, to use the Melanesian term, an adverse *mana*. As such he not only is a danger to himself, but may transmit the danger to others, and may affect the whole community. Hence certain restrictions are imposed upon him: he is isolated, his actions are regulated that they may not affect the well-being of the community—*e.g.*, in such a matter as the food supply—until such time as he has been freed from danger by a purificatory ceremony or, in a case in which defilement is so great that the interests of the community are paramount, the adverse influence has been removed by his outlawry or death.

2. Loss of purity by defilement.—(*a*) *Death.*—Ceremonial defilement is closely connected with the occasions of crisis in human life, both social and natural, such as birth, initiation, puberty, marriage, and death. The ceremonies which accompany these crises are to a great degree both directly and indirectly purificatory in intent.

Death to the primitive mind is the greatest pollution of all—so much so that it commonly puts an end for a time to all activity over a social circle of varying extent. As the Bathonga say, 'the uncleanness of death kills if it is not properly treated.' Not only the corpse, but the possessions of the deceased, are regarded as infected with danger, which must be averted by ceremonial treatment. Many customs testify to the peril which is supposed to attach to contact with a dead body. There is a reluctance to handle it.

Among the Lillooets of N. America the last offices of preparing the body for the grave are performed by the shaman, whose innate magical qualities are regarded as in themselves sufficient to secure his immunity from harm. Among other Indian tribes of the north-west the duty of disposing of the body is performed by grave-diggers, who themselves become unclean and must for some days observe certain restrictions with regard to food, relations with their wives, and the like.[1] Among the Bathonga the grave-diggers, who are employed because of the great danger involved should relatives handle the body, plug their nostrils with the leaves of a strongly-scented plant as a protection against the dangerous influences of the corpse. They must undergo a rite of ablution and, with their wives, they are subjected to vapour baths. They also suffer from disabilities such as those mentioned in the case of the N. American Indians. They eat with special spoons, and for five days must not take food from the common plate.[2]

The wide-spread custom of placing implements, weapons, etc., in the grave for the use of the spirit is also no doubt to some extent an outcome of an idea that they are 'unlucky,' while the custom, almost equally wide-spread, of avoiding the use of the name of the deceased is based on a disinclination to afford an opportunity for an adverse influence to make itself felt by the use of a word which is associated with the 'unclean.' Such possessions as are not devoted to the spirit of the dead are frequently destroyed.

The Lorchenx crush and break the dead man's beads. Among the Thompson Indians the *tepee* in which a man died is burned, or, if death took place in the more permanent hut, it is washed with water in which juniper or tobacco has been steeped. In the lodge no one sleeps in the dead man's place for a considerable period.[1] In Uganda the hut in which the queen, the king's mother, or one of his wives had died was destroyed. When a man dies, the main post of his house is taken down by his sister's son and is partially burned in the fire.[2] Among the southern clans of the Bathonga the crown of leaves which tops the hut is taken down and used to block the doorway, where it remains for some time until the hut is ceremonially cleansed. The food and the gardens belonging to the dead man must also be purified.[3]

In these instances, which could be multiplied indefinitely, it is clear that material things which have been in intimate contact with the deceased are dangerous to those who handle them. The same danger attaches with added intensity to human beings, first those in his immediate circle—his wives, who are especially impure, and his relatives — and ultimately the whole community. Each is a centre of danger to others until a purificatory ceremony has removed the defilement. Hence the restrictions which surround any one who has become polluted aim at segregating him or her from the remainder of the community. Certain mourning customs, signs of grief and bereavement, such as allowing the hair and nails to grow and the wearing of special clothes, mark the mourners as a class apart;[4] the resumption of their ordinary appearance and attire marks their return to a state of purity.

In addition to the custom of segregation, general among primitive peoples, special regulations, varying according to the locality and people, may have to be followed.

Among the various tribes of the Déné and Salish the segregation period extends in the case of mourners to a period of two moons, but in the case of widows for twelve months. The possibility that they may affect the food supply adversely by their action is recognized, and precautions against such a contingency are taken. They must observe a period of fast, varying from four days to four months, during which no fresh meat or hot food must be eaten; food must not be handled or cut, but must be torn by the teeth, and a special birch-bark cup, which is thrown away after four days, must be used for drinking. Not only must a widower refrain from eating venison, flesh of any kind, or fresh fish, and from smoking, but, should he touch another man's net or fish from his place, the net and the station become useless for the season. Both widows and widowers are regarded as specially unclean; the former may retire to the woods for a period of one year, performing purificatory ceremonies, bathing in streams, and taking sweat-baths, while the latter must in some cases watch the place where the corpse was buried for a like period, eating no fresh meat in that time.[5]

Among the Bathonga widows form a secret society. Until the great mourning the chief widow lives in a special hut in front of the mortuary hut, and the period of mourning of all the widows lasts for one year. Before another husband could be taken, the ceremony of 'throwing away the malediction of death' had to be performed, in which a stranger, ignorant of the circumstances, was deceived by the woman, and, by a ceremonial sexual act in the bush which was not completed, took upon himself the pollution and had to be purified in turn. Pollution by death is sufficiently strong to attack the members of the family who are absent even so far away as Johannesburg. A relative who returned home even months after the death could not enter the village or eat any food in it until purified. This people in fact recognize grades of impurity following on death, in which the degrees are first the widows, then the grave-diggers, thirdly the community, and lastly relatives and wife's relatives in other villages. At the death of the headman the village was abandoned, and, although the pollution in the case of an ordinary death was not sufficiently grave to require such an extreme measure, the community was affected in a certain degree. No sexual relations were allowed, and the warriors were unable to go out to battle until they, holding their assegais, had taken part in a purification ceremony in which the whole of the community was aspersed by the medicine-man. No fire could be kept burning in the village except that which had been kindled in the open by the medicine-man with fire from the mortuary hut. This was used by the whole village for its requirements until the fifth day, when it was put out by the medicine-man and a new fire kindled, from which the people lighted their fires. This was a part of the ceremonial purification of the village.[6]

[1] C. Hill Tout, *British N. America*, i. *The Far West*, London, 1907, p. 190 f.

[2] H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, London, 1912-13, i. 134 f.

[1] Hill-Tout, pp. 192 f., 206 f.

[2] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, pp. 116, 121.

[3] Junod, i. 144 f.

[4] This is not incompatible with the explanation that mourning clothes are a disguise against spirits. This aspect of the custom emphasizes the danger to the infected person.

[5] Hill-Tout, p. 193 ff.

[6] Junod, i. 135, 197 f.

Among the Greenland Eskimo the restrictions which followed death were very distinctly of a protective character. Not only was the corpse buried as quickly as possible, but the relatives were secluded for five days, and every one avoided crossing the tracks of those who had dragged the corpse to its burial-place. No man who was in a state of pollution by death was allowed to disentangle the dog traces; a boy accompanied every expedition to perform this office. During the five days' seclusion there was no hunting or fishing, and no work was done; but, if any sewing was necessary, the eyebrows were blackened.[1]

Among the Todas, owing to the peculiar ritual importance of the dairy and the susceptibility of the cattle and the milk to ceremonial defilement, great stringency prevails in the regulations to be observed after a death. A special hut is provided for the corpse, or (among the Tatharol division of this people) a special dairy with three rooms is set aside for mortuary purposes. All who are near the corpse are impure, while the whole family of any one who comes to the village in which the relics of the deceased—a lock of hair and a piece of skull—are kept, in the period between the first and the second funerals, are polluted. All who attend the funeral, unless they take up their position at a distance, are affected in like manner, while the *wursol* (dairyman-priest) who attends to kill the sacred buffalo loses his office. The *pep*—the ceremonial portion of the dairy product which preserves ritual continuity from day to day—is thrown away, and new *pep* is prepared. Relatives of the deceased remain in a state of impurity until the moon after the second funeral.[2]

The break in continuity brought about by death, which is marked among the Todas by the casting away of the *pep* and the preparation of new *pep*, frequently finds expression in a cessation of all normal activities. Action is rendered unlucky or useless by the defilement. All work done by the Basutos on the day on which a chief dies is defiled.[3]

The pollution of death is intensified if it be due to violence, even though the killing may be justifiable or accidental.

In the Cameroons an accidental death must be followed by a purificatory ceremony,[4] while among the Akikuyu, although the death of a member of another tribe entails no disabilities, the killing of a fellow-tribesman requires atonement by a ceremony in which the slayer eats with the brother of the slain, and the ghost, in the shape of a wild cat, partakes of part of the food placed for it at the foot of a tree.[5] Even warriors are not immune from the consequences of their act. As the Bathonga say, 'they are black, the black must be removed.' Consequently, Bathonga warriors, on their return from an expedition, must remain at the capital for some days, wear old clothes, eat from old or broken vessels, and have special food, partaking of no hot meals until they have been purified.[6] The Awemba warrior must not sleep in the hut until he has washed in a stream and been smeared with medicine,[7] while the Basuto must be purified by his chief.[8] On the Wanigela river, British New Guinea, the man who is guilty of blood sits apart on the 'logs of sacrificial staging.' He is then placed apart in a special hut in charge of two or three boys, and is re-admitted to the community only after a hunt in which a kangaroo is killed, with the spleen and liver of which he is smeared.[9] The Chinook murderer is strictly quarantined; no one eats with him, nor is he allowed to see any one eat until he has been purified.[10] The Pima Indian who has slain an Apache is not allowed to look at a blazing fire during the whole of the sixteen days in which he is undergoing purification.[11]

Contact with the murderer may transfer his unclean state to others.

Among the Akikuyu, if a homicide sleeps and eats in a village, those who entertain him are polluted to such a degree that they must have recourse to the medicine-man.[12]

Some form of penalty may be imposed, whether the killing is regarded as sin or not.

In Rajmahal, if two men quarrel and one wounds the other, the guilty man is fined a hog or a fowl, but the intention is purificatory as well as penal; the blood of the fine is sprinkled over the wounded man to prevent him from being possessed by a devil.[13]

[1] K. Rasmussen, *The People of the Polar North*, Eng. tr., London, 1908, p. 113 f.
[2] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 368 f.
[3] E. Casalis, *The Basutos*, London, 1861, p. 275.
[4] F. Autenrieth, 'Zur Religion der Kamerun-Neger,' *Mitteil. Geogr. Gesellsch.* xii. [1893] 93.
[5] C. W. Hobley, 'Kikuyu Customs and Beliefs,' *JRAI* xl. [1910] 438.
[6] Junod, ii. 453.
[7] J. H. W. Sheane, 'Wemba Warpaths,' *Journ. African Soc.* xli. [1911] 31.
[8] Casalis, p. 258.
[9] R. E. Guise, 'On the Tribes inhabiting the Mouth of the Wanigela River, New Guinea,' *JAI* xxviii. [1898] 213 f.
[10] F. Boas, *Chinook Texts*, Washington, 1894, p. 258.
[11] Bancroft, *NR* i. 553. [12] Hobley, *JRAI* xl. 431.
[13] T. Shaw, 'On the Inhabitants of the Hills near Rajamahall,' *Asiatic Researches*, iv. [1807] 78.

It has sometimes been thought that the disabilities which follow murder are an expression of horror at the intentional spilling of that precious substance, blood. Now, while it is undoubtedly true that blood is highly tabu, and while the importance attached to it in various purificatory ceremonies shows its sacred character and ceremonial value, yet the explanation of the ceremonies and disabilities given by natives themselves appears to minimize the importance of the spilling of blood in death by violence, while emphasizing the fact that those who are guilty of the death of a human being are subject to attacks from the spirits of those whom they have slain, and that through them the danger may be transmitted to the whole community. The penalty, *e.g.*, which follows omission of the purificatory ceremony is usually madness caused by the spirit of the dead.

The Bathonga warriors are pursued by their slain enemies, who would drive them mad if the proper precautions were not taken. The Basuto warriors are anointed with the gall of a sacrificial ox, this preventing the ghost from pursuing them.[1]

On the other hand, there is a connexion between the ghost and blood in the explanation given by the Kai of German New Guinea.

They say that the souls of the slain follow the returning warriors to recover those parts of the souls which cling to the blood clots on the clubs.[2]

Not only is it the souls of those slain in battle that are feared; the soul of the murdered man pursues his murderer.

Among the Eskimo of N. Greenland the victim's soul drives the murderer mad, or it may tear him to pieces, should he venture far on the ice.[3]

It would be possible to multiply instances to show that that which renders the man unclean—unfit to re-enter on the life of the community—is not the fact that there is blood upon him, that he is physiologically unclean, but the fact that he is the storm-centre of a dangerous force which, unless appeased or sterilized, will prove harmful to himself and to all with whom he comes into contact. When these conditions may arise after any death for which an individual is responsible, it is clear that intention, which constitutes the murder, is, from a ceremonial point of view, of little importance. Such a conception belongs to a different code, and only gradually rises into prominence in the development of moral ideas.

This view of the primitive theory of the consequences of murder is supported by the ideas which prevail about the killing of animals.

The Hottentots, *e.g.*, purify themselves after slaying animals. The character of the beliefs held by the Bathonga makes it clear that the source of the danger is the spirit of the animal. Purificatory ceremonies, closely resembling those to which returning warriors must be submitted, must follow the killing of certain animals, under penalty of persecution by the soul of the animal which has been killed. Some animals are more dangerous than others. Unless the medicine-man performs a purificatory ceremony after the killing of an eland, madness follows, while, if the man is accompanied by his wife, she shares his impurity; a bracelet of the skin must be made for her, or they cannot eat together, and on the following day the couple must repair to an anthill and there set fire to the bracelet.[4]

Cf. also art. DEATH (Introductory and Primitive).

(*b*) *Childbirth.*—Childbirth is another of the important crises of human life; it is marked by its intimate and peculiar character and by experience as requiring special measures for the protection of the mother and child, sometimes of the father, and of the other members of the community.

In the Malay Peninsula it is believed that mother and child are the special objects of attack of certain spirits of an extremely virulent and dangerous character, themselves women who have died in childbirth or have lost their children at birth. The belief in the danger of attack by these and other spirits is probably to be regarded as the explanation of the peculiar custom which requires the Malay mother for the whole period of impurity, lasting for 44 days after labour, to mount daily (and sometimes two or three times a day) a platform upon

[1] Casalis, *loc. cit.*
[2] C. Keysser, quoted by J. G. Frazer, *Psyche's Task*², p. 121.
[3] Rasmussen, p. 127 ff. [4] Junod, ii. 57 f.

which she is subjected to intense heat from a fire for a considerable period and, after returning to bed, to have a heated stone from the furnace applied to her stomach.[1]

That expectant mothers are regarded as impure and a source of defilement to others is indicated by the period of seclusion imposed upon them by the customs of many peoples.

Among the Kota of the Nilgiri Hills the wife dwells in three different huts in the first three months of pregnancy, staying for one month in each, then for a time in the house of a relative, while the husband purifies himself with water and smoke.[2] A period of segregation also follows after birth. In N. India husband and wife are separated, and the mother is unclean for a period of five weeks.[3] The Basuto father is separated from his wife for four days, when the medicine-man performs a ceremony in which the woman, sitting on the *lepheko* (a log four or six feet long), and the man, sitting opposite with his legs touching her legs, are anointed with a preparation of roots and fat, and drink healing water.[4] Among the Bulgars birth is followed by a rigorous tabu period of 40 days. At the end of this period the woman goes to church with the child. On her return she visits three houses, where the people make gifts to her and sprinkle the child with flour. On the next day the relatives visit the mother's home, and she sprinkles with holy water all the places in the house and courtyard where she has been during her 40 days' seclusion.[5] Segregation among the Todas takes place in the fifth month of pregnancy; the mother retires from the village, the distance being determined by the degree of sanctity of the village. A special hut is built for her, where she is visited by the relatives, who, however, may not come near her. When she enters into seclusion, her wrist is burned ceremonially after the erection of an artificial dairy, and then, when she has stayed in the hut for a month, a second ceremony called 'to the village buttermilk we pour' is performed, after which she returns to her ordinary hut. For the next 30 days she lives on a diet of buttermilk and food cooked in buttermilk. After the birth mother and child go to the seclusion-hut again. On her way the mother steps over a leaf on which are some threads from the garment of the dairyman known as *tursol*, and water from an artificial dairy erected for the ceremony is poured over a calf and given her to drink, while a few drops are sprinkled over the child. In the procession to the hut of seclusion the woman holds up a leaf umbrella, does not look at the sun, and avoids looking at the star or other body called Keirt, which is believed to be near the sun. The ceremony is intended to avoid and avert the evil of Keirt. Among the Teivaliol division of the Todas the husband assists his wife in her journey, and thereby himself becomes unclean and must remain with her at the hut.[6] The intention of some of these Toda customs is obscure, but the ceremonial of stepping over a leaf and part of the garment of the holy man appears to be a case of transference of evil, the wrist-burning is purificatory, while the 'buttermilk ceremony' is a ceremonial re-introduction of a person in a transitory state to a sacred substance. The use of an umbrella by the Toda woman to keep off the rays of the sun is connected with a wide-spread belief, which also appears in connexion with female puberty, that neither the mother nor her offspring must see the sun. In Korea the rays of the sun are excluded for 21 or 100 days after birth, according to the rank of the family.[7] New Guinea tribes confine the mother to the house for a month; when she leaves it, unless she covers her head with a mat, a male relative will die.[8]

The object of the Eskimo customs is less obscure. Here too there is segregation. The expectant mother must leave the house which she inhabits with her husband. Her conduct may affect the well-being of the community, especially in the most important item of food. Therefore on the day of birth she must eat only meat fried in fat on a flat stone. After the first night following the birth she must make herself new clothes, as her old clothes must be thrown away, and immediately after the birth she must wash from head to foot. Women who have fewer than five children may not eat young rough seals, eggs, entrails, heart, lungs, or liver.[9]

The impurity of the mother extends to the child. For ceremonies admitting the child and re-admitting the parents to society see art. BIRTH (Introduction).

(*c*) *Puberty.*—In the ceremonies which mark the introduction of the individual to full sexual and tribal life, at puberty or at initiation, purificatory rites in some form or another are usually a prominent feature. These rites, which present certain general resemblances, by such observances as a period of seclusion, a special diet, frequent ablutions, the use of pigment for the body, and bodily mutilation such as circumcision or the loss of a tooth, emphasize or, as the primitive mind would regard it, bring about the separation from a former status and the entry on a new phase of life.

In some cases among the tribes of Australia the novices are regarded as having died. Among the American tribes (*e.g.*, the Shawanese) not only did the initiates observe a special dietary, but they also took an emetic at regular intervals—an obvious and common method of purification.[1] In the Kurnai initiation mothers and sons sprinkled one another with water to mark the separation.[2] Further, it was a common custom to take a new name at initiation. In the Fijian *nanga* rites, at the close of the ceremonies, all the initiates went to the river bank and washed off the black paint with which they had been smeared.[3]

As in the case of mothers after childbirth, pubescent girls during their period of impurity were rigorously secluded from the rays of the sun, and frequently were not allowed to touch the earth with their bare bodies. This was the case in Loango.[4] Girls of the Zulu and kindred tribes, should they perceive that they have attained puberty while away from home in the fields, were required to hide in the reeds lest they should be seen by a man, and to cover their heads lest the sun should shrivel them up. At nightfall they ran home, avoiding the paths, and were secluded for a fortnight, during which time they and the girls who waited on them were not allowed to drink any milk, lest the cattle should die.[5] In New Ireland pubescent girls were confined for four or five years in cages, in which they were kept in the dark, and were not allowed to set foot on the ground.[6]

In the Bathonga nubility customs followed in the case of girls among the northern clans a period of seclusion took place at the appearance of the menses. Three or four girls who ran away to an adoptive mother lived in association; each morning they were covered with a cloth and led to a pool in which they were immersed to the neck. On their return from the pool they were imprisoned in a hut, where they received instruction. Any man who saw them during this period was smitten with blindness.[7] In the case of boys, on leaving the village for their period of seclusion, they leapt over a fire of scented wood which had been made in the road; every morning while they were in the school they were smeared with white paint as a mark that they had abandoned the darkness of childhood. Before the end of the school the medicine of purification was administered to them in a mouthful of beer, and on the last day their foreskins were burnt and made into a powder which was smeared on the pole which stood in the place of seclusion. Finally, all the paraphernalia of the school were destroyed by burning—an act in which 'all the filth and ignorance of childhood was burnt.' The boys were then led to a stream, where they washed off the white clay, cut their hair, anointed themselves with ochre, and put on new clothes.[8]

Circumcision, like other forms of initiation, being a ceremony introducing the novice to a new status in life, is usually found to be accompanied by some period of seclusion or withdrawal, in itself a purification, but it also as a rule included some element of a more obvious kind, such as the taking of emetics, washing, plastering with clay, the individual being thus prepared to face the new spiritual influences with which he or she was to be brought into contact. The position of the uncircumcised in Fiji was indicated by the fact that they were regarded as unclean and not allowed to carry food for the chief.[9]

(*d*) *Marriage.*—The ritualistic observances which precede, accompany, and follow the marriage ceremony are of such a character as to indicate that, when this important stage in the individual life is reached, the parties immediately concerned are particularly liable to spiritual influences. Although some of the practices are more obviously of a purificatory character than others, as a whole they are intended to minimize the danger (1) of contact between the individuals, and (2) of the entry into a new set of conditions and a new phase of life. On both grounds marriage is brought

[1] W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 342 f.
[2] H. Ploss and M. Bartels, *Das Weib*[8], Leipzig, 1904–05, ii. 413.
[3] W. Crooke, in *NINQ* i. [1891] 277.
[4] H. Grützner, 'Über die Gebrauche der Basutho,' *Verh. der Berl. Gesellsch. für Anthrop.* ii. [1877] 78.
[5] A. Strausz, *Die Bulgaren*, Leipzig, 1898, p. 291 f.
[6] Rivers, p. 313 ff.
[7] Mrs Bishop (Isabella L. Bird), *Korea and her Neighbours*, London, 1898, ii. 24.
[8] J. L. van Hasselt, quoted in *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 29.
[9] Rasmussen, p. 119 f.

[1] A. Featherman, *Social Hist. of the Races of Mankind*, London, 1881–91, iii. 182.
[2] L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, 1880, p. 197.
[3] B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 155.
[4] E. Pechuel-Loesche, 'Indiscretes aus Loango,' *ZE* x. [1878] 23.
[5] D. Kidd, *The Essential Kafir*, London, 1904, p. 209.
[6] B. Danks, 'Marriage Customs of the New Britain Group,' *JAI* xviii. [1889] 284.
[7] Junod, ii. 178 f.
[8] *Ib.* i. 75 f.
[9] Thomson, p. 216.

within the category of the crises in human life which require the observance of purificatory rites.

The measures taken to guard against the first-named danger usually take the form of seclusion. It is almost invariably the case among primitive peoples that, from the time of betrothal until the actual ceremony, bride and bridegroom do not meet, repeating in the individual the segregation which takes place between the sexes as a whole at puberty or initiation.

In New Guinea betrothed persons may not see one another.[1] The Menangkabauers allow no communication before marriage,[2] while the Malay *fiancée* makes every endeavour to avoid her future husband.[3] The Wa-taveta bride is 'sealed' to the bridegroom by the payment of the first ox of the bride-price, and until the price is complete must see no man.[4]

Measures may be taken to prepare for contact between the parties, just as initiation prepares for sexual maturity.

Loanda girls, *e.g.*, are excised eight days before marriage by the medicine-man, while the ceremony performed on girls at puberty among Central Australian tribes is actually the marriage rite and initiation ceremony.[5]

It is significant that re-marriage of a widow or widower requires less elaborate ceremony.[6] This, especially if taken in conjunction with the fact that intercourse with a medicine-man or other person of essentially magical quality, such as a chief, is sometimes exacted from a virgin, and precedes marriage, suggests that the ritual precedent on marriage is a preparation for the entry on a new state. It is also no doubt the result in some degree of the conception that the sexual act involves uncleanness.

The ceremonies which accompany the marriage rite indicate that those who are in contact with the bride are also involved in the danger. It is usual to take some measure of precaution to avert the influence of the spirits during the marriage procession.

In Nizhegorod the 'best man' walks three times round the party, against the sun, holding a holy picture. He then scratches the ground with a knife, cursing evil spirits and evilly-disposed persons.[7] Guns are fired during the progress to or from the church—a custom at one time followed in the north of England.[8] In Manchuria the bridal procession is preceded by two men, each of them holding a red cloth to ward off evil, the arrival of the bride's sedan-chair at the groom's house is signalized by firing crackers, and the chair itself is afterwards purified with incense.[9]

A common preliminary is lustration.

In S. Celebes the bridegroom bathes in holy water, and the bride is fumigated.[10] The Matabele bride pours water over the man on arriving at his house,[11] while among the Malays lustration continues for three days after the ceremony; at the actual wedding the first operation is the fumigation of the bride and groom with incense and the smearing with the neutralizing 'rice paste,' which forms such an important element as a purificatory or protective agent in all the magico-religious observances of Malay life.[12] In all Muhammadan countries purification by water in the bath and painting with henna are among the more important of the preliminaries to the wedding rite. The bath usually takes place a day or two before the departure for the groom's house. In Egypt the bride goes in state through the streets in a procession as elaborate as means allow, accompanied by her friends.[13]

[1] J. L. van Hasselt, 'Sitten und Gebräuche der Noeforezen Neu Guinea,' *ZE* viii. [1876] 180.
[2] A. L. van Hasselt, *Volksbeschrijving van Midden-Sumatra*, Leyden, 1882, p. 275.
[3] Skeat, p. 366.
[4] J. Thomson, *Through Masai Land*, London, 1885, p. 61.
[5] Ploss-Bartels, i. 384; Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 93.
[6] See E. Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco*, London, 1914, p. 328 f.
[7] J. Abercromby, 'Marriage Customs of the Mordvins,' *FL* i. [1890] 445.
[8] W. Henderson, *Notes on the Folk-lore of the Northern Counties of England and the Borders*, London, 1879, p. 38.
[9] J. H. Stewart Lockhart, 'The Marriage Ceremonies of the Manchus,' *FL* i. 487.
[10] B. F. Matthes, *Bijdragen tot de Ethnologie van Zuid-Celebes*, The Hague, 1875, p. 21.
[11] L. Decle, 'On some Matabele Customs,' *JAI* xxiii. [1894] 84.
[12] Skeat, p. 353 f.
[13] E. W. Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*[3], London, 1846, i. 217; Westermarck, p. 136 f.

The custom of cutting the hair or of wearing old clothes, which in other connexions marks an occasion for, or forms part of, a purificatory rite, also occurs in connexion with marriage.

Among the Muhammadan tribes of N.W. India both bride and bridegroom wear old clothes for some days before marriage.[1] The head of the Kafir bride is shaved, while the Fijian bride cuts off a long lock of hair or shaves her head.[2]

Notwithstanding the great variety of marriage rites and ceremonies, they agree to a great extent in the same manner as the preliminary rites in having as their object the prevention of the transmission of harmful influence from one individual to another and the aversion of the influence of malicious spirits. The ceremonies may be supplementary to those preliminary rites, marking especially the separation from the former life with all its circumstances and magical influences. Of such, lustration, cutting the hair, and the abandonment of old clothes are significant instances. Or they may be protective, as the use of the veil and of fire-arms, or the custom of Muhammadan countries, where one of the most important days of the wedding ceremony is that on which the smearing of hands and feet with henna, antimony, etc., takes place.[3] Another form of protective rite at marriage occurs in Morocco in the tapping of the bride with a sword on the wedding night by the bridegroom to drive away evil spirits.[4]

Finally, the wedding observances may be purificatory in neutralizing or preparing the individual for the new existence upon which he or she is about to enter. In this category would fall such customs as the ceremonial intercourse by men of the tribe, as in Australia, or by the chief or the medicine-man, as in America,[5] sometimes by friends of the groom, as among the Wa-taveta.[6] The customs of substituting a bride, which occurs, *e.g.*, among the Beni Amer, and of marriage to a tree preceding the actual marriage, such as occurs among the Mundas,[7] have the same protective and preparatory object.

After the ceremony bridegroom or bride or both may still continue to be regarded as impure and a danger to others. It is not uncommon for a further period of seclusion to follow marriage.

Among the Arabs of Mount Sinai the bride must remain in her hut for a fortnight.[8] In the Aru Islands and Ceramlaut the pair are shut up for some days,[9] and among some of the Bedawin the wife may not leave the house or touch any work for three years.[10]

(*e*) *Sexual relations.*—Notwithstanding the pre- or post-nuptial looseness of sexual relations found among many peoples, among others irregularities, and in particular incest in the wider sense in which it includes all the rules of exogamy, are regarded as a great pollution especially to be avoided on account of its effect not merely upon the individual but upon the life of the community. The infecting influence is removed by death, segregation, casting out from the community, or other purificatory process, such as sacrifice, smearing with the blood of the victim, lustration, etc. This class of crime is closely connected with the well-being of the crops. At certain periods of the crops' growth married couples live apart.

[1] W. Crooke, *PNQ* ii. [1884–85] 960.
[2] J. Shooter, *The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country*, London, 1857, p. 75; Featherman, ii. 283.
[3] Westermarck, pp. 95, 105, etc. [4] *Ib.* p. 235, etc.
[5] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 93; *NR* i. 82, 584.
[6] Mrs. French-Sheldon, 'Customs among the Natives of E. Africa from Teita to Kilimegalia,' *JAI* xxi. [1891] 365.
[7] E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 194.
[8] Featherman, ii. 142.
[9] J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, pp. 262, 172, quoted in A. E. Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, p. 333, where additional instances are given.
[10] W. Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien*, Schaffhausen, 1864, p. 148.

In ancient Greece the olive was planted by virgins or pure boys, and, in default of such workers, the crop was gathered by men who had taken oaths of their marital fidelity.[1] The Karens believed that illicit love blighted the crop; the guilty man in his prayer in the course of the ceremony of purification accused himself of having destroyed the productiveness of the country, and went on to say: 'Now I repair the mountains, now I heal the hills and the streams and the lands. May there be no failure of crops.'[2] In Rajmahal the adulterer furnished a hog to avert plague and the ravages of tigers.[3]

In some cases incest was regarded as the cause of barrenness.

This was the case among the Dinkas and Bathonga, while among the latter people as well as among the Akikuyu marriage of cousins, being within the forbidden degrees, required a special ceremony which purged the uncleanness and loosed the bond of relationship.[4] In Borneo first cousins could marry only after the ceremony of *bergapût*.[5] The Sulka of New Britain considered the pollution of pre-nuptial unchastity so great that not only was it fatal to the parties unless they were purified, but their mere presence was sufficient to tarnish the instruments of the sacred dance,[6] while among some Dayak tribes the family was made responsible for any death by drowning which happened a month before the atonement.[7]

The frequency with which death by drowning or the use of substitutes, either sacrificial animals or personal possessions, follows sexual crime, and especially incest, is due to the fact that the degree of defilement is so great that even shedding the blood of the guilty is avoided in order that the earth may not be polluted. Consequently among the Torajas of Celebes adultery was expiated by the sword, but incest by clubbing or throttling.[8]

The importance of sexual purity is further indicated by the numerous occasions upon which it is emphasized as a condition of a certain course of action or its absence is regarded as a deterrent.

In Morocco no man who is not clean in regard to sexual matters may enter a granary or vegetable-garden.[9] No sexual act may be committed in a holy place, nor must a person so polluted present himself in a holy place until he has washed; otherwise he will go blind, become lame, or go mad, he or his family will die, or he will lose some of his animals or his crop. A person sexually unclean may not pray. An act usually considered sacred will lose its magical efficacy if performed by a sexually unclean person.[10] Among the Romans a cook or butler might not handle food or butter while unclean. Reference has already been made to the cultivation of the olive in Greece and the incense tree in Arabia. During the Cherokee New Year Feast[11] sexual relations were forbidden, and the same regulation is found in the Bathonga community after the death of a headman and when a village is removed.[12] Among the Todas the relations of the dairymen-priests were regulated according to the degree of sanctity of their grade of office. The number of nights they might sleep in their village huts varied according to their grade, but the highest grades, the *pohkartpol* and the *palol*, were required to avoid women altogether while holding office.[13]

(*f*) *Relations of the sexes.*—The regulations governing the relations of individuals and of the sexes are based upon the idea of the transmission of evil either maliciously or inadvertently from one person to another. The danger may be permanently present, but in any case is considered to be peculiarly acute at particular times, such as the performance of natural functions, eating, drinking, etc., or at natural crises. The penalty for the infringement of the tabus which regulate action and intercourse is of such a character, or the consequences are averted by such means, as to indicate that disregard of the tabu entails pollution. A widely-recognized danger lies in contact with the inferior female sex. Violation of the rules governing the relations of the sexes usually requires some ritual act of expiation. Although in some cases such violations may be regarded only as breaches of correct social behaviour, the observances and the ritual are such as to appear to be derived originally from a tabu connected with danger, and especially with danger arising out of impurity.

A typical attitude finds its expression in Morocco, where women, because of their uncleanness, are subject to many tabus. They are forbidden to enter the threshing-floor or granary for fear of destroying the virtue of the corn; some tribes do not allow them to work in a vegetable-garden or to ride beasts of burden, and they are injurious to bees and must not handle them. In some places, should they enter a shop, its prosperity will be destroyed, and they are not allowed to visit certain holy places or to attend the feasts of the saints who died fighting Christians.[1]

In Nukahiva, if a woman sat on or passed near an object which had become tabu by contact with a man, it could not be used again, and she was put to death.[2] Among the people of Rajmahal, if a man detects a woman sitting on his cot, he kills a fowl furnished by the woman and sprinkles the blood on his bed. For the converse the man pays a fine of four fowls to the woman.[3] Among the Samoyeds and Ostyaks a wife may not tread in any part of the tent except her own corner, and, after erecting the tent, she must fumigate it.[4] The club-houses which form a feature of social life in the Pacific are sometimes tabu to persons of the opposite sex. In the Marquesas, should a woman pollute the men's house by her presence, the penalty is death.[5]

The differentiation which extends to occupation is also in many cases enforced by consequences which are explicitly stated to involve either a condition of impurity or something analogous to such a condition.

Pastoral and cattle-keeping peoples, especially in Africa, frequently debar their women from tending the flocks and herds. The Todas, with their rigorous exclusion of women from the work of the dairy, and the tabu which keeps them and their characteristic domestic implements apart from contact with the cattle and the dairymen and even forbids their use of the cattle paths, are a case in point.[6] Among the Bantus of S. Africa women are not allowed to touch the cattle.[7] As already stated, pubescent Bantu girls and their attendants were not allowed to touch milk. Some of the pastoral tribes of the Sûdân and E. Africa forbade women, especially at certain times, and those sexually impure to come into contact with the milk, and among the Dinkas even old men were not allowed to milk the cows, this duty devolving on boys and girls who had not yet attained the age of puberty.[8] The same applies to men in the case of women's occupations. *Tapa*-making, *e.g.*, is tabu to men, while the use of canoes is forbidden to women.[9] In the case of man's most important occupations—hunting and fighting—a certain precaution must be observed in relation with the other sex; continence for a varying period is often a necessary preparation. In certain S. African tribes the warriors must abstain from women.[10] Among the Nutka Indians a preparatory abstinence of some weeks is required.[11] In New Guinea warriors are not allowed to see or approach a woman.[12]

In both hunting and war success depends upon the observance of these regulations. The purificatory ritual underlying these disabilities and exclusions is still more clearly indicated when it appears that women are debarred from participation in religious ceremonies.

In the Sandwich Islands women were not allowed to share in religious worship because their touch polluted the offerings; while, if a Hindu widow touched an image, its divinity was

[1] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 107, quoting Palladius, *de Re Rustica*.
[2] F. Mason, 'On Dwellings, Works of Art, Law, etc., of the Karens,' *JASBe* xxxvii. [1868] pt. ii. p. 147.
[3] Sewaw, *loc. cit.*
[4] *ERE* iv. 709; Junod, i. 243 f.; Hobley, *JRAI* xl. 438.
[5] H. Ling Roth, 'Low's Natives of Borneo,' *JAI* xxi. 133.
[6] P. Kaudern, 'Die Sulka,' *AA* xxix. [1904] 211.
[7] Spenser St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*[2], London, 1863, i. 62.
[8] Frazer, *Psyche's Task*[2], quoting N. Adriani and A. C. Kruijt, p. [illegible]
[9] Westermarck, *Ceremonies and Beliefs connected with Agriculture, certain Dates of the Solar Year, and the Weather in Morocco*, Helsingfors, 1913, p. 17.
[10] Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies*, p. 334 f.
[11] Westermarck, p. [illegible]
[12] Junod, [illegible] 290 f.
[13] Rivers, p. 236.

[1] Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies*, p. 339 f.
[2] J. S. C. Dumont d'Urville, *Voyage autour du monde*, Paris, 1834-35, i. 505.
[3] H. T. Colebrooke, in *Asiatic Researches*, iv. 88, quoted by Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, p. 36.
[4] J. G. Georgi, *Les Nations samoyèdes*, Petrograd, 1777, pp. 15, 137, quoted in Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, p. 37.
[5] H. Melville, *Four Months among the Natives of the Marquesas Islands*, London, 1846, pp. 101, 210.
[6] Rivers, p. 245.
[7] E. Holub, 'On the Central S. African Tribes, from the South Coast to the Zambesi,' *JAI* x. [1881] 11.
[8] C. G. Seligmann, 'Some Aspects of the Hamitic Problem in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,' *JRAI* xliii. [1913] 656 f.
[9] Melville, pp. 13, 246.
[10] J. Macdonald, 'Manners, Customs, Superstitions, and Religions of S. African Tribes,' *JAI* xix. [1890] 284.
[11] *NR* i. 189.
[12] J. Chalmers, *Pioneering in New Guinea*, London, 1887, p. 65.

destroyed and it had to be thrown away.[1] Australian women were not allowed to see a *bora* under pain of death, and in Fiji they could not enter any temple.[2]

Reference to the customs attendant on the attainment of puberty, to initiation ceremonies—rites in themselves largely of a purificatory nature—will show the importance attached to the protection of one sex from the evil of the other, even when conveyed by such a means as the sight.

Among the Basutos, *e.g.*, no woman may come near the boys at their initiation.[3] The practice alluded to above of confining pubescent girls in seclusion both protects them from harm—barrenness appears to be the consequence most generally feared—and at the same time prevents defilement being conveyed to others. In New Ireland girls are kept in cages from puberty to marriage; during this period they must be seen by no males except their relatives;[4] and in Ceram no male must come near girls at the puberty ceremonies.[5]

The aim of preserving purity is, however, most clearly marked in the case of sexual crises such as menstruation, when both segregation and a subsequent ceremony are almost invariably practised.

Among the Pueblo Indians a man will fall ill if he touch a woman during menstruation or pregnancy.[6] In the Island of Yap there are special houses for menstruous women.[7] Among the Bathonga the woman separates from her husband, wears old clothes, which she brought from her home at her marriage for the purpose, and at the termination of the period purifies her hut.[8]

(*g*) *Contact of sacred and profane.*—Apart from the impurity which is the result of some specific act or contact, there is also an impurity which attaches normally to the individual, and becomes especially pronounced when he is brought into relation with things or persons of a tabu or 'sacred' character. This belief is responsible for such regulations as those which govern the relations of castes in India and for the secrecy surrounding the practice of the rites of the mystic religions of Greece, which found expression in a warning cry addressed to non-initiates, such as the 'Procul este, profani' of the Sibyl.[9] Instances of such beliefs are of frequent occurrence among primitive races.

Among the Polynesians the tabu character of a chief is violated by the touch of an inferior, although in this case the danger falls upon the inferior. On the other hand, in Efate the 'sacred man' who comes into contact with *namim* (ceremonial uncleanness) destroys his sacredness.[10] In Uganda, before building a temple, the men were given four days in which to purify themselves.[11] On the other hand, the chief and his belongings are very often regarded as sacred and therefore as dangerous to others of an inferior rank. In Tonga Island any one who touched a chief contracted tabu; it was removed by touching the sole of the foot of a superior chief.[12] The sacred quality of the chief in the Malay Peninsula also resided in the royal regalia, and any one touching it was visited with serious illness or death.[13]

Even the ordinary individual may in some degree possess this quality.

In New Zealand any one who touched the head of another received 'sacredness' from the contact.[14]

The impurity of the ordinary individual is responsible for the purificatory element in a number of ceremonies.

In the case of the ceremony of pouring drugs on the roof of the hut practised by the Thonga hunter the purification takes on a protective character. In the Mambura ceremony which precedes the circumcision of Kikuyu youths in the Masai fashion those who were present purified themselves by licking a little of the diatomaceous earth used in their purification ceremonies and then smearing themselves on throat and navel. The candidates themselves were purified by an elder with his principal wife, two sisters, and another elder; after smearing them with the white earth, he sprayed honey-beer upon them from his mouth. This purified them and at the same time protected them from any *thahu* which might otherwise pass from spectator to candidate.[1]

A most striking example of the influence of the relation of a sacred substance and profane society is to be found among the Todas, the whole of whose elaborate ritual and (it would not be too much to say) the whole basis of whose social organization are directed towards securing the ceremonial purity of the sacred herds, the sacred dairy, the vessels, and the milk, and of those whose duty it is to minister, the strictness and elaboration of the rules and methods to attain this object varying according to the degree of sacredness of each dairy. In the *ti* dairy, *e.g.*, the sacred vessels are always kept in a separate room, and the milk reaches them only by transfer to and from an intermediate vessel kept in another room. The priests or dairymen, of whom there are four grades, are admitted to office only after an elaborate ordination, which in effect is a purification, removing them from the ranks of ordinary men to a state of fitness for sacred office, while their conduct is governed by regulations such as those which permit only certain grades of priest to sleep in the village and only at certain times, or that which entails that a priest who attends a funeral should cease from that time from his sacred function. On the other hand, the milk, a sacred substance, is to be used by the profane, and in the migration ceremonies, when the dairies are moved from one village to another, the sacred vessels are open to profane view. It has therefore been conjectured that the aim of much of the ritual is to avert the dangers of profanation and prepare or neutralize the sacred substance for consumption by those who are themselves unclean.[2]

(*h*) *Contact of old and new; strangers; strange countries.*—It is a familiar dogma of primitive thought that anything new or doing anything for the first time entails peculiar dangers. Reference has already been made to this belief in connexion with other matters above. Its importance lies in the fact that it involves an endeavour to protect the agent by a purificatory ceremony in which the pollution of the former state is cast off. This is especially the case in seasonal festivals such as harvest, when it is held desirable to avoid all contact between the new crops and the old, or the influences connected with the old, in order that the former may not lose their virtue or harm those who consume them.

The peculiar *nanga* rites of the Fijians appear to have been in part an initiation and in part a firstfruit ceremony. In certain elements they were purificatory.[3] The firstfruit ceremonies of the Cherokee were accompanied by the clearing out and purification of the whole village, the taking of emetics, the throwing away of old and the wearing of new clothes, and other measures. The devil-driving ceremonies at harvest or at the end of the old year or beginning of the new year were sometimes a similar protection and sometimes a remedy for indifferent crops.

On the other hand, it is not only necessary to observe certain precautions to safeguard the virtues of the new crop; it is almost equally important that it should be neutralized or prepared for consumption by a purificatory process. This is the object of many of the firstfruit ceremonies which are observed.

The Bathonga regard it as dangerous for the subjects of the king to eat certain foods before they have undergone the *luma*, or purificatory process, in which they are mixed with royal drugs. The most important of these rites is the *luma* of Kafir corn, the staple crop.[4]

Another instance in which entry upon a new state requires special preparation is on the removal of a village from one site to another, when each dwelling and the community as a whole must be purified.[5]

A related idea, which, however, in its application is the converse of these practices, governs the precaution that must be taken in entering new ground or a new country. Here it is not a case of the new being protected from the profanation of the old, but those who are passing into it must be protected from its dangers. It is therefore customary for a purificatory ceremony to be performed before

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[1] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832, i. 129; W. Ward, *A View of . . . the Hindoos*, London, 1817–20, ii. 13.
[2] W. Ridley, 'Australian Languages and Traditions,' *JAI* ii. [1873] 271; T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*[2], London, 1860, pp. 232, 238.
[3] K. Endemann, 'Mitteil. über die Sotho-Neger,' *ZE* vi. [1874] 37.
[4] Danks, *JAI* xviii. 284 ff.
[5] Riedel, p. 138.
[6] *NR* i. 549.
[7] A. Senfft, 'Ethnogr. Beiträge über die Karol. Yap,' in *Petermanns Mitteil.* xlix. [1903] 53.
[8] Junod, i. 187.
[9] Vergil, *Æn.* vi. 258.
[10] D. Macdonald, *Oceania*, Melbourne and London, 1889, p. 181.
[11] Roscoe, p. 293.
[12] E. Dieffenbach, *Travels in New Zealand*, London, 1843, ii. 105.
[13] Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 23 f.
[14] E. Shortland, *The Southern Districts of New Zealand*, London, 1851, p. 68.

[1] Hobley, *JRAI* xl. 444 f.
[2] Rivers, p. 231 ff
[3] Thomson, *Fijians*, pp. 146 ff., 216 ff.
[4] Junod, i. 366 f.
[5] For a description of the elaborate Bathonga ceremonial see Junod, i. 290 f.

crossing the borders from the known to the unknown. That that which is outside or strange is powerful for evil unless neutralized is a familiar belief.

Among the Bathonga it is believed that those who travel outside their own country are peculiarly open to danger from foreign spiritual influence, and in particular from demoniac possession.[1] Strangers are tabu because, worshipping strange gods, they bring strange influences with them. They are, therefore, fumigated or purified in some other way.[2] In the Dieri and neighbouring tribes even a member of the tribe returning home after a journey was treated as a stranger, and no notice was taken of him until he sat down.

In the same manner those entering a house from the outside world should perform some ceremony, even if it were only to remove their shoes, which would purify the incomer from the evil with which otherwise he might contaminate those within, while the threshold, door-posts, and lintel—important as points of contact with the outer world—are smeared with blood or sprinkled with water when any member of the household or of the community has become a source of pollution, or a horseshoe is suspended over the door to keep out evil and bring good luck.

The danger of entering a new country is as great as that which attaches to those who come thence.

In Australia, when one tribe approaches another, the members carry lighted sticks to purify the air,[3] just as the Spartan kings in making war had sacred fires from the altar carried before them to the frontier, where they sacrificed. This attitude towards a foreign country and those who belong to it is perhaps best expressed in that passage in the Vedas which is the basis of the rule that higher castes lose caste if they cross the sea or sojourn beyond the recognized borders of their land. Manu[4] says: 'That land on which the black antelope naturally grazes is held fit for the performance of sacrifices; but the land of foreigners is beyond it. . . . Let the three first classes [Brāhmans, Kṣatriyas, and Vaiśyas] invariably dwell in the above-named countries; but a Śūdra may sojourn wherever he chooses.' In the *Brāhmaṇas* it is said that Agni, the fire-god, flashed with fire over five rivers and as far as he burnt the Aryas could live.[5]

(*i*) *Illness.*—Illness, frequently attributed to the influence of spirits or to violation of the regulations of ceremonial purity, may itself be regarded as a source of defilement for others.

In Borneo the Kayans hang leaves of *long* (a species of caladium) and a large sun-hat on the door of a sick-room to signify that it is tabu. In returning thanks for recovery from a long illness an altar consisting of a bamboo is set up; the upper part is split and a fresh fowl's egg inserted.[6]

While the use of the egg suggests a propitiatory offering to the *toh*, or spirits, upon whom rests the responsibility for punishing the infringement of any tabu, the use of the split bamboo may be compared with the split bamboo through which the mourners step in a funeral ceremony (see below), and further with the custom of passing through a fissure in a tree as a charm in the case of deformity or illness.[7] The purificatory intention of the ceremony in which propitiatory offerings of eggs and fowls are made to the *toh* when a tabu is infringed is indicated by the sprinkling of the culprits with the blood of young fowls or pigs, which is performed by the chief.[8] As a rule, however, the purificatory element in observances connected with illness, whether directed against the dangers of contact or intended for the benefit of the sufferer, can be readily distinguished.

The Beni Amer cure their sick by bathing them in the blood of a girl or some animal; or the blood of a goat is poured over the man's head or body.[9] Changing the name, a method of putting away the past at a critical moment, was one means employed by the Dayak to rid himself of dangerous influences after a serious illness.[1] In Fiji disease was often introduced by foreigners, and strangers were therefore quarantined and sometimes killed. In the Marquesas on one occasion the natives of Kau Atolls disinfected or disenchanted the crew of a European vessel at the end of a conference held at sea; one man in each Marquesan canoe held a handful of ashes wrapped in leaves, which he scattered in the air at the close of the interview. In Normanby Island, in the D'Entrecasteaux group, the natives would not hold parley with an exploring party until an old man had chewed a scented bark and spat it over the visitors and his own party.[2] The use of the sweat-house in America as a cure for disease is largely, though not entirely, magical; its use in ceremonial purification is frequent. The vapour bath also appears in African ceremonial. Among the Bathonga it is employed both as a cure for certain complaints, especially when a ritual defilement is feared, and after a death. Further, among the same people an obligatory ceremonial purification, in which the patient, sitting on a mat, rubs himself with *psanyi* (the half-liquid contents of a goat's stomach) mixed with drugs, follows a successful treatment of a serious disease 'to disperse the bloods which have made him sick so that they cannot return to him violently.' This ceremony is also obligatory after weaning. The drugs themselves of the medicine-man are subjected to an annual ceremony in which they are purified and renewed by the addition of new material (part of which is dried and part roasted, the whole village assembling to inhale the smoke); a goat is sacrificed, and *psanyi* squeezed on the burning drugs to put them out. The ceremony of renewing the drugs cast away the evils and misfortunes of the old year and prepared the community for the year to come, in the words of the medicine-man, 'that it may not be too heavy for us.'[3]

3. Results following from ceremonial impurity.—The consequences which are thought to follow upon an act involving loss of purity or upon failure to remove pollution when incurred help to throw light upon the nature of the conception as it exists among primitive peoples. Not only is the ceremonial character of these beliefs clear, but at the same time it is apparent that any attempt to ward off these consequences is frequently undertaken as much in the interest of the community as in that of the individual.

Sometimes the consequences of impurity are conceived only in a vague way: ill-luck or danger follows transgression. At other times the form which the danger will take is precisely defined.

One form of evil which frequently follows loss of purity, especially after contact with a corpse, is illness and death. The danger may be general, affecting the whole community, or it may attack the individual and spread from him to others, or it may be confined to the one person contaminated.

An instance in the first category occurs in Rajmahal, where incest is followed by plague or the ravages of tigers.[4] The same offence among the Khasis, in this case in the form of contravention of the laws of exogamy, leads to great disasters, people being killed by lightning and women dying in childbed.[5] On the other hand, such an individual misfortune as barrenness may be the consequence. The Dinkas and the Bathonga regard incest as the cause of barrenness,[6] while among the Sulka of New Britain the death of both guilty parties ensues as a result of the fatal pollution that they have contracted.[7] Barrenness is frequently regarded as a consequence of the infringement of regulations governing conduct at puberty. It is necessary that a Baganda girl should immediately inform her parents of her condition, that her father may perform the ceremonial act of jumping over her mother at the end of the period; otherwise barrenness followed. The Akamba hold that a like result follows from disregard of the prohibition of the use of public paths to girls at their first menstruation. This comes about if they should leave a spot of blood on the path and a man have connexion with a woman after stepping over it.[8] Among the Thompson Indians, again, should any of the purificatory ceremonies and prohibitions which should follow a death be omitted or neglected, it is believed that the culprits will suffer from sore throat, loss of voice, or loss of sight.[9] An Akikuyu who is under the ban of *thahu* must be relieved, or he will suffer from boils and probably die.[10] In New Zealand the breaking of a tabu entailed punishment by the *atua*, or spirits; this took the form of deadly sickness or disease.[11] A Thonga hunter who failed to perform the requisite rites after killing an eland ran the risk of losing his head and of being unable to find the way home, while a similar neglect, if his wife were travelling with him at

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[1] Junod, ii. 433 f. [2] Crawley, *FL* vi. 136 f.
[3] R. Brough Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, Melbourne and London, 1878, i. 134.
[4] ix. 23 f.
[5] For discussion of this point in relation to caste see R. V. Russell and Rai Bahadur Hira Lāl, *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, London, 1916, i. 16 ff.
[6] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 7 f.
[7] See *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 54 f.
[8] Hose, McDougall, ii. 8, 26. [9] Munzinger, p. 310.

[1] St. John[2], pp. 1, 73. [2] Thomson, *Fijians*, p. 243 ff.
[3] Junod, ii. 416, 426 f. [4] T. Shaw, *loc. cit.*
[5] P. R. T. Gurdon, *The Khasis*[2], London, 1914, p. 94.
[6] Seligmann, *loc. cit.*; Junod, i. 242.
[7] Rascher, *loc. cit.*
[8] Roscoe, p. 80; C. W. Hobley, *The Ethnology of A-Kamba and other East African Tribes*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 65.
[9] Hill-Tout, p. 209. [10] Hobley, *JRAI* xl. 428.
[11] *Old New Zealand*, by a Pakeha Maori, London, 1863, p. 94.

the time, brought misfortune on their child, which became weak, miserable, and emaciated. Ritual defilement was also held by this people to be the cause of many forms of disease, but in particular of swelling of the hands, feet, and joints, and of pains in the bones.[1] Among the Basuto, if the medicine-man did not perform the purificatory ceremony which should follow childbirth, the father swelled up and died.[2]

Insanity not infrequently followed as a consequence of a death by violence unless atonement by purification were made.

Among the Awemba the slayer of a man was believed to go mad.[3] In Fiji, should any of the uninitiated see those who are being initiated in the *nanga* rites, they become insane.[4]

This form of penalty is not uncommonly associated with the idea that vengeance for the violation of the tabu is the work of the spirits of the dead.

Thonga warriors, until purified, are in great danger from the spirits and run the risk of becoming insane, and for the same reason after a death all members of the community cut their hair to a degree of shortness determined by their connexion with the deceased.[5] Among the Greenland Eskimo the spirit of a murdered man will torment his murderer until it frightens him to death, or, if he goes on the ice after neglect of the rites and regulations following death, may tear him to pieces.[6]

That the fear of ghosts or spirits lay at the root of the purificatory ceremony and that those who were ceremonially impure were peculiarly susceptible to their attacks is in many cases either expressly stated or implied. In addition to the cases already mentioned in which insanity, disease, or death caused by spirits is to be feared, attention may be called to the ceremonial as a whole of those Indian tribes of N. America to which reference has already been made. In some matters it is directly stated that the danger apprehended comes from the ghost; in others the character of the belief is such as to justify the same explanation.

The guests at the funeral feasts, *e.g.*, would not eat, drink, or smoke in the open air after sunset, nor did they sleep for four days for fear of ghosts. Widows underwent a ceremonial purification in order that they might be long-lived and innocuous to their second husbands, while among some tribes a protective breech-cloth was worn for some days. The sleeping-place of a dead man in the hut was not occupied for a considerable period, and then first by an adult male for four nights in succession.[7] In Africa—*e.g.*, in Uganda, among the Basutos, and among other peoples — the purificatory ceremonial is intended to lay the ghost and prevent its troubling those upon whom lies the responsibility of causing death.[8]

That fear for the community rather than for the individual is the more potent influence is suggested by the number of prohibitions connected with food and the precautions taken to preserve the food-supply from contamination. Food should on no account come into contact with impure persons.

No Basuto who is unclean should handle the corn when it is exposed to view.[9] Reference has been made above to the precautions taken in Morocco to protect the corn from the adverse influence of women and those polluted by sexual intercourse. After a death the Bathonga perform a ceremony purifying the food which belonged to the dead man.[10]

Everywhere, in eating and drinking, the impure must avoid touching food with their hands or follow certain rules which mitigate the danger.

Among the American Indian tribes those who take part in a burial or who are nearly related to the deceased must refrain from fresh meat for a period; their food should be cold and not cut with a knife, but torn with the teeth; they must be fed by others or eat with the help of a twig, and must drink from a special vessel which they carry with them.[11] In Samoa relatives of the deceased must be fed by others. The Bathonga require those who are unclean—*e.g.*, widows, those who have helped to bury the corpse, or those suffering from a disease which is the result of defilement—to eat with spoons and drink from their own cups, while victorious warriors who have killed eat with special spoons from special plates or broken pots and take their food cold, lest, being hot themselves, they swell internally.[12] Among the Thompson Indians, if an unpurified widow gathered berries, the whole crop would fall off the bushes or wither up. If a widower transferred a trout from one lake to another, he had to remove the pollution of his touch by chewing deer-fat and spitting some of it on the fish before he let it go, bidding it farewell and telling it to propagate its kind.[1]

The implication in these cases is that contact with pollution would endanger a whole species or class.

It is, however, particularly in connexion with sexual impurity that the prosperity of the crops is involved. Illicit love is held to blight the crops, while at certain seasons legitimate relations must be suspended.

In Arabia those who tended the incense-trees were required to be free from the pollution of sexual relation and of death. Ceremonial purity increased the crop.[2] Among the Karens bad crops were the consequence of adultery.[3] If the Battak found an unmarried woman with child, she was married at once; otherwise the crops failed.[4] The purificatory ceremony of Celebes in which the blood of the sacrificial goat or buffalo, substituted for the human victims guilty of incest, was poured on the field was intended to preserve or restore their fertility.[5] Among the Dayaks incest and bigamy, and among the Torajas of Central Celebes unnatural unions, were believed to be the cause of incessant rainfall.[6]

Laxity in sexual matters or acts in contravention of sexual tabus involved other penalties, in particular through sympathetic ties. The belief that the conduct of the wife affected the success or safety of the husband while he was absent at war or on the chase is of frequent occurrence.

The Dayaks believed that, if the wife was unfaithful, the husband would lose his life.[7] A somewhat similar example, in which the consequence by sympathy falls upon another as well as the guilty party, occurs among the northern Bathonga. When a community moves its village to a new site, sexual relations are forbidden until renewed ritually as part of the purification of the community in its new quarters. Any violation of this tabu is followed by the illness or paralysis of the headman, while the woman herself becomes barren, and the work of removal must begin again.[8]

4. The purification ceremony.—(*a*) *Water.*—One of the mediums most frequently employed to dispel impurity, as well as one of the simplest, is water either in aspersion or in ablution.

On the fifth day after handling a corpse the Samoan, who between that day and the time of the pollution was not allowed to handle food but was fed by others, bathed his face and hands with hot water.[9] After an interment on the Gold Coast those who have touched the corpse go to the nearest brook and sprinkle themselves with water.[10]

Water is frequently used as a purifying agent in other cases in which also the idea of its cleansing properties is prominent, as, *e.g.*, after childbirth, when both mother and child are thoroughly washed.

One of the duties of the Eskimo mother is to wash herself completely after the birth.[11] The Malays purify mother and child by washing them in warm water, and this is repeated every morning and evening for some time.[12] The first act of the Uganda mother, on leaving the hut after seclusion, is to wash herself; the sponge which she uses is sent to her husband, and with it he washes the private parts of his body.

Bathing at the public bath has already been mentioned above as one of the most important items in the ceremonial preceding marriage in Muhammadan countries. In Morocco at Fez the bride is purified with water and henna. On the fifth, fourth, and third days before the wedding she goes to the hot bath, and on the last occasion seven buckets of lukewarm water are poured on her by seven women, 'so that she shall have no quarrel with her husband.'[13] In S. Celebes the bridegroom bathes in holy water, while the bride is fumigated.[14] In Abyssinia for several days before the marriage the bride performs ablutions and restricts her diet,[15] while the Matabele bride, on arriving at the bridegroom's hut, pours water over him.[16]

The physical contact in such cases probably both suggests the remedy and is responsible for its

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1 Junod, ii. 58, 426.
2 Grützner, *loc. cit.*
3 Sheane, *loc. cit.*
4 Thomson, *Fijians*, p. 155.
5 Junod, i. 145, ii. 453.
6 Rasmussen, pp. 128–130, 133 f.
7 Hill-Tout, p. 203 ff.
8 See H. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, ii. 743 f.; Casalis, p. 258; Junod, ii. 453; see also *GB*³, pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 165 f.
9 Casalis, p. 252.
10 Junod, i. 146.
11 Hill-Tout, p. 206.
12 Junod, i. 145, ii. 434, 453.

1 Hill-Tout, p. 209.
2 Pliny, *HN* xii. 54.
3 Mason, *JASBe* xxxvii. pt. ii. p. 147 ff.
4 J. B. Neumann, quoted in *GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 108.
5 Kruijt, quoted by Frazer, *Psyche's Task*², p. 53.
6 H. Ling Roth, *JAI* xxi. 113 f.; A. C. Kruijt in *Tijd. voor Ind. Taal.* xliv. [1901] 4.
7 F. E. Hewitt, 'Some Sea-Dayak Tabus,' *Man*, viii. [1908] 187.
8 Junod, i. 290 f.
9 G. Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia*, London, 1861, p. 228.
10 A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of W. Africa*, London, 1887, p. 241.
11 Rasmussen, p. 120.
12 Skeat, p. 334 f.
13 Westermarck, *Marriage Customs in Morocco*, p. 136.
14 Matthes, p. 21.
15 Featherman, iii. 604.
16 Decle, *JAI* xxiii. 84.

simplicity. On the other hand, simple lustration may be employed where the idea of superficial contact has given way to one of ingrained and essential impurity.

In Ireland, according to the legend, in the kingdom of Munster, the crops were blighted by the incest of the king and his sister. The nobles demanded their offspring in order that they might be burned and their ashes cast into the stream. One of the princes was saved by being sent out of the kingdom to a Druid, who purified him daily by placing him on a white cow with red ears and pouring water over him.[1]

Water may be used, possibly to some extent in a symbolical sense, as the final mark of separation from a previous state at a critical stage in the life-history of the individual. As has already been stated, initiation ceremonies usually include, as part of their ceremonial, some form of purificatory operation.

The Kurnai initiation ceremony, in which the boys and their mothers sprinkle one another with water, signifies, it is said, that the boys are no longer under their mothers' control.[2] The Hausas of Tunis practise a ceremonial purification of half-a-dozen boys and girls before the harvest. They are shut up in a large house for a period during which they are stuffed with food to make them strong, and taught the Bori dances as well as their duty to totem and clan. At the end of the period the medicine-man washes the boys and the medicine-woman washes the girls in the forest. In both cases the washing is medicinal.[3]

The last instance presents two features which commonly occur: (1) the fortification of the purificatory agent by medicine, and (2) the intervention of the medicine-man, the expert in these sacred matters. Both these elements tend to become more prominent as greater attention is paid to the spiritual or magical side, the manifestation of which, however, is still conceived as material and to be treated on material lines.

At a Boloki funeral a trench about 20 ft. long is dug, and the mourners take up their position on the side nearer the grave. The medicine-man's assistant pours water into one end of the trench, and the medicine-man then helps the mourners over the trench as the water runs down.[4]

In this ceremony the idea of the cleansing power of water has given way to that of the magical efficacy of running water as a barrier which the noxious influence of the ghosts is unable to pass. On the other hand, the two ideas combine in the Thonga cure for childlessness in which the medicine-man pours water over a married couple who have no children.[5] The class of regular or professional hunters also fortified with drugs the water used in the purificatory ceremony performed before they set out on a journey.

A pot of drugs was cooked, in the froth of which the hunter washed himself. He then poured the contents of the pot on the roof and allowed the water to drip on him as he entered the hut. The medicine-man at the same time uttered a prayer and incantation: 'Go and be happy. Though the rain will fall on you, though the dew make you wet, when you sleep you will be everywhere as in a hut,' and so forth, making it clear that the object of the ceremony was to protect him from the dangers of the bush.[6]

That this ceremony is purificatory rather than protective, as might be thought from the character of the prayer, is indicated by the further condition which must be observed to secure not merely success but also safety in hunting. Sometimes a fowl is sacrificed, but only children may eat it; the hunter must not partake, must not touch salt, and must abstain from sexual relations; *i.e.*, he must in all respects be pure.

Water is used in various ways in a number of ceremonies connected with special seasons of the year. In many places, *e.g.*, a water fight follows the bringing in of the harvest or the last sheaf, or an individual may be attacked with water, usually by women. As a general rule these practices must be regarded as rain charms. Sometimes, however, they have a purificatory intention.

In Burma, at the end of the solar year in April, when a great feast lasting several days took place, in order to wash away the impurities of the past and commence the new year free from stain, it was the custom on the last day for the women to throw water over every man they met, and for the men to retort. A visitor, on entering the house of a dignitary, was met by the family and presented with a bottle of rose-water, a little of which was poured into the hand of the host, who sprinkled it over himself. The mistress of the house poured a little rose-water over the host, and then over each of the guests, after which a water fight began.[1]

(*b*) *Other detergents.*—In the use of water as a purifying agent it would be reasonable to assume an obvious connexion in idea with its effect in cleansing physical impurity. The same idea may be at the root of the use of other materials.

In the Kai Islands the warriors smear themselves with the juice of a disinfecting plant. The Akikuyu remove *thahu* by a process of lustration which in the more serious cases is performed by the medicine-man or the native council. The slaughter of a sheep accompanies the ceremony, and they smear themselves or are smeared by the medicine-man with the contents of the stomach and with a white diatomaceous earth.[2] Such a custom as the complete smearing of a Kafir woman with green and red clay after childbirth[3] is perhaps connected with the custom of donning new clothes at the end of mourning or after a period of seclusion due to ceremonial impurity. In New Britain men guilty of unchastity may rid themselves of the taint by drinking sea-water in which coconut and ginger have been shredded. They are then thrown into the sea and, on emergence, throw away their dripping clothes.[4]

(*c*) *Changing clothes, cutting hair, nails, etc.*—

The Eskimo mother after childbirth begins to make herself a new suit of clothes.[5] The Thonga woman is rigorously secluded from her husband at the regular periods, sleeps on a special mat, and wears special clothes which she brought with her at her marriage. At the end of the period she puts on her ordinary clothes once more. A woman who loses an infant is deeply defiled, and after a period of impurity of some two or three months' duration she undergoes purification in a ceremonial sexual act by her husband, and then buys new clothes.[6]

New clothes, however, are rather a sign of the termination of a period of uncleanness than a purification. In mourning they mark the close of the period of danger to others—the final putting off of the pollution of death.

At the end of the Thonga purification of the warriors everything that they had used during the tabu period was tied in a bundle with their clothes and hung on a tree at some distance from the village, and left to rot.[7] Among the Kayans, after the termination of the mourning in a ceremony for which a freshly-taken human head was required and in which every one had been sprinkled with the blood of a sacrifice of pigs and fowls, mourning garb was laid aside and new clothes put on.[8]

The complete severance with the old and impure life which is brought about by the purification ceremony is further marked in some cases by changes or modifications of the toilet.

On the death of a relative the eyebrows or head may be shaved, as in the case of the Baganda warriors mentioned above, whose heads are shaved on their return from battle; or, on the contrary, the hair and finger- and toe-nails may be allowed to grow. The Bathonga cut their hair completely for the death of a near relative, the operation being performed by a doctor or some one who knows the correct method.[9] The father and mother of twins among the Baganda allow their hair and nails to grow until the purification ceremony, when they are cut and wrapped in bark cloths. They are kept until the men go to war. At the end of the period of mourning for the king all shaved their heads, cut their nails, and put on new clothes.[10] The Lillooets on the fifth day after a burial—a period spent in fasting and ceremonial ablution—had their hair cut by the mortuary shaman who prepared the corpse for burial. They then returned to their homes and painted their faces, while the hair which had been cut was rolled up into a ball, taken into the forest, and fastened to a tree.[11]

(*d*) *Artificial stimulation of natural processes.*—Other methods, based in an equal degree on getting

[1] G. Keating, *The Hist. of Ireland*, Eng. tr., New York, 1857, p. [illegible]

[2] [illegible] and Howitt, p. 197 f.

[3] A. J. N. Tremearne, *The Ban of the Bori*, London [1914], p. 116 f.

[4] J. H. Weeks, *Among Congo Cannibals*, London, 1913, p. 102 f.

[5] Junod, ii. [illegible]

[6] *Ib.* ii. 58.

[1] M. Symes, 'Account of an Embassy to . . . Ava . . . in 1795,' in Pinkerton's *Voyages and Travels*, London, 1808–14, ix. 434 f.

[2] Hobley, *JRAI* xl. 429.

[3] J. Maclean, *A Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs*, Cape Town, 1866, p. 94.

[4] Rascher, *AA* xxix. 211.

[5] Rasmussen, *loc. cit.*

[6] Junod, i. 187, 190.

[7] *Ib.* ii. 453.

[8] Hose-McDougall, ii. 38.

[9] Junod, i. 146.

[10] Roscoe, pp. 68 f., 119 f.

[11] Hill-Tout, p. 200 f.

rid of all influence of the past, depend upon an artificial stimulation of natural processes.

Before the new season's corn can be eaten, an emetic must be taken.[1] In Fiji one of the first acts after a birth is to give the infant an emetic.[2] Pastoral and cow-keeping tribes in Africa, such as the Masai or the Nandi, require a certain period of time to elapse between the eating, in some cases, of meat, in others, of vegetables, and the drinking of milk.[3] The Shawanese boys during the period of their preparation for initiation took an emetic at regular intervals. The Seminoles took 'black drink,' which was supposed to efface from their minds all wrongs that they had committed and to endue them with courage.[4] The Lillooet widower induced vomiting by means of a stick thrust down the throat.[5]

(*e*) *The sweat-bath.* — Among N. American Indians the employment of the sweat-bath is almost universal as a means of removing physical impurities. It also serves by analogy to remove spiritual influences, to cure illness, and to remove ceremonial impurity. A widower during the period of seclusion is required to bathe frequently in a special sweat-house erected near a stream.[6]

(*f*) *Beating and other forms of expulsion of material evils.*—A method which showed a combination of the belief in the material and spiritual character of defilement was followed in Car Nicobar.

A man possessed of devils was rubbed all over with a pig's blood and beaten with leaves, the idea being that the devils were swept off by the leaves, which were then folded up and tied tightly with string. Before daybreak all the packets of devils were thrown into the sea.[7]

The purificatory ceremony of driving out the devils is sometimes practised on an extensive scale, especially at critical seasons of the year such as before or after a harvest.

The Iroquois practised an annual expulsion of evils, while at the Cherokee New Year festival all old clothes were burnt and pots, pans, and utensils were broken, all cabins swept clean, provisions destroyed, and all fires extinguished. The warriors took medicine and fasted for three days, abstaining from sexual intercourse, while all malefactors were pardoned. On the festival day new clothes were donned, new fires lighted, and the new corn cooked and eaten.[8] On the other hand, the Nicobarese method of dealing with the physical side of the belief finds its analogy in the Navaho custom of scraping the body with a bundle of stuff and blowing away the evil from the bundle through the smoke-hole of the dwelling;[9] or the New Hebrides custom of sprinkling or pouring water from a coco-nut or of drawing a forked branch of a particular plant over the body.[10] The tribes of N.W. Canada — *e.g.*, the Thompson Indians—after a death passed through rose-bushes, the object no doubt being to leave the impurity behind them as the thorns entangled their flesh or garments. The rose-branches that formed part of the beds on which they slept during the period of impurity were in like manner doubtless intended to entangle the ghosts whose attacks they feared. They also cleaned themselves with fresh fir-twigs morning and evening for a period of one year.[11]

(*g*) *The use of blood.*—Blood, being of extreme importance in ritual, not unnaturally figures prominently in many purificatory acts, both as a cleansing agent and as a symbol.

The Caribs washed the new-born infant in some of the blood of the father.[12] But the blood with which the ceremony is performed is more commonly that of the victim offered by the guilty or unclean in part as an expiation of their offence. In cases of adultery—*e.g.*, that in Rajmahal cited above—both parties are sprinkled with the blood of the hog furnished by the lover. Among the Dayaks the incessant rain caused by sexual irregularity is stayed by the use of the blood of a pig to purify the earth and atone for the moral guilt.[13] The pollution may attach more particularly to the dwelling. The Batang Lupar Dayaks, in cases of a daughter's frailty, sacrifice a pig and sprinkle blood on the doorway to wash away the sin.[14] For incest the tribes of Borneo purify the household with the blood of pigs and fowls, the property of the offenders,[1] while in Ceram every house in the village is smeared with blood.[2]

Blood is also used as a medium of purification in other cases than sexual impurity—*e.g.*, death from other than natural causes, when the blood of a sacrificial animal may be used.

In the Cameroons an accidental death is expiated by the sacrifice of an animal, with the blood of which the relatives of both slayer and slain and all present are smeared.[3]

Blood is also used in the interesting ceremony called 'the purifying' which forms a part of the complicated Toda funeral rites.

At the second funeral, which takes place some time after the first and simpler ceremony, the blood of a buffalo is mixed in a cup with powdered *tudr*-bark. A Teivali man, dressed in the mantle of the deceased and many ornaments, accompanied by a *wursol* (dairyman-priest), walks to a female buffalo-calf under one year old, the *wursol* throwing the blood from the cup as he goes before and behind him. On reaching the calf, the Teivali man hangs a bell on its neck, and the *wursol* touches the remains three times with bow and arrow. The calf is driven away, and all fall down touching the earth with their foreheads. The skull and hair of the deceased are then rubbed with the blood and *tudr*-bark. The object of the ceremony is apparently that any one who in his lifetime has not been purified by the sacred *tudr*-bark, which is used in the ordination of the dairyman-priest, should be so purified after death.[4]

(*h*) *Death or excommunication of offender.*—The use of blood in purification ceremonies appears to be due to one of two distinct trains of thought. In some cases, such as those already cited, the use of blood seems to be dictated largely, if not entirely, by a belief in its purificatory qualities. If, however, these instances are examined more closely and especially in relation to the general character of the belief in purification, it will appear that this belief in all probability is a growth from the desire to rid the community of an individual whose conduct has endangered himself and the community in which he lives. As this usually involves in serious cases the death or exile of the offender, what is objectively a purification of the community becomes subjectively a punishment. This connexion between punishment and purification is particularly apparent in the case of sexual crime. While the purificatory ceremony involves the use of sacrificial blood, the animal to be sacrificed must be furnished by the offenders. This may in itself be regarded as a punishment by fine.

In Rajmahal, as stated, the pig required by the ceremonial is furnished by the adulterer. Among the Nias of Sumatra, who regard rain as the tears of the god weeping at adultery or fornication, the culprits are buried in a narrow grave with their heads projecting and are then stabbed in the throat with knives; then the grave is filled up; or they may be buried alive.[5] Among the pagan tribes of Sarawak a bamboo is driven through the hearts of the offenders into the ground, where it is left to take root. But it is said that this is rarely done, because it is difficult to get any one to assume the responsibility of taking life. Therefore a commoner method is to put the offenders in a cage and throw them into a river.

(*i*) *Substitution of expiatory victim.*—Among the Torajas of the Celebes adultery is punished by the spear, but incest by throttling. This aversion from shedding the blood of the incestuous is not infrequent and is, it is to be presumed, to be attributed to a fear that the blood of a person already infected is noxious in an enhanced degree — so much so that sometimes a goat or buffalo is sacrificed and the blood mixed with water is poured on the fields to appease the spirits and restore fertility.[6] This doctrine of substitution is frequently encountered in connexion with sexual crimes. It is clear that it is a case of substitution arising out of a disinclination to spill the blood of the guilty, and not primarily a propitiatory offering.

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[1] See art. HARVEST. [2] Thomson, *Fijians*, p. 211.
[3] See art. PASTORAL PEOPLES, § 4 (*e*).
[4] Featherman, iii. 171, 182. [5] Hill-Tout, p. 203.
[6] *Ib.* p. 202.
[7] V. Solomon, 'Extracts from Diaries kept in Car Nicobar,' *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 227.
[8] Featherman, iii. 187. For further reference to purification by the public expulsion of evils see *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 128 ff.
[9] W. Matthews, 'The Mountain Chant, a Navajo Ceremony,' *5 RBEW* (1887), p. 420.
[10] B. T. Somerville, 'Notes on some Islands of the New Hebrides,' *JAI* xxiii. 12.
[11] Hill-Tout, p. 208 f.
[12] J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikan. Urreligionen*, Basel, 1867, quoted by Jevons, p. 76.
[13] H. Ling Roth, *loc. cit.* [14] St. John[2], i. 63.

[1] Hose-McDougall, ii. 198.
[2] A. Bastian, *Indonesien*, Berlin, 1884–89, i. 144.
[3] Autenrieth, *Mitteil. Geogr. Gesellsch.* xii. 93.
[4] Rivers, p. 372 ff.
[5] H. Sundermann, *Die Insel Nias*, Barmen, 1905, p. 34.
[6] Hissink, quoted in Frazer, *Psyche's Task*[2], p. 53 f.

In the Dayak ceremony of *bergapût*, preparatory to the marriage of first cousins,[1] the couple go to the river and fill a small pitcher with personal belongings and sink it in the river. They also fling a plate and chopper into the water. A pig is sacrificed on the bank, and the carcass, when drained of blood, is thrown into the water. The pair themselves are then pushed into the water and made to bathe together. Finally a joint of a bamboo is filled with blood, and the couple parade the country sprinkling blood as they go.[2] In another case, among the Kayans, in a closely analogous practice, the idea of substitution or mitigation is still more clearly indicated. The property of the pair is smeared with blood, eggs are sent floating down stream, and the pair, as they come out of the water, are attacked with grass blades representing spears.[3] A still more significant case is that of the Tomori expiatory (purificatory) ceremony for the marriage of uncle and niece—again a case of incest—in which a garment of each is laid on an open vessel, the blood of a sacrificed animal is allowed to drip on to them, and the vessel with its contents is set to float down the river.[4]

(*j*) *Parts of victim other than blood.*—An act of purification may be performed with parts of the sacrificial animal other than the blood.

After the bathing of the returned Basuto warriors in the stream it is sometimes the custom of the chief to complete the ceremony by the sacrifice of an ox in the presence of the army, with the gall of which the warriors are smeared.[5]

On the Wanigela river in British New Guinea a man who has taken life is unclean and is segregated from the community until he has undergone certain ceremonies. As part of the ceremony he hunts and kills a kangaroo, which is cut open and whose spleen and liver are rubbed over his back. He then goes to the nearest water and washes himself straddle-legged, while the young warriors of the village swim between his legs.[6]

A custom of interest in connexion with the reverence for grass which exists among pastoral peoples is found among the peoples of the eastern side of the African continent, extending from the Dinkas in the north to the Bathonga in the south. This is the use in nearly all the purification ceremonies of the half-digested grass found in the stomachs of goats, bullocks, or sheep, when killed, with which the person undergoing the ceremony is smeared. In cases of incest among the Dinkas, the abdomen of the guilty man or woman is smeared with the contents of the large intestine of a bullock. Among the Bathonga cousins who marry are purified and saved from the consequence of their sin by a ceremony in which they are smeared with *psanyi*. A hole is cut in the goat-skin, in which the heads of the pair are inserted. The medicine-man's assistants take *psanyi* and place it on the head of the bride, saying, 'Go and bear children.'[7] The use of cow-dung—*e.g.*, by the Kavirondo in the purification of warriors returning from war in which they have killed, when they are smeared with this substance by their friends and their heads shaved, or among the Wa-wanga when the warrior must smear with dung the cheeks of his wives and children as he enters the hut—not improbably must be traced to the same idea as inspires the use of *psanyi*.[8]

The custom of clothing the subject in the skin of the goat or sheep or making an anklet or wristlet of the skin is also frequent among these tribes. The Thonga hunter made one for his wife if he killed an eland while bringing her home.[9] Among some of the Indians of N. America it is also customary to wear a circlet of willow withies round the waist or a thong of buck-skin round the wrist, ankle, neck, or knee.[10]

(*k*) *Fire and fumigation.*—Fire, or the concomitant smoke, and incense are other means which are held to be efficacious in dealing with defilement.

The less serious *thahu* are removed by means of smoke among the Akikuyu.[11] In the Kakadu tribe of Australia after a death a circle of grass is made, in the middle of which is placed the bark in which the corpse was wrapped when it was carried to the grave. All the possessions of the camp, but especially the dilly bags of the women, are then purified by smoke from the fired grass, while the men of the tribe pour water over one another and rub themselves with charcoal.[12] Jumping across a fire in preparation for a journey was at one time practised in Persia,[13] and the custom has already been noted above in connexion with the boys' seclusion among the Bathonga. The great fire festivals of the European peasantry, as well as the fire-walking ceremony, appear in like manner to have for their object the general freeing of the community in the districts from evil influences and evil spirits, and therefore, like the devil-driving or devil-clearing ceremonies, may be regarded in a broad sense as purificatory in intention.[1]

(*l*) *Transference of impurity; the scapegoat.*—The principle of the transmissibility of impurity was sometimes called into play in order to remove the defilement. It was transferred to some one who was already tabu.

In New Zealand, if any one touched the head of another, the head being a peculiarly 'sacred' part of the body, he became tabu. He purified himself by rubbing his hands on fern-root, which was then eaten by the head of the family in the female line.[2] In Tonga, if a man ate tabued food, he saved himself from the evil consequences by placing the foot of a chief on his stomach.[3]

The idea of transmission also appears in the custom of the scapegoat.

In Fiji a tabued person wiped his hands on a pig, which became sacred to the chief,[4] while in Uganda at the end of the period of mourning for a king a 'scapegoat,' along with a cow, a goat, a dog, a fowl, and the dust and fire from the king's house, was conveyed to the Bunyoro frontier, and there the animals were maimed and left to die. This practice was held to remove all uncleanness from king and queen.[5]

The same idea underlies the practice of sin-eating (*q.v.*), by which the sins of the dead are assumed by any stranger who may eat of a cake and other food prepared for the purpose.[6]

LITERATURE.—A. E. Crawley, 'Taboos of Commensality,' *FL* vi. [1895] 130 ff., *The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902; L. R. Farnell, *The Evolution of Religion*, do. 1905; J. G. Frazer, 'On Certain Burial Customs as illustrative of the Primitive Theory of the Soul,' *JAI* xv. [1886] 64 ff., *GB*[3], London, 1911–15, pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii., pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, *Psyche's Task*[2], do. 1913; F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, do. 1896; A. van Gennep, *Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909; E. Westermarck, *MI*, 2 vols., London, 1908.

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PURIFICATION (Babylonian).—Purification may be considered as including any ceremony or ritual observance undertaken with a view to purging or cleansing a person, place, or thing from the ritual consequences of impurity. Impurity was a bar to communion with the deity, often to social intercourse, and was sometimes a real danger to the health and well-being of the person or community. Most writers who refer to purification among the Babylonians and Assyrians are influenced by the OT views on the subject, for which see PURIFICATION (Hebrew). Consequently, some chiefly seek for parallels to the Hebrew treatment of clean and unclean. Others take a wider view and compare the usages connected with purification in all the religions and civilizations where they can be recognized. The subject of rites, exorcisms, and other ritual ceremonies is already dealt with in art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS, vol. ii. especially pp. 316–318. For the Babylonian attitude to offences against chastity the art. CHASTITY (Semit.-Egyptian), vol. iii. p. 498, § 3 should be compared with CHASTITY (Introductory). For the Babylonian conception of sin and the need to be purified from it compare CONFESSION (Assyro-Babylonian), vol. iii. pp. 825–827. The way in which disease was regarded may be gathered from art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Assyro-Babylonian), vol. iv. pp. 741–747. The connexion of expiation and atonement with purification is brought out in art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Babylonian), vol. v. pp. 637–640. HOLINESS (Semitic), vol. vi. pp. 751–759, illuminates the ideas of cleanness and purity, and their opposites.

No formal treatise on the subject has come down to us amid the mass of cuneiform literature, mostly fragmentary, which, however, supplies instruction

[1] See above, p. 469. [2] H. Ling Roth, *JAI* xxi 133 f.
[3] A. W. Nieuwenhuis, *Quer durch Borneo*, Leyden, 1904–07, p. 367.
[4] Kruijt, quoted by Frazer, *Psyche's Task*[2], p. 53.
[5] P. Porte, 'Les Reminiscences d'un missionnaire du Basutoland,' *Les Missions catholiques*, xxviii. [1896] 371.
[6] R. E. Guise, *loc. cit.*
[7] Seligmann, *ERE* iv. 709; Hobley, *JRAI* xl. 429; Junod, i. 448–454.
[8] H. H. Johnston, *loc. cit.*; K. R. Dundas, in Frazer, *Psyche's Task*[2], p. 121.
[9] Junod, ii. 58. [10] Hill Tout, p. 210.
[11] Hobley, *loc. cit.*
[12] B. Spencer, *Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia*, London, 1914, p. 45.
[13] 'Extracts from the Travels of Pietro delle Valle in Persia,' Pinkerton, ix. 11.

[1] See, for instances and discussion of object of fire ceremonial, *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, i. 329 ff.
[2] Shortland, p. 68.
[3] W. Marmer, *An Account of the Natives of Tonga Islands*[2], London, 1818, ii. 220.
[4] Crawley, p. 231, quoting C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition*, 1838–42, Philadelphia, 1845, ii. 99 f.
[5] Roscoe, p. 108 f. [6] *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 43.

and formulæ for many cases presumably involving the need for purification. From this mass of exorcisms, medical receipts, prayers, hymns, spells, and magic ceremonies we have to deduce what was the Babylonian view of impurity and what was the method of cleansing or removal of that impurity.

This is a long and by no means easy task—long because of the enormous amount of material to be considered, difficult because so much of it is merely implicit and admits of so many different estimates of its implications. We have rarely much security that we estimate rightly the intention of the ceremony, which may really have been directed to a completely different aim.

The sufferer may have been the victim of some affliction and quite mistaken as to its origin and cause; indeed, it is likely after all to have been purely imaginary. If the supposed or implied cause of his distress was really what he suspected, we may fairly charge the ancient Babylonian with being very nervous about himself. But we may well believe that the Babylonian ministers of religion exercised their ingenuity in inventing many cases of conscience and providing remedies for them to an extent far beyond the demands of those who came to them for help and comfort. To judge from what we already know, every abnormal experience must have given the Babylonian uneasiness, as to his health of body or soul. Certainly the belief in demons and their power to plague humanity, the suspicion of having offended the gods, or broken tabu, must have added many terrors to the natural feelings of discomfort and apprehension, the prickings of conscience or despondency. To the average layman it was by no means easy to say wherein he had offended, nor against whom, and his good intentions were but a slight solace to a man who believed that he might be called to suffer not only for unwitting misdeeds but also from the malice of devils or men. So he hastened to the priest or soothsayer, the magician or astrologer, to discover for him his offence or the evil influence that was upon him. He may have gone in turn to all and certainly was called upon to suffer many things of them.

Whatever their diagnosis of his evil case, it seems probable that purification was the first requisite. But that was not all. When the thing to be removed from the man had been recognized as sin, disease, anger of the gods, possession by devils, or the spell of some witch, a further treatment appropriate to the case awaited the victim. An obstinate case might have to undergo all the treatments in turn. But none was likely to take effect if he had not been purified.

In itself purification might be a washing with pure water. This requirement was strongly insisted upon. Pure water must be procured from the Tigris or the Euphrates or, even better, from the mouth of the rivers, where their waters met and where were the Isles of the Blessed. The water must have been kept in a pure place 'preserved faithfully in the abyss.' The abyss, *apsu*, was properly the cosmic sea which underlay the whole earth, on whose bosom the earth rode, to which the kings boasted that they had dug down their palace foundations, the fresh water sea from which arose the springs and rivers. But in every great temple stood the 'great sea'—the laver, also called *apsu*, like Solomon's brazen sea. Doubtless, it is this temple abyss which held the pure water referred to. It is called the water of Eridu, 'the sweet or good city.' But, in default of such holy water, the water of wells was allowed, if only it were consecrated by a correct incantation.

Pure water was often modified by the addition of herbs or aromatic woods. What these were is difficult to ascertain from their names, such as *binu*, 'herb of Dilbat' (perhaps the place of Venus-Ishtar), a date-stone, straw, *gatstsu*, *unqu aban nisikti* (perhaps a ring, set with precious stones, possibly as fee to the priest), *GAM-GAM* scent, *burashu* (possibly cypress). The *binu* plant is thought to be 'tamarisk.' It is probable that such additions had magical efficacy. The washing of the hands was repeated often, accompanied by different incantations, usually cited by their first lines, of which we often know no more, but which we may hope gradually to know completely. But to follow out in detail the various accompaniments of the hand-washing would demand a treatise.

It does not seem in any case to have been necessary to bathe the whole person; usually the hands sufficed, though the head or forehead is sometimes ordered. Special cases demanded a cleansing of the mouth, and the water was sometimes drunk. Sprinkling sufficed occasionally. A proper time had to be determined, which was the object of divination and the subject of omens. The literature of these fit times is extensive and usually obscure. Often it is prescribed that the ceremony shall be performed in a clean place; the open country or the desert would do. But for perfect security a *bît rimqi* was built. This was a 'washing-house,' or lustration-chamber, and was often attached to a house in the city, possibly to a priest's house or for the convenience of any who could pay for its use. There was a distinct ritual for the *bît rimqi*, whither the polluted should be taken. The ceremony was performed in special vestments of a sable hue, worn both by the suppliant and by the minister.

Apparently the motive of the washing was the symbolical removal of the contamination and often its symbolical transfer by the water to some object, rendered by incantation a representation of the supposed author of the trouble—*e.g.*, a clay or wax image of the witch. This image could then be buried, burned, or otherwise destroyed, and the sufferer freed from his uncleanness. But in this case also the methods are most varied, and no exhaustive treatment is possible here.

It is not clear just how much of the treatment was merely purification. A sick person had to be purified before he could be cured, for without purity he could not expect the cure to work at all. But the full cure may be regarded in his case as a purification. Hence the word has been used to cover all the process by which a man who believed that his distress came under the head of uncleanness was relieved of his ailment. As he did not confine the idea of uncleanness to any very simple category, it is hard to say what cleansed him of it, and the whole of the above-named articles must be read to exhaust the already recognized ideas of purification. It is dangerous to attempt classification of the kinds of uncleanness. But analogy suggests some classes.

Sexual impurity is very hard to define. On the one hand, all sexual intercourse involved the necessity for purification. But, on the other hand, the Babylonians seem to have allowed even homosexuality. It is difficult, therefore, to state wherein consisted the impurity of irregular intercourse. Possibly excess, leading to the reaction of lassitude, was productive of the suspicion that the patient was under a spell or a demon. This may have been extended by fear to all cases of indulgence. But we must know more before we can fairly generalize, and our material, with all its fullness, has many omissions, which may or may not be significant.

Fear of consequences, when there was so much to fear, hard to distinguish from consciousness of wrong-doing, was evidently the motive to declare

oneself unclean and seek purification. The spiritual director would move the penitent to confession and quite honestly prescribe a treatment deemed likely to be effective.

LITERATURE.—The literature quoted in art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS and the relevant sections of artt. CHASTITY, CONFESSION, DISEASE AND MEDICINE, EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT, etc., is ample for a preliminary treatment of the subject. Much further research is needed before a clear and consistent view can be set out, if that can ever be attained now. Distinction will have to be made between the usages of different periods, and changes of view may be detected.

C. H. W. JOHNS.

PURIFICATION (Buddhist).—The religious movement which is known as early Buddhism did not take as its central doctrine an ideal of purity to be aimed at by a system of ritual purification. Its own keynotes are those of individual enlightenment, of release, of spiritual vision, and of movement to a goal discerned thereby. But early Buddhism largely made itself felt as a protest and reaction against a system, or systems, of elaborate rites and practices cultivated for the express purpose of obtaining absolution and purification from the impurities inherent in this fleshly mechanism and in the deeds wrought by it. As formulated doctrine, a religion was referred to as *dhamma*, but, as end gained by ritual works, it was referred to as *suddhi* (or *visuddhi*, 'purity,' 'purifying,' 'cleansing'). Buddhism laid down its own *dhamma* as insight into truth, and as path or means of attainment. But we see it turning aside from these to take account of the prevailing notion of ritual purification. It condemned the methods in practice; it substituted 'inward spiritual grace' for external symbols, and upheld its own 'vision' and 'way' as the true κάθαρσις.

Salvation envisaged as (*vi-*)*suddhi*, when Buddhism arose, appears in many of the early Pali documents, as the belief or 'view' of Brhāmans and recluses:

'The views of recluses and brahmins, not of us, who deem that *suddhi* is by moral conduct, that *suddhi* is by ritual, or by both' (*Dhamma-saṃgaṇi*, § 1005).[1]

'With us alone is *suddhi*, so they declare; not in other norms (*dhammas*) is Visuddhi' (*Sutta-Nipāta*, 824).[2]

'Not so
Were pure (religion) to be reached'
(*Psalms of the Brethren*, 893).[3]

'The celebrant in many a sacrifice,
I fostered sacred fire, oblations made;
"These be the pure and holy rites!"[4] methought'
(*ib.* 341).

'Some recluses and brahmins hold that purity is by dieting . . . by transmigration[5] . . . by rebirths . . . by sphere of being . . . by oblations . . . by tending a (perpetual) fire' (*Majjhima-Nikāya*, i. 80 f.).

'Lo! ye who blindly worship constellations of heaven,
Ye who fostering fire in cool grove wait upon Agni,
Deeming ye thus might find purification (*suddhi*)' . . .
(*Psalms of the Sisters*, 143).

The rites and practices to gain *suddhi*—otherwise referred to as release (*mokṣa* [*q.v.*]) from demerit—most frequently condemned in Buddhist scriptures are of three kinds: (1) asceticism, (2) fire-ritual, (3) baptism, or frequent immersion in any convenient (usually) running water. Thus the 'dieting' alluded to above consisted in reducing the daily food to a minimum vegetable diet, even to a single bean. There was, again, the *tapas* ('austerity') of the five fires (one on each side and the sun overhead), and all the petty acts of self-thwarting and self-denial enumerated in *Dīgha-Nikāya*, i. 165 f. (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 226 f.), and elsewhere. They were less characteristic of Brāhmans than of recluses generally, whether these were Brāhmans or not. Nevertheless in the anthologies a Brāhman is made to say:

'Painful the penances I wrought for heaven,
All ignorant of purity's true path'
(*Psalms of the Brethren*, 219).

Protest against the belief that such practices made for real purity finds expression in a *sutta* describing the Buddha resting in the sense of enlightenment and of deliverance from his own self-torturing exercises that had brought him no light. The tempter assails him by suggesting doubt:

'His penitential tasks abandoning,
Whereby the sons of men are purified,
The impure fancieth that he is pure,
When he hath strayed from path of purity.

[*The Buddha*:]

Full well I understood how any rites
Austere, aimed at the overthrow of death,
Belong to matters useless for our good.
Yea, nothing good they bring along with them,
Like oar and rudder in a ship on land.
But morals, concentration and insight—
The Path to Enlightenment—these were my tasks;
That Path creating and developing,
Have I attained the purity supreme'
(*Saṃyutta*, i. 103).

A more typical Brāhman view, however, is that of the Bhāradvāja referred to as Suddhika ('purity-man,' 'puritan'):

'Though he be virtuous and penance work,
There is in all the world no brahmin found
Thus rendered pure.
In Veda-lore expert and in the course
His class lays down:—thus is he purified,
Unique 'mong men' (*ib.* i. 166).

This expertness in the latter field (*charaṇa*, explained by the commentary as *gotta-charaṇa*, the practice of the clan or *gens*—in Sanskrit, *chāraṇa*) includes (*a*) all religious observances peculiar to the Brāhmans, and (*b*) all 'colour' or class regulations. The specific differences marking off the four social classes of early India one from another are called 'colour-purity' (*chatu-vaṇṇī suddhi*) in *Majjhima*, ii. 132. The Brāhman claimed priority in class 'on account of his pre-eminence, of the superiority of his origin (Brahmā), of his observance of restrictive rules, and of his particular sanctification' (*Laws of Manu*, x. 2 [*SBE* xxv. (1886) 402]). The Buddha, as against such a claim, affirmed that social worth depended solely on character and quality of work. There was no 'colour' bar to purity, social or religious:

'And be he noble, brahmin, commoner,
Or labouring man, or of a pariah class:—
Who stirs up effort, puts forth all his strength,
Advances with an ever-vigorous stride,
He may attain the purity supreme'
(*Saṃyutta*, i. 166).

Of religious observances, which every Brāhman house-father was qualified to celebrate (see art. BRAHMAN), none appeared to incur the protestant disapproval of early Buddhism so often as those of oblations to fire and of ceremonial bathing. Both are denounced as merely external, and therefore misdirected and futile. Let the *suttas* speak for themselves:

[*The Buddha*:]

'Nay, brahmin, deem not that by mere wood-laying
Comes purity. Such things are all external.
To him who thus purification seeketh
By things without, none is made pure, the wise say.

I lay no wood, brahmin, for fires on altars.
Only within burneth the fire I kindle.
Ever my fire burns, ever tense and ardent,
I, Arahant, work out the life that's holy'
(*Saṃyutta*, i. 169).

Again, to a matron who was making her regular food-offering to Brahmā, while her son, a saintly *bhikkhu*, stayed without on his round for alms, the Buddha says:

'Far hence, O brahmincc, is Brahmā's world, . . .
And Brahmā feedeth not on food like that . . .

[1] Ed. *PTS*, London, 1885; *Dhamma-Saṃgaṇi: a Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, London, 1900.
[2] Ed. *PTS*, London, 1913.
[3] *PTS*, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, London, 1913.
[4] Lit. 'this is *suddhi*'.
[5] Cf. *Jātaka*, iv. (tr.) 117.

Lo here! this Brahmadeva, son of thine,
A man who past the gods hath won his way, . . .
. . . hath come up to thy house for alms . . .
Meet for oblations from both gods and men, . . .
By evil undefiled, grown calm and cool, . . .
His heart at utter peace, all vices purged . . .
Let him enjoy the choice meats thou hast served'
(*ib.* i. 141).

Another of the ritualistic Bhāradvāja clan invites the Buddha to go bathing in the Bāhukā river.

The Buddha asks: 'What of the river, brahmin, what can it do?' The reply is: 'Many consider it as a means of deliverance and of merit; many people let it bear away their evil deeds (*karma*).'

[*The Buddha*:]

'What boots the Bāhukā, or the Gayā? . . .[1]
For ever and a day his foot may plunge
Therein, yet are his smutty deeds not cleansed.
They will not purge the man of passions vile.
To him that's pure, ever 'tis Phalgu-time,
To him that's pure, ever 'tis Sabbath-day,
To him that's pure and in his actions clean,
Ever his practices effectual prove.
Here, brahmin, is 't that thou shouldst bathing go:—
Become a haven sure for all that breathes;
Speak thou no lies, harm thou no living thing,
Steal nought, have faith, in nothing be thou mean.
So living, what are river-rites to thee?'
(*Majjhima-Nikāya*, i. 39).

To another Brāhman who confesses to belief in the moral cleansing power of water, the rebuke takes this form:

'The Norm's a lake, its strand for bathing virtue,
Clear, undefiled, praised by the good to good men,
Wherein in sooth masters of lore come bathing.
So, clean of limb, to the beyond pass over'
(*Saṃyutta*, i. 183).

In the anthologies Sister Puṇṇā pours ridicule on a Brāhman seeking a shivering purity in the water, in which he must inevitably be excelled by any animal having its habitat in that element (*Psalms of the Sisters*, lxv.).

The quoted passages throw some light on the advocacy by Buddhism of ethical purity unaided by ritual symbols. Some further testimony will assist in bodying out their ideas of purity, and their application of it to their own specific doctrines.

We find the purification idea applied to the possibility of melioration in all rational beings. The Buddha maintains, against a current sceptical doctrine, that beings either deteriorated ('became defiled') or advanced ('became purified') through a sufficient cause. This was the hedonically mixed nature of the factors of life. In other words, our experience is sufficiently pleasant to make the things of this world seductive, and sufficiently painful to make us long for something better (*Saṃyutta*, iii. 69 f.). This is called the 'twofold doctrine hard to penetrate' (*Dīgha*, iii. 274).

How did Buddhism conceive the nature of defilement (*saṅkilesa, upakilesa*) and its opposite? Consciousness, or heart (*chitta*), was not considered as intrinsically impure. Though 'formless' or immaterial, it was likened to a radiant or flashing clarity, infinitely swift and plastic in procedure, but liable to defilement by adventitious influences (*Aṅguttara*, i. 5–11). These made their advent on occasion of sense. In reacting to sense-impressions, a number of mental adjuncts were held to come into play, such as feeling, volition, emotions, etc. Prominent among these were the three radical conditions ('roots') of immoral activity—appetite or lust, enmity, dullness or unintelligence. The corresponding three opposites might come into play instead—disinterestedness, love, intelligence or insight. The *karma* from previous lives would decide this in the first instance; nurture and training would modify the adjuncts during life. But defilement consisted in the three immoral conditions exerting themselves in response to the calls of sense. That defilement is fully described, *e.g.*, in the *Āmagandha Sutta* (*Sutta-Nipāta, SBE* x. [1881] 40 f.), as consisting in violence and injustice, sensuality, covetousness, and deceit, obstinacy and conceit, etc. Again, sixteen forms of *chitta*-defilement are given in the *Vatthūpama-Sutta* (*Majjhima*, i. 36 f.).

Purification from all these spiritual defilements consisted, as the latter *sutta* shows, in a mental awakening (1) to new ideals, (2) to the nature of defilement as such; and in an emotional upheaval and subsequent tranquillization, the defiling tendencies having been ejected. The process of course took time, and was held to be perfected only by progress along the 'Four Paths,' *i.e.* stages of the path, to saintship. It is illustrated (*ib.*) negatively and positively by a well-cleansed cloth taking on a fine dye, or again by refining in fire:

'Little by little, one by one, as pass
The moments, gradually let the wise,
Like smith the blemishes of silver, blow
The specks that mar his purity away'
(*Dhammapada*, 239).

Another favourite purity simile is that of moon or sun getting free from cloud, resplendent in a clear sky:

'Passionless, purified, undefiled as the moon when clear of blotting (cloud)' (*Sutta-Nipāta*, 636).

We have seen Buddhism using purity ritual as metaphor to emphasize the inwardness of its ideal. More appropriate is the figure borrowed from that craft on which its central doctrine was modelled, to wit, medicine. The possible cure of certain ailments for which the physician prescribes purging and cathartics (*vamana, virechănă*) are compared (*Aṅguttara*, v. 218 f.) with the sure remedy for all suffering in the 'Ariyan Eightfold Path' of the perfect life. The convalescent is described, not as purified, but as emancipated or released—a more characteristic Buddhist ideal, as has been stated above, than that of purification.

Once annexed, the ideal of purity was applied to every kind of proficiency of heart and head. The acme of purity (*koṭi-parisuddha*) in conduct was to exercise self-reference—not to do unto others what would be disagreeable if done to one's self (*Saṃyutta*, v. 252 f.). The inward purifying fire referred to by the Buddha (see above) is explained as his insight. Vision and insight have to be 'cleansed,' but different temperaments are stated to attain this ideal in different ways (*ib.* iv. 191–195). Mystical or supernormal sight and hearing are also defined as purified or clarified (*visodhita*) as well as 'divine' (*dibba*, 'godlike,' or 'angelic').[1] Achievements of this kind are attributed, in varying degrees, to recluses graduating in saintship. But none of the emphasis of Christian mysticism on the purity or clarity as such is to be found in the Buddhist canon.

Finally, three special applications of the purity ideal may be noted, namely, to morals, to the work of teaching, and to the *summum bonum*.

Thus observance of the five sets of rules for the order are technically called 'the five purities' (*Vinaya*, v. 132; cf. *Vinaya Texts* [*SBE* xiii. (1881)], i. 15, 55, etc.).

'Perfectly pure teaching' is such as is undertaken because of the excellence of the doctrine's ideal and method, and out of love and compassion felt by the teacher (*Saṃyutta*, ii. 199).

'Purity' is again annexed as one of the 44 synonyms for salvation or *nibbāna* (*ib.* iv. 372), and this is at times referred to as 'the purity supreme.' Thus envisaged, the sovereign means of attaining it was that of the exercises in self-knowledge known as the 'Four Applications of Mindfulness' (*Dialogues*, ii. XXII.):

'the path that leads only to the purification of beings . . . to the realization of Nibbāna.' (The translation 'one and only path' in that work (*ekāyano*) is not correct.)

[1] The typical ceremonial bathing was in the Gayā, at the spring-festival of Phalgu (*Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 181).

[1] See, *e.g.*, *Dialogues*, i. 89, 91.

Insight into impermanence, suffering, and non-existence of soul are called no less 'the path to purity' (*Dhammapada*, 277–279; *Psalms of the Brethren*, 676–678)—a phrase that became immortalized for all Buddhists of the Theravāda teaching down to the present day as the title of Buddhaghosa's classic work, the *Visuddhi-Magga*.

LITERATURE.—All the texts and translations quoted are named in the text, and all, except those in *SBE* and in *SBB*, are among the Pali Text Society's publications.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

PURIFICATION (Chinese).—The technical term usually employed by the Chinese to denote the rites connected with ceremonial purity is a word which in modern Pekingese is pronounced *chai*. The word is used, especially among Buddhists, to denote the practice of abstinence from animal food; but it implies much more than this. The written character for *chai* is a modification of another character *ch'i* (radical 210); indeed, in classical literature *ch'i* is used where modern writers would use *chai*; and this fact provides us with an unmistakable clue to the original ideas which the term was intended to convey. *Ch'i* means 'to regulate,' 'to arrange in order,' 'to make even,' 'to equalize,' 'to establish uniformity'; and, when used in an ethical sense, it implies the due regulation or adjustment of the whole personality—physical, intellectual, and moral. The process of adjustment (*chai*) was regarded as an essential preliminary to the exercise of priestly or sacrificial functions, and it implied fasting, self-control, and an inward purity of which physical cleanliness and spotless raiment were outward and visible signs.[1]

1. The State ritual.—The principal authority for sacrificial and other religious rites in ancient China is the *Li Chi* (*SBE* xxvii. and xxviii. [1885]). In that Chou dynasty classic we find the greatest stress laid on the necessity for gravity, sincerity, and reverence in all who take part in such rites. We are told that sacrifice is not 'a thing coming to a man from without; it issues from within him, and has its birth in his heart.' Religious ceremonial is not merely an external show, nor should it be carried out for selfish reasons or in expectation of reward; it is the outward expression of inward feelings, and, unless those feelings are of a pure and disinterested character, the ritual in which they find expression will necessarily lack dignity and impressiveness. Hence it is only men of exalted virtue who should presume to officiate at sacrifices (*SBE* xxvii. 61 f., xxviii. 236 f.). But even men of the noblest character must not occupy themselves with sacred things without scrupulous self-preparation; hence, 'when the time came for offering a sacrifice, the man wisely gave himself to the work of purification' (*SBE* xxviii. 239). To effect this purification, he had to guard himself against all noxious and unclean things and to keep his desires under strict control. He shunned music, because music would cause mental distraction and excitement. He kept all wayward thoughts out of his mind, and concentrated his attention on the way of rectitude. He refrained from unnecessary movements of his hands and feet. He strove to bring his intellect and his moral sentiments to the highest degree of clarity and refinement. When he had succeeded in conducting himself in this manner for the required number of days, he was in a fit condition to enter into communion with spiritual beings (*ib.* 239 f.).

Of this purificatory process there were two stages. The lower stage, known as *san chai*, 'lax purification,' lasted for seven days; the higher, known as *chih chai*, 'strict purification,' occupied the three days immediately preceding the performance of the sacrificial ceremony. The process involved bathing (*mu yü*), the wearing of clean raiment, restriction to the simplest food, and abstinence from sexual relations. The person undergoing 'strict' *chai* separated himself from his family, and lived by himself in apartments other than those which he usually occupied. He wore unadorned garments of a black colour, because these were regarded as consonant with, or symbolical of, the solemn nature of his thoughts, which should be concentrated on the unseen world (*SBE* xxvii. 448; see also J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*[2], i., Oxford, 1893, p. 248). Great stress was laid on the inutility of attending merely to the external aspects of the purificatory rites. Mencius implies that a well-regulated mind was far more important than outward comeliness and correctness, when he tells us that even a leper (or a person of external repulsiveness) may sacrifice to God, provided he carried out the rules of *chai* in the proper spirit.[1]

The sacrificial rites for which purification was and still is considered necessary are mainly those connected with the cult of ancestors, and purification is therefore theoretically binding upon all heads of families and others whose business it is to lay sacrificial offerings before the family tombs or the spirit-tablets in the ancestral temple. But the rule applies with equal force to the stately ceremonies which are or were conducted by the emperor or his deputies in connexion with the cult of canonized sages and heroes such as Confucius, Kuan-Ti, and Yo-Fei; the worship of the Supreme Deity and the divinities of earth, mountains, rivers, and other nature-spirits; and the propitiation of the spiritual beings whose function it is to distribute the rainfall, to ward off pestilences and other calamities, to promote the growth of crops, and to regulate the seasonal changes. The impressive ceremony of the worship of Shang-ti (the Supreme Being) at the winter solstice took place at the marble Altar of Heaven, which is situated in the midst of a wooded park in the southern section of the city of Peking. The theoretical sanctity of the emperor's person did not exempt him from the duty of undergoing *chai* before he was qualified to act as high-priest for myriad-peopled China.

Three days before the ceremony his majesty moved into a building called the *chai kung*, 'purification palace,' situated within the 'forbidden city.' Here, in cloistral stillness, he was expected to remain two days and nights. On the third day he proceeded to the sacred enclosure of the Altar of Heaven, and was conducted to another *chai kung*, where he kept solitary vigil during the last of the three nights of 'strict purification.'

Similar purificatory rites were in ancient times performed by the emperor at the beginning of the four seasons.

Three days before the festival of Li-Ch'un ('Beginning of Spring') the Grand Recorder informed the emperor that 'on such and such a day the spring will begin.' Thereupon 'the son of Heaven devotes himself to self-purification, and on the day he leads in person the three ducal ministers, his nine high ministers, the feudal princes (who are at court), and his Great officers, to meet the spring in the eastern suburb.'[2]

The emperor's duties and prerogatives in connexion with these State rituals were to some extent shared by his consort, though the imperial pair were separated from one another during the period of purification.[3] In the third month of spring a ceremony took place in which the empress acted alone.

'In this month orders are given to the foresters throughout the country not to allow the cutting down of the mulberry trees and silk-worm oaks. . . . The trays and baskets with the

[1] J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics*[2], ii., Oxford, 1895, p. 330. For the translation of 'leper,' which is doubtful, see H. A. Giles, *Confucianism and its Rivals*, London, 1915, p. 93. Legge's tr., 'wicked,' is unsupported by the commentators and is inappropriate.

[2] *SBE* xxvii. 253. For similar observances at the other seasons see *ib.* pp. 269, 284, 297. For a reference to the emperor's restricted diet when undergoing purification see E. Biot, *Le Tcheou-Li*, Paris, 1851, i. 72 f.

[3] See, *e.g.*, *SBE* xxviii. 433; cf. Biot, ii. 15, 18 f.

[1] See ERE, vol. v. p. 761, § 4.

stands (for the worms and cocoons) are got ready. The queen, after vigil and fasting, goes in person to the eastern fields to work on the mulberry trees' (*SBE* xxvii. 265; cf. xxviii. 223 f.).

This was done in order that the women of China might be encouraged to feel that, when they laboured at one of the great national industries—the production of silk—they were following the example and carrying out the precepts of the first lady in the land. Similar recognition was accorded by the emperor to the industry of agriculture; for the custom was that in the first month of spring the emperor prayed to heaven for bountiful harvests, and then, with his own hand on the plough, turned up three furrows (*SBE* xxvii. 254 f.). This rite has been kept up till our own day.

2. Purification in Confucianism. — A modern writer has hazarded the statement that in Confucianism fasting is perhaps 'wholly unrecognized' (*EBr*[11] x. 193). This remark is by no means accurate, for ritual fasting is an essential part of the rites of purification referred to in the *Li Chi*, and the *Li Chi* ranks as a Confucian classic. In bk. xxix. we find the following remark attributed to Confucius himself:

'Vigil and fasting are required (as a preparation) for serving the spirits (in sacrifice); the day and month in which to appear before the ruler are chosen beforehand:—these observances were appointed lest the people should look on these things without reverence' (*SBE* xxviii. 331).

From other sources also we have ample evidence that Confucius by no means ignored these ritual observances. In a classical passage we are told that there were three things which Confucius took very seriously and in regard to which he showed the greatest reverence and circumspection. These were purification (*chai*), warfare, and disease (Legge, i. 198). The selection is not so whimsical and arbitrary as may be supposed. The third, it will be observed, concerns the individual human life, which it mars or cuts short; the second affects the welfare of society and the rise and fall of states; while the first is associated with the solemn rites that are believed to open a channel of communication between living men and the spiritual world. From another passage we learn that Confucius 'purified himself with water' before going to court to announce the murder of a feudal prince. Legge rightly points out in connexion with this passage that the Chinese phrase (*mu yü*) represented by these words 'implies all the fasting and all the solemn preparation as for a sacrifice or other great occasion' (i. 284). In the same classic (the *Lun Yü*) we read that Confucius, when undergoing *chai*, arrayed himself in clean linen cloth, changed his diet, and sat elsewhere than in his usual seat (Legge, i. 232). In the classic usually known to Europeans as *The Doctrine of the Mean* Confucius is represented as having uttered the following words:

'How actively do the spiritual beings manifest their powers! They are beyond the ability of eyes to see or ears to hear, yet they are immanent in all things. It is for them that men purify themselves and don rich array and establish the rites of sacrifice and worship.'

Not only was purification known to and practised by Confucius and his disciples and contemporaries; it also forms part of the ritual of the cult of which Confucius himself is the central figure. The chief seat of this cult is the imposing temple at Ch'ü-fou in Shantung. The temple stands near the enclosure which contains the sage's tomb, and adjoins the palace of the ennobled representative of the Confucian family—the Yen Shêng Kung, 'duke of extended sagehood.' As the rites of the Confucian cult throughout the empire are modelled on those practised at Ch'ü-fou, special interest is attached to a book called the *Shêng Mên Li Yo Chih*, 'Records of the Ritual and Music of the Holy Temple,' which is in two small volumes printed from wooden blocks preserved in the temple precincts. The latest edition of this work was published in 1887 under the editorial supervision of a committee composed wholly of the sage's reputed descendants. From this handbook we may gather authoritative information concerning the place occupied by purificatory rites in the Confucian ceremonial.

Fifteen days before the date fixed for the sacrificial ceremony the duke (as hereditary custodian and superintendent of the temple and its rituals) carries out a rite technically known as *ti shêng*, 'the purification of the sacrificial animals' (ox, sheep, pig, etc.). The duke and his assistants, arrayed in their robes of office, go to the park in which the animals are kept (the *hsi-shêng-so*) and select unblemished and well-conditioned victims for the forthcoming sacrifice.[1] These animals are then ceremonially washed with warm water; and every day thereafter, until the time comes for the sacrifice, this cleansing rite is repeated. On the same day a proclamation is issued at one of the temple-gates, called the Yang-kao-mên, 'the gate of gazing upwards,' whereby the temple officials and all whose duty it is to take part in the ceremonies are called upon to prepare themselves for the rites of purification, which in their 'lax' form begin on the tenth day before the sacrifice. From the tenth day onwards the temple-officers go daily to the temple and carry out a thorough cleansing of it. The courtyards are weeded, and all dust and rubbish are carefully removed. This process is technically known as *sa sao*. On the third day before the ceremony the ministrants enter upon the period of 'strict' *chai*. At noon on this day there is a solemn procession of robed officials, headed by the duke himself, to one of the temple-gates known as the Tung-wên-mên, where they stand in order of precedence. The persons who are to officiate at the ceremony, and who are therefore about to enter upon three days' *chai*, then perform the treble obeisance (*kotow*), while a herald (*hsüan-tu-shêng*) reads aloud the *chieh-tz'ü* and *shih-tz'ü*, *i.e.* the vows (*shih*) by which the ministrants bind themselves to a faithful observance of the rules of abstinence (*chieh*).[2] After this ceremony the candidates for purification proceed to the special pavilions set apart for their use—buildings known as *chai-su-so*, 'purification lodgings.' Between the hours of 3 and 5 on the same day they must bathe and array themselves in clean garments made of plain black cotton. They then walk to the Hall of Poetry and Rites (one of the main temple-buildings), salute each other decorously, and carry out certain duties connected with the arrangement of the sacrificial vessels. Their nights have to be spent in the 'purification lodgings,' where they are under the supervision of officials who after dark go their rounds with lamp in hand to see that there is no unseemly breach of rules.

Into the details of the sacrificial ceremony itself we need not enter. The culminating moment arrives when the sacrificial articles are solemnly placed in front of the 'spirit-tablets' of Confucius and his canonized associates. This can be done only by persons in a state of ceremonial purity, and the privilege falls therefore to those who have just completed their three days' strict *chai*. Even they, however, are not allowed to approach the altars with the sacrificial meats and fruits until a final ceremony of purification has duly taken place. From a richly-garnished vessel (*chin lei*) a ministrant takes a ladleful of clean water and transfers it to a smaller vessel (*kuan-p'ên*), which is simply an ordinary washing basin placed on a four-legged wooden stand. The officer (*chêng-hsien-kuan*) who is to take the offerings up to the altars then goes through the form of washing his hands. One of the ministrants takes a long narrow strip of fringed cloth from a bamboo basket (*ssü*), kneels down, and passes the cloth to the *chêng-hsien-kuan*, who uses it to dry his hands.[3] The latter then proceeds to wash seven goblets (*chio*) which are to hold the sacrificial wine. The *chio* is a three-legged cup with two ears and a projecting lip. Three of the seven are intended for the altar of Confucius; the other four are destined for the altars of the four subordinate sages who are associated with Confucius in the sacrificial rites. These are Yen Hui (the favourite disciple), Tsêng Tzü, Mêng Tzü (Mencius), and Tzü-ssü.

There are various rules of discipline which have to be observed by all persons who occupy permanent posts in connexion with the Confucian rites. Among the offences which entail dismissal from office two are of interest as bearing on our present subject. One is the offence of *ju miao pu chai*, entering the temple (to perform duties connected therewith) without having undergone purification. The other is the offence of *ni sang ju miao*, entering the temple while in a state of mourning, and concealing the fact. The temple-ministrant

[1] For references to similar functions carried out in ancient times by the monarch see *SBE* xxviii. 222 f.; cf. Biot, i. 455 f.

[2] For a similar custom in ancient times see Biot, ii. 107 f.

[3] For further references to hand-washing as a ritual act in China see Biot, i. 466 f., ii. 230. It will be seen that there were occasions on which the ablution had to be performed by the emperor himself. For observations on the religious significance of the rite, and its use in other parts of the world, see art. HAND, vol. vi. p. 498 f.

who is in mourning is expected to notify the fact without delay to his official superiors, in order that arrangements may be made to have his duties temporarily delegated to some one else.

There are several references in ancient Chinese religious literature to a curious belief that, when the rites of strict purification had been scrupulously fulfilled, the purified worshipper would see the spirits to whom his sacrifice was to be offered and on whom his thoughts had been concentrated (see, *e.g.*, *SBE* xxvii. 448, xxviii. 211). This rather startling statement should not be taken as the expression of a literal belief that the spirits would present themselves before the worshipper's bodily eyes. It is not impossible, indeed, that statements of this kind indicate the survival of pre-historic beliefs similar to those which existed down to our own time among the Eskimo or the American Indians, who believed that the fastings and other austerities which a youth underwent at puberty would enable him to see his guardian-spirit.[1] It is also possible that among the ancient Chinese, as among many sects known to Christendom, fasting and other ascetic practices were the cause of psychical disturbances which resulted in 'visions.'[2] An interesting parallel to our Chinese text is to be found in the 'oracle' of the Montanist prophetess Priscilla, which declared that 'purity unites (with the Spirit), and they (the pure) see visions, and bowing their faces downward, they hear distinct words spoken.'[3] The Chinese, however, under the sober influences of Confucianism, have shown little inclination to carry their religious austerities to morbid extremes; indeed, worshippers are told that they should not emaciate themselves till the bones appear, nor should they let their seeing and hearing become affected by their austerities.[4] Confucian Chinese, therefore, prefer to interpret the classical references to the visibility of spirits in a sense similar to that in which the term *t'ien yen* ('heavenly eye') is understood by Buddhist mystics. This 'heavenly eye' is much the same thing as Plato's 'eye of the soul' when it is turned towards reality, or the 'mind's eye' and 'heart's eye' of Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine. When our Chou dynasty enthusiast expressed his belief that the spirits would become visible to their faithful and purified devotee, he probably meant exactly what was in the mind of the 15th cent. Christian mystic who said:

'Si tu esses intus bonus et purus, tunc omnia sine impedimento videres et bene caperes. Cor purum penetrat caelum et infernum' (*de Imit. Christi*, ii. 4).

3. Purification in ancestor-cult.—Strict purity has always been enjoined on those who officiate at the sacrifices to the dead.

'When a filial son is about to sacrifice, he is anxious that all preparations should be made beforehand. . . . The temple and its apartments having been repaired . . . the husband and wife, after vigil and fasting, bathe their heads and persons and array themselves in full dress.'[5]

Purity is indicated by the very name of the great spring festival of Ch'ing-ming, at which the family graves are visited, repaired if necessary, and swept clean; for *ch'ing ming* means 'pure and bright.' This phrase contains an allusion to the belief that on this day all nature achieves a general purification and renewal. This was symbolized by the lighting of 'new fires' to take the place of the old fires which, in accordance with ancient custom, had been extinguished on or before the preceding day. The term *han shih* ('cold eating') was applied to the day (or to the three days) preceding the Ch'ing-ming festival because, as the old fires had been put out and the new ones were not yet lighted, it was impossible to do any cooking.[1] The ceremony of lighting new fires is almost forgotten now, but there is ample evidence that it once took place and that it was regarded partly as a purificatory rite by which evil was extinguished and the old life transformed into something new and clean.[2] Both 'pure water' and 'pure fire' occupied a place in the ritual offerings of ancient China.[3] Frazer, referring to a certain fire-ceremony still celebrated in the province of Fuhkien, records the significant fact that 'the chief performers in the ceremony . . . refrain from women for seven days, and fast for three days before the festival.'[4] The well-known custom of letting off fire-crackers, which is intended to exorcize evil spirits and effect a general purification, is still well known throughout China. 'Disembodied spirits,' as de Groot says, 'are afraid of fire.'[5] The original meaning of the Ch'ing-ming festival has been obscured in China by the fact that the day came to be regarded as the appropriate occasion for the performance of the spring ceremonies in honour of deceased ancestors; and the importance of the ancestral cult naturally caused the other associations of the festival to recede into the background. But the idea of purity is associated with the performance of the ancestral rites no less closely than with the renewal of nature's activities, though, as we shall see below, pollution of a distinctive kind was believed to be inseparable from the mere fact of being in mourning or of having come in contact with death. The ancient customs forbade any approach to the tombs or the spirit-tablets by any member of the family who had sullied the honour of his house by committing a crime, or who had brought disgrace upon himself or his ancestors.[6] This is interesting as showing that something better than mere 'ritual purity' was expected of those who paid religious honours to the dead.

4. Popular purificatory rites.—Apart from the State rituals and the national cults of Confucius and of ancestors, there are many occasions on which ceremonial purification in some form or other was formerly practised by the people, though in modern times most of these rites have tended to become obsolete. At an ancient triennial drinking festival described in the *Li Chi* there was a ceremonial washing of hands and rinsing of cups (*SBE* xxvii. 56, xxviii. 435 f.). In the Confucian *Analects* there is an interesting passage which, according to the commentators, contains a reference to an old custom of 'washing the hands and clothes at some stream in the third month, to put away evil influences' (Legge, i. 249). Purification ceremonies, whereby

[1] See artt. FASTING, vol. v. p. 761 f., AUSTERITIES, vol. ii. pp. 22[illegible], [illegible], 231[illegible].

[2] See H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, London, 1876–96, i.[4] 261; Tylor, *PC*[4] ii. 410 f.; J. B. Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, New York, 1908, pp. 65, 97; see also art. FASTING, vol. v. p. 759.

[3] Quoted by Rufus M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, London, 1909, p. 52.

[4] *SBE* xxvii. 87. We may refer to the book of Mencius, however, for a curious case in which fasting and purification *were* carried to a morbid extreme (see Legge, ii. 284 f.).

[5] *SBE* xxviii. 214; cf. 292 and see xxvii. 87. For observations on the ritual washing of the head see art. HEAD, vol. vi. p. 538 (§ 7 (*b*)). The Chinese phrase here used is *mu-yu*, which is the term ordinarily employed to denote ritual ablutions and includes washing of the head (see Legge, i. 284).

[1] See R. F. Johnston, *Lion and Dragon in Northern China*, London, 1910, pp. 185–187. There is a well-known Chinese legend which professes to trace the Han Shih festival to an episode attributed to the 7th cent. B.C., but it was probably invented to explain a ritual of which the original meaning had been lost. See L. Wieger, *Moral Tenets and Customs in China*, Ho-kien-fu, 1913, p. 427 f.; and H. A. Giles, *A Chinese Biographical Dictionary*, London, 1898, no. 353.

[2] See *PC*[4], pp. 194 f., 297, 429, and *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, i. 136 f., ii. 3; cf. art. FIRE, FIRE-GODS, vol. vi. p. 28.

[3] Biot, ii. 297, 316, 381 f.; *SBE* xxvii. 445.

[4] *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, ii. 3; see art. FIRE-WALKING, vol. vi. p. 30; cf. Virgil, *Æn.* xi. 786–788.

[5] J. J. M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Leyden, 1892–1910, bk. i. p. 355; see also bk. ii. pp. 911–952.

[6] For an early Chinese discussion and criticism of this custom see Wang Ch'ung's *Lun Héng*, tr. A. Forke, Berlin, 1911, pt. ii. p. 379.

disease and other things of ill omen were expelled from the house or locality, were regularly practised in the Chou dynasty, as we know from the *Chou Li* (Biot, ii. 225); and in various forms similar rites are still performed on New Year's Eve and other great occasions, and at some of the village festivals.[1] Purification and fasting formerly took place when marriages were announced to the spirits of the ancestors (*SBE* xxvii. 78). Before marriage the bridegroom went through 'fast and vigil,' and wore a dark-coloured cap to signify the solemnity of his thoughts (*ib.* p. 441). At one time it appears to have been the custom for a father to fast on the occasion of the birth of a child.[2] Purification was resorted to in cases of extreme illness.

'All about the establishment was swept clean, inside and out. . . . Males and females changed their dress' (*SBE* xxviii. 173).

The patient himself, if recovery was deemed hopeless, was clothed in new raiment.

In China, as in many other parts of the world, contact with death has been supposed to cause pollution. We have already seen that a person in mourning is forbidden to take part in the rituals of the Confucian worship, and that, if he conceals the fact that he is in mourning, he is liable to the punishment of dismissal. Purification is sometimes undergone by those who have merely paid visits of condolence to a bereaved household, though purification of this kind is probably carried out as a matter of local custom only, and in a perfunctory manner.

'Some condolers,' says de Groot, 'hide a few garlic roots under their garments, convinced that the strong smell will prevent the influences of death from clutching to their bodies; on leaving the house they throw the roots away in the street. Others, on re-entering their dwelling, purify themselves by stepping over a fire, or over some burning incense powder of a kind considered especially suitable for this and similar ends and therefore styled *tsi'ng hiung*, "purification incense."'[3] The same writer mentions cases where pollution caused by contact with a corpse is removed 'by passing through a small fire of straw kindled on the pavement.'[4]

It seems not improbable that the well-known custom of Government officials, after the death of a parent, vacating their posts and retiring into private life until the period of mourning is over (three years in theory, 27 months in practice) was based not merely on the traditional doctrines of filial piety but also on a belief that the interests of the State would suffer if persons who were in mourning, and therefore ceremonially impure, were allowed to take part in public affairs.

5. Buddhist rites.—Buddhism has various purificatory rites of its own, and the rituals of all the sects make provision for ceremonial ablutions and other cleansing rites; but, as these do not materially differ from the ceremonies already described, it is unnecessary to mention them in detail. Reference has been made to the fact that *chai* is used by Buddhists to denote abstinence from animal food. Pilgrims to sacred hills and famous shrines are known in some places (*e.g.*, the Wu-tang mountain in Hupei) as *chai kung*, a term which indicates that such pilgrims have undertaken to confine themselves to a vegetarian diet until their pilgrimage is over. To certain bands of rebels and revolutionaries the curious name *chai fei*, 'fasting robbers,' has been applied. The term is derived from the fact that the illicit societies which were responsible for some of the anti-dynastic movements of modern times often assumed the guise of quasi-Buddhist sects, or borrowed certain Buddhistic usages and formulas for the purpose of throwing an air of religious mystery over their secret rites. Such was the White Lotus Society, which was the cause of an immense amount of bloodshed in the reign of Ch'ien-Lung.

6. Taoist view of purity.—In the Taoist system purity and purification are regarded from a point of view which differs very considerably from that of Confucianism. *Chai hsin*, 'the fasting (or purified) heart,' is strongly contrasted with the *chi ssŭ chih chai*, the ceremonial purification, which may be merely external and fictitious. But, when Chuang Tzŭ and other Taoist writers speak of the 'fasting heart,' they do not mean exactly what the Confucian means when he insists, as we have seen, that true purification must be internal as well as external. For the Taoist the only thing worth fastings and purifications is the attainment of *Tao*, and for the single-minded seeker after *Tao* all ceremonies are superfluous and meaningless. The 'fasting heart' is a negative state in which the individual shuts himself off from sense-contact with the outer world, and, by discarding everything that is treasured by ordinary mankind, fits himself for the reception of the only thing that endures and is incorruptible—the transcendental *Tao*.[1] 'The height of self-discipline,' says the Taoist, 'is to ignore self.'[2] But the orthodox Confucian cannot ignore self (so the Taoist would argue) so long as he lays stress on outward observances and attributes importance to the correct fulfilment of 'rites.' Moreover, ceremonies imply activity—and activity of a kind which, from the Taoist point of view, is useless. Man's function is to be rather than to do. The true sage 'does nothing, and therefore there is nothing that he does not do.'[3] He is one who has cleared away all the impurities that dimmed the lustre of his true self and who knows that he has transcended the limitations of his phenomenal Ego. His perfectly purified nature is in complete conformity with the ineffable *Tao*, which is never so fully possessed as when it eludes all observation and makes no outward manifestation of its presence. At the outset of his search for *Tao* the sage usually retires to the lonely hills, where he makes himself a romantic hermitage among the rocks and woods and lives on wild herbs and the pure water of the mountain streams. The beauty and wonder of his surroundings gradually enter into his soul and teach him that all the most glorious manifestations of external nature are but signs and symbols of spiritual glories that lie far beyond the range of unpurified vision. As he grows in spiritual stature, he catches fugitive glimpses of that loveliness, and after a long upward struggle he learns at last 'to ride upon the glory of the sky, where his form can no longer be discerned.'[4] He is now a *hsien-jên*—a Chinese term which etymologically means nothing more than 'a man of the mountains,' but which in Taoist lore means one who has attained the immortality and the spiritual graces which *Tao* alone can confer. One of the highest grades of this transcendent state is that of the *chên-jên*, the 'true man,' one who 'fulfils his destiny. He acts in accordance with his nature. He is one with God and man.'

He is a being 'whose flesh is like ice or snow, whose demeanour is that of a virgin, who eats no fruit of the earth, but lives on air and dew, and who, riding on clouds with flying dragons for his team, roams beyond the limits of mortality.'[5]

Such is the language in which the old Taoist mystics strove to express the inexpressible—language

[1] Cf. H. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine*, Shanghai, 1911–15, iv. 416; Johnston, pp. 179, 183, 193 f.

[2] *SBE* xxvii. 471; for instances of this in other countries see art. FASTING, vol. v. p. 759 f.

[3] De Groot, bk. i. p. 32; see also pp. 162, 209 f., 231, 640 f.; cf. *SBE* xxviii. 151 f.

[4] De Groot, bk. i. p. 137. The steps taken to purify a house in which a death has occurred are described by the same writer (bk. i. pp. 107–110), but the description does not apply to all parts of China. Purging the grave with incense and by means of various rites and incantations (described by de Groot, bk. i. p. 209 f.) is practised in some localities (cf. *PC*[4] ii. 436 f.).

[1] Cf. H. A. Giles, *Chuang Tzŭ*, London, 1889, pp. 42 f., 282; *SBE* xxxix. [1891] 208 f.

[2] Giles, p. 205.

[3] *Ib.* pp. 97, 121, 138, 209; see also the *Tao-tê-ching*, *SBE* xxxix. 26, 48, 79–90, 106 f.

[4] Giles, p. 151.

[5] *Ib.* pp. 7, 151.

which led in later ages to pitiful misunderstandings, and which fostered the growth of that degraded modern Taoism which is a hotch-potch of magic, ritualism, priestly mummeries, and demonology. The priests of the cult are, for the most part, comparatively harmless members of society—if, indeed, it is possible for uselessness and harmlessness to co-exist. But they are ignorant, unenterprising, and superstitious; and, though they may know a good deal about the mysteries of talismans and exorcisms, it must be confessed that they show very little knowledge of, or interest in, the 'mystic way' of philosophic Taoism.

See also CHASTITY (Chinese), vol. iii. p. 490.

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the article.

R. FLEMING JOHNSTON.

PURIFICATION (Christian).—Purification of course implies defilement. It is the act or operation of cleansing, and may be spoken of in regard to things physical or things spiritual.

The sense of sin, which has from very remote times oppressed man's understanding, has led to a general consciousness of unworthiness in relation to the Deity; and this consciousness is developed in proportion to the increasing realization of the holiness of God.[1] The purer the religion, the stronger the conviction of separation—far-offnsse—from the Deity, through personal defilement. In Christianity, therefore, we may expect to find this sense-impression at its highest.

1. NT modification of Jewish teaching. — Formerly, when religion itself was regarded more or less as an external thing, external purification was considered essential and adequate. Rites of purification—ceremonial cleansing—are common to all ancient religions. The Jewish religion had many elaborate rites of this nature. The references to ceremonial purification which are found in the NT are purely Jewish, and therefore do not call for consideration here.[2] It is, however, quite otherwise as regards the teaching. Examination of our subject from a specifically Christian standpoint must start from the controversy about purifying between Christ and the Pharisees, of which a record is preserved in Mk 7 (cf. Mt 15). The teaching of Christ here, as always, is concerned with the inward rather than the outward. It is true that this was not 'a new teaching' (cf., *e.g.*, Is 1^{11-17}), yet so far had the Jewish teachers of the time departed from the higher ideals of their own prophets that it might well seem so to the majority of people who heard it. We take Mk 7, then, as the *locus classicus* for the Christian principle of purification.

The ceremonial rites of Judaism, though not formally abolished, are here relegated to their proper subordinate position.

'It cannot be too carefully noticed that no condemnation is passed upon these rites of purification in themselves. Had the Pharisees recognised their symbolism and deep moral significance, had Jesus been certain that when they washed their hands they thought of or prayed for purity of heart and life, He would have been the last person to rebuke them, however much they multiplied external forms and ceremonies. These are useful as stepping-stones to higher things; but the moment they begin to satisfy in themselves they become snares, and lead to superstition.'[3]

Henceforth there can be no ceremonial, but only moral, defilement. It is sin alone that defiles a man and renders him impure. It is from sin, therefore, that purification must be sought and obtained. Unless ceremonial purification is truly symbolic of that which is much higher, much holier than itself, it is indeed a vain thing.

Thus purification becomes entirely symbolic for Christians.[1] St. Paul's treatment of the question of circumcision illustrates his attitude towards purification and shows that he had grasped the principle of Christ's teaching in this matter.

2. The sacraments.—The primary significance of baptism seems to have been that of cleansing, and usually, though not always, it was understood in a more than material sense. The Pauline Epistles throughout regard baptism as a cleansing from sin. It has been said that the idea of purification attains its highest form in the Christian rite of baptism; certainly it is on the spiritual purification that the emphasis is now laid.

As 'baptism had in Judaism come to mean *purificatory consecration*, with a twofold reference—from an old state and to a new—so was it in Christianity.'[2]

The gift of the Holy Spirit does not seem at first to have been associated with the baptismal ceremony (cf. Ac 8^{16}). The rite seems to have been regarded by the primitive Church simply as a cleansing from sin, bringing about the renewal of a former undefiled state. The convert must be purified in the laver of regeneration,[3] as a preparation for the reception of that which is to follow.[4] So effective is the purification here that it can be regarded as 'a death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness'—not a generation, but a regeneration. This conception is maintained in the Baptismal Office of the Church of England in the prayer for the sanctification of the water to the mystical washing away of sin and in the vow of renunciation.[5]

'Since the middle of the second century the notions of baptism in the Church have not essentially altered. The result of baptism was universally considered to be forgiveness of sins, and this pardon was supposed to effect an actual sinlessness which now required to be maintained.'[6]

This maintenance was supplied by the second great sacrament, which, offering the means of communion with God, through outward and visible signs, became the recognized channel for the conveyance of grace and strength to the soul, purified already in baptism, and a guarantee of the continuance of that purification. Yet it was soon realized that the flesh still remained weak and continued to act as an instrument of defilement to the spirit. Thus, just as it was necessary that the purification of baptism should cleanse from sin and so prepare for the gift of the Holy Spirit, so it became necessary that a formal purification should precede, cleanse, and prepare for the gift received in Holy Communion. Hence the further sacrament of penance (*q.v.*) and absolution, which was entirely a rite of purification in its conception and effect.[7]

'The original position was that baptism alone was the cure for sin; it was in itself sufficient for the needs of the believer. Experience, however, showed the difficulty of this position; it became more and more clear that Christians were not immune from the attacks of sin, and if sinlessness were really required from them as a condition of salvation few indeed would be saved. Sin after baptism thus became a practical problem; a

[1] Only the greatest saint can realize that he is the greatest sinner.

[2] *E.g.*, Jn 2^{6} 3^{25}, Lk 2^{22}, Mk 1^{44} 7^{3}, Lk 5^{14}, Ac 21^{24-26}, etc.

[3] H. M. Luckock, *Footprints of the Son of Man as traced by Mark*, ed. London, 1890, p. 149 f., on Mk 7. Not only does Christ not condemn, but, on occasion, He orders the observance of rites of purification (cf. Mk 1^{44}). Yet it should be remembered that He did not always Himself observe the traditions in this respect (Lk 11^{38}), nor did His disciples (Mk 7[2]).

[1] Cf. esp. Tit 1^{15}, Ro 14^{14-20}, 1 Co 6^{11}, 2 Co 7^{1}, 1 Jn 3^{3}, 1 P 1^{22}, Ac 15^{9}, Eph 5^{26}, He $9^{13f.}$, Ac $10^{14f.}$.

[2] *ERE* ii. 377[b], art. BAPTISM (New Testament); cf. also Chrysostom's οἱ αἱρετικοὶ βάπτισμα ἔχουσιν, οὐ φωτισμα, *ap.* Suicer, *Thesaurus*, Amsterdam, 1728, *s.v.* φωτισμα.

[3] At a much later period Cyprian speaks of 'lavacrum regenerationis et sanctificationis' (cf. Cyprian, *Ep.* lxxiv. 7, 6, *de Bono Patientiæ*, 6; also Tertullian, *de Res. Carnis*, 47; for other references in Cyprian to purification in baptism see *de Hab. Virg.* 2, 23, *Ep.* lxviii. 15, lxxiii. 18.

[4] Cf. 1 Co 6^{11}, He 10^{22}.

[5] Note also the prayer, 'We call upon thee for this infant, that he, coming to thy holy Baptism, may receive remission of his sins by spiritual regeneration.'

[6] A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., London, 1894–99, ii. 140.

[7] Note the comprehensiveness of the words of absolution: 'by his authority committed to me, I absolve thee from *all* thy sins.'

second baptism, suggested by some, was regarded as impossible, but nevertheless analogous rites—in so far as they were looked upon as sacraments—were established. Penitence (or Penance, to use the more customary word) and the Mass came to be used as the sacramental means whereby Christians could be cleansed from the stains of post-baptismal sin, and the ministry of the Church developed into a great system for their administration, in order to heal and comfort souls stricken with sin and calling for the care of a physician.'[1]

The Roman Church to this day insists upon this formal purification for the individual before allowing access to the second great sacrament. It is impossible not to recognize in the provision for frequent and continual purification of a formal kind, even apart from any particular material ceremony, a dangerous resemblance to the older and pre-Christian usages.[2] The Church of England has never insisted upon this pre-communion purification, yet has rightly recognized the essential idea in the collect at the opening of the Communion Office: 'Cleanse the thoughts of our hearts . . .,' and in the confession and absolution which must precede the reception of the sacrament. It is on these lines that purification is treated in the other offices and prayers of this Church.[3]

3. Purification and the contemplative life.—The idea that underlies purification has always appealed most strongly, as we have already hinted, to the more earnest and sincere Christian. It has been the initial cause of many great movements, both within and without the orthodox body; the Novatian and the Montanist movements, *e.g.*, were attempts to realize this idea. But it is above all in mysticism (*q.v.*), with its passionate desire for communion with God, that we find the greatest stress laid upon purification. It is an essential part of the system. It is the earliest path—'the purgative way'—which alone can lead to 'illumination.' To those who follow it will come indeed many a 'dark night of the soul,' until the end is reached and the achievement of purification brings light. The process is a gradual advancement, step by step, at each of which something is left behind. As the runner strips himself of one garment after another in order to attain the goal that is set before him, so the mystic must disencumber himself of all material or spiritual hindrances, as he strives after purification.

'Now be assured that no one can be enlightened unless he be first cleansed or purified and stripped. . . . Thus there are three stages: first, the purification; . . . The purification concerneth those who are beginning or repenting, and is brought to pass in a threefold wise; by contrition and sorrow for sin, by full confession, by hearty amendment.'[4]

This notion of purification as an absolutely essential element in the religious life was the immediate cause of monasticism (*q.v.*). It was in order to escape the defilement which, it was thought, was almost necessarily incurred in living the ordinary life of men that the extraordinary life was adopted. There were fewer enemies to contend with in the seclusion of the cell or the monastery, and against these the most severe measures were taken—fastings, self-mortifications, and constant prayer. Only a state of purification could bring about that condition of holiness which is the passport to eternity.[5] The practice and exaltation of celibacy most probably find here their root motive. Thus the two greatest developments of the contemplative life—mysticism and monasticism—may fairly be said to be developments of the Christian idea of purification.[1]

4. Purification through suffering.—No article on Christian purification would be complete without consideration of the purificatory influence inherent in suffering. Perhaps the best illustration of this to be found in literature is contained in the beautiful poem of Mrs. Hamilton King, *Ugo Bassi's Sermon in the Hospital*.[2] It is not given to many to attain purification in this way, though opportunity is rarely lacking.

'It is only those who are already far in the path of spiritual growth who are purified by suffering, even as the Captain of our Salvation was thus made perfect.'[3]

Those, however, who do through suffering win the peace of God which passeth all understanding reach a level of purification which is higher and more perfect than that which can be attained in any other manner.

The suffering which comes to us through the fault of another would seem to possess a very high capacity for purification. This kind of purification embraces the idea that lies at the root of atonement. It is exemplified in its most perfect form in the life of Christ Himself,[4] and it is on these lines only that it is possible for men to become pure even as He is pure and, in so scaling the rugged heights of true Christian purification, to win for themselves the beatific vision of the promised land which lies beyond—'the glory that shall be revealed.'

5. Cleansing of the conscience.—When it has been once realized that it is no longer purification of the body but purification of the conscience and character that is the really essential thing,[5] it will be seen that the need for purification may exist even when the act which would render the person obviously impure has not been committed. This is indeed definitely taught by Christ Himself in the Sermon on the Mount.[6] Many other nations besides the Jews have required a ceremonial purification of the body after deeds of lust and bloodshed. Christianity, if it is to follow the conception of its Founder, requires the purification of the conscience after the 'will' to commit such deeds, even when the opportunity of actually doing them has been lacking. Again, non-Christian ceremonial purification can be and sometimes has been refused, but Christian purification can never be refused to the true penitent who seeks for it.

6. Ceremonies of purification still observed in Christianity.—The Feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary is still observed by the Church. But the ceremony which it commemorates was a purely Jewish rite, though it has been taken over by Christianity in the Office for the Churching of Women after childbirth. The notion of legal uncleanness, which prevented the Jewish mother from appearing in public until after the ceremonial purification had been performed, has been dropped.[7] The many women who still insist very strongly on going to this service before going elsewhere do so from the notion of thanksgiving rather than from that of purification. They have no idea of being legally unclean. The offering of the lamb, pigeon, or turtle-dove which was connected with the purification idea has given place to a money-offering, which, though forming

[1] Kirsopp Lake, *The Stewardship of Faith*, London, 1915, p. 116.

[2] Cf., *e.g.*, Eur. *Ion*, 96,

. . . καθαραῖς δὲ δρόσοις
ἀφυδρανάμενοι στείχετε ναούς.

[3] Cf., *e.g.*, the Collect for the Sixth Sunday after Epiphany: 'Grant us, we beseech thee, that, having this hope, we may purify ourselves, even as he is pure'; see also Clem. Rom. xxix. 1, and many references in *The Shepherd of Hermas*.

[4] *Theologia Germanica*, tr. S. Winkworth, London, 1854, ch. xiv.

[5] Cf. Mt 5[8]: 'Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.'

[1] For many references to purification in mysticism see E. Underhill, *The Mystic Way*, London, 1913.

[2] H. E. Hamilton King, *The Disciples*[9], London, 1887, pp. 96–121. See also J. R. Illingworth, 'The Problem of Pain,' in *Lux Mundi*, do. 1889, pp. 113–126.

[3] W. Temple, *Church and Nation*, London, 1915, p. 65.

[4] He 2[10]; cf. Rev 7[14].

[5] Cf. Ja 4[8], 1 P 1[22].

[6] Cf. Mt 5[22-24, 28].

[7] Innocent III., in the canon law (*Cap. unico de Purif. post partum*): 'If women after child-bearing desire immediately to enter the Church, they commit no sin by so doing, nor are they to be hindered.'

an actual part of the service, again emphasizes the thanksgiving motive.

7. Purification of churches after suicide, sacrilege, etc.—Ceremonies of purification are still observed in many churches for reasons of this nature. The idea is that of restoration to the former state of holiness conveyed by consecration.

8. Purification of the sacred person. — The Church of Rome has many elaborate directions for the purification of the individual priest after accidental or unconscious defilement.

LITERATURE.—See the works mentioned in the article.

H. C. TOWNSEND.

PURIFICATION (Egyptian).—I. *INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.*—Owing to the prevailing climatic and geographical conditions the entire water-supply of Egypt is derived from the river Nile. When the weather is hot, the modern Egyptian bathes at least once a day either in a bath in his house or else in the river or a canal. The heat and dust combined make washing essential for health and comfort. Washing, therefore, must have been one of the common acts of daily life in ancient no less than in modern Egypt.

The ground that the Nile cannot reach by irrigation, inundation, or percolation is to all appearances dead—a barren and dusty tract of crumbling clods. But, when once this ground is inundated or irrigated, it soon begins to show signs of life and grows green with vegetation in a remarkably short space of time.

Thus the same Nile waters both cleansed and vivified—a phenomenon that seems to have profoundly influenced the ancient Egyptians' ideas about purification (see below, esp. V. 1, 3).

II. *MATERIALS AND VESSELS EMPLOYED FOR PURIFICATION.*—**1. Materials.**—Water was the most usual as well as the most natural purificatory medium. Natron, *i.e.* native carbonate of soda[1] (variously named *ḥsmn, smn, smin, ntr, bd*),[2] was often dissolved in the water to enhance its cleansing properties.[3] Natron was also used dry (see below, V. 2 (*d*), 7 (*a*)); a box of this substance is included among the requirements of the dead in certain Middle Kingdom funerary prayers.[4] Incense was used for fumigation, but was apparently also employed like the dry natron (see below, V. 2 (*e*) (ii.)). Sand was likewise regarded as purificatory (see below, VI. 4), and so, in a secondary sense, were food and drink (see below, V. 1 (*d*)).

2. Vessels.—Two varieties of metal ewer and a basin were used for washing the hands.[5]

The tall thin ewer was named *snb·t*,[6] the squat one, apparently, *'pr·t*[7] or *ḥsmny*;[8] the basin was named *ḫ'w*[9] or *ś'wty*.[10]

The same kind of basin was used for feet-ablutions,[11] but the ewer employed for this purpose was of a very curious shape.[12]

All these vessels could be made of gold or silver, but were more usually of copper.[13] For bathing or sprinkling purposes, earthenware pitchers were employed; also a metal vase named *ḥs·t*, or a *snb·t*-ewer.[1]

The pitchers, variously designated *nms·t*,[2] *dšr·t*,[3] and *'ḫ·t*,[4] were sometimes of gold.[5] The *ḥs·t*-vase was usually copper, but sometimes gold or silver.[6] *Piankhi Stele*, line 112, mentions 'all the vessels for the purification of a king, of gold and every precious stone.' The stone vessels would perhaps be those originally made of pottery. For fuller details and a number of useful references see Kees, *Der Opfertanz des ägyptischen Königs*, Leipzig, 1912, pp. 54 ff., and 212–214.

III. *SECULAR WASHING, SANITATION, AND SANITARY OBSERVANCES.*—In an Old Kingdom palace the toilet-rooms were designated 'House of the Morning' (*pr-dw'·t*), in a noble's house of the Middle Kingdom 'Cabinet of the Morning' (*ḫnwty dw'·t*). They would have comprised from quite early times a privy[7] and a bathroom,[8] of which excellent examples (XVIIIth dynasty) have been unearthed at El-Amarna.[9] The 'House' or 'Cabinet of the Morning' was probably so named because, as in modern Egypt, ablutions were performed immediately upon rising.

Morning ablutions were so much a matter of course that a 'wash' (*ś'w*) is not an uncommon term for a light morning repast—a *petit déjeuner* doubtless being served directly the morning toilet had been completed.[10]

The compound *pr-dw'·t*, 'House of the Morning,' obsolete after the Old Kingdom, survived right down into Ptolemaic times as the name of the temple vestry.[11]

1. Bathing.—A Pharaoh or noble, when he took a bath, seems to have squatted or stood in a tank, or upon a stone slab or pedestal, while servants poured water over him;[12] the water often contained natron.[13] Two attendants rubbed him dry,[14] after which he was sometimes fumigated with incense.[15]

2. Purification of the mouth.—The mouth was ceremonially purified by chewing natron (see below, V. 2 (*e*) (ii.), 7 (*a*)); but this was doubtless also a secular practice. Incense was apparently put to a similar use. The mouth, one would imagine, was afterwards swilled out with water. The natron was certainly spat out.[16]

After the mouth had been cleansed with natron, it was said to be like the mouth of a sucking calf on the day it was born.[17] A light repast, consisting of a loaf of bread and a jar of drink, was called *ś'w-r'*, 'a mouth-wash.'[18] Perhaps the word *ś'w*, 'breakfast,' mentioned above, is an abbreviation of *ś'w-r'*. If so, the official in charge of 'all the places of the king's mouth-ablution'[19] was not a courier who assisted at the royal toilet, but, as Sethe supposes,[20] the person responsible for the proper serving of the Pharaoh's breakfast.

3. Washing of the feet.—The feet would have been frequently washed, as in the modern East;[21] there was a special ewer for feet-ablutions (see above, II. 2).

1 See A. Lucas, *Journal of Egyptian Archæology* i. [1914] 120.

2 *E.g.*, K. Sethe, *Die altägyp. Pyramidentexte* (hereafter cited as *Pyr.*), Leipzig, 1908–10, 26 f., 849, 2015.

3 *E.g.*, P. E. Newberry and F. Ll. Griffith, *El-Bersheh*, London, n.d. [1895], i. pl. x.

4 P. Lacau, *Sarcophages antérieurs au nouvel empire*, Paris, 1906–07, i. 203, ii. 56, 58; Newberry-Griffith, *loc. cit.*

5 N. de G. Davies, *The Rock Tombs of Sheikh Said*, London, 1901, pl. ix.; A. M. Blackman, *The Rock Tombs of Meir*, do. 1914, iii. pls. xxiv. 2, xxxviii. 2; Lacau, figs. 37, 38, 46–48.

6 *Pyr.* 1179*b*. 7 Lacau, 28118, no. 32, fig. 46.

8 *I.e.* 'the thing that belongs to *or* contains natron (-water)' (Lacau, 28024, no. 25, 28027, no. 26).

9 *Pyr.* 1320*a*; *Book of the Dead*, clxxii. 32 f.; *Book of the Dead* unless otherwise specified, stands for E. Naville, *Das ägyptische Totenbuch der xviii. bis xx. Dynastie*, Berlin, 1886.

10 Lacau, [illegible], no. 26, 28027, no. 26.

11 *Book of the Dead*, *loc. cit.*

12 Lacau, [illegible], nos. 27, 28, 28027, nos. 37, 38, fig. 88; Sethe, *ap.* L. Borchardt, *Grabdenkmal des Königs Śaḥu-re'*, Leipzig, 1910, ii. 93.

13 Lacau, 28024, nos. 25, 26, 28123, nos. 41, 42; *Book of the Dead*, *loc. cit.*

1 Newberry-Griffith, i. pl. x.: C. R. Lepsius, *Denkmäler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien*, Berlin, 1851–59, iii. pl. 231*b*.

2 *Pyr.* 1180*a*; Lacau, figs. 53, 56. 3 Lacau, fig. 55.

4 *Pyr.* 1116*b*. 5 H. Kees, *RTr* xxxvi. [1914] 7.

6 Lacau, 28024, no. 29, 28027, no. 27.

7 For a 11th dynasty tomb latrine see *British Association Report* for 1914, p. 215.

8 N. de G. Davies and A. H. Gardiner, *Tomb of Amenemhêt*, London, 1914, p. 74; A. Mariette, *Les Mastabas de l'ancien empire*, Paris, 1882–89, D47, p. 308; Gardiner, *RTr* xxxiv [1912] 198.

9 Borchardt, *Mitt. der deutsch. Orient-Gesellsch.*, no. 50 [1912], p. 20 f.

10 *Pyr.* 716*a*, 1576*a*, *b*; F. Ll. Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri from Kahun and Gurob*, London, 1898, pp. 8, 101; A. Erman, *Gespräch eines Lebensmüden mit seiner Seele*, Berlin, 1896, p. 60, n. 1.

11 *RTr* xxxiv. 196–198, xxxvi. 1 ff.

12 Newberry-Griffith, i. pl. x.; see below, V. 2 (*c*) (*d*), 7 (*b*).

13 Newberry-Griffith, *loc. cit.*

14 *Pyr.* 519*b*. 15 *Ib.* 1164*c*, 1181*b*, 2066*b*.

16 *Ib.* 26*c*, *d*. 17 *Ib.* 27*d*.

18 *E.g.*, M. A. Murray, *Saqqara Mastabas*, London, 1905, pls. xxi. xxiii.; *Pyr.* 60*a*. There is a variant, *'bw-r'*, 'purification of the mouth.' Accordingly, Inêni, an XVIIIth dynasty magnate, says: 'I was supplied from the table of the king, with bread of the king's mouth-purification' (Sethe, *Urkunden des ägyp. Alterthums*, iv. [Leipzig, 1906] 50, Griffith, *The Inscriptions of Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, London, 1889, pl. i. lines 44, 51).

19 Mariette, p. 229; cf. p. 185. 20 *Ap.* Borchardt, ii. 93.

21 *Book of the Dead*, clxxii. 33, 41.

4. Cleaning of nails.—Care was taken to keep the finger- and toe-nails clean.[1]

5. Shaving.—(*a*) *The face.*—From the time of the early Old Kingdom[2] and onwards the custom was to shave off all facial hair, a false beard being assumed on special occasions.[3] The moustache is very rare.[4]

(*b*) *The head.*—From early Old Kingdom times the hair of the head was either closely cropped or shaved off entirely, wigs being worn by the upper and well-to-do classes.[5]

For cooks and personal servants with their heads close shaven for the sake of cleanliness see Blackman, *Rock Tombs of Meir*, ii. pl. xviii. 16, iii. p. 31, pls. xxiii. 1, xxv. xxvi.; Newberry-Griffith, *El-Bersheh*, i. pl. xiii.; P. Virey, *Le Tombeau de Rekhmara*, Paris, 1889, pl. xlii.; W. Wreszinski, *Atlas zur altagyp. Kulturgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1914, pl. 7*a*. For representations of barbers shaving men's heads see Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, ii. pls. iv., xiii. Razors (?) formed part of the burial equipment in the IIIrd dynasty.[6]

6. Depilation.—There is evidence for thinking that depilation was practised by the upper classes and priests in the Old and Middle Kingdom, as it certainly was by the priests in later times (see below, V. 7 (*f*)).

There is a passage in *Sinuhe* (line 291 f.) which suggests that part of that exile's toilet upon his return to civilization consisted in the removal of body-hair.[7] It should be noted, too, that the modern Egyptian peasants of both sexes shave off their pubic hair.

7. Purification before a meal.—The Egyptians, in ancient as in modern times, purified themselves before partaking of food; indeed, as Griffith points out,[8] 'purify oneself' is equivalent to 'take a meal.' This purification would usually have consisted merely in the washing of the hands.

'Thy hands are washed . . . thy *ka* washes himself, thy *ka* sits down, he eats bread with thee.'[9] Even before drinking a cup of beer, a man would have his hands washed by his wife.[10] The washing of the hands was often followed by fumigation with incense.

In the list of requisites for a banquet[11] 'water for washing the hands' is immediately followed by 'incense.' Davies[12] shows two servants, one of whom pours water from a ewer into a basin, while the other holds a brazier of burning incense.[13] Table servants were required to have clean hands.[14]

IV. *SOCIAL PURITY AND PURIFICATION.*—By this is meant the avoidance or removal of impurities which impair man's relations with the community.

1. Circumcision.—See art. CIRCUMCISION (Egyptian), vol. iii. p. 670 ff.

2. Purification at birth.—A child was washed immediately after birth.[15] The cutting of the umbilical cord seems to have been associated with purification and is given a religious signification in *Book of the Dead*, xvii. 19.[16]

3. Purification after sexual intercourse.—The modern Egyptian men of the peasant class are very scrupulous about purifying themselves after sexual intercourse or after a nocturnal emission, sometimes having a bath, and always washing the genital organs.

[1] *Pyr.* 136*Sa*, 2015*d*; cf. below, V. 2 (*d*), 7 (*e*); for a pedicurist attending to a man's toe-nails see Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, London, 1893–1900, ii. pl. iv. reg. 2, left end.
[2] J. E. Quibell, *Tomb of Hesy*, Cairo, 1913, pls. xxix.–xxxii.
[3] Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 225.
[4] *Ib.*; G. Elliot Smith, *The Ancient Egyptians*, London, 1911, p. 124.
[5] See Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 219 ff.
[6] Quibell, p. 33 f., figs. 14, 15.
[7] A. H. Gardiner, *Notes on the Story of Sinuhe*, Paris, 1916, p. 111 f.
[8] *Catalogue of the Demotic Papyri in the J. Rylands Library*, Manchester, 1909, iii. 82, with n. 11; see also his *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, Oxford, 1900, p. 44.
[9] *Pyr.* 788c–789c; cf. Virey, p. 127.
[10] *Pap. D'Orbiney*, xii. line 8 f. [11] Murray, pl. i.
[12] *Rock Tombs of Sheikh Saïd*, pl. ix.
[13] See also Blackman, *ZÄ* l. [1912] 66 ff.
[14] A. H. Gardiner and A. E. P. Weigall, *Topographical Catalogue of the Private Tombs of Thebes*, London, 1903, p. 24, nos. 92, 101, p. 32, no. 176, p. 38, no. 238.
[15] Erman, *Die Märchen des Papyrus Westcar*, Berlin, 1890, i. 63; cf. H. Grapow, *Urkunden des ägyp. Altertums*, v. [Leipzig, 1915] p. 23, line 15, p. 24, line 13.
[16] See Grapow, Germ. tr., p. 10, n. 1.

Perhaps this explains why the citizen (*nds*) regularly bathed in the pool after spending the day with the wife of Ubaöner in the pavilion.[1]

4. Purification of women.—(*a*) *During menstruation.*—The Egyptian women washed themselves with water containing natron during their periods.[2]

The Egyp. for 'menstruate' is *ir ḥsmn*, 'make a purification with natron' (for *ḥsmn* as an active verb, 'purify,' see H. Brugsch, *Hieroglyph.-demot. Wörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1867–82, p. 996; *RTr* xvi. [1897] 56 f.).

The women evidently performed these particular ablutions in a special part of the house.[3] This, and the women's quarters in general, seem, as in a modern Egyptian house, to have been upstairs.[4]

(*b*) *After childbirth.*—Women purified themselves for fourteen days after childbirth. When this purification was accomplished, they could resume their household duties.[5] The purification consisted in washing and in fumigation with incense,[6] also perhaps in eating a special kind of cake.[7] The *pr-mst*, 'birth-house,' also called *ḥt-ʿbw*, 'house of purification,' attached to Ptolemaic temples of goddesses, suggests that a woman remained secluded in a special apartment during her *accouchement* and subsequent purification.[8] Chassinat believes that this seclusion extended also over the whole period of pregnancy.

V. *RELIGIOUS PURITY AND PURIFICATION.*—By this is meant the avoidance or removal of impurities which impair man's relations with the gods.

1. Purification of the living Pharaoh.—Many ceremonies and beliefs which originally were connected with the king alone obtained, during the feudal period, a general use and application; unless this is recognized, their true significance is often obscured.

(*a*) *In infancy.*—The Pharaoh was apparently fitted for the kingship by a purification undergone in early childhood. The officiants, according to the XVIIIth dynasty accounts, were supposed to be the gods Atum and Month, or Re-Harakhte and Amūn.[9] The ceremony, which consisted in sprinkling the child with water, was not merely purificatory; it endowed the prospective ruler with vital force and certain divine qualities.[10] It is possible that in early times royal children were washed at birth in the sacred pool of the State god.[11]

(*b*) *Before coronation.*—Piankhi, on his way to Heliopolis, 'was purified in the midst of the Cool Pool,' and 'his face was washed in the water of Nun in which the sun-god washes his face.'[12] By this act Piankhi was brought into close association with the sun-god, who was about to be asked to recognize him as his son. Like the pilgrimage to Heliopolis itself, it probably formed part of a procedure followed by every Pharaoh.[13] It was with a view to his being affiliated to the sun-god that the deceased Pharaoh, apparently reborn, is said to bathe, or be washed by Atum, in the sacred Heliopolitan waters.[14]

[1] Ermān, *Märchen des Pap. Westcar*, pl. ii. lines 10–12, 24 f., pl. iii. line 13; cf. below, V. 8, and Herod. ii. 64.
[2] Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests*, p. 88 f.
[3] E. Revillout, *Chrestomathie démotique*, Paris, 1880, p. 233; J. J. Hess, *Roman von Setna Ḫa-m-us*, Leipzig, 1888, p. 24.
[4] Erman, *Märchen des Pap. Westcar*, i. 68; Hess, *loc. cit.*
[5] Erman, i. 67.
[6] E. Chassinat, *Bulletin de l'Institut français d'Archéologie orientale*, x. [Cairo, 1912] 190.
[7] *Ib.* p. 184; cf. below, V. 1 (*d*) and 3. [8] Chassinat, p. 185 ff.
[9] A. Gayet, *Le Temple de Louxor*, Paris, 1894, pl. lxxv.; E. Naville, *The Temple of Deir el-Bahari*, London, 1895–1908, iii. pl. lvi.; J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1906, ii. 216; Sethe, *Urkunden des ägyp. Altertums*, iv. 242, Germ. tr., p. 112.
[10] Naville, *loc. cit.*, and see below, (*c*) (*d*).
[11] See *Pyr.* 211 ff.; *Book of the Dead*, ch. 17, lines 20–23; Grapow, *Urkunden*, v. 22–25; see also below, (*b*) and 8 (*b*).
[12] H. Schäfer, *Urkunden des ägyp. Altertums*, iii. [Leipzig, 1908] 37; Breasted, *Ancient Records*, iv. 870.
[13] Breasted, *Ancient Records*, ii. 222.
[14] *Pyr.* 211 f.; cf. also *Book of the Dead*, clxix. 19 f., and see above, (*a*).

(*c*) *At coronation.*—The coronation purification was a renewal of that undergone in infancy. It was performed before the diadems were placed upon the Pharaoh's head,[1] by a priest impersonating the god Yahes (*Ī;hs*).

The god thus addresses the king: 'I purify thee with the water of all life and good fortune, all stability, all health and happiness.' The Pharaoh, therefore, was not only purified, but endowed with the qualities which fitted him for his new position, and which he possessed, *qua* Pharaoh, in common with the sun-god.[2] Perhaps this ceremony and that of (*a*) above have some connexion with the primitive ideas about kingship and fertility. In both scenes[3] the water issues from the vessels as strings of symbols of life, ☥.

(*d*) *Before officiating in a temple.*—Before he could enter a temple to participate in any ceremony, the Pharaoh had to be purified by two priests impersonating Horus and Thōth[4] or Horus and Seth.[5] Cf. 'Horus and Thōth hold out their hands to receive thee when purifying thy body.'[6] This purification, which took place in the House of the Morning,[7] consisted, when the full procedure was carried out, in sprinkling the king with water, which sometimes contained natron,[8] fumigating him with incense, and presenting him with natron to chew[9] and thereby cleanse his mouth (see below, V. 2 (*d*) (*e*)); he was also offered food and drink.[10]

The water, called the 'water of life and good fortune,'[11] and 'that which renews life,'[12] was brought from the sacred pool with which every temple seems to have been provided.[13] The purification, therefore, besides cleansing the Pharaoh, imbued him with divine qualities; it also reconstituted him, as is shown by other formulæ pronounced during the ceremony, which are like those accompanying the funerary purifications. Food and drink were also purificatory in this secondary sense, for they possessed similar virtue to that of water and incense.[14]

Probably on ordinary occasions the king merely washed his hands,[15] after, perhaps, being lightly sprinkled with water by the two priests. It is unlikely that the fumigation with incense was ever omitted.

The king is described as 'pure of hands when performing the ceremonies.'[16] For a realistic representation of the king washing his hands in the House of the Morning see Lepsius, iv. pl. 4a. In the sun-temple of Nuserrē some or all of the ablutions were probably performed in the two basins which are sunk in the pavement just outside the door of the vestry, one on either side of it.[17]

(*e*) *At a Sed-festival.*—At this festival special importance seems to have been attached to the washing of the king's feet[18] and hands.[19]

In the mutilated scene from the sun-temple part of the special can for feet-ablutions is still recognizable.[20]

2. Purity and purification after death.—Many of the funerary texts found in general use during and after the feudal period treat of what was once considered the destiny of the royal dead only (see above, under 1).

[1] Naville, *Deir el-Bahari*, iii. pls. lxiii., lxiv.; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 262; Breasted, *Ancient Records*, ii. 99.
[2] *E.g.*, D. R. MacIver, *Buhen*, Philadelphia, 1911, p. 34 (138), and *passim* in the temple reliefs.
[3] See Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 262, note (*b*).
[4] Mariette, *Dendereh*, Paris, 1869–80, i. pl. 10; Blackman, *Temple of Derr*, Cairo, 1913, pl. xliii.
[5] Lepsius, iii. pl. 124*d*. [6] Mariette, *Dendereh*, pl. 9.
[7] See above, III.; also Kees, *RTr* xxxvi. 1 ff.; Schafer, *Urkunden*, iii. 35–37; Breasted, *Ancient Records*, iv. 866, 871.
[8] Mariette, *Dendereh*, i. pl. 10, inscr. left of scene.
[9] Cf. A. H. Gardiner, *The Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage*, London, 1909, p. 76.
[10] Kees, *RTr* xxxvi. 6–9; and cf. Chassinat, p. 183 f.
[11] Mariette, *Dendereh*, i. pl. 10; Lepsius, iii. pl. 124*d*.
[12] Mariette, *ib.*, inscr. behind Thōth.
[13] J. Dümichen, *Bauurkunde der Tempelanlagen von Dendera*, Leipzig, 1865, pl. viii.
[14] J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912, p. 60; cf. Blackman, *ZA* [illegible] ff.; see below, V. 3.
[15] Kees, *RTr* xxxvi. 5.
[16] Mariette, *Dendereh*, ii. pl. 69*b*.
[17] Borchardt, *Re-Heiligtum des Konigs Ne-Woser-Re*, Berlin, 1905, pp. 15 f. and 49 with fig. 42.
[18] *Ib.* p. 15 f., *ZA* xxxvii. [1899] pl. i.
[19] Naville, *The Festival Hall of Osorkon II.*, London, 1892, pl. v.
[20] See above, II. 2., and Newberry-Griffith, *El-Bersheh*, i. pl. x.

As the Pharaoh during his lifetime had to be purified before entering a temple, so after death he had to be purified before he could enter the solar, or Osirian, kingdom, the inhabitants of which, and all things connected with them, were pure.

Examples are the abodes of the sun-god,[1] those who sail in the boat of Osiris,[2] the lotus-flower which the sun-god holds to his nose,[3] and the deceased's throne in heaven or his seat in the sun-god's bark, either of which he can occupy only if he himself is pure.[4]

Purity was therefore the only passport to posthumous happiness.

Accordingly, the dead Pharaoh's ascent to heaven did not take place until his purity was assured. 'Thou art pure, thou ascendest unto Re.'[5] 'Pīōpi is pure . . . this Pīōpi ascends to heaven.'[6] The guardians of the gates of the under world allow the deceased to cross their thresholds because he is pure.[7]

This purity as originally conceived was to a large extent physical.

Before Thōth and the sun-god can draw the dead king up to heaven, it must be said of him: 'The mouth of N. is pure, the Great Ennead have censed N., and the tongue which is within his mouth is pure. What N. abhors is dung, N. puts urine far from him. N. abhors this. N. eats not this abomination.'[8]

The purity demanded by the gods of the dead Pharaoh, according to the Pyramid Texts, was not incompatible with gross sensuality or flagrant immorality.[9] It is, however, occasionally stated that something more than physical cleanliness was expected of him.[10] From the time of the VIth dynasty onwards[11] the claims made by the dead to moral integrity and purity become more and more prominent; they find, perhaps, fullest expression in the *Book of the Dead.*

In ch. cxxv., the 'Assertion of Sinlessness,' among the many sins which the deceased claims to be innocent of are fornication, masturbation ('Introduction,' line 15), and adultery ('Confession,' line 20).

In their conceptions of moral purity and righteousness the Egyptians very rarely, at any stage of their religious development, lost sight of the sanitary observances in which they had their origin.

'Let me pass,' says the deceased to certain gods who block his way, 'I have purified myself upon this great *w'r-t*, I have put away my evil, I have banished wrong, I have driven to the earth the evil appertaining to my flesh.'[12]

There were several ways of attaining that purity upon which the welfare of the dead so entirely depended.

(*a*) *Ceremonial acts performed by the deceased in his lifetime.*—These acts, which had associated, or identified, him with certain divinities and so rendered him pure, are (i.) bathing in sacred waters or pools (see V. 1 and 8 (*b*)); (ii.) participation in the Osiris mysteries (see V. 8 (*c*)).

(*b*) *Spells*, asserting (i.) that those acts had been performed;[13] (ii.) that all impurities had been avoided.[14] By means of these potent formulæ the things alleged, however untrue they might be, became actualities.[15]

(*c*) *Ablutions performed after death by the deceased himself* (i.) on earth: in the 'water of

[1] *Pyr.* 1359*b*. [2] *Ib.* 1201*c*.
[3] *Book of the Dead*, lxxxi. A, 3.
[4] *Pyr.* 710*a–c*; *Book of the Dead*, clxxxi. 10.
[5] *Pyr.* 733*c*. [6] *Ib.* 1411*a*, *b*.
[7] *Book of the Dead*, cxlv. [ed. Lepsius, Leipzig, 1842] 3 f.; see also ciii. 4.
[8] *Pyr.* 127*a*–128*a*.
[9] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 177.
[10] *Ib.* p. 171 f. [11] *Ib.* p. 168 ff.
[12] *Book of the Dead*, lxxxvi. 7 f.; see also cxxv. ['Conclusion'] 12 f., 17–20, clxxxi. 13–15; P. J. de Horrack, *Le Livre des respirations*, Paris, 1877, pl. i., § 2.
[13] *Book of the Dead*, xvii. 20–23, cxxv. ['Conclusion'] 17–20, cxlv. *passim*, i. 3, 8–10, 13 f., clxxxi. 13 ff., and see below, 8 (*c*).
[14] *E.g.*, the 'Assertion of Sinlessness,' *Book of the Dead*, ch. cxxv.
[15] Cf. Gardiner's remarks about the ceremonial voyage to Abydos (Davies-Gardiner, *Tomb of Amenemhet*, p. 47 f.); cf. also *Pyr.* 921, which describes the followers of Horus not only as washing the dead king, but as reciting spells whereby he was rendered righteous and so might ascend to life and happiness (Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 171 f.).

Khereḥa,'[1] the two pools at Herakleopolis Magna;[2] (ii.) in the other world: he might, like the sun-god, cleanse himself in the Field or Pool of Earu,[3] or squat on a stone (cf. below, V. 7 (*b*)) beside the Pool of the God and wash his feet.[4]

(*d*) *Ceremonies performed for him by the gods* (i.) on earth: the deceased might be washed by Satis in the waters of the First Cataract—the source of the Nile, according to tradition,[5] and therefore especially pure and sacred[6]—or by Atum at Heliopolis;[7] (ii.) in the other world: in the Field of Life, the birth-place of the sun-god, Kebḥōwet, daughter of Anubis, might empty her four pitchers of water over the deceased and then fumigate him with incense.[8] He might bathe with the sun-god in the Pool of Earu and then be rubbed dry by Horus and Thōth,[9] or wash his feet in the sun-god's own silver basin which had been fashioned by Sokar.[10] He is described as sitting upon the lap of Mekhentirti while his mouth is purified with natron (see below, (*e*) (ii.)) and the gods clean the nails of his fingers and toes.[11] Again, he is shaved by Duawer,[12] and his face is washed by that god and massaged by Sokar.[13]

(*e*) *Ceremonies performed by the living.*—Purificatory rites figured prominently in the funerary ceremonies, in which the deceased (originally the dead Pharaoh) was identified with Osiris[14]—the officiants impersonating Anubis, Horus, and other divinities.[15] Doubtless it was believed that the purifications supposed to be performed by the gods in the other world actually were performed if they were faithfully mimicked on earth and the proper formulæ recited.[16] One of the funerary libation formulæ describes the washing of the dead Pharaoh by Horus.[17]

(i.) In the *w'b-t*, 'Place of Purification,' *i.e.* the embalmer's workshop,[18] the corpse was washed with water in which various kinds of natron had been dissolved,[19] and with wine, milk, and beer.[20]

(ii.) At the 'Opening of the Mouth' in the 'House of Gold,' *i.e.* the sculptor's studio,[21] and at the burial and periodical services in the tomb-chapel, various purification ceremonies were performed on behalf of the deceased. These consisted in sprinkling the mummy, or its substitute, the statue, with water, fumigating it with incense, offering it libations, and holding up to its mouth (see III. 2, V. 2 (*d*), 7 (*a*)) balls of natron and incense.[22]

3. The significance of the posthumous purifications.—As Junker has clearly shown in his *Götterdekret über das Abaton* (Vienna, 1913), the object of the ceremonies performed on behalf of Osiris was to furnish the god with never-failing supplies of vital force and so keep him perpetually rejuvenated, thereby securing a high Nile and a fruitful season. Since every person (originally only the Pharaoh) became at death an Osiris, the same ceremonies were performed for the dead as for the god.

The funerary washings, sprinklings, fumigations, etc., possessed, therefore, a secondary, what we might term sacramental, significance; they both helped to reconstitute the deceased and, together with the food- and drink-offerings, supplied him with nutriment which enabled him to continue his existence and to maintain unimpaired all his reconstituted faculties and powers.

(i.) The water with which the corpse or statue was washed or sprinkled not merely cleansed the deceased from his impurities but brought together the head and bones and made the body complete (*tm*) in every particular.[1] Accordingly either stream of water that flows about the figure of the dead User[2] terminates in a large symbol of life, ☥ (see above, V. 1). With the offering of libation-water to the deceased is associated the giving to him of his spirit (*ā'ḥ*) and his power (*sḥm*), and at the same time he is bidden to stand upon his feet and to gather together his bones.[3]

(ii.) Incense-smoke had the same effect, cleansing the dead 'from all the evil appertaining to him,' and making him 'strong and powerful above all gods.'[4]

(iii.) For the mysterious virtue of the food- and drink-offerings see Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 60.

(iv.) The deceased was also, of course, supposed to be similarly reconstituted by the purifications that he underwent in the other world. After ablutions in the Field of Earu he received 'his bones of metal' (*bā'*) and 'stretched out his indestructible limbs which are in the womb of the sky-goddess.'[5] By the washings of Horus and Thōth and other divinities the dead was cleansed from all impurities, moral and physical, his body came together again or was entirely refashioned, and he was fit to enter heaven or the Tēi, *i.e.* under world.[6]

4. Purification of divinities in the temple ritual.—Owing to the influence of the Osiris myth, and to the fact that the Pharaoh was Horus and every god was conceived of as his father, the ceremonies performed in the temple and tomb-chapel were in many respects identical. Every divinity, for cult purposes, was treated as an Osiris, and his or her statue was purified like that of a dead person—and for the same reasons.

When his statue was sprinkled,[7] Amūn was acclaimed not merely as pure but as reconstituted: 'Unite unto thee thy head, unite unto thee thy bones, make fast for thee thy head unto thy bones . . . what appertains unto thee is complete; pure, pure is Amūn, Lord of Karnak!'[8] The libation-water also is 'life-renewing.'[9] The incense both purifies the god[10] and imbues him with life and vigour.[11]

5. Purity and purification of offerings to gods and dead.—(*a*) *Purity.*—All offerings made to the gods and dead, and everything used in their service, had to be pure.

The door-posts of temples often bear the following, or a similar, inscription: 'The offerings and all that enters the temple of such-and-such a divinity—it is pure.'[12] The living pray that the mortuary equipment of the dead may consist of 'every good and pure thing.'[13]

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1 *Book of the Dead*, clxix. 19 f.
2 W. Wreszinski, *Aegyp. Inschriften . . . in Wien*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 63; Grapow, *Urkunden*, v. 23.
3 *Pyr.* 918*a*, 1408 ff., 1421, 1430.
4 *Book of the Dead*, cxxvii. 42. 5 Cf. Herod. ii. 28.
6 Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 103.
7 *Pyr.* 211; see V. 1 (*a*), 8 (*b*).
8 *Pyr.* 1189 ff. Incense, like the water, is purificatory (*ib.* 1017*a*, *b*, 2066*a*, *b*), and upon a cloud of purifying incense-smoke the deceased is wafted up to heaven (*ib.* 2053 f.; cf. 365*b*).
9 *Ib.* 519*a–c*; cf. 1247*a–d*.
10 *Book of the Dead*, clxxii. 32 f. 11 *Pyr.* 1367*c*–1368*b*.
12 *Ib.* 1428*a*; see Sethe, *ap.* Borchardt, *Grabdenkmal des Königs Sa'ḥu-rē'*, ii. 97.
13 *Pyr.* 2042*a*, *b*.
14 Cf. Blackman, *The Temple of Bigeh*, Cairo, 1915, p. 28, *e*.
15 Davies-Gardiner, *Tomb of Amenemhēt*, p. 55.
16 Cf. the employment of models (*Book of the Dead* [Pap. Nu.], rubrics of chs. 133, 136A), or pictures (H. Junker, *Die Stundenwachen in den Osirismysterien*, Vienna, 1911, p. 6 f.); cf. G. Möller, *Die beiden Totenpapyrus Rhind*, Leipzig, 1913, 1. vi. line 1 ff.
17 E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of Opening the Mouth*, London, 1909, ii. 85 f.
18 Davies-Gardiner, p. 45.
19 Junker, *Stundenwachen*, p. 82; Möller, 1. vi. lines 1–4; cf. Horrack, pl. i. § 2; *Book of the Dead*, clxix. 18 f.
20 Junker and Möller, *locc. citt.*; *Book of the Dead*, clxix. 6–8.
21 Davies-Gardiner, p. 45.
22 Budge, *Book of Opening the Mouth*, i. 14 f., ii. 2 ff.; E. Schiaparelli, *Il Libro dei Funerali*, pt. i., Turin, 1882, pt. ii., Rome, 1890, i. 30 ff.; Budge, *The Liturgy of the Funerary Offerings*, London, 1909, pp. 42 ff., 151 ff.; Davies-Gardiner, pp. 55 ff., 76 ff.; G. Maspero, *La Table d'offrandes des tombeaux égyptiens*, Paris, 1897, pp. 4–12.

1 Junker, *Stundenwachen*, p. 103 f.; Budge, *Book of Opening the Mouth*, ii. 4, 80; Schiaparelli, i. 31–33, ii. 128–130; *Pyr.* 10, 837–843, 1908, 2043*c*.
2 Davies, *Five Theban Tombs*, London, 1913, pl. xxi.; cf. *Louvre Stele*, C. 15 (= E. Gayet, *Stèles de la XIIe dynastie*, Paris, 1886, pl. liv.); A. Moret, *Mystères égyptiens*, do. 1913, pl. i., and see also Davies-Gardiner, p. 57. The water is apparently being poured through a sieve, in order to break up and distribute the flow all over the man who is being washed. See also Virey, pl. xx.; J. J. Tylor, *El-Kab: the Tomb of Renni*, London, 1900, pl. xi.
3 *Pyr.* 857 f.
4 Junker, *Stundenwachen*, p. 90; cf. Blackman, *ZÄ* l. 71 ff.
5 *Pyr.* 529 f.; cf. 749*b*, 1454, 2051*d*.
6 *Ib.* 211*c*–213, 519, 921–923, 1141 f., 1247, 2170 f.; Möller, 1. vi. lines 1–9; Horrack, pl. i. § 2.
7 Cf. Lepsius, iii. pl. 66*c*; Naville, *Deir el-Bahari*, ii. pl. xlv.
8 *Ritual of Amon*, xxvii. 2 f.; see also Mariette, *Dendereh*, ii. pl. 59*a*, where the water of the *nms-t*-pitchers is said to 'rejuvenate her [Hathor's] body.'
9 Mariette, iii. pl. 62*a*; cf. Junker, *Stundenwachen*, pp. 79 f., 82, *Götterdekret über das Abaton*, p. 14 f.
10 *Ritual of Amon*, viii. 2.
11 *Ib.* xii. 8–xiii. 8; see also *ZÄ* l. 71 ff.
12 *E.g.*, MacIver, pl. 17, p. 49; Naville, *Deir el-Bahari*, iv. pl. xcv.
13 Griffith, *Siût*, pl. i.; Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. pl. xx., and *passim* on the funerary stelæ.

Herodotus[1] describes the measures taken to ensure the ceremonial purity of victims offered to the gods, and in Græco-Roman times this was reckoned a matter of supreme importance.[2] The testing of at least funerary victims was customary as far back as the Old Kingdom.[3]

In A.D. 122–123 a regulation was introduced forbidding the officiating priest to offer a victim until he had received a written certificate of its purity.[4] For an extant example of such a certificate see L. Mitteis and U. Wilcken, *Grundz. und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, Leipzig, 1912, I. ii. 'Chrestomathie,' p. 118, no. 89.

(*b*) *Purification.* — Offerings were purified by pouring libations over them and by fumigating them with incense.[5]

Virey (pl. xxv.) shows a lector pouring water over the carcass of a victim which a butcher has begun to dismember. Offerings presented to the dead could be washed or sprinkled with water containing natron, the purifying qualities of which were thus transmitted to the dead.[6]

The purification of the offerings possessed the same significance as the other purificatory rites.

As already seen (V. 3), the water used in lustrations and libations, incense-smoke, and food- and drink-offerings were endowed with mysterious reconstructive powers. The soaking in the liquid, therefore, and the fumigation added to the already existing virtue of the food, and, when the formula of presentation was recited, the combined qualities were imparted simultaneously to the god's (or dead person's) soul (*bꜣ*).[7]

The table or altar upon which the offerings were placed had first to be purified with water and incense.[8]

The following formula shows that the water might contain natron: 'It is pure. Purified is the offering-stand (*wdḥw*) with natron, with cool water (*ḳbḥw*), with incense . . . for the *ka* of the Osiris N.'[9]

6. Purification of temples and of buildings used for religious ceremonies.—(*a*) *Consecration of a new temple or shrine.*—A new temple was solemnly purified before it was handed over to its divine owner.[10]

The two chapels or booths of Upper and Lower Egypt that figure in the funerary ceremonies appear to have been purified by having water sprinkled over them.[11]

(*b*) *Renewal of purification.*—It was sometimes thought advisable to purify a temple afresh.

A certain Sebekḥotp informs us that he was sent by Sesostris II. to purify the temples in the Theban nome 'for the sake of the pure celebration[12] of the monthly festival and the clean observance of the half-monthly festival.'[13]

Purification would naturally be necessary after the profanation of a temple or sacred city.

The day after Piankhi had taken Memphis by assault 'he sent men into it to protect the temples of the god, hallowed (?) the sanctuaries of the gods, offered to the community of gods (*dꜣdꜣ·t*) of Ḥetkeptaḥ, purified Memphis with natron and incense.'[14] So also Mentemḥet 'purified all the temples in the nomes of all Paturis, according as one should purify violated temples,' after the Assyrian invasion in 667 B.C.[15]

7. Purity and purification of the priests.—The characteristic mark of the priest, from the earliest down to the latest period, was his purity. This appears in the ordinary word for priest, *wē'eb*, 'pure one,' Coptic ⲟⲩⲏⲃ.

The retention of the word by the Christian Egyptians suggests that even with them it was still his purity, rather than his sacrificial and intercessory functions, that separated the priest from the layman.

A number of measures were taken by the priests to ensure their absolute purity.

(*a*) In the Græco-Roman period a priest had to purify himself for several days before entering upon his course[1]—a practice that is evidently very ancient.[2]

Pap. Turin, pl. 57, line 9 ff. (*temp.* Ramesses IV.–V.) shows that this prefatory purification comprised drinking natron for a specified number of days; until they were accomplished, the priest could not enter certain parts of the temple precincts nor carry the image of the god.[3] The wailing women who bemoaned Osiris had to purify themselves four times before they could stand within the 'door of the Broad Hall';[4] they also washed their mouths and chewed natron (see V. 2 (*d*), (*e*)), and fumigated themselves with incense, in order that both they and the lamentations with which they 'spiritualized' the dead Osiris might be pure.[5] A passage in Gardiner, *Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage* (p. 76), suggests that the bread eaten by a priest during his prefatory purification and his course must be white bread (*ꜣḥa*).

(*b*) Priests and priestesses had always to wash or sprinkle themselves before entering a temple or engaging in a religious ceremony; every temple seems to have possessed a tank or pool set apart for this purpose (cf. V. 1 (*d*)).

A priest pronounced a special formula when entering the temple 'after making his purification in the pure pool.'[6] During the service he continually refers to his purity.[7] G. Legrain and E. Naville (*L'Aile nord du pylone d'Amenophis III.*, Paris, 1902, pl. xi. B) reproduce a mutilated relief depicting priests and priestesses purifying themselves before entering the temple. They seem to be standing in two shallow pools or tanks, while water is poured over them.[8] The descriptive text reads: 'Going down to wash by the prophets, the god's wife, the god's hand (*dr·t ntr*), in the Cool Pool, (and then) entering into the temple.' According to Herodotus,[9] the priests washed in cold water twice every day and twice every night.

Legrain found at Karnak an alabaster pedestal—bearing a dedicatory inscription of Tethmōsis III.—on which the priests stood while they purified themselves.[10] Cf. the stone beside the Pool of the God on which the deceased washed his feet.[11]

(*c*) The priests also perhaps fumigated themselves with incense before officiating in the daily service (see (*a*) and V. 1 (*d*)).

Before taking hold of the brazier, which was to contain the burning incense, the priest said: 'Hail brazier . . . I am cleansed by the Eye of Horus.'[12] 'Eye of Horus' in this context must surely mean incense.

(*d*) Great emphasis is laid upon the purity of the priest's hands.

Ikhernofret says of himself: 'I was pure handed in adorning the god, a *sem*-priest with clean fingers.'[13] 'Pure of fingers' is the oft-recurring epithet of priests.[14]

(*c*) *Paring the nails.*—The priests cut their nails short so as not to harbour dirt which would render them ceremonially unclean.[15]

Reliefs in the *mastaba* of 'Enkh-me'-ḥôr, a *sem*-priest and

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1 ii. 38 f.

2 W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Ägypten*, Leipzig, 1905–08, i. 62 f., ii. 79; A. Wiedemann, *Herodots zweites Buch*, Leipzig, 1890, ii. 180–183; R. Reitzenstein, *Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete*, ii. [1902] 8.

3 J. E. Quibell, *The Ramesseum and the Tomb of Ptah-hotep*, London, 1896, pl. xxxvi.; Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 289.

4 Otto, i. 62 f.

5 Lepsius, iii. pls. 66*c*, 180*b*; Blackman, *Derr*, pl. xxxvi., *Meir*, ii. pl. x.; *RTr* xxi. [1899] 142, xxii. [1900] 87; see also Schiaparelli, ii. 164; Budge, *Book of Opening the Mouth*, ii. 94; Junker, *Götterdekret über das Abaton*, pp. 10 ff., 20, 30.

6 Blackman, *Meir*, iii. 31 f.; *Pyr.* 1112*c*, *d*.

7 Junker, *Götterdekret über das Abaton*, p. 14 f.

8 Schiaparelli, ii. 157; Budge, *Book of Opening the Mouth*, ii. 90 f.; Virey, p. 125.

9 Lacau, *Sarcophages antérieurs au nouvel Empire*, ii. 50. The same formula occurs in *Cairo*, no. 20455 (= H. O. Lange and H. Schäfer, *Grab- und Denksteine des mittleren Reichs*, Berlin, 1902, ii. 49), with the word 'natron' omitted.

10 F. W. von Bissing, 'Die Reliefs vom Sonnenheiligtum des Rathures,' *SBAW*, 1914, p. 3; cf., perhaps, Gardiner, *Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage*, p. 76.

11 Virey, pl. xxvi.

12 For this use of *wꜣb* and *twr* cf. *Book of the Dead*, clxxxi. 13.

13 *Egyptian Stelæ*, iv. pl. 7.

14 Schäfer, *Urkunden*, iii. 34 f.; Breasted, *Ancient Records*, iv. 86.

15 Breasted, *Ancient Records*, iv. 902, 905.

1 Otto, i. 25.

2 Gardiner, *Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage*, p. 76 f.

3 The present writer is indebted to Dr. A. H. Gardiner for this reference; cf. Blackman, *Bigeh*, p. 47.

4 Junker, *Stundenwachen*, p. 6.

5 *Ib.* p. 70 f.; cf. *Festival Songs of Isis and Nephthys*, i. 2 f. = Budge, *An Egyptian Reading Book*, London, 1896, p. 39.

6 A. Moret, *Le Rituel du culte divin journalier en Egypte*, Paris, 1902, p. 8, n. 1, p. 79, n. 2.

7 *Ritual of Amon*, i. 5, 7 f., ii. 2, *et passim*.

8 Cf. , the word-sign for *wē'eb*, 'priest.'

9 ii. 37.

10 *Annales du service*, iv. 225 f.

11 *Book of the Dead*, clxxii. 41 f.

12 *Ritual of Amon*, ii. 1.

13 Schäfer, *Die Mysterien des Osiris in Abydos unter Konig Sesostris III.*, Leipzig, 1904, in Sethe's *Untersuchungen zur Gesch. und Altertumskunde Aegyp.* iv. 18 f.; Breasted, *Ancient Records*, i. 608.

14 Newberry-Griffith, *El-Berscheh*, ii. pl. vii.; Lange-Schäfer, *Grab- und Denksteine des mittleren Reichs*, ii. 148 [7], 165 [10]; Gardiner-Weigall, *Catalogue of the Private Tombs of Thebes*, p. 43; Wreszinski, *Aegyp. Inschriften . . . in Wien*, p. 22; cf. p. 132.

15 Moret, *Rituel du culte divin journalier*, p. 170 = *Ritual of Amon*, xxvi. 7–10; cf. V. 2 (*d*), ii.

lector,[1] possibly depict the cutting and cleaning of priests' finger- and toe-nails, and not, as has been suggested, surgical operations.

(*f*) *Depilation.* — Herodotus[2] states that the priests in his day shaved their whole body every third day to ensure ceremonial purity.

Depilation seems to be an ancient practice (see above III. 6). The depilation of a priest is perhaps depicted in the *mastaba* of 'Enkh-me'-ḥôr:[3] the man's leg is being rubbed to remove hair. The adjacent scene possibly represents a priest having his back scrubbed to render it ceremonially clean. It is said of the women who impersonated Isis and bewailed Osiris: 'Their body is pure . . . the hair of their body has been removed.'[4]

(*g*) *Shaving.*—The clean-shaven head does not appear to have become the distinguishing mark of the priestly caste[5] till towards the end of the XVIIIth dynasty.[6] In the Græco-Roman period the regulations about the priests shaving their heads were very strict.[7]

(*h*) *Dress.*—From the time of the New Kingdom onwards the priests seem to have been very punctilious in the matter of dress.[8] As early as the IXth to Xth dynasties we learn that a priest during his period of service had to wear white sandals.[9]

(*i*) *Circumcision.* — See art. CIRCUMCISION (Egyptian), vol. iii. p. 670 ff.

8. Purity and purification of the laity.—(*a*) *Purification before entering a temple or sacred place.*—Until the Græco-Roman period we know practically nothing about the purification of the lay people before entering a temple,[10] but we may be certain that ablutions of some sort were deemed necessary. There is possibly a reference to this practice in an inscription dating from the reign of King Teti of the VIth dynasty.[11] In the Old Kingdom it also appears to have been reckoned impious for those who had eaten an impure thing, *bwt*,[12] or who were still purifying themselves, *m 'bw-sn*,[13] to approach the portrait-statue in a tomb-chapel, or indeed enter the building (cf. below, VI. 1). Ch. lxiv. of the *Book of the Dead*, line 46, speaks of a worshipper's hands as pure when praising the god. Herodotus[14] says that a man had to discard his woollen cloak before entering a temple.

Hero of Alexandria (fl. *c.* 250 B.C.) says that 'stoups (περιρραντήρια) for the sprinkling of those who enter' stood at the entrances to Egyptian temples.[15]

Perhaps we have examples of the περιρραντήρια of Hero in certain large stone vessels of the Ptolemaic age, which, as the inscriptions show, came from temples, and which, apparently, were meant to hold water. Some of them are decorated on the inside with the symbols , 'good fortune, life, stability,' which are associated (see above, V. 1) with religious ablutions.[16]

Hero also speaks of bronze wheels, which were apparently fixed to the doors of temples, and were turned by those entering 'because it is thought that bronze cleanses.'[1]

This is quite an un-Egyptian device, and was probably imported from the East.[2] Von Bissing describes what may be an actual example of one of these wheels and gives a drawing of it.[3]

An inscription of the Ptolemaic period[4] states that people who had become impure through sexual intercourse,[5] birth, miscarriage, menstruation, etc., had to pay dues before being admitted into the temple of Asklepios at Ptolemais. These were apparently paid into a money-box (θησαυρός) at the entrance to the temple.[6]

A bronze wheel was sometimes, it seems, associated with the money-box; thus a person paid his or her dues and then was purified by turning the wheel. Hero[7] proposes to make a combined money-box and wheel; the former is to be surmounted by a bird which will sing when the wheel is turned.[8] We also learn from Hero[9] that bronze wheels were set up near the water-stoups. He therefore proposes to make a 'contrivance of such a kind that when the wheel is turned the water runs out of it for the sprinkling.'[10] For further particulars as to these two contrivances, the former of which was a penny-in-the-slot machine worked by 5-drachma pieces, the latter an ingenious swivel tap, see Rochas, *Annales du Service des Antiquités*, xi. [1911] 95 ff.

(*b*) *Purification in sacred waters and pools.*—(i.) Near Khereḥa (the Græco-Roman Babylon) there was a pool connected with the Heliopolitan sun-cult. In its waters the sun-god washed his face, and it was of advantage to mortal men to do the same.[11]

(ii.) At Herakleopolis Magna there were two great pools in the precincts of the temple of Ḥarshef, called the 'Pool of Natron' and the 'Pool of Mē'et.'[12] The worshippers of the god washed in these pools and so were cleansed from their sins; their offerings were washed in them also.[13]

An official of the Saite period records that he built a wall 'behind the Pool of Mē'et.'[14]

(iii.) The water at the First Cataract, the traditional source of the Nile,[15] was believed to be endowed with special cleansing properties, and therefore was used (or supposed to be used) for all the lustrations and libations offered to the gods and the dead.[16] The fact that the dead go there to be bathed by the goddess Satis[17] suggests that the living also performed ablutions there.[18]

(*c*) *The Osirian mysteries.*—Participation in the Osirian mysteries[19] was productive of religious purity. This is suggested by certain statements in the *Book of the Dead.*

E.g., the deceased thus addresses the gods in the other world: 'I am pure of mouth, pure of hands, one to whom is said "Welcome, welcome" by those who see him; for I have heard those words which the ass spake with the cat' (cxxv. ['Conclusion'] 13 f.). Again he says to his *ka* who stands in his way: 'Let me pass, for I am pure. I have made Osiris to triumph against his foes' (cv. 8); see also i. 3, 8–10, 13 f., clxxxi. 13 ff.

9. Purification before going into battle.—Apparently the only reference to this custom in Egyptian writings is *Pyr.* 2190*a*–2191*b*,[20] which says:

'Horus comes forth from Khemmis. Buto Town arises for Horus, and he purifies himself there. Horus comes pure that he may avenge his father.'

[1] J. Capart, 'Une Rue de tombeaux à Saqqarah,' in *L'Art égyptien*, Brussels, 1907, pl. lxvii.; W. Max Müller, *Egyptological Researches*, Washington, 1906, pl. 105.
[2] ii. 37. [3] Capart, pl. lxvi.; Müller, pl. 105.
[4] *Festival Songs of Isis and Nephthys*, i. 2 f. = Budge, *Egyptian Reading Book*, p. 49.
[5] *E.g.*, Lepsius, iii. pl. 128*b*.
[6] See Davies, *The Rock Tombs of El-Amarna*, London, 1903–08, i. pls. viii., xxii.; also Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, pp. 250, 298.
[7] Otto, i. 63, ii. 78.
[8] Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 297; Herod. ii. 37; Otto, ii. 78, 256.
[9] *Pap. Petersburg*, 1116 A, recto line 64 [Golénischeff, *Les Papyrus hiératiques No No 1115, 1116 A et 1116 B de l'Ermitage Impérial à St. Pétersbourg*, Petrograd, 1913, pl. xi.] = *Journal of Egyptian Archæology*, i. 27; cf. below, VI. 1.
[10] See Erman, *Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1907, p. 40.
[11] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. [Leipzig, 1903] 87.
[12] *Ib.* i. 58; cf. *Piankhi Stele*, lines 147–153.
[13] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 49, 50, 142; H. Sottas, *La Préservation de la propriété funéraire dans l'ancienne Égypte*, Paris, 1913, p. 9 ff.
[14] ii. 81. [15] Otto, i. 396; Hero, *Pneumatika*, i. 32.
[16] Erman, *ZÄ* xxxviii. [1900] 54; Wiedemann, *PSBA* xxiii. [1901] 270–274.

[1] i. 32; Erman, *ZÄ* xxxviii. 53.
[2] C. C. Edgar, *ZÄ* xl. [1902] 140 f.
[3] *ZÄ* xxxix. [1901] 144 f.
[4] *RA*, 3rd ser., ii. [1883] 181; cf. 3rd ser., xiii. [1889] 70 ff.
[5] Cf. Herod. ii. 64.
[6] Otto, i. 396; see also Edgar, *loc. cit.*
[7] ii. 32. [8] *ZÄ* xxxviii. 54. [9] i. 32.
[10] *ZÄ* xxxviii. 53; see also Otto, i. 397.
[11] *Piankhi Stele*, line 101 f.; Breasted, *Ancient Records*, iv 870; cf. *Book of the Dead*, clxix. 19 f.; *Pyr.* 211*c*–213; see V. 1, 2 (*a*).
[12] *Book of the Dead*, xvii. 21; Grapow, *Urkunden*, v. 23–25.
[13] *Book of the Dead*, *loc. cit.*
[14] P. Pierret, *Recueil d'inscriptions inédites du musée égyptien du Louvre*, Paris, 1878, p. 16.
[15] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 103.
[16] *Pyr.* 864*b*, 1908*a–c*, and *passim* in the religious texts.
[17] *Ib.* 1116*a*, *b*.
[18] See *Egyptian Stelæ in the British Museum*, ii. pl. 9, line 3 = Breasted, *Ancient Records*, i. 611.
[19] See Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 285 ff.
[20] *Ib.* p. 29.

VI. *PURITY AND PURIFICATION IN MAGIC.*—1. The reciter of a spell and a magician must be pure. He who would recite ch. cxxv. of the *Book of the Dead* must be pure (*w'b*) and clean (*twr*), must be clothed in the finest linen and shod with white sandals (cf. above, V. 7 (*h*)), have his eyes painted with stibium, and be anointed with the finest unguent.

The purity demanded of the reciter could be obtained by washing with water containing natron[1] or by washing and fumigation in the sunlight.[2] Impure food, such as venison and fish, and sexual intercourse are to be avoided.[3] In the case of one spell the reciter, and his servants also, are directed to purify themselves for nine days.[4]

To be successful in 'spirit-gathering' the magician must be pure.[5]

In vessel-divination by the moon the magician, if a medium is not used, must be 'pure for three days.'[6] In divination by a lamp without a medium the magician, who must be 'pure from a woman,' is directed to lie down on green, *i.e.* fresh, reeds.[7]

2. Purity of the medium.—In 'spirit-gathering' the medium must be a 'boy, pure, before he has gone with a woman.'[8]

3. Purity and purification of the objects used.—The papyrus upon which a spell is written must be pure.[9] The table used in 'spirit-gathering' is to be 'of olive-wood, having four feet, upon which no man on earth has ever sat.'[10]

In lamp-divination the lamp must be a white one 'in which no minium or gum-water has been put, its wick being clean'; it is to be filled with clean genuine Oasis oil, and is then to be set upon a new brick.[11] The *Book of the Dead*, ch. cxxv., rubric, directs that the representation of the Hall of the Two Truths be drawn upon a pure tile of porcelain fashioned of earth upon which no pigs or small cattle have trodden. The canopy (?) placed over the model of a boat used in a magical ceremony is to be purified with natron and incense.[12] In Griffith-Thompson, xxviii. 4, we learn that the bronze vessel used in divination is to be washed with water of natron.

4. Purity and purification of the place where the ceremony was performed.—The place where the magic rite was to be performed must be clean.[13] Sometimes it had to be both 'clean' and 'dark without light,'[14] and in addition must be purified with natron water[15] or sprinkled with 'clean sand[16] brought from the great river.'[17] Furthermore, it is laid down that there is to be no cellar underneath it.[18]

VII. *PURITY OF THOSE WHO WISHED TO HAVE AUDIENCE OF THE PHARAOH.*—In the *Piankhi Stele*, lines 147–153, we are informed that of the four princes who came to the Pharaoh to pay homage three, being fish-eaters, were not admitted to the royal presence. Perhaps this scrupulosity on the part of Piankhi was due to the fact that he had just been affiliated to the sun-god (see above, V. 1 (*b*)), to whom fish was evidently supposed to be an abomination.[19]

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the article. AYLWARD M. BLACKMAN.

[1] *Book of the Dead*, ch. xx., rubric.
vol. viii. p. 267[n].
[2] *Ib.* cxxxv. A, rubric.
[3] *Ib.* ch. lxiv., rubric; cf. rubric of ch. cxxv., and *Piankhi Stele*, line 151 f.; cf. V. 8 (*a*), VII.
[4] Naville, *PSBA* iv. [1876] 16; see art. MAGIC (Egyptian).
[5] F. Ll. Griffith and H. Thompson, *The Demotic Magical Papyrus of London and Leiden*, London, 1904, iii. 6.
[6] *Ib.* xxiii. 23. [7] *Ib.* v. 32. [8] *Ib.* iii. 11, xxvii. 15
[9] *Book of the Dead*, ch. c., rubric.
[10] Griffith-Thompson, iv. 1 f.
[11] *Ib.* vi. 2–10; see also xvi. 21–25, xxiii. 31, xxv. 8–16, xxix. 1–3, 30.
[12] *Book of the Dead*, ch. cxxxiii., rubric [*Pap. Nu.*] = E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Dead* (Hieroglyphic Text), London, 1898, p. 291.
[13] Griffith-Thompson, iv. 3.
[14] *Ib.* vi. 1 f. [15] *Ib.* v. 3 f., xvii. 23.
[16] Cf. the mound of sand upon which the statue is to be placed for the ceremony of 'opening the mouth' (Davies-Gardiner, *Tomb of Amenemhet*, p. 58; Budge, *Book of Opening the Mouth*, i. 9, 148, ii. 1 f.). An Egyptian Muslim uses sand instead of water for the ablutions preceding prayers, if no water is obtainable (cf. art. PURIFICATION [Muslim]).
[17] Griffith-Thompson, v. 5 f. [18] *Ib.* xxv. 16–18.
[19] See *Book of the Dead*, lxv. 11 ff.; Grapow, *ZA* xlix. [1911] 61; Lacau, *Textes religieux égyptiens*, Paris, 1910, i. 91 [xliv.].

PURIFICATION (Greek).—All the lower religions and most of the higher are concerned with the ritual of purification in its manifold forms; the higher are also deeply interested in purity as a spiritual ideal. The history of Greek religion falls into line with the general history of religions in both these respects. Its 'cathartic,' or purificatory, ritual agrees in essential respects with that of the other communities noted in the various sections of this article; it agrees also with the history of the higher religions in that a spiritual ideal, appealing to the more exalted or more sensitive minds, emerged from that ritual. Nevertheless, the phenomena of Greek purification, the ideas and the value attaching to it, bear the impress of the unique temperament of the people, and especially illustrate the pliancy with which the Greek communities could adapt the traditions of ritual to serve the purposes of legal and ethical development.

The student of this department of Greek religion is at once confronted by a chronological question that is also a question of origins: At what period and from what source did the cathartic system arise in Greece? It has been maintained that the whole of it was post-Homeric, and that in origin it was non-Hellenic, being derived from some Oriental or Anatolian source—*e.g.*, from Lydia.[1] This view rests mainly on Homer's supposed silence concerning it, and his silence is explained by his ignorance of any such ritual, which therefore could not have existed in the period when the poems were composed. But we have now learned that Homer's 'silence' has to be carefully and critically judged and interpreted before it can be accepted as certain evidence that what he is silent about did not exist in his time. Also the statement that the Homeric poems are wholly silent concerning any ritual of purification from stain ignores the plain or the probable significance of certain texts. We read that Odysseus purifies his hall with fire and sulphur after the slaughter of the suitors;[2] we may suspect a religious sense of impurity as a motive, though we cannot prove it. But Hektor's words, 'It is not meet for a man stained with blood and grime to offer prayers to God,'[3] cannot but be interpreted in relation to a contemporary simple rule of ceremonial purity—the same religious rule that compels Achilles to wash his hands in lustral water before raising them in prayer to Zeus,[4] or Telemachos to wash his hands in sea-water before praying to Athene.[5] Also, we find the χέρνιψ, or lustral water, the purificatory value of which cannot be doubted, a constant concomitant of the Homeric sacrifice and libation.[6]

Again, we should consider the purification of the Achæan camp, ordered by Agamemnon as a method of expelling the plague, as by no means a merely sanitary or hygienic act, but as inspired by dæmonic or divine fear and therefore as a religious act of purgation; for it is the immediate preliminary to a sacrifice to Apollo, and the Achæans throw the λύματα, the articles with which they had purified themselves and their tents, into the sea; and this is a formal act suggesting that these things are tainted with a curse or religious contagion or the μίασμα of evil spirits.[7]

Therefore the evidence of the Homeric poems does not allow us, still less compel us, to suppose that the Greeks of the Homeric period were wholly destitute of purificatory ceremonies; had they been so, we should have to regard them, in the light of

[1] G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 10 vols., London, 1888, i. 22; P. Stengel, *Die griechischen Alterthümer*, p. 114.
[2] *Od.* xxii. 481 f. [3] *Il.* vi. 267 f.
[4] *Ib.* 228. [5] *Od.* ii. 261.
[6] *e.g.*, *Il.* i. 449, xxiv. 305; *Od.* iii. 440.
[7] *Il.* i. 314; cf. the throwing into the sea of the slaughtered boar upon which the oath-curse had been laid (*Il.* xix. 267 f.)

modern anthropology, as in this important respect distinguished from all the other races of the world. Doubtless the invaders from the north, whose blending with the southerners, the people of the Minoan culture, generated the Hellas of history, brought with them their own cathartic ideas and practices; and the evidence of legends and accounts of festivals recorded by the later Greek writers suggests that they found on the soil of Greece and in Crete a more elaborate system of the same significance and of immemorial antiquity.

But there is indeed a marked difference between Homeric society, so far as that is mirrored in the Homeric poems, and the succeeding periods of Greek life; and this difference should be noted at the outset before we proceed to the details of the subject. If we call the people to whom those poems were originally addressed the Achæans, we may venture to say that the Achæan conscience took its cathartic duties, such as they were, very easily and lightly; on the other hand, the later Hellenic conscience became anxious and at times even sombre in regard to such matters, and was often haunted by terrors of the ghostly world and by the feeling that certain acts, especially homicide, might arouse the wrath of unseen spirit-powers or ghosts, and that such dangers could be averted only by an elaborate prophylactic ritual of purification. There is a wide cleavage between the Achæan and the later Attic religious consciousness in this vital respect, as wide as that between the genius of Homer and the genius of Æschylus. The Homeric ghost is impotent and piteous, of no power in the social-religious world, no shadow on the brightness of that early epoch.[1] And nothing more vividly illustrates the moral light-heartedness of the Homeric world, so splendidly endowed in most respects, than its normal indifference concerning ordinary homicide. Man-slaying was regarded in certain cases as a sin and might at times concern the whole community; but nowhere in the poems is there any hint of the need of purification from the stain of bloodshed, which in later Attic law was prescribed even for the accidental slaying of a slave. Tlepolemos, who has committed the sin of shedding kindred blood, has merely to flee from the wrath of his kinsmen;[2] the suppliant who has fled from his home for having killed a man is at once admitted by Telemachos at the moment of a religious service.[3]

Now, much that appears post-Homeric, merely because the first record of it belongs to the later period, may be an ancient inheritance of the pre-Hellenic stock that was submerged temporarily by the wave of northern invasion but rose to the surface again and re-asserted its traditions. So the later prevalence of a cathartic system, especially elaborated in regard to bloodshed, may only be another example of revival.

Such a revival would receive strong stimulus from the diffusion from Thrace through Greece of the religion of Dionysos, a religious phenomenon of great import for the spiritual history of the race. The cult had begun its Hellenic career already in the earlier 'Homeric' period, but had finally established itself in most parts of the Greek-speaking world, and especially at Thebes, Delphi, and Athens, at the close of the later migratory and colonizing movement. The god was aboriginally associated with the ghostly world and some part of his ritual was 'cathartic'; and this aspect and function of his cult were strongly proclaimed by the brotherhoods of 'Orpheus,' who were propagating doctrines and establishing their influence in Greece perhaps as early as the 7th cent. and with marked success in the 6th and 5th. And the religious-philosophic system known as Pythagoreanism, maintained by the Pythagorean brotherhoods which played a prominent part in the religious and political world of those two centuries, bore the closest affinity to Orphism, agreeing with it on the whole in its views as to the destiny of the soul and the need of an elaborate ritual of purification and a careful rule of purity.[1] Fortunately the Orphic-Pythagorean mission did not succeed in capturing the Greek democracies or the chief centres of the national worship; but it undoubtedly helped to render the general religious consciousness more sensitively anxious concerning purity and impurity; and Aristophanes warmly acknowledges, in terms that are doubtless too sweeping, the deep indebtedness of his countrymen to 'Orpheus' for much of their spiritual life.[2]

We may now review briefly the details of Greek *κάθαρσις* and consider the ideas attaching thereto; our records are mainly late, the literature from the 5th cent. onwards and certain later inscriptions; but we must always bear in mind that a fact is not necessarily 'late' because the earliest record of it is.

The technical inquiry is concerned always with two questions: (*a*) What are the acts, states, objects, agencies, seen or unseen, that are supposed to leave a stain on the soul or body of a person, which unfits him for intercourse with man or deity because he is spiritually, not merely physically, unclean and is liable to infect others and render nugatory any divine service by his *μίασμα*? (*b*) What are the cleansing, purgative, or cathartic processes, material or spiritual, by which he can rid himself of that stain?

The Greek evidence on these two questions, which is very multifarious and scattered, may be briefly summarized thus. (*a*) The causes of impurity were bloodshed, the presence of ghosts and contact with death, sexual intercourse, child-birth, the evacuations of the body, the eating of certain food such as pea-soup, cheese, and garlic, the intrusion of unauthorized persons into holy places, and, in certain circumstances, foul speech and quarrelling. (*b*) The purgative means, usually called *καθάρσια* by the Greeks, were lustral water, sulphur, onions, fumigation and fire, incense, certain boughs and other vegetative growths, pitch, wool, certain stones and amulets, bright things like sunlight and gold, sacrificed animals, especially the pig, and of these especially the blood and the skin; finally, certain festivals and festival rites, especially the ritual of cursing and the scapegoat (*q.v.*). More exceptional methods might be cutting off the hair of the polluted person, or sacrificial communion with the deity. To philosophize on these bizarre phenomena belongs to the more general exposition of the theme; and little study is needed to convince us that they concern in the first instance the sphere of primitive psychology rather than ethics; but, if we look more carefully into their history, we shall find how closely they are interlinked with the higher moral and religious life of the people and states.

1. The causes of impurity.—The deepest impurity was that caused by the shedding of human blood in certain circumstances; and the growing sensitiveness of conscience in this matter was a vital force in the development of society. We have noted the weakness of the sentiment in the Homeric world, and that world was still barbaric in its rules regarding homicide. The first record

[1] The ghost of Elpenor backs up his prayer to Odysseus by the threat of the gods' wrath, not his own, if the latter neglects it (*Od.* xi. 73).
[2] *Il.* ii. 661-666.
[3] *Od.* iii. 222-281.

[1] See *ERE*, vol. ix. p. 80; also art. PYTHAGORAS; E. Rohde, *Psyche*², Freiburg, 1898, ii. 38-56, 103-136.
[2] *Frogs*, 1032.

of a change in feeling is the citation of an incident in the *Aithiopis*, an epic poem by Arktinos of Miletos, composed probably near the close of the 8th century B.C. Achilles, provoked by the gibes of Thersites, slew him and was thereupon obliged to quit the army for a time and to retire to Lesbos, where he was purified by Apollo and Artemis.[1] It is very doubtful if the poet of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* would have comprehended this. Thersites was no kinsman to Achilles, and at most only a degraded member of the same Achæan stock. Yet the Milesian poet feels that his homicide, however justifiable, deeply concerns the whole army and is a stain upon Achilles, who must be purged by a religious ritual at some distant place before he can safely resume fellowship with his compatriots. The legend represents, no doubt, the contemporary State law of Miletos, and exhibits that State as having advanced soon after its foundation beyond the stage of culture wherein homicide is only a matter of the blood-feud and the *wergild* to the higher religious thought that the slaying of any member of the community brought a stain on the slayer and a danger on the whole society against which it must protect itself. We are still very far from the establishment of advanced secular law; the various stages of progress in later Greece and the ideas that inspired and assisted it are obscure and difficult to trace. On one point we may form a probable hypothesis. As ideas of purity and impurity are closely related to natural sensations of horror and aversion, and in Greece as elsewhere these feelings were most strongly excited by the shedding of kindred blood, it is probable that this type of homicide was the first occasion for the institution of an elaborate ritual of purification. Some of the few legends concerning its origin and vogue convey this impression. Ixion, who slew his father-in-law treacherously, figures in Greek mythology as the first murderer, and he is also the first suppliant who is pitied and purified by Zeus Ἱκέσιος, the god who hears the prayer of the suppliant and outcast. Bellerophon was purified by King Proitos for the accidental slaying of his own brother; Theseus, who slew the robber Sinis most justifiably, had to be purified from the stain, as Sinis happened to be his cousin; and the typical exemplar of the divine law of purification is the matricide Orestes.[2] But, if the law was in origin limited to this special kind of homicide, it had already enlarged its scope at some indefinitely early period. The law of Miletos, as illustrated by the passage referred to above in the poem of Arktinos, attests such an enlargement for the 8th cent.; and the legends that Athens purified Herakles from the blood that he had copiously shed,[3] and that Apollo himself, the pure god, had to be purified in Crete from the blood of Pytho,[4] bear the same significance, and may have arisen in the same early period. To explain this extension of the ritual we might suppose that the sphere of kinship, in which it originated *ex hypothesi*, was enlarged when the city-State was built up and included various kins within its union, until the slaying of any member of the political community came to be regarded as a stain similar to that of kindred-slaughter. But this would not explain the belief, which some of the legends cited attest, that the same impurity might be contracted by the slaying of an alien enemy, unless we are to attribute to the Greeks of an early period the advanced conceptions of the kinship of the whole human race and the sacredness of all human life. But no one would hazard such a theory to explain any evolution of the early post-Homeric epoch; and we may seek a more probable explanation in the increasing terror of the ghost-world; for we have the evidence of the later funeral laws and ritual, confirmed by many legends, to suggest that this was more potent in the post-Homeric than in the Homeric and Mycenæan periods. Given an intensified belief in the dangerous power of the ghost, and the conviction that purification from bloodshed was the only safeguard both to the individual and to the community against the wrathful spirit of the slain, we can well understand the wide extension of the law, until it covered the slaying of a slave; for even the ghost of a slave might be dangerous.[1] The miasma emanating from a ghost was supposed to attach also to inanimate objects that had caused the death of a man; the civilized Attic law required that the axe which had slain the sacrificial ox of Zeus Πολιεύς should be formally tried and cast into the sea—a means of purging and purifying the land;[2] solemn purification ceremonies were performed over the head of the bronze ox at Olympia that fell upon a boy and killed him.[3]

This sensitiveness to bloodshed and death may become extravagant and morbid, and has at times evoked such strange vagaries of the ritual law of purity as may half-paralyze the life of a community; but the Greek was saved from this by his moderation and a certain secular common sense, which protected him from the extreme logic of the view that all bloodshed was impure. We are not sure that any purification was imposed by Greek State law or social custom upon a man who had slain an alien in foreign lands; that would depend on his own sensitiveness or on his desire to be initiated at any of the great mysteries, which would demand a *κάθαρσις* from such a stain. Nor have we any record proving or suggesting any rule, such as prevailed with stringency among the Hebrews or still more and with detrimental results among the Indian tribes of N. America, requiring the purification of the army returning from battle;[4] the Greek soldier was probably content with an ordinary washing, sufficient for the purposes of refinement. Nor, again, was the ordinary Greek troubled by over-sensitiveness in regard to the blood of animals shed for sport, for food, or for sacrifice; there is no hint that the butcher or, as a general rule, the sacrificer incurred impurity.[5] At least, the only evidence that can be quoted of some such feeling is isolated and peculiar; the priest who slew the sacred ox in the Attic Bouphonia had to go for a time into exile; but this ox was a mystic, 'theanthropic' animal, charged with the divine spirit of the altar, and the priest had shed divine blood;[6] there is no reason to believe that at any time the Attic people regarded the slaughter of an ordinary ox as a heinous impurity. We may note also the fact that a certain altar of Apollo in Delos was specially called *ἁγνός*, 'the pure,' because the offerings and ritual were bloodless, no animal-sacrifice being allowed;[7] this is no proof of ordinary Greek feeling, but suggests rather some peculiar sacerdotal development of thought concerning blood.

Not bloodshed alone, but any contact with death and the ghost-world was a strong source of im-

[1] G. Kinkel, *Epicorum Græcorum Fragmenta*, Berlin, 1877, p. 32.

[2] See *CGS* i. 66 69.

[3] *CIG* 2374, i. 29.

[4] Paus. II. vii. 7, xxx. 3. Eus. *Præp. Evang.* v. 31; cf. Paus. x. vi. 7.

[1] Antiph. *Or.* vi. p. 764; Eur. *Hec.* 291 f.

[2] Demosth. κ. Ἀριστοκρ. § 76, p. 645; cf. *CGS* i. 56 f.

[3] Paus. v. xxvii. 9 f.

[4] The Macedonian army was purified in spring before the campaign (Livy, xl. 6); a similar Boeotian custom described by Plutarch (*Quæst. Rom.* 111) may have had a similar significance.

[5] As regards the hunter, there is a passage in Arrian, *Kynég.* 32, recommending the purification of the hounds and the huntsmen after the chase in accordance with ancestral rule; but the text is not well preserved.

[6] See *CGS*, *loc. cit.*

[7] Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 848 P; cf. *CGS* iv. 432, R. 276.

purity or μίασμα. The household to which the corpse belonged was impure; even the friends and others who attended the funeral were impure. In the tolerant Greek world this did not mean that they were severely boycotted, but only that they were unfit to approach the altars and to take part in divine service with others, also that it might be unlucky for them to carry on any serious business while in that state; Hesiod is our first witness to a superstition which descends from a far older period, that it was unlucky for a man returning from a funeral to try to beget a child.[1] The inscriptions and other evidence show that the period of impurity varied in the different states; at Lindos in Rhodes (in the time of Hadrian) it lasted for forty,[2] at Eresos in Lesbos for twenty days.[3] Those who merely attended the funeral were under the tabu for three days at Eresos, but at Pergamon they could recover purity on the same day by means of lustration.[4] The fear of the ghost-world, implying a shrinking of vitality in the living and a general sense of bad luck abroad, explains much of the funeral ceremonies of the Greeks, which show indeed the desire to please the ghost and to assure it of the family affection, but at the same time the determination to keep it at a distance and especially to prevent it following the mourners back to the house; one day of the Attic Anthesteria was devoted to an All Souls' celebration, when the spirits of the dead kindred were formally invited to an entertainment within the houses, but great care was taken to purify the dwellings at the end and to effect a complete riddance of them;[5] meantime the whole day was μιαρά, impure and unlucky. The same feeling explains the elaborate ritual to which the δευτερόποτμος must submit, the person who had been reported to be dead and had had funeral ceremonies performed over him and was then found to be alive and desirous of returning; society was afraid of such a person, for, though he had not really been in the ghost-world, yet the unnecessary funeral ceremonies had put that contagion upon him, which must first be washed off before he could be received back.[6] Such was the condition of Alkestis, when Herakles had rescued her from Death and was placing her in the hands of Admetos. Even those who performed the rites known as ἀποτρόπαια, rites for 'turning away' evil spirits, including ghosts, were constrained to wash their persons and garments before returning to their homes.[7]

There were certain occasions when the whole community performed cathartic ceremonies to purge itself of such evil influences of the unseen world. Such occasions were either periodic and regular or exceptional owing to a crisis that had arisen. In spring, when the new vegetation was beginning, or when the early harvest was ripe for gathering and the firstfruits ready for consecration, the feeling that this was the proper time to cleanse the whole city of the evil influences that had accumulated throughout the old year inspired such festivals as the Thargelia[8] in May and probably the Dionysia in February–March, the former certainly, the latter probably, possessing a cathartic value. It inspired also the frequent practice at the end of the old year and the beginning of the new of the extinction and rekindling of fires, especially the fire on the city's hearth,[9] and the washing of the statues of the tutelary divinities. The Attic Plynteria, held in May, is the best known example of the last ceremony, when the vestments and probably the idol of Athene were solemnly washed, and its day was μιαρά, the air being temporarily dangerous when contagion was being expelled.[1] Resort was had to the same sort of ritual at some momentous crisis or emergency. The Persian invasion had polluted the Greek temples with the presence of the stranger,[2] itself a source of defilement to the national deities apart from any outrage committed against them; therefore the first care of the Greeks after the victory of Platæa was the purification of the holy places.[3] The presence of the matricide Orestes was supposed to pollute the Tauric image of Artemis, which therefore needed washing in the sea.[4] Another momentous crisis was the foundation of a new city, and we have some indication that the ground was first carefully purified so that the settlement might start under good auspices purged from evil dæmonic agencies.[5]

The gravest crisis of all was one that was only too frequent in the life of the Greek states—the outbreak of civic massacre, when kindred blood was shed, the sense of guilt weighed on the citizens, and the atmosphere was charged with the miasma of wrathful ghosts. This was the condition of things at Athens in the 6th cent. B.C., when Kylon and his adherents had been sacrilegiously slain, and the people appealed to the aid of the Cretan prophet Epimenides, who came over and purified the whole city, the fields, and the homesteads; the recollection of this historic event lingered late in Attic tradition and gave rise to the erroneous belief that it was this prophet who first taught the Athenians the ritual of purification and its value.[6]

As regards sexual intercourse, we have evidence that the Greeks, like other primitive and advanced peoples, regarded the act as an occasional source of impurity and held the belief that abstinence had a certain value and efficacy for some religious or magical ritual. A deeper and more interesting question arises when we consider purity in the abstract and the Greek view of chastity as a religious duty and ideal. The law of purification in this matter was very simple and easy; such an act was supposed to render the person unclean in the religious sense, but the uncleanness could be immediately removed by washing and anointing, and some temple codes might allow the person to approach the altar on the same day, others might impose a tabu of one day or even more; for the catechumens of the mysteries and for certain lengthy ceremonials such as the Thesmophoria a longer abstinence might be required. In the later inscriptional records we are interested to mark the glimmer of an ethical idea; for the impurity is regarded as greater and the period of tabu imposed longer in the case of irregular and lawless indulgence;[7] and by Attic law the adulteress was permanently excluded from temple worship.[8] But, on the whole, the temple rules in regard to this act are concerned not directly with morality, but with a superstition arising from a primeval feeling that has evolved our modern social laws of decency; and the non-ethical standpoint is sufficiently revealed in some of the special rules and some of the phrasing of the temple-inscriptions: in the inscription from Eresos a longer tabu is imposed in cases

1 *Works and Days*, 735.
2 W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Græcarum*, Leipzig, 1883, no. 567.
3 *ClR* xvi. [1902] 290.
4 Dittenberger, no. 566.
5 *CGS* v. 214–224.
6 Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* 5; Hesych. *s.v.*
7 Porphyry, *de Abst.* ii. 44.
8 *CGS* iv. 268–284.
9 *Ib.* v. 383 f.

1 *CGS* i. 261 f.
2 The impurity of the stranger is illustrated by the phrase in Greek ritual inscriptions, ξένῳ οὐ θέμις.
3 Plut. *Vita Arist.* 20.
4 Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 1193.
5 See *ClR* xxvii. [1913] 90.
6 Diog. Laert. i. § 110. Crete was from time immemorial preeminent for its cathartic lore; Apollo had resorted thither to be purified, and an Orphic sect with a punctilious code of purity was early established there.
7 Cf. Dittenberger, nos. 566, 567.
8 Demosth. κ. Νεαίρ. §§ 85–87; cf. Stobæus, *Flor.* 74, § 60 (Meineke, 3, 64).

of loss of virginity than in other sex-indulgence,[1] and in the rules of ἁγνεία, or 'purity,' demanded of the visitants to the altar of Zeus Κύνθιος and Artemis Κυνθία at Delos the prescription of temporary chastity was put on the same footing with abstinence from salt-fish and meat.[2] The priest was concerned, not with society in general, but with safeguarding the purity of the temple. Therefore the sexual act, by which a stain was incurred that must be washed off before the person could safely approach the altar, became immeasurably more heinous if committed within the precincts of the temple; in the Greek legends that relate such exceptional incidents the whole community suffers divine punishment until expiation is made.[3]

The same feeling prescribed the law, which is practically universal, against the defilement of the temple or the temple-precincts with the evacuations of the human body; and some of the sacred codes carefully proscribed the entrance of cattle into the *temenos* for the same reason.[4] It may also explain the rule prevailing in some of the Greek temples against the wearing of sandals in the holy place, the rule which is universal in Muslim communities;[5] the source of it may be sought in the fact that the sandals are made of the skins of dead animals and that therefore they bring the impurity of death into the shrine.[6]

From the same prompting of primeval feeling, child-birth has been generally regarded as a strong source of impurity to both the woman and the man of the house,[7] not because it is the result of the sexual act, but because of its concomitants and the awe attaching to it; nor did the civilized Hellenic societies differ in this respect from the savage, though their tabu and rules of purification were much milder and easier. Such an event was not likely to happen within the temple itself; but we are familiar with the law that required the removal from Delos of any woman who was approaching her time, lest the island of the pure god should be polluted. The ordinary temple codes would be concerned only to prescribe the period during which the woman should be in tabu after travail;[8] it is noteworthy that in one example we find the abnormally long period of forty days imposed in the case of miscarriage, the more unnatural event producing the greater sense of strangeness and awe to which the idea of religious uncleanness is so closely linked. In the ἱεροὶ νόμοι of the Greek temples we might have expected to find under this head some rule of tabu concerning menstruous women, about whom the code of Leviticus is anxiously severe; but no direct evidence touching this matter has yet been found,[9] and probably none will be; for the Greek religious mind was more easy and tolerant than the Hebrew, and the vast number of Greek priestesses would make the application of any such rule very difficult.

As regards impure food, the Greek world was happily free from the severe scrupulousness of some other religions, nor was the distinction between clean and unclean animals natural to the Greek mind; the Greek inscriptions that preserve certain temple laws only indicate that it was desirable, in order to attain the ἁγνεία necessary for participation in religious service, to abstain for a short time beforehand from certain foods. What these were the various codes probably did not agree in determining, and it would be hard to find a common principle explaining all. In some we seem to detect the natural feeling that foods which left an unpleasant odour attaching to the person ought to be avoided before worship; hence would arise a tabu on pea-soup, salt-fish, cheese, and garlic;[1] for evil smells have much to do with the sense of uncleanness and with the belief in the presence of evil spirits. Again, the rule sometimes enjoined abstinence from certain animals because they were specially dear to the divinity, and the question of the origin of such rules involves a discussion of totemism (*q.v.*).

As speech suggests action, it was natural that the same law should apply to foul speech as to impure act, and that evil words should be considered to mar the purity of the divine service; hence the universal Greek rule that before the sacrifice began the command for εὐφημία should be proclaimed to the people; this word, at first meaning 'auspicious speech,' became indirectly a synonym for 'silence'; for, as it was difficult for each member in a vast concourse to be sure what word was auspicious and what not, it was best for general silence to prevail.[2]

In accordance with the same idea, the purity of the ritual would be disturbed if any quarrelling or altercation arose, for quarrelling suggests bloodshed. Hence during festivals of exceptional solemnity, such as the Eleusinia, by Attic religious law no legal action could be taken, no creditor could distrain, even a person aggrieved by the State might not lay a suppliant-bough on the altar; for all this implied strife.[3]

2. The means of purification.—The means of purification are of two kinds, (*a*) mechanical, and (*b*) religious or quasi-religious; and the two may be used together. Among the former we find in Greece, as elsewhere, such natural purgative media as water, fire, sunlight. To the examples already noted of the first may be added the Attic custom of purifying the bride with water from the sacred spring before the marriage ceremony.[4] It is not clear that there was any ceremonial purification of the new-born infant with water equivalent to our baptism. The need was fulfilled some days after birth by an interesting ceremony called ἀμφιδρόμια, 'the running around,' in which the new-born infant was carried at a running pace round the fire of the domestic hearth;[5] and with this we may compare the Eleusinian legend that the goddess Demeter tried to purge away by fire the impure and mortal parts of her fosterling Demophon.[6] The use of fire in certain Greek rituals, such as that of the Mænads who sprang through the fields with torches, may be supposed to have the cathartic effect of driving away evil influences or spirits,

[1] *CIR* xvi. 290.

[2] J. de Prott and L. Ziehen, *Leges Græcorum sacræ*, Leipzig, 1896–1906, ii. 1, nos. 91, 92.

[3] *Ib.*, Paris VII. XIX. 1–6.

[4] *Ib.*, Dittenberger, nos. 560, 561, 570. [5] *Ib.* no. 560.

[6] This is supported by the rule at Eresos that neither shoes nor any other leather garment were to be brought into the temple, and by the regulation of the mysteries at Andania that women should wear sandals and garments of wool (Dittenberger, no. [illegible]).

[7] [illegible] from Eresos (*CIR* xvi. 290); Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 382; Theoph. *Char.* xvi. 9; Porph. *de Abst.* iv. 16.

[8] At Eresos this seems to have been ten days; Censorinus, *de Die Nat.* 11, § 4, in a doubtful passage speaks as if the Greek rule excluded the woman eight days, forty before child-birth and forty after.

[9] The only Greek inscription known to the present writer dealing with these [illegible] refers to the cult of the Phrygian god Men (Dittenberger, [illegible]).

[1] Dittenberger, nos. 564 (inscr. from Delos, wine tabued), 567 (Lindos, pea-soup, goats' flesh, cheese), 633 (Sunium, Men Tyrannus, garlic and pork, Oriental influence); Prott-Ziehen, ii. 1, no. 91 (Delos, temple of Zeus Κυνθιος and Athene Κυνθία, all flesh forbidden), no. 92 (Delos, shrine of Artemis, salt fish). The rules of ἁγνεία in the mysteries were much severer than in ordinary cult (*e.g.*, Porph. *de Abst.* iv. 14; Libanius, *Orat. Corinth.* iv. 356 (Reiske).

[2] Cf. *Il.* ix. 171; Arist. *Thesm.* 294; Eur. *Hec.* 530.

[3] Andoc. *de Myst.* 110; cf. Demosth. κ. Μειδ. § 10 11, p. 517; cf. schol. Demosthenes, 22, § 68 (L. R. Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 287).

[4] Schol. Pind. *Ol.* xi. 58.

[5] Schol. Plat. *Theæt.* 160 E; I. Bekker, *Anecdota Græca*, Berlin, 1814 21, p. 207, l. 13.

[6] Hom. *Hymn. Demet.* 239 261.

though other explanations are possible, and we are told that the torch was used in the purification of cities.[1] The idea of the purity of fire is strikingly illustrated by the annual rite practised by some of the Greek states of renewing the purity of their hearth-fires, both public and private, by bringing new fire from some specially pure source, such as the altar of Apollo at Delos or of Hephaistos in the Academy at Athens.[2]

The use of incense at the sacrifice, as a mode of purifying the air by fumigation, which Greece adopted from Assyria in the 8th cent. B.C., had in the East a strong cathartic power against demons, who are generally supposed to be attracted by evil smells and banished by good; and, though its pleasing odour would cause it to be maintained merely as an attractive concomitant of worship, we may believe that at least the earlier Greeks were aware of its original significance.[3] Fumigation by sulphur had an obvious purificatory value; for, though its odour is not pleasant in itself, its pungency is such as to overpower other smells which might be dangerous; hence Homer calls it κακῶν ἄκος, 'a healing of evils.'[4]

The boughs of certain trees, probably on account of their smell or colour, possessed a cathartic value, such as the laurel at Delphi, which Apollo was supposed to have brought back from Tempe after his purification there from the blood of the Python,[5] the withy-bough, or λύγος, which the Attic women used as a purifying medium in the Thesmophoria,[6] and especially the squill, or σκίλλη, which was used in the general purification of cities and for beating the scapegoat in the Thargelia,[7] a ritual of purification or expulsion of evil; therefore the Arcadian rite in which the image of Pan was beaten by boys with squills must be interpreted as cathartic.[8] When the Athenians on one day in the Anthesteria stuck branches of buckthorn at the entrances of their houses, this was a mechanical means of purification, its object being to keep out ghosts;[9] for its thorns would naturally embarrass the ghost, as would the sticky pitch with which the citizens at the same time smeared their doorposts.

Thunder-stones in certain religious circles had a recognized cathartic value, which their mysterious origin and perhaps their connexion with fire would naturally attach to them.[10] Perhaps it was a stone of this kind that, according to a Bœotian legend, Athene dashed at Herakles to cleanse him of his madness after he had slain his children.[11] There is also an Arcadian story about the sacred stone called Zeus Καππώτας, evidently from its name meteoric, by sitting on which Orestes was healed from his madness.[12]

There is some evidence that gold, the pure and bright metal, was regarded as purificatory;[13] also among the mechanical cathartic media we must include amulets, which were as much in vogue in the later periods of classical antiquity for keeping ghosts and evil spirits at a distance as they were in Christendom; some of the Greek types, such as the φαλλός and the pointed finger have no connexion with religion; others might be carved in the form of divinities, but their working was mechanical magic.

The other type of purificatory methods consists of those that may with more right be called religious, as connected directly and indirectly with the worship of the divinities or with their influence. The use of certain animals—their blood or skin or whole carcass—was perhaps the most common method of purification from bloodshed and other taints. The fleece of the ram offered to Zeus Μειλίχιος, the god who had specially to be appeased when kindred blood had been shed, was used for the purification of the catechumens at Eleusis, upon whom the stain of blood rested and who knelt on the 'fleece of God,' the Διὸς κώδιον—as it was called—while the purgation ceremony was performed over them.[1] In the mysteries of Andania we hear of the 'ram of goodly colour' used for the purification of the initiates.[2] Plague might be averted from a city by a priest carrying round its walls the ram of Hermes.[3] But the most usual animal employed for purification was the pig, of special potency in the Eleusinian mysteries. The Athenian assembly was purified before its meeting by a ceremonial procession of little pigs;[4] and no other purgation was of such avail for the homicide as pig's blood. Hence on one vase representation we see Apollo himself purifying Orestes by holding over his head a pig dripping blood.[5]

Now, we have strong evidence that in the magic rites of purification practised by many modern savage societies the blood of animals—the goat, the bullock, or swine—has an intrinsic mysterious potency in itself, wholly unconnected with sacrifice or divine worship; and this primitive feeling may have survived here and there in historic Greece. But that this is in general a sufficient explanation of the Greek ceremonies is not credible. The ram's fleece and the pig's blood in Hellenic purifications were suggested by their intimate sacrificial association with the high god and the great goddesses and powers of the lower world; just as the αἰγίς, or goat-skin, of Athene, wherewith her priestess at Athens visited the newly-married couples for cathartic or fertilizing purposes, derived its efficacy from its contact with Athene.[6] In Hellas the pig was the sacred animal of Demeter and Kore, the powers of the world of spirits; the pig's blood was charged with a portion of their divinity, and therefore the homicide who had offended those powers could recover grace by its contact, in fact by a sort of communion with them.[7]

A different type of communion, serving a cathartic purpose, is suggested by a record of Plutarch that at Argos the period of mourning for a death in the family lasted thirty days, and that at the end of that time the mourners regained their original status by a sacrifice to Apollo; we may interpret this to mean that by communion with the pure god they finally wiped off their impurity.[8]

It has been observed that cathartic features, often overlaid and obscured by other accretions, attached to some of the complex Greek festivals; the Thargelia at Athens and elsewhere is an example of this, as the driving out of the scapegoat, which was its central act, effected a κάθαρσις of the whole community from sin and other evil.[9] Another curious but not unique accompaniment of certain Hellenic ritual and festivals was the employment of curses, ribaldry, satire, and abuse:

[1] Dio Chrys. ii. 144 (Dind.). [2] See above, p. 485.
[3] Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, pp. 233, 306.
[4] See above, p. 482b, note 2; cf. Theokr. *Id.* xxiv. 94 f.
[5] *CGS* iv. 294 f. [6] Pliny, *HN* xxiv. 59.
[7] Dio Chrys. *loc. cit.*; Tzetz. *Chiliad.* v. 736.
[8] Theokr. *Id.* vii. 106 f. [9] Phot. *s.v.* Μιαρὰ ἡμέρα.
[10] See J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 56, 61.
[11] Paus. IX. xi. 2 (the stone was called Σωφρονιστήρ, 'the restorer of reason').
[12] *Ib.* III. xxii. 1.
[13] See *ARW* x. [1907] 402 (inscr. from Kos, 3rd cent. B.C.—the priestess of Demeter is to purify herself from any pollution ἀπὸ χρυσίου).

[1] Suidas, i. 1, p. 1404, Διὸς κῴδιον; Eustath. p. 1935. 8; *CGS* i. 64–66.
[2] H. Sauppe, *Die Mysterieninschrift von Andania*, Göttingen, 1860 (*CGS* iii. 365 f.).
[3] Paus. IX. xxii. 1.
[4] Schol. Æschin. κ. Τιμαρχ. (Dind. p. 13); Photius, *s.v.* Περιστίαρχος.
[5] Roscher, iii. 983; cf. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 478.
[6] Suidas, *s.v.* αἰγίς.
[7] The hound used in the purification of the Bœotian army had also a chthonian significance.
[8] Plut. *Quæst. Græc.* 24. [9] *CGS* iv. 268–284.

in the solemn procession along the sacred way to Eleusis the aspirants to the mysteries were ceremonially abused and ridiculed by the crowd at one point;[1] in the Thesmophoria the men abused the women and the women the men;[2] and that such badinage had a cathartic purpose—the averting of νέμεσις or of evil spirits—is a reasonable theory confirmed by a text in Suidas that the people of Alexandria in old days purged the city of ghosts by going round in waggons to the doors of the houses and proclaiming the sins and misdoings of the individuals within.[3] This humorous procedure may be regarded as a kind of vicarious confession; the cathartic character of confession has been long recognized, but confession in our sense, a private and personal revelation of one's sins to a priest, was alien to the old religious system of Greece.[4] The purgative value of personal satire may have been one motive for its dramatic development in the Dionysiac festivals.

The religious aspect of the Greek system of purification was further emphasized by its close association with certain high divinities, especially Zeus Meilichios and Apollo of Delphi. The former deity belongs to the older stratum of Greek religion, but retained his function of granting or withholding purification from kindred and civic bloodshed throughout the later centuries.[5] The Delphic-Apolline κάθαρσις has been a subject of much dissertation and cannot be even summarized here.[6] But it may be noted that it was the claim of the Apolline priesthood to deal with the question of purification from bloodshed that led to the establishment of one of the most important law-courts in Athens to deal with the plea of justifiable homicide, whereby the civilized Athenian State approached the level of modern equitable law.[7] But, though power was thus taken out of the hands of the priesthood, the secular court at Athens that dealt with homicide remained strikingly religious in their procedure; and it is mainly their strong infusion of cathartic ideas concerning the miasma of blood that differentiates them from the modern tribunal.

A side question that may be glanced at under this section is whether Greek feeling about impurity was always associated with a belief in ghosts and evil demons as its cause. The question is important because an overstrong susceptibility to the terrors of the demon world can vitally affect the religious and scientific development of a race. We have seen that the sense of the impurity of bloodshed in Greece was connected with the fear of the ghost and that ghosts made a household impure; but we have no reason to believe that this fear or any clear belief in evil demons accounted to the Greek of the 'classical' period for the other sources of impurity. It is true that Porphyry declares that the chief motive for the various ἁγνείαι, or methods for obtaining purity, was to drive away the evil spirits which cling to certain kinds of food.[8] But Porphyry is no true witness for the earlier Greek thought, as he represents the later demonology that swept over the Mediterranean world from the East and found expression in Neo-Platonism and the Hermetic literature. But in the earlier Hellenic spiritual world there was no true dualism of good and evil spirits; nor was the average Hellene of the earlier centuries ghost-ridden or demon-ridden or much dependent on the exorcist for his peace of mind;

[1] *CGS* iii. 172. [2] *Ib.* iii. 104.

[3] Suidas, s. v. τὸ εἰς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἀκούμματα.

[4] It was demanded of the candidates for initiation into the Samothracian mysteries, but these were in origin non-Hellenic (see art. KABEIROI).

[5] *CGS* i. 64 ff. [6] *Ib.* iv. 295–306.

[7] *Ib.*; cf. Farnell, *Evolution of Religion*, London, 1905, p. 151 f.

[8] Eus. *Præp. Evang.* iv. 22.

and this is one of the most salient differences between Greece and Babylon.[1]

3. The idea of purity.—It remains to consider briefly certain religious and moral aspects of the idea of purity. This was expressed by the Greek ἁγνεία, meaning originally a state of the body and the person that fitted an individual for communion with the deity, and this state could be obtained by certain ceremonies and abstinences. It was required with peculiar insistence of the Greek priesthood and as a condition of participation in the greater mysteries, which offered to the initiated the promise of posthumous happiness. Hence the idea could gain ground that a state of purity, as it qualified a person in this world for divine fellowship, might also be a potent means of grace and salvation in the next. It was the Orphic sects that developed this view with the greatest zeal in Greece. They preached and practised a specially stringent code of abstinences, and based on this their claim to happiness in the next world. Ἔρχομαι ἐκ καθαρῶν was the Orphic password in the portals of Hades—'I come from the pure.'[2] But most of our ancient evidence concerning Orphism suggests a ceremonial and Pharisaic 'purity,' rather than an ethical, and an exclusive sect-prejudice which demanded even a separate burying-ground for the votaries. And we cannot allege that it was wholly or mainly from their influence that the ideal of purity of soul permeated at last the higher mind of Greece. Its earliest testimony is in the 5th cent. B.C., a phrase of Epicharmos, 'If thy mind is pure, thou art pure in all thy body';[3] and the elevated ethical thought that purity of soul was of more avail than all lustration and mere washing of hands was proclaimed later by the Delphic oracle and the Pythagorean literature near the beginning of our era;[4] and even some of the later codes of temple ritual adopted it in their formulæ.[5] This 'purity of heart' connoted to the Greek the absence of any stain on the conscience and of evil purpose or thought; it is important to note that the idea of sexual purity, which is often the sole significance of our English word, was not the dominant idea in the Greek ἁγνεία. The Greek philosophers and ethical teachers, who preached σωφροσύνη, or self-restraint, the Greek priesthood, who required occasional chastity under special circumstances, never preached chastity in general as an ideal of life. The Greek priest and priestess were usually married; chastity was enforced very rarely upon the priest, still rarely though more frequently upon the priestess, who was probably in this case considered the bride of a jealous god, and whose position was only temporary. The Greek priest had to be of unblemished body, and led the normal life of a citizen; the eunuch played no part in Greek religion, which was saved by its sanity from the morbid anti-sexual excesses of the Phrygian. Even the worship of Artemis, apart from its mythology, could not and did not attempt to establish among the Hellenic people any conception of the chaste life as spiritually more perfect and dearer to God.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited throughout, see G. F. Schoemann, *Griechische Alterthümer*[2], Berlin, 1861–63, ii. 337–354; P. Stengel, *Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer* (I. Müller, *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, v. iii.), Munich, 1890, pp. 106–114; E. Fehrle, *Die kultische Keuschheit im Alterthum*, Giessen, 1910; art. CHASTITY (Greek).

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[1] See Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, pp. 206–208.

[2] J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], Cambridge, 1908, ch. xi.

[3] Clem. Alex. *Strom.* p. 844.

[4] Farnell, *Evolution of Religion*, p. 130 f.; *CGS* iv. 212.

[5] U. von Wilamowitz Möllendorff, *Isyllos* (= *Philolog. Untersuchungen*, ix [1886]) 6; *Anth. Pal.* Adespota, ccxxxb; *CIG*, *Ins. Mar. Æg.* i. 789; Dittenberger, ii. 563.

PURIFICATION (Hebrew).—The term 'purification' is applied to those ritual observances by means of which an Israelite was absolved from the taint of uncleanness. This article deals exclusively with the Jewish laws and customs relating to purification; to estimate the methods by which the Israelite probably reached his conception of it, it will be necessary to refer to the other articles in this series.

W. Robertson Smith (*The Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 425 f.) points out that, 'primarily, purification means the application to the person of some medium which removes a taboo, and enables the person purified to mingle freely in the ordinary life of his fellows'; he shows that the normal life of the holy people was a holy life, and therefore 'the main use of purificatory rites is not to tone down, to the level of ordinary life, the excessive holiness conveyed by contact with sacrosanct things, but rather to impart to one who has lost it the measure of sanctity that puts him on the level of ordinary social life.' Speaking of blood as being one of the media of purification, he says (p. 427): 'In the most primitive form of the sacrificial idea the blood of the sacrifice is not employed to wash away an impurity, but to convey to the worshipper a particle of holy life. The conception of piacular media as purificatory, however, involves the notion that the holy medium not only adds something to the worshipper's life, and refreshes its sanctity, but expels from him something that is impure.'

We must first consider in what ways the uncleanness was produced or contracted, and then the observances by which purification was effected. And we shall see that there were ritual ordinances in regard both to persons and things and to a land defiled.

1. **Uncleanness and its penalties.**—Uncleanness was contracted in various ways.

(*a*) *Sexual uncleanness*, in the functions of reproduction (*e.g.*, Lv 18[20, 23f.], Nu 5[13ff.]), by issues in both sexes (Lv 15[4ff.]), in menstruation.

The functions of reproduction 'early excited the superstitious awe of mankind, which invested the organs and their activities with mysterious powers. Sexual intercourse was widely regarded as producing uncleanness' (A. S. Peake, in *HDB* iv. 827). The period of separation lasted seven days, and the uncleanness was communicated to the bed or seat, contact with either produced uncleanness until the evening, and required the washing of the body and clothes (Lv 15[18], 2 S 11[4]). It is worth observing that 'holiness' and 'uncleanness' were regarded as infectious and demanded similar ritual purification, and instances occur in which a condition of sacredness necessitated abstinence from sexual intercourse, as, *e.g.*, prior to the approach of Jahweh at the giving of the Law (Ex 19[15]); the holy bread of the sanctuary could be eaten by David's men in 1 S 21[4] only if they had strictly observed this abstinence; and the same regulation applied to men on active military service, for war was regarded as a sacred act (cf. the expression חַדֵּשׁ מִלְחָמָה [Jer 6[4] 22[7] 51[27f.]], from the custom of opening a campaign by sacrifice). The same idea obtains probably in the case of the first year of marriage, when a man is exempted from military service (cf. Lk 14[20]); and in Uriah's refusal in 2 S 11[8-13] to obey the king's order. In ordinary cases the uncleanness lasted till the evening (Lv 11. 15[5ff.]), but in menstruation, at the end of seven days from the cessation of the symptoms, in the evening, the candidate for purification performed an ablution both of the person and of the garments, and on the eighth offered two turtle-doves or two young pigeons, one for a sin-offering, the other for a burnt-offering. The same means of purification applied to males with abnormal issues. And so infectious was the condition in such cases that contact with such persons or contact with their clothing or furniture involved uncleanness and necessitated ablution on the day of the infection. In lesser cases of issue, such as *gonorrhea dormientium* in males, a condition of uncleanness was involved until the evening, and the ablution of the person and of the defiled garments was necessary.

(*b*) *In childbirth.*—J. G. Frazer (*GB*[3], London, 1900, iii. 463) informs us that 'women after childbirth and their offspring are more or less tabooed all the world over.' With regard to purification after childbirth, a difference was made between the birth of a boy and that of a girl; in the case of the latter the period of uncleanness was doubled, as it was commonly held that in this case the symptoms of infection continued much longer. In the case of the birth of a boy the mother is unclean for a week, during which time she would be infectious, and she continues 'in the blood of her purifying' for thirty-three days (during the latter period she would not presumably be infectious). During the whole forty days 'she shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into the sanctuary.' At the expiration of the forty days she was required to offer a yearling lamb for a burnt-offering, and a young pigeon or turtle-dove for a sin-offering. In the case of poverty she was permitted to substitute a second pigeon or turtle-dove (*e.g.*, Lk 2[24], Lv 12[8]).

(*c*) *Ceremonial uncleanness.*—(1) Caused by contact with death, by contact with carcasses of unclean animals (Lv 11[24ff.]) or with any carcass (17[15]), by eating a carcass (22[8]), by contact with the dead (Nu 6[9-12], Ezk 44[25]). Such contact involved uncleanness till the evening. The eating or the carrying of a carcass involved, besides uncleanness till the evening, the necessity of washing the clothes, and in some cases (Lv 17[15]) the washing of the person. In the case of a Nazirite coming in contact with the dead it was necessary to shave the head, and to offer two turtle-doves, for a sin-offering and for a burnt-offering, and a lamb for a trespass-offering.

(2) Caused by contact with one unclean by the dead (Nu 19[22], Hag 2[13]), or by contact with one unclean from whatever cause (Lv 5[3] 22[5]), or with some thing unclean (22[6]). The purificatory observance in these cases involved the ordinary condition of uncleanness until the evening, the confession of guilt, and the offering of a trespass- and sin-offering (5[5-10]).

(3) Caused by contact with creeping things (22[5]) or by eating creeping things, or with certain animals which were always unclean (11[26f.]: 'every beast which divideth the hoof, and is not cloven-footed, nor cheweth the cud . . . and whatsoever goeth upon his paws, among all manner of beasts that go on all four'). The purification in these cases was principally that of remaining unclean until the evening.

(4) Caused by leprosy. The full regulations are dealt with in Lv 13 and 14, in regard to the disease in the person, the garments, and the house.

The ceremonial of purification consisted of various elements. (α) After the examination by the priest, two living birds were to be brought, together with a rod of cedar (juniper)-wood, scarlet wool, and hyssop; one bird was to be killed over water from a running stream, and the leper was to be sprinkled seven times with the blood of the bird, signifying the new life imparted to one who was regarded as 'dead,' and the living bird was to be released, a symbol of the removal of the evil. (β) The washing of the clothes, shaving off all the hair, and bathing. It was also necessary to remain outside the house for seven days, and the shaving and ablutions were also repeated. (γ) On the 8th day the final offering was made at the 'Tent of Meeting,' and consisted of (i.) a guilt-offering and a consecration of the cleansed leper by the priest placing oil on parts of the body and pouring it on his head. 'This offering was a reparation to God for the loss of service during the time of his seclusion'—the blood of the victim (a lamb) and the oil being symbols of atonement and reconsecration (R. A. S. Macalister, in *HDB* iii. 98); (ii.) a second he-lamb as a sin-offering before readmission into the congregation; (iii.) a ewe-lamb as a burnt-offering and three-tenths of an ephah of flour as a meal-offering; special provision was made for the poor by the substitution of doves for the lambs, and a reduction in the quantity of the flour for the meal-offering.

(*d*) *Uncleanness in religious matters.*—Uncleanness might be caused by idols (Ezk 22[3]), conceived

as whoredom (Hos 5[3], Ezk 20[30f.]), by necromancers (Lv 19[31]), or by sacrificing children to idols (Ps 106[37-39]). The prohibition rings out clearly in such cases, but it is often disregarded. But what is the purification? Jahweh takes the matter into His own hands. The only purification possible is punitive; such sins need the smelting in the furnace of Jahweh's wrath: 'And ye shall know that I the Lord have poured out my fury upon you' (Ezk 22[22]). Sacred places were also defiled by Israel through the sacrifice of children (Lv 20[3], Ezk 23[38f.]), and Jahweh 'defiled' him thereby, and made him desolate to the end that Israel might 'know' Jahweh. Josiah 'defiled' the idolatrous places of worship by destroying them and making them unfit for use (2 K 23[8f.]). Death, stoning, excommunication, the opposition of the face of Jahweh, could be the only purification.

(*e*) *Uncleanness of land or country.*—Again, a land or country is defiled by the sexual impurities of the people, by spiritual whoredom (Lv 18[28], Ezk 23[17]). Israel is warned repeatedly against this contamination: it was the sin of the nations driven out by Jahweh; Israel had been and will be visited for such, and the very land itself 'vomiteth out her inhabitants.' The antidote is the observance of the divine statutes, the remembrance that Jahweh is their God, and the purifying punishment is the cutting off of the souls from among the elect people, and the raising up of the divine instruments of judgment, the Babylonians, etc. A land may also be defiled by the shedding of innocent blood (Nu 35[34]). The purifying punishment of the land is the shedding of the blood of the murderer; the land is sacred because Jahweh dwells among His people; there can be no expiation for the land except by the shedding of the murderer's blood. A land may not be defiled by allowing a murderer to hang upon the tree all night; the body shall be buried on the day of execution; the land is sacred because it is the inheritance of the people sacred to Jahweh (Dt 21[22f.]). A land was defiled by idolatrous practices (Jer 2[7], Ezk 36[17f.]); it was a goodly land that Israel had inherited, and the people, priests, and rulers had made it an abomination by idolatry; their way was before men, כְּטֻמְאַת נִדָּה; the outpouring of Jahweh's wrath and captivity among the heathen were the punitive, purifying remedies.

2. Purificatory media.—We have seen that there are various media of purification, and various acts of ritual to be observed. Speaking of cathartic sacrifices, Robertson Smith says:

'Purifications are performed by the use of any of the physical means that re-establish normal relations with the deity and the congregation of his worshippers—in short, by contact with something that contains and can impart a divine virtue. For ordinary purposes the use of living water may suffice, for, as we know, there is a sacred principle in such water. But the most powerful cleansing media are necessarily derived from the body and blood of sacrosanct victims, and the forms of purification embrace such rites as the sprinkling of sacrificial blood or ashes on the person, anointing with holy unguents, or fumigation with the smoke of incense, which from early times was a favourite accessory to sacrifices. It seems probable, however, that the religious value of incense was originally independent of animal sacrifice, for frankincense was the gum of a very holy species of tree, which was collected with religious precautions. Whether, therefore, the sacred odour was used in unguents or burned like an altar sacrifice, it appears to have owed its virtue, like the gum of the *samora* tree, to the idea that it was the blood of an animate and divine plant' (p. 426 f.).

The principal media of purification would thus be water, blood, ashes, herbs, incense, oil, shaving the hair, seclusion, confession, and punitive destruction.

(*a*) *Water.*—In regard to water it should be observed that sacred wells, fountains, and streams are often found near sanctuaries in Arabia, Phœnicia, and Syria.

Robertson Smith points out (p. 173) that 'the one general principle which runs through all the varieties of the legends [about sacred waters], and which also lies at the basis of the ritual, is that the sacred waters are instinct with divine life and energy . . . their main object is to show how the fountain or stream comes to be impregnated, so to speak, with the vital energy of the deity to which it is sacred.' And, again, in regard to the healing power of the sacred spring, he says (p. 183): 'Beyond doubt the first and best gift of the sacred spring to the worshipper was its own life-giving water, and the first object of the religion addressed to it was to encourage its benignant flow. But the life-giving power of the holy stream was by no means confined to the quickening of vegetation. Sacred waters are also healing waters.' And once more (p. 184): 'The healing power of sacred water is closely connected with its purifying and consecrating power, for the primary conception of uncleanness is that of a dangerous infection. Washings and purifications play a great part in Semitic ritual, and were performed with living water, which was as such sacred in some degree.'

(*b*) *Blood.*—For the cathartic nature of blood reference should be made to artt. SACRIFICE. Here we need only quote the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews (9[22]): 'Without shedding of blood is no remission.'

(*c*) *Incense.*—For incense used in purification see above, and Robertson Smith, p. 426 f. Cf. Nu 17[11f.] [EV. 16[46f.]] for its atoning efficacy.

(*d*) *Confession.*—For instances of confession cf. 1 K 8[33. 35], Ps 32[5], Pr 28[13], Ezr 10[1], Neh 9[3], Dn 9[4], Lv 16[21] (P) 26[40(ff.)], Nu 5[7] (P), Lv 5[5] (P), Neh 1[6] 9[2], Jos 7[19], and especially the ceremony of the scapegoat (*q.v.*). The idea is both corporate and individual, as these instances will show. For the idea of lamentation cf. Is 15[2], and Robertson Smith, p. 430 ff.

(*e*) *Ashes.*—The term אֵפֶר is frequently used as a token of humiliation and penitence (Job 42[6], Is 58[5], etc.). In Nu 19[9f.] (P) it denotes the mixture composed of the ashes of the red heifer and those of 'cedar wood, hyssop and scarlet,' and used for the preparation of the 'water of separation' (cf. G. B. Gray, *Numbers* [*ICC*], Edinburgh, 1903, pp. 241–247; for ashes of the red heifer cf. *HDB* iv. 207 f.).

(*f*) *Herbs.*—For the use of herbs, especially the hyssop, for the act of sprinkling blood in ceremonies of purification cf. Ex 12[22], Lv 14, Nu 19[6], Ps 51[7]; it is spoken of literally in 1 K 4[33]. G. E. Post (*HDB* ii. 442) identifies it with *Origanum Maru*, which is eminently adapted for the purpose of sprinkling. He points out that in certain of the ceremonial sprinklings, as in the case of leprosy, there was added to the bunch some cedar-wood, scarlet wool, and a living bird. Gray (p. 251) contends that it was used 'on account of its cleansing properties,' and he adds:

'The scarlet thread was presumably selected for its colour, for the same obscure reason that required the cow to be red; the cedar, perhaps, on account of its soundness and endurance, and its supposed property of imparting these qualities.' He reminds us that Pliny mentions 'numerous medicinal qualities with which cedar and hyssop were credited in the ancient world' (*HN* xvi. 76).

LITERATURE.—The authorities are cited throughout the article.

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PURIFICATION (Hindu).—There is nothing that an orthodox Brāhman, or Brāhmanized castes generally, will shun so much as external defilement. 'The predominating idea in their general conduct, and in their every action in life, is what they call cleanness,' says J. A. Dubois.[1] The rules regarding impurity (*āśaucha*) and purification (*śuddhi*) occupy, therefore, a conspicuous place in the Sanskrit law-books, and there are many special treatises in Sanskrit on this subject—the *Āśauchanirṇaya*, *Śuddhitattva*, *Śuddhimayukha*, etc. The horror or superstitious dread inspired by the sight of a corpse becomes particularly manifest in these rules. The impurity of a Brāhman caused by the death of a relative is declared to last in general ten days. Those who have carried out a dead relative and burnt his

[1] *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], p. 179

corpse are required to plunge into water, dressed in their clothes. During the period of impurity they must sleep on the ground and practise other austerities, and must give up all intercourse with other people in order to avoid defiling them. When the impurity is over, they must bathe, sip water, and make gifts to Brāhmans. Even those who have merely come near the smoke of a funeral pyre must bathe. Childbirth is an occasion of impurity in the same way and for the same length of time as death. Menstruating women are considered unclean, and their touch contaminates. They become pure after four days by bathing. A bath is also ordained for a man who touches such a woman, or the carrier of a corpse, or members of the lowest castes, or the corpses of certain animals, or one who has had his hair cut, or has vomited or been purged, etc. If the lower part of the body has been defiled by one of the impure excretions of the body, it is sufficient to cleanse the limb in question with earth and water. In minor cases of pollution, as after spitting or sneezing, one has to sip water. The ancient and popular story of King Nala shows how one neglecting such purification was supposed to be liable to be possessed by a demon. Even before birth men were believed to be tainted with uncleanness, and the various *saṁskāras*, such as tonsure, investiture with the sacred thread, marriage, etc., were regarded as purificatory ceremonies capable of removing that taint (Manu, ii. 27).

Purity in regard to food was considered even more essential than external purity, and the rules concerning allowed and forbidden food are very numerous (see FOOD [Hindu]). Drinking alcoholic drinks was reckoned as a mortal sin, like killing a Brāhman or incest. Any one offering spirits to a Brāhman was liable to capital punishment, and one offering forbidden food to such had to pay a heavy fine (*Viṣṇu*, xxxv. 1, v. 98 ff.). A Brāhman tasting the food or water of, or eating with, a Śūdra or other person of low caste had to perform a penance, such as the *parāka* (fasting for twelve days) or *sāntapana* (subsisting for one day on the five products of a cow, including her urine and dung, and fasting the next day). Another set of rules concerns the purification of inanimate objects (*dravyaśuddhi*). Spirituous drinks and the impure excretions of the body are declared to cause the worst kind of pollution. If an iron vessel has been defiled by them, it should be cleansed by heating it in fire; utensils made of stone or shells should be dug into a pit for seven days; objects made of horn, ivory, or bone should be cleansed by being planed; but wooden or earthenware vessels should be thrown away. In lighter cases of pollution the defiled object should be washed or sprinkled with water, or rubbed with earth or ashes, etc., the general rule being that earth and water should be constantly applied as long as the scent or moisture caused by an unclean substance continues on the defiled object. Specially purifying qualities are attributed to cows, the cow being considered a sacred animal. Thus not only are the five products of a cow (*pañchagavya*) swallowed, but a piece of ground may be cleansed by allowing cows to pass some time on it or by plastering it with cow-dung; stagnant water is pure if a cow has drunk from it; and even drops of water trickling from a cow's horn are said to have an expiatory power. The detailed provisions regarding a man's daily bath, which include the recitation of prayers and other religious ceremonies, also fall under the head of purificatory rules. Bathing in a sacred river is believed to be specially purifying, and the water of the Ganges is considered the purest of all kinds of water.

The Buddhists, Jains, and other religious sects have each their own code of defilements and purifications. Nor have these ancient notions of purity and impurity died out in modern India. Thus, according to Dubois (in India from 1792 to 1823), the Hindus immediately after a funeral 'hasten to plunge themselves into water . . . even the news of the death of a relative . . . produces the same effect.'[1] The ten days' period of mourning or impurity is still observed, and during all this time the mourners must neither take more than one meal a day, nor shave, nor perform domestic worship, nor use dainties or spices. A sick person is entirely excluded from some religious ceremonies. Married women near the period of confinement are taken into a small room or shed, where they are shut up for a whole month, during which period they must touch neither domestic utensils nor clothes, still less any person. The same rule is observed during the monthly sickness of a woman. The time of seclusion being over, she has to take a bath, or else a large quantity of water is poured over her head and body. If a woman miscarries, the family become impure for ten days. 'A scrupulous Brahmin,' Dubois says, 'would be defiled and obliged to bathe if by accident his feet should touch a bone, a piece of broken glass or earthenware, a rag, a leaf from which any one had eaten, a bit of skin or leather, hair, or any other unclean thing. . . . but any one may sit on the ground without fear of defilement, if the place has been recently rubbed over with cow-dung.'[2] Here we have a modern instance of the veneration paid to the cow. A mediæval instance of it may be found in al-Bīrūnī, where he speaks of Hindus returned to their homes from Muslim captivity, when, after fasting by way of expiation, they were buried in the dung, stale, and milk of cows for a certain number of days, and given similar dirt to eat afterwards. The fear of personal contact with people of a different caste is gradually dying out in this age of trams and railways, but there are even now depressed castes—*e.g.*, in Kashmīr—which are obliged to live outside of the villages, and must make a sign to persons of high caste from a distance so as to avoid meeting them (see PARIAH). Many of the ancient rules regarding food and commensality are still in force, and nothing is so apt to cause loss of caste as a breach of these rules. The rumour that the British Government was conspiring to rob the Sepoys of their caste by greasing the cartridges of the guns with offensive fat was among the causes of the Mutiny of 1857. Earthenware vessels have to be destroyed in case of defilement, whereas metal ones may be purified by washing.[3] It is true that Brāhmans and rich Śūdras are gradually abandoning the use of earthenware vessels for cooking. Silk and cloth made of the fibres of certain plants are and were believed to remain always pure. It is for this reason that the ancient Brāhman hermits used to wear clothes made of such material, and that a modern Brāhman doctor, when feeling the pulse of a Śūdra, first wraps up the patient's wrist in a small piece of silk so that he may not be defiled by touching his skin.[4] The prevailing belief in the sanctity and purifying power of Ganges water is too well known to require illustration.

LITERATURE.—*The Institutes of Viṣṇu*, tr. J. Jolly in *SBE* vii. [Oxford, 1900]; *The Laws of Manu*, tr. G. Bühler, *ib.* xxv. [do. 1886]; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], tr. H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906; J. Wilson, *Indian Caste*, Bombay, 1877; S. C. Bose, *The Hindoos as they are*, Calcutta, 1881; al-Bīrūnī's *India*, tr. E. Sachau, 2 vols., London, 1888; *BG*, *passim*.

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PURIFICATION (Iranian).—In the less developed religions of the world purification means

[1] *Loc. cit.*
[2] *Ib.* p. 182 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 181.
[4] *Ib.* p. 181 f.

the expulsion of the contagion of a ritual pollution. In higher religions it is above all the liberation from an ethical depreciation. Mazdæism combines both conceptions. The annulling of sin is primarily to be obtained by outweighing the evil deeds, evil words, evil thoughts by good deeds, good words, good thoughts (*huṣkyaothna*, *hūkhta*, *humata*). A penitential formula (*paitita*) was also recited before the *dastūr*.[1] The term *paitita* expresses the balance of merits and sins,[2] and in later texts seems to be applied to the state of mind of the penitent renouncing the sin, and saying, 'Henceforth I will no more commit the sin.'[3] But there is no remission—or, more exactly, neutralizing—of the sin unless by good actions in compensation for the evil inflicted on good creation by the evil act. In the *Vendīdād* these works are enumerated; they consist in building bridges, gifts to the priests, purification of defiled good beings, etc. More often regular penances are provided, in the form of strokes by means of a whip of discipline (*ashtrā*, *sraoshō-ḳarana*). The rate of strokes is given in several passages of the *Vendīdād*. In later times, as a substitute for the strokes, silver coins were paid by the penitent, and a scale of fines was established.

Often, also, spells had to be recited, expiatory offerings had to be presented, or purifications performed;[4] and here we have prescriptions connected with the more materialistic conception of purity and purification, as we find it in lower religions, where sin is but one of the many pollutions that may be inflicted upon man and have to be wiped off by means of some ritual process.[5] Mazdæism gives to purity and purification as much importance as any lower religion, because those conceptions have been made to fit into the dualistic system. Pollutions come from contact with impure beings or are ascribed to demons, exactly as in the beliefs of primitive people, but they are considered at the same time as an achievement of Ahriman, the evil spirit, creator of the evil creation, source of every evil, material or moral. When those defilements are suppressed by means of water, *gōmēz*, and other substances, or by rituals completely similar to those used for that purpose in all magical proceedings, it is inasmuch as these elements are endowed with the purifying power emanating from Ormazd, the producer of good creation. In all this we have to do with aspects of the great struggle between the two principles. The material and the moral aspects of purity are wholly intermingled in Mazdæan conceptions.

The verb *yaozhdā*, 'to purify,' is akin to Lat. *jus* and Skr. *yosh*. It refers to all that is fine, good, or right—all that is as it should be. In the *Gāthās* the word is found only once and means 'to accomplish,' 'to make perfect,' 'to put in good shape.' It is used of the *daēna*, the conscience, the soul of the faithful, while in the *Vendīdād* we find it used of the body and of all kinds of material beings susceptible of being polluted.

Darmesteter[6] compares this double meaning to that of 'cleanliness' in English, which is a moral as well as a material virtue—'cleanliness is next to godliness'; and he adds with much reason that, for a Zoroastrian, cleanliness is an aspect of godliness, since it is the state of a being belonging to Ahura Mazdāh. In most cases one has to do with pollutions that are real infections or defilements. But they not only soil; they also put one in the power of the evil spirits. Impurity most nearly resembles the contagion of a disease; it extends by contact and dooms the victim to perdition unless it be redeemed by a purification that gives it back to the realm of Ormazd. The conception of purity comes fairly near to that of health. All that is unhealthy or abnormal in the body is impure: disease, menstruation, childbirth, death of the whole body or of parts of it; and, after all, sin is a kind of disease also—a folly in contrast with wise conduct (*ārmatay*) or the right kind of mind (Vohu Manah).

It is therefore not surprising that Mazdæism professes that wise conduct and good teaching purify man's life (*Yaozhdao mashyāi aipi zanthem* [*Ys.* xlviii. 5]).

The worst impurity is that which arises from contact with a corpse. For a Mazdæan, to die was to pass into the power of the *druj* Nasu (νεκύς). Hence it is necessary to minimize the evil produced by this demon by protecting all good beings and substances from its power, and, if contact has taken place, it is urgent that the defiled substance should be freed as soon as possible from the grasp of the *druj*. The first process of purification applied in that case is the *sag-dīd*, or the look of a dog, preferably of one with yellow ears and four eyes (*i.e.* with spots near the eyes). This, however, is not sufficient to destroy the impurity inherent in the corpse, and every person and thing that has come in direct or even indirect contact with it must be purified. The contact is greater on soft and wet ground and where decomposition has set in. The corpse is therefore deposited on a flat stone around which the *nasā-sē-lār* traces with a knife three deep circles to prevent the Nasu from infecting the surroundings. The corpse has to be stripped of its soft and liquid parts by the action of vultures or other animals of the evil creation. It is therefore deposited in some remote and dry place far from the cultivated fields or on a *dakhma* till it is completely dried up. Then it is presumed to be no longer infectious. All kinds of purification are prescribed for the people who perform the duties connected with the dressing of the corpse and its transportation. See, further, art. DEATH, etc. (Parsi).

Next to death, the worst impurity is menstrual blood. The *dashtān*, 'woman during her courses,' must be kept indoors in a special room (Pahl. *armēsht-gāh*), where food is handed to her from a distance by means of a stick. The woman after childbirth is treated in the same way, and must be confined during forty days in the *armēsht-gāh*, which greatly increases the mortality among Parsi women.

All that is detached from the body, being dead, is impure. Hence the ceremonies prescribed for cutting the hair or the nails (*Vend.* xvii. 1–9). This is also the reason why the priest wears the *paitidāna*, or piece of gauze, before his mouth when he comes near the sacred fire—lest he should soil it by his breath.

All that has been touched by one of the defiling substances has to be purified, and the greater part of the *Vendīdād* is devoted to the description of the ritual processes securing the purification of all kinds of elements or materials, such as wood (*Vend.* vii. 28), corn (*ib.* 32), water (vi. 26), fire (viii. 73 ff.), earth (vi. 1–24), the house of a dead man (viii. 3) or the road followed by the carriers of the corpse (*ib.* 14, 22), household utensils (vii. 74), clothes (*ib.* 10 ff.), and animals—*e.g.*, the cow that has eaten from a corpse (*ib.* 76 f.). Soft and porous substances require a more complete cleansing than hard and dry ones, and purifications are more elaborate in winter than in summer.

The cleansing substances are the same as are used in all rituals of the same kind, viz. above all, water, and next to it *gaomaēza* (Pahl. *gōmēz*),

[1] Cf. L. C. Casartelli, *The Philosophy of the Mazdayasnian Religion*, Lect. iv., Bombay, 1889, p. 169.
[2] C. Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterbuch*, Strassburg, 1904, s.v.
[3] *Shayast la-shayast*, viii. 8; Casartelli, p. 170.
[4] *Vend.* xv., 7 ff.
[5] Cf. art. MAGIC (Iranian).
[6] *Zend-Avesta*, ii. p. x.

or urine of cattle. A *rivāyat* quoted in Darmesteter (*Zend-Avesta*, ii. 266) explains that, when Jamshēd (Yima Xshaēta) extracted Tahmuruz from the body of Ahriman, he had soiled his hands; but, a drop of *gōmēz* having by chance fallen on them, they immediately recovered their fine aspect. Earth is also mentioned at times as a purifying element (*Vend.* vii. 14, 74).

As for fire, it is generally considered to be the purifying element *par excellence*; it has been exalted so high in Zoroastrianism, as the purest offspring of the good spirit, that it cannot be used as a purifier. It must never come in contact with anything impure.

For some specially serious cases of contamination there was provided an extensive ceremony—the *barashnūm*, or purification of the nine nights, described in *Vend.* viii. 35–72 and ix. 1–57. The ground had to be prepared by cutting down trees in a dry place. Then holes had to be dug, and furrows drawn. The unclean person had to walk to the holes, recite a prayer, and be sprinkled with water and *gōmēz* on all parts of his body in succession.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works mentioned throughout, see J. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, 3 vols., Paris, 1892–93 (esp. the introd. to the *Vendīdad*); C. P. Tiele, *Gesch. van den Godsdienst in de Oudheid*, Amsterdam, 1895–1901, ii.; H. Oldenberg, *Die iranische Religion* (=*Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I. iii. pt. i.), Leipzig, 1906, p. 77; F. Spiegel, *Die traditionelle Litteratur der Parsen*, do. 1860; W. Geiger, *Ostiränische Kultur im Altertum*, Erlangen, 1882.

ALBERT J. CARNOY.

PURIFICATION (Jain). — **1. Introductory remarks.**—The Jains of to-day are rightly proud of the old saying that a Jain might be trusted in the zenana of a king; so great, indeed, was their character for purity that it won for them the epithet of *paraghara pavesā*, 'worthy to enter another's house.' There can be little doubt that this splendid reputation was due to the ethical character of their religion, though even to-day the ethical nature of Jainism is insufficiently realized by European scholars, and too little appreciated even by the Jains themselves. It is in accordance with this ethical tradition that sins against purity of any kind are never glossed over, but always treated with the greatest severity. Adultery is accounted one of the most heinous sins, equivalent to taking life (*jīva himsā*), and the layman or monk who breaks the vow of chastity is held to have broken all his vows. Every sin of impurity, whether it lie in thought, word, or deed, or in causing others to offend against the law of chastity in thought, word, or deed, must be confessed to one's director (*guru*) as soon as possible, and the penance imposed by him performed. The usual penalty for unchastity is for a monk nothing short of expulsion from the order, and he must undergo long fastings before he can hope to obtain reordination. A layman guilty of impurity is held to have slipped back on the ladder of rebirths and fallen below the stage not only of being a Jain but even of being human, and he must observe the strictest fasts with the idea of torturing the body which led him to commit such crimes before he can win back again the birthright which he has forfeited. If the sin be not repented of and confessed, the most hideous torments await the offender in a future rebirth as a hell-being. With regard to women who sin against the law of chastity, a Jain husband can never divorce his wife, but, if she prove unfaithful, he would very probably separate from her, and though, as a rule, the practice of taking a second wife is much looked down on, it would be considered pardonable in such a case, and the woman would look forward with dread to being widowed in her next existence.

The idea of purity differs of course for a monk and a layman. The monk must observe the most rigorous celibacy, never looking at, thinking of, speaking to, or touching a woman, never even sitting where a woman has sat or stroking a female animal. It is interesting to notice that these laws are enforced in their sacred books not only by every religious sanction present and future, but also by appealing to the natural laziness of the monk, warning him of the burdens and cares of married life.

A layman vows to maintain his wife in all honour and loyalty and to renounce the society of other women. It is customary for a devout layman to observe celibacy before any of the great Jain festivals or fasts, before going on pilgrimage, and for twenty days in every month, and, as he advances in holiness, he at last renounces entirely the society of his wife (*brahmacharya pratimā*).[1] All unnatural sins against purity are punished in this life by heavy penances, or after rebirth by the most hideous tortures.

The Jains are also proud of the purity of their worship, for courtesans are not to be found connected with their temples, nor does their religion permit any *śakti* or *vāma mārga* orgies, and their entire sacred literature contains nothing approaching to the Tantras of the Hindus.

With regard to ritual purity and purifications, the Jains themselves say that they have borrowed their rites from the Hindus and especially from the Brāhmans; so it will be interesting to compare the two systems on this point. A Jain is always most anxious to maintain ceremonial purity, for only when in a state of ritual holiness can he go to temple or monastery, or perform any of his religious duties, such as meditation, adoration, or reading the sacred books; but ceremonial pollution is very difficult to avoid, accruing, as it does, in so many minor ways,[2] and especially on the occurrence of any birth or death in a family.

2. Birth impurity (*vṛddhi sūtaka*).—Before the birth of the first child the young mother goes to her own old home, where she must stay for at least a month and a quarter after the child's birth; during all this time she is considered ceremonially impure and 'untouchable,' and her husband is not allowed to see her or to enter the house where she is living.[3] The child, when born, is considered impure, and the midwife bathes it with all possible speed, for, if it dies before being thus purified, it might have to be buried somewhere in the compound of the house instead of in the children's cemetery reserved for infants dying when less than eighteen months old, which is situated near the burning ghāt.

There are four distinct stages in the progress of the mother back to ceremonial purity:

(*a*) *On the tenth day* after the child's birth she bathes in the house and on the very bed on which she gave birth to the child; her forehead is marked with an auspicious mark (*chandalo*) in red powder, and a change is made in her diet. She is not allowed to touch milk during the whole forty days of her impurity, and the first day after the child's birth she has to observe as a fast; if she rebels very much against this, she may be given a native dish called *rāba* (a gruel made of wheat-flour, *ghī*, and molasses). Up to the tenth day she is allowed to eat only a favourite Jain dish called *śiro* (the same ingredients as *rāba*, but less liquid), but after the tenth day she may take bread and the curried vegetables which she so keenly relishes, and several different kinds of gruel.

(*b*) *On the twentieth day* the mother again bathes in the house, and on the same bedstead, which is then washed and put in the sun; and the earthen floor and sometimes the walls of the room are freshly plastered with the usual mixture of clay, cow-dung, and water. An auspicious mark is again put on her forehead (she had not been allowed to do this during the intervening days), and, though she is still 'untouchable,' and must sit apart and eat apart, she may now be allowed to sweep the house, but

[1] See M. Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, p. 223.

[2] *Ib.* p. 258.

[3] If, however, he is very anxious to see his first-born, it may be brought outside the house for him to look at after it is twelve days old.

must not go outside (unless the family is so poor that she must help with the work). On this particular day she may again eat *śiro* and, according to some Jains, she may now begin to tell her beads.

(*c*) *On the thirtieth day*, or on the Thursday nearest to the thirtieth day after the child's birth, the mother bathes in the ordinary bathing-place of the household, whether it be in a room or in the courtyard, and again is decorated with the auspicious mark and given *śiro* to eat; she is now considered less unclean and allowed to go outside the house, though she still must not touch any one or go to the nunnery or temple.

(*d*) *On the fortieth day*, or on some convenient Sunday, Tuesday, or Thursday nearest the fortieth day, the mother bathes again in the household bathing-place, and is at last considered ceremonially pure; she is now allowed to touch the household water-pots, the family hearth, and the hand-mill, and may cook for her friends. If during these forty days she has used earthen pots, they will be thrown away, but the brass vessels that had been kept apart for her use will be cleansed by fire or ashes, and taken into general use. After bathing, the mother is marked with the *chāndalo* and is given *śiro* or some specially dainty dish to eat, perhaps *kaṁsāra* (a dish resembling *śiro*, but not cooked with *ghī*). She then goes to her mother-in-law's house (which is probably her husband's house also), does obeisance at the feet of her mother-in-law, and offers that much-feared lady a present of money, which varies according to her purse. Very often the daughter-in-law gives two rupees if a son has been born to her, and eight annas if it is only a daughter. After this her husband may permit her to return to her own mother's house for a varying period lasting probably six months—this seems the 'correct' thing to do, as it is the Brāhman custom—or he may summon her at any time.

Among most of the Jains the child's father is considered impure for ten days, and for that length of time he is not allowed to go to the temples or perform any religious duties; and all his near relatives that bear his surname are in the same state of ceremonial impurity (though, unlike the Brāhmans, they are allowed to celebrate weddings during that period). The impurity is removed at the end of ten days by simply bathing in the ordinary way. In cases of necessity, however, the father and his relatives may purify themselves by ordinary bathing the day after the child's birth.[1] Though the Jains are anxious that the mother should not die before the purification is complete, yet, if she should not survive, they do not have to perform that pathetically tragic rite of bathing the young mother's dead form one hundred and eight separate times, as the Nāgar Brāhmans do. It is good to know that human nature is stronger than tradition, and the writer's Indian friends have assured her that, if their wives were to die in childbirth, they would now break through every custom and insist on being with them at the last.

3. Death defilement. — The defilement which death brings on a household (*mṛtyu sūtaka*) is far heavier than that of a birth. During the time the pollution lasts the Jains, like the Brāhmans, can celebrate no marriage, hear no music, eat no sumptuous meals, and perform no religious duties, and they must wear only white turbans, but, unlike the Brāhmans, they need not shave off their moustaches.

When a Jain is dying, he is placed on the floor, which has been newly plastered with cow-dung and clay (if Hindu influence is strong, the cow-dung will probably have been mixed with water from the river Ganges), and the patient is so arranged that his head is towards the north and his feet towards the south. Great attention is paid to the purification of the dying man's soul, and, with this in view, he is urged, even before he has been placed on the floor, to take certain vows, especially that of religious suicide (*santhāro pāṭha*),[2] in which he promises never to eat or drink again while he lives; he also gives away much in alms for feeding cattle and the poor; and, the moment he dies, his heirs offer further alms in his name. Still with the object of purification, a lamp fed with melted butter is lit close to the man when he is on the point of death, and is kept constantly burning till the dead body is carried out of the house. The corpse is not usually bathed, but, in the case of a woman dying while her husband is still living, the big toe of her right foot is bathed, and her forehead is smeared with red powder.

Every one in the house is considered unclean; the men of the family go with the corpse to the burning-ground and bathe before returning.[1] The women leave the house to go and bathe in a river or tank after the corpse has been carried out, but they must be careful to return before the men. The period of ceremonial impurity lasts for seven or nine days, and is broken on a Monday, Thursday, or Friday nearest the seventh day, when the men all go to the river and bathe, and then shave for the first time since the death occurred. The women bathe in the house, wash their hair, and change their clothes.[2] The house has also been impure during the week, and no outsider would drink water in it; but now it is all cleansed and re-plastered with cow-dung. The room in which the person died is re-plastered with special care, and, if Hindu influence is strong, it will be further purified by having cow-urine sprinkled on the floor. All the clothes worn during the seven days have to be washed, the vessels used purified with ashes and water, and the cooking-hearth cleansed with water and cow-dung. The funeral ceremonies end with a feast to all the caste-fellows, whether Vaiṣṇava, Jain, or Svāmi Nārāyaṇa by religion.

4. Special impurity of women.—The birth and death *sūtaka* are the two great periods of impurity for a man, but a woman contracts ceremonial pollution more frequently, and is regarded as untouchable for four days in every month. During this time she must sit apart either on a thick cloth or on a hassock made of sacking, and, though she may sleep on a bed, it must not have the mattress spread over it, but only sacking or thick cloth. She must eat apart, and may not touch copper or bronze vessels, though she is allowed to use brass or crockery, but all the vessels that she touches are regarded as impure and have to be cleansed at the end of the four days. She should not go out of the house, if she can possibly avoid doing so, and of course cannot visit temple or nunnery; nor may she perform any of her religious duties, such as meditation or confession, even in the house. During these days she must not cook for the family or touch the hearth or the water-pots. At the end of the fourth day she bathes, changes her clothes, and washes her hair. On the occasion of first attaining puberty, however, the purification ceremonies are more elaborate. The girl, who, though married, is probably still living in her mother's house, bathes after the fourth day and puts on a simple green bodice and red *sārī* (two auspicious colours) that her mother has prepared for her, and then starts out for her mother-in-law's house; but, just before she leaves, her mother puts some molasses in her mouth. Arrived at her destination, she makes her reverence at her mother-in-law's feet and offers her two rupees; and the old lady, if gracious and kindly, presents her daughter-in-law with a more elaborate green bodice fashioned of silk. Then the mother-in-law invites her to a feast of specially nice food, which will include a dish of wheat, treacle, and *ghī* (*lāpasī*). The girl can be summoned any time after this to go and live with her husband in her mother-in-law's house, and the sewing of the trousseau will be hastened, for she must not go till this is completed. Prob-

[1] The mother's own brothers are not considered ceremonially impure, though they may have been in the house where the child was born.

[2] See Stevenson, p. [illegible]

[1] It is interesting to notice that, though the body may be carried out through the ordinary house-door, there are usually certain city-gates through which a corpse may not be borne.

[2] Near relatives, even if living in a distant village, are obliged to go and bathe in a stream immediately after hearing of the death.

ably, despite all the bowing that she has done and will do at her mother-in-law's feet, the last thing that her own mother will whisper in her ear will be the proverb, 'Don't be as bitter as a *nīm*-tree, or you will be spat out; but don't be as sweet as sugar, or you will be eaten up [with the work they will put on you].'

5. Accidental pollution.—A Jain, however, may also acquire pollution in his ordinary life, and especially through what he eats and drinks. The worst fault that a man can commit is to eat meat, and, if this were done openly and persistently, he would be put out of caste absolutely and never be allowed to eat with his equals again. If, however, it were done accidentally and repented of, the offender would confess it to his director and have to observe very strict fasts before he would be regarded as purified. The rule is the same for drunkenness: even moderate wine-drinking is absolutely prohibited on account of the entry of life by fermentation, though eating opium and smoking tobacco (while not approved of) do not render a man impure.

Pollution is also acquired by touching an out-caste (an untouchable), and, after sitting beside one in a train or brushing against one, Jains purify themselves either by bathing and changing their garments, or, if less particular, by just sprinkling water over their clothes; village Jains are content with simply touching a Muhammadan by way of purification. If an out-caste passed very near their house or accidentally entered a room, Jains would purify it by sprinkling water, and, if he brought them wood, they would sprinkle water on the faggots; in the same way, after walking through an out-caste quarter of the town, they would purify themselves by bathing or by sprinkling. The rule seems to be that a very particular Jain purifies himself by immersion or, rather, affusion, and a less strict one does it just as effectually by aspersion—an interesting parallel to the varying methods of Christian baptism.

Bronze and copper vessels are treated with great respect; if they should, despite every precaution, be defiled, they are put into the fire to be cleansed. Brass vessels can be purified with fire or more simply with ashes, crockery by being washed in warm water; but the writer was shown in one house the glass that a Muhammadan visitor frequently drank from, kept in a special niche in the garden wall. In schools, in the same way, the vessels used by Muhammadans are kept separate from those belonging to Hindu or Jain children.

If the whole of a house be defiled—by a dog bringing a bone into it or a crow dropping some meat in the courtyard—the householder summons a Muhammadan or some meat-eating Hindu, such as a Koḷī, to take it away and himself purifies the house by sprinkling water and cow-urine where the meat had lain.

Unlike the Hindus, the Jains do not become impure during an eclipse, but, where Vaiṣṇava influence prevails, they throw away their earthen cooking-pots when the eclipse is over and bathe in a river.

Like the Hindus, the Jains perform ceremonial bathing and teeth-cleansing every morning, and until their teeth have been rubbed with the tooth-stick they will not swallow a drop of water.[1] Monks and nuns, once they are professed, may never bathe, lest they should injure the water-*jīva*. Naturally cleanly ascetics, however, evade this by rubbing themselves over with a cloth which has been moistened in warm water. But they must never clean their teeth. Before they are professed, they bathe in the ordinary way, and then their heads are shaved except one lock of hair which they must themselves pull out. Every year afterwards they have to pull out their hair[1] before the great annual confession—a custom which is believed to be peculiar to the Jains.

[1] Cutch and Mārwār Jains do not, like other Jains, bathe daily as a religious duty.

The idols in the temples are also bathed every morning, but the most elaborate idol-bathing is that which takes place every twenty-five years at Śrāvaṇa Belgolā (see art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS [Jain]). Before a man can worship in a temple, he must bathe; and, if he wishes to penetrate the inner shrine, he must bathe at the temple and don the special pure clothes provided at the cost of the community and kept in a particular room attached to the temple. In Kāthiāwār the Jains seem to be able to go to England without going through any special purification on their return, but in other places where Vaiṣṇava influence is strong a Jain goes and bathes in a sacred river, such as the Ganges, the Godāvari, or the Narbadā, and, under the pressure of Hindu opinion, he might even sip the fivefold nectar which consists of butter, curds, milk, sugar, and honey. He would also probably have to go on pilgrimage to Pālitānā, Girnār, or some other sacred place. All this trouble, however, is sometimes avoided by a well-understood and useful fiction—the man simply giving out that he is going on pilgrimage, and then quietly proceeding to Europe, but returning *via* the pilgrim resort.

E.g., a well-known Jain gentleman was travelling in Germany at the outbreak of the war and suffered all sorts of difficulties before he was able to leave for India. He was careful, however, to return to his native place by way of a sacred hill; and it was apparently assumed that he had spent the whole time there, though his hearers must have found it difficult to reconcile the stirring adventures, alarms, and excursions under the Kaiser's tyranny, which he openly recounted to every one he met, with the peaceful happenings incident to a pilgrimage, which ought to have composed his story. Anyhow, no purification was demanded.

LITERATURE.—The information contained in the above article has been derived directly from Jain informants. See also the present writer's *Notes on Modern Jainism*, Oxford, 1910, *The Heart of Jainism*, do. 1915; and *SBE* xxii. [1884] and xlv. [1895].

MARGARET STEVENSON.

PURIFICATION (Japanese).—As cleanliness or purity is the dominating ideal of Shintō, rites and ceremonies of purification make up a considerable portion of the 'way of the gods.' The most important among these are the two ceremonies known as *harai* and *misogi*.

Their origin is said to date from pre-historic times as far back as Izanagi and Izanami, the male and female creators of the land of Toyo-ashi-hara, as Japan was anciently called.

Izanami died and departed to the land of *yomi*, or darkness; her husband followed her and, behold, 'her body was already putrid, maggots swarmed over it . . . and Izanagi, greatly shocked, exclaimed, "What a hideous and polluted land I have come to unawares!" So he speedily ran away.' He threw aside the stick with which he had touched the dead, and his belt, garments, waist-cloth, hat, and bracelet, thus sweeping off everything that had clothed his body. The action was called *harai*, literally the 'sweeping off.' Thereafter he jumped into the sea and cleansed his body with its water. This was termed *misogi*, 'watering' the body, in token of the removal of all impurities. Thus *harai* and *misogi* became integral parts of court ceremony and consequently of Shintō ritual.

There are various kinds of *harai*, named according to their purpose and importance: *yoshino-harai*, *akuno-harai*, *ō-harai*, *kamino-harai*, *nakano-harai*, *shimono-harai*, etc. *Yoshi* means 'good,' and *yoshino-harai* is to secure the good; *aku* means 'evil,' and *akuno-harai* is to avoid evil; *ō* means 'great,' and *ō-harai* is the most important of all; *kami*, *naka*, and *shimo* mean respectively 'upper,' 'middle,' and 'lower,' thus indicating their grade of importance.

The *ō-harai*, or great purification, is a ceremony intended to cleanse from all the evils and pollutions experienced since its last celebration. It is observed twice a year (at the end of June and the

[1] Stevenson, p. 165 f.

end of December), when the official in charge, after the proper purification of his own body, offers flax and a sword. The most important part of the ceremony is the reading of the formula known as the *Nakatomi-no-norito*, so called from the fact that in the beginning the family of Nakatomi had charge of the reading. The formula first announces to all whom it may concern the celebration of the ceremony, then enumerates the evils and impurities which have been incurred, and concludes with the statement that these all shall be purged away by the virtue of the rite.

The *ō-harai* was usually performed at the southern gate of the royal palace in Kyoto. Special messengers were sent by the court to all parts of the empire, and the same ceremony was performed in various Shintō temples. Regulations governing the details of the ceremony were formulated from time to time, but these tended not to perpetuate the ceremony but to hasten its decline. For several hundred years previous to the restoration of 1868 the observance of these ceremonies was much neglected by the court; but with the restoration, together with many old forms, they were again brought into more or less prominence.

Special occasions of public calamity, such as the outbreak of pestilence, famine, or destructive fires, also call for the observance of *ō-harai*. Local and individual *harai* are at times observed for various reasons upon a much smaller scale. Individual *harai* has at times been looked upon as a penalty for certain offences, and in A.D. 801 was carried to such an extent that the court issued an ordinance regulating its use.

Saikai, or *monoimi*, is a form of self-purification in preparation for worship. When the worship has been duly performed, the worshippers discontinue the *saikai* by a ceremony of *kai-sai*, dismissing the *sai*. While under *saikai*, certain things are forbidden, such as attending funerals, visiting the sick, sentencing a criminal or putting him to death, playing upon a musical instrument, or taking part in any impure or desecrating act. The length of the observance may vary from one day to a month, according to the importance and nature of the occasion.

The *Yengishiki*, or 'Book of Ceremony,' published during the Yengi era (901–923), has the following regulations concerning those who are to be regarded as polluted by various acts of impurity and who are therefore to be prohibited from taking part in Shintō worship. Pollution from the human dead shall debar for thirty days from the day of the funeral; pollution from human birth for seven days; pollution from animal dead for five days; and from animal birth, not including chickens, for three days. Those who ate the flesh of beasts were impure for three days. Participation in the reburial of the dead rendered one impure for four months or longer. Those who had attended a funeral, visited the sick, or been present at a memorial service were forbidden to enter the royal gate on the same day. Buddhist priests and nuns and those in mourning were forbidden to enter the palace during the *saikai*, and both before and after the chief festivals such as *kinen*, *kanname*, and *niiname*.

Court ladies in pregnancy were obliged to withdraw from the court during the time of *saikai*, as also were those temporarily incapacitated at the time of the ceremony itself. A conflagration rendered those within the house impure for a period of seven days. Complicated regulations, as has been said, were formulated governing all possible cases; but in practice the observance has gradually decreased, so that at present slight attention is paid in general to ceremonies of purification.

Various symbols of purification are still more or less common. People returning from a funeral are not infrequently greeted with salt, that they may be freed from all impurity before entering their homes. Spitting or breathing on them is thought to remove contamination from sights and objects near at hand. Shaking the *gohei*, strips of white paper attached to a rod, is an act of purification, and the *shimenawa*, or straw rope above the entrance gate, is likewise thought to protect the dwelling from impure influences.

LITERATURE.—W. G. Aston, *Shinto: the Way of the Gods*, London, 1905; B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*[3], do. 1901; T. Harada, *The Faith of Japan*, New York, 1914; artt. relating to Shintō temples and ritual in *TASJ*.

TASUKU HARADA.

PURIFICATION (Muslim). — **I. The ritual of purification.**—The Muhammadan ritual of purification is based primarily on the late Qur'ānic passage, v. 9, repeated with slight variations from iv. 46:

(*a*) 'O believers, when ye come to fulfil the prayer, wash your faces, and your hands as far as the elbows; and rub your heads, and your feet unto the ankles'; (*b*) 'and if ye be polluted then purify yourselves' (*faṭṭahharū*; but iv. 46, 'wash yourselves,' *taghtasilū*); (*c*) 'but if ye be sick, or upon a journey, or one of you come from the privy or have touched a woman, and ye find no water, then take pure earth and rub your faces and hands therewith.'

With the help of traditions, the variations in the two versions of this law have been harmonized, certain verbal and logical obscurities removed, and the details elaborated into a ritual of practice as follows.

(*a*) *Wuḍū', or waḍū', the minor ablution, of the appendages (not the trunk) of the body.*—It is performed regularly before each of the five daily prayers, whether at home or in the mosque; but it may be omitted if the worshipper is sure he has in no way become polluted since the last *wuḍū'*, as, *e.g.*, when he continues praying from one period without interruption into the next. It is usual also before touching the Qur'ān and at the approach of death; and it forms an integral part of the major ablution.

The *wuḍū'* is performed at a tank (*miḍa'ah*) or reservoir (*ḥanafiyah*) provided with spouts; after a declaration (*niyah*) that the intended act is for purposes of purification, the Muslim, with sleeves tucked above the elbow, performs each of the following acts three times: washing the hands; rinsing the mouth (here the tooth-pick also is used); compressing each nostril with the left fingers and snuffing up water from the right hand, followed by expulsion of the water; washing the face; washing the right arm and permitting the water to run from the palm to the elbow; washing the left arm similarly. Then follow once each: passing the wetted right hand over the upper part of the head, the turban being pushed back with the left; combing the beard with the wetted fingers; inserting the tips of the forefingers into the ears and passing the thumbs around the back of the ears; wiping the neck with the back of the fingers of both hands; washing each foot as high as the ankle and passing the fingers between the toes (Shī'ites, however, conform more literally to the Qur'ānic passage by rubbing [*masḥ*] the feet with the wetted hand instead of washing them; see also *masḥ*, under *taṭhīr*, p. 497[a]).

(*b*) *Ghusl, the major, total ablution of the body.*—As based upon the Qur'ān, it is demanded in the case of certain physical pollutions, specified by tradition to be those of coition, nocturnal pollution, menses, and childbirth, the period of uncleanness in the last (*nifās*) continuing for forty days according to Sunnite law, for ten according to Shī'ite. As based upon tradition only, and hence called *ghusl masnūn*, it is demanded in the case of conversion to Muhammadanism; before the prayers of Friday and the festivals; after washing a corpse; after blood-letting; after death (performed by the *mughassil*, or washer of the dead). It must be performed in more than a certain minimum of water, which must touch every part, every hair, of the body, and hence takes place usually in the *ḥammam*, with its plunge bath. *Ghusl* includes also the *wuḍū'*, though the washing of the feet should be deferred by a *niyah* to the end of the

entire ablution; in the case of the *wuḍū'* as part of the *ghusl* of a corpse the mouth and nose are stopped with cotton instead of being washed.

(*c*) *Tayammum, the minor purification with dust in place of water.*—It may be performed when water cannot be secured within two miles or without incurring danger; in case of sickness, open wounds, or fractured bones; because of lack of time for the proper *wuḍū'* before the prayer on festival-days and at funerals. It consists of the declaration of intention, and of clapping dry dust or sand upon the face and hands.

(*d*) *Various practices of personal cleanliness.*—Some of them, together with *wuḍū'* and *ghusl*, are classed under the general term *ṭahārah*, 'purification,' some of them form part of the regular *wuḍū'* also, others are practised as occasion demands; in so far as they are not mentioned in the Qur'ān, they are declared to have been sanctioned by the Prophet as *fiṭrah*, lit. 'nature,' the natural religion in which man was created (xxx. 29), interpreted also as 'customs of the [previous] prophets.' These are use of the tooth-pick (*miswāk*)—an insistent practice of Muhammad; cleansing the nose and mouth with water (*istinshāq*); clipping the ends of the moustache to prevent them from entering the mouth; clipping the finger-nails; cleaning the finger-joints; depilation of the armpits; shaving of the pubes; abstersion (*istinjā'*) with water or dry earth or a piece of stone after evacuation and urination. Washing the hands before and after meals is also declared sometimes to have been demanded by a *ḥadīth*; and it is quite generally practised. Another enumeration of five usages of *fiṭrah* includes circumcision, which in usage is also regarded as an act of purification, and hence the term *taṭhīr* (see below) applied to it; it is nowhere mentioned in the Qur'ān, however, nor is it absolutely necessary in the case of an adult converted to Muhammadanism.

(*e*) *Taṭhīr, the purification of objects which have become ritually unclean.*—This is based on *ḥadīth* only; like personal purification, it may be performed with dry earth instead of water. One of the most important rules of *taṭhīr* is that termed technically *mash*, the purification of the inner boots; according to Sunnite law, if they cannot be cleansed of filth by rubbing dry earth upon them, they may still be made ceremonially clean (and worn during prayers) by stroking (*mash*) them with the wetted fingers three times; Shī'ites, however, deny that the boots may be worn at all during prayers. Some of the other numerous details of *taṭhīr* are the following:

Any spot can be made ritually fitted for prayer by spreading a clean rug or garment upon it; but the ground itself is clean when dry. Handling forbidden animals, such as dogs, pigs, and rats, requires purification of the person and garments. Dishes which have contained wine or the flesh of swine (conditions which may exist when such dishes have belonged to Jews or Christians) must be purified before a Muhammadan may eat from them. A vessel from which a dog has drunk must be washed seven times; a mosque defiled by a dog can be purified with water or earth together with recitations from the Qur'ān; it should be noted, however, that the mere presence of the animal, if dry, does not render unclean, while, on the other hand, if wet, the mere contact of its nose with the clothes requires (so the Shāfi'ites hold) that the clothes be washed seven times, each time in fresh water, and be rubbed once with earth; even Muhammadans less strict hold that body and clothes are defiled by a dog's saliva, and naturally by its micturition; many will not use mattresses made of dogs' hair. Another tradition declares that any considerable amount of fleas' blood defiles a garment. To a certain extent the ordinary washing of clothes is considered an act of purification, since the operation is concluded by pouring clean water upon them and reciting the *shahādah*, or testification of faith.

The water used for purificatory purposes must itself be pure, *i.e.* clean. Therefore rain-water is preferred and regarded as specifically recommended in Qur'ān, viii. 11:

'Remember when . . . He sent down upon you rain from heaven to purify you therewith and remove from you Satan's pollution' (*rijz*; perhaps intended rather in the sense of 'temptation [to desertion and idolatry]').

On the basis of *ḥadīth*, water from other sources may be used; that of the sea, springs, wells, rivers, hail, snow, and ice (but not ice itself), providing colour, smell, and taste give no evidence of pollution; with those restrictions, running water may be used even if a dead body or other unclean thing has fallen into it. The same permission is given in the case of standing water of more than a certain volume; but, if an animal falls into a well, at least 300 bucketfuls of water must be drawn, and the well must not be used for a day, or, if putrefaction of the body has set in, for three days. Earth or sand used for purification must not be damp.

2. **Origin and motive.**—The details of these purificatory practices were derived by Muhammad and the elaborators of his laws from pagan Arab, from Jewish, and from Christian sources. Occasionally a tradition seems to show that the Prophet (or those speaking in his name) was still under the influence of the primitive superstitions which gave rise to the particular practices in question; some traditions show an appreciation of the religious and ethical transmutations of Judaism and Christianity; others a mere toleration of existing customs in so far as they were free or could be freed from idolatrous implications. But to the extent that there was any logical purpose in his eclecticism at all, that purpose seems to have been partly rationalizing and disciplinary, mainly æsthetic. For it would seem that filth in any form was repugnant to Muhammad, particularly to his olfactory sense. This abhorrence of filth and keenness of smell may well have been due in part at least to his early Bedawīn apprenticeship, for both are very pronounced in the true Bedawīn. At any rate tradition is insistent in ascribing them to Muhammad.

Thus one *ḥadīth* declares that he demanded that any one who had eaten garlic or onions should avoid his presence (a variant reading restricts the prohibition to prayer-time); another tradition, accounting for the institution of the *ghusl* as a regular Friday practice, declares that he ordered it on an occasion when the people had performed their daily labour while wearing blankets and had perspired to such a degree that the odour from their bodies had become disagreeable. Again, he is reported to have said that in paradise all bodily excretions will be carried off as a perspiration with the odour of musk; that only the sensing of an odour or the hearing of a sound must be considered an interruption of the required absorption in prayer; and, still more significant, that, when a man tells a lie, the foulness of its odour drives his guardian angels a mile away.

It is possible, of course, that underneath the selfish æsthetic motive there was a trace of that sublimated anthropomorphic conception which leaves to the deity a gratification in the odour of sacrificial smoke or of incense, and hence might ascribe to God man's own aversion to foul odours. Indeed, there is even a tradition which declares that the sacrificial blood itself reaches Allāh's acceptance before it touches the ground; but, as far as Muhammad himself is concerned, this evidence is nullified by the Qur'ān (xxii. 37):

'Their flesh will never reach to Allāh, nor yet their blood, but your piety will reach him.'

The tradition cited probably represents merely a popular expression of the surviving primitive superstitious conception; still more primitive in conception is the declaration that the nasal purification was instituted for the purpose of driving out the evil spirit which lodges in the nostrils during the night. From the Qur'ān itself the impression is derived that Muhammad's purificatory ordinance was perhaps merely an expression of the feeling which, superstitious origins forgotten, still demands a certain decency and comeliness on the part of the worshipper; for the ordinance in

question follows immediately the rational injunction, 'Come not to prayer while ye are drunk, until ye understand.' The rationalizing tendency of Muhammadanism in the purificatory ordinances is seen also in the limitation of contactual ritual contamination to cases of actual physical transference of perceptible impurity. There is evidence that the strictness of Hebrew legislation in regard to the menstruous woman was shared at least in part by the pagan Arabs (in the earlier Arabic usage the only clear equivalents to the Hebrew *ṭāmē* and *ṭāhōr*, 'unclean' and 'clean,' seem to be *ṭāmith* and *ṭāhir* as applied to the menstruous and the 'clean' woman); but several traditions show that Muhammad, in accepting the general principle and some particular details from both sources, modified the severity and declared that mere contact with a woman in this condition need not be avoided. Nor does touching a corpse render unclean any one except the person who washes it for burial; still less does mourning in general, or contact with sacred objects. The same tendency to identify ritual uncleanness exactly with physical malodorous uncleanness, with excretions, dampness, and putrefaction, is evidenced in some of the definitions cited above; *e.g.*, a dog's contact defiles only if the animal is wet; earth is clean (and cleanses) if not damp. The tradition declaring that the micturition of a 'clean' animal does not defile is, of course, not of this rationalizing tendency.

3. **Connexion with expiation.**—There are a few isolated indications that purification might by some have been regarded as having expiatory or atoning force—that it washed away guilt. Whether any such idea attaches to a tradition that in paradise the faithful will be distinguished by the marks of purification on hands and forehead is doubtful; the *ḥadīth* that he who performs the *wuḍū'* thoroughly will extract all sin from his body, even though it may lurk under his finger-nails, is clear. And such an idea may have been present in the mind of the governor of Kūfah who ordered the pulpit of its mosque to be washed because his predecessor, who had been guilty of immorality and injustice, had occupied it. But such a conception of purification from sin is not found in the Qur'ān, nor has Muslim theology developed it. Even prayer, for which ablution is only a preparation, absolves only from the minor sins (those inherent in human nature and hence more or less unconsciously performed) and not from the major sins (including all crimes, usury, lying, disobedience to parents, and the frequent commission of minor sins); one looks in vain for evidence that the ablution of a convert represented a baptism into new birth, or that circumcision was really regarded as an act of purification. Neither blood nor fire appears as a purificatory medium. Nor does the use of earth as a substitute for water indicate that purification was a symbolic act; for earth or sand was regarded as an actual sanitary hygienic medium; in the case of sickness the avoidance of water was due apparently to an old and still persisting belief that water poisons wounds and, when cold, causes fever; though here again there is a contrary tradition that Muhammad thought his own fever was due to a spark from hell-fire and might be cured with cold water.

4. **Application to food.**—Muhammad's treatment of the subject of animals used as food seems to support the view that he did not place much emphasis on the ritualistic, technical distinction between clean and unclean, for he did not use the terms at all in this connexion. To him permitted foods are merely *ṭayyibah* (lit. 'good,' 'pleasant,' then 'sound,' 'healthful': ii. 269, v. 6, xxiii. 53). Forbidden animals are not specifically mentioned in the Qur'ān (except the swine); later law, however, characterizes various animals with the legal terms *ḥalāl* ('lawful'); *mubāḥ* ('permitted'; legally indifferent); *makrūh* ('disliked' or 'abominable'; disapproved, but without penalty for use); *ḥarām* ('forbidden'); the various legal schools differing in the assignment of certain animals to specific classes. Quadrupeds that seize their prey with their teeth are absolutely prohibited; included in this class are the elephant, the weasel, the ass, the mule; according to Ḥanifite law, also the hyena, the fox (but these are regarded as lawful by the Shāfi'ites), and the horse (held to be indifferent by the Shāfi'ites, while Mālikite law agrees with Ḥanifite). Birds which seize their prey with their talons, such as ravens and some crows, are also forbidden. According to some interpretations, all aquatic animals except fish are unlawful (though the Mālikites permit them). Included in *makrūh* are pelicans, kites, crocodiles, otters, and insects (except locusts, which are permitted); in *mubāḥ* are hares, crows that feed on grain, magpies. But all animals used for food (except fish and locusts) must be slaughtered by drawing the knife across the throat in such a manner as to sever windpipe, carotid arteries, and gullet; and at the moment of slaughter (in the case of prey at the moment when the weapon is discharged, or, in hunting with dogs, when the animal is let slip [v. 6]) the words, 'In the name of Allāh, Allāh is most great,' must be recited. And all food is forbidden if slaughtered by an idolater or an apostate from Muhammadanism.

It seems evident from the Qur'ānic passage on which this legislation is based (ii. 167) that Muhammad's own restrictions had as their purpose the avoidance of any participation in idolatrous worship and the insistence upon freshly slaughtered food; in speaking of fish used for food he emphasizes the latter idea:

> 'He hath subdued the sea that ye might eat therefrom flesh that is fresh' (*ṭarī*; xvi. 14).

He refused to accept all the ritualistic restrictions of the Jews:

> 'All food was allowed to the children of Israel (except what Jacob forbade himself), ere the Law was sent down' (iii. 86); and (iii. 44): 'I have come to . . . allow you part of that which had been forbidden you.'

In this permission interpretation includes the eating of fish without fins or scales, of the caul and fat of animals, and of camel's flesh; indeed, Muhammad probably intended in general that his followers might eat whatever was customary to them. There is a tradition that on one occasion he refused to eat of roast lizard when it was placed before him; being asked whether it was forbidden as food, he replied: 'No, but, as there are none in my native place, I feel a repugnance against eating thereof.'

5. **Value of the ritual.**—The prescription of ritual practices and distinctions belongs to the later period of Muhammad's life; and it may be concluded that his priestly or legal, as distinct from his prophetic, activity was one of secondary importance to him, adopted, at least in part, because of the demands for definiteness in creed, code, and practice which the mass of believers demands. Moreover, the ritualistic prescriptions provided a certain discipline of unifying value; and they were the more demanded in that his religious system dispensed with priests, and fixed personal responsibility upon each individual.

As a sanitary code which made cleanliness not next to godliness but a part of it (in a tradition: 'Cleanliness . . . is one half of the faith'), the purificatory ritual had a decided value; it has raised the standard of cleanly and healthful living among all classes of observant Muhammadans. Some Bedawīn, it is true, are little observant of

ceremonies; Burton[1] quotes the Bedawīn saying: 'We pray not, because we must drink the water of ablution'; nevertheless they show an innate eagerness to bathe at every opportunity. A more serious neglect is frequently noticed in the case of children, who are purposely left uncared for out of fear of the 'evil eye.' But in general those who have lived in the Muhammadan East support the emphatic verdict of Burton and Lane that there is a marked contrast between Muhammadans and non-Muhammadans in this matter of refinement.

6. Its defects.—On the other hand, Muhammadanism by its emphasis on ritual has subjected itself to the danger of making cleanliness not a part but the whole of godliness. In the effort to prevent this the ritual provides that each act of the *wuḍū'* should be followed by a short prayer making the act at the same time the symbol of some ethical or religious idea.

Thus, after the rinsing of the mouth the prayer is: 'Oh Allāh, assist me in the reading of Thy book, in thanking Thee through worshipping Thee well'; on washing the ears: 'Oh Allāh, make me to be of those who hear what is said and obey what is best.'

As a matter of fact, however, many Muhammadans neglect these intermediate prayers and finish the entire *wuḍū'* in two or three minutes (despite the exactness of regulation, there is a decided difference in the manner of performance by an educated and that by an uneducated Muhammadan); and, when the prayers are recited by non-Arabic speaking peoples, they may be little better than meaningless.

7. Outward and inward purity. — But these defects are not necessarily to be regarded as of the essence of Islām; they are rather inherent in any system which gives to unthinking masses fixed forms and ceremonies. It might even happen in more advanced circles of thought that the Qur'ān, by making clearer the distinction between forms and faith—*e.g.*, by making of the purification ritual merely a divinely-ordered sanitary ordinance clear of superstitious connotations—might lead to a lofty spiritual conception. But it is the misfortune of any theocratic code which must provide for all the life of man that the distinction between police ordinance and moral precept is easily obscured—that, perhaps contrary to intention, emphasis is misplaced upon the easily comprehended ritual to the neglect of less specific exhortations to moral righteousness. In the Qur'ān, as a matter of fact, the ritual of physical purity is a subject of but few passages; it is not mentioned at all in the definition and summary of true piety found in ii. 172. References to religious, ethical, and moral purity, however, are many, though the exact meaning of the term 'purity' is sometimes difficult to determine. On the whole, 'purity' is a negative term, denoting the absence of what is foreign and obnoxious to the normal, natural, or simple state.

Man was created in purity; though of clay, even the angels bow to him (xv. 30); and 'purity of faith' to Muhammad was merely freedom from idolatrous corruptions and superstitions which had crept into the natural, original faith of Adam. Purity of the heart is demanded under varying forms of expression. As idolatry is uncleanness (*najs*), firm belief in Allāh is purity; thus, in v. 45, 'those whose hearts Allāh does not please to purify' (*yuṭahhir*) are those who do not believe sincerely and without hypocrisy; in xcviii. 2 the Qur'ān itself is 'pure' (*muṭahharah*), *i.e.* freed from falsehood; at least according to tradition (lvi. 78, 'none shall touch it [the Qur'ān] except the purified') means 'none shall understand it except those who are pure of heart.' Another word for 'purity,' one normally not used in the ritual sense, appears in ii. 146: 'And we sent you an apostle from among yourselves to read unto you our signs and purify you (*yuzakkīkum*) and teach you the Book and wisdom,' in which the purification evidently refers to faith; so also xci. 9: 'Well for him who has purified it [his soul, *zakkāha*]; ill for him who has defiled it.' Or the pure heart (in the religious sense) is the 'sound heart' (*qalb salīm*: xxvi. 89, xxxvii. 82), while hypocrisy is found in those 'in whose hearts is sickness (*fī qulūbihim maraḍun*)'; the sincere in heart are those who 'clarify their faith' (*mukhlisīna 'd-dīna*: xl. 14); and cxii. is the '*Sūrah* of Sincerity' (*Sūrat' 'l-ikhlāṣ*). Vaguely the same idea is expressed in *barr*, 'pious' (ii. 41, 172), which in Hebrew is 'pure.'

Purity of purpose is demanded in many passages where no specific term is used; thus ix. 28 is directed against those who out of fear of loss of trade were willing to make concessions to idolaters; lxxiv. 6 inveighs against those who, when they do a kindness, have in their hearts the hope of receiving in return. From the negative side purity of intention is emphasized in the teaching that no sin attaches to one who under compulsion eats forbidden food, provided that he is 'without lust or wilfulness' (ii. 168). And this Qur'ānic insistence upon purity of intention is embodied in the purification ritual itself, which, like every act of devotion, must begin with the *nīyah* ('intention'), the thought or the words, 'I purpose to offer up to God only with a sincere heart'; and it is expressed doctrinally in the statement that 'the fundamentals of Muhammadanism are sincerity of belief (*ṣiḥḥat al-'aqd*), truth of intent (*ṣidq-al-qaṣd*), observance of the lawful limit, and keeping of the covenant' (so stated in the Shāfi'itic exposition of Muhammadanism put in the mouth of the learned slave-girl Tawaddud in the 443rd night of the *Thousand and One Nights*). The Sayyid Amīr 'Alī quotes, against those who find in the Qur'ān only physical purity as a prerequisite for prayer, vii. 204:

'And think within thine own self on Allāh, with lowliness and with fear, and without loud spoken words, at even and at morn.'

8. Moral purity.—In the moral (sexual) sense it is difficult to fix a definite value for the term 'purity'; the relativity of the term, as denoting sexual self-restraint within varying limits of indulgence, is expressed in the *Thousand and One Nights* (night 915) in these words:

'As for the lust of reproduction, that which pleaseth Allāh thereof is, that it be of that which is permitted, and that which he dislikes is that which is forbidden.'

As compared with previous conditions, the Qur'ān (see CHASTITY [Muslim], LAW [Muhammadan]) narrowed the legal limits of indulgence; but it left them much wider than the ideal limits set by Christianity, *e.g.*, in that it specifically permitted monogamy and concubinage, and made divorce easy, especially for the male. In so far as this freedom was based only on the Semitic desire for numerous offspring, it does not involve the question of moral purity, though it might perhaps be suggested that Muhammad should by analogy have deduced the doctrine of purity in morality through monogamy from that of the purity of religion through monotheism. But Muhammad in his legislation was mainly an opportunist, a compromiser, satisfied to ameliorate the most evidently vicious social evils to the extent that he could without jeopardizing the success of his main purpose. It is doubtful, indeed, whether monogamy, if desirable, was possible of achievement under the social conditions of the Arabia of his day. And, in general, it is even possible that, by permitting a lower standard of moral purity and making it possible of attainment by those whom his mission reached, he achieved a greater amount of social good than he otherwise would have achieved. At any rate, he raised the standards of moral purity among many primitive peoples which other systems had not before, and have not since, been able to affect seriously or permanently. And, in trying to estimate how far Islām lags behind the more enlightened social systems in this matter, it is again necessary to consider not only standards of monogamy but also to what extent those standards are reached. In the first place, not even

[1] *Pilgrimage*, ii. 110.

a strictly observed monogamous relationship of necessity denotes 'purity' defined as self-restraint in sexual indulgence. Moreover, there are some who doubt whether the amount of indulgence through the lax interpretation of laws of divorce (but more especially through the legal and social toleration of prostitution) is relatively smaller among non-Muhammadan Europeans than among Muhammadans. For polygamy and concubinage, owing to imposed conditions and natural difficulties, are by no means practised by even a majority of Muhammadans; and, while the legalization of the double standard implies a lowering of the general ideal of womanhood, it has meant the saving from absolute moral degradation of a considerable portion of womanhood. For the punishment for transgressing legal bounds is strict; and the seduction of Muslim women is exceedingly rare. Legal restrictions, however, are of no avail in checking those outbursts of sexual violence which accompany the riots of mobs inflamed by racial or religious fanaticism or jealousy, whether in Muslim or in non-Muslim lands, and which are directed against the women of the persecuted race. It is in such crises, perhaps, that the moral shortcomings of Islām stand out prominently, because the Qur'ānic permission for cohabitation with female captives (iv. 28, xxiii. 5, xxxiii. 49), Jewish and Christian, furnishes a ready excuse for reactionary and fanatical Muslim leaders who are willing to make lust serve the purposes of religious hate.

In so far as 'purity' is used not only of actions but also of thought and word, it is again a relative term. In Islām, since matters of sex-relations in themselves are not considered to be impure, the thought or mention of them in literature or conversation is not in itself regarded as evidence of moral depravity. Here also, if the standard of purity be made the amount of sexual stimulation produced, it is doubtful if the natural frankness of Muhammadans is worse in its results than the veiled suggestiveness permitted elsewhere; it is extremely difficult, *e.g.*, to judge what the actual effect of Muhammad's picture of the pleasures of paradise is upon the mind of the Muhammadan.

At all events a high ideal and voluntary practice of moral purity are not impossible even when the law permits (but does not command) extremes of indulgence. The interpretation of Qur'ān (and Scripture) is often more important than the letter; and, while there are not many Muhammadans who have attempted to allegorize away the sensualism of the Prophet's paradise, there are many of high moral standards who have found and emphasized other texts in the Qur'ān (see, *e.g.*, the passages quoted in art. CHASTITY [Muslim]; it may be added that in the popular version of the Shāfi'ite teaching presented by the *Thousand and One Nights* the 'super-structure of Islām' is said to include 'striving against the lusts of the soul and warring them down,' while prayer 'restraineth from lewdness and frowardness'). It is, of course, of more significance that certain Muhammadan teachers find in such passages the highest ideal of purity demanded than that detractors of Muhammadanism deny the possibility of such ideals within the faith; it is hopeful that such a passage, *e.g.*, as xxxii. 17, 'No soul knoweth what joy [or 'satisfaction'; lit. 'coolness'] of the eyes is reserved (for the good) as a reward for their works,' together with the frequent promise of the 'grace of Allāh' (lit. 'additional recompense'), is explained by some to refer to a higher reward reserved for those who are most worthy, namely, the joy of gazing upon God's face and in this spiritual pleasure forgetting the lower, sensual pleasures of paradise. In a similar way Ghazālī taught that there are degrees of purification: that of the body from pollution and filth, of the actions from wickedness and injustice, of the heart from immoral desires and vicious promptings, of the mind from irreligious ideas and worldly distractions. Graded lessons are taught also in the matter of polygamy; there is nothing in the Qur'ān (as there is nothing in the OT) to inhibit those Muhammadans who are insisting upon higher standards of moral purity through the voluntary relinquishment of polygamy and slavery.

LITERATURE.—*DI*, *s.v.* 'Purifications' and the other artt. there cited, 'Water,' 'Wells,' 'Food,' 'Clean and Unclean Animals,' 'Dogs,' 'Circumcision,' 'Fiṭrah'; E. W. Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*[5], London, 1860, Index, *s.vv.* 'Wudoo,' 'Ghusl,' 'Cleanliness,' 'Death,' 'Dogs'; R. F. Burton, *The Book of the Thousand and One Nights*, 10 vols., Benares, 1885, Index, *s.v.* 'Wuzu-ablution'; al-Bukhārī, *Les Traditions islamiques*, tr. O. Houdas and W. Marçais, Paris, 1903–08, vol. i. *passim*, and nos. 460, 676; Hadji Khan and W. Sparroy, *With the Pilgrims to Mecca*, London, 1905, p. 33; D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, New York, 1905, pp. 101, 103; Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, Calcutta, 1902, p. 143; Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah*, do. 1893, ii. 109, 190; J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*[2], Berlin, 1897, p. 167 f.; G. Sale, *The Koran*[8], Philadelphia, 1888, 'Preliminary Discourse,' pp. 73–77; J. M. Rodwell's tr. of the Qur'ān is quoted, with slight variations. WILLIAM POPPER.

PURIFICATION (Roman).—**1. Early history of the idea.**—In the earlier ages of Rome the feeling for purity and the need for purification depended mainly on a yearning after ceremonial exactitude, in order to avert resentment of supernatural beings because of flaws in the forms of service which they required from mortals. The beings whose discontent would be dangerous were very dimly apprehended, sometimes as ghosts, sometimes as *numina*, divine forms hardly recognized with clearness as persons. Anthropomorphic ideas of the supernatural slowly made their way into Rome and came principally from without, through foreign channels. Consciousness that duty towards existences not of this world had been imperfectly performed did produce a sense of defilement, which weighed upon the soul, even when the wrong done was involuntary. At first the foulness arising from conduct, except in extreme cases, was hardly regarded as belonging to the spirit. But the use of the words *purus*, *puritas*, like that of terms cognate in meaning, such as *castus*, *sanctus*, shows a progressive development in the spiritual direction. The notion of impurity accidentally incurred, and independently of the will, tended to pass away from the religion of the educated class, and to retain its force mainly among the rude and the rustic.

Although the apprehension of divinities in the earlier days was but dim, their power to protect the household and the State was real. The strong sense of law which was characteristic of the Roman in all ages led him to conceive the relation between himself and the god or the ghosts in terms of a bilateral contract. If he did his duty by them, they were bound to do their duty by him, and to hold him free from harm. There was in time elaborated a complicated code of divine law (*ius divinum*) parallel to the human law (*ius humanum*). Originally, those who knew and expounded both forms of this law were the same, the college of *pontifices*. It is too much, however, to say, as has often been stated, that the primitive idea of obligation towards divine creatures was entirely non-ethical. The horror inspired by murder, especially of the atrocious kind called *parricidium*, and even by lesser offences, such as wrongful treatment of a client by his patrician patron, placed the offender under a ban, and rendered him accursed (*sacer*) and deprived him of civil rights.

2. Common acts of purification.—The necessity of purification ran through the life of the indi-

vidual. In a sense the new-born babe was impure, and was the subject of various ceremonies. The day on which a child received its name was its *dies lustricus*, 'day of purification' (Macrobius, i. 16: 'dies lustricus quo infantes lustrantur'). The cleansing operation was probably at first conceived as a protection against spirits which might otherwise be malignant. Lustral rites were also accompaniments of marriage. The farm and the herd had in like manner to be protected by a ritual which Cato the Censor describes (*de Re Rustica*, 141). When a death occurred in a house, a cloud hung over it, which could be dispersed only by elaborate purification. Without it the family would continue to be *funesta*, *i.e.* at variance with the world of spirits. The *pontifices* evolved elaborate rules to bring this condition to an end (Cicero, *de Leg.* ii. 55: 'finis funestae familiae'). Until this was accomplished, a branch of cypress was hung at the door, or in poorer houses a bundle of fir twigs, to warn from entering those who were specially bound to purity—in particular, priests and Vestals. A *pontifex* was not permitted to look on a corpse (Tac. *Ann.* i. 62, and many other passages in literature). It may be that the burning of the body on the pyre had a cathartic effect (Rohde, *Psyche*[2], ii. 101). The period during which the house was *funesta* ended with the curious ceremony called *ossilegium*, which affords a remarkable example of the Roman unwillingness to break entirely with the past. What was called 'the gathering of the bones' was, after the introduction of cremation, practically the collection of the ashes, but one finger-joint remained unburned, in order to do homage to the more ancient custom. All unpurged contact with the dead would bring with it foulness and a liability to misfortune. A Roman poet makes the spirit of a wife who died early say that the torch which graced her marriage must have been lit at a funeral pyre (Propertius, v. iii. 13; cf. Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 577). The prohibition (general in the Roman empire) against burying within the walls of a city probably had its origin more in the dread of ghosts than in sanitary considerations.

Parallel to the *lustratio* of the house is the periodical purificatory ritual applied to a country district (*pagus*). The *lustratio pagi* consisted in a religious procession right round its boundaries, with sacrifice. There seems to have been in ancient days a similar procession round the walls of a city, called *amburbium*. In historical times special purification of the city (*lustratio urbis*) was carried out when calamity called for it—*e.g.*, after the early disasters in the Second Punic War (Livy, xxii. 20). The object of all such expiations was 'to seek reconciliation with the gods' ('pacem deum exposcere,' of frequent occurrence in Livy). A lustral ceremony accompanied the foundation of a colony (Cicero, *de Divin.* i. 102). The *Terminalia*, protective of boundaries, and the *Compitalia*, of streets in the city, were also probably lustral in their origin. Down to a late period the priests called *Luperci* perambulated the boundaries of the earliest Rome, the settlement on the Palatine (Tac. *Ann.* xii. 24). That archaic priesthood, the Arval brotherhood (see ARVAL BROTHERS), was concerned with an annual solemn progress round the limits of the most ancient *Romanus ager*, the territory of the primitive city. The ceremony was called *Ambarvalia*, and it was distinctly piacular. When Roman territory was expanded, no corresponding extension of the lustral rite seems ever to have been made. These roundabout piacular surveys were common elsewhere, inside as well as outside of Italy, and particularly in Greece. The solemn words and prayers of the traditional chant, duly gone through without slip of tongue, seem to have had a sort of magical effect. Any error in the pronouncement of these forms would involve a need of reparation, just as in the earliest Roman legal system the mispronunciation of the established verbal forms would bring loss of the law-suit. At Iguvium in Umbria there was a solemn lustration of the city, the details of which are contained in the great and very ancient record in the Umbrian dialect, preserved in the *Iguvine Tables*. It may be noted that, from the commonness of these lustral perambulations, the verb *lustrare* acquired its secondary sense of surveying a scene with the eyes.

Other forms of quaint ancient ritual were connected with the piacular conception. The *Salii*, ancient priests of Mars, made a journey at certain times round a number of stations in the city. They also had a 'cleansing of the weapons' (*armilustrium*) and a 'cleansing of the trumpets' (*tubilustrium*), which testify to a primitive notion that the efficiency of the army's weapons required the use of religious as well as secular means. The 'washing' (*lustrum*) with which the census ended was in essence military; for it was connected with the *comitia centuriata*, which is merely the army in civil garb (*exercitus urbanus* [Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 88]). A *lustratio exercitus* was often performed when the army was in the field, to remove a superstitious dread which sometimes attacked it; at other times it was merely prophylactic. There was also a lustration of the fleet (Livy, xxxvi. 42; Appian, *Bell. Civ.* v. 96). We very seldom find the *lustratio* referred to particular divinities. But Virgil represents the host of Æneas as offering a piacular ceremony to Jupiter on landing in Italy (*Æn.* iii. 279).

3. Irregular occasions.—In almost all the instances given above the cleansing operation is frequent and ordinary. But often it was occasional and irregular. Religious officers, particularly the *flamen* of Jupiter (*flamen Dialis*), were beset by many tabus, the breach of which would involve expiation. So, when the Arval Brothers took an iron implement into their sacred grove to cut down or trim the trees, atonement had to be made. The erring Vestal, if unpunished, brought calamity on the whole people. Individuals who made unauthorized compacts with the enemy, as the compacts rested on religious sanction, involved the nation, unless the nation, on repudiating the agreements, handed over the authors to the foe—a cheap form of expiation, adopted, *e.g.*, in the case of the officers responsible for the agreement made after the disaster at the Caudine Forks, and in that of Hostilius Mancinus in Spain. On one notable occasion the irregular shedding of blood in political strife at Rome spread a sense of impurity among the people, which the senate thought it well to remove. The murderers of Tiberius Gracchus (a sacrosanct tribune) professed to have secular justification for their crime, but, on the advice of the keepers of the Sibylline books, a sacred embassy was sent to the temple of Ceres at Henna in Sicily, and a choir of twenty-seven maidens sang in procession at Rome (Cicero, *in Verr.* iv. 108; Obsequens, 27). The need of purificatory ceremonial was especially felt in times of national disaster, particularly those entailed by war or pestilence. The people's souls were harrowed by extraordinary occurrences, which long experience had shown to be signs of divine wrath. Elaborate regulations were evolved for averting the consequences. The experts of Roman origin were the *pontifices*; but from Etruria came the *haruspices*, and Greek influence established firmly the college of the *decemviri* (later *quindecemviri*), who had charge of the Sibylline oracles. Prodigies or portents of the less serious kind were expiated after consultation

with the *pontifices* or *haruspices*; extraordinary signs led to an examination of the Sibylline books (Livy, xxii. 9: 'tetra prodigia'). But the priests in all these circumstances had no initiative; they had to wait until they were asked by the senate to give an opinion. There was a fixed ritual for making appeasement when a thunderbolt struck the ground or killed a man. The spot became banned. Rain or thunder cut short the meetings for public business in Rome, as in Athens, and in other ancient states. If affairs were carried on in defiance of the sign, guilt would be incurred and a piacular offering would be due. Some ceremonies which have been deemed by scholars to have an expiatory significance can only doubtfully be so regarded. Whether the curious ceremony of driving in the nail in the temple of Minerva every hundred years was purificatory in character is uncertain. But the *ludi sæculares* certainly were, as is abundantly shown in the records of the elaborate celebration by Augustus in 17 B.C. The ceremony was a sort of larger *lustrum*, a great amplification of the censor's performance, which came every five years.

4. Dies atri et religiosi.—In Rome certain days in the year were called *atri*, such as the anniversary of the battle of the Allia, and others *religiosi*, on which public business was prohibited and many private affairs would be suspended. Even on a *dies nefastus*, the chief sign of which was that the law-courts were closed, a *prætor* who opened court incurred a piacular offering (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 30).

One form of taint from which both private families and the State were careful to keep free, by forms of purification and appeasement, was derived from contact with unsatisfied spirits of the dead, who were conceived as in a sense divine and described as *di parentum*. The month of February was in part devoted to observances of the kind, and derived its name (Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 19) from *februa*, which in the ancient tongue meant 'expiations' (*piamina*). Another application of *februa* was to the leathern thongs wielded by the *Luperci*, when in February they ran their rounds and freed from sterility the women who sought to be smitten by their blows. From the 13th to the 21st day of February was a time of ceremonial gloom. These were the *dies parentales*, and the ritual of offerings to the dead was *parentatio*. All temples were closed, all marriages forbidden, and the magistrates divested themselves of the purple-bordered robe (*prætexta*) and other marks of office. Family ceremonies called *parentalia* also took place on anniversaries of the birthdays or death-days of deceased members. In the imperial period there were in May or June two days of flower-offerings for the spirits—a 'day of the rose' (*dies rosæ*) and a 'day of the violet' (*dies violæ*). Of these there is frequent mention in inscriptions. The 21st of February was called *Feralia*, when appeasement was an affair of State. The following day was one of joyful family feasts, and bore the name of *Caristia* or *Cara Cognatio*. The characteristics of the three days in May when the ritual called *Lemuria* was performed resembled those of the gloomy *dies parentales* in February. It has been supposed that the wild festival of the *Saturnalia*, held in December, was originally directed to keeping the ghosts aloof. The theory is very doubtful; even if it is sound, the Romans early lost all memory of the origin of this revelry. Other ancient practices have been held by eminent scholars to have a purificatory character. Specially may be mentioned the custom of passing prisoners of war under the yoke, which is best known from the story of the disaster to the Roman arms at the Caudine Forks. So too, with the passage of the triumphing general under the *porta triumphalis*, and with the *sororium tigillum* which figures in the tale of Horatius. All these ceremonies have been believed to be modes of purging away the stain of bloodshed. The present writer is not convinced of the correctness of this explanation.

5. Means for assuring purity.—The signs of purity and the means of purification were very various. The service of the gods often required abstinence, especially from sexual indulgence. Priests were of course under stricter rules than ordinary worshippers. The innocence of young boys and maidens was welcome to divine beings who had to be propitiated. Those who took part in worship as singers or in other ways were called *camilli* or *camillæ*; from this usage Virgil's Camilla takes her name. Only such children as had living parents were permitted to serve, and these were designated as *patrimi et matrimi*. The Vestals were in touch with purificatory rites. The sacrificial offerings on such occasions were of many different kinds. In great public expiations the sacrifice of a pig, a sheep, and a bull (*suovetaurilia*) was common. The pig was offered in private as well as public expiations. Water, fire, and incense (*suffimenta*) had lustral power. Bodily impurity, and also the defilement of a bad dream, could be removed by running water (Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 35 ff., 623 ff.; Persius, *Sat.* ii. 15). Many herbs were believed to exert a purifying influence. The laurel originally worn by the triumphing general, and later by the emperors, has often been believed to have been a means of cleansing the stain of blood shed in war; and the *verbena*, which the *fetiales* carried with them, has been supposed to be of lustral efficacy. These beliefs are very questionable (see the present writer, in *JRS* ii. [1912] 45 ff.). Myrtle was in customary use in connexion with the dead and also in the marriage ceremony, and it is possible that *lustratio* was the cause. The willow (*agnus castus*) was supposed to have purifying power, because its name was in popular etymology connected with ἁγνός.

6. Ethical aspects of purification.—In the belief of the rustic Italian personal purity was needed to give full effect to many operations. The birth of bees was supposed to be non-sexual; therefore the bee-keeper, when dealing with his bees, must be 'pridie castus ab rebus venereis' (Columella, ix. 14. 3). Especially did the efficacy of medicinal herbs depend on the purity of the persons who gathered or applied them. To assure this, a boy or maiden might be employed (Pliny, *HN* xxii. 27, xxiii. 130, xxvi. 93, and many passages in medical writers).

Purification was not merely ceremonial or mechanical. That an ethical element entered into it, even in very early days, is indisputably shown by the fact that some taints were inexpiable. All those to which the vague penalty 'Sacer esto' was attached were of this kind (Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 35, is in error). There were some offenders with whom the gods would make no peace (Cicero, *de Leg.* i. 40, ii. 22). In literature from the late Republic onward a strong distinction is constantly drawn between material and spiritual purity. It is true, however, that the yearning after a clean heart which in Greece afforded an opportunity to quack purveyors of καθαρμοί was not natural to the ancient Italic peoples. Faith in the old forms was gradually lost. The calamities of the Second Punic War spread among the people a conviction that a stain lay on the nation and could be washed away only by extraordinary expiations; but the much greater horrors of the Social War, followed by the long series of civil wars which ended with the triumph of Augustus, produced no such consequences. Although there was a feeling that the Romans were steeped in guilt—a feeling to which

much in Augustan literature testifies—there was no popular response to the restoration of archaic ceremonial which Augustus promoted. There was a desire for other and more effectual modes of cleansing. Josephus remarked in the early imperial age that, while old ritual was dying, new rites were sought after which were characterized by 'all manner of purifications' (*c. Apionem*, ii. 35 : *καθάρσεσι παντοδαπαῖς*). The new tendency was towards purity of a more intimate and inward character, which would bring men closer to the divine. Hence the great invasion of Eastern cults; those of Isis, the Magna Mater, and Mithras especially made a strong appeal to the Western world. Purification by sprinkling with the blood of victims in the ceremony called *taurobolium* affected worshippers profoundly. They testified to a conviction that they were 'born anew for ever' (so repeatedly in inscriptions). Christian writers considered that the devil inspired this belief, out of spite for the purification effected by the blood of Christ (Firmicus Maternus, xxvii. 8). The Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic philosophies did much to spread among educated classes in the West an idea of spiritual purity which powerfully assisted the Christian propaganda.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], London, 1911-14, contains a rich store of material for the study of purificatory rites in all ages; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Romer*[2], Munich, 1912, and J. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*, Leipzig, 1874-78, iii., contain abundant references to authorities. The separate artt. in Pauly-Wissowa and in Daremberg-Saglio are often important. In W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, and *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, do. 1911, all matters connected with Roman lustration are admirably handled. Many sidelights are thrown on the subject by E. Rohde, *Psyche*[2], 2 vols., Freiburg, 1898. Two recent works of interest are E. Fehrle, *Die kultische Keuschheit im Alterthum*, Giessen, 1910, and S. Eitrem, *Roman Festivals, Expiatory and Purificatory*, Christiania, 1913-17.

J. S. REID.

PURIFICATION (Teutonic).—The religion of the Teutonic peoples, as it is presented to us by our sources, was not a religion of fear. To a very considerable extent those peoples appear to have ignored the possibility that supernatural powers might exist who were hostile to mankind, and accordingly they aimed at securing the assistance of their friendly anthropomorphic gods by the positive method of sacrifice rather than by the negative process of avoiding ceremonial impurity and the resulting defencelessness against supernatural dangers. We must remember, however, that our sources paint the picture of Teutonic religion either from the point of view of the missionary, whose attention is focused on the more active forms of heathenism, or, in the case of the Icelandic sagas, from the angle of vision of the upper classes. The practices of the modern rural populations of Teutonic countries must suggest to us that the conceptions of tabu and of ceremonial purity[1] were by no means so foreign to Teutonic religion as we are inclined to believe. An examination of the older evidence in the light of modern customs will not yield very much, but the results will not be entirely negligible.

1. Birth.—In the life of the primitive individual purificatory ceremonies cluster round birth, puberty, marriage, and death. The sprinkling of water on a newly-born infant, which the sagas state to have been customary in Iceland in pre-Christian times, is clearly a purificatory ceremony, and there is no reason to suppose that it is merely a late imitation of the Christian rite of baptism. The ceremony was performed by the father; and, until it was done, the infant enjoyed no rights as a human being, for the father could refuse to have it reared.[2]

[1] See art. PURIFICATION (Introductory).

[2] See art. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE; R. Cleasby and G. Vigfusson, *Icelandic-English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1874, *s.v.* 'Ausa.'

2. Puberty.—Of the ceremonies performed at the period of puberty we know nothing, and we must assume that they played a negligible part in the life of the individual. They seem, however, to have existed, for we are told that an Icelandic chieftain, Thord gellir, was taken to the cross-knolls held sacred by his family, at the time when he was 'introduced into manhood.'[1] It appears that the ceremony was connected with ancestor-worship, for it was the belief of this family that they 'died into' the knolls.

3. Marriage.—For marriage ceremonies we are referred almost entirely to more modern accounts, beginning with that of the Swedish archbishop Olaus Magnus, of the 16th cent., who describes the bridal hot-air bath, taken in the communal bath-house, to which the bride and her female friends walk in procession, preceded by men carrying jars of ale or wine, bread, sugar, and spices. On their return the party wear wreaths.[2]

A number of other Scandinavian customs, but recently extinct, show that the people have clung obstinately to the idea that by marriage they incur a kind of ceremonial impurity which lays them open to supernatural dangers. A device clearly intended to avert those dangers is that of introducing another make-believe couple to act, as it were, as scapegoats. This pair, fantastically dressed, one of them a man got up as a woman, make their appearance in various parts of Sweden during the wedding festivities, are received with much honour, have a collection made for them, and finally are driven from the house. Sometimes it is only the bridegroom who has a 'double.' In some parts of Sweden the bridegroom is driven by a grotesquely disguised 'coachman,' who sits in front of him on the sledge; and in Västmanland a kind of mock bridegroom, who was expected to amuse the company, used to be thrown into the nearest stream on the third day of the feast. In Würtemberg there was no substitute for the bridegroom in this part of the ceremony, and he was obliged to choose between 'wine and water.' If he chose wine, he had to treat the company; if water, he was ducked.[3]

In other parts of Sweden the youngest bridesmaid walked round the table at which the guests were seated, 'in order to remove all evil.'[4] In Norway the bride was regarded as specially open to the attacks of chthonic deities, who had to be frightened off by the hallooing and pistol-shooting of the wedding-party.[5] Possibly the custom mentioned by Olaus Magnus,[6] of celebrating weddings on small islets, has its roots in a similar fear. Both in Norway and in Sweden weddings were usually celebrated at midsummer, when the powers of darkness were weakest.

In both ancient and modern wedding customs the wedding ale seems to have had a prophylactic or purificatory value. A Norwegian bishop of the 12th cent. has to assure his flock that a wedding is legal even though celebrated with whey; and the belief in the special virtues of wedding ale seems to survive in a superstition current in some parts of Sweden, that it is unlucky to call the banns 'on an empty cask,' *i.e.* before the wedding ale is brewed.[7] In Sweden it was customary for the bride and bridegroom to drain a beaker before entering their house on their return from church.

[1] *Landnáma*, ed. Finnur Jónsson, Copenhagen, p. 158.

[2] *Hist. om de nordiska Folken*, 1555, bk. xv. ch. 35 f., Swedish tr., published by St. Michael's Guild, Upsala, 1909–

[3] N. E. Hammerstedt, in *Maal og Minne*, Christiania, 1911, p. 339 ff.

[4] Lundgren, 'Frieri, Trolofning och Bröllop i Vingåker,' in *Sverige, Fosterländska Bilder*, 1877-78, p. 15.

[5] K. Visted, *Vor gamle Bondekultur*, Christiania, n.d., p. 235.

[6] Bk. xiv. ch. 10.

[7] L. F. Rääf, *Samlingar . . . till en Beskrifning öfver Ydre härad i Östergötland*, Linköping, 1856, p. 110.

The bowls used for the purpose were often apparently the property of the commune.[1] In Dalecarlia a large tree was brought into the house and 'slaughtered' by having branches lopped off it, and the company drank the 'ox-blood'—coffee and brandy.[2] In some parts of Sweden the 'wedding tree' was flung into a stream or pond at the end of the festivities.

4. Death.—In the more primitive communities purificatory ceremonies are regarded as especially necessary in the case of association with death. This idea is not actually expressed in our sources, but the customs of destroying, burning, or burying a dead man's personal property, of sending the corpse out to sea in a ship, etc., may have their *raison d'être* in some such conception. The custom of *sati*, which appears to have been at least occasionally practised, is probably connected with the fear of pollution from a dead man's personal belongings. Some traces of this fear can be found in the Norwegian custom of solemnly burning the straw of a dead man's bed. The old town-law of Bergen, while prohibiting all other bonfires, specially exempts such fires, kindled in the streets. In recent Norwegian custom the sledge on which a coffin was conveyed to the churchyard was left to rot or used as firewood by the poor.[3]

Ancient Teutonic religion offers but few traces of this feeling of pollution on contact with death in general. But from ecclesiastical prohibitions of unseemly laughter, songs, dances, story-telling, and mask-wearing at the memorial feasts for the dead we can guess that in the Germany of Charlemagne such observances aimed at averting the dangers of association with the dead. In Scandinavia this feast seems to have been more orderly and its original significance more obscured.

But the necessity for purification was still keenly felt in regard to persons who had been of an evil disposition during life. An Icelandic saga tells us that, when the wicked Thorolf bægifot dies in his chair, his son breaks a gap in the house wall and has him carried through it, so that the ghost may not find the way back.[4] In spite of this precaution, the ghost 'walked' until the corpse was burned and the ashes were blown out to sea. We do not hear of any actual purificatory rites performed in houses subject to ghosts, for the account in *Eyrbyggja Saga* of the legal proceedings resorted to was probably intended by its author as farce rather than history. Here the ghosts are summoned in turn, and an adverse verdict is given against each. This saga, however, gives an example of the belief that the properties of the dead are dangerous: as long as the bed-hangings of Thorgunna were unburned, the household was a prey to every kind of misfortune. We may assume that here, as elsewhere, dead persons who had not received the proper rites were regarded as a danger to the community; for, according to Icelandic law, a man who killed another became an outlaw if he failed to cover up the body with stones or earth. In this connexion we may mention the wide-spread belief which makes it obligatory on every passer-by to add a stone to the cairn raised over some person who had died a violent death. This custom was observed until last century in some parts of Sweden.[5]

5. Harvest.—The various purificatory observances connected with harvest or other seasons of the year can be traced only in modern custom and can be best studied in Frazer's *Golden Bough*. An exception is the need-fire (*q.v.*), which is first mentioned as early as 742.[6] It seems to have been the most characteristic example of purificatory rites to be found in Teutonic custom. Leaping over the fire, usually on Midsummer Eve, was believed to avert disease, and the cattle were driven through the flames with the same intention. A similar purificatory rite, vouched for only in modern Sweden, is the custom of grinding down the edges of flint axes—'Thor's hammers,' as they are called in Sweden—and mixing them with the fodder for the cattle.

6. The scapegoat.—The scapegoat idea, in which the conception of the purification of the community finds its most characteristic expression, is perhaps not formally recognized in Teutonic religion. Akin to it is the expulsion or death of guilty members of the community, which can be traced in Tacitus's account of the driving out of an unfaithful wife[1] and in the clause of the Old Frisian law which enjoins the mutilation and drowning of a sanctuary breaker.[2] A similar conception probably inspired the slaying of a king in time of famine, of which Swedish tradition records two examples.

7. Festivals and idols.—In the ceremonial of religious festivals purificatory rites play only a small part. The sprinkling of the blood of the sacrificial victim upon the assembled worshippers, which appears to have been an integral part of Scandinavian festivals, may possibly have had a purificatory intention. The purification of the deity herself, reported by Tacitus in his account of the goddess Nerthus, is frequently held to have been nothing more than a rain-charm. Once a year, says Tacitus, the goddess Nerthus emerged from her retirement in a sacred grove, and was driven round the country with her priest, amid general rejoicings, after which the chariot and the goddess herself were laved in a sacred lake.[3] From what we know of deities of fertility in general, and in especial of the Scandinavian god Frey and his human spouse, we are justified in considering the possibility that the immersion of the goddess was of the nature of a bridal bath. It is worth noting that a little wooden figure of a bishop which used to stand in the church at Eidsborg in S. Norway, and which the peasants called Nikuls, used to be carried down to the lake below the church every midsummer and solemnly washed. The sweat which appeared on the wood after this ceremony was believed to heal all diseases.[4] Similar idols, without the ecclesiastical connexions, are known to have been in the possession of Norwegian families far into the 18th cent., and to have had ale offered to them at Christmas. One of them is said to have been washed every Saturday. The direct descent of these figures from heathen idols seems to be proved by the fact that one of them is said to have been regularly rubbed with fat as late as the 19th century.[5] According to a late saga, this treatment was accorded to a wooden image of the god Balder.[6] It is possible that this ceremonial rubbing of idols with fat was intended to avert some dangers from the idol.

Such traces of purificatory rites as we find among the Teutonic peoples seem to have been fragmentary survivals of an attitude to religion more primitive and more mystical than we find among the upper classes in the last days of heathendom. The lack of insistence on ceremonial purity is probably connected with the absence of any highly specialized priesthood, resulting in what we must regard as an enlightened

[1] Hammerstedt, p. 504 f. [2] *Ib.* p. 492.
[3] Visted, p. 46 ff.
[4] *Eyrbyggja Saga*, ch. 33. [5] Raaf, p. 90.
[6] Sarpe, *Indiculus Superstitionum*, Leipzig, 1891, p. 21.

[1] *Germ.* 19.
[2] K. von Richthofen, *Fries. Rechtsquellen*, Berlin, 1840, p. xlii.
[3] *Germ.* 40.
[4] Nicolaysen, *Norske Fornlevninger*, Christiania, 1862–66, p. 227 f.
[5] Visted, p. 184.
[6] *Fornaldar Sögur*, ed. CC. Rafn, Copenhagen 1829, ii. p. 86.

freedom from formalism, shown also in the contempt of the upper classes for magical practices. On the other hand, it may be pointed out that regard for ceremonial purity may develop into the conception of ethical righteousness, a conception to which the heathen Teutonic mind can hardly be said to have attained.[1]

LITERATURE.—See the works cited throughout.

B. S. PHILLPOTTS.

PURIM.—'Purim' is the name given to a festival in the Jewish Church, celebrated for two days, on the 14th and 15th of the month of Adar, the last month of the Jewish lunar calendar. The supposed origin of the festival, which is of a distinctly popular character, marked by merry-making, feasting, masquerading, and exchange of gifts, is given in the book of Esther, forming part of the OT canon. According to this book, the festival marks the miraculous deliverance of the Jews resident in Persia from the destructive designs of Haman, the grand vizier of King Ahasuerus, *i.e.* Xerxes (485–465 B.C.), who had planned a general massacre of the Jews for the 13th of Adar in the 12th year of the king's reign, corresponding to the year 473 B.C. Through the intervention of Esther, a Jewess whose beauty led her to the king's *harîm*, where she rose to the rank of queen, the plan was frustrated. Haman and his sons were condemned to the gallows, while Mordecai, the uncle of Esther, was raised from his humble station to become the second in the extensive kingdom of the Persian king. Instead of being slaughtered, the Jews were permitted to slay those who attacked them on the day set aside for the massacre, which they did with great vigour; and in commemoration of the deliverance a two days' festival was instituted. The only religious feature of the festival, however, is the reading of the book of Esther in the synagogue at the evening service for the two days in question. The otherwise purely secular observance itself points to a non-Jewish origin for the festival.

It is now universally recognized by scholars that the book of Esther is a pure romance to which a quasi-historical setting is given. From the silence of Ben Sira, the author of Ecclesiasticus (*c.* 180 B.C.), who does not mention Esther in his enumeration of the sacred writings known to him, the conclusion is justified that its composition cannot be placed before the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C., and was perhaps as late as 100 B.C. Apart from the fact that there is nothing to warrant the belief that in the days of Xerxes there was any persecution of the Jews in Persia, or, in fact, that there was even an extensive Jewish settlement in that country, and apart from the inherent improbability of the story itself, the chronological discrepancy in making Mordecai one of those carried into captivity by Nebuchadrezzar in 597 B.C. and yet still living 125 years later suffices to show that we are dealing with pure fiction. It so happens also that we know from Herodotus (ix. 109, 112) that the queen of Xerxes at the very time when Esther was supposed to occupy this distinction was Amestris, the daughter of a Persian general.

If, then, the book of Esther is pure romance in a quasi-historical setting but without any historical basis, it follows that the origin of the festival as given in this book is equally fictitious, and we are thrown back upon investigations independent of the festal legend to solve the problem involved. The author of the book of Esther, by his evident desire to connect the name 'Purim' with a non-Hebrew word *pûr*, supposed to mean 'lot' (3^7 $9^{24.\ 26}$), recognizes the name as foreign. In view of the Persian setting of the festal legend, suggesting that the author of the book of Esther was a Persian Jew, one naturally thinks of a Persian origin for the festival, and, if there were a Persian word *pûr* meaning 'lot,' the necessary proof would have been furnished that the author of the festal legend at least had in mind the adaptation of a Persian festival to the Jewish festival cyclus. No such Persian word as *pûr* exists, however, and all attempts to find in it some adaptation of a Persian term (see L. B. Paton, *Commentary on the Book of Esther*, pp. 84–86, for various conjectures and suppositions, all, however, rejected by Paton and properly so) have failed. On the other hand, the possibility that the author of the book of Esther, in connecting the name 'Purim' with *pûr*, had in mind a Babylonian term must be admitted, especially as a word *pûru* exists with various meanings, among which those of 'lot' and 'term of office' are possible, though not certain (see H. Zimmern's discussion in *KAT*[3], p. 518; P. Haupt, 'Purim,' in *BASS* VI. ii. [1906] 20; and art. CALENDAR [Babylonian], vol. iii. p. 77[a]). The names of the two chief personages in the festal legend, Mordecai and Esther, carry us distinctly to Babylonian soil; for Mordecai is clearly identical with the Babylonian deity Marduk, the head of the pantheon after the rise of his patron city, Babylon, to be the capital of the united districts of the Euphrates valley, while Esther is quite as unmistakably the Babylonian goddess, Ishtar, the chief female deity and as such directly associated with Marduk. Even rabbinical exegesis connected Esther with the planet Venus (Istahar=Ishtar [Talmud Bab. *Mᵉgillāh*, 13*a*]), with which Ishtar was identified by the Babylonians. According to P. Jensen, who first called attention to this double identification, Mordecai=Marduk, and Esther=Ishtar, the two other names, Haman and Vashti (the queen whom Esther displaces) are Elamitic deities, Humman (or Humbar) and Mashti, skilfully disguised or connoted ('Elamitische Eigennamen,' in *WZKM* vi. [1892] 47 ff., 209 ff.). These two identifications, however, are less certain; and to go a step farther and assume that the story of the book of Esther rests upon a Babylonian myth, relating a conflict between Marduk and Ishtar, the gods of spring and light, against hostile powers symbolizing winter and darkness, and therefore identified with 'foreign' deities or as modifications of Kingu and Tiamāt, who in the main Semitic-Babylonian version of creation are the personifications of primeval chaos and discord, who must be overcome by Marduk, the establisher of order in the universe—to do this is to enter the province of pure conjecture. Until some fortunate chance reveals to us the story of such a conflict with all four names unmistakably introduced, we must content ourselves with the definite proof that at the foundation of the book of Esther, or at all events as an element in it, we have some Babylonian tale of the gods in which Marduk and Ishtar play the chief rôles, and that this tale was transformed in such a manner by the Jewish author of the book of Esther as to make it the basis for an elaborate festal legend to justify the adoption of a 'foreign' festival into the Jewish calendar. The character of this festival is unmistakable. Its occurrence in the middle of the last month of the winter season and just before the beginning of the spring, the natural beginning of the year, points to its being the beginning of the celebration of the conquest of the winter by the youthful sun-god of the spring—as Marduk is regarded in various Babylonian myths. The rejoicing and merry-making of Purim fit in with such a spring festival, while the fast added at a much later date for the 12th of Adar—it cannot be traced farther back than the 9th century—is the percursor to the festival which afterwards takes on a sombre hue as a preparation for the feasting to follow. As Haupt aptly puts

[1] See art. ETHICS (Teutonic).

it (p. 1), 'shroving was preceded by shriving.' That the Babylonians began the year in the spring follows, apart from other evidence, from the order of the months adopted by the Jews, which begin with Nisan, the time of the spring equinox; and we know that the Babylonian New Year festival known as Zagmuk, and celebrated during the first eleven days of Nisan, became primarily the festival of Marduk and his consort in the days of the united Babylonian Empire (see CALENDAR [Babylonian]). The circumstance that in the 2nd book of Maccabees (15[36]) the Purim festival is designated as Μαρδοχαικὴ ἡμέρα, *i.e.* 'Marduk (or Mordecai) day,' is a significant testimony to the association of Purim with the Babylonian New Year period, bound up with the Marduk cult. The middle of the month preceding the 1st of Nisan would thus mark the preparation for the period of rejoicing at the approaching triumph of the god of spring, Marduk, over the hostile and destructive forces of the winter and rainy season. The Jews in Babylonia and Persia, subject to the influences of their environment, would naturally be led to take part in a merry-making season, just as at the present time Jews in Europe and America participate in Christmas festivities and in New Year's exchange of felicitations, despite the fact that the old mid-winter festival has been given a Christian interpretation and that the Jews still observe a religious 'New Year' in autumn (*Rōsh Hashshānāh*, 'beginning of the year') on the first of Tishri, the seventh month, pointing to an older calendar, in which the year began in autumn.

Corresponding to the festal legend set forth in the 1st book of Maccabees for the celebration of the Roman Saturnalia or mid-winter festival at the time of the winter solstice (adopted by the Jews under Græco-Roman influence and converted into a Jewish festival by association with the victory of Judas Maccabæus and his army over the Greek forces), the romantic tale in the book of Esther was composed to provide a justification for the participation of the Jews in the general rejoicing indulged in in Babylonia and in lands where Babylonian influences prevailed, at or near the beginning of the vernal equinox. The one link missing in the chain of evidence connecting Purim with the period of merry-making in honour of Marduk and Ishtar is evidence of a celebration in Babylonia or Persia in the middle of Adar—just before the New Year's season proper two weeks later. Until such evidence is forthcoming, the view here set forth lacks definite confirmation. It may well be, however, that with the coming of the Persians into Babylonia in the second half of the 6th cent. B.C. a Persian New Year's festival celebrated at the period of the vernal equinox, and fixed for a time somewhat preceding the date selected in the Babylonian calendar for the Zagmuk, became the current New Year's season of rejoicing. The natural tendency would be to bring this Persian New Year into close affiliation with the Babylonian festival. Purim would thus represent the result of such a combination of Persian and Babylonian customs and festival rites. To this day the New Year's season is a time of rejoicing and festivity in Persia. The New Year's day, known as Nauroz, is fixed for the first day after the sun has crossed the vernal equinox, and is therefore a movable feast, like the Christian Easter, likewise an old New Year's festival. The festivities incident to the Nauroz last a week. It is to be noted, also, that in the Jewish calendar the tendency is to fix festivals connected with the transition of one season to the other either in the middle of the month (*e.g.*, the spring festival Pesaḥ and the harvest festival Sukkōth on the 15th day of Nisan and Tishri respectively) or at the beginning of the month, as, *e.g.*, the Rōsh Hashshānāh. The 15th of Adar would thus be fixed as corresponding to an average date for the vernal equinox. Finally, we find evidence that in the 2nd cent. B.C. the Jews of Palestine also celebrated the 13th of Adar as a festival and that, under the same tendency to give to popular rejoicings, when adopted from foreign sources, a Jewish setting, this festival was associated with the victory of Judas Maccabæus over the Syrian general Nicanor of Adasa in the year 161 B.C., and in consequence became known as 'Nicanor's Day' (1 Mac 7[39-50]; Jos. *Ant.* XII. x. 5 [409]; see FESTIVALS AND FASTS [Hebrew], vol. v. p. 866[a]). The book of Maccabees thus furnishes the festal legend for two holy days adopted by the Jews: (1) the Saturnalia, or mid-winter festival, at the time of the winter solstice, celebrated for a week, which became the Jewish Ḥanukka, in commemoration of the supposed restoration of the Temple at Jerusalem to Jewish worship after the victories of Judas Maccabæus; and (2) the spring festival in the middle of Adar, adopted under Babylonian-Persian influences and associated by the festal legend with a specific occurrence in the so-called wars of the Maccabees.

Nicanor's Day and Purim thus represent the same festival. To the one a Jewish aspect was given by making it a commemoration of a victory gained over the enemy at a critical period in Jewish history, while for the same festival adopted under Babylonian-Persian influences a festal legend was composed which transformed a Babylonian myth, celebrating the deeds of Marduk and Ishtar, into a Jewish romance. It may be also that the Jews of Persia suffered some annoyance from hostile officials, and that a liberation through the dismissal of an offensive vizier suggested some of the incidents in the festal legend, which, in accord with the tendency of legendary compositions, would give to a comparatively insignificant episode an exaggerated importance. All this, however, is purely conjectural, and it must be frankly admitted that there is no evidence for any persecution of the Jews under any of the Persian rulers, who, on the contrary, appear to have been at all times favourably disposed towards them. The main thesis in connexion with Purim, that it is a foreign festival, a precursor of the Babylonian New Year's festival or the Persian New Year adopted by the Hebrews, is not affected even if we assume some historical occurrence to be a factor in the composition of the romance, which was written to give a Jewish setting to a celebration that had become popular among the Jews of Rome and Babylonia and had spread to other countries where Jews had settled. The sad experiences of the Jews, encountering hostility and frequent persecutions in the Diaspora, tended to increase the popularity of Purim. The story in the book of Esther became typical of the sufferings of the Jews in many lands. There were Hamans everywhere who tried to work injury to the Jews, and the celebration of Purim helped to maintain their trust during the dark days in the ultimate deliverance from the dangers and difficulties besetting them. The merry-making at Purim also afforded an outlet for pent-up feelings, and furnished a much-needed relief from the serious life led during the greater part of the year.

All the festivals of the Jews except Purim take on a sombre hue, even those which, like the Passover and the Festival of Booths, were in their origin distinctly joyous occasions. The somewhat cruel and vicious spirit of the book of Esther, reciting with evident satisfaction how the Jews avenged themselves on their enemies by slaughtering thousands of them (9[1-10]), was overlooked in the abandonment to joy that marked the two days of Purim.

Masquerading and games became one of the features of the popular rejoicing. Presents were exchanged and drinking was enjoined almost as an obligation. Sober and serious-minded persons gave themselves over to the joy of Purim, and it was regarded as quite proper to put oneself in such a condition at Purim time that one could not distinguish between 'Cursed be Haman' and 'Blessed be Mordecai' (Talmud Bab. *Mᵉgillāh*, 7*b*), though naturally a playful allusion of this kind must not be forced beyond the point of showing that, as far back as Talmudic days, Purim was regarded primarily as a time of jollification, devoid of any genuinely religious character. The exceptionally secular nature of the festival is also shown by the express permission of the rabbis (*Mᵉgillāh*, 18*a*) that the roll of the book of Esther may be read in any language in the synagogue, while otherwise, as a matter of course, only Hebrew was to be used in the service. Even the synagogue service in connexion with Purim acquired some of the boisterous character of the festival; for at the mention of Haman and his sons the congregation stamped with their feet or made a noise with rattles or by knocking two sticks on which the name of Haman was written against one another until the name was erased. Such customs are to be regarded as popular survivals of endeavours to drive away evil demons by noises or by some form of sympathetic magic. They are closely bound up with the popular view that at transition periods—and such the New Year's festival is—the evil spirits were particularly malevolent, lying in wait for victims. Masquerading is also to be viewed under this aspect as a means of disguising oneself from the evil spirits or of deceiving them. Another interesting trace of the original character of Purim as a New Year's festival is to be seen in the persistency with which the idea of its being connected with 'drawing of lots' clings to it, for, whatever the etymological origin of the word *pûr*, there is no reason to question the correctness of the tradition as set forth in the book of Esther which connects it with 'casting lots.' At the New Year's period, according to the Babylonian view, the gods sit in the council chamber of fate and decide the lot or portion of individuals in the year to come; and from the Babylonians this view passed to the Jews, for whom the ten days of the New Year's month are days of probation, corresponding to the ten or eleven days of the Babylonian Zagmuk period. On the 10th day, the Day of Atonement, the fate of the individual is definitely inscribed in the book of fate and sealed. The exchange of presents on Purim also rests ultimately on an association of ideas between 'lot' and 'portion' as something set aside for some one. The term used for 'presents' (*manôth*) in the book of Esther ($9^{19, 22}$) in connexion with the description of the custom is precisely the word which means 'portions,' while *pûr* is specifically explained in a gloss (9^{24}) as *ha-gôrāl*, *i.e.* the common term for 'lot.'

LITERATURE.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew) and (Jewish); L. B. Paton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Esther* (*ICC*), Edinburgh and New York, 1908, pp. 1–118; P. Haupt, 'Purim,' *BASS* VI. ii. [1906].

MORRIS JASTROW, Jr.

PURITANISM.—1. Definition and application of the term.—The widely divergent estimates of Puritanism still current unite in recognizing its significance as a formative factor in the life and character of the English people. Probably no other religious movement has left so deep an impress on the history of England. Some of the Puritan positions have been embodied once for all in the constitutional development and Church life of the country; others of their contentions may yet be realized. In a modified form, the Puritan ideal of a Church at once national and self-governing may be the subject of a modern revival. But whether or no the ecclesiastical programme of Puritanism has a future, reverence for the very letter of the Puritan tradition lingers in many minds, while its inner force is by no means spent.

It would conduce to clearness in historical studies if the term 'Puritanism' could be confined strictly to the movement for further reform of the Church of England whose history falls within the century from the Act of Uniformity of 1559 to the Act of Uniformity of 1662. The Puritan party consisted of all those who believed in the maintenance of one National Church in England, and who desired that Church to be reformed after the model of Geneva. According to Thomas Fuller[1] (*Ch. Hist. of Britain*, London, 1655, bk. ix. § 66 f.), 'the odious name of puritans' was first applied in 1564 to those who resisted the attempt of the bishops in that year to enforce uniformity in ritual and in the use of vestments. A passage in John Bunyan's *Life and Death of Mr. Badman* (written in 1680)—'The man was a godly old Puritan, for so the godly were called in time past'—suggests that the term began to fall out of use as a distinct party label after the overthrow of Puritanism at the Restoration. It is confusing to extend the use of the term either backwards, as S. R. Maitland does (*The Reformation in England*, ed. London, 1906), to include early reformers of the time of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Mary, or forwards, to cover later dissent. The kinship of Puritanism with earlier elements in the English Reformation is as obvious as is the indebtedness to it of the Free Churches. But Puritanism stood primarily for an ecclesiastical ideal which was not definitely adopted by any distinct body of Englishmen before the time of the Elizabethan settlement, and which was not accepted by the Nonconformist churches of later times. Puritanism is most simply defined as the movement for Church reform whose first great leader was Thomas Cartwright and whose last was Richard Baxter.

A wider application of the term 'Puritan' to all who attempted a greater sobriety of life than was customary in Elizabethan England became familiar in the 17th cent., if not earlier. Richard Baxter says that his father was dubbed a Puritan by his neighbours because he disliked the village custom of dancing round the May-pole on Sundays, and preferred to pass his time at home, reading the Bible and the Prayer-Book:

> 'For my Father never scrupled Common-Prayer or Ceremonies, nor spake against Bishops, nor ever so much as prayed but by a Book or Form, being not ever acquainted with any that did otherwise: But only for reading Scripture when the rest were Dancing on the Lord's Day, and for praying (by a Form out of the end of the Common-Prayer Book) in his House, and for reproving Drunkards and Swearers, and for talking sometimes a few words of Scripture and the Life to come, he was reviled commonly by the Name of *Puritan*, *Precisian*, and *Hypocrite*.'[2]

The wider aspect of Puritanism revealed in this application of the term cannot be ignored in any account of the subject, because the effort after a sober godly life which drew down this reproach was part of the whole religious movement of which Puritanism in the strict sense was the narrower ecclesiastical expression. It is worth noting incidentally that the name 'Puritan,' like the words 'Christian' and 'Quaker,' was a term of insult which became a title of honour.

2. Puritans as a party in Church and State.—(*a*) *The Prayer-Book controversy.*—When Elizabeth came to the throne in 1558, the hopes of reformers ran high. It was certain that she would reverse the religious policy of her predecessor. The burn-

[1] J. Stow's still earlier application of the term to some Anabaptists is rightly rejected as erroneous. See *OED*, *s.v.* 'Puritan.'

[2] *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, London, 1696, p. 3.

ing of heretics would cease, and subserviency to the pope would be ended. Though the number of convinced Protestants was not large, the country as a whole was prepared for a considerable change. In some sense England would become a Protestant power. But how far was the queen prepared to go? It was thought that she would at least re-establish the standard of reform set up by Edward VI.; it was hoped in some quarters that she would go much farther. For, while many were content with the measure of advance embodied in the Prayer-Book of 1552 (and indeed the martyrdom of some of the authors of the Prayer-Book had consecrated it in the eyes of its users), others who had been in exile on the Continent had come under the spell of Geneva, and desired a more thorough reform along the lines laid down by Calvin. The Protestant world had not stood still since the days of Edward VI., and it seemed absurd to be content with something obviously limited and faulty like the work of Cranmer. The position of many of the leaders like John Jewel, Edwin Sandys, and Edmund Grindal, who were among the first of the Elizabethan bishops, was that they would gladly go back to the system set up in the time of Edward VI. as a starting-point, but that they hoped to be allowed to make it the basis of a further development. The convenience of adopting the English Prayer-Book of 1552 was manifest. It obviated the necessity of thinking out at short notice forms of service and of government for the Elizabethan Church, and it gave a sense of continuity in the work of the Reformation in England. There was therefore no surprise or regret when the Act of Uniformity re-imposed the use of the second Prayer-Book of Edward VI.

The Act of Uniformity was preceded by the Act of Supremacy, which made Elizabeth chief governor of the Church of Christ in England. Her authority she was to exercise in the first instance through an ecclesiastical commission until a regular administration by duly appointed bishops should be possible. These two Acts ensured lay control of the Church, abolished papal authority and the Mass, and restored the English liturgy. So far, so good; but what was to be the next step?

When the revised Prayer-Book was issued, it contained one or two features which occasioned disquiet among the more radical reformers. The clause in the Litany praying for deliverance from 'the tyranny of the Bishop of Rome and all his detestable enormities' had vanished. The sentences appointed for the use of the priest in delivering the elements at communion included those from the Prayer-Book of 1549 which were capable of being interpreted to imply the doctrine of transubstantiation. Moreover, into the Prayer-Book was inserted, apparently at the last moment and without the knowledge of Parliament, an additional rubric directing that[1] 'the minister at the time of communion and at all other times in his ministrations, shall use such ornaments in the church as were in use by authority of Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI.' In accordance with this rubric, ministers in the communion service were to put on 'a white Albe plain, with a vestment or Cope'—the garments used in the celebration of the Mass.

This was the starting-point of a renewed vestiarian controversy. To the dismay of the reformers, the queen was determined that her clergy should wear a distinctive dress in ordinary life, and should continue to use the vestments of the unreformed Church. When Archbishop Parker, under pressure from the queen, determined in 1566 resolutely to enforce uniformity in the use of vestments, the formation of a distinct Puritan party was inevitable. Some ministers resigned their cures rather than wear the prescribed dress. Small groups of parishioners in London went so far as to set up separatist meetings. The majority of men with Puritan sympathies remained in the Church, but began to entertain a doubt as to the bishops' hopes of further reform, and to subject the Elizabethan settlement to a more searching criticism.

(*b*) *Protests against popish abuses.*—The broader Puritan position was championed by Thomas Cartwright, Lady Margaret professor of divinity at Cambridge, who in lectures on the Acts denounced the government of the Church of England as unscriptural and illegitimate. The hierarchy, he held, was as clearly popish and anti-Christian as the vestments. Cartwright was deprived of his professorial chair in 1570, but his views found expression in two 'Admonitions' presented to Parliament in 1572. The first, written by John Field and Thomas Wilcox, is a singularly effective and vigorous statement of the Puritan programme of ecclesiastical reform.

The authors begin by laying down the essentials of the Puritan standpoint, which consist in 'abandoning al popish remnants both in ceremonies and regiment,' and 'also in bringing in and placing in Gods church those things only, which the Lord himself in his word commandeth.' The Puritans stood for making the breach with Rome as complete as possible, and the approach to the NT Church as close as possible. The writers of the Admonition then proceed to survey the condition of the Church in England in the light of the requirements of a true Christian Church, which are 'preaching of the worde purely, ministring of the sacraments sincerely, and ecclesiastical discipline which consisteth in admonition and correction of faults severelie.' With regard to the ministry, the Puritans maintained the clergy to be quite inefficient. Large numbers of the clergy were mere 'Vicars of Bray,' who had accepted every change in religion from Henry VIII.'s time onward. Many were unlearned and incapable of teaching. They were men without any call to the ministry, and the method of their ordination and appointment was irregular and unchristian. Men who could preach were discouraged, by being made subject to a special licence, and by being bound down 'to a prescript order of service.' The ordinary ministry was starved, in order to maintain an expensive hierarchy, while the abuses of pluralism deprived godly ministers of opportunities, compelled congregations to go without preachers, and were yet inevitable because the incomes of many livings did not suffice to keep the incumbent. The contrast between the Elizabethan ministry and the primitive evangelists and pastors was glaring. 'Then, as God gave utterance they preached the word onely: now they read homilies. . . . Then feedyng the flocke diligently: now teaching quarterly. Then preaching in season and out of season: now once in a month is thoght sufficient, if twice, it is judged a worke of supererogation.' For a thorough reformation, it was necessary to 'displace those ignorant and unable ministers already placed, and in their rowmes appoint such as both can, and will by Gods assistance feed the flock.'

Passing from preaching to the sacraments, the Puritans objected to many details in the communion service, which they regarded as popish and out of harmony with primitive Christianity. Beyond their criticism of details, they complained of private communions and baptisms. This private use of the sacraments ignored their essential character as acts of Church-fellowship, and in effect 'tied the necessitie of salvation to the sacraments.' An even worse abuse was the readiness with which men were admitted to the Lord's Supper and indeed obliged by law to partake of it. 'They [the early Christians] toke it with conscience. We with custume. They shut men by reasen of their sinnes, from the Lordes Supper. We thrust them in their sinne to the Lordes Supper.' One of the most urgent reforms is 'that papists nor other, neither constrainedly nor customably, communicate in the misteries of salvation.'

In dealing in the third place with ecclesiastical discipline, the authors of the Admonition claimed that 'the whole regiment of the church' is to be committed to 'Ministers, Seniors, and Deacons.' The existing hierarchy is to be removed. In particular the exercise of discipline must no longer be left in the hands of one man—the monarchical bishop acting through chancellors, archdeacons, proctors, and what not. There was a sad confusion, they felt, between ecclesiastical and civil jurisdictions, both in procedure and in penalties. The use of excommunication should be more sparing and more solemn.

This outline of necessary reforms was supplemented by 'A View of Popishe Abuses yet remaining in the Englishe Church,' whose presence prevented the Puritan clergy from subscribing an article to the effect that the Prayer Book contained nothing repugnant to the Word of God.

[1] See T. M. Lindsay, *Hist. of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1907, ii. 351 f., and H. Gee, *The Elizabethan Prayer-book and Ornaments*, London, 1902.

The chief Puritan criticisms of detail may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Prayer-Book stands for a reading ministry as contrasted with a preaching ministry. (2) It enjoins the use of homilies which have not yet appeared, and which consequently cannot be approved. Those homilies, too, are to discourage preaching—the main work of the minister. (3) It provides for the keeping of saints' days—contrary to the Fourth Commandment. (4) The order of the communion insists on the communicants kneeling instead of sitting when they receive the elements. The book, moreover, retains the term 'priest' in this connexion, and allows private communion. (5) The sacrament of baptism is divorced from teaching, and may be administered in private even by women. Public baptism is also 'full of childishe and superstitious toyes,' as in suggesting that God has sanctified water to wash away sins. Other 'toyes' are the impossible promise made by godparents, the interrogatories uselessly addressed to infants, and the use of the sign of the cross. (6) In the marriage service the Puritans objected to the wedding-ring, and to the phrase 'with my body I thee worshippe,' whereby a man 'makes an idol of his wife.' Other superstitious customs are associated with the ceremony. (7) Confirmation is bestowed on those 'that lacke both discretion and faithe,' and is wrongly confined to bishops. (8) The burial service maintains prayer for the dead, and is associated with many undesirable customs. (9) The order of service for the churching of women 'smelleth of Jewishe purification.' The Holy Scriptures are profaned as in the use of Ps 121, the Benedictus, Nunc Dimittis, and Magnificat, which are quite unsuited to the condition of those who constantly use them. (10) 'In all their order of service there is no edification . . . but confusion.' The standing up for the Gospel, and not for the Old Testament, shows that they 'are ignorante that the scriptures came from one spirite.' The bowing and scraping at the name of Jesus is equally unjustifiable. (11) Their Pontifical is simply popish. 'As the names of Archbishops, Archdeacons, Lord bishops, Chancelers, etc., are drawne out of the Popes shop togither with their offices. So the governement which they use, by the life of the Pope which is the Canon law is Antichristian and devilishe, and contrarye to the scriptures.' (12) The titles of honour assumed by the great ecclesiastics are against the Word of God, as is also the practice of joining civil with ecclesiastical offices. (13) The remaining criticisms concern the exercise of discipline and the appointment of ministers. The bishops' authority spoils the pastor of his normal power of discipline. Ministers are made at random by the bishops, and the men ordained rashly have to seek for livings by dishonourable means. The cathedral churches maintain an idle and useless ministry at the cost of an effective parochial ministry. The whole system of patronage is wrong and encourages self-seeking among the clergy. The bishops' courts and methods of discipline, their licences, dispensations and excommunications, are also unscriptural; for their administration is secular in temper, and is far removed from the brotherly reproof and admonition which should prevail among Christians. (14) As an after-thought, they add a protest against what they hold to be the blasphemous use of the sentence 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost' in the ordination service.[1]

(*c*) *Puritan position defined.*—The foregoing analysis will suffice to bring out the negative aspect of Elizabethan Puritanism, as revealed in this series of objections to the Prayer-Book. A more attractive positive statement of the Puritan view may be found in Walter Travers, *Ecclesiasticæ Disciplinæ. . . . Explicatio* (La Rochelle, 1574, Eng. tr. by Cartwright, n.p., 1574). Travers had certain peculiarities of his own, but his book is broadly representative.

Travers begins by emphasizing the importance of good discipline, *i.e.* sound government, to all human societies. The Church, like the State, cannot continue in health without discipline. He then urges that the discipline essential for the Church must be discovered from the Word of God. If God prescribed laws for the Jews—laws to which they were not allowed to add and from which they might not subtract—it follows that He will have laid down a platform of government for the Church of Christ. If the civil ruler may determine the constitution of the Church at his or her pleasure, what becomes of the sovereignty of Christ over His own subjects? If Christ is lawgiver and king, He cannot have left the ministry and government of His Church indeterminate. There is, moreover, a clear system to be discerned in the NT—a system which must derive from Christ Himself and may not be changed. And the adoption of this system is essential to the work of reformation. For doctrine and discipline go together. The Church of England has reformed the former, but retained the latter in its old popish character. Such a half-hearted reform cannot last.

What, then, is the nature of the ecclesiastical discipline laid down in the NT? Before we discuss the particular offices of Christ's Church, we may note one general characteristic. No function is lawful in the Church apart from vocation. The office and the mode of appointment to it must be of Divine ordering. A true vocation requires that a man be called to some certain place or church (*i.e.*, he must not be ordained a deacon or a priest in general, but must be ordained to serve a particular community). A further requirement of a true vocation is that those called be faithful in the discharge of their office. There are two parts in vocation, viz. election and ordination. In election the elders should lead the congregation, but the assent of the congregation is necessary. It is essential that the men elected be fitted for the office for which they are chosen. This points to the necessity of careful examination of those who are to bear office, and the qualifications that they are to possess may be learnt from the Pastoral Epistles. Ordination consists of public prayer together with the laying on of hands. The latter feature of the ceremony belongs of right to the whole eldership.

Turning to the particular offices, we find two kinds of ordinary official, viz. bishops and deacons. The bishops and presbyters, or elders (for they are one and the same in the NT), are appointed to look after particular churches. They are of two kinds, doctors and pastors. Ability to teach and to pray is the chief qualification of the former; the latter's duty is to speak the word of exhortation needed on particular occasions and to administer the sacraments. The deacons, according to Travers, are also of two kinds, the first being treasurers and almoners, and the second overseers or elders responsible for the discipline of the individual members of the church. The diaconate of the NT has nothing in common with deacons' orders in the Church of England. For the latter is but a step towards the priesthood, while the former is a distinct and permanent office. These are the only offices required or, indeed, permitted in the Christian Church. It is true, the NT mentions other offices, such as apostles, prophets, and evangelists; but these were extraordinary functions either peculiar to the first age of the Church or only revived in special circumstances of reform and advance, and consequently out of place in settled churches. The ordinary officers are bishops and deacons.

Travers proceeds to develop another point to which the Puritans attached great importance. The higher government of the Church belongs, not to particular officials, but to a compound office, *i.e.* not to individuals set over and above ordinary ministers, but to synods of the ministers themselves. The eldership or assembly gathered from the three chief orders—*i.e.* pastors, doctors, and overseers, or elders—exercises the highest authority. These synods are responsible for elections and depositions of Church officers. They are also responsible for discipline, alike in giving admonitions and in suspending members from communion or in pronouncing complete excommunication. The essential point is the corporate character of authority in the Church, and the corollary which the Puritans drew was to the effect that the monarchical episcopate is contrary to the spirit of early Christianity and to the letter of such passages as Mk $10^{42f.}$ and Mt 23^{8-12}.

(*d*) *The break with Anglicanism.*—The First Admonition to Parliament and the tract by Travers afford an excellent survey of the Puritan case regarding the liturgy and government of the Church of England. The whole field was covered in the long and embittered controversy that followed between Cartwright and Whitgift, in which both writers displayed great learning, much animosity, and an inadequate sense of proportion. But their works were overshadowed by Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, perhaps the noblest piece of controversial literature in the English language. It is not possible to trace the development of the controversy in detail. The Puritans failed to secure any part of their programme in the time of Elizabeth. Indeed, the administration of the bishops, especially under the leadership of Whitgift, rendered their position more and more difficult. No relief was given to their consciences in respect of the details to which they objected in the liturgy. They were expected, not only to conform, but also to profess themselves satisfied that the details in question were not repugnant to the Word of God. The queen was mainly responsible for this severe repression of Puritanism, and those who sympathized more or less with the Puritans were unwilling to disturb the closing years of her reign by opposing her. Hooker's searching analysis of the Puritan presuppositions and his finely tempered defence of the Prayer-Book also served to raise a barrier of moderate opinion against the advance of Puritanism. The movement as a whole became more restrained and more modest. The Millenary Petition, presented to James I. in 1603, contains no sweeping programme of reform. The demand for a complete change of Church govern-

[1] The First Admonition may be read *in extenso* in *Puritan Manifestoes*, ed. W. H. Frere and C. E. Douglas for the Ch. Hist. Soc., London, 1907, pp. 8–55.

ment is abandoned. On the whole side of the Puritan case embodied in Travers the petition is silent. Instead, the desires of the petitioners are grouped under four heads:

The first reproduces the following details from among the changes urged in the First Admonition:[1] 'In the church service, that the cross in baptism, interrogatories ministered to infants, (and) confirmation, as superfluous, may be taken away. Baptism not to be ministered by women, and so explained. The cap and surplice not urged. That examination may go before the communion. That it be ministered with a sermon. That divers terms of priests and absolution and some other used, with the ring in marriage, and other such like in the book may be corrected. The longsomeness of service abridged. Church songs and music moderated to better edification. That the Lord's day be not profaned: the rest upon holidays not so strictly urged. That there be an uniformity of doctrine prescribed. No popish opinion to be any more taught or defended: no ministers charged to teach their people to bow at the name of Jesus. That the canonical scriptures only be read in the church. In the second place, the petition urges the importance of a preaching and resident ministry. Thirdly, they protest against the abuses of pluralities and impropriations of tithe. Under the fourth head they ask that enormities of discipline and excommunication may be redressed. They particularly desire that excommunication may not be issued by laymen, nor employed for trivial offences. They criticize the fines and the fees, and the delays in ecclesiastical courts. The oath ex officio,[2] whereby men are forced to accuse themselves, should be more sparingly used.'

In the Hampton Court Conference the Puritan representatives went somewhat farther. The uniformity of doctrine which they desired was to be found in the famous Lambeth Articles of 1595, which embodied the most rigid form of Calvinism. They desired corresponding changes in the other articles. Their plea for the association of ordinary ministers with the bishops in discipline drew from the king the famous and fatal aphorism, 'No bishop, no king.' Some minor concessions were made to the Puritans as a result of the conference, but, broadly speaking, their position was not eased. If the bulk of their more moderate demands had been conceded, or if some latitude in the use of ceremonies had been permitted, the danger of schism might have been averted. As it was, the Puritans became the party of constitutional reform, attacking alike the abuses of the royal prerogative and the claims of the monarchical episcopate. Under Laud the tide of feeling against episcopal rule steadily rose. 'Sion's plea against prelacy' commanded an ever more respectful hearing. In the Long Parliament the movement for ecclesiastical reform was no longer directed towards modifying episcopal control or securing detailed changes in the Prayer-Book; the hierarchy was to be destroyed root and branch, the Prayer-Book displaced by the Directory for Public Worship. That, however, is not the final phase of the Puritan ecclesiastical ideal. At the Savoy Conference in 1661 they put forward somewhat sweeping pleas for a reformed liturgy, and expressed their willingness to accept Archbishop Usher's scheme of a constitutional episcopate—a scheme under which the bishops governed with the assistance of representative church councils. The Puritans were out-manœuvred at this conference. They were asked to state their full demands, and they did so, in good faith; and then the boldness of their demands was used as a justification for refusing all concessions. They would have been content with less than they asked; as it was, they got nothing but expulsion, and thus regretfully they turned their backs on the National Church and on their ideal of such a Church, and set themselves to create their own religious organization. Puritanism as a definite movement for the reform of the Church of England was ended.

3. The influence of Puritanism as a tendency on religious and social life.—How far were the Puritans right in their ecclesiastical aims? Did they form a correct estimate of the needs and possibilities of the English Reformation? Were their criticisms of the Elizabethan settlement justified in detail and in principle? Any answer to these questions involves the introduction of the personal equation, but some answer must be attempted nevertheless.

(*a*) *Elizabeth's ecclesiastical policy.*—The assumption that the queen gauged the temper and wishes of the country with singular sagacity is part of the persistent legend of Good Queen Bess. Elizabeth is supposed to have given the National Church exactly the form that the mass of the people desired. In suppressing the Puritans she was restraining short-sighted extremists who would have broken the national unity, and given to the Church of England a rigid constitution which would have offended the Englishman's love of compromise. This view is frequently taken for granted, but it is really open to question. It would be truer to say that the country was prepared to accept almost any Church that Elizabeth liked to set up, provided it was more or less definitely Protestant, than to say that Elizabeth gave the country precisely the Church that it instinctively desired. No doubt the people generally would have revolted against any attempt to establish the Genevan model in England, but there is equally no doubt that, if Elizabeth had cared to go farther than she did in the Puritan direction, she would have had the approval and support of the majority of her first group of bishops and of many of her leading statesmen and favourites, including Burleigh and Leicester. Very little encouragement would have sufficed to make the clergy predominantly Puritan. As it was, a considerable and influential section of the clergy sympathized with the Puritan position. A majority in Parliament could have been found at almost any time to advocate and sanction further reforms.[1] There is no reason to suppose that in the matter of religion Elizabeth possessed any special genius for interpreting the mind of her subjects. The rank and file, like their leaders, would put up with almost anything from the queen, because the maintenance of her throne was essential to the national safety and independence. But, had she insisted on a more Calvinistic reform, the change would certainly have been accepted as readily as the actual settlement, and in all probability a more fully reformed Church would have evoked greater enthusiasm.

The limits which Elizabeth set to reform in England cannot be regarded as an inspired expression of the national mind in religion either then or since. It is possible to claim for Elizabeth's ecclesiastical policy that it was determined by a diplomatic skill to which Puritans were strangers. The retention of the ornaments may have been intended, as Lindsay suggests,[2] to give a Lutheran character to the Church of England and to secure for it from the emperor and the pope the toleration extended to Lutheranism by the Peace of Augsburg. The ornaments rubric and the other little changes in the second Prayer Book of Edward VI. also conveyed to the pope and to Philip II. of Spain the suggestion that England might return to the Catholic fold at any moment and at short notice. No doubt such an impression was intended, and

[1] G. W. Prothero, *Statutes and Political Documents* (1558-1603), Oxford, [illegible] p. 141.

[2] This was the oath which had enabled Whitgift to detect and repress Puritan clergy. In virtue of their office, ministers had been compelled by Whitgift in 1584 to answer certain questions and subscribe certain articles—thus becoming their own accusers. Cartwright's claim to have been a champion of religious liberty has been questioned (see F. Paget, *An Introd. to the 1 Oth Bk. of Hooker's Treatise*[2], Oxford, 1907, p. 41), but at least one refused to take the oath 'ex officio mero' must be counted under him for righteousness. It is remarkable that the reference to these detested and arbitrary procedure in the Millenary Petition should be so restrained in character.

[1] Cf. Prothero, p. xxxiii.

[2] ii. 408.

one cannot but admire the skill with which Elizabeth used her ecclesiastical settlement to minimize the dangers which she had to face in her foreign policy. But the element of statesmanship counted for less than the element of personal caprice. Diplomatic reasons justified a cautious beginning—they did not suggest an absolute halt—in the work of reform. After the pope had excommunicated her, and still more after the failure of the Armada, reasons of State counselled a stiffening of England's Protestantism rather than the reverse. If statesmanship had been the determining factor, Elizabeth might have held back the Puritans at first; she would almost certainly have encouraged them later. She did not do so, because she was a Tudor and liked her own way. She meant to have the Church reformed according to her taste, and the Puritans were not to her liking.

One reason for the queen's personal animosity to the Puritans was her indifference to religious truth. She was consequently at variance with the Puritans on the question of a preaching ministry. The queen did not greatly care whether the people were instructed in the faith or not. To the Puritans it seemed all-important that a reasoned statement of the Protestant position should be popularized. If it was desirable that the country should become Protestant at all, then undoubtedly the Puritans were right in desiring an intelligent conversion and a learned preaching ministry. On this issue Elizabeth was obscurantist; the Puritans were standing for enlightenment and education, however narrow the views may have been which they would have propounded ostensibly for popular acceptance, and in effect for popular discussion.[1] Elizabeth, in attempting to starve thought and stifle discussion, was a sheer reactionary, and one of the most short-sighted measures on which she insisted was the suppression of the prophesyings—a measure against which Archbishop Grindal vigorously protested, to his eternal honour. There is no reason to doubt that the Puritan demand for a preaching ministry could have been very largely realized, had the queen wished it. There can be no question that the maintenance of an educated ministry would have been in the best interests alike of Church and of State. Even the instruments and defenders of the queen's policy admitted that. The main obstacles to the creation of such a ministry were the avarice and prejudice of the queen.

In some particulars the Puritan leaders certainly showed a truer appreciation of the religious needs of England than did the queen. Events soon proved that they saw farther than their fellow-reformers, when they urged that reformed doctrine would not co-exist for long with unreformed discipline and worship. The apologists of the Elizabethan settlement pointed to the pure standard of reformed theology enshrined in the articles. Further reform of the liturgy or of Church government they held to be superfluous. The Puritans declared that the unreformed liturgy would undermine the reformed doctrine, and they were clearly justified in holding this view. If the Church of England was intended to be unmistakably Protestant, as the rulers of it claimed, then the Elizabethan settlement was a fatal compromise, as the critics of it urged.

(*b*) *The Puritan polity.* — The details of the Puritan criticism of the Prayer-Book need not detain us. Some of the weightiest charges given in the First Admonition apply not so much to the book itself as to misuse of it and to the association of superstitious customs with its rites and ceremonies. Some of the Puritan criticisms seem now unimaginative if not captious (*e.g.*, their objection to the ring in marriage or to the use of the Magnificat in public worship). Others seem obvious, and have been more or less recognized. Thus, their demand for a revised lectionary was valid for other reasons besides the reverence for Scripture which dictated it. The protests against the strict observance of saints' days and the lax observance of the Sabbath were also necessary, though both may have been pushed too far. The 'longsomeness of matins' is likely to be taken into account in any future liturgical reform. But, in general, such reform, when it comes, will probably not owe much to Puritan criticism.

It is more important to notice that Puritan ministers might have been accorded the liberty to omit or vary unessential details, not only with great relief to their consciences, but also with advantage to their congregations. The denial of liberty of conscience to the Puritan clergy in things indifferent is not excused either by the probability that such concessions would not have contented them or by the fact that, as a party, they were as much possessed by the craving for outward uniformity as the queen and the bishops.

With respect to the ministry and government of the Church of England, the Puritans were clearly right in pleading for a better educated, a better paid, and a more carefully appointed ministry. They had good grounds for protesting against the abuses of pluralism and patronage. The system and methods of ecclesiastical discipline lay open to the charges which the Puritans made against them. By 1662 all England agreed with them as to the necessity of separating civil and ecclesiastical offices, and Laud has had no successor in the position that he secured in the councils of State. The impression that Hooker completely disposed of the Puritan case owes not a little to the neglect of the incomplete posthumous books of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*—vi., vii., and viii. When he came to grips with the Puritan criticisms of the actual working of episcopacy, Hooker was obliged to make large concessions to his opponents, and, where he would not make concessions, he did not find it easy to maintain his defence. There was, indeed, no answer to some of the main criticisms which the Puritans passed on the state of the ministry, and the only kind of reply possible was to deprecate haste in reform and to urge that the bishops were doing their best—the real obstacles being the intransigence of the queen and the vested interests of some highly placed laymen.

The platform of Church government which the Puritans drew from the Scriptures, and the appeal to the Scriptures on which it was based, raise further points of interest. As interpreters of the NT, Puritan scholars were not at fault in contrasting the diocesan episcopate with the NT bishops who were in charge of particular churches and were the same as presbyters. It was fair to insist upon the difference between the primitive diaconate—a distinct office alongside of the eldership—and the later use of the diaconate as a mere stage in the evolution of the presbyter or priest. The element of corporate action and responsibility, alike in the choice of officials and in the maintenance of discipline, undoubtedly existed in NT times, and was rightly emphasized by the Puritans. In restricting membership to communicants, and in making strict examination before communion the instrument of discipline, the Puritans were also keeping close to the early Church. It is disputed whether they were correct, as a matter of scholarship, in claiming presbyterial ordination as the normal primitive practice, and it is doubtful whether their division of NT Church offices into extraordinary and ordinary can be legitimately

[1] See Douglas Campbell, *The Puritan in Holland, England, and America*, London, 1892, i. 458.

maintained. But the point on which their position has been most effectively challenged is the assumption that there must be laid down in the NT a final form of Church government, to be rigidly enforced at all times and in all places. The Puritans took great pains to prove that 'God must have delivered in Scripture a complete particular immutable form of church polity.' Otherwise, they said, the Christians would be worse off than the Jews, and God would be negligent if He did not provide for the least detail of Church order. Hooker is never happier than when undermining this *a priori* dogmatism, in which the Puritans so frequently indulged:

'In matters which concern the actions of God, the most dutiful way on our part is to search what God hath done, and with meekness to admire that, rather than to dispute what he in congruity of reason ought to do. The ways which he hath whereby to do all things for the greatest good of his Church are more in number than we can search, other in nature than that we should presume to determine which of many should be the fittest for him to choose, till such time as we see he hath chosen of many some one; which one we then may boldly conclude to be the fittest, because he hath taken it before the rest. When we do otherwise, surely we exceed our bounds; who and where we are we forget; and therefore needful it is that our pride in such cases be controlled, and our disputes beaten back with those demands of the blessed Apostle, "How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who was his counsellor?"'[1]

It would now be generally conceded that the government of the Church to-day cannot helpfully be made to reproduce exactly the features of the NT polity, even if we knew more accurately than we do the character of that polity. It is probable that no uniform system existed in the early Church, and Church institutions have necessarily been developed and adapted to changing conditions. The Puritan hypothesis of a divinely ordained and unalterable form of Church government is not tenable. Yet their appeal to the primitive Church was not fruitless, and is still a necessary safeguard against the easy assumption that, in the development of Church order, whatever is is right. Growth in Church organization is inevitable and desirable, but not every development is suited to the genius of Christianity, and none can escape criticism in virtue of its mere existence. When we refuse to follow the Puritans in denying the legitimacy of development in the realm of Church life, we have still to consider whether they were not justified in condemning particular developments as alien from the temper revealed in the arrangements adopted by the primitive Church. When the Puritans criticized the monarchical episcopate, as involving a social distinction and a secular greatness incongruous with the Christian ministry, and as exercising an arbitrary authority unsuited to the Christian brotherhood, they were occupying ground from which it was very difficult to dislodge them. The difficulty is at once apparent in Hooker's ineffective discussion of the phrase, 'it shall not be so among you' (Mt 20[26]).[2] In origin and in character the institution of diocesan episcopacy was not specifically Christian. Moreover, the representative and democratic element in early Church order cannot be dismissed as accidental. There was and there is something vital to the expression of Christianity in the presence of just that element. And, above all, the Puritans rendered a service at once to Christianity and to liberty, when they in effect set limits to the authority of the sovereign in ecclesiastical matters. At the heart of their position was the belief that the Church has a constitution of her own, which she is to determine for herself, and which is not to be shaped to suit the diplomacy of States or the caprice of princes. This challenge to the royal prerogative roused the resentment of Elizabeth. It also turned the Puritans, almost against their intentions, into the champions of constitutional government and political liberty.

[1] *Eccl. Pol.* bk. iii. ch. xi. § 21. [2] Bk. vii. ch. xvi.

(c) *Influence on English life and character.*—After the failure of their ecclesiastical hopes and their loss of political power the Puritans did not cease to influence England. The movement left its mark, for good and ill, on popular religion and, indeed, on every department of national life. In attempting to characterize the broad effects of Puritanism on English life and character, we may begin with its appeal to the Scriptures.

'Puritanism carried the genius of the Scriptures into the very heart and soul of England.'[1]

As is apparent from the contemptuous protest of the First Admonition against showing special reverence for the Gospel lessons, the Puritans were more impressed with the unity of the Bible than with the difference between Law and Gospel. They recognized development, but they tended to attribute an equal authority to all books of the Bible as coming from the one Spirit. They sent men to the Bible as the Word of God, and bade them seek there comfort and guidance for every occasion. They championed the view that the Bible was the people's book, and their appeal to Scripture did in effect guarantee the religious independence of humble folk. Unlearned men could read the book and appropriate its treasures for themselves. The Puritans were sometimes shocked at the results of the Bible study which they advocated, but they could not undo the consequences of their own principles. The setting up of the Scriptures as the authority in religion favoured liberty of thinking and developed personal religion. The concentration of attention on the Bible had a remarkable educative effect on many minds. Unconsciously men like Bunyan acquired literary taste and power, because their reading was confined almost exclusively to one really great book. Dowden claims that by this means certain popular sympathies were fostered in literature:

'A homely strength, a genial warmth, a respect for man as man, a breadth of human interest, a humour that is not supercilious, a pity which is not condescending.'[2]

It is difficult to overestimate the gains, intellectual and spiritual, derived from assigning this premier position to the Bible.

There is, no doubt, a considerable discount on the services of Puritanism in this regard. In demanding direct Scripture warrant, not only for creed and Church order, but also for every act of daily life, the Puritans were in danger of depreciating ordinary reason, as Hooker declared, and they were also in danger of troubling tender consciences. Whatsoever is not of faith is sin, they urged, and whatsoever is not grounded on the Word of God is not of faith. Hooker's second book brings out admirably the dangerous exaggeration to which Puritan reverence for the Scriptures committed them:

'Admit this [that it was the drift scope and purpose of Almighty God in Holy Scripture to comprise all things which man may practise] and what shall the Scripture be but a snare and a torment to weak consciences, filling them with infinite perplexities, scrupulosities, doubts insoluble and extreme despairs?'[3]

Another result of this admission was to set man wresting the Scriptures in order to get from them the guidance and assurance that were not on the surface. It also enhanced the temptation to fill up the lacunæ of the NT by moral precepts and civil laws derived from the OT: the uncompromising attitude of the Puritans towards popery was duly defended by the directions to the Children of Israel to destroy the Canaanites utterly; Sabbatarianism, intolerance, and the belief in the death

[1] E. Dowden, *Puritan and Anglican*, London, 1900, p. 15.
[2] P. 33. [3] Bk. ii. ch. viii. § 6.

penalty for witches were strengthened by this appeal to the OT; the wide acceptance in Puritan circles of the theory that heathen virtues are splendid vices may also be traced to the same root. If the English are essentially an OT people, the Puritans are largely responsible for it.

(*d*) *Puritan theology and ethics.*—Puritan theology was simply Calvinism, ultimately worn thin. It is not necessary to describe the system, and it is not possible here to trace its development in detail. It petrified into a series of dogmas, known as the five points of Calvinism, which dealt with election and reprobation, the limited scope of the atonement, total depravity, irresistible grace, and final perseverance. Since the English people ceased to be familiar with these doctrines, they have ceased to possess a definite theology, and their thoughts on ultimate questions have become chaotic and vague. The main principles affirmed in Puritan teaching were the sovereignty and righteousness of God and the sinfulness and all-pervading character of sin. The emphasis on original sin and total depravity made mortification of sin one of the central duties of the Christian life, and this lent to Puritan devotion and Puritan sainthood a somewhat sombre and gloomy character. The devout Puritan was very different from earlier Franciscans or later Methodist saints like Billy Bray. The Puritan did not normally attain to the sense of being at home with God, which may be found in the Franciscan and in some sections of the Evangelical movements. On the other hand, he had a strong sense of responsibility, and the religion which he embraced had an individualizing influence.

'The unvarying central element in Puritanism was the belief that the relation between the invisible spirit of man and the invisible God was immediate rather than mediate.'[1]

The true Puritan stood ever in the great Taskmaster's eye. He learned to fear God and found that he had nothing else to fear.

This stern creed was not without its consolations. Once convinced of the supremacy of God, men and women could face terrible things, confident that even these things would be overruled for righteousness. Mark Rutherford says with reference to this side of the subject:

'Confess ignorance and the folly of insurrection, and there is a chance that even the irremediable will be somewhat mitigated. Poor!—yes; but it is genuine; and this at least must be said for Puritanism, that of all the theologies and philosophies it is the most honest in its recognition of the facts; the most real, if we penetrate to the heart of it, in the remedy which it offers.'[2]

It was a creed which enabled men to face disappointment and disaster without despair.

Submission to God's will expressed itself in self-control. Indeed, Puritan emphasis on God's sovereignty and man's depravity necessitated a stern and repressive moral discipline. As the advantages of his training in a Puritan home, Mark Rutherford mentions two things: (1) an abhorrence of lying, and (2) the conviction that unchastity is a sin and not a venial weakness. Those were elementary features of Puritan morality. With regard to the first, the Puritan tradition tended to err through literal-mindedness. It became prosaic and distrusted works of imagination, alike poetry and romance, though the latter was more especially apt to be banned. But this insistence on literal truthfulness has probably not been without its effect in developing the scientific temper. The second point constitutes perhaps the greatest service rendered by Puritanism to social life. It was and remains the head and front of the Puritans' offending in the eyes of many who resent the restriction of natural pleasures. Yet even what may seem the over-scrupulousness of Puritanism on this subject is not without its value.

'To Puritanism we owe the characteristic which, in some other countries, is expressed by the term English prudery, the accusation implied being part of the general charge of hypocrisy. It is said by observers among ourselves that the prudish habit of mind is dying out, and that is looked upon as a satisfactory thing, as a sign of healthy emancipation. If by prude be meant a secretly vicious person who affects an excessive decorum, by all means let the prude disappear, even at the cost of some shamelessness. If, on the other hand, a prude is one who, living a decent life, cultivates, either by bent or principle, a somewhat extreme delicacy of thought and speech with regard to elementary facts of human nature, then I say that this is most emphatically a fault in the right direction, and I have no desire to see its prevalence diminish.'[1]

Beyond any doubt Puritanism made possible and common a sound home-life in England, so far as its influence on sexual morality is concerned.

Its effects on the relations of parent and child were not altogether admirable. The doctrine of original sin led to an utter distrust of child nature. Even Bunyan bids parents remember that children are cursed creatures. The wills of children, being evil, were to be broken, and children were to be taught to keep their distance. Home discipline was to be strict, and the rod was not to be spared. The relative justification for this attitude is sometimes overlooked by those who criticize Puritan home training and education. Thus Samuel Butler, in *The Way of all Flesh* (London, 1903), looks back with regret to 'the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth.' Then the relations between parents and children seem on the whole to have been more kindly.

'The fathers and the sons are for the most part friends in Shakespeare, nor does the evil appear to have reached its full abomination till a long course of Puritanism had familiarized men's minds with Jewish ideals as those which we should endeavour to reproduce in our everyday life.'[2]

As a matter of fact, in the days of Elizabeth the friendship of father and son often meant the initiation of boys into vice in very tender years. The advantages of sowing wild oats were firmly believed in. Children who would now be at a kindergarten were sometimes familiarized with drinking and swearing, while youth was encouraged to see life. The pages of Ascham's *Scholemaster* afford a sufficient revelation of the moral laxness and parental irresponsibility against which Puritanism reacted, and no one who knows that side of Elizabethan social life would wish to return to it. The main defect of Puritanism in this connexion was its depreciation of childhood; its chief merit was its insistence on a sense of duty—on the need of making a serious use of life. It has yet to be shown that the belief in original sin, which E. G. A. Holmes[3] regards as the root of all evil in education, and which did in fact involve a distrust of child nature,[4] can really be abandoned without losing an element of truth and hardness which made for strength of character and purity of life.

(*e*) *Influence on education and industry.*—In the matter of education the Puritans had to provide for themselves after 1662, and they made no small contribution to educational progress. As a reforming party they sat loose to the mediæval and classical traditions to which the universities and grammar schools were still wedded. They were readier for changes both in method and in curriculum. It was in Puritan circles that Comenius attracted attention and sympathy in England. The Long Parliament seems seriously to have considered entrusting to him the task of reforming national education. The dissenting academies of

[1] Dowden, p. 11.
[2] *The Revolution in Tanner's Lane*, London, 1887, p. 127.

[1] G. Gissing, *The Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft*, London, 1903, p. 280.
[2] P. 21 f.
[3] See *What is and what might be*, London, 1911, *passim*.
[4] The general tendency to distrust natural feeling may be illustrated further from the records of Evangelicalism—*e.g.*, the story of Augustus Hare's upbringing by his aunt, Maria Hare, or the tragedy of Henry Martyn's love-story.

the 18th cent. compared favourably with the older universities alike in expense, morals, and intellectual keenness. It was in these academies that the teaching of modern subjects was begun.[1] The Puritans are being blamed nowadays for having been too exclusively intellectual, and it is true that 18th cent. deism and rationalism may be regarded as the children of Puritanism. But this strong intellectual tendency was really a virtue, in spite of its limitations. In the States it was the Puritan colonists who cared for education. The colonists of Virginia took no such interest in the subject, as witness the sentence of W. Berkeley, governor of Virginia in 1671:

'I thank God there are no free schools or printing, and I hope we shall not have them these hundred years.'[2]

After all, the sermon itself, on which the Puritans set such a high value, is an appeal to the reason of the common man, and is an instrument of education. It assumes that religion must capture the head as well as stir the feelings. And so far the Puritan appeal to reason made for a higher intellectual life and activity. The independence of character which Puritanism fostered also helped to produce pioneers in educational reform.

The moral discipline enforced by Puritanism had a considerable reaction upon industry. The Christian life was regarded as essentially an ordered life. The passions were to be under rational control. Puritanism cut men off from wasteful expenditure and worldly pleasure. Forms of indulgence which dissipated both wealth and energy were sternly denounced and repressed. Time and talents were not to be wasted. On the contrary, the Christian's first duty was to make the most of his powers and possessions in whatever might be his calling. Idleness was a sure sign that one's standing in grace was doubtful. No one should be unemployed; even the man of leisure should find some occupation which would be of service to the common weal. Puritan pressure in these directions certainly tended to develop the spirit of enterprise and industry characteristic of modern capitalism. Both by inculcating frugality and by strengthening home ties, Puritanism encouraged thrift and the accumulation of capital. Moreover, by insisting on a careful use of time and on self-control, it helped to form those regular habits on which the conduct of modern industry depends. The business virtues, viz. honesty, punctuality, and steady application to work, were reinforced by the ethic of Puritanism. Once again, the emphasis on personal responsibility which was characteristic of the movement served to make men bring an independent judgment to bear on their business problems, and so increased the power of individual initiative. After 1662 the influence of Puritanism was thrown still more clearly on the side of economic freedom. For the Puritans, having lost power, naturally distrusted State control, while they were in any case convinced opponents of State absolutism. Their first concern was toleration, and they became the champions of the movement for limiting State interference in every direction.[3]

(*f*) *Puritanism and art.*—The relations of Puritanism to art and literature are not easy to define. The movement has been wrongly held responsible for the general degradation in taste, especially in architecture, which took place in the 18th century. Much vandalism has been attributed to Puritans in which they only shared or did not share at all.[1] It is of course clear that Puritanism tended to dissociate itself from certain forms of art, particularly the dramatic art and the stage, which it treated as hopelessly corrupt, and whose moral recovery it consequently tended to retard. It is also of the essence of Puritanism that it depreciated the outward. Calvinism has been called 'the ugliest of all religions.'[2] Its symbolism is of the plainest. Dependence on the outward is discouraged. The central emphasis on God's righteousness still further contributed to a neglect and a distrust of the merely beautiful. The Puritan was intensely preoccupied with moral issues, and, as a result of the Puritan tradition, many have neglected and stunted the artistic sides of their nature. And yet this very concentration on the moral life and on the supremacy of God's righteousness has not been without its vivifying influence on art and literature. The deepening of the inner life due to Puritanism was bound to find expression.

'Puritanism in itself is ill-fitted to produce a great art. Yet the inward life of the soul may be intense and the more intense because it does not readily distribute itself through appointed forms; and absorbing thoughts and passions cannot fail in some way to discover or to create that outward vehicle through which alone they can secure a complete self-realisation.'[3]

Nor is the self-discipline of the Puritan unfavourable to art.

'For the maintenance of high passion the habit of moral restraint is in the long run more favourable than the habit of moral relaxation.'[4]

And it may be urged that, in the last resort, art reaches its highest achievements precisely through the practice of moral renunciation, *i.e.* through the Puritan acknowledgment of the supremacy of God's righteousness.

'No man does real justice to beauty till he feel the moral beauty of resisting beauty—upon due occasion. There is something incomplete in artistic taste till it see, with so great an artist as Plato, the beauty of Puritanism.'[5]

4. **Summary.**—To sum up, the Puritans stood for an ecclesiastical ideal, the chief importance of which lay in asserting that the Church must not be made the tool of the State. In thus maintaining the independence of the Church, and also the necessity of a democratic element in Church government, the Puritans promoted constitutional liberty and very powerfully influenced British ideals of government. These ideals they carried with them into the colonies which they founded in America, where their conception of Church and of State found freer expression. Through the United States Puritanism has perhaps exerted an even greater influence on the Anglo-Saxon world than it has through its effects on British character. By means of a definite if narrow theology Puritanism has shaped the thinking of generations of Englishmen on the great themes of religion. By its insistence on strict self-discipline it has inculcated 'a steady and almost stolid dutifulness,' which has expressed itself largely in industry and in industrial progress, but which is apparent in all professions and careers in the men and women who have come under the influence of the Puritan tradition. If Puritanism has favoured the growth of democracy, it has also developed those qualities of self-control and of devotion to duty without which no democracy can be preserved from corruption. In temper and outlook Puritanism has shown some of the defects associated with the somewhat parallel Jewish movement known as Pharisaism. The Puritans leaned too much to the OT. Their belief in

[1] See Irene Parker, *Dissenting Academies in England*, Cambridge, 1914.

[2] cf. D. Campbell, *The Puritan*, i. 32.

[3] See on this subject Max Weber, 'The Ethic of Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism,' two artt. in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, xx [1904], xxi [1904]; E. Troeltsch, *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen*, Tübingen, 1912; H. Levy, *Economic Liberalism*, London, 1913; and an essay by H. G. Wood, in *Property: its Rights and Duties*, London, 1915.

[1] See J. Crouch, *Puritanism and Art*, London, 1910.

[2] Tiele, *ap.* W. B. Selbie, *Life of A. M. Fairbairn*, London, 1914, p. 105.

[3] Dowden, p. 9.

[4] *Ib.* p. 30.

[5] P. T. Forsyth, *Christ on Parnassus*, London, 1913, p. 280.

original sin led to a too sweeping depreciation of human nature and to harsh, unsympathetic judgments on opponents. Their religion tended to lack gladness, and their 'cardinal error lay in a narrow conception of God as the God of righteousness alone, and not as also the God of joy and beauty and intellectual light.'[1] But no movement of religious thought could fail to ennoble human life and to possess permanent worth which, like Puritanism, was inspired with the conception of the chief end of man as being to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever.

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PURITY.—A fine passage from the works of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–87) will give a good idea of the wide meaning which the gospel attaches to the word 'purity':

'By purity I understand a due moderation and rule over all the joys and pleasures of the flesh, bearing so strict an hand and having so watchful an eye over their subtle enticements and allurements and so firm and loyal affection to that idea of celestial beauty set up in our minds, that neither the pains of the body nor the pleasures of the animal life shall ever work us below our spiritual happiness and all the compatible enjoyments of that life that is truly Divine; and in this conspicuously is contained whatever either moral temperance or fortitude can pretend to.'[2]

To this large conception of the meaning of purity corresponds the view of Augustine that the purity of heart mentioned in Mt 5[8] means single-heartedness or simplicity:

'Hoc est mundum cor quod est simplex cor.'[3] 'Ille est vere castus qui Deum attendit, et ad ipsum solum se tenet.'[4]

It thus appears that 'purity,' like 'temperance' and 'sobriety,' has, properly speaking, a wider sense than is usually connected with the word. It connotes the singleness or simplicity of a nature which finds the perfect satisfaction of its desires in God. The opposite of purity is uncontrolled or misdirected desire; and the characteristic reward of purity is the vision which is man's true life: 'Vita hominis visio Dei.'[5]

The origin and usage of the word are sufficiently dealt with in *HDB*, *s.v.* It will suffice to recall the obvious fact that the idea of purity, like that of holiness, gradually passed over from the material and ceremonial sphere into the range of ethical ideas; the notion of outward consecration or dedication to the service of the Deity gave way in process of time to that of inward sanctity. In this process the teaching of the Hebrew prophets played a conspicuous part.[1] The culminating point is perhaps marked in our Lord's teaching recorded in Mk 7[14-23] (Mt 15[10-20]). Christ's saying about the thing that 'defileth a man' in fact distinguishes between two spheres, the physical and the spiritual, which men had hitherto tended to confuse. Henceforth, as Christians were led to perceive, '"pollution" (τὸ κοινοῦσθαι) in the sense contemplated by the Scribes can be predicated only of that which affects man's moral nature.'[2] It is interesting to trace anticipations of this principle in ancient writers—*e.g.*, Cicero:

'Caste jubet lex adire ad deos, animo videlicet, in quo sunt omnia: nec tollit castimoniam corporis; sed hoc oportet intelligi, cum multum animus corpori praestet, observeturque, ut casta corpora adhibeantur, multo esse in animis id servandum magis. Nam incestum vel aspersione aquae vel dierum numero tollitur; animi labes nec diuturnitate evanescere nec amnibus ullis elui potest.'[3]

As in the case of other virtues which re-appear in Christian ethics, the idea of purity directly depends upon the Christian conception of God as a Being to whom 'all hearts are open and all desires known.'[4]

1. Purity in the narrow sense of freedom from sensual pollution was a virtue which, before the coming of Christ into the world, held at best a precarious position. Israel cannot be said to have been very far above the general level of the ancient world in this respect. Where polygamy is not condemned, no very high standard of purity can be expected, and grave lapses from chastity in OT times were of frequent occurrence. These were often closely connected with Israel's inveterate tendency to idolatry, and in fact the prophets usually describe the apostasy of the nation as 'adultery' (Hos 2, Jer 3, Ezk 16, etc.). As regards the Gentile world, heathen moralists could inculcate purity only by appealing to self-regarding and prudential motives. They had no resources for taming or restraining the force of human passion. Purity was a virtue of which men despaired. St. Paul in his sombre picture of heathen degradation regards the Gentiles as actually given over to an abandoned mind (Ro 1[24-28], Eph 4[19] 5[11f.]). Religion itself was corrupted at the source; the current mythology was a chief factor in the general demoralization. The better elements in the ancient religion passed over into the mysteries (*q.v.*), which at least appealed to the sense of moral defilement, though they could not appease it. These bore their own imperfect witness to the truth that purity of life was needed for acceptable approach to God.

Now, Christianity dealt with the evil which was too strong for the heathen world by re-emphasizing, with sanctions peculiar to itself, the Stoic doctrine of the sanctity of the human body. Seneca had spoken of God as 'near us, with us, within us,' 'lodging in the human body.'[5] Epictetus had said:

'Thou bearest God about with thee, within thyself; and thou dost not realize that thou art outraging Him with thy impure thoughts and thine unclean deeds, . . . God Himself being present within thee and overlooking and overhearing all,' etc.[6]

St Paul points to the body as the actual 'temple' of the Holy Spirit (1 Co 6[19]); the bodies which are misused in sin are 'the members of Christ' (1 Co 6[15]). The sin of uncleanness does despite to the indwelling presence of the Spirit; it outrages that nature which the Son of God made His own and hallowed by contact with His deity; henceforth

[1] Dowden, p. 11.
[2] 'Of the Divine Life,' ch. xii. (*Theol. Works*, London, 1708, p. 37).
[3] *De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, I. ii. 8.
[4] *De Beata Vita*, 18; cf. John Smith, *Select Discourses*, London, 1660, p. 432: 'Every particular good is a blossom of the First Goodness; every created excellency is a beam descending from the Father of lights; and, should we separate all these *particularities* from God, all affection spent upon them would be unchaste and their embraces adulterous. We should love all things in God, and God in all things, because He is all in all, the beginning and original of being, the perfect idea of their goodness and the end of their motion.'
[5] Iren. IV. xx. 7.

[1] See *HDB*, *s.vv.* 'Unclean, Uncleanness,' 'Holiness.'
[2] H. B. Swete, *The Gospel according to St. Mark*[2], London, 1902, p. 152, on Mk 7[18f.].
[3] *De Leg.* II. x. 24.
[4] See R. C. Trench, *Synonyms of the NT*, Cambridge, 1854, § lxxxv., εἰλικρινής, καθαρός.
[5] *Ep. Mor.* xli., xxxi., quoted in J. B. Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians*[4], London, 1878, p. 280.
[6] *Diss.* II. viii. 11 f., quoted in Lightfoot, p. 314 f.

the body is 'for the Lord, and the Lord for the body' (1 Co 6[13]). We find an echo of this language in Tertullian's passionate assertion of the sanctity and dignity of the material which the Son of God has condescended to assume and to hallow.

'God forbid that He should abandon to everlasting destruction the labour of His own hands, the object of His care, the receptacle of His own Spirit, the queen of His creation, the heir of His liberality, the priestess of His religion, the soldier of His testimony, the sister of His Christ.'[1]

Christian purity is in fact sanctioned by motives peculiar to the religion of the Crucified. It forms a part of that self-control (ἐγκράτεια) which is the most characteristic element in Christian morality, and which was 'primarily identified with sexual purity, and then extended to include renunciation of the world and mortification of the flesh.'[2] Purity is the spirit which strives to bring every bodily impulse, every affection, every passion, every faculty—thought, imagination, memory—into subjection to Christ. But it is important to remember that purity implies not mere abstinence from illicit pleasure but the positive dominion of the Holy Spirit in man. The way to purity lies through the practice of self-control in all things great and small (1 Co 9[25]). This is pointed out more at length elsewhere (see art. TEMPERANCE).

There are certain safeguards of purity which may be mentioned here.

(*a*) Of *religious faith* something has already been said. The gospel supplied a new and powerful motive to purity in teaching the sanctity of the body, hallowed by the Incarnation and redeemed by the Passion of the Son of God. That which He had worn as a vesture, exalted to the throne of heaven and made the temple of the Spirit, could no longer be employed as an instrument of sin (Ro 6[11-13]).

The prominence of this doctrine in the NT is a proof of 'the intense desire which religion has to protect the founts of life against whatever might destroy, waste, or pollute them.' Christianity 'erects a sacred fence round the most dangerous places in our life.' It does not despise the body, but labours 'to preserve and increase vitality. With this motive, it visits with its sternest censure any assertions of the individual's right "to do what he will with his own" body.'[3]

Further, if purity implies the right direction of desire, the gospel brought to bear upon the force of passion 'the expulsive power of a new affection' in so far as it inspired and developed the love of God and of man for God's sake.

(*b*) Christ's law of *mortification* has an obvious bearing on the process of self-purification. 'If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out.' Mortification implies something more than mere self-restraint, the habit of which in other matters is so essential a condition of victory over fleshly sin. It implies the cutting off of even innocent pleasures that are found perilous to purity. It implies the use of what Jeremy Taylor[4] calls 'some rudenesses' towards the body (cf. 1 Co 9[27], ὑπωπιάζω, δουλαγωγῶ)—spare diet, occasional fasting, habitual abstinence, and other wholesome austerities; it means also continual watchfulness against the beginnings and least occasions of evil.

(*c*) *Occupation* is also a valuable and necessary safeguard. While sloth and ease are the frequent forerunners of impurity, any kind of employment which leaves few vacant spaces of time is of great benefit.

(*d*) Of the power of *prayer* and of the recollection of the Divine presence it is needless to speak. Without them purity in its perfectness is impossible. One particular remedy may, however, be mentioned, namely, recollection of the sympathy of Christ with the tempted. He has felt the full pressure of temptation, yet without sin (He 4[15]), and one great aid to purity is the thought of His example, of the travail which He underwent in order to be made in all things like unto His brethren, and of the cross on which He endured the open shame which is the appropriate penalty of secret sin (He 12[2]).

(*e*) Finally, we must bear in mind that the desire which occasions the sin of impurity finds its appropriate hallowing in marriage.

'Honourable marriage hath a natural efficacy, besides a virtue by divine blessing, to cure the inconveniences which otherwise might afflict persons temperate and sober.'[1]

2. Purity in the larger sense is virtually equivalent to 'simplicity' or 'single-mindedness.'

'It carries on to the whole of our nature that watchful reserve and restraint which it imposes upon the body.'[2]

Purity means the integrity of a will dedicated to God in perfect simplicity of purpose; it implies not the sacrifice of innocent desires, but the consecration of them; not the effort to acquire a single virtue, such as chastity or purity in the narrower sense, but the striving after goodness in the widest sense. Purity of intention consists in seeking to please God in all things and to make His glory the object of every act and word. The pure heart is that which is continually seeking God, passing through all things onwards and upwards to God, embracing one only object of life, and holding fast to a single purpose amid the bewildering multiplicity of calls and duties, claims and responsibilities, which make life difficult and complex. The pure heart is undivided, undistracted, unsophisticated. It imparts to character that 'moral unity' which Christ in a supreme degree exhibits, the unity which springs from devotion to a single end—the love and service of God.

And the reward of this purity is vision, insight, illumination (Mt 5[8]). 'Cor purum penetrat caelum et infernum.'[3] Aquinas connects the beatitude 'Beati mundo corde,' etc., with the Holy Spirit's gift of 'understanding.' The reward of purity is a certain freedom from intellectual illusion and error; by purity of heart, 'etsi non videamus de Deo quid est, videmus tamen quid non est.'[4] The perfect vision which shall satisfy not only the intellect but every element in man's complex nature is the consummation of a process that begins in this life—the cleansing of the heart and conscience from all lower aims than the service of God. Purity, in fact, in its completeness is the effect on the character of true faith in God (Ac 15[9]), the faith that works by love (Gal 5[6]). So Bernard makes it to consist in two things which are both different aspects of love: 'in quaerenda gloria Dei et utilitate proximi.'[5] For purity is, as we have already noticed, not mere abstinence, not the mere cleansing of the heart from wrong or inordinate desires, but desire or love directed aright, and finding in God and His service the one true and satisfying end of human life. The pure heart seeks not God's gifts merely, but Himself. It thinks of Him as the only adequate response to the deepest yearnings of human nature. It believes that what He is, rather than what He gives, is the true life of man.

'Ille non aliquid ex iis quae condidit; sed se ipsum tibi dat ad fruendum, se ipsum omnium conditorem.'[6]

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1 *De Resurr. Carn.* 9.
2 A. Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, i. 111.
3 R. Inge, *Truth and Falsehood in Religion*, London, 1906, p. 74.
4 *Holy Living*, ch. ii. sect. 3.

1 J. Taylor, *Holy Living*, ch. ii. sect. 3, *ad fin.*
2 G. Congreve, *Parable of the Ten Virgins*, London, 1904, p. 108.
3 Thomas a Kempis, *de Imit. Christi*, ii. 4.
4 *Summa*, n. ii. qu. viii. art. 7, resp.
5 *De Mor. et Off. episc.* iii. 10.
6 Aug. *Serm.* cclix., 'in Oct. Pasch.,' 3.

PURUṢA.—*Puruṣa* signifies in Sanskrit 'man,' then 'the living principle in men and in other beings,' and finally 'the supreme Spirit,' both the supreme personal God of theism and the impersonal world-soul in a pantheistic sense.

As early as the Rigveda (x. 90) there is found a hymn, which reappears with several variations in later Vedic texts, wherein the *puruṣa* is described as the primeval Being, as the personification and starting-point of the whole universe. The heavens, the atmosphere, and the earth proceed forth from the *puruṣa*, also the sun and moon, gods, men, and animals. From the head, the arms, the legs, and the feet of the *puruṣa* respectively are derived (according to vv. 11, 12) the four castes of men, which are here mentioned for the first time in Indian literature. Since in this hymn, though only in mythological fashion, the thought of man's identity with the universe is expressed, we may see in it an anticipation of the main teaching of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta (*qq.v.*), that is, of the doctrine of the essential identity of the inner man, the soul, with Brahman, or the soul of the universe.

In the philosophical systems of India the word *puruṣa* is used in the same sense as the more common *ātman* to denote the souls of living beings; and this is done independently of the particular meaning attached to the word, whether, as in the Vedānta, the individual souls are conceived as one with the indivisible soul of the universe or, as in the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya (*qq.v.*), as existing in infinite numbers.

LITERATURE.—P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894, i. 1, pp. 150 ff., 288 ff., Eng. tr., *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1906; F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, pp. 331-343.

R. GARBE.

PUSEY.—Edward Bouverie Pusey (1800-82), scholar and divine and leader of the Oxford Movement (*q.v.*) in the Church of England, later known as the Catholic Revival, was regius professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford from 1828 to his death. This crown appointment, combining with it a canonry of Christ Church, gave him a central and independent position, from which he was able, by books, sermons, and individual personal dealings, to give a unity of character and aim to the Movement, both in its earlier and to a great extent also in its later phases.

1. His place in English life.—Pusey was by birth an English gentleman 'of the old school' (cf. the anecdote in Liddon's *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, i. 186), and it may be said that some of the best influences of his time had combined in the formation of his mind and character. He was one of the first English theologians to study German, and in two long visits to Berlin, Bonn, and Göttingen in 1825-27 he worked under Freytag, Ewald, Tholuck, Schleiermacher, and Eichhorn, and came to know what scholarship meant to them.

'From Eichhorn Pusey learnt the vastness of the world of modern learning and the standard of work which was necessary in order to explore it. When in later years he would say, "A German professor would think nothing of doing so and so," he meant Eichhorn' (Liddon, i. 74).

Pusey was a fellow of Oriel at the time when this common-room was the intellectual centre of Oxford, and until his wife's death in 1839 he mixed freely in all the varied life of the university. Even in the deep seclusion from ordinary society which he inflicted upon himself after that date he was in touch through his family with the life of the English upper classes, and such sermons as that entitled 'Why did Dives lose his Soul?' (preached in All Saints', Margaret Street, on Ash Wednesday, 1865), or 'Our Pharisaism' (delivered in St. Paul's, Knightsbridge, on Ash Wednesday, 1868), show his unerring insight into their spiritual needs. This is an important element in Pusey's life, which has not always been sufficiently recognized. In social life no less than in scholarship he was a man whom none could patronize or despise, and he knew how to speak to Victorian society about its vulgarity and worldliness with a searching directness which could not be evaded or ignored (cf. his rebuke to a lady in *Spiritual Letters of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, London, 1898, p. 77, and to the heads of houses in Oxford for their luxury [Liddon, ii. 110]). Students of 19th cent. manners would find a great deal of material in his sermons. In Liddon's *Life*, i. 51, there is a charming account of Lady Emily Herbert, who was married to his brother Philip in 1822, and of her relations with Pusey, which helps to put this side of his life into true perspective.

2. His part in the Oxford Movement.—In the Church revival which began in 1833 the acknowledged leaders were Pusey, Keble, and Newman, and Pusey's special part in the work may best be understood by comparing his mind and temperament with those of his two friends. Imagine, then, a young man, interested in religion, but inclined to scepticism, coming into contact with the three leaders of the Movement in its early days, and starting some controversial subject, such as the difficulty of believing that there can be only one true Church. Keble, we can imagine, jealous for the truth of God, and looking at the matter from a high mystical plane, would make some shrewd and unanswerable remark in very simple language, which would silence and perhaps somewhat abash the questioner, even if it did not altogether convince him. Newman would instantly throw his mind sympathetically into the problem, and work it out speculatively, as if trying to arrive at the truth about it for himself. Pusey, on the other hand, would concentrate his attention on the questioner, would study his character, and begin to try to convince him of the truth. He had, that is to say, pre-eminently the mind of a pastor, and had no taste or capacity for speculation. Thus in a religious movement his would not be the mind to originate the ideas, or even to give them striking expression. His work would be to translate them into action and to press them upon men's attention. Pusey's eminence lies in his immense strength of character and of conviction. To this he added very great learning, and the power of bringing it to bear upon the matter in hand in that cumulative and somewhat uncritical manner which was more controversially effective in those days than it would be in ours.

'Pusey,' said R. W. Church, commenting on the significance of his adhesion to the original Tract writers, 'knew the meaning of real learning. In controversy it was his sledge-hammer and battle-mace, and he had the strong and sinewy hand to use it with effect' (quoted in Liddon, i. 358).

The most striking contemporary appreciation of his personality and influence is in an essay by J. B. Mozley about the sermon which he preached on 'The entire Absolution of the Penitent,' at the close of his two years' suspension (1st Feb. 1846).[1]

The religious principles and ideas which it was Pusey's work to press home in this way into the unresponsive soil of Victorian England were not anything which he had acquired as the result of a sudden conversion; nor had they been adopted in any way as a working hypothesis to be tested by their success; they were part and parcel of his whole self, acquired by tradition in childhood, and confirmed by all the experiences and studies of early manhood. He never had any temptation to doubt, and was always in the mental position of a teacher. If the truth which he thus held so con-

[1] Liddon, iii. 59, and J. B. Mozley, *Essays, Historical and Theological*², i., London, 1884.

fidently were attacked, his nature would rise up to defend it with all the ardour of a crusader, and he would be ready to face all reverses and difficulties with the uncompromising courage of an early Christian martyr. Church's judgment about him was that he was 'a man after all to rank with religious leaders of high mark in all ages.'[1] His temperament was thus essentially that of the ecclesiastic, and he was mercilessly severe to anything that seemed to him like a dilettante attitude towards religion, but genuine unbelief he was quite able to understand and to meet sympathetically. While still an undergraduate, he had tried unsuccessfully to win an old school friend from atheism, and this experience left a deep and very important mark upon him (Liddon, i. 46). It is true, indeed, of all the early Tractarians that they felt themselves to be striving not for the triumph of one particular form of Christianity, but for the maintenance of genuine religion as a whole. In this they were far in advance of their time, and it is one reason perhaps for the strong prejudice which they had to overcome. Soldiers are not popular in countries which think themselves secure (cf. the striking speech made by Lord Salisbury after Pusey's death [Liddon, iv. 391 f.]). This may have been also in part a cause of that simplicity in Pusey's outlook which made him, as a Roman Catholic writer says, unable ever 'to calculate the effect of his arguments on any who differed from him.'[2] With this directness and intensity of character he combined an equally strong capacity for affection. The controversies and work of the Tractarians must never be thought of apart from that ἐκτένης ἀγάπη (1 P 4[8]) which bound them to each other, and the refined family life which was the permanent background of all their activities. The movement had indeed its centre in a university, but there was none of that easy tolerance or that cold-blooded aloofness from the real world in its leaders which make religious people rightly suspicious of the word 'academic.'

3. Theological position.—The foregoing considerations are necessary for a right understanding of Pusey's theology. The Tractarians were practical religious reformers, and the moral struggle against unbelief was always before them. They were never sitting, as it were, calmly in the study, as historians or critics or compilers of dogmatic systems. They were not, like the Scholastics, the products of a settled ecclesiastical world, nor, like the modern Biblical scholar, did they stand aside from the problems of practical religious endeavour. Their theological work was all called out by the needs of a religious revival and by the combat with teachers whom they felt to be hindering it.

Pusey's lasting contribution to the religious thought of his time is the conception of Christianity as being necessarily a single whole. This was the natural result of the apologetic preoccupation noticed above. God is one, and Jesus Christ is one, and the Word of God through Jesus Christ is one. So also must be the life of the Church and the faith of the Church. These are almost commonplace assumptions with Christians nowadays, but they are to a very great extent the legacy of the Tractarians and the result of the conflict of the Tractarians with the leading tendencies of their time. A recent Broad Church writer, V. F. Storr, charges Pusey and the other Tractarian leaders with having had a narrow outlook on their time, with being out of sympathy with its aims, and lacking insight into its fresh problems.

'For them, theology was not the science of the living God who was building Himself in many ways, but rather the formal study of the defined beliefs of the Christian Church at a certain period of its existence: a period which they assumed was to be the norm and pattern for all time. The object of their endeavour was, confessedly, not to construct a new theology, but to recover an old one' (*The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1800–1900*, London, 1913, p. 257).

To write like this is to be blind to the whole moral aim and achievement of the Oxford Movement on its theological side. It is like blaming pioneers among brushwood for not raising crops as quickly as their neighbours on the prairie. Pusey and his friends found the ground occupied by the two formidable obstacles of Bible-worship and rationalism, and they had not only to expose their logical weaknesses, but also to overcome the obstinate self-satisfaction with which they were rooted in men's minds. Pusey's careful study of the way in which Christian thought in Germany was being dissolved by rationalism made him keen to observe its symptoms elsewhere, and in his first big work, the tract on baptism,[1] he pointed out in masterly fashion that the evangelical appeal to the Bible suffered from precisely the same logical inconsistencies.

By rationalism he meant, says his biographer, 'that attitude of mind which allows Reason to limit the possibilities of Revelation, instead of confining itself to its legitimate work of testing its evidence and understanding its moral weight' (Liddon, iv. 4).

And in his first public controversy, in 1836—the protest against the appointment of R. D. Hampden as regius professor of divinity—Pusey defined the principle of rationalism, against which they were fighting, thus:

'The assumption that uncontrolled human reason in its present degraded form is the primary interpreter of God's Word, without any regard to those rules or principles of interpretation which have guided the judgments of Christ's Holy Catholic Church in all ages of its history and under every variety of its warfare' (*ib.* i. 373).

That the evangelicals were logically not different from the rationalists he showed from their rejection of the plain sacramental teaching of Holy Scripture on the subject of baptism (*ib.* i. ch. xv.) because it does not fit in with their preconceived notions of 'spiritual' or 'gospel' truth.

'A great deal of the Bible,' he declared, 'is thus nowadays read with what, if men examined it, they would find to be the very spirit of unbelief' (*Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism*, p. 150).

He argued that the evangelicals, in that they rejected the sacramental view of baptism, while accepting the doctrine of the Incarnation, 'although the one doctrine is declared in Holy Scripture as explicitly, as incidentally and as variously' as the other, were applying a rationalistic 'solvent' to the totality of Bible truth. This eclectic method of dealing with the Bible was justified in evangelical circles on the ground that they were fixing their attention upon the 'kernel' of the gospel. Pusey meets this contention in a finely indignant passage, which might be quoted as a motto for the whole Tractarian teaching:

'I would by the way,' he says, 'protest against such illustrations, whereby men, too commonly, embolden themselves to call any portion of God's institution for our salvation "husk" or "shell" or the like; let it seem to us never so external, it can in no stage of the Christian course be dispensed with, which these similitudes would imply. Rather if we use any image, we might better speak of the whole Gospel as an elixir of immortality, whereof some ingredients may be more powerful than the rest, but the efficacy of the whole depends upon the attemperament of the several portions; and we, who formed neither our own souls, nor this cure for them, dare not speak slightingly of the necessity of any portion' (*ib.* p. 5, quoted from *Tracts for the Times*[1], London, 1842, vol. ii. pt. ii.).

4. The appeal to antiquity.—Pusey's primary contention, in other words, was that Christian truth must be treated as a whole, and that it must be approached, like any other subject-matter, with a scientific submission to fact and in a historical spirit, instead of with arbitrary assumptions. However much men may differ from him as to the application of these principles, they should at any

[1] *Life and Letters of Dean Church*, London, 1895, p. 182.
[2] W. Barry, 'Pusey and Puseyism,' in *CE* xii. 583.

[1] *Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism*, Oxford, 1835 (containing nos. 67, 68, and 69 of the *Tracts for the Times*).

rate give him credit for having in this way cleared the ground for the intelligent modern study of theology.

Every one in that day looked on the Bible as the source of religious truth, and for the most part he did not need to go behind that. Pusey's contention merely was that the Bible must be studied in its proper historical context of the early undivided Church. If it were objected to him by Evangelicals that by this deference to the Fathers he was thereby setting up an authority other than that of Holy Scripture, he would answer:

'The contrast in point of authority is not between Holy Scripture and the Fathers, but between the Fathers and *us*; not between the book interpreted and the interpreters, but between one class of interpreters and another; between ancient Catholic truth and modern private opinions; not between the Word of God and the word of man, but between varying modes of understanding the Word of God' (Liddon, i. 418).

This appeal to antiquity was not with Pusey, it should be noticed, something that could be applied in a mechanical way. It was an appeal to the whole mind of an age 'which had deeper and truer thoughts, an altogether deeper way of viewing things than moderns' (*ib.* i. 410), and the early Christian writers are of permanent value not as supplying an infallible authority in matters of either faith or practice, but as being a great reservoir of true Christianity, in which those who would understand Holy Scripture for themselves should first be steeped. This standard is, of course, very difficult to apply to individual questions at any particular moment, and is perhaps difficult to defend in the face of a hard unsympathetic logic, whether from Roman Catholics or from sceptics, but Pusey believed that it represents a truly spiritual and theologically satisfactory conception of the authority of the Church, within which all that is true both in Romanism and in Protestantism is seen to be embraced. The effect of this line of thought upon an able young man who had been brought up as a Methodist may be seen in Gregory's autobiography,[1] and a clear sketch of the practical conclusions to which it led is given in a letter of Pusey's in 1840 answering the question, 'What is Puseyism?' (Liddon, ii. 140). For an account of the 'Library of the Fathers,' edited by Pusey and his friends, in order to make the chief Patristic writings available for English readers, see *ib.* i. ch. xviii.

5. **Attitude towards science and criticism.**—Within the limits of space available in a work like the present it has seemed better to draw out these broader aspects of Pusey's teaching than to go into the detailed controversies which accompanied the application of his principles to the life of the Church of England. A list of the main controversies is given for reference below.

The Oxford Movement proper was previous to the theological difficulties connected with evolution and other scientific hypotheses, and Pusey was the only one of its leaders who lived on into that new period. He describes the change that had taken place in thought in an interesting letter to his old pupil J. B. Mozley when he returned to Oxford in 1871 as regius professor of divinity (*ib.* iv. 221). Pusey was always a good friend to the teaching of natural science when he felt it was not being used to undermine religion, and he was much more alive to its importance than many of the 'liberal' theologians of his time. In 1855 the final vote of £30,000 for the construction of the museum at Oxford would have been lost if he and his friends had not supported it (*ib.* iv. 332). One of his last sermons bore the characteristically cumbrous title *Un-science, not Science, adverse to Faith* (London, 1878), and is described by his biographer with good reason 'as a permanent and most valuable contribution to the right understanding of the relations between Religion and Science' (Liddon, iv. 335; cf. p. 80). In regard to the science of Biblical criticism Pusey, it is well known, withdrew his first book, *The Theology of Germany*, from circulation (*ib.* i. 175) and never relaxed from an attitude of inflexible conservatism. It should be noted, however, that this was due not to any obscurantist aversion to free inquiry, but, like everything else in his life, to his preoccupation with practical religion and to his convictions about the truth and unity of the Christian Revelation. The new views, he felt, were in large measure the products of an intellectual atmosphere in which the truth of the Incarnation was ignored or denied, and the writers tended to be 'totally insensible to the religious import' of the literature with which they were dealing (*ib.* i. 73, iv. 65, 74). His 'Fabian tactics' in regard to their work have probably contributed much more than would often be acknowledged towards the creation of the far more satisfactory atmosphere in which English theologians are able to work to-day.

6. **Practical interest in church work.**—Pusey's work has left a considerable mark upon the institutions and methods of the Anglican Church, no less than upon her theology. Of these the revival of the 'religious life' is the most remarkable. His desire for sisterhoods sprang perhaps originally from his sense of the spiritual needs of the great cities and of the lack of outlet for the religious energies of unmarried women rather than from any deliberate intention to re-establish monasticism, but his Patristic studies (Liddon, iii. 2) had made him feel that the life of virgin self-consecration was an essential feature of the Catholic tradition, and so the two motives were closely combined. He had made it a subject of prayer for some years, and this seemed to find its first answer in the strong desire of his eldest daughter Lucy, who died in 1844 at the age of 15, to devote herself to a single life and to work for the poor. He wrote from her deathbed to Newman:

'I ventured to give her in charge to pray for us all in the presence of her Redeemer, and, if it might be, for those institutions to which she had herself hoped to belong' (*ib.* ii. 386).

Marian Hughes, who died in 1913 as mother of the Convent of the Holy Trinity in Oxford, dedicated herself to the 'religious life' as early as 1841 (*ib.* iii. 10), and the first community for women was founded on 26th March 1845. Its superior, Miss Langston, was later one of the nurses taken by Florence Nightingale to the Crimea (Maria Trench, *Story of Dr. Pusey's Life*, London, 1900, p. 279). R. M. Benson, the founder of the first revived community for men in 1866, was also one of Pusey's intimate friends (*Letters of Richard Meux Benson*, Oxford, 1916, pp. 6, 206, 328).[1]

Pusey's overwhelming sense of the failure of the Church to minister to the great cities showed itself also in relation to the ordinary parochial system. At the time when he was composing the tract on baptism in 1835 he wrote an article on the need for new churches in London which gave the stimulus to Bishop Blomfield's Metropolitan Churches Fund.[2] He and his wife gave up their carriage, and started to live much more simply in order that he might subscribe to the fund. In 1845 he founded anonymously the Church of St. Saviour's, Leeds, which was consecrated in the same month as Newman seceded, and the course of nineteen sermons which were preached during the octave of the consecration was the first of those 'parochial

[1] *Robert Gregory, 1819–1911: being the Autobiography of Robert Gregory, D.D., Dean of St. Paul's*, London, 1912.

[1] Cf. also Russell's *Dr. Pusey*, 108 ff.; for the only complete account of modern Anglican communities see S. L. Ollard and G. Crosse, *Dictionary of English Church History*, London, 1912.

[2] Liddon, i. 329, and iv. 82.

missions' which have now become an ordinary feature of English church work.[1] In connexion with this absorbing interest in the spiritual welfare of the great cities may be mentioned the personal help that Pusey gave in Bethnal Green during the outbreak of cholera in 1866.[2]

The personal reminiscences recorded by those with whom he worked there give a pleasant and vivid impression of his personality.

'I served on the Committee of the hospital with Dr. Pusey,' wrote a clergyman, 'and very often I met him at the bedside of the patients—simple, tender-hearted, and full of sympathy. If the word "sweet" had not become somewhat canting—I should say there was something inexpressibly sweet in the smile and quiet laughter which so brightened his face when he was pleased and hopeful' (Liddon, iv. 143). This smile of Pusey's, it may be noted, was appreciated also by one who was far from being his admirer in other ways. 'Jenny Lind,' wrote Dean Stanley in 1848, 'has been in Oxford for three days. When animated she is perfectly lovely, and her smile is, with the exception of Dr. Pusey's, the most heavenly I ever beheld' (*Letters of J. B. Mozley*, London, 1885, p. 196; cf. also Liddon, iii. 108).

Pusey's influence upon individuals was very great. From 1838 onwards he heard confessions from persons in every rank of life (Russell, p. 78), and, though strongly opposed to any idea of making private confession compulsory, he used frequently to urge its practical necessity in the case of certain sins.[3] His adaptations of Roman Catholic books of devotion, such as Scupoli's *Spiritual Combat*,[4] though much criticized at the time,[5] have greatly enriched the spiritual life of Anglicans, and helped to break down a great deal of the prejudice which is due to ignorance against the Roman Church. In 1856 he held a devotional conference of clergy for a week in his house, and was one of the pioneers in beginning systematic 'retreats' (*q.v.*).[6] In this connexion also should be mentioned his commentary on *The Minor Prophets* (Oxford, 1877), and his little volume of *Private Prayers* (London, 1883), which shows the simplicity and fervour of his own devotional life. No undertaking for which he was responsible was nearer to his heart than the 'Companions of the Love of Jesus, engaged in Perpetual Intercession for the Conversion of Sinners,' and the volume of *Eleven Addresses* (Oxford, 1868) given in a retreat for this gild would suggest why a place has been sometimes claimed for him among the English saints.[7]

7. Pusey's principal controversies.—

1841-46. Jerusalem bishopric—the relation of the Church of England to Lutheranism.
1843. . His sermon on the Eucharist condemned.
1845. . Letter to the *English Churchman* on Newman's secession.
1846. . The condemned doctrine of the Eucharist reasserted and not challenged—'the power of the keys.'
1847. . The Gorham judgment—the doctrine of baptism.
1854. . The Denison case—the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist.
1860. . *Essays and Reviews.*
1865-70. Reunion with the Roman Church.
1870. . Use of the Athanasian Creed.
1871. . The Purchas case—ritual questions (see also Liddon, iv. ch. viii.). For Pusey's attitude towards changes in religious ceremonial cf. also *ib.* ii. 142, iv. 210, 369.
1873. . Declaration on confession and absolution.
1879. . Dean Farrar's *Eternal Hope.*

LITERATURE. H. P. Liddon, *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*[4], 4 vols., London, 1893-94; G. W. E. Russell, *Dr. Pusey*, 'Leaders of the Church' series, do. 1907 (popular and throwing much fresh light on his personality, esp. chs. xii. and xiii.); a complete bibliography of Pusey's printed books, pamphlets, and sermons is given in Liddon, iv. 395-453. Special mention may be made of *The Church of England leaves her Children free to whom to open their Griefs*[2], Oxford, 1850, *The Doctrine of the Real Presence as contained in the Fathers*, do. 1855, *What is of Faith as to everlasting Punishment?* do. 1880. For letters to the archbishop of Canterbury (1842) and to the bishop of London (1851) see Liddon, ii. 278, iii. 297.

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[1] Liddon, ii. 197. [2] *Ib.* iv. 141. [3] *Ib.* iii. 68, and iv. 265.
[4] L. Scupoli, *The Spiritual Combat, with the Path of Paradise*, Eng. tr. [by L. B. Pusey], London, 1846.
[5] Liddon, ii. 394. [6] *Ib.* iii. 377.
[7] Cf. a letter of Newman's about him, quoted in Liddon, i. 389.

PYGMIES.—See DWARFS AND PYGMIES, NEGRILLOS AND NEGRITOS.

PYRRHONISM.—See SCEPTICS.

PYTHAGORAS AND PYTHAGOREANISM.—1. Pythagoras.—Pythagoras was regarded as more than human by the members of the society which he founded, and all differences between them were supposed to be settled by the formula *αὐτὸς ἔφα, ipse dixit.* On the other hand, he had left no written statement of his doctrine, and little more than a century after his death the most divergent accounts of it were already current. We find some Pythagoreans denying that the practice of abstinence formed any part at all of the master's teaching, while others gave it the first place. This divergence seems to have arisen from the ambiguous character of the society, which was from the first at once a religious order and a scientific school. We shall see grounds for thinking that the two things were one in the mind of Pythagoras himself, but the scientific side of his doctrine inevitably attracted some, while others clung to his religious beliefs and practices. By the 4th cent. B.C. the divergence had become so great that it is hard to find anything in common between the two sects except their reverence for the name of Pythagoras. As is natural, we have no direct testimony from the Pythagorists of the strict observance, though the denials of the more enlightened members of the society would sufficiently prove their existence. Fortunately, however, they were a favourite subject of ridicule with the 4th cent. comic poets, and we still have a considerable number of fragments in which they are made fun of for their squalid and penurious ways. It is perfectly plain that they did, as a matter of fact, abstain not only from meat but from fish, and that they wore a peculiar costume and went barefooted. They also looked for a privileged position in the next world, and regarded their present life as a sojourn in a strange land (*ἀποδημία*). For the rest, they are said to have been lousy and dirty, which is the impression that ascetics are apt to make on men of the world.

This is a matter of such importance for the history of Greek religion that it may be well to give translations of a few fragments. The originals will be most readily found in A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Select Fragments of the Greek Comic Poets* (Oxford, 1900), to which references are added. Aristophon, in his *Pythagorist*, says: 'In heaven's name, do you think the men of former days that turned Pythagorists were so squalid because they liked it, or that they enjoyed wearing coarse cloaks? Not a bit of it, in my opinion. It was from necessity, seeing they hadn't a thing, that they invented a fine pretext for economy, and established canons useful to the poor. Why, serve up to them fish or meat, and if they don't eat it up toes and all, I'm ready to be hanged ten times' (Pickard-Cambridge, p. 69). And again: 'He said he had descended to the dwelling-place of those below and had beheld each class of them, and that the Pythagorists had a great advantage over all the dead. He said that Pluto would eat with them alone because of their piety'—'The god is not particular, then, if he likes to keep company with such dirty fellows!' . . . 'And they eat vegetables and wash them down with water, and none of our young men would put up with their lice and their old cloaks and their avoidance of baths' (*ib.* p. 70). In the *Tarentines* of Alexis, the following dialogue occurred: 'The Pythagorisers, as we are told, neither eat fish nor anything else with life in it (*ἔμψυχον*), and they alone drink no wine.'—'Epicharides eats dogs, though, and he is one of the Pythagoreans.'—'Yes, but he kills them first; for then they no longer have life in them.'—'They live on Pythagorisms and subtle words and chiselled thoughts (*φροντίδες*), and their daily fare is this. A fresh loaf for each and a cup of water, that's all.'—'Why, that is prison fare!' (*ib.* p. 86). Other extracts will be found in Diels, *Vorsokratiker*[3], Berlin, 1912, i. 378. It will be observed that the comic poets of the 4th cent. speak of the Pythagorists very much as Aristophanes speaks of Socrates. The reference of Aristophon to the descent into Hades (*καταβάσις εἰς Ἅιδου*) is of special importance for the reconstruction of the system. The passage about the *ἀποδημία* will be referred to later in another connexion.

On the other side, we have the statements of Aristoxenus of Tarentum, who had been personally acquainted with the leading Pythagoreans of the beginning of the 4th cent. B.C., and who had been

a disciple of the Pythagorean Xenophilus before he joined the school of Aristotle. He affirmed that Pythagoras only enjoined abstinence from the flesh of the ploughing ox and the ram; and, with respect to the mysterious tabu on beans, he said that, as a matter of fact, they were the favourite vegetable of Pythagoras, who valued their laxative properties. He also said that Pythagoras had a weakness for the flesh of young porkers and tender kids. In a similar spirit, though without the characteristic exaggeration of Aristoxenus, Dicæarchus of Messene, another disciple of Aristotle, who maintained even against his master the superiority of the active to the contemplative life, endeavoured to represent Pythagoras as a legislator and statesman.[1] No doubt it is this divergence that accounts for the almost total silence of our earliest authorities about Pythagoras himself. Plato was very deeply interested in Pythagorean doctrine, and it is a very remarkable fact that the name of Pythagoras occurs once only in his writings,[2] and all that we are told in that passage is that he won his followers' affection in an unusual degree (διαφερόντως ἠγαπήθη) by teaching them a 'way of life.'

'Even at the present day,' adds Socrates, 'their successors are conspicuous by their manner of life, to which they give the name of Pythagorean.'

So far as it goes, this is evidence that, at the supposed date of the conversation reported in the *Republic*, some time before the close of the 5th cent., the 'Pythagorean life' was known at Athens and regarded as an original part of the system. Even the scientific Pythagoreans are mentioned only once in Plato by that name, in the passage where Socrates is made to say that the Pythagoreans (Πυθαγόρειοι) regard music and astronomy as sister sciences.[3] On the other hand, Plato has a great deal to say about the views of people whom we know from other sources to have been Pythagoreans; the strange thing is that, for all Plato tells us, we should only have been able to guess this even of such leading men as Philolaus and Echecrates. Generally he introduces Pythagorean philosophical views anonymously as those of 'ingenious persons' (κομψοί τινες), or the like, and he does not even say that Timæus the Locrian, into whose mouth he has placed an unmistakably Pythagorean cosmology, was a member of the society. We are left to infer it from the fact that he comes from Italy. This reticence must surely be deliberate, and Aristotle imitates his master's caution. The name of Pythagoras occurs only twice in the genuine Aristotelian writings that have come down to us. In one passage[4] we are told that Alcmæon was a young man in the old age of Pythagoras, which is a useful piece of information; the other[5] is a mere quotation from Alcidamas to the effect that 'the men of Italy honoured Pythagoras.' When Aristotle has to discuss definite Pythagorean theories, he uses studiously vague phrases like 'the men of Italy who are called Pythagoreans.' By great good fortune, however, he also wrote a special treatise on the Pythagoreans, which is lost, but is quoted by later writers. These quotations are invaluable; for they are evidence that the miraculous legend of Pythagoras was not, as might have been supposed, the invention of a far later age, but was known at Athens in the 4th century. It may be assumed that Aristotle heard it from some of the Pythagorists of whom the contemporary comic poets made fun. Pythagoreanism was not at all congenial to him, and he probably wished to represent Pythagoras as a charlatan.

[1] For references and a discussion of the sources of the traditional life of Pythagoras see Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], London, 1908, p. 102 ff.

[2] *Rep.* x. 600 B.

[3] *Ib.* vii. 530 D.

[4] *Met.* A. 5, 986ᵃ 29.

[5] *Rhet.* B. 23, 1398ᵇ 14.

The intention of Aristotle seems to be shown by his statement that Pythagoras busied himself with the theory of numbers, but that 'he did not break with the miraclemongering of Pherecydes' (τῆς Φερεκύδου τερατοποιίας οὐκ ἀπέστη).[1] At a later date Apollonius of Tyana (*q.v.*) and Iamblichus were delighted to be able to quote Aristotle's authority for the miracles of Pythagoras, and in this way that philosopher unwittingly became one of the founders of Neo-Pythagoreanism—a thing which was enough to make him turn in his grave.

The earliest reference to Pythagoras is a practically contemporary one. Xenophanes, like Pythagoras himself, was one of the Ionian *émigrés* who found a home in the West 'when the Mede appeared'; and some verses from an elegy of his are quoted by Diogenes Laertius,[2] in which we are told of Pythagoras that he once heard a dog howling and appealed to its master not to beat it as he recognized the voice of a departed friend. It is true that Pythagoras is not named in the verses themselves, but Diogenes, or rather the writer from whom he is excerpting, is more than usually precise in his method of citation; for he says that they occurred in the elegy of which the first line is a verse which he quotes. It is clear, then, that he had the whole elegy before him, and he can hardly have been mistaken when he said it referred to Pythagoras. If that is so, we have contemporary evidence of the fact that Pythagoras taught the doctrine of transmigration or rebirth (παλιγγενεσία). The verses are satirical, as we should expect from Xenophanes, and the next reference to Pythagoras is hostile too. Heraclitus said of Pythagoras[3] that he had carried scientific inquiry (ἱστορίη) farther than any one, that he claimed its results as a wisdom of his own, and turned them into an art of mischief (κακοτεχνίη). Later still, though within a century of the time of Pythagoras, Herodotus[4] speaks of him as 'not the weakest sophist (*i.e.* scientific man) of the Hellenes,' and says he had been told by the Greeks of the Hellespont that the legendary Scythian Salmoxis had been a slave of Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, at Samos, and had learnt from him the strange doctrine of immortality. Herodotus does not believe this, for he is of opinion that Salmoxis lived many years before Pythagoras; but the story is evidence that Pythagoras was well known in the 5th cent. both as a man of science and as a preacher of immortality, and that is what we want to know.

The Life of Pythagoras by Diogenes Laertius is a farrago of Alexandrian erudition and speculation, while those by Porphyry and Iamblichus are subsequent to the romantic reconstruction of the story by Apollonius of Tyana. They all contain, however, a good deal of material derived from Aristoxenus and Dicæarchus, which may embody genuine tradition in such statements as have no connexion with the particular views regarding Pythagoras which they were anxious to propagate. The historical setting came mainly from Timæus of Tauromenium in Sicily, who was anything but a trustworthy historian, but who had special means of access to original sources for the history of the West. The facts that we can really be said to know may be very briefly stated. Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, was a Samian, and the period of his activity fell in the second half of the 6th century B.C. According to Aristoxenus, he emigrated from Samos because he would not submit to the tyranny of Polycrates, which seems probable enough, though we do not require any special explanation for the emigration of Ionians to the west at this date. He found a new home at Croton, a powerful Achaian colony in the Gulf of Tarentum, famous for its healthy climate and the number of Olympic victors it produced. Here he established his society, which was at once a religi-

[1] Aristotle, frag. 191 (Rose).

[2] viii. 36.

[3] Frag. 17 (Bywater).

[4] iv. 95.

ous order and a school of science. It soon acquired a dominant position in Croton and the other Achaian states of these parts, and this naturally called forth a strong opposition, which was led by Cylon, a wealthy noble. It seems certain that Ephorus and Timæus connected the outbreak of opposition to Pythagoras with the war between Croton and Sybaris, which ended with the destruction of the latter in 510 B.C. In any case, Timæus said that Pythagoras lived at Croton for twenty years, and then emigrated to Metapontum, where he died. He also said that the Metapontines consecrated his house as a temple; and Cicero tells us[1] that, when he visited Metapontum, he refused to go to the house where he was to stay till he had seen the place where Pythagoras died. The opposition of the partisans of Cylon to the Pythagorists was carried on after their founder's death, and ended in a regular massacre, from which very few of them escaped. Polybius tells us[2] that the days when they set fire to the lodges (*συνέδρια*) of the Pythagoreans were followed by a period of disturbance in Magna Græcia, 'as was natural, seeing that the leading men of every state had so unexpectedly perished,' and the Greek cities of S. Italy were filled with bloodshed, civil war, and confusion of every kind, till at last they got the assistance of the Achaians in the Peloponnese, whose colonists they were, in restoring tranquillity. No date is given anywhere for this persecution, but Aristoxenus said that only two of the Pythagoreans in Croton escaped, Lysis and Archippus—for whom Plutarch[3] substitutes Lysis and Philolaus. We know that Lysis was the teacher of Epaminondas at Thebes, and, as Epaminondas cannot have been born much before 420 B.C., Lysis must have been still living in 400 B.C. We must assume, then, that the great persecution took place somewhere about the middle of the 5th century. On the other hand, it must have been before the establishment of a Panhellenic colony by Pericles near the deserted site of Sybaris (444 B.C.), or we should have heard of these troubles in that connexion. It is evident from Plutarch that the Pythagoreans played a very important part at Thebes, and that it was now one of the chief seats of the society. We know from Plato's *Phædo*[4] that Philolaus was resident there some time during the last twenty years of the 5th cent., and also[5] that Echecrates and others, whom we know from Aristoxenus to have been Pythagoreans, were settled at Phlius near Sicyon. Some time before the death of Socrates, however, it must have become safe for the Pythagoreans to show themselves in S. Italy again, for we gather that Philolaus had already left Thebes by that time, and we know that he settled at Tarentum, henceforth the chief seat of the society, where it is represented in the next generation by the distinguished mathematician, statesman, and general, Archytas, the friend of Plato. The Pythagoreans of Tarentum were the centre of the opposition to Dionysius I. of Syracuse, and it was at their request that Plato undertook the education of his successor, Dionysius II. The story of Damon and Phintias, which Aristoxenus said he was told by Dionysius himself when in exile, belongs to this period.

The uncertainty of the chronology is a great difficulty. The dates usually given for Pythagoras himself were obtained by the usual process of synchronizing his fortieth year (his ἀκμή or *floruit*) with the most important event of his middle life. This was taken to be his emigration to Italy; and, on the basis of the statement of Aristoxenus referred to above, that was dated by the era of Polycrates (532 B.C.). It is also clear that some estimates were based on the dates of the previous incarnations of Pythagoras as Aithalides and Euphorbus.[1] If we could be quite sure that Timæus and Ephorus were right in connecting Pythagoras with the war between Sybaris and Croton (511 B.C.), that would be a fixed point, though we cannot tell how old he may have been at the time. The residence of the leading Pythagoreans at Thebes towards the end of the 5th cent. is also a fact, and it is not going too far to suggest that the brilliant career of Epaminondas and the brief supremacy of Thebes in Greece may be traced to their inspiration. At any rate Aristotle[2] quotes from Alcidamas the remark that, as soon as the 'philosophers' became the leaders of the Thebans, the city prospered. Plutarch, who knew his Bœotian history and who made use of Bœotian writers, in his dialogue *de Genio Socratis* describes the conversation that took place among the conspirators on the winter night of 379 B.C., when Pelopidas freed Thebes by seizing the Cadmea. He tells us that the conspirators had met in the house of Simmias, the Pythagorean disciple of Socrates whom we know from the *Phædo*, and that, while they were talking, Epaminondas, who disapproved of their project, introduced a Pythagorean from Italy, Theanor of Croton, who had come to pour libations on the tomb of Lysis, whose spirit had appeared to the brethren and told them of his death. He relates how, after the massacre at Metapontum, from which only Lysis and Philolaus escaped, it was unknown where Lysis was, till Gorgias of Leontini reported having met him at Thebes. The Pythagoreans in Italy wished to send for Lysis or to recover his remains if he were dead, but were prevented by the civil wars and tyrannies prevailing at the time. Theanor did not, however, intend to disturb his body now; for he had heard a voice while he watched by the tomb bidding him leave it where it was, and he saw that Epaminondas had given Lysis a proper Pythagorean burial down to the most secret details. No doubt this may be a romance, but it implies a very definite historical background in the mind of Plutarch, and he knew what he was talking about.

Pythagoras was an Ionian, and it is absurd to make him the champion of the 'Dorian aristocratic ideal,' as most German writers since A. Boeckh and O. Müller have done. To begin with, what they mean by the 'Dorian ideal' is really a fancy picture of the Spartan and Cretan ideal invented by Athenian conservatives of the 5th cent. and popularized by Athenian philosophers. Corinth and Syracuse were as purely Dorian as Sparta, and probably more so, and they will not fit into this picture. The source of the impression that there is something Dorian about Pythagorism is simply that the few fragments of genuine Pythagorean writing that survive belong to the generation when the Dorian Tarentum was the chief seat of the school, and were naturally composed, not indeed in the local dialect of that city, but in the 'common Doric' which was the literary language of Sicily and S. Italy at the time. The very numerous forgeries of Pythagorean writings naturally followed this model, and so there has come to be a sort of Doric veneer on the surface of Pythagorism. But Croton, Metapontum, and the other original seats of the society were not Dorian, but Achaian, and there was no love lost between Dorians and Achaians, especially in Italy. Herodotus tells us[3] that the Sybarites accused the Crotoniates of getting the better of them by Dorian help—a suggestion which the Crotoniates repudiated with indignation. Besides, if a Crotoniate at this date had anything important to say, he would have written in Ionic (as Alcmæon of Croton, who was a young man in the old age of Pythagoras, appears to have done); for Ionic was the recognized dialect for serious works, and even the Dorians used it. The literary use of Doric, except for farces and satires, dates only from the reaction against Athens caused by the Peloponnesian War. Grote protested long ago against the annexation of Croton to the Dorians by Boeckh, and his protest has at last been listened to in Germany by Eduard Meyer.[4]

Nor is there any evidence that the Pythagorists espoused the cause of the aristocracy. They were a religious association, and we are told a good deal about the severe tests applied by Pythagoras to aspirants to the novitiate, but there is no hint that birth or wealth was essential. The character-

[1] *De Fin.* v. 2 (4). [2] vii. 39.

[3] *De Genio Socratis*, 583 A (13).

[4] 61 D. Simmias and Echecrates were young men in 399 B.C., and had been disciples of Philolaus at Thebes.

[5] 57 A.

[1] Laqueur, in *Hermes*, xlii. (1907) 530 ff.

[2] *Rhet.* B. 23, 1398b 18. [3] v. 44.

[4] *Gesch. des Altertums*, Stuttgart, 1884-1902, vol. ii. § 502, note.

istic of such associations in Greece and elsewhere is just that any one is admitted to membership who is able and willing to fulfil their requirements, whatever his condition may be. The prominent part played in the society by women from the very first depends on this. It is probably true that Pythagoras dissuaded the Crotoniates from giving up the refugees from Sybaris, but that was surely because they were suppliants, and not because they were aristocrats, if indeed they were, of which there is no evidence. Aristoxenus said expressly that Cylon, the leader of the opposition to Pythagoras, was a man distinguished by birth, position, and wealth, not a popular leader, as modern writers assert. Moreover, when the Pythagoreans did return to Italy, they settled at Tarentum, which was an extremely democratic state, and it is hard to see anything else that could have recommended a Dorian city to them. It is true that Archytas was at the head of the Tarentine government for years, but he owed his position to popular election. Lastly, though Empedocles (*q.v.*) may not have been a member of the Pythagorean society, he was certainly an enthusiastic admirer of Pythagoras, and seems to have taken him as his model; and Empedocles was the leader of the democratic party in another Dorian state, Agrigentum.

It is no doubt possible that there is some truth in the statement of some authorities that the family of Pythagoras was descended from a certain Hippasus, who left Phlius rather than submit to the conquering Dorians. The exiles settled first at Lemnos, from which island they were afterwards expelled by the Athenians, when the family of Pythagoras settled at Samos. Pausanias[1] heard this account of the matter at Phlius itself, and it is noteworthy that Echecrates and other Pythagoreans settled at Phlius in later days, and that the name Hippasus is well known as that of a Pythagorean who revealed the secrets of the society. That makes no difference, however, to the Ionism of Pythagoras; for the exiles from Phlius belonged to the original population who were settled in the Ægean before the Achaians came, and whom we must identify with the Arcadians on the one hand and the Ionians on the other. If the family of Pythagoras preserved the memory of these things, he would be less than ever inclined to sympathize with 'Dorian ideals.' Nor were the Achaians Dorians. It may be that they spoke a very similar dialect, though we have not sufficient remains of it to be sure, but that can be sufficiently accounted for if we suppose that they both adopted the language of the original population before the not very remote date when the Ionians took to saying *Elis* instead of *Valis*, for instance. The retention of the old pronunciation by backward communities is normal. The whole question has been needlessly complicated by the unwarranted assumption that the Arcado-Cypriote dialect is Achaian, whereas it is most closely akin to the dialect of Homer. It has actually been said that Pythagoras changed his name from Pythagoras in order to signify his adhesion to the 'Dorian ideal'! Of course the form is due to the fact that we generally read of him in Attic writers who use the Attic form, and there is no reason to suppose that he ever called himself anything else but Πυθαγόρης, as he was still called by Democritus.

2. Pythagorean religion.—In the light of modern anthropology, the Pythagorean religion has become a good deal easier to understand than it was. We can see that, so far as the leading ideas on which it was based are concerned, it might have arisen anywhere; for those ideas are primitive and world-wide. The first of them is that the soul can leave the body temporarily or permanently and take up its abode in another body. The second is the kinship of men and beasts, which makes it possible for the same soul to inhabit the bodies of either. The third is the necessity of observing certain abstinences or tabus. To make a religion out of these ideas, it only requires a great teacher to give them an ethical character which they do not inherently possess, and that is why we find so many resemblances in Pythagorism to systems which can have no historical connexion with it. Some of these had already struck people in the 5th century. Herodotus[2] notes the agreement of the Pythagorean rule to bury the dead in linen with the Egyptian practice of excluding wool from temples, and he hints[1] that not only this, but the belief in immortality and transmigration, came from Egypt. The rule about linen is simply, of course, a consequence of the tabu on wool as an animal product, and may arise independently in many places; and Herodotus was wrong in supposing that the Egyptians believed in transmigration. It was probably an impression that he gathered from the semi-animal figures on the monuments. As the geographical horizon became wider, Pythagoras was sent farther and farther afield for his religious instruction—to the Chaldæans and the Druids and other peoples. In modern times his system has been derived from China, and even now there are those who think it came from India. Now there are certainly some striking resemblances between Pythagorism and Buddhism, though the differences are more striking still. That can be explained quite naturally, however, when we remember that the Hindus, like the Greeks, had a bent for philosophy, and that the operation of philosophical speculation on the same basis of primitive belief would naturally yield somewhat similar results. The question of Egyptian influence is on rather a different footing; for it is historically possible, and, if we remember the close connexion between Polycrates of Samos and Amasis of Egypt, it will seem quite likely that Pythagoras visited Egypt. If we could find any real trace of Egyptian influence, we should not hesitate in admitting it. It is strange, however, that Herodotus does not say that Pythagoras had ever been in Egypt, and that the first statement that he had occurs in a work which expressly disclaims any historical character, the *Busiris* of Isocrates, and in a passage obviously based on the somewhat obscure remark of Herodotus. We must remember, too, that what Pythagoras might have learnt in Egypt at that date would have been the confused and artificial theology of the Saite period, and we can find no trace of that. We shall see that the religion of Pythagoras, like everything else about him, has a definitely Ionian character, and that the doctrine of rebirth or transmigration was known in the Ægean before his time.

The word 'metempsychosis,' by which this doctrine is generally known, has only very late authority, and is based on a confusion of ideas; for it would mean that the same body was inhabited successively by different souls. The correct term would have been μετενσωμάτωσις, which is actually used by Plotinus and the Christian apologists. The proper expression is undoubtedly παλιγγενεσία, or rebirth.

The first point to notice is the intimate association of Pythagorism with the cult of Apollo at Delos. We know from the Homeric *Hymn* that the Apollonia (*q.v.*) at Delos had become a meeting-place for all Ionians long before the time of Pythagoras, though their official chief deity was the Minyan god Poseidon Helikonios, who presided over the Panionion at Mycale. Now, as L. R. Farnell has rightly insisted, Apollo Lykeios, the wolf-god (who has nothing to do with the sun in classical Greek literature) comes from the north, and his connexion with Lycia, which may have been called after him, is secondary, and due to Achaian colonization in those parts. Everything points to his having been a god of the northerners who took the place of the old Ægean rulers in the 14th century B.C. There is nothing strange in his having been adopted by the Ionians. When great sanctuaries like that at Delos are established, the seats of the gods become fixed, even though the people to whom they originally belonged have disappeared or been absorbed, as the Achaians were by the Ionians of the Ægean. In much the same way, those Achaians who were able to maintain their separate nationality after the Dorian conquest of

[1] ii. 13. 1. This explains why Aristoxenus called Pythagoras a 'Tyrrhenian.' In the 4th cent. B.C. the 'Pelasgians' whom Miltiades expelled from Lemnos were called 'Tyrrhenians.'

[2] ii. 81.

[1] ii. 123.

the Peloponnese, when they expelled the Ionians from the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, took over the worship of Poseidon Helikonios which they found there. The most interesting trace of the northern origin of Apollo is the bringing of the offerings of the Hyperboreans to Delos every year by one or more ancient routes, and Apollo himself was supposed to revisit the Hyperboreans annually. Now Aristotle wrote in his work on the Pythagoreans that the citizens of Croton gave the name of Apollo Hyperboreus to Pythagoras.

For the Hyperboreans and their offerings see Farnell, *CGS* iv. 99 ff. They are found in the legend of Delphi too. The story told to Herodotus at Delos was as follows: 'The holy things wrapped in wheaten straw were carried from the Hyperboreans to the Scythians, and were passed on by them from people to people till they reached the Adriatic. Thence they were sent southwards and were received by the men of Dodona, who were the first of the Hellenes to receive them. From Dodona they came down to the Malian Gulf and crossed to Euboea, whence they were passed on from town to town till they reached Carystus, and from Carystus they were conveyed by the Carystians to Tenos, without touching at Andros, and the Tenians handed them on to Delos.'[1] Pausanias[2] mentions another route by way of Sinope which has puzzled scholars. If it should prove to be the case that the Hittites spoke an Indo-European tongue of the same type as the Italo-Celtic, the meaning of this will be clear enough, and, in view of that, which seems to be more than a possibility, the Achaian character of Apollo becomes important. Now, in discussing another Hyperborean institution, the Olympian crown of wild olive, Pausanias gives us the following information:[3] 'Olen the Lycian, in his Hymn to Achaiia, was the first to affirm that there are men who dwell beyond the North Wind; for in that hymn he says that Achaiia came to Delos from the Hyperboreans. Afterwards Melanopus of Cyme composed an ode on Opis and Hecaerge, in which he said they too had come to the Hyperboreans before Achaiia did so.' It does not matter for our purpose here whether Olen is a historical person or not; for it is at least clear that these statements were made in Delian hymns. It may be noted further that the Homeric *Hymn* represents Apollo as ruling over many places which were not Ionian at a later date, but which formed part of the Achaian land in the heroic age. This may possibly help to explain the similarities between Pythagorism and Druidism which made such an impression on the Greeks and Romans of a later date. W. Ridgeway[4] holds (the present writer believes rightly) that the Achaians were Celts, and it seems plain that the Druids (*q.v.*) did teach the doctrine of transmigration.[5] We do not know how sophisticated these Druids (who used the Greek alphabet) may have been, but there is after all a fairly general agreement that a new view of the soul reached the Greeks from the north (see art. SOUL [Greek]), and there are certain elements in the Delian legend which seem definitely Celtic, such as the singing swans so beautifully described by Aristophanes.[6] Now these, as every one knows, occur in Plato's account of the death of Socrates,[7] where Socrates is made to say he is a fellow-servant of Apollo's swans.

If we follow up the clue suggested by the identification of Pythagoras with Apollo Hyperboreus, we shall find many confirmations of the hypothesis that Delos was the source of his inspiration. In the first place, his very name suggests some family connexion with the worship of Apollo; for the most obvious etymology of it is that it means an envoy to the sister sanctuary at Pytho (cf. the πυλαγόραι who were sent to the Amphictyonic Council). We note further that the Hyperboreans are represented as vegetarians, and that the oldest altar of Delos, that of Apollo the Father (γενέτωρ), was reserved for fireless oblations of vegetable offerings like the firstfruits of the Hyperboreans. We read in Diogenes Laertius[8] that Pythagoras worshipped at this altar only, and, though this may not be genuine tradition, it is probable enough that, in his preaching of abstinence from animal flesh (ἀποχὴ ἐμψύχων), he should have appealed to this ancient worship of his people. Moreover, purification (κάθαρσις) was one of the leading ideas in Pythagorism, and it certainly was a prominent feature of the cult of Apollo. There are, indeed, reasons for thinking that it was not an original feature of this cult, but there is no doubt that, by the time of Pythagoras, Apollo was regarded as the cathartic god *par excellence*.

[1] iv. 33. [2] i. 31. 2.
[3] v. 7. 8. Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* iii. 16, where we learn that the Hyperboreans were settled on the Danube.
[4] *The Early Age of Greece*, Cambridge, 1901, i. 337 ff.
[5] *Caesar, de Bell. Gall.* vi. 14 *fin.* [6] *Birds*, 769.
[7] *Phaedo*, 84 E. [8] viii. 13.

Further, there are indistinct memories of earlier missionaries of Apollo than Pythagoras. Herodotus tells us[1] of Abaris the Hyperborean, a holy man who travelled from country to country with a golden arrow in his hand. He tasted neither food nor drink, and averted plagues and earthquakes by his spells. Pindar said this was in the days of Crœsus, only a generation before his own birth. Herodotus also speaks[2] of Aristeas of Proconnesus, who, when 'rapt by Phœbus' (φοιβολαμπτὸς γενόμενος), visited the northern peoples. His soul could leave his body, and he was seen in far distant places. Like Pythagoras, he found his way to the Achaian colony of Metapontum, and told the men of that city that to them alone in Italy had Apollo come. There was a statue of him beside that of Apollo in the market-place there. To the same circle belongs Hermotimus of Clazomenæ, who could leave his body for years at a time, and bring back prophecies of the future, till once his enemies burned his body in the absence of his soul and he was seen no more. It is plain that Pythagoras was not without predecessors, and that he had no need to visit remote regions to learn the view of the soul on which his doctrine was based.

On the cathartic element in the religion of Apollo see *CGS* iv. 295 ff. Purification (κάθαρσις) came to be so closely associated with Apollo that Socrates, in Plato's *Cratylus*,[3] proposes to derive his name from ἀπολύων or ἀπολούων, or both.

But we can go further than this; for we can show that Pythagoras had Ionian predecessors in his cosmogony as well as in his doctrine of the soul. There are traces of cosmogonical theory even in Homer,[4] and it is plain that Hesiod did not invent the cosmogonical figures at the beginning of his *Theogony*; for he introduces Chaos and Eros without a word of explanation, and there is no indication of the parts they played in the creation of the world. As Gomperz[5] very justly observed, 'Hesiod's system is a mere husk of thought which must once have been filled with life.' Moreover, his doctrine[6] that the men of the Golden Age have become 'holy spirits' (δαίμονες ἁγνοί) who watch over mortal men goes far beyond primitive belief, though we can hardly suppose that Hesiod invented that either. Such doctrines are obviously the fruit of what we must call theological speculation, and that raises a great difficulty. It is generally evaded by attributing all such speculations to the Orphics, and there is no doubt that they held cosmogonical doctrines and entertained beliefs about the soul of the very type that we are now considering. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Orphic communities existed at so early a date as we should have to assume if we are to account for the facts in this way. Moreover, so far as we can see, Orphism was the religion of humble people, and we know of no great Orphic teachers whom we can credit with the origination of such daring speculations. It seems as if Orphism, when it did arise, was rather a parallel phenomenon to Pythagorism than its source. It must be remembered that the Orphic god is Dionysus, not Apollo, and the worship of Dionysus is of much more recent date than that of Apollo. It certainly became tinged with mysticism like that of Apollo, and to some extent that of Demeter at Eleusis, but the problem of the origin of this mysticism remains, and it is not easy to rest content with the view that it is Thracian. The belief in ecstasy may well have been so, but that does not take us very

[1] iv. 36. [2] iv. 13.
[3] 405 B. [4] *Il.* xiv.
[5] *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., London, 1901–12, i. 40.
[6] *Works and Days*, 122 f.

far; for what we have to account for is the existence of cosmogonical speculation and an elaborate doctrine of the soul, which presents many common features in all the religious movements of the time, so far as we know anything about them.

The obvious affinities of *Iliad* xiv. and *Odyssey* xi. with Orphic doctrine have led some scholars to suppose that they are later additions to the Homeric poems, but they would have to be so late that the theory loses all plausibility. The view that Hesiod is the originator of Greek cosmogonical speculation, which we all held in the 19th cent., is shown by a close examination of the *Theogony* to be wrong. Hesiod is certainly repeating those things at secondhand. It is of great significance that Dionysus is not any more important for Hesiod than he is for Homer. It is mentioned in passing that he is the son of Zeus and Semele, but there is no hint that he is an important god. That seems fatal to the view that there are Orphic elements in Hesiod.

Since the close of the 19th cent. it has been possible to look at these things in another light, though it is not easy to adjust our vision to the new perspective. We know now that there was a highly developed civilization in the Ægean dating from the Neolithic Age, and excavations at Menidi and Miletus have shown that it passed by gradual transition into the early Ionic civilization. There is not the slightest ground for regarding the semi-barbarous invaders from the north as the main stock of the Greek people, *i.e.* the people to whom we owe Greek civilization and everything that makes Greece of value to us to-day. Every day brings fresh confirmation of the view that the Achaians or Hellenes, or whatever they called themselves, adopted the language and civilization of the conquered Ægean people and were ultimately absorbed by them. Now we can have no difficulty in supposing that the people who created the Ægean civilization were capable of theological speculation. Nor is there any need to suppose that they were dependent on Egypt or Babylon in any way for this. The Ægean civilization is as old as that of Babylon or Egypt, and in many ways superior to either of them. The Achaians and Hellenes did not bring civilization to the Ægean, but in some ways set it back. What they did bring was apparently the Olympian gods and the war-chariot and the chivalrous ideal as we find it in the poems of Homer. In that way, no doubt, the incursion of the northerners introduced a new and valuable element into the life of the Ægean, but for most things they were dependent on the higher civilization of the people whom they had conquered. The coming of the Achaians marks the beginning of the Greek Middle Ages, but there was a long antiquity behind that.

It is most unfortunate that we cannot discuss Pythagoras adequately without constant reference to ethnological problems, but that is forced on us by the treatment of the subject in most recent works. It is necessary at this point to say that it seems impossible, in view of recent discoveries, to maintain the view that the Greek language reached the Ægean from the north. Its affinities are closest with the languages of Irān and India, and not with those of the Italo-Celtic type. This appears clearly from its system of declension and conjugation. The Greek, Sanskrit, and Avestan verbs are inflected on identical principles, and in particular they alone possess the augment, save for some survivals in Armenian—an exception that proves the rule and gives us a hint of the route by which Indo-European speech may have reached the Ægean. It is the fact that the oldest datable traces of Indo-European speech are to be found in Asia Minor, and this is so whether the new view of the Hittites proves to be sound or not. Hittite, if it has been correctly interpreted, is a language of the Italo-Celtic type, and has no special affinities with Greek. The distinction between *centum* and *satem* languages, of which so much has been made, is a futile one, since the sibilization of *k* is a secondary phenomenon which may occur anywhere and at any time. The Romance languages have become *satem* languages in historical times. Now, if these views are sound—and every fresh piece of evidence seems to confirm them—there is no difficulty at all in supposing that an older form of Greek was spoken in the Ægean in the Bronze Age, and that it was adopted from the original population by the Achaians and Dorians from the north, who must originally have spoken a form of Celtic. Of course they would introduce a number of their own words, notably θεός, which is inexplicable as a native Greek formation. The continuity of early Ægean and Ionic speculation, which is being assumed in this article, has, therefore, nothing startling about it. In this respect, at least, Ridgeway saw how the land lay when there was much less evidence than there is now.

If this view is correct, we can easily understand how there came to be 'theologians,' as Aristotle calls them,[1] in Ionia long before the time of Pythagoras. We still have a priceless fragment of one of the latest of these, Pherecydes of Syros, an island close to Delos (see art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Greek]). It is the oldest piece of Greek prose in existence, and was already known in part from Clement of Alexandria, while the beginning and some of the continuation of it have been recovered from an Egyptian papyrus published by Grenfell and Hunt. This introduces us to speculations which are most easily understood if we suppose them to be old Ægean in character, such as that of the cloak (φᾶρος), embroidered with 'Land and Ogenos and the homes of Ogenos,' which Zas (Zeus) gave to Chthonie (Earth) at their 'holy marriage,' and which was spread over a 'winged oak' (ὑπόπτερος δρῦς). For us the important point is that our earliest authorities, including Aristoxenus, who was not anxious to emphasize the mystical side of Pythagoras, agree in representing him as the disciple of Pherecydes. Aristotle too, as we have seen, spoke of his attachment to the miracle-working (τερατοποιία) of Pherecydes. This means at least that Pythagoras was acquainted with a speculative cosmogony, and probably with a doctrine of the soul's immortality rather less primitive in character than any we can attribute to Aristeas or Abaris. At any rate the discovery of an actual fragment of Pherecydes in Egypt makes it much more likely than it seemed before that later ages had some real knowledge of his doctrine, and that Cicero may have had good authority for his statement that he taught the immortality of the soul.

The fragments of Pherecydes will be found in Diels, *Vorsokratiker*[3], vol. ii. p. 202 ff. The present writer cannot believe that Pherecydes was influenced by Anaximander, as Diels supposes. The 'winged oak' points to Arcadia or Dodona rather than Miletus. Nor can it have any connexion with Babylon, where there never were any oaks. The scholiast on Apollonius Rhodius, i. 645, quotes Pherecydes for the statement that Aithalides, the herald of the Argonauts, received from Hermes the boon that his soul should be at one time in Hades and at another on earth, and from Apollonius himself we learn that he had also the gift of remembering his former lives. If we can trust this, it is very important; for Hermes is an Arcadian (and therefore pre-Achaian) god, and the Argonauts are Minyans. Now Aithalides was regarded as a previous incarnation of Pythagoras, Euphorbus being the next. The statement of Cicero[2] is that Pherecydes was the first to teach the immortality of the soul, which only means that he was the first extant writer to do so. The immediate source of the statement is probably Posidonius.

There is no reason, then, for supposing that the doctrine of rebirth or transmigration was the original contribution of Pythagoras to religion, and the same may be said of his detailed prescriptions as to the avoidance of certain acts and the observance of certain abstinences. There can, in fact, be no doubt that most of the Pythagorean precepts are tabus of a thoroughly primitive type, and many of them can be matched among savage peoples to-day. Later writers, of course, interpret these ἀκούσματα, as they are called, as symbols or allegories of moral truth; but that view will not easily be accepted now, in view of our increased knowledge of such things. It is natural to suppose that, to many of the followers of Pythagoras, these precepts were the most important of his teachings, and that there was a rift between the higher and the lower Pythagorism from the first. That is only human nature, and it seems to be the explanation of much that we are told about the hierarchical organization of the society. It is very significant that one of the names given to the lower grade is ἀκουσματικοί, which can hardly mean

[1] *Met.* A 6. 1071b 26, the first occurrence of this fateful word.
[2] *Tusc.* i. 16 (38).

anything else than those who made the precepts, or ἀκούσματα, the principal thing. The distinction between Pythagoreans and Pythagorists has no doubt a similar origin. It is probable that modern scholars are right in holding these distinctions to be of late date, but the difference between those who were capable of assimilating only the external side of the religion and those who could reach its inner meaning must have been present from the first, and, as we have seen, it soon became so accentuated that it split the society in two. The same consideration throws light upon what we are told of the obligation of secrecy imposed on the members of the society. As usually stated, that is clearly an attempt to explain how certain doctrines were apparently unknown to the mass of the members, and so far it is unhistorical. Pythagorean doctrines were apparently quite well known, and influenced outsiders from an early date. At the same time, it is quite credible that novices were bound to silence for a period. That is too common everywhere to excite surprise, and the words which are used to describe this obligation, ἐχεμυθία and ἐχεγγημοσύνη, suggest this rather than the *disciplina arcani*. Now these words are distinctly Ionic in character, and that is a good reason for believing that they have come down from the early days of the society.

The following may be quoted as specimens of the ἀκούσματα: 'Not to pick up what has fallen,' 'Not to break bread,' 'Not to stir the fire with an (iron) sword,' 'Not to eat from a whole loaf,' 'Not to let swallows share one's roof,' 'Not to look in a mirror beside a light.' There can be no doubt how precepts of this kind are to be classified, and we cannot take seriously the later explanations such as that 'Not to stir the fire with a sword' only means that we should not further provoke an angry man.[1]

But all this, however largely it bulked in his teaching, was only a part, and not the most important part, of the contribution of Pythagoras to religion. There must have been something to account for the striking difference between the development of the Orphic and Pythagorean sects. The former seems to have become utterly corrupt in a very few generations; and in a conversation supposed to take place well before the close of the 5th cent. Plato makes Adimantus condemn the Orphic religion as a mere traffic in pardons and indulgences.[2] We know that there were Pythagorists at Athens in the 4th cent., but nothing of the kind is suggested of them; they are only laughed at for their abstinence and their devotion to the simple life. On the other hand, there were at the same date a number of eminent scientific men, calling themselves Pythagoreans, who paid no respect to these external observances, and even tried to explain them away. Now the one great difference that we can discern between the Orphics and the Pythagoreans is just this—that the Pythagoreans all agreed in tracing everything to the inspiration of a great individual, while we do not hear of any great Orphic teacher at all. Those whose names have come down to us, like Onomacritus, are known chiefly because they were suspected of literary frauds. We may reasonably infer from this that the higher side of Pythagorean religion came from the founder himself.

It is not possible, of course, to prove conclusively what this higher doctrine was, but an examination of our earliest evidence will afford us some positive indications. In the *Phædo*[3] Plato makes Socrates express surprise that Cebes and Simmias have not been taught by Philolaus the true reason why it is unlawful for a man to take his own life. The first reason, which he says is a 'high doctrine' and not easy to understand, is that our souls are bound in the prison house (φρουρά) of the body, and we have no right to try to escape till God gives the signal. There is a further doctrine, which Socrates accepts, that we are the chattels (κτήματα) of the gods, and they watch over us. There can be no doubt that Plato means us to understand all this to be Pythagorean; for Philolaus was the most distinguished Pythagorean teacher at the time of which he is speaking. We are also told that he did not give any clear account of this doctrine, which was therefore presumably one which he had inherited from his predecessors. Now it will be seen that it has a distinctly ethical tendency, such as we do not find in anything that we know of Orphism. The imprisonment of the soul in the body has a disciplinary character, and the gods or God (the two forms of expression are used quite indiscriminately) have imposed it on us for the good of our souls, so that it is our duty to submit. So much we may fairly infer from this passage, which is really our oldest and best authority.

If we may also regard the famous description of the true philosopher in the *Theætetus*[1] as inspired by Pythagorean teaching, we may go a step further and attribute to Pythagoras the doctrine that the end of man is to become like God (ὁμοιώσις τῷ θεῷ). We are not able to prove this indeed, but it is so far confirmed by the fact that Aristoxenus makes the 'following of God' (τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ) the keynote of the Pythagorean system as expounded by him; and an unknown writer excerpted by Stobæus[2] gives 'Follow God' (ἕπου θεῷ) as a Pythagorean precept, and calls attention to the agreement of Plato with it. It is obvious that this is on a different level from 'Do not stir the fire with iron' and the rest of the ἀκούσματα, and it appears to furnish a clue to the real meaning of Pythagoras. It gives Pythagorism something more than the mainly negative attitude to life of Buddhism, and distinguishes it from Orphism, which emphasizes 'release' (λύσις) above everything else. To the Orphic the body was the tomb of the soul (σῶμα σῆμα), and what we call life was death; and that is a very different thing from regarding the body as a house of correction. There is, in fact, no evidence that the idea of a final release from the 'wheel of birth' played any part in Pythagorism. That is admitted by Rohde, who attributes it to the defectiveness of our information. Pythagorism without a final release, he says, would be like Buddhism without a *nirvāṇa*.[3] The present writer would suggest that, imperfect as our information may be, it would be extraordinary that it should afford no evidence of this doctrine, if it had ever existed. We have the excellent authority of Aristotle for saying that the Pythagoreans divided rational living things into gods and men and 'such as Pythagoras,'[4] and so it would seem that the fully purified soul becomes incarnate in a philosopher and religious teacher who seeks to raise others to his level. So far as we can judge from the *Phædo*, its final destiny is not any sort of *nirvāṇa*, but 'to dwell with the gods.' It is an interesting point that the purified soul remembers its previous incarnations. It is said that Pythagoras remembered that his last incarnation had been as Euphorbus the Dardanian, who, by Apollo's help, wounded Patroclus (*Il.* xvi. 804 ff.). It is not necessary either to disbelieve this or to attribute it to imposture. Men were very exalted in those days, and it is perfectly possible that Pythagoras was in dead earnest when he saw the shield of Euphorbus dedicated by Menelaus at Argos, and recognized it as that which he had borne in Apollo's service in a former life. We may gather from this the further information

[1] See Burnet², p. 106. [2] *Rep.* ii. 364 E. [3] 61 D–62 B.

[1] 176 B D.

[2] *Ecl.* ii. 249. 8 (Wachsmuth); cf. Aristoxenus, *ap.* Iambl. *Vita Pyth.* 137.

[3] *Psyche*[5], Tübingen, 1910, ii. 165, note 2.

[4] Frag. 192 (Rose): τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου τό μέν ἐστι θεός, τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ οἷον Πυθαγόρας.

that there was an interval of several generations between each rebirth, which, if we regard the myths which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates as Pythagorean, were spent in purgatory, the very name of which has a definitely Pythagorean sound.

For the doctrine of the body as the tomb of the soul see Plato, *Cratylus*, 400 C, where we are told that the body is called σῶμα, *i.e.* σῆμα, 'on the ground that the soul is buried in the present life.' Socrates goes on, however, to give it as his own opinion that the Orphics (οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα) really called the body σῶμα, because the soul is now paying the penalty for 'those things for which it pays the penalty,' and that it has a covering (περιβολος) in the likeness of a prison (δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα) 'so that it may be kept safe' (ἵνα σῴζηται) till it has paid in full all that it owes. The word σῶμα is on this view derived not from σῆμα but from σῴζω. This looks very like an attempt to explain the Orphic doctrine in terms of the Pythagorean.

3. Pythagorean science.—This is not the place for a full discussion of Pythagorean science, but it is necessary for our purpose to establish its Ionian character—which will prove that it goes back to Pythagoras himself—and it is desirable that it should be shown, if possible, in what, if any, relation it stood to Pythagorean religion. The subject is difficult because, while the religion of Pythagoras underwent no important development, as far as we know, Pythagorean science was extremely progressive. That, again, is because, while the leading Pythagoreans took their religion for granted or neglected it altogether, they were obliged to defend their scientific teaching against criticism of all kinds, and of course it became greatly modified in the process. In particular, we see that it was necessary to account for the 'four elements' of Empedocles, which had become the foundation of medical science, and above all to take up a definite attitude towards Zeno's very serious criticism of the Pythagorean view of space and the unit. We are safe in referring theories which show a preoccupation with problems of this kind to a later generation of the school. On the other hand, Parmenides, who describes himself as a youth in his poems, must have written not very long after the death of Pythagoras, and there is clear evidence that he had been a Pythagorean. The cosmology which he expounds in the second part of his poem, and which he tells us has no truth in it, cannot well be anything else than Pythagorean, and, considering the time at which he wrote, it must be practically the doctrine of Pythagoras himself. Unfortunately we have only fragments, though they are instructive enough, and show pretty clearly which parts of the Pythagorean cosmology may be regarded as original. In view of the relation of Pythagoras to Pherecydes, it is not surprising that his expositions should have taken the form of a cosmogony, and we even gather from a chance remark of Plato[1] that it contained stories about the gods such as were usual in cosmogonies. The cosmogonic Eros is mentioned in a fragment that survives. It is clear, however, that the leading ideas of the system came from quite another source than Pherecydes. In the first half of the 6th cent. B.C. science, as we understand the word, had arisen for the first time in the world's history at Miletus on the mainland not far from Samos. Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes had been busy with the question of the stuff of which the world is made, and this had been defined as a limitless something (ἄπειρον), ultimately held to be air, which at that time was supposed to be a vapour and identified with steam and mist. Water and earth and other solid substances were explained as condensed air, while fire was air still further rarefied. In this limitless mass there were innumerable worlds, each with its earth, sun, moon, and stars, and these arose and passed away like bubbles in the limitless mass of vapour. Moreover, Anaximander, the second of the Milesians, had put forth a daring theory of the earth and the heavenly bodies, which was rejected by his successor Anaximenes, but evidently left its mark on the mind of Pythagoras. According to this, the earth hung free in space in the centre of the world, and it kept its place because there was no reason why it should fall in one direction rather than another. On the other hand, Anaximander was not able to shake himself free from the idea that we are living on a disk, and he was thus led to picture the earth as cylindrical, with another disk antipodal to ours. He further explained the sun, moon, and stars by supposing that they were rings of fire enclosed in air, with the fire escaping at a single orifice where we see the luminary. This was the earliest form taken by the notion of a planetary orbit. The school of Miletus had also formulated some very elementary geometrical propositions about triangles which gave them the means of calculating the distance of inaccessible objects, such as ships at sea. The influence of all this is clearly marked on the system of Pythagoras, though it is evident that he went far beyond his teachers. He was the real founder of arithmetic and geometry, and he may fairly be credited with a large part of the first six books of Euclid. The proposition about the square on the hypotenuse still bears his name, though we happen to know that the proof of it given in Euclid, i. 47, is not the Pythagorean one. It is probable that the original proof was of a more arithmetical character, and was connected with a very old piece of traditional knowledge, namely, that a triangle of which the sides are as 3, 4, 5 has always a right angle, and $3^2+4^2=5^2$. This proposition solved the problem of the duplication of the square, but it also brought up the difficulty of incommensurability, since the side and the diagonal of a square have no common measure. For that reason a number of problems which we should deal with algebraically are treated geometrically in Euclid, ii., which is in substance Pythagorean. It is also certain that Pythagoras is to be credited with the discovery of the spherical shape of the earth, which was a commonplace of Italian science in the 5th cent., though the Ionians refused to accept it, and even Anaxagoras and Democritus maintained that the earth was flat. This was closely connected with the explanation of lunar eclipses, which may also be confidently ascribed to Pythagoras, though it was not known in Eastern Hellas till a later date. To judge from the poem of Parmenides, Pythagoras also retained the theory of planetary rings, and indeed there is no evidence that spheres were substituted for rings before Eudoxus. Like Anaximenes, he regarded the stuff of which things are made as air (*i.e.* mist or darkness), and he must have said that the world inhales this from without; for Xenophanes already ridiculed the idea. What differentiates him completely from all his predecessors, however, is that he paid more attention to the form or limit of things than to the limitless something of which they were made. Later Pythagoreanism identified this with abstract space, but there is reason to believe that this is a more recent development. It is the fact that Pythagoras introduced the idea of the limit (πέρας) as the correlative of the Milesian limitless (ἄπειρον) that gives him his place in the history of science and affords a clue to his apparently strange doctrine that things are numbers. According to this, the limitless once limited gives us the point, twice limited the line, thrice limited the plane, and four times limited the solid; and all things are made of such geometrical solid figures in various arrangements. It will be seen that the weakness of this view is that the point is identified with unity,

[1] *Symp.* 195 C.

instead of with zero, as it should be, and this is where Zeno's criticisms proved fatal. The definition of the point as 'unity having position' enabled Pythagoras to treat geometry as a form of arithmetic up to a certain point; but Zeno showed the difficulties of this, and the later Pythagoreans had to abandon the doctrine that things *are* numbers and to substitute the statement that things *are like* numbers. Nevertheless it was a magnificently daring conception of reality and, but for the necessary imperfections of its first statement, it is substantially the same as that of Descartes.

For all this the reader is referred to Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], chs. i., ii., and vii., with the modifications contained in his *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., *Thales to Plato* (London, 1914), chs. ii. and v. As a proof of the remarkable scientific insight of the Pythagoreans, it should be mentioned here that the successors of Pythagoras (though not, so far as we can judge, Pythagoras himself) held that the earth and the other heavenly bodies revolved round a central luminary. This was not, indeed, identified with the sun, which was supposed to be a planet like the earth, but it was a very great step to regard the earth as a spherical planet.

Pythagoras carried his theory a step further by his great discovery that the intervals of the scale recognized in his day—the fourth, the fifth, and the octave — could be expressed by simple numerical ratios. This discovery was no doubt based on measurements of the length of the string which corresponded to these intervals, and it suggested a solution of another Milesian problem. The Milesian system had been dominated by the idea of the 'opposites,' especially hot and cold, wet and dry, which appeared to be at war with one another, and Anaximander had spoken of the observance of a due measure between these as 'justice' (δίκη). This Pythagoras thought he could explain from his great acoustic discovery. If high and low pitch can be brought together in a perfect attunement (ἁρμονία), it was natural to suppose that all other opposites could be similarly treated and that all stable reality would prove to be a 'blend' (κρᾶσις) of opposites in proportions which could be numerically expressed. There were certain 'means' (μεσότητες) between each pair of them, of which the arithmetical mean (corresponding to the octave) is only one. It is the same idea of combination in fixed proportions that Dalton introduced into chemistry. Pythagoras thought it was the key of the world, and perhaps it is. He applied it among other things to the problem of the relative distances of sun, moon, and stars, which he expressed in terms of the intervals of the scale. That ideas of this kind need not be altogether futile is shown by the fact that Bode's law of the planetary distances, which is based on a similar conception, has been of use in giving a direction to astronomical research, though it has not been empirically verified, and that Mendeléeff's periodic law has actually led to the discovery of new elements. The meaning of the statement of Socrates in Plato's *Republic*,[1] that the Pythagoreans made music and astronomy sister sciences, will now be plain.

It was in medicine that the other great application of this principle was made, chiefly, it would appear, by Alcmæon of Croton. Health was regarded as the proper tuning (ἁρμονία) of the body, so that the right proportions between hot and cold, moist and dry, were preserved. Disease was just the disproportionate expansion of one of them. Alcmæon expressed this further by comparing health to the reign of equal laws (ἰσονομία), and disease to monarchy. This is the original sense of the doctrine of the 'temperaments' which played so great a part in the history of medicine; for *temperamentum* or *temperatura* is but a translation of the Pythagorean term κρᾶσις.

[1] vii. 530 D.

So far we have been dealing with those 'anticipations of nature' to which after all science owes its most striking advances, but at this point the religious teacher and mystic comes into contact with the man of science. If the sun, moon, and stars really correspond to the fourth, the fifth, and the octave, they must give forth sounds like the tuned strings of the lyre. If we do not hear these notes, that is because our souls are out of tune and do not vibrate in unison with them. This is the theory generally known by the misleading name of the 'harmony of the spheres'—an expression which is meaningless as applied to astronomy before Eudoxus. It has had a great history and inspired not only Shakespeare and Milton, but even Kepler; and it seems to give definite meaning to the precept 'Follow God.' It explains at once the remark of Aristoxenus that the Pythagoreans used medicine to purge the body and music to purge the soul. Alcmæon of Croton said the soul was immortal 'because it was like to things immortal,' and it had this likeness in virtue of its being always in motion; 'for all divine things, the moon, the sun, the stars and the whole heavens are in continuous motion.'[1] He also said that the reason men die is that 'they are not able to attach the beginning to the end,'[2] as the heavenly bodies do in their revolutions. We find the same doctrine of the circles of the heavens and the circles of the soul in Plato's *Timæus*, which is in the main a statement of the later Pythagorean doctrine, and we may infer that the saying quoted by Socrates in the *Phædo*, that 'philosophy is the highest music,' is Pythagorean too. If that is so, we have found the connecting link between Pythagorean religion and Pythagorean science. The highest purification (κάθαρσις) of all was just science, and especially mathematical science.

In the *Ode on the Nativity* Milton of course introduces the 'crystal spheres,' and in other respects gives us a later form of the doctrine. Shakespeare's statement of it is put into the mouth of Lorenzo in the fifth act of the *Merchant of Venice*. In the *Book of Homage to Shakespeare* (London, 1916) the present writer has tried to throw some light on the channels through which a knowledge of Pythagorean doctrine may have reached the England of Shakespeare's youth.

The doctrine was capable, however, of being applied in a way that Pythagoras can never have intended, and this was the chief cause of the breakdown of Pythagorism as a religion. It was only a step to say that the soul was itself an attunement (ἁρμονία) of the body, and that was fatal to the doctrine of its immortality. We are told distinctly in the *Phædo* that this tenet was maintained both by the Pythagoreans of Thebes and by those of Phlius at the end of the 5th cent., and Aristoxenus continued to maintain it even after he had become a member of the school of Aristotle. This may account for the vagueness of Philolaus on such subjects as reported by Cebes and Simmias, and it is noteworthy that Plato represents Socrates as refuting the theory on his dying day. It seems clear that the preoccupation of the Pythagoreans with medicine had led them to regard the soul more and more as a function of the body, and it has recently been ascertained that Philolaus wrote on medicine and played a considerable part in the development of that science. That was the end of the Pythagorist religion among the more enlightened members of the order, though the old practices and beliefs were continued underground, as it were, by other followers of Pythagoras, who handed them on to the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Neo-Platonists (*qq.v.*), who revivified them by bringing them into touch with the Platonic tradition. In fact Plato was the true successor of Pythagoras, whose doctrine was represented in a one-sided way by

[1] Aristotle, *de Anima*, A. 2. 405b 29.
[2] Arist. *Probl.* 916b 33.

both sects of his nominal followers. In this way scientific Pythagoreanism became merged in the Academy (*q.v.*), while religious Pythagorism had a good deal to do with the rise of Cynicism (*q.v.*).

4. Pythagorean ethics.—It would, of course, be an anachronism to speak of a Pythagorean system of ethics. The constitution of such a system was the work of the schools of Athens and, with the exception of some indications of ethical theory in the fragments of Democritus (*q.v.*), of them alone. On the other hand, it is necessary to insist that the ethics of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were based on a Pythagorean foundation, and are not fully intelligible unless we bear this in mind. It may be added that Democritus too was a pupil of the Pythagoreans and wrote a book entitled *Pythagoras*.

Being a religious community, the Pythagoreans had of course a rule of life, and it has recently been urged with great plausibility that certain hexameter verses, which are quoted at a fairly early date, and which may have been derived from the work of Timæus of Tauromenium, are actual fragments of this rule. The *Golden Verses* are spurious, of course, but they may well have been modelled on an older original. In particular, it seems certain that the members of the society had to make an examination of conscience morning and evening. They had to go over the events of the day that was past and ask themselves, 'In what have I transgressed, what have I done that I ought not to have done, and what have I left undone that I ought to have done?' It is obvious that a rule of this kind would be favourable to the rise of speculation on ethical subjects.

For the probability that there was a rule such as that described see A. Delatte, in *Revue de Philologie*, xxxiv. [1910] 175 ff. Delatte has been misled by some of his German authorities when he says that the original dialect of Pythagoreanism was Doric and that the original form of the doctrine was that things are like numbers, but he makes out a good case for the thesis that verses like πῇ παρέβην; τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δεόν οὐκ ἐτελέσθη; are really as old as the 5th cent., and formed part of a 'rule' in hexameter verse. Five verses (including the above) are quoted in Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* (40 Nauck) and give a description of the Pythagorean examination of conscience.

Now, we find that the ethical theories of Plato and Aristotle everywhere take for granted a classification of human lives into wisdom-loving, honour-loving, and gain-loving; and this is closely bound up with what is usually called the doctrine of the tripartite soul as expounded in Plato's *Republic*. It seems very difficult to doubt that it is Pythagorean, and, as a matter of fact, Posidonius[1] said that he had found the doctrine of the tripartite soul in the writings of the successors of Pythagoras. The story was that Pythagoras himself had used the word φιλόσοφος for the first time in a conversation with Leon, tyrant of Phlius or Sicyon, and it is everywhere implied in Plato that it was perfectly familiar to Socrates and his circle. 'Is not Euenus a philosopher?,' asks Socrates in the *Phædo*,[2] and the answer comes at once, 'I think so.' It seems to mean a man who holds a certain doctrine about the soul, and to have a much more specialized sense than the corresponding verb, as it is used in Herodotus. Life, Pythagoras is said to have told Leon, is like a gathering (πανήγυρις) such as that which comes together for the Olympic Games. There are three classes of visitors. The lowest are those who come to buy or sell, and next above them are those who come to compete; the best class, however, are those who come to look on (θεωρεῖν). If this is really the teaching of Pythagoras himself, we can see at once that it is the foundation of all subsequent Greek ethics, and in particular of the doctrine of the primacy of the theoretic life (lit. 'the life of the spectator'), which was held by Plato, with important reservations as to the duty of philosophers to take their turn in descending into the cave from which they had escaped (καταβατέον ἐν μέρει), and by Aristotle with no reservations at all.

[1] *Ap.* Galen, *de Hipp. et Plat.* 478.

[2] 61 C.

The importance of Pythagoreanism in connexion with the rise of Greek ethical theory has been too much neglected, as is well shown by J. L. Stocks in his paper, 'Plato and the Tripartite Soul,' published in *Mind*, no. 94, new ser., xxiv. [1915] 200 ff. Important evidence of the Pythagorean origin of these ideas is furnished by a fragment of the *Tarentines* of Alexis,[1] where some one, presumably one of the Pythagoreans who are the subject of the comedy, says: 'No man of sense could bear a grudge against us with reason, seeing that we do no wrong to our neighbours. Dost thou not know that what is called living is but a name, a euphemism for our human lot? For myself I cannot tell whether any one will say that I judge rightly or wrongly, but the view I take on reflexion is this, that all human affairs are wholly insensate, and that we that are living have as our portion merely a sojourn in a strange land (ἀποδημία), like men released for a gathering (πανήγυρις) from death and darkness to this passing of time and to this light that we behold.' The moral drawn from these considerations is that we should eat, drink, and be merry, which is not exactly Pythagorean, but the point may well have been the inconsistency between the doctrine and the practical inferences from it. That has always been a favourite subject of comedy. The verses are quoted here only to show that the idea of the πανήγυρις (Vanity Fair) and the ἀποδημία are Pythagorean.

This, then, seems to be the source of the view of life which is common, *e.g.*, to Plato's *Phædo* and bk. x. of Aristotle's *Ethics*, but there is a further side of their ethical doctrine which is derived from Pythagorean science rather than Pythagorean religion—the doctrine that goodness is the health of the soul, and that the soul's health is determined by a mean. This is generally associated with the name of Aristotle, but Aristotle got it in the main from Plato's *Philebus*, and Plato distinctly gives us to understand that it is of Pythagorean origin.[2] In this connexion it is very significant that Socrates is the chief speaker in the *Philebus*, though it is one of Plato's latest dialogues and he had for a long time given up his early custom of making Socrates the central figure. Already in the *Phædo* he makes Socrates use the doctrine that goodness is an attunement (ἁρμονία) of the soul, to refute the theory that the soul is an attunement of the body. That would land us with an attunement of an attunement, which is absurd. Socrates evidently expects the Pythagoreans to accept this explanation of goodness as an attunement at once, and that is just the meaning of the doctrine of the mean as we find it in Aristotle's *Ethics*. There is a fragment of Archytas in which he speaks of πλεονεξία and ἰσότης very much as Socrates is made to do in the *Gorgias*,[3] though it breaks off just before it comes to the point, if it ever did. But, after all, it is not a far cry from what Alcmæon says about the health of the body to the doctrine of the mean as determining the health of the soul, and it may be that this step was already taken in the Pythagorean society. In any case it is based on Pythagorean ideas, and was implicit in the teaching of Pythagoras from the first.

It is certain that Pythagoras is entitled to be called the father of science, and it becomes more and more clear that all European religion and ethics, so far as they do not originate in Palestine, can also be traced back to him. There is still a great deal of work to be done, however, before we can grasp his historical character firmly. Most recent advances in our knowledge of the subject have been due to discoveries in other fields which have thrown a quite unexpected light on Pythagoras. What is now required is a thorough examination of all the forged Pythagorean documents of later days in the light of this new knowledge. Undoubtedly they are forgeries, and there is no chance of their being rehabilitated as genuine documents. At the same time, it is clear that

[1] Pickard-Cambridge, p. 86

[2] Plato, *Philebus*, 16 C ff.

[3] Archytas, frag. 3 (Diels). Cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 508 A.

they are the work of men who knew a good deal more about Pythagoreanism than we do, and they would have had no chance of passing off their productions as genuine if they had not been careful to give them an air of verisimilitude. It is not enough to condemn them because they contain ideas and use terminology which we are accustomed to regard as Platonic or Aristotelian; for nothing is more certain than that Pythagoreanism is the basis of Athenian philosophy, and some even of Aristotle's terminology is demonstrably of Pythagorean origin. That, so far as can be seen, is the direction which research may most profitably take at present.

LITERATURE.—The older works on Pythagoras and his school are antiquated, and the time has not yet come for a new synthesis. **A. E. Chaignet**, *Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne*, 2 vols., Paris, 1873, was an attempt to apply reasonable principles of criticism to the subject, but it was premature. An intelligible historical view of the subject was first made possible by **Erwin Rohde**'s 'Die Quellen des Iamblichus in seiner Biographie des Pythagoras,' *Rheinisches Museum*, xxvi. [1871] 554 ff., xxvii. [1872] 23 ff. These made clear for the first time the position of Aristoxenus and Dicæarchus. The same writer's *Psyche*[6], Tübingen, 1910, throws much light on the subject too. The interpretation of Pythagoreanism as a system has been possible only since the publication of **Paul Tannery's** *Pour l'hist. de la science hellène*, Paris, 1887. Among the works which may be said to have issued from the school of Tannery, **G. Milhaud**, *Leçons sur les origines de la science grecque*, Paris, 1893, and *Les Philosophes-Géomètres de la Grèce*, do. 1900, deserve particular mention and may be specially recommended to those who desire a lucid exposition of the mathematical side of the doctrine. The histories of philosophy (E. Zeller, T. Gomperz, etc.) generally give a fair view of the state of the question at the time of their publication, though it must be said that German writers, to their own great loss, have done scant justice to the admirable work produced in France.

JOHN BURNET.

Q

QĀDIĀNĪ.—Qādiānī was the name originally given to the followers of Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad of Qādiān, Gurdaspur District, Panjāb, in order to distinguish them from orthodox Muslims. In 1900 they were, at their own request, entered in the Government census lists as Aḥmadīya Muslims, and they have since been called by that name. Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad (1839–1908) was a man of some learning and unusual powers of leadership. In 1889 he announced that he possessed the right to receive *baī'at* ('homage') from his followers. Two years later he declared himself to be the 'promised Messiah' of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, and the Maḥdī expected by Muslims at the last day. In asserting that he fulfilled in himself the prophecies relating to both the Messiah and the Maḥdī, he controverted the usual Muhammadan belief that the two will be distinct personalities with different missions. He said that he had come 'in the spirit and power' of Jesus and of Muhammad, and he later declared that he was greater than Jesus, since he was the Messiah of Muhammad, as Jesus was of Moses. Shortly before his death he announced that he was likewise the final incarnation (*avatāra*) of Viṣnu, whom Hindus had been expecting; and since his death his followers have added the further claim that he was 'the latter-day reformer of Parsis' and 'the Buddha of the East.'

The proofs by which he sought to establish his claims were declared to lie in revelations and miracles, the latter chiefly taking the form of prophecies of the death or discomfiture of his enemies among orthodox Muslims, Christians, and members of the Ārya Samāj. After the sinister fulfilment of one of these prophecies, in the death under suspicious circumstances of a prominent leader in the Ārya Samāj, the Mīrzā was compelled by order of the Deputy Commissioner of Gurdaspur District, dated 24th Feb. 1899, to refrain from further predictions involving the death or disgrace of another. One of the so-called miracles, which served to prepare the way for the announcement of the Mīrzā's Messianic office, was the alleged discovery, through a divine revelation, of the existence of the tomb of Jesus Christ in Srīnagar, Kashmīr. Jesus was said to have been taken down from the cross in a swoon and healed by the miraculous 'ointment of Jesus' (*marham-i-Īsa*). He then set out on a mission to 'the lost sheep of the house of Israel' in Central Asia and Kashmīr, finally dying, at the age of 120, in Kashmīr, where his tomb in time became confused with that of a local saint named Yus Asaf. No serious evidence has been brought forward in proof of this novel theory, on which the whole claim of Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad and his followers admittedly rests.

Regarding his claim to be the expected Maḥdī, the Mīrzā was constrained perhaps by political considerations to make known a revelation alleging that the Maḥdī was not to be 'a man of blood,' as had been universally supposed, but was rather to lead Islām to triumph by means of a *peaceful* holy war (*jihād*). In this connexion he made much of his loyalty to the British Government. In further substantiation of his manifold claims he pointed to the corrupt condition of modern society and of the character of the accepted priests and teachers in every religion, which called for a great reformer and prophet, like himself, to bring to all hearts a new and quickening certitude in things religious. He drew a sharp line of demarcation between his followers and orthodox Muslims by enjoining all true Aḥmadīs to refrain from following orthodox *imāms* in their prayers, attending non-Aḥmadī funeral services, and giving the hands of their daughters to non-Aḥmadī husbands, though their sons might marry non-Aḥmadī girls. He also turned his face resolutely against all political controversy, and denounced as mischievous the activities of the All-India Moslem League and the Muhammadan Educational Conference.

The movement has grown steadily since its inception in 1889. In 1896 it claimed 313 members. In the 1901 Government census 1113 males were returned for the Panjāb, 931 for the United Provinces, and 11,087 for the Bombay Presidency (obviously an inaccuracy). In 1904 the Mīrzā claimed 'more than 200,000 followers,' and before his death he estimated the total number of his followers at 500,000. Against this manifest exaggeration must be placed the returns of the census for the Panjāb in 1911, viz. 18,695 Aḥmadīs. Probably 60,000 would be a liberal estimate of the total strength of the movement throughout India to-day. There are also a few scattered followers in other countries.

Before his death in 1908 Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad appointed his close friend and early disciple, Ḥakīm Nūr al-Dīn, as his successor, the 'first *khalīfah*' of the movement. Under the direction of the *khalīfah* the work was to be carried on by a board called the Ṣadr-Anjuman-i-Aḥmadīya. During the ensuing six years, before Nūr al-Dīn's death in 1914, a schism developed within the sect. One party, led by Khwājah Kamāl al-Dīn, a

prominent barrister, began to take part in political controversy, and in its religious literature showed a leaning towards the rationalism of Sir Syed Aḥmad Khān, the founder of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Alīgarh. The other party tended to magnify the supernatural claims and unique position of Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad, and continued to emphasize the evils of present-day Islām and its priests. In short, the former wing sought to bridge the chasm separating the sect from Islām generally, whereas the latter stressed the points of difference as fundamental. When Nūr al-Dīn died, the split widened. The son of the Mīrzā, Hazrat Maḥmūd Aḥmad, now hailed as 'the promised son of the promised Messiah,' was hastily elected the second *khalifat ul-Masih* by a group of his adherents at Qādiān. The rationalistic party forthwith seceded, and founded a new society in Lahore called the Anjuman-i-isha'at-i-Islām, whose interests were vested in a group of men rather than primarily in a single individual. Two of the members of this group, Khwājah Kamāl al-Dīn and Maulvi Sadr al-Dīn, are the founders of a Muslim mission at Woking, England, through the instrumentality of which some scores of English people, including one peer, Lord Headley, have announced that they have become Muslims. A monthly paper in English, *The Islamic Review and Muslim India*, is published at Woking, and it is worthy of note that no trace of Aḥmadīya influence is to be found in it, save perhaps in the evident anti-Christian animus.

The Qādiān party continues to publish *The Review of Religions* in English, and several vernacular papers, conducts a successful high school, and carries on considerable missionary work. It can truly claim to embody the real spirit and tradition of the founder and his original followers.

J. N. Farquhar thus succinctly sums up the position and importance of Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad's teachings in relation to similar movements in India to-day:

> 'Apart from these personal claims, his teaching is an attempt to find, amidst the irresistible inrush of Western education and Christian thought, a middle path between impossible orthodoxy and the extreme rationalism of Sir Syed Aḥmad Khan' (*Modern Religious Movements in India*, p. 146).

Recent events indicate that the middle path was destined to end speedily in cross-roads.

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H. A. WALTER.

QARO.—Joseph ben Ephraim Qaro, a famous codifier of Rabbinical Judaism, was born in Spain in 1488, and died at Safed, Palestine, in 1575. On the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, which sent many scholars to other lands and diffused Rabbinical culture more widely, his parents went with him to European Turkey, settling first in Nicopolis. Here he received thorough instruction in the Talmud from his father, who was eminently qualified to be his teacher. Later he lived in Adrianople, Salonica, and Constantinople—successive steps in his long-cherished journey to Palestine, which he reached about 1535, Safed becoming his place of residence.

It was an age of mystical tendencies in Judaism, which is so inherently opposed to such influences from the earliest times. Owing undoubtedly to long periods of persecution, which reached its climax in Spain, an added stimulus was given to Kabbalistic dreamers, whose fantasies took firm hold on many susceptible minds which had lost judgment and balance under the burden of exile and wretchedness. Turkey, which opened its dominions to the oppressed, and where large and fairly prosperous communities could be found, attracted all types of Jews, the visionaries in goodly number. Safed in particular proved a seat of mystics, and Qaro's early fantasies were revived and strengthened by the new environment. He had met some years before Solomon Molcho, who strove to play the part of a Messiah and suffered death at the stake in 1532, and he gave full vent to his mystical ideas which, long cherished, were clamouring for expression. He was so far overwrought as to invoke a familiar — even in his Nicopolis days—and for fifty years he kept a diary which recorded his discussions with this imaginary genius. The book of visions, called *Maggid Mesharim*, whether actually written by him or merely ascribed to him by a zealous disciple, as occurs not rarely in literary history, makes him a double personality—a mystic as well as a codifier. Happily, and as one evidence that the diary or collection of desultory notes is not entirely genuine, the comprehensive works upon which his fame is really based show no mystical influences. Whatever his reverence for the *Zōhār* as authority for the Kabbalistic dreamer of dreams, he gave undisputed first place to the Talmud, with his logical mind, and was impelled by the needs of the times to popularize and strengthen its hold on the life and thought of Judaism. He was not the first intellectual whose imagination was to prove an incentive, not an opiate.

Qaro's fame depends chiefly on his two digests of Rabbinical law. He wrote these in an age of dispersion when in the Jews' new settlements, which were never wholly secure, the fundamental law and authority of Judaism were imperilled as much by the violent and arbitrary changes in environment as by the half-knowledge of leaders and the almost total ignorance of the people. Considering these conditions, one can understand how his passion for saving from destruction the traditional creed and customs worked upon a susceptible nature and fostered fantastic reveries as well as lofty ambitions. If he could not be a Messiah in the popular sense, he could save his people none the less by inculcating the authority and permanence of the law.

As early as 1522 in Adrianople, he began the first of his great works, *Beth Yosef*, 'House of Joseph,' which, completed in 1542 at Safed and published in 1550–59, raised him to the front rank of Talmudists of his own age or earlier. This work, while a commentary on Jacob ben Asher's *Arba'ah Ṭurim*, 'Four Orders,' whose method he closely followed, is more than a digest of the authorities cited therein. It gives a careful critical view of many Rabbinical opinions not quoted by his predecessor. Hence it furnishes an unsurpassed wealth of material. The range of reading displayed, in both Talmudic and post-Talmudic literature, together with the critical sagacity in the study and comparison of authorities, leaving little uninvestigated, gives a monumental character to the work. A sturdy independence is exhibited in the discussions, although the standard authorities, al-Fasi, Maimonides, and Asher ben Jehiel, are accepted. Qaro's aim throughout was partly to familiarize the Rabbi with the duties that devolved upon his high office as leader in Israel, and partly to explain to the student clearly and methodically how laws are developed from the Talmud through later Rabbinical literature. It was not merely to answer the Epicurean, but to stimulate to study and research, and to gain for practical life an intelligible,

harmonious system which would maintain the old faith for all time.

Not wholly satisfied with *Beth Yosef*, in later years he wrote his second great code, *Shulḥan Arûkh*, 'Prepared Table' (1565; according to Steinschneider,[1] 1555). It is possible that he underestimated its value and character, for in the introduction he speaks of having prepared it for young students, thus stamping it as elementary. He preferred the other digest in his decisions—it was for experts, for Rabbis deep in the law. Yet the *Shulḥan 'Arûkh* has rapidly outdistanced the earlier code as authority. Despite continuous controversy—in fact largely by reason of the attacks made upon it—it has become the Rabbinical code which defines Judaism to our own day in the lives and opinions of the great majority of Jews throughout the world. For almost a hundred years the contest waged—it was a bloodless battle of the books, however—the chief opposition being on the part of Talmudists who were Ashkenazim, of German stock, as contrasted with the Sephardim, or Spanish, to whom Qaro was naturally acceptable. It is the opinion of L. Ginzberg[2] that the Ashkenazim regarded the work as an unquestioned authority only after Isserles, who adduces still later views, had subjected it to criticism and extensive supplements. After the period of censure came the age of admiration, with a host of commentators that made it a household word in the 17th cent. and to our age. Its authority was firmly established, with here and there an eminent Rabbi, with a bent to individualism, who refused to recognize its guidance as binding.

Since the development of Reform Judaism and the rise of modernism in various lands there have been countless attacks on Qaro and his code. On the whole, most of these have been rather unjust; for he is not responsible for laws, opinions, and customs that have existed in Israel from grey antiquity. His function was to photograph Jewish tradition, to record and interpret it according to the authorities, so as to weld still more firmly past, present, and future. His office was not that of an apologist, but that of a codifier. Graetz[3] claims that Qaro erred in citing all opinions, however transient and trifling, and made his work a store-house of views which do not always reflect credit on Judaism and have really furnished biting texts, if perverted, for the anti-Semite. There is undoubted force in this contention, but Qaro's candour and fullness are not to be underrated. He had nothing to conceal or to extenuate. It must also be stated in his vindication that he lays no claim to absolute authority, asserts no doctrine of infallibility. Far from forging an iron bond, he rescued Jewish thought from stagnation and promoted the conflict of opinion, eminently healthful for a creed that claims to be intelligent.

The work consists of four parts, called *Oraḥ Ḥayyim*, 'Path of Life,' *Yoreh De'ah*, 'Teacher of Knowledge,' *Ḥoshen ha Mishpaṭ*, 'Breastplate of Judgment,' and *Eben ha Ezer*, 'Stone of Help.' The first deals mainly with prayer, the blessings, Sabbath and holy days, and their prescribed observances. The second concerns itself with food and its preparation, and the slaughtering of animals for food, Jew and non-Jew in their relations to each other, duties to parents and charity, religious customs connected with agriculture, and the rites of mourning—a rather extended and diversified list of contents. The third part treats of marriage and divorce from the civil and religious points of view. The fourth and concluding section discusses legal proceedings, laws as to business, and the relation of man to man in an everyday working world. All life in its variety and complexity was thus considered as part of the concern of religion. In the dark ages that were upon the Jew as the 17th and 18th centuries arrived the work preserved him from disintegration. Whether its influence was to be as salutary, with the spreading of civil and religious liberty among the nations and the gradual passing away of the Ghetto and its necessarily narrowed life, if not vision, cannot be so summarily answered. All depends upon the point of view.

Qaro's life in Safed was much influenced for a time by R. Jacob Berab, one of his most learned associates in that place. The recognized head of its Jewish community about 1535, he was the centre of a number of disciples and was called 'teacher' by Qaro. In 1538 he attempted to restore the rite of ordination, with no less an object in view than the re-establishment of the Sanhedrin in Palestine as seat of the highest authority in Israel. Qaro was elated by the idea and became one of the four disciples to be ordained without delay. Unfortunately Berab died two years later and the grandiose scheme failed to be realized. Qaro, with all his ardent leanings towards the Messianic rôle, sensibly preferred his work as teacher and author. He lived until 1575, and had the satisfaction of seeing his fame and authority more and more generally acknowledged, while hundreds of students, some of high distinction, thronged his lecture-hall to hear his opinions and interpretations.

In addition to his two codes Qaro published in his life-time *Kesef Mishneh*, 'Double Money' (Venice, 1574–75). After his death appeared *Bedek ha Bayith*, 'Repairing of the House,' supplements and corrections to his *Beth Yosef* (Salonica, 1605); *Kelale ha Talmud*, 'Principles of the Talmud' (do. 1598); *Abḳat Rokel*, 'Powder of the Merchant, Decisions' (do. 1791); *Maggid Mesharim*, 'Who preaches Righteousness' (Lublin, 1646, with supplements, Venice, 1654). Some fragments in the Bodleian, a few sermons in the collection *Oz Ẕaddiḳim*, 'The Strength of the Righteous' (Salonica, 1799), and a number of commentaries on the Mishnah and on Rashi's and Naḥmanides' Pentateuch commentaries, which seem to have disappeared, complete the list.

LITERATURE.—H. Graetz, *Gesch. der Juden*, Leipzig, 1866–78, ix., Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, iv.; S. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, 2nd ser., London, 1908, pp. 210–236; M. Gaster, 'The Origin and Sources of the Shulchan Aruch,' in *Report of Lady Judith Montefiore College*, London, 1893; L. Ginzberg, *s.v.* 'Caro,' in *JE* iii.; D. Cassel, 'Josef Karo und das Buch Maggid Mesharim,' in 6th *Jahresbericht der Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, Berlin, 1888.

A. S. ISAACS.

QUAKERISM.—See FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF.

QUEEN OF HEAVEN. — This expression occurs in the AV of Jeremiah (7^{16-20} 44^{15-30}) and seems to be the natural rendering of the Hebrew when vocalized *malkat haśśāmayim*, and is strongly supported by the versions. But the view that the expression should imply the same idea as the often mentioned 'host of heaven' apparently suggested a different derivation, from *meleket* in the sense of 'work' or 'cult,' and led to a different vocalization which influenced other versions.

The ritual as ascribed to the worshippers of the Queen of Heaven by the prophet Jeremiah lays emphasis on the offering of 'cakes.' The Jewish women made these cakes with much ceremony; the boys of the family gathered firewood, the adult males kindled the fire, and the women kneaded the dough. The offering was made 'by fire' accompanied by libations. Jeremiah alleges this to have been a common cult in the cities of Judah and the streets of Jerusalem. It may not be wise to insist too strongly on the details, as the prophet's indignation may have led him to caricature to some extent, but this and the name are all that we have by which to identify the cult.

[1] *Catalogus librorum Hebraeorum in Bibliotheca Bodleiana*, Berlin, [illegible] 1852–60.

[2] *JE* [illegible]

[3] *Hist. of the Jews*, iv. 652.

The cakes, *kawwanim*, which the LXX transcribes and the Vulgate renders *placenta*, are not without parallel in Greek cults. But it is precarious to argue as to their form or significance from such parallels. The name is literally the same as the Babylonian *kamānu*, denoting the cakes or biscuits used in the cult of Ishtar. Whether the reference to fire in the word *kiṭṭer* demands burning of the cakes in the act of offering or refers to the process of their manufacture is not easily decided; but it can hardly mean to burn incense as an accompaniment of the offering.

The difficulty felt in identifying this expression as a name of Ishtar is largely due to the fact that, while Ishtar is frequently called *belit šamê* or *šarrat šamê*, 'lady *or* queen of heaven,' *malkat šamê* has not yet been found as her epithet. That *malkatu* is an equivalent of *šarratu* cannot be denied, but the question remains open whether we have in this worship a mere transfer of a Babylonian cult of Venus or a local variation of the same. The Tammuz worship which Ezekiel mentions (8[14]) makes it likely that we have to do with a Venus cult here. On the other hand, a connexion of *meleket* with the configuration of the sky would agree with the astral theory. The form is difficult to account for as a Hebrew word, but would be correct as a transliteration of the Babylonian; only this supposed Babylonian prototype is not yet authenticated. Still the cakes are very suggestive.

There is nothing to suggest an identification of the Queen of Heaven with the moon, which is a male deity in the Semitic world.

LITERATURE.—*EBi* and *HDB*, *s.v.*; *KAT*[3], p. 441 ff. and *passim*; A. Jeremias, *The Old Testament in the Light of the Ancient East*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, i. 60, 98 f., 118 f., ii. 232, and *passim*; S. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, Oxford, 1914, pp. 71, 94.

C. H. W. JOHNS.

QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA.—See MILINDA.

QUICHES.—See MAYANS, POPOL VUH.

QUIETISM.—Quietism may be defined as the exaggeration and perversion of the mystical doctrine of interior quiet. Viewed as a tendency, it is co-extensive with the history of mysticism (*q.v.*), and it might successfully be argued that some early and mediæval mystics were more definitely 'Quietistic' than most of the members of the post-Reformation group known as Quietist. Viewed as a specific movement, Quietism swept over the religious life of Europe in the latter part of the 17th and the early part of the 18th cent., gaining sway in many countries and taking deep root within both Catholicism and Protestantism.

I. *DOCTRINES.*—**1. Passivity.**—On the surface it is not easy to distinguish between the Quietist doctrine of passivity and the 'orthodox' mystical doctrine of quiet, and we find so competent an authority as Heppe asserting that the teaching of Molinos was substantially identical with that of St. Teresa;[1] but it might with more justice be asserted that the characteristic doctrines of Molinos are traceable, not to his appropriation of St. Teresa's doctrine of the orison of quiet, but to his deflexions from it.

(*a*) *St. Teresa.*—For St. Teresa, as for the mediæval mystics, the state of quiet is that 'busy rest' in which the soul abandons all superficial activity in order that it may engage in the deeper activity of opening itself to God. It contains of necessity a passive element, for the soul that would hold the Divine Word as a shell holds the ocean must be self-emptied and set a watch upon its undisciplined impulses even when they urge it towards the divine. But such 'wise passiveness' does not exclude the active aspect of 'stretching' towards God. Its stillness—to use the fine simile of D. A. Baker,[1] the Benedictine mystic—is the stillness of the soaring eagle, which cleaves its way through the blue with motionless wings. It is 'the rest [that] springs . . . from an unusually large amount of actualized energy,' the rest that 'is produced by Action "unperceived because so fleet," so near, so all fulfilling.'[2] Moreover, such mystic quiet is not an end, but a means—not a goal, but 'like the repose of a traveller who, within sight of the goal, stops to take breath and then continues with new strength upon his way.'[3]

(*b*) *Molinos.*—When we turn from St. Teresa to Molinos, we find that, while the latter, in his *Guida Spirituale*, says much about interior quiet that is in complete accord with the conceptions of classic mysticism, the main trend and ultimate teaching of the book is Quietistic; *i.e.*, the quiet for which he contends is in the last resort the negative, impassive, sterile state which Ruysbroeck[4] castigated so severely in its earlier manifestations. In common with most mystical writers, Molinos distinguishes between meditation, in which the reason is active and the mind occupied with definite aspects of Christian faith and life, and contemplation, which may be defined as an absorbed, loving intuition of divine things, a direct spiritual apprehension of God and adhesion to Him.

To quote St. Thomas Aquinas,[5] as epitomized by Luis de la Puente, contemplation is 'a simple view of eternal truth without variety of reasoning, penetrating it by the light of heaven with great affections of admiration and love at which ordinarily no man arrives but by much exercise of meditation and discourse (*i.e.*, reasoning, or analysis and synthesis).'[6]

But, while the great mystics insist that pure contemplation is of necessity incomplete and intermittent and that, while discursive reasoning is suspended, the intellect (higher reason) is present and active,[7] Molinos demands a Stoic ataraxy in which intellect as well as feeling is uncompromisingly renounced:

'Inner Solitude consists . . . in a perfect abnegation of all purpose, desire, thought and will. . . . For if the Soul does not detach herself from her own appetite and desire, from her own will, from spiritual gifts and from repose, even in spiritual things, she never can attain to this high felicity. . . .[8] Undeceive thyself, and believe that if thy Soul is to be wholly united to God, she must lose her self and renounce life, feeling, knowledge and power; whether living or not living, dying or not dying, suffering or not suffering; without thought, or reflection. . . .[9] Their lives [*i.e.* the lives of true contemplatives] are so detached, that although they continually receive many supernatural Graces, yet they are not changed nor affected thereby, being just as if they had not received them, keeping always in the inmost of their Hearts a great lowliness and self-contempt dwelling humbly in the abyss of their own unworthiness and vileness. In the same way they are always quiet, serene and even-minded in Graces and in extraordinary favours as also in the most rigorous and bitter torments. No news causes them to rejoice, no event saddens them. Consider nothing, desire nothing, will nothing, endeavour after nothing, and then in everything thy Soul will live reposed in quiet and enjoyment.'[10]

(*c*) *Madame Guyon.*—In the writings of Madame Guyon the same tendency is traceable, though in a logically undeveloped form. The highly emotional character of her work and its loose and inconsistent use of language make it difficult to determine the precise extent of her Quietistic convictions. While emphasizing the active element in the orison of quiet,[11] her writings abound in passages which can be construed only in an explicitly Quietistic sense.

[1] H. Heppe, *Gesch. der quietistischen Mystik*, p. 21. W. R. Inge takes the same view (*Christian Mysticism*, London, 1899, p. 231).

[1] *Sancta Sophia*, Douai, 1657, Eng. tr., London, 1908, treatise iii. § iii. ch. vii.

[2] F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, ii. 132.

[3] St. Teresa, *The Way of Perfection*, ch. xxxiii.

[4] *Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage*, bk. ii. ch. lxvi. f.

[5] *Summa Theol.* II. ii. qu. clxxx.

[6] L. de la Puente, *Meditations*, Eng. tr., London, 1852–54, i., Introd. p. 53.

[7] When, *e.g.*, St. Teresa uses the expression 'the silence of the understanding,' she refers to the cessation of what she calls 'the eliciting from one subject many thoughts or reflections' (*Life of St. Teresa*, tr. David Lewis, London, 1870, ch. xiii. p. 32).

[8] *Guida Spirituale*, III. xii. 119, 126.

[9] *Ib.* III. vii. 71.

[10] *Guida Spirituale*, III. i. 5.

[11] *Le Moyen court*, ch. xxi.

'My prayer from this moment was without forms, ideas and images [*i.e.* of any definite thoughts]. . . . All distinctions were lost to give room for more expansion without motives or reasons for loving. That sovereign of the powers—the will—swallowed up the two others and took from them every distinct object to unite them the better in it.'[1] 'The killing pain which one feels when one loses the definite consciousness of the Divine Presence shows that one has not yet become perfectly *indifferent* and that one is still tied to *gifts* of God.'[2] 'I had no more a will to submit; it had, as it were, disappeared, or rather passed into another Will. It seemed to me that this powerful and strong One did all that pleased Him, and I no more found that soul which He formerly conducted by His crook and staff with an extreme love. He appeared to me alone and *as if the soul had given place to Him or rather had passed into Him, henceforth to become only one same thing with Him.*'[3]

This losing of the soul in transcending the state in which it is shepherded by the divine love marks the extreme of Quietistic theory, and, while Madame Guyon's language cannot be pressed too far, its general tendency is unmistakable.

(*d*) *Fénelon.*—In Fénelon Quietism found its apologist. His *Maxims of the Saints* was written with the express purpose of defending Quietism against the popular charges of 'idle basking in the Divine Presence' and of immoral apathy. It is all the more significant that, in the very act of seeking to distinguish between true mysticism and Quietism, he moves in that atmosphere of negation and abstraction which is the logical presupposition of Quietism in its most extreme and exaggerated form.

'Pure contemplation,' he says, 'is negative, being occupied with no sensible image, no distinct and nameable idea; it stops only at the purely intellectual and abstract idea of Being.'[4]

That he makes this idea include as distinct objects all the attributes of God, the Trinity, the humanity of Christ, and all His mysteries is only one instance of the contradictions which make his work of comparatively little value as an authoritative contribution to the literature of Quietism.

2. The one act.—In close logical connexion with the Quietistic conception of passivity as a negative and abstract state is the doctrine that the soul's surrender to God is made once for all in an act not to be repeated. Molinos is emphatic in his assertion that the soul that has once made the great surrender to God 'by means of the act of pure Faith' remains in an indefectible state of union with God.

He contends that the soul 'may persevere in prayer though the imagination be carried about with various and involuntary thoughts.'[5] For, according to Quietist doctrine, 'Faith and Intention are sufficient, and these always continue . . . nay, the more simple is that remembrance, without words or thoughts, the more is it pure, spiritual, internal and worthy of God. So that so long as thou retractest not that Faith and Intention of being resigned, thou walkest always in Faith and Resignation, and consequently in Prayer, and in virtual and acquired Contemplation, although thou perceive it not and remember it not, neither makest new acts and reflections.'[6]

3. Pure or disinterested love.—The doctrine of a continuous and 'habitual' state (as distinct from occasional aspirations, which Roman Catholic theology has always counted among the highest exercises of the soul) of loving God purely (*i.e. secundum Se*, without hope of reward or dread of punishment or any regard to even His most spiritual gifts) attained special prominence through the famous controversy upon the subject between Bossuet and Fénelon. Bossuet's point of view is summed up in his extraordinary assertion:

'Pure love is opposed to the essence of love, which always desires the enjoyment of its object, as well as to the nature of man, who necessarily desires happiness.'

Against this view Fénelon urges that a selfish or mercenary love is obviously a contradiction in terms. This is, of course, the normal Christian view, but Fénelon passes beyond it to an explicitly Quietistic interpretation.

He declares that 'a man's self is his own greatest cross. . . . Uncompromising renunciation of this wretched self—that is the true crucifying of the flesh.'[1] He goes so far as to say that 'all generosity, all natural affection, is only self-love of a more subtle, delusive . . . and diabolical quality. One must wholly die to all friendship.'[2]

Love, he contends, loves no particular thing or object and asks for no return, even in kind. His definition of sanctification, as a state of holy indifference and utter non-desire, applies equally to his conception of disinterested love. And, while he seeks to guard against the Quietist error by insisting with St. Paul that hope, as well as love, must abide, his whole teaching implies an indifference to salvation which robs the term 'hope' of every true meaning. Conceived with greater mental stability and expressed with more caution, his position is ultimately very much the same as that of Madame Guyon when she declares that the soul must become dead to all desire, even to its desires for spiritual gifts and graces and for salvation itself, and that it must learn to love God and prove its love by the utmost self-sacrifice and devotion, without being concerned whether He cares or responds.[3] The whole trend of his teaching is towards a Stoical or Buddhistic conception of self-renunciation and non-desire which logically excludes love of any kind, whether 'pure' or interested.

4. Summary.—The Quietistic doctrine of passive contemplation, of which the doctrines of the one act and of disinterested love are corollaries, is based upon the Neo-Platonic *via negativa*, which from Dionysius onwards took an Asiatic rather than a Greek form, representing 'a sense of the divine transcendence run riot.'

Molinos appeals to Dionysius in teaching that 'we know God more perfectly by negatives than by affirmatives. We think more loftily of God by knowing that He is incomprehensible than by conceiving Him under any image.'[4]

But, while the roots of 17th cent. Quietism are struck deep in metaphysical soil, it must be borne in mind that the controlling motive of post-Reformation mysticism in general and of Quietism in particular was not metaphysical, but theological. Seventeenth century Quietism is the mystical expression of the doctrine of the total depravity and helplessness of human nature, which Protestant theology and the counter-Reformation had sharpened to a despairing conviction of 'the utter miserabilism of the "creature."' Fénelon expresses this conviction in characteristic fashion:

'As the sacristan at the end of the service snuffs out the altar candles one after another, so must grace put out our natural life; and as his extinguisher, ill applied, leaves behind it a guttering spark that melts the wax, so will it be with us if one single spark of natural life remains.'[5]

It is abundantly clear that such a sentiment is derived from Augustine rather than from Dionysius, to whom any counsel to abhor the self that is God's temple was entirely foreign. Moreover, while the 'nothingness' of Dionysius refers to that 'divine dark' in which the soul perceives and apprehends the ineffable, the nothingness of Molinos is a nothingness of the soul itself, and amounts to annihilation of all that is capable of union with God in any real sense. None the less we may see in Quietism the negative method, stimulated to its 'dying spasm'[6] by Reformation influences. Its exaltation of an empty consciousness—an experience without differentiations in which distinction of actions vanishes[7] and the soul can neither will nor not will—paralyzes morality.

[1] *Autobiography*, tr. T. T. Allen, 2 vols., London, 1897, pt. i. ch. viii.
[2] In a letter to Fénelon (M. Masson, *Fénelon et Madame Guyon*, letter xx.)
[3] *Autobiography*, pt. i. ch. xxviii.
[4] *Maxims of the Saints*, p. xxvii.
[5] *Guida Spirituale*, i. xiv. 99, 103. [6] *Ib.* i. xiv. 103, 105.

[1] Letter to Madame de Maintenon (*Correspondance*, Paris, 1827-29, v. 466).
[2] *Ib.* [3] *Les Torrents spirituels*, ch. v. sect. 10.
[4] *Guida Spirituale*, preface, § 8.
[5] *Spiritual Letters*, cxiii. [6] Inge, p. 238.
[7] Madame Guyon, *Les Torrents spirituels*, ch. ix. sect. 74.

It resolves religion at its highest into an experience in which the soul is translated to a region 'beyond good and evil,' and so cuts the nerve of morality, which always implies a clear vision of the distinction between good and evil and a definite choice in which the whole personality is active. In its consistently logical form Quietism makes communion between man and God an impossibility by annulling the distinction between them, ultimately reducing God to a vague and empty abstraction, and dehumanizing man. Its radical acosmism 'conceives the Good outside of humanity and removes conduct to a sphere of fictitious interests where the will cannot act.'[1] Although Christian Quietists have always to a greater or less extent formulated their doctrines in terms of Jesus Christ and His gospel, Quietism *per se* is fundamentally opposed to incarnational religion. On the practical and devotional side, it resolves itself into pure fanaticism, *i.e.* 'the fanaticism of expecting from God a grace which He never gives.'[2] Its determining motive—the desire to cleanse religion from selfishness and to emphasize an inwardness which seeks the Giver above even His most precious and purely spiritual gifts—is a valid one. While the antithesis between gift and giver as applied to God is largely false, and rests upon a conception of 'grace' which externalizes it into something 'given' by God and separable from His self-giving, Quietism represents a genuine and still much-needed protest against a theology which debases grace to a form of magic and imports the crassest self-interest into the soul's commerce with God.

II. *HISTORY.*—The term 'Quietist' was first used in the 14th cent., when its Greek form, *Hesychastai*, was applied to a certain community of monks on Mount Athos who, *inter alia*, indulged in trance-experiences not unlike those of the Indian Yogi. Quietistic teaching was first popularized by the Beghards and the Brethren of the Free Spirit (*q.v.*). Condemned by the Council of Vienna in 1311 and sorely persecuted, these mystical groups persisted for more than a century and familiarized the common people with Quietistic conceptions of religion. Eckhart was included in the ecclesiastical disapproval of Quietism, Pope John XXII. condemning his views on interior quiet in 1329; and the castigations of Quietism in the writings of Ruysbroeck and Tauler show how wide-spread the doctrine was and how disastrous in its extreme and debased forms. It must be borne in mind, however, that the primary motive of the official opposition to Quietism was ecclesiastical rather than religious. The Church authorities recognized its anti-institutional character, and no expedient was deemed too cruel or too mean, provided it bade fair to secure the extinction of Quietist sects.

But, while large tracts of pre-Reformation and counter-Reformation mysticism admit of a Quietistic interpretation, it needed the impulse of a mighty religious movement to develop the implications of what were, after all, only latent or sporadic tendencies. Such an impulse was provided by the new religious spirit, the new demand for inwardness, which found expression in the Reformation (*q.v.*). The 17th cent. Quietists were, for the most part, devoted Roman Catholics and derived their immediate inspiration and authority from the great mystics of the counter-Reformation, one of whom at least, St. John of the Cross, was more radically anti-institutional than Molinos himself. Yet they were essentially a fruit of the Protestant spirit—a fact which Rome was swift to discern.

While by common consent Quietism, in the strictest sense of the term, is taken to begin with Molinos, the first half of the 17th cent. already exhibits individuals and groups representing strongly Quietistic convictions. Prominent among such were the Spanish mystic, Juan Falconi (1596–1638), who attracted a large following, and whose *Alfabeto et Lettera* prepared the way for the *Guida Spirituale*; Marie de l'Incarnation (1599–1672), an Ursuline of Tours, afterwards of Quebec, whom Bossuet called 'the St. Teresa of our times and of the New World';[1] the saintly layman, Jean de Bernières Lovigny (1602–59), Treasurer of France and greatly admired by Fénelon; the influential writer, Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin, first Chancellor of the Académie Française (1595–1676); the profound but often fanciful secular priest, Henri Marie Boudon (1624–1702); the gifted ascetical writer, Jean-Joseph Surin (1600–65), formally approved by Bossuet; and many others. The Pelagini (a society called after its founder, Giacomo Filippo di Santa Pelagia, a layman of Milan) were largely a recrudescence of the 16th cent. group of the Alombrados or Illuminati, which had been crushed out by the Inquisition for holding that one could dispense with the ordinances and ignore the requirements of the Church. That there was a vigorous Quietistic movement in France at least twenty years before the term 'Quietist' was first applied to the followers of Molinos in 1681 is shown by Nicole's rare book, *Les Imaginaires et les visionnaires*—an attack on the 'new heresies,' published as early as 1667.

When, in 1675, **Miguel de Molinos** published his *Guida Spirituale*, Juan Falconi's *Alfabeto et Lettera* had prepared thousands of earnest souls in Spain, Italy, and France to welcome the new doctrine. Born in Saragossa in 1640, Molinos took the degree of Doctor of Theology at Coimbra and migrated to Rome in 1669 or 1670. His piety, learning, and sympathetic personality soon made him one of the most sought-after spiritual directors and a noted figure in Roman society. Among his friends were many of the cardinals, including Cardinal Benedict Odescalchi, afterwards Pope Innocent XI., who sanctioned his position as the most esteemed confessor in Rome by giving him lodgings in the Vatican. Cardinal D'Estrée, the representative of Louis XIV., also approved of him in those days, and, when his *Guida Spirituale* appeared, it bore the approbation of various distinguished ecclesiastics, among them four inquisitors. Priests advised their penitents to discard formal prayers and devotions for the simple method of Molinos; societies for the study of this method were formed everywhere, and within six years the *Guida Spirituale* had passed through twenty editions in Italian, Spanish, French, and Latin. But soon the Jesuits realized that a method of prayer which deprecated Masses and formal devotions was contrary to the interests of the Church. Father Paul Segneri, one of their ablest and most popular preachers, was selected to confute Molinos. He did so in a small book entitled *Concordia tra la Fatica e la Quiete nell' Oratione* ('The Harmony between Effort and Quiet in Prayer'), which was published five years after the *Guida Spirituale*. But so firmly was Molinos entrenched in popular favour that Segneri, hitherto the idol of the people, was overwhelmed with scorn and denunciation, and there is reason to believe that even his life was in danger. A commission was convened in 1682 to inquire into the writings of Segneri and Molinos, as well as into a book entitled *La Contemplazione Mystica Acquistata*,

[1] E. Récéjac, *Essay on the Bases of the Mystic Knowledge*, Eng. tr., London, 1899, p. 218.

[2] J. C. Hedley, 'Prayer and Contemplation,' *Dublin Review*, xxvii. [1876] 337.

[1] *Etats d'oraison*, bk. xix. 3.

written by the saintly Cardinal Petrucci, a loyal friend of Molinos. As a result Segneri's book was condemned, Petrucci was made Bishop of Jesi, and the teaching of Molinos was triumphantly vindicated. The Jesuits, however, were determined to gain the victory, and, seeing that the Vatican protected Molinos, they appealed to Cæsar in the shape of King Louis XIV. Through his confessor, Père La Chaise, they roused the apprehensions of the king, and induced him to bring pressure to bear upon the pope. Innocent XI. was induced to refer the matter once more to the Inquisition, and this decided the fate of Quietism within the Roman Church. Molinos and Petrucci were summoned before the Inquisition in 1685, and the former was cast into prison; but it was not until two years after, when the popular indignation against his imprisonment had spent itself, that the Jesuits determined to strike. In 1687 about 200 persons, including many members of the aristocracy and some priests, were arrested and imprisoned. A commission of inquiry regarding Quietism in monastic houses resulted in the discovery that many monks and nuns had exchanged the prescribed devotions of the Church for the 'Prayer of Quiet.' A panic was created among the orthodox. Molinos was formally charged, on the ground of 68 propositions, extracted partly from his writings, partly from the declarations of his followers, with grave errors in doctrine and serious offences against decency and morality. He was also stated to have himself confessed having committed improper acts, and the populace that had once idolized him now clamoured for his execution. In the end it was announced that he had confessed his sins and was willing to abjure his heresies, in consideration of which he had been sentenced to life-long imprisonment. The recantation took place with all the pomp of ecclesiastical procedure. Nothing more is known of the fate of Molinos except that he died in prison in 1697. His books and papers were burnt; persons known to have been attached to him or in sympathy with his teaching were hunted down throughout Spain and Italy; and all writings of a Quietistic character were rigorously suppressed. Among those who fell victims to this relentless persecution was the blind mystic of Marseilles, François Malaval, whose *La Pratique de la vie vraie: théologie mystique* was first published in 1670.

In France the drama of Quietism played itself out in an atmosphere of political intrigue and personal animosity. Its central figure was **Madame Guyon.** Born at Montargis in 1648, Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la Motte Guyon showed an early bent towards mysticism and asceticism, and as a child desired to enter the Order of the Visitation. Her parents had other plans for her, however, and in 1662 she was married to Jacques Guyon, Seigneur de Chesney, a wealthy man, twenty-two years her senior. It was, as might have been expected, an exceedingly unhappy marriage, sorely aggravated by the petty tyranny of a malignant mother-in-law, and the highly-strung girl turned more passionately than ever to the spiritual world. She had no difficulty in finding guides and helpers in her search for the inward way to God, since the France of her day abounded in souls of a genuinely mystical type; and, at the age of twenty, the words of an obscure young Franciscan to whom she turned in her need and who bade her seek God within her own heart finally started her on her spiritual pilgrimage. Her mystical experience was exceptionally sharply defined, falling into three distinct stages. The first was marked by an almost overwhelming influx of the Divine Presence, 'without word, thought or image,' which awoke in her soul a fierce joy of possession. This was succeeded by a period of dryness and dereliction, during which outward troubles as well as inward trials increased. Her father, husband, and daughter died in quick succession; her son turned against her; small-pox destroyed her beauty, and was followed by one disease after another. But suddenly, in 1680, her 'obscure night of the soul' gave place to a 'unitive' state, in which she recovered all the joy that she had lost, and experienced in addition a sense of infinite freedom—a new 'God-me' taking the place of the old 'self-me.' This state was entered upon under the influence of a Barnabite monk, Francis La Combe, superior of the Barnabite Order at Thonon, who proved to be her evil genius. A man of quite mediocre mentality, deficient in moral sense, and of an unstable, neurotic temperament, he yet succeeded in exercising a hypnotic influence upon her. It was during the La Combe period that her two most original books were written—*Les Torrents spirituels*, composed largely in a state of automatism, and *Le Moyen court et très facile de faire oraison*—books which are characterized by profound spiritual insight, but which none the less exhibit some of the fatal weaknesses and extravagances of Quietistic piety. Her consciousness of an apostolic mission to found an 'interior' Church and inaugurate a world-wide spiritual reformation also dates from this period. Taking the form of a sense of spiritual 'fecundity' or 'maternity' involving much suffering ('I can bring forth children only on the cross'), it was accompanied by certain unpleasant hysterical and neurotic symptoms which brought constant ridicule and persecution upon her.

In 1681 it seemed as if she had found her vocation as the head of the newly-founded community of Les Nouvelles Catholiques at Gex—an institution for the training of the daughters of Protestants and other converts to the Catholic faith. But the work proved uncongenial, and it was not long before she abandoned it, taking refuge with the Ursulines of Thonon. From 1681 to 1688 her fortunes were closely intertwined with those of La Combe, who, in the autumn of 1687, accompanied her to Paris, only to be arrested on his arrival by order of the archbishop as an alleged follower of the ill-starred Molinos. Madame Guyon herself was arrested in the following January, but was released after eight months, thanks to the influence of Madame de Maintenon, who was profoundly impressed by her piety. As the *protégée* of Madame de Maintenon, she soon became a prominent figure in the inner spiritual circle of the court of Louis XIV. It was at this time that she first met Fénelon.

François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon was at that time a rising young ecclesiastic with a growing reputation as a director of consciences whose spiritual genius, religious fervour, and magnetic personality attracted the *belles âmes* of Paris. He was superior of the society of Les Nouvelles Catholiques, in which capacity he wrote his manual *De l'Éducation des filles* (Paris, 1687), and had been on a six months' mission to the Protestants of Poitou, which he conducted with characteristic tolerance. In Madame Guyon he saw not merely a woman of commanding gifts, but also a saint, and his championship of her cause was wholehearted and generous. She, on her part, recognized in him the spiritual 'child' of her dreams, and the extraordinary correspondence which passed between them bears witness to what Rufus M. Jones describes as 'a subtle conquest,'[1] designated by Madame Guyon herself as 'spiritual filiation,' and abounding on her side in neurotic features. Fénelon was the cool and cautious partner in this intense relationship. His pastoral instinct and

[1] *Harvard Theological Review*, x. 41.

sound sense warned him against a spiritual condition which took its own impulses for divine movings, and he never allowed himself to forfeit reason or judgment in his admiration of Madame Guyon's spiritual genius.

In 1689 Fénelon was appointed tutor to the young duke of Burgundy, for whom he subsequently wrote *Les Aventures de Télémaque* (Paris, 1699). His success as an educator of princes brought him into high favour at court, and in 1695 he was made archbishop of Cambrai. Meanwhile, in 1693–94, the storm which had been gathering round Madame Guyon broke, and involved Fénelon in a bitter and ignoble conflict which ultimately drove him into exile. Madame Guyon's doctrines had penetrated to Madame de Maintenon's school at Saint Cyr, and this roused the suspicions of Bossuet.[1] He subjected her to a stringent examination, extending over six months and ending in her imprisonment as a heretic. Fénelon never saw her again, and he might easily have extricated himself from a very difficult and perilous position had he consented to join in signing her condemnation. This he refused to do—a refusal which lost him his many influential friends, including Madame de Maintenon.

There ensued the stormy controversy between Bossuet and Fénelon which stirred all France. In his *États d'oraison* Bossuet had condemned 'pure' faith (*i.e.* faith without content), disinterested love, and the prayer of quiet. Fénelon replied by publishing his famous *Explication des maximes des saints sur la vie intérieure*, in which he restated Madame Guyon's fundamental convictions in a more sober and cautious way. The book, which, in spite of its dry, guarded, and not always lucid manner, teaches Quietistic mysticism in an extreme and extravagant form, created intense excitement, and divided France into two opposing camps. Bossuet attacked its author with a personal animosity which amounted to persecution, and the court ranged itself on his side. Although Fénelon had the support of the Jesuits and the secret approval of the king's confessor, the clergy sided solidly with Bossuet, and in the end Fénelon was ordered to leave Versailles and banished to Cambrai. He appealed to Rome and, after long hesitation, the mild and cautious Pope Innocent VIII., impelled by urgent pressure on the part of the king and Bossuet, condemned as erroneous certain propositions extracted from the *Maximes*. Fénelon spent the remaining eighteen years of his life quietly in his diocese, devoting himself to the welfare of priests and people alike, and dying at the age of sixty-three, greatly beloved and lamented.

Madame Guyon suffered successive terms of imprisonment, and, after being liberated from her last prison in the Bastille in 1703, passed her remaining years in quiet seclusion at Blois, where she died in 1717.

Among the minor prophets of Quietism **Antoinette Bourignon** (1616–80) occupies a distinctive place. Born at Lille, she was, like Madame Guyon, a precocious child with an abnormally developed religious instinct. As a girl she wished to become a Carmelite, but was soon disillusioned regarding cloistral religion and set herself to find a better way of retirement from the world. When, in 1636, her father tried to force her into marriage, she escaped from home in male disguise. After some curious adventures she was brought back, but finally fled to Mons, where she placed herself under the protection of the archbishop, and under his patronage made a short-lived attempt to establish an ascetic community on primitive lines. On the death of her father she brought a successful lawsuit against her step-mother, securing his entire property for herself. About this time she fell in with a decidedly questionable admirer of mystical religion, Jean de Saint Saulieu, who induced her to found an orphan home for girls, which she subsequently placed under Augustinian rule. The experiment came to an abrupt end in 1662, when she was accused of gross cruelty to her young charges and had to take flight. Her enforced wanderings took her to Mechlin, where she found her first 'spiritual child,' Christian de Cort, superior of the Oratorians. By this time she had developed her system (if such it can be called), which embodied the characteristic features of extreme Quietism in a fantastically exaggerated form. As in the case of Madame Guyon, 'spiritual maternity' occupied a central place in her consciousness. She was 'the woman clothed with the sun,' 'the bride of the Holy Ghost,' God's chosen vessel who would restore 'the Gospel spirit' to the world, 'the virgin who would bear many sons' and found a communistic, priestless brotherhood.

In 1662 she went with de Cort to Amsterdam, where she spent a period of happy intercourse with the many heretics who had made that city their Cave of Adullam. An attempt, inspired by de Cort, to found a community house for her spiritual children on the island of Nordstrand in the North Frisian Sea, and the long series of difficulties and complications to which it gave birth, occupied the rest of her stormy life. The mad scheme involved de Cort in financial difficulties from which only a premature death—in prison—released him, and embittered her remaining years. Her capricious, overbearing, stingy disposition and her entire impracticability involved her in endless legal proceedings, and finally forced her to flee once more. A few years later a printing-press which she had set up at Husum brought her into conflict with the authorities and revived the flame of persecution. For a time it seemed as if she had found a refuge with another of her spiritual sons, the eccentric Colonel La Coste. But a miserable quarrel led to his formally accusing her of sorcery in 1679, and once more she had to flee to escape arrest. She remained in hiding until her death in the following year. Her voluminous writings, which she professed to have 'received' inwardly by inspiration, abound in fantastic and neurotic elements, yet she exercised a remarkable influence over minds finer than her own, among them Comenius and Jean de Labadie. Indeed, her extraordinary influence extended to almost every land and continued long after her death. In Scotland especially she had so many followers among the clergy that from 1711 until recently 'Bourignonism' was included in the list of heresies which candidates for ordination in the Church of Scotland were required formally to forswear.

Among those who represented the practical and devotional aspect of Quietism as it appealed to the unlearned, **Nicolas Herman of Lorraine** (Brother Lawrence) is the classic example. Born about 1610, he was first a soldier, then a gentleman's servant, and finally a lay brother in a Carmelite monastery, where he was charged with the humble duties of the kitchen. His *Practice of the Presence of God*, as set forth in his letters, which is to-day among the best-known devotional books, expounds the central doctrines of Quietism with a winsome simplicity and a rare degree of practical wisdom. His *Maxims* give further instruction to those who would realize the presence of God along the same homely and wise lines. He died in 1691.

[1] La Combe, whose mind had gradually given way under imprisonment, had confessed to improper relations with Madame Guyon, but the very careful investigations made by Bossuet and his fellow-inquisitors could show no ground for questioning her moral integrity.

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QUR'ĀN (Koran, Alkoran, etc.).—**I. Names.**—The names of this, the sacred book of the Muslims, are reckoned at fifty-five, of which the most familiar and the most frequently used in the book itself, *al-Qur'ān*, seems to mean 'The Lesson,' being the abstract noun of the verb *qaraa*, 'to read,' 'to recite,' occasionally employed in the original sense.

E.g., lxxv. 17: 'Verily upon us is the collecting and the reading (*qur'ān*) thereof; and when we read it, follow thou the reading (*qur'ān*) thereof'; xxviii. 85: 'He who enjoined on thee the reading'; x. 62: 'Thou dost not recite any reading thereof,' where the word *qur'ān* is used as the verbal noun of the synonymous verb *talā*, 'to read.'

The word is normal in formation (cf. *kufran*, *ghufran*, *rujḥan*), and is not borrowed from any other language, though it may be an imitation of the Hebrew *miqrā*, applied by the Jews to the Bible, of which the Arabic analogue *maqra'* is occasionally used for 'reading.'[1] Other etymologies are collected by Suyūṭī (see below), but they are fanciful, though it is worthy of note that a grammarian of eminence pronounced the word *quran* as though the root were *qrn*, 'to associate'; and his interpretation 'collection' is at least suggested by lxxv. 17 (cited above). The word is not used by Muslims except of their sacred book, but Jews and Christians sometimes employ it as a designation of their Bible. Almost as familiar is the name *Muṣḥaf*, which is said to have been invented by the Khalifah Abu Bakr, and is evidently the Ethiopic for 'book.' The word *kitāb* (Arabic for 'book') is often used as a name of the Qur'ān in the work itself and in the principles of jurisprudence, but ordinarily requires some eulogistic epithet (*e.g.*, 'the perspicuous book'). Both this word and *Qur'ān* can be used of separate texts as well as of the whole. The name *Mufaṣṣal* is applied to the last seventh of the Qur'ān, but, as it repeatedly described itself as a book 'whose texts are distinct' (*fuṣṣilat*), there seems no reason why it should not be applied to the whole work;[2] and indeed there are various opinions as to the portion of which this name may be used.[3] The etymology of the name *Furqan* in xvii. 107, 'A Qur'ān, which we have divided up (*faraqnāhu*) that thou mightest recite it unto the people leisurely,' is probably correct, this name being more properly applied to a book supposed to have been revealed to Moses and Aaron, Hebrew *peraqim*, *i.e.* 'sections'; but this particular form is Syriac and means 'deliverance'—a sense which it sometimes has in the Qur'ān. The Hebrew *Mishnah* (Aram. *Mathnitha*) seems to underlie the name *Mathānī*, said to be the plural of *mathnāt*, which appears to be used of the whole Qur'ān in xxxix. 24, whereas in xv. 87 the Deity states that He has given the Prophet seven *mathānī* and the mighty Qur'ān. The interpretations of this passage are very numerous and divergent, as may be seen from Lane, p. 300. Other names are descriptive or eulogistic—*e.g.*, 'The Guidance,' 'The Wise Record,' 'The Revelation.'

The chapters of the Qur'ān are called by the enigmatic name *sūrah*, plural *suwar*, of which no satisfactory account has as yet been given. It is sometimes explained from the Hebrew *sōrāh* (Is 28[25]), 'row,' 'order,' used in the Jewish oral tradition for a row or rank of men,[4] but this seems to violate a sound-law. It is said to be used for a row of bricks in a wall, in which case it is clearly derived from *sūr* (Heb. *shūr*), 'wall,' and its transference to the region of literature might be analogous to that of 'column.' In the Qur'ān it evi-

[1] *E.g.*, by Sakhāwī, *Tibr Masbūk*, Cairo, 1896, p. 217.

[2] As by Ṭabari, *History*, Leyden, 1898, i. 3007.

[3] Collected by E. W. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, London, 1863–93, p. 2407.

[4] See J. Levy, *Neuhebräisches . . . Wörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1876–80.

dently means 'homily,' 'discourse,' and is usually construed with the verb 'to send down.' Thus xxiv. styles itself 'a *sūrah* which we have sent down and ratified and wherein we have sent down clear signs.' Probably both sense and form are adequately accounted for by identification with the Syriac *sbharta*, 'preaching,' 'gospel,' 'message,' as in the title of Mark 'the Holy Gospel, preaching (*sbharta*) of Mark,' etc. The separate texts are called *āyah* (plural *āy* or *āyāt*), often used for 'sign' or 'miracle,' and clearly identical with the Hebrew *ôth*, 'sign,' 'letter,' 'miracle.' Its sense 'letter' is perhaps retained in the opening verses of certain *sūrahs*, where after a series of letters of the alphabet there follow the words, 'Those are the signs of the perspicuous book,' etc.

2. Contents.—Owing to the miscellaneous character of the work, which professes to contain 'a detailed account of everything' (xii. 111), the rapidity of its transitions, and its interminable repetitions, an analysis of its contents cannot easily be made. Those who furnished the chapters with names called them after the first words or letters, after some striking word or phrase occurring within the homily, or after some subject which occupied a prominent place in it. A certain amount of variety still exists in the naming of particular *sūrahs*, and in earlier times there seems to have been yet more. In the case of *sūrah* xii., which is called after Joseph, very nearly the whole homily is occupied with the story of the patriarch; but the second *sūrah*, which is of 286 verses, is called after 'the Cow,' described in four verses (63–66); while *sūrah* xxvi., of 228 verses, is called after 'the Poets,' with whom only three verses at the end deal; *sūrah* xvii. is called 'Asra' after a word occurring in the first verse, *sūrah* xxiv. 'Light' after verse 35. When a *sūrah* is called after a particular person, it must not be inferred that the homily deals exclusively with that person, or even gives his history more fully than it is given elsewhere.

The contents are mainly warnings, remonstrances, and assertions of or arguments in favour of certain doctrines, the narrative portions being for the purpose of enforcing morals. These narratives are for the most part of events in the remote past; but allusions to contemporary history and to the Prophet's own experiences are frequent, their purpose being to warn or to apologize. The two final *sūrahs*, each of a few words only, are incantations; cxi. is an imprecation on a contemporary foe, and lxxx., lxxxiii., and civ. are similar in purport, though the enemy is not named. The warnings being mainly of future punishment, the book abounds in realistic descriptions of both the pains of hell and the delights of paradise.

Legislation occupies a very small place in the work; hence its claim to give a 'detailed account of everything' occasions trouble even when 'everything' is restricted to the region of law.[1] Collections of commandments are indeed to be found in various places—*e.g.*, vi. 152 f.—and precepts on various subjects are scattered throughout the work, the most detailed being probably those connected with inheritance in iv. 12–16, to which verse 175 is a supplement, and those in xxiv. 2–9 dealing with adultery and accusations of it. Enactments on various subjects are also to be found in *sūrah* ii. The character of the Qur'ānic legislation resembles rescripts (*fatāwā*) — *i.e.* answers to special questions—rather than a code; and that the collection contains contradictory rulings on the same subjects is admitted by jurists, though this is variously explained. Where narratives occur in a series, there is at times an attempt at maintaining chronological order, but at other times it is neglected.

The narratives most frequently recounted are those connected with Noah, Abraham, Lot, Moses, and the otherwise unknown prophets Hūd, Ṣāliḥ, and Shu'aib. The story of Adam is told in ii., vii., and xx., that of the nativity of Christ in iii. and xix.; numerous stories are told only once—*e.g.*, that of Ṭālūt (a combination of Gideon and Saul) in ii., that of the Queen of Saba and King Solomon in xxvii., that of the Seven Sleepers in xviii., which also contains a fresh story about Moses and one about Dhu'l-Qarnain, thought to be Alexander the Great. Of the OT prophets the Qur'ān knows Elijah and Jonah; it also contains some information about David and Job. Of Arabian history it knows the name Tubba' (xliv., l.); the ruin of the Sabæan empire (xxxiv.); the persecutions of the Christians in the Jewish state of S. Arabia (lxxxv.), if the last passage is correctly interpreted; and the Abyssinian attack on Meccah (cv.), if the interpretation be correct and the attack historical. Of contemporary history outside Arabia, it notices the Persian invasion of the Nearer East.

Where the same story is repeated, the various versions at times contain fresh details; thus *sūrah* xl., 'the Believer,' is called after a believing subject of Pharaoh who delivers a monotheistic homily, but does not figure elsewhere; and in xi. 46 there is an account of a disobedient son of Noah who perishes in the Flood, and who also is not mentioned elsewhere in connexion with the patriarch. Though the story of Moses is often told, his adventures in Midian are recounted only in *sūrah* xxviii. These repeated versions, then, to some extent supplement one another, though they cannot always be harmonized.

The tendency of the author is to prefer the apocryphal accounts to the plainer narratives in the canonical Scriptures, whence Solomon is represented as understanding the language of the lower animals and having at his disposal the forces of the *jinn*; the mountain is said to have been raised over the heads of the Israelites, and Jesus to have made birds of clay and animated them.

Descriptions of the phenomena of nature are not uncommon, though usually exceedingly brief; their purpose is of course not scientific, but the demonstration of monotheism.

A certain amount of the matter is introspective, taking (as usual) the form of personal addresses by the Deity to the Prophet. The consolatory *sūrahs* (xciv. and xciii.) are striking specimens of this class; lxxiii. and lxxiv., which contain exhortations to the Prophet, are similar; lxxii. describes a personal experience which the Prophet is told to repeat; it is how certain of the *jinn*, hearing the Qur'ān recited, were converted. Three *sūrahs* deal with his domestic affairs, which of course were of importance to the whole community, and in one of these (xxxiii.) his wives are apostrophized. The only names of contemporaries mentioned in the book are those of his adopted son, Zaid, and his unbelieving uncle, Abu Lahab. Allusions to others occur, but reliance has to be placed on the tradition for their identification.

Owing to the intensity of the Prophet's loves and hates and other emotions, and the frequency with which the expression of these takes the form of a revelation, the Qur'ān might in many parts be described as the author's diary or commonplace-book; it records doubts felt by himself as to the reality of his mission and its likelihood of success, critical situations at different times in his career, what he said when they occurred, and hard blows which he received and gave. It thus constitutes the most important set of materials for

[1] See Ghazālī, *Mustaṣfā*, Cairo, 1324, ii. 256.

his biography, its utility being somewhat impaired by the absolute want of chronological arrangement, which has to be conjecturally restored chiefly on the basis of the later official biography, which is itself largely based on the Qur'ān.

3. Sources.—That the material of the Qur'ān is in the main identical with that of 'the Former Leaves,' *i.e.* the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, is admitted in the work itself; these 'Leaves,' more accurately described as 'the Leaves of Moses and Abraham who was faithful,' are quoted in liii. 37–55 for a variety of matters.

The first, 'that no burdened soul shall bear the burdens of another and that there is nothing accounted to a man save what he has wrought,' comes from Ezk 18[20]; verse 45, 'and that he causeth to die and maketh alive' is from 1 S 2[6], which is followed by a clause cited with fair accuracy in verse 49 as 'He enricheth and causeth to possess.' Further, verses 53 and 54 refer to Genesis, where the destruction of the 'people of Noah' and of the 'overturned cities' is described. Verse 50, 'that He is the Lord of Sirius,' may be identified with Job 9[9], the name of the star being altered for the rhyme.

The narratives of the destruction of the tribes 'Ād and Thamūd, also quoted from these 'Leaves,' are certainly not to be found in the Christian Scriptures; but this is not a serious inaccuracy. 'The Law' (*Taurāt*) is quoted in verse 49 for the rule, 'soul for soul, and eye for eye, and nose for nose, and ear for ear and tooth for tooth'; the reference is to Ex 21[23f.], where, however, 'hand' and 'foot' are found instead of 'nose' and 'ear.' The Psalms (*Zubūr*) are quoted in xxi. 105:

'We have written in the Psalms after the Record: My pious servants shall inherit the earth.'

The reference is to Ps 37[29], but the phrase, 'after the Record,' is most obscure. The Mishnāh of *Sanhedrin*, iv. 5, is cited in v. 35:

'On account of this we have written for the Children of Israel that whosoever slays a soul save for a soul or for mischief in the land, it is as though he had slain all mankind; and whosoever saves one, it is as though he had saved all mankind.'

The exceptions are not found in the text of the Mishnāh, but otherwise the citation is accurate. A somewhat vaguer reference to the Law and the Gospel is in xlviii. 29:

'That is their likeness in the Law and their likeness in the Gospel: like the seed which putteth forth its stalk, then strengtheneth it and it groweth stout, and riseth upon its stem, rejoicing the husbandman.'

The reference to the Gospel appears to be to Mk 4[26-29]; perhaps that to the Law is to Ps 72[16].

These are probably the only actual quotations; reproduction of matter or of phrases occurring in the OT, the NT, the Talmud, or the NT Apocrypha is found throughout the Qur'ān, and this is at times sufficiently close to render the term 'quotation' not inappropriate.

Noticeable cases are vii. 39: 'Nor shall they enter Paradise until the camel passeth through the eye of the needle' (Mt 19[24]); xxi. 104: 'The day whereon we shall roll up the heaven as the scribe(?) rolleth up the book' (Is 34[4]); xxviii. 76: 'We gave him [Corah] treasures of which the keys would weigh down a company of strong men' (B. *Pesaḥim*, 119*a*: 'The keys of the treasures of Corah were a burden for three hundred white mules'); xxxi. 26: 'If all the trees that are upon the earth were to become pens, and if God should after that swell the sea into seven seas [of ink], His words would not be exhausted' (Midrash *Rabbāh*, Ca 1[2]: 'If all the seas were ink, and the thickets pens, the heavens and the earth scrolls, and all mankind scribes, they would not suffice to write the Law').

From these quotations and borrowings it would not be permissible to infer that the author of the Qur'ān had direct access to the Bible, Apocrypha, and Talmud; still less would it be permissible to infer from their inaccuracies that he had no such access; for the limits to inaccuracy in quotation cannot be fixed, and even in our own time, when numerous appliances make the verification of quotations exceedingly easy, we find experts in Homer confusing Andromache with Penelope, etc., and Biblical experts confusing Joseph with Daniel, etc. When verification was a cumbrous process, the standard of accuracy was far lower. Now, the Qur'ān exhibits intimate acquaintance with the books of Genesis and Exodus, out of which it reproduces numerous chapters—sometimes, it is true, mixed up with Midrashic matter; and this reproduction is often accompanied with serious inaccuracy, as when Moses is said to be sent to Pharaoh, Haman, and Qarun (Corah). In both matters its method resembles that of the NT, where, *e.g.*, Stephen confuses Abraham with Jacob (Ac 7[16]), and Paul uses Midrash as though it were Scripture (1 Co 10[4]), though doubtless it differs in degree. The latter practice seems to come from the constant association of certain comments with the text, and has its parallel in professedly scientific works of our own time, where, *e.g.*, the statements of the Homeric poems are mixed up with inferences drawn from them by later authors. The most natural conclusion would be that the Prophet had at some time studied those two books (Genesis and Exodus) with the aids current among the Jews, and had afterwards reproduced his information without verifying his references. His acquaintance with other parts of the OT is much slighter, yet he displays some with the books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings. In these cases, too, Midrash is mixed up with Biblical matter, and the attempt to reproduce the story of the scene between David and Nathan (xxxviii. 20–23) suggests that he had known the story at one time, but had afterwards forgotten its context and many important details.

Of the NT he clearly knows far less, the only personages belonging to it whose names he mentions being Zacharias, Yaḥyā (John the Baptist), Maryam (the Virgin), 'Isā (Jesus), and the angel Gabriel. Maryam is the daughter of 'Imrān (Amram), and the sister of Hārūn (Aaron). His 'Gospel of the Nativity' (in *sūrahs* iii. and xix.) is similar to what is found in the *Protevangelium Jacobi Minoris*, but contains certain details drawn from other sources; one of these, that the Virgin supported herself on a palm-tree during her throes, is clearly traceable to the Greek myth of Leto. The employment of the title 'Word' (*kalimah*) for Christ must go back to the Fourth Gospel.

The difficulty of assuming that the Biblical matter of the Qur'ān was got at first hand from books lies in the fact that there is no evidence of any parts of the Bible having been translated into Arabic before Islām—even the tradition that Khadijah's relative Waraqah translated a Gospel is obscure, and may mean merely that he copied it—and none of the Prophet having studied any language but his own, coupled with the circumstance that both the proper names and the names of religious technicalities in the Qur'ān belong to some four different languages. Thus *Jahannum* (Gehenna) is Hebrew, *Nūḥ* (Noah) Syriac, *Alyās* (Elias) and *Yūnus* (Jonas) Greek, *Shaiṭān* (Satan) Ethiopic. Of the form used for Jesus no satisfactory explanation has as yet been given. The assertions made by the Meccans, viz. that the Prophet had gone to school (vi. 105), that he had assistants (xxv. 5), or one foreign teacher (xvi. 103), and that his helpers dictated to him morning and night, though probably containing some truth, fail to account for all the facts.

A curious Hebraism is to be found in the name for Christians, *Anṣār*, explained (with reference to the apostles, whose name in the Qur'ān is Ethiopic) as 'Helpers of God'; this is evidently the Hebrew *Nosᶜrim*, 'Nazarenes,' which, however, might be rendered 'protectors'; the Arabic sense 'helpers' is very close. The name for 'the Law,' *Taurāt*, is also Hebrew; probably it should have been pronounced (as it is written) *Torah*. That for the Gospel, *Ingīl*, is near, but not quite identical with, the Ethiopic *Wangel*; that for the Psalms, *Zubūr*, appears to be derived by popular etymology from

the Syriac *Mazmūrē*. Names which seem to be Biblical but cannot be identified with certainty are those of the prophets Idrīs, Dhu'l-Kifl, and Dhu'l-Nūn. The subject from which *sūrah* v., said to be the latest, derives its name, 'the Table,' appears to exhibit a strange conflation of different matter; the apostles (v. 112) ask 'Īsā to pray that a table be sent down to them from heaven, and he, after rebuking them, prays that it may be sent down 'to be a festival to the first and to the last of us'; and the prayer is answered. The basis of this appears to be the phrase 'the table of the Lord,' in 1 Co 10^{21}; but there seems also to be an allusion to Christ's feeding of the multitude and to the vision of Peter (Ac 10^{9-16}). The extent to which the Prophet's memory and imagination, or the peculiarities of his informants, gave rise to these and similar statements will never be accurately determined. Had we not the *Protevangelium*, we might have attributed to him the confusion between Samuel and the Virgin Mary which appears in *sūrah* iii. Certain lost works appear to have contained matter which resembles what is found in the Qur'ān; *e.g.*, the Περίοδοι τῶν Ἀποστόλων, excerpted by Photius, had the statement that not Christ but another had been crucified, which is near the Qur'ānic doctrine (iv. 156), in which the Jews are charged with falsely asserting that they had killed Christ, whereas this had happened only in semblance.

Of matter that is not Biblical but is obtained from Christians, the story of the Seven Sleepers (*q.v.*) and probably that of Dhu'l-Qarnain are examples; that of the adventures of Moses with a person called by the Muslims al-Khiḍr is said to have a similar origin. Of acquaintance with any foreign literature other than that belonging to these communities there appears to be no certain trace, though there are references to the Magians, whose literature is known, and the Sābians, who are still a puzzle. When we read, 'The whole doctrine of the Qurán concerning Iblís and the genii, or Satans of the Qurán, has been borrowed for the most part from the Magi of Persia,'[1] it is hard to see how this can be proved. For the data of the Qur'ānic story are Biblical; that Adam was created from earth is known from Gn 2^{7}, and that the 'ministers' are of flaming fire is known from Ps 104^{4}; that the words, 'Let all the angels of God worship him' (Ps 96^{7} LXX), were said on Adam's entry into the world is known to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (1^{6}). The doctrine that fire is more honourable than earth, whence Satan's refusal to carry out this order is intelligible, and made the ground of it, is an Aristotelian commonplace. What we have then is a Midrash worked up in Qur'ānic style, precisely as the story of Abraham and his father's idols (xxi. 52–71) is worked up from the material preserved in *Genesis Rabbāh*, 38.

That there was no native literature in the possession of the Arabs to whom the Qur'ān addresses itself is stated so frequently and emphatically that we are compelled to believe it.

Passages of this type are xlvi. 3: 'Bring me a book before this or a monument of knowledge, if ye speak true'; lxviii. 37: 'Have ye a book wherein ye study?'; xxxiv. 43: 'We have not given them any books to study nor sent them any one to warn them before thee'; xxxv. 38: 'Have ye given them [*i.e.* the pagan deities] a book, wherein they have proofs?'; xxxii. 2: 'That thou mayest warn people to whom no warner came before'; xxxvii. 156: 'Have ye any clear authority? Then bring your book, if ye speak true'; lii. 41: 'Are they in possession of secrets and do they write?'; lxii. 2: 'He it is who hath sent among the illiterates a messenger of themselves to read unto them His signs.'

Clearly, then, the Prophet had not, like the Christian missionaries among the pagan Greeks, to overthrow the authority of books which served to maintain an older system; nothing could be cited against his assertions but immemorial practice. Although the language of the Qur'ān must represent in the main that which was current in Meccah when it was composed, and to the creation of that idiom many persons must have contributed, it is improbable that the Prophet had in the language of his country any literary model to which he was indebted for either form or matter. He does, indeed, know of the existence of poets, who 'roam in every valley and say what they do not do' (xxvi. 225), and was himself charged with being a *jinn*-ridden poet, though he asserts that God had not taught him poetry; but it is evident, both from what the Qur'ān says on the subject of these persons and from what it puts into the mouth of the Prophet's adversaries, that they were not writers of authority who aspired to become national classics.

According to Ṭabarī,[1] certain Arabs in the Prophet's time possessed the book of Luqman, some of whose sayings are reported in *sūrah* xxxi. In the later literature he figures as a writer of fables and is often quoted for maxims; yet it is doubtful whether anything was known about him except from the passage in the Qur'ān. The story of Thamūd and their prophet Ṣāliḥ is located in N. Arabia, and the name of the tribe is attested by classical geography; the rock tombs were mistaken by its author for houses; the source of the story is unknown, as is that of 'Ād and their prophet Hūd. Ṭabarī derives this tribe from the son of the Biblical Uz, also located in Arabia. The name seems to be the Biblical word for 'eternity,' and to be about as historical as Cadmus. The phraseology and to some extent the statements of the Qur'ān are often illustrated from 'pre-Islāmic poetry'; and some of this came to be recognized as classical at any rate in the early Abbāsid period. These poets, unlike those of other communities, seem to be entirely ignorant of their national or tribal religions, whence it has been suggested that they were all Christians! There appears, however, to be no possible method of reconciling their existence with the statements of the Qur'ān cited above; for, even if these had been shameless falsehoods, the work should have produced some argument or reason for ignoring the poets' words, which (*e.g.*, the *Mu'allaqah* of Zuhair) contained moral precepts and at times accounts of the very matters narrated in the Qur'ān (*e.g.*, the poems of Umayyah b. Abi Ṣalt).

The source of every statement or expression in the Qur'ān cannot of course be traced, and there is no reason for denying its author considerable originality. The requirements of the rhyme must of themselves have led to the invention of new phrases, and even of historical details—*e.g.*, the location of the call of Moses in 'the holy vale Ṭuwā' (lxxix. 16), and of the meeting between Moses and the sorcerers 'at midday' (xx. 61). The same consideration perhaps dictated the specification of the 'tree Zaqqūm' as the food of the damned, which seems to have provoked criticism at Meccah (xvii. 62), and the description of Pharaoh as 'the man of the stakes' (*dhu'l-autād* [xxxviii. 11, lxxxix. 9]), though this may conceivably be a misunderstanding of the Greek word αὐθάδης. Originality is doubtless displayed in the descriptions of hell and paradise, though in these some details are traceable to the Johannine Apocalypse.

The claim to speak by inspiration and not as the result of study is in itself not different from that urged by other poets, who professedly obtain their information from the Muse, etc. It may have been taken too literally by the Prophet's opponents, and consequently, as it could not be withdrawn, it had to be maintained as a fact.

[1] E. M. Wherry, *A Comprehensive Commentary on the Qurán*, London, 1882–86, i. 301.

[1] i. 1208.

4. Original theory of revelation.—The Qur'ān is, on the one hand, something written, on the other, something read or recited. The written document, however, is in heaven.

It is 'an honourable Qur'an in a hidden book which shall not be touched save by the cleansed' (lvi. 76);

and this is somewhat elucidated by another passage:

'It is a record on honourable, cleansed, exalted leaves in the hands of honourable, pure scribes' (lxxx. 11-14).

The 'cleansed leaves containing permanent writings,' which 'are recited by an Apostle from God' (xcviii. 2), are thus thought of as in heaven; and in vi. 7 the 'book' is clearly distinguished from such as are on ordinary materials:

'Had we sent down unto thee a book written on parchment, and they had touched it with their hands, the infidels had surely said: "This is nought but plain sorcery."'

Since in vii. 142 it is stated that the Deity wrote for Moses on the Tables a homiletic and encyclopædic work similar in character to the Qur'ān, which is itself said to be on 'a guarded table' (lxxxv. 22), it would seem that revelation means the mental perusal by the Prophet of the divine book which is in heaven, whose contents he communicates to his countrymen. And indeed the Jews are spoken of as 'those who read the Book before thee,' whom the Prophet is to consult, if he has any doubt about his revelations (x. 94). It is suggested that the language of the divine original is heavenly (xliii. 2 f.), which is then translated into Arabic so as to be intelligible. Of the divine language it is probable that the letters prefixed to some of the *sūrahs* are specimens. This theory accounts in part for the fact that so many of the *sūrahs* are repetitions of the same matter; the reproduction by the Prophet of the portions of the divine book which he was privileged to peruse would not necessarily be verbally coincident. The book is brought down by 'the Faithful Spirit' (xxvi. 193), called Gabriel (ii. 91), to the Prophet's heart, while it is also in the books of the ancients (xxvi. 197), and in the breasts of those to whom knowledge has been given (xxix. 48), *i.e.* learned Israelites (xxvi. 197). For even the reduction of the Law of Moses to parchment is supposed to be an innovation (vi. 91), its proper seat being the memory of the rabbis (v. 48). It might have been revealed in a foreign tongue (xxvi. 198, xli. 44), but this would have involved various objections. Apostles are sent speaking the language of their own people only (xiv. 4); hence the notion of reproducing the contents of a concealed book has a tendency to give way to that of bearing a message, which the messenger would naturally express in his own words.

There does not appear to be any reference in the Qur'ān to any but oral communication of its contents. The passage cited above from vi. 7 plainly indicates that it was not produced on parchment; and similarly in xvii. 95 the Meccans ask for a book to be brought down from heaven 'which they can read themselves.' The texts are recited either by the Prophet or by his followers (xxii. 71); there is little suggestion that the one or the other employed a written copy, though perhaps vi. 146, 'I find not in what has been revealed to me save . . . ,' might be interpreted of a search through MSS. Hence, when the Qur'ān quotes itself, it quotes rather the general sense than the exact words of the passages:

E.g., iv. 139. 'He hath sent down unto you in the Book that when ye hear the Signs of God denied and mocked, ye shall not sit with them until they discuss another topic.' The passage cited is vi. 67. 'When thou seest those who discuss our Signs, then leave them alone until they discuss another topic, and if Satan cause thee to forget, then sit not with the ungodly people.'

Where obliteration of texts is mentioned, the reference is to alterations made by the Deity in the divine original (xiii. 39, xlii. 23); to erase in this case has for its equivalent 'to cause to be forgotten' (ii. 100).

The tradition at times agrees with the Qur'ān in this matter, as where the Prophet is made to confess that he has forgotten a text which is recited to him, the genuineness of which he acknowledges,[1] or to explain differences between the forms in which the same text is current by the theory that the Qur'ān had been revealed in seven different forms.[2] At other times it assumes that some one or other wrote down the texts as soon as they were delivered and kept a copy; so Zaid b. Thābit was summoned by the Prophet to write down a text which had been revealed (iv. 97), and brought a shoulder-blade for the purpose; presently some one complained that the verse was hard upon him, and some additional words were revealed meeting the case.[3] Certain verses were lost because 'A'ishah kept the scroll which contained them under the Prophet's bed, and let it be worm-eaten during his illness.[4] Long lists were given of people who 'copied down the revelations.'

On the whole, the phenomena displayed by the Qur'ān itself render it difficult to suppose that it was committed to writing in the Prophet's time, though its character was greatly changed by the transference of Islām from Meccah to Medīnah. The claim to uniformity and consistency which it urges is more intelligible if it is thought of as a lecturer's treatment of a subject than if it is regarded as a permanent document; the repetitions of the same narratives with insignificant variations are natural in the former case, almost unthinkable to the extent to which they are found in the Qur'ān in the latter. But, if any revelation became fixed in writing, the need for having the whole so fixed would speedily make itself felt. The assertions that the statements of the Qur'ān were absolutely consistent with one another and with the earlier Scriptures, which were reasonable enough when men were concerned with the general sense of what had been uttered, assumed a very different character when, by being committed to some writing material, they became definitely fixed.

When an official copy had been circulated to the exclusion of others, a theory of verbal and even literal inspiration began to be evolved, and ultimately became dominant, though loose citation is sometimes found where we should least expect it; thus Bukhārī[5] says that the text, 'except that ye knit a relationship between me and you,' was revealed, but the commentators acknowledge that they cannot find it, and suppose the words to be a paraphrase of xlii. 22: 'save love of my kin.' Ibn Mas'ūd († 32), when ordered to alter his copy in accordance with the official text, declared that he had heard seventy *sūrahs* from the lips of the Prophet, and could not adopt these alterations;[6] readings of his were employed as late as 322 A.H., when their use was forbidden on pain of execution,[7] and the books which contained them were burned.[8] These variants consisted mainly in the substitution of synonyms for the words of the text. Hence grammarians began to cite 'God who is exalted' for grammatical forms and rhetorical ornaments. A Masorah arose which counted not only chapters and verses but words and letters (the various computations are given by Suyuṭī, § 19). A pious woman never spoke except from the Qur'ān for forty years, for fear of uttering what was false.[9]

1 *Itqān*, Calcutta, 1853, ii. 923.
2 *Musnad*, Cairo, 1313, iv. 205.
3 Bukhārī, *Le Recueil de traditions musulmanes*, ed. L. Krehl, Leyden, 1862-68, ii. 209.
4 *Musnad*, vi. 269. 5 ii. 381. 6 *Musnad*, i. 414.
7 Yāqūt, *Dictionary of Learned Men*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, Leyden, 1913, vi. 301.
8 Miskawaihi, ed. H. F. Amedroz, in the press, i. 285.
9 *Rauḍat al-'Uqalā*, Cairo, 1328, p. 35.

In the early days of Islām inaccurate citation was common for a time at least; a Khārijite woman declared that the ignorance of God's book displayed by Umayyad governors had led her to revolt.[1] Fragments which, whether by the Prophet or not, were not included in the official Qur'ān were here and there preserved as having once belonged to it; and, when a reader made a spurious addition to a *sūrah*, it was not always easy to detect its inferiority to the genuine matter.[2] Stories are told of lengthy interpolations by ministers in public worship who desired to further their own ends,[3] and of others which were harmless supplements to the texts.[4] See, further, art. INSPIRATION (Muslim).

5. **Chronology and arrangement.**—The order of the *sūrahs* (114 in number) is evidently according to length, but this is far from strict, and early traditions suggest that certain *sūrahs* were grouped together owing to their reaching a certain length, but that their order within those groups was haphazard.

In the *Musnad*[5] we read: 'Said Ibn 'Abbās: I said to 'Uthmān: What induced you to take the Surah Anfāl (viii.) which is one of the Mathānī [*sūrahs* of less than 100 verses?] and the Surah Barā'ah (ix.) which is one of the hundreds [*sūrahs* of between 100 and 200 verses?], and write them, not writing between the two the words "In the Name of God," etc., and to place them among the seven long Surahs? He said: As time passed numerous Surahs were revealed to the Prophet: when something was revealed to him, he used to summon one of his scribes and bid him place it in the Surah wherein such and such matters are mentioned; when a group of texts was revealed, he used to say, Place these texts in the Surah wherein such and such matters are mentioned; and he would say the same when a single text was revealed. Now the Surah Anfāl was one of the first of the Medinese Surahs, whereas the Surah Barā'ah was one of the last Surahs of the Qur'ān; but it resembled the other in matter, so we supposed that it belonged to it, and the Prophet died without distinctly asserting that it belonged thereto. This was the reason for our procedure.'

In the same work[6] we are told that al-Ḥārith b. Khazamah brought 'Umar the last two verses of *sūrah* ix.; 'Umar recognized them as having been uttered by the Prophet; had there been three, he added, he would have made of them a separate *sūrah*; as there were only two, he bade al-Ḥārith find a suitable place for their insertion; he accordingly placed them at the end of *sūrah* ix.

These traditions indicate that both the second and the third Khalīfahs had a hand in the arrangement of the Qur'ān, though in the main the arrangement was the Prophet's; and it is noticeable that 'Uthmān, who, according to the most familiar tradition, is responsible for the circulation of a uniform copy and the destruction of all others, in a saying put by Ṭabarī into the mouth of one of his murderers,[7] was the first whose hand wrote the *Mufaṣṣal*, implying that his edition was the first *written* edition. Usually the collecting of the Qur'ān is placed in the reign of the first Khalīfah, whose scruples were overcome by the fear that the book might be lost if the readers should perish in the wars; and indeed it was asserted that parts actually perished with some of the martyrs of Yemamah;[8] but admirers of 'Alī declared that he, noticing the bewilderment that arose after the death of the Prophet, immediately made a copy of the Qur'ān from memory in three days; and this, wanting some leaves, was said to be still in existence in the 4th century.[9] If there were any truth in this story, the copy should have wanted those verses which the person—Zaid ibn Thābit—who is said to have edited the ordinary text found with difficulty; so, according to Bukhārī,[10] when he copied the leaves into his edition, he missed a verse (xxxiii. 23) which he had heard the Prophet recite; finally he found it in the possession of Khuzaimah, the Anṣārī, whose evidence was worth that of two men.

[1] Yāqūt, vi. 94. [2] *Alif-Ba*, Cairo, 1287, i. 375.
[3] *Ghurar al-Khaṣā'iṣ*, Cairo, 1284, p. 229.
[4] Yāqūt, vi. 430. [5] i. 69. [6] i. 199.
[7] i. 3007. [8] *Musnad*, i. 143.
[9] Al-Nadim, *Kitab al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flugel, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1871–72, i. 28.
[10] ii. 204.

The persons who produced these stories had to account for a fact which is generally acknowledged, viz. that the *sūrahs* often contain matter which belongs to very different periods, coupled with the assumption that single texts or small groups of texts were often revealed. If, *e.g.*, ix. 85 was a special revelation for the instruction of 'Umar,[1] whereas ix. 1–10 was delivered on a different occasion to 'Alī,[2] how came these various texts and groups of texts to form one unit called a *sūrah*? In the *Musnad* the location is said to have been dictated in most cases by the Prophet; and the tradition admits that the *sūrahs* had as yet neither names nor numbers, so that they could only be distinguished as 'containing such and such matter.' Perhaps the only passage in the Qur'ān which suggests that the Prophet arranged the texts is viii. 67, which restricts the promise of verse 66, that 100 Muslims should overcome 1000 unbelievers, to a promise that they should overcome 200, prefixing to the reduction the words, 'Now God has lightened your burden, knowing that there is weakness in you,' where the word 'now' indicates that an interval has passed between the two promises. But the suspicion lies near that this reducing verse is not from the Prophet himself, but from some later annotator. Ordinarily, where one statement corrects another, they are widely apart. So in viii. 9 the fighters at Badr are promised a reinforcement of 1000 angels; but in iii. 120 f. the number is increased to 3000 or even 5000, though the occasion on which the promise was made is the same, and the same comment is added on both (viii. 10 and iii. 122). It could scarcely have been the Prophet's intention to let both reports of his oracle remain.

Hence it is more usual to suppose that the *sūrahs*, where they are evidently collections of matter belonging to different times, represent the results of private effort, and the process called 'collecting the Qur'ān' probably refers to this preliminary putting together of revelations delivered by the Prophet. According to the tradition, as early as the battle of Uḥud (A.H. 3) special honours were assigned to those who had collected the Qur'ān, and in proportion to the amount which they had collected; one Mujammi', son of Ḥārithah, who figures in some incidents of the Prophet's biography, got his name from his carrying out this process;[3] the name of the first person who 'collected the Qur'ān' in Yemen is recorded;[4] and we are told that 47 men of one tribe, who had collected the Qur'ān, were killed on one morning.[5] Four persons are mentioned in the tradition as having collected the Qur'ān in the Prophet's time.[6] Where, then, the same verses with slight differences are found in different *sūrahs*, the Prophet may be repeating himself, or the repetition may be due to our having the matter in the collections of different persons.

Cf., *e.g.*, lxii. 6 f.: 'Say, O ye that have judaized, if ye profess that ye are friends of God out of all mankind, then desire death if ye speak true. But never will they desire it owing to their previous handiwork, and God knoweth concerning the wrong-doers,' with ii. 88 f.: 'Say, if the last world be yours exclusively out of all mankind with God, then desire death if ye speak true. But never will they desire it owing to their previous handiwork, and God knoweth concerning the wrong-doers.'

It is hard to say whether this represents two reports of the same message to the Jews, put together by different collectors, or two messages delivered by the Prophet at different times, with a

[1] *Musnad*, i. 16. [2] *Ib.* i. 151.
[3] Ibn Hisham, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1860, p. 358.
[4] *Isabah*, iii. 1298. [5] Ṭabarī, ii. 90. [6] Bukhārī, iii. 11.

very slight difference in the wording. And similar cases are frequent, notably the statements about the miracles in the wilderness, the entry into the Holy Land, and the transformation into apes of Israelites who broke the Sabbath, which occur in vii. 160, 161, 162, 166 and ii. 54–57, 61, though these *sūrahs* are supposed to have been delivered respectively in Meccah and Medīnah.

To some extent, then, the *sūrahs* present phenomena analogous to those of the Gospels; *i.e.*, the same matter is repeatedly produced with variation in the arrangement and in the expression, or even in the sense; it is difficult to think of these as reports of different matter; they are much more like reports of the same discourses with the variations inseparable from oral tradition.

An example may be taken from ii. 98: 'O ye that believe, say not "rā'inā" but say "unẓurnā" and "hear."' In iv. 48 there is the following: 'Among those that judaize are such as corrupt the phrase from its location and say: "We hear and disobey," and "hear, not made to hear," and "rā'inā," twisting their tongues and attacking the religion. Had they said: "We hear and obey" and "hear" and "unẓurnā," it would have been better for them and more correct.' In ii. 87 it is said of the Israelites that 'When we took their covenant and raised above them the mountain, "Take what we have given you with power, and hear," they said, "We hear and disobey."'

Now, the Arabic words quoted, of which one is approved and the other disapproved, appear to be synonymous, and in the later literature are both in common use; the phrases 'we hear and obey' and 'we hear and disobey' are contradictory; the phrase 'hear, not made to hear,' for which 'hear' is offered as the correct equivalent, is unintelligible. In *sūrah* iv. all three are offered as examples of improper expressions used by the Jews with malevolent intent; in *sūrah* ii. the phrase 'we hear and disobey' is recorded as the defiant reply of the Israelites to the commandments delivered from Sinai, whereas *unẓurnā* is stated to be the proper substitute for the improper *rā'inā*, while the improper substitute for 'hear' is not recorded. In v. 45 we have another version of the commencement of iv. 48:

'Among those that judaize are hearers of falsehood, hearers of other people who have not come to thee, who corrupt the phrase from its location.'

The account which seems to agree best with the facts is that we have the inaccurate records in these various places of the same sayings put together by different persons long after they were delivered, when the circumstances of the original delivery had been forgotten. Hence the charge of 'corrupting the phrase from its location' in one *sūrah* is thought to refer to the conduct of the ancient Israelites, in another to the Prophet's Israelitish contemporaries, in a third to incorrect reporters of the Prophet's sayings, to whose testimony the Israelites of his time attached value.

Thus the questions of chronology, arrangement, and genuineness are inextricably connected, and any attempt at arranging the *sūrahs* in chronological order is impeded by the fact that the *sūrahs* are themselves largely agglomerations, while the probability that much was not committed to writing till long after the texts to be reproduced had been uttered necessarily affects the genuineness; and doubts about the genuineness of texts are not altogether wanting in the Muhammadan chronicles.

According to Ṭabarī,[1] when Abū Bakr after the Prophet's death [illegible] in 13 H., where the possibility of Muhammad's death is mentioned, 'the people did not seem to know that the [illegible] had been revealed to the Prophet until Abū Bakr recited it.' When this verse and another in which Muhammad's death is distinctly foretold (xxxix. 31) were repeated on this occasion, according to another account,[2] certain persons swore that they had not [illegible] been aware of their existence.

The authenticity of the two final *sūrahs* was denied by some persons. European critics have naturally fewer scruples than Muslims about obelizing verses, but, since these interpolations, if there be any, must belong to a period which is very imperfectly known, not many verses have been condemned. Certain passages very clearly belong to definite epochs in the Prophet's biography, for the order of which the work of Ibn Isḥāq is generally trusted, though its authority was clearly not established in the 2nd century. Thus the authoritative Shāfi'ī[1] places the Raid of Dhāt al-Riqā', which was the occasion of iv. 103 f., after the Battle of the Trench, whereas in the narrative of Ibn Isḥāq the raid was in the year 4, and the battle in the year 5. The number of texts that can be dated by these considerations is comparatively small; for a great many commentaries, or special works dealing with 'the occasions of revelation,' invent cheap fictions to which no importance should be attached. The editions of the Qur'ān regularly divide the *sūrahs* into Meccan and Medīnese, but it is admitted that some Meccan *sūrahs* are interpolated with Medīnese matter. It is generally held that there are in the main three periods: one in which the productions were ejaculatory and tentative, represented chiefly by the short *sūrahs* towards the end, some of which, however, are very clearly fragments; one in which they were homiletic and narrative—to this class the greater number of the longer Meccan *sūrahs* belong; and one in which they were journalistic and legislative—this is the period of the Medīnese *sūrahs*. About the first and last verses we have guesses recorded by Suyūṭī; the first was either xcvi. 1 or lxxiv. 1; the last was iv. 175, ii. 278, or ii. 281, etc.

The *Fihrist* gives a chronological order of the Meccan *sūrahs* and another of the Medīnese, in both cases ostensibly following authorities of the 1st cent.; one which differs in numerous points is given by Suyūṭī, p. 21 f. The *Fihrist* also recorded the order in which they were arranged in the copies of Ibn Mas'ūd, Ubayy b. Ka'b, and 'Alī—but the last is lost in the MSS used by the editors. In a story told by Ṭabarī[2] of the year 35 'Uthmān himself is made to refer to the Qur'ān according to the numbering in Ibn Mas'ūd's copy, in which the *sūrah* of Yūnus was the seventh. The author of the *Fihrist* states that he himself had seen many copies which professed to give the recension of Ibn Mas'ūd, of which no two agreed, while all differed from the authority whom he quotes for the order. His chronological list reverses ordinary notions in making *sūrahs* xcix., lxxvi., xiii., and others Medīnese, since in both style and subject they seem clearly to belong to the Meccan period. Thus *sūrah* xiii. assumes that 'those who have knowledge of the Book' (*i.e.* the Jews) side with the Prophet against those who deny his mission, and that he is undergoing persecution which will be settled either by the fulfilment of God's promise or by his death—conditions which suit the Meccan period but had been changed when the Prophet was installed in Medīnah. If these lists have the antiquity which is assigned them, they indicate that the early Muslims took no interest in the matter, and that no tradition of the occasions on which the *sūrahs* were first delivered was preserved.

The attempts made by Europeans to fix the chronology of the *sūrahs* are not likely to be more successful than those made by native critics. Thus, in Rodwell's translation, which is chronologically arranged, *sūrah* xvi. is numbered 73 and *sūrah* vi. is numbered 89; yet in xvi. 119 there is a reference to 'that which we narrated to thee before,' viz. in vi. 147! If the *sūrahs* are capable of being dated, vi. must be earlier than xvi.; on the other hand, vi. 119 states that 'God has already

[1] I. 1846. [2] Ṭabarī, i. 1819.

[1] *Risālah*, Cairo, 1321, p. 27. [2] [illegible]

explained to you what food he has made unlawful for you,' and, though this may be a reference to vi. 146, yet, since the list there begins with the words, 'Say: I find in that which has been revealed unto me nothing forbidden save,' etc., the reference to xvi. 116 seems the more natural; for, if the reference be to ii. 168, then we have a worse anachronism, since there will be a reference to a Medīnese *sūrah* in two Meccan *sūrahs*! Dating by the supposed development of the Prophet's psychology is naturally an unscientific proceeding; nor does it seem possible to obtain any help from the development of his knowledge; thus A. Sprenger[1] asserts that about the year 617 the Prophet learned that the stories about Hūd and Ṣāliḥ were apocryphal, and in consequence was careful to make no further allusion to them. In fact he alludes to them in *sūrah* ix. (71)—according to the tradition, the last *sūrah* but one, or the last, in the Qur'ān.

6. The miracle of the Qur'ān.—The meaning of the miraculous nature ascribed to the book has been the subject of much discussion, and the treatises in which it is explained are not very convincing. In xxix. 47–50 the miracle seems to be explained as the sudden acquisition by the Prophet of the ability to read and write; and somewhat the same is suggested in xlii. 52. More often it is interpreted as its claim to produce accounts of events which could have been revealed to the Prophet only by supernatural means, these being 'the contents of the former Leaves' (xx. 133). Why it should be lawful to identify the Qur'ānic narratives with these, but impious to call them 'the Stories or Writings of the Ancients,' is not known. If these 'Leaves' were no longer in existence and the Prophet had no teacher, his knowledge of their contents, which was attested by the learned, could have been acquired only supernaturally; and there is nothing improbable in the Prophet's supposing these 'Leaves' to have perished, since in the 4th Islāmic cent. at a public discussion in Baghdād both the Christian and the Muslim assume that the Greek classics had all perished and only survived in Syriac translations. Hence the reader is frequently reminded in the Qur'ān that the Prophet, though he is able to report an event, was not present on the occasion; he was not with Joseph's brethren when they conspired, yet he knows about it (xii. 103); he was not present when lots were drawn for the guardianship of the Virgin Mary (iii. 39); and much the same is said with reference to the Deluge (xi. 51), the adventures of Moses (xxviii. 44–46), and the dialogue at the Resurrection (xxxviii. 69 ff.). It does not appear that the Prophet's contemporaries were much impressed by this reasoning; they supposed that he had been primed (vi. 105, xliv. 13) and were even prepared to name his mentor or mentors. What is most interesting to us in these passages is the implication that the Biblical narratives were quite unknown in Meccah before the Prophet told them. More importance might reasonably be attached to the prophecies of future events—the defeat of the Jews (iii. 107 f.), the recovery of the Nearer East by the Byzantines from the Persian conquerors (xxx. 1–4), to which Gibbon attached some importance, and the continuance of the bickerings between the Christian sects until the Resurrection (v. 17), a prophecy which thirteen centuries have not falsified. These passages occupy so small a space in the book that they can scarcely give a character to the whole. Hence it is usual to fall back on the literary style, and this, it may be supposed, is meant where the opponent is challenged to produce ten *sūrahs* (xi. 16) or one *sūrah* (x. 39, ii. 21) or any talk (lii. 34; cf. xxv. 35) which could rival it, and is assured that the united efforts of mankind and *jinn* would fail in such an endeavour (xvii. 90). This doubtless limits the effectiveness of the miracle in the first place to Arabs and in the second to experts in style; but it is pointed out that in most matters the majority are laity who have to be guided by experts. Hence works are composed by rhetorical experts who show how everything in the book is expressed in the best possible way; the recently published *Ṭirāz*, by the Zaidī Khalīfah Yaḥyā b. Ḥamzah († 749 A.H.; 3 vols., Cairo, 1914), proceeds on those lines, and discovers unsuspected beauties—*e.g.*, in the phrase 'and thou didst thy doing which thou didst' (xxvi. 18).

Possibly these expressions of self-approbation in the Qur'ān do not differ much from those employed by other Oriental authors and at times by Europeans. What we learn from its statements is that the Meccans in general found it intolerable, and demanded a 'reading' of another kind (x. 16); and even in the late Medīnah period (ix. 66, 125) there were Muslims who, to the Prophet's extreme annoyance, ridiculed the revelations. A curious method of dealing with the miracle is that ascribed to a Mu'tazil doctor, who supposed it to lie in the failure of the Arab poets and orators to take up the challenge of the Qur'ān and produce a rival performance; if in spite of their number and ability they abstained, they must have been supernaturally prevented. It is urged against this view that, were it correct, the miracle would be not the Qur'ān's, but God's; but it rests besides on premisses of very doubtful validity—one, that there were at the time numerous poets and orators, and a second, that the challenge was not taken up. Indeed, it seems certain that a rival Qur'ān was produced by the pretender Maslamah or Musailimah; and Palgrave[1] asserts that much of it was preserved in Yemamah as late as the 19th century. The claims of this work as against the Qur'ān were settled by the sword. The challenge has probably been taken up at various times—and indeed the Qur'ān comes near admitting this for its own time (vi. 93)—notably by the famous Abu'l-'Alā of Ma'arrah († 449), of whose *Fuṣul wa-Ghāyāt* some fragments are preserved;[2] the work itself was destroyed from pious motives, though one person thought that it should have been allowed to exist as a monument of failure.[3] The eminent vizier Ibn 'Abbād was not displeased when told that his own compositions were equal to the Qur'ān;[4] and we casually hear of books written by professing Muslims in which the defects of the Qur'ān were pointed out; one Ibn Abi'l-Baghl, who aspired to the vizierate in the 4th cent., is credited with a work of the kind.[5]

The magical use of the Qur'ān appears to have begun at an early time; the practice of opening it for *sortes* is mentioned in the year 33,[6] and has been common ever since; and rules for this employment of the work are found in some MSS. Certain passages are written on amulets, and the water in which some have been washed is thought to be a preservative or cure.

7. Literary form.—The style of the Qur'ān is twice described in the work itself by the word *tartīl*, the purpose of this artifice being to fix it in the Prophet's memory (xxv. 34); the sense of the word is not exactly known, but it is likely to refer to the rhyme, the existence of which cannot be denied, being indeed demonstrated by the variation in the order of the names Musa and Harun, of which the former as the more eminent should

[1] *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed*, Berlin, 1861–65, III. xxiii.

[1] *Journey through Arabia*, London, 1865, i. 382.
[2] *Centenario di M. Amari*, Palermo, 1910, i. 228.
[3] Yaqūt, vi. 235.
[4] *Ib.* ii. 277, 297.
[5] *Wuzarā*, ed. H. F. Amedroz, Leyden, 1905, p. 270.
[6] Ṭabarī, i. 2923.

properly have the first place. But it is said to be improper to apply to this style the ordinary name for rhymed prose, *sajʿ*, which, according to a tradition, was said by the Prophet to be characteristic of paganism. Oracles that are supposed to have been delivered by pagan wizards (*kāhins*) are, indeed, in a style that differs from that of the Qur'ān by the regularity of the rhyme; these are most probably all spurious, as are other monuments of pre-Islāmic Arabic prose; in the later literature this style was popular especially for orations and official letters, the unit of the rhyme being usually a couplet, sometimes extended to a triplet, whereas in the sermon style the rhyme has a tendency to be maintained throughout the discourse, perhaps in imitation of the Qur'ān. Judged by these performances, the rhyme of the Qur'ān is illiterate, but such a view is naturally regarded as impious, and it is thought better to regard it as inimitable. In the Meccan period the Prophet was regarded as a poet by his countrymen, and this title might well be earned by the early ejaculatory *sūrahs*; it is, however, repudiated with vehemence in the Qur'ān, partly perhaps because the poets were thought to be inspired by *jinn*. Where, therefore, texts of the Qur'ān admit of scansion according to one or other of the recognized metres, this is not supposed to be intentional; and there is nowhere sufficient of a series to make the word 'metre' applicable, though *sūrah* xciv. almost fulfils the conditions.

Certain *sūrahs* contain besides special artifices; thus in lv. the texts are followed for the most part by the refrain, 'Which then of the bounties of your Lord will ye twain deny?' which may be compared with the refrain in the Song of the Three Holy Children and that in Ps 136. In xxxvii. after the story of each prophet the words 'Peace upon Ibrahim,' etc., follow, either the sentence or the name of the Prophet being accommodated to the rhyme.

The tendency of the earlier *sūrahs* is to employ short sentences, whereas rhythms more accommodated to prose prevail in the later parts of the work. It is noticeable that neither the antithetic method which is characteristic of Hebrew poetry nor the counting of syllables which is usual in Syriac forms an element in the style of the Qur'ān. The language claims to be perspicuous Arabic, and attention is often called to the clearness of the texts. This does not exclude the employment of phrases which require explanation; about a dozen times some phrase is employed followed by the formula, 'What is there to tell thee what it is?' Though extreme orthodoxy denies the existence of foreign words in the Qur'ān, it is generally recognized that its style admits not only foreign proper names, but a considerable number of words borrowed from other languages; a meritorious collection of these is to be found in the work of Suyūṭi,[1] which, however, contains many inadmissible statements. Many words are evidently of Persian, Ethiopic, Syriac, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin origin; but it is impossible for us to discover whether they were introduced by the Prophet or were already familiar. Some of the foreign usages can more easily be distinguished and located by European than by native critics—*e.g.*, the employment of *fatḥ* in the sense 'judgment' (Ethiopic), *faṭara* for 'create' (the same), *jabbār*, 'mighty' (Hebrew as applied to God), etc., where the Arabic language offers possible interpretations.

8. Place in Islām.—No sooner was the Qur'ān published than it became the basis of education, being studied immediately after the acquisition of the alphabet; so the first Umayyad Khalīfah, Mu'āwiyah, when he appointed a man governor of Ta'if, said, 'He is in his ABC'; when made governor of Meccah, 'He is in the Qur'ān.'[1] Men were chastised by the Khalīfah Walīd I. for not having read it.[2] Public and private worship consisted largely in the repetition of portions of it; verses employed by the Prophet himself for this purpose are specified in traditions collected in the *Musnad*.[3] After the Prophet's death it became the primary source of law, for in his own time it was liable to abrogation or addition, whence in v. 48–55 Jews and Christians who require their causes judged are referred to the Law and the Gospel. The difficulties of using the work compiled by 'Uthmān for this purpose were very great, though not too great for the ingenuity of the jurists, who began to arise in Medīnah shortly after the Prophet's death. The difficulty of teaching the Qur'ān to foreign converts is said to have given rise to the study of Arabic grammar, for which of course it supplies an absolutely firm foundation. Orthodox theologians, arguing from certain statements in it, declare that it contains all possible knowledge. If Fakhr al-Din al-Razi († 606) could find 10,000 problems suggested by the *Fātiḥah* (introductory *sūrah* of seven short verses), it should be possible to discover 'a detailed account of everything' in it by the use of suitable methods.

Citation of and reference to the Qur'ān are exceedingly common in Muslim works, whether grave or gay. When the composition of State documents fell into the hands of non-Muslim secretaries, these persons were compelled by the needs of their profession to acquire a competent knowledge of the book, though the strict interpretation of a verse cited above, 'None save the cleansed shall touch it,' is thought to render such study highly improper; and anecdotes are recorded of divine favour shown to grammarians who had refused to teach Jews or Christians their subject because of the necessary reference to Qur'ānic usage. It is not easy, however, to reconcile with this theory the doctrine that the unbeliever should be converted by the miracle of the Qur'ān; the doctrine has to give way to the theory, so that those who raid the lands of unbelievers are forbidden to carry the Qur'ān with them lest it fall into infidel hands. Translation of the book was certainly not contemplated by the Prophet; the rhyme obviously constitutes a great difficulty, and the initial letters of some *sūrahs* an even greater one; Muslim sentiment has ordinarily been against attempts at translation even where the language of the version is one of those habitually and mainly used by Muslims; still such attempts have been made, though nothing resembling an 'authorized version' appears to exist in any Muslim language.

The Muslim notion of the sacred book as the main authority on law, the chief source of grammar, and the unapproachable model of eloquence not infrequently causes Muhammadan writers to misunderstand the place assigned to the Bible in Christian communities; on the other hand, there seems little doubt that this theory has influenced the Jews and Christians who are resident in Muslim countries.

9. Interpretation.—The sacred book gave rise to a great variety of studies, partly grammatical, partly exegetical; and the names of the authors who distinguished themselves in those lines with their works occupy some eleven pages of the *Fihrist* (28–39), though that work was composed near the end of the 4th century. Although Muhammadan learning attaches the very greatest importance to what is orally handed down, there is reason for thinking that the students had little to utilize besides the consonantal text fixed by

[1] *Itqān fī ʿulūm al-Qur'ān*, § 38.

[1] Ṭabari, ii. 167, anno 54.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 1271, anno 96.
[3] i. 230, 230, 265, v. 26.

'Uthmān at a time when the Arabic script left much ambiguity; certain peculiarities may therefore be due to misreading of this text—*e.g.*, the form Yaḥyā for Yuḥanan (John), Tāghūt for Ta'ūth, and even Shu'aib for Hobab. Where either the words or the allusions offer difficulties, it does not appear that there was any trustworthy tradition which the interpreters could employ; *e.g.*, in vii. 174, when the Prophet is bidden tell the history of a man 'to whom we vouchsafed our signs, and who departed from them,' some suppose the person meant to be Balaam, others the Prophet's contemporary Umayyah b. Abi Ṣalt; a third suggestion is that he was 'the Monk,' *i.e.* a resident in Medīnah who was unable to accept the mission of the Prophet. In xvi. 49 there occurs a phrase of which the meaning is said to have been unknown to 'Umar, and very unconvincing explanations of it are given. On the whole it may be said that the tradition furnished no help that is of value for the explanation of hard passages, though the Prophet's biography, where it is independent of the Qur'ān, furnishes some.

As Islām developed sects, the dogma of the infallibility of the sacred book was common to all; hence the champions of those sects were compelled to show that it supported their opinions; and sectarian commentaries arose, of which not many specimens survived the establishment of Ash'arite orthodoxy. The popularity of the *Kasshāf* of Zamakhshari († 538), in which Mu'tazilite opinions are boldly maintained, is surprising, and must be due to its author's fame as a grammarian and lexicographer. That unorthodox opinions are not always easy to reconcile with the text may be illustrated by his comment on iv. 51:

'Verily God forgiveth not association with Himself, but He forgiveth what is less than that to whom He will,'

which he says means:

'God forgiveth not to whom He will association, unless he repent, but He forgiveth whom He will what is less than that, if he do repent.'

Yet perhaps the orthodox commentaries have at times to resort to equally drastic expedients. The most popular of the latter, the *Ma'ālim al-tanzīl* of Baiḍāwī († 691), is largely copied from Zamakhshari's work, and, though its author's object was to refute the unorthodox passages, he has taken over not a few unthinkingly. For European scholars neither of these works has the interest of the much earlier commentary of the historian Ṭabarī († 310), which is swollen to gigantic proportions by the chains of authorities quoted for each gloss; even so, it is said, it is an abridgment of a work three times the size, but it appears to give a complete record of the Qur'ānic interpretation current in its author's time. Hence it is of great value for tracing the sources of statements found in later works, from which the chains of authorities are omitted. Great praise is bestowed by Sprenger on the commentary of Tha'labi († 427), which is as yet unpublished; and even greater is bestowed on that by his pupil Wāhidi († 487) in the account of this person given by Yāqūt (v. 101), who asserts that its merit was universally acknowledged. Mystical and devotional commentaries were produced by Ṣūfis, whose interpretations naturally wander far from the obvious sense of the passages. A commentary of this kind is that ascribed to Ibn 'Arabi.

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10. Editions and various readings.—We have seen that the inspired oracles delivered by the Prophet in some circumstances of his life were not generally committed to writing. The Prophet had himself given orders not to hasten with the Qur'ān before its inspiration was decided (xx. 113), and intimated that its collection, reading, and interpretation were lawful only to him (lxxv. 16 f.). Our knowledge of how it was collected and put into the form in which we read it is commonly derived from writers belonging to the 'Abbāsid period, or approximately to the 9th Christian century. The necessity for a reasoned history of the Qur'ān does not seem to have been felt very acutely under the Umayyad and the Pious Khalīfahs; what occasioned the appearance of some critical works on this subject was the era of religious controversies which animated the learned circles of the city of the Khalīfate. At the end of the 8th cent. Timothy, Nestorian patriarch residing in Baghdād, had a public discussion before the Khalīfah Mahdī and the Muslim theologians of his time; Abu Noḥ, secretary to the governor of Mosul, was writing about the same time a refutation of the Qur'ān in his native town (*c.* A.D. 820). Al-Kindi was completing his famous *Apology* of Christianity at the court of Ma'mūn. These public discussions and apologies, which contain severe criticisms of the Qur'ān, had the salutary effect of inducing the Muslim theologians to define their positions with regard to their scriptures.

The method of reasoning from data furnished by authors living more than two hundred years after the events is somewhat precarious, and indeed there are scholars who would give but little credence to their stories. In view of this sceptical attitude of outsiders, great care is taken by the Muslim authors to authenticate their statements, by a chain of uninterrupted links of oral traditionists going back to the first years of the Hijrah; frequently also there is reference to some accounts of men living at the end of the 1st Islāmic cent., who in their turn had heard them from companions of the Prophet; but, as these intermediary traditionists have written nothing which has come down to us, it is practically with men of the 9th cent. and even of a later date that we generally work. These oral compilations afford for our investigations a field extending from the lifetime of the Prophet to A.D. 705, or roughly from A.H. 1 to 86. According to their attribution of the Collection (*Jam'*) of the Qur'ān (1) to the lifetime of the Prophet, (2) to the time of the Pious Khalīfahs, (3) to the time of the Umayyad Khalīfah 'Abdul-Malik and his lieutenant Ḥajjāj, these oral traditions will be classed in three groups.

If any Qur'ānic verses were written in the Prophet's lifetime, they must have been written by secretaries and amanuenses. From different sources combined the number of these amanuenses totals forty, but it is very doubtful whether many of them did really help the Prophet in his literary task. The longest list is given by Ibn al-Athīr,[1] Dyarbakrī,[2] Nawawī,[3] and Ṭabarī.[4]

Ibn Sa'd[5] enumerates ten different persons who had collected the Qur'ān in the time of the Prophet. Bukhārī[6] reduces this number to four; the *Fihrist*[7] gives seven. Ṭabarī[8] counts also four persons as having accomplished this task, but, as their names differ sometimes considerably in the various lists, we may perhaps be justified in saying that nothing was known with certainty at the time of the above writers. Some of them indeed report other oral traditions to the effect that it was 'Uthmān, the third Khalīfah, who collected the Qur'ān under the Khalīfate of 'Umar[9] or that its collection in *ṣuḥufs* is due to 'Umar himself.[10] Suyūṭi[11] has gathered a considerable number of such traditions, two of which have appealed to the critics of last century;

[1] *Usd*, Cairo, A.H. 1285–87, i. 50.
[2] *Tārikh*, Cairo, A.H. 1283, ii. 181.
[3] *Tahdhib*, ed. F. Wustenfeld, Gottingen, 1842–47, p. 37.
[4] *Annales*, Leyden, 1878–90, i. 1782, ii. 2, 836.
[5] *Ṭabaqāt*, Leyden, 1912, ii. 112–114. [6] iii. 397.
[7] P. 27. [8] ii. 2, 836. [9] Ibn Sa'd, ii. 113.
[10] Ibn Sa'd, in Nöldeke's *Gesch. des Qorans*, Göttingen, 1860, p. 193.
[11] *Itqān*, ed. Calcutta, 1854, p. 133.

they are those first reported by Bukhārī[1] and then reproduced by many subsequent writers. They state that Zaid ibn Thābit, one of the amanuenses of the Prophet, undertook the collection of the Qur'ān at the request of the first and third Khalīfahs, and that he made two recensions of it, his sources for the first recension under Abu Bakr having been palm-branches, white stones, bones, and memory of men; the second recension, which took place under the Khalīfate of 'Uthmān, would be an official revision of the previous one, its primary object having apparently been to put an end to the 'discrepancies about the Book as the Jews and the Christians have.' His work finished, the Khalīfah found himself powerful enough to destroy or burn 'everything else from the Qur'ān (found) in the form of *ṣaḥīfah* or *muṣḥaf*'; to circulate his version, he sent 'to every country' a *muṣḥaf* of what Zaid had transcribed. Nothing is said about what happened to the direct witnesses of the revelation—the white stones, bones, and palm-branches; but in the absence of better data the story is generally accepted as true by all writers belonging to a period later than the 9th cent., and is quoted in our days almost in every composition referring to the sacred book of Islām. The plausibility of the account is brooded over by some subsequent writers, who put the following accusation into the mouth of the third Khalīfah's enemies:

'The Qur'ān was in many books, and thou discreditedst them all but one,'[2] and he 'tore up the Book.'[3]

It would be unsafe, however, to believe that this tradition can account for all the difficulties. For instance, there are numerous verses which refer to the Qur'ān as *kitāb* not only in the sense of a 'written thing,' but also in the sense of a 'real book' (xlvi. 11, lxviii. 37, etc.). These verses, if not interpolated, can hardly be explained if the sources for the first edition of Zaid were only palm-leaves, white stones, memory of men, bones, and such things.

An attempt to produce an official edition of the Qur'ān is also attributed to the Umayyad Khalīfah 'Abdul-Malik and his lieutenant Ḥajjāj. They are said to have written copies of the Qur'ān and sent them to different provinces, as the third Khalīfah had done before them.[4] Some historians tell also that they proscribed various readings which were used in their time.[5] Others go even so far as to ascribe to them the final collection of the Qur'ān,[6] and some put in the mouth of the Khalīfah the important saying,

'I fear death in the month of Ramaḍān—in it I was born, in it I was weaned, in it *I have collected the Qur'ān* (*jama'tul Qur'ana*), and in it I was elected Khalīfah.'[7]

It is a well-known fact that the Shī'ah writers accuse them of the elimination of many verses.

After A.H. 86 the process of collecting the Qur'ān came to an end, and, so far as we are aware, there are no historical data after this period for its further standardization; and therefore it is highly probable that the text with which we are familiar is the very text sanctioned by its *qurrā* (reciters and readers) of the end of the 1st Islāmic cent., and officially recognized by the third Khalīfah.

Besides the official copy of the State, traces are found of the recensions made by other collectors of the Qur'ān, and the Muslim traditionists have preserved the names of some of them. Three deserve special mention: Ubayy b. Ka'b, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, and 'Abdallah b. Mas'ūd. The two first are believed by all the best and earliest authorities quoted above to have even collected their Qur'āns in the lifetime of the Prophet, but, as the Sulṭāns and their officials had proscribed their copies, sometimes under pain of death, the author of the *Fihrist*[1] was unable to find a single one for purposes of comparison, and he contents himself with reporting the saying of Faḍl b. Shadhān that some of his friends had seen a copy of Ubayy's recension, the order of which he gives; on p. 26 the order followed by Ibn Mas'ūd is also exhibited on the authority of the same man. As to the nature of their wording we are somewhat more fortunate, since the commentators have recorded it whenever it was known in their time. Zamakhshari is in this respect the best source of information. Some words are so different that we are entitled to believe that at least a few of them come from a source completely foreign to that of the official text.

In xix. 67 the official text has, 'I shall come forth'; but Mas'ūd reads, 'And He will give thee.' Mostly, however, these variants consist of synonyms or of one or two added or eliminated words, such as 'saying' for 'order' (xix. 65), 'they will become cloven' for 'they will burst asunder' (xix. 92), 'people were disputing' for 'disputed' (xix. 35).

Some Shī'ah books give examples of wonderful interpolations, and their authors state that the words that they have added had been purposely deleted from the official text, but there is reason to believe that most of them are the outcome of political intrigues which cannot seriously affect the early edition. One of the best works on this theme is the *Kāfī* of Abu Ja'far-al-Kulīnī († A.H. 328), which was lithographed in Persia in A.H. 1281. From a MS in the John Rylands Library we extract the following example (fol. 161):

'And if ye are in doubt of what we have revealed unto our servant, *concerning 'Alī*, then bring a Surah like it' (ii. 21).

The same author says that some of these interpolations were found in the Qur'āns used in the time of Imām Rida († A.H. 203); his contention is set forth in such an emphatic manner that we are obliged to believe him. The end of v. 11 and the beginning of v. 12 of *sūrah* xlii. were, according to him (*ib.*), as follows:

'A great thing to the idolaters is that which thou callest them to, *O Muhammad, concerning the authority of 'Alī*.'

More serious is the attempt of contemporary scholars who have called attention to some interpolations, political or religious. P. Casanova[2] has gathered several of them.

The variants of the official text itself are of two kinds. Some are due to the defective character of the Arabic script, which has many letters distinguishable from one another only by an extraneous dot put over or under them. Since the ancient Qur'ānic MSS were undotted, *qurrā* of one country often read words with letters different from those adopted by *qurrā* of another country. A second series of variants consists mainly of the addition or omission of one or two consonants, such as the copulative particle *wāw* and the feminine *t*. Many books have been written to collect these various readings, the handiest being the *Muḥkmī* of Dānī (A.D. 1052). Even in the 12th Christian cent. Zamakhshari tells us that there were copies which occasionally added complete words to the standard text.

In xix. 19 some copies which he used added 'he ordered me,' and in xx. 15 some others added, 'How can I show it to you (the hour)?'

Our knowledge of these variants is derived exclusively from the commentators and some works written *ad hoc* by Muslim theologians. There are

[1] [illegible] [2] Ṭabarī, i. 6, 2952. [3] *Ib.* ii. 1, 546.
[4] [illegible] *Itḳān*, Cairo, A.H. 1309, iv. 72-74; 'Asḳalānī, *Iṣāba*, [illegible] *Wahab*, London, 1907, p. 315.
[5] [illegible] 303; Ibn Ḳuteyba, *Vies des hommes illustres*, [illegible], ed. M. G. de Slane, Paris, 1843, i. 188.
[6] [illegible] p. 37, ed. W. Muir, London, 1887.
[7] [illegible], *Chron. Arab.*, Beirut, 1890, p. 194.

[1] P. 27.
[2] *Mohammed et la fin du monde*, Paris, 1911-14, ii. 'Notes complémentaires,' p. 146 f.

in public libraries of Europe many Qur'ānic MSS of high antiquity, the oldest dating probably from the 2nd Islāmic cent., but, apart from some anomalies of spelling due to the rudimentary character of the early Arabic orthography, no real variant can be detected in them. This conclusion is borne out by Nöldeke, who examined some such MSS, and by the present writer, who for the purpose of this article consulted three of them preserved in the John Rylands Library. To our knowledge, therefore, the only extant MS which offers slight variations is a palimpsest in the possession of Mrs. A. S. Lewis; its underscript contains scraps of Qur'āns written by different hands, and its variants consist of the addition or omission of a few consonants which, however, do not injure the general meaning, although in two cases it has words completely foreign to those of the official copy; there are sufficient grounds for stating that some of these scraps belonged to those early Qur'ānic copies of Medīnah, Kūfah, and Damascus, which, according to Dānī and other writers, exhibited such variants.

11. External evidence for the existence of the Qur'ān.—If we mistake not, there is no mention of the Qur'ān in any Christian book till the end of the 8th century. The date of the Christian sources corresponds approximately with the first written records of the Muslim world. A curious fact is that the Christians of the beginning of Islām did not call the Muhammadans by the words 'Muslims' or 'Ḥanifites,' which refer to a religious belief, but simply applied to them the adjectives 'Hagarians,' 'Ishmaelites,' and 'Ṭayyāyé,' which denote their ethnological origins rather than their religious system. Numerous writers seriously believed that these Hagarians had come not so much to spread a new religion as to conquer new towns. The Muslims were helped in their conquests by many Christian Arabs, such as the powerful tribes of Banu Taghlib, 'Aḳūl, Tanūkh, and Ṭau', whose evangelization goes back to the 4th century. John of Phenek[1] expressly states about A.D. 690 that among the first Arab conquerors there were many Christians, some Monophysites and Melchites, and some Nestorians.

The anonymous historian printed by Guidi[2] gives Muhammad in the second half of the 7th cent. as a mere general professing the old Abrahamic faith preserved in the town of Madian (Medīnah), named after the fourth son of Abraham from Keturah. John of Phenek[3] attributes to him certain practices deviating in some points from the customs of the Old Covenant, but the word *mashilmanūtha* which he uses suggests that in his time and to his knowledge there was nothing yet committed to writing among the Muslims. This view of a political rather than doctrinal character of the Prophet's teaching is generally followed by all early Christians. Joannes Damascenus, writing at a later date, is more precise. Although not mentioning any sacred book, he refers to some Qur'ānic doctrines and expresses his opinion about Muhammad as follows:

'Down to the time of Heraclius (the Ishmaelites) worshipped idols; from this time to our days a pseudo-prophet has risen to them, named Μαμεδ, who through colloquies with an Arian monk had access to the Old and New Testaments, and founded a special sect.'[4]

From a discussion which took place in Syria on Sunday, 9th May, A.D. 639, between 'Amr the 'amir' and John I. the Monophysite patriarch of Antioch, it would seem that the teaching of the Qur'ān on the matter of heritages, the denial of the divinity and death of Christ, and on the subject of the Tôrāh, for which Muhammad's oracles show a marked predilection, was familiar to the Arab conquerors present in the discussion; but, on the other hand, it is certain that no Islāmic book was mentioned in the course of the colloquy. This public discussion, the Syriac text of which has been published by F. Nau in *JA* vi. [1915] 248, is recorded by the historians Michel[1] and Barhebræus.[2] The Qur'ānic dogma which denies sufferings to Christ frequently helped the Nestorians against the Jacobites. So we are told in the letters of the patriarch Isho' Yabh of about A.D. 647.[3] John of Phenek[4] informs us that the Arabs 'had a special order from the one who was their *leader* in favour of the Christian people and the monks.' This would scarcely tend to corroborate ix. 31, 34, but it is in harmony with v. 85.

The first mention of the Qur'ān by Christian writers is closely associated with the story of the monk Sergius Bḥīra ('the esteemed') which was current in Christian circles about the middle of the 8th cent., or some hundred years after the death of the Prophet. It is told in a modified form so persistently by Eastern and Western writers, and by Muslim traditionists themselves, that one is tempted to believe that it may contain some vague elements of truth.

The legend tells that an excommunicated monk called Sergius helped Muhammad in his literary, political, and religious career, and that after his death his rôle of mentor was taken up by a Jewish rabbi called Ka'b. According to Joannes Damascenus,[5] Sergius was an Arian monk. More probable is the opinion held by all the Eastern and many Western historians that he belonged to the Nestorian community. The main sources of criticism are the Arabic *Apology* of al-Kindī (*c.* A.D. 820) and the Syriac text printed by W. Gottheil in *ZA* xiii. ff. (1898 ff.), which here and there contains elements dating from the same period. Some scholars of our day have even gone so far as to assert that the story of Sergius is necessary for the right understanding of the Qur'ān.[6]

To Sergius are attributed, in their hypothesis, the very numerous passages worded in the following manner:

'But if God bring thee back to a company of them, and they ask thee leave to go forth, say, "You shall never go forth with me"' (ix. 84).

In this sentence the subject of the imperative 'say' can hardly be 'God'; otherwise instead of the word 'God' we should have had the pronoun 'I.' Until the story of Sergius is more surely established, nothing definite can be made of these surmises. The Muslim traditionists have as usual modified proper names foreign to them; so instead of *mar Yahb* they read the uncommon *Murhib*; and instead of naming Sergius they generally adopted for his proper name the Syriac word *Bḥira*, which means 'the esteemed,' and which is applied by the Syrians to every monk as a title. The Muslim traditions bearing on the subject have been gathered by Sprenger and Nöldeke,[7] and the Byzantine sources have been analyzed by Nau.[8]

12. Translations.—The Qur'ān has been translated into many European languages, but, as its miracle lies in its style, it is doubtful whether any of these translations can satisfy all the exigencies of a Semitic language exhibiting the phenomenon of rhymed prose (*saj'*). The Oriental images coloured by the tints of local

1 *Sources syriaques*, ed. A. Mingana, Leipzig, 1908, i. 146 f.
2 *Chron. Min.* in *Corp. Script. Chr. Orient.* iv., Paris, 1903, pp. 30, 38.
3 *Loc. cit.*
4 *PG* xciv. 764.

1 *Chron.*, ed. J. B. Chabot, Paris, 1899–1906, ii. 431.
2 *Chron. Eccl.*, ed. J. T. Lamy, Louvain, 1872–77, i. 276.
3 *Corp. Script. Christ. Orient.* lxiv. [1904] 97, 251.
4 *Loc. cit.*
5 *Loc. cit.*
6 Nau, *Expansion nestorienne*, Paris, 1914, p. 214 f., and *JA* vi. [1915] 248.
7 *ZDMG* xii. [1858] 238, 699.
8 *Expansion nestorienne*, p. 214 f.

topics are also to be counted among the many difficulties which the translator has to meet, not to speak of the play on words, or intended catchwords of which only the original Arabic can give a true idea.

The first translations came into existence immediately after the period of the Crusades, when Western people became more acquainted with Islām. At the initiative of Petrus Venerabilis, abbot of Clugny, the Qur'ān was rendered into Latin by Robert of Retina and Hermann of Dalmatia in 1143, and published in Basel in 1543 by T. Bibliander. A better translation is that of L. Maracci (Padua, 1698). An Arabic-Latin Qur'ān was published (Leipzig, 1768) by J. F. Froriep.

The first French translation is apparently that of A. du Ryer (Paris, 1647). Better translations are those by M. Savary (do. 1783), M. Kasimirski (do. 1840), and G. Pauthier (do. 1852).

The first English translation is the extremely bad one made from du Ryer's version by A. Ross (1648–88). A much better, but somewhat paraphrastic, translation is that of G. Sale (London, 1734). J. M. Rodwell's version of 1861 marks the first attempt to arrange the *sūrahs* chronologically; the translation of E. H. Palmer (*SBE* vi., ix., Oxford, 1880–82) is more literal.

The earliest Italian version seems to be that made from the Latin of Bibliander by A. Arrivabene (Venice, 1547). A recent and much better version is that by A. Fracassi (Milan, 1914).

The first German translations were made from the Latin, the Italian, and the English. A better translation is that of G. Wahl (Halle, 1828), which is a revision of that by F. E. Boysen (do. 1773). A more recent version is that of L. Ullmann (Bielefeld, 1853).

There are also several Dutch versions, the best of which, it is said, is that by H. Keijzer (Haarlem, 1860). A Russian version appeared at Petrograd in 1776. J. Tornberg undertook in 1876 a translation into Swedish.

All the above translations are by European Christians. Some Muslims have in the last few years tried to render their Scriptures into English; the translation by Muhammad Abdul-Hakim Khan (London, 1905) and that by Mirza Abdul-Fazl (Allāhābād, 1911) deserve special mention. The editor of the *Islamic Review* has announced a new translation, but *al-Manār*[1] is protesting against such an enterprise. Possibly it is of this translation, comprising, it is said, 30 volumes, that the first instalment appeared in 1916.

We cannot know the precise year in which the Qur'ān began to be translated into Oriental languages. The public libraries of Europe contain many MSS showing translations of the Qur'ān into Persian and Turkish. These versions do not seem to go back much before the era of the first Latin translations. There is reason to believe that a translation into Persian was in existence in the 13th century. The oldest MS to our knowledge which contains a translation into old Turki is found in the John Rylands Library—a beautiful MS of several volumes. The old Turki version which it contains may possibly date from the 14th century. The MS contains the Arabic text with an interlinear translation into Persian and Eastern Turkish, but the translation differs sometimes from the text (so the Arabic text of the MS in iii. 116 has 'and if it befall them,' while both Persian and Turki translations have 'and if it befall you'). There are many modern translations into Persian; the edition of Calcutta (A.D. 1831) and that of Delhi (1315 A.H.) seem to have widest circulation. Apparently the Turkish Government did not encourage the translation of the Qur'ān into Osmanli Turkish, and it was only after the proclamation of the so-called Constitution in 1908 that a certain Ibrahim Hilmi could in 1912 print his version at Constantinople. It is said that the most used translation into Urdu is that by Wali Ullah (Delhi, 1790). We learn from the *Moslem World*[2] that a Christian missionary, W. Goldsack, had in 1908 undertaken a translation into Bengali.

LITERATURE.—A bibliography of works which had appeared in Europe bearing on the Qur'ān was published by V. Chauvin, *Bibliographie des ouvrages arabes*, vol. x., 'Le Coran et la Tradition,' Liege, 1907. Of native works, Jalal al-Din-Suyuṭi († 911 A.H.), *Itqān fi 'ulum al-Qur'an*, first printed Calcutta, A.D. 1857, is the most complete.

A. MINGANA.

[1] xvii. 794. [2] v. [1915] 258.

R

RABBINISM.—See JUDAISM.

RACE.—1. Race-feeling and ethnology.—The word 'race' is used in different senses by men of science and ordinary people. The scientific ethnologist is concerned to find some precise, objective classification of mankind, and he employs the word 'race' to denote the particular differentia by which he classifies. As he classifies principally by physiological factors, such as shapes and proportions of skulls, degrees of pigmentation, facial angles, cross-sections of the hair, and so on, he groups the human species into corresponding 'races'—dolichocephalic and brachycephalic, brunette and blonde, prognathous and orthognathous, round-haired and elliptical-haired. This physiological classification is dealt with in detail in the art. ETHNOLOGY, but there are other objective or apparently objective characteristics which can be, and generally are, taken into account. Men can be classified by their language, and in this sense we can talk of the Latin, Teutonic, or Slav race. It is equally admissible to classify them by their social organization (matriarchy or patriarchy, blood-feud or criminal law, primogeniture or division of inheritance, etc.), or by their material technique (stone age, iron age, nomadism, agriculturalism, industrial revolution, etc.). All these classifications are taken into account by the ethnologist. See artt. ETHNOLOGY, MOTHER-RIGHT, BLOOD-FEUD, LAW, INHERITANCE, FIRST-BORN, AGRICULTURE, HUNTING AND FISHING, PASTORAL PEOPLES, etc.

It is worth noting here that the ethnologist frequently blunders in attempting to make different schemes of classification coincide with one another. He tends to identify the group with yellow skins, round hair, and slanting eyes with the group that speaks agglutinative languages, or even with the group that has a shamanistic religion, and to bracket together all these differentiæ as the marks of a single race. This tendency is unscientific, because it does not correspond to the facts. There are white populations, like the Finns, Magyars, and Ottoman Turks, who speak languages of the agglutinative family. There are yellow populations which are Christian, Muhammadan, or Buddhist in religion. The groups based on these

different factors of classification cut completely across one another; and these cross-divisions increase with the increase of civilization, for the 'objective' characteristics of civilized communities are more highly differentiated and more subject to modification than those of primitive man.

The tendency to ignore this fact is an instinctive approximation, on the part of the scientist, to the popular conception, and marks the distinction between ethnology and race-feeling. Race-feeling represents the divisions between races as clear-cut and absolute. The idea that men can belong to one race in one respect and to another in another is quite foreign to it, and this simple view is not contradicted by the data of its experience, for many of the scientific ethnologist's differentiæ are unknown to it. No racial feeling, for instance, has ever been excited by difference in skull-form, on which particular stress is laid in ethnological classification. Only students are acutely aware of the cranial differentia, which demands the application of exact scientific measurements to hundreds of thousands of human beings, and an elaborate synthesis of the experimental data, before it can be used. Yet, though race-feeling is unscientific and uninformed, it is a very real factor in social psychology, and it is the purpose of this article to examine its nature.

Race-feeling generally asserts itself by contrast with other social principles.

The bonds and divisions which it creates, and actions which it excites, are remarkably different from those produced by the feeling of State. As members of a state, men are nearly always prepared to go to war for their state and to fight members of another state which is thought to menace their own state's existence. Community of race-feeling does not inhibit in any degree this willingness to fight, and some of the fiercest political wars have been inter-racial; *e.g.*, the white populations in the Northern and Southern States of the United States felt themselves racially one, yet, because they were divided politically into Virginians, Pennsylvanians, and so on, and the Virginians held by 'State rights,' while the Pennsylvanians held by 'the Union,' they went to war with one another and fought out their difference. Again, the English-speaking ('Anglo-Saxon') race as a whole is divided into two political groups—the British Empire and the United States—which have been more hostile to one another than friendly. Britain is the only State against which the United States of America have fought twice since their independent existence. It has been the same with Prussians and Austrians on the European continent. Both were Germans, yet they went to war with one another repeatedly for more than a century to decide whether the Prussian or Austrian State should have the hegemony of Germany.

When we study this political feeling, it seems the paramount principle that divides or unites mankind. Yet all the time there are other relations between Germans as such, or 'Anglo-Saxons' as such, which are unaffected by the political barriers that happen to arise among them. The Northerners made the political rights of the Negro race the chief principle for which they fought, but their race-feeling towards the Negro has remained as strong as, or stronger than, the Southerners'. The tabu against intermarriage between the black and white races is still as absolute in the North as in the South, while Northern and Southern Whites have intermarried as freely since the Civil War as before it. Again, the political schism between the United States and Britain has not affected their feeling of a common racial inheritance. The American draws his culture from Milton, King James's Bible, and Shakespeare; he holds by the Habeas Corpus Act as the foundation of his civil liberties; he makes pilgrimages to English castles and cathedrals as shrines in which the romance of his early history is preserved, while the Englishman, on his part, takes pride in the voyages of Sir Walter Raleigh and the Pilgrim Fathers, which were the foundation of the United States. It is the same with the Prussian and Austrian. Turn their minds from Sadowa and Frederick the Great to Goethe or the hero Siegfried, and they become simply Germans, of one 'race' with one another and with the German-speaking Swiss.

In most human societies there is, in fact, a sense of some 'objective' grouping more permanent, and in the last resort more strong, than the political organization created artificially by acts of will. You may make and unmake social contracts, draw up acts of union and declarations of independence, make slavery a legal status or abolish it by emancipation, but these underlying bonds and divisions remain eternal, and are not to be modified by human desire or human contrivance. This objectivity of race is proverbial. 'Blood is thicker than water,' we say, when we see the bond of race-feeling overcoming the divisions of interest and accident; or 'Can the Ethiopian change his skin?', when race-feeling emerges as a disruptive force and checks some effort after fraternity or common citizenship by the conviction that 'Black is Black and White is White,' and that good intentions cannot change them.

This sense of an objective grouping has played an important part in history, of which we shall give a brief account. But it is essential to note, once again, that we are dealing with the sense, or mental representation, of objective grouping, and not with the really objective classification which the scientific ethnologist sets out to discover. The factors which race-feeling represents to itself as objective, and from which its stimulus is derived, are often far from being objective in fact. They vary perpetually from each other and from the scientific norm. But it is the representation, and not the external stimulus of it in any given case, that is the important element in the feeling of race.

2. Racial myths.—In a completely isolated, and also completely undifferentiated, human group the race-feeling of the members would be an accurate scientific analysis of the real objective factors constituting the character of the group. These factors would be handed down unincreased and undiminished from one generation to another, and their aggregate would be as constant as the race-feeling that it stimulated represented it to be.[1] But this is only an abstraction, and there are no actual human groups of this kind. There is no known group which does not mix and cross itself to some extent with other groups of mankind, and it is probable historically that all existing groups are differentiations from a single original stock. Even endogamous communities, which aim (of course unsuccessfully) at isolation, tend, on the other hand, to a specially sharp differentiation of 'marriage-classes' internally. Whether by internal differentiation or by coalescence with other groups outside, the permanence and objectivity of the group-character are in practice destroyed, and the sense of permanence and objectivity, which we call race-feeling, can therefore only express itself intellectually by a myth.

[1] Even in a perfectly isolated and undifferentiated group this would be true only in theory, for it appears that the factors in the character of any living organism are infinite, or, in other words, that there is a constant process of variation which makes immunity from differentiation impossible.

There are probably the rudiments of a racial myth wherever race-feeling exists, though they are often inarticulate and do not attract our attention. There are cases, however, in which myths have been deliberately invented to express existing race-feeling or even to stimulate race-feeling where it did not before exist.

The name 'Belgium' is a myth of this artificial kind. In 1830–31 certain populations which had been grouped together politically, and separated from their neighbours, for about three centuries by accidents of ecclesiastical history and the dynastic balance of power, felt an impulse to break away from Holland, with which the act of a European Congress had united them for the past fifteen years, and to form an independent political group of their own. The impulse issued in a revolution; the revolution was successful; a new state was founded. It was a very living state—the creation of a group which had just asserted its independence by fighting for it, and was determined to maintain it for the future. But this group and this state were without a name. The country had been called the Spanish Netherlands or the Austrian Netherlands for the past three hundred years, but these names were merely negative; they expressed the absence of any independent group-impulse and group-idea, and therefore could not express the new growth and realization of them. A new name was wanted for a new thing; and the Southern Netherlanders, ransacking history, appropriated the name of a conglomeration of tribes that lived between the Seine and the Meuse when Cæsar conquered Gaul. The real connexion between Cæsar's 'Belgæ' and 'Belgica' and the new group and state of 1831 was infinitesimal. Cæsar's Belgæ spoke Celtic, the Netherlanders Teutonic and Romance, and even the Romance-speaking half of the group were only very doubtfully descended from Latinized Belgic provincials. There was no relevant continuity of culture, for the Netherlanders drew their cultural inspiration from mediæval Flanders and Revolutionary France, the Belgæ theirs from the Central European iron age, and then from Rome. But the dead name artificially revived was given life by the new group-feeling by which it had been appropriated. All the national feeling of 1831 found expression in the Belgian myth; and in 1914—the next great crisis in the national history—King Albert exhorted his army to withstand the Germans by the reminder that Cæsar had called the Belgæ the bravest of the Gauls. In eighty-three years an academic myth had penetrated to the heart of a group-emotion.

The stimulation of feeling by an artificial myth, where the feeling did not exist before, can be illustrated from the history of Athens. About 511 B.C. the Athenian statesman Kleisthenes wished to abolish the traditional groupings within the Athenian State, which were bound up with the old social order, and to establish new groupings in their place which would stimulate a more democratic feeling in the members of them. The new groups that he planned were highly artificial in their character. They were to be territorial, but, to prevent them from becoming vehicles of local feeling, the territory of each group was to be scattered in three different parts of Attica. The problem before Kleisthenes was to inspire these new artificial groups with a corporate feeling stronger than the loyalty to the traditional groups. Unless he solved this, his reorganization might nominally be accepted, but would have no practical influence on Athenian political life. Yet the traditional groups not only were knit by the bonds of kinship and locality, which Kleisthenes deliberately eschewed; they were fortified by the existing body of Attic mythology, which traced back the ancestry of each φυλή and φρατρία and γένος to some hero worshipped by the Athenian people.

Kleisthenes decided to canonize his artificial groups by inventing an even more artificial myth for each of them. He drew up a panel of a hundred Attic heroes, asked the god at Delphi to select the ten most suitable, and then proclaimed these ten as the ἀρχηγετεῖς ('ancestors' or 'founders') of his ten new φυλαί. To a modern statesman this would have seemed the surest way of exposing the new φυλαί to ridicule, but Kleisthenes knew just where the vein of race-feeling in his fellow-countrymen lay. The statues of the ten ἀρχηγετεῖς were solemnly set up before the government house at Athens; festivals were enjoined on their φυλεταί in their honour; and the contingent of each φυλή was placed under its own hero's protection in war. And in less than a century the ἀρχηγετεῖς were the most living myth in Athens after the national myth of Athene Polias. They had appeared to their tribesmen in battle; they were appealed to in patriotic speeches; in fact, they had developed individual personalities. The new myth had struck root, and it had brought a new group-feeling with it. The new φυλαί supplanted the old as completely as the Departments supplanted the old French Provinces, and an Athenian now felt that he was an Erechtheid or Pandionid, and all his ancestors before him, back to Erechtheus or Pandion himself. The ten φυλαί, invented by an Athenian's statesmanship, had become for other Athenians part of the objective order of the universe.

Race-feeling is one of the strongest conservative forces in social life. It tends to stabilize any human institution, any system of grouping or division, to which it once becomes attached, no matter how recent, artificial, or transitory in its nature that institution may be. This effect of race-feeling was known to Plato, and in a famous passage of the *Republic*[1] he exploits it, half humorously and half in earnest, to conserve the highly artificial constitution of his ideal State.

Plato's State is to be differentiated into rigid castes, with the sharpest division of function and privilege; but the castes are to be recruited by merit, and every individual, starting as a child on an equality with every other, is to be assigned to his caste by a process of selective education. The psychological problem before Plato is to reconcile the feeling of permanent objective likeness and difference implied in the system of caste with the feeling of change, development, and competition implied in the process by which the castes are to be recruited. Unless his citizens feel that they each and all belong inevitably to whatever caste they have been assigned to, the castes will be mere forms without moral influence on the life of the community. But the competition by which the caste of each individual is to be determined is calculated to stimulate the very opposite feeling—that human will and effort are the determinants of human relations; and the change, at an arbitrary moment, from competition to fixity is likely to aggravate this feeling rather than to make it give place to the other feeling of objective determinism, on which the caste-system itself must depend. On the other hand, if once the sense of fixity is implanted in the adults, they will tend to extend it to their own children in turn, and will feel that they must derive their caste from their birth, and not from the selective process through which the parents have originally passed themselves, and which, like caste, is the law of the State.

The problem, in fact, is to make the citizens of the ideal State hold two opposite views of social relations simultaneously, and Plato proposes to solve it by making them—if not the ruling caste, at any rate the rest—believe 'a single noble lie.'

'I shall try,' he says, 'to make them believe that the upbringing and education we gave them was all a dream, and that, while they imagined they were being given it, they were really being moulded and brought up in the bosom of the Earth, and that their arms and tools were being fashioned there too. Then when they were finished off, I shall tell them, the Earth, their mother, brought them to the light, and it is now their duty to take counsel and arms for the country in which they find themselves (if that country is attacked), as for their nurse and mother, and to feel for their fellow-citizens as brethren born of the same Earth as themselves. . . .

'"All of you in the State are brethren," we shall tell them in our myth, "but when God moulded you, he blended gold in the substance of those among you fit to rule, and that is why they are the finest; in the warriors he put silver; and iron and bronze in the peasants and other workers. You are all of one stock, so you will generally beget children like yourselves; but sometimes there will be silver offspring from gold, gold from silver, and all the other possible permutations. So this is God's first and chiefest commandment to the rulers: Show yourselves good guardians and keep vigilant guard above all things over the children, to see which metal is blended in their souls; and if your own children are born with bronze in them or iron, have no pity on them, but dismiss them to the workers and peasants, where they belong by nature; and if workers or peasants have a gold or silver child, put him too where he belongs and promote him among the guardians or warriors, as the case may be. Thus saith the Lord, on the day when he that ruleth the State is of iron or of bronze, on that day the State shall be brought to destruction."'

The imaginary speaker then proceeds to ask his interlocutor in the dialogue whether he can see any way of getting this myth believed. 'None,' he answers, 'of making your citizens themselves believe it; but one could make their children believe it, and their children's children, and everybody that followed after.'

The suggestion is a dogmatic State education, and there is nothing visionary in expecting it to produce the intense psychological effect which Plato demands. The national states of the modern world have all organized this kind of education for their children in different degrees, and the stimulation of race-feeling in each state has been remarkably proportionate to the thoroughness with which this has been done. But the racial myth is capable

[1] 414 B–415 C.

of striking root without an educational propaganda, as is shown by the example of Kleisthenes quoted above. It can do so because the race-feeling to which it gives form is one of the instinctive social needs of mankind. There are other feelings and myths on which human societies may be founded, but they show a strong tendency to revert to the racial type in the last resort. The Jews, for instance, think of themselves theoretically as a 'Chosen People'; their foundation-myth is a 'Covenant'; their physical hall-mark is not a skin which they cannot change or a stature to which they can add no cubit, but the artificial and deliberate custom of circumcision. The covenant between Jahweh and Abraham is essentially an act of will on both sides (see art. COVENANT, § 3). Jahweh chooses Abraham, and Abraham accepts the choice; and logically every member of the Chosen People from Abraham onwards can be so only by receiving and answering the same call. Yet the idea of race has been imported into the Jewish foundation-myth. Abraham's covenant is made 'for his seed for ever,' and the chief factor in the Jewish group-consciousness is the racial factor of 'having Abraham to their father.' The retort that 'God out of these stones can raise up children to Abraham' is a profound criticism on the idea of race itself. It implies that an objective or external principle of grouping, even if it exists, will be utterly inconsequent in its workings. If you trace Judaism by descent, any one or any thing may be a Jew without partaking of any of the factors essential to Jewish group-character. To be a true heir to Abraham's covenant depends on a subjective not an objective factor—not on race but on will.

Christianity was in its origin a reaction against this reversion to race-feeling in the Jews. It proclaimed that the covenant was made not with every descendant of Abraham, but with any individual in the world who was converted to accepting it. Christianity deposed race and set up faith instead of it, and it is the more remarkable that Christianity, in turn, should have reverted towards race-feeling in the doctrine of predestination.

This doctrine may be reconciled with free choice by theological dialectic, but its underlying motive is to go behind free choice and represent it as a mere expression of an objectively determined classification. It really eliminates from the covenant the will of man, and leaves only the will of God, which, being external to man, is, from the standpoint of man's personality, as mechanical as physical phenomena. Predestination divides mankind into two races sundered from one another by an unalterable difference of spiritual morphology, just as ethnology divides it into races by the different morphology of pigmentation or skull-form. It is a racial myth considerably hypostatized, but it is a racial myth none the less, like the myth of descent from Abraham, or from the ten ἀρχηγενεῖς, or from the Belgæ in Cæsar's Gaul.

This persistent return of the social consciousness to the racial basis is doubtless the response to a psychological need. Race-feeling puts those who experience it into an atmosphere of eternity and certainty. It is like a treasure laid up in heaven, which cannot be impaired by the weaknesses and vagaries of the human will. It is an antidote to the sense of transience, effort, and weariness, which infects the world of time and change. But, though it lightens the burden on the individual, it also diminishes his power and cramps his initiative, and there is therefore a counter-current in mankind of revolt from racial determinism towards free association. The patriarchal myth is challenged by the hypothesis of the social contract, the system of caste by citizenship. This tendency towards self-determination in social grouping may be classed as political, in contrast to the racial tendency (though both these terms are possibly too narrow to cover the psychological fields included under them here). The two tendencies can be seen at tension in the course of history.

3. Historical survey.—(*a*) *General tendencies.*—All group-feeling implies a standard—a common idea of what is 'the normal,' and a common impulse to approximate towards this type.

The need for 'normality' is illustrated by the case of the African explorer who, after he had lived several years among negroes without seeing any white man but himself, used to be turned sick by the sight of his own white skin, which now seemed a leprous and obscene exception from the normal black.

The abnormal man is in fact usually more conscious of the type, and craves more keenly towards it, than members of the group who are not conscious of any peculiarity in themselves. He is his own most effective chastiser (for example, the Indian Sweeper, who accepts his caste as religiously as the Brāhman, and is as careful as he to keep his proper distance when they meet in the street, though it is the Brāhman who is in danger of being defiled). It is this homage to type on the part of the individual who varies from it that gives the group-spirit its crushing disciplinary power, and makes a group, once constituted, so inelastic towards its members within and towards other groups without. There is an element of rigidity in every group, which is probably necessary for its preservation; but the degree of rigidity varies vastly from group to group, in proportion to the degree in which the group-feeling is based on race or on free association.

The less advanced people are in civilization, the less their life (both physical and spiritual) is under their control. Nearly all the forces of nature, and many of the workings of their mind, are data external to their will instead of material to be moulded by it, and social groups are as rigid for them as all other phenomena. The internal bonds seem indissolubly intimate, the external barriers insuperably wide. Each tribe, each sex, each age within each sex or tribe, is discrete from every other; and it is just as incomprehensible (and formidable) that a boy should turn himself into a man, or a seed into a tree, as that a man should turn the tree-stem into a boomerang. Yet these miracles are happening all the time. Nature passes, and men like her, through the changes of birth, maturity, and death, and the human will is increasingly (though still unconsciously) imposing on its environment a purpose of its own. There is a contradiction in primitive man's experience, and he solves it by an elaborate development of initiation-ritual, to tide over the changes of unchanging things, which are an intolerable abnormality in a group founded upon race.

In primitive man race-feeling is thus strong, but it is an obstacle in his path which he is using all his ingenuity and imagination to surmount. The initiation-ritual is the germ of free association and conscious control, and these constitute civilization (see INITIATION [Introductory and Primitive]). In civilized society race-feeling is relatively weak, but it grows strong again in civilizations that are in bad health or on the decline—no longer as an obstacle now, but as a preservative.

When a group is decadent, it has lost its power of growth, differentiation, and assimilation; it is even losing the accumulated capital of the past; and change, instead of being the essential expression of its vitality, seems to be the process by which its vitality is wasting away. Change must be arrested if the decadent group is to survive, and the members of the group attempt to arrest it, not merely by conscious archaism and reactionary legisla-

tion, but by concentrating their group-feeling upon the objective, unalterable aspects of the group-character. If a Chinaman is always a Chinaman, if every Chinaman born inherits the qualities of the eternal Chinese race, then the China of the Boxer rebellion is as good as the Celestial Empire of the Han; and Chinese vitality, like water from a never-failing reservoir, is always bound to find the level of its highest altitude in the past. The 'foreign devils' may superficially be more clever and successful than the Chinaman of to-day, but that need not confound him so long as he holds fast to his race. They are children of to-day and will perish to-morrow, while he is of the race of the Han, who were at the zenith of human achievement when the foreigners lived like the brutes.

This defensive recrudescence of race-feeling is characteristic of all civilizations that have passed their prime—the Chinese, the ancient Egyptians (whose priests told Solon that 'the Greeks were always children,' and showed Hekataios the statues of 345 high-priests descending from father to son[1]), the Spartans and Athenians in the first centuries of the Christian era, the East Romans in the Middle Ages. It is strong at the present day among the Jews in Europe and the Jewish and Near-Eastern immigrants in the United States; and this is a remarkable case, because the motive of self-defence is here comparatively weak. These immigrants do not find themselves at a disadvantage individually as against the aliens with whom they come in contact. Unlike the Egyptians or Chinese, they adapt themselves successfully to the modern environment, and even attain the highest positions of wealth and power in the new groups to which they attach themselves. The pressure which maintains their race-feeling is not external, but arises within themselves. The Gentile group is not closed against the Jew; it is the Jew who will not merge himself in it, because that would be a tacit admission that his own group had lost its existence—a failure which he refuses to face. The more successfully, therefore, a Jew or Eastern European adapts himself to his present group-environment, the more jealously he cherishes the race-feeling that identifies him with the group of the past. He cultivates the ritual and language, prophets and heroes, folk-songs and national dress of a group which was broken up five hundred or eighteen hundred years ago, by Muhammad the Conqueror or by Titus and Vespasian. Only a few individuals overcome this instinctive group-reaction and surrender themselves spiritually to the new group in which they live and have their individual being. Such individuals are often scorned for 'losing their race'; they should rather be commended for casting out an irrational race-feeling which no longer corresponds to their real social relations, and giving their allegiance to the new group into which they have voluntarily entered.

(*b*) *Race-feeling in ancient Greece.*—It has been suggested above that race-feeling in any human society tends to be in inverse ratio to the vitality of its civilization. There is not space here to trace this curve of race-feeling through the whole of history consecutively, but it may be tested in two important instances—the civilizations of ancient Greece and modern Europe.

Ancient Greek civilization sprang more abruptly out of primitive conditions than ours, and was therefore penetrated by race-feeling more profoundly at its roots. The city-state (which was the ancient Greek state-form, as the national state is ours) was rooted in it. Historically, these city-states were not racial unities at all. They were combines of smaller groups—village communities scattered over a plain (φρατρίαι[1]), or bands of rovers flocking together from across the sea (φυλαί[2]), and even these smaller units were not homogeneous in themselves. They had come together in the Ægean from the four quarters of the earth, and an ethnologist would have analyzed in each of them every variety of skull-form and pigmentation. Yet race-feeling dominated the group-consciousness of the city-state and its structural parts. The city's legendary founder was conceived as the ancestor of the living citizen-body. He had fixed the constitution and begotten the men and women who were to live under it. The constitution could be supplemented by current administrative regulations, but (like the American federal constitution) it could be altered only by elaborate 'initiation-ritual' or else by revolution. The citizen-body, again, could be supplemented by immigration; but the immigrants remained resident aliens. They might live in the city from father to son, build up its trade, pay its taxes, serve in its wars, and even create its literature (Lysias, the model of Attic oratory and leader of the Athenian bar, was a resident alien of ancient family); but they were still aliens, without a vote and even without a status before the law (Lysias, who could present the case of his citizen-clients, could not enter the court as a principal himself). The fullest participation in the city's life could not make the blood of the founder flow in their veins, and citizenship was inseparable from this racial qualification. 'Naturalization,' like constitutional development, could be brought about only by revolution, and revolution, when it occurred, was generally complete. Every free inhabitant of the city territory—citizen, free immigrant, or enfranchised slave—then became a citizen of what was virtually a new state, with a new internal organization and a new racial myth which made the new citizen-body just as exclusive as the old.

The city-states of ancient Greece were thus racial to the core, and that is why they were never transcended—a failure that was the political ruin of the Greeks. Greek national life, on the other hand, which sprang from the same origins as the city-state, emancipated itself from race-feeling easily and quickly. It has been mentioned that in Greece, as in primitive societies, every racial group was a religious group as well, so that race-feeling and religious feeling were co-extensive (see art. GREEK RELIGION, § 4). But there were several Greek groups—Delphi, Pisa, Eleusis—which, as it were, abnormally developed their religious side and received into their religious communion neighbour-groups which would have remained hopelessly sundered from them and from each other on the narrow racial principle. Delphi, for example, by the 6th cent. B.C. had received into its 'amphictyony' about two-thirds of the Greek-speaking population on the mainland, and had given the common name of 'Hellene' to all Greek-speaking people. All 'Hellenes,' in turn, were admitted at Pisa to the religious festival of the Olympian games. Admission to the games became the test of 'Hellenism' or Greek nationality.

This Hellenism was at first conceived racially. The Hellene was contrasted with the 'barbarian' (the man who spoke jargon), and was thus distinguished by language, which, though a far broader basis of association than the ancestral basis of the city-state and its sub-groups, was still external and objective. But his Hellenism was never tested by his mother-tongue alone. Slaves, for example, were excluded from the games, though most slaves in 6th and 5th century Greece were Greek by speech and ancestry; and a man was not necessarily a Hellene even if he spoke Greek and was free. In

[1] Herod. ii. 143.

[1] Lit. 'brotherhoods.' [2] Lit. 'growths (from one stem).'

the 5th cent. B.C. a Macedonian king entered himself for the foot-race at Olympia and was appealed against as being a 'barbarian' by his competitors, but was admitted to be a Hellene on showing that his genealogy derived from the mythical ἀρχηγενεῖς of the city-state of Argos.[1] Now a king was certainly a freeman, and the Macedonians spoke as genuine a Greek dialect as the Argives themselves. The appeal against this Macedonian king therefore looks like a reversion from the linguistic basis of Hellenism to the narrower ancestral basis of the city-state. Really, however, it marks an advance in the other direction, for the qualification required of him was not that he should be a registered citizen of this city-state or that (as in fact he was not a citizen of Argos), but that he should be within the pale of the 'city-state culture.' Hellenism, by this ruling, implied not merely the freeman's status and the Greek mother-tongue, but a certain kind of social life, and other Greek historians besides Herodotus support this view. Thucydides calls the inhabitants of Epirus barbarians, though they too spoke Greek. Aristotle, on the other hand, talks of Rome[2] as a πόλις Ἑλληνίς, classifying not by language but by constitution; and he also describes the constitution of the city-state of Carthage in his *Politics*—a work otherwise devoted almost exclusively to the politics of Greece.

These standards of Hellenism led up to the conception that Hellenism was not an inalienable and untransmittable race-character, but a quality that could be acquired.

'The Hellenic people,' says Herodotus,[3] 'has in my opinion spoken the same language ever since it existed [a concession, this, to the objective notion of race]. It was originally an offshoot of the Pelasgian people, and started weak; but from small beginnings it has grown to include a multitude of populations which have become assimilated to it—chiefly Pelasgians, but many other barbarian populations as well. As for the Pelasgians, I do not imagine that, *as barbarians*, they grew to anything great previously to the growth of the Hellenes.'

In other words, the essence of Hellenism is not a certain language spoken from time immemorial by a certain group, but a development of culture which enabled this group to assimilate far larger groups outside it—the population of Attica[4] among others. This cultural evolution of Hellenism, by which an ever-expanding group is distinguished progressively from the raw material of humanity, is sketched in by Thucydides:

'Hellen and his sons grew to power in Phthiotis and were called in to assist the other city-states; and so, one by one and by the effect of intercourse, chiefly, they came to be called Hellenes, and it is only a short time ago that this name established itself among them all.'[5]

'Once all Hellas wore arms in civil life like the barbarians. The parts of Hellas that still live like this witness to the life that was once lived by all alike.

The Athenians were among the first to leave off weapons and change to less austere habits. . . . The Lacedæmonians were the first to strip naked and to take off their clothes in public and rub themselves with oil when they took exercise. Formerly even in the Olympian games the competitors wore girdles when they competed, and it is not many years since this was given up. Among some barbarians, especially the Asiatics, they still wear girdles when they box or wrestle. In fact, a great number of points can be adduced in which the life of the ancient Hellenes was undifferentiated from that of the modern barbarians.'[6]

This evolutionary view of Hellenism is at the farthest remove from the racial concept of φυλή and φρατρία which pervaded the city-state, and contemporary Greek thinkers were conscious of the contrast. They called the two opposite principles νόμος and φύσις, and debated their relation to one another. Pindar, the reactionary poet, was always proclaiming the paramountcy of φύσις, but it was also his saying that 'νόμος is king of all,'[7] and this idea entered profoundly into the attitude of the Greeks towards the likenesses and differences between group and group.

[1] Herod. v. 22.
[2] In a fragment which is the first mention of Rome in literature.
[3] i. 58. [4] *Ib.* i. 57. [5] i. 3. [6] i. 6.
[7] Quoted by Herod. iii. 38.

During the 5th cent. the Greeks became intimately acquainted with peoples strikingly unlike themselves—the Egyptians in the Nile valley and the Skythians in the Russian steppes; and this might have stimulated their race-feeling afresh. To recognize a common Hellenism in the descendants of Theseus and the descendants of Herakles was one thing, but to recognize a common humanity in men with brown skins or men who never tilled the ground needed a greater intellectual effort. The Greeks, however, accomplished this feat of imagination. The strangeness of the country and climate in Egypt and Skythia struck them as forcibly as the strangeness of the inhabitants; and they concluded that the latter was conditioned by the former, and that Skythians, Egyptians, and Hellenes were the same human metal stamped with a different impress by the diverse environments into which it had been introduced. Thus the experience of alien human types, so far from stimulating race-feeling in the Greeks, tended to make them sceptical of race altogether.

This explanation of group-differences by adaptation to different environments is worked out in a treatise on *Atmospheres, Waters, and Localities* included in the 5th cent. collection of medical writings left by the Hippokratean school.[1]

'Some (human) natures,' the writer lays down, 'are like well-wooded, well-watered mountains, some like thin-soiled, waterless country, some like meadow and marsh land, some like stiff, arable lowland.'[2] 'The Skythians,' he says elsewhere,[3] 'are like one another and no other people in the world, and it is the same with the Egyptians, except that these have been forced into their physique by the heat, and the Skythians by the cold.' He explains temperaments in the same way. 'A wild, unsociable, impetuous temperament' is produced by a climate of extremes, for in such a climate 'the mind receives constant shocks which implant wildness and weaken the mild and gentle side of character.'[4] He even traces differences in group-temperament to differences in political constitution: 'The inhabitants of Europe are also made more warlike by their institutions, because they are not ruled by kings like the Asiatics. Where people are ruled by kings, they are inevitably more cowardly.' He discusses in detail the psychological reasons for this, and cites the exception which proves the rule—'The Greeks and barbarians in Asia who are not under autocratic government, but are self-governing and labour for their own profit, are as warlike as anybody.'

But, if the group-differences between Hellene, Egyptian and Skythian, European and Asiatic, were accidental and alterable by human endeavour, if your group-character merely depended on whether you lived a thousand miles nearer the Equator or the Pole, in a swamp or on a mountain, whether you built your city with this aspect or that, whether you let yourself be governed by a king, then racial barriers were potentially abolished. Any barbarian, by taking thought, could raise himself into a Hellene, and any Hellene could sink into being a barbarian.

This conception of Hellenism, not as race, but as a culture for all humanity, gained ground steadily from the 5th cent. on. Herodotus tells the story[5] of the Skythian king who lived as a Hellene in a Greek trading-settlement several months each year, till his tribesmen discovered the double life that he was leading and killed him. The campaigns of Alexander gave vast populations the opportunity of 'Hellenizing' themselves freely; and, though this Hellenization was sometimes superficial (*e.g.*, in the propaganda of 'Jason' [Joshua] the Jewish high-priest, who conceived Hellenism in terms of a gymnasium and felt hats, and was very properly overthrown by the Maccabæan reaction), yet in other cases it was profound. The cities beyond Jordan produced a distinguished

[1] Chs. xii.–xvi.: Group-characters and environment (Egyptians, Macrocephali, Phasians, Skythians); xvii.–xxii.: Skythians in detail; xxiii.: European group-differences; xxiv.: The theory of group differences in general.
[2] Ch. xiii. [3] Ch. xviii. [4] Ch. xxiii. [5] iv. 78–80.

generation of Hellenic rhetoricians, scientists, and poets, and a new school of Hellenic philosophy was founded by the Phœnician Zeno. Taking the profound and the superficial together, it is true to say that the idea of Hellenism in ancient Greek civilization did transcend completely the idea of race inherent in the city-state. It made possible a feeling of unity between all men, and passed over without a break into Christianity.

Christianity in its origin was the antithesis of race-feeling; its membership depended on an inward spiritual act, and within the Christian group there was no more Jew or Gentile, Skythian or Hellene, bond or free. But in this it had been anticipated by the little Greek φρατρία of Eleusis, which had developed its primitive initiation-ritual into a spiritual religion and had thrown it open to all mankind.

(c) *Race-feeling in modern Europe.*—The history of race-feeling is more difficult to trace in modern Europe, because it is still unconcluded, but it is clearly very different from the development just outlined in the case of ancient Greece. European civilization did not spring straight, like Greek, from primitive social life, and was therefore partly emancipated from race-feeling at the outset. It had behind it Hellenism and Christianity—two social forces which were the antithesis of race—and also Roman imperialism, which had imperfectly translated Hellenism and Christianity into political terms by building a 'world city state.'[1] The Latin Church of the Middle Ages, with its common ecclesiastical organization, common culture-language, and common outlook on life, overrode race-feeling triumphantly. It assimilated the outer barbarians who broke into the Roman Empire in its decay. It initiated into European civilization populations which had lain entirely outside the Roman pale—Angles and Saxons, Scandinavians, Poles, Hungarians, Lithuanians. It looked on all Latin Christendom as one, and on heathens and Muslims not as vessels of destruction, but as raw clay ready for the Christian mould. The legend of Prester John (*q.v.*), the mighty Christian king who was to come out of the heart of Africa or the heart of Asia and aid his fellow-Christians to make Christianity prevail all over the world, shows how completely free from race-feeling the spirit of mediæval Christendom was. And the history of mediæval theology, orthodox and heretical, shows how living was the community of thought within the Christian group. A new doctrine travelled within a few years from one end of Christendom to another, was passed on from Croats to Albigenses, from Englishmen to Czechs, receiving a fresh but unbroken development from each of the wandering students or pilgrims by whom it was transmitted. No race-feeling inhibited this general interplay of ideas.

But this great anti-racial force on which European civilization was founded has been invaded by race-feeling to an increasing degree. The linguistic basis of association and dissociation, which had been transcended first by Hellenism, and of which Christianity in its origin had been independent, began very early to assert itself and to split the Church, united by the subjective bond of a common belief and a common will, into a number of groups divided from one another by their 'mother tongues.' This relapse towards race-feeling as the basis of grouping began on the eastern fringes of the Christian world. It first made itself felt in the disguised form of doctrinal disagreement. The Jacobite, Nestorian, and Gregorian Churches left the Catholic communion nominally because they differed on some article of the creed or some ruling of a council; and the founders of those Churches were probably unconscious that they were also ministering to an impulse in their followers to have a liturgy and a literature in their own vernacular — Coptic, Syriac, or Armenian. A few centuries later the Orthodox Church broke communion with the Roman Church, also nominally on doctrinal grounds; but the practical issue was the struggle of the Greek and Latin languages each to become the official language of the Church, and the inability of either to conquer the whole field of Christendom from the other. This linguistic element in Orthodoxy reveals itself in the liberality with which the Greek Orthodox Church allowed its Slav converts in the Balkans and Russia to form autonomous Orthodox Churches with the Bible and liturgy in their native tongue. And it is noteworthy that among the Slavs on the Adriatic littoral, who bordered on the field of Orthodox missionary expansion, the papacy was forced by competition to make equally liberal linguistic concessions, in complete contradiction to its general policy elsewhere.

The Protestant Reformation (*q.v.*) in W. Europe was in large part a linguistic movement too. The Hussites (*q.v.*) in Bohemia took up arms for 'communion in both kinds,' but they were in fact the Czech peasantry reacting against German penetration. Luther (*q.v.*), a century later, set out to restore the Bible to the laity, and with this object he and his fellow-Protestants in other countries translated the Bible into the High German, Danish, Swedish, Dutch, French, and English tongues. But the translators were also ministering to an impulse among these populations to develop native linguistic cultures of their own, of which these vernacular Bibles became the foundation.

Moreover, there was a political side to the Protestant movement, and this again was disruptive in its effect. Luther attacked the ecclesiastical centralism of the Roman papacy, and so transferred an immense field of patronage and administration to the local state. The rule 'Cuius regio eius religio' was formulated in Germany, but it was acted upon just as ruthlessly by Henry VIII., and a momentous increase in state sovereignty was the result. Each state aimed at establishing its own uniform state religion, uniting all the members of the state to one another and dissevering them from members of other states beyond the frontier. This state uniformity at the price of a schism in European civilization was enforced by persecution (such as had only been employed before by the Catholic Church acting for Christendom as a whole), and persecution led to religious war, both internal and inter-state, which widened the breaches still further.

Historians often allege nowadays that religious persecution is obsolete, that European civilization has transcended it, and that this is a notable triumph in its progress. In reality it has not been transcended, but has simply completed its development. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation were largely secular at the outset; in the course of several centuries the groups to which they gave birth have been secularized completely. The Dutch national state—to take an example—is the lineal descendant of a Protestant group which differentiated itself in the 16th cent. from the Church of Rome; the Belgian national state owes its historical limits to the fact that the population of the present Belgian territory held fast to Catholicism when its neighbours, all round it, were breaking away. In instances like those we can see the ecclesiastical factor in the group-character being eliminated, and the linguistic factor coming to the front more and more, but all the time the race-feeling, once generated in the group, has preserved

[1] 'Urbem fecisti quod prius Orbis erat' (Venantius Fortunatus to Rome).

its continuity, and has increased rather than diminished in its sense of objectivity and its intolerant spirit. It still produces persecution, civil war, and war between state and state, by a fanatical belief in the necessity and rightness of external uniformity, and by an uninhibited craving to impose this uniformity by violence. And this ideal of linguistic uniformity is the religion of Europe in the 20th cent. (so far as religion is a group-phenomenon) in the same sense as the ideal of doctrinal uniformity was in the 17th. In spite of the superficial change of orientation, the creed of 'Cuius regio eius religio' has persisted, because the race-feeling behind it has remained the same.

Thus the inheritance of internal unity which European civilization derived from Hellenism and the Christian Church has been frittered away, and the anti-racial group-feeling of Catholicism has degenerated gradually into the acutely racial group-feeling of nationalism. There has been a corresponding 'racialization' of the division between those inside and those outside the civilized pale.

It has been said that mediæval Catholicism divided mankind into Christians and pagans (including Muslims), and regarded the latter, not as creatures different in species, but as potential Christians capable of becoming actual Christians at any moment by an individual act of will.[1] But, about the time of the Reformation, the great maritime discoveries brought Europeans into contact with other populations markedly different from the people of Europe and W. Asia in externals. Their pigmentation was at the opposite extreme of the human colour-scale; their culture was too primitive to be placed in any scale of comparison at all with European culture; and the climate in which they lived was tropical instead of temperate. In coming into contact with these populations, Europeans were having the same experience as the Greeks when they came into contact with Egyptians and Skythians, but their reaction to it was not the same. The Greeks, struck by the environmental contrast as much as by the contrast in human type, explained the latter by the former, and concluded that all human beings, however acute their superficial differences, were the same in essence, and that every variation of human kind was potentially transmutable into every other. The Europeans were struck so forcibly by the external differences that it never occurred to them to explain their origin by the secondary influence of environment, or to look forward to their elimination by change of environment or progress in culture. The differences hypnotized them as the one overwhelming fact. The black man might become a Christian, he might adopt European clothes or habits of life; but he remained black, and the European white. The colour-barrier presented itself to the European as insurmountable, and it displaced religion for him as the dividing-line between people within the pale of civilization and people without. Instead of classifying mankind as Christians and pagans, transmutable, by conversion, into one another, he now classified them as 'white men' and 'natives,' the 'white race' and the 'black race,' divided from one another by external objective characteristics which no act of will on either side could surmount. And, just as the Greek's hypothesis of adaptation to environment, as an explanation of the Egyptian and the Skyth, reacted on his own feeling of Hellenism, making it more humane and un-racial in quality, so the European's hypothesis of a specific difference between Black and White reacted on his own growing nationalism and made it more uncompromisingly racial than it need otherwise have become.

[1] It is typical of mediæval Catholicism that its artists represented one of the Three Magi as a negro.

The internal unity and external assimilative power which Christendom once possessed can be inferred by comparison with the Islāmic world as it still is—Islām being an inferior reproduction of Christianity with a belated development (see MUHAMMADANISM). The Muslim missionary in W. Africa or India makes more converts than the Christian missionary, because he really receives his converts into his own group, treats them as social equals, and gives them his daughters in marriage, while the European missionary is divided by the colour-bar from Christian natives just as acutely as from pagan, and can only organize his converts into a 'native church,' which is still outside the pale of the European community.

It is noteworthy, however, that the Muslim populations which have approached nearest to the standards of European civilization are also losing their pan-Islāmic sense of brotherhood and acquiring a sense of linguistic nationality of the European kind. Among the Arabs of Syria this new nationalism, which is dividing them from their Persian or Turkish-speaking co-religionists, has tended in compensation to break down the barriers between Christians and Muslims of Arabic speech. The Osmanli Turks, on the other hand, have developed a nationalism of the purely dissociative kind. Before 1908 the Ottoman Empire, like mediæval Christendom, was a group which gave the privileges of its membership to all inhabitants of its territory who professed the established group-religion, whether they inherited its creed or adopted it by conversion. The Young Turkish party, when it came into power, substituted for this pan-Islāmic basis a programme of 'Ottomanization,' which made the Turkish language, instead of the Muslim faith, the obligatory group-characteristic, and set out to eliminate all inhabitants of Ottoman territory who would not or could not be 'Ottomanized' by force. The racial persecutions in Turkey during the European War were directed against the Muslim Arabs as well as the Christian Armenians; and, though the Armenians were offered the traditional alternative of conversion, those who accepted it either were distributed among Turkish families, if they were individual women and children, or, if they were whole towns or villages, were made away with as mercilessly as those who refused. Communities converted wholesale would have retained their linguistic nationality, as the Slavs of Bosnia retained theirs after their wholesale conversion in the 15th century. But the Young Turks set no store by the religious uniformity[1] which had been the paramount social bond for their forefathers, if it left outstanding the external, objective differences that offended their sharpened racial sense.

This historical outline of the development of modern race-feeling raises a problem. Why should the most progressive Muslim populations be affected most powerfully by 'racialization,' which is clearly a retrogressive tendency? And, if European influence is the cause, how has European civilization made such vigorous and constant progress as it has from the Dark Ages to the present day, with this equally rapid and steady counter-current carrying it in the reverse direction?

The answer seems to be that the degeneration of group-feeling which we have traced, from the anti-racial spirit of the Catholic Church to the almost unmitigated racialism of contemporary nationality, is only one strand in the development of European civilization seen as a whole. Even in the movements through which we have observed race-feeling

[1] In the case of forced converts, the uniformity would of course be purely nominal, and in no sense an act of will implying a unity of spirit; but history shows that the spiritual bond, which the forced converts never feel, establishes itself almost automatically in their descendants.

progressively gaining ground other and anti-racial forces were disengaged. The schisms of doctrinal theology were not only expressions of linguistic particularism but fields for intellectual activity; the Lutheran Reformation was not only a descent towards the national state but a victory for freedom of thought and conscience; and the narrowest and most intransigent nationalism of the 20th cent. is not a mere substitution of dogmatic barriers for the brotherhood of mankind, but the struggle towards equality of populations which, through disunion, numerical weakness, illiteracy, or other adverse social and political conditions, had previously been dominated by other groups or had altogether lacked a group-consciousness of their own. The stimulation of race-feeling, which resulted from these movements, and which we have so far considered in abstraction from the other consequences that they had, was often only the lesser backwash of a forward wave—the toll which liberation of mind and will had to pay to slavery. And there were also movements, like the American or the French Revolution, in which the gain so outbalanced the loss that no definitely new stimulation of race-feeling can be traced to them, to offset the impulsion which they gave towards free association.

This anti-racial tendency in European civilization, which has so far outdistanced the racial tendency of nationalism by the whole span of European progress, is what we name 'democracy'; and modern democracy has liberated broad fields from race-feeling which Hellenism and Christianity never conquered.

There was the inveterate racialism of the ancient city-state, which on its political side was only superficially transcended by the Roman Empire; and the Roman Empire, at the time when Christendom was offering spiritual unity to all mankind, was disintegrating into the 'feudal system,' under which a man was bound to the soil on which he was born by more sordid and prosaic fetters than the φυλαί and φρατρίαι of the historical Greek city-state, or the citizens of gold, silver, and bronze in Plato's racial myth. Feudalism is the greatest, though by no means the only, incubus of racialism inherited by European civilization and successfully thrown off. But, as was remarked at the beginning of this section, it is impossible to trace the history of race-feeling in European civilization with a certain hand, because it is still in the making. In the phase of history that led up to the European War nationalism made such formidable advances among almost all civilized peoples that race-feeling and democracy seemed on the way to equilibrium, and the continued progress of civilization probably depends upon the ulterior consequences of the war. For this equipoise which is embodied in the contemporary 'democratic-national state' is not, after all, a stable condition. Nationality and democracy are really opposite tendencies—the one towards race-feeling and the other away from it—and one of the two must have the mastery in the end. But the data are insufficient for speculation into the future, and we must be content to study race-feeling through the past history of it, which has been outlined in this article.

LITERATURE.—i. *GENERAL*.—**W. Z. Ripley**, *The Races of Europe*, London, 1900 (for distinction between race-feeling and ethnology). **Eduard Meyer**, *Gesch. des Altertums*[2], i. i., Stuttgart, 1907.

ii. *ANCIENT GREECE*.—**Herodotus; Thucydides; Plato**, *Republic*, ed. J. Burnet, in 'Oxford Texts,' Oxford, 1901-06; H. Francotte, *La Polis grecque*, Paris, 1908 (for the internal structure of the Greek city-state).

iii. *MODERN EUROPE*.—**H. S. Chamberlain**, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, Eng. tr., London, 1911 (for uncritical theorization). *The Birth of a Nation*, cinematograph film produced by W. W. Griffiths (showing genuine race-feeling and its essentially negative character).

A. J. TOYNBEE.

RĀDHĀ SOĀMIS.—The Rādhā Soāmi Satsaṅg is one of the numerous sects which have sprung up in India since the opening of the 19th cent. as a result of Christian and Western influence. It is a Hindu sect, its closest affinities being with the Vaiṣṇavites, and especially with Kabīr (*q.v.*).

A banker of Kṣatriya caste, resident in Agra, and known as Śiva Dayāl Saheb, was already regarded as a notable teacher and saint before the Mutiny. He came of a Vaiṣṇavite family, and had connexions with the Vaiṣṇavite priests of Brindāban. Very little is known about his life, but it is clear that he gradually gathered round him a band of devoted disciples, and exercised considerable influence. His theology was similar to that of Kabīr, but he also taught his pupils a system of secret meditation, which induced trances and other hypnotic results. He claimed for himself the title Sant Satguru, 'holy preceptor.' His wife, who was a woman of character, also took part in the teaching. Photographs of husband and wife were given to disciples to be contemplated during meditation, and husband and wife were worshipped as divine *gurus*. In 1861 the *guru* made a public statement of his doctrine, and he left two books in Hindī, both called *Sār Bachan*, 'Essential Utterance,' which form part of the scriptures of the sect.

His most famous disciple was Saligram Saheb, a Government official, who rose to the position of Postmaster-General of the United Provinces and received from Government the title Rai Bahadur. He was a man of vigorous and orderly mind. The horrors of the Mutiny drew his thoughts away from the world, and he became a disciple and devoted personal attendant of the Sant Satguru. Max Müller gives a short account of him in his life of Rāmakṛṣṇa.[1]

In 1878 the *guru* died, and Rai Saligram Saheb Bahadur was at once accepted by the disciples as his successor. It seems clear that, while the essentials of the system came from the first *guru*, everything else is the work of Saligram Saheb. He organized the sect, gave it its name, and formulated the theology, doubtless following closely the lines of the original *guru's* teaching. The following sketch of the system is drawn from his *Rādhā Soāmi Mat Prakāsh* ('Exposition of Rādhā Soāmi Doctrine'), a short systematic manual in English, which was printed at Benares in 1896 for private circulation:

The universe is in three spheres or divisions, each subdivided into six regions.

A. The first sphere is purely spiritual. In it dwells the Supreme Being, who is altogether unknown. His name, however, is known to be Radha Soami; for that name resounds through all regions, and can be heard by those who have had the proper initiation and training.

B. The second sphere is spiritual-material. It contains matter as well as spirit, but its matter is comparatively pure and is controlled by spirit. Over this region presides a Viceroy, who is said to be the God of the Bible, the *Brahman* of the *Upaniṣads*, the *Lāhut* of Muslim saints.

C. The third region is material-spiritual. In it matter dominates spirit, and all spirits contained in it are clothed in gross matter. The Governor of this material universe is identical with the Hindu Brahmā and with the ordinary gods of other religions.

From the Supreme Being there proceeds an emanation called the Śabda, *i.e.* the Word, which streams down through all regions and returns again to the Supreme. From the Śabda there rings out in all regions the divine name Rādhā Soāmi.

Man's soul is a pure drop from the ocean of the Supreme Spirit; but, being wrapped in coarse matter, it falls into bondage to material things, and may degenerate seriously, unless spiritual help is given; but the Supreme Being has certain 'beloved sons'—men who have risen to perfect union with himself, who from time to time descend from the spiritual sphere in mercy and love, in order to deliver men from the bondage of matter and to enable them to rise to the highest spiritual heights. Each of the *gurus* of the sect is one of those beloved sons.

The *guru* teaches his disciples, by means of the secret discipline of the sect, to hear in their inner organs the sound made

[1] *Ramakrishna: his Life and Sayings*, London, 1898, p. 204ff.

by the Śabda, as it resounds through all regions. He then teaches them to mount on this spirit-current and to rise on it to the Supreme. There is no way of approach to the Supreme except through the Sant Satguru; so that all men ought to have recourse to him for salvation. The secret discipline is called *Surat-Śabd-Yoga*, 'union of the human spirit with the Word.' The methods of this discipline are not known further than that they are said to be meditative, and that the *guru* gives the disciple his photograph, and bids him contemplate it as the revelation of God in his meditations. In addition to the secret practice, men are told that prayer, works of faith and charity, a vegetarian diet, abstinence from intoxicating drink, and attendance at meetings of the sect for worship are necessary for the holy life.

The second *guru* died in 1898. Besides the English booklet mentioned above, he left behind him four volumes in Hindī verse, named *Prema Bāṇī*, 'Love Utterances,' and six volumes in Hindī prose, named *Prema Patra*, 'Love Letters.'

The third *guru*, Brahmā Saṅkara Miśra, a man of Bengali extraction, resident in Benares, guided the sect from 1898 until his death in 1902. His book, *Discourses on Rādhāsoāmi Faith* (Benares, 1909), contains brief statements about the *gurus*, which have been used in this article.

Since the death of the third *guru* the sect tends to fall into two sections, one of which is in favour of appointing a new *guru*, while the other is opposed to it. The former section recognizes at present Ānand Swarūp as their *guru*, while the other party is led by Mādhava Prasād, who refuses to be called a *guru*.

The Sant Satguru is held to be identical with the Supreme Being, and receives lofty titles to express his dignity. The worship of the sect therefore centres in him. All the excesses of Hindu *guru*-worship are reproduced among Rādhā Soāmis. They not only prostrate themselves before the *guru*, adore him, meditate on his virtues, pray to him, and believe that everything that has touched his body is filled with spiritual power; they also follow certain Hindu sects in a number of disgusting practices. They drink the water in which he has washed his feet, eat certain products of his body, and, after his death and cremation, drink his ashes in water.

When a *guru* dies, his relics are placed in a tomb, his photograph is affixed to it, and round it is erected a building which, because it is sanctified by the relics of the *guru*, is called a *gurudvāra*. Since three *gurus* have passed away, there are three *gurudvāras*: (1) the shrine of the first *guru*, who is called Rādhā Soāmi, or Soāmijī Mahārāj, is at the Rādhā Soāmi Bāgh, some four miles from Agra; (2) the shrine of the second *guru*, who is called Huzoor Mahārāj, is at Pipalmandi, Agra; (3) the shrine of the third *guru*, whose title is Mahārāj Saheb, is in a fine new building in Madho Das's garden, Benares.[1]

Apart from the adoration of the *guru*, the worship of the sect is a simple service consisting of scripture-reading, hymn-singing, prayer, and a sermon. Their scriptures are the writings of Kabīr and of certain other Hindu saints and the works of their own *gurus*.

Since the sect is largely guided by Kabīr, and recognizes one God only, the visiting of Hindu temples and the worship of Hindu idols are discountenanced. Yet a Hindu, a Muslim, or a Christian may remain outwardly a member of his old religious community and conform to its usages, while secretly avowing himself a Rādhā Soāmi and partaking in the worship and private meditations of the sect.

The name of the sect is rather an enigma. The word *satsaṅg* is quite clear, for it is a Hindī word used by the Sikhs for a company of pious people; but *Rādhā Soāmi* is obscure. It is a phonetic misspelling of Rādhāsvāmī, 'Lord of Rādhā,' a title used of Kṛṣṇa in relation to Rādhā, his famous cowherd mistress, in the latest cycle of the myth. It is most strange that, in a sect which worships one God only, this phrase with all its coarse associations should be declared to be the name of God, and should also be used as the title of the first *guru* of the sect, and to form the name of the sect itself. No credible explanation has ever been given by any member of the sect. It transpires, however, that the first *guru* and his wife used to dress up as Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā to receive the worship of their disciples; and when, in February 1914, the writer of this article visited the *gurudvāra* of the first *guru*, he found two photographs hanging on the tomb. An educated member of the sect, who acted as cicerone, said that they were the photographs of Rādhā and Soāmi, the first *guru's* wife and the *guru* himself. Thus it is probable that, during the lifetime of the *guru* and his wife, when the disciples went to worship them, they addressed them as Rādhā and Soāmi, and that the double name thus became associated with the chief act of worship of the sect. That would be sufficient to account for the way in which it is used.

While the main body of the teaching and the practice of the sect comes from Kabīr and other Vaiṣṇavite sources, certain phrases and ideas are clearly Christian in origin. In many points both of teaching and of practice there is a curious similarity between the system and theosophy (*q.v.*).

LITERATURE.—The chief publications of the sect have been mentioned in the course of the article. A valuable pamphlet, *The Radha Swami Sect*, by H. D. Griswold, was published several years ago by the Cawnpore Mission Press, but is now out of print. The fullest account of the sect will be found in J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, New York, 1915, pp. 157–173.

J. N. FARQUHAR.

RĀDHĀVALLABHĪS.—The Rādhāvallabhīs are a Vaiṣṇava sect of N. India, numbering about 25,000 adherents, and founded in the early part of the 16th cent. by one Harivaṁśa, the son of a Gauṛ Brāhmaṇa living in the Sahāranpur District. Harivaṁśa's name appears in the list of teachers of the Sanakādi-sampradāya of the Bhāgavata faith, founded by Nimbārka (see artt. NĪMĀVĀTS and BHAKTI-MĀRGA, vol. ii. p. 545). This *sampradāya* was divided into five *śākhās*, or branches, by a teacher named Harivyāsa, and Harivaṁśa's name is entered in the list as that of the third teacher of the fourth branch.[1] Other authorities state that he belonged to the Mādhva-sampradāya[2] (see artt. MĀDHVAS and BHAKTI-MĀRGA, vol. ii. p. 545), and his teaching, as Growse[3] points out, was professedly derived partly from the one and partly from the other of these churches.

Harivaṁśa was born in A.D. 1502, his father being at the time a high official in the service of the emperor.[4] He married, and had two sons and one daughter. After settling his daughter in marriage he determined to become an ascetic. On the way to the holy land of Vṛndāvana he met a Brāhmaṇa, who declared that he had been commanded in a dream to present him with his two daughters and also with an image of Kṛṣṇa in the character of Rādhāvallabha, or lover of Rādhā. Harivaṁśa married the girls and, in A.D. 1525,[5] set up the image in a temple which he had founded in Vṛndāvana, on the bank of the river Jamnā.

The worship of the sect founded by him is nominally directed to Kṛṣṇa as Rādhā's lover, but practically it is devoted to Rādhā herself. Rādhā was one of the *gōpīs*, or herdmaidens, who are

[1] Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, p. 165, lines 19–27, is erroneous.

[1] *Vaiṣṇavasarvasva*, p. 15. [2] *Bhaktanāmāvalī*, p. 11.

[3] *Mathurā*, p. 186.

[4] The *Bhaktamāla* does not say who the emperor was. Sikandar Lōdī was at that date reigning at Āgrā.

[5] So *Bhaktanāmāvalī*, p. 11. This would make him twenty-three years old, which does not give much time for him to have a marriageable daughter. But girls are married in infancy in N. India.

celebrated as the companions of Kṛṣṇa during his youth spent in Vṛndavana. The legend of his sports with these herdmaidens is fairly old. It appears in the *Harivaṁśa*, or supplement to the *Mahābhārata*, and in the *Viṣṇu* and *Bhāgavata Purāṇas*, but it is not till we get to the *Brahma Vaivarta Purāṇa*, a late sectarian work, that we find prominence given to Rādhā as the leader of the *gōpīs* and as Kṛṣṇa's beloved mistress. Here we are told that Rādhā, from the beginning of all things, had been Kṛṣṇa's *śakti*, or energic power, and that, when he came down to earth in human form, she also became incarnate.

In many religions there has been a tendency exhibited to worship a female counterpart of the deity, as his energic power. This was not confined to India. It has even appeared in corrupt forms of Christianity which substituted the Virgin-Mother for the Third Person of the Trinity. In India this *śakti*-worship became most developed among the Śaiva sects, but it has also obtained some currency among Vaiṣṇavas, some of whom direct their prayers more particularly to Lakṣmī or to Sītā, the spouses of Viṣṇu and of Rāmachandra respectively; but among Rādhāvallabhīs this is carried to an extreme length. Rādhā is the supreme object of worship, and the writings of the sect are devoted to singing her praises, and to describing, with most sensuous and erotic detail, the union of Kṛṣṇa with his beloved. The whole is, of course, capable of mystic interpretation, and is so interpreted by the pious, but Growse,[1] in commenting on one of Harivaṁśa's devotional poems, is not unfair in saying:

'If ever the language of the brothel was borrowed for temple use, it has been so here. But, strange to say, the Gosains, who accept as their Gospel these nauseous ravings of a morbid imagination, are for the most part highly respectable married men, who contrast rather favourably, both in sobriety of life and intellectual acquirements, with the professors of rival sects that are based on more reputable authorities.'

To indicate the fervour of his love for Rādhā, Harivaṁśa took the prænomen of Hita, 'affectionate,' and he is generally now known as Hita Harivaṁśa. This custom was followed by his disciples, so that we find names such as Hita Dhruva Dāsa and Hita Dāmōdara as those of his pupils and imitators.

Harivaṁśa was about sixty-five years old at the time of his death. He was the author of two works. One of these, written in Sanskrit, is the *Rādhāsudhānidhi*, 'Store of the Nectar of Rādhā,' extending to 170 long couplets. The other, the *Chaurāsi Pada*, 'Eighty-four Stanzas,' is in Hindi. They are both very erotic in character and exhibit much poetical fancy. Portions of them have been translated by Growse. Stray verses attributed to him are also recited. Wilson mentions a work entitled the *Sēvāsukhī-vāṇī*, 'Sayings of the Companions in (Rādhā's) Service.' He states that it is a more ample exposition of the notions of the sect and of their traditions and observances, as well as a collection of their songs and hymns. He does not mention the author's or compiler's name.

By his later marriage Harivaṁśa had two sons, one of whom, Vraja Chandra, or Braj Chand, was the ancestor of the present Gosains of the temple of Radhavallabha in Vṛndāvana, the chief temple of the sect. It dates from the end of the 16th or beginning of the 17th century.

LITERATURE.—The only English authors who have written on the religious sects of this sect are H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, p. 175 ff., and F. S. Growse, *Mathurā, a District Memoir*[2], Allahabad, 1880, p. 18 ff. The following Indian authorities may also be consulted: Nābhā Dāsa, *Bhaktamāla* (see *ERE* ii. 546), verse 90, and Priyā Dāsa's commentary thereon; the best edition is that of Sītārāmaśaraṇa Bhagavāna Prasāda, Benares, 1905 (the account in this is summarized by Wilson, and given in full by Growse); Dhruva Dāsa, *Bhaktanāmāvalī*, ed. with full commentary by Rādhākṛṣṇa Dāsa (Nāgarī Pracharinī Sabhā), Benares, 1901, p. 11 f.; Harischandra, *Vaiṣṇavasarvasva* (in *Harischandrakalā*, Bankipur, n.d.), p. 15; Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Upādhyāya, *Hita Hariwaṁśa Praghaṭṭa*, Bṛndaban, 1910; Ganēśavihārī Miśra, Syāmavihārī Miśra, and Sukadēvavihārī Miśra, *Miśrabandhuvinōda*, Khaṇḍwā and Allāhabad, 1913, p. 284 ff.

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

RAGGED SCHOOLS.—See JUVENILE CRIMINALS.

RAI DĀSĪS.—The Rai Dāsīs are a Vaiṣṇava sect of N. India, founded by Rai (or Ravi) Dās, one of the twelve chief disciples of Rāmānanda (see *ERE* ii. 546, and art. RĀMĀNANDĪS). Its members are low-caste Chamārs, or leather-workers, and, in fact, Chamārs, as a caste, often call themselves 'Rai Dāsīs.' Their doctrines do not differ materially from those of other followers of Rāmānanda. They are chiefly found in the United Provinces of Āgra and Oudh, where their numbers are considerable, but, owing to the use of the title not only as a sect name but also as the name of a caste, the total is quite uncertain. In the census of 1891 their numbers were recorded as 417,000, and in that of 1901 as 47,000; but nothing can be deduced from these figures except that, in the latter year, it is probable that many were shown, not as belonging to their particular sect, but under the more general title of Rāmāwat.

Rai Dāsa, like his followers, was a Chamār by caste, and the sect founded by him, if it can be called a sect, is hardly more than an association of Chamārs who have adopted the tenets of his master, Rāmānanda. It has no peculiar sacred book, although it has orally preserved a number of hymns attributed to its founder. Several of these have found their way into the Sikh *Granth*, and another collection of them has lately been printed under the title of *Rai-dās-jī-kī Bāṇī aur Jīwan-charitra* (Allāhābād, 1908). A perusal of these hymns shows that the only important point on which their author laid more stress than did some of the contemporary Vaiṣṇavas was that *bhakti*, or devotional faith, in Rāma was of infinitely more importance than a belief in the Vedas or in the teaching of Brāhmanical Hinduism. As is natural in members of a despised community, stress was also laid on the unimportance of caste-distinctions, but this doctrine is common to all the developments of Rāmānanda's teaching.

Rai Dāsa's home was at Benares, and, as a disciple of Rāmānanda, he probably flourished in the earlier part of the 15th century A.D. He was a fellow-disciple with Kabīr (*q.v.*), with whose teaching his doctrine regarding the uselessness of the Vedas and Brāhmanical Hinduism had much in common.

In the art. RĀMĀNANDĪS attention is drawn to the catholicity of Rāmānanda's reformation. His twelve chief disciples included not only women, but men not of the Brāhman caste, such as Kabīr, the Musalmān weaver, Sēna, the barber, and, lowest of all, Rai Dāsa, the despised leather-worker. Salvation was now no longer the monopoly of Brāhmans, nor was it any more conveyed through the medium of Sanskrit, a dead language. It was now freely offered to all men, of no matter what caste, and in the language of their everyday life. A man could be a saint, and yet adhere to that state of life to which it might please God to call him. Saint and teacher though Rai Dāsa was, he nevertheless lived the life of a married man, and supported himself by his caste-trade, as a shoemaker.

The *Bhaktamāla* contains several legends concerning him, of which a brief account may be given. In order to get over the inconvenient fact of his low caste, it is stated that he was originally a Brāhman. Contrary to his teacher Rāmānanda's instructions, he took alms from a shopkeeper who had dealings with Chamārs. Rāmānanda cursed him to be reborn in that

[1] *Mathurā*, p. 199.

caste. He at once died, and was born again in the house of a neighbouring Chamar; but, owing to his former piety, he came into the world with a memory of his previous instruction, and refused to drink his mother's milk till he had been duly initiated as a Vaiṣṇava. Rāmānanda was informed of this by a direct divine communication, and hastened to the house. There he saw the babe, and whispered into its ear the initiatory formula, or *mantra*. The infant thereupon accepted the breast and grew up a pious votary of Rāma. His father at length expelled him from the house, and he set up a little hut close by, where he lived with his wife in great poverty, carrying on his trade as a shoemaker. He made a practice of presenting a pair of shoes to any pious man who happened to pass by, and kept body and soul together by selling what remained. Further legends tell how, by the direct interposition of Rāma, he became wealthy and was able to found a monastery, to which he attracted numerous disciples. He was persecuted by Brāhmaṇas, and haled before the king as an unauthorized teacher; but, in consequence of a miracle performed by the deity in answer to his prayer, reminding us of Elijah's trial of strength on Mount Carmel, not only was he released, but he converted his opponents.

One of his converts was Queen Jhālī of Chitaur. She invited him to come thither to a great religious feast. The local Brāhmaṇas refused to eat with him, and were provided by the queen with uncooked food, which they prepared for themselves in a place apart. When, however, they sat down to eat, they found that, by a miracle, Rai Dāsa had multiplied himself, and was sitting and eating between each two of them. This opened their eyes, and, filled with humility, they also became his disciples. Rai Dāsa then tore open his skin, and, showing to them beneath it his former Brāhmaṇa body wearing a sacred caste-thread of gold, he died and went to heaven.

These legends were recorded by Priyā Dāsa, under the instruction of Nābhā Dāsa, who lived only three generations later than Rai Dāsa, and their marvellous character illustrates the impression that his teaching must have made upon his immediate successors.

LITERATURE.—Practically the only authority is Nābhā Dāsa, *Bhaktamāla* (see *ERE* ii. 546), verse 54, and Priyā Dāsa's commentary thereon. See, however, Literature at art. SIVA-NĀRĀYAṆĪS. The best ed. of the *Bhaktamāla* is that of Sītārāmaśaraṇa Bhagavān Prasāda (Benares, 1905). A summary will be found in H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, p. 113 ff., where the legends about Rai Dāsa will be found related more fully than above, but not quite in accordance with the original. Cf. also Dhruva Dāsa, *Bhaktanāmāvalī*, ed. with a full commentary, by Rādhākṛṣṇa Dāsa (Nāgarī Pracāriṇī Sabhā), Benares, 1901. In this Rai Dāsa is no. 110. According to the editor, there are still descendants of Rai Dāsa in Benares, who carry on their ancestral trade of shoemaking. For an ed. of his songs see the text above (p. 560).

GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

RAIN.—Water is the first need of man, since without it vegetation withers and animals and men languish and die. It is therefore not to be wondered at that in countries inhabited by primitive people where rain is scarce magico-religious ceremonies are resorted to in order to regulate the supply. In fact, so important is this aspect of primitive cult that a special class of magicians, and, in some cases, a particular totem, are set apart for the due performance of rain-making ceremonies. From an anthropo-geographical survey of the distribution of these rites it is evident that the supernatural control of rain is chiefly found in areas in which there is an abnormal rainfall, as, *e.g.*, in sultry lands like Australia, and parts of E. and S. Africa, where for months together the sun blazes down from a cloudless sky on the unprotected bodies of men and the parched and withering vegetation. At the same time it must be remembered that it is not unknown in the moister climate of Europe, as, *e.g.*, in Russia.

1. The water-totems in Australia.—Among the Arunta tribe of Central Australia is a group of people who have water for their totem, and to whom the secret of rain-making was imparted in the *alcheringa*, or 'dream-time' of long ago, by an individual named Irtchwoanga, who also settled upon the exact places at which the *intichiuma* ceremony should be performed. One of the most important of the water-totem groups is a local subdivision of the Arunta, inhabiting a district about 50 miles to the east of Alice Springs, called by the natives the 'rain country' (*Kartwia quatcha*).

When the *chantchwa*, or leader, of this group is about to hold a rain-making ceremony, 'he sends messengers, called *Inwurra*, to the surrounding groups, to inform them of his intention, and to call the members of the totem together. . . . When all are assembled . . . the men of the totem march into camp, painted with red and yellow ochre and pipeclay, and wearing bunches of eagle-hawk feathers on the crown and sides of the head. At a signal from the Chantchwa all sit down in a line' and sing. At another signal they all jump up and walk in single file out of the camp, and spend the night a few miles away. 'At daybreak they scatter in all directions in search of game, which is cooked and eaten, but on no account must any water be drunk, or the ceremony would fail.' While some of the men paint themselves, others erect a 'wurley,' or shelter of boughs, near the main camp. When the decorating is complete, the men march back to the wurley silently and in single file. The young men enter first and lie face downwards at the inner end, while the older men, after decorating the leader, take up a position near the opening. Singing continues for some time, and then the *chantchwa* walks up and down a trench outside the wurley, his body and legs quivering in a most extraordinary manner. This performance is repeated at intervals during the night, the singing continuing practically all the time. At daybreak he executes a final quiver, and, thoroughly exhausted, 'declares the ceremony to be at an end, and at once the young men jump to their feet and rush out of the wurley, screaming in imitation of the spur-winged plover. The cry is heard in the main camp, and is taken up with weird effect by the men and women who have remained there.' On the next night an ordinary rain-dance is held by the men.[1]

J. G. Frazer explains the ceremony by making it imitative of a rising storm.[2] The wurley, he imagines, stands for the vault of heaven, from which the rain-clouds, represented by the chief actor strutting across the trench, come forth to move across the sky. The other performers imitate birds that are supposed to be harbingers of rain.

The Kaitish tribe of Central Australia has also a water-totem.

When the headman desires to hold an *intichiuma* ceremony to make rain, 'he goes to a place called Anira, where, in the Alcheringa, two old men sat down and drew water from their whiskers, the latter being now represented by stones out of which the rainbow arose. First of all he paints the stones with red ochre,' and then he paints a rainbow on the ground, one or more on his body, and one on a shield, which he also decorates with zig-zag lines of white pipeclay to represent lightning. After 'singing' the stones and pouring water from a vessel on them and on himself, he returns to camp, taking with him the shield, which must be seen only by the men of the same moiety of the tribe as himself, lest the rites be rendered of no avail. The shield is hidden away in his camp until sufficient rain has fallen, after which it is brought forth and the rainbow is rubbed out. A vessel containing water is kept by the side of the headman, into which he throws pieces of white down from time to time, representing clouds. The wife of the leader is obliged to absent herself from the camp for the time being, and on her return imitates the sound of the plover, a bird whose characteristic cry is always associated with rain in these parts. 'If rain follows it is attributed to the performance of the ceremony, but if it does not then it simply means that some one else has prevented it by superior magic.'[3]

2. Rain-charms.—(*a*) *Animals.*—The Tjingilli, to the north of the Arunta, have a curious ceremony concerned with rain-making, apart from the ordinary *intichiuma*.

'A fat bandicoot is caught, care being taken not to injure it.' A man belonging to a special moiety of the tribe 'then wraps it up in paper-bark and carries it about in a *pitchi* [hollowed trough], singing over it until such time as it becomes very thin and weak. Then he lets it go, and the rain is supposed to follow.'[4] Spencer and Gillen could find no explanation of this relationship between the bandicoot and rain.

In the Anula tribe of N. Australia rain-making is specially associated with one particular spot called Upintjara, where there is a water-hole in the bed of a creek. The dollar-bird, commonly known as the rain-bird, is connected with the rainy season.

A man of the Mumbakuaku totem can make rain by catching a snake and putting it alive into the water-hole. 'After holding it under for a little time, he brings it out, kills it, and lays it down by the side of the creek. Then, in imitation of a rainbow, he makes an arched bundle of grass stalks . . . and sets it up over the snake. All that he then does is to sing over the snake and the imitation rainbow, and sooner or later the rain falls.'[5]

J. Batchelor describes a curious method of mak-

[1] Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 189–193.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 261 f.
[3] Spencer-Gillen[b], pp. 294–296.
[4] *Ib.* p. 311.
[5] *Ib.* p. 314 f.

ing rain by the aid of animals practised by the Ainus.

When fishermen, after a long spell of fine weather, are tired and long for a rest, they take out at night the skulls of racoons (animals capable of hearing a request for rain) and pray to them, throwing water over one another. If this is done properly, bad storms are sure to follow, and the people get their desired rest. As soon as the rough weather begins, the men buy *sake* and offer libations to the skull; if very bad weather indeed is required, the people make gloves and caps of racoon- and marten-skins, put them on, and dance.[1]

Animals intimately associated with water, such as frogs, toads, etc., have a wide-spread reputation as custodians of rain,[2] and therefore often play a part in charms designed to draw the needed showers from the sky. In order to give effect to the rain-charm, the animal in some cases must be black, the colour being typical of the appearance of the desired rain-clouds. Conversely, if fine weather is needed, the animal must be of a spotless white.[3]

(*b*) *Stones* are often supposed to possess the power of bringing rain, provided they are brought into contact with water.

In New South Wales the natives supplicate 'invisible beings' to send rain, by placing a particular sort of stone on the edge of a water-hole.[4] In this district, as in Queensland, quartz crystals figure in rain-making ceremonies.[5] Again, in Samoa a stone was carefully housed in a village as the representative of the rain-making god. When there was too much rain, the stone was laid by the fire and kept heated till fine weather set in. In a time of drought the priest and his followers dressed up in fine mats, and, wending their way in procession to the stream, dipped the stone in and prayed for rain.[6] This custom may, perhaps, be compared with the practice prevailing till recently in France of dipping the image of a saint in water as a means of procuring rain.

No doubt the fact that stones are often regarded as the abodes of spirits accounts for their use as rain-making charms.

(*c*) *Pouring water* is a common feature in ceremonies for the procuring of rain in some parts of the world, a survival of such a practice being found in various rain-charms resorted to in times of drought in S. and N. Russia.

In Africa it is common to attribute lack of rain to the concealment of miscarriages by women. To remove the pollution and thus set free the rain, a black ox is killed, and the partly digested grass from its stomach placed in a pot buried in the ground. Into this vessel little girls pour water till it overflows along four channels, representing the cardinal points. The women then strip off their clothes, dance a rain-dance, and thereupon proceed to dig up the remains of the premature births, pouring water on the graves. At dusk they bury the remains in the mud near a stream. Then the rain will be free to fall.[7] The custom of pouring water on a leaf-clad mummer is still resorted to at carnivals in parts of Europe for the purpose of producing rain.[8] In Celebes, in times of drought, the villagers go to a stream and splash each other with water, sometimes imitating the sound of falling rain by hitting the surface of the water with their hands or with an inverted gourd.[9]

(*d*) *The dead.*—Sometimes the dead are involved in rain-making ceremonies.

In New Caledonia the priests blacken themselves all over. They then exhume a dead body, take the bones to a cave, suspend the skeleton over some taro-leaves, and pour water over it so that it runs down on to the leaves. It is thought that the soul of the departed takes up the water, makes rain of it, and showers it down again. Since the rain-maker has to fast and remain in the cavern until it rains, it is not surprising that the wet months (March and April) are usually chosen for the performance of the rite.[10] The Euahlayi tribe in Australia think that a dead person always sends rain within a week of his death to wash away his tracks on the earth.[11] In times of drought in Zululand girls carry pots of water to a certain tree under which an ancestor who was in his day a great rain-maker has been buried. They dance around the tree and pour water on its roots, so that the rain-maker may send them rain.[1]

Such ceremonies as these can hardly be described as magical, if magic imply the presence of an automatic efficacy, since they imply a belief in a control from without, the appeal for help being made to the supernatural powers of the deceased.

(*e*) *Bull-roarers* are used for procuring rain in Australia, Africa, and Central America. The reason for the association of this ceremonial object and rain is apparent. Heavy rainfall accompanies thunder-storms in arid regions, and therefore, since the swinging of the bull-roarer causes a noise bearing a striking resemblance to thunder and wind, both harbingers of rain, it is in accordance with the principles of savage philosophy that the bull-roarer should figure in rain-making ceremonies. The Navahos say that the 'sacred groaning stick' (bull-roarer) which makes a mimic storm may be made only of the wood of a pine tree which has been struck by lightning,[2] thus showing the connexion between a thunder-storm and the instrument.

Among the Zuñi Indians the rain-maker whirls a bull-roarer, while one of his associates whips a mixture of water and meal into frothy suds, symbolic of clouds, and another plays the flute. 'All this is an invocation to the gods for rain—the one great and perpetual prayer of the people of this arid land.'[3] The bull-roarer is then laid aside, and the offerings are sprinkled six times with the consecrated water, whereupon the bull-roarer is again sounded.

It is significant that in parts of Africa, where the bull-roarer is little more than a toy, the Kafirs still have sufficient regard for the rain-making qualities of the instrument to forbid boys to play with bull-roarers when they want dry weather, lest a gale of wind should be attracted.[4]

3. Dances.—From Carl Lumholtz[5] we have a detailed description of the rain-dancing of the Tarahumare Indians of Mexico.

In describing the relation of these Indians to nature, he says that rain 'is the focal point from which all their thoughts radiate,' 'since the people obtain their subsistence from the products of the soil.' In order to induce the gods to let it rain, dancing, consisting of a series of monotonous rhythmical movements, is kept up sometimes for two nights. 'The dancing is accompanied by the song of the shaman, in which he communicates his wishes to the unseen world, describing the beautiful effect of the rain, the fog, and the mist on the vegetable world. He invokes the aid of all the animals. . . . The Tarahumares assert that the dances have been taught them by the animals.'

'The Indian never asks his god to forgive whatever sin he may have committed; all he asks for is rain, which to him means something to eat, and to be free from evil.' If there should be too much rain, the people also dance to avoid calamity from floods. Therefore dancing expresses not only prayers for rain, but also petitions to the gods to ward off evil to the crops and to man. Sometimes the family dances alone, the father teaching the boys, one being deputed to bring down the fructifying rain by this means, while the rest of the family plant, hoe, weed, or harvest. In the evening the others sometimes join the unfortunate dancer for a while, but often he goes on alone all night. In winter they dance for snow, at other times in order that the clouds from the north and south may clash and bring down rain to make the grass grow and the deer and rabbits multiply.

4. Prayers.—Reference has already been made to prayers for rain. In Australia the only actual instance of prayers being offered to supernatural beings is in connexion with rain-making.

In the Dieri country the sky in which the *mura-muras*—the predecessors and prototypes of the blacks—live is supposed to be a vast plain inhabited by wild tribes. The clouds are regarded as bodies in which rain is made by rain-making *mura-muras*. In times of severe drought the Dieri call upon these supernatural beings to give them power to make a heavy rainfall, proclaiming in loud voices the impoverished state of the country and the half-starved condition of the tribe consequent upon the difficulty of procuring food in sufficient quantities to preserve life.[6] In S.W. Africa, 'if a drought has lasted long,

[1] *The Ainu and their Folk-Lore*, London, 1901, p. 334.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 292 ff.
[3] *Ib.* i. 290 ff.; W. Weston, in *JAI* xxvi. [1896-97] 30.
[4] E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, Melbourne, 1886-97, ii. 277.
[5] A. L. P. Cameron, in *JAI* xiv. [1884-85] 362; W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies among N.W. Central Queensland Aborigines*, Brisbane, 1897, p. 167.
[6] G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 45.
[7] *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 154 f.
[8] *Ib.*, pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, do. 1914, i. 237.
[9] *Ib.*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 277. [10] Turner, p. 345 f.
[11] K. L. Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, London, 1905, p. 90.

[1] D. Kidd, *The Essential Kafir*, London, 1904, p. 115.
[2] W. Matthews, *5 RBEW* (1887), p. 435 f.
[3] M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW* (1904), p. 175.
[4] Kidd, *Essential Kafir*, p. 333; G. McCall Theal, *Kaffir Folk-Lore*, London, 1882, p. 222 ff.
[5] *Unknown Mexico*, London, 1903, i. 330 ff.
[6] Howitt, p. 394.

the whole tribe goes with its cattle to the grave of some eminent man . . . lay offerings of milk and flesh on the grave and utter their plaint: "Look, O Father, upon your beloved cattle and children; they suffer distress, they are so lean, they are dying of hunger. Give us rain."[1] Among the Bari of Central Africa the rain-maker, after anointing rain-stones with oil, prays to his dead father to send rain.[2] If there is a drought among the Masai, the women collect together, and, having tied grass on to their clothes, sing an invocation to their god to refresh them with his cooling showers.[3] The Nandi in times of drought look towards the Tindiret or Chepusio Hill every morning and say, '*Robon, Tindiret*' ('Rain, Tindiret'). If the drought is protracted and a famine is threatened, the old men collect and take a black sheep with them to the river. Having tied a fur cloak on to the sheep's back, they push it into the water, and take beer and milk into their mouths and spit them out in the direction of the rising sun. When the sheep scrambles out of the water and shakes itself, they sing, 'God! have we prayed to thee, give us rain.'[4] In the last instance prayer is found in association with a piece of sympathetic magic.

In Upper Burma bread, coco-nuts, plantains, and fowls are offered to the spirit who is thought to send rain, with the prayer, 'O Lord *nat* [spirit], have pity on us poor mortals, and stay not the rain. Inasmuch as our offering is given ungrudgingly, let the rain fall day and night.'[5] In the sacred rites at Eleusis,' the worshippers looked up to the sky and cried "Rain!" and then looked down at the earth and cried "Conceive!"' These mysteries were celebrated at the end of the long drought of summer and before the first rains of autumn, and therefore no time could be more suitable for the invocation to the heavens to pour down rain, and the earth to conceive seed under the fertilizing shower.[6]

5. Sacrifice.—Closely related to prayers for rain is the offering of sacrifices in order to make rain.

Thus, in S. Africa Umbandine, the old king of the Swazis, had vast herds of cattle of a peculiar colour which he sacrificed for large sums of money to make rain. 'He could threaten to "bind up the skies" if they [the natives] did not pay him what he demanded, and thus exercised enormous power. When the ox is killed the blood is caught in calabashes, and is on no account allowed to fall to the ground. The dish of blood is then placed in a hut, together with the meat of the dead ox, which is left untouched for the night; on the morrow the meat is eaten, and on the third day the bones of the ox are burnt. The priest is said to confess over the beast the sins of the people; but this confession of sin is little more than an admission that they have not honoured the ancestral spirits sufficiently.'[7] The Akikuyu of British E. Africa sacrifice sheep and goats beneath the sacred *mugomo*-tree by way of intercession for rain. 'The whole of the meat is left under the tree, the fat being placed in a cleft of the trunk or in the branches, as special titbits for Ngai [the good god who sends rain, riches, thunder, and lightning]. Those who worship merely cross their lips with a morsel of meat before sacrificing.'[8]

6. The rain-maker.—In Australia any members of the tribe, men and women alike, irrespective of class or totem, are permitted to take part in some of the ceremonies connected with rain-making; but in the sacred *intichiuma* ceremonies only the initiated men of the water-totem may take part. The majority of the members of this totem belong to the Purula and Kumara class, since it was to them that the secret of rain-making was imparted in the *alcheringa*. Among the Arunta the office of *chantchwa*, or rain-maker, descends from father to son, provided he belongs to the water-totem. If the *alatunja*, or leader, has no son of the right totem, then the office descends to one of his blood-brothers, always provided that he is of the right totem; and, failing such a one, to some tribal brother or son of the water-totem as determined upon by the elder men or, more probably still, by the old *alatunja* before his death.[9] In the Dieri country the whole tribe joins under the direction of the medicine-man in 'making rain.' Among the Kurnai the rain-makers (*bunjil-willung*) could also bring thunder, and it is said of them, as of the other medicine-men, that they obtained in dreams the songs which form part of the ceremonies.[10]

The principal work of the chiefs among the Wambugwe, a Bantu people living in E. Africa, and among other African tribes is rain-making. So important is this aspect of their office that it often is a rule that, should the chief be unable to make rain himself, he must procure it from some one who can.[1] The Nandi rain-makers belong to a special clan.[2] In olden times the chief was the great rain-maker among the Kafirs. Some chiefs allowed no one else to compete with them, lest a successful rain-maker should be chosen as chief in their stead.[3] The rain-maker invariably exerts great power over the people, and so it is important to keep this function in the 'royal household.' Tradition always treats the power of making rain as the fundamental glory of ancient chiefs and heroes, and it therefore probably played an important part in the origin of chieftainship, hedging round the chief's person with tabus, though not necessarily, as Frazer suggests, with divinity. All influential people are sacred, but the most sacred do not work—*e.g.*, the Mikado. If the chief were divine, so sacred would be his person that he would not be able to execute his functions. An ordinary chief or king is charged with *mana* only to an extent sufficient to hedge him round with simple tabus. Frazer's divine kings are a specialization of the conception of kingship, occurring only where the *mana* aspect of chiefs is exaggerated.

The rain-maker is simply a particular individual—usually a medicine-man—who is endowed with *mana* (*q.v.*), by means of which he is able to control the weather by supplying wind, calm, rain, thunder, famine, and plenty at will and for a price. It is not surprising that, in those parts of the world in which recurring periods of drought are frequent, the powers of the rain-maker cannot be lightly esteemed. Among the Dinka rain-makers are considered to be animated by the spirit of a great rain-maker, which has been handed down through a succession of rain-makers. By virtue of this inspiration a successful rain-maker enjoys great power. In fact, so sacred is the office that the holder thereof is put to death before old age and infirmity creep on, lest his demise from natural causes should bring distress on the tribe. But so honoured a life and death are not always the lot of the rain-maker. His position is beset with difficulties. Though a successful career offers great rewards, the unskilful practitioner may easily hit upon hard times. When people believe that a man has power to make the rain to fall, the sun to shine, the winds to blow, the thunders to roll, and the fruits of the earth to grow, they are also apt to attribute drought and dearth to his negligence or evil magic. Thus, the Banjars of W. Africa beat the chief in times of drought till the weather changes, and the tribes on the Upper Nile rip up the abdomen of the rain-king, in which he is supposed to keep the storms, if he does not make the showers fall.[4]

7. Rain-gods.—The Dieri believe in rain-making supernatural beings, known as *mura-muras*, who live up in the sky and make the clouds, which are the 'body or substance of rain.' The rain-making ceremonies are thought to be seen by the *mura-muras*, who cause the clouds to appear in the sky, unless they are angry or influenced by the evil magic of some other tribe. In Africa rain is attributed to a high god. The Akikuyu recognize three gods, two good and one bad. The first sends rain and riches, the second good wives and healthy children, and the third sickness and loss. All three are called *ngai*, but it is the god who sends the rain that is considered the supreme deity and credited with divine powers.

[1] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 287.
[2] F. Spire, *Journal of the African Society*, xvii. [1905] 16–21.
[3] A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. 347.
[4] Hollis, *The Nandi*, do. 1909, p. 48.
[5] *Gazetteer Upper Burma*, Rangoon, 1900, II. iii. 63 ff.
[6] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, i. 69.
[7] Kidd, *The Essential Kafir*, p. 115 f.
[8] H. R. Tate, in *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 263.
[9] Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 189 ff.
[10] Howitt, pp. 394–397.

[1] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, p. 342 f.
[2] Hollis, *Nandi*, p. 52.
[3] Kidd, *Essential Kafir*, p. 114.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, p. 353 f.

The Akikuyu regard their deities as common to other tribes, such as the Masai and Akamba.[1]

The Ewe-speaking people associate a falling star with a powerful rain-god, who sends the showers from the sky. In times of drought they call upon him by night with wild howls, and once a year an ox is sacrificed to him. The priests consume the flesh, while the people smear themselves with the pollen of a certain plant, and go in procession through the towns and villages, singing, dancing, and beating drums.[2] The Dinka believe in a great god who sends the rain from the 'rain-place' where he dwells, and who animates the human rain-maker. His name, Dengdit, means literally 'great rain.' It was he who created the world and established all things in their present order; and, according to the Niel Dinka, he was the ancestor of a clan which has rain for its totem. Bullocks are sacrificed in spring to a spirit, Lerpiu, for the purpose of inducing him to move Dengdit to send down rain on the parched earth.[3] Likewise among the Shilluk a bullock and a cow (or hen) are given to Nyakang, the semi-divine ancestor of their kings. One (or both) of the animals is slain, while the king prays to the divine hero for rain.[4]

In Mexico Tlaloc, or Tlalocateuchtli, is the god of water and rain, and the fertilizer of the earth. He is thought to reside where the clouds gather, on the highest mountain-tops, especially those of Tlaloc, Tlascala, and Toluca, his attributes being the thunderbolt, the flash, and the thunder. Prayers were offered to him in times of drought, as the chief of the water-gods, to look down in mercy on the sufferings of man and beast, and give the things which are 'the life and joy of all the world, and precious as emeralds and sapphires.' When there is no rain for four years, children are sacrificed to Tlaloc by being closed up in a cave.[5]

The rain-god of the Kandhs is Pidzu Pennu, a being who rests on the sky and whom the priests propitiate with eggs, rice, and sheep, and invoke with prayers, so that he may send down water upon them through his sieve before men and cattle die of want.[6] The Kol tribes of Bengal consider their great deity Marang Buru, 'great mountain,' to be the rain-god. His dwelling is on one of the most conspicuous hills of the plateau near Lodmah in Chotā Nagpur. In times of drought the women climb the hill, led by the wives of the *pahans*, with girls drumming, to carry offerings of milk and *bel*-leaves, which are put on the rock at the top. The women then invoke the deity to give the seasonable rain, wildly gesticulating and dancing till the prayer is answered by distant peals of thunder.[7]

E. B. Tylor thinks that the rain-god is usually the heaven-god exercising a special function, though sometimes taking a more distinctly individual form, or blending in characteristics with a general water-god.[8] Although the tribal All-Father in very primitive cult is remote and in need of nothing that man can give, and therefore is not concerned with human affairs[9]—rain-making being the function of the *mura-muras*—yet it seems that the rain-god proper is a heaven-god. This view is supported by the evidence from the Akikuyu, where it is the supreme deity who sends down the refreshing showers to water the parched ground in answer to the prayers of the people.

[1] *JAI* xxxv. 26[illegible].
[2] *GB*, [illegible], *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 61[illegible].
[3] *Ib.* p. [illegible].
[4] [illegible], *The Cult of Nyakang and the Divine Kings of the Shilluk*, Khartoum, 1911, p. [illegible].
[5] [illegible] *NRA* iii. 3[illegible].
[6] [illegible] Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, London, 1865, pp. 80, 355.
[7] E. T. Dalton, *TES*, new ser., vi. [illegible] [illegible] *PCS*[illegible] ii. 259.
[8] [illegible] A. Lang, [illegible] God (Primitive and Savage), vol. [illegible] p. [illegible]43.

Likewise, Dengdit is the creator and sustainer of all things. The Mexican Tlaloc was probably originally a heaven-god, since he is supposed to reside where the clouds gather, and is evidently superior to the god of the earth. Pidzu Pennu, the rain-god of the Kandhs, rests on the sky, and Marang Buru of the Kol tribes dwells on the top of a high hill. In classical times it was to the heaven-god Zeus that the Athenians turned with requests for rain,[1] while in later and still more enlightened ages it is the Lord of heaven and earth that men supplicate in times of drought by solemn litany and procession to send such 'moderate rain and showers that they may receive the fruits of the earth to their comfort and to His glory.'

8. Conclusion.—Frazer is of the opinion that the method adopted by the rain-maker is usually based on homœopathic or imitative magic. In other words, he seeks to produce rain by imitating it.[2] Now, there can be no doubt that many of the rites associated with rain-making imitate the natural process. Thus, *e.g.*, when the Dieri erect a hut over a hole in the ground and drop blood on the men sitting round, while others throw handfuls of down in the air, they symbolically represent the natural phenomena connected with rainfall. The hut portrays the firmament, the down the cirrus clouds, the dropping blood the rain. The two large stones in the centre of the hut suggest gathering clouds presaging rain, and the overthrow of the hut by men butting at it with their heads the piercing of the clouds and the downpour of rain. Such a rite as this certainly contains an element of imitation, but only because the savage is a man of action, who 'dances out his religion.' When he wants wind or rain, he does not, in the lowest states of culture, prostrate himself before his remote All-Father, but gathers certain people together, often members of a water-totem, to perform magico-religious rites. Thus he expresses by actions, sometimes accompanied by suitable exclamations, his inmost desire. Rain-making ceremonies, therefore, may be described as outward and visible signs of inward emotions and longings.

It is not surprising that primitive ritual is often imitative, since it *represents* symbolically that which in higher cult is expressed by utterances. Frazer's theory of imitative magic does not take into account the emotional and representative aspect of rudimentary religion—the pent-up desire to act discharging itself on the mere symbol of the object. In developed magic the operator is more or less aware that he is dealing with a symbol, yet, in his need for emotional relief, he makes himself believe that the desired effect, though enacted on the symbol, is actually transmitted to the real object.[3] What applies to magic in general is equally applicable to rain-making in particular.

A modern community is chiefly dependent upon the weather for its incomings and outgoings, and for the variation in the prices of bread and vegetables, yet even so it is not easy for us to understand a condition of life in which a bad harvest means starvation. But in primitive society, where the food-supply is governed directly by the rainfall, the attitude of man towards the weather is one of grave anxiety calculated to produce states of emotional intensity. The emotions must find outlet somewhere. This they do in representative and emotional ceremonies to produce the desired result.

[1] Marcus Antoninus, v. 7.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, p. 247.
[3] Cf. R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*[2], London, 1914, ch. ii.

When the savage wants thunder to bring rain, he does not imitate it, but simply swings his bull-roarer in order that he may actually make it. It is not a noise like thunder that he imagines he hears, but the thunder itself. It is only as the belief in magico-religious practices declines that primitive ideas of making or being a thing degenerate into a merely imitative ceremony, a piece of frivolous and valueless mimicry. Thus the prayer attitude is but the more developed expression of the hope and faith with which the so-called 'magical' rite is instinct.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the art.; cf. J. E. Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual*, London, 1913; E. O. James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, do. 1917; and artt. GOD, MAGIC, MANA, WATER. E. O. JAMES.

RAINBOW.—See PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS, vol. x. p. 371 f.

RĀJPUT.—Rājput (Skr. *rājaputra*, 'a king's son,' 'a prince') is the general term applied to a group of septs which constitute the so-called 'military' class of India. At the census of 1911 they numbered 9,430,095, appearing in the greatest numbers in the Panjāb, United Provinces, and Bengal. In Rājputāna, the head-quarters of the tribe, they numbered 675,789.

1. Ethnology.—Within the last few years an important change of view regarding the origin of the Rājputs has taken place. Following the universal tradition of the Hindus, it was generally assumed that they were the direct successors of the Kṣatriyas, one of the four groups (*varṇa*, 'colour') which constituted the Vedic polity. According to Manu (*Laws*, i. 89), the Creator commanded the Kṣatriya 'to protect the people, to bestow gifts, to offer sacrifices, to study (the Veda), and to abstain from attaching himself to sensual pleasures.' The true position of this group of septs has now been clearly ascertained.

'So far back as the time when the *Dialogues of the Buddha* were composed, the Kshatriyas were recognised as an important element in society, and in their own estimation stood higher than the Brahmans. The fact probably is that from very remote days ruling clans of Kshatriyas essentially similar to the Rājputs of later days, existed and were continually forming new states, just in the same way as in the mediæval period. But their records have perished, and only a few exceptionally conspicuous dynasties are at all remembered, and so stand out on the page of history in a manner which does not fully correspond with the truth. The term Kshatriya was, I believe, always one of very vague meaning, simply denoting the Hindu ruling classes which did not claim Brahman descent. Occasionally a rāja might be a Brahman by caste, but the Brahman's natural place at court was that of minister rather than that of king' (V. A. Smith, *The Early Hist. of India*[3], Oxford, 1914, p. 408).

In the tradition, which in India ranks as history, there is a sudden gap: the old Kṣatriyas disappear, until the 6th and 9th centuries A.D., when we find a group of states under Rājput rulers. But it is impossible to say whether these rājas were merely successful adventurers, or how far they were the heads of dominant clans. The true situation has now been ascertained from a study of the epigraphic evidence in N. and W. India. It is clear that the break in the tradition—in other words, the disappearance of the old Kṣatriyas—was the result of the invasion of India by successive hordes from Central Asia. The earliest of these were the Sakas in the 2nd cent. B.C., followed by the Yueh-chi or Kushāns in the 1st cent. A.D. It is believed that the chiefs of these invading hordes rapidly succumbed to the influence of their new environment, became Hindus, and assumed, as ruling princes, the old name of Kṣatriya. But it is still uncertain whether the pedigrees of any of the ruling clans go back to this period. During the 5th cent. A.D. and the early part of the 6th cent. the Huns (or Hūnas, as the Hindus called them) made a fresh invasion, and crushed the Hindu polity. They settled principally in the Panjāb and Rājputānā, their most important group being that of the Gurjaras, who, in name at least, are represented by the modern Gūjars (*ERE* vi. 453). The Gurjaras founded important kingdoms, and gave their name to the province of Gujarāt. These Gurjaras were soon admitted to the status of Hindus, and we are thus enabled to interpret the strange legend of the fire sacrifice at Mount Ābū (*ERE* i. 51 f.). Their passing through the fire was a mode of expressing the purgation which they underwent; their impurity was removed, and they became fitted to enter the Hindu caste system (W. Crooke, 'Rājputs and Mahrattas,' *JRAI* xl. [1910] 42).

In later times the same process of introduction into the Rājput body has continued. Many chiefs of the so-called aboriginal races, with their followers, have marked their rise to the status of rulers by assuming the title of Rājputs, which, as has been said, merely implies the fact that they claim to be rājas or cadets of a ruling house. For further details of this, the most recent and important advance in our knowledge of Indian ethnography, see Smith, p. 412 ff.; Crooke, p. 41 ff.; *BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] 443 ff., where full details and references will be found.

This mixed body, containing perhaps some survivors of the older Kṣatriyas, reinforced by foreigners and aborigines, being thus admitted to Rājput status, were naturally desirous of authenticating their descent. Complacent bards, like the heralds of modern times, were ready to provide pedigrees linking the new ruling class with the gods and ancient heroes, just as Livy and Virgil affiliated the new Roman Empire with the heroes of the Trojan war. Hence arose the mass of legend assigning to various septs their descent from the sun or moon or other gods, or from the heroes who fought in the great war described in the *Mahābhārata* epic. These legendary pedigrees are recorded in great detail by J. Tod, the enthusiastic historian of the Rājputs, in his *Annals of Rajast'han*.

2. Religion.—As might be expected from what has already been said, the Rājput cults and beliefs are of a mixed type, including those taught by their bards and Brāhmans who trace their pedigrees to gods or legendary heroes, and those of the foreign or aboriginal stocks from which the Rājputs are derived.

(*a*) *The place of Rājputs in the development of Hinduism.*—In the early Hindu period tales are told which describe the antagonism between the Kṣatriya and the Brāhman. Some refractory rājas are said to have opposed the pretensions of the Brāhmans (Manu, *Laws*, vii. 38–42). Viśvāmitra, a Kṣatriya, is said to have attained the rank of a Brāhman (Muir, *Orig. Skr. Texts*, i. [1858] 58 ff.). The same feeling appears in the rise of the Bhaktimārga, or the monotheistic Bhāgavata religion, which was the work of Kṣatriyas (*ERE* ii. 537 ff.). In the same way, both Buddhism and Jainism were the result of a Rājput reaction against the claim of Brāhmans to retain the monopoly of admission into the ascetic orders (*ERE* vi. 694, vii. 209). Even at the present day some Rājput septs assign a higher rank to the bard than to the Brāhman, and this feeling is encouraged by the notorious laxity of practice among some classes of Brāhmans in Rājputāna (*ERE* vi. 693). But the Brāhmans are anxious to accept the new situation, and by politic concessions to Rājput feeling lose no opportunity of regaining their position in the courts of the reigning princes.

(*b*) *Cult of Śiva and the mother-goddesses.*—As a martial race, many Rājputs favour the cult of Śiva-Mahādeva combined with that of his consorts, the latter being largely drawn from the non-Aryan races, but now freely admitted into Hinduism.

If, as some believe, the cult of Śiva had its origin in the Himālaya, we may suspect that it was introduced, or rapidly assimilated, by the Scythian or Hun invaders. Vāsudeva, king of the Kushāns (*c.* A.D. 140–173), figured on his coins the image of Śiva with that of his bull, Nandī (Smith, p. 272). The chief Śaiva temple in Rājputāna is that known as Eklingjī, 'he that is worshipped under the form of a single *liṅgam*.' It is also known as Kailāspurī, Mount Kailāsa being the Himālayan seat of the god. It is situated 12 miles from Udaipur, the capital of Mewār (H. D. Erskine, *Rajputana Gazetteer*, ii. A. [1908] 106; Tod, i. 409 ff.). The Rānās of Mewār combine the functions of prince and priest, and are known as the vice-regents (*dīwān*) of the god (Tod, i. 182). With the cult of Śiva is combined that of his consort Durgā. In another form she is known as Māmā Devī, 'mother of the gods,' and round her image are grouped those of the other gods (*ib.* i. 553). Again, as Gaurī, the 'yellow' or 'brilliant' goddess, probably representing the ripe corn, she is the subject of a special cult, when at the Gangaur festival her image is taken to the lake at Udaipur and ceremonially bathed, possibly in order to free her from the last year's pollution, or as a rain charm; as in the worship of the Bona Dea, no male may be present at the rite (*ib.* i. 544; *IA* xxxv. [1906] 61). She is also worshipped as Annāpūrṇā, 'she who is possessed of food,' and her mimic marriage to Śiva is performed (Tod, i. 455). In other forms she is worshipped as Śākambharī, 'nourisher of herbs,' Mātā Janamī, 'the birth mother,' and Āsāpūrṇā, 'she who fulfils desire.'

(*c*) *Kṛṣṇa.*—In Rājput belief Kṛṣṇa is the deified hero of the Yādava tribe, and he has his seat at Mathurā (*q.v.*), where he sports with the *gopīs*, or milkmaids. In another form, at Dwārkā, he is god of the dark storm-cloud (J. Kennedy, *JRAS*, 1907, p. 951 ff.). His shrine is at Nāthdwārā, 30 miles N.N.E. of the city of Udaipur. His image is said to have been removed from Mathurā to escape the persecution of Aurangzīb; when the cart came to this place, the god refused to go farther, and a shrine was erected for him, which is a sanctuary for criminals, receiving donations from merchants throughout the Hindu world, and his pontiff is a personage of great sanctity and authority (Tod, i. 415 ff.). It is strange that the gentle Kṛṣṇa should be worshipped side by side with Śiva. On the whole, his cult has exercised a good effect on Rājput society, and Tod quotes a case in which he interposed to prevent *satī* (i. 423).

(*d*) *Ancestor-cults.*—It is the primary duty of the Rājput to visit the cenotaphs of his ancestors in the season of mourning, and to feed their hungry ghosts. Special veneration is paid to the *mahāsatī*, or place of sacrifice of faithful wives.

'The Rajput never enters these places of silence but to perform stated rites, or anniversary offerings of flowers and water to the manes of his ancestors' (*ib.* i. 62).

He also venerates the heroes of his sept, as in the remarkable court at Mandor, which contains images of the heroes of the Rāṭhors (*ib.* i. 573 f.).

(*e*) *Tutelary deities.*—Each sept worships its tutelary goddess; Rāṭhasen or Rāshṭrasenā is the embodied luck of the Sesodias of Mewar, as Nagnecha, the serpent, protects the Rathors, and Vavan Mata the Chavadas, while Khetrapāla, 'the field-watcher,' is the patron of agriculture (*ib.* i. 225 n.). The patron god or goddess of the sept used to accompany the chief to battle. On one occasion the Rathor god fell into the hands of the Kachhwahas of Jaipur. Their prince took him to his capital, wedded him to the Jaipur goddess, and returned him with his compliments to his defeated adversary. 'Such,' says Tod (ii. 87), 'were the courteous usages of Rajput chivalry.' The tutelary god of Kotah is Brajnāth or Kṛṣṇa, and the chief at every battle used to carry his golden image on his saddle. He too was lost in battle, and it was many years before he was restored, 'to the great joy of every Hāṛā' (*ib.* ii. 413).

(*f*) *Cult of youthful heroes.*—The cult of the youthful hero (*putra*) is common among the Rājputs. Laut, the young hero of Ajmēr, is worshipped by the Chauhān sept, and, as he wore at the time of his death a silver chain anklet, this ornament is tabu to the children of the sept (Tod, i. 200 n.). The cult is not confined to youths. The queen of Ganor, who killed by means of a poisoned robe the Musalmān who attempted to outrage her, receives no special worship, but in the spirit of sympathetic magic a visit to her tomb cures tertian ague (*ib.* i. 497).

(*g*) *Worship of natural objects.*—Water-spirits are honoured by throwing coco-nuts into the water. The spirit of the Banās river used to raise her hand over the water to receive the offering, but, as in the common fairy-gift legend, 'since some unhallowed hand threw a stone in lieu of a coco-nut, the arm has been withdrawn' (*ib.* i. 527; *PR* i. 287 ff.). There was a sun fountain at Valabhī, whence at the summons of Rājā Sīlāditya, the seven-headed horse which bears the chariot of the sun rose to bear him to battle (Tod, i. 179).

(*h*) *Snake-worship.*—The Pushkar lake is provided with a remarkable snake legend indicating a conflict of cults (C. C. Watson, *Rajputana Gazetteer*, i. A. [1904] 19). The Nāgpañchamī festival, 'the cobra's fifth,' is celebrated in its honour (Tod, i. 462). The usual tales are told of the serpent protecting or recognizing the true heir to the throne (*ib.* i. 236, ii. 281). The worship of snake heroes, like Tejajī, Gugā, and Pīpā, is common (*PR* i. 213 f.; Tod, i. 580).

(*i*) *Sacred animals and trees.*—Next to the cow, the boar is sacred to the Rājput, and possibly represents the corn-spirit (*GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, i. 298 ff.). Birds of augury are carefully protected, and the pigeon, as the bird of love, has become associated with the erotic cult of Kṛṣṇa, and is still regularly fed at every courthouse in Rājputāna. Among trees the varieties of the fig are especially sacred. It was from a *pīpal*-tree (*Ficus religiosa*) that Āsāpūrṇā, the tutelary goddess of Būndī, appeared to protect the queen (Tod, ii. 368).

(*j*) *Festivals.*—The Rājput festivals are numerous and interesting. The reader may be referred for details to Tod's classical account (i. 444 ff.). But, when he compares the ritual with that of Egypt and other countries to the west of India, it must be remembered that his theories are, to a large extent, obsolete.

LITERATURE.—The classical authority is **J. Tod**, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajast'han*, 2 vols., London, 1829–32 (the original ed. is now very scarce, but it has been often reprinted; the references in the text are from Routledge's popular ed., London, 1914). For the Rajputs of districts outside Rajputana see **A. K. Forbes**, *Ras Mala*, London, 1878; **H. A. Rose**, *Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and the N.W. Frontier Province*, vols. ii., iii., Lahore, 1911–14; **D. C. J. Ibbetson**, *Punjab Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883; **W. Crooke**, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, do. 1896; **R. V. Russell**, *Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces*, London, 1916.

W. CROOKE.

RĀMAISM.—1. History.—Vaiṣṇavism, one of the two main divisions of the Hindū religion, includes, besides the worshippers of Viṣṇu in his proper form as a supreme personal god, two large sects embracing not only the great majority of the Vaiṣṇavites, but also a very considerable portion of the Hindus of to-day. These two parties are the votaries respectively of Viṣṇu's two last incarnations, Kṛṣṇa and Rāma.[1] The cult of Rāma as a chief god at the present day prevails over an ex-

[1] See art. INCARNATION (Indian), vol. vii. p. 113

tensive area in India. But Rāma was at first only an epic hero; for in the original part (bks. ii.–vi.) of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (*q.v.*), which celebrates his life and deeds, he is represented as an essentially human character. On the other hand, in bks. i. and vii., which are admittedly later additions, his divine nature is fully accepted. In another passage also (vi. 117), which is without doubt an interpolation, the gods, with Brahmā at their head, appear and declare Rāma, who had till then regarded himself as a man, to be Nārāyaṇa, *i.e.* Viṣṇu, the highest god. The character of Rāma, already a model of morality as the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, was still more exalted by later poets, including those of the *Purāṇas* and especially by Bhavabhūti (first half of the 8th cent. A.D.), the author of two Sanskrit dramas concerned with the life of Rāma. Having thus become immensely popular, the epic hero was before the lapse of many centuries generally acknowledged, by a people ever prone to deification, as an incarnation—an already familiar feature of the Hindu religion—of the supreme god Viṣṇu. Though there is not sufficient evidence to show exactly when Rāma came to be accepted as an *avatār*, there is good reason to regard this belief as having already existed in the early centuries of the Christian era. Thus in the 10th canto of Kālidāsa's epic, the *Raghuvaṃśa*, which dates from the first half of the 5th cent. A.D., the poet, before relating the story of Rāma's birth, represents Viṣṇu as promising to be born as a son of King Daśaratha for the destruction of the demon Rāvaṇa. The *Vāyu Purāṇa*, which probably belongs to the same century, also refers to his divine character. Much later, A.D. 1014, we find the Jain author Amitagati making the statement that Rāma was regarded as the all-knowing, all-pervading protector of the world. But, though the divinity of Rāma had thus been recognized for centuries, there is no evidence that any cult in his honour existed during this long period. It cannot, however, have been established much later than the 11th century A.D. Thus Madhva (*q.v.*), otherwise called Ānandatīrtha (the founder, in the 13th cent., of a Vaiṣṇava sect, which aimed at confuting not only Śaṅkara's theory of the unreality of the universe and the identity of the human soul with the supreme deity, but also Rāmānuja's doctrine that God is the material cause of the world), is declared to have brought the image of Rāma from Badarikāśrama in the Himālaya, and to have sent his pupil Naraharitīrtha to Jagannātha in Orissa, about A.D. 1264, to bring back what were called the original idols of Rāma. Hemādri, a voluminous Sanskrit writer who flourished in the latter half of the 13th cent., describes the ceremony connected with the birth of Rāma on the 9th day of the bright half of the month Chaitra (March–April). An indication of the comparative lateness of the cult of Rāma as an incarnation is the fact that, among the 24 names of Viṣṇu that are repeated at the present day by Vaiṣṇavites at the beginning of every ceremony which they perform, the name of Rāma does not occur, though those of two other incarnations, the Dwarf and the Man-lion, are mentioned. Again, while the ordinary ceremonies of Vaiṣṇavism include a repetition even of Vedic *mantras*, or formulæ, this is not the case in the cult of Rāma. At the present day every Hindu is familiar with Rāma's exploits, and throughout the length and breadth of India his name is on every one's lips irrespectively of class, caste, or creed. Thus, when friends meet, they often greet each other by uttering Rāma's name twice ('Rām, Rām'). No name is more frequently given to children, and none is more often invoked at funerals and in the hour of death.

2. Literature.—The literature of Rāmaism is of late origin. There exist in the first place various manuals which describe the forms of Rāma-worship by means of *mantras*, or formulæ, and magic circles, like those prescribed in the *Sātvata-Saṃhitā* for the worship of Vāsudeva (Viṣṇu). There are besides a few works that set forth the doctrines of the Rāmaite faith. The *Adhyātma-rāmāyaṇa* aims throughout at expounding the divinity of Rāma and explaining the relation of the individual soul to him as the supreme soul. Sītā and Rāma are introduced by the author as the exponents of the doctrines inculcated in this work. The fifth canto of the last book is entitled *Rāma-gītā*, 'the Song of Rāma,' which is intended to correspond to the Kṛṣṇaite *Bhagavad-gītā* (*q.v.*), and which is narrated by Rāma to his brother Lakṣmaṇa, the counterpart of Arjuna in the parallel poem. The teaching is monistic throughout, the world and the individual soul being described as illusory, while the one supreme spirit, here Rāma, alone really exists. Composed of extracts from older writings, it has no claim to any connexion with Vedic literature. It is also mentioned as a modern treatise by Ekanātha, a Mahārāṣṭra saint of the 16th cent., in his *Bhāvārtha-rāmāyaṇa*. There is another Rāmaist work (published at Madras) also entitled *Rāma-gītā*, which is composed in 18 chapters like the original *Bhagavad-gītā*. Its contents are narrated by Rāma to Hanumān. It is a very modern compilation, for it professes to be based on the 108 *Upaniṣads*, some of which are unmistakably very recent. What may be regarded as the Bible of the Rāmaites is the *Rāmcharitmānas*, an adaptation of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa*, composed in Hindī by Tulasī Dāsa, the greatest of modern Hindu poets, in the 16th century. What the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and the *Bhagavad-gītā* are to the Kṛṣṇaite, Tulasī Dāsa's poem, together with the Sanskrit *Rāmāyaṇa*, is to the many millions in N. India whose vernacular tongue is Hindī.

3. Doctrine.—The following are the doctrines held by all Rāmaites in common: (1) the deity is not devoid of qualities (as is *brahman*, the impersonal world-soul of Śaṅkara); (2) Viṣṇu is the supreme deity and should be the object of worship together with Lakṣmī, his wife; (3) Rāma is the human incarnation, or *avatār*, of Viṣṇu; (4) Rāmānuja and all the great teachers who have succeeded him are also *avatārs* of Viṣṇu. The first three of these doctrines afford a parallel to the conceptions of Western religion. Like Jahweh, Viṣṇu is a personal supreme deity who is an object of worship, while the relation of Rāma, as a human manifestation of the supreme deity, to Viṣṇu is analogous to that of Christ to God. The Rāmaist attitude resembles that of a Western deist who might adopt Christ as the main object of his devotions.

4. Sub-sects.—Rāmānanda, fifth disciple in succession from Rāmānuja, from whose school he seceded, was the founder of the Rāmaite sect which goes by the name of Rāmāwats, in the 14th century.[1] A teacher named Kīlh, separated from Rāmānanda by a successive series of several disciples, founded the Khākī (*q.v.*) sect, which is a striking example of the tendency of Hinduism to eclecticism and compromise. See also art. RĀMĀNUJA.

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A. A. MACDONELL.

RĀMAKṚṢṆA.—Rāmakṛṣṇa is the adopted name of one of the three leaders of the revival of Hinduism during the latter half of the 19th cent.,

[1] See art. RĀMĀNANDĪS.

the other two being Dayānanda Sarasvatī (1824–83) and Svāmī Vivekānanda (1862–1902). All three adopted in early youth the life of the ascetic devotee—striking illustrations of the deeply-rooted conviction which prevails among Hindus that renunciation (*q.v.*) is the highest religious ideal, and which for more than two thousand years has led innumerable young Indians to give up home, marriage, property, and money for the attainment of union with God.

1. **Life.**—Gadādhar Chatterji, the son of a poor but orthodox Brāhman, was born on 20th Feb. 1834, in the village of Kamarpukur, situated in the Hugli district of Bengal. Losing his father when he was seventeen, he migrated to Calcutta, where for a few years he earned his living as a *pūjārī*, or ministrant attending to the worship of the household idols in Hindu families. In 1855, when a temple of the goddess Kālī, built on the bank of the Ganges by a rich Bengali lady named Rāni Rāsmoni, a few miles from Calcutta, was opened, his elder brother was appointed chief priest, while he himself not long after became one of the assistants. His religious instinct, of which he had shown signs as a boy, now developed into passionate worship of the image of Kālī in the temple. Thinking of her as the mother of the universe and as his own mother, he used to sing hymns, talk, and pray to her by the hour till he became unconscious of the outer world. He would then pass into the state of religious trance called *samādhi*, which often lasted for hours, and in which the action of the pulse and the heart became imperceptible. When he was twenty-five, his relatives, hoping to cure him of his religious ecstasies, induced him to undergo the usual ceremony of child-marriage, though his bride was only six and would not live with him as his wife till she was eleven or twelve years old. Returning to the temple and being now convinced that it was possible to see the deity visibly, he renewed his devotions with such intensity that he neglected his duties and could no longer retain his official position. So he left the temple and settled in a neighbouring wood, where for the next twelve years he lived a life of strenuous prayer and self-repression in continuous efforts to attain union with God. Having as yet received no education or training, he was helped during this period in his aspirations first by a Brāhman nun, who instructed him in *yoga*, or the system of exercises producing mental concentration, and in the *Tantras*, or manuals dealing with the worship of Kālī and the theology concerned with her cult. Afterwards he came for nearly a year under the influence of an ascetic named Totāpuri, who expounded to him the monistic Vedanta doctrine of Śaṅkara, that God is impersonal, that the human soul is identical with God, that the world is an illusion, and who taught him the highest stage of religious trance in which every trace of consciousness disappears. Totāpuri also initiated him as a *sannyāsī*, or ascetic who renounces every worldly attachment. In accordance with the practice of such devotees, Gadādhar now assumed a new name. Henceforward he was known as Rāmakṛṣṇa; and later he received from his friends the title of Paramahaṃsa, which is given only to ascetics of profound knowledge and sanctity. After Totāpuri's departure he lived for six months almost continuously in a state of exalted religious trance. This condition ended in a severe attack of dysentery, from which, however, he recovered after a month or two.

Rāmakṛṣṇa now entered on a new phase of religious aspiration—the craving to realize the Vaiṣṇava ideal of passionate love for God. This aim he sought to realize by imagining himself one of the great devotees of ancient stories. Thus at length in a trance he saw the beautiful form of Kṛṣṇa. Now he was satisfied; he had at last achieved mental peace. By this time (1871) he was thirty-seven years of age and was becoming famous. His wife, who was now eighteen, came to see him. When he explained that, being a *sannyāsī*, he could not live with her as her husband, she agreed to reside at the temple as his pupil and be taught by him how to serve God; she thus remained a devoted disciple till the end of his life. She survived her husband many years, during which she regarded him as an incarnation of God Himself, and endeavoured to further the work that he had begun.

Though as an ascetic he no longer had any caste, he now began to feel that he had not yet given up his Brāhman prejudices towards the lower orders. Having accordingly resolved to do the work of men of the lowest caste, he acted as a scavenger in the temple and cleansed it like a Pariah during the night. He also collected and ate the fragments of food left by the beggars who were daily fed at the temple, and who included Muhammadans, outcastes, and bad characters.

The last stage in his religious development was the result of a new desire that arose in him to know and understand other religions. Thus he went to live with a Muhammadan saint, becoming temporarily a Muhammadan in dress, manner of life, and religious practice. He then turned to Christianity and once saw Jesus in a vision, being unable for three days after to think or speak of anything else but of Him and His love. These experiences led him to the conclusion that all religions are true, as being various paths leading to the same goal.

At the end of 1872 one of his intimate friends, Paṇḍit Vaiṣṇava Charan, took him to Calcutta, where he stayed till the beginning of the following year. During this visit he made the acquaintance of Dayānanda Sarasvatī, the founder of the Ārya Samāj. About 1875 Keshab Chunder Sen, one of the leaders of the Brāhma Samāj, made the acquaintance of Rāmakṛṣṇa, and, becoming deeply impressed by his devotion and conversation, went to see him often, occasionally accompanied by a number of his adherents, and drew public attention to his merits both by talking and by writing about him. The result was that Rāmakṛṣṇa was now visited at his temple by many educated Hindus from Calcutta, and also made the acquaintance of the young men who became his attached pupils and continued his work after his death. His conversation is described as brilliant, and was listened to by many noted Indians who went to see him at his temple. During the last seven years of his life he was constantly engaged in talking to his visitors. He never wrote anything, even in this last period; but his disciples made copious notes in Bengali of his sayings, of which several collections were published after his death. He was essentially a conversationalist, and not a formal instructor; indeed, he regularly disclaimed the status of a *guru*, or teacher. According to the testimony of his most celebrated disciple, Svāmī Vivekānanda, his conversation was of two main types. On the one hand, he represented himself as the servant of all human beings and would never claim any high position. On the other hand, he would speak of himself not only as possessing all power and all knowledge, but as the re-incarnated soul that had once been born as Rāma, as Kṛṣṇa, or as Buddha. Such things were not said in any spirit of arrogance, but as a result of his intense realization of the Vedānta doctrine of the identity of the individual soul with the impersonal God.

The incessant labour of speaking to the increasing crowds of men and women that came to see

him at the temple of Dakṣineśvara at last told on his health. In 1885 he began to suffer from an affection of the throat, which after a time developed into cancer. He was removed to Calcutta, where he was attended by the best physicians. They advised him to keep the strictest silence; but he could not refrain from addressing the crowds that gathered wherever he went. He would still fall into trances, on awaking from which he would talk incessantly as before. Even when his throat became so constricted that he could hardly swallow even liquid food, he continued his efforts, cheerful and undaunted, till 15th March 1886. On that day he fell into a *samādhi* from which he never returned. After his death a group of his disciples decided to devote their lives to the spread of his teaching, and to become *sannyāsīs*. The most prominent of these was Narendra Nath Dutt, a Bengali, who on becoming an ascetic took the name of Vivekānanda.

2. **Habits and character.**—Rāmakṛṣṇa had not many personal traits. Though a *sannyāsī*, he not only dressed, but lived, like an ordinary Bengali. He is described by one of his disciples as distinguished by profound humility and childlike tenderness, the outward manifestation of which was a singular sweetness of expression. His character was simple, for every detail of his life can be explained from the one motive of a passion for God, which mastered his whole being. It was this that made him at an early age enter the life of a *sannyāsī*, in which he renounced all earthly ties and by tremendous self-repression completely conquered the sex instinct and acquired a hatred of money. His aversion to gold and silver became so great that he could not even touch them, and the simple contact of a coin, even when he was asleep, would make him shrink convulsively. In his later days he could touch no metal, not even iron. Mathurānātha, the son-in-law of the foundress of the temple, repeatedly offered to hand the temple over to him together with a property yielding an income of 25,000 rupees a year, but he refused and threatened to leave the place if the offer were pressed. A gift of 25,000 rupees pressed on him by another wealthy man was similarly declined. His deep sincerity and exclusive devotion to God won him the boundless love and reverence of his disciples, who regarded him as a divine person.

3. **Belief.**—Rāmakṛṣṇa had no proper education. He knew no Sanskrit and scarcely any English, and he possessed no scholarly knowledge even of Bengali. Never having had any systematic training in philosophy, and deriving, with the aid of a retentive memory, practically all that he knew of it from his occasional intercourse with the religious teachers with whom he came in contact at his temple, he neither was nor claimed to be the founder of a new religion. His belief regarding God and the relation of God to man and the world was based on the Vedānta system. It may be summed up thus: God is unknowable and utterly beyond the reach of man; on the other hand, every human being and every thing that exists is a manifestation of God, who is so truly all that is that everything that happens is in a sense done by Him, and therefore moral distinctions become obliterated in Him. Hence, as he looked upon every human being as a manifestation of God, Rāmakṛṣṇa would, if he met an unfortunate, bow down before her in adoration. Like every ordinary Hindu, he also regarded all deities as manifestations of the impersonal Supreme Soul. But he believed the goddess Kālī to be the chief manifestation of God as the divine mother of the universe. He worshipped her more than any other divinity, and that by means of idols; for he implicitly held the Hindu belief that the divinity fills every one of his own idols with his presence. He further shared the ordinary Hindu idea of the *guru*, or spiritual teacher, declaring that the disciple should never criticize his own *guru* and must unquestioningly obey his behests. Thus he was a true Hindu, and was always ready to defend the whole of Hinduism. In these respects he was only one of the multitude of very devoted Hindus who might have lived at any time during the last 2000 years.

4. **Distinctive doctrine.**—What differentiated his belief from that of other revivers of Hinduism was the doctrine that all religions are true, because in their inner essence they are identical, and that each man should therefore remain in the religion in which he has been born. In order to illustrate the idea of the harmony of all religions and of the part played by Rāmakṛṣṇa in introducing it to Keshab Chunder Sen, a pupil of his caused to be painted a symbolical picture in which a Christian church, a Muhammadan mosque, and a Hindu temple appear in the background, while on one side in front Rāmakṛṣṇa is pointing out to Keshab a group in which Christ and Chaitanya are dancing together, and a Muhammadan, a Confucianist, a Sikh, a Parsi, an Anglican, and various Hindus are standing round. Rāmakṛṣṇa's universalistic theory of the truth of all religions furnishes a strong defence of Hinduism because it implies that no Hindu should abandon his religion either as a whole or in any of its individual doctrines.

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RĀMĀNANDĪS, RĀMĀWATS.—The Rāmānandīs or Rāmāwats are an important Vaiṣṇava sect in N. India, numbering from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000. Their founder was Rāmānanda, a teacher who was fifth in descent from Rāmānuja (*q.v.*), the *Bhaktamāla* giving the succession as (1) Rāmānuja, (2) Dēvāchārya, (3) Hariyānanda, (4) Rāghavānanda, (5) Rāmānanda. According to the N. Indian tradition regarding Rāmānanda's life and times, Rāghavānanda was a prominent teacher of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava church founded by Rāmānuja. He travelled over India spreading its doctrines, and finally settled in Benares. In the year 4400 of the Kaliyuga, corresponding to A.D. 1299,[1] Rāmānanda was born at Prayāga, the modern Allāhābād. His father was a Kānyakubja Brāhmana named Punyasadana (or Bhūrikarmā or Dēvala), and his mother's name was Suśīlā. The child was named Rāmadatta, and, as he grew up, he acquired knowledge rapidly, so that by the time he was twelve years old he had become a finished *paṇḍita*, and went to Benares to study religious philosophy. There he attached himself to a Smārta teacher, who followed the Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkarāchārya.[2] One day he happened to meet Rāghavānanda, who had the power of foretelling future events, and who expressed his sorrow that Rāmadatta had not yet taken refuge with Hari (*i.e.* Rāma), as his days were fulfilled and he had but a short time to live. Rāmadatta returned to his Smārta teacher and reported the conversation. The teacher had to

[1] So all native authorities. Bhagavān Prasāda (*Bhaktamāla*, p. 432) refers to eight or nine, and quotes three. Tradition says that it was 162 years after Rāmanuja's death, which would thus have occurred in A.D. 1137.

[2] It is noteworthy that both Rāmānuja and Rāmānanda are represented as having begun by being followers of Śaṅkara, and later to have seen the error of their ways.

confess that the prediction was a true one, and that he himself could offer no remedy. He therefore recommended him to throw himself on the mercy of Rāghavānanda. Rāmadatta did so, and Rāghavānanda received him, taught him the Śrī Vaiṣṇava initiatory *mantra*,[1] and changed his name to Rāmānanda. He also instructed him in the *yōga* methods of suppression of breath, etc., leading the practiser into intense mental absorption, and, when the time for his death arrived, with their aid, put him into a trance. Death came to take him away, but, finding him in this death-like condition, departed leaving him unharmed. Rāmānanda then awoke from his trance, and thenceforth devoted himself to attending on and learning from Rāghavānanda, who blessed him and gave him the boon of an exceptionally long life.[2] After serving his *guru* for a considerable time, he went on a pilgrimage over the greater part of India. A persistent tradition asserts that he even visited the island of Gangāsāgara at the mouth of the Ganges, and that there he discovered the site of Kapila's hermitage, all trace of which had long been lost. After completing his pilgrimage he returned to Benares, and settled at Pañchgangā Ghāṭ, where his footprints can still be seen by the faithful.

The Śrī Vaiṣṇava church, of which Rāghavānanda and Rāmānanda were members, allows only Brāhmaṇas to occupy the post of teacher, and imposes upon all the strictest rules as to the preparation and consumption of food. When Rāmānanda returned from his long wanderings, he essayed to rejoin the brotherhood, but they refused to receive him, alleging that it must have been impossible for him during his peregrinations to carry out all these observances. They accordingly demanded that Rāghavānanda should impose a penance upon him. Rāmānanda resisted this, and in the discussion that ensued Rāghavānanda finally solved the problem by deciding that Rāmānanda must go his own way, and might form a sect of his own. This quarrel thus resulted in one of the most momentous revolutions that have occurred in the religious history of N. India. Its effects were by no means confined to Rāmānanda's immediate disciples, for his teaching worked as a leaven upon the beliefs of nearly the whole population. Rāmānanda took his *guru* at his word, and founded the Rāmāwat sect—also nowadays called, after him, the sect of the Rāmānandīs. The philosophical system is the same as that of Rāmānuja (*q.v.*) and need not detain us; but Rāmānuja wrote for Brāhmaṇas and in Sanskrit, and imposed a rule of ceremonial purity that was strict in the extreme. Rāmānanda, by his expulsion from the brotherhood for an imaginary impurity, was converted to broader notions. His ethical system was based, not on spiritual pride, but on spiritual humility. It was developed in various directions by his successors, but through all their teaching we find insistence ever laid upon two great principles: (1) that perfect *bhakti*, or faith in God, consists in perfect love directed to God, and (2) that all servants of God are brothers. Rāmānanda called his followers 'Avadhūta,' because they had 'shaken off' the bonds of narrow-mindedness. His follower, Kabīr, carried this doctrine of catholicity still farther, and it reached its full development, and—what is more—its general acceptance by the masses of Hindōstān, seven generations later, through the works of modern India's greatest poet, Tulasī Dāsa.

The most striking point about Rāmānanda's teaching, and that which has so captured the mind of India as to be enshrined in a proverbial saying, is that, so long as a man or woman has genuine loving faith in the Supreme, his or her caste and position in life are matters of no importance. The Śrī Vaiṣṇavas admitted only Brāhmaṇas as teachers, and only people of high caste as lay members. But Rāmānanda permitted no such bounds. As the saying referred to above says, he taught:

jāti pāti pūchhai nahī kōī,
Hari-ku bhajai, sō Hari-kau hōī,

'Let no one ask a man's caste or with whom he eats. If a man shows love to Hari, he is Hari's own.'

Hari is the name given to the Supreme when allusion is made to him as a loving father, and, in this character, it is to the incarnation of Viṣṇu as Rāmachandra, the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, that the devotion of Rāmānanda and his followers was more particularly directed. His initiatory *mantra*, or formula, was the words 'Śrī Rāma,' the salutation among members of the community being 'Jaya Śrī Rāma,' 'Jaya Rāma,' or 'Sītā Rāma.'

Rāmānanda had twelve chief disciples or apostles, and the list shows his disregard for caste in matters of religion. They were:[1] (1) Anantānanda, (2) Sukhānanda, (3) Surasurānanda, (4) Narahariyānanda, (5) Pīpā, (6) Kabīr, (7) Bhāvānanda, (8) Sēnā, (9) Dhanā, (10) Rai Dāsa, (11) Padmāvatī, (12) Surasarī.

Of these nos. 11 and 12 were women. Regarding Padmāvatī nothing is known. Surasarī was the wife of Surasurānanda, and the *Bhaktamāla* (66) tells a pretty story of how she was once wandering alone in the forest praying, when she was attacked by Musalmān robbers. Thereupon Rāma took the form of a lion, and guarded her, like another Una, till she was out of danger.

Anantānanda was Rāmānanda's first disciple. He is most famous as the apostle of the Jōdhpur country, the king of which he converted by a miracle at Sambhar, recalling that of the barren fig-tree in Mk 11[20]. (*Bhaktamāla*, 32). The third in descent from Anantānanda, in line of teacher and pupil, was Nābhā Dāsa, the author of the *Bhaktamāla*.

Sukhānanda was a poet. His hymns are famous, and have been collected in a volume entitled the *Sukhasāgara* (*Bhaktamāla*, 64).

Surasurānanda, the husband of Surasarī, was famous for his faith. The *Bhaktamāla* (65) tells a curious story about him, the lesson of which reminds us of Mk 7[18]. A wicked Musalman gave him and his disciples cakes secretly mixed with flesh (an impurity). He accepted them as food offered in the name of the deity, and they all ate the food. Then the Musalmān told the disciples of the presence of meat in the cakes. They came to their master in alarm at the defilement that they had incurred. But he replied that they had not eaten the food in faith, and bade them vomit. They did so, and meat issued from their mouths. Then he vomited, and showed them that by his faith the impure meat had been transubstantiated into leaves of the holy *tulasī*-plant. He is of importance, for through him Tulasī Dāsa traced his descent from Rāmānanda in line of teacher and pupil.

A curious legend is told about Narahariyānanda. One day, being in want of fuel to dress food for a party of holy men, he took an axe, and went to a temple of Dēvī and cut away from it a sufficient portion of wood.[2] Dēvī promised, if he would desist from spoiling her temple, to give him a daily supply of fuel, and so it came about. A covetous and unregenerate neighbour, hearing of this, thought that he would follow the saint's example, but, as soon as he applied his axe, Dēvī attacked him, and wounded him so grievously that, when people came for him, they found him at death's door. Dēvī spared him only on condition that for the rest of his life he would supply Narahariyānanda's wants in the way of fuel (*Bhaktamāla*, 67).

Pīpa was a Rajput raja of Gagaraun. He was originally a worshipper of Dēvī, but was commanded by her in a dream to become a disciple of Rāmānanda. Rāmānanda refused to accept him, saying that he had no dealings with men of war like him, and, when Pīpā persisted, angrily told him to go and fall into a well. Pīpā at once tried to cast himself into the well in the courtyard of Rāmānanda's house, and was with difficulty stopped by the bystanders. Rāmānanda then took pity on him, and received him on probation as a disciple. After a year's trial he was fully admitted, abandoned all his early possessions, and, in spite of the remonstrances of his family, set out with Rāma

[1] *Om Ramaya namah.*

[2] The legend of this boon is of some importance. Rāmānanda does seem actually to have lived to a great age. Nābhā Dāsa takes pains to record that he 'bore his body for a very long time,' and tradition says that he lived 111 years.

[1] The list given by Wilson (*Religious Sects*, p. 56) is incorrect, being based on a mistranslation of the *Bhaktamāla*.

[2] Almost the only stringent duty laid upon the followers of Rāmānanda was that of showing hospitality to wandering holy men. The necessity of providing the means for this seems to have been held to justify almost any course of conduct. We shall see extreme instances of this in the case of Pīpā. Cf. also the story of Dhanā, below.

nanda on a pilgrimage to Dvāraka, accompanied by Sītā Sahachari, one of his wives, who had become as ardent a devotee as himself.

The *Bhaktamāla* devotes much space to Pipā, and narrates or alludes to a great number of legends regarding him and his wife. Some of them are given by Wilson (p. 57 ff.). Two or three of the legends regarding Sītā Sahachari illustrate the lengths to which Rāmāwats are supposed to be willing to go in order to fulfil the duty of hospitality to wandering saints. She is represented as a peculiarly holy woman and as a devoted wife, and yet, on more than one occasion, she was ready to sacrifice her chastity in order to provide the means for carrying out this duty, being each time saved from the last extremity by miraculous intervention (*Bhaktamāla*, 61).

Kabir (*ib.* 60) was a Musalmān weaver. It was through him that Nānak Shāh, the founder of the Sikh religion, inherited much of Rāmānanda's teaching (see *ERE* vii. 632).

The *Bhaktamāla* gives no particulars concerning Bhāvānanda, beyond mentioning his name, nor can the present writer find anything about him elsewhere except an anonymous couplet praising his devotion to Rāma and his wisdom.

Sēnā was a barber by caste (for the tradition concerning him see art. SĒNĀPANTHĪS).

Dhanā was a simple peasant. He belonged to the Jāṭ caste, which is notorious for the boorishness of its peasant members. The account of him given by the *Bhaktamāla* (62) tells that one day some wandering saints asked him for food, and he gave them the only grain that there was in the house—that which had been reserved for seed. To conceal the pious theft from his parents, he proceeded to plough a field, into which he pretended to sow the grain. He was subjected to much ridicule from neighbours who knew the facts of the case; but, as time went on, a miraculous crop sprang up in the field, which surpassed the crops of those who laughed at him. On one occason he saw a Brāhmaṇa worshipping a sacred *śālagrāma* stone, and, in his simplicity, asked him for a similar object of devotion. The other picked up an ordinary pebble, and, giving it to the silly boor, said, 'Here is your god. Take it home and worship it.' Dhanā, looking upon it as a representation of Rāma, carried it home, and tended it with great devotion. The god, pleased at the simple faith of the peasant lad, came to him in person, in the character of a fellow-Jāṭ, and served him as a ploughman. After some time he recommended Dhanā to go to Benares and become Rāmānanda's disciple. He did so, and, after receiving instruction from the teacher, returned home. There he again saw his ploughman, and, his eyes being opened, he recognized him as Rāma. The god then blessed him and departed, and Dhanā remained at home, carrying on his household duties, and worshipping the Supreme.

Rai Dāsa (*Bhaktamāla*, 59) was a Chamār, or leather-worker, and belonged to one of the most degraded and despised castes (for particulars see art. RAI DĀSĪS).

This account of Rāmānanda's twelve apostles, childish though some of the legends may appear, is interesting, and is typical of the doctrine of the equality of all men and women before God. While we may assume that such men as Anantānanda and Sukhānanda were Brāhmaṇas, the list also contains a Musalmān, a professional soldier, a barber, a boorish Jāṭ, and, lowest of the low, Rai Dāsa, the Chamār. Note also the important position assigned to women. It is true that in all the sects of the Vaiṣṇava reformation (see *ERE* ii. 548) women saints are frequently met with, but, so far as the present writer is aware, Rāmānanda was the only teacher who placed the sexes on an equality by calling two women to be his apostles.

According to modern belief, Rāmānanda was a direct re-incarnation of Rāmachandra, and each of his twelve apostles was also an incarnation of some subordinate god or demi-god. Thus Anantānanda was an incarnation of Brahmā, Sukhānanda of Śiva, Surasurānanda of Nārada, Kabīr of Prahlāda, Sēnā of Bhīṣma, Rai Dāsa of Yama, and so on. Rāmānanda borrowed from his predecessors the title *ānanda*, 'joy,' which he added to the names of most of his disciples, to indicate the joy of their devotion to Rāma. Probably the full names of Pipā, Sēnā, and Dhanā were thus Pipānanda, Sēnānanda, and Dhanānanda. Not being Brāhmaṇas, they could be addressed familiarly, and it is a common familiar custom in India to omit the final syllables of a name, just as we say 'Will' for 'William.'

Although the great claim of Rāmānanda to recognition is his insistence on the equality of all believers, a corollary of this teaching also deserves more than a passing notice. The doctrines of his predecessors, the Rāmānujas, were, in N. India, taught only in Sanskrit. Their scriptures were learned books, written for learned men, in a learned language. But, for Rāmānanda, with disciples like Kabīr, Pipā, Sēnā, Dhanā, and Rai Dāsa, who were not Sanskrit scholars, this was intolerable. His teaching was therefore everywhere in the vernacular, and his followers wrote their hymns and other similar compositions in one or other of the various dialects of Hindī. He himself wrote little that has come down to us, but—not to mention the less known works of men like Sukhānanda—his successor Kabīr was one of the most voluminous authors in that language. It was largely owing to the influence of Rāmānanda and his followers that Hindī became a literary language, and not only was its most shining light, Tulasī Dāsa, a devout Rāmāwat, but all his poetry was written under the direct influence of Rāmānanda's teaching. The debt which the literature of Hindōstān owes to Rāmānanda cannot be overestimated.

While we may be fairly certain that Rāmānanda was born in A.D. 1299, the date of his death is involved in some obscurity. The popular tradition is that he died in Samvat in 1467 (=A.D. 1410). This would give him a life of 111 years, which is improbable. We can, however, accept the tradition, borne out, as it is, by the direct statement of the *Bhaktamāla*, that he had an exceptionally long life, and this would authorize us to state that he lived during the greater part of the 14th century A.D. He was thus contemporary with the later Khiljī kings, and with nearly all the kings of the house of Tughlak. In his youth occurred the famous sack of Chitaur by 'Alāu'd-dīn Khiljī, and his ripe manhood corresponded with the insanely tyrannous rule of Muḥammad Tughlak. If he lived to the age of 99, he saw the invasion of India by Tamerlane, and the sack and massacre of Delhi. It is impossible not to believe that this series of calamities exercised much influence on Rāmānanda, and that his doctrine of faith in the benignant and heroic Rāmachandra, offered to all classes of the community, owed much of its ready acceptance to the sufferings then being undergone by the Indian people under cruel, alien rule.

Of Rāmānanda's twelve apostles three—Kabīr, Sēnā, and Rai Dāsa—founded branch sects of their own. The others contented themselves with preaching the doctrines of their master. Separate articles are devoted to Kabīr, Sēnā, and the Rai Dāsīs. Kabīr was the only one of these three that really founded a sect. The other two so-called sects are little more than separate groups of Rāmānandīs called after the respective names of the teachers from whom they are spiritually descended. Through the preaching of these twelve and of their followers the pure and chaste worship of Rāma became widely spread over Hindōstān, and successfully competed with the more sensuous worship of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā that centred round Vṛndāvana, and reached its culminating point in the erotic raptures of the Rādhāvallabhīs (*q.v.*; see also artt. BHAKTI-MĀRGA, vol. ii. p. 545, and VALLABHĀCHĀRĪS).

LITERATURE.—Numerous books have been published in Hindī devoted to the life and teaching of Rāmānanda. The only really authoritative work is the *Bhaktamāla* (30 f.) of Nābhā Dāsa, with Priyā Dāsa's commentary; the best ed. is that of Sītārāmaśaraṇa Bhagavān Prasāda (Benares, 1905), in which are given extracts from the contents of the more modern works dealing with Rāmānanda. A summary (not always correct) of the statements in the *Bhaktamāla* will be found in H. H. Wilson, *Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, pp. 46 ff., 54 ff.; other European accounts are based on this, and reproduce Wilson's mistakes. For a briefer summary see R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism, and Minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913, p. 66 f. Other Indian accounts that may be consulted with advantage

..re Dhruva Dāsa, *Bhaktanāmāvali*, ed. Rādhakṛṣṇa Dāsa (Nagārī Pracāriṇī Sabhā), Benares, 1901, p. 63ff.; Jīvarāma, *Śrīnāmakaprakāśa-bhaktamāla*, Bankipur, 1887, verse 10ff.; Harischandra, *Vaiṣṇavasarvasva*, do., n.d., p. 14.

The account given in the present article is based entirely on Indian authorities. GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

RĀMĀNUJA. — Tradition dating from the 13th cent. A.D. ascribes the birth of Rāmānuja to the year 938 of the Śaka epoch (=A.D. 1016–17). In his youth he lived at Conjeeveram, and was a pupil of Yādavaprakāśa, an adherent of the strict Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja, however, fell under the influence of the Vaiṣṇavism which had been made current by the efforts of the Ālvārs in the Tamil country, and separated on this ground from his preceptor, attaching himself instead to Yāmunamuni, who represented the philosophical aspect of the creed of the Ālvārs. In due course he succeeded his new teacher as the head of this school of opinion, and settled at Śrīraṅgam near Trichinopoly, where most of his life was spent. In his old age he is said to have fallen under the disfavour of the Chola king, Kulottuṅga, who was an adherent of Saivism, and to have removed his residence in 1096 to the dominions of the Hoysala princes of Mysore, where in 1098 he succeeded in converting to his faith Biṭṭi Deva, or Viṣṇuvardhana, at that time a viceroy for his brother, Ballāla, and later (1104–31) himself king. Another tradition recorded in Nṛsiṃha's *Smṛtyarthasāgara*[1] refers to him as alive as late as 1127, and it would clearly be unwise to attach too much weight to the precise dates assigned for his birth; his activity, it is certain, fell in the last quarter of the 11th cent. A.D., with which accords the statement of the *Prapannāmṛta*[2] that in 1091, towards the end of his life, he dedicated an image of Nārāyaṇa on Yādavāchala. Numerous works are attributed to him,[3] in many cases doubtless without just cause; of special importance are only the *Vedāntadīpa*, the *Vedāntasāra*, the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, which are independent works, and his commentaries (*bhāṣyas*) on the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*.

1. Philosophical tenets.—The essential contribution of Rāmānuja to Indian thought was the effort to develop in a complete system, in opposition to the uncompromising Advaitism of Śaṅkara, a philosophical basis for the doctrine of devotion to God which was presented in poetical form in the hymns (*prabandhas*) of the Ālvārs—a task for which his training under a teacher of Advaitism rendered him specially fit. In attempting this task, which he undertook on the bidding of his teacher, Yāmunamuni, he was, it is clear, not developing any essentially new line of thought, and he makes no assertion of originality; in his interpretation of the *Brahmasūtra* as a text-book of Vaiṣṇavism, he claims merely to be following the commentary (*vṛtti*) of Bodhāyana and the opinions of previous teachers, of whom elsewhere he enumerates several—Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardin, and Bhāruchi; of these Dramiḍa at least preceded Śaṅkara, and indications in Śaṅkara's own commentary show that Rāmānuja's claim to be following tradition is not unfounded. The disappearance, however, of the works of his predecessors and the hopeless obscurity in itself of the *Brahmasūtra* render it impossible to determine what degree of independence is to be assigned to Rāmānuja. The *Śrībhāṣya*, his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, conveys an impression of no mean philosophical insight, and it is fair to assume that his work in substantial merit and completeness far outdid any previous effort to find in the *Brahmasūtra* a basis for monotheism.

To Śaṅkara the whole universe was one, *Brahman* without a second (*advaita*), without qualities, consisting of thought, but without differentiation of subject and object: the world of experience arises from the association with the one reality of *māyā*, or illusion, and has therefore but a conventional existence, being the object of the lower knowledge as opposed to the higher knowledge of the one reality. Escape from the fetters of transmigration, which is an essential part of the conventional life, is obtained by the act of intellectual intuition which appreciates the illusory character of the empirical universe. A creator (Īśvara) exists, and his grace serves to secure in some degree this intuition, but the existence of God, as also of the soul itself as individual, is in ultimate analysis mere illusion, and His grace is equally illusory. To establish this scheme Śaṅkara does not rely on the human faculties unaided: freely as he uses argument, he bases his views on the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahmasūtra* as an eternal and conclusive revelation.[1] Rāmānuja is no less dogmatic, but the doctrine which he deduces is very different. In the *Upaniṣads* his opinions find their chief support in the *antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*, contained in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,[2] in which *Brahman* is described in detail as the inner ruler of the whole of the universe in all its aspects, and in a passage in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*[3] in which stress is laid on the threefold unity in *Brahman* of the empirical subject (*bhoktṛ*), the objective world (*bhogya*), and the power which instigates (*preritṛ*). He teaches, therefore, a monism, for all is *Brahman*, but a qualified monism (*viśiṣṭādvaita*), since room is found for the reality of individual souls and the external world. The highest reality is God, endowed with all desirable qualities, not consisting of knowledge alone, but having knowledge as an attribute, all-powerful, all-pervading, and all-merciful. Whatever exists is contained within God, and therefore the system admits no second independent element. But within the unity are distinct elements of plurality which, if effects or modes (*prakāra*) of God, are yet absolutely real, and not figments of illusion. These are souls of varying classes and degrees (*chit*) and matter in all its forms (*achit*), which together are represented as constituting the body of God, standing to Him in the same dependent relation as is occupied by the matter forming an animal or vegetable body towards the soul or spirit. Both matter and souls exist eternally in God, and have had no absolute beginning and will have no absolute end. But there are two distinct forms of this existence. In the *pralaya* condition, which occurs at the end of each world-period (*kalpa*), matter exists in a subtle state in which it possesses none of the qualities which make it an object of ordinary experience; the souls likewise cease to be connected with bodies, and, though retaining the essential quality of being cognizing agents, are unable to manifest their intelligence; in this condition *Brahman* is said to be in the causal state (*kāraṇāvasthā*). From this condition creation develops by the will of God: subtle matter takes on its gross form,[4] souls expand their intellect, entering at the same time into connexion with bodies in accordance with their deeds in previous forms of existence; in this condition *Brahman* occupies the state of an effect (*kāryāvasthā*). But between the two states there is no essential difference; the effect is the cause which has undergone

[1] [illegible], *Bodleian Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS*, Oxford, [illegible]

[2] [illegible] Mitra, *Notices of Sanskrit MSS*, v., Calcutta, [illegible] p. 104.

[3] Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogorum*, i., Leipzig, 1891, p. 522.

[1] P. Deussen, *Das System des Vedanta*, Leipzig, 1883, p. 95 ff.

[2] III. vii. 3. [3] i. 12.

[4] The details of the process are borrowed bodily from the Sāṅkhya system, and have no independent value.

a process of development (*pariṇāma*). The difference, however, serves to explain in the view of Rāmānuja those passages in the *Upaniṣads* which seem to deny all duality: in the causal state the differences are merely implicit and may be ignored; passages which assert the creation of the material world, while assuming the eternal existence of soul, are explained away by the fact that in its subtle state matter may be regarded as in a sense non-existent, since it has in that condition none of its essential qualities, while even in the *pralaya* condition the soul remains essentially intelligent. There is, however, clear proof that Rāmānuja felt difficulty in picturing to himself the relation of the non-sentient matter to *Brahman*: in discussing the *Brahmasūtra*[1] there are presented, as possible explanations of the relation, the views that such beings are special arrangements (*saṅsthānaviśeṣa*) of *Brahman*, as are the coils of the body of a snake, or that the relation of the two entities is comparable to that of the luminous object and light, which are one in that both are fire, or that the material world is a part (*aṅśa*) of *Brahman*, which is the position definitely assigned to the soul. The relation of souls and the material world causes Rāmānuja no difficulty; he accepts the same frankly realistic position as Śaṅkara, though in the case of the latter the realism is ultimately illusory.[2]

As with Śaṅkara, the fate of the soul is determined by its knowledge, but, as the nature of that knowledge differs entirely in the two systems, so does the fate of the soul. Knowledge means not extinction of individuality, but a life in heaven of eternal bliss, distinguished from God Himself merely by the fact that the released soul does not possess the powers of creating, ruling, and retracting the world which are the special characteristics of the supreme soul.

2. Religious system.—The actual system of religion expounded by Rāmānuja and his school, while resting on the basis of the metaphysics of the *Śrībhāṣya*, is clearly largely the traditional inheritance of the Pāñcharātra or Bhāgavata school; in the *Śrībhāṣya* itself the only sectarian hint is the use of the term Nārāyaṇa as a synonym of *Brahman*. In the theology of Rāmānuja God manifests Himself in five forms. The first is the highest (*para*), in which, as Nārāyaṇa or Parabrahman, He dwells in His city of Vaikuṇṭha, under a gem pavilion, seated on the serpent Śeṣa, adorned with celestial ornaments and bearing His celestial arms, accompanied by His consorts Lakṣmī (prosperity), Bhū (the earth), and Līlā (sport); in this condition His presence is enjoyed by the delivered spirits. The second form of manifestation consists of His three or four *vyūhas*, conditions assumed for purposes of worship, creation, etc.; of these Saṅkarṣaṇa possesses the qualities of knowledge (*jñāna*) and power to maintain (*bala*); Pradyumna has ruling power (*aiśvarya*) and abiding character (*vīrya*); Aniruddha has creative power (*śakti*) and strength to overcome (*tejas*); while Vāsudeva, when included as a fourth *vyūha*, has all six qualities. The third form comprises the ten *avatārs* of the ordinary mythology; the fourth the *antaryāmin*, in which condition He dwells within the heart, can be seen by the supernatural vision of the Yogi, and accompanies the soul in its passage even to heaven or hell, while the fifth form is that in which the deity dwells in idols or images made by men's hands.

The individual soul, which is a mode of the supreme soul and entirely dependent upon and controlled by it, is nevertheless real, eternal, endowed with intelligence and self-consciousness, without parts, unchanging, imperceptible, and atomic[1]—a doctrine denied energetically by Śaṅkara. Souls are classified as eternal (*nitya*) in a special sense, such as those of Ananta or Garuḍa, which dwell in constant communion with Nārāyaṇa, released (*mukta*), or bound (*baddha*). Of the latter some seek mere earthly gains, others aim at the joys of heaven, while others strive for the eternal bliss of final deliverance. For the latter two means of attaining the end desired are available; the former is confined to the three higher classes alone, excluding the Śūdra; it leads through the *karmayoga* and the *jñānayoga* to *bhakti*, while the latter is open to those who despair of accomplishing this elaborate process and fling themselves upon the will of God (*prapatti*).

The *karmayoga* is the teaching of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, which bids man perform acts without desire of reward; it includes the ceremonial worship of the deity—the practice of penance, the offering of sacrifice, the bestowal of charity, and the performance of pilgrimages. It serves as a preparation for the *jñānayoga*, in which the devotee attains the knowledge of himself as distinct from matter and as a mode of *Brahman*. This, again, leads to *bhakti*, which for Rāmānuja is not ecstatic devotion, but a continuous process of meditation upon God. This meditation is to be promoted by subsidiary means, including the use of none but unpolluted food, chastity, the performance of rites, the practice of such virtues as charity, compassion, abstaining from taking life, truth and uprightness, the maintenance of cheerfulness, and the absence of undue elation. Thus promoted, *bhakti* results in an intuitive perception of God, the highest state realizable. *Prapatti*, on the other hand, consists in the sense of submission, the avoidance of opposition, the confidence of protection, the choosing of God as the saviour, the placing of oneself at His disposal, and the consciousness of utter abasement.

The relation between *bhakti* and *prapatti* was left obscure in Rāmānuja's teaching, for it immediately formed a subject of bitter division between the two schools which claimed to follow his teaching—the Vaḍagalai, or northern school, which used Sanskrit as its medium of teaching, and the Teṅgalai, or southern, which resorted to the vernacular, thus continuing the tradition of the Ālvārs. The former, which seems to reflect more closely the temper of Rāmānuja in its conservatism and restraint, claimed that *prapatti* was merely one way of salvation, not the only way, and that it should be resorted to only when it was found impossible to attain the desired result by the other modes; moreover, they found in it essentially an element of human action in that it demanded a distinct effort on the part of the *prapanna*, resulting from the effect of his sense of submission, etc. The southern school, on the other hand, maintained that *prapatti* was the only mode of salvation, that it precluded any action on the part of the devotee,[2] action emanating from God alone, and that the sense of submission, etc., was the outcome of *prapatti*, not the means of producing it. Similarly, the schools differed in their treatment of Śūdras: the Vaḍagalai confined equality to conversation alone, and forbade the teaching to them and indeed even to Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas of the *mantra* of homage to Nārāyaṇa with the syllable *Oṁ* prefixed, while the southern school asserted the equality of the castes and permitted the use of *Oṁ* by all.

In addition to *bhakti* and *prapatti* Rāmānuja is credited with permitting the attainment of deliverance by *ācāryābhimānayoga*, in which the votary places himself under the control of his

[1] III. ii. 27–30.
[2] See their commentaries on *Brahmasūtra*, II. ii. 28–31.

[1] See *Brahmasūtra*, II. ii. 19–32.
[2] Cf. art. PRAPATTI-MĀRGA.

teacher, who performs for him the necessary acts to attain deliverance.

Greater importance attaches to the ceremonial worship of the deity in the practice of the school than was seemingly laid upon it by Rāmānuja himself, though he fully accepted it and made it an integral part of his system. The modes of worship prescribed include the stamping of the discus or conch of Hari on the body, the wearing of a mark on the forehead, the repeating of *mantras*, the doing of service to his devotees, fasting on the eleventh day of both lunar fortnights, the laying of *tulasī*-leaves on his idol, the drinking of the water in which the feet of the idol are washed, and the eating of the food presented to Hari. Importance attaches to the last practice, for it bears a certain resemblance to the Christian sacrament and suggests the possibility of borrowing from the Nestorian Christian communities of S. India. The same conclusion is also indicated by certain features of the doctrine of *prapatti*, and above all by the method of salvation in which the teacher performs the necessary steps, while the part of the devotee consists in implicit faith in the teacher—a mode which bears a remarkable similarity to the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice. It is unnecessary, however, to assume that these features in the system of Rāmānuja were borrowed by him personally from Christian teaching; they are much more likely to have been already incorporated in the Vaiṣṇavism which he expounded and defended. It is characteristic of the intellectual rather than emotional character of Rāmānuja's teaching that he ignores the aspect of Viṣṇu's character in which he appears as Gopāla-Kṛṣṇa and sports with Rādha and the cowherdesses, and that even Rāma does not appear to have been the object of his special devotion.

LITERATURE.—The chief authorities for Rāmānuja are R. G. Bhandarkar, *Report on the Search for Sanskrit MSS in the Bombay Presidency during the Year 1882-83*, Bombay, 1887, p. 68 ff., *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious Systems* (=*GIAP* III. vi.), Strassburg, 1913, p. 50 ff.; G. Thibaut, tr. of *Vedanta-Sūtras*, with Śaṅkara's comm., *SBE* xxxiv. (1890) introd., and tr. of Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya*, *SBE* xlviii. (1904); A. Govindāchārya Svāmī, tr. of *Bhagavad-Gītā*, with Rāmānuja's comm., Madras, 1898, *The Life of Ramanuja*, do. 1906, tr. of *Arthapañchaka* of Pillai Lokāchārya (13th cent. A.D.), *JRAS*, 1910, pp. 565-607, and description of the points of difference between the northern and southern schools, *ib.* pp. 1103-1112. See also M. Rangāchārulu, *Life and Teachings of Rāmānuja*, Madras, 1895; C. R. Śrīnivāsa Aiyengar, *The Life and Teachings of Śri Ramanujacharya*, do. 1908. A criticism of the system of Rāmānuja from the standpoint of Advaitism is given in the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* of Madhava (14th cent. A.D.), tr. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, London, 1882, and P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Gesch. der Philosophie*, I. iii., Leipzig, 1908.

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RĀMĀYAṆA.—1. Character.—This poem, 'the Career of Rāma,' is one of the two great Sanskrit epics of ancient India. Both have been a national possession for at least 2000 years, deeply influencing the literary production as well as the moral and religious thought of the Indian population. But they offer several contrasts. The *Mahābhārata* (*q.v.*) in its literary aspect represents the type of old popular legendary tale called *purāṇa*, while the *Rāmāyaṇa* belongs to the class called *kāvya*, or artificial epic, in which form is regarded as more important than the story, and poetical ornament (*alaṃkāra*) is abundantly applied. The *Mahābhārata*, being a congeries of many parts only loosely connected by the thread of its epic kernel, which forms not more than one-fifth of the whole work, is hardly an epic at all, but rather an encyclopædia of moral teaching; its authors are unknown, and the traditional name of its final redactor, Vyāsa, 'the arranger,' is evidently mythical. The *Rāmāyaṇa* is a real epic of the romantic type, being homogeneous in plan and execution, on the whole the work of a single author named Vālmīki. Being in its main and original narrative almost free from interpolated and secondary episodes, it is also much shorter than the *Mahābhārata*, containing about 24,000 as compared with 100,000 stanzas. The warfare in the epic nucleus of the *Mahābhārata* is that of heroic human combatants on both sides; in the *Rāmāyaṇa* it consists of conflicts with monsters and demons such as are described by writers of fairy-tales without first-hand knowledge of real fighting. The *Mahābhārata* was composed in the western portion of N. India, the ancient Madhyadeśa, or Middle Land, which lies between the eastern confines of the Panjāb and the city of Allahābād, while the *Rāmāyaṇa* arose in the ancient kingdom of Kosala, which lay to the north-east of the Ganges, and roughly corresponds to the modern Oudh.

2. Importance.—The importance of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is twofold—literary and religious. It is the first product of the artificial epic, or *kāvya*, literature of India. It thus always served as a model to be imitated by the later classical poets, who regarded it as 'the first epic' (*ādi-kāvya*) and its author as the 'first epic poet' (*ādi-kavi*). Thus it supplied the subject of Kālidāsa's epic, the *Raghuvaṃśa*, 'the Family of Raghu,' as well as of two of the plays of the great dramatist Bhavabhūti. Even at the present day the recital of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is listened to with delight by many thousands of Hindus at the great festival of Rāma held every year at Benares. In the Middle Ages the Sanskrit epic was translated into the spoken languages of India, beginning with the Tamil version, which appeared at the beginning of the 12th cent. and was followed by adaptations and renderings in the vernaculars all over the country. On the *Rāmāyaṇa* the greatest mediæval poet of India, Tulasī Dās (1532-1623), founded his religio-philosophic poem in Hindī, entitled *Rām Charit Mānas*, 'Lake of the Doings of Rāma,' which as a lofty standard of purity and virtue is like a Bible to over 90,000,000 of the population of N. India. Dramatic representations of the story of Rāma are still performed at religious festivals in the towns and villages of India. Thus the 'Play of Rāma' (*Rām Līla*), in which the most popular scenes from the *Rāmāyaṇa* are exhibited, is annually performed at Lahore before a vast number of spectators.

Probably no work of world literature, secular in its origin, has ever produced so profound an influence on the life and thought of a people as the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The nobility and magnanimity of Rāma's character and the conjugal devotion and fidelity of his wife Sītā have, for a great many centuries, exercised a far-reaching moral effect as paragons for imitation among Indians. His early deification has, moreover, secured to the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa* the worship of the Hindus down to the present day. The belief that he was an incarnation of Viṣṇu, which forms the fundamental doctrine of the religious reformers Rāmānuja (*q.v.*) in the 12th and Rāmānanda (see art. RĀMĀNANDIS) in the 14th cent., has contributed much to counteract the diffusion of the degrading superstitions of Śaivism in the south as well as in the north of India.

3. Recensions.—In its present form the *Rāmāyaṇa* consists of about 24,000 couplets composed almost entirely in the ordinary epic metre called *śloka*, which consists of two hemistichs of sixteen syllables with an iambic cadence. It exists in three recensions—the Bengal, the Bombay, and the West Indian, which differ to the extent that about one-third of the verses contained in each do not occur in the other two. The oldest appears to be the Bombay recension, in which the irregularities of the epic language have not been removed, as is the case in the other two. It must not,

however, be regarded as representing the original text of which the other two recensions are mere revisions. The variations can for the most part be explained by the divergent forms which the popular tradition had assumed, in different parts of India, by the time when those three recensions came to be written down. There is, moreover, evidence to show that those recensions existed at a comparatively early period. Thus quotations from the epic in works of the 8th and 9th centuries indicate that a text allied to the Bombay recension was then in existence, while a poetical abstract of the *Rāmāyaṇa* composed by Kṣemendra proves that at least the West Indian recension was known to that author in the first half of the 11th century A.D.

4. Present text.—The *Rāmāyaṇa*, as it has come down to us, consists of seven books; but careful and detailed research has shown that the first and last were later additions. The former not only contrasts as inferior in language and style with the original, but contains both internal contradictions and statements conflicting with the following books. Thus it includes (in cantos i. and iii.) two tables of contents which must have been composed at different times; one of them, which takes no notice of the first and last books, was evidently made before these were added. Again, Lakṣmaṇa is stated in bk. i. to have been married at Ayodhyā at the same time as his brother Rāma, while at a later period, in bk. iii., he is expressly said to be still unmarried. The original poem evidently came to an end with the conclusion of bk. vi. For in bk vii. as well as bk. i. the tribal hero of the old books has become a national hero, the people's moral ideal; and the human hero of those books appears in the first and last as an incarnation of the supreme deity Viṣṇu (while Indra, and not Viṣṇu, is accounted the highest god in the original parts). Again, Vālmīki, the author of the epic, is in the additional books introduced as a contemporary of Rāma and is regarded as a seer. In bks. i. and vii. the thread of the narrative is characteristically interrupted, as in the *Mahābhārata*, by numerous episodes, myths, and legends, while this feature is very rare in the other books. Some cantos have been loosely interpolated in the genuine books also, but these consist chiefly of extensions of the finest passages added by professional rhapsodists wishing to meet the demands of the popular taste. Though the additions to the original poem must have been made before the three recensions came into being, it is evident that they could have become part of the epic only a long time after the old part was composed.

5. Place of origin.—There is evidence indicating that the *Rāmāyaṇa* was composed in the country of which the capital was Ayodhyā, the royal residence of the race of Ikṣvāku. Thus it is stated in bk. i. that the *Rāmāyaṇa* arose in the family of the Ikṣvākus; the hermitage of Vālmīki is described in bk. vii. as situated on the south bank of the Ganges; and the poet must have been connected with Ayodhyā, for Sītā, Rāma's wife, sought refuge in his forest retreat, where her twin sons were born, brought up, and taught to recite the epic by the poet. In or near Ayodhyā, therefore, Vālmīki may be assumed to have worked into a homogeneous whole the various epic tales current among the court bards of Ayodhyā about the life of the Ikṣvāku hero Rāma. This poem was then learnt by rhapsodists, who wandered about reciting it in different parts of the country.

6. Age.—The question of the age of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is involved in some doubt, because the arguments bearing on it are rather inconclusive. There is no evidence to show that either the *Mahābhārata* or the *Rāmāyaṇa* existed even in its earliest beginnings before the end of the Vedic period (*c.* 800 B.C.). As regards the relative age of the two epics, it is probable that the original form of the *Rāmāyaṇa* was finished before the epic nucleus of the *Mahābhārata* had assumed definite shape. For, while the leading characters of the latter are not referred to in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the story of Rāma is often mentioned in the sister epic. Again, two of Vālmīki's lines (vi. 81, 28) are quoted in a passage of the *Mahābhārata* (vii. 143, 66) which there is no reason to regard as a later addition. There is an episode of Rāma (*Rāmopākhyānam*) in the *Mahābhārata* that presupposes the existence of the extended *Rāmāyaṇa*, in which Rāma was already deified as Viṣṇu. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, moreover, was along with its later additions a complete work by the end of the 2nd cent. A.D., and was already an old book by the time the sister epic had more or less attained its final shape in the 4th cent. of our era. With this divergence in the date when their growth was completed the permeation of all the old parts of the *Mahābhārata* with new matter is in keeping, while in the *Rāmāyaṇa* such permeation hardly extends beyond the first and the last books. Both epics not only have, in all their books, many phrases, proverbial idioms, and whole lines in common, but also betray a far-reaching general agreement in language, style, and metre. Hence it may safely be concluded that the period of the growth of the *Rāmāyaṇa* coincides with that of the *Mahābhārata*, though it came sooner to an end. The earliest elements of the original *Mahābhārata* may, however, be older than the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, because the former has certain archaic features compared with which Vālmīki's poem shows an advance. Thus, while speakers are introduced in the longer epic with prose formulas such as 'Yudhiṣṭhira spoke,' in the sister poem such expressions invariably form part of the verse. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, too, comes decidedly nearer the classical poets in the use of poetical figures. Various sources of evidence have been examined in order to fix approximately the upper chronological limit of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The history of early Buddhism supplies no decisive information. In the oldest Buddhist literature, the Pāli *Tipiṭaka* (see art. LITERATURE [Buddhist]), there is no mention at all of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. It is true that in a *Jātaka* (*q.v.*) concerned with King Daśaratha there are twelve verses in which Rāma consoles his brothers for the death of his father, Daśaratha, and that one of these verses actually occurs in our *Rāmāyaṇa*. The fact, however, that there is only one verse in common indicates that some old story about Rāma rather than the epic itself is the source of the *Jātaka* verses; for there is not a word in the whole *Jātaka* about Rāvaṇa and his following, though it is full of fabulous matter and has much to say about demons and *rakṣasas*. On the other hand, excepting one evidently interpolated passage, there is not a trace of Buddhism in the *Rāmāyaṇa* itself. Such silence, however, may very well be due to the absence of any reason to mention Buddhism in a poem like this. Now, H. Oldenberg has shown (*Gurupūjākaumudī*, Leipzig, 1896, p. 9 ff.) that the metre of the *Rāmāyaṇa* represents a later stage of development than that of the Pāli poetry of Buddhism. This positive evidence would place the composition of the original *Rāmāyaṇa* appreciably later than the rise of Buddhism, *c.* 500 B.C.

Excepting in two passages, which have been shown to be later additions, the *Rāmāyaṇa* contains no reference to the Greeks, who first came into direct contact with India during Alexander's expedition in 327 B.C.

A. Weber's belief that Greek influence can be traced in the *Rāmāyaṇa* seems to be baseless. There is no real parallelism between the story of the abduction of Sītā by the demon Ravaṇa and Rāma's rescue expedition to Laṅkā on the one hand and that of the rape of Helen and the Trojan war on the other. Nor need the account of Rāma's bending a powerful bow to win Sītā have any connexion with a similar exploit performed by Ulysses. Stories of such feats of strength for a like object are met with in the literature of others as well as the Greeks, and may easily have grown up independently.

Thus far we have no reason to go back much farther than 300 B.C. for the genesis of Vālmīki's poem. H. Jacobi, however, adduces some arguments based on the political conditions appearing in the epic to show that it dates from before the rise of Buddhism.

In the first place, he notes that the city of Pāṭaliputra (now Patna), which had become the capital of India by 300 B.C., is not mentioned at all, though Rāma is described (i. 35) as passing its very site, and the poet makes a point of referring (i. 32 f.) to the foundation of various actual cities in E. India to show how far the fame of the *Rāmāyaṇa* had spread beyond Kosala, the country of its origin; he could therefore hardly fail to mention it had it existed. He further observes that in the old part of the *Rāmāyaṇa* the capital of Kosala is always called Ayodhyā, while to Buddhists, Jains, Greeks, and Patañjali (*c.* 150 B.C.) its name is invariably Sāketa. In bk. vii. we learn that Lava, one of Rāma's twin sons, established his government in Srāvastī, a city which is not mentioned at all in the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, but which we know to have been ruled in Buddha's time by King Prasenajit of Kosala. From these data he infers that the original epic was composed while Ayodhyā was still the capital of Kosala, before its name of Sāketa was known, and before the seat of government was shifted to Srāvastī. It would seem, further, to follow that the first and last books, which also mention Ayodhyā and, though added much later, do not know the name Sāketa, must have been composed considerably before the time of Buddha. Such a conclusion is in the highest degree improbable. Jacobi finally notes that in bk. i. Mithilā and Viśālā are twin cities governed by separate rulers, while it is known that by Buddha's time they had become a single city named Vaiśāli ruled by an oligarchy.

It is to be observed that these arguments are based on data to be found in the late first and last books, the evidence of which for the time of Buddha and before must be regarded with suspicion. They do not appear to the present writer to have any cogency as proof of a pre-Buddhistic date for the original *Rāmāyaṇa*.

A further argument has, however, been adduced to show that the old part of the *Rāmāyaṇa* dates from before the time of Buddha.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* is a popular epic, and its language is a popular Sanskrit. Now, about 260 B.C. King Aśoka used for his inscriptions not Sanskrit, but vernacular dialects resembling Pāli. Buddha himself before 500 B.C. preached not in Sanskrit, but in the speech of the people. A popular epic could not have been composed in a language that was already dead, but must have been written in one that the people understood. The original form of the epic must therefore date from a pre-Buddhistic period when Sanskrit was still a living tongue. Now, the foregoing argument is not cogent, because Sanskrit has always lived as a literary language beside the popular dialects, and has been understood by large sections of the population. There is therefore nothing strange in Sanskrit epics being composed and listened to while Jain and Buddhist monks were writing poetry and preaching in popular dialects, especially when these dialects had as yet diverged comparatively little from the literary language. Even at the present day it is not uncommon in India for two languages to be current side by side in the same district; and in a great part of N. India there is in use a modern Indian literary language which diverges very considerably from that of everyday life.

Occasionally verses occurring in the *Mahābharata* and *Rāmāyaṇa* are also found as Pali or Prakrit verses in Buddhist and Jain texts. This by no means implies that such verses have been translated into Sanskrit from popular languages. [illegible] more baseless is the view of several scholars that the two great epics were originally composed in popular dialects and were only later translated into Sanskrit. Not the slightest trace of any record that such a translation ever took place has come down to us. On the other hand, the fact that in the Sanskrit drama (*cf. ERE* viii. 112) the bard (*sūta*) regularly speaks Sanskrit, and not a popular dialect, indicates that the poems of the bards, *i.e.* the epic, was composed in Sanskrit. [illegible] were first propounded by A. Barth in *RC*, xxiii. [illegible] and further elaborated by him in *RHR* xxxvii. [1898] 288 ff., xlv. [1902] 195 f. It has been refuted by Jacobi in *ZDMG* [illegible] 407 ff.

A review of all the available evidence appears to the present writer to indicate that the original part of the *Rāmāyaṇa* came into existence about the middle of the 4th cent. B.C., when popular stories current about Rāma were collected and worked up into a homogeneous epic by the poet Vālmīki; while it attained its present extent by the end of the 2nd century A.D.

7. **Two parts.**—In the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, as told in the original books, two parts can be clearly distinguished. The first is an ordinary narrative of human life without any admixture of mythological elements. Beginning with the intrigues of a queen at the court of Ayodhyā to ensure the succession of her son to the throne, it describes the results that followed. Had the poem ended with the return of Rāma's brother Bharata to Ayodhyā after the death of their father, King Daśaratha, it might have passed for an epic based on historical events. On the other hand, the second part, being founded on myths, is full of marvellous and fantastic adventures. The theory was formerly held (by Lassen and Weber) that the narrative is an allegorical representation of the spread of Aryan culture to the south of India and Ceylon. This view is, however, not borne out by the statements of the epic itself. The poet is evidently unfamiliar with the south, which he fills with the fabulous beings that might easily be imagined to haunt an unknown country. There is much more probability in Jacobi's theory that the second part of the original *Rāmāyaṇa* represents a narrative of terrestrial events based on mythological elements traceable to the earliest Veda. The name of the heroine Sītā appears in the *Rigveda* as the personified Furrow invoked as an agricultural goddess (IV. lvii. 6). In a ritual work of the latest Vedic period (*Kauśika Sūtra*, 106) she appears as a divinity of the ploughed field, a being of radiant beauty, black-eyed, adorned with lotuses, the wife of the rain-god. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* itself Sītā is said to have arisen from the earth when her adoptive father Janaka was ploughing, and in the last book she finally disappears underground, received into the arms of Mother Earth. Her husband Rāma would then represent Indra, and his fight with the demon Rāvaṇa a modification of the Vedic conflict of Indra with Vṛtra, the demon of drought. It is here probably significant that Rāvaṇa's son is called Indra-śatru, 'foe of Indra,' which is an epithet of Vṛtra in the *Rigveda*. The rape of Sītā by Rāvaṇa is parallel to the abduction by the demons of the cows later recovered by Indra. Again, Hanumān, the chief of the monkeys, who aids Rāma in flying hundreds of leagues to recover Sītā from the island of Laṅkā, is the son of the god of wind and bears the patronymic Māruti, 'son of the Maruts.' This suggests a reminiscence of Indra's association with the Maruts, or storm-gods, in his fight with Vṛtra. The name of the dog Saramā, who for Indra crosses the river Rasā in search of the captured cows, reappears as that of a demoness who consoles Sītā when imprisoned by Rāvaṇa in the island of Laṅkā.

8. **Contents.**—Such being the general character of the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, we may now proceed to sketch the contents of the complete epic in the expanded form in which it has come down to us.

(*a*) *First part.*—Bk. i., called *Bāla-kāṇḍa* ('Childhood Section'), commencing with an introduction on the origin of the poem, goes on to narrate the story of Rāma's youth. We are told how Vālmīki in his forest hermitage was preparing to describe worthily the fortunes of Rāma. While he was [illegible] ing a pair of birds on the bank of a river, the male was [illegible] shot by a hunter and fell dead to the ground weltering in its blood. The poet, touched by the grief of the bereaved female, uttered words lamenting the death of her mate and threatening vengeance on the murderer. Strange to relate, his utterance was no ordinary speech, but issued from his lips in metrical form. As he wandered towards his hut pondering this occurrence, the god Brahmā appeared and, announcing to the poet that he had unawares created the rhythm of the *śloka* metre, bade him compose the divine poem on the life and deeds of Rāma in that measure. This story possibly preserves [illegible]

cal reminiscence: it may mean that the epic *śloka*, which in the form of the *anuṣṭubh* goes back to the *Ṛigveda*, and which is identical in structure throughout the *Mahābhārata* and the *Ramayaṇa*, was fixed in its final form by Vālmīki.

There follows an account of the city of Ayodhyā, in which the wise and mighty Daśaratha ruled. The king, being for a long time without a son, resolved to offer a horse-sacrifice, to direct which he appointed the potent seer Ṛṣyaśṛṅga. Just at that time the gods were suffering many things from the violence of the demon Rāvaṇa. They accordingly turned for help to Viṣṇu, imploring him to consent to be born in human form, because Rāvaṇa was immune from death except by the hand of a human foe. Viṣṇu having consented to be born as a son of Daśaratha and the horse-sacrifice being over, the three wives of the king bore four sons, Kauśalyā becoming the mother of Rāma (the incarnation of Viṣṇu), Kaikeyī of Bharata, and Sumitrā of the pair Lakṣmaṇa and Śatrughna. Of these sons Rāma was his father's favourite, and to him his brother Lakṣmaṇa was particularly devoted from the beginning. After the sons were grown up, the great seer Viśvāmitra, who had come to Ayodhyā, conducted the two princes Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa to the court of Janaka of Videha. That king had announced that he would give his daughter in marriage to the prince who could bend a powerful bow that he possessed. Many had tried in vain; Rama not only bent the bow, but broke it in two. The wedding of Rāma and Sītā, attended by King Daśaratha, was then celebrated with great festivities. For many years after the young couple lived in great happiness.

In this supplementary book the thread of the narrative is, just as in the *Mahābhārata*, interrupted by numerous episodes, many of which, in different versions, recur in the sister epic, and which are constantly alluded to in the later classical literature. One of these (i. 51–65) deals with the enmity of the famous sages Viśvāmitra and Vasiṣṭha. The former, a powerful king (though originally, in the *Ṛigveda*, a seer), came into conflict with the latter in the endeavour to deprive him forcibly of his miraculous cow. Unsuccessful in his attempt, Viśvāmitra undertook great penances which extended over thousands of years, and in which he resisted the seductions of beautiful nymphs, till at last he achieved Brāhmanhood and became reconciled to his rival Vasiṣṭha. Among others may be mentioned the story of the dwarf-incarnation of Viṣṇu (i. 29), of the birth of the war-god Kumāra or Kārttikeya (i. 35–37), and of the churning of the ocean by the gods and the demons (i. 45). The fantastic legend of the descent of the Ganges (i. 38–44) relates how the sacred river was brought down from heaven to earth in order to purify the remains of King Sagara's 60,000 sons, who had been burnt to ashes by the sage Kapila enraged by their disturbing his devotions.

Bk. ii., called *Ayodhyā-kāṇḍa* ('Ayodhyā Section'), with which the main story of the epic begins, describes the events that occurred at Daśaratha's court of Ayodhyā. The king, by this time growing old, held an assembly, in which he announced, amid general approval, his intention to make Rāma his heir-apparent. Kaikeyī, Bharata's mother, whose heart was set on her son's succession to the throne, now reminded Daśaratha of his former promise to grant her any two boons she might choose. On his consenting to fulfil his promise, she requested him to appoint Bharata his successor and to banish Rāma from Ayodhyā for fourteen years. Kaikeyī having refused to withdraw her demand, Daśaratha passed a sleepless night. Next day, when the consecration of Rāma was to have taken place, the king sent for and explained the situation to his son. Rāma, accepting his father's commands calmly and dutifully, without delay set forth into exile, accompanied by Sītā and his half-brother Lakṣmaṇa. The old king, overwhelmed with sorrow, cut himself off entirely from Kaikeyī, remained with Rāma's mother, and died after a few days, lamenting the banishment of his son. Bharata, who had been living with his maternal grandparents at Rājagṛha, was now summoned to Ayodhyā, but, indignantly refusing the succession, set out for the purpose of bringing Rāma back as king to the capital. In the wild forest of Daṇḍaka he found Rāma living happily with Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa. But Rāma, though deeply affected by the magnanimity of his brother's request, declined to return, considering it his duty to fulfil his vow of exile. He accordingly took off his gold-embroidered shoes, and handed them to his brother, in token of transferring the succession to him. Bharata then went back to Ayodhyā and, placing on the throne Rāma's shoes surmounted by the royal umbrella as emblem of sovereignty, retired to Nandigrāma, whence he administered the affairs of State as Rāma's vicegerent. Herewith ends the first part of the original epic, which deals with the world of reality.

(*b*) *Second part.*—With bk. iii., the *Araṇya-kāṇḍa* ('Forest Section'), we are introduced to the world of romance in which Rāma is constantly engaged in adventures and conflicts with fantastic creatures and demons of various kinds till the end of the poem. After the exiles have been living for some time in the Daṇḍaka forest, pious anchorites come to seek Rāma's protection against the *rākṣasas*, or demons, infesting the forest and terrorizing their hermitages. Rāma, having promised his aid, now enters upon a series of efforts to clear the forest of these monsters. Rāvana's sister Śūrpanakhā, falling in love with Rāma, is rejected first by him and then by Laksmaṇa. To avenge the insult, she brings her brother Khara with 14,000 demons against Rāma, who, however, destroys them all together with their leader. She then hastens across the sea to the fabulous island of Laṅkā and complains to her brother, Rāvaṇa, its ten-headed ruler. The latter, filled with rage and bent on revenge, speeds through the air in his golden car to the forest. There he transforms one of his followers into a golden deer, which appears to Sītā and at her request is pursued by Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa. Meanwhile Rāvaṇa, disguised as an ascetic, approaches Sītā, seizes her, and carries her off by force in his chariot through the air. The vulture Jaṭāyu, an old friend of Daśaratha, attacks him on his flight and succeeds in shattering his car, but is finally slain. Rāvaṇa again seizes Sītā with his claws and carries her across the sea to his palace in Laṅkā. He shows her all its splendours and tries to persuade her to become his wife. She indignantly refuses and is finally confined in a cave guarded by female demons. Rāma returns from a fruitless chase only to find that his wife has vanished. Reduced to despair, he wanders southwards with Lakṣmaṇa in search of Sītā. They fall in with a headless demon, who advises Rāma to conclude an alliance with the monkey king Sugriva, who will help him to find his lost wife.

Bk. iv., called the *Kiṣkindhā-kāṇḍa* ('Kiṣkindhā Section'), describes the alliance concluded by Rāma with the monkeys for the purpose of recovering Sītā. At the lake Pampā they meet Sugriva, who tells them that he has been robbed of his wife and sovereignty, and expelled from his kingdom, by his brother Vālin. Rāma and Sugriva then form an alliance. At Kiṣkindhā, the capital of Vālin, a battle takes place in which Rāma slays Vālin. Among the councillors of Sugriva, who has now become king, the wisest and most trustworthy is Hanumān. He is accordingly entrusted with the task of finding Sītā, and, accompanied by a host of monkeys, proceeds southwards. After many adventures they fall in with Sampāti, a brother of the vulture Jaṭāyu, who tells them he has seen Rāvaṇa carrying off Sītā, and describes the position of Laṅkā. On reaching the coast the monkeys are filled with despair as to how they can cross the sea. Hanumān, who has proved his ability to leap farther than any of the rest, ascends Mount Mahendra and prepares to bound across the ocean.

Bk. v., which describes Hanumān's doings in Laṅkā, is called the *Sundara-kāṇḍa* ('Beautiful Section'), perhaps as especially attractive because it contains more fabulous stories than any of the other books. With a mighty spring from Mount Mahendra Hanumān rises in the air and after a flight of four days, during which he undergoes various adventures, he reaches Laṅkā. From a hill he first surveys the city, which looks almost impregnable. Then, reducing himself to a minute size, he enters Laṅkā after dark, and inspects the whole city—Rāvaṇa's palace, his marvellous aerial car, and the women's apartments. After a long search he at last discovers Sītā in a grove. He rouses her from her grief by the news that Rāma is coming to the rescue. Hanumān then returns as he came, reports to Rāma the success of his search, and gives him a message from Sītā.

Bk. vi., entitled the *Yuddha-kāṇḍa* ('Battle Section'), describes the great conflict between Rāma and Rāvaṇa. Sugriva having advised the building of a bridge from the mainland to Laṅkā, an attack on the island is arranged and the vast monkey army marches to the seashore. On the news of its approach Vibhīṣaṇa, Rāvaṇa's brother, counsels the surrender of Sītā. Repelled and insulted by Rāvaṇa, Vibhīṣaṇa flies across the sea, allies himself with Rāma, and advises him to seek the help of the god of the sea, with whose aid the monkeys build the bridge in the course of a few days. The city being now invested, Rāvaṇa's army sallies forth and a general battle, as well as many single combats, ensues. In one of the latter Rāvaṇa's son Indrajit is slain by Lakṣmaṇa. Enraged at this, Rāvaṇa appears on the scene and fights a duel lasting a day and a night with Rāma, till at last he falls pierced to the heart. Rāma then orders the funeral of the dead chief of the demons to be celebrated and appoints Vibhīṣaṇa to succeed him as king of Laṅkā. Summoning Sītā, he announces his victory, but rejects her in the presence of all the monkeys and the *rākṣasas*. Loudly lamenting Rāma's unjust suspicions, Sītā then throws herself into the flames of a funeral pyre, but the god Agni, raising her unhurt, hands her over to Rāma, assuring him that she has been faithful to him throughout her captivity. Rāma hereupon declares that he has never doubted her innocence, but has considered it necessary that her purity should be proved in the eyes of the people. Sītā now returns joyfully with Rāma to Ayodhyā, where he is consecrated king and reigns gloriously, inaugurating a new golden age for his subjects.

Bk. vii., called *Uttara-kāṇḍa* ('Last Section'), is, as we have seen, a late addition to the original poem. Only about one-third of it is concerned with Rāma and Sītā. It is here related that one day Rāma hears that the people are dissatisfied at his having taken back Sītā after she has so long been a captive of Rāvaṇa, because they thought this would have a bad influence on the women of the country. Unable to endure the reproach that he was setting a bad example to his subjects, he requests Lakṣmaṇa to take Sītā away and abandon her. Lakṣmaṇa, conducting her to the bank of the Ganges and explaining why Rāma has cast her off, leaves her there. The weeping Sītā at length finds her way to the hermitage of the sage Vālmīki, who entrusts her to the charge of the anchorite women living there. After some time Sītā bears the twin sons Kuśa and Lava in the hermitage. Many years pass by. The boys have grown up and become the pupils of Vālmīki, who takes them with him to attend a great horse-sacrifice undertaken by Rāma. The two boys are selected to recite the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which has been composed by him, and are listened to with rapture by the audience. Rāma, hearing that the two youthful bards are the sons of Sītā, requests Vālmīki to cause Sītā to purify herself by an oath. The sage brings her and solemnly declares that she is innocent and that the twins are the actual sons of Rāma. The latter admits that he is satisfied by Vālmīki's words, but nevertheless desires Sītā to clear herself by the ordeal of the oath. Then all the gods descend from

heaven, and Sita prays that, as surely as she has not even thought of any other man than Rāma, the goddess Earth may open to receive her. Scarcely have the words been uttered when Mother Earth, rising from the ground, embraces Sita and disappears with her in the depths. Rāma in vain implores the goddess to give Sita back to him; but the god Brahmā appears and holds out the hope of Rāma's being again united with her in heaven. Soon after Rāma, making over the kingdom to his two sons, enters heaven and again becomes Viṣṇu.

As in the first book, the thread of this narrative is interrupted by many myths and legends which have no connexion with the story of Rāma. Such are the well-known tales about Yayāti and Nahuṣa, of the slaying of Vṛtra by Indra, of Urvaśī, beloved of the gods Mitra and Varuṇa, besides several others aiming at the glorification of the Brāhmans quite in the spirit of the latest parts of the *Mahābhārata*.

LITERATURE.—i. *TEXTS.*—Bengal recension, ed. G. Gorresio, Turin, 1843–67, Calcutta, 1859–60; Bombay recension, with three commentaries, 3 vols., Bombay, 1895, ed. K. P. Parab², do. 1902; W. Indian recension only in MSS (cf. Hans Wirtz, *Die westliche Rezension des Ramayaṇa*, Bonn, 1894).

ii. *TRANSLATIONS.*—English: by R. T. H. Griffith, Benares, 1874 (verse); M. N. Dutt, 7 vols., Calcutta, 1892–94 (prose); Romesh Dutt, *Ramayana: the Epic of Rama, rendered into English verse* (abridged tr.), London, 1900. Italian: by G. Gorresio, 5 vols., Paris, 1847–58. French: by H. Fauche, 9 vols., do. 1854–58 (worthless); A. Roussel, 3 vols., do. 1903–09 (sound). German: only highly condensed contents in verse, by F. Rückert, *Ramas Ruhm und Sitas Liebesleid*, Frankfort, 1868; bk. i. in prose by J. Menrad, Munich, 1897.

iii. *SUBJECT-MATTER.*—A. Weber, 'Ueber das Rāmâyaṇa,' in *ABAW*, 1870, pp. 1–88; H. Jacobi, *Das Rāmāyaṇa*, Bonn, 1893, also in *ZDMG* xlviii. [1894] 407 ff., li. [1897] 605 ff.; A. Ludwig, *Ueber das Rāmāyaṇa*, Prague, 1894; A. Baumgartner, *Das Rāmāyaṇa, und die Ramaliteratur der Inder*, Freiburg, 1894; J. C. Oman, *The Great Indian Epics: the Stories of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata*, London, 1894–99; C. V. Vaidya, *The Riddle of the Ramayana*, Bombay and London, 1906. Cf. E. W. Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*, New York and London, 1901 (concerned primarily with the *Mahābhārata*, but containing much matter bearing on the *Rāmāyaṇa*, as ch., ii. 'Interrelation of the two Epics,' pp. 58–84, and Appendix A, 'Parallel Phrases in the two Epics,' pp. 403–446; see also Index, *s.v.* 'Rāmāyaṇa'); also Truman Michelson, 'Linguistic Archaisms of the Rāmāyaṇa,' *JAOS* xxv. [1904] 89–145.

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RAM MOHAN RAY.—See BRĀHMA SAMĀJ.

RĀMOSHĪ.—The Rāmoshī, also called Nāik (Skr. *nāyaka*, 'leader'), a jungle tribe found in the Deccan and W. India, profess to derive their name from the demi-god, Rāma, who is said to have created them when on his way to Laṅkā to recover Sītā; others doubtfully connect the name with Skr. *aranyavāsin*, 'jungle dwellers.' At the census of 1911 they numbered 60,064, found in Bombay, with a small body in the Central Provinces and Berār.

Those in the Deccan appear to be an outlying branch of the Kanarese or Telugu tribe or group of tribes known under the general name of Bēḍar or Byāḍaru, hunters or woodmen.[1] The fact that the branch in Poona is divided into two groups, Chauhān and Yādava, names of leading Rājput septs, has been held to indicate an admixture of higher blood. Like their neighbours the Kolīs (see art. KOL, KOLARIAN), they were for a long time notorious on account of their disorderly and predatory habits. They supported the Marhāṭā leader, Śivajī, against the Muhammadans, and under British rule, as late as 1879, they committed outrages in Satārā and the neighbouring districts. In virtue of their traditional descent from Rāma, some of the tribes in Poona are called Rāmbhakt, 'worshippers of Rāma,' and are vegetarians. But more generally they have adopted Śiva in his form Khaṇḍobā as their tribal deity. He is represented riding on a horse with two women—a Vāṇī (or merchant-women), his wedded wife, and his Dhāṅgar (one of the jungle tribes) concubine behind him. As turmeric is a vegetable in which Khaṇḍobā is supposed to dwell, they swear by it, and no other oath is considered so binding. The oath ritual prescribes that the person swearing shall take a leaf of the *bel*-tree (*Ægle marmelos*) sacred to Śiva, a few grains of millet, and some turmeric powder which has been laid on the *liṅga*. The oath is recited with an imprecation against perjury, a little powder is eaten, and some is rubbed on the forehead. They also revere Kedārī, now regarded as a form of Śiva, the tutelary deity of the Purandhar fort in the Poona District, before whose image Raghūjī, one of their leaders, is said to have laid his turban, with an oath that he would never wear this head-dress until his tribe should be restored to the privileges of which they had been deprived by the Marhāṭas. Besides these they worship many local gods, Musalmān saints (*pīr*), the demon-leader Vetāla, who has many female spirits, or 'mothers,' in his train. The tomb of an Englishman in the neighbourhood of Poona is called by them Rāmdeval, 'Rāma's temple,' and is tended by an old Rāmoshī woman, who pours water over it, keeps a lamp burning, and allows no one who has eaten meat that day to visit the place.

Mackintosh remarks that both men and women had frequently to 'undergo the expiatory penance of the swinging ceremony, when the penitent is elevated to a considerable height and swung over a pole erected in front of the entrance of the temple, supported by a hook run through the skin and sinews of the back.'[1]

Indications of totemism are found in the badge, or crest (*devak*), which is generally some tree or a bunch of the leaves of several trees. Persons with the same crest are regarded as brothers and cannot intermarry, nor can they eat the fruit or use the tree in any way. They dread the spirits of the dead. At a funeral, on the way to the grave, the corpse is turned round and the bearers change places in order to baffle the spirit and prevent its return. As an additional precaution, heavy stones and thorns are placed in the grave. The same fear of the dead appears in the marriage rites. If a woman has lost three husbands in succession and wishes to marry a fourth, she holds a cock under her left arm, and the tribal priest marries her to the bird before she is joined to her new husband. The intention is that the vengeance of her former husbands may fall upon the bird. Their belief in amulets is shown by the story told of their noted leader, Dādjī. When he was brought to execution, it was impossible to behead him until he had made an incision in his arm and removed from his flesh a gem which he had inserted as a protective. Like other tribes in the same state of culture, they are much vexed by witches and sorcerers, and have a profound faith in omens.

LITERATURE.—The best account of the tribe is that by A. Mackintosh, *An Account of the Origin and Present Condition of the Tribe of Ramoossies, including the Life of the Chief Oomiah Naik*, Bombay, 1833; W. F. Sinclair, *IA* iii. [1874] 186 ff.; *BG* xviii. pt. i. [1885] 409 f., pt. iii. [1885] 34 ff., xvii. [1884] 209, xix. [1885] 108 f., xxi. [1884] 174 f., xxiv. [1886] 107; *Census of India, 1911*, vol. viii., *Bombay*, Bombay, 1912, pt. i. p. 300; *Bombay Ethnographical Survey*, monograph no. 138, do. 1909; M. Kennedy, *Notes on the Criminal Classes of the Bombay Presidency*, do. 1908, p. 143 ff.; R. V. Russell, *TC Central Provinces*, London, 1916, iv. 472 ff.

W. CROOKE.

RANTERS.—The term 'Ranters' was the nickname given to an antinomian movement—hardly cohesive enough to be properly called a sect—in the period of the English Commonwealth, appearing about 1644. The name is derived from the English verb 'to rant,' *i.e.* to talk in an extravagant, high-flown manner (cf. Shakespeare's phrase, 'I'll rant as well as thou' [*Hamlet*, v. i. 307]).

The Ranters constituted the somewhat chaotic 'left wing' of a serious attempt to work out in England in the 17th cent. a type of Christianity conformed to apostolic, primitive Christianity, free from what the leaders of this movement called 'the apostacy,' and loosely enough conjoined and

[1] E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, i. 60 ff.

[1] *Account*, p. 53.

organized to allow very wide individual liberty of thought and action. The central individualism of the movement tended to produce a great variety of groupings around prominent leaders, so that England at this epoch appeared to 'swarm with sects,' though the 'sects' were hardly more than marked variations of one general ground-swell movement. Ephraim Pagitt's description is vivid and well expresses the horror which the guardians of orthodoxy felt as this 'infection' swept over the country:

'The plague is of all diseases most infectious: I have lived among you almost a jubile, and have seen your great care and provision to keep the city from infection. The plague of heresy is greater, and you are now in more danger than when you buried five thousand a week. You have power to keep these heretics and sectaries from conventickling and sholing together to infect one another' (*Heresiography*, Dedication to the Lord Mayor).

Marsden very well reproduces the prevailing feeling among those who were contemporary with what Milton called the 'year of sects and schisms.'

'Absurd excesses of opinion now appeared, as exotics in a hotbed. The distractions of the times suspended the restraints of Church discipline; opinions monstrous and prodigious started up every day, and were broached with impunity in public and in private, and multitudes were led astray. The number of new sects, religious and political, with which England swarmed appears almost incredible. The sober Puritans were confounded. The state of England reminded them of the fabulous description of the sands of Libya, where scorching suns produce new monsters every year' (*Hist. of the Later Puritans*[2], p. 224).

All movements, such as this one, which express a deep popular striving to escape from the rigidity of old systems and to secure a large area of individual freedom tend to develop an extreme wing. Persons of unstable equilibrium are swept on by the contagion of the movement. Those who are abnormally responsive to suggestion are certain to be carried along with the movement. These psychopathic persons, lacking in perspective and balance, bring into strong light the dangers that are involved in complete religious liberty. The Ranters were largely composed of this type of person, and some of them were obviously insane.

The Ranters, so far as they can be differentiated from the general ferment of the time, show two marked characteristics: they were (1) pantheistic, and (2) antinomian. Masson says:

'Pantheism or the essential identity of God with the universe, and His indwelling in every creature, angelic, human, brute or inorganic, seems to have been the belief of most Ranters that could manage to rise to a metaphysics' (*Life of Milton*, v. 18).

Richard Baxter says of them:

'These also made it their Business . . . to set up the Light of Nature, under the name of *Christ in Men*, and to dishonour and cry down the Church, the Scripture, the present Ministry, and our Worship and Ordinances; and call'd Men to harken to Christ within them' (*Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, i. 76).

Joseph Salmon and Jacob Bauthumley may be taken as characteristic specimens of the leaders and exponents of the Ranter idea. Bauthumley (or Bottomley), who was called by George Fox 'a great ranter' (*Journal*, ed. N. Penney, i. 151), was the author of a pantheistical book with the title *The Light and Dark Sides of God* (London, 1650). The book opens in his best and sanest vein as follows:

'O God, what shall I say thou art, when thou canst not be named? What shall I speak of thee, when speaking of thee I speak nothing but contradiction? For if I say I see thee, it is nothing but thy seeing of thyself; for there is nothing in me capable of seeing but thyself. If I say I know thee there is no other but the knowledge of thyself, for I am rather known of thee than know thee. If I say I love thee it is nothing so, for there is nothing in me can love thee but thyself, and therefore thou dost but love thyself. My seeking thee is no other but thy seeking of thyself' (p. 1 f.).

On p. 77 he develops his extreme doctrine of the inward Light:

'It is not so safe to go to the Bible to see what others have spoken and writ of the mind of God as to see what God speaks within me and to follow the doctrine and leading of it in me.'

Joseph Salmon wrote *Heights in Depths, and Depths in Heights: or Truth no less Secretly than Sweetly, Sparkling out of its Glory* (London, 1651). This strange tract recounts in extravagant style the mystical experiences of the writer:

'I appeared to myselfe as one confounded into the abyss of eternitie, nonentitized into the being of beings, my soul split and emptied into the fountaine and ocean of divine fulness, expired into the aspires of pure life' (p. 13).

The tract is throughout a presentation of extreme pantheism. A tract entitled *The Smoke of the Bottomlesse Pit* (London, 1650–51), written by J. Holland Porter, who claims to be 'an eye and ear witness,' gives many details of the Ranters' views and their manner of life. All contemporary writers unite in the opinion that the Ranters were morally disordered in their way of living, and that they held antinomian views of conduct; *i.e.*, they were 'above' the usual moral distinctions of right and wrong. George Fox's *Journal* gives many concrete accounts of personal experiences with Ranters, and these accounts generally emphasize the two aspects under consideration—the pantheistical and the antinomian. In 1649 Fox went to visit a group of Ranters in prison in Coventry. He says:

'When I came into the jail, where the prisoners were, a great power of darkness struck at me, and I sat still, having my spirit gathered into the love of God. At last these prisoners began to rant, and vapour, and blaspheme, at which my soul was greatly grieved. They said they were God; but that we could not bear such things. When they were calm, I stood up and asked them whether they did such things by motion, or from Scripture; and they said, from Scripture. A Bible being at hand, I asked them to point out that Scripture; and they showed me the place where the sheet was let down to Peter, and it was said to him, what was sanctified he should not call common or unclean. When I had showed them that that Scripture proved nothing for their purpose, they brought another, which spoke of God's reconciling all things to himself, things in heaven, and things in earth. I told them I owned that Scripture also, but showed them that that was nothing to their purpose either. Then seeing they said they were God, I asked them, if they knew whether it would rain to-morrow? they said they could not tell. I told them, God could tell. Again, I asked them, if they thought they should be always in that condition, or should change? and they answered they could not tell. Then I said unto them, God can tell, and God doth not change. You say you are God; and yet you cannot tell whether you shall change or not' (*Journal*, bi-centenary ed., i. 47 f.).

Under date of 1654 Fox writes:

'During the time I was prisoner at Charing-Cross, there came abundance to see me. . . . Among those that came to see me, was one Colonel Packer, with several of his officers; and while they were with me, came in one Cobb, and a great company of Ranters with him. The Ranters began to call for drink and tobacco; but I desired them to forbear it in my room, telling them, if they had such a desire for it, they might go into another room. One of them cried, "all is ours"; and another said, "all is well"' (*ib.* i. 211 f.).

Richard Baxter's testimony almost certainly overstates the case against the Ranters, but, as it is the opinion of a high-minded contemporary, it must be given due weight. After presenting the views of the Ranters, he describes their manner of life:

'But withal, they conjoyned a Cursed Doctrine of *Libertinism*, which brought them to all abominable filthiness of Life: They taught as the *Familists*, that God regardeth not the Actions of the Outward Man, but of the Heart; and that to the Pure all things are Pure (even things forbidden): And so as allowed by God, they spake most hideous Words of Blasphemy, and many of them committed Whoredoms commonly. . . . There could never Sect arise in the World, that was a lowder Warning to Professors of Religion to be *humble, fearful, cautelous*, and *watchful*. . . . But the horrid Villanies of this Sect did . . . speedily Extinguish it' (p. 76 f.).

The Ranters were vigorously dealt with by Acts of Parliament, and many of the extreme Ranters were severely punished for their views and for acts considered either blasphemous or immoral. The better element in the groups of Ranters were 'convinced' by the preaching of George Fox and became Quakers. The movement was checked, and gradually disappeared from public notice, though the antinomian tendency has at intervals continued to reappear sporadically both in England and in America.

LITERATURE.—The most important books for a study of the movement are the following: E. Pagitt, *Heresiography*, London, 1645; T. Edwards, *Gangræna*, do. 1646; L. Stuckley, *Gospel Looking-Glass*, do. 1667; R. Hickock, *A Testimony against the People called Ranters*, do. 1659; J. H. Porter, *The Smoke of the Bottomlesse Pit*, do. 1650–51; G. Roulston, *A Ranter's Bible*, do. 1650; J. Jackson, *A Sober Word to a Serious People*, do. 1651; G. Fox, *Journal*, 2 vols., ed. N. Penney, Cambridge, 1911, and bi-cent. ed., 2 vols., London, 1901; W. Penn, *The Spirit of Alexander the Coppersmith lately Revived*, do. 1673; R. Baxter, *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, ed. M. Sylvester, do. 1696; S. Fisher, *Baby Baptism meer Babism*, do. 1653; R. Barclay, *The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth*, do. 1876; R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, do. 1909; D. Masson, *Life of Milton*, 6 vols., do. 1859–80; J. B. Marsden, *Hist. of the Later Puritans*[2], do. 1854; H. Weingarten, *Die Revolutionskirchen Englands*, Leipzig, 1868; T. Sippell, *William Dells Programm*, Tübingen, 1911.

RUFUS M. JONES.

RASHI.—This is the name familiarly applied to Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac; it is, indeed, derived from the Hebrew initials of his name. Some writers erroneously called him Jarchi (Yarḥi), supposing that his name was connected with the city of Lunel (*yeraḥ*=lune=moon). Rashi, however, was born in Troyes in 1040, and died in the same town in 1105. Like most of his contemporaries, Rashi did not derive any emoluments from his work as rabbi. He was among the many Jews of his epoch in France who engaged in viticulture. He was nevertheless an industrious student and author, and his works have won an enduring fame. No mediæval commentator is more studied in modern times. His exposition of the Pentateuch is still beloved of Jews, while his Commentary on the Talmud remains absolutely indispensable to the understanding of that work.

The first Hebrew book to be printed (of known date) is Rashi's Commentary on the Pentateuch (Reggio, Feb. 1475). Rashi expounded most of the Bible, but his repute now depends on his Pentateuch. In this Commentary he combined the newer grammatical method with the older Midrashic style, creating a harmony of unique charm. Nicholas de Lyra (1270–1340) familiarized Europe with Rashi's Biblical exegesis, and through de Lyra Luther carried on Rashi's influence into his German translation. A well-known line tells of Luther's indebtedness to de Lyra: 'Si Lyra non lyrasset, Lutherus non saltasset'; and Lyra, on his part, was much indebted to Rashi.

Rashi compiled *Responsa*, liturgical and other compendia, but apart from his Pentateuch he is best known for his great Commentary on the Talmud. He did much to settle the text, and added notes which for lucidity and brevity have few rivals. The Talmud is invariably read with Rashi by Jewish students, and all scholars are dependent, either directly or indirectly, on his interpretation. This has stood the test of time, and the numerous super-commentaries and annotations on Rashi have only brought out the supreme merits of his work.

LITERATURE.—L. Zunz, 'Salomon b. Isaac,' in *Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, 1823, pp. 377–384, Heb. tr., Lemberg, 1840; I. H. Weiss, 'Rabbenu Shelomoh b. Yiṣḥaḳ,' in *Bet-Talmud*, ii., nos. 2–10, reprinted in *Toledot Gedole Yisrael*, Vienna, 1882; M. Liber, *Rashi* (Jewish Worthies Series), tr. from French, London and Philadelphia, 1906, with bibliography, pp. 231–239.

I. ABRAHAMS.

RATIONALISM.—1. **Definition.**—Rationalism, says A. W. Benn, means the hostile criticism of theological dogma, 'the mental habit of using reason for the destruction of religious belief.'

'Christian has ruled that the submission of belief to pure reason shall be called rationalistic in reference to every branch of natural knowledge, and rationalism only when it leads to the rejection of the supernatural or dogmatic beliefs with which religion has become identified.'

J. B. Bury has the following:

'The [illegible] by reason of her absolute rights throughout the whole domain of thought is termed *rationalism*, and the slight stigma which is still attached to the word reflects the bitterness of the struggle between reason and the forces arrayed against her. The term is limited to the field of theology, because it was in that field that the self-assertion of reason was most violently and pertinaciously opposed.'[1]

The usage involves us in obvious difficulties. An argument will or will not be rationalistic, not according to its intrinsic contents alone, but according to the intention of the user or to its effects upon the hearer—and indeed certain theses of geology or astronomy which have been classed as rationalistic in one century have in a later century been accepted by all parties. A further difficulty lies in the use of the word 'reason.' It would seem impossible to deny the right and the duty of good thinking, of the utmost use of intelligence, in every department of life. Even the appeals to revelation or to authority, to the usefulness of a certain belief, or to the needs and rights of feeling and action, are themselves appeals to our intelligent judgment for comprehension and sympathy. Thought can be criticized, on whatever grounds, only through thought.

The use of 'rationalism,' indeed, whether as a war-cry or as a term of reproach, is a use belonging to popular philosophy, and cannot be pressed with too much exactness. (Its more technical uses in the theory of knowledge are not considered here.)

On the whole, the usage is governed by two considerations. (1) An argument is rationalistic when it is directed against a belief which by many of its holders at any rate is counted a 'religious' belief. The person bringing the argument may or may not have a constructive philosophy of his own to maintain. He may be a monotheist attacking polytheism, or a deist criticizing the doctrine of the Trinity; he may be a materialist, or an agnostic, or none of these things; the 'rationalism' of his argument lies in its attack, in the name of sound thinking, on the particular shape of a particular religious system. Obviously such arguments, though anti-religious in one sense, may be used in the service of religion. A higher form of religious belief in conflict with a lower must sometimes use negative criticism as well as positive teaching. And a developing belief, trying to fit itself continually better to the facts of the soul and of the universe, must often use such criticism on itself.

(2) In its derogatory use, on the other hand, the name of 'rationalism' is specially applied to a certain kind of bad thinking—an unimaginative criticism from the outside. If a difficult idea has been crudely and imperfectly stated by those who have groped after it and only half attained it, the lower rationalism makes no attempt to reach it and to state it better, but fastens on the crudities of the accepted statement, is triumphant in showing the untenability of this as it stands, and therewith rejects the whole conception.

In rationalism in this sense 'reason holds off, as it were, from trying to comprehend what is most characteristic in religious experience. Instead of allowing the paradoxical nature of religious doctrines to be provocative to it and to stimulate it to further effort, the rationalistic understanding makes it a ground for declining to consider them further. Thus doctrines like those of the Trinity or of Original Sin in Christian theology are set aside because in arithmetic one and three are different numbers, and because the citizen of a civilized state will not accept responsibility for his ancestors' criminal acts. The question is not put, why such obvious contradictions to our ordinary ways of thinking have been entertained and considered of high importance. Or it is put, and the answer is suggested that we have here mere survivals of fanciful notions elsewhere discarded; and the further question is not raised, why they are not discarded here also, for it is plainly not because they have not been made the subject of close attention. The rationalistic criticism ought only to bring out the need of putting and answering such enquiries; but it may simply lead to the neglect of them as not worth pursuing.'[2]

[1] *Hist. of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. [illegible], pp. [illegible], 4.

[1] *Hist. of Freedom of Thought*, p. 18.

[2] C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, London, 1911, p. 72 f.

2. History.—There can scarcely have been a century or a country in the history of the world where rationalistic thoughts have not existed in some men's minds. For the Western world rationalism enters into history with the criticisms brought by Ionian philosophers against the popular mythology of Greece. Early Christian apologists attacked paganism on rationalistic grounds. In the Middle Ages the controversies among Christians and Jews and Muhammadans similarly had to be largely rationalistic. When men of one religion dispute with men of another, they can appeal only to the human intelligence which is common judge for both. After the Reformation, again, when Church opposed Church, or Church collided with State, reason was invoked by all parties.

In the development of Christian thought rationalistic contributors or opponents have stood sometimes outside the Christian Church and sometimes inside it. Of their arguments, drawn from philosophy, science, history, or the criticism of documents, some have fallen to the ground; others have had real effect in modifying or developing the doctrines grouped together under the general name of Christianity. For this, like every other system of living thought, has developed partly by taking up criticisms into itself, and it is almost inevitable that disputes should arise in each generation as to the amount of new modification that can be allowed if the system is still to retain the name of Christian.

It is not possible to write the history of rationalism as one would write the history of a religion or a science, or that of a nation. The story of England can show a continuous line of movement; it is complex but unified; whereas the story of 'attacks on England' will have disconnected factors of the most various kinds. A religion has unity and definite movement, but the series of criticisms brought against that religion may have little of either. Some slender thread of historical development must, indeed, run through it, appearing and disappearing, since to some extent the criticism must follow the movement of religious thought—changes in this either giving rise to new forms of attack or abolishing old forms. Or, again, the story of rationalism may exhibit fragments of many histories, because some part of the negative criticism in any generation may be the cutting edge of a single positive, brought forward by a rival religion, or by a school of philosophy or science, whose own development makes a true history.

All these features appear in the rationalism of the last hundred years in Europe. The first point hardly needs illustration—new developments in religion are sure to call out opposition and therefore argument, not only from those who stand outside the religion, but still more from conservative supporters of the religion itself, and from followers of rival movements within it. The second event—the supersession of an important criticism by a change in the doctrine criticized—is a good deal rarer, but has occurred more than once even in the last hundred years. Historical examination of Biblical documents had been practised ever since Spinoza, but 19th cent. studies gave it impetus enough to take irresistible effect, and the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch (at any rate) is probably no longer a 'religious opinion' in most circles. The idea of a gradual formation of the world and its inhabitants is a good deal older than Darwin, but, since it was taken up into the form that he gave it, the ordinary religious belief of educated persons has gradually ceased to include a six days' creation. For the third point—the exhibition of fragments of other histories—the illustrations just given would still serve, since they belong not only to the history of religious opinion but also to that of the study of documents and of natural science. Or we might select another fragment: part of rationalist argument in the last four generations has been the cutting edge of a change in the science of collective psychology, and this has turned not only against certain religious doctrines but against some older criticisms of them. D. F. Strauss, *e.g.*, offers his 'mythical' account of the Resurrection deliberately as superseding older explanations, such as the suggestion that the disciples stole the body of Jesus for the sake of their own ambition and self-interest, or the other suggestion (which Strauss calls specially 'rationalist') that Jesus recovered consciousness after a deep swoon but was never able thenceforth to persuade his disciples that he was not a being from another world.[1] We are probably safe in saying that these explanations have indeed been superseded by the growth of a psychological school in which Strauss may stand as one of the pioneers.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to arrange individual rationalists in a clear order of historical development. The threads cross too much. Opinions and criticisms which are obsolete in some circles are not obsolete in others. Different men may use the same argument in the interests of the most diverse schools of thought; and few men can be fairly described as if they were specialists of a single argument. What Renan says of himself is true of most—that their doubts arose not from one train of reasoning but from ten thousand.

Renan's own difficulties, indeed, were comparatively specialized, numerous as they were:

> 'If I could have believed that theology and the Bible were true, none of the doctrines . . . would have given me any trouble. My reasons were entirely of a philological and critical order; not in the least of a metaphysical, political, or moral kind. These orders of ideas seemed scarcely tangible or capable of being applied in any sense. But the question as to whether there are contradictions between the Fourth Gospel and the synoptics is one which there can be no difficulty in grasping. I can see these contradictions with such absolute clearness that I would stake my life, and, consequently, my eternal salvation, upon their reality without a moment's hesitation.'[2]

A clearer example than Renan's of doubts arising from ten thousand trains of reasoning may be found in one who, like Renan, started from the most devout and orthodox standpoint of his time and country, and only gradually and reluctantly came to oppose what he used to believe. This was **Francis William Newman**, younger brother of Cardinal Newman. In *Phases of Faith, or Passages from the History of my Creed* (London, 1850), he describes his evangelical upbringing and youthful belief, then his testing of various points by his Bible reading. In one matter after another—the Sabbath, the Mosaic Law, infant baptism, episcopacy, the Lord's return—he found discords between the teaching of the NT and what he had been taught himself. Persisting, as a lay missionary in Persia, in trying to read the Gospels with fresh eyes, he found the Fourth Gospel clash with the Athanasian Creed, and returned to England to find himself cast off by his friends as a heretic. He moved next, on grounds of moral criticism, to the rejection of eternal punishment, original sin, and the vicarious suffering of Christ. He had already begun to discern that it was impossible with perfect honesty to defend 'every tittle contained in the Bible,' and further study forced him to conclude that the assumed infallibility of the entire Scripture was a proved falsity, not merely as to physiology and other scientific matters, but also as to morals. Finally, the NT miracles became a burden to the doctrine instead of a support. Miracles were irrelevant as a means of proving the goodness and veracity either of the person who

[1] *Der alte und der neue Glaube*[7], Bonn, 1874, sect. 15.
[2] *Recollections of my Youth*, Eng. tr.[3], London, 1897, 'The St. Sulpice Seminary,' pt. iii. p. 260.

worked them or of God; and the kind of evidence on which the NT writers accepted them was definitely inadequate for a modern mind.

Newman claimed that what was left to him in the end was still the essential part of religion—the heart's belief in the sympathy of God with individual man. What Renan kept was not theology, but the sympathy of a scholar, a poet, and an Eastern traveller with the persons who founded Christianity. His *Vie de Jésus* (Paris, 1863) was not intended as a scientific work either for historians or for theologians, but was simply a poetic retracing, in the clearest and the tenderest colours at his command, of a picture which religious tradition had veiled, he thought, from many readers.

A very different book on the same subject was published almost immediately afterwards—**D. F. Strauss's** *Leben Jesu fur das deutsche Volk* (Leipzig, 1864). His more famous *Leben Jesu* had appeared nearly thirty years before. The purpose in these books is not to paint a picture, but to re-interpret the growth of a doctrine. Stories of miracles arise for the most part, the author urges, not by any one's deliberate invention, but out of the unconscious imagination of a community. As with ancient myths, the fact is created by the idea, the legend grows of itself. Interpretation on this line was not new as regards the OT, but Strauss was the first to apply it with anything like such thoroughness to the narratives in the Gospels. His view in 1835 was that very few of these were newly created myths; most were based on OT legends and pictures, transferred, between the Exile and the birth of Jesus, to the person of the expected Messiah. The Messiah must be transfigured like Moses, must multiply food and raise the dead like Elijah and Elisha, must perform works of healing because Isaiah had said that in His day the eyes of the blind and the ears of the deaf should be opened. In 1864 Strauss left much more room for the growth of legend within Christian circles, reflecting the growth of Christian experience and thought, and laid less stress on the OT correspondences. It was far easier of course to apply interpretation by myth to the Gospels, if once it had been admitted that none of these was the work of an eye-witness; and Strauss, though not himself a professional critic of documents, had studied most attentively the contemporary work of F. C. Baur and others. His sketch of the doings and the personality of Jesus is less vivid and definite than Renan's, largely because of his scrupulousness in evaluating the sources and confining himself to what he thought to be proved facts.

While Strauss worked at re-stating the history of the Christian form of religion, his contemporary, **L. A. Feuerbach**, in *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Leipzig, 1841), re-stated its philosophy. The universal reason of the human race operates on an uncultured man only under the image of a personal being. He must separate from himself the element in his own nature which gives him moral laws, and place it in opposition to himself; thus we have the picture of a personal God. Yet, if God were really a different being from myself, why should His perfection trouble me? God is the latent and the ideal human nature, the truth of man; to doubt of Him is to doubt of myself. Our gods are strong first, because physical strength is the first thing we count as glorious; then they are majestic and serene; finally, God loves and suffers, because we have come to see that feeling is absolute, divine in its nature. 'God loves man' is an Oriental expression of the truth, 'The highest conceivable is the love of man.' Not the attribute of the divinity, but the divineness or deity of the attribute, is the first true Divine Being. When this projected image of human nature is made an object of theology, it becomes an inexhaustible mine of falsehoods. The foundation of religion is man's feeling of the sacredness of man and nature; the result of religion too often is that he sacrifices man and nature to his God.

In the line of Strauss and of Feuerbach, whether consciously or not, stand several living writers, including in France **Emile Durkheim** (*Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912) and **L. Lévy-Bruhl** (*Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, do. 1910) and in England **F. M. Cornford** (*From Religion to Philosophy*, London, 1912) and **Jane E. Harrison** (*Ancient Art and Ritual*, do. 1911, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, *Alpha and Omega*, London, 1915). For these writers the beginning and the foundation of religion is the 'collective consciousness' of a group, dominating the primitive individual as an irresistible pressure from outside, and answering to itself as the voice of conscience within. He 'projects' it first in the figure of a totem animal or plant, later in other figures which grow out of primitive ritual. All such projections are embodiments of collective emotion, desire, and law. High emotional tension is caused and maintained for a savage only by a thing felt socially; the group-consciousness in tension then makes a picture of itself, which takes finally the form of a god. The mystery-god is both human and dæmonic, re-created at every celebration of his central rite, in the collective emotion of his congregation. Such a scheme provides the appropriate setting for figures half-human and half-divine—actual living prophets who during their lives or after their deaths become the dæmons of religious societies. Group-action and group-emotion, not their formulation in any theology, make the essence of religion.

In this line of writers we certainly find a section of real history of rationalism. How far we judge them to have succeeded in interpreting the facts of religion will probably depend on our opinion, and on our estimate of these writers' opinion, of the reality of the concrete universal. In the common Spirit within us, and in the divinity of the attribute, have we something which merely deludes us into forming a religion, or have we something of which the highest language of religion is really true?

There remain some typical or outstanding figures in 19th cent. rationalism which stand apart from those already described. **F. K. C. L. Büchner** (*Kraft und Stoff*, Leipzig, 1855) is not so much a landmark as a type recurrent in every century, though the special forms of the arguments change. He attacks the idea of the creation of the world; for no force can exist except as a property of matter; and matter itself can never be either produced or annihilated. Writing five years before the appearance of *The Origin of Species*, Büchner claims it as highly probable, even certain, that life may be spontaneously generated out of the non-living, and that higher forms of life have been slowly developed by a natural process out of lower forms. No soul can exist without brain; the experimenter's knife cuts off the soul piecemeal. It would be waste of words to try to prove the impossibility of a miracle. No educated, much less a scientific, person, who is convinced of the immutable order of things, can nowadays believe in miracles. There exist no supersensual or supernatural things, and no supersensual capacities; and they can never exist, as the eternal conformity of the laws of nature would thereby be suspended. Having laid down these metaphysical doctrines, Büchner adds that there is no such thing as meta-

physics, and that all metaphysical systems come to nothing and lose themselves in an unintelligible play of words. All our knowledge is relative; we can have no knowledge and no conception of the Absolute—of that which transcends the sensual world.

Büchner ends with agnosticism, though he does not begin with it. The name 'agnostic' was originated by Huxley, but popularized by **Leslie Stephen**, whose *Agnostic's Apology* was first published in the *Fortnightly Review* for June 1876. Dogmatic atheism, he holds, is a rare opinion, but agnosticism is increasing. The agnostic asserts that there are limits to the sphere of human intelligence, and that theology is 'metempirical' knowledge which lies outside these limits. In the whole history of the race no agreement on theological questions has ever been attained. In matters that are still involved in endless and hopeless controversy ignorance is no shame, but a duty. Many of the Christian doctrines have created far more numerous and far more horrible difficulties than those which they profess to remove. It is better to admit openly that man knows nothing of the Infinite and Absolute, that the ancient secret is a secret still.

Agnosticism is metaphysics binding her own hands, and constructive criticism of religious doctrine will not come from this quarter. A different position belongs to philosophical workers whose negative criticisms are incidental, though necessary, in their own constructive thought. Such, among living writers, is **J. M. E. McTaggart** (*Some Dogmas of Religion*, London, 1906). The subjects of religious discussion, he says, are the most important and the most practical in the world. Religion rests on a conviction of the harmony of ourselves with the universe, and nothing but exact metaphysics can justify us in holding this conviction. We are not justified in believing any dogma because all, or most, people believe it; nor because it is held by people who can work miracles; nor because of its importance for our happiness. Nor could observation without metaphysics ever give it sufficient support.

McTaggart's negative criticism is directed chiefly against certain conceptions of the Deity. If God is strictly omnipotent, He cannot be good, for He has permitted evil when He need not have permitted it. It is said that He could not secure the benefits of human free will without also permitting the evil of sin, but there is nothing that an omnipotent being cannot do. When believers in God save His goodness by saying that He is not really omnipotent, they are taking the best course open to them; but then they must accept the consequences of their choice, and realize that the efforts of a non-omnipotent God in favour of good may, for anything they have yet shown, be doomed to almost total defeat. Again, suppose God not to be omnipotent—can He be creative and still be good? A creator has nothing but his own nature to determine him, and, if a being who is completely self-determined produces evil, knowing that it is evil, how can we say that such a being is not wicked? Could there be a God, perhaps, who was neither omnipotent nor creative, but just a person more wise, good, and powerful than any other? He might be well deserving of worship, and might dominate the universe as much as an efficient schoolmaster dominates his school. It is a possible theory, though not an established one.

But, McTaggart asks, does religion require the existence of a personal God at all? Suppose our metaphysics led us to believe that the universe consisted, not of matter, but of a harmonious system of selves. Then the directing mind of a God, though not disproved, would not be needed in any way to account for the traces of order in the universe.

'The non-existence of God would leave it as possible as it was before that love should be the central fact of all reality. . . . Whether the friends whom all men may find could compensate for the friend whom some men thought they had found is a question for each man to answer. It is a question which can never be answered permanently in the negative while there is still a future before us' (p. 290).

'If we want to know the truth . . . we must have faith in the conclusions of our reason, even when they seem . . . too good or too bad to be true. Such faith has a better claim to abide with hope and love than the faith which consists in believing without reasons for belief. It is this faith, surely, which is sought in the prayer, "Suffer us not for any pains of death to fall from thee." And for those who do not pray, there remains the resolve that, as far as their strength may prevail, neither the pains of death nor the pains of life shall drive them to any comfort in that which they hold to be false, or drive them from any comfort in that which they hold to be true' (p. 75).

LITERATURE.—For all except the most recent years A. W. Benn, *Hist. of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 2 vols., London, 1906, covers the ground and gives a great number of references. A smaller book is J. B. Bury, *A Hist. of Freedom of Thought*, do. 1913. Brilliant work within its own limits is to be found in O. Pfleiderer, *The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant, and in Great Britain since 1825*, Eng. tr., do. 1890.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

REALISM AND NOMINALISM.—1. Ancient and mediæval.—Although these terms are most properly used only of mediæval schools of philosophy, the disputes of the Middle Ages were prepared by the division already existing in the fragments of Greek philosophy which they inherited. Plato was known as a realist, and Aristotle was usually believed to be opposed to him—in spite of the fact that after Thomas Aquinas 'Aristotle' meant a synthesis of realism and its opposite. We may judge from the first statement of metaphysics which we now possess, the Platonic dialogues, that the forms (ideas) had been accepted as the explanation of the likeness between objects or individuals, before Plato wrote.[1] This meant that the data of experience were (1) individuals, objects, or things, and (2) certain other realities called 'forms' (εἴδη, ἰδέαι) with peculiar relations to the individuals. The relation was sometimes said to be participation or copying; and it was implied in the Platonic school that the individuals were in some sense less real than, or dependent upon, the forms. Aristotle seems to have objected that this was only to add a new kind of individual existence to what was obvious; and his argument was perhaps intended to prove that individuals were ultimately real; but the result was that he appeared to make the forms less real than, or dependent upon, the individuals.

At the very beginning of mediæval thought (cf. art. SCHOLASTICISM) Scotus Erigena[2] attempted to reduce to logical coherence the confusion of semi-philosophical statements, primitive science, and popular superstition, which was known as *catholica fides*. But the guide that he took was the obscure Neo-Platonism of the pseudo-Dionysius. In accordance with this, he established a form of realism. Being, the most general of all likenesses or forms, was said to be the ultimately real, and we departed more and more from reality in approaching the objects of sensation. The theological results we need not discuss; on the philosophical side, realism implied that what is usually called 'abstraction' is the correct method for the study of the real world to the subordination, if not the exclusion, of sense-perception, and therefore the real was contrasted with the apparent. The result was a form of mysticism in which all exact knowledge seemed to be useless.

Against this nominalism was a revolt. Aristotle had said that 'things [*res* = realities] cannot appear

[1] Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, ser. i., Oxford, 1911; J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, pt. i., 'Thales to Plato,' London, 1914.

[2] *De Divisione Naturæ*

as predicates,' and the conclusion was made that universals, or the likenesses between things, were not *res*. But, since the word *res* seemed to mean what we now mean by 'reality,' the nominalists were charged with saying that universals were mere words or *flatus vocis*. Unfortunately we know the early nominalists only from their opponents. It is, however, quite possible that they were attempting to turn philosophical attention towards the individual objects of perception. Abelard (*q.v.*), the first great mediæval thinker, easily showed, on the other hand, that the classification of things as like, one to the other, cannot be due to the caprice of the perceiver and must therefore have a ground in the things. It is probably unhistorical to make Abelard a pure conceptualist or to suppose that he had a theory of forms of the mind or categories due to the structure of mind. It is difficult to be historically just to the early mediæval thinkers. They were probably even more simple and primitive than their words seem to imply. The great step onwards came with the introduction of more works of Aristotle; and Thomas Aquinas (*q.v.*) easily dominated the current of thought. He was a realist in the sense that, although he held the individual to be ultimately and irreducibly real, he maintained that universals are objective (in the mediæval language, 'subjective') and are 'in the things' (*universalia in rebus*). Duns Scotus, the great opponent of Aquinas in other issues, in this did not differ very much from him, although he preferred 'thisness' (*hicceitas*) to the 'principle of individuality' (*principium individuationis*) as the explanation of the individual. It is to be noted, however, that both seem to hold the individual object of perception to be a composite, made up of universals (likenesses, etc.) with some individuating element added. Realism, thus modified, was triumphant. It was conclusive in showing that classification was not arbitrary, and that objects or individuals were like one another quite independently of the perceiver. But it had in it the seed of its own destruction in the mistaken Aristotelian attempt to secure the universal by making it a component part of the object of perception.

The last stage of the mediæval controversy was reached by William of Ockham (see art. SCHOLASTICISM), who to the mind of his time completely destroyed the realism of Aquinas and Scotus. His most effective argument was directed against the *principium individuationis* of his predecessors. He showed that this ultimate difference was nothing else than the individual itself; and, asserting that the individual needed no explanation, he turned upon the universals of the realists. He showed that they did not exist *in re* and the alternative, as he phrased it, was that they existed *in mente*. Probably Ockham was not clear as to what he meant; but he certainly did not mean that universals are fictions or even 'the work of the mind'; for he expressly dismisses that theory. At this stage the controversy was displaced from its mediæval prominence; but, being still logically implied in every new metaphysical theory, it was handed on through the Renaissance to modern philosophers. The accepted view was generally what Ockham had left it. The individual objects of perception were real and the source of all our knowledge; and the likenesses between them were mental or conceptual. There was still the implication that such likenesses were due to the structure or activities of the perceiving mind; but the attention to sense perception for which Ockham's nominalism stood combined readily with the new interest in physical science. Thus Ockham was opposed to mediæval realism, according to which universals were *actual*, but he is the precursor of modern realism in giving them conceptual (objective) existence and in refusing to suppose the thing to be made up of its qualities.

It is not quite fair to the earlier modern philosophers to class them as realists and nominalists; for this particular issue was never faced in the same terms after the Renaissance. The two tendencies, however, continued, and conceptualism (*q.v.*) was developed as a theory that the objects of perception were what they were because of the perceiving mind. This theory in Berkeley and Hume (*qq.v.*) seems to have implied that there was a certain human arbitrariness in classing things as like, one to another. The elaborate study of mental process added to the philosophical prejudices which implied that we never observe the thing 'itself'; and then with Hegel (*q.v.*) the whole of what the plain man regards as the world was supposed to be an emanation from percipient mind. The result was to make of exact science only a study of mental process or its effects; and realism was driven from the field.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

2. Realism in modern thought.—Modern realism differs from its earlier connotation largely owing to this displacement of the centre of interest from ontology to epistemology; it is a doctrine concerning the relation between cognition and the thing known. In its simplest form as the naive realism of the unphilosophical man it holds that the subject has immediate knowledge of the external world, that things are what they seem, and that they are independent of being known. The view that things are what they appear as, taken apart from the further supposition of independence, is variously called 'epistemological monism,' 'the theory of immanence,' and 'phenomenalism.' The last term is a survival from, and represents the antithesis of, an earlier meaning of the 'real' as contrasted with appearance. In this sense the real is that of which something is known, not what it is known as. The 'natural realism' of the Scottish school was of this 'substance' type,[1] and arose as a protest against the 'theory of ideas' of Berkeley and Hume (see art. SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY). Cartesian dualism had asserted that we can have experience only of 'ideas' which merely represent external objects, and led to a subjectivism which Reid was anxious to avoid. He argued that, since the qualities of a body do not themselves constitute the body, there can be no question of their remaining mere ideas through the uncertainty of the existence of the underlying body. This argument as against ideas is curious; for, in sharply distinguishing between a body and its qualities, the possibility is introduced that in all cognition what is known is never the object itself but only an idea representing that object. And it was precisely this dualism in knowledge that Reid wished to avoid;[2] indeed he claims, but nowhere substantiates, that cognition is immediate. In fact epistemological dualism is born of the belief that propositions about things are of the subject-predicate form (cf. below, § 3), and leads naturally, as in Hamilton and Spencer, to agnosticism regarding the 'real' object—thus being fatal to all naturalisms of substance. It remains to be shown how the epistemological monism part of naive realism came to be recognized as expressing a relational view of cognition.

Shadworth H. Hodgson, the forerunner with L. T. Hobhouse[3] of English 'new realism,' sought in his 'subjective analysis of what is actually experienced'[4] to reach the reality of objects in

[1] Reid, 'On the Intellectual Powers,' in *Works*[2], ed. Sir W. Hamilton, Edinburgh, 1849, p. 232.

[2] 'Inquiry into the Human Mind,' in *Works*[2], p. 106*a*.

[3] *The Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1896.

[4] *The Metaphysic of Experience*, London, 1898, i. 18 *f*.

'face to face perception.' A thing is what it is known as[1]—a reality independent of the existence of a perceiving consciousness. Now, Berkeley himself had escaped from the difficulties of epistemological dualism by denying it; and it was therefore of vital importance for realism to distinguish between his monism and his subjectivism so as to be able to avoid the latter and to assert independence. That is why 'The Refutation of Idealism' by G. E. Moore[2] cleared the way for future realist construction. Moore contends that a sensation is in reality a case of knowing or being aware of something. Therefore, when we know that the sensation of blue exists, the fact which we know is that there is awareness of blue. On analysis the 'sensation of blue' is thus seen to include, besides 'blue,' both a unique element, awareness, and a unique relation of this element to blue. From this it follows that, when we know that the sensation of blue exists, we know blue—*i.e.*, we are already outside the subjectivist's circle of his own ideas and sensations. This distinction between sensation and sense-data thus forms a step towards the generalized argument against subjectivism,[3] basing itself on the externality of relations—a doctrine supported by the success of modern logic, since it merely expresses the justification of logical analysis.[4] New realist adherence to analysis[5] is exemplified in the significant attempt of the 'platform' realists,[6] E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding, at what Russell called, in welcoming their appearance, the 'patient co-operative accumulation of results by which the triumphs of science have been achieved.'[7] Perry[8] believes that realism is further strengthened by the possibility of showing that critical naturalism 'gives to being in the last analysis a logical rather than a physical character.'[9] But 'logical atomism,' the search for 'piecemeal, detailed, verifiable results,'[10] renders it difficult to give any adequate summary, in the crude unanalyzed language of common discourse, of the positions gained, such as the according of full ontological status to logical entities (not only particulars but also universals are real) or the acceptance of Kant's contention that, if any knowledge is possible, mathematical and logical knowledge is,[11] without acknowledging the priority of epistemology.[12]

There is one important difference between, speaking roughly, American and English new realists; and this is due largely to William James, who has been to the one school what Hodgson was to the other. In his *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (London, 1912) James approved of the view that things are what they are known as (p. 27), but insisted that they need not be known in order to be (p. 26). The divergence comes when he urges that there is no specific character of mental things, the difference between mental and physical being one of context and arrangement (*ib.* p. 25). The origin of this lies far back in Hume's application of the argument from the ego-centric predicament to the subject as object. Thus, *if subjectivism is assumed*, we reach the radical phenomenalist world of neutral elements in momentary being at the instant of perception. The further step of giving these elements independent existence apart from perception Hume mentioned[1] only to reject it because he thought that the so-called illusions of sense proved the dependence of ideas on the structure of our organs. But, on Hume's initial assumption, our organs have no permanent structure; they exist when somebody perceives them and not otherwise.[2] If we now retrace our steps, we have the following results: (1) since the argument based on relativity to sense-organs is inoperative, Hume's tentative step of assuming independence for the elements becomes a possible one; but (2) we were led to the necessity for this step by the difficulty of knowing the subject as object, which (3) arises only if subjectivism is assumed, and this (4) has been refuted by Moore. Now American realists believe that they can retrace step (1) without retreating farther, and so find themselves in James's position of neutral epistemological monism *plus* independence. The argument against this, elaborated above, applies equally to the phenomenalistic naturalisms of Clifford, Karl Pearson, Ernst Mach, and Avenarius.[3]

A detailed analysis of neutral monism is given by Russell.[4] Some important consequences follow from the theory; *e.g.*, a mind which had only one experience would be a logical impossibility, since, according to it, a thing is mental in virtue of its external relations—a view which places the important realist claim of independence at the mercy of a thoroughgoing relativist like N. Wiener.[5] Furthermore, neutral monism unduly assimilates belief or judgment to sensation and presentation, thus leading to the view of error as belief in the unreal, and so to the admission of unreal things.[6] The problem of error must, however, be disentangled from that of 'sense-illusion.' The more complete avoidance of subjectivism by the English realists makes this easier, and renders the question of secondary qualities much more amenable. The objects of acquaintance cannot be illusory or unreal;[7] so, when a hot metal touches a cold spot on the skin, the 'coldness' is objective.[8] Though sensations are functions of the sense organs and the nervous system, this is not primitive knowledge and cannot form part of the epis-

[1] *Mind*, new ser., vi. [1897] 235.

[2] *Mind*, new ser., xii. [1903] 433; cf. 'The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception,' *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, new ser., vi. [1905–06]; for a realist theory of value see his *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge, 1903.

[3] Cf. Bertrand Russell, *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, new ser., vii. [1906–07] 37; also 'Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III),' *Mind*, new ser., xiii. [1904] 513.

[4] On external relations see Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, London, 1910, p. 160; K. Costelloe, *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, new ser., xv. [1914–15] 271; the six American 'programmists,' *The New Realism*, New York, 1912, p. 33; E. G. Spaulding, *ib.* p. 155; R. B. Perry, *ib.* p. 99, and *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, New York, 1912, p. 319.

[5] Cf. Russell, *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, Herbert Spencer Lecture, London, 1914, p. 4.

[6] *Journ. of Phil.* vii. [1910] 393. [7] *Ib.* viii. [1911] 161.

[8] *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 83.

[9] Cf., however, C. D. Broad's acute critique of anti-realist thought in *Perception, Physics, and Reality: An Enquiry into the Information that Physical Science can supply about the Real*, Cambridge, 1914. In this work it is shown by detailed analysis how much more must be assumed than is generally believed before even the naivest realism can be overthrown. Broad differs from Russell in clinging to the physical object as well as to sense-data and sensation; but in his discussion of Russell's present view of 'things' as series of aspects in *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, new ser., xv. [1914–15] 250, a partial reconciliation seems indicated.

[10] Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*, Chicago and London, 1914. p. 4.

[11] See *ERE* vii. 656b.

[12] Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London, 1912; Marvin, in *The New Realism*, p. 45.

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888, p. 207.

[2] Broad, p. 165.

[3] We may note that S. Alexander holds that Berkeley in some passages avoids the confusion of mental act and what it is about (the confusion which gives rise to subjectivism), and regards sensible things as independent presentations ('The Basis of Realism,' *British Academy*, vi. [1914]; cf. also J. Laird, 'Berkeley's Realism,' *Mind*, new ser., xxv. [1916] 308).

[4] 'On the Nature of Acquaintance,' *Monist*, xxiv. [1914] 1, 161, 435.

[5] *Journ. of Phil.* xi. [1914] 561.

[6] Russell, *Monist*, xxiv. [1914] 174 f.; for a criticism of Russell's theory of judgment see G. F. Stout, *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, new ser., xv. [1914–15] 332.

[7] Russell, 'Definitions and Methodological Principles in Theory of Knowledge,' *Monist*, xxiv. [1914] 586.

[8] S. Alexander, *Mind*, new ser., xxi. [1912] 18, 'On Sensations and Images,' *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, new ser., x. [1909–10] 16.

temological premisses of epistemology.[1] Furthermore, the difficulty of colours occupying the same place at the same time has been resolved. T. P. Nunn[2] concluded that a wider idea of 'thing' must be constructed. The necessary logical work has been accomplished by Bertrand Russell, who showed that the difficulty over the phrase 'in the same place' arose from a too simple and unambiguous conception of space.[3]

It is obvious that much remains to be done; in the words of a keen critic of realism, 'the new philosophy is not out of the wood, but it has cleared hopeful paths in it.'[4] A. E. HEATH.

3. Modern logic and realism.—A stimulus to philosophical realism came through modern logical analysis of mathematics and mathematical advances in theories of infinity and continuity (cf. art. CONTINUITY, vol. iv. pp. 96–98).

The traditional logic of Aristotle and the Schoolmen was principally a collection of rules of syllogistic inference, and propositions were analyzed into attributing of predicates to subjects. Leibniz, indeed, perceived that there could be valid asyllogistic inferences, such as 'Jesus Christ is God, therefore the mother of Jesus Christ is the mother of God,' and 'If David is the father of Solomon, without doubt Solomon is the son of David.'[5] The logic of relations which was indicated by Leibniz was cultivated with not much success by Johann Heinrich Lambert,[6] and with great success in the middle of the 19th cent. by Augustus de Morgan. In this respect de Morgan's work was on quite different lines from that of George Boole, whose symbolism for logic was ultimately based on the Aristotelian logic. De Morgan's work was published in the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society* from 1850 to 1865 and in his *Syllabus of a Proposed System of Logic* (London, 1860). This part of de Morgan's work may be shortly indicated by saying that it was a successful attempt to fulfil a certain recommendation expressed by Sir William Hamilton:

'Whatever is operative in thought must be taken into account and consequently be overtly expressible in logic; for logic must be, as to be it professes, an unexclusive reflex of thought, and not merely an arbitrary selection—a series of elegant extracts—out of the forms of thinking.'[7]

But modern logic proper may be said to begin with the work of Gottlob Frege. Frege's first work, *Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens* (Halle, 1879), should be read in connexion with his second work, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung uber den Begriff der Zahl* (Breslau, 1884). For the purpose of coming to a decision as to the nature (synthetic or analytic, *a priori* or *a posteriori*) of the concept of number, Frege devised an extraordinarily effective, though rather clumsy, symbolism for expressing with great precision the various concepts and methods of deduction in logic; and this symbolism and analysis were developed in the years 1879–1903. Frege's final statement of his whole theory is in his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet* (2 vols., Jena, 1893–1903). Philosophically speaking, Frege's point of view is clearly expressed in his criticism of the psychological logic of Benno Erdmann's *Logik* (Halle, 1892):

'It seems to me that different conceptions of the truth are the origin of the controversy. I look upon the truth as something objective and independent of the person who judges. It is not so according to the psychological logicians. What Erdmann calls "objective certainty" is only a general acknowledgement proceeding from those who judge, and which therefore is not independent of them but may change with their psychical nature. . . . I acknowledge an objective domain which is not a domain of actual things; while the psychological logicians, without more ado, look upon the non-actual as subjective.'[1]

In many of his works Frege carried on a sometimes ironically expressed polemic against the thesis that the subject-matter of arithmetic is the actual symbols and not the universals denoted by the symbols. Even eminent mathematicians such as H. L. F. Helmholtz, L. Kronecker, H. E. Heine, J. Thomae, O. Stolz, A. Pringsheim, H. Schubert, and many others maintained, in most cases quite explicitly, this form of nominalism. Frege succeeded in showing quite satisfactorily that the numbers used in arithmetic belong to a domain which is both non-actual and non-mental.

The logical work of Giuseppe Peano began to be published nine years after that of Frege, but was quite independent of Frege's work. The foundations of Peano's logical system were much more in conformity with those of Boole and his successors, but Peano used a very convenient and ingenious symbolism and attempted with great success the analysis of whole trains of reasoning which included already symbolized mathematical deductions. Peano laid stress on the fact that his symbolism was a true 'ideography' and thus did not make use of anything expressed in ordinary language. Although in many respects Peano's analysis was greatly inferior to that of Frege, Peano has the merit of being the first explicitly to point out the fact that the two propositions 'Socrates is mortal' and 'All men are mortal' are different in form. This distinction, which seems to have been well known to Frege also, though it was not explicitly expressed by him until after Peano had done so, was and is unfamiliar to most other logicians, including some symbolic logicians, because of the use of verbally the same copula ('is' or 'are') in both cases. The philosophical aspect of this distinction has been thus expressed by Russell:

'This [corresponding] confusion . . . obscured not only the whole study of the forms of judgment and inference, but also the relations of things to their qualities, of concrete existence to abstract concepts, and of the world of sense to the world of Platonic ideas.'[2]

The work of Bertrand Russell began with the completion of Peano's system by the addition of a correspondingly symbolized logic of relations, and advanced, by the independent discovery of many of Frege's subtle distinctions as well as by unanticipated discoveries, to a very satisfactory combination and development of the results of Frege in logic, Georg Cantor's results in the theory of transfinite numbers, and Peano's symbolism. The more philosophical discussion formed the subject of *The Principles of Mathematics* (vol. i., Cambridge, 1903), and a detailed symbolical exposition of the theory of A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell was given in *Principia Mathematica* (3 vols., Cambridge, 1910–13).

The philosophical bearing of modern logical work has been particularly emphasized by Russell. Broadly speaking, proper names stand for particulars, while other substantives, adjectives, prepositions, and verbs stand for universals. Pronouns and some adverbs stand for particulars, but are ambiguous. Only those universals which are named by adjectives or substantives have been much or often recognized by philosophers, while those named by verbs and prepositions have

[1] Russell, *Monist*, xxiv. 592.

[2] 'Are Secondary Qualities independent of Perception?' *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, new ser., x. [1909–10] 191.

[3] 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics,' *Scientia*, xvi. [1914] 7.

[4] G. Santayana, *Journ. of Phil.* xi. [1914] 449.

[5] B. Russell, *Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, Cambridge, 1900, p. 288; L. Couturat, *La Logique de Leibniz*, Paris, 1901, pp. 73–75, 454.

[6] Cf. J. Venn, *Symbolic Logic*[2], London, 1894, p. xxxiv.

[7] Quoted in de Morgan's *Syllabus*, p. 27.

[1] From a tr. of part of the *Grundgesetze* in *Monist*, xxvi. [1916] 187.

[2] *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 41.

usually been overlooked. Speaking generally, adjectives and common nouns express qualities or properties of single things, whereas prepositions and verbs tend to express relations between two or more things. Thus the neglect of prepositions and verbs, which is due to the fact that, in practical life, we dwell only upon those words in a sentence which stand for particulars, led to the belief that every proposition can be regarded as attributing a property to a single thing (the belief that all propositions are of the subject-predicate form) rather than as expressing a relation between two or more things. Hence it was supposed that ultimately there can be no such entities as relations, and this leads either to the monism of Spinoza (*q.v.*) and Bradley or to the monadism of Leibniz (*q.v.*).[1] The belief just referred to gives rise to reflexions of much the same kind as the one of Hamilton and de Morgan mentioned above.[2] It seems that most philosophers have been less anxious to understand the world of science and daily life than to convict it of unreality in the interests of a super-sensible 'real' world either revealed to mystical insight or consisting of unchangeable logical entities. We find examples of such reasons with Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza, Hegel,[3] and this is at the bottom of the idealist tradition in philosophy. However, it is not true that all relations can be reduced to properties of apparently related terms.[4] Here we may refer to § 2 above and to *Principles*, p. viii; cf. p. 448.

Another of the grounds on which the reality of the sensible world has been questioned by philosophers is the supposed impossibility of infinity and continuity.[5] The explanation of the world which assumes infinity and continuity is much easier and more natural,[6] but from the time of Zeno, whose paradoxes were invented to support indirectly the doctrine of Parmenides,[7] the supposed contradictions of infinity have played a great part in philosophical speculation. Some of the problems of infinity were well treated by Bernard Bolzano;[8] but it was the mathematician, Georg Cantor, who, about 1882, first practically solved the difficulties. In fact, it is not essential to the existence of a collection, or even to knowledge and reasoning concerning it, that we should be able to pass its terms in review one by one; but infinite collections may be known by their characteristics although their terms cannot be enumerated—collections can be given all at once by their defining concepts. Thus, an unending series may form a whole, and there may be new terms beyond the whole of it.[9] Because of the fact that infinite collections are not self-contradictory, 'the reasons for regarding space and time as unreal have become inoperative, and one of the great sources of metaphysical constructions is dried up.'[10]

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted throughout the article.

PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN.

REALITY.—The words 'real' and 'reality' are used in a variety of different senses; it is therefore impossible to give a single satisfactory definition of them. Moreover, in the most fundamental sense in which they are used they are indefinable. Their meaning is best made clear by considering certain correlative expressions in which they are commonly met (*e.g.*, reality and appearance) and by discussing their relations to certain other notions with which they are very closely connected (*e.g.*, existence).

1. Existence and reality.—In the ordinary philosophic use of reality it would seem that a distinction is drawn between it and existence; for some things which would be asserted to exist would be denied by the same philosopher to be real, and some things that are said to be real are denied to exist. The two words, therefore, cannot be reasonably regarded as having the same intension, and any one who says that their extension is identical is called upon to give some proof of his assertion; *e.g.*, many philosophers deny that such things as colours are real, but it seems hardly possible to deny that they exist. When I see a colour or hear a sound, I am aware of something, and not of nothing. Also I am aware of something different in the two cases, and the difference seems to be between the objects of which I am aware, and not merely between my two awarenesses as mental acts.

Sounds and colours then may be said to exist, at any rate so long as any one is aware of them; and those who deny that they are also real are denying something the absence of which is compatible with their existence in the above sense. The two words are not, however, used consistently, and it would perhaps be as much in accordance with usage to say that colours are real but do not exist. At any rate, this example shows that reality and existence differ in intension; and we shall see reasons for preferring to say that colours exist even though they be unreal rather than that they are real even though they do not exist.

The fact that reality and existence differ in intension can also be shown from another side. Many philosophers hold that such things as the number 3 are real; but hardly any one would say that 3 exists, though of course certain collections of three things may exist—*e.g.*, the Estates of the Realm and the Persons of the Trinity.

As a foundation for setting up a consistent terminology, we have the following two facts about the common use of words: (*a*) hardly any one would think it appropriate to say that such things as numbers exist, but many would say that they are real; and (*b*) there are two kinds of things which almost every one would agree to exist if they be real—physical objects and minds with their states. With these two facts fixed, we may proceed to deal with the more doubtful cases of such objects as sounds and colours. We note that the two kinds of objects which are said without hesitation to exist if they be real are particular individuals; *i.e.*, they are terms which can be subjects of propositions but not predicates. Minds and physical objects clearly stand in this position. Objects which are said to be real but are seldom naturally said to exist are universals, whether qualities or relations—*i.e.* terms which can be subjects of propositions but can also occupy other positions in them. The number 3 is an example; for we can say both that 3 is an odd number and that the Persons of the Trinity are three. We may therefore lay it down as a general rule that objects are most naturally said, not merely to be real, but also to exist, when they are real and have the logical character of particular individuals.

When a man says that he sees a colour, he means that he is aware of an extended coloured object and not merely of a quality. This coloured object—*e.g.*, a flash of lightning—is a particular, and therefore, if real, exists. When we say that red exists, we mean two things: (1) that there are red objects, and (2) that these are particulars. The first part of our meaning corresponds to the

[1] See Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London, 1912, pp. 145-149; cf., on what precedes this paragraph, *Principles*, pp. 42-81.
[2] Cf. Russell, *External World*, p. 45.
[3] *Ib.* pp. 166, 45-47, 63 f., 39, 6 f.
[4] *Ib.* pp. 47-50.
[5] Cf. Russell, *Problems*, pp. 227-229.
[6] Russell, *External World*, p. 155.
[7] See art. CONTINUITY, vol. iv. p. 91; Russell, *External World*, pp. 129, 155-182.
[8] *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*, Leipzig, 1851.
[9] Russell, *External World*, pp. 159, 181 f.
[10] Russell, *Problems*, p. 229.

wider technical use of existence which is involved when mathematicians talk of existence-theorems. In this sense a universal is said to exist if it can be shown that it has or may have instances. Thus the number 3 exists in this sense because we can point to collections having three terms. But this is not the common use of existence in philosophy. To be able to say that a quality like red exists, we must be able to show both that it has instances and that these are particulars; for it is only particulars that are primarily said to exist, and existence, in the secondary sense in which it is ascribed to red, is derived from the existence, in the primary sense, of its instances. It seems, however, that we do not naturally ascribe existence to a universal in all cases where it has instances which are particulars. The number 3 has instances which are particulars, yet we do not commonly say that it exists. This difference in usage seems to depend on whether or not the judgment in which the quality is asserted of the subject occurs instinctively and without a recognized process of intellectual analysis. When we see a red object, we pass, if we choose, to the judgment 'This is red' without explicit analysis, and so we say that red exists; to judge that a collection which we see has three members, we have to break it up in thought and re-synthesize it, and so we hesitate to say that 3 exists, though we admit that it is real. It is difficult to believe that this difference of usage is of any philosophical importance, but it is necessary to notice it.

2. **Reality of universals.**—We have now to ask in what sense such objects as colours can be said to be unreal though they exist. It certainly seems that in the primitive senses of reality and existence nothing can exist that is not real. And this must be accepted; coloured objects, while we see them, both exist and are real in the primary sense of reality. But both their reality and their existence are denied by many philosophers; those philosophers must therefore be using the terms in a new sense. To say that red is unreal though it exists means (*a*) that red objects exist while they are perceived; (*b*) that nothing is red except when some one perceives it; and (*c*) that it is commonly believed that things might be red though no one perceived them. The third factor is quite essential. Toothache exists only when some one feels it, yet no one calls toothache unreal on this account. We may say, then, that reality is denied of a quality in this special sense when there are particular instances of it which we perceive, and our perception is accompanied by the belief in unperceived instances of it, and this belief is held to be erroneous.

It is clear that every immediate object of our senses both exists and is real in the primary meaning of these terms so long as we remain aware of the object. For it seems to be a synthetic *a priori* proposition that anything of which we can be directly aware by our senses is both real and particular; and what is real and particular exists in the primary meaning of that word. In a secondary meaning of reality, such objects may be called unreal if they give rise instinctively to judgments asserting the continued existence of the same or similar objects when unperceived, whereas in fact nothing of the kind can exist unperceived. Questions as to the reality of any particular, when reality has its primary sense, can arise only if that particular be not an object of direct awareness. Thus we ask, Does God really exist? or, Are atoms real? The meaning of such questions is as follows: God and atoms are not the direct objects of our minds at any time; if they were, there could be no doubt of their existence and reality in the primary sense at certain times (viz. when we were directly aware of them). But we know what we mean by the words 'God' and 'atom'; *e.g.*, we may mean by 'God' an *ens realissimum* or a First Cause. But these descriptions which we understand are partly in terms of universals; thus 'first' and 'cause' are universals. When we ask whether God really exists, we mean, Is there an instance of the complex universal involved in the definition or description of what we mean by the word 'God'? We can see that, if there be an instance, it must be a particular; so that, if there be one, God is both real and existent.

We may now turn to those objects that commonly would be said to be real but not to exist. It would seem that every simple universal of which we are immediately aware must be real (*a*) in the primary sense, and also (*b*) in a secondary sense which involves the already-mentioned secondary sense of existent as a special case. If we are directly aware of a universal, it is the object of a thought, and is clearly something real in the same sense in which a particular flash of light is real when it is the object of our senses. It does not, however, exist in the primary sense, because it is not a particular. Again, to be aware of a simple universal, it is necessary to have been aware of some instance of it. Thus any simple universal of which we are directly aware must have instances. It must therefore exist in the mathematical sense. It need not, however, exist in the philosophical sense, because its instances may not be particulars; *e.g.*, we are directly aware of the universal colour, but the instances of colour are red, yellow, etc., which are themselves universals. Thus it seems more natural to say that colours exist than that colour exists. Nevertheless this is largely a matter of mere usage. We cannot become aware of a simple universal of a higher order unless we are aware of one of the next lower grade, and so on till we come to the lowest universals in the hierarchy—those whose instances are particulars. Thus, to become acquainted with colour, we need to be acquainted with colours; and, to become acquainted with colours, we need to be acquainted through our senses with particular coloured objects. So we may fairly say that every simple universal of which we are directly aware either exists in the secondary sense or is known through universals that are instances of it and themselves exist in the secondary sense.

It follows that the only universals about the reality of which questions can reasonably be asked are either (1) those which are not directly cognized by us, but are described in terms that we understand, or (2) complex universals. The questions that can be asked about the reality of such universals are closely connected; *e.g.*, it may reasonably be doubted whether any one is directly acquainted with the number twelve million and forty-nine. But we all know this number perfectly well under the description of 'the number which is represented in the decimal scale of notation by the symbols 12,000,049,' provided that we are acquainted with all the terms involved in this description and with the significance of their mode of combination in it. It is then open to ask: Is there really such a number? This question involves two others: (*a*) Is there anything contradictory or incoherent in the description, as there would be if a number were described as that represented in the decimal scale by a bow and arrow? and (*b*) If the description be self consistent and intelligible, is there really an object answering to it? If both these questions can be answered in the affirmative, the number will be said to be real in the primary sense. We can then go on to ask

the question: Is there any collection of particulars that has this number? If so, we can add that the number exists in the secondary philosophic sense in which existence can be predicated of universals.

Very similar questions arise over complex universals—*e.g.*, a golden mountain. It would seem that complex universals which involve no internal incoherence must be real in the primary sense if their constituents be real. Thus the universal 'golden mountain' is real even though there are as a matter of fact no golden mountains. If the universal has no instances, it will exist neither in the mathematical nor in the philosophic sense; if it has instances which are not particulars—as, *e.g.*, the complex universal 'perfect number'—it will exist in the mathematical but not in the philosophic sense. But very difficult questions arise as to the reality of complex universals which involve a contradiction or some other *a priori* incoherence—*e.g.*, a 'round square.' Can we say that such universals are in any sense real?

This question has been discussed very fully and acutely by Meinong and his pupils. The following are arguments for supposing that such universals are in a sense real. These incoherent universals appear as the subjects of propositions—*e.g.*, in 'A round square is round' and 'A round square is impossible.' Such propositions are not about nothing; they seem to be about round squares; hence even these universals must have primary reality. Again, when we understand such a proposition as 'A round square is impossible,' the proposition is the object of an act of judgment, and, as such, is real. But the proposition is a complex, and, to understand it, its elements must also be the objects of acts of presentation. Hence the universal 'round square' must be the object of certain mental acts; it therefore cannot be nothing, and must have primary reality. It will be seen that the question discussed here is similar to that raised by Plato in the *Sophist*: In what sense, if any, can not-being be?

Meinong and his school have been led to the view that there is a most primitive form of being that applies to all objects about which assertions or denials can be made, whether they be internally coherent or not; that reality is a species of this and existence a species of reality. We may agree that anything that is really the object of a state of mind, or is really the subject of a proposition, has what we have called primary reality; but we may doubt whether such objects as round squares have any kind of being at all. For Meinong's views lead to very grave difficulties. This form of being will have no opposite, and the law of contradiction will not hold for propositions about impossible objects. Thus the propositions 'A non-human man is human' and 'A non-human man is not human' will both be necessarily true, and yet be contradictory. Again, the expedient leads to an infinite series of orders of being of increasing absurdity. Suppose we agree with Meinong that a round square has being. Then the proposition 'A non-being round square has not being' seems as genuine and necessary as 'A round square is round.' But, if the latter forces us to ascribe a kind of being to round squares, the former must equally force us to ascribe a kind of being to non-being round squares. And this process of postulating fresh and ever more absurd kinds of being will go on indefinitely. Closely connected with these difficulties is the question whether propositions, and in particular false propositions, be in any sense real. Meinong assumes that all mental acts concerned with propositions are founded on an act in which the proposition is before our minds as sense-data and universals are when we are directly aware of them. If so, propositions which we judge, whether they be true or false, have exactly the same claims to primary reality as a red patch that we see or the quality of redness that we cognize. Yet it is very difficult to believe that every false proposition that any one has ever judged is real; whilst, if we reject the reality of false propositions, we can hardly save that of true ones.

The general means of meeting Meinong's difficulty depends on recognizing the fact that, in the verbal forms which stand for propositions, the word or phrase that counts as grammatical subject cannot be regarded always as the proper name of the logical subject of the proposition. In the sentence 'Red is a colour' the grammatical subject 'red' is the proper name of the logical subject of the proposition, and therefore the universal red is real; but it does not follow that in the grammatically similar form of words, 'A round square is round,' the phrase 'a round square' is the name of anything. In fact two other possibilities remain open: (1) that the sentence 'A round square is round,' though it has the same verbal form as some sentences which do stand for propositions—*e.g.*, 'A penny is round'—does not itself stand for any proposition; and (2) that, whilst the sentence does stand for some proposition, the proposition for which it stands can be analyzed into a combination of several in none of which a single object whose name is 'round square' appears as subject.

Both these alternatives may be used for dealing with the reality of round squares. In the first place, we may suggest that a sentence like 'A round square is round' seems to stand for a proposition only because of its similarity in grammatical form to certain sentences which do stand for genuine propositions. Actually, when we see these marks or hear the corresponding sounds, we do not think of any proposition whatever. And likewise, when we say that it is necessary that a round square should be round, we mean only that sentences in which the name of a part of the grammatical subject appears as the grammatical predicate stand for necessary propositions *if* they stand for propositions at all. On the other hand, the statement 'A round square is contradictory' does stand for a genuine proposition, but it is not a proposition about an object denoted by the phrase 'round square.' The proposition really is: 'If an object be round, it cannot be square, and conversely.' This proposition does not contain a complex term denoted by 'round square,' but asserts a relation of incompatibility between roundness and squareness. Hence its reality, truth, and intelligibility do not imply the reality of a complex universal 'round square.'

Before leaving this subject, a word must be said about the reality of objects that involve an *a priori* incompatibility, but in which the incompatibility is not obvious without proof as in the case of 'round' and 'square.' Does the phrase, 'an algebraical equation of the second degree one of whose roots is π,' stand for any real object? It does not, for it involves *a priori* incompatibilities. But we must not say that sentences with this phrase as their grammatical subject as used by most people are in the same position as 'A round square is round.' For persons who do not see the *a priori* incompatibility these sentences may stand for propositions, though they cannot be about any object of which the phrase in question is the name.

3. **Appearance and reality.**—The question of the reality of propositions would lead us into problems connected with Bertrand Russell's theory of judgment and G. F. Stout's doctrine of real possibilities which would carry us too far afield. We will

therefore pass at once to the opposition between reality and appearance, with which is connected the doctrine that there are degrees of reality.

The simplest and most obvious case of this opposition is what is known as the contrast between sensible appearances and physical realities. A cup is believed to be round, yet from all points of view but those which lie in a line through the centre of the circle and at right angles to its plane it appears elliptical. The elliptical shapes seen from the various points of view are called the 'sensible appearances' of the cup, and are contrasted with its real shape. It must be noticed that the opposition between sensible appearance and physical reality is not simply that between true and false judgment. The elliptical appearance may never lead us to the false judgment that the cup is elliptical; moreover, if it should do this and the error should afterwards be corrected, the cup does not cease to appear elliptical. It is important to be clear on this point because efforts are sometimes made to hold that appearances are not objects connected in a certain way with a physical reality, but are certain ways of viewing a physical reality. The latter theory makes appearances mind-dependent in a way in which the former does not. When we talk of different ways of viewing one reality, the differences must be supposed to qualify our acts of viewing, and not the object viewed; they are thus differences in mental acts and can subsist only while the acts themselves exist. But, if we suppose different appearances to be different objects, then, though it is possible and may be probable that these objects exist only when the acts which cognize them exist, it remains a fact that they are not in any obvious sense states of mind or qualities of such states.

Now it seems certain that different sensible appearances are different objects, and not merely different mental relations to the same object. Inspection shows clearly that the elliptical shape which is seen from the side is as good an object as the circular shape seen from above. Moreover, if we call the appearances mental acts, to what precisely does the quality 'elliptical' which we ascribe to the appearances belong? Surely not (*a*) to any mental act, for these have no shape; nor (*b*) to the physical object, for this is supposed to be round; and, if it be said (*c*) that it applies to 'the physical object as seen from such and such a place,' the supporter of this alternative may be asked to state what he supposes this partly mental and partly physical complex to be, and how he supposes it to have the spatial predicate of ellipticity. The view against which we are arguing is somewhat supported by the common phrase, 'The cup *is* round but *looks* elliptical.' But the only meaning which it seems possible to give to this is the following: viewing the cup from a position from which the real shape cannot be seen, we are aware of an appearance that has the same shape as we should see if we looked straight down on a cup that was really elliptical.

We may say, then, that a sensible appearance *is* a reality; but it is not a *physical* reality, because it does not obey the laws of physics; and it is not a mental reality in the sense of a state of mind, nor is it any quality of a mental act, though it is commonly believed that it exists only as the object of an act of sensation or perception. We may agree, then, so far with two celebrated dicta about appearance and reality: 'Reality must in some way include all its appearances,'[1] and 'Wieviel Schein soviel Hindeutung auf Sein.'[2] Since an appearance, taken by itself, is as real as anything else (in the primary sense of reality), it can be called an appearance only in virtue of some essential reference in it to something else with which it is contrasted. Thus *sensible* appearance is contrasted with *physical* reality; both are real in the primary sense, but the former is called an appearance because it always tends to make us think of the existence and qualities of the latter, and we have a tendency to ascribe qualities to the one that belong only to the other.

The last point is of considerable importance with reference to the statement that Reality is a harmonious whole and that appearances are condemned because of their internal incoherence or contradiction. Reality is here used as a concrete substantive, and means the whole system of what really exists. But presumably it is also true that anything that is real, and therefore any part of Reality, must be internally coherent. Now, sensible appearances are real, as we have tried to show; hence they must be internally consistent. There is no *internal* inconsistency in a red elliptical patch seen by any one, and the person who calls this an appearance does not do so because of any internal incoherence, if he knows what he is about. The incoherence arises when the elliptical red patch is taken to be identical with some other part of Reality (*e.g.*, a colourless circle) whose qualities are incompatible with its own. The elliptical red patch is certainly real, and the colourless circle may very well be real; the former is called an appearance, and the latter a reality, because objects of the latter kind are of much greater practical interest and importance as obeying the laws of physics, and because the intimate relations between the two are liable to cause us to make the mistake of identifying the qualities of the two where they really differ. Reality—the whole system of all that exists—must include both the elliptical red patch and the colourless circle, if both be real; and their precise nature and relations are a matter for further philosophical investigation.

This seems obvious enough when we consider only the contrast between sensible appearance and physical reality. But we must notice that eminent philosophers use the contrast in many cases where what they call the appearance is not an object of sense-perception. F. H. Bradley, *e.g.*, argues that the self and goodness and relations are all appearances, though appearances of different degrees of reality. What precisely does this mean? Primarily, that certain notions which we all use in thinking about the world are internally inconsistent. We treat the world, *e.g.*, as consisting of various terms in various relations to each other. Bradley tries to show that such a view involves vicious infinite regresses. When appearance is used in this sense, it seems to be connected with a special kind of false judgment, viz. the assertion that the world or some part of it has incompatible characteristics. This is very different from the kind of false judgment connected with sensible appearances. (1) As we saw, no kind of false judgment need be made there, and, if it be made and corrected, the sensible appearance continues to exist and be perceived. (2) There is nothing self-contradictory in the predicate that is wrongly ascribed to physical reality through confusing it with sensible appearance. The judgment 'This cup is elliptical' is false, not because there is anything self-contradictory in the predicate 'elliptical,' but because it is incompatible with the circularity that the physical cup is supposed to possess. On the other hand, if the self be an appearance in Bradley's sense, the assertion 'Socrates is a self' is false, because the predicate is self-contradictory;

[1] F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, bk. i. ch. xii. p. 132 (2nd ed.). 'Appearances exist . . . And whatever exists must belong to Reality.'

[2] J. F. Herbart, *Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik*, in *Sammtl. Werke*, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1850-52, iii. 14.

it is like saying 'Socrates is both tall and short.' The quality of being a self can be truly asserted of nothing, whilst that of being elliptical can be truly asserted at least of the sensible appearance. There is thus a great difference between what is meant by calling the seen ellipse an appearance and calling the self an appearance.

When this difference is recognized, we see that, whilst it is obvious that sensible appearances are contained in Reality, it is not at all obvious in what sense such appearances as the self can be contained in it; for these would seem to be in the position of round squares. This brings us to the doctrine that there are degrees of reality. It is held that all appearances are internally incoherent, but that some are more coherent than others. As a corollary to this, it is maintained that no appearance is as such contained in Reality; on the other hand, as Bradley puts it, 'appearances are transmuted' in order to be contained in Reality, and the one-sidedness of one appearance cancels out with and is corrected by that of others. This doctrine seems to be closely connected with three others: (*a*) Reality as a whole being a harmonious system, it is assumed that, the more an appearance needs to be modified and supplemented in order to take its place in Reality, the less coherent and therefore the less real it is; and (*b*) this is largely dependent on the view that all appearance is connected with the peculiar position of finite minds, which can know Reality only fragmentarily and from an individual angle; lastly (*c*) it is held that no part of Reality can be internally coherent in abstraction from its relation to the rest of Reality. We may trace the development of this view in Spinoza's doctrine of the three kinds of knowledge and in the Hegelian dialectic to its completest form in Bradley's philosophy.

It is clear that both (*a*) and (*c*) are needed if it is to be assumed that Reality is the only harmonious system. And this is assumed; for very often something is condemned as appearance, not so much because of any internal incoherence that can be directly detected in it as because it obviously cannot be predicated of Reality as a whole. It is impossible to give a fair and adequate criticism of so subtle and elaborate a doctrine here. But the following remarks may be made:

(1) Either Reality can be correctly regarded as possessing parts or not. If so, it would seem that there must be some propositions that are true about the parts and not about the whole (*e.g.*, that they are parts). And again, if the parts be real, they must be as internally harmonious as the whole. It may be perfectly true that what we take as one self-subsistent differentiation of Reality is often neither one nor self-subsistent, but a mere fragment whose limits do not correspond with those of any single differentiation (cf. here Spinoza's distinction between the hierarchy of infinite and eternal modes and the finite modes, and his closely connected theory of error). But even a fragment is something and has a nature of its own, and perfectly true judgments should be possible about it. We may of course make erroneous judgments if we ignore the fact that it is a fragment, and if we make assertions about that in it which depends on its relations to what is outside it. But we do not always ignore the fact that what we are talking about is not the whole; *e.g.*, when we say that Socrates is a self, we are perfectly aware that Socrates is only a part of Reality, and that our statement may be false of the whole. And it is not obvious that all assertions about a fragment must depend for their truth on what is outside the fragment (cf. here Spinoza's doctrine of the function of the *notiones communes* in passing from imaginative to rational knowledge). If, on the other hand, we suppose that Reality cannot be correctly regarded as having parts, the question arises: What precisely is it that is called an appearance, and what precisely is supposed to be 'transmuted and supplemented' in Reality? Something must be transmuted and supplemented; it cannot be Reality as a whole; what can it be unless Reality has real parts? Bradley has seen these difficulties perhaps more clearly than any other philosopher of his general way of thinking; but it is hard to believe that his doctrine that Reality is a supra-relational unity, and that all predication involves falsification is a satisfactory solution. Indeed, it perhaps comes to little more than a re-statement of the theological position that the nature of God can be described only in negative terms which at least ward off error.

(2) Sensible appearances, which, as we have seen, differ in important respects from others, are also held to exhibit what may be called degrees of reality in a special sense. As we know, these realities are called appearances and unreal only with respect to their relations to a supposed physical reality about which they are held to be an indispensable source of information. Now, those who deny the physical reality of secondary qualities would be inclined to say that the colours seen in waking life are less real than the shapes that are seen at the same time, and more real than the colours and shapes seen in dreams, delirium, or illusions. We may usefully compare here Kant's distinction between *Schein*, *Erscheinung*, and *Ding-an-Sich* in his example about the rainbow to that between the colours and shapes of dreams, the colours of waking life, and the qualities of physical objects (it is not of course suggested that Kant had in mind precisely the distinctions which we are now considering).

As far as can be seen, the ascription of degrees of reality to sensible appearances simply depends on how intimately their qualities are supposed to be connected with those of a corresponding physical reality. To a man who takes the position of Locke and of most natural scientists the elliptical shapes seen in waking life (to revert to our old example) are the most real of appearances, because the corresponding physical reality actually has a shape, and that shape is a closed conic section connected by simple laws with that of the appearance. The colours seen in waking life are less real appearances because it is not believed that any physical object has colour, though it is held that the colour seen is correlated with the internal structure of the corresponding object. And the shapes and colours of dreams or hallucinations are held to have the lowest degree of reality, because, while it is admitted that they are correlated with distinctions that exist *somewhere* in the physical world, it is held that these distinctions exist in the brain or in the medium rather than in any object that can be regarded as specially corresponding to the appearance in the way in which the round physical cup corresponds to the elliptical visual appearance seen in waking life.

4. Ethical sense of the term.—It remains to notice one more use of the words 'real' and 'reality.' They are sometimes used in an ethical sense to stand for what ought to be as distinct from what is. This is rather a paradoxical use of terms. Often we contrast real and ideal, and say that what actually exists is real, whilst what ought to exist but does not is ideal. Yet some ethical writers use the word 'real' for 'ideal,' when they speak of the real or true self, meaning the self that ought to be as contrasted with that which now is. This use of terms is generally connected with metaphysical theories of ethics such as Kant's or Green's, which hold that the self that

ought to be really exists and has a higher degree of reality than what would commonly be called the self as it really is.

LITERATURE.—The following works are of importance in connexion with the subject of this article. (1) On the relation of reality to existence and on the reality of contradictory objects.—Plato, *Sophist* and *Theætetus*; St. Anselm, *Prosologium* and *c. Insipientem*; A. Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, Leipzig, 1910, *Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie*, do. 1906–09, *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*, do. 1904; B. A. W. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London, 1912, *The Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge, 1903; A. N. Whitehead and B. A. W. Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, do. 1910, i.; G. F. Stout, 'The Object of Thought and Real Being,' *Proc. of the Aristotelian Society*, 1911. (2) On the relation of reality to appearance.—Spinoza, *Ethics*, tr. W. H. White[2], London, 1894; F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*[2], London, 1902, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, Oxford, 1914. (3) On sensible appearance and physical reality.—Descartes, *Meditations*; G. Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, London, 1776; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1881; H. A. Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, Oxford, 1909; Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, Chicago, 1914; Stout, *Manual of Psychology*[3], London, 1913; S. Alexander, artt. in *Mind*, new ser., xxi. [1912], *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, new ser., xi. [1910–11], and *Proc. British Academy*, vi. [1914].

C. D. BROAD.

REALITY (Buddhist).—In religious philosophy as in metaphysic the words 'real,' 'reality' express more than one aspect of things—the actual as opposed to the fictitious, the essential as opposed to the accidental, the absolute or unconditioned as opposed to the relative or conditioned, the objectively valid as opposed to the ideal or the imagined, the true as opposed to the sham, the important as opposed to that which, in the same connexion, is of less value, and finally, that which ultimately and irreducibly *is* as opposed to that which names conventionally signify in the average mind's stock of knowledge.

Neither in the *Suttas* of the earlier Buddhist religious doctrines nor in the early or the early mediæval elaborations of a more metaphysical kind do we meet with terms quite so packed with meanings as 'real' and 'reality,' but all the above-named antitheses occur and find expression in a variety of terms. The *Suttas* are more deeply concerned with the truth and the pragmatical importance of things. And the true and the actual, or that-which-is, are identified by one and the same word: *sacca*=*sat-ya*, *i.e.* fact, or the existent (see art. TRUTH [Buddhist]). There were certain facts or realities relating to spiritual health concerning which it was of the first importance to hold right views and take action accordingly. To rank other realities, such as objects of sensuous and worldly desires, as of the highest value (*aggato karoti*) was likened to the illusion that the painted forms in a fresco were real men and women,[1] or to the illusions achieved in conjuring or occurring in dreams.[2] Metaphors again play around, not the actuality, but the essential nature of the living personality, physical and mental. Thus the material factors of an individual are compared to a lump of foam: 'Where should you find essence [lit. pith] in a lump of foam?', the mental factors—feeling, perception, volitional complexes, and consciousness—to bubbles raised in water by rain, to a mirage, to a pithless plant, and to conjuring respectively.[3] The world is also compared to a bubble and a mirage,[4] etc. These figures are not meant to convey the later decadent Indian Buddhist and Vedāntist sense of the ontological unreality of the objects and impressions of sense. The similes convey on the one hand a repudiation of (*a*) permanence, (*b*) happy security, (*c*) superphenomenal substance or soul, and on the other a deprecation of any genuine satisfying value in the spiritual life to be found in either 'the pride of life' or the 'lust of the world.'

[1] *Therapatha*, 393. [2] *Ib.* 394.
[3] *Samyutta*, iii. 141. [4] *Dhammapada*, 170.

This trend in Buddhist teaching was not due to the absence of theories concerning the nature of being in the early days of Buddhism. There were views maintained very similar both to that of the Parmenidean school in Greater Greece—that the universe was a *plenum* of fixed, permanent existents; and to the other extreme as maintained by Gorgias and other Sophists—that 'nothing is.' These Indian views, probably antedating those of Greece by upwards of half a century, were confronted by the Buddha with his 'middle theory' of conditioned or causal becoming. His brief discourse is given in the *Suttas* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*,[1] and is cited by a disciple in another *Sutta* nearly adjacent to that containing the similes referred to above.[2] And we hear no more of the extremist views till we come to the book purporting to be the latest in the canon—the *Kathāvatthu*. There among the first, presumably the earliest compiled, arguments of the work[3] we find that the positive theory—'everything exists' (*i.e.* continues to exist)—so far from being generally rejected among Buddhists, was maintained by a school which attained to great eminence not only in North India, especially in Kashmīr, but also in Central and Eastern Asia, and in the south-eastern islands—the school of Sarvāstivādins (*q.v.*; Pali, Sabbathivādins), or 'All-is-believers.'

The attitude taken up in the Theravāda, or mother-church, towards what might now be called reality, developed along a different line. This confronts us in the very first line of the *Kathāvatthu*: 'Is the person (self or soul) known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?' In other words (as is revealed in the process of the long series of arguments), does the term 'person,' conventionally used as a convenient label for the composite phenomenon of a living human being, correspond to any irreducible and permanent entity, noumenon, ego, soul, immanent in that phenomenon? This distinction between the current names in conventional usage and the real nature 'behind,' or 'above,' what is designated by them is anticipated already in the earlier books of discourses and dialogues ascribed to the Buddha.[4] A man's personality is conceded as being real, or a fact (*sacca*) to him at any given moment, albeit the word expressing that personality is but a popular label, and is not paralleled by any equally fixed entity in man. But, in the inquiry of the later book, the *Kathāvatthu*, the more evolved philosophical problem is betrayed by the first appearance of a more technical nomenclature. *Sacca* ('true,' 'fact') is used in adjectival form—*saccika*, 'actual.' And *paramattha* ('ultimate sense,' lit. 'supreme thing-meant'), a word which, in Theravāda literature, has become an equivalent of philosophic or metaphysical meaning, here starts on its long career. It is along the line of this distinction between popular and ultimately real or philosophic meaning that the commentator (*c.* 5th cent. A.D.) discusses the opening argument in the controversy and perorates at the close of it.[5] It is in the forefront of Anuruddha's planning of his classic manual, *A Compendium of Philosophy* (*Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*): 'These things are set forth *in their ultimate sense* as Categories Four,'[6] the commentaries pointing out that *paramatāthto* is opposed to *sammuti*, the conventional. And Anuruddha discusses in his eighth chapter[7] the distinction between the things that are real existents and those that are, in virtue of a name, apparently so. Finally the present-day vitality

[1] ii. 17. [2] iii. 134. [3] i. 64.
[4] Cf. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 263; *Kindred Sayings*, i. 169 f.
[5] Cf. the tr. by C. A. F. Rhys Davids and S. Z. Aung, *Points of Controversy*, London, 1915, pp. 8, 63, n. 2.
[6] London, 1910, p. 81. [7] P. 199 f.

of this aspect of reality for Buddhists is visible in the writings of Ledi Mahāthera.[1]

In his discussion of the terms *paramattha* and *sacca* S. Z. Aung quotes mediæval philosophical works, which are practically at one in interpreting *paramattha* as meaning either a sense-datum or a thing *per se* (*sabhāva*) which is verifiably existent to the extent of irreversibility or infallibility. Such ultimately real things, referred by Anuruddha to a 'fourfold category,' may also be distinguished under two heads — as unconditioned and conditioned. Under the former head, meaning 'whatever is not causally related to anything else,' Buddhist philosophy refers its metaphysical conception of *nibbāna* (*nirvāṇa*), *i.e.* its hypothetical state which is not life, in that there is no birth or death, the essentials of life. Under the conditioned are comprised all the elements (not the compound phenomena) of matter and mind. In the former the elements, abstractions from earth, water, fire, air, are, respectively, that which extends itself, coheres, burns, moves. Mind is ultimately conceived as consciousness *plus* a number of what the present writer has called mental coefficients (Pāli, *cetasika-dhammā*, 'mentals'), such as feeling, perception, volition, etc. All these conditioned elements, though ultimately real, are in a perpetual state of change, *i.e.* of genesis and cessation, wherein there is always a causal series, one momentary state arising because of its predecessor and transforming itself into its successor. Nothing is casual or fortuitous. All is in a state of causally determined becoming. In the ultimate constituents of conditioned things, physical and mental, Buddhism has never held that the real is necessarily the permanent. Unwitting of this anticipation, Bertrand Russell is now asking modern philosophy to concede no less.[2]

LITERATURE.—See works referred to in the article.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

REAL PRESENCE.—See EUCHARIST.

REASON.—**1. Definition.**—In the most generalized sense of all, reason might be defined as the relational element in intelligence, in distinction from the element of content, sensational or emotional. Such a definition could justify itself by etymology: both λόγος and *ratio*, from which the word as a philosophical term descends historically, have sometimes the meaning simply of 'relation.' This, however, is too generalized to be serviceable. We must seek for something more limited.

At the beginning of the search we are met by an ambiguity. Man is defined as the 'rational animal'; yet the 'reason of animals,' at a level below the human, is currently spoken of. The explanation of this ambiguity will point out the definition which we require.

It is true that the lower animals have 'reason' as well as 'instinct' (which may be defined as the direction, psychical as well as physical, of actions to ends, without knowledge of the end) in the sense that they, in varying degrees, direct their actions intelligently to desired ends; but not even the animals nearest to man have the power of thinking in general terms expressed in language. Man has this; and, in the traditional definition of man, it is this that is distinguished by the name of 'reason.' The subject may thus be dealt with either psychologically or epistemologically—*i.e.*, we may consider the origin and growth of conceptual thought; or we may consider it as actually exercised in the discovery of true propositions. Psychologically it has been dealt with under the head of INTELLECT. In the present article we shall consider reason, not further in relation to the classification of the mental powers, and not genetically, but in relation to the philosophical discussions on the validity of scientific knowledge, of moral precepts, and of metaphysical beliefs.

2. The term in Greek philosophy.—(*a*) *The pre-Socratics.*—Reason, of course, was used by man long before the use of it was reflected on, and long before it was appealed to as the ground of knowledge or belief. When it is thus appealed to, it comes to be set, along with experience, in antithesis to passively accepted custom or tradition; and then again, more precisely, in antithesis to the particular facts known, as distinguished from the form and the generality of knowledge. The last stage was reached in the early philosophy of Greece—not at the very beginning, but as early as Heraclitus and Parmenides (6th to 5th cent. B.C.). For the earlier period of the Hellenic world, as for the pre-Hellenic world generally, the vague Homeric use of such words as νόος, φρένες, πραπίδες, in which reason is not clearly distinguished from sense, or the mental process from the organic process that goes with it physiologically, may be taken as characteristic. Something of this vagueness indeed always remains in literary and even in philosophical usage;[1] but there comes a time when language enables us to distinguish if we choose. The time when generalizing thought was consciously recognized, in distinction from the sense or experience in which it is immersed, arrived when the deductive science of mathematics had begun as a new departure of Greek science, marking a step beyond the accumulation of observations and empirical formulæ in the science of the ancient East. It was this, though perhaps neither thinker was fully aware of the source of his thought, that caused Heraclitus and Parmenides to begin the series of articulate statements of a philosophical criterion. Earlier thinkers had already started the series of doctrines, but without a definite test of truth.

The balance, as a necessary consequence of the new departure in which the inquiry had its source, inclines at first to reason in its distinctive meaning as against the later-formulated criterion of experience. Heraclitus, indeed, appeals also to experience against tradition[2] in the saying, ὀφθαλμοὶ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες (frag. 15 [Bywater], 101[a] [Diels]); but to reason is given the predominance. The final criterion is the judgment of the soul, not the witness of eyes (experience) or of ears (tradition), though the eyes are more trustworthy than the ears:

κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων (frag. 4 [B.], 107 [D.]).

This, however, is still vague philosophically. Parmenides is more precise, and in his affirmation that reason[3] is the criterion he is more exclusive: we are to 'judge by argument' (κρῖναι λόγῳ [frag. 1. 36]). Anaxagoras returns to a kind of balance, distinguishing the two modes of knowing as 'by rational consideration' (λόγῳ) and 'by experience' (ἔργῳ). This at least seems a fair interpretation of a fragment translated less determinately by Burnet:

'So that we cannot know the number of the things that are

[1] *E.g.*, *Vipassanādīpanī*, Rangoon; 'Expositions,' *Buddhist Review*, Oct. 1915; 'Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine,' *JPTS*, 1913-14, p. 129, as well as in S. Z. Aung's art. 'The Philosophy of the Real,' *Journ. Burma Research Society*, Rangoon, 1917.

[2] 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter,' *The Monist*, London, 1915, p. 401 f.

[1] *E.g.*, some misapprehensions would have been avoided if the 'common sense' of the Scottish school had been described as 'common reason.' Historically it takes its origin from κοινὴ αἴσθησις, but its meaning approximates rather to κοινὸς λόγος (see art. SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY).

[2] See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], p. 147, n. 2.

[3] The meaning of λόγος in Heraclitus is still disputed; but, when it most approximates to reason, it seems to mean a rational law of things and of the mind rather than a test applied by the mind to its knowledge of things (see art. LOGOS)

separated off, either in word or deed' (ὥστε τῶν ἀποκρινομένων μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ πλῆθος μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ [frag. 7; Burnet, p. 300]).

Democritus, not much later, declares outright that true knowledge is not by the senses but by reason. This is the interpretation of Sextus Empiricus; and it is supported by the strong terms in which Democritus rejects the claim of the senses to judge. As Sextus sums up his positions:

δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνησίην καλεῖ, . . . τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει. . . . οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ κριτήριον, ὃν γνησίην γνώμην καλεῖ (*adv. Math.* vii. 138 f.).

These positions of the pre-Socratics may not be ultimately compatible with the outlook implied in their tracing of reason as well as other modes of mind to dependence on certain material mixtures in the bodily organs; but complete clearness could not be attained so early; and it is interesting to find that the most decided materialist, Democritus, lays most stress on reason as against the experiences of sense-perception. Perhaps, however, Democritus ought rather to be counted as belonging to the next phase, when attacks on the possibility of knowledge had to be expressly met. In his appeal distinctively to reason he was at one with his constructive contemporaries, however he might differ in his ontology.

(*b*) *Plato and Aristotle.*—When, in the Sophistic period, the subjective criticism that examined the mind's own process was turned against the efforts of the early thinkers to arrive at truth in a direct objective way, Socrates, as a preliminary to reconstruction, set himself to examine the nature of the concept. Though by Aristotle induction from particulars (ἐπαγωγή), as well as the search for general definitions, is ascribed to Socrates, it was as a dialectical rather than as an experiential thinker that he became most influential. His central effort, as distinguished from incidental positions that interested eccentric thinkers like Antisthenes and Aristippus, was carried forward by Plato and then by Aristotle. For Plato reason, or coherent thinking, decidedly had the predominance, as a test, over experience of particulars. 'Dialectic' was conceived as a more general method than that of deductive mathematics, which implies it, but adds untested hypotheses of its own. The appeal to reason, in Plato's ideal system of knowledge, thus became part of a whole in which, while experience had a place, dialectic, with deductive mathematics at the next step below, was the model of ultimately valid thought. At a higher stage than that of discursive reason (διάνοια) there was pure intellect, intuitive thought (νοῦς, νόησις), by which true reality is to be grasped; at a lower stage was opinion (δόξα), not properly scientific because not dialectical or mathematical, which deals by more or less conjectural methods with the phenomena presented to sense-perception.[1] On the dialectical side, what had been partially formulated by Plato was definitively formulated by Aristotle, who stated the axioms since known as the 'laws of thought,' and made them the basis of his codified formal logic. Aristotle, on another side of his mind, was much more of a naturalistic inquirer into detail than Plato; but, in his general view of the test or tests of truth, he remains faithful to the principles of his master.

(*c*) *Epicureans and Stoics.*—The next period of Greek thought, occupied as it was with the effort to formulate a rule of life for the individual in a cosmopolitan world for which the bond of the city State had become a waning tradition, brought on the search for a more tangible reality than that of the metaphysics in which the Platonic and Aristotelian dialectic found its consummation. To arrive at some external reality in the most expeditious way was the theoretical problem. Then, without useless lingering over this, the philosophic learner could go on to the essential thing, which was practice. The great positive schools of this period, the Epicureans and the Stoics (*qq.v.*), while differing much in detail, solved this problem fundamentally in the same way. Going back to the earlier thinkers, they developed more consistently the naturalistic side of their doctrines. The rudiments could be found in them of theories which, in the explanation of mind, proceeded from the physiological organs and made the senses psychologically fundamental. From these rudiments the new schools, with the long dialectical development of the intervening period behind them, worked out in considerable detail what we may call an experiential theory of knowledge. Not rational argument as such was the criterion, but a certain mode of experience. Epicurus, while taking for his ultimate account of reality the atomism of Democritus (with changes that were scientifically for the worse), completely inverted the position of Democritus with regard to the senses. For Epicurus sense-perception is the criterion: things are exactly as they appear. This is formally stated by Sextus Empiricus, who was our authority for the precisely opposite affirmation of Democritus. Epicurus, he says, affirms that sense-perception is trustworthy in its hold of reality throughout:

τὴν αἴσθησιν . . . διὰ παντός τε ἀληθεύειν καὶ οὕτω τὸ ὂν λαμβάνειν ὡς εἶχε φύσεως αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο (*adv. Math.* viii. 9).

The more elaborate doctrine of the Stoics equally adopted for its criterion sense-perception, though not indiscriminately, but only when it was perception of a certain kind. The difference was in effect that Zeno and his successors laid stress on an active element in the grasp of external reality; mere recipiency did not seem to them sufficient. Reality is seized, they said, by the φαντασία καταληπτική—a kind of presentation that is known to give a true account by the sense of possession that goes with it and the absence of any opposing presentation. As Sextus puts it,

κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν . . . μηδὲν ἔχουσαν ἔνστημα (vii. 253).

The part of λόγος in the Stoic system, like that of νοῦς for Anaxagoras, is ontological. In one of its meanings λόγος is the law that runs through the world; but reason as the procedure of the mind in dealing with the general is not for the Stoic theory of knowledge the ultimate test of truth. The ultimate test for the Stoics, as for the Epicureans, is experience.

(*d*) *Sceptics.*—The opposition that this doctrine had to meet came from the sceptics, especially those of the New Academy. That the most reasoned scepticism should have proceeded from the Academy (*q.v.*) reveals its essential nature. For a time the attempt to build a positive system from the points of view developed in Plato's *Dialogues* was abandoned, and his school threw itself into negative criticism. A system of confident dogmatism like that of the Stoics provided it with material exactly to the purpose. Carneades recognized his dependence on his opponents when he said, parodying the verse that made Chrysippus the effective founder of the Stoa, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐγώ. The method was to apply to the Epicurean and Stoic tests of truth a stringent dialectic which, after the emergence of idealistic criticism, no naively realistic doctrine could bear. Indirectly, therefore, scepticism, earlier and later, was the preparation for the next constructive school, that of the Neo-Platonists,

[1] See *Republic*, end of bk. vi., for an exact account.

which, arising independently, at length absorbed the Academy.

(*c*) *Neo-Platonists.*—With a positive, and no longer a negative, aim, Plotinus revived the Platonic idealism, bringing into it more system through the study of Aristotle, and turning it critically against the Stoic materialism (see art. NEO-PLATONISM). Even sense-perception, he showed, is inexplicable from the basis of mere physiology; but, for the test of truth, he turned away from sense and insisted on reason as that which judges. Mysticism, though a distinctive feature of his thought, does not furnish the criterion. For the mystical experience, being a state beyond knowledge, seizing upon that which is beyond mind, cannot be explained to one who has not had it. The reasoned system points to it, but does not include it as part of a completely rational process: it is ἔκστασις, a standing out of system. The system itself consists of demonstrations, and its criterion is reason. Thus, after a long and fluctuating process, thought had returned to the dialectic and logic of Plato and Aristotle as offering the soundest principles of knowledge yet discovered.

This was, however, more clearly brought out by Proclus (A.D. 410–485) two centuries after Plotinus (204–270). For Plotinus the ideal of reason is an intuitive thought such as Spinoza[1] holds to be the highest order of knowledge. Proclus does not reject this, as he does not reject the more distinctively mystical experience beyond it; but for the definitive test of truth he selects a more generally applicable criterion. The criteria that the thinker may use for himself in relation to different kinds of subject-matter are many; but the soul is a unity as well as a multiplicity; and there must be some universal criterion for every soul. This he finds to be neither pure intellect (νοῦς) at one extreme nor sense-perception (αἴσθησις) at the other, but discursive reason (λόγος). Here is the process of explicit formulation by which the higher is mediated to the lower and the lower to the higher. The mind may start from the glimpses of intuitive reason and may use sense-perception as material for criticism or confirmation; but, if there is to be a system of knowledge, it must be established by a process of argument. The circumspection which he ascribes to Plato in assigning their proper part in knowledge to all the modes of mind is certainly to be found in the passage where he gives this guarded expression to philosophical rationalism:

εἰ τοίνυν τὸ κρίνειν ψυχῆς ἐστιν—οὐ γάρ που τὸ ἡμέτερον σῶμα κριτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν—ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἕν ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος, καὶ τὸ κριτικὸν ἕν ἐστιν ἅμα καὶ πολλά, καὶ μονοειδὴς ἡ κριτικὴ δύναμις καὶ πολυειδής. τίς οὖν ἡ μία δύναμις; φαίη τις ἄν. ὁ λόγος, φήσομεν (*Comm. in Tim.*, ed. E. Diehl, Leipzig, 1903, i. 254–255).

As first matter, or mere possibility, below the limit of true knowledge, is seized by a kind of bastard reasoning (νόθῳ λογισμῷ in Plato's phrase), so the One, at the other extreme above knowledge, is seized by a kind of bastard intuition (νόθῳ νῷ). Thus every test finally has a certain resemblance to the model test of explicit reason. If the other tests are to be regarded as having their own validity, it must be shown by argument how they can have it; though argument, of course, cannot enable us to dispense with direct perceptions whether of intellect or of sense.

For antiquity, therefore, what may be called in the philosophical sense 'rationalism' remained finally supreme.

3. Mediæval and modern use.—(*a*) *Scholasticism.*—In the mediæval schools rationalism (*q.v.*) became predominant in a narrowed sense. The passage cited above from Proclus might have been taken by the Schoolmen of Western Christendom, without its qualifications, as a text to prove the exclusive value of their characteristic activity. It was long after Proclus, and long after the suppression of the school at Athens of which he was the last great name, that the revival of philosophical thought began in the West; but, when it came, it gave evidence of continuity with the latest thought of antiquity. Its first great movement was an immense development of discursive reason. Precisely because the Middle Ages had lost the freedom with which in classical antiquity ultimate beliefs could be discussed, there was such an elaboration of formal method as had never been known before. The value of this must not be underrated. In a sentence from W. Hamilton's *Discussions in Philosophy* which Mill prefixed to the first book of his *Logic* it is put thus:

'To the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what precision and analytic subtlety they possess.'

Croom Robertson says:

'All the world has heard of scholasticism as an oppressive system of pedantic belief: it has still to be known as a system of rationalism struggling to be' ('The English Mind,' *Philosophical Remains*, London, 1894, p. 34).

The reverse side of the case remains, of course, that this rationalism was very limited. The Schoolmen made a fine art of formal reasoning; but the habit of accepting traditional authority for facts and data was so fixed that the attempt to bring again into view the claims of experience remained merely sporadic. To get out of the circle of things taken for granted or assumed dialectically, a revolt against the School-philosophy itself became necessary. The controversy about the reality of universals was primarily ontological. By their contention that only particulars are real, and that the genus or species is only a name indicating resemblance between the members of a class, the nominalists might seem nearer to modern experientialism than the realists, for whom class-names indicated a reality like that of the Platonic ideas; but the methods of both were equally dialectical. An aid to the imagination in forming a notion of the time that it took new views about method to emerge is to remember that there is a longer interval between the exhortations of Roger Bacon to go to experience and those of Francis Bacon, than between the publication of the *Novum Organum* (1620) and the present date.

Roger Bacon is an isolated figure in the greatest period of Scholasticism, the 13th century. Another great English thinker, William of Ockham, in the next century, promoted by his dialectic the disintegration of the imposing dogmatism of St. Thomas Aquinas (*q.v.*) and John Duns Scotus (see art. SCHOLASTICISM). Then came the beginnings of the new movement of humanism (*q.v.*), taking the form at first of a more literary interest in the Latin classics. After the revival, in the 15th cent., of direct knowledge of Greek thought in its original sources, followed by the setting up, in the 16th, of older types of thinking, in conscious rivalry with the whole mediæval scheme of theology and philosophy, the movement against Scholasticism took a more systematic new departure.

(*b*) *Experientialism and rationalism.*—This, in the 17th cent., expressed itself in the effort to establish once for all the right 'method' of seeking truth. The new aspiration for firm knowledge, instead of barren disputes about insoluble questions, culminated for the time in the philosophical reforms of Bacon and Descartes (*qq.v.*). Bacon not only clothed in the most impressive language the appeal to experience as the test by which every claim to possess real knowledge must be verified, but also developed some genuine outlines of a theory of induction, no longer unsystematic, but rising by stages from particulars to generals, as deduction descends from generals to particulars.

[1] *Eth.* ii. prop. 40, schol. 2.

Descartes, himself a discoverer in geometry, set against the sterile formalism of mere logic, which could bring out only what had been implicitly asserted, the real deduction of new truth in the mathematical sciences. Thus began the two great movements of philosophy known as English experientialism and Continental rationalism; but it is important to note that these were not so definitely rivals as they had become later when Kant turned his 'critical' thought on both at once. The great Continental rationalists, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz (*qq.v.*), all took occasion to recognize in some way the new departure of the English in their appeal to experience. In all the English thinkers, on the other side, unreduced elements from the rationalism of ancient science and of the Scholastic tradition remain over. It would be easy to show this in the case of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley (*qq.v.*). And Hume (*q.v.*), who carried farthest the effort to resolve all 'principles of reason' into derivatives of pure experience, treated his results not as 'dogmatic' but as 'sceptical,' *i.e.* as suggesting problems for reconsideration; finally abandoning his first elaborate attempt to explain mathematics as an essentially empirical science. By Kant (*q.v.*), while the opposition with him arrived at the most explicit statement, the reconciliation of 'reason' and 'experience' as constituents of truth was most systematically attempted. Reason, according to Kant, does not merely enable us to arrive at 'analytical' judgments implied in what has been already said, but, in mathematics at least, yields genuine new truth in the form of 'synthetic judgments *a priori*.' Yet, while these are not given in mere experience, they have no valid application beyond all possible experience. All true science consists in carrying reason into the construction of nature so as to make it intelligible to thought. Even those highest principles that seem to go beyond this have value only as furnishing an ideal that the actually working system of science may try to approach and so gradually perfect itself.

(*c*) *The Kantian reaction and the revival of experientialism.*—If we were to stop here, it might seem that now, as at the end of ancient thought, the supreme place, though with circumspection, was assigned to reason. Kant, however, did not, even at first, approximately satisfy any considerable group of thinkers. The problem became on the one side to develop him, on the other side to answer him. Hegel (*q.v.*) has been thought to have carried philosophical rationalism to the highest point. By a new logic, the whole order of the universe, he seemed to promise, was to be shown forth as a manifestation of reason. Yet, curiously, his power appears most in a strong grasp of experience intermittently attained, but unmediated by any method fitted to carry general conviction. The next representatives of experientialism, in contrast, were men of pre-eminently deductive minds, whose strength was in reasoned exposition, and who, in the days of Scholasticism, might have been famous as irrefragable doctors. For the complex period at which we have arrived it is more true than ever, in the phrase borrowed by Hegel himself from Anaxagoras, that things are not 'cut in two with a hatchet.'

It would have contributed much to a clear issue for the thinkers just alluded to had they known Kant at first hand; but they knew him only indirectly or very imperfectly. Comte, who, like Descartes and Leibniz among modern philosophers, was a mathematician of original power, thought that he could explain even mathematics philosophically as based in generalizations from pure experience (see art. POSITIVISM). J. S. Mill (*q.v.*), who succeeded in founding a valid inductive logic by deducing the actual tests of experimental science from a general principle, 'the uniformity of nature,' fell back, for the proof of this, on the weakest mode of induction—viz. that 'induction by simple enumeration' which the Baconian canons and his own had been devised to supersede. And this, in both cases, without any close consideration of Kant's arguments for the necessity of *a priori* principles in the sciences of nature as in mathematics. It is not surprising that, both in France and in England, the two countries where the experientialism that took shape from Locke had been strongest, there was a reaction—or a forward movement, as some put it—in the Kantian direction. For the whole of Europe, however, it must be said that the predominant movement in the 19th cent., through the influence on philosophy of the enormous new developments in the sciences of experiment and observation, was greatly to enlarge the place given to experience as compared with that which it held in antiquity, and to reduce the principles of reason which science finds that it cannot do without to an attenuated form. The elaborate apparatus of Kant was not adopted by men of science; and in Germany the movement which took for its watchword 'Back to Kant' signified a return to the experiential side of Kant against the extreme speculative developments of his successors (see art. NEO-KANTISM).

There is, however, it has also become clear, an element in scientific knowledge not explicable as a resultant of accumulating experience. The most general principles of logic, whether of formal inference, of mathematical deduction, or of the natural and humanistic sciences, remain more than arbitrary linkings of ideas that can have their validity proved or disproved by their applicability to certain subject-matters. They are not in the end mere 'working hypotheses.' There is in reason, as Kant with all his over-elaboration proved, an *a priori* factor in virtue of which we distinguish it from pure experience.

4. A priori.—This term has been dealt with in a separate article, but calls for a brief discussion in relation to the present subject. Its source, as has been shown, was Aristotelian. Aristotle distinguished between that which is first in relation to us and that which is first by nature. In knowledge the experiences of sense-perception are first in relation to us, *i.e.* in the order of genesis; but, since, in his view as in Plato's, the formal essence (εἶδος), expressed in a concept, is the determining reality of everything, the ideal of knowledge for the philosophically trained mind is to begin with the general and proceed to particulars. Thus the syllogism, into which all formal reasoning can be thrown if we need expressly to test its validity, is 'first by nature' and has more in it of true cognition; but induction, which is the procedure from particulars to generals (ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος), is more persuasive and carries plainer evidence to the ordinary mind.[1] Quite fitly, therefore, the term *a priori* was adopted by Kant as the technical expression for reason in its purity, proceeding, whether theoretically or practically, as something necessarily general and not to be derived from experience conceived as a sum of unrelated particulars presented to the mind from outside. Since Kant the expression has become a kind of shorthand, understood without reference to its historical origin or to any distinctive system. Those who use it do not imply that they are reasoning from a formal cause, which has priority in the Aristotelian sense as being the real essence; nor even that they regard their general principles as transcendental in the Kantian sense, *i.e.* as not derived from ex

[1] See *Top.* i. 12, 105a 13, and *Anal. Pr.* ii. 23, 68b 32.

perience though having possible application only within experience. Their claim is simply to be in possession of general principles, whatever the source of these, from which they are justified in inferring propositions applicable to groups of particulars. Herbert Spencer, *e.g.*, while he is always classed with the series of the English experientialists, uses the term as freely as Kant, and he was at least as confident an *a priori* reasoner as Aristotle and decidedly less of an observer. The ground of his *a priori*, however, was quite different. For him the order of genesis is the real order of nature; and the *a priori* principles of the mind, though it can now apply them with scientific security, are valid only as the last result of accumulated experiences in the race and the individual. Yet, perhaps, in a very broad sense, a philosophical conception of the *a priori* akin to that of Aristotle or of Kant lurks behind. For experience, according to Spencer, does not simply consist of 'feelings,' but includes 'relations between feelings'; and these are not derivative, but constitute a kind of λόγος, or *ratio*, in which all explicit knowledge had a prior existence. In this extremely general sense of the *a priori*, Spencer also may be classed with the philosophical rationalists.

5. Reason in ethics.—Moral conduct may be considered as practically determined either by the notion of an end of action, a final good, or by the notion of a law to which action ought to conform. In whichever way it is considered, both reason and experience must be allowed a part in deciding what actual conduct shall be. For Greek and Roman antiquity moral philosophy was on the whole dominated by the idea of an end or good (see artt. ETHICS AND MORALITY [Greek] and [Roman]). This might be derived from experience and treated as something empirical to which the means had to be sought; or it might be determined in relation to some metaphysical reality that was thought to confer on it its ultimate desirability as an end. In the latter case it would naturally be regarded as ascertainable by the direct insight of reason. Plato's idea of the good is conceived as the final object of rational insight, conferring on all ends their desirability as on all modes of being their reality; but he admits that he cannot say what it is.[1] In Plato's and Aristotle's actual treatment of moral problems there is a mixture of points of view, both reason and experience being appealed to. This, however, does not make the philosophers illogical. Their ideal is that the end or the good should be rationally knowable; but they recognize, in the conditions of human nature, the need for much empirical balancing of one thing with another. The conceptions of 'pleasure' as the end, interpreted by Epicurus as in its highest degree tranquillity, and of the 'life according to nature,' selected by the Stoics as their final good, may be considered as experiential, in accordance with the theoretical philosophy of the schools that adopted them. In these schools, however, points of view came decisively forward that led on to the later 'ethics of law,' which in modern times has tended to become the type of rationalist, as distinguished from experiential, ethics. The Epicureans made considerable use of the notion of keeping contracts, already present in the Aristotelian theory of justice; and the Stoics brought the detail of their ethics under ideas of a natural justice or of a law common to all. This had much influence on the formulation of Roman legal conceptions. Neo-Platonism treated ethics on the whole from the metaphysical point of view, according to which degree of worthiness in ends corresponds to degree of reality in the scale of existences. Christian ethics adapted, for philosophical systematization, Stoic, Platonic, and Aristotelian positions, in this chronological order. Its notion of a divine legislation tended to reinforce the beginnings that already existed of the 'ethics of law,' moral duties being put in the form of commands. Thus in the Middle Ages ethics took the name of 'moral theology.' In the early modern period a kind of ethics of law, placed on natural or rational grounds, was formulated by Hobbes (*q.v.*). Its precepts might be also divine commands, but they could be known, though not enforced, independently of all positive legislation, human or divine, as declarations by natural reason concerning that which ought to be done. A certain end was fixed, viz. social peace and security as the general condition allowing individuals to seek their personal good, which is no one thing, but consists in a multiplicity of things that present themselves as desirable in the course of experience. The end being fixed, the 'law of nature' in its ethical sense becomes demonstrable. Since, however, all ends are considered as known only empirically, and the law is determined ultimately by relation to these, Hobbes, though in part rationalist in his expressions, has always been classed with the experientialists in ethics and politics as in general philosophy. His successors and opponents, Cudworth and Clarke, with their appeal to 'right reason' and 'the fitness of things' as the proper determinants of action apart from command or self-interest, were stringently rationalist in form, but did not disentangle their ethics of law from the metaphysical points of view that they had inherited from Plato and his ancient or Scholastic successors. A new departure was taken by Kant when he insisted that the only generally valid form of ethics is that which expresses itself as the 'moral law,' obligatory without relation to ends; and that moral obligation is rationally determined by itself without reference either to experience or to any metaphysical propositions about the nature of a reality beyond experience. Ultimate moral judgments, stating what ought to be done, are determined by 'pure practical reason,' as the ultimate types of assertion about what is or may be real are determined by 'pure speculative reason.' This mode of ethical thought has since been developed and modified with most originality by C. Renouvier (*Science de la Morale*, 2 vols., Paris, 1869) and by E. Juvalta (*Il Vecchio e il Nuovo Problema della Morale*, Bologna, 1914). For further details on rationalist positions in modern ethics see artt. MORAL LAW, MORAL OBLIGATION.

6. Reason versus understanding.—An antithesis that has had considerable importance historically is that which was set up by Kant's distinction between reason in an eminent sense (*Vernunft*) and understanding (*Verstand*). Understanding relates one thing to another within experience, but does not go forward to the ideal completion of experience in a total system. Such an ideal completion is wrought by the reason, which rises above the bounds of experience and affirms the three transcendental ideas of the soul as a permanent being (the psychological idea), of the world as a totality (the cosmological idea), and of God as the necessary being who is the cause of the whole (the theological idea). These ideas of the reason, Kant argues, are not theoretically demonstrable; but neither are they theoretically refutable; and we have the intellectual right to assert them as postulates of the moral life. For, while this, being autonomous, is independent of any metaphysical doctrine, it does not simply rest in itself, but claims that it shall find its fulfilment in a universe ordered in relation to its demands. By Kant's idealist successors in Germany the antithesis of reason and understanding was often turned to account—in defiance of Kant's aim at limiting the pretensions

[1] *Rep.* vi. 506.

of the speculative reason—to claim the warrant of a higher faculty for their own utterances, all detailed criticism being treated as an affair of the 'mere abstract understanding.' To English readers this procedure became familiar through its use by Coleridge and his disciples to discredit attacks on tradition, political or religious. The reason saw in this a deep meaning, placing it at once beyond the vulgar hostility of crude radicalism and the arid defences of conventional conservatism, both alike bound within the limits of the inferior pedestrian faculty. In Germany Schopenhauer (*q.v.*) made an attempt to turn the tables by contending that the understanding is always the originative thing, reason, as merely conceptual, being only the means of preserving consistency—*e.g.*, to be reasonable (*vernünftig*) is not necessarily to be moral; it may mean only consistency in pursuing well-understood self-interest; true morality implies a sympathetic insight that is not merely rational. Understanding no doubt includes what is below, but it also includes what is above, the process of logically connecting concepts—at once the instincts and perceptions of animals and the perception or 'instinct' of genius. This, however, means that Schopenhauer in his own manner continued the old distinction, while inverting the reference of the names. This he could easily do by limiting 'reason' to its sense of ratiocination. Whatever the terms used, the distinction in fact remains. A mind so strongly developed on the side of the understanding, or of reason in its sense of ratiocination, as that of J. S. Mill could acknowledge that in some respects Coleridge had deeper insight than Bentham. And Comte, while maintaining the claim of his philosophy to complete 'positivity,' found that, because it was philosophy and not merely science, the supreme place in it belonged to certain 'vues d'ensemble.' The problem of a truly philosophical reform must be to make the 'esprit d'ensemble' predominate over the 'esprit de détail.' 'Dispersive specialism,' when uncontrolled, becomes an aberration of the human mind, relatively justifying that conservative reaction which at least maintains the synthesis of the past. The Coleridgian distinction, it is evident in the light of these testimonies, cannot be dismissed as a mere verbal trick. The problem is to find the right terms. Thus only can we hope to set ourselves free at once from arrogance and from confusion. Now the right terms are ready to our hand in Milton,[1] who puts into the mouth of Raphael the declaration that the soul's being is reason, 'discursive, or intuitive,' 'differing but in degree, of kind the same.' Those terms, taken no doubt from a Scholastic source, go back to Plato and Aristotle. Intuitive reason is the νοῦς of the Platonic theory of knowledge; discursive reason is the διάνοια. The former corresponds to the reason of Kantism; the latter to the understanding. These terms, 'intuitive' and 'discursive' reason, have the advantage of accurately rendering, without arbitrary specialization of meaning, a difference that really exists and is plain when it is pointed out. No difficult introspection is needed to see that there is a total grasp, a 'synoptic' view of things, and that there is also procedure from point to point. But it must always be borne in mind that, if the former is higher, it is unavailable till it has been mediated by the latter. The ideal of philosophic presentation is achieved by those who, like Plato and Berkeley, have both in due balance.

LITERATURE.—As the antithesis between reason and experience runs through all the history of philosophy, the following general authorities may first be mentioned: J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, London, 1908; H. Ritter and L. Preller, *Historia Philosophiae Graecae*[9], Gotha, 1898; F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philosophie*, i.[10], Berlin, 1909, ii.[10] 1915, iii.[11] 1914, iv.[11] 1916. On the impossibility of reducing the supreme principle of inductive logic to 'hypothesis,' Carveth Read, *Logic*[4], London, 1914, p. 286 f. On rational and empirical ethics, T. Whittaker, *The Theory of Abstract Ethics*, Cambridge, 1916. On the 'synoptic' view to which philosophy returns, J. T. Merz, *Hist. of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, iii., iv., Edinburgh, 1912–14.

THOMAS WHITTAKER.

[1] *Par. Lost*, v. 486–490.

REBELLION, REVOLUTION.—Rebellion, in the sense of active resistance to established authority, is a phenomenon as old as political society; the doctrine that there is a right so to resist was proclaimed somewhat late, and after the Reformation it came into collision with the theory that kings have a divine right to absolute power. The question was settled to their own satisfaction by the champions of absolutism, but Locke asserts (*Two Treatises of Government*, London, 1690, bk. ii. § 90) that a monarchy such as they advocate, arbitrary and unlimited, is no form of civil government at all; and he shows that the question of a right of revolution is not so easily disposed of. Still popular judgment on the subject of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of insurrection is so often influenced by religious considerations, by the ideas involved in the old theory of divine right (*q.v.*), that no fair conclusion can be formed without an examination of this theory, apart altogether from its political and historical importance.

All early government was monarchical, and the sovereignty of the ancient State was absolute. But this was not because of any belief in divine right, since on this and other kindred subjects men had not begun to hold theories at all; the reason was that they were not yet conscious of those rights as men and citizens which, by their very existence, limit the power of government. In more modern times, according to Bluntschli (*Theory of the State*, bk. vi. ch. viii.), among the Greeks and Germans, kings were regarded as being of divine extraction but not as being themselves gods or as superior to human laws. The Romans, again, chose their kings as a rule by election, and did not recognize a supernatural descent even for those who succeeded by inheritance, although they acknowledged the right of the gods to direct the affairs of the State (*ib.* ch. ix.). It was in mediæval times that it first became the custom to talk of a king as the vicegerent or anointed representative of God, responsible to Him alone. Even usurpers like Pepin regarded themselves as wearing their crown 'Dei gratia.' Such a claim as that of Louis XIV. to a monopoly in his own person of political rights could not find even outward justification except on the assumption that his power was divinely derived.

There is a sense in which this doctrine may be said to be based upon the teaching of the NT. It did not come from the Jews, whose chronicles show them to have been, as a nation, more rebellious than law-abiding, whose kings besides were in the strictest sense servants of Jahweh, subject in all their acts to the censorship of His prophets. Moreover, the God of the Hebrew people sometimes favoured insurrection, as we see in 2 K 18[7], where it is stated that the Lord was with Hezekiah, the king of Judah, when 'he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and served him not.'

On the other hand, the early Christian Church taught what amounted practically to a doctrine of passive obedience to the State. 'The powers that be,' says St. Paul, 'are ordained of God' (Ro 13[1]). And again we find: 'Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him' (1 P 2[13f.]). These words were held, after the Reformation, to support the theory to which we have referred, that kings

were the anointed representatives of God, who, according to Louis XIV., reserved 'to himself the right to judge their acts' (*Œuvres*, Paris, 1806, ii. 317). But such an inference leaves out of account the fact that the Christian religion made a sharp distinction between Church and State, between the all-embracing power of God and the mere temporal authority of the emperor. Its Founder was not a prince of this world, and He Himself expressly separated the things which were Cæsar's from the things which were God's (Mt 22^{21}, Lk 20^{25}). The only divine rule belonged to the Almighty, but the early Church preached an unhesitating submission to the laws of the State, so long as these did not conflict with the higher mandate of religion (Ac 5^{29}).

The doctrine of an absolute sovereignty was first set forth in the form of a philosophical theory by Hobbes, and he urged passive obedience to the authority of the State under all circumstances whatsoever. Hobbes supported this extreme form of absolutism by an ingenious use of the theory of contract, which Locke employed later for the contrary purpose of upholding the ultimate right of the people 'to remove or alter the legislature'—the same theory which appeared at the time of the French Revolution to justify violent resistance to the government. We have to bear in mind, when reading Hobbes and Locke, that both are animated by the spirit of partisanship and are writing to condemn and defend, respectively, the rebellions of their time. But Hobbes did not carry his premisses to their logical conclusion. If right lies with might, as he asserts—and as has been held by J. Austin and the English jurists who strip sovereignty of every attribute but force—then right is with the people in any insurrection successfully carried out.

There can, in fact, be no legal right so called to disobey the established law of the land. We find it asserted, anarchical and contradictory as it is, in several of the American Declarations of Independence, along with other claims not less open to criticism (Ritchie, *Natural Rights*[3], pt. ii., esp. ch. xi.). But a constitutional right of resistance is a contradiction in terms, absurd and unthinkable, though plausible in a certain degree on the old hypothesis of a contract between a ruler and his subjects, according to which it was the part of the former to rule justly and of the latter to obey, the contract lasting only so long as each fulfilled these obligations.

There is, however, another point of view. It is generally admitted that the end for which the State was instituted is, as Locke put it, 'the good of mankind' (ii. § 229). And there are conceivable conditions under which continued well-being may be impossible and the existence even of a nation may be threatened. Under such circumstances it is generally agreed that there is a moral right or even duty of resistance.

The question then may properly be asked, When is revolution justifiable? No rule can be laid down, although the first necessity is that the common good should urgently demand reform of a radical kind. Other considerations must be taken into account. From an ethical standpoint, resistance is to be attempted only where it seems to have a chance of being successful, and approved only where the victorious party has been able not only to overthrow the ruling administration, but to construct on its ruins a government capable of preserving the independence thus attained. Moreover, there is the reservation that this should be done only after every form of conciliation has been tried, and where there are extreme misgovernment and suffering so intolerable as to make the cause seem worth the price of inevitable misery and bloodshed. Given these conditions, no one will dispute the right of what Schiller calls the 'appeal to Heaven' (*Wilhelm Tell*, act. ii. sc. 2). Even so zealous a defender of the power of the Crown as Johnson was forced to admit that there is a remedy in human nature against tyranny:

> 'If a sovereign oppresses his people to a great degree, they will rise and cut off his head' (Boswell, *Life of Samuel Johnson*, ed. H. Morley, London, 1884, ii. 144).

Hence we may say that, on moral grounds, revolution, like war, is to be justified only by the necessity which urges a nation to save its own existence at any cost.

It has been frequently argued, in the praise of democracy, that the so-called right of revolution cannot exist under a popular government, because the resistance of a part of the community to the will of the whole is, firstly, immoral owing to the supreme right of the majority, and, secondly, futile owing to its superior might. Henry Sidgwick (*The Elements of Politics*, London, 1891, p. 619 ff.) finds an element of sound reason in both these arguments, but decides in favour of the right of the minority to follow the dictates of its reason and conscience, inasmuch as it may possess superior knowledge and even have at its command superior physical force. Indeed, neither democracy nor any other form of government can prevent the possibility of civil war. Rather, as Kant—himself an advocate of passive obedience—points out, the safety of a State and its security against internal dissension and discontent lie in the education and moral development of its citizens. This is the sense in which statesmanship may best be defined as the art of avoiding revolutions. As Charles James Fox is reported to have said (John Stuart Mill, *Autobiography*, London, 1873, ch. v.), the theory of a right of resistance is a doctrine to be forgotten by subjects and remembered by kings.

LITERATURE.—J. C. Bluntschli, *Theory of the State*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1885; D. G. Ritchie, *Natural Rights*[3], London, 1916 (see also an essay on 'The Rights of Minorities,' in his *Darwin and Hegel*, do. 1893). The subject of the ethics of resistance is discussed by T. H. Green, *Philosophical Works*[5], do. 1906, ii. 455 ff. Among Hume's *Essays*, pt. ii., Edinburgh, 1752, is one on passive obedience.

M. CAMPBELL SMITH.

REBIRTH.—See REGENERATION, TRANSMIGRATION.

RECAPITULATION (Biological).—The biological facts indicated by the terms, recapitulation, rudimentary organs, reversion, retrogression, regeneration, rejuvenescence, and regression may be profitably discussed together.

1. Recapitulation.—All the higher organisms reveal in their development certain features which recall a distant ancestry. On each side of the neck of the embryo reptile, bird, and mammal there are branchial pouches comparable to those which have a respiratory function and may or do persist throughout life in fishes and amphibians. In reptiles, birds, and mammals these pouches are on the whole transient, like fleeting reminiscences. The first seems to persist as the eustachian tube, and the thymus gland is connected with another, but the rest pass away without persistent result. Similarly, the embryos of higher vertebrates show for a time a notochord—a primitive skeletal axis derived from the roof of the embryonic gut, and thus of endodermic origin. It persists throughout life in lancelets and lampreys, serving as the dorsal axis of the animal, as the forerunner of the backbone which, from fishes onwards, develops from the mesodermic sheath of the notochord. The notochord does not become the backbone, though perhaps serving as a sort of tissue-scaffolding for it, and every stage of the replacement of the one by the other is to be seen in fishes. Yet

on to man himself the notochord appears in development, has its short day, and passes, leaving but an unimportant vestige behind. Similarly, in the establishment of the brain, the skull, the heart, and other important structures the foundations are laid down on old-fashioned lines, not directly suggestive of what is to follow. Thus in individual organo-genesis there is frequently a recapitulation of historical stages. The development of many an organ is circuitous, as if the old paths had to some extent to be re-trod, and yet the progress of a hundred thousand years may be condensed into one day. Another aspect of the same fact is that the developing embryos of, say, bird and reptile are for some days very much alike, moving on parallel lines along the great highway of amniote development, but, sooner or later—about the sixth day in the case of the chick—their paths diverge and become distinctively avian and saurian. It is thus that the individual development (ontogeny) tends to recapitulate racial evolution (phylogeny), that the past lives again in the present with a compelling force. Three saving clauses must be noted: (*a*) the recapitulation is on the whole very general and always much condensed; (*b*) the individual development (especially when there are larval forms) often has its recapitulatory features obscured by secondary adaptations to relatively recent conditions of life; and (*c*) a living creature is extraordinarily specific from the very first—itself and no other. Yet it remains an important fact that the organism's inheritance garnered for ages does in many cases express itself in a step-to-step development, from the general to the special, which is in some degree a recapitulation of stages in what is believed to have been the racial evolution. But the doctrine of recapitulation is one that requires careful handling.

2. **Rudimentary organs.**—The fact of recapitulation leads naturally to the occurrence of rudimentary or vestigial structures, which linger on in dwindled expression long after they have ceased to be of use. Darwin compared them to the unsounded letters in some words, quite functionless, but telling us something of history. Some of the whales have deeply buried remnants of hip-girdle and hind-limb; birds have a vestigial and useless right oviduct; the skate has a minute remnant of a gill in its spiracle; man has a useless vestige of a third eyelid, occasionally with a supporting cartilage, and a large number of other historical relics. Among vestigial organs may be included those definite structures which appear in the course of development in weak expression and disappear without leaving a trace. Thus the whalebone whale has two sets of tooth-rudiments which never cut the gum. But the list must not include those structures which, though not attaining their original expression or form, are diverted to some new line of development. Thus the spinnerets of spiders are morphologically equivalent to two or more pairs of abdominal appendages—much reduced when compared with limbs, but in no true sense vestigial. The eustachian tube, which leads from the tympanic cavity to the back of the mouth, is a transformed and persistent spiracle, but it should not be called a vestige. In fact, one of the great methods of organic evolution has been the invention of novel structures by the rehabilitation or transformation of what is really very old. The three-linked chain of ossicles which convey vibrations from the drum to the internal organ of hearing was once in whole or in part included in the commonplace framework of the jaws. It is interesting to inquire whether there may not be vestigial functions and habits as well as vestigial organs and structure. Thus, according to Darwin, the dog that turns round and round on the hearth-rug before settling to sleep is making a comfortable bed in imaginary grass. Its needless activity is a vestigial survival of what its wild ancestors did to a purpose among the rough herbage. Similar interpretations may be given of 'shying' in horses and so on, but they must be considered critically.

When, because of some defect in nutrition or the like, there is an arrest of development, an organism may present an appearance which recalls what is permanent in a remote ancestral type. Thus harelip in man has been compared to the naso-buccal grooves normal in cartilaginous fishes. It does not tend to clearness to call this sort of thing a reversion; it is an unfinishedness in development, often due in mammals to some extrinsic cause affecting the mother. If, as the result of famine, war, over-work, poisoning, or other causes, infants are born markedly arrested in development, it would be justifiable to describe this as reversionary, but it cannot be asserted that the offspring of these under-average individuals would in conditions of good nurture be under-average. Many reversionary conditions exhibited by individual organisms are due to modifications (indents), not to variations (new outcomes), and are not directly transmissible.

3. **Reversion.**—In the art. ATAVISM it has been pointed out that what may be described as a harking back to a more or less remote ancestor may not be due to the re-assertion or re-awakening of ancestral hereditary contributions which have lain for several generations latent or unexpressed, like dormant seeds in a garden. This must be re-emphasized, especially in the light of Mendelian experiment, for it seems probable that many domesticated races of animals (such as hornless cattle or tailless cats) have arisen by the dropping-out of some item or items in the heritable complex of the wild species or of its descendants. By taking advantage of the mysterious natural analysis or 'unpacking' of the complex pelage of the wild rabbit, man has established many true-breeding colour-varieties or races of domestic rabbit. It may happen that a crossing of two of these races results in offspring resembling the wild rabbit. But this is not to be regarded as a mysterious rehabilitation of a dormant 'wild-rabbit character' but as a 're-packing' of what had been previously sifted out. This is the Mendelian interpretation of reversion, and it is corroborated by many experiments. On the other hand, the sudden appearance of stripes on the fore-quarters of a horse, or of a horned calf in a pure-bred hornless breed, may perhaps be due to the re-assertion of a particular 'factor' which has lain latent for many generations.

4. **Retrogression.** — The term 'retrogression' should be kept for cases where structures pass in the individual development from a higher to a lower grade of differentiation, or for cases where a similar reversal may be recognized, on presumptive evidence, in the history of a race. The larval ascidian is a free-swimming creature, like a miniature tadpole, with a brain and dorsal nerve cord, a brain-eye, and a notochord supporting the locomotor tail. In the course of the subsequent adaptation to a sedentary mode of life the nervous system is reduced to a single ganglion, the brain-eye disappears, and the tail is absorbed. As regards these structures the ascidian shows retrogression, though it must be clearly understood that the adult is on the whole a much more complex organism than the larva. The respiratory pharynx, *e.g.*, exhibits a high degree of differentiation. Individual retrogression is well illustrated in the life-history of many parasites. Thus the well-known Sacculina, which is parasitic in crabs,

starts in life as a free-swimming Nauplius-larva, with three pairs of appendages, a median eye, and a food-canal, which all disappear in the course of the adaptation to parasitism. Similarly the thymus gland is relatively large in most young mammals, but undergoes retrogressive development as age increases, and this again suggests that retrogression does not necessarily imply any degeneration of the organism as a whole, but rather a re-adjustment to a changed mode of life. The gills of a tadpole exhibit retrogression and are entirely absorbed as the lung-breathing frog develops. But the frog as a whole is obviously on a higher structural plane than the tadpole. Retrogressive changes are sometimes exhibited seasonally, as is seen in the dwindling of the reproductive organs of birds after the breeding period; or at crises in the life-history, as in the extraordinary de-differentiation that occurs in the metamorphosis of insects; or after serious injuries when a process of dissolution and reduction often occurs before the reconstitution begins.

5. **Regeneration.**—Great interest attaches to the regenerative capacity exhibited by many animals and by most plants. It is exhibited in the repair of injuries, in the restoration of lost parts, and in the regrowth of a fragment into a whole. It is rarely exhibited in regard to internal organs by themselves, though it includes them if they are removed along with a portion of the body as a whole; it is not common in relation to wounds that border on being fatal; it has a curious sporadic distribution among animals, and this, taken along with other considerations, points to its occurrence being adaptive. Weismann in particular sought to show that the regenerative capacity tends to occur in those animals, and in those parts of animals, which are, in the natural conditions of their life, peculiarly liable to a frequently recurring risk of injury, provided always that the part is of real value, and that the wound is not fatal. The facts of regeneration are very remarkable, such as a fragment of begonia-leaf or potato-tuber growing an entire plant, a spoonful of minced sponge growing into an entire animal, one Hydra producing half a dozen when cut into pieces, a starfish arm forming a complete starfish, an earthworm growing a new head or a new tail, a lobster replacing a leg, a snail restoring its horn and the eye at the end of it forty times in succession, a newt's eye making a new lens, a lizard regrowing a tail, and a stork repairing a great part of its jaw. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in the process of differentiation that goes on in normal development, the essential constituents of the inheritance are distributed throughout the body in all the cells though only a few of them are expressed in each cell. If we think of the inheritance as a bag of diverse seeds, and of the cells of the body as the thousand beds of a garden (some small animals have about that number), differing greatly in exposure or stimulation, we can imagine that, although each bed gets a representation of all the different kinds of seeds, only a few will develop in each case. Under extraordinary circumstances, however, it might be possible to awaken in a particular set of beds a full representation of all the seeds, and it is something like this that occurs in regeneration. In some tissues the re-awakening is easy, as in the cambium of plants or the bodies of polyps and simple worms; in other cases it is impossible, as in the supremely differentiated nervous tissue of higher animals which cannot even replace its own worn-out elements. It is not difficult to understand that the re-growth should not always be perfect; thus a lobster, instead of growing an eye for an eye, may grow an antenna instead, and an earthworm that has lost its head may re-grow an anterior tail. Particularly instructive, linking regenerative processes back to recapitulation, are two facts: (1) the restoration is sometimes effected by stages which are different from those of embryonic development, and (2) the final result, as in the case of a lizard's tail or an insect's foot, may be of a somewhat simpler pattern compared with the original—may indeed be of definitely ancestral type.

The wide-spread distribution of the regenerative capacity among organisms is to be thought of in connexion (*a*) with the continual occurrence of recuperative processes that tend towards making good the wear and tear of bodily structure, for regeneration is this in a more thoroughgoing fashion; (*b*) with the frequent occurrence of asexual modes of multiplication, for it is impossible to draw a firm line between the development of a piece thrown off in the spasms of capture and the development of a piece separated off by more spontaneous autotomy. Many a starfish habitually surrenders an arm when that is seized by an enemy; as the creature has not a single nerve-ganglion in its body, there can be no question of calling its self-surrender deliberate; yet this reflex autotomy expresses the fact that the creature has organically learned the lesson that it is better that one member should perish than that the whole life should be lost. But there is at least one starfish which separates off arms as a mode of multiplication, as others do to effect escape.

6. **Rejuvenescence.**—It has been already mentioned that the process of re-growing a lost part, or of restoring a whole from a fragment, is frequently preceded by de-differentiation—a retreat preparatory to an advance. Thus regeneration is linked back to retrogression. But another fact of great significance has rewarded C. M. Child's prolonged study of Planarian worms: the process of reconstitution of a fragment separated off either naturally or artificially, or of a form greatly reduced by starvation, is preceded by a period of rejuvenescence. By rejuvenescence is here meant that the fragment or starveling shows a higher rate of metabolism than when it was part of the intact organism or was untampered with by starving. The rate of metabolism is gauged by the output of carbon-dioxide (measured by Tashiro's 'biometer') and by the change in susceptibility or resistance to certain poisons, such as cyanides. Similar exhibitions of rejuvenescence are discovered in the asexual multiplication of hydroids and some other relatively simple animals, and it seems very probable that senescence and natural death may be in this way indefinitely staved off. On Child's view the process of differentiation necessarily involves a retardation of the rate of life and a diminution of vigour, because of the establishment of complexities of structure in the colloidal substratum which forms the framework of the chemico-physical basis of life. This complexity of stable framework adds greatly to efficiency, but it also increases mortality. The very simple organism has practically perfect processes of rejuvenescence; in forms like the freshwater polyp rejuvenescence is never far behind senescence; in more complex forms there have to be special periods for rejuvenescence; in all the higher animals even this possibility is much restricted and senescence is inevitable. It may be that one of the several reasons why sexual reproduction by special germ-cells has replaced asexual reproduction (and has been added to it or kept along with it in cases, like Hydra, where it is far from being the main means of multiplication) is that it affords opportunity for re-organization or rejuvenescence at the very start of the individual life—thus lessening the risk of the organism being 'born old.'

Looking backwards over the various processes

briefly discussed in this article, we see the possibility of pathological variation or modification at every turn. (1) The degree of development depends in some measure on the fullness of appropriate nurture; the absence of certain stimuli in the nurture may inhibit the full expression of the inheritance. In man's case we know that this fortunately works both ways, for changes of nurture may hinder the opening of undesirable as well as promising buds. (2) The rehabilitation of a long latent ancestral character may spell mischief; it may be that some types of criminals are anachronisms of this sort. (3) Rudimentary organs often show a considerable range of variability, and a disturbance of balance may be caused by the undue prominence or activity of a structure which is normally dwindling away. (4) It seems important to recognize that a great part of what is called disease (apart from microbic disease) may be described as metabolic processes which are occurring out of place and out of time. What may be advantageous in one organism or organ or stage of life may be fatal in another. The involution or retrogression which besets the thymus is normal, but, if it besets the thyroid, it is likely to be fatal. The process which separates off the stag's antlers every year would be a serious necrosis of the bone if it occurred elsewhere. With what would in other cases be a pathological product of the kidneys the male stickleback weaves the sea-weed into a nest. The capacity which is normalized in one animal to effect regeneration may lead to a dangerous neoplasm in another.

7. **Regression.**—'Regression' is a term applied by Galton and Pearson to the tendency exhibited by the offspring of the extraordinary members of a stock to approximate towards the mean of that stock. It probably holds only in regard to blending characters, such as stature, and not in regard to Mendelian characters. It works both ways, levying a succession tax on the highly gifted and on those unusually defective. The mean height of the sons of a thousand fathers of 6 ft. will be 5 ft. 10·8 in., approaching the mean of the general population; the mean height of the sons of a thousand fathers of 5 ft. 6 in. will be 5 ft. 8·3 in., again approaching the mean of the general population of sons. The reason for the fact of filial regression is that the ancestry of any ordinary member of a human community is always a fair sample of the general population. Here again we have an illustration of the past living on in the present, the thread uniting the various subjects treated of in this article.

See further artt. AGE, BIOLOGY, DEVELOPMENT, EVOLUTION, HEREDITY, LIFE AND DEATH (Biological), ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY.

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J. A. THOMSON.

RECEPTIVITY.—'Receptivity' is a technical term used by Kant and those influenced by his philosophy, and employed in one definitely restricted way. Kant always talks about the 'receptivity of *impressions*,' and uses this expression to describe the sensuous faculty of the human soul. Sense is to him a mere faculty of receiving passively what comes to the mind from a source outside of it; it is thus distinguished from understanding, which is a faculty in virtue of which the mind originates the concepts necessary for the scientific activity of thought.

The notion of sense being a receptive faculty is ultimately derived from the Aristotelian philosophy. But the Aristotelian theory of the nature of the sensuous faculty differs markedly from the Kantian. According to Aristotle, sense is a faculty, and the sense-organ is an instrument, by which we receive in consciousness those characteristics which, taken together, constitute the form or knowable nature of material objects; but, while receptive, sense is at the same time discriminative, *i.e.*, it is able to distinguish the different sensuous qualities and to combine them (when they are compatible) in a single perception. Hence, according to Aristotle, sense manifests the characters both of receptivity and of spontaneity, features which Kant wished to assign to diverse faculties of the soul.

LITERATURE.—Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, London, 1860, pt. i. 'Transcendental Æsthetic' (at beginning), pt. ii. 'Transcendental Logic' (at beginning); E. Wallace, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle*[3], London, 1883, p. 87 ff.; W. Windelband, *Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., London and New York, 1893, p. 150.

G. R. T. ROSS.

RECHABITES.—Although the very existence of the Rechabites as a clan or community distinct from, and yet at least to some extent incorporated in, Judah would have been unsuspected save for the narrative of Jer 35, it is evident from the language there used that Rechabite characteristics were well known at the end of the 7th cent. B.C. It was maintained by Jeremiah ($2^{10f.}$)—perhaps not altogether justly, inasmuch as the prophet did not make allowance for the Canaanite elements in Israel—that his own nation had shown a fickleness in religion the like of which could be seen in no other people; and, by way of contrast, he showed the loyalty of the Rechabites to ancestral custom. Although the literal meaning of Jer 35^3 is perhaps not to be pressed, the natural inference from this statement is that the Rechabites were not very numerous, since 'the whole house' (by which phrase we should naturally understand at least the adult male members) were taken by Jeremiah into one of the chambers of the Temple. Thereupon, in response to an invitation to drink wine, the Rechabites are represented as saying:

> 'We will drink no wine: for Jonadab the son of Rechab our father commanded us, saying, Ye shall drink no wine, neither ye, nor your sons, for ever: neither shall ye build house, nor sow seed, nor plant vineyard, nor have any: but all your days ye shall dwell in tents; that ye may live many days in the land wherein ye sojourn. And we have obeyed the voice of Jonadab the son of Rechab our father in all that he charged us, to drink no wine all our days, we, our wives, our sons, nor our daughters; nor to build houses for us to dwell in: neither have we vineyard, nor field, nor seed: but we have dwelt in tents, and have obeyed, and done according to all that Jonadab our father commanded us.'

The 'Jonadab the son of Rechab' here referred to is evidently the same who is mentioned in 2 K $10^{15f.}$ as a supporter of Jehu in his attack on Baal-worship. From the fact that he is called by the Rechabites 'our father' it might be inferred that he was either the founder of a sect or gild or the eponymous ancestor of a clan. Such an inference is, however, inadmissible, since Jehonadab himself is described (2 K 10^{16}) as 'son of Rechab'; it seems better, therefore, to understand the word 'father,' as in Jg 17^{10}, as used of a religious teacher or law-giver. It is not improbable that it was in the days of Jehu that the primitive Decalogue setting forth the exclusive claims of Jahweh to the ritual worship of Israel was drawn up (see art. ISRAEL), and at the same time Jehonadab may have given to his own clan the rule of life which thenceforth for more than two centuries they held fast.

The term 'Rechabite' has frequently been regarded as equivalent to 'teetotaller,' but it is to be noted that abstinence from wine was but part of the rule which Jehonadab imposed upon his

people, the sum total of which was insistence on the continuance of a nomadic life and on the repudiation of all Canaanite civilization. Jeremiah did not offer the Rechabites bread, which, with the Chaldæan army in occupation of the land, was perhaps scarcely to be obtained; but it may certainly be inferred from the Rechabites' refusal to cultivate land and to sow seed that they also abstained from cereal food, living in nomadic fashion on milk. The intense interest of the episode lies in the fact that the Rechabites, having no concern with agriculture, could have had no share in the great agricultural feasts—the only feasts made obligatory in the older documents of the Pentateuch (Ex $23^{14ff.}$ $34^{18.\ 22}$; cf. Dt 16^{1-17})—and consequently no share in the sacrifices offered on the occasion of these feasts (Ex 23^{18} 34^{25}). In 2 K 10^{23}, indeed, Jehonadab is represented as accompanying Jehu when the latter went in to the temple of Baal 'to offer sacrifices and burnt offerings'; but, since these sacrifices were offered to Baal, whose worship Jehu was bent on destroying, no argument can be drawn from the incident as to Jehonadab's view of sacrifice, even if he really was associated with Jehu on this occasion.

The great prophets of the 8th and 7th centuries B.C. (see Am 5^{21-25}, Hos 6^{6}, Is 1^{11-14}, Mic 6^{6-8}, Jer 7^{21-23}; cf. Dt 5^{22}) all use language which can scarcely be interpreted otherwise than as meaning that, according to the tradition to which the prophets confidently appeal, sacrifice was unknown in ancient Israelite religion; and, although it may be urged that those few passages can have little weight against the vast mass of testimony both of the Pentateuch and of the historical books, the wonder is, when we consider the dominance of Zadokite religion and its influence on the Hebrew Scriptures, not that we possess so few passages in denunciation of sacrifice, but rather that we possess any at all.

It is significant that the first prophet whose denunciation of sacrifice has come down to us is Amos, the sheep-breeder of Tekoa, *i.e.* a man whose manner of life, though he lived in a permanent dwelling, may be supposed in many respects to have approximated to the nomadic rather than to the agricultural life. Whether Amos, like the Rechabites, rejected wine is uncertain. He denounces the drinking of wine in the case of the Nazirites (2^{12}), and he certainly disapproved of the probably excessive wine-drinking at Bethel (4^{1}); but the more natural interpretation of such passages as 2^{13} $4^{7.\ 9}$ 5^{11} is that he did not object to agriculture in itself; and the same is probably true of Hosea and the other pre-Exilic prophets.

But, although the Rechabites kept their nomadic customs down to the last days of the kingdom of Judah, yet even they, or at all events some of them, were finally compelled, at least to some extent, to abandon their ancestral rule; for in the days of Nehemiah (3^{14}) a Rechabite, Malchijah by name, repaired a portion of the wall—a fact which implies that some members of the clan had adopted a fixed habitation. Doubtless in Israel proper the change from nomadic to agricultural life was accomplished only gradually, and was more rapid in some clans than in others. Probably, as the prejudice against Canaanite civilization was gradually broken down, certain elements more definitely associated with Canaanite religion would still be resisted for a considerable time. Thus Hosea, though he says that Jahweh has given the corn and the wine and the oil (2^{8}), regards raisin cakes (3^{1}) as an element of heathenism.

One thing, however, is certain: what was possible for the Rechabites was possible for other tribes also. The unity of the nation which later Hebrew writers ascribe to the period of the monarchy is not attested by the older documents. The genuine Israelites—*i.e.* the immigrant clans who subjected the Canaanites—brought in with them a monotheistic religion immeasurably superior to the nature-worship of Canaan and possessing neither sacrifice nor other barbarous rites. It is their voice that speaks in the noblest passages of prophecy and of the Psalter, and they are the true precursors of Jesus Christ.

LITERATURE.—See W. H. Bennett, art. 'Rechabites' in *HDB* and bibliography there given. R. H. KENNETT.

RECOGNITION.—1. Recognition is the psychological process by which an object presented in perception or imagination gives the impression of having already formed part of our experience. The term 'object' is here used to include anything from a sensory quality, colour, taste, odour, etc., to the contents of a novel or a philosophical system; the most frequent cases are, however, objects of perception, as persons, animals, buildings, scenes, melodies, etc. The impression of 'already experienced' may have any degree of circumstantiality; thus a face, a gesture, a foreign word, may appear vaguely familiar without any definite thought of the previous occasion or occasions on which it affected us, while an odour or a scene may call up with extreme vividness the exact date and all the important details of the earlier experience.

2. Recognition has really two distinct stages, the second of which frequently remains unrealized. There is first the 'sense of familiarity,' an immediate awareness that the presented object is not new to us; this sense may not be formulated in words, or in any cognitive terms, but may remain a mere feeling; practically it shows itself in our adaptation or adjustment to the object; during mental abstraction a key, *e.g.*, is grasped in a different way from a knife or a pair of scissors. Common words, everyday objects, frequently repeated sense-qualities, etc., rarely pass beyond this stage of immediate, direct, or indefinite recognition. The second stage is that in which associated ideas arise in the mind, the name of a person seen, the place where a former meeting took place, the topic of conversation, etc.; such memories circumstantiate the process of recognition, and verify it if doubtful. This is mediate or definite recognition—recognition in the strict sense of renewed cognition. It is obvious that, as a form of knowing, recognition may be true or false, correct or incorrect. An 'already experienced' may fail to be recognized, may not excite the sense of familiarity, or call up the associated ideas; a scene revisited after a term of years may impress us as quite unfamiliar; a professor of philosophy is said to have read an article in an encyclopædia with much approval, and to have been greatly surprised to find his own name at the end. Again, a 'new' object may give the sense of familiarity that belongs to one that is 'old' or already experienced; an event that is being enacted before our eyes appears as if it were the repetition of something we have already known, and we seem to anticipate the details that are to follow. A modified form of this error is when an imagined event, a tale read, an adventure described, or a dream is falsely recognized as a real event that has happened to oneself—the so-called 'pathological lying.' Experiments show also that the degree of subjective certainty or confidence has very little relation to the objective accuracy of the recognition; a correct judgment may be hesitant and uncertain, while a false recognition may have absolute confidence behind it.

3. The psychological problem which arises is

that of the analysis of the process of recognition, as it actually occurs, the conditions on which it depends, and the differences between its forms. The classical theories of recognition are those which emerged in the controversy between Höffding and Lehmann (see Literature below). According to Höffding, the typical form of recognition is the immediate; it represents the first stage beyond pure sensation towards ideation, a half-way or transition process, in which memory is involved, a 'tied' or 'implicate idea,' as opposed to the 'free idea' of the memory-image. When a stimulus which has already given rise to a sensation (of colour, sound, or the like) is repeated after an interval, the new sensation will be different from the old, because of the latter's previous occurrence. Further, Höffding holds that this modification takes place through the re-excitation of the earlier sensation and the fusion of this element with the new or direct presentation. The revival may not be a separate or conscious one, the fusion being between processes rather than products. If A represents the direct sensation, and a its image or indirect revival, then recognition is really a complex of $A + a_1 + a_2 +$ etc. Höffding prefers the formula $\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)$, where a represents the one or more past experiences called up by the direct process A and combining or fusing, subconsciously, with it. The theory was connected, inconsistently, it may be said, with the physiological assumption that, when a sensation is repeated or revived in memory, a similar modification takes place in the same part of the brain as the original process; each time it occurs, some trace is left, by which the change becomes easier with each successive repetition. Bain[1] had already ascribed to this supposed fact the effect of repetition in making any single impression *adherent*, *i.e.* more firmly impressed on the mind, more easily retained and recalled. The nerve tracks become more practicable the oftener they are traversed. 'A process,' as James says, 'fills its old bed in a different way from that in which it makes a new bed.'[2] Psychologically Bain infers only 'that a present occurrence of any object to the view recalls the total impression made by all the previous occurrences, and adds its own effect to that total.' Thus there is a constant re-instatement of past impressions, and a corresponding deepening of the present impression, as an experience is repeated. But for Höffding a sensation or perception acquires through this repetition a distinguishing mark—the mark or character of knownness, or familiarity, by which it is clearly distinguished from entirely new sensations, or new perceptions.

4. Lehmann's theory takes mediate recognition as the typical form, and association by contiguity as the process chiefly involved in it. When an object is first perceived, we associate with it some of its accompanying events or circumstances—with a person, *e.g.*, the name, the actions, or the words; with a sense-quality, its name also, or its effect upon us, some determining mark, some 'head of classification.'[3] On a second occasion, the object tends to call up, by contiguity association, in memory the associated name or mark; this, according to Lehmann, is recognition. When the ideas are distinct (date, scene, etc.), we have definite or circumstantial or explicit recognition; but, after frequent repetitions, an object may cease to call up definite associates; these remain below the threshold of consciousness, but are none the less active, and we have implicit or immediate or direct recognition, which is thus a reduced form of the first type. James states it clearly when, referring to the recovery of a name which we have sought for some time, he says:

'It tingles, it trembles on the verge, but does not come. Just such a tingling and trembling of unrecovered associates is the penumbra of recognition that may surround any experience and make it seem familiar, though we know not why.'[1]

5. Recent experimental work suggests that the process of recognition is much more complex and varied than either of the above theories implies, and that we learn to know a repeated object by different signs or marks, just as we learn to know a distant or a near, a beautiful or an ugly, object. The characters which we learn to use as signs of repetition, or of the 'already experienced,' vary for different materials, for different individuals, and for the same individual at different times and for different purposes. They are, *e.g.*, (1) the facility or ease with which we perceive or notice or grasp the object, its clearness and definiteness; (2) the feeling of agreeableness or pleasure, which often accompanies this facility; (3) verbal or other determining marks attached to the object on its earlier occurrence, and recalled by 'association'; (4) expectation or anticipation of changes or effects of the object, which are in fact realized, etc. (5) But the principal mark arises from the fact that our organic and intellectual reaction to a repeated object is different in a very characteristic way from that to a totally or partially new one. In the latter case, if we are interested, we make an effort to appreciate the object, 'run the eyes over' the outstanding points, imitate a movement with our head or limbs, try to follow a sound with our inward voice; by this means we appropriate it, link it on to our self 'complex.' When it is repeated, the whole reaction, through the law of habit, runs off with little or no effort, and the attitude of appropriation is instinctively taken up. Where for any reason the self-feeling is absent or weak, or where reactions do not easily take place, as in illness or senility or in any temporary lack of attention, recognition fails; in extreme mental feebleness or degeneration the simplest everyday impressions may appear entirely new and strange, however often repeated. Conversely, in intense pathological self-absorption, the strangest and newest objects may give the illusion of 'the *déjà vu*.' In the former case recent events may be revived as memories, yet fail of recognition; recognition and reproduction are, in fact, distinct processes. Recognition, says Claparède, implies a previous act of synthesis, an attachment to the personality. When the impression or image is repeated, it is coloured by the self-quality, as it were, which it received from being taken up or assimilated into our consciousness.[2] There is accordingly a primary and immediate certainty, given by the immediate feeling or attitude of the self to the impression; this is either weakened or strengthened by the memories and associations that subsequently arise, which, if adequate, make the recognition into a definite or circumstantial one. False recognitions mostly depend on the instinctive confidence in the primary feeling, which may be misled by some partial similarity between the new and some old impression.

The very interesting experimental work on the subject of recognition is summarized in Katzaroff and other papers; see references in Literature below.

LITERATURE.—H. Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, Eng. tr., London, 1891, 'Über Wiedererkennen,' *Vierteljs. für wiss. Phil.* xiii. [1889] 420–458, and xiv. [1890] 27–49, 167–205, 292–316, 'Zur Theorie des Wiedererkennens,' *Phil. Stud.* viii. [1892] 88–96; A. Lehmann, 'Über Wiedererkennen,' *Phil. Stud.* v. [1889] 96–

[1] *The Senses and the Intellect*, London, 1868, pp. 338, 349.
[2] *Principles of Psychology*, i. 674, note.
[3] *Ib.*

[1] i. 674.
[2] Claparède and Baade, 'Recherches exp. sur un cas d'hypnose,' *Archives de Psych.* viii. [1909] 387, quoted D. Katzaroff, *ib.* xi. 26.

156, 'Crit. und exper. Studien über das Wiedererkennen,' *Phil. Stud.* vii. [1891] 169 ff.; A. Allin, *Über das Grundprincip der Association*, Berlin, 1895, 'The Recognition-theory of Perception,' *AJPs* vii. [1896] 237–273, 'Recognition,' *Psych. Rev.* iii. [1896] 542–548; James Ward, 'Assimilation and Association,' *Mind*, xviii. [1893] 347–362, xix. [1894] 509–532; William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols., London, 1891; Max Offner, *Das Gedächtnis*, Berlin, 1909 (Bibliography); D. Katzaroff, 'Contribution à l'étude de la recognition,' and E. Claparède, 'Recognition et Moi-ïte,' in *Archives de Psych.* xi. [1911] 1–78, 79–90; H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Eng. tr., London, 1911. Recent experimental papers on recognition are to be found in the Psychological Monographs for 1915 (Princeton, N.J.) by G. A. Feingold (no. 78), and R. B. Owen (no. 86), in *AJPs* xxv. [1915] 217–228 (E. F. Mulhall), 313–387 (E. L. Woods), and in *Studies from the Psych. Lab. of Bedford College*, London, 1915, pp. 29–66 (L. G. Fildes).

J. L. McINTYRE.

RECONCILIATION.—See FORGIVENESS (NT and Christian), SALVATION (Christian).

RECORDING ANGEL.—In all the early literatures of the world the angel is called upon to perform a motley variety of tasks. The universe was recognized to be the scene of a ceaseless divine activity. But it puzzled men to know how God, who was pure spirit and infinite, could come into actual contact with matter, which was impure, imperfect, and finite. Hence arose the notion of the angel, a kind of offshoot of the divine, a being semi-human and semi-divine, standing on a lower rung of divinity than the Deity, mingling freely with earthly creations and exercising over them an influence bearing the strongest resemblance to that which came directly from the Deity. The angel, in other words, bridged the yawning gulf between the world and God. It follows from this that, as the innumerable experiences of man during life and after death were subject to angelic influences, the latter had, in the imagination of early peoples, to be pigeonholed into separate and independent departments of activity. Each angel had its own specialized task to see to, and each religion particularized those tasks in its own way. The idea of a recording angel charged with a peculiar task of its own and bearing a distinct name or series of names figures in Judaism, Christianity, and Muhammadanism. The function which it performs is, in the main, identical in all the three religious systems, but the details vary considerably.

In Judaism the work of the recording angel is that of keeping an account of the deeds of individuals and nations, in order to present the record at some future time before man's heavenly Maker. The presentation of this record may take place during the lifetime of the individual or nation, or, as is more often the case, after death; and upon this record depends either the bliss or the pain which is to be apportioned in the after life. In the OT there are three passages which form a basis for these ideas. In Mal 3^{16} it is said: 'Then they that feared the Lord spake one with another: and the Lord hearkened, and heard, and a *book of remembrance* was written before him, for them that feared the Lord, and that thought upon his name.' Jahweh hears what His righteous servants say and resolves to reward them at some future time for their steadfastness. The figure of speech is derived from the custom of Persian monarchs, who had the names of public benefactors inscribed in a book, in order that in due time they might be suitably rewarded.[1] In Ezk 9^4 the man 'clothed in linen which had the writer's inkhorn by his side,' is bidden to 'go through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and *set a mark* upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and that cry for all the abominations that be done in the midst thereof.' This man 'clothed in linen' is one of the six angels sent to exact speedy punishment upon the defiant city of Jerusalem. But the punishment must be discriminating. While the unrepenting are to be slain without mercy, the angel was to 'set a mark' on those who expressed sincere grief for their backslidings and who dissociated themselves from the sinners. This mark was, presumably, to serve as a reference on the day when retribution would be meted out. The third passage is Dn 12^1: 'And at that time shall Michael stand up, . . . and there shall be a time of trouble . . . and at that time thy people shall be delivered, every one *that shall be found written in the book.*' When this is read in connexion with the succeeding verses, the underlying idea seems clearly that of some future divine judgment when the righteous classes and the wicked classes will each reap their deserts, and the record of 'who's who' will be found written in 'the book,' the angel Michael acting as recorder.

As R. H. Charles puts it, 'the book was "the book of life" . . . a register of the actual citizens of the theocratic community on earth. . . . This book has thus become a register of the citizens of the coming kingdom of God, whether living or departed' ('Daniel,' in *Century Bible*, Edinburgh, n.d. [1913], p. 139).

A rabbi of the Mishnaic epoch, Akiba ben Joseph (A.D. *c.* 50–*c.* 132), summarized and elaborated all these OT conceptions of the account between man and his Maker (without, however, introducing the idea of the recording angel) in a remarkably striking parable, thus:

'Everything is given on pledge and a net is spread for all the living. The shop is open and the dealer gives credit; and the ledger lies open; and the hand writes; and whosoever wishes to borrow may come and borrow; but the collectors regularly make their daily round and exact payment from man whether he be content or not; and they have that whereon they can rely in their demand; and the judgment is a judgment of truth, and everything is prepared for the feast' (Mishnāh, *Ābôth*, iii. 16).

The 'feast' refers to the leviathan, on the flesh of which, according to a frequent idea of the Talmud and Midrash, the righteous Israelites will regale themselves in the beyond.

The rich angelologies of the Jews and Christians (as well as of the Muhammadans, who borrowed largely from the OT and the rabbinic writings) built further on these OT references to a recording angel, and transferred the work of recording to some one or other angel bearing a special name, the Deity becoming merely the recipient of the record. In rabbinic theology and in the mysticism of the *Zôhār* and mediæval Ḳabbālāh generally, the recording angel is kept particularly busy in one great department of activity—viz. prayer. Meṭatron (Gr. μητάτωρ, Lat. *metator*, 'guide') usually plays this rôle. According to a statement in Midrash *Tanḥūmā Genesis*,[1] as well as in the Slavonic *Book of Enoch*,[2] it is the angel Michael, originally the guardian-angel of Israel, who was transformed into Meṭatron, the angel 'whose name is like that of his Divine Master'[3]—a piece of doctrine which may possibly have influenced the Christian doctrine of the Logos. So impressive was the work of Meṭatron that a rabbi of the early 2nd cent. A.D., Elisha b. Abuyah, confessed to seeing this angel in the heavens and thus being led to believe that the cosmos was ruled by 'two powers.'[4] Of course such belief was heresy. According to a Talmudic statement, Meṭatron bears the Tetragrammaton in himself. This was derived from Ex 23^{21}, where it is said of the angel who would in the future be sent to prepare the way for the Israelites: 'Beware of him . . . *for my name* is *in* him.'

According to a passage in the *Zôhār* (Midrash *Ha-Ne'el-am* on section *Ḥayê-Sarah*), Meṭatron 'is appointed to take charge of the soul every day and to provide it with the necessary light

[1] Cf. Herod. iii. 140, v. 11, viii. 85.

[1] Ed. S. Buber, Wilna, 1885, p. 17. [2] xxii. 6.
[3] T.B. *Sanh.* 38*b*. [4] T.B. *Ḥagīgāh*, 15*a*.

from the Divine, according as he is commanded. It is he who is detailed to take the record in the grave-yards from Dumah, the angel of death, and to show it to the Master. It is he who is destined to put the leaven into the bones that lie beneath the earth, to repair the bodies and bring them to a state of perfection in the absence of the soul which will be sent by God to its appointed place [*i.e.* the Holy Land where they will again be put into bodies, which have come thither through a process of terrestrial transmigration—a favourite idea of some rabbinic theologians].'

The *Book of Jubilees*[1] speaks of Enoch as 'the heavenly scribe.' A similar description is applied to Meṭatron in T.B. *Ḥagîgāh*, 15*a*, where he is designated as 'he to whom authority is given to sit down and write the merits of Israel.'[2] In the Jerusalem Targum to Gn 5^{24} 'And Enoch walked with God: and he was not; for God took him,' the rendering is 'And he called his name [*i.e.* Enoch's] Meṭatron, the great scribe.' In Targum *Jonathan* to Ex 24^{1} 'And he said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord,' the paraphrase runs 'And unto Moses, Michael the archangel of wisdom said, on the seventh day of the month, Come up unto the Lord'; while in *Ascensio Isaiæ*, ix. 21, it is Michael who is honoured with the name of heavenly scribe. From these various references one readily infers that Meṭatron, Enoch, and Michael were names given to angels who were pre-eminent in the realms of wisdom or scholarship, and who would, as such, be best qualified to act as 'scribes' or 'recorders' of men's deeds.

Passages in the Qur'ān bear out this view of a special 'scholarly' angel who writes down the record of men. In *sūrah* ii. the rôle is given to Gabriel, who was so great an adept in the work that the act of writing down the Qur'ān for Muhammad's benefit was actually ascribed to him. Man's work on earth and God's work in heaven were brought into touch with one another by the scholarly recording activities of Gabriel. In *sūrah* l. another view is propounded.

'When the two angels deputed to take account of a man's behaviour take account thereof; one sitting on the right hand, the other on the left: he uttereth not a word, but there is with him a watcher ready to note it.'

Two 'recording' angels seem to be in evidence here. The meaning seems to be that, although the dying man may refuse to speak, or be unable to do so, yet the two 'recording' angels can read his inmost thoughts and take complete account of them. Sale puts quite another construction on the text, which, however, seems very far-fetched and improbable.

Quoting from the native commentary of Al-Beidawi, Sale further tells of a Muhammadan tradition to the effect that 'the angel who notes a man's good actions has the command over him who notes his evil actions; and that when a man does a good action, the angel of the right hand writes it down ten times; and when he commits an ill action the same angel says to the angel of the left hand, Forbear setting it down for seven hours; peradventure he may pray, or may ask pardon' (note on *sūrah* l. in Sale's *Koran*, new ed., London, 1825, ii. 350).

The idea of the 'good' always preponderating over the 'evil' is taught abundantly in the rabbinic writings, as is also the idea of a respite ever being open to the condemned even at the eleventh hour, at the bar whether of human or of divine justice (see T.B. *Ta'anîth*, 11*a*, where it is said that 'two ministering angels who accompany man, they give witness for him'). In the same passage in T.B. *Ta'anîth* it is further said:

'When man goes to his everlasting home, all his works on earth are passed in review before him, and it is said to him, On such and such a day thou didst do such and such a deed! The man replies, Yes. Then it is said to him, Seal it [*i.e.* your evidence]. He seals it and thus admits the justice of the Divine decree.'

Here man after death becomes his own recording angel—obviously a higher and more philosophical view.

[1] iv. 23; also *II Enoch*, liii. 2.

[2] In the *Zôhar* the two names are frequently put together thus, Meṭatron-Enoch.

Further references in rabbinical and apocalyptic literature are as follows:

In T.B. *Megillah*, 15*b*, the phrase in Est 6^{1} about the sleeplessness of the king is applied to God 'the king of the world,' who bids that 'the book of records of the Chronicles' be brought to Him. It is then found that Shimshai the scribe (see Ezr 4^{8}) has erased the passage recording Mordecai's rescue of Ahasuerus, but Gabriel rewrites it 'for the merit of Israel.' Thus Gabriel becomes here a kind of national registrar. The *Testament of Abraham*, the *Book of Jubilees*, *Enoch*, the Syriac *Apocalypse of Baruch*, and 2 Esdras all speak of the day of the great judgment, when angels and men alike will be called before the bar of justice and the book in which the deeds of men are recorded will be opened. According to the *Testament of Abraham* (A. xii.), this book in which the merits and demerits are written is ten cubits in breadth and six in thickness (cf. Ezk $28^{f.}$, Zec $5^{1f.}$). Each man will be surrounded by two angels, one writing down his merits and the other his demerits, while an archangel weighs the two kinds against each other in a balance. Those whose merits and demerits are equal remain in a middle state (corresponding to the purgatory of the Church) and the intercession of meritorious men, such as Abraham, saves them and brings them into paradise. The permanent recorder is Enoch, 'the teacher of heaven and earth, the scribe of righteousness,' and the other two angels are assistant recorders. This is probably the origin of the Qur'ān statement alluded to above.

The Pharisaic school of thought, as reflected in the Mishnāh, Talmud, and the Jewish liturgy generally, transferred a great deal of the eschatological connotations of the recording angel to man's temporal life on earth. Whilst admitting that man will be judged and his record taken in a hereafter, the rabbis taught that on the Jewish New Year's Day (Rōsh Ha-Shānāh, the first day of Tishri) the Books of Life and Death lie open before God, who as the Recorder *par excellence* looks through the records which He has put down against the name of each individual throughout the course of the year and then seals each one's destiny for the coming year. The mediæval Ḳabbālāh has amplified this doctrine with the addition of large angelological hierarchies into which man's soul enters on New Year's Day to hear its own favourable or unfavourable record from the mouth of hosts of recording angels. But the main trend of Jewish belief is in the direction of that simple but higher faith which holds that there is but one recording angel for or against man—God.

LITERATURE.—K. Kohler, 'The Pre-Talmudic Haggadah,' in *JQR* vii. [1895] 581–606; M. Friedländer, *Der vorchristliche jüdische Gnosticismus*, Göttingen, 1898, p. 102 ff.; N. I. Weinstein, *Zur Genesis der Agada*, pt. ii., 'Die alexandrinische Agada,' do. 1901; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judenthums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, Berlin, 1903, p. 247 ff.; *GJV*[3] iii. 252 ff.; R. H. Charles, *The Book of Enoch*[2], Oxford, 1912, *The Book of Jubilees*, London, 1902; M. R. James, *The Testament of Abraham*, Cambridge, 1892; *JE*, *s.vv.* 'Recording Angel,' 'Book of Life,' 'Abraham, Testament of,' 'Meṭatron.'

J. ABELSON.

RECREATION.—See AMUSEMENTS.

REDEMPTION.—In this article the question of the redemption of the first-born is discussed; the theological aspects of redemption are considered under SALVATION.

1. Introductory.—In the Pentateuch there are several references to the sacrifice of firstlings, and to the redemption of first-born sons and firstlings of unclean domestic animals. In E, 'The Book of the Covenant' (Ex $22^{29f.}$), first-born sons are to be given unto the Lord, also firstlings of oxen and sheep. According to J, every firstling male is to be set apart to the Lord and sacrificed. But the firstling of an ass is to be redeemed with a lamb, or, if it is not redeemed, its neck is to be broken. First-born sons are also to be redeemed, but the valuation is not fixed. This custom is connected with the deliverance from Egypt and the slaying of the first-born of man and beast there (Ex $13^{11ff.}$; cf. $34^{19f.}$). In P all first-born of man and beast are to be sanctified to the Lord (Ex 13^{16}). The firstling of an unclean beast is to be ransomed

'according to thine estimation' *plus* one-fifth more, or 'sold according to thy estimation' (Lv 27[26f.]). Elsewhere in P the hallowing of the first-born of man and beast is associated, as in J, with the smiting of the Egyptian first-born, but the Levites are said to have been taken instead of the first-born of the Israelites or of those more than a month old, and their cattle instead of the other Israelites' firstlings. Twenty thousand Levites take the place of as many first-born Israelites numbered at the time, and the overplus of 273 first-born are redeemed by a money-payment of five shekels each to Aaron and his sons (Nu 3[11f. 40ff.]). In another passage from P the first-born of man and beast are made over to Aaron and his sons, but those of men, from a month old, are redeemed for five shekels. Firstlings of oxen, sheep, and goats are not redeemed; their blood is sprinkled on the altar, the fat burned, and the flesh eaten by the priests. The firstlings of unclean beasts are to be redeemed (Nu 18[15f.]). Lastly in Dt 15[19] firstling males of flock and herd are sanctified to the Lord, and are to be eaten by the owner and his household in the place which the Lord shall choose. Such as are blemished may be eaten at home (cf. 12[6f. 17f.] 14[23]).

The main differences in detail in these passages may be noticed first. (1) Eating the flesh of firstlings: in Dt. this is done by owner and household, in P by Aaron and his sons. These differing laws seem to 'reflect the usage of two different periods of the history.'[1] (2) The redemption of the first-born: in E nothing is said of the redemption of the first-born of men; in J their redemption value is left vague; in P it is fixed at five shekels; but again in P the origin of the Levites as a sacred class is referred back to a redemption of the existing first-born of men, the overplus being redeemed at five shekels. Here there is obviously a myth originating at a period when the redemption value of the first-born had become fixed. As to the cattle of the Levites being regarded as sacred instead of the firstlings of the other Israelites' cattle, which, according to Nu 18[17], could not be redeemed, this may show that the myth belongs to a time when the legislation regarding firstlings had fallen into abeyance. (3) In E the 'giving' of the first-born of men to God is not connected, as in J and P, with the slaying of the first-born in Egypt. (4) Firstlings of unclean beasts: in J the firstling of an ass is to be redeemed; in P firstlings of unclean beasts, as if now other 'unclean' animals than the ass had been domesticated. In J and P the methods of valuation also differ.

We are thus confronted with legislation which varied from age to age, and which perhaps was no more than ideal at any given time. It also tended to be explained mythically, or fictitious reasons for the sanctity of the first-born were apt to be given.

2. Redemption of the firstling of the ass.—As the firstlings of domestic animals, like the first-fruits of the earth, were sacrificed or made over to God (see artt. FIRSTFRUITS, FIRST-BORN), those of the ass, a domestic animal, were His also. But asses and probably some other domestic animals were 'unclean,' *i.e.* unfit for sacrifice or for eating. Hence in their case arose the idea of redemption, the word used in Ex 13[13], *pādāh*, being that which always was used with reference to redemption from death or slavery (cf. 1 S 14[45], Ps 49[7. 15]). Another sacrificial animal was offered in its stead, or, if not so redeemed, it was killed, but not sacrificially; its neck was broken without shedding of blood, so that it could be of no further use to its owner. Later legislation permitted it to be redeemed at *plus* one-fifth of its value, or simply to be sold for the benefit of the sanctuary. In the earlier legislation the breaking of the neck of the unredeemed animal shows that the firstling was regarded as itself sacrosanct, or tabu, whether it was sacrificed or not.

[1] S. R. Driver, *The Book of Exodus*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 105.

3. Redemption of the first-born child.—There is little doubt that some special sanctity attached to the first-born. He was the first gift of God after marriage. In a sense he was God's property. Or the blood of the kin flowed 'purest and strongest in him.'[1] Was he therefore sacrificed? That the Semites sacrificed children, and frequently the first-born, is certain, though whether all the first-born were once regularly sacrificed has not been confirmed.

The jar-buried infants found at sacred sites in Palestine cannot be proved to be first-born children. It has also been questioned whether they were sacrificial victims.[2]

The question of the redemption of the first-born by some rite or equivalent sacrifice or money-payment, which appears strictly as a Hebrew custom, is one which arose either (1) because of the inherent sanctity of the first-born or (2) because he ought to be sacrificed. Now the *regular* sacrifice of the first-born among the Hebrews in historic times is open to question. The references in the OT to sacrifices of children are frequently general (2 K 16[3] 21[6] 23[10]; cf. Lv 18[21], 'any of thy seed'). A son or daughter (not males exclusively, and not always the first-born) was sacrificed. Nor was this sacrifice, when called for, always performed in infancy. The king of Moab sacrificed his eldest son, who was thus not an infant (2 K 3[23]), and so in the case of Isaac and of Jephthah's daughter. Thus even outside Israel the custom occurs not in infancy—a point not sufficiently noticed by writers on this subject—and only on occasion of some great calamity. That the Hebrews had such an occasional practice, or borrowed it, is not unlikely, and no more than this need be signified in Mi 6[7], where 'thousands of rams' and 'ten thousands of rivers of oil' show that Micah is speaking hyperbolically. In Ezk 20[26] 'all that openeth the womb' is spoken of as sacrificed to Molech in Israel, as if the custom had become general. But, if general, it need only have been so upon certain necessary occasions, when, if human sacrifice was to occur, the first-born was chosen. As far as Israel was concerned, the practice in historic times was borrowed, whether in earlier times it had been more general or not. This is shown by the words of the prophets, who may be presumed to have known the facts.

Jeremiah and Ezekiel make this clear, but their words seem to show that the people, seeing these costly sacrifices among the Phœnicians, deemed that they were due also to God in time of disaster. The practice of redeeming the first-born was regarded as merely permissive. Occasion might arise when this permission must be disregarded. Jeremiah says that God never commanded such sacrifices (7[31] 19[5]), and Ezekiel (20[26]) regards the current interpretation of Ex 13[12] as a mistake—a pollution.

Further, special privileges attached to the first-born, showing that he was not sacrificed (Gn 25[32], Dt 21[16]; cf. 1 Ch 5[1] [disgracing the birth-right]); and the method in which Israel is spoken of as God's first-born (Ex 4[22]; cf. Jer 31[9] [Ephraim], Ps 89[27] [Messiah as God's first-born]) shows that the first-born was specially favoured, not sacrificed. The words of Micah (6[7]) and Ezekiel (20[26]) belong to the period when the Israelites borrowed the custom from their neighbours. So, too, probably does the story of Isaac's sacrifice, in which the victim is commuted or redeemed by a ram—a far less spiritual thought than Micah's.

Why then was the first-born redeemed? (1) If the custom of sacrificing the first-born had once been general in early times, as perhaps the state-

[1] W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 465; cf. Gn 49[3], Dt 21[17].

[2] W. H. Wood, *BW* xxxvi. [1910] 166 ff.

ment of the law in Ex 22[29] and the similarity of expressions in the case of the first-born and first-lings (Ex 22[29f.] 34[19]) suggest, the redemption must be a softening of the practice in an age which had morally outgrown it and demanded a more humane custom. Yet that age must have been previous to that of Moses, since he, a first-born son,[1] was not sacrificed. The idea that the first-born was due to God still remained; hence he had to be redeemed, and, even when redeemed, he might still be sacrificed when sufficient occasion arose. This appears to underlie the story of Isaac, which may be a later tale explaining the origin of the redemption. Otherwise it was explained by the fact that, since God had slain the first-born of Egypt, therefore the first-born of Israel must be redeemed—a theological explanation in an age when the true rationale of the practice was forgotten.

J. G. Frazer assumes that not the first-born of Egypt were slain, but those of Israel in some sacrificial ritual by priestly executioners at Passover. This was afterwards commuted by the sacrifice of a lamb, its blood being smeared on the door-posts instead of that of the child. That a strong tradition of some tragic event occurring to the Israelites should thus be transformed is most unlikely. That event was some species of plague, not slaughter, and it is most unlikely that a joyous feast should originate in such general sacrifice of Israelite children.[2]

In the curious story in Ex 4[24ff.], if Zipporah's child was to be given as an offering in place of Moses, the circumcising of him would be a species of redemption. The story would thus be another method of accounting for the redemption of the first-born.[3]

(2) If, on the other hand, the practice of occasionally sacrificing first-born children arose through Israel's contact with peoples who regularly or occasionally followed this practice, it would be felt that the first-born was due to God, and, when not sacrificed, must be redeemed. The technical term for the Molech sacrifice was 'cause to pass over to Molech.' The same term is used in Ex 13[12], 'cause to pass over to Jahweh,' even when the redemption is insisted on.

(3) Again, apart altogether from sacrifice, if a special sacredness, 'a congenital holiness,'[4] attached to the first-born, which resulted in his being regarded as God's property or as tabu, some act of removal of holiness or of tabu was necessary—the rite of redemption—before he could be considered as an ordinary mortal. The 'redemption' was a redemption from sanctity.

(4) Others, again, have supposed that in the redemption 'we are to see not a toning down of an ancient custom which had demanded human sacrifice, but only an expedient for extending the precept relating to firstlings so as to include men and non-sacrificial animals.'[5] This is akin to W. R. Smith's view that, when the belief in the 'congenital holiness' of the first-born of men and animals came to mean that such holy things were set aside for sacrifice, the obvious unsuitability of human or unclean animal offerings led to their being redeemed.[6] Wellhausen also regards the claim to the human first-born as merely 'a later generalization.'[7]

To sum up: the language regarding the first-born suggests an earlier custom of sacrifice; but the probability is that the legislation is late, and that the language is coloured either by that used of firstlings or by that used regarding actual sacrifices of the first-born among the Canaanites. Wellhausen and W. R. Smith reject the idea of the early general sacrifice of the Hebrew first-born. J. G. Frazer accepts it, but his evidence of similar sacrifices of the first-born among other peoples needs sifting. Several instances refer not to sacrifice but to infanticide. Not all are supported by clear evidence, nor do all refer exclusively to the first-born.[1]

4. Parallel ethnic practices. — The Hebrew custom finds an echo in folk-tales in which childless parents agree to give up their first-born to some one who offers to remove the wife's barrenness. These tales arose in some custom of dedication of first-born to a deity. In some such stories a gift or a substitute is offered instead—a suggestion of redemption.[2] It is also remarkable that Syriac women will vow an unborn child to a Muhammadan saint at his shrine, yet 'in that case the child is not slain, as may once have been the case, but is redeemed' by an offering.[3] In Muhammadan custom the victim—a ram or goat sacrificed soon after the birth of a child—is called a ransom for the child.[4] Reference may also be made to the May ritual described by Ovid, in which the house-father threw black beans over his shoulder to the ghosts, with the words nine times repeated, 'With these beans I redeem me and mine.'[5] The custom of redemption, if it was actually redemption from sacrifice as illustrated in the story of Isaac, has parallels in ethnic myth and practice in which an animal takes the place of an earlier human victim, not necessarily a first-born. At the temple of Artemis Triclaria it had formerly been the custom to offer a beautiful youth and maiden, but in the time of Pausanias this sacrifice was commuted. Pausanias also mentions the offering of a goat to Dionysus at Potniæ in place of an earlier youth.[6] At Laodicea the annual stag sacrifice was believed to take the place of a former offering of a maiden.[7] In Babylonia the rite in which an animal was slain for a sick man—its life for his life, its head, neck, breast for his head, neck, breast—suggests some species of commutation or substitution.[8] When human sacrifices were prohibited among the Celts of Gaul, the Druids offered a victim symbolically, pretending to strike him, and drawing from him a little blood.[9] In many quarters other commutations of human sacrifice occur, often with legends attached to them showing that they originated in more humane feelings. Frequently effigies of human beings are offered, as among the Villalis, Gonds, Chinese, Japanese, and Romans; or a coco-nut is offered because of its resemblance to a human head;[10] or, again, an animal victim takes the place of a human, when people cannot afford the latter, as among the Tshis.[11]

These correspond to commutations of animal sacrifices, or in general to the offering of a less for a more important object. For, as Servius says,

'The simulacrum is accepted in place of the real object; hence when certain animals, difficult to obtain, are demanded in sacrifice, images of them are made of bread or wax, and are received in their stead.'[12]

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the notes.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

[1] Miriam and Aaron were probably children by a previous marriage: see Driver's note to Ex 2[2].
[2] See *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 176.
[3] *EB* ii. 1596.
[4] W. R. Smith[2], p. 465.
[5] *EB* i. 1913.
[6] W. R. Smith[2], p. 465.
[7] *Prolegomena zur Gesch. Israels*[3], Berlin, 1886, p. 90.

[1] *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, p. 179 ff.
[2] MacCulloch, *CF*, p. 410 f.
[3] S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, London 1902, pp. 157, 167.
[4] E. W. Lane, *Arabian Society in the Middle Ages*, London, 1883, p. 191; and see *ERE* ii. 660[a].
[5] *Fasti*, v. 431 ff.
[6] Paus. ix. viii. 1.
[7] Porphyry, *de Abst.* ii. 56.
[8] P. Dhorme, *La Religion assyro-babylonienne*, Paris, 1910, p. 273; cf. Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 162, where Crane gives a young sow to the Striges in place of the new-born infant, with the words, 'Take, I pray thee, heart for heart, and vitals for vitals; we give you this life instead of a better one.'
[9] Pomp. Mela, iii. ii. 18.
[10] N. B. Dennys, *Folklore of China*, London, 1876, p. 138; W. Crooke, *PR* ii. 106.
[11] A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of W. Africa*, London, 1887, p. 36.
[12] *ad Æn.* ii. 116.

REDEMPTORISM.—See LIGUORI.

RED INDIANS.—See AMERICA.

REFORMATION.—The great upheaval which we call the Reformation was very much more than a religious rising of Teutonic Europe in the 16th century. We can trace its origin to the beginnings of monasticism and Northern Christianity, and watch the gathering of the storm all down the Middle Ages. The acute religious conflict lasted all through the 17th cent., and is separated by no sharp break from its secular consequence and counterpart, the great Liberal movement which began with the English Commonwealth and the American Revolution, and now seems passing into social reconstruction. The issues of the Reformation have broadened out, but in altered forms they are the living issues of our own day, for they raise the permanent questions of the society and the individual, authority and reason, slavery and freedom, religious, intellectual, political, and social. Nor was the Reformation purely Teutonic in its origin, though it has maintained itself chiefly among Teutonic peoples. Latins and Slavs were as restive as Teutons under the yoke of Rome. Even now Protestantism can claim Slavs on the shores of the Baltic; and in France it has always been strongest in the Latin south. Least of all was it a purely religious movement. It was the issue of a vast complex of forces, intellectual, political, and social as well as religious, acting in different ways and with constantly varying intensity in different countries. In England and Sweden its course was guided by kings, in Germany by princes, in France, Bohemia, and Poland by nobles, in the German cities and Switzerland by burghers. Its first political tendency was in England to despotism, in Germany and France to civil strife, in the United Provinces to freedom. At Geneva it set up a theocratic republic, in Germany and England it gave the Church an Erastian form. Thus its first results were of bewildering diversity. 'The variations of Protestantism' were real, though the Romish argument founded on them is frivolous. A great revolution takes more than one generation to bring ideas and institutions into harmony. Its early leaders have to pick their way through many stumbles. They see its meaning dimly and in part, and often the boldest of them, like Luther after the Peasants' War, shrink from what they had thought they saw. So the Reformers carried over more mediæval ideas than they knew, and their successors have ever since been slowly and often reluctantly throwing them off. The greatness of the Reformation is less in what was actually done—though that was great—than in the still greater work which it made possible. Almost all the fruitful thoughts of Europe for the last four centuries, even in Roman Catholic countries, are direct or indirect results of the Reformation.

Our work is threefold: (1) we have first to trace the causes of the Reformation, giving a short view of earlier attempts at reform, and of the new conditions which made it possible in the 16th cent.; (2) we must then indicate the deeper principles of the Reformation, and say something of their practical tendency; (3) lastly, we must give a comparative view of the different forms which it assumed, and point out some of the causes and consequences of this variety. It is not our purpose to narrate events or to enumerate details which are better left to particular treatises. If our picture of the mediæval Church appears to some too darkly coloured, it must be remembered that a statement of grievances is not the whole truth, and is not here presented as the whole truth. On the other hand, the grievances were more real, more general, more scandalous, more integrally connected with the doctrine of the Church than its apologists are willing to admit, and often too outrageous and abominable to be more than hinted at in the more decent language of modern times. If the picture is dark, the background is darker still, for much of the worst must be left untold.

1. Causes of the Reformation. — The loose organization of the apostolic churches was shaped by the needs of the next generation into a uniform system of government by bishops, and this again was consolidated by the needs of the Christian Empire into a great confederation of churches which called itself the Holy Catholic Church, and claimed to be the sole dispenser of salvation. It was a grand system; but where was the layman? His royal priesthood was forgotten, and more and more his access to God was only through the ministrations of the Church.

Then came the monks. Their flight was from an evil world which a worldly Church had failed to overcome; but it was almost as much a flight from the Church itself. True, they were neither heretics nor schismatics, but the most zealous of churchmen, whose ascetic zeal put to shame the worldliness of the priests. Many a time the monks rushed in where bishops feared to tread. None the less, the principle of monasticism was ultimately subversive of the Church system. That principle was neither asceticism nor seclusion, for these were confessedly no more than means to an end. It was individualism. The man retired from the world, not only because the world was wicked, but also because the Church in the world could not give him what he wanted. 'Doubt makes the monk' was a German proverb. What he wanted was to save his soul, and to save it in his own way, because he had not found the priest's way satisfactory. Therefore he sought out for himself a monastery of like-minded men, and in its rule he found his freedom. However the priest might magnify his office, there must be a direct access to God without him. Else how could hermits be saints? Yet neither was the monastery essential, whatever help and comfort his fellows might give him (for in the Eternal's presence he must stand alone), nor was the asceticism essential; it was only the belief of the time, and might be abandoned if he ceased to find it the more excellent way. But, though priests and monks were often at variance, they never clearly saw that their conceptions of religion were radically different. The Church made peace by taking the monasteries into the system, and allowing them services of their own which did not require the administration of sacraments. But the two antagonistic principles were held together chiefly by the common belief of churchmen that asceticism is the higher life. If ever that belief came to be discredited, the individualism would not fail to seek expression outside the Church system. It is not accidental that so many of the Reformers, from Luther and Bucer downwards, had once been monks or friars.

Then came the conversion of the Northern peoples. They were docile enough on doctrine, whatever their practice might be, and showed no taste for heresy. They accepted the Church system as it came to them, and even helped a little to develop it, for they took very kindly to lurid stories of hell-fire, and thought it only natural to pay for their sins as they paid for their crimes. No doubt God would accept a *wergild*. Nevertheless, the fact remained that the system was not simply Christian, but Latin and sectarian,

shaped by Latin hands and saturated by Latin thought. The Northern peoples were as yet no more than children in the faith; but, when they grew to man's estate, they were not unlikely to throw off the Latin tutelage and shape their religion into Northern forms, perhaps equally sectarian.

The next great step was the Hildebrandine reformation and the rise of the mediæval papacy. If the pope could bring some order into the anarchy of feudalism and the scandalous confusion of the Church, he was welcome to set St. Peter's chair above the thrones of kings. The opposition of the emperors was not a Teutonic revolt: the Saxons always held with the pope. The imperialist literature of Germany and Italy, joined for a moment by Gerard of York in England, only disputed some of the papal claims, and scarcely touched the doctrine and system of the Church. Its power was finally broken by the fall of the Hohenstaufens, and its echoes died away with the Schoolmen of Ludwig IV. The last imperial coronation at Rome was performed in peace (1452), because Frederick III. was not worth a scuffle in the streets.

But long before that time the Hildebrandine dream of a righteous papacy governing the wicked world had faded into the light of common day. The higher the pope's power rose, the more his kingdom became a worldly kingdom, seeking worldly ends by worldly means. It was indeed a mighty world-power, with its thousands of priests in the parishes and chantries; with its armies of monks, Benedictine, Cluniac, Cistercian, recalling three great religious revivals; with its troops of friars prowling round the land; not to mention the vast numbers of dependents of the Church. Not half the inmates of a monastery were monks. It was a vast and ancient system, resting upon the twin strongholds of transubstantiation, which gave the priest a more than royal dignity, and auricular confession, which laid open to him every secret of private life, and above all upon the ancient horror of heresy. All sins might be forgiven, but the sin of heresy could not be forgiven, because it denied the only power which had authority on earth to forgive sins.

But the Church was full of scandals, moral, financial, and political; and these were the grievances which in the end compelled some to face the risk of heresy by questioning its doctrines. In the first place, the Hildebrandine reformation had failed to cleanse the Church. If celibacy was supposed to lift the priest above the mire of the world, auricular confession plunged him back into it, for the priest's ear became the sink of the parish. And the celibacy itself was full of dangers, on which we must not enlarge, for the grossness of the Middle Ages cannot be told in decent language. Suffice it that in practice the vow of 'chastity' commonly abolished nothing of marriage but God's holy ordinance. Many priests kept it faithfully, though often at the cost of struggles which hardened and demoralized them in other ways; but, unless all the evidence is false, a much larger number had *focariæ*, or did worse, and many of these were compelled by their flocks in their own interests to keep *focariæ*. Other temptations of a lonely priest settled among the rustics are obvious, and gave plenty of scandal to his neighbours.

Yet, after all, more offence was caused by the worldliness of the many than by the flagrant vice of not a few. The wealth of the Church was enormous. In Sweden it held two-thirds of the land, and perhaps one-third or two-fifths in England, where the accumulation had been checked by the Statute of Mortmain (1279). If the bishops were generally modest in Italy, they were great lords in England, where the primate stood next to the sovereign, and the bishop of Durham ruled the Scottish border almost as a king. Still more magnificent was their state in Germany and Hungary. Men said that the donkeys and the women in the host of Christian of Mainz were more in number than Barbarossa's army. But this vast wealth was very unequally distributed. There were a few favoured pluralists, whose wealth was the envy of the rest and a scandal to the laity. One of these might hold perhaps half-a-score of church preferments and leave their duties undone, or done after a fashion by cheap hirelings, while he spent his time in the service of pope or king, or intriguing at their courts for new and more lucrative appointments. In England the bishoprics were commonly the reward of success in the king's business, from Flambard and Thomas to Morton and Wolsey; and in Germany it was much the same in Franconian and Hohenstaufen times. In the later Middle Ages we see a class of pure aristocrats, such as Courtenay and Arundel, Beaufort and Neville in England; and in Germany this was the prevailing type. The three clerical electors at the time of the Reformation were all nobles—Albert of Brandenburg, Hermann of Wied, Richard of Greiffenklau. The aristocratic character of the German hierarchy was not a novelty of the Reformation.

But large numbers of the priests were needy. Their endowments may have been sufficient, and were in some cases ample. But a great deal was 'appropriated' by the monks. A monastery took the endowments of a parish, and was supposed to provide for the cure of souls, perhaps only by sending a monk to say mass on Sundays. The Lateran Council of 1179 ordered them to provide resident vicars, and earnest churchmen of the next century managed at last to enforce this. The monastery took the great tithes of corn, and left the small tithes to the vicar. Thus many rich livings were reduced by 'appropriations' to poor curacies, while many more were impoverished by pensions granted on them by the popes. And a needy man is apt to be rapacious and ignorant. There could not be much respect for a priest who was forced to wrangle over petty dues, and could hardly say his old *mumpsimus*. He had some excuse for ignorance, but sometimes it was very dense.[1] Nor were his administrations edifying, for they were all in Latin, except parts of the marriage service. The mass was said in a low voice, and the people were not supposed to follow the service but to occupy themselves with their private devotions, and there were primers for such as were able to read. If the canonized emperor Heinrich II. could make a fool of his unlearned chaplain by erasing from the mass-book the first syllables of the prayer 'pro (fa)mulis et (fa)mulabus tuis,' we may imagine what a rustic parish would do with Sir John Lacklatin or Sir John Mumblematins. We must go to Russia for a modern parallel to the mixture of superstitious dread of the priest's mysterious powers with good-natured contempt for his person.

The monasteries were in a similar state in the later Middle Ages. Some were rich, some very poor, many were burdened with debt, and all were impoverished by papal exactions. An abbot could scarcely get his election settled without spending perhaps two years' revenue on a journey to Rome, with fees and 'presents' to pope and cardinals. Besides this, the monasteries had outlived their

[1] There were priests in the diocese of Gloucester in 1551 who did not know who was the author of the Lord's Prayer, or where it was to be found.

usefulness. They spent little on the poor, and learning had found a more congenial home in the universities. The monks had long ceased to labour, and had become mere landlords. The houses had been half emptied by the Black Death, and had never recovered their numbers; some, indeed, were so decayed that they had to be suppressed for want of inmates. Pious founders had ceased to build new houses, and endowed colleges and chantries. Their moral condition was various. Some were well conducted, others as bad as bad could be, for here again the worst cases are sheltered by their very foulness. But the larger number were worldly rather than depraved, though they had more than occasional scandals. There was always an aristocratic flavour about the monasteries; and now the inmates of the richer houses lived very much as their neighbours did. They hunted and hawked, attended chapel by deputations in rotation, ate flesh, and were notorious lovers of good living. This was very far from the rigour of the monastic rule, and gave much occasion for blaspheming, but at all events it was not flagrant vice. The worst of the matter was not that flagrant vice was by no means rare, but that it was hardly ever seriously punished. The rule of the order was strict enough, but the abbot was often himself the worst offender in the way of evil living, embezzlement, and even murderous assault. The bishop was sometimes an offender likewise, often too busy with State affairs to look after his diocese; and the strongest and most earnest might well hesitate to take in hand a bad case, where he was likely to be met by a claim to exemption backed up with forged charters and entailing years of litigation at Rome, to be finally decided by bribery or by the fixed policy of the Church to smother scandals rather than amend them. At worst, a peccant priest might be removed to another parish, or an outrageous abbot induced to retire on a handsome pension.

The condition of the friars was very similar, but distinctly worse. Their beginnings were splendid, but within a century the tale was different. They evaded their corporate poverty by vesting the property of the order in trustees or the pope; and, when some of the Franciscans insisted that their poverty must be real, Pope John XXII. decided against them that Christ and His apostles had property, so that poverty is not necessary for the highest Christian life. This decision stultified the whole system of mendicancy, so that henceforth, while some of the most earnest seekers after God still became friars, others formed simpler societies of their own, and others again turned to mysticism or heresy. Meanwhile, the ordinary friar was little better than a vulgar mountebank, puffing his pardons and relics as impudently as any other quack of the market-place. Of all the churchmen the friar was the least respected.

Besides vice and worldliness, there was a third great scandal in the divisions of the Church. True, the Latins never sank into Irish anarchy, where a bishop would wander about the country living on his ordination fees, and a whole monastery would turn out, monks, servants, women, and all, for a pitched battle with the next house of holy men. But the quarrels were continual and bitter. Bishops and chapters wrangled and litigated for years together. Seculars and regulars had a standing feud, and the friars were a plague to both. If a parish priest refused absolution to some offender, the next friar was likely to sell it with pleasure. But the most repulsive quarrel of all was round a rich man's deathbed. If masses profited in purgatory, how could he better dispose of his worldly goods than in having masses said for his soul? And they were all eager in the work of charity. So the quiet of the chamber of death was continually disturbed by an unseemly quarrel of rival orders, each struggling to get the dying man into its own habit as the one sure passport to heaven. The wicked world looked on with wonder and disgust.

The economic evils of the Church system were neither few nor trifling. The Church was a corporation which constantly acquired property and never lost it, except by fraudulent dilapidation and waste, so that in most countries it secured the larger part of the national wealth; and this was in itself an evil of the first magnitude. If the monks were easier landlords than the lay impropriators who followed them, their lands were not so well cultivated. Then the number of the clergy was excessive. The parish priests alone may have been half as many as we have now for a much larger population; and to these we must add the chantry priests, the monks, the friars, the nuns, and the minor orders. It is true that they were not all withdrawn from the common work of life. In the 13th cent. they were still the literary men, the founders of schools, the writers of chronicles, and the teachers of agriculture; but now they had little to show but troops of lawyers. The charge that they were nothing but a burden on the land was too sweeping, but a burden they were, and a heavy burden. They did a good deal of trading too, partly in spiritual wares like relics, pardons, and masses for the dead, partly in worldly things in which they were forbidden to trade. Indeed, it was not good that the parish priest should be a money-lender or a tavern-keeper, as the bishops complain that he not uncommonly was. Another great economic evil arose from the teaching that good works are an expiation (in practice often a payment) for sins, for it made charity more indiscriminate than it might otherwise have been. The good work rested to the credit of the giver, and the unworthiness of the receiver was not his business. The type of this kind of charity is a Spanish archbishop of a couple of hundred years ago, who spent a princely revenue in daily doles to an army of beggars at his gate. Mediæval charity was not all of this sort, but a good deal of it was, so that the relief of distress was more or less balanced by a vast encouragement of idleness and imposture, especially when the great age of beggars began in the 15th century. Even more keenly felt than this was the similar working of Church festivals, which had been multiplied beyond all reason, and made a large part of the year useless for trade or agriculture, for no work was allowed on the day itself or after the noon of the day before it. Idleness was compulsory, but not soberness, for no occupation was provided beyond the morning mass. To the abundance of holy days we may partly ascribe the marked taste of the later Middle Ages for shows, pageants, miracle-plays, and the like. But there were worse things than these. Besides encouraging drinking, revelling, quarrelling, and vice of every sort, these festivals, frequent and irregular, were a formidable hindrance to habits of steady work. They not only made serious gaps in the work, but demoralized what remained of it. The grievance was serious in the 13th cent., and was made more urgent by the growth of trade and the exhaustion of the land in the 15th. How far the holy days were observed it is not easy to say; but these were the commands of the Church, and there are complaints enough to show that they were enforced.

Before we come to the political grievances, we must note that the fundamental error of the Latin Church was the twofold error of the Pharisees. It mistook the gospel for a law, and again mistook the office of law. In fact, our Lord lays down

principles, not laws, telling us always the spirit in which we ought to do things, never the things we ought to do, except the two sacraments. He seems to care absolutely nothing for good or bad actions, except as the signs of a good or bad heart. A good deal of manipulation was needed to turn the law of liberty into a law of commands like the Mosaic. Further, it is not the office of law to teach right and wrong generally—only to put certain right and wrong actions in black and white, so that the criminal offends wittingly, and his condemnation is just. This tendency to make the gospel a code of law worked mischief in two opposite directions. The natural man is always glad to compound for the weightier matters of judgment and mercy by obedience to works of law; and even the better sort of monk was likely to be very well pleased with himself when he could say, 'All these have I kept from my youth up.' On the other hand, if a code of law contains all that God commands, it cannot contain all that is well-pleasing to Him. Common people might be content with doing what God commands, but the higher life consisted in doing more, and thereby earning merit, which would be available for self and others. And these works of supererogation—these *consilia evangelica*—were reached by generalizing words referring to particular individuals or classes of men. Thus the command to the rich young man must be a counsel for all; and, if those who are able to receive it are blessed, they must be better than those who are not called to receive it. The result of all this was a double standard which misdirected the saints to a false ideal, debased the sinners with a low ideal, and turned both away from the vital question, 'What lack I yet?'

This conception of the gospel as a law necessarily implied a concrete and visible Holy Catholic Church confronting the world with a law of its own, which it had a divine right to enforce on all men without regard to the secular power, or, if necessary, in defiance of the secular power. That law was professedly spiritual; but the Church drew the limits of the spiritual, and drew them wide. Most things, indeed, have a spiritual side, so that there were few on which the Church had nothing to say. The protection of the Church covered all priests and men of religion, minor orders, and the hosts of dependents of the churches, and beyond these the weaker classes of the laity and those specially attached to the Church—the widow and the poor, the leper and the sanctuary man, the crusader, the pilgrim, and the palmer. The jurisdiction of the Church covered not only ordinary spiritual matters but the special cases of heresy and witchcraft, and things of a more secular nature like usury and marriage, and some purely secular things like wills. In addition to this, the Church claimed that its bishops must be independent, and not appointed by the kings. The Hildebrandine popes claimed for them freedom from their feudal duties, and Boniface VIII. forbade them to pay subsidies; but these attempts were failures. The Church also constantly interfered in matters of high policy, forbidding wars, reconciling wars, and not uncommonly stirring them up. If a king was disobedient, he must be rebuked, or in graver cases interdicted or excommunicated, and even deposed, and his kingdom given to another. The law of the Church was canon law, consisting of decisions of certain councils collected in the *Decretum* of Gratian, with additional decrees of successive popes, especially Gregory IX. and John XXII. It was a milder system than the civil law, so that many were anxious to claim its protection; but it was generally unpopular as being foreign, expensive, and dilatory. Henry VIII.'s six years' divorce case is no extreme sample of its delays. Obstinacy was visited with excommunication, which in its milder forms made the offender a leper to his friends and cut him off from the Church, outside which there was no salvation. In graver cases the secular power was called on to imprison him indefinitely, or, if a heretic, to burn him; and the form of excommunication was an elaborate curse by all the saints on every act of his life. 'As these candles stink on earth, so may his soul stink in hell.'

Some of the things which seem to us encroachments on the secular power were very rightly undertaken by the Church in times when the secular power was weak. Wills, *e.g.*, almost necessarily came to the clerics when so few laymen could even read them. Marriage also needed some regulation in those gross and disorderly times, and the usurer was so unpopular that there could be no objection to any one who undertook to punish him. But on the whole the Church fulfilled its trust badly, even in the judgment of its friends. Its methods, to begin with, of anonymous accusation, concealment of charges, inquisitorial questioning, torture on suspicion, and indefinite imprisonment, were a terror to the innocent. The soundest Catholic ran a risk of the fire if somebody reported that he had eaten meat in Lent. Then the jurisdiction of the Church sheltered criminals wholesale. The criminous clerk must be judged by the spiritual court, which could not shed blood, and therefore had to remit an offender to the secular power when it wanted a heretic burned. Sanctuary also was a crying scandal, for it depended on the holiness of the place, so that it sheltered all comers without distinction, and did not even prevent them from issuing forth from sanctuary to commit new crimes. Holy places have always been chief haunts of unholy men, from the times of Diana of Ephesus to those of Our Lady of Mariazell or Loreto. So great were the disorders that strong kings like Henry VII. put down some of the worst abuses before the Reformation. Nor was the Church more successful in dealing with other matters. Marriage, *e.g.*, was vainly consecrated by declaring it a sacrament, and effectually degraded by forbidding it to the clergy. In theory it was indissoluble, even for adultery; in practice it was continually annulled. So many and so various were the canonical impediments that no marriage was secure if any one had an interest in getting it dissolved—and could pay the fees. If other excuses failed, some forbidden relation could almost always be found within the seventh degree of kindred, affinity, or gossipred. All Henry VIII.'s marriages were faulty in canon law, except perhaps the last. But one mischief was mitigated by another. The Church sold dispensations for marriages forbidden by canon law, and supposed to be forbidden by the law of God. The case of Catharine of Aragon was not exceptional. This was one of the most lucrative of all the abuses of the Church, and one of those most deeply resented. Wills were in a similar state. The Church lawyers piled up mortuaries, probate fees, and other exactions till they set both rich and poor against them. Witchcraft was not a grievance, for all were agreed that dealings with the devil were the very worst of sins; but all that was called heresy was not equally heinous to the lay mind. If a man denied the faith, by all means let him be burned; and, if he disobeyed the Church, he might have punishment in due measure; but the Church had got into such a panic that it suspected heresy in every trifle, and brought the soundest Catholic into danger of savage persecution.

The majestic theory of the Catholic Church was

gathered round the pope. The vicar of Christ was supposed to be a father in God, guiding all the churches—all alike his children—in the way of righteousness and mercy; and for this purpose divine authority was given him to restrain the wickedness of kings, to smite the evil-doers of the earth, and to bring every soul into subjection to the apostolic see. Such was the dream of Gregory VII.; and it was at least a noble dream. But a dream it was; the facts were squalid. In the first place, given mediæval conditions of travel, St. Peter himself could not have guided all the churches from Rome or Avignon. No human genius was equal to this colossal task, especially when the righteous guidance had to be enforced by continual interference with almost every act of government. However well-disposed the pope might be, he was too far off, too ignorant of foreign peoples and their ways of thinking, and too dependent on the reports of interested advisers to govern wisely. Sometimes he did good service, as when the legates of Honorius III. helped William the Marshal to restore order in England, or when 15th cent. popes organized wars against the Turks, though their crusades were more often mischievous, like the Albigensian and the Hussite, and still more often they were pure and simple pretexts for exacting money. But the Latin Church of the Middle Ages was not organized with modern efficiency. To put it broadly, the pope can scarcely be said to have governed at all; he could not do much more than meddle, and seemed to meddle chiefly for the sake of filthy lucre. Four conflicting policies — of witnessing to the world, ruling the world, renouncing the world, and making gain of the world—could lead to nothing but confusion. The scandals and disorders caused by his interference were multitudinous and flagrant, notorious and in their own time undisputed. The nine cardinals who reported to Paul III. in 1537 were in entire agreement as to facts with the most violent of the Reformers. Their very first demand was that law should be observed as far as possible, and some limit put to the sale of exemptions, dispensations, and such-like breaches of law. In fact, the whole system was very much a system of extortion. Peter's pence dated early; and by the end of the 12th cent. papal taxation was enormously extended. There were heavy fees for almost every business in which the pope could interfere. Among the most offensive abuses were provisions, or papal nomination to preferments, often not yet vacant; reservations, by which the pope reserved to himself the right to fill such preferments or to grant pensions out of them; and annates, or firstfruits, invented by John XXII., or payment to the pope of the first year's revenue by every one receiving preferment. Provisions were politically important. It was an old custom in the 7th cent. that, if a bishop died at Rome, a successor was sent from Rome for the comfort of his flock. So, when Wighard died at Rome, Pope Vitalian sent Theodore of Tarsus to Canterbury. In later times this casual right was enormously extended. Not only bishoprics but other preferments were 'reserved' by the popes for nominees of their own, without regard to the rights of kings or other patrons; and papal nominees were commonly Italians, or French in the Avignon times. This system of reservations at last covered almost every preferment, and the strongest kings could scarcely resist it. Thus Nicolas III. refused Edward I.'s request for Burnell, and nominated Peckham to Canterbury. In the next century it was limited in England by the statutes of *Provisors* and *Præmunire*, and in France later by the Concordat of Bourges (1438). But the popes did not consider themselves bound by statutes, or even by their own concordats, and the kings often had reasons of their own for conniving at papal encroachments.

In truth, the popes had put themselves in a false position, above the laws of God and man. The Renaissance popes broke solemn treaties and plotted assassinations at their convenience, and knew that they could do so with impunity. When they found resistance in the growing strength of nations, their foreign policy shrank back on Italy, and centred on the acquisition, by fair means or by foul, of territories for their nephews, so that each new pope had to begin the work afresh for a new set of nephews. Similarly their domestic policy was to turn everything into a source of revenue. Everything was on sale at Rome, from bishoprics and divorces downward. Jubilees were proclaimed; privileges, pardons, and the virtues of relics were sold wholesale all over Europe; and even the indulgences — the theory invented for them was purely academic—were no more than the latest development of a practical system of licences for every sin but heresy. 'God willeth not the death of a sinner, but rather that he should pay, and live.' Vanity Fair is the Rome of the Renaissance, drawn by an enemy, but drawn to the life, and in no way overdrawn.

Nor did the popes generally command personal respect. Some, indeed, were worthy men, and liberal patrons of learning and art, like Nicolas V. and Pius II. when he had put away the sins of his youth; but they were generally worldly, and in the Renaissance period they were mostly scandalous. What else was to be expected in a city where the harlots walked at noonday with a train of senators and clergy? We need not believe all the charges against John XXIII.; perhaps the Council of Constance did substantial justice when it suppressed the worst of them for decency's sake, and condemned him on the rest. Other condottieri may have been as bad, but they had not strayed into St. Peter's chair. So, too, some of the worst of the crimes ascribed to Alexander VI. seem to be society gossip; but the fact remains that he was a very bad man, and that the cardinals who chose him cannot have been much better. Such was the school from which the popes of the Renaissance came; and most of them worthily represented it.

At the end of the Middle Ages there was no dispute about the condition of the Church. From the bulls of the popes and the registers of the bishops to the allusions of the chroniclers and the lampoons of the profane, all the evidence of the time tells the same story of deep corruption without a hope of mending it. Two methods were imaginable. 'Heretics' might overthrow the Church system and replace it by something better; or reformers from within might clear away scandals and abuses. Both plans had been tried, and tried in vain. We need not ask whether the 'heretics' had anything better to offer, for they utterly failed to overthrow the Church system, or even to influence it—except in the reverse way, for terror of heresy hardened the Church to a savage cruelty which in the end turned every feeling of humanity against the persecutors. In fact, the 'heresies' bear the mark of reaction, and, like other reactions, the Reformation itself included, took over a good deal from the system that they were opposing. They all attacked the claims and the exactions of the priests, but each sect in its own way. The Cathari and Albigenses took over the asceticism of the time, but developed it in an anticlerical sense, and were therefore called Manichæans. The Poor Men of Lyons belonged to the same movement as the friars, and were preachers like the Dominicans, but soon showed a taste for Scripture which the Church could not tolerate. Most of the sects held that the unworthiness of the minister

invalidated his services, and the later 'heretics' had a new grievance in the refusal of the Cup to the laity. By far the deepest thinker among them was Wyclif, who not only started Lollardy in England, but gave the tone to 'heresy' in Bohemia, for Hus did little more than copy him. Wyclif began as a political controversialist, and gradually became a religious reformer of the boldest sort. His denunciations of the friars, and even of the pope, were only what many were thinking; and even his crowning enormity of denying transubstantiation as a philosophical absurdity — substance without accidents, and accidents without substance—was not the most formidable blow that he aimed at the Church. His translation of the Bible and the mission of Poor Priests to preach it made the complete suppression of the Lollards impossible. They appealed to the same religious instinct as the early friars, but turned it against the Church. But Wyclif's doctrines of 'dominion founded on grace' and 'no mesne lords in the kingdom of God' were a deadly offence, not only to the Church, but to the ruling class of nobles and landowners. Wyclif himself was not implicated in the Peasants' Rising of 1381, but some of his followers were in sympathy with the social unrest of the time. So the governing classes who urged Henry IV. to spoil the Church, as Henry VIII. spoiled it, were yet heartily agreed with the Church to put down heretics who were also social disturbers. So the House of Lancaster came in pledged to destroy heresy; and, if Henry IV. was not over-zealous in the cause, Henry V. was more active, and the gentleness of Henry VI. gave no relief to the Lollards. Still a remnant survived, a simple-minded, yea, forsooth, Puritanical folk, treasuring stray leaves of the forbidden Bible, and meeting secretly in the woods or the slums, till they were merged in the Reformation. There was more trouble in Bohemia. Crusade after crusade was preached against the Hussites, and each failed more disastrously than the last, till Frederick of Hohenzollern persuaded the Council of Basel to divide the heretics by conceding the Cup. They turned against each other; and after the victory of the moderates at Lepan (1484) Bohemia ceased to be the terror of Europe, though it did not cease to be troubled with heresy till it was brought fully under the yoke of the Hapsburgs and the Jesuits after the battle of the White Mountain in 1620. The German Peasants' War came in 1522, and was more barbarously suppressed than the English; but, instead of serfdom quietly dying out afterwards, it lasted till Napoleonic times, and in Mecklenburg till 1831. Its religious bearing was partly the same, for the Romanists of course laid the blame of social unrest on the disturbers of religion. But social movements had few supporters but extreme men and Anabaptists. Luther attacked them with unmeasured violence, and the Church in Lutheran States was even more closely allied to the governing classes than in England.

Reform from within was an equal failure. The efforts of individuals, and even of popes, were always defeated by the classes who had an interest in abuses. The successive monastic revivals had only partial and transitory effects, and even these had ceased to be possible since the decay of the friars. But could not the 'reform in head and members' be effected by the united wisdom of the bishops? The idea was in the air. Philip the Fair had appealed (perhaps not very seriously) from Boniface VIII. to a General Council, and in 1414, when two popes, and latterly three, had been dividing the allegiance of Christendom and cursing each other ever since 1378, a General Council met at Constance. When it had deposed John XXIII., it was faced by the question, 'Reform first, or unity?' It decided for unity, and allowed Martin V. to be elected. The mistake was fatal. The Council could deal with a scandalous pope, but a decent pope could deal with the Council. Reform was now impossible. Martin had only to make a few vague promises in separate concordats, contemptuously rejected by France and England. The Council of Basel (1431) took a bolder course. It made reforms, like the abolition of annates, and set the pope at defiance. But in the end Eugenius IV. was too strong for them, and the Council of Basel failed as completely as that of Constance. Men were inclined to think that, if the pope's rule was bad, the rule of the bishops was likely to be worse. After all, the Councils were too orthodox to touch the worst difficulty—that the abuses were not simply sins of individuals or miscarriages of administration, but logical, natural, and necessary results of the teaching of the Church. Only a reform of doctrine could reach the root of the matter; and that was the last thing that the bishops desired. They burned Hus in defiance of the emperor's safe-conduct, and made religious wars internecine by declaring that no faith was to be kept with heretics. The Council of Basel was forced by the exterminating Hussite wars to negotiate with the heretics; but it was as resolute as ever to allow no reform of doctrine. Therefore it failed, and with it vanished the last hope of real reform by a General Council. So by the end of the 15th cent. all were agreed that a drastic reform was urgently needed, but none could see how it might be made.

Something, however, had been done. In most countries particular abuses had been put down or limited by the civil power; and in Spain a real reformation—of a sort—had been carried out under Queen Isabella's guidance by Cardinal Ximenes, armed with the special powers conferred on the Spanish sovereigns by the bull of 1482. Ximenes aimed at the restoration of discipline, the removal of abuses, the encouragement of learning in the service of the Church, and the merciless extirpation of heresy. He succeeded in all—witness the Spain of the 17th century.

The dilemma was only too plain. The heretics wanted drastic changes, but could do nothing; the bishops would have no reform of doctrine, and could not carry even administrative changes against the pope's opposition. Had this been all, reform might never have got beyond epigrams in Italy and growlings in Transalpine lands. The forces which made the Reformation possible were growths of the later Middle Ages. First came the rise of nations. The tribal kingdoms of the early Middle Ages and the local feudalism which followed them might well be crowned with a Holy Roman Empire and a Holy Catholic Church. But first the Crusades, then the decay of feudalism, then the growth of commerce and general intercourse, had called forth a new sense of national unity, represented in France, in England, and latterly in Spain, by national kings who could rely on the support of national assemblies for the assertion of national rights, and not wanting where the kings were weaker or absent, as in Italy, Germany, and Scotland. The growth of nations in the 13th cent. may be measured by the failure of Boniface VIII. against Edward I. and Philip the Fair. The popes themselves weakened the imperial ideal by their contests with the emperors, the Catholic ideal by their astute negotiations with separate nations; and, now that the right divine of fallen emperors had come down to kings of nations, it was becoming possible to believe that the rights of the Catholic Church might be exercised by particular or national churches acting on their own discretion.

The intellectual position of the Church was not improved by the efforts of the Schoolmen to defend by reason a system based on an agnostic denial of the competence of reason in matters of religion. Thomas Aquinas got over the difficulty by sharply separating the kingdom of grace from the kingdom of nature, so that the two could have no contact. But this could not stand the subtle scepticism of Duns Scotus, and the decline of Scholasticism was marked by the Ass of Buridan and other barren logomachy. It gave, however, an impetus to study; and the first discovery was that the papal claims which appealed to the False Decretals and the Donation of Constantine were based on shameless forgeries. Then came the New Learning. We see first an age of enthusiastic collectors—none more zealous than Pope Nicolas V. Then came an age of Christian Platonism, in Italy, often passing into frank paganism. If Greece was risen from the dead, it was not yet with the NT in her hand. Some, indeed, of the scholars would as soon have worshipped Zeus as read the 'bad Greek' of the Gospels. In truth, the Renaissance was terribly wanting in moral earnestness till it reached more serious peoples across the Alps. German mysticism was a sign of discontent with Latin thought; and the New Learning found an eager welcome in new universities like Erfurt and Heidelberg. England was a little behind; but in 1498 Colet was lecturing on St. Paul's Epistles; and it was Colet more than any one who diverted Erasmus from the exclusive study of the classics to the NT and the Fathers. Erasmus' edition of the Greek Testament in 1516 marks an epoch; and the invention of printing gave it a currency which earlier translations could never have attained. Popes like Nicolas V. and Pius II. encouraged the New Learning; Julius II. was a liberal patron of its art; and Leo X. was its worthy representative. Yet it was fraught with danger to the Church system. It revealed a world which was not Latin; and the romance of the Crusades paled before that of the old world of Greece. For a thousand years Europe had been moving in the Latin orbit; now it broke loose like a comet deflected by some great planet into a new path. The old Latin thoughts and ideals were compared with the older thoughts and ideals of Greece, and found wanting. And the Greek thoughts were not simply other than the Latin, but directly contrary to them. The spirit of the Greek philosophy—the love of truth for its own sake—was utterly foreign to a Church which had no conception of truth but as a tradition of the Church or a form of justice to our neighbours, and therefore set no value on truth of thought. The moral contrast was as great as the intellectual. The text of the Latin Church was 'De contemptu mundi,' and the sermon was more often 'Dies irae' than 'Jerusalem the golden.' To the natural man the goodness of God is always too good to be true: 'I knew that thou wast a hard man.' So the same spirit of unbelief which turned the gospel of free forgiveness into a slavery of good works also refused the goodness of God in the common joys of life. When the saint renounced the gifts of God as he renounced the works of the devil, he fixed on them a brand of sin which no formal teaching could remove. They were tainted even for common men, as inconsistent with serious holiness. To men who had grown up in the Latin gloom the old Greek joy of life and sense of order and beauty in the world came like a burst of sunlight, like a message of goodness from the realm of truth. It might be that God 'giveth to all men freely, and upbraideth not.' Nor did the message of the Renaissance come alone. Feudalism was society organized for war; and, when quieter times followed its decay, there was more room for domestic life, for commerce, for learning, and for worldly interests in general. Then came the question whether the world was really as bad as the Church made out. The friars had shown that the higher life could be lived among the people; the Church itself had declared that poverty is not essential; and it only remained for the Reformers to renounce the asceticism and strive to live as children of God in a world which after all is God's world, and not the devil's. And this brings us once again to the individualism of the Reformation.

2. Principles of the Reformation.—It would be a mistake to find the principles of the Reformation in the rejection of the pope or of transubstantiation, or even in appeal from Church authority to Scripture. All these are only inferences; the principle behind them is that the knowledge of God is direct and personal. Any man may help us with example and spiritual counsel, and the priest may minister to us the services of the Church; but in the end we must know God for ourselves. But this principle may be embodied in many forms. Mysticism is almost independent of history, and not even specifically Christian. But movements are commonly shaped by historical circumstances, as monasticism by the asceticism of the Middle Ages, the Reformation by the reaction from it.

Individualism implies the duty of the individual to judge of spiritual truth; and the Reformers invited men to see for themselves the untruth of the Roman Church. But they did not see that the principle was equally valid against their own churches. They merely limited to nations the mediæval idea of a visible corporation with no dissent allowed. Hence in theory they were as intolerant as the Romanists, though their practice was commonly less ferocious. There was no real advance when Germany came to a deadlock in 1555, upon the principle, 'Cujus regio, ejus religio'; and a similar deadlock is marked in France by the Edict of Nantes in 1598. These were only political compromises which ended civil wars. The real struggle for toleration was decided for Germany in 1648 by the Peace of Westphalia, for England by the Act of 1689, for France only by the Edict of 1787.

But, if the individual is to judge, by what standard is he to judge? Scripture or tradition? If Scripture must be interpreted by tradition, it is resolved into isolated texts which mean whatever the Church may choose to say they mean, and the whole system rests on nothing more spiritual than an unreasoning assent to an unverified historical process. So the Reformers appealed to Scripture as a rational whole, to be interpreted by sound learning. In this appeal they are unanimous. Thus the Westminster Confession:

> 'The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from scripture: unto which nothing may be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men' (ch. i.).

Yet here, too, the Reformers hardly saw the depth of their own teaching. Calvin indeed, their one great systematic genius, expressly says that 'the word, *however conveyed to us*, is a mirror in which faith may behold God'; but that age could not see clearly that God speaks, not in Scripture only, but in nature, history, and life. Rome was right in looking to history for a revelation, but she merely interpreted Scripture by tradition, instead of seeing all history illuminated by the living Word of whom Scripture speaks. Moreover, the Reformers carried over from the Middle Ages the conception of revelation as a code of law. This blinded them to the progress of revelation, as if everything contained in Scripture were not only

divine, but equally divine. Luther indeed saw clearly that what speaks most of Christ is most divine, so that the Epistle of James is 'a right strawy Epistle' compared with that to the Galatians; and Calvin was too good a scholar to ignore the doubts about certain books of the NT. But to their successors inspiration became more and more mechanical, till Buxtorf took over from the rabbis the inerrancy of the text. The worst offenders were some of the English Puritans, who held that Scripture is a complete rule of conduct, so that no command is lawful without its express warrant. Hence the sarcasm, that the Holy Spirit had remembered the basons, and forgotten the archbishops; or, in more sober form, God is not the legislator of His Church, unless He has prescribed its government. This caused much straining of texts, and often led to great absurdities, as when the Puritans objected to square caps on round heads, and Laud replied by proving from Scripture that heads are square (Lv 19^{27} 'Ye shall not round the corners of your heads'). One of the worst mistakes was about Sunday. The Reformers saw that it was more than a feast of the Church like All Souls or Corpus Christi; yet neither Luther nor the English Reformers nor even Calvin identified it with the Sabbath. But the tendency to find in Scripture a code of law led naturally to the rigid Pharisaism of the Puritan Sabbath. The best excuse for it is the formal services and noisy games—themselves an inheritance from the Middle Ages—of an English Sunday under Elizabeth and the early Stuarts. It must be noted that, when the Puritans had not got scent of Antichrist, their scruples were commonly definite objections to definite things which in their times ministered to vice. In the stage, *e.g.*, there is a steep descent from Shakespeare to Massinger, and again from Massinger to Dryden and other foul creatures of the Restoration. So against bear-baiting they entered the same plea of humanity as we should. They had very little of the ascetic's vague dread of the pleasure generally, as though every creature of God were bad, and to be refused.

The appeal to Scripture had far-reaching consequences. Whatever was contrary to Scripture must be reformed; and in some cases omission is prohibition. Thus transubstantiation is sufficiently refuted by the single argument that it cannot be proved by Scripture, and the silence of Scripture about prayers for the dead is significant.

Sooner or later the Reformers always came to the conclusion that the first great practical evil was the authority of the pope. On this they were all agreed, though Melanchthon added to the Schmalkald Articles a note of his own, that, if the pope would allow the gospel to be preached, his authority might be accepted for the sake of peace and unity, but *humano jure* only. This, however, was an extreme concession which gave great offence, for the rest were much more disposed to call him Antichrist and the Man of Sin. We must note Melanchthon's condition—'if he will allow the gospel to be preached'—because it shows that the objection was at bottom practical. The papacy was contrary to Scripture, not simply because there were sundry texts against it, but chiefly because it was the centre of a system which had been shown by experience to make void the righteousness of God revealed in Scripture. Justification was by faith (which Luther defined as trust in God), and by faith only, whereas the whole system ruled by the pope was an elaborate scheme for setting up a righteousness of our own which was not of faith. The sacraments were not simply signs or means of grace, but channels which conveyed it. The Church gave spiritual life to the infant in baptism, nourished it with the Eucharist, consecrated it with matrimony or orders, renewed it in penance, and finally sealed it with extreme unction. And sacraments had their efficacy *ex opere operato*—from the due (*rite*) performance of the ceremonial with intention on the priest's part. They conveyed grace 'always and to all who do not put a bar in the way (non ponentibus obicem).' The Council of Trent nowhere expressly tells us what constituted a bar, though we may safely say that unconfessed mortal sin was a bar; but, if baptism conveys grace 'always and to all' infants 'who have no faith,' it is clear that want of faith is not a bar. The faith of the parents or of the Church is not the faith of the person concerned, and is therefore in this connexion irrelevant. Thus the whole sacramental system was involved in the primitive confusion of matter and spirit, magic and religion. Moreover, to put it in another way, the message of the gospel is one of free forgiveness—not that forgiveness will be given some day on conditions, but that in Christ it is already given to all that will by faith receive it. 'By grace ye are saved, through faith.' Faith—trust in God—is necessary for salvation, and sufficient for salvation. Works are the outward signs, but only the outward signs, of a good or a bad heart, and in and for themselves have no value before God. But the Church sought justification by works. Baptism indeed carried free forgiveness of past sins; but, if a man sinned after baptism, as he always did, he would have to earn forgiveness by good works and penances, and, if those were insufficient, he would have to pay the balance in purgatory, where accurate accounts were kept of sins and compensations for sins. But certain sins called mortal needed confession to a priest and absolution, if the sacraments necessary to salvation were not to be refused by the Church. Thus attention was concentrated on sins instead of sin, and on sins not as the signs of an evil heart—the particular answers that it gives to particular temptations—but as so many separate debts to God, which had to be paid or compounded for. Instead of repentance—the new heart—the Church required good works and penances. Penitentials—such and such penances for such and such sins, irrespective of motives and circumstances—date back early in the Middle Ages, and commutations became common after the rise of the papacy. A pilgrimage was meritorious, and a crusade atoned for all sins. The next step was that others might be paid to do the pilgrimage or to go on the crusade; and at last money was frankly accepted instead of good works. Further, a debt was cancelled in Roman law by payment, whoever paid it; so a vast system arose of vicarious satisfaction through the merits of the saints—a new application of the *communio sanctorum*. The climax of this was the traffic in indulgences (*q.v.*), which was the occasion for Luther's protest. The theory of these may be left to the canonists; in practice they were certainly understood by sellers and sinners alike as a public sale of licences for sins.

This is what made the Church system intolerable to so many persons of serious religion. Some, indeed, were content to pass lightly over its bad sides, many thought reform hopeless, a few took refuge in the detachment of mysticism; but many again were stirred to action. Their objection was not simply that the papal claims were unfounded, or that the Church was full of scandals, or that this or that doctrine was untrue, but that the system as a whole was a practical hindrance and not a help to devotion. Luther himself was a model of ascetic piety till he found in practice that, in St. Paul's words, it was of no value,

tending only to the full satisfaction of the carnal nature. And to this conclusion the more earnest Reformers always came. The Church stood not simply in error, but in deadly antagonism to the living power of Christ. It had returned to the principles of Pharisaism, and made the Saviour's work of none effect. 'If righteousness come by law, then Christ died in vain' (Gal 2^{21}).

3. **Outward forms of the Reformation.**—Form being superficial, classification by form is apt to be superficial too. Apparently similar principles may issue historically in different forms, while apparently similar forms may conceal different principles. But form is the outward and visible sign which the world understands, and it always expresses a principle, though not always the deepest, so that we shall find it convenient to use the familiar classification of the Reformed Churches as Lutheran, English, and Reformed, meaning by the last the Zwinglian and Calvinistic Churches of the Continent and Scotland. Only we must not take for granted that their deeper affinities are precisely what their outward forms may seem to indicate. Each of them in different ways came nearer than the others to Latin thought; and, if the Calvinists bore the brunt of battle with Rome, it does not follow that their deeper principles were more unlike the Latin. The importance of the English Church and the difference of its government require for it an independent place alongside of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. The doctrine, however, laid down especially in the Articles, is entirely that of the Reformed Churches, and was fully recognized as such on both sides, though predestination is taught in such general terms as do not exclude Arminianism. It is simply said that man 'is very far gone (quam longissime) from original righteousness,' and there is nothing about reprobation and irresistible grace. Thus it takes off the edges of the stricter Calvinistic doctrine. In addition to these three branches and their offshoots, we have the Arminian reaction from Calvinism, while Moravians and Quakers form an appendix of mysticism, and we cannot entirely ignore Socinians and Deists, though they pushed some principles of the Reformation into a denial of its fundamental doctrines.

On some great doctrines all the Reformed Churches were agreed; and these we shall review before we come to their differences. They were agreed that the revelation of salvation through Christ is contained in the Bible to the exclusion of tradition, and that the meaning of Scripture is determined by reason and scholarship, and not by any Church authority. Every Church must of necessity declare the terms of its own communion, but there is no infallible authority declaring truth. The chief exceptions are the Socinians, who limited the authoritative revelation to the NT, and the English Carolines, who spoke much of antiquity and general councils. In this, however, they had no intention of setting up tradition in the Romish way as a continuous inspiration which practically superseded Scripture; they were only giving to times of 'primitive purity' a weight which others thought excessive. The Reformed Churches were also agreed, except the outliers, in the full orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The only peculiarity is the Lutheran *Communicatio idiomatum.* Theories of a Real Presence consistent with a reception which is not '*only* after a heavenly and spiritual manner' have before them the difficulty that the divine element of Christ is not carnally pressed with the teeth, while the human is not present everywhere, and 'the flesh profiteth nothing.' Rome calls transubstantiation a mystery, and leaves it a contradiction of reason; but the Lutherans had to reconcile their consubstantiation with reason, and did it with their peculiar doctrine of the Incarnation, that the properties of the divine nature (ubiquity in particular) were communicated to the human. This is practically Monophysite, and carries the important consequence that the Body and Blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received, not only by the faithful, but by all who eat and drink in the Supper of the Lord. With this exception, they are generally agreed on the sacraments, accepting Baptism and the Lord's Supper, and denying the sacramental character of Confirmation, Orders, Matrimony, Penance, and Extreme Unction, though Penance has a somewhat ambiguous position with the Lutherans. They all have their solemn rites of marriage and ordination, and all endeavoured for a long time to keep up a disciplinary system of penance for gross scandals. But they entirely abolished extreme unction, and the confirmation of the Lutherans and the English has little more than the name in common with the Romish sacrament. The Calvinists have generally replaced it with some form of admission to full membership.

The Reformed Churches are further agreed that the work of Christ upon the Cross is complete and final, in the sense that there can be no more sacrifice for sin or priests to offer it, and also that no good works of ours can have merit or in any way contribute to salvation. Of the whole Church system there is nothing that they denounce more fiercely than the doctrine that the Mass is a true propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the living and the dead. Thus, when the Council of Trent anathematized those who called the sacrifice of the Mass blasphemous, the English Church replied in deliberate and direct defiance that such sacrifices 'were blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits.' With the sacrifice went the sacrificing priest. The minister of Christ was restored to his true dignity and office, to preach the Word and offer with his people the higher sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving—'with them,' not 'for them,' for all the Reformed Churches use the vulgar tongue, and invite the people to take their part in the services. And, if the work of Christ upon the Cross is complete, then, as the Augsburg Confession points out, nothing can be added to it by any good works of our own. All that we can do is to receive it and be thankful. In other words, justification is God's act for Christ's sake, and the faith by which alone we can receive it is its result and not its cause. And, if faith itself is not a merit which claims reward from God, still less are good works, which are no more than the natural expression of faith before men. Least of all is it possible to acquire merit by doing more than God commands. Any such teaching directly contradicts the plain words of Christ.

The most conspicuous cause of the differences among the Reformed Churches was the action of the secular power. That action was entirely favourable only in Scandinavia. The favour of the princes in N. Germany and of the cities in the south-west was partly balanced by the hostility of the emperor, and in England there were two reactions before the Reformation was settled by Elizabeth. The secular power was hostile in Scotland, France, the Netherlands, Bohemia, and Poland; and in Spain and Italy it suppressed the Reformation without much difficulty. For the other countries there were long struggles, but in the end the Reformation was finally defeated in France, Bohemia, and Poland; in the United Provinces and Scotland it prevailed. Where the princes favoured it, they commonly favoured it—and shaped it—for political ends; where they were

hostile, it took its own course. Thus England would certainly have declared for Puritanism if Elizabeth had not seen political advantage in a show of Lutheranism. Few, indeed, of the sovereigns had much personal zeal for the Reformation—Edward VI. of England and Christian III. of Denmark excepted. In England and Scandinavia the Reformation was substantially a revolt of the laity, headed by the king, against the overgrown wealth of the Church and the vexatious claims of the priests; and this could not be carried through without a great reform of doctrine, for the pope's authority barred the way, and could not be overthrown without laying the whole Church system in ruins. In England, at least in London and the eastern counties, there was a party for doctrinal reform under Henry VIII., and similarly in Denmark and Sweden; but in Norway, where the scandals were fewer, there was less discontent with the Church; and in Iceland the new faith had to be established by violence. The Reformation was a popular movement in Germany and the United Provinces, and also in Scotland, where the scandals of the Church were especially flagrant. In England and Scandinavia the victory was gradual. Though Mary Tudor had made Romanism impossible, England became definitely Protestant only in the course of Elizabeth's long reign, and the issue was not beyond a doubt till the deposition of James II. In Sweden the Augsburg Confession was not formally adopted till 1593; and even now the Church is 'Evangelical'; but the nation had become thoroughly Lutheran when Sigismund was deposed in 1599 for bringing in a Polish army to restore the old religion. The danger was like that which faced England in 1688, and it was dealt with by similar laws. All holders of office were to be Lutherans, and only a Lutheran was to have any claim to the crown, such claim being forfeited if he married a papist. The marriage of John III. with Catherine Sagello caused nearly the same evils as that of Charles I. with Henrietta Maria—a more or less Romanizing father and an avowed papist son, and a policy directly contrary to the best interests of the nation, a policy which nothing but a lawless despotism could have carried out.

Princes and nobles had long coveted the wealth of the Church; and under cover of the Reformation they were able to plunder it at leisure. The magnificence of the bishops might well have been cut down, though some of them, like Alcock and Merton in England, were princely benefactors; and men of serious religion were generally agreed that the wealth of the monasteries might be turned to better uses; but the actual plundering was shameless. Neither the suppression of religious houses, nor their suppression by the secular power, nor the use of their revenues for secular purposes, was a novelty of the Reformation. The pope himself abolished the Templars in 1312, and many houses came to an end or were amalgamated with others for want of inmates after the Black Death. In England the alien priories were granted to Henry V. in 1415, and their wealth was partly used for the French war, though some of it remained for Henry VI.'s foundations of Eton and King's College. In fact, it was the habit of founders like Alcock and Wolsey to secure the revenues of some decayed houses. The only novelty of the Reformation was the extent of the suppressions and the undisguised rapacity of princes and nobles.

In Germany the great sees were filled by nobles, and in the later Middle Ages became something like apanages of the princely houses; and such they remained till the general secularization of 1802. Thus the sees of Osnabrück and Minden were commonly held by younger sons of Brunswick and Brandenburg, and Köln itself was given to cadets of the Wittelsbachs from 1583 to 1761. But in the reformed states the sovereign rights of sees were abolished, and the titular bishops were laymen and lived as laymen. The case was similar with the monasteries. The Duke of York, son of George III., was bishop of Osnabrück from his infancy till 1802, the commentator Bengel was abbot of Alpirspach, and a sister of Frederick II. closed the long line of abbesses of Quedlinburg. In some cases, however, the bishops were abolished.

In Sweden Gustavus Vasa could plead dire necessity; and the Recess of Westerås (1527) placed in his hands the whole property of the Church. He took the castles of the bishops and some of their estates. The monasteries were partly taken by the king, partly granted to the nobles, and those founded since 1454 were resumed by the heirs of the founders. But there was no violence. Monks and nuns were free to stay or leave; and one or two houses struggled on till 1595. In Denmark the estates of the bishops were given to Christian III. in 1536, but the royal power was not strengthened as in Sweden and England. The gain fell to the nobles, as in Scotland.

In England the monasteries fell first. They were granted to the Crown, the smaller houses in 1536, the larger in 1539. Some of the property was used for six new bishoprics and other foundations, or for the defence of the realm; but the larger part was granted or sold on easy terms to men in favour at court. Thus a new nobility was formed, pledged to the new order of things. But the monasteries had appropriated the tithes of many parishes on condition of providing for the services; and this right and this obligation came to the new owners. So far then the parishes lost nothing; and, if the new impropriators were laymen who frankly treated the tithes and advowsons as private property, they did no more than the monks had done before them. It was the same with the chantries, which became meaningless when it was declared by the Ten Articles of 1536 that masses cannot deliver souls from purgatory, and were suppressed in 1547. The parishes, however, lost much by the suppression of pilgrimages, relics, and other lucrative superstitions; and the churches were sadly defaced, and sometimes brought into a ruinous condition by the rough removal, especially in 1559, of images, roods, and other monuments of superstition. The bishoprics fared worst of all. Under Somerset and Northumberland, and again under Elizabeth, every vacancy was an excuse for spoliation, and the new bishop was not admitted till he had given up manors, perhaps receiving a poor compensation for them. Most of Elizabeth's bishops died in debt to the Crown, and left their families destitute; and the process was stopped only by the Act of 1604, which disabled bishops from making such exchanges with the Crown. But the spoliation was not all the work of Protestants; something must be allowed for the systematic dilapidations of the Marian bishops before they were deprived in 1559. They left Salisbury, for instance, in a beggarly state. 'This Capon hath devoured all,' said Jewel.

Coming now to the differences of the Reformed Churches, we note first that, though Lutherans, English, and Calvinists were in general agreement on the three great doctrines of justification, predestination, and the supremacy of Scripture, yet each of them laid the stress differently from the others. The Lutherans made justification by faith the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiæ*, while the Calvinists gathered their conceptions of right

belief round predestination and election. The English Church made no such distinctive doctrine avowedly central, but the central place was practically held by the supremacy of Scripture. Now this means that Lutheranism was essentially conservative. It removed practical hindrances to true religion—and they were many—but had no special interest in further changes. Luther's was the genius of vivid insight, not of systematic thought, so that he changed only when and so far as he was obliged to change. The English Church was conservative too, but more logical and systematic; and by its emphatic disavowal of any reception in the Lord's Supper which is not 'only after an heavenly and spiritual manner' it was enabled to deal more boldly with the Mass and the ceremonies generally. Calvinism stands apart from the others, for the individualism which to them was fundamental was to the Calvinists only an inference from their really fundamental doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of God. On that doctrine their whole system was moulded, and everything that seemed to conflict with it was ruthlessly swept away. The older the error, the more dangerous it was; and the more innocent the 'rags of popery' seemed, the more they were to be suspected. Hence the Calvinists were much less conservative than the Lutherans or the English. If the old system went about to establish the righteousness of man against the sovereign grace of God, as it undoubtedly did, they were disposed to count it not only false in principle, but bad in all its details. The farther from Rome, the nearer to Christ.

These different ways of thinking were reflected in the different forms of Church government which always seem the chief things to the natural man. In the Church of the Middle Ages there were priests to offer sacrifice for the living and the dead, and these priests were ordained by bishops, who were themselves consecrated by other bishops who were supposed to trace their spiritual descent in an unbroken succession to the apostles. Thus ordination, consecration, and apostolic succession (three legal questions) were vital. The Reformed Churches all abolished sacrificing priests, but all (except the Quakers) had a regular ministry, and all but the Socinians and some outliers required for it a regular call by the lawful authority of the Church, usually with admission by prayer and laying on of hands—for edification and solemnity, not as impressing any sacramental or indelible *character*. But here again Calvinism stands apart. To the Lutherans and the English Church government was a matter which every Church must determine for itself. No form of government and no ceremony of worship is officially held to be ordained of God. However ancient or edifying it may be, it is still only an ordinance of men, which may by men be altered or abolished. So they used their discretion in various manners. Luther's insistence on the universal priesthood implied the sanctity of the State, so that the civil ruler was the natural representative and ruler of the Church also. Thus Lutheran churches have commonly been Erastian, seldom giving serious trouble to princes who did not try to force them into Romanism or Calvinism. The old services and ceremonies (*e.g.*, altar, vestments, etc.) they generally retained, only translating them into the vulgar tongue, and removing or explaining superstitions and excrescences. As regards Episcopacy, they had no objection of principle to it. The Confession of Augsburg says:

'It is not our object to have the bishops deprived of their authority. The one thing we ask is that they will allow the Gospel to be purely preached, and relax a few observances which cannot be kept without sin' (pt. ii. § 7).

But, when the bishops refused, the results were various. In Germany the spiritual office was abolished, and the princes took over the general government of their churches. The bishops had consistory courts where lawyers and divines sat together; and these, with extensions and modifications, became the chief subordinate authorities. In Denmark the bishops were equally intractable, and played a great part in the civil war after the death of Frederick I. So, as soon as Christian III. had captured Copenhagen in 1536, he arrested the bishops, and set them free only after their jurisdiction had been abolished by the National Assembly and the goods of the Church given up to the king. Then Christian appointed seven superintendents to work under himself as *summus episcopus*, and these were consecrated, not by bishops, but by Luther's friend Bugenhagen, and soon took the title of bishops. There was no consistory. Sweden was more conservative. There again the bishops were intractable, but Gustavus Vasa mastered the Church once for all at the Riksdag of Westerås in 1527; and Brask of Linköping, the champion of the old order, left the country in despair. The vast estates of the bishops, the chapters, and the monasteries were placed at the king's disposal. But the change was gentle and gradual: there were no martyrs on either side. The Mass was translated into Swedish and the ceremonies were explained. Unction, *e.g.*, was only a symbol of the inward unction by the Spirit. The forms of Church government were very little changed. The old bishops were gradually replaced by Lutherans, chosen by the clergy and consecrated by other bishops. Even the apostolic succession seems to have been preserved (though this is disputed) by the unwilling hands of Petrus Magni of Westerås, though the Swedish Church leaves its spiritual value an open question. There was no central consistory—Gustavus Adolphus tried in vain to establish one—but parish priests are appointed by the bishops, and all dignitaries must have the king's approval.

The English Reformation took generally the same course as the Swedish, though the changes and the reactions were much more violent. The Tudors were stronger than the Vasas, and the antagonisms between Papalists and Nationalists, and between Catholics and Reformers, were much sharper than in Sweden. The English Church was Erastian because it was national, and therefore fitly represented by the civil power, and because further the dangerous political situation after the separation from Rome induced the English people to give Henry VIII. a practical dictatorship. Thus the strong monarchy of the Tudors was raised to its height by the Reformation. Henry VIII. mastered the Church once for all at the 'Submission of the Clergy' in 1532. The king was acknowledged as Head of the Church—Supreme Head; convocation was not to make or even to discuss any new canon without the king's permission, and, if the election of bishops remained with the chapters, they could elect none but the king's nominees. The king's supremacy was not exercised through a consistory, but in a harsher form by Cromwell as Vicar-general. Elizabeth took the less offensive title of 'Supreme Governor,' though she claimed the same powers as her father, and exercised them through the Court of High Commission (not fully organized till 1583), which was substantially a central consistory. She carefully preserved not only the rite of consecration but the apostolic succession. She may have cared for it as little as Gustavus Vasa, but its political value was evident, especially when it suited her to pose like a Lutheran prince prescribing the religion of his subjects according to the Peace of Augsburg.

Thus the English Church has it as a matter o fact, but has nowhere officially declared it to have any spiritual value. Indeed, it was not supposed to have any before the rise of the Carolines, which is commonly dated from Bancroft's sermon in 1589. There is no mention even of Episcopacy in the English definition (Art. 19) of the Church; and, though no one has been allowed since 1662 to minister without episcopal ordination, this is given simply as a domestic rule 'in the Church of England,' and passes no censure on churches which otherwise ordain. In Church government then the English were as conservative as the Swedes; in public worship they took a bolder line. The various books and the local uses were consolidated into the single national Book of Common Prayer in English for congregational use. The services were generally simplified, and the excessive number of the ceremonies was much reduced. Morning and Evening Prayer in 1549 contained little that was not in the Hours, and the Marriage Service is even now nearly what it was in the Middle Ages, nor was the Mass itself entirely changed. It was translated and much simplified; but it was still said by a priest in a vestment at an altar, and still provided for private confession and absolution. Its doctrine was upon the whole a spiritual Presence, but it was quite consistent with consubstantiation, though Gardiner needed a good deal of special pleading to get transubstantiation into it. But in 1552 the Prayer-Book was 'godly perused' and revised. Invocation of saints and prayers for the dead were entirely removed. The 'Service of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion' was now to be said by a priest or minister in a surplice at the Holy Table. It provided for spiritual help and ghostly counsel, but individual confession was limited to the visitation of the sick, and even there was neither private nor compulsory. Moreover, the whole structure of the service was changed for the deliberate purpose of disavowing every sort of Presence that is not purely spiritual. Every passage quoted by Gardiner was altered. The Canon of the Mass was broken up into three parts. The prayer for the whole state of Christ's Church was limited to the living, the prayer of consecration was brought close to the administration in order to prevent 'eucharistic adoration,' and the oblation of the elements was turned into an oblation of 'ourselves, our souls and bodies' after the elements had been consumed. Thus in public worship the English made greater changes than the Swedes.

It will be noted that in N. Germany, in Sweden, and in England the new churches were or soon became national, not simply as independent of Rome, but as true expressions of national character. Luther was so intensely German that his influence continued to dominate the North, even after the inroad of Calvinism in the latter half of the 16th century. In Sweden the new religion owed its consolidation to the services of Gustavus Vasa, the reaction against John III. and Sigismund, and the work of the great kings of the 17th century. Dissenters were always very few, and even now they are less than one per cent. In England the transition was during the peace of Elizabeth. A nation which in 1558 was hardly more than disgusted with the fires of Smithfield had become firmly Protestant when it confronted Spain in 1585, and never wavered afterwards. Even the Carolines (except a few creatures of Charles I.) were heartily opposed to Rome. But from the beginnings of Christianity in England there was a cleavage of religious thought and feeling. The side which was always dominant, except in the time of the Civil War, preferred the regular and stately services of a national Church. The other, represented in successive ages by friars, Lollards, Puritans, and Dissenters, leaned to the freer ministrations and looser order of local congregations. The Reformers endeavoured, and for a moment successfully, to bring the whole nation into a single Church. That hope was wrecked by the tyranny of Bancroft and Laud; and, if the tyranny of the Commonwealth made the Church thoroughly popular, the tyranny of the Restoration shut out men who stood for one whole side of the religious life of England. It condemned the Church to be a sect, yet a sect in which the other side is not forgotten. That it is the most national of the sects is shown at once by its powerful influence on English Dissenters and by its conspicuous failure to win the Celts of Wales and Cornwall.

Unlike the Lutheran and the English Churches were the Reformed. One marked historic difference is that they had the secular power against them everywhere but in the cities of the southwest—roughly, from Frankfurt and Lindau to Geneva. Where that power was friendly, they were guided and controlled by burghers instead of princes; where it was hostile, they had to form their churches as the early Christians did, according to their own conceptions of doctrine and expediency. As the Romish sacerdotalism created an aristocracy of priests who alone could dispense the necessary means of grace, so the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination created an aristocracy of the elect, for whom alone Christ died, who alone received saving grace and alone properly constituted the Church. This aristocracy was created not by some visible rite of ordination, but by God's eternal counsel secret to us, so that it could not form a visible class in the Church. The chief of sinners might be of the elect, and an apparent saint might prove a reprobate. So, while the distinction of priest and layman was denied, the acknowledged difference of elect and reprobate had to be ignored in the organization of the churches. Calvinism is indeed an inspiring creed—that God has foreknown *me* from all eternity, and sent me forth to do in His strength and not my own the work predestinated for me before the foundation of the world. It is the creed of the strong, as asceticism is the creed of the weak, when neither the one nor the other can rise to the higher faith, that Christ died for all men, and not in vain. It is only a half-truth, and, like other forms of the opinion of necessity, it must be treated in practice as if the limitation were false. As every Calvinist in his right mind believes himself to be elect like the boy in the English Catechism, he must presume that his neighbours also are elect, though he believes that some of them are not. It was like our own very necessary convention that our neighbours are honourable men, though we know that there are knaves among them. Only, a knave can sometimes be found out, a reprobate never. Hence a Reformed Church was in theory a democracy, with all spiritual authority deriving from the people. This principle was extended to civil authority by the English Independents in 1647, though the Commonwealth could not carry it out. It prevailed in America, where it was favoured by colonial conditions, and from America it was brought back to France, and became the basic principle of the Liberal movement of the last century. This principle would seem to require a free Church independent of the State; and to this ideal the Reformed doctrine pointed almost as clearly as the Romish. But the condition of freedom is persecution. The State cannot refuse to decide questions of Church property for any sect which is tolerated, and cannot decide them without judicial interpretations of its confessions and deeds of settlement. Hence the Reformed Churches

became subject to the State the moment they had mastered it. The burghers of Zürich or Amsterdam or the Lords of the Congregation in Scotland might be the stoutest of Protestants; but they were determined to keep the ministers in their place, and allow no such clerical rule as that from which the Reformation had delivered them. They had no objection of principle—the Germans have none now, and the English had none then—to what we should consider a most vexatious interference with private life. They were used to it. Every town was full of sumptuary laws and minute regulations on all sorts of subjects, and a few more or less made little difference. But there was more than this. Calvin's high estimate of the Lord's Supper and of the primitive Church led him to demand the restoration of the primitive discipline and its enforcement by the secular power; and in this the Reformed Churches generally, including the English, were more or less inclined to agree with him. They had some reason. Public morals were in a dreadful state, and this was keenly felt, now that the new preaching had roused the public conscience, which the mediæval Church had so debauched with formal righteousness and easy payments for sin that the foulest crimes passed with no more censure than in the old pagan times. The new discipline was hideously severe and did infinite mischief; but it was hardly more severe than the old would have been, if the Church had not preferred to make a traffic in sin. It was at least impartial. Magnates and even ministers had to do their public penance like other sinners. Neither the ministers of Geneva, nor the Scottish Kirk, nor the High Commission in England showed any respect of persons. None the less the system hardened the saints with formalism and spiritual pride, and drove the sinners to hypocrisy or despair. It was long before the Reformed Churches could shake off the belief taken over from the Middle Ages that it was their duty to punish sin as sin with spiritual censures enforced by temporal penalties. But laymen were jealous of this dangerous power of excommunication, and moderate churchmen like Bullinger disowned it. In German Switzerland it was not allowed at all; in French Switzerland (even in Geneva) and in Scotland it was not entrusted to purely clerical authorities. In England the frequency of excommunication and its misuses for secular offences were a standing grievance against the early Stuarts; and the endeavour of the Presbyterians to introduce the Scottish discipline was foiled by the lawyers, the Independents, and the nation generally.

On the other hand, there was a doctrine which often partly counteracted the natural dependence of a dominant sect upon the State. The holiness of the Church was nowhere more of a living truth than in the Reformed Churches, for they believed as firmly as any Romanist that it was ordained of Christ and guided by His Holy Spirit. Eternal predestination was a still mightier inspiration than the august tradition claimed by Rome, and there was no double standard of priests or monks to shelter common sinners from its fullest claims. So the ministers could stand up as boldly as any popes or bishops against wickedness in high places, and they did so with a courage which, though not wanting, was less often seen in the more courtly Lutheran and English Churches. The Reformed had much more trial of persecution than the Lutherans, for the Peace of Augsburg left them alone to fight the hardest of the battle against the treachery of the savage Catholic revival. Small wonder if their zeal was often fierce and narrow, quarrelsome and overscrupulous. But they are not fully represented by such extremists as Puritans, Covenanters, and Camisards, who were more or less demoralized by Stuart or Bourbon tyranny. If we look to more peaceful churches like those of Zürich or Strassburg, or even Geneva, or to the early stages of the Reformation in Scotland, we shall find greater moderation. Calvin himself charged the English Liturgy of 1552 with nothing worse than *tolerabiles ineptias*, and the Scots used one like it (with ceremonies omitted and some freedom to the minister) till they were disgusted with all forms of prayer by the attempt of Laud and Charles to force an English form upon them. Bucer and even Laski urged Hooper in 1550 not to refuse the episcopal vestments, and in Elizabeth's time Bullinger and Gualter gave plain counsel to the Puritans. The surplice, they said, was not used at Zürich, and they did not like it; but the queen's enforcement of it was no reason for giving up their ministry.

In one direction the Reformed Churches far excelled the rest. The appeal to Scripture made the study of Scripture a duty for all according to their powers; so that instruction in religion had to be both deeper and more general than heretofore. The Reformers were conspicuously learned men. Luther himself was the greatest of German teachers; Cranmer and Jewel were above comparison with their opponents; and Calvin was not only the best patristic scholar of his time, but the greatest commentator since Augustine. However they may have erred, it was not for want of diligent and faithful study of Scripture with all helps thereunto then attainable. And this learning they sought to spread among the people. They translated the Bible, urged all to read it, and shaped the services for instruction as well as for devotion. The English Reformers did what they could, but were hindered by the rapacity of the nobles, who were much more inclined to plunder the old schools than to found new, and, moreover, saw no need of education for the lower classes. The Lutherans were less thorough in this as in other matters, and soon lost themselves in a jungle of controversies. The Calvinists did better. Geneva under Calvin and Beza was the centre of Protestant learning, and the village schools established by Knox and Melville gave Scotland such a system of general education as England has reached only in our own time.

4. Results of the Reformation.—We are now in a position to survey the Reformation as a whole, and form some estimates of its results. Shortly, national Churches replaced the catholic Church, Scripture became the standard instead of tradition, and the individual gradually gained first religious, then civil, liberty. This was a revolution, and the greatest since the rise of Christianity, so that it called forth the most violent opposition, and was the occasion for enormous evils—the savage persecutions and wars of religion, the desolation of the Netherlands and Germany, and a long severance of the comity of Europe, north and south. Strict Romanists and strict Protestants were never heartily allied till 1686, and the embers of religious hatred are not yet quenched. Even now the pope visibly prefers infidel Germany to heretic England. To the Reformation we owe further the religious divisions of N. Europe, the multitudinous sects of England and America, involving scandals without end to the unbelievers, and also the whole school of rationalists from Deism and the *Aufklärung* to the latest extravagances of the Germans and their imitators. To the Reformation again we owe the Tridentine reaction which (with some reform of scandals) consolidated the mediæval system into a firm barrier against all freedom in S. Europe. The age of the Jesuits and the Inquisition was brought to an end in the 18th cent. by the philosophic despots and the French Revolution, only to

be followed by something lower still. If there was much honest ignorance in the Middle Ages, there is much organized falsehood now.

Of all these evils the Reformation was the occasion, and of some the cause; and to these we may add the mischief done in the suppression of the monasteries and in the corruption of the upper classes by the plunder of the Church, the mischiefs caused by the too great subservience of the Lutheran and English Churches to the State. We now look at the other side. The abolition of a mischievous and sometimes unfriendly foreign authority gave the nations freedom to develop themselves, and made better order possible in both Church and State. What were scandals in the 18th cent. were matters of course in the 15th. National character became stronger and more earnest, and gained a new sense of duty from the new responsibility laid on every man when the new teaching abolished auricular confession, swept away a vast amount of superstition, and trading on superstition, and removed the poison from family life by its emphatic rejection of the ascetic ideal; and all this was summed up in a rational worship constantly challenging comparison with an open Bible.

Yet all this was but the prelude of the mighty evolution. The depth of meaning in the principles of the Reformation was reached slowly and through many conflicts, and is not exhausted yet. The Reformers were men of their own time, and took over from the Middle Ages many beliefs inconsistent with their own principles. They took over the old imperial conception of God as a despot in heaven, the old view of the gospel as a law of commands, the old belief in a rigid visible Church which could allow no dissent, and the old reliance on a penitential discipline enforced by the State. All these are finally inconsistent with the individualism of the Reformation. A God who calls on us to judge the righteous judgment cannot be despotic, so that despotism and slavery on earth stand condemned. A gospel of free forgiveness—in technical language, justification by faith—cannot allow a visible Church with no salvation outside it. If freedom from Rome did not at once bring freedom in religion, it made the coming of that freedom certain by throwing back on every man the burden of seeking for truth from which the Church had relieved him. And freedom in the highest sphere carried freedom in the lower, sometimes even for countries which rejected the Reformation as well as Rome. The supremacy of conscience proclaimed by the Reformation meant freedom first for heterodoxy. Persecution on a large scale was made impossible in Germany by the Peace of Westphalia, in England by the Revolution, in France by Voltaire and the Constituent Assembly. But it meant also political freedom, and the growth of freedom is bringing the whole conception of government into better accord with the divine ideal of goodness and unselfishness. All Protestant states except retrograde Germany are seeking justice, and the Catholic states nearly in proportion to their independence of Rome. The freedom won for criticism and science has been the occasion for many excesses; but the broad result emerging is confusion to the twin powers of agnosticism inside and outside the Christian Church. Above all, the free appeal to history has shown that the gospel is vaster and more varied, freer and more loving, than our fathers knew. The Reformation opened the way to a vision of God; and the vision of God is the inspiration of men.

LITERATURE.—[Dr. Gwatkin had finished this article, but had not added the literature, before his death. The following list has been prepared by the Editors.]

The writings of the Reformers and the works of leading Church historians may be consulted for the history proper of the Reformation. Exhaustive lists of authorities will be found in the bibliographies attached to *The Cambridge Modern History*, i.-iii., Cambridge, 1902-04. In vol. i., *The Renaissance*, the section by **W. Barry**, describing 'Catholic Europe,' may be referred to, and that by **H. C. Lea**, on 'The Eve of the Reformation,' is also valuable. Vol. ii., *The Reformation*, gives the history of the movement in the different countries of Europe. Vol. iii., entitled *The Wars of Religion*, deals with those international and other conflicts which owe their origin to the Reformation.

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See also artt. CALVINISM, HUGUENOTS, HUSSITES, LUTHER, PAPACY, PROTESTANTISM, WESTERN CHURCH.

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REFORMATORIES. — See CRIMINOLOGY, JUVENILE CRIMINALS.

REFORMED BAPTISTS.—See DISCIPLES OF CHRIST.

REFORMED CHURCHES.—See PROTESTANTISM.

REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA.—**1. The name and its meaning.**—At first the churches of this body were addressed as 'the Reformed Dutch Churches in New York and New Jersey.' In 1789 the title, 'the Reformed Dutch Churches in North America,' was given. The minutes of Synod at the adoption of the Constitution use the term, 'the Dutch Reformed Church in North America.' But the name on the title-page of the first edition of the Constitution, printed in 1793, is 'the Reformed Dutch Church in the United States of America.' The same title appears on the second edition of 1815. In subsequent editions it is 'the Reformed Dutch Church of North America.' The act of incorporation of the Synod in 1819 gives the name as 'the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church.' In these terms the history and geographical position of the Church are outlined. It was 'Protestant' in contrast with Roman Catholicism. It was 'Reformed' because it belonged to the school of Calvin rather than to that of Luther. It was 'Dutch' because Holland was the country of its origin. The expressions 'America,' 'North America,' and 'United States' give the country of its development. In process of time the title was considered cumbersome, and the word 'Dutch' inappropriate, since the membership had become thoroughly American. In 1867 the name was therefore changed to 'the Reformed Church in America.'

2. **History.**—(*a*) *Period of the Dutch domination* (*1623–64*).—To the Dutch West India Company, chartered in 1621, was committed the government of the Dutch colony on the banks of the Hudson, called New Netherland. The policy of this company was to foster the Reformed religion in the Dutch colonial possessions. Therefore in 1623 the company sent Sebastian Jansen Krol, a comforter of the sick, to New Netherland. He conducted services according to the rites of the Church of Holland.

Because the office of the company for New Netherland was in Amsterdam, the Classis of Amsterdam, by the decree of 1624, took charge of the religious work of the colony. The first Dutch pastor, Jonas Michaelius, was sent out in 1628. In April of that year he organized a church of 50 members in New Amsterdam. Peter Minuit, the governor, was an elder in this church. This was the beginning of Presbyterian church government in America. The church thus formed became the mother church of the denomination. It has had a continuous, recorded history from that day to this. With ample endowment and ten church buildings, it conducts a great work in the metropolis of the Western world. Its school is probably the oldest educational institution in the United States.

Under the Dutch West India Company the Reformed Church was the Established Church of the colony. Other sects were tolerated, although Governor Stuyvesant showed personal hostility to them. Thirteen churches were founded, and sixteen ministers served during this period. Seven of these were on duty at the time of the surrender to the English in 1664.

(*b*) *Period of struggle for civil independence* (*1664–1737*).—By the terms of surrender the Dutch Church was assured of freedom. But the change of Government was a severe blow to it. Financial support from the State soon ceased. The Church owed civil allegiance to the English Government and ecclesiastical allegiance to the Classis of Amsterdam. The combination was fruitful of misunderstandings. Few people came from Holland, but many English poured into the colony. Within the first twelve years after the surrender only one Dutch minister arrived. In 1676 only three Dutch ministers were in the country. The English governors obeyed the letter of the treaty granting freedom to the Dutch Church, but there was a tendency for the Church to become a mere organ of the civil power. Several incidents during the first generation of English rule taught the Reformed Church to be on its guard against encroachments on its liberties.

The Revolution in England in 1688 produced the Leisler tragedy in New York. This made a sad division in the Dutch Church, in which the populace was on the side of Leisler and the ministers and higher classes on the side of the Government. Governor Fletcher took advantage of this condition to advance the Episcopal Church at the expense of the Dutch. At his request the Ministry Act was passed by the Assembly in 1693. This Act provided for the support by taxation of 'a good, sufficient, Protestant minister' in each of the four southern counties of the province. The Dutch members of Assembly did not intend by this Act to establish the Episcopal Church, but Fletcher and several of his successors affected to consider the English Church established thereby, and much friction resulted. The Dutch Church of New York City, taking alarm, obtained a charter for itself in 1696. By this the rights and liberties of that individual church were secured. It was therefore able to lend effective moral support in the struggle to other churches. The majority of the Dutch ministers stood their ground in all the tedious disputes with the governors, but a few surrendered their ecclesiastical independence from motives of personal ambition.

In the fight against a State Establishment the Dutch Church as a whole was at an advantage compared with other denominations. It was a National Church, not classed with 'Dissenters,' able to appeal to the treaty rights of 1664. While no 'Dissenting' church could obtain a charter before the Revolutionary War, several Dutch churches secured this coveted privilege. The Dutch Church therefore won the victory in its contest with the royal governors. By the third decade of the 18th cent. the theoretical liberty of the earlier time had become actual.

During these years the Church was growing. The natural increase of the Dutch population was great. Religious persecution drove French Huguenots and German Palatines to America. These united with the Reformed Church and became an important element in its life. By 1737 the thirteen churches of 1664 had become 65, and the seven ministers had become nineteen. There was need for more ministers, but to obtain them from Holland was difficult. It had always been contrary to the policy of the Classis of Amsterdam to allow American ordinations. They grudgingly permitted a few with the understanding that they were not to become precedents.

(*c*) *Period of struggle for ecclesiastical independence* (*1737–92*).—Under the leadership of Theodorus Jacobus Frelinghuysen the religious movement known as 'the Great Awakening' took a strong hold of the Dutch Church. This increased the desire for more ministers and loosened still further the weakening bond which held the Church to the Classis of Amsterdam. Frelinghuysen proposed that an institution to train young men for the ministry should be founded, and the churches organized into an Assembly to ordain them and perform other functions of an independent Church. In the year 1737 a plan for such an Assembly or Coetus was sent to Holland for approval. The Classis of Amsterdam doubted the wisdom and ability of the American Church. They thought it better for them to unite with the Germans and Presbyterians. This plan came to naught. With the precedent of other American churches becoming independent before their eyes, after long delay, in 1747, they granted permission for the Dutch Church in America to form a Coetus. But this privilege was bound with such restrictions that it was practically worthless. Ordinations were allowed only by special permission, and appeals to Holland were granted. For six years this Coetus led an ineffectual life, and then in 1754 issued a declaration of independence. This offended some of the more conservative ministers, who seceded under the leadership of Domine Ritzema, senior minister of the Dutch Church of New York City.

The members of the new Classis or Coetus possessed energy and piety. They professed reverence to the Classis of Amsterdam, but took their own independent course. They ordained, when they thought proper, young men for service in the Dutch churches of America, and made strenuous efforts to found a college for the education of ministerial candidates. This they accomplished in 1766, when Queen's College, afterwards Rutgers, obtained a charter. The seceded ministers called themselves 'the Conferentie.' They were a minority in number, but possessed the weight of age and scholarship. They professed to be the legitimate successors of the old Coetus, and they retained the records of that body. They emphasized their subordination to the Classis of Amsterdam and were free in their criticisms of the Coetus brethren.

Yet they realized the necessity of theological education, and Domine Ritzema evolved the plan of a Dutch Divinity professorship in the newly-organized King's College, in New York City. The plan was adopted, but the chair was never occupied. In 1764 the Conferentie organized themselves into an 'Assembly subordinate to the Classis of Amsterdam.' The next year by special permission they ordained one young man.

The Classis of Amsterdam did not understand conditions in America. At first they favoured the Conferentie, but in time they perceived that the freedom usurped by the Coetus was necessary to the life of the American Church. John Henry Livingston, sometimes called 'the father of the Reformed Church,' was influential in enlightening them. A well-informed American, he studied theology at the University of Utrecht in 1765–70. He took every opportunity to explain conditions in the American Church to members of the Classis of Amsterdam. On Livingston's return to America he became pastor in New York City, and the next year (1771) under his influence a peace conference was held. At this a plan of union, proposed by the Classis of Amsterdam, was presented. Both parties were tired of strife, and peace was obtained with surprising ease. The freedom desired by the Coetus was secured, and the feelings of the Conferentie were soothed by the adoption of names not connected with the old disagreements. An organization, called a 'general body,' was formed with power to ordain, and five 'special bodies' were grouped under it. The Church, now acknowledged independent, was about to enter upon a full ecclesiastical and religious life.

But the clouds of the Revolutionary War were gathering, and the Reformed Church was directly in the track of the storm. The losses of the Church during that upheaval were great. Much property was destroyed and congregations were scattered. Within New York City a handful of Dutch Tories held service during its occupation by the British, although their pastors and most of their brethren had fled.

At the return of peace in 1783 the Church rapidly arose from its ruins. In 1784 the independent names of Synod and Classis were assumed without further regard to conservative feelings. The same year Livingston was chosen professor of Theology in connexion with his New York pastorate. In 1788 a committee was appointed to translate the standards of doctrine, liturgy, and the rules of order of the Dutch Church into English. They were to revise such statements as did not suit the free conditions in America. This was accomplished in 1792, and the next year the work was issued. Thus the organization of the independent Church was completed and the Church began its national life. Letters between the mother Church in Holland and the daughter Church in America were occasionally sent for about a score of years, but the custom gradually fell into disuse.

During the colonial period about 150 churches were organized, and about 150 ministers served in the Dutch Church.

(*d*) *Period of the independent American Church* (*1792–1916*).—The life of the Reformed Church in America during the years of its national existence has been similar to that of other Presbyterian bodies within the United States. The English language is generally used, and the membership has been drawn from Evangelical Christians of every name. It is not uncommon in the cities to find that the members of an individual Reformed church trace their ecclesiastical ancestry to a dozen different sources. The general public does not distinguish it from its Presbyterian neighbours.

In 1846 the Reformed Church received a stream of emigration from Holland which increased its numbers, and caused the flavour of the Dutch Reformation to prolong its life in the Middle West. The Church had always been strong in New York and New Jersey. These immigrants founded about 200 churches in the region of which Chicago is the centre, and have extended their influence to the Pacific coast.

There have been a few secessions from the Reformed Church. In 1822 Solomon Froeligh and four suspended ministers, being more conservative in doctrine than their brethren, organized 'the True Reformed Dutch Church.' This became extinct in 1890. In 1882 another secession of certain Hollanders in the west took place. They were displeased because the Synod would not take action against Freemasonry. They joined with others to form 'the Christian Reformed Church.'

The Reformed Church in America has always been interested in missionary effort. In the generation succeeding the Revolutionary War the church of New York City received constant appeals for aid from weak churches. To these she seldom turned a deaf ear. Several Domestic Mission Societies were organized at different times, and the Board of Domestic Missions of the Church was born in 1831. Its chief work is to aid feeble churches and to organize new ones in proper places. Many of the strong churches of the denomination have received aid from it in their infancy. The first year of its existence its income was $5,400. In the year 1915 it received $197,555.55.

Foreign missionary work has received unusual attention. The first society for this purpose was organized in 1796. From 1826 to 1832 the Reformed Church worked in union with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. From 1832 to 1857 its relation with that board was that of co-operation. Since 1857 the Reformed Church has conducted its foreign mission work independently but with hearty co-operation with other Churches in the foreign field. The receipts of this board in 1915 were $300,752.51. The board at present maintains five missions, viz. Amoy, China, 1842; Arcot, India, 1853; N. Japan, 1859; S. Japan, 1859; Arabia, originally an independent mission, 1889, but adopted by the board in 1894. The women of the Church also maintain foreign and domestic mission boards.

Other boards of the Church are: the Board of Direction, which has charge of the property of the Synod; the Board of Education, which aids young men studying for the ministry and assists in the support of certain educational institutions; the Board of Publication and Bible Work; the Disabled Ministers' Fund and the Widows' Fund.

In 1915 there were reported 718 churches with 126,847 communicant members, served by 750 ministers.

3. The doctrine and polity of the Reformed Church in America.—The Constitution of the Netherlands Reformed Church, decreed by the Synod of Dort (1618–19), was formally adopted by the Reformed Church in America in 1771. That Constitution then contained the following elements: the Belgic Confession of Faith, the Heidelberg Catechism and the compendium of the same, the liturgy, the canons of the Synod of Dort, and the rules of Church government.

The standards of doctrine have remained unchanged, but the Church has been little troubled with heresy. It has been conservatively progressive in the interpretation of these standards. The Constitution and the liturgy have been revised in 1833, 1874, and 1916. Certain portions of the liturgy are optional. Some of these have fallen into general disuse. But certain portions are required; they are generally admired and perhaps

are the most distinguishing feature in the services of the Reformed Church.

The form of government is of the Presbyterian type, first proposed by Calvin and adopted by the Netherland churches in 1568. It requires four classes of officers in the church: ministers, teachers (of theology), elders, and deacons.

The unit of government is the Consistory ruling the individual church. A group of churches forms a Classis. Of this body the ministers and an elder representing each church are members. In 1915 there were 37 Classes in the Reformed Church of America. Above the Classis is the Particular Synod, of which there are four. The General Synod is the supreme court. It has held regular annual sessions since 1812. It was incorporated in 1819.

While loving its own doctrine and method, the Reformed Church has always been charitable towards other views and methods, and ready to labour hand in hand with every other denomination of Evangelical Christians.

4. Educational institutions. — The Reformed Church has always insisted upon an educated ministry. Its institutions of learning are as follows: (1) Rutgers College, New Brunswick, N.J., 1766; its name was changed from Queen's to Rutgers in 1825; it is the State college of New Jersey and since 1865 is no longer under the control of the General Synod; (2) the Theological Seminary, New Brunswick, N.J., 1784; this is perhaps the oldest institution of its kind in the United States; it has been located at New Brunswick, N.J., since 1810, when Livingston, who had been both pastor in New York and professor of Theology, resigned from his pastorate and removed to New Brunswick to devote his entire time to teaching; (3) Hope College and the Western Theological Seminary, 1866, both located at Holland, Michigan. Besides these the Church has several schools of lower grade in America and important institutions upon its mission fields.

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REFORMED CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES.—This religious denomination, which was formerly known as 'the German Reformed Church,' is derived from the Reformed Churches of Germany and Switzerland. In government it holds to the Presbyterian system. Its confession of faith is the Heidelberg Catechism. It developed 'the Mercersburg Theology,' one of the phases of American theological thought.

Individual members of the Reformed Church emigrated to America early in the 17th century. Peter Minuit, the leader of the Swedish colony which in 1638 settled on the banks of the Delaware, had been a ruling elder of one of the Reformed churches of the German city of Wesel. Among the Hollanders who founded New York there were not a few Germans, but these generally identified themselves with the Reformed Dutch churches. In the southern colonies there were German and French Reformed among the earliest settlers. Wherever Episcopalians or Presbyterians had occupied the field, they rarely attempted a separate organization. In Pennsylvania Reformed families are known to have settled before the arrival of William Penn.

About 1709 German Reformed people began to arrive in America in great numbers. Most of these were natives of the Palatinate on the Rhine or of neighbouring provinces, though there were also many Swiss. The principal cause of this extensive migration was no doubt a desire on the part of the immigrants to better their worldly condition. In the Palatinate great distress was directly or indirectly the result of the French wars which had devastated the land. Even after peace had been declared there was no immediate improvement. Finally came the terrible winter of 1708–09, which greatly increased the distress. It was reported that Queen Anne had invited the suffering Palatines to emigrate to the British colonies.

'Then,' says F. Löher, 'men looked into each other's faces and said: "Let us go to America, and if we perish, we perish."'[1]

The condition of Switzerland was hardly more encouraging than that of the Rhine country. The people complained that great numbers of foreign refugees had crowded into Switzerland; and, as many of these were skilled labourers, they unintentionally deprived the natives of their means of subsistence. As early as 1663 Peter Fabian, of Bern, sent out by the English Carolina Company, visited Carolina in the hope of establishing a settlement, but he does not appear to have been successful. In 1710 Christoph von Graffenried and Michell, natives of Bern and sailing from England, founded Newbern, in N. Carolina. About 1730 the stream of Swiss immigration turned northward, and in E. Pennsylvania the Swiss became especially numerous. There were no doubt some of them among the Palatines who went from Amsterdam to London in 1709; but the Swiss generally sailed directly from Rotterdam to America, and purchased land soon after they reached their destination.

The estimates of the extent of the German and Swiss immigration to America in the 18th cent. differ. Isolated settlements were founded here and there from Canada to Georgia, and for a long time there was little communication between them. Theodor Poesche, a careful authority, puts the number in America before the Revolution of 1776 at 200,000, A. B. Faust[2] at 225,000. About the middle of the 18th cent. there may have been 30,000 members of the German Reformed Church in Pennsylvania alone, but it is evident that nothing like that number was gathered into congregations. It was, however, in that province that the Germans were most numerous, and it is there that we find the beginnings of a general organization of the Reformed Churches.

The history of this denomination may be comprehended in five periods.

1. 1709–46; Isolated congregations. — This period is characterized by the founding of congregations and the beginning of missionary activity. The earlier portion is very obscure. Religious services were held in private houses, or sometimes in the open air. In the absence of regular ministers, sermons were read by schoolmasters or other intelligent laymen. Among the best known of these schoolmasters was Thomas Schley, the ancestor of Admiral Winfield Scott Schley and the founder of Frederick City, Md. He was singled out by Schlatter as the best teacher he had found

[1] *Gesch. und Zustände der Deutschen in Amerika*, Leipzig, 1855, [2] Göttingen, 1855, p. 42.

[2] *The German Element in the United States*, i. 285.

in America, edifying 'the congregation on every Lord's Day by means of singing and reading God's Word and printed sermons.'

John Frederick Haeger (1684–1722) was the earliest missionary. He was ordained by the bishop of London on 20th Dec. 1709, at the solicitation of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, 'for service among the Palatines, New York.' He laboured in the settlements on the Hudson and began to build a church, but did not live to complete it. His father, John Henry Haeger, an ordained minister who had been rector of the Latin school at Siegen, in Nassau-Dillenberg, followed him to America in 1714, and became pastor in Virginia at a village, named Germanna, which had been built by certain miners who had been brought over by Governor Spottswood.

In Pennsylvania the earliest missionary labour appears to have been performed by a Hollander. At Neshaminy, in Bucks county, there was a Reformed Dutch church—the only one in the province—and from its records it appears that its pastor, Paulus Van Vlecq, on 29th May 1710, visited the (German) settlement at Skippach, where he baptized several children, and on 4th June of the same year ordained elders and deacons at White Marsh. These were probably the earliest German Reformed churches in Pennsylvania, though it is possible that some sort of organization may have been almost simultaneously established at Germantown and Falkner Swamp.

Samuel Guldin (1664–1745) was a Swiss minister who arrived in Pennsylvania in 1710. He had been associate pastor of the cathedral church at Bern, but was removed from his charge for Pietism. In America he seems to have lived in retirement, though he preached occasionally in Germantown. He published three small volumes, treating principally of his unhappy European experiences.

In 1725 the congregations at Falkner Swamp, Skippach, and White Marsh, after seeking in vain for a regular minister, extended a call to John Philip Boehm, who had previously served as their 'reader.' His ministry proved successful, and, after communications with the Classis of Amsterdam, he was ordained in 1729 by Dutch ministers of New York. John Philip Boehm (1683–1749), whose indefatigable activity and great importance for the Reformed Church in the U.S. have been recently established by W. J. Hinke,[1] had been a parochial teacher at Worms, and came to America about 1720. He prepared for his congregations a constitution, which was approved by the synods of Holland and was long regarded as a model. He was the author of several vigorous controversial pamphlets and founded many congregations, his missionary journeys extending from the Delaware river almost to the Susquehanna. Profoundly impressed by the helpless condition of the churches of Pennsylvania, he appealed for aid to the synods of Holland, and it was greatly by his influence that the European churches were awakened to a sense of their duty towards their brethren beyond the sea.

In 1727 George Michael Weiss (1700–63), an ordained minister, arrived at Philadelphia. He had been commissioned by the Ober-Consistorium of Heidelberg to accompany 400 Palatines to America as their leader and guide. In the year of his arrival he organized the Reformed Church of Philadelphia. In 1730 he accompanied Jacob Reiff on a journey to Europe, to collect money and books for several destitute churches, returning to America the following year. He subsequently served a charge in the province of New York, but finally returned to Pennsylvania.

[1] *Letters and Reports of the Rev. John Philip Boehm.*

John Peter Miller (1710–96) and John Bartholomew Rieger (1707–69), both natives of the Palatinate, arrived in 1730. After serving in the Reformed Church for several years, Miller joined the Seventh-day Baptists and became the head of a monastic institution at Ephrata. Rieger subsequently studied medicine, and, though he was at times active in the work of the Church, was in later years best known as a physician.

The name of John Henry Goetschius (1718–74) frequently appears in early congregational records. His father, Mauritz Goetschius, who had previously been pastor at Saletz, in the canton of Zürich, Switzerland, came to America in 1735, accompanied by his family. He died not long after landing in Philadelphia, and his son, John Henry, soon afterwards began to preach with great acceptance, though he was only seventeen years old. In 1736 he claimed to be pastor of twelve congregations. In later years he became an eminent minister in the Reformed Dutch Church. His brother-in-law, John Conrad Wirtz, also became a minister, and is regarded as the founder of the Reformed Church in the city of York, Pennsylvania.

In 1742 several Reformed ministers joined with Count Zinzendorf in the organization of the 'Congregation of God in the Spirit.' It was proposed to unite the German denominations (Lutheran, Reformed, and Moravian) in a higher unity without destroying their identity. Until 1748 this organization laboured earnestly, especially among the Reformed and Lutherans, but the movement finally proved unsuccessful, and most of its adherents identified themselves with the Moravians. The most eminent of the Reformed ministers who belonged to the 'Congregation' were Henry Antes, John Bechtel, Christian H. Rauch, Jacob Lischy, and John Brandmiller.

2. 1746–93: Denominational organization.—The leading event of this period was the founding of the 'Coetus,' by Michael Schlatter, in 1747. For eighteen years the Church of Holland had been directly interested in the German churches of Pennsylvania; but nothing had been done to secure a general organization. It was believed that the American churches were not ready for the establishment of an independent Synod; and it was, therefore, suggested that an advisory body, composed of ministers and delegated elders, should as soon as possible be organized. This body was to be known as the 'Coetus,' or 'Convention'—a term which was first applied by John à Lasco to a weekly conference of ministers which he established in 1544 at Emden, in Germany.

There were certain difficulties which may at first have appeared almost insurmountable. The Germans of Pennsylvania were not of Dutch speech or nationality; they had not been trained to acknowledge the national Confessions of the Netherlands, and it would have required much labour to bring them into full accord with their new ecclesiastical relations. A man was needed who could speak the language of both nationalities, who was willing to be the confidential agent of the Dutch Synods, and might serve as a personal link between the Old World and the New. There was, therefore, great rejoicing when a young Swiss minister appeared and offered to undertake the work.

Michael Schlatter (1716–90), a native of St. Gall, belonged to a prominent family and was thoroughly educated. Having spent a part of his youth in Holland, he was familiar with the language of that country. After his ordination to the ministry he preached for several years in his native country; but, having heard of the necessities of the American churches, he went to Holland and was commissioned by the synods of Holland to undertake the work of organizing them. Nine days after receiv-

ing his commission he set sail for America, where he arrived on 1st Aug. 1746. In his American work he manifested extraordinary energy and perseverance. He made extensive missionary journeys, organized thirteen pastoral charges, and convened the first Coetus in Philadelphia on 29th Sept. 1747, with four ministers and 28 elders in attendance. The ministers, besides Schlatter, were Boehm, Weiss, and Rieger. From this time the Coetus met annually, its proceedings being sent to Holland for revision and approval.

In 1751 and 1754 Schlatter visited Europe in the interest of the American churches. His first mission proved remarkably successful. In one year he wrote and published his *Appeal*, attended many conferences in Holland, Germany, and Switzerland, induced six young ministers to accompany him on his return to America, and collected £12,000, the interest of which was to be applied to the destitute churches of Pennsylvania and schools. The ministers who accompanied Schlatter to America were Philip William Otterbein, John Jacob Wissler, John Waldschmidt, Theodore Frankenfeld, Henry William Stoy, and John Casper Rubel.

Schlatter's enthusiasm proved contagious, and David Thomson, pastor of the English church at Amsterdam, went to England to plead for the establishment of schools among the Germans of Pennsylvania. He was very successful, and it is said that the king gave a personal contribution of £1000. A number of so-called 'Charity schools' were founded in Pennsylvania, and Schlatter was made superintendent of this educational movement, a position which he filled till 1756. He was for some years a chaplain in the Royal American Regiment of infantry, and subsequently lived in retirement near Philadelphia.

The Coetus increased slowly. 'The fathers' in Holland sent a number of missionaries, who had, almost without exception, been well educated in German universities. They refused, however, to grant to the American body the privilege of conferring the rite of ordination, and this led to frequent disagreements. A considerable number of ministers failed to become members of Coetus.

Among the most prominent members of Coetus were the following: J. Conrad Steiner (1707–62), author of several volumes of sermons; Philip William Otterbein (1726–1813), pastor in Baltimore, who, under the influence of the Methodist revival, founded religious societies from which the denomination of 'the United Brethren in Christ' was developed; J. Daniel Gros (1737–1812), professor in Columbia College, New York, and author of an important philosophical work (in English); C. D. Weyberg and William Hendel, two ministers who united, in 1787, with several Lutheran pastors in founding at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Franklin College, so named in honour of Benjamin Franklin, who was the largest individual contributor to its endowment.

The leading independent minister was John Joachim Zubly (1724–81), of Savannah, Georgia, an author, and elected in 1775 a member of the Continental Congress. In 1787 the Reformed ministers of S. Carolina joined with several Lutheran ministers in forming a union which received the double name of 'Corpus Evangelicum' and 'Unio Ecclesiastica.' This movement is interesting principally from the fact that it anticipated the Prussian Church union of 1817 in some important particulars.

During this period the Coetus remained warmly attached to the Church of Holland. In 1770 an attempt to unite the German and Dutch Reformed elements in a General Synod was defeated by the Germans on the ground of gratitude to 'the fathers' in Holland and particularly to the Classis of Amsterdam. In the war of the Revolution, when communication with Europe was much interrupted, the American churches learned to depend upon their own resources. In 1792 the Coetus abandoned the custom of sending its minutes to Holland for revision. The period of dependence was at an end and the Coetus by its own act became an independent Synod.

3. **1793–1820: The independent denominational organization.**—About twenty ministers united in the organization of the Synod which met at Lancaster, Pa., in 1793. The condition of the Church at that time could hardly be called encouraging. Congregations had grown numerous, but were apathetic. The pioneers had passed away, and the younger ministers were imperfectly educated. No provision had been made for higher education, and the number of candidates for the ministry was small, so that extensive districts were left without pastors. Important congregations called pastors, without much discrimination, from other denominations, and the people were in danger of being alienated from the faith of their fathers. The introduction of the English language was resisted by the older generation and led to serious conflict. Pastors generally laid stress on catechetical instruction, but the establishment of Sunday schools was viewed with suspicion, as were all so-called Methodistic methods. The faith of the people was mainly traditional, and the prevailing theology was that of the Cocceian or Federalistic school. The Church, however, grew by natural increase, and a new and brighter era was ahead of it.

4. **1820–63: Consolidation and development, educational institutions and liturgical worship.**—At the beginning of this period the number of ministers had increased to 70, and it was found difficult to bring them together at synodical meetings. It was, therefore, determined to divide the Synod into eight Classes, which held their earliest meetings in 1820. From this time onwards the Synod was a delegative body chosen by the Classes. The Classis of Ohio, on account of the Synod's refusal to grant to the Classes the privilege of conferring the rite of ordination, became in 1823 a separate body, known as the 'Synod of Ohio.' In this position it remained until the organization of the General Synod in 1863. Heidelberg College at Tiffin, Ohio, was founded in 1850. In 1820 a plan was adopted for the establishment of a Theological Seminary, which was opened at Carlisle, Pa., 1825, with Lewis Mayer as the first professor of Theology. Mayer wrote *A History of the Reformed Church* and valuable monographs.

In 1825 James R. Reily, one of the zealous friends of the Seminary, visited Germany to solicit contributions towards an enterprise that was so intimately related to the welfare of emigrants from the fatherland. He secured a good library and a considerable sum of money. Among the most liberal contributors was His Majesty Frederick III. of Prussia. In 1829 the Seminary was removed to York, Pa., and in 1837 to Mercersburg, Pa. Two years before (1835), this small town, afterwards to become famous, was made the seat of Marshall College.

Frederick Augustus Rauch (1806–41), the first president of Marshall College and associate professor in the Theological Seminary, had served a short time as professor extraordinary at Giessen, in Germany, and had just been appointed a full professor at Heidelberg when, on account of political troubles, he was compelled to leave his fatherland. He had been a favourite pupil of the great eclectic philosopher, Carl Daub, and, though he was recognized as a Hegelian, many elements of his thinking were derived from Schelling and

others of his great contemporaries. In theology he was orthodox, and he had been ordained to the ministry. At Mercersburg he wrote his *Psychology* (New York, 1846) and had begun a treatise on æsthetics, when he died suddenly on 2nd March 1841.

In 1839 Mayer retired from his professorship, and in 1840 John Williamson Nevin was elected his successor. He was at that time professor in the (Presbyterian) Western Theological Seminary at Pittsburgh, Pa., and was already known as an earnest student of German philosophy and theology.

Nevin was born in Franklin county, Pennsylvania, on 20th Feb. 1803, and died at Lancaster on 6th June 1886. He graduated at Union College, New York, and studied theology at Princeton. Before going to Pittsburgh he had been assistant teacher of theology at Princeton, and had published his *Summary of Biblical Antiquities* (Philadelphia, 1828). In accepting the invitation to Mercersburg he was convinced that he was called to perform an important task, and his transition to the Reformed Church was fully approved by his Presbyterian associates. For many years Nevin was the head of the institution at Mercersburg. The books which he wrote, though few in number, had great influence in his denomination. His tract *The Anxious Bench* (Chambersburg, Pa., 1843) aroused wide attention, and his book *The Mystical Presence* (Philadelphia, 1846) presented the real spiritual presence in the Lord's Supper. He was a profound thinker and a powerful controversial theologian. From 1849 to 1853 he edited the *Mercersburg Review*, and most of his theological articles appeared in that periodical.

In 1843 the Synod, convened at Lebanon, Pa., elected F. W. Krummacher, of Elberfeld, Prussia, to become Rauch's successor at Mercersburg. Benjamin S. Schneck and Theodore L. Hoffeditz went to Germany to present the call, and their visit attracted much attention in Berlin and other cities. When Krummacher declined the call, the attention of the commissioners was diverted by Neander, Tholuck, Julius Müller, and Krummacher to Philip Schaff (1819–93), who was at that time a *privatdocent* in the University of Berlin. On this recommendation Schaff was elected professor of Theology at Winchester, Va., on 19th Oct. 1843, and came to America the following year.

Schaff's inaugural address, *The Principle of Protestantism*, published with an Introduction by Nevin (Chambersburg, Pa., 1845), defended the doctrine of historical development, a theory at that time considered dangerous by many German Reformed ministers. For this reason and on account of alleged Roman Catholic tendencies, the inaugural was made the ground of a charge of heresy. Schaff was tried before the Synod and acquitted by a practically unanimous vote.

Through the teachings of Nevin and Schaff Mercersburg became widely known as the seat of the 'Mercersburg Theology.' Misrepresented as a Romanizing movement in sympathy with the Tractarianism of Oxford, it really was strongly Protestant, but stood for a high view of the Church and her ordinances and not for any peculiar system of divinity. Stress was laid upon the liturgical element in worship, the real spiritual presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper, and the importance of the early Church Fathers. Nevin's articles on 'Early Christianity' and on 'Cyprian' in the *Mercersburg Review* (1851, 1852) helped to increase the unrest which Schaff's inaugural had stirred up.

Schaff was active in literary labour as well as in the class room. He stated his views of historical development in *What is Church History?* (Philadelphia, 1846), and published his *History of the Apostolic Church* (first in German, Mercersburg, 1851,[2] Leipzig, 1854, Eng. tr., New York, 1853) and his *History of the Christian Church, 1 A.D.–600 A.D.* (2 vols., New York, 1858–67), a German *Hymnbook* (1859) still used in the worship of the German Reformed and Presbyterian Churches of the United States, and other works. Nevin resigned his professorship in 1851, subsequently becoming president of Franklin and Marshall College, the chief literary institution of the Church. Schaff remained in Mercersburg till 1863.

Influenced by the example of these teachers, many younger men engaged in literary work and became prominent as authors and Church leaders—H. A. Bomberger, E. V. Gerhart, Henry Harbaugh, Thomas C. Porter, George W. Williard, and Jeremiah I. Good. In 1851 Catawba College was founded at Newton, N. Carolina. In 1853 Marshall College was removed to Lancaster and consolidated with Franklin under the title of Franklin and Marshall College. In 1871 the Theological Seminary was removed from Mercersburg to Lancaster, where both institutions have since been successfully conducted. During this period also the Church was greatly disturbed over the preparation and use of a Liturgy, Schaff being one of the leaders in the preparation of the book (Philadelphia, 1857).

Missionary work in the West was successful, especially among the Germans. In 1860 a colony of emigrants from Lippe-Detmold founded the Mission House at Franklin, Wis., which has become an important centre of missionary activity.

5. 1863–1918: The peaceful growth of the Church.—The year 1863 was distinguished by the tercentenary celebration of the Heidelberg Catechism. There were several largely attended conventions, at which essays were read which were afterwards published in English and German in the *Tercentenary Monument* (Chambersburg and Philadelphia, 1863). A memorial edition of the Heidelberg Catechism in three languages was also published (*The Heidelberg Catechism in German, Latin, and English*, with Introd. by J. W. Nevin, New York, 1863, Bonn, 1864, and *Der Heidelberger Catechismus, nach der ersten Ausgabe von 1563, etc.*, Philadelphia, 1863, rev. ed. 1866).

In the same year the General Synod was organized by the union of the Eastern and Western Synods. During their long separation these bodies had developed local peculiarities, and there were disagreements on the general subject of cultus. As early as 1847 a Liturgical Committee had been appointed by the Eastern Synod, and several proposed orders of service were published. During the heated controversy over the subject Ursinus College was founded, in 1869, by Bomberger. In 1879 the controversy was concluded by the appointment of a Peace Commission, which also prepared the order of worship now generally used. There is no disposition to abridge the freedom of worship, and the use of the Liturgy is not compulsory.

The Reformed Church is connected with the 'Alliance of Reformed Churches holding to the Presbyterian System,' and is greatly interested in the establishment of a closer federation. There have been several efforts for an organic union with the Reformed Church in America (Dutch) (*q.v.*), but these have hitherto proved unsuccessful, principally on account of a difference in doctrinal standards. A movement for the union of the Church with the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. of America came to an end in 1915; 220 presbyteries had voted in favour, but the majority of the Classes was against it. In 1869 the foreign patrial adjective, 'German,' was removed from the official

title of the Church. In spite of difficulties and trials, the Reformed Church in the United States has greatly increased in numbers and influence. In 1916 there were, in connexion with the General Synod, 9 district synods, 1213 ministers, 1759 congregations, and 320,459 communicants, with contributions for congregational purposes of $2,201,545 and for benevolence $680,450. There are missions in Japan and China, with 6 schools. Of the synods 6 are prevailingly English, and 3 wholly English. There are 15 theological seminaries and colleges, and 26 recognized periodicals. Five orphan homes and a deaconess home are maintained.

The Reformed Church is sincerely attached to its ancient standards, but also believes in the principle of progress. Its theology is Christocentric—an attitude which has found elaborate and systematic expression in E. V. Gerhart's *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (2 vols., New York, 1891–94, with Introd. by Philip Schaff). Religious services are conducted according to the general order of the Church year. Confirmation is practised, not as a sacrament but as an appropriate rite attendant upon admission to the Church. Its attitude towards other Christian denominations is fraternal.

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REFORMED EPISCOPAL CHURCH and FREE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.—The Free Church of England, and, as its title indicates, the Reformed Episcopal Church in the United Kingdom, otherwise called the Reformed Church of England, claim, each separately, to possess the historic episcopate, indirectly from Canterbury, to which the old-fashioned, unemotional English Churchman, in his cautious self-guard and conservative ecclesiasticism, attaches supreme importance. In the Reformed Episcopal Church three orders of ministers are recognized: bishops, priests (*i.e.* presbyters), and deacons. The Free Church of England, in its published Declaration of Principles, says:

'Guided by the New Testament and by the ecclesiastical polity of the Primitive Church, this Church recognizes only two Orders of Ministers, Presbyters and Deacons.'

Nevertheless, the first order is divided into two offices, *i.e.* bishops and presbyters. The attitude of both the Churches is very clearly expressed about their view of episcopacy. The Reformed Episcopal Church says:

'This Church recognizes and adheres to Episcopacy, not as of Divine right, but as a very ancient and desirable form of Church polity.'

The Free Church of England expresses the same belief in similar words and adds:

'But for the avoidance of any possible misunderstanding, it hereby emphatically declares its repudiation of the Romish dogma of Apostolical Succession in the Ministry as involving the transmission of spiritual powers.'

Both of the Churches in similar terms condemn and reject the following 'erroneous and strange doctrines as contrary to God's Word':

'*First.*—That the Church of Christ exists only in one order or form of ecclesiastical polity.

Second.—That Christian ministers are "priests" in another sense than that in which all believers are a "royal priesthood."'

How the Free Church of England came to be possessed of the historic episcopate, of which the founders never dreamt, must now be told. We are dealing with the history and polity of the Free Church of England before that of the Reformed Episcopal Church in England because of the two Protestant Episcopal Churches outside the Established Church the former was the first founded. In fact, the latter grew out of the former, withdrawals having quietly taken place from the Free Church of England on the question raised by Churchmen in the religious press concerning the historic episcopacy. Four of those who thus seceded, one of whom had been episcopally consecrated as a bishop in the Free Church of England, became subsequently bishops in the Reformed Episcopal Church. As three out of these four seceders had been at one time Congregational ministers, it may fairly be assumed that none of them was personally hampered by any deep conviction that, in order to secure valid orders, the 'laying on of hands' must be by a bishop in the historical succession, but that they took the important step because they thought that by so doing they would better meet the objections of rigid Church people to a purely elective episcopacy.

1. **The Free Church of England.**—The Free Church of England is a Protestant Episcopal Church, which, as regards orders, doctrine, and worship, takes outside the Established Church a position similar to that of the Evangelical party within. The Oxford Movement (*q.v.*), as it is generally called, which, according to Cardinal Newman, was started on 14th July 1833, in order to arouse the clergy of the Church of England from the cold, apathetic condition into which they had fallen, led to the formation of the Free Church of England, as an effective antidote to the advanced sacerdotal teaching of the pioneers of the ritualistic campaign—the eminent clergymen of the Church of England who had dived deeply into early Patristic teaching and pre-Reformation practices—and the materialistic exaggerations of their immediate successors, who did not possess the scholarship, sanity, or personal piety of such men as Keble, Pusey, Ward, and Faber, but who far surpassed them in zeal.

For a decade there had been simmering among the loyal Evangelical clergy an opinion, which gradually deepened and widened in larger and in even outside circles, that something effective should be done to counteract the rapidly spreading sacerdotal movement. In 1843 matters were brought to a head, and precipitated the formation of the Free Church of England.

The see of Exeter was presided over by Henry Phillpotts, who was a strong High Churchman, a strenuous controversialist; and, holding Cyprianic views as to the Divine authority of the episcopal office, to which he did not hesitate to give effect in his diocese, he was at times in serious conflict with one or another of his clergy. In Church history (1847) he is well known by his attempt to stretch ecclesiastical law by imposing an unheard-of test upon George Cornelius Gorham, a third wrangler and a Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge, before instituting him to the vicarage of Brampford-Speke, Exeter, to which he had been appointed by Lord Chancellor Cottenham. James Shore had for ten years been the esteemed minister of Bridgetown Chapel-of-Ease. A new vicar, on coming into residence, informed him that his nomination to the Episcopal chapel could not be renewed; and the bishop withdrew his licence and declined to state his reasons for so doing. The Duke of Somerset, on being memorialized by 800 members

of the congregation, decided to re-open it, but this time without the bishop's licence. Shore wrote formally, and, as he thought, legally, resigning his position in the Church of England; and on 14th April 1844 he again preached in the chapel to his old well-beloved congregation; but this time as a clergyman in the Free Church of England. The bishop of Exeter, believing as a High Churchman in the indelibility of Holy Orders, because, when they are conferred, a special spiritual grace, mysteriously handed down from the apostles, is *ex opere operato* then imparted by the ordaining bishop, which can only be sinned away by the recipient, promptly instituted proceedings against Shore. The law, as it then stood, was in the bishop's favour. Notwithstanding this, Shore again preached at Spa Fields Chapel on 9th March 1849; and, when he came down from the pulpit, he was arrested by two officers of the ecclesiastical court for non-payment of the bishop's costs. Hereupon Thomas E. Thoresby, the minister of Spa Fields Chapel, London, inserted an advertisement in the *Times*, calling for a meeting at Exeter Hall 'to confer as to the best means of altering the law under which the Rev. James Shore had been committed; and of effecting his immediate liberation.' At that meeting 5000 men were present, and one of the speakers significantly declared 'that by God's help there would be a Church in which the Bishops would not be able to play such pranks.' It was Thoresby who thus spoke, and from henceforth he devoted his sound judgment, strong intellectual powers, and scholarly attainments to the establishment of the Free Church of England. Advice was sought, friends were consulted, and the draft of a plan, which he discovered among the documents in the possession of the Countess of Huntingdon (but which the Countess did not live to execute), formed the basis of a constitution, or deed poll, which was submitted to some of the leading Evangelical clergymen and ministers of the Connexion inviting suggestions, improvements, and criticisms, in order to secure as thorough and complete a Church polity as possible, moulded strictly upon NT authority. Fourteen years of the prime of his life did Thoresby give to the work which he had taken in hand and on which he had set his heart. The plan took definite shape in the year 1863, when at the annual conference of the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion (*q.v.*), held on 24th June at Spa Fields Chapel, the 'Free Church of England' was formally organized and duly inaugurated by the passing of a resolution setting forth the position of the Connexion and the reasons which led to the adoption of the title of 'The Free Church of England.' The long preamble to the resolution, after alluding to the circumstances under which the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion came into existence, goes on to say:

'Whereas by a solemn statement made by the Countess's devisees, the Connexion was declared to be essentially in the main, as to its doctrine and liturgy, one with the Church of England; and as to its government, whilst allowing the distinctness and separate government of the several congregations, was held to be Presbyterian and Episcopal; and whereas the congregations in the Connexion have, for the most part, borne a distinctive character inasmuch as they have used with slight modifications the Liturgy of the Church of England, and in their general action have been subject to a general guidance of Presbyters, under the guidance of a President Bishop: and whereas in the public mind of Great Britain, there is a demand for the sound doctrine expressed in the general sense of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, to be held in connexion with a Revised Liturgy of the Book of Common Prayer: and whereas the Connexion cannot change either its form or name; and the trusts contained in the several deeds upon which the existing Chapels are settled cannot be altered without a vesting order from the Court of Chancery or the Charity Commissioners, etc.; it is therefore resolved by the Conference, for the perpetuation and development of the principles on which the Connexion is founded, that it is highly expedient from this time that any new Churches, and Congregations gathered in them, shall be known as "The Free Church of England," holding the Doctrines, and governed by the Laws, Regulations, and Declarations hereinafter stated.'

The laws, etc., here referred to formed the constitution of the Free Church of England, and were finally embodied in a deed poll, which was duly registered in the High Court of Chancery on 31st Aug. 1863.

Largely in consequence of the action of the bishop of Exeter in pursuing Shore from one ecclesiastical court to another, incurring ruinous costs which it was quite impossible for Shore to discharge, and then imprisoning him for not paying them, the Free Church of England spread, and new churches in different parts of England were opened—among others, St. James's Free Church of England, Grosvenor Place, Exeter, and Christ Church, Portland Street, Ilfracombe, the congregation of which had as its minister Benjamin Price, who was at one time a member of the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion, and who subsequently became the first bishop of the Free Church of England.

For three years in succession Price had held the high office of president of the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion, and in that capacity had acted as its representative at ordinations and similar functions. But, as it was considered by the members of the conference to be simply a distinguished office, no service of consecration was held or deemed to be desirable. But the president of the Connexion was also at the same time *ipso facto* the bishop of the Free Church of England, and among the members themselves the demand grew that the head of the Church should bear a more thoroughly ecclesiastical title than 'president'—one which would convey to outsiders the idea of episcopacy. This internal desire found expression when, in 1868, St. John's Church, Tottington, Bury, Lancashire, was opened, and public announcement was made that it would be consecrated by the Rev. Benjamin Price, 'Bishop Primus' of the Free Church of England. On that eventful occasion the title was used for the first time—against Price's knowledge or desire, it is true. It was felt that the term 'president' did not appeal to Church-people, whereas 'bishop' was thoroughly understood by 'the man in the street.' The anomalous position in which Price found himself was this, that as executive officer he had to perform episcopal duties, without having been consecrated 'by men who have publick authority given to them' to do so. Many evangelical clergymen, nevertheless, became warmly attached to the new movement; and their adhesion gave it a more distinctly Church character. This was emphasized by the following manifesto, which in 1873 was signed by over 50 influential clergymen:

'1.—We, the undersigned Clergymen of the Church of England, hereby declare our solemn conviction that it is essential to maintain the distinctive Protestant character of our Church.

2.—We have noticed with alarm the tendency of the late "Bennett Judgment" to lower that character, and to establish a compromise unworthy of our old Reformers and their traditions. The adoption of the principle that what our formularies do not in express terms condemn, they must be considered to allow, points to the conclusion that those who hold the doctrines of Rome have only to disguise them in sophistical subtleties and non-natural language in order to make their position tenable. We consider this a state of things fraught with dangerous consequences to the Church at large.

3.—We hold firmly that Romish errors, against which some of the Articles of the Church of England most emphatically protest, may not on any account be sanctioned.

4.—We lament exceedingly that Romish and Ritualistic practices and doctrines have made sensible progress of late years, in spite of all efforts which have been put forth to check them.

5.—We regard it as indispensable that objectionable passages in the Book of Common Prayer, which have been found to promote such practices and doctrines, should be removed.

6.—We look in vain for any sign of Liturgical Revision by authority in the Established Church.

7.—We have, therefore, determined, at this grave crisis, to express an open sympathy with those kindred Church bodies in England and Ireland which have made Revision of the Prayer-book a leading question. We allude to the Disestablished Church of Ireland and to the Free Church of England. Without pledging ourselves to the details of their respective arrangements, we shall be glad henceforth to act in friendly co-operation with both these bodies for the repression of Ritualism.

8.—We unhesitatingly approve the union of Church and State, and do not advocate secession; but we cannot ignore the *fact* that some Clergymen have determined otherwise; and unless some decisive step be taken to maintain the Protestant principles of the Reformation, we fear that many of the Laity may practically fall away from our Church, as sheep without a shepherd.'

The above declaration was drawn up by Edward Vesey Bligh, son of the Earl of Darnley and vicar of Birling, Kent.

As the movement spread, it became more imperative that Price should be consecrated, according to Church order, with the accompaniment of 'laying on of hands,' according to apostolic custom. In March 1874 the Free Church of England made a friendly suggestion to the Reformed Episcopal Church of America, which had lately been organized, that the two Churches, inasmuch as their principles and doctrines were identical, should be united. The proposition was warmly entertained, and a federative union was arranged —the bishops and clergy of either Church to be eligible to attend and vote at all meetings. One of the bishops of the American Church, Edward Cridge, of British Columbia, an Englishman, and at one time a dean in the Church of England, came to England to visit his friends; and, at the special request of the Reformed Church of America, supplied that which seemed to orthodox Church people to be lacking in the episcopacy of the Free Church of England by publicly consecrating Bishop Price, by prayer and the 'laying on of hands,' to his sacred office. In time this union was allowed to lapse, and the Free Church of England is not now affiliated with any American Church.

The Free Church of England is free (1) to go into any parish to preach the gospel, although, as a matter of practice, she does not do so, unless invited; (2) to use the Book of Common Prayer, from which passages which are interpreted to confer 'absolving and retaining' powers on the clergy have been expunged; (3) from State control, under which ecclesiastical questions are surrounded with restrictions and difficulties; (4) to hold communion with other denominations, on the ground that the Church of Christ is one. 'Multi illi unum corpus sumus in Christo' (Ro 12^5).

In its uncompromising Protestantism the Church denies (1) that the Church of Christ exists only in one order or form of ecclesiastical polity; (2) that Christian ministers are 'priests' in another sense than that in which all believers are a 'royal priesthood'; (3) that the Lord's Table is an altar on which the oblation of the Body and Blood of Christ is offered anew to the Father; (4) that the presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper is a presence in the elements of bread and wine; and (5) that regeneration is inseparably connected with Holy Baptism.

2. The Reformed Episcopal Church in the United Kingdom, otherwise called the Reformed Church of England.—The earliest settlers in the United States of America (Virginia) in 1607 were members of the Church of England, and therefore naturally desirous of having a bishop in canonical Church order for ordinations, confirmations, etc.; but their applications for the privilege were courteously declined, or postponed, by the English archbishops. In 1784, however, their wish was partly met by the consecration at Aberdeen of Samuel Seabury, rector of St. Peter's, New York, by three bishops of the Episcopal Church of Scotland (Robert Kilmour, Arthur Petrie, and John Skinner). The colonists thus had a bishop of their own; but nevertheless they were not completely satisfied. A renewed request of the descendants of the first English emigrants, that a colonial clergyman, whom they might elect, should be consecrated, so that the union with the old country might be strengthened and the Church creed of their fathers followed by their children's children, was favourably entertained; and on 4th Feb. 1787 the archbishop of Canterbury (John Moore), assisted by the archbishop of York (William Markham) and the bishops of Bath and Wells (Charles Moss) and Peterborough (John Hinchliffe), consecrated in his chapel at Lambeth Palace, first William White, of Pennsylvania, and immediately afterwards Samuel Provoost, of New York, as bishops. Three years later (19th Sept. 1790) James Madison, president of William and Mary College, Virginia, was consecrated at Lambeth by the archbishop of Canterbury (John Moore), assisted by the bishops of London (B. Porteous) and Rochester (J. Thomas). The first episcopal consecration in America took place on 17th Sept. 1792, when Thomas John Claggett was consecrated in New York bishop of Maryland, by bishops White, Provoost, Seabury, and Madison. The co-operation of Seabury invested this consecration with prime importance, as it joined the two sources of orders, the Scottish and English, in the Protestant Episcopal Church of America. On 15th Nov. 1866 George David Cummins, rector of Trinity Church, Chicago, was consecrated at Christ Church, Louisville, by the presiding bishop, John Henry Hopkins, of Vermont (who was assisted by six other bishops of the American Church), and appointed suffragan bishop of Kentucky. In the autumn of 1873 the Evangelical Alliance held in New York its annual Convention, which was terminated by a united communion service in the Presbyterian Church in Madison Square, in which Bishop Cummins, the dean of Canterbury (R. Payne Smith), and Canon Fremantle took prominent part. The bishop of Zanzibar (W. G. Tozer) and other extremists vehemently denounced these eminent clergymen, and charged them with infringing ecclesiastical law in participating in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper administered in a Nonconformist church. Keenly sensitive to the attacks made on him through the public press, and alarmed at the spread of ritualistic innovations in his own diocese, which, with the limitations imposed upon him as a suffragan bishop, he was unable to stem, he resigned on 10th Nov. 1873 his position in the Protestant Episcopal Church of America; and three weeks afterwards organized the 'Reformed Episcopal Church of America.' On 14th Dec. 1873 he consecrated Charles Edward Cheney as a bishop in the new Church; and on 24th Feb. 1874 he consecrated William R. Nicholson to the same high office, both at Kentucky. Generally speaking, these Church incidents would hardly have passing interest, and the record of them might be considered merely trifling; but to a Church claiming to possess the historic episcopate they are of supreme consequence.

Information concerning the inauguration of the Reformed Episcopal Church of America reached England through the usual channels, and led to a missionary movement on similar Church lines in this country, under the charge of T. Huband Gregg, formerly vicar of E. Harborne, Birmingham; in the following year a General Synod for Great Britain and Ireland was formed, with the right of self-government. In 1894 it was reorganized with P. X. Eldridge as presiding bishop; and 'Constitutions and Canons' were drawn up and agreed upon.

No good purpose would be served by reviving memories of the objections made as to 'form of service' at the consecration of Bishop Cummins, and 'intention,' and other trivialities, which marred the discussions in the first instance; suffice it to say that the Reformed Episcopal Church of Great Britain, although it possesses, equally with the Church of England, all that, from the extreme Churchman's point of view, is necessary for valid episcopal orders, yet in strongest terms repudiates the teaching that the sacraments of Holy Baptism and the Lord's Supper are mechanically operative as channels of spiritual grace, when administered by a 'priest' 'lawfully called' and 'episcopally ordained.' It declares for three orders of ministry, *i.e.* bishops, presbyters, and deacons, but fully recognizes that the ministry of the Word and sacraments of Nonconformist Churches is of equal value with that of the Episcopal. It was founded to maintain the Evangelical principles of the Protestant Reformation; the Holy Scriptures form its sole rule of faith and practice; the Book of Common Prayer being used at divine service, it is liturgical in its worship; the government, although episcopal, is vested in a General Synod, composed of bishops and presbyters, together with two lay representatives from each of the affiliated congregations; it is a refuge for members of the Established Church who are distressed by unauthorized ritual in their parish churches; and, being free from State patronage and control, it is legally able to hold fellowship with all Evangelical Churches, and delights to do so.

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G. HUGH JONES.

REFORMED PRESBYTERIANS. — See PRESBYTERIANISM.

REFORM JUDAISM.—See LIBERAL JUDAISM.

REGALIA.—The word 'regalia' is not found in classical Latin bearing its present meaning. We meet with it, however, in the 12th cent. in the work of the monkish chronicler, William of Malmesbury, *de Gestis Regum Anglorum*,[1] in which, after describing the coronation of Emperor Henry V. by Pope Paschal II., he says that after the ceremony the pope laid aside his *sacerdotalia* and the emperor his *regalia*. In English the words 'regale' and 'regalia' at first bore the meaning of royal prerogatives. The word 'regale' in particular was used of the privileges enjoyed for centuries by the kings of France of receiving the revenues of vacant sees and abbacies and of presenting to benefices which were dependent on them. By the 17th cent. the modern significance had already become attached to the word 'regalia,' while the singular 'regale' had fallen into desuetude. The articles which have formed a part of insignia of kingship in all the different stages of human culture have of course varied enormously in character, and it would be impossible within the scope of an article like the present to attempt to state the significance of each of them. This article is therefore restricted to a brief discussion of their religious symbolism and magical attributes in general. The term 'regalia' will not, however, be limited exclusively to objects worn and carried by kings, but will be extended to cover such material objects as confer upon their possessors the right to the throne.

[1] Rolls Series, no. 90, 2 vols., London, 1887–89, p. 502.

1. **Royal fetishes.**—More than twenty years ago J. G. Frazer, in his *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, called attention to the sacred character of the kingly office among primitive, semi-civilized, and, in a lesser degree, civilized peoples; and he inferred that, if it could be traced to its ultimate origins, it would be found to be identical with that of the priest, shaman, or medicine-man.[1] In its main outlines this hypothesis appears to be irrefragable. We must then expect to find among primitive peoples a resemblance between the royal insignia and the magical apparatus of the medicine-man. In this quest we are not disappointed, for we find that among the Malays the magician possesses insignia analogous to the regalia, both in fact bearing the same name (*kabĕsaran*).[2] In the Northern New Hebrides, according to R. H. Codrington, chieftainship is not in theory hereditary, but becomes so in practice, as a chief hands on to his son his charms and magic stones, containing the *mana* on which the chieftainship depends.[3] The dependence of the royal authority on the possession of certain fetishes is found in its most extreme form in S.E. Asia and the Malay Archipelago. In S. Celebes it is said actually to reside in the regalia.

'In short,' says Frazer, 'the regalia reign, and the princes are merely their representatives. Hence whoever happens to possess the regalia is regarded by the people as their lawful king. For example, if a deposed monarch contrives to keep the regalia, his former subjects remain loyal to him in their hearts, and look upon his successor as a usurper who is to be obeyed only in so far as he can exact obedience by force. And on the other hand, in an insurrection the first aim of the rebels is to seize the regalia, for if they can only make themselves masters of them, the authority of the sovereign is gone. In short, the regalia are here fetishes, which confer a title to the throne and control the fate of the kingdom. Houses are built for them to dwell in, as if they were living creatures; furniture, weapons, and even lands are assigned to them. Like the ark of God, they are carried with the army to battle, and on various occasions the people propitiate them, as if they were gods, by prayer and sacrifice and by smearing them with blood. Some of them serve as instruments of divination, or are brought forth in times of public disaster for the purpose of staying the evil, whatever it may be. For example, when plague is rife among men or beasts, or when there is a prospect of dearth, the Boogineese bring out the regalia, smear them with buffalo's blood, and carry them about. For the most part these fetishes are heirlooms of which the origin is forgotten; some of them are said to have fallen from heaven. Popular tradition traces the foundation of the oldest states to the discovery or acquisition of one of these miraculous objects—it may be a stone, a piece of wood, a fruit, a weapon, or what not, of a peculiar shape or colour. Often the original regalia have disappeared in course of time, but their place is taken by the various articles of property which were bestowed on them, and to which the people have transferred their pious allegiance.'[4]

In Loowoo, on the south coast of the Celebes, two toy cannon, and in Bima a sacred brown horse, formed part of the regalia. Among the Malays the regalia are of the nature of talismans on which the safety of the State depends, and are clearly bound up with the sanctity of the king.

'Not only is the king's person considered sacred, but the sanctity of his body is believed to communicate itself to his regalia, and to slay those who break the royal taboos. Thus it is firmly believed that any one who seriously offends the royal person, who touches (even for a moment) or who imitates (even with the king's permission) the chief objects of the regalia, or who wrongfully makes use of any of the insignia or privileges of royalty, will be *kena daulat*, *i.e.* struck dead, by a quasi-electric discharge of that Divine Power which the Malays suppose to reside in the king's person, and which is called "Daulat" or "Royal Sanctity."'[5]

Similar tabus on the wearing of royal robes are found in various parts of the world. In Japan any one who wore the emperor's clothes without his leave was supposed to suffer from swellings all over the body.[6] Similarly, in Fiji, disease is

[1] See art. KING (Introductory).
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 362.
[3] *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 56.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 363.
[5] Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 23 f.
[6] Pinkerton, *Voyages and Travels*, London, 1808–14, vii. 717.

supposed to result from wearing a chief's clothes. Among the Baganda so sacred were the king's clothes that, when he renewed them at the ceremonies which were held for the prolongation of his life, he deposited the old ones in a shrine of the god Mukasa.[1]

The articles comprising the regalia of Malay kings are of a very miscellaneous character. In Malacca they were a book of genealogical descent, a code of laws, a vest, and some weapons, among which there was generally a spear. In Perak and Selangor the regalia consisted largely of instruments of music.

The regalia of the 'fire-king' and the 'water-king' in Cambodia—two mysterious individuals whose authority is of a purely spiritual character—are talismans, which would lose their efficacy if they were to leave the family, and for this reason the office is hereditary. One of these talismans is a magic sword. If it were drawn from its scabbard, awful cosmic catastrophes would ensue.[2] The king of Cambodia, who occupies the position of temporal ruler within the country, sends an annual gift to the 'fire-king' of rich stuffs to wrap up the magic sword.[3]

Royal and public talismans were well known in the ancient world. The most famous instance of a public talisman is of course the Palladium, an archaic wooden image of Athene on which the safety of the city of Troy was supposed to depend.

'In antiquity the Scythian kings treasured as sacred a plough, a yoke, a battle-axe, and a cup, all of gold, which were said to have fallen from heaven; they offered great sacrifices to these sacred things at an annual festival; and if the man in charge of them fell asleep under the open sky, it was believed that he would die within the year. The sceptre of king Agamemnon, or what passed for such, was worshipped as a god at Chaeronea; a man acted as priest of the sceptre for a year at a time, and sacrifices were offered to it daily. The golden lamb of Mycenae, on the possession of which, according to legend, the two rivals Atreus and Thyestes based their claim to the throne, may have been a royal talisman of this sort.'[4]

It is said that in Japan the imperial crown was formerly a sort of palladium. In an account written about two centuries ago by Engelbrecht Kaempfer, physician to the Dutch embassy at the emperor's court, we read:

'In ancient times, he (the Emperor) was obliged to sit on the throne for some hours every morning, with the imperial crown on his head, but to sit altogether like a statue, without stirring either hands or feet, head or eyes, nor indeed any part of his body, because, by this means, it was thought that he could preserve peace and tranquillity in his empire; for if, unfortunately, he turned himself on one side or the other, or if he looked a good while towards any part of his dominions, it was apprehended that war, famine, fire, or some other great misfortune was near at hand to desolate the country. But it having been afterwards discovered, that the imperial crown was the palladium, which by its immobility could preserve peace in the empire, it was thought expedient to deliver his imperial person, consecrated only to idleness and pleasures, from this burthensome duty, and therefore the crown is at present placed on the throne for some hours every morning.'[5]

The Mogul emperors, who were never crowned, used at times to sit with a crown suspended over their heads.[6] A native historian of India in the 15th cent. narrates the prevalence of a somewhat similar idea in that country, where the throne rather than its occupant was the chief object of veneration.

'It is a singular custom in Bengal, that there is little hereditary descent in succession to the sovereignty. There is a throne allotted for the king; there is, in like manner, a seat or station assigned for each of the Amirs, Wasirs and Mansabdars. It is that throne and these stations alone which engage the reverence of the people of Bengal. A set of dependants, servants and attendants are annexed to each of these situations. When the king wishes to dismiss or appoint any person, whoever is placed in the seat of the one dismissed is immediately attended and obeyed by the whole establishment of dependants, servants and retainers annexed to the seat which he occupies. Nay, this rule obtains even as to the throne itself. Whoever kills the king and succeeds in placing himself on the throne is immediately acknowledged as king. . . . The people of Bengal say, "We are faithful to the throne; whoever fills the throne, we are obedient and true to it."'[1]

The Egyptian kings also claimed a divine character, being incarnations of Horus and Set.[2] They claimed to hold their authority directly from heaven.

'The sacred character of the royal house extended also to its insignia and attributes. The various crowns especially appear as sacred objects, which themselves possess divine powers, and the principal functionary in charge of the royal jewellery serves it in the character of priest.'[3]

The crowns of the two kingdoms possessed a mystical character, the white crown, which was the symbol of the king's dominion over the upper kingdom, being identified with the vulture-goddess Nekhbet, and the red crown, which symbolized his dominion over the lower kingdom, being identified with the serpent-goddess Buto. In other parts of Africa the regalia also possess a fetishistic character. Among the Yorubas, a people of the west coast, the royal crown is believed to be the residence of a spirit which requires propitiation. A few years ago the king of Ife sacrificed five sheep to it.[4] The throne is a fetish among the Ashantis and sacrifices are offered to it, while among the Hos, an Ewe-speaking tribe in Togoland, the king's proper throne is quite small and is bound with magic cords and kept wrapped up in a sheep's skin.[5]

The ideas underlying these facts are of course quite foreign to modern and even mediæval Europe. Nevertheless we may perhaps find dim reflexions of them in the mysterious atmosphere of sanctity which has attached itself to the two most celebrated crowns of Europe—the holy Crown of St. Stephen, and the Iron Crown of Lombardy. The former, which is compounded of two crowns, one sent by Pope Sylvester II. to St. Stephen, the first king of Hungary, in A.D. 1000, and the other sent by the Byzantine emperor, Michael Ducas, to King Geisa in 1073, has throughout Hungarian history been a kind of national palladium, the kingdom itself being known as the 'Lands of the Sacred Crown,' and a Hungarian magnate as 'membrum sacræ coronæ.'[6] When it was returned to Presburg in 1790 by Joseph II., who six years earlier had caused it to be removed to Vienna, it was received with the greatest joy, triumphal arches being erected in its honour. It occupies a position distinct from the king, who cannot exercise his constitutional prerogatives before his coronation, and, if he should die before the ceremony, his name is struck off from the roll of kings. Though less famous than the Crown of St. Stephen, the Iron Crown of Lombardy, which is kept at Monza, is received with royal honours on the rare occasions on which it appears in public. After the coronation of Charles V. it was not used again till the time of Napoleon I. On its way to Milan Cathedral for his coronation it was accompanied by an escort of the Old Guard, and a salvo of artillery was fired in its honour. Similarly on its way to Rome to accompany the funeral cortège of Victor Emmanuel II., in 1878, it was received with royal honours on its journey through Italy, on which it was escorted by the cathedral chapter and the municipal council of Monza.

2. Relics of dead kings as regalia.—Corporeal portions of deceased rulers often form the most important article of royal insignia. Since the

[1] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 141.
[2] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 5.
[3] Cf. art. INDO-CHINA, vol. vii. p. 228.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 365. [5] Pinkerton, *loc. cit.*
[6] M. K. Ferishta, *The Hist. of Hindostan*, tr. A. Dow, London, 1812, ii. 329

[1] H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India as told by its own Historians*, London, 1867–77, iv. 260.
[2] E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Altertums*, i.[2] pt. ii. [1909] §§ 199, 219.
[3] A. Erman, *Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, Eng. tr., p. 38.
[4] *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 365. [5] *Ib.*
[6] A. Vambéry, *Hungary*[6] (Story of the Nations), London, 1897, p. 374.

king is the repository of the *mana*, or 'luck,' of his people, it is necessary that there should be a kind of psychic continuity which must not be broken by the death of a ruler. In S. Celebes portions of the bodies of deceased rajahs actually confer the right to the throne.

'Among the Sakalavas of southern Madagascar a vertebra of the neck, a nail, and a lock of hair of a deceased king are placed in a crocodile's tooth and carefully kept along with the similar relics of his predecessors in a house set apart for the purpose. The possession of these relics constitutes the right to the throne. A legitimate heir who should be deprived of them would lose all his authority over the people, and on the contrary a usurper who should make himself master of the relics would be acknowledged king without dispute. It has sometimes happened that a relation of the reigning monarch has stolen the crocodile teeth with their precious contents, and then had himself proclaimed king.'[1]

When a king of the Panebian Lybians died, his head was cut off, covered with gold, and deposited in a sanctuary. It is the custom among the Masai for a chief to remove the skull of his predecessor's body a year after burial, and to secrete it, at the same time offering a sacrifice and a libation. The possession of the skull is understood to confirm his authority.

'When the Alake or king of Abeokuta in West Africa dies, the principal men decapitate his body, and placing the head in a large earthen vessel deliver it to the new sovereign; it becomes his fetish and he is bound to pay it honours. Similarly, when the Jaga, or king of Cassange, in Angola, has departed this life, an official extracts a tooth from the deceased monarch and presents it to his successor, who deposits it along with the teeth of former kings in a box, which is the sole property of the crown and without which no Jaga can legitimately exercise the regal power.'[2]

It is said that among the Guanches of the Canary Islands the femur of the dead king constituted an important part of the regalia, and that the oath of allegiance taken by the chiefs to the new ruler was sworn upon it. Frazer believes that through the corporeal relic the soul of his predecessor is transferred to the new ruler. A somewhat different theory has been maintained by Westermarck, who believes that it is not the soul of the dead ruler which becomes transferred, but his *mana*, or holiness. The sultan of Morocco is enabled to transfer to another his *baraka*, or sanctity.[3]

3. Election of a king by means of the royal insignia.—In view of the great sanctity of the kingly office in the lower stages of culture, and the belief that the luck of the people is bound up with its holder, it is of course of vital necessity that he who is most suitable should be elected to fill it. In order to obtain supernatural ratification for the choice of a king, divination has often been resorted to; sometimes the actual symbols of royalty themselves serve as a medium, and sometimes a particular object is kept for this purpose, which may not improperly, therefore, be termed a part of the regalia. This practice, though reflecting a very primitive phase of thought, has remained in vogue even among peoples who have attained to a considerable measure of civilization.

In an old Transylvanian *Märchen*, when the people assembled to choose a new ruler, they placed the crown upon a hillock, from whence it rose, floated into the air, and descended on the head of the future monarch.

Another interesting example is found in ancient India.

It is said that in Benares, when a king died, four lotus-coloured horses were yoked to a festive carriage, on which were displayed the five emblems of royalty (sword, parasol, diadem, slipper, and fan). This was sent out of a gate of the city, and a priest bade it proceed to him who had sufficient merit to rule the kingdom.[4]

The Lia Fail, as the stone on which the early kings of Leinster were crowned was called, which legend has identified with the English Coronation Stone brought by Edward I. from Scone, is said to have recognized the destined king by roaring when he stood upon it. It seems not impossible that similar animistic or animatistic beliefs may have once been attached to the 'King's Stone' at Kingston-on-Thames on which the Anglo-Saxon kings were crowned, and to the Coronation Stone of the kings of Sweden at Upsala. A curious story of the power of a sacred stone to determine the succession to the throne is related of a certain Scythian tribe.

When a king died, a tribal assembly met on the banks of the river Tanais to determine on a successor to the throne. In the river was a stone like a crystal, resembling in shape a man wearing a crown. Whoever was able to find it and produce it in the assembly became king.[1]

The following story from Africa shows the prevalence of similar ideas in that continent:

'When Dagara, the King of Karagwe, on the western shore of Lake Victoria Nyanza, died, he left behind him three sons, any of whom was eligible to the throne. The officers of state put before them a small mystic drum. It was of trifling weight but, being loaded with charms, no one could lift it, save he to whom the ancestral spirits were inclined as the successor.'[2]

4. Symbols of kingship.—As soon as social distinctions began to reveal themselves in human society—which was of course at a very early stage in its evolution—they would quite naturally be indicated by the wearing of certain ornaments. Interments of the Palæolithic Age show the widespread use of teeth and shells for decorative purposes, but it is impossible to draw any certain inferences from them as to the wearer's rank. Among the remains of the Bronze and Early Iron Ages in Europe we find torcs, rings, and bracelets of gold as well as those of baser metals, and we may perhaps assume with some degree of safety that they were made for the chiefs. We know, of course, very little of the dress of the pre-historic peoples of Europe, though a few fragments of woven stuff have been found among the remains of the lake-dwellings (*q.v.*) of Switzerland. Probably the costume of chiefs differed little from that of ordinary persons, apart from their more solid ornaments. A royal costume may indicate that its wearer is the representative of a god. Naramsin carried two horns on his helmet, signifying his divine character.[3]

'The vestments of early kings of England,' says J. R. Planché, 'on state occasions do not appear to have differed from their ordinary apparel, unless occasionally the materials may have been more costly.'[4]

In some parts of the world a certain colour is emblematic of royalty. Among the Malays the royal colour is yellow, the privilege of wearing which is shared by the magician. In ancient Persia the Great King wore a robe of purple. This colour was adopted by the Macedonian kings after the conquests of Alexander the Great. Purple was also a royal colour among the Etruscans. The *paludamentum* of the Roman emperor, a military mantle analogous to the Greek χλαμύς, was of purple, and the expression *sumere purpuram* became equivalent to mounting the throne, while the anniversary of the emperor's accession was called *natalis purpuræ*.

At the present day an ornamented club, a girdle of feathers in the Pacific, a string of boar's teeth in New Guinea, throughout S. Asia the umbrella, and in Ashanti a gold axe, are insignia of chieftainship. A small battle-axe was also carried by high officials in ancient Egypt.[5] Among European peoples they usually include the following ornaments: crown, sceptre or staff, sword, and ring. The regalia may gradually acquire a special

[1] *GB*[3], pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 202.
[2] *Ib.* p. 203.
[3] E. A. Westermarck, 'The Killing of the Divine King,' *Man*, viii. [1908] 99, 24.
[4] *The Jātakas*, no. 445 (ed. E. B. Cowell, Cambridge, 1895–1907, iv. 25).

[1] *FL* xiv. [1903] 48; Plut. *de Flur.* xiv. 3.
[2] E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, London, 1914, p. 317.
[3] Meyer, § 402.
[4] *Cyclopædia of Costume*, 2 vols., London, 1876–79, *s.v.* 'Robe.'
[5] Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 73.

sanctity as the relics of some kingly saint or national hero. Thus the ancient regalia of England, which were destroyed under the Commonwealth in 1649,[1] were venerated as relics of St. Edward, by whom they were believed to have been worn. The regalia of Hungary are regarded as relics of St. Stephen. The imperial and French regalia were to some extent relics of Charlemagne.

The English regalia consist of St. Edward's crown, the imperial crown, the sceptre with the dove, the sceptre with the cross, St. Edward's staff, the orb, the gold spurs, the sword of State, and the second and third swords, and the curtana, or sword of mercy. The regalia of the Holy Roman Empire consisted of Charlemagne's crown, his dalmatic embroidered with large crowns, the golden apple or globe, Charlemagne's sword, his golden sceptre, the imperial cloak embroidered with eagles, the buskins, gloves, and the hereditary crown of Rudolf II. The French regalia included the crown said to have been given by Pope Leo III. to Charlemagne, Charlemagne's sword, called 'Joyeuse,' a sceptre six feet high, the hand of justice, and Charlemagne's spurs, vestments, dalmatic, tunic, buskins or sandals, and mantle. The Scottish regalia included a crown, sceptre, and sword.[2] It seems to have been the custom for the English kings to be buried in their coronation robes, as was shown at the opening of Edward I.'s tomb in 1774. Owing to this practice, there existed, of course, no hereditary royal robes in England as in some other countries.

The most important regalia of the khalīfahs were the supposed relics of the Prophet — his striped cloak (*burdah*), his ring, his staff, and his sword.[3] They are said to have been dug up in A.H. 132, and to have been brought to Constantinople in the reign of Selim I. (1512–21), who on his conquest of Egypt forced the last of the 'Abbāsid khalīfahs to make over his rights to him. There seems, however, little chance that they are genuine, as, even supposing that the story of their being dug up is true, they would probably have perished when Baghdād was taken by the Mongols in A.D. 1258. As the origin and symbolism of the crown have already been dealt with,[4] they need not be discussed here, but something may be said of some of the other more prominent insignia of royalty.

5. The sceptre.—John Selden, in his *Titles of Honor*,[5] says:

'For the Scepter, some testimonies make it an ancienter Ensigne of a King than the Crown or Diadem is. Justin (or rather Trogus Pompeius) seems to denie that the old Kings of Rome had any Diadems; but that instead of them they carried Scepters. So I conceive him in those words spoken of the age of those Kings, "Per ea adhuc tempora reges hastas pro Diademate habebant, quas Græci SCEPTRA dixere." For their Diadems, enough alreadie. But it is most cleer that both in prophan and holy writers the scepter is much ancienter (as it was attributed to a King) than either Crown or Diadem.'

It is probable that the ancestor of the sceptre is far older than even Selden imagined. Possibly it is to be found as early as the old Stone Age. A shaft of reindeer's horn perforated at its broader end by one or more cylindrical holes has been found in certain Aurignacian and Lower Magdalenian deposits in France. In its later form it is decorated with incised designs. Gabriel de Mortillet, believing it to be a ceremonial object, gave it the question-begging name of *bâton de commandement*.[6] Among the chiefs and medicine-men of the Plains Indians of N. America carved batons served as emblems of authority. Their use was forbidden to ordinary persons.[1] More recently the resemblance of the *bâton de commandement* to the arrow-straightener of the Eskimo has been pointed out.[2] Neither in Greek nor in Latin is the word 'sceptre' (σκῆπτρον, *scipio*) used exclusively of a royal emblem, and from this we may infer that in origin it did not differ from other staffs, but that in very early days a common implement was put to a ceremonial use. The σκῆπτρον was a staff used in Greece by old men; the *scipio* was a wand carried by magistrates in Rome. Mommsen[3] regards the story related by Livy of the senator M. Papirius striking the Gaul with his sceptre as unhistorical. That a staff was an emblem of kingly rank during the monarchical period we know from the well-known expression of Homer, σκηπτοῦχοι βασιλῆες.[4] The σκῆπτρον was handed down from father to son. At Rome the augur's baton, or *lituus*, was a stick curved like a shepherd's crook at the upper end. The *lituus* with which Romulus is said to have divided the city into regions was believed to have been miraculously preserved at the burning of Rome by the Gauls in 390 B.C. The *lituus* was probably of Etruscan,[5] and therefore ultimately of Asiatic, origin. The Hittite priest-king is represented carrying a reversed *lituus*. A crook was also part of the insignia of the Egyptian kings.[6] Pliny uses *lituus* as synonymous with *scipio*.[7] The magistrate appeared in the triumphal car in the *processus consularis* at the games, bearing in his hand an eagle-tipped sceptre of ivory.

'This, however, was an emblem of apotheosis, and unlike the other "ornamenta triumphalia," was never worn on other occasions during the life of the triumphator, nor was it carried at his funeral.'[8]

On Etruscan and other coins Zeus holds an eagle-tipped sceptre, and on Cilician coins of the 4th cent. B.C. Baal Tars (Sandas) is also represented holding one. The ivory sceptre tipped with an eagle which was carried by the early kings of Rome is regarded by Cook as symbolizing the fact that the holder was an incarnation of Jupiter.[9] All the Achæan chiefs had sceptres. Mention has already been made of the fact that Agamemnon's sceptre was worshipped at Chæronea. Nestor reminds Agamemnon that he bears the sceptre of Zeus in his capacity as judge.[10] This appears to have been an oaken staff or spear (δόρυ) of great sanctity. Cook believes that the royal sceptre which conferred the right of judgment was a conventionalized form of the oak of Zeus.[11]

'The god whom the Chaeroneans honour most is the sceptre which Homer says Hephaestus made for Zeus, and Zeus gave to Hermes, and Hermes to Pelops, and Pelops bequeathed to Atreus, and Atreus to Thyestes, from whom Agamemnon had it. This sceptre they worship, naming it a spear; and that there is something divine about it is proved especially by the distinction it confers on its owners. The Chaeroneans say that it was found on the borders of their territory and of Panopeus in Phocis, and that the Phocians found gold along with it, but that they themselves were glad to get the sceptre instead of the gold. I am persuaded it was brought to Phocis by Electra, daughter of Agamemnon. There is no public temple built for it, but the man who acts as priest keeps the sceptre in his house for the year; and sacrifices are offered to it daily, and a table is set beside it covered with all sorts of flesh and cakes.'[12]

The veneration of staffs is world-wide. Hector and Priam raise their sceptres while taking an oath.[13] Achilles also swears by a herald's staff.[14]

[1] Previous to the Commonwealth there existed in England duplicate sets of regalia—the relics of St. Edward, with which each king was crowned, which were kept at Westminster, and a new set made for the use of each king, which were kept in the Tower.

[2] Taylor, *The Glory of Regality*, p. 88 f.

[3] Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab* ('Golden Meadows'), tr. C. Barbier de Meynard and P. de Courteille, Paris, 1861–77, vi. 77.

[4] See art. CROWN.

[5] 2nd ed., p. 175.

[6] See art. STAFF.

[1] *Bull. 30 BE* [1907], pt. i. p. 136.

[2] W. J. Sollas, *Ancient Hunters*², London, 1915, p. 305.

[3] *Röm. Staatsrecht*², Leipzig, 1876–77, i. 140.

[4] *Il.* ii. 86.

[5] Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Lituus.'

[6] Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 60.

[7] J. Garstang, *The Land of the Hittites*, London, 1910, pp. 217, 229; *HN* xxviii. 4.

[8] Smith, *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities*³, London, 1890–91, *s.v.* 'Sceptrum.'

[9] *FL* xvi. [1905] 302.

[10] *Il.* ix. 96 ff.

[11] *FL* xv. [1904] 371.

[12] Paus. IX. xl. 11 f., ed. Frazer, i. 496 f.

[13] *Il.* x. 321, 328.

[14] *Ib.* i. 234

'In concluding a treaty the Romans took a sceptre and a flint from the temple of Jupiter Feretrius; they swore by the sceptre and "struck (concluded) the treaty" with the flint.'[1]

The war-clubs of celebrated warriors, *anava*, in Samoa were venerated by their families. It was regarded as indispensable to success in battle to perform certain rites in their honour.[2] A Mexican merchant carried a smooth black stick representing the god Yacatecutli, who was believed to protect him on his journey.[3]

'In Aneitum, New Hebrides, South Pacific, there used to be a sacred staff, made of iron-wood, rather longer and thicker than an ordinary walking-stick. It had been kept for ages in the family of medicine-men, and was regarded as the representative of the god. When the priest was sent for to see a sick person, he took the stick with him, and leaning on it harangued the patient, whose eyes always brightened at the sight of the stick.'[4]

In the OT the word 'sceptre' is frequently used as a synonym for royalty.[5] The Hebrew *shēbeṭ'* may stand either for a short ornamental sceptre, such as Assyrian kings are sometimes represented as having, or for a long staff.[6] The Roman emperors adopted the *sceptrum eburneum* of the triumphant general. When the empire became Christian, a cross was often substituted for an eagle. In some countries two sceptres came into use at an early period. In a 9th cent. English Coronation Order, which is said to be a copy of the Pontifical of Egbert, archbishop of York, 732–766, a sceptre (*sceptrum*) and a staff (*baculum*) are mentioned.[7] The word *baculus*, *baculum*, was not applied to staffs of a ceremonial character in Rome,[8] but merely to ordinary ones. The Coronation Order of Ethelred II. mentions a sceptre (*sceptrum*) and a rod (*virga*).[9] Ethelred II. is the first English king on whose coins a sceptre is represented. Since the time of Richard I. the two sceptres have borne a cross and a dove respectively. The sceptre with the dove was a reminiscence of the peaceful part of the Confessor's reign after the expulsion of the Danes.[10] Of the French sceptres one bore a *fleur-de-lys*, and the other a hand in the act of blessing. The latter was known as the *main de justice*. It was put into the left hand of the king. The human hand as an amulet was widely used throughout the Mediterranean, and in the same region an outstretched human hand is often painted on houses as a protection against the evil eye. A bronze relief at Copenhagen represents Zeus-Sabazios in Phrygian costume, holding in his right hand a pine-cone and in his left a sceptre tipped with a votive hand.[11] In early Christian art a hand was a symbol representing God the Father. As to the cause of the duplication of the sceptre, Lord Bute makes the following plausible suggestion:

'This may possibly have arisen from the words, "Thy rod and thy staff, they comfort me," in Psalm xxiii., which was treated as a Regal Psalm on account of the passage "Thou hast anointed mine head with oil," and was additionally appropriate in the Latin, from commencing, "Dominus regit me" as an acknowledgment of the Divine Sovereignty over earthly Princes.'[12]

'In the English Coronation Orders the sceptre is especially the sign of regal power, while the rod is more the ensign of the paternal authority of the sovereign.'[13]

[1] Frazer, *Paus.* v. 211.
[2] *Ib.* quoting J. B. Stair, in *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, no. xvii. [1896] p. 40.
[3] *Ib.* v. 212, quoting F. S. Clavigero, *Hist. of Mexico*², tr. C. Cullen, London, 1807, i. 388 ff., and B. de Sahagun, *Hist. gén. des choses de la Nouvelle-Espagne*, French tr., Paris, 1880, pp. 38 f., 296 f.
[4] *Ib.*, quoting G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 327 f.
[5] Cf. Gn 49¹⁰: 'The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between his feet, until Shiloh come.'
[6] *HDB* iv. 417.
[7] Wickham Legg, *English Coronation Records*, p. 31.
[8] Daremberg-Saglio. [9] Wickham Legg, *loc. cit.*
[10] A. P. Stanley, *Hist. Memorials of Westminster Abbey*⁵, London, 1882, p. 39.
[11] Cook, *Zeus*, p. 392.
[12] *Scottish Coronations*, Paisley and London, 1902, p. 15.
[13] Wickham Legg, p. xliii.

6. The orb.—

'As the Scepter,' says Selden, 'is the ornament of the right hand, so in the left the Globe or Mound, with the Crosse Infixt, in Statues and Pictures (and in some Coronations) of Kings, is a singular Ensign of Royall dignitie. The severall times wherein the solemne use of this in severall kingdoms began, is not so easily found, nor perhaps worth the inquirie. It shall suffice here to shew how it began in the Empire, whence the use of it was by example taken into all or most of other kingdoms of Christendom. That which we name a Globe or Mound here is also sometimes called an Apple, sometimes a Ball, and it is observed by learned men that it was frequent in the state of Rome before the Emperors were Christian to have both among their Ensigns in the field and in their monies the Ball or Globe, the beginning whereof ISIDORE also referres to AUGUSTUS. PILAM, saith he, IN SIGNA CONSTITUISSE FERTUR Augustus, PROPTER NATIONES SIBI IN CUNCTO ORBE SUBJECTAS UT Malus FIGURAM ORBE OSTENDERET. Thus some copies have it, and not MAGIS FIGURAM etc. as we usually read here.'[1]

At the imperial coronations the orb was carried by the Counts Palatine of the Rhine, under the name of *pomum imperiale*.[2] The apple was sacred to Aphrodite, and is a token of love in S.E. Europe at the present day, but does not appear to have been a token of kingship in the ancient world. In its origin, however, the orb appears to have symbolized the vault of heaven. Zeus is frequently represented with a blue *orbis*, or globe. A coin of Caracalla represents Jupiter Capitolinus holding a globe in his right hand and a sceptre in his left.[3] Sometimes a globe rests beside the god's feet.[4] From being a symbol of the sky-god the globe becomes one of the imperial insignia. Imperial coins of the 3rd and 4th centuries show the emperors holding a globe.

'These representations imply on the one hand that the emperor has stepped into the shoes of Iupiter, and on the other hand that his duties descend in unbroken succession from occupant to occupant of the imperial seat. . . . Frequently from the time of Commodus to that of Diocletian we find Iupiter delegating the globe to his human representative.'[5]

Both in Roman mosaics and in Pompeian paintings the globe is coloured blue or bluish-green, which indicates that it signified sky rather than earth. It is uncertain whether the cross was first added to the globe by Constantine or by Valentinian I.[6] Julian the Apostate replaced it by a figure of victory. Under the name of *globus cruciger* it was a part of the Byzantine regalia. Though the orb formed a part of the regalia of the Holy Roman Empire and of England, it was not used in France. In the English coronation ceremonial it is treated as a symbol of the dominion of Christ over the world. On placing the orb in the sovereign's right hand, the archbishop addresses him in an exhortation containing these words:

'When you see this orb set under a cross, remember that the whole world is subject to the power and Empire of Christ our Redeemer.'

7. The sword.—The symbolism of the sword is of course self-explanatory. The girding of the new monarch with a sword is a practically universal feature of coronation ceremonies. It is a reminiscence of the days when the king was not merely the titular but the actual war-chief of his people. So intimate a part have weapons played in the religion of a warlike people that deities have been worshipped under their forms. A spear kept in the Regia was worshipped as an image of Mars; the Scythians sacrificed sheep and horses to an iron sword, and the war-god of the Alans was worshipped as a naked sword stuck in the ground.[7]

Indeed, in the case of the sultans of Turkey, the girding on of the sword of Osman in the celebrated mosque of Eyub on the Golden Horn is the formal ceremony of inauguration. At the coronation of the king of Hungary an impressive ceremony is connected with the sword of St. Stephen. After the coronation the king rides on his charger to a

[1] P. 180. [2] *Ib.* p. 183. [3] Cook, p. 46.
[4] *Ib.* p. 42. [5] *Ib.* p. 45 ff.
[6] Selden, p. 181. [7] Frazer, *Paus.* v. 211.

mound made of earth brought from all the provinces of the kingdom and waves his sword towards the four points of the compass, indicating his determination to defend his kingdom against surrounding foes. The tendency of the various royal ornaments to become multiplied is also apparent in the case of the sword. No fewer than five swords now form part of the English regalia: (1) the sword of State which is carried before the king on various occasions; (2) a small sword which is substituted for it during the coronation ceremony, and with which he is ceremonially girded; (3) the sword of spiritual justice; (4) the sword of temporal justice; (5) the curtana, *i.e.* 'shortened' sword, or sword of mercy, which is blunted at the end by the removal of the point. Such swords were in ancient times carried by heralds. A similar idea is found in Japan, where certain officials such as doctors wore in their garments a wooden ornament resembling a short sword.[1]

8. Bracelets and rings.—It is not unlikely that bracelets, anklets, and rings may have at one time been amulets, and have participated in the inevitable tendency of amulets to degenerate into ornaments. As emblems of kingship bracelets seem to have been more prevalent in the East than in the West. They were worn by the kings of Persia, and also formed part of the royal insignia of Saul, whose bracelets were, after his death, brought to David by an Amalekite.[2] They were formerly in use in England, and a pair belonging to the regalia was ordered to be destroyed under the Commonwealth. They have not been used in England since that date.[3] The use of the ring is, however, almost universal. Though at an early period it may have been an amulet, yet before degenerating into a mere ornament it passed through a period of usefulness as a signet. The Spartan magistrates had a public signet with which they sealed everything that had to be sealed.[4] That rings were royal ornaments from an early period we know from the curious legends surrounding the rings of Minos and of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos. In Rome the gold ring was often conferred as a military distinction. The *jus anuli aurei* limited its use. The emperor's ring was a kind of State seal. In the *Liber Regalis*, which represents the fullest development of the mediæval English coronation ritual, the ring is referred to as 'Catholicæ fidei signaculum.'[5] In Europe the ceremonial use of rings is of course most familiar in connexion with betrothal and marriage. The coronation ring symbolizes the marriage of the monarch to his people, just as the episcopal ring symbolizes the marriage of the bishop to his see. The English coronation ring is indeed sometimes called the wedding-ring of England.[6] The doge of Venice used to cast a ring into the Adriatic, symbolizing the marriage of the city to the sea. The ceremony was called *sposalizio del mar* ('the wedding of the sea'), and was celebrated annually on Ascension Day.

A curious legend attaches to St. Edward's ring. It is said that he once bestowed it upon an old man. Some years later two English pilgrims in the Holy Land met the old man, who restored it to them, revealing himself as St. John the Evangelist, and bade them return it to the king. There is also a superstition that the closer the ring fits the king's finger, the more loved will he be, and the longer will be his reign.[7] Royal rings have served various symbolic purposes. Alexander the Great on his death-bed bestowed his ring upon Perdiccas, as symbol of his intention to entrust the government of the empire to him. The Anglo-Saxon king Offa is said to have appointed his successor by sending him his ring.[1] The bestowal of the royal ring may symbolize a pledge, as in the case of Elizabeth's gift to Essex, or it may symbolize a royal command. In the book of Esther Ahasuerus gives his ring to Haman as a warrant for massacring the Jews. Adrian IV. confirmed Henry II. on the throne of Ireland by sending him a gold ring. Mary Queen of Scots, by sending her ring, pardoned two burgesses who were about to be hanged.[2]

9. The umbrella.—Throughout Asia and parts of Africa the umbrella is one of the most important insignia of royalty. It is or has been in use among the Malays, in Burma, Siam, India, and among the Seljuk sultans and the Mogul emperors.[3] An umbrella is shown on the reverse of a coin of Herod Agrippa I. It also forms part of the regalia in Madagascar. In one of the *Jātaka* tales a prince who wishes to dispossess his brother of the throne says, 'Give the royal umbrella up to me, or give battle.'[4] In 1855 the king of Burma, addressing the governor-general of India, spoke of himself as 'the monarch who reigns over the great umbrella-wearing chiefs of the Eastern Countries.' It seems most probable that the ceremonial character of the umbrella is due to the tabu which prevents certain sacred persons from being exposed to the sun's rays, and is a counterpart to the very common tabu which prevents their feet from touching the earth. The Mikado and the high-priest of the Zapotecs of Mexico were forbidden to expose themselves to the rays of the sun. Pope Alexander III. accorded to Ziani, doge of Venice, the right of having a canopy or umbrella carried over him as a symbol of sovereign power.

'Umbrellas appear to have been sometimes used in ritual for the purpose of preventing the sunlight from falling on sacred persons or things. . . . At an Athenian festival called Scira the priestess of Athena, the priest of Poseidon, and the priest of the Sun walked from the Acropolis under the shade of a huge white umbrella.'[5]

10. Investiture with the regalia.—Whether a monarchy is elective or hereditary, it is usual for some ceremony to be held for the purpose of inaugurating a new reign. This ceremony usually takes the form of investing the sovereign with the royal insignia. The inauguration of the king of Tahiti consisted of his being ceremonially invested with a sacred girdle of red feathers in the presence of the image of the god Oro. By means of this ceremony he was formally initiated into divine rank. After describing the girdle, the officiating priest would say, 'Parent this of you, O King.'[6]

Among the Baganda, when the period of mourning for the dead monarch was over, the new ruler and his consort were ceremonially divested of their bark clothes and invested with new ones. This ceremony was called 'confirming the king in his kingdom.'[7] In Madagascar the object of the inauguration ceremony was to secure for the king the quality of *hasina*, an intrinsic supernatural virtue, which renders an object good or efficacious.[8] For this purpose the new ruler mounted a sacred stone, and exclaimed, 'Masina, Masina, masina v'aho?' The assembled people replied, 'Masina.' These words van Gennep translates, 'Have I acquired the powers of *hasina*? Am I holy?'[9] Among the Ba-Thonga the inauguration of a new

1 *Times*, *Coronation Supplement*, 19th June 1911.
2 2 S 1[10].
3 Wickham Legg, p. xliv.
4 Frazer, *Paus.* iii. 329.
5 Wickham Legg, p. 97.
6 Stanley, p. 40.
7 Wickham Legg, p. xlix.

1 W. Jones, *Finger-ring Lore*, London, 1877, p. 181.
2 *Ib.* p. 182.
3 Ferishta, tr. Dow, ii. 328 f.
4 *Jātakas*, no. 539 (vol. vi. p. 19).
5 *GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, i. 20, note.
6 W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832–36, iii. 103.
7 Roscoe, *The Baganda*, p. 197.
8 Van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, p. 17.
9 *Ib.* p. 82.

chief is a purely military affair, and no religious ceremony takes place.[1]

The coronation of the Egyptian kings was supposed to take place in heaven. In a description of the coronation of Rameses III. we read :

'Then my father Amon-Re, Lord of Gods, Re-Atum, and Ptah, beautiful of face, crowned me as Lord of the Two Lands on the throne of him who begat me; I received the office of my father with joy; I was crowned with the atef-crown bearing the uraeus; I assumed the double-plumed diadem like Tatenen. I sat upon the throne of Harakhte. I was clad in the regalia, like Atum.'[2]

Another inscription speaks of Rameses III. assuming the regalia of Horus and Set.[3]

The inauguration ceremony of a new emperor of Japan consists in the ceremonial taking possession of the three chief articles of the regalia. The principal one is a sacred sword which is called Kusanagi no Tsungi.

'This sword (so legend goes) was found by Susa-no-o in the tail of an eight-headed serpent, which he intoxicated with "sake" and then slew. Having been brought down from heaven many centuries ago by the first ancestor of the Mikados, it came into the possession of Yamato-take, and assisted that prince in the conquest of Eastern Japan. This treasure is never shown, but a great festival is held in its honour on June 21st.'[4]

The two others are a mirror and a jewel. They are kept at Kyoto and the inauguration takes place there, after the period of mourning for the dead ruler is over.

In Europe, with the exception of Hungary, to which reference has already been made, a coronation ceremony has usually served rather to ratify the election of a king than actually to create one. Before set forms came into use, it was often of a more or less spontaneous character. When Julian the Apostate was proclaimed emperor at Paris in 360, a standard-bearer named Maurus took off the torc which he was wearing, and placed it upon the head of the newly-elected ruler.[5] The earliest known account of a coronation in Great Britain is that of King Aidan by St. Columba, which is found in St. Adamnan's life of the saint.

Throughout the Middle Ages the position of the Church was that of witness to a contract between ruler and people at the crowning of a king. The *Pontificale Romanum* provides a special Mass for the coronation of the king. The Church presents the newly-elected monarch with his investiture.

One of the bishops who are presenting the king to the metropolitan says, 'Reverendissime Pater, postulat Sancta Mater Ecclesia Catholica ut praesentem egregium militem ad dignitatem Regiam sublevatis.' The metropolitan asks, 'Scitis esse dignum, et utilem ad hanc dignitatem?' The bishop replies, 'Et novimus, et credimus, eum esse dignum, utilem Ecclesiæ Dei, et ad regimen hujus Regni.'[6]

W. Stubbs's view of the ceremony is as follows:

'The ceremony was understood as bestowing the divine ratification on the election that had preceded it, and as typifying rather than conveying the spiritual gifts for which prayer was made. That it was regarded as conveying any spiritual character or any special ecclesiastical prerogative there is nothing to show; rather from the facility with which crowned kings could be set aside and new ones put in their place without any objection on the part of the bishops, the exact contrary may be inferred.'[7]

The same view is taken by the French writer Menin, who says that in his own day (reign of Louis XV.) kings were recognized independently of all ceremony of investiture. No formal recognition of the king, however, is found in the French coronation ritual.

'Le sacre des Rois,' he says, 'est une ratification publique du droit qu'ils ont de succéder à la couronne de leurs ancêtres, et une confirmation du premier acte qui les a mis en possession du Trône; c'est une espèce d'alliance spirituelle du Roy avec son Royaume qu'il épouse, pour ainsi dire, qu'il s'engage de maintenir, de défendre, et de protéger, en même temps que sa Royaume, par la voix des peuples, lui promet solennement fidelité et obeissance.'[1]

Nevertheless a wide-spread belief seems to have grown up in the Middle Ages that the anointing of kings was of a sacramental nature, conferring a mark or character on the soul of the recipient. At all events a king was widely held to possess a quasi-sacerdotal character. The emperor was permitted to read the Gospel at his coronation Mass, and the French king to communicate under both kinds at his coronation. These facts led to the conviction that an unanointed and uncrowned prince was no true king. The French kings until the 12th cent. began their reign on the day of their coronation.[2] 'Le Roi dormoit,' said the old chroniclers, speaking of the period before a coronation. This belief had not completely died out even in the 19th century. Renan mentions the fact that some Bretons held that Louis Philippe, who had been neither anointed nor crowned, had no more right to exercise the functions of a king than any one who was unordained would have to exercise those of the priesthood.[3]

Precedent for the crowning of a prince during the lifetime of his father was found in the crowning and anointing of Solomon by order of David, and was frequently resorted to in order to ensure the stability of a dynasty. The survival of a coronation ceremony in Europe at the present day is not necessarily associated with the possession of great monarchical prerogatives. The German Emperor and the Emperor of Austria[4] are not crowned, though the 'hereditary presidents' of England and Norway are. In Spain the coronation ceremony has been discontinued. In England its discontinuance was seriously discussed at the accession of William IV. In most of the monarchies founded in the 19th cent., such as Italy, Belgium, Greece, it has never been introduced, and the king merely takes an oath to observe the Constitution. One of the oldest coronation ceremonies in Europe is the crowning of the pope, who is crowned by the youngest cardinal-deacon with the tiara or triple crown, an ornament ultimately derived from the *camelaucum*, a head-dress worn by high Byzantine officials. It is not a liturgical ornament, and the papal coronation has no religious significance.

No definite rules can be laid down with regard to the crowning of queens-consort. In England, if the king is married at the time of his coronation, the ceremony has usually been performed, and sometimes it has been performed separately if he married afterwards. In France it was usually omitted, and, if performed, it generally took place at St. Denys and not at Rheims with the king. The coronation of a queen-consort merely typifies her participation in the royal dignity. Sometimes this is indicated in the coronation ritual; the king of Hungary holds the Crown of St. Stephen for a time on the right shoulder of the queen during the coronation ceremony, and the Tsar of Russia used to touch the Tsarina on the forehead with his crown before crowning her.

When a ruler has abdicated voluntarily and without pressure, he has often symbolized this act by publicly laying aside the royal insignia. Diocletian divested himself of the purple at Nicomedia in 305 in the presence of his assembled troops,[5] and in more recent times the eccentric Queen Christina of Sweden laid aside her crown in the presence of the Swedish senate.

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[1] H. A. Junod, *Life of a S. African Tribe*, London, 1912–13, p. 34r.

[2] J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905–07, iv. 401.

[3] *Ib.* iv. 62.

[4] Murray's *Handbook for Japan*, by B. H. Chamberlain and W. B. Mason, London, 1907, p. 236.

[5] F. E. Brightman, in *JThSt* ii. 366, quoting Amm. Marc. xx. 4.

[6] Ed. J. Catalani, Rome, 1738–40, i. 376.

[7] *Constitutional Hist. of England*[5], Oxford, 1891, i. 163.

[1] *Traité hist. et chronolog. du sacre . . . des rois*, p. 177.

[2] *Ib.* [3] *Questions contemporains*, Paris, 1868, p. 434.

[4] The latter, as has already been mentioned, is crowned as king of Hungary.

[5] E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ed. J. B. Bury, London 1896, vol. i. ch. xiii. p. 387.

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H. J. T. JOHNSON.

REGENERATION. — Through all theology and religion there runs a clear antithesis between outwardness and inwardness. In theology this shows itself in the opposition between transcendence and immanence, anthropomorphism and animism. It asks, Is God a glorified man or an indwelling potency? Does He operate on Nature from without or from within? Should we concentrate our thought and faith on Jesus as the risen Lord, the ascended Mediator; or on Christ as Spirit, operating in His Church and in us as believers? Sometimes the contrasts are accentuated, and the opposing views are polemically controverted; sometimes men are content to accept both as the two poles of an unsolved antinomy. A similar antithesis occurs also as to the nature of religion, causing men to ask, Is religion doing or being? Is the vital matter what a man does or what a man is? Ought my great concern to be, What am I to do? or, What ought I to become? *E.g.*, as to the nature of sin, it is disputed whether sin is transgression of a commandment moral or ceremonial, or is perversity and pollution. Again, as regards reconciliation with God, the two queries arise: Is this effected by having sin pardoned, or by having perversity rectified and pollution cleansed? Is the favour of God to be secured by righteously obeying the precepts of His law or by being inwardly changed and sanctified by a Power other and higher than we? Further, is this change to be studied as manifesting itself in outward life and conduct, or as a spiritual and psychological phenomenon? In the former case we are engaged with the subject of conversion, in the latter with that of regeneration.

1. OT conception.—Kirsopp Lake considers the antithesis between outwardness and inwardness to be characteristic severally of the Jew and the Greek. The Jew asked, What am I to do? He required a code of life and action to tell him definitely what to do. The Greek asked not, What am I to do? but, What am I to be? He wished to become something different. What distressed him was the feeling that his very being was corrupt, and he wanted a religion that would help him to become a new being.[1] There are just two criticisms which one would like to make on this: (1) instead of the word 'Greek,' the word 'Hellenist' would be more accurate—the orientalized Greek; and (2) it is unfair to the Jews to suggest that they were not sensible of the inwardness of religion. Both views find expression in the Jewish Scriptures. It is true that outwardness is prominent in the OT. We have much external morality and external observance of ceremonial requirements. Sin is often disobedience to God's statutes and precepts. Restoration to divine favour is secured by sacrifices offered in accordance with a meticulous ritual. But this is not the only conception of sin that meets us in the OT. Sin is also disorder. It is שָׁוְא, 'desolation,' 'chaos.' It is רֶשַׁע, 'restless agitation.' It is defilement, making men unfit to commune with God. It is תּוֹעֵבָה, 'abomination.' It is נִדָּה, that from which men flee, because it is abhorrent; and as such it needs an internal remedy—a remedy which man himself cannot administer. There is a distinct vein of OT teaching which is very pronounced as to man's inability to cleanse himself (Jer 13[23], Pr 20[9]). Man's will is powerless to effect the needed change. Something must be done in man and for man, which divine intervention alone can accomplish (Is 6[5], Ps 51[5], Job 9[2] 15[14-16]). This is apparent from the way in which the best of men plead for divine help and cleansing (Ps 25[11, 18] 41[4] 6[2]), and from the way in which God promises to render the needed help (Jer 2[22] 33[8], Ezk 36[25]). Sin is not something to be merely pardoned, atoned for, taken away, or forgotten. So long as the propensity to sin remained, the OT saint groaned under its tyranny and pollution. He cried for cleansing (Ps 51[2]) and for healing (41[4]). But even this could not satisfy him. He longed for thorough renovation. Regarding the heart as the seat of the collective energies of the personal life, and conscious that this is depraved and that sin has thus banefully affected the very formative sources of character, he cries, 'Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a stedfast spirit within me' (51[10]). Saul was 'turned into another man,' and 'God gave him another heart' (1 S 10[6, 9]), but, alas! he fell away; and so the Psalmist prays that the clean heart, imparted by a new creation, might, by constant renewal, be kept 'stedfast.'

2. The Greek word and its synonyms.—The word 'regeneration' occurs twice in the NT, in either case for the same Greek word παλιγγενεσία = ἡ πάλιν γένεσις (√ γίνομαι), a becoming new again, a reconstitution. The Greek word which would most accurately represent the ideas that we associate with regeneration would be ἀναγέννησις (√ γεννάω); but this does not occur in NT, though the verb is found in 1 P 1[3]. The word παλιγγενεσία first appears in Greek literature to represent the great Stoic conception of world-cycles, according to which the present world will come to an end by conflagration—to be followed, however, by a renovation or reconstruction, a παλιγγενεσία of everything just as it now is. Then, after a definite period, will come another conflagration and reconstitution, and so on—the period between one catastrophe and another being termed a 'great year,' a περίοδος. Hence Marcus Aurelius[1] speaks of 'a periodic παλιγγενεσία of the universe.' Being a high-sounding phrase, it was used hyperbolically to denote any extraordinary change; as when Cicero[2] describes his restoration to rank and favour after exile as 'παλιγγενεσίαν nostram'; and when Philo speaks of the birth of Seth as the παλιγγενεσία of Abel,[3] and of the sons of Noah as 'founders of a παλιγγενεσία,[4] since they were 'pioneers (ἀρχηγεταί) of the second period of the world'; so Josephus[5] speaks of the restoration of the Jews after the Exile as a παλιγγενεσία. With a nearer approach to the original Stoic meaning, Matthew (19[28]) describes the new heavens and the new earth, to which Christians (2 P 3[13]) and Jews (Is 65[17]; *En.* lxxii. 1; *Jub.* i. 29) were looking forward, in these words: 'In the παλιγγενεσία, when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye which have followed me shall sit,' etc. The second NT occurrence of our word is in Tit 3[5], where παλιγγενεσία has an ethical or religious sense: 'According to his mercy he saved us, through the washing [marg. 'laver'] of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost.'

[1] *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, London, 1911, p. 430*f.*, *The Stewardship of Faith*, do. 1915, p. 88*f.*

[1] ii. 1.
[2] *ad Att.* vi. 7.
[3] *De Poster. Caini*, § 36 (Mangey, i. 249).
[4] *De Vita Mosis*, ii. 12 (Mangey, ii. 144).
[5] *Ant.* xi. iii. 4.

Other Greek words with kindred meaning found in NT are: (1) γεννάω, 'beget' (Mt 1[2-16], Ac 7[8]+) and also 'bear children' (Mt 19[12], Gal 4[24], Jn 16[21]+). In a religious sense it occurs in 1 Co 4[15] 'I begat you'; Philem[10] 'whom I begat in my bonds.' In 1 Jn the perf. pass. occurs eight times, and in RV is uniformly translated 'be begotten,' though in five of these instances AV has 'be born'—*e.g.*, 'Every one that loveth is begotten of God' (4[7]); 'Every one that believeth that Jesus is the Christ is begotten of God' (5[1]); but in the eight occurrences in Jn 3[3-8] RV everywhere retains 'be born.' (2) ἀναγεννάω (ἀνά is repetitive), 'beget again *or* anew': 1 P 1[3] 'Blessed be God . . . who begat us again . . . by the resurrection of Jesus Christ.' The noun ἀναγέννησις is not found in NT, but is found in Philo[1] of the rebirth of the physical world. (3) ζωοποιέω, 'make alive,' 'quicken': Eph 2[5] 'God . . . quickened us, together with Christ, when we were dead in trespasses.' (4) ἀποκυέω, 'give birth'; often in an abnormal manner: Ja 1[15] 'Sin bringeth forth death'; 1[18] 'He having so willed, brought us forth [or 'gave us birth'] by the word of truth.' (5) ἀνακαινόω, 'make new again.' This verb, in NT, refers not to the initial quickening, but to the maintaining of the state of newness, 'keep new,' or 'renovate' (Ro 12[2], Col 3[10]).

3. **Cognate ideas and metaphors.**—It is proverbially difficult to translate emotions into words; and to very many of the early Christians who had previously been steeped in sin the change which took place when they entered on the Christian life was so radical and so thorough that it demanded many modes of expression. Such an experience can be expressed only in figures; and 'regeneration' is but one of many metaphors occurring in the NT, all of which are designed to express the fact that, before any man can enjoy the favour of God, a profound change must be wrought in him, which God alone can effect. The early Christians were so amazed at the change in disposition and character which had suddenly come over them that they framed all sorts of theories to account for it, describing their new experience in terms and preconceptions of their own age.[2]

A. *Repentance.*—The simplest metaphors meet us in the Synoptic Gospels. (*a*) Emphasis is laid on repentance (Mt 4[17] 11[20], Lk 13[3]). The Aramaic word for 'repentance,' אֶתְהַפְּכוּתָא, is derived from אתהפך, 'to turn' (cf. Mt 18[3]); and hence we may safely affirm that the repentance (*q.v.*) which Jesus insisted on was a practical one—turning the back on one's former life.

(*b*) 'Becoming as a little child' (Mt 18[3]).—The context discloses what our Lord intended by this. It is the abandonment of pride and ambitious self-seeking, the attainment of meekness, lowliness, and dependence on a father's love, that Jesus desiderated in His disciples. The need of divine grace for the attainment of this great ethical change is not so much explicitly taught as implied in the importance attached to prayer.

(*c*) The quickening effect of the divine Word and the need for co-operation between the human and the divine are taught very clearly in the Parable of the Sower. 'The seed is the word of God' (Lk 8[11]); but three of the four kinds of soil are unproductive; there is only one which is so far receptive of seed as to yield the fruit of a new life within the natural heart of man.

B. *Impartation of a new life.*—The Fourth Gospel takes the three great ideas, life, light, and speech, and expresses the activities of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and also the religious experiences of believers, under one or other of these categories. Jesus says: 'I came that they might have life' (10[10]); 'My sheep . . . follow me, and I give to them eternal life' (10[27f.]); My words 'are spirit, and are life' (6[63]); 'He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life' (3[36]); 'In him was life, and the life was the light of men' (1[4]).

C. *New birth.*—This appears under two aspects, both contained in the word γεννάω: (1) the origination of life—begetting; and (2) the emergence into a new mode of being and into new relations—birth.

(1) In 1 Jn the perf. pass. γεγεννῆσθαι, indicating an initial definite act abiding permanently in its consequences, implies the impartation of a new life-germ, which develops in likeness to God, its veritable Father and fontal source. The same thought is presented in 1 P 1[3] 'Blessed be God who begat us again unto a living hope.'

(2) In Jn 3, though both perf. and aor. are used, it is generally recognized that the metaphor is that of birth; not quickening or impregnation, but emergence into a new world—a new atmosphere, a new environment, and new objects of interest. This is clearly implied in the words of Nicodemus, when, in reply to Christ's statement, 'Ye must be born again,' he crudely asks, 'Can a man enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born?' (3[4]). Similarly we interpret 3[5] ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῇ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος, 'Except a man shall have been born [not 'begotten,' as though the water had a vivifying effect upon him, but 'born'] out of [or from] water[1] and the Spirit' (water and Spirit being the elements out of which the neophyte emerges). The reference probably is to the words of John the Baptist in Mt 3[11] 'I indeed baptize you in water . . . but he shall baptize [or 'immerse'] you in the Holy Ghost.' The context implies that Nicodemus was a disciple of John, and Jn 3[5] inculcates the lesson of Mt 3[11] that immersion in water and emergence from water are not enough; there is needed also an immersion in the Holy Spirit, from which one may emerge a new man, as one newly born emerges from his mother's womb into a new world. The same metaphor occurs in Ja 1[18], where J. B. Mayor[2] is no doubt correct in saying that the verb ἀποκυέω is 'properly used of the mother'—'Having so willed, he gave us birth'

D. *A new creature* (καινὴ κτίσις).—It has been objected that regeneration is not prominent in Paul's teaching; but it would be rash to maintain that he ignored the doctrine of regeneration because he does not use the same metaphor as occurs in John, Peter, and James—indeed, when Paul says, in 2 Co 5[17] 'If any man be in-union-with Christ, he is a new creature,' he is not far away from the same similitude. He is moving in the circle of OT ideas which find expression in Ezekiel: 'I will put a new spirit within you'; 'and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh' (11[19] 36[26]). Again, the Apostle says, 'We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works' (Eph 2[10]), which evidently implies that such a radical change takes place in a Christian as to be comparable to a creation, that this creation is possible only in union with Christ, that God develops the new creation, and that the grand purpose of it all is practical and ethical. Similarly in Col 3[10] and Eph 4[24] 'the new man,' *i.e.* the new self, is stated to be a divine creation, which, in the one case, is 'being renewed in accordance with the image of its Creator,' and, in the other case, is said to be in harmony with God (κατὰ θεόν), 'created in righteousness and holiness of truth.' Some would render καινὴ κτίσις in

[1] *De Incorr. Mundi*, 3 (Mangey, ii. 490).

[2] Cf. T. R. Glover, *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*, London, 1909, p. 156 ff.

[1] Lake (*Inaugural Address at Leiden*, 27th Jan. 1904) and F. C. Burkitt (*Evangelion Da-Mepharreshe*, Cambridge, 1904, ii. 309 f.) advocate that ἐξ ὕδατος should be treated as 'an interpretative gloss,' because it is sometimes omitted in the Fathers; but a consultation of the 36 variants in which 3[5] is quoted in the early Fathers, given in A. Resch, *Paralleltexte zu Johannes*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 73 ff., seems to dispose of this theory; for, though there are several instances in which both 'water' and 'Spirit' are omitted, and several in which 'the Spirit' is omitted, there is not one citation from the Fathers in which 'the Spirit' is inserted and 'water' omitted.

[2] *The Epistle of St. James*[2], London, 1897, p. 59.

2 Co 5[17] 'there is a new creation' (as RVm), implying that man's entire outlook on earth and heaven, man, and God seems changed. Many Christians have testified that, when the spiritual nature is no longer enfeebled and diseased by sin, they seemed to be in a new world. The new life enters also into the larger world of spirit, recognizes its kinship with spiritual forces, feels a companionship with all that is holy and true, and sees God in everything.[1] This is very true and very beautiful, but probably RV represents Paul's thought best, as also in Gal 6[15] 'Neither is circumcision anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.'

E. *A change of clothing.* — This metaphor, though significant, is not fully adequate. Clothing is external; regeneration is internal, psychical, vital. Life only can illustrate life. Vital processes can alone fittingly represent it. Our best similitudes must therefore be drawn from botany or zoology. Character, as others know it, is compared to clothing in Eph 4[22, 24]: 'Put off the old man which is corrupt . . . and put on the new man'; Col 2[11] speaks of 'the putting off of the body of the flesh,' and Col 3[9f.] reads: 'Ye have put off the old man with his doings, and have put on the new man, which is being renewed,' etc.

F. *A passage from death to life.*—Jn 5[24] reads: 'He that heareth my word and believeth on him that sent me . . . hath passed from death unto life,' Eph 2[1]: 'You did he quicken [cause to live] when ye were dead.' These texts are sometimes taken to imply the instantaneousness of the new birth and the absolute deadness and insensibility of the human soul, as well as man's native incapacity for goodness and godliness; and thus they present difficulties equally to the scientist and to the theologian. Many theologians feel obliged, however, by the general trend of Scripture to regard the 'deadness' here spoken of as relative rather than absolute, and to consider man's spiritual nature as diseased and inert rather than literally dead; while the scientist, who objects to admitting anything instantaneous and unprepared for, in any grade of life, organic or psychical, explains the apparent suddenness of the change in man's religious life by the hypothesis of the subliminal self. The new life at first is inchoate, working in the region of subconsciousness; and then, more or less suddenly, there is often a time of spasmodic volitional and emotional tempest, which comes as a great surprise, but which has really been quietly prepared for in that part of our nature where racial and inherited tendencies lie buried beneath the threshold of consciousness.[2] Paul was kicking against the goads of spiritual conviction for some time before his so-called conversion at Damascus.

G. *Burial and resurrection.* — This figure is similar to the above and occurs in the well-known passages Ro 6[3] and Col 2[12].

All these metaphors are, of course, very valuable and carry us a certain distance in the way of elucidation; but scholars are unanimous in admitting that there is an inner fact which defies analysis and description. The universal Christian consciousness is ready to say of the change: 'It is "not of ourselves: it is the gift of God,"' but the *modus operandi* is inscrutable.

'After analysis,' says B. Jowett, 'there remains something which eludes criticism.'[3] 'The nature of regeneration,' says Hodge, 'is not explained in the Bible further than the account therein given of its author, God; its subject, the whole soul; and its effects. . . . Its metaphysical nature is left a mystery.'[1] W. James bears the same testimony. No one 'can explain fully how particular experiences are able to change one's centre of gravity so decisively.' We speak of '"motor efficacy," but such talk is only circumlocution; for whence the sudden motor efficacy?'[2] So Starbuck: 'Who can tell what really happens in one's consciousness when one turns seriously into communion with one's deeper self?' 'What happens below the threshold of consciousness must, in the nature of the case, evade analysis.'[3]

4. Nature of the change.—(1) *The change is new.* —All are agreed as to its newness.

'As a new divine Principle,' says I. A. Dorner, 'the Holy Spirit creates, although not substantially new faculties, a new volition, knowledge, feeling — a new self-consciousness. In brief, He produces a new person.'[4] 'All things are new,' says Horace Bushnell, 'Life proceeds from a new centre. The Bible is a new book. Duties are new. The very world itself is revealed in new beauty and joy to the mind.'[5] And of course Hodge is in thorough agreement here, as he says, 'This new life, therefore, manifests itself in new views of God, of Christ, of sin, of holiness, of the world, of the gospel, and of the life to come.'[6]

(2) *The change expressed in terms of metaphysics.* —The Puritans expressed themselves very largely in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics.

Stephen Charnock († 1680), whose discourses on regeneration were for many years the great authority on our subject, defines regeneration as a 'powerful change, wrought in the soul by the efficacious working of the Holy Spirit, wherein a vital principle, a new habit, the law of God and a divine nature are put into and framed in the heart enabling it to act holily and pleasingly to God.'[7] The distinctions drawn are very subtle, if not conflicting. We note that 'a divine nature is put into the heart'; and yet on p. 93 Charnock assures us that regeneration is 'not an addition to nature,' or a 'change in the substance of the soul.' 'As in the cure of a man, health is not added to the disease; but the disease is expelled and another form and habit set in its place. Add what you will (we are told), without introducing another *form*, it will be of no more efficacy than flowers and perfumes strewed on a dead carcase can restore it to life and remove the rottenness.' We learn, then, that, though regeneration is 'not an addition to nature,' and 'the new creation gives no new faculties,' yet 'a vital *principle* is put into the heart' and 'a new *form* is introduced.' In regeneration there are 'no new faculties,' says a Princeton divine, 'but there are new principles';[8] and from him we obtain a definition of the word 'principle,' which we seek in vain in Charnock. He defines it as 'that foundation which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any particular kind or manner of exercise of the faculties of the soul.' In other words, a 'principle' is 'a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercise of the same faculty of understanding.'

(3) *The change expressed in terms of psychology.* —The great spiritual change which, when viewed causally and subjectively, is called regeneration and, when viewed in its manifest results in life and character, is called conversion (*q.v.*) is a psychical fact and therefore can be expressed in terms of psychology. Metaphysics is ambitious to treat of the soul as an immaterial entity, possessed of substance and faculties, form and principles. Psychology pursues the humbler path of analyzing consciousness and interrogating experience.

E.g., E. F. Scott describes regeneration thus: 'It is like another and higher will sustaining ours, and gradually subduing the whole nature to itself—till the natural life becomes "spiritual" life.'[9] E. Reuss describes it as 'an abdication of our own individuality, allowing the Holy Spirit to evoke a complete metamorphosis of our human nature.'[10] J. Strachan speaks of it as 'practically . . . a new life which turns all the forces of one's being into a new channel. All the energies that formerly made a man a sinner are now employed to make him a saint.'[11] 'Such sudden and radical changes in a man's life' as those of Paul, says Percy Gardner, 'may often be led up to by many experiences and thoughts. But these often culminate in what may be called a violent spiritual and emotional tempest, which shakes the whole being to its utmost depths.'[12] Starbuck

[1] T. M. Herbert, *Sketches of Sermons*, London, 1878, p. 1 ff.; E. D. Starbuck, *Psychology of Religion*, do. 1899, p. 328 f.
[2] W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1902; G. A. Coe, *The Spiritual Life*, New York, 1900; Starbuck, *op. cit.*
[3] *St. Paul's Epistles*², London, 1859, ii. 231.

[1] *Systematic Theology*, London and Edinburgh, 1872–73, iii. 5 f.
[2] *Varieties*, p. 196 f.
[3] Pp. 406, 107.
[4] *A System of Christian Doctrine*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1880–82, iv. 162.
[5] *The New Life*, London, 1861, p. 114.
[6] iii. 34.
[7] Charnock's *Works*, Edinburgh, 1864–65, iii. 87 f.
[8] *Princeton Theological Essays*, 1st ser., Edinburgh, 1856, p. 316.
[9] *The Fourth Gospel*, Edinburgh, 1906, p. 328.
[10] *Hist. de la théologie chrétienne*, Strassburg, 1852, ii. 137, Eng. tr., London, 1872–74, ii. 123.
[11] *ERE* iv. 106[b].
[12] *The Religious Experience of Saint Paul*, London, 1911, p. 31.

says of conversion (though what he says is much more true of regeneration) that it is 'the birth of new powers.' It is 'as if there had been the liberation of fresh energy, or as if new streams had flowed into consciousness.' It is 'life on a higher plane.' 'It is a process of *realising the possibilities* of growth; of making a draft on the latent energies . . . which might otherwise have lain dormant always.'[1]

The psychological expression of regeneration may well be subdivided as follows:

(*a*) *In terms of personality.*—'The new personality is formed,' says Dorner, 'in inner resemblance to the second Adam, on the same family type, so to speak.'[2] 'Grace and freedom meet,' says H. Martensen, and '*a new personality* is established, a copy of the divine and human personality of Christ.'[3] So J. Vernon Bartlet: 'A new personality arises from the new union of the will and the higher element dependent on and akin to the Divine: the man lives anew with a fresh type of moral life—that being dominant which before was subject, and *vice versa*.'[4] And A. C. Headlam: 'St. Paul . . . thought of the Spirit as a beneficent Divine personality . . . inspiring our higher nature, giving us a new personality, a new power, a new life.'[5] Putting the matter more scientifically, James says: 'What is attained is often an altogether new level of spiritual vitality, a relatively heroic level, in which impossible things have become possible, and new energies and endurances are shown. The personality is changed; the man is born anew.'[6] So Starbuck teaches us that in adolescence, with its ferment and unrest, there are indications, when the influences of the Spirit of God which enlightens every man are not violated, that 'a personality is forming beneath that has capacity for self-direction and independent insight.' We thus witness 'the birth of selfhood, the awakening of a self-conscious personality.'[7]

(*b*) *Unification.*—'Every man,' says Percy Gardner, 'finds himself a human being of mixed tendencies.'[8] 'We are each of us,' says G. Steven, 'as it were composed of many "selves."' What we need is 'the unifying of the self or personality,' which was probably in the mind of the Psalmist, when he prayed, 'Unite my heart to fear Thy name.'[9] So Frank Granger: 'The unity of the soul is thus something to be reached after and found both within God and within itself.' 'The soul is not there to begin with, but must be gained.'[10] Accordingly, we find that James, who devotes a chapter of his great work to 'The Divided Self,' says that 'to find religion is only one out of many ways of reaching unity';[11] and defines regeneration as 'the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self, hitherto divided, and consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.'[12] Paul describes his experience of the divided self in Ro 7, and Augustine, who in so many ways duplicated Paul's experience, says, 'Thou didst gather me again out of my dissipation, wherein I was torn piecemeal; while turning away from Thy unity, I lost myself in many things.'[13]

(4) *The change expressed in terms of physiology.*—There seems to be a parallelism between cerebral and psychical processes, but modern psychologists have long abandoned the attempt of David Hartley and his school to maintain that mental acts can ever be adequately described, much less explained, as brain currents or vibrations, or indeed by any physical terms. While aware of the inadequacy of physiology, it seems a fascination to some of our scientific theologians to throw their account of mental acts and states into physiological terms.

E.g., Starbuck says: 'What happens below the threshold of consciousness must, in the nature of the case, evade analysis. It tends to fill in the chasm in our knowledge, however, to explain it in terms of the nervous system and its functionings.'[14] And again: 'If we turn to our crude analogy of nerve cells and connections . . . we may get a definite picture, at whatever cost of accuracy.'[15] Accordingly, we find him describing 'the phenomena' which 'cluster about the birth of a new self' as 'the organisation of nerve elements about a new centre.'[16] In another passage he says that it 'seems entirely accurate' to speak of one who had experienced the 'awakening of new powers and activities' as 'born of the Spirit,' but he immediately adds: 'It is as if brain areas which had lain dormant had now suddenly come into activity—as if their stored-up energy had been liberated, and now began to function.'[17] Starbuck insists strongly that conversion is an adolescent phenomenon; that the periods of physical and mental maturity are the periods when the vast majority of conversions occur. In these periods

[1] Pp. 129-134. [2] *System*, iv. 162.
[3] *Christian Dogmatics*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1866, p. 383.
[4] *HDB* iv. 218.
[5] *St. Paul and Christianity*, London, 1913, p. 111.
[6] *Varieties*, p. 241. [7] P. 394 f.; cf. also pp. 116, 125.
[8] *The Ephesian Gospel*, London, 1915, p. 163.
[9] *Psychology of the Christian Soul*, London, 1911, p. 50 f.
[10] *The Soul of a Christian*, London, 1900, p. 33.
[11] *Varieties*, p. 175. [12] *Ib.* p. 189.
[13] *Confessions*, ii. 1. [14] P. 167. [15] *Ib.* p. 406.
[16] *Ib.* p. 118. [17] *Ib.* p. 132.

'the life-forces tend upward toward the higher brain centres,'[1] and biologically the new birth is 'coming to live on the highest level of the nervous system.'[2] James describes the new birth 'symbolically' thus: that a 'new centre of personal energy has been subconsciously incubated';[3] and Lake attaches so much importance to the theory of a subliminal self that he considers that the really serious controversy of the future will be to determine whether religion is merely 'communion of man with his own subliminal consciousness, which he does not recognize as his own, but hypostatizes as some one exterior to himself.'[4]

5. The efficient cause of regeneration.—(1) *The power of the Spirit.*—The teaching of the NT is emphatic that man needs a drastic inward change as a condition of salvation (Mt 18[3], Jn 3[3]), and in the Acts and Epistles it is everywhere implied that the primitive Christians had experienced such a change (1 Co 6[11], Eph 2[5], Col 1[13], 1 Jn 2[29]). It is equally clear that man is unable to effect this change by himself. There is need of the inworking of a power other and holier than himself. This power is the Holy Spirit. The NT teaches that man is to a greater or less degree controlled by an evil spirit (Ac 5[3], 2 Co 4[4], 1 P 5[8], 1 Jn 3[8]); but over against man in his sin and weakness there stands a Divine Spirit, endowed with creative energy; and into hearts which are opened to receive Him He enters, vivifies latent faculties, and supports men in the struggle of life. Christians in all ages have testified that they were changed. Another will controls their will. A new light illumines everything. A new force controls their emotions, stimulating the higher, repressing the lower. 'Old things are passed away; behold, they are become new' (2 Co 5[17]). God gives the Spirit (2 Co 1[22], 1 Th 4[8], Gal 3[3], Ph 1[19]); man receives the Spirit (Ro 8[15]). The Spirit dwells in man (1 Co 3[16])—not that there are two entities, the human spirit and the divine, existing side by side; but that the Divine Spirit energizes, dynamizes the human spirit, ennobling, dignifying, purifying it. As A. Sabatier expresses it,

'The Spirit of God identifies itself with the human Me into which it enters and whose life it becomes. If we may so speak, it is individualized in the new moral personality which it creates.'[5]

When we come to inquire more minutely what is the divine power which the Christian receives, we find some indefiniteness. There are three terms which are used in NT interchangeably—'Christ,' 'the Spirit of Christ, and 'the Holy Spirit.' The same verbs are used with each, and the same functions are ascribed to each (cf. Ro 8[9], 2 Co 3[17], Gal 2[20] 4[6], Jn 14[16] 20[22], 1 P 1[11]). But does identity of function necessarily imply identity of person or agent? That is a question much discussed. There are not a few scholars who maintain that the 'Holy Spirit' of the Christian dispensation is the spiritual, ascended Christ; *e.g.*, A. Tholuck[6] and Reuss[7] both maintained that the Holy Spirit in the NT is not a self distinct from Christ, but is Christ Himself glorified into a spirit, or the spiritual presence and manifestation of Christ to His disciples after His departure from earth. Franz Delitzsch also maintained that all communications of the Spirit, since the Ascension, are effected through the Spirit of the Son of Man.[8] G. A. Deissmann says:

'The living Christ is the Spirit . . . "The last Adam became a life-giving Spirit."'[9]

Other scholars express themselves more cautiously. *E.g.*, R. C. Moberly says: 'The Holy Ghost is, to us, immedi-

[1] Starbuck, p. 208. [2] *Ib.* p. 290.
[3] *Varieties*, p. 210. [4] *Earlier Epistles*, p. 251 f.
[5] *The Religions of Authority*, London, 1904, p. 307
[6] *Comm. on Gospel of St. John*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1860, p. 336 f.
[7] ii. 524 ff., cited by G. B. Stevens, *The Johannine Theology*, London, 1894, p. 193.
[8] *A System of Biblical Psychology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1867, p. 398.
[9] *Paulus*, Tübingen, 1911, p. 85, Eng. tr., *St. Paul*, London, 1912, p. 125.

ately, the Spirit of the Incarnate Christ. . . . To us, He is the Spirit of God through, and as, being first, for us, the Spirit of the Christ.'[1] So E. F. Scott says: 'Practically, the Spirit is to Paul the power of Jesus acting on believers';[2] and R. J. Drummond, while maintaining that 'it would not be true to say that the Spirit is simply the spiritual presence of the Exalted Christ,' yet, after quoting Christ's words, 'I will send,' 'I will come,' admits that 'the presence of one is practically the presence of the other.'[3]

The important matter is to insist that, since the resurrection and ascension of Christ, there has been *a new potency on the earth.* Whether we seek to explain the matter metaphysically, in terms of the Church's Creeds, or, more wisely, are content to leave it unexplained, the truth is that the Spirit, which, under the Christian dispensation, regenerates and sanctifies believers, is endowed with the properties of the God-man. At Pentecost, and ever since, the Church has been animated by a new power—not the power of the Logos, but a theanthropic power, the power of the glorified Christ. 'The Holy Spirit was not yet, because Jesus was not yet glorified' (Jn 7[39]). The Holy Spirit of the Christian dispensation has the value of the ascended Christ, and has become in the Church a new moral, religious, personal force—the efficiency of Him who 'became in all things like unto his brethren' that we may be 'transformed into his image.' To quote from Dorner:

'The Spirit of God is the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ.[4] As the Spirit of Christ, He carries in Himself the power to diffuse the divine-human life. . . . In fixed historical continuity, the divine-human personal unity . . . is employed for the purpose of propagating the life of the God-man. . . . Through the Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of Christ, humanity is led back to God, appropriated by Christ's theanthropic life; and this is the *Church.*'[5]

(2) *Human co-efficients.* — The co-efficients of regeneration, on the human side, are repentance and faith.

(*a*) *Repentance.* — It has been an error on the part of some Calvinists to maintain that at the time of regeneration man is passive or perhaps even antagonistic. It is very true that no man can come to Christ 'except the Father draw him'; that God always takes the initiative in man's salvation; that 'we love him because he first loved us.' But, before the new birth can be effectuated, there must be a period of unrest and self-dissatisfaction. It is not the first touch of the Spirit upon a sinful soul that regenerates. There are preparatory dealings of God with the soul. Christian experience often testifies to convictions, pleadings, drawings, remorse, and self-accusation, which may perhaps be compared to birth-pangs preceding the new birth. There are, it is true, many cases all down the history of the Church in which the new birth seems to occur very abruptly and suddenly, but the modern mind distrusts the sudden and catastrophic in all departments of life. Accordingly, the modern method of accounting for apparently sudden conversions is to assume that in such cases there is a much richer, inherited subliminal self than in others, and that the upheavals of unrest and remorse have been long taking place beneath the threshold of consciousness. Most modern psychologists[6] very properly raise a protest against the procedure of some denominations which seem to recognize the sudden, remorseful, spasmodic type of conversion as the only genuine one. They do this on the ground that such experiences are entirely a matter of temperament and that some constitutions are incapable of developing spasmodically.

(*b*) *Faith* is the second antecedent to the new birth (Eph 3[17], Ro 8[10], Gal 2[20])—faith in its double meaning of (1) appropriation of a message and trust in the person whom it declares; and (2) self-surrender to a power other and purer than we, which seeks to control our life (see art. FAITH [Christian]). (1) It may be quite true that there are ethnic phenomena which resemble conversion, but Christian regeneration can be effected only by contact with Christ—on the divine side, dynamically, by the operation of the Spirit of the God-man upon the heart of man, and on the human side by hearing of Christ and by trusting and loving Him. Regeneration is conditioned by personal trust in Jesus as Saviour. Every true Christian can say, 'For me to live is Christ.' (2) Self-surrender finds an important place in all religious psychology. It is compared to 'relaxation of effort' on the verge of discovery, when, after hours or days of research, the solution comes unexpectedly, perhaps immediately after awaking from sleep. Many of Starbuck's cases confessed that, after long and weary efforts to conquer sin and to secure, with the much-coveted suddenness, a sense of pardon and regeneration, they found themselves obliged to desist from the wrestling and struggle, and to yield themselves up into Christ's hands. When the surrender is made, then often the new birth—the emergence from darkness to light, from bondage to freedom—takes place.[1]

6. Subsidiary causes.—(1) *The word.*—Divines often call this 'the instrumental cause.' The efficacy of the written or spoken word as the expression of the mind and heart and will of God is often taught in Scripture. When we read that 'man does not live by bread alone, but [is endowed with a life which is nourished] by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God' (Dt 8[3]), when we read that 'the word of God is living and powerful' (He 4[12]), when Jesus says, 'My words are spirit and they are life' (Jn 6[63]), and when Paul reminds the Corinthians that 'in Christ Jesus' he had 'begotten' them 'through the gospel' (1 Co 4[15]), we cannot escape the conviction that a 'word' was believed to be endowed with potency. Certainly the rabbis held this view; and, when they read in the story of Creation that God said 'Let light be,' and light was, they considered that the very words were a *vera causa*, operating in the physical realm, and effectuating 'that whereunto they were sent' (Is 55[11]), as we read in Is 9[8], 'Jehovah sent a word into Jacob and it alighted upon Israel,' and as in Zec 5[4] we read of 'a curse' that should 'enter a house and consume its timbers and its stones.' In a similar manner the causality of a divine word is taught in the NT, where we read that we are 'begotten again . . . through the word of God' (1 P 1[23]), that 'God gave us birth through the word of truth' (Ja 1[18]), that 'the word of the message worketh in those who believe' (1 Th 2[13]), and that the gospel is 'God's δύναμις' (Ro 1[16]). Evidently the 'word' is conceived as having the efficacy to regenerate and sanctify; and, when those of us who have listened to the recital of Christian experience recall how often the decision for Christ—the entrance into joy and liberty—is traced to the effect of some divine word, embodied in some hymn or passage of Scripture, we cannot but feel that there was some ground for the peculiarly Semitic conception of the potency of a word.

(2) *Thoughts or beliefs.* — The psychology of religion strongly emphasizes that thoughts are forces, that one phase of regeneration is enlightenment, and that ideas have psychical, if not indeed physical, potency.

[1] *Atonement and Personality*, London, 1901, p. 203.
[2] *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 329.
[3] *The Relation of the Apostolic Teaching to the Teaching of Christ*, Edinburgh, 1900, p. 332.
[4] Cf. Ro 8[9], Gal 4[6].
[5] iv. 160 f.
[6] James, *Varieties*, p. 236; Granger, p. 77; Coe, p. 213; Starbuck, p. 173.

[1] Starbuck's table xii. on p. 97; cf. James, *Varieties*, pp. 111, 206 ff.

'Every idea that is relevant to our condition moves us,' says Steven;[1] and James dwells on 'the regenerative influence of optimistic thinking' and on the 'doctrine that thoughts are forces'; maintaining that 'one gets by one's thinking reinforcements from elsewhere for the realization of one's desires; and the great point in the conduct of life is to get the heavenly forces on one's side by opening one's mind to their influx.'[2] Undoubtedly thoughts are forces, whether they originate from our own cogitations or from suggestion by others, though persons differ very widely as to their impressionableness to suggestion. Hypnosis is just the focusing of suggestion. We may not enlarge on this; but it enables us to realize how efficacious it is to centre the thoughts on God, to have a firm belief in His wrath or His love, His goodness or His severity, during the period which elapses between the time when the soul is quickened by the Divine Spirit and the time when, more or less suddenly and joyously, the soul enters into the liberty of the sons of God.

7. Ethnic and Jewish parallels.—(1) *Hindu.*—In ancient India there were three castes of Aryans—the Brāhmans, the Kṣatriyas, and the Vaiśyas—who were believed to have the spiritual capacity for being 'twice-born.' The second birth was foreshadowed in the sacred ceremony of initiation, known as *upanayana*, which took place at various ages between eight and sixteen, according to caste. The boy was brought to his *guru* (spiritual preceptor), and, after a prayer in ancient Sanskrit, he was invested with the sacred cord, which consisted of three slender cotton threads—white, to typify purity—and tied in one place by a sacred knot. The cord was placed over the left shoulder and under the right arm and worn perpetually. It was of no use unless blessed by Brāhmans, consecrated by the recitation of Vedic texts, and sprinkled with holy water. The ceremony was accompanied by the ten-times-repeated prayer, 'Let us meditate on the excellent glory of the Divine Vivifier [*i.e.* Regenerator].' After this act of investiture the novitiate commenced his study of the Vedas, and by and by, according to his period of study, he became qualified to teach and expound the Vedas, to recite prayers, and to take part in religious services and sacrifices. The disciple was taught to revere his *guru* very profoundly; indeed, in the *Institutes of Manu* it is enjoined:

'Of the two, the one who gives natural birth and the one who gives knowledge of the whole Veda, the latter is the more venerable father, since the second or divine birth ensures life, not only in this world but hereafter eternally' (ii. 146). 'The twice-born man who shall have passed the period of his studentship, shall ascend after death to the most exalted of regions and no more again spring to birth in this lower world' (ii. 249).[3]

(2) *Jewish.*—Judaism at a very early period applied to its proselytes the ideas of birth and creation, as we see from Ps 87[4], 'Behold Philistia and Tyre; this one was born there,' and 102[18], 'A people that shall be created shall praise Jahweh.'

Similarly in *Bereshîth Rabbah*, xxxix. 14, on Gn 1[26], R. Eleazar ben Zimra says: 'If all who come into the world were met together to create one fly, they could not impart to it life: but he who induces a man to become a proselyte is as if he created him.' *Shir R.* i. 3 says: 'Every one who gathers one creature under the wings of the Shekinah is as if he created and formed him'; vii. 2 reads: 'The house of my mother' = *i.e.* Sinai. R. Barachiah said: 'Why do they call mount Sinai my mother? Because there Israelites were made, infants a day old.' *Babha Mṣi'a*, ii 11, teaches that a man ought to reverence his teacher more than his father: 'His father only brought him into this world. His teacher who taught him wisdom brings him into the life of the world to come' (cf. above, [1]). *Yebhamoth*, 62*a*: 'The stranger who is proselytized is like a child who is newly born, because he must break away from his former teachers and principles, customs and habits, as well as from the bond of kinship. It is expected of him that he will lay aside his previous habits and comport himself as if he were born that very day.'[4]

Philo often dwells on the necessity of a radical change before a man can secure the favour of God. He employs the figure of regeneration in a more psychical way than the Palestinian Jews and contemplates the change as a profound religious experience.

'What length of time could ever transform the harlotry of a soul trained in early and habitual incontinence? No time could do this, but God alone, to whom all things are possible; even those which among us are impossible.'[1] 'I have learned to appreciate my own nothingness (οὐδένειαν) and to gaze at the indescribable summits of thy munificence and then I recognize myself to be "dust and ashes" or something worse. . . . I am so elementally-changed (ἀνεστοιχειωμένος) that I do not even seem to exist.'[2] Again, 'How could the soul ever have known God, if He had not breathed into it and touched it κατὰ δύναμιν?'[3] 'Who is it that sows good seed in human souls but him who is the Father of existing things, the unbegotten God who begets all things?'[4] Our next quotation reminds us of the 'once-born' man of W. James, whom Philo calls αὐτομαθής. 'Every self-taught man is one who does not grow better by struggle and conflict, but from the outset found Wisdom ready prepared for him, showered down on him from above.' Of such men Philo says further on: 'The αὐτομαθὲς γένος is something new, surpassing description and really (ὄντως) divine, subsisting not by human conception but by inspired frenzy.'[5] And once more he says: 'If a divine thought (ἔννοια) enters the διάνοια of man, it at once blesses it and heals all its diseases.'[6]

(3) *Stoicism.*—Stoicism had before NT times become a religion quite as much as a philosophy, announcing its ability to free men from the domination of evil and to bring them into union with the divine. It appealed strongly to the sturdy Roman character and had a deep influence on the best men in the early Roman Empire. S. Dill speaks of Seneca as 'the earliest and most powerful apostle of a great moral revival,' and as 'one of the few heathen moralists who warm moral teaching with the emotion of modern religion.'[7] Seneca speaks of multitudes stretching out hands for moral help; and there is evidence that he himself was seized with a passion to win souls to goodness and truth, and seriously regarded it as his mission to form or reform human lives. He taught clearly that 'no mind is good without God.'

'"God comes to men, nay! nearer still! he comes *into* men. . . . Divine seeds are sown in human bodies"[8] and will grow into likeness to their origin if rightly cultivated.'[9] God is within us, inspiring good resolves and giving strength in temptation. God is without us, bestowing on us His gifts and chastising us in His wisdom.

Many Stoics taught a doctrine of instantaneous regeneration. Goodness is brought about not by addition, but by a thorough change. There may be a progress from folly and wickedness in the direction of wisdom, but the actual passage from one to the other must be momentary and instantaneous. It may be a long preparation, but it is followed by a change (μεταβολή), sudden and complete. Just as a drowning man[10] may be rising for some time towards the surface, but his experience when he emerges into the air is totally different from that which he passed through while rising, and must be instantaneous, so the final step in which a man suddenly finds himself transformed is different in kind from all the steps that have gone before. Cicero says of himself: 'I consider myself not merely to be amended but transfigured';[11] and Stoicism claimed many indisputable instances of men who had experienced a thorough and sudden change of character, as, *e.g.*, Polemon, the dissolute son of a wealthy Athenian who was thoroughly changed by listening to a discourse by Xenocrates.[12]

(4) *The mystery-religions.*—In the 6th cent. B.C. a remarkable wave of religion swept over Greece, the cause of which was largely personal, being due

1 P. 54.
2 *Varieties*, p. 107.
3 Cf. art. INITIATION (Hindu); M. Monier-Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891, ch. xiii.
4 Cf. Weber, on Jn 3[3], 2 Co 5[17]; Schürer, *HJP* ii. i. 317; A. Wünsche, *Erläuterung der Evangelien aus Talmud und Midrasch*, Göttingen, 1878, p. 500.

1 Philo, *Works*, tr. C. D. Yonge, London, 1854-55, iii. 249.
2 *Quis rerum div. her.* 6.
3 *Leg. allег.* i. 13.
4 *De Cherub.* 13.
5 *De Fuga*, 30.
6 *Leg. allег.* iii. 76.
7 *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, London, 1904, p. 304.
8 *Ep.* lxxiii. 15 *f.*
9 Glover, p. 61.
10 Cicero, *de Fin.* iii. 14 (48).
11 *Ep. ad Fam.* vi. 1, quoted by Mayor, *St James*[5], p. 197 n.
12 Dill, p. 347.

to the influence of such men as Pindar, Hesiod, and perhaps Orpheus — men who were at once poets and prophets. The period was marked by (1) a more serious appreciation of right and wrong; (2) a yearning to know what awaits the righteous and the wicked after death, and a conviction that the wrongs of this life will be righted hereafter; (3) a deeper sense of the turpitude of sin and its defiling influence; (4) a growing belief in henotheism; and (5) a longing for fellowship with God. All this was accompanied by a disposition to give to religious beliefs a visual, scenic form and dramatic representation. Foreign rites and ceremonies were appropriated, old rustic symbols and mystic plays—in fact anything that could evoke intense religious feeling. Into these weird symbols men read new meanings, and used them to mediate a crude sense of communion with the divine—everything appealing quite as much to their highly-sensitized organisms as to their psychical or moral nature. Men in the distant past were far more truly 'children of Nature' than we are; and they experienced real pain and joy in the changes of the seasons, bemoaning the apparent death of vegetal life and indulging in ecstatic revels at the return of spring. They were keenly sensitive to the parabolic significance of Nature. Their life was *en rapport* with the life of Nature. Their soul was believed to be a fragment of the great World-Soul. The annual renovation of Nature in springtime fostered two anticipations: (1) that, as Nature puts on her beautiful attire in spring, after months of ugliness and deformity, so there must be a possibility, if one could only enter into thorough unison with the World-Soul, of renovating, cleansing, and beautifying the human soul, of whose pollution they were so painfully conscious; (2) that, as Nature lives again yearly after apparent death, so it must be possible for the human soul to undergo some processes which shall render it incorruptible and secure for it a glorious immortality. During the two centuries before and after Christ this movement spread and deepened immensely, gradually orientalizing Roman paganism and acclimatizing Phrygian, Egyptian, and Persian divinities and ceremonies, in every great centre of the empire. Everywhere there was found a deep sense of the pollution of sin and a longing for immortality; and in consequence there was a readiness to submit to any crude, pre-historic ceremony, resuscitated with new symbolism, in the frenzied longing to be inwardly changed, to become a child again, and to be made fit hereafter to dwell with God.[1] These ceremonies were the mysteries (μυστήρια).

(*a*) *The Eleusinian mysteries*, as held in Athens, furnished the grandest artistic display and scenic ornamentation. The great object of mystic contemplation was an ear of corn. There were ablutions in salt, fumigation with sulphur, and smearing with clay or with blood—all done with the intense desire to cleanse the soul. There were scenic representations of events in the history of Demeter and Persephone, on which the mystics gazed with wild, frenzied stare, in the hope that the experiences of the risen Persephone might be reproduced in their soul. Speaking of the lustrations, Tertullian says:

'The nations ascribe to their idols the same power of imbuing water with the self-same efficacy as we do. . . . At the Eleusinian mysteries, men are baptized, and they assume that the effect of this is their regeneration and the remission of the penalties due to their perjuries.'[1]

(*b*) *Egyptian.*—In this religion Osiris was slain and dismembered by Set, and his limbs were concealed all over the world. The limbs were sought and found by Isis and her son Horus, and were reconstructed, and Osiris received a new life, divine and eternal. The one absorbing desire of his worshippers was to become partakers, in a mystical, spiritual sense, of the new life of Osiris.[2]

In the great Parisian magic papyrus published by Carl Wessely, we read of a mystic who has been allowed access to the divinity Set, and who is instructed by the mystagogue to address the divinity thus: 'O mighty Typhon, sceptre-bearer and ruler of the upper kingdom. . . . I am thy soldier. . . I fling myself before thee . . . energize me (δυνάμωσον), I implore thee.' Having done this, he is bidden to put on white raiment, and to say to the god: 'I am united with thee in a sacred form. I am energized by thy sacred name. I have met the effluence of thy good gifts,' and he is assured that he has obtained a godlike nature (ἰσοθέου φύσεως) which has been effected by the union with god. Another prays: 'Come into me, O Hermes, as children are in the mother's womb'; and in another passage we read: 'Come into the soul of this child that it may be fashioned (τυποῦσθαι) after thy immortal form in thy powerful imperishable light.'[3]

Lucius Apuleius, who wrote about A.D. 130, humorously describes his metamorphosis into an ass, from which condition he was delivered by the priest of Isis, and was initiated at Cenchreæ into the mysteries of Isis. He describes the day of his initiation as his sacred birthday. He says that on that day he penetrated to the boundaries of death and trod the threshold of Proserpine.[4] He compares this to 'a voluntary death' and his restoration to life to 'a salvation vouchsafed in answer to prayer.' He is certain that through the goddess Isis he has been in a manner born again ('quodam modo renatus') and placed again on the course of a new salvation.

The Hermetic literature.—Reitzenstein, in his work *Poimandres* (Leipzig, 1904), publishes and copiously edits a strange compilation of eighteen sacred documents made about A.D. 300 by an Egyptian priest. The Greek fragments are of various ages and belong to several religious communities; but the type of religion presented is generally Hellenized Egyptian. Among them is a remarkable dialogue between Hermes and his son Tat on the subject of regeneration (παλιγγενεσία).

The son reminds his father that he once said that no man can attain to σωτηρία unless he is born again and looses himself from this world of seeming. Tat says that he has done this, and begs to be instructed as to the doctrine (λόγον) of regeneration. Hermes replies: 'It cannot be taught. God causes it to grow in human hearts. The event is a begetting. God's will begets. Those begotten are reborn; they are sons of God.' Tat still presses his father to reveal more. He seeks to have a description of the new nature, and asks: 'He who is born, of what sort is he? for that which is born will be another and will have no share in the noetic being which is in me.' The father can only reply that such knowledge is not taught, but, when God wills, He can cause it to come to mind. But the son asks again: 'Do you mean that I who am by nature descended from my father am another's son? Explain to me the manner (τρόπον) of the regeneration.' Hermes can give little light as to the method; but the results of the change are remarkable. Form loses its outline, and magnitude loses its dimensions. The mind cognizes; no longer do the senses perceive. The injunction is: 'Nullify the perceptions of the body and the birth of Deity will take place in thee.'[5]

(*c*) *Phrygian.*—The Phrygians elaborated their conception of psychical regeneration from the myth of Attis, the devotee of Cybele, who bled himself to death under a pine-tree for his imagined unfaithfulness to his goddess and was restored to life by the Earth-Mother. Men weary of earthly life and of sin yearned for a thorough change—a death, a burial, a new life. Under the influence, probably, of Mazdæism, according to which a mystic bull is the originator of creation and resurrection, the old custom of devouring the bull, and thus receiving the strength of the bull into themselves to renew their physical energy, underwent a

[1] Consult artt. MYSTERIES (Christian) and (Greek, Phrygian, etc.); J. J. I. von Dollinger, *The Gentile and the Jew*[2], Eng. tr., London, 1906, i. 131–211; Lewis Campbell, *Religion in Greek Literature*, do. 1898, pp. 238–266; E. Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (*HL*), do. 1890, pp. 283–309; H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, do. 1913, *passim*; F. B. Jevons, *Introd. to Hist. of Religion*, do. 1896, pp. 358–381; A. Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*, Eng. tr., do. 1904, i. 274 ff.

[1] *De Bapt.* 5. [2] See art. MYSTERIES (Egyptian).

[3] R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 31.

[4] *The Golden Ass*, xi. 21 (Loeb's Classical Library, p. 574 f.); Kennedy, p. 100 ff.; Dill, p. 572 ff.

[5] Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 339 ff.; Kennedy, pp. 107–110.

sublimation of meaning, and was used as a means of acquiring eternal regeneration of the soul. They appropriated the blood-bath, in which the novitiate descended into a grave over which were boards, and on them a bull was slain. The man underneath received on his naked person, and into all the orifices of his body, the warm blood, under the belief that his sins were thereby cleansed and his nature regenerated.[1] For some time the fiction of the new birth was kept up by feeding the mystic on milk and tending him as a babe (ὥσπερ ἀναγεννώμενον).

(*d*) *Mithraism.*—Mithraism (*q.v.*) employed, and probably initiated, the bath of blood, and on many tombstones, even of Roman patricians, there are found the words 'in æternum renatus,' indicating that they believed themselves regenerated by the Mithraic ceremony. Albrecht Dieterich has published a papyrus which he believes to be a liturgy of Mithraism. Its opening prayer is very striking:

'O! first genesis of my genesis! First spirit of the spirit which is in me! First water of the water which is in me! . . . May it please thee to translate me, who am trammelled by the nature which underlies me, to an immortal genesis . . . that I may be born again (μεταγεννηθῶ) in my mind; that I may be initiated and the sacred Spirit may breathe on me. Though I was born a mortal from a mortal mother . . . having been sanctified by sacred ceremonies, I am about to gaze with immortal eyes on the immortal Æon.'[2]

When all is over, he says to Helios, lord of heaven and earth:

'I have been born again by thee: one, out of so many myriads, I am immortalized in this hour.'

8. Metaphors common to NT and the mysteries.—The researches of late years, and especially the discovery of papyri, have disclosed that many technical NT words are also found in the vocabulary of the mysteries. In NT times the mysteries were very popular, not only the national ones, but also those of a more private character, held in halls or private houses; and almost every respectable man was a member in one or other of these mysteries.[3] The ceremonies were kept secret, but the results claimed to be effectuated thereby were no secret; and Paul could not live in an intellectual centre like Tarsus without becoming familiar with the technical phrases of the mystery-religions. And, though we admit that Paul was antipathetic to them, and though it be true, as A. Jacoby maintains,[4] that the keenest struggle of Christianity was with the mystery-religions, yet we need not be surprised that Paul should borrow metaphors from them; for he often derives metaphors from the athletic games against which Christians showed vehement opposition in later years. Early Christianity did not invent a religious vocabulary; almost all its terms were in vogue at the time. The professed aim of the mysteries was σωτηρία, to secure union with God and eternal life. Regeneration is the central theme in the Mithra liturgy, in the Isis ceremonies described by Apuleius, and in the conversation between Hermes and Tat. Hence many of the pagans who listened to Paul and Silas were members of mystic brotherhoods; and, 'when this new group of travelling preachers from the East proclaimed the promise of σωτηρία and the assurance of life eternal, their message was bound to appeal to such an audience.'[5] The early Christians used familiar terms and metaphors, but infused a vastly higher meaning into them. We proceed now briefly to show how the metaphors of the NT concerning regeneration are found, though not with the same significance, in the mysteries (the sections are the same as in § 3 above).

A. '*The seed is the word*' (Lk 8^{11}; cf. 1 P 1^{23}, Ja 1^{18}).—In the Hermetic literature it is taught that 'regeneration is the end and aim of all revelation.' While Tat, in silent devotion, sits listening to the instruction of his father Hermes concerning the divine potencies, these potencies manifestly enter into him and form his new 'I';[1] and it is taught that the reader of the book recording the conversation between Hermes and Tat might also be regenerated, under the grace of God; but a translation of the book would not have the same effect.[2] Tat asks his father of what sort of mother he was regenerated, or of what sort of seed, and receives the answer: 'The will of God is the sower, and the seed is the true Good.'[3]

B. *Impartation of life.*—As we have seen, there was a deep longing for immortality in the period from 600 B.C. onwards, and the popularity of the mysteries was chiefly due to the fact that they claimed to confer life and joy hereafter. The gods worshipped in the mysteries were those who, like Osiris, Attis, and Kore, died and lived again; and, while gazing at vivid spectacular displays of their sufferings, death, and rebirth, accompanied by mournful addresses, listened to with sobbings and wailings and self-mutilations, the μύσται strove frantically to become partakers in the sufferings and death of the gods, that they might become partakers in their glorious life. In the mysteries of Attis, when the worshippers have almost spent themselves in sympathetic grief over the sad death of Attis, the priest chants in low tones:

'Be of good cheer, O mystics, since the god has been rescued from death, there is σωτηρία for you from your toils.'

Similarly it is said of one who has become mystically united to Osiris:

'As truly as Osiris lives, shall he live. As truly as Osiris is not dead, shall he not die.'[4]

C. *New birth.*—It is extremely probable that the words παλιγγενεσία and ἀναγέννησις, to describe the change which the μύσται claimed to have undergone, are pre-Christian. It was believed that the lustrations and the sympathetic dramas causally produced this state of regeneration. Of course, we need scarcely remark that the παλιγγενεσία was vastly different from that of the NT. In the mysteries the phenomena were hyperphysical, due to sensuous excitement, akin to that of the *faqir* in India, or the prophets of Baal. In the NT the change was supremely ethical (1 Co 6^{9-11}). In some cases, it may be, the result of the mysteries was morally elevating, but that was not their primary intent. They were designed to evoke a sensuous religiousness—to appeal to the feelings and to foster the condition in which men and women of neurotic temperament see visions and dream dreams. They encouraged manticism as distinct from prophecy. The church at Corinth was in danger of reverting to a 'mystery.' It is doubtful whether those who claimed ἀναγέννησις through Attis and Isis lived on a much higher moral level than their neighbours.

D. *A new man or a new creature.*—There is everywhere in the mysteries the notion that the soul, as a highly attenuated material entity, undergoes some change. This is emphasized when, as in the Mithra liturgy, the word μεταγεννᾶσθαι is used instead of the other synonyms. We find constantly the idea of union (συνουσία) of the divine with the human, cleansing, ennobling, and transfiguring it. Osiris, Attis, Adonis were men. They died as men; they rose as gods. If men unite themselves with them, 'receive them,' 'put

[1] Cf. art. MYSTERIES (Greek, Phrygian, etc.); F. Cumont, *Die orientalischen Religionen*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 82.
[2] A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 3 ff.
[3] Kennedy, p. 79.
[4] *Die antiken Mysterienreligionen und das Christentum*, Tubingen, 1909, p. 91.
[5] Kennedy, p. 79.

[1] Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 217.
[2] Reitzenstein, *Hellenist. Mysterienreligionen*, p. 36.
[3] Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 339.
[4] Cumont, pp. 71 f., 261; Kennedy, p. 99.

them on,' they are thereby deified. They become sons of God.[1] Yet in one place we have a sort of Nestorian conception — *συνάφεια* rather than *σύγκρασις*—when Tat asks whether the inborn son of God is himself or another, and prays for Hermes to come into him 'as children are in the mother's womb.'[2]

E. *A change of clothing.*—Here we meet with the conception that the soul cannot be changed while in the body. It must first be 'out of the body.' The soul wanders through the heavens, and receives a new *μορφή* before it returns. The soul of one who is admitted to the mysteries of Isis travels through the twelve houses of the zodiac and in each puts on a different garment—twelve different transmigrations. He returns to earth wearing an Olympian garment, stands before the assembled mystics, and is revered as a god.[3] So in the cult of Mithra the soul of the mystic is born again by means of wandering through the heavens. Arrived there, he calls out for his own heavenly body, which God has formed for him in the world of light, and wears it for a time; but he must lay it aside when he returns to earth, and put on the garment of his earthly body.[4]

F. *A passage from death to life.*—Development is quite a modern conception. It was simpler to the ancients to conceive of transition, as death followed by life. Even yet we can speak of the death of the old year and the birth of the new. The great change to which the initiates to the mysteries laid claim was often represented as a death, followed by a changed life. When the initiation was being celebrated, it was usual for the *μύσται* to simulate death, from which they were aroused by the call of the *μυσταγωγός*. Apuleius, describing his own initiation, says: 'I went to the confines of death. I trod the threshold of Proserpine.' Among some savage tribes youths were beaten till they were unconscious, that they might enter on a new life; and for a time they were expected to behave as babes.[5]

G. *Burial and resurrection.*—This, of course, is a very similar metaphor. Burial was designed to emphasize the reality of the death. In the cult of Attis a pine-tree was felled, and the trunk adorned with garlands and solemnly buried. The mystics wailed for Attis, who had died again in his sacred tree; they gashed themselves and sprinkled their blood on the altar. Next night they assembled in the temple, simulating death, and a light and the resurrected pine-tree were brought in, while the priest moved round among the prostrate *μύσται*, informing them that the god had been rescued from death, and besmearing their throats with oil that they might sing the praises of the risen god.[6] Dieterich, speaking of the customs of some uncivilized peoples, says:

'The adepts are besmeared with chalk or mud; then suddenly cleansed and assume a new name. They are buried and then fetched up out of the grave. They are beaten almost to death and then brought back to life.'[7]

Proclus (fl. A.D. 450), in his work on the *Theology of Plato*, iv. 9, says:

'What is most wonderful of all is that the priests command the body to be buried, except the head, in the most sacred of all the ceremonies.'[8]

It is certain that in the mysteries all the effects were believed to follow magically rather than ethically. The ceremony produced the results irrespective of the ethical condition of the novitiate. Physical contact with the water regenerated the soul. The words uttered by the priest were believed to have a magical effect on the soul. The burial and besmearing with clay or mud, followed by restoration to life, were held to produce in the votary a psychical death, burial, and new birth. The new birth produced a sense of union with God, compared with marriage to the god or having him as a guest in the soul. All was in the realm of feeling, and left the moral nature of most men untouched.

[1] Reitzenstein, *Hellenist. Mysterienreligionen*, p. 7.
[2] Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 230.
[3] Reitzenstein, *Hellenist. Mysterienreligionen*, p. 26.
[4] *Ib.* p. 32. [5] Dieterich, p. 158 f.
[6] Kennedy, p. 91; Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 267-274.
[7] P. 158. [8] Quoted in Dieterich, p. 163.

9. Connexion between regeneration and baptism.—The subject of Paul's teaching as to the significance of baptism has been a burning question during the past decade. The disputants fall into three classes:

(1) Those who believe that baptism (which in this case is restricted to believers) is nothing more than (*α*) a symbol of a spiritual union which already exists between Christ and the believer; (*β*) a declaration of allegiance to Jesus as Master and Lord; (*γ*) a public avowal of faith in God the Father, Jesus Christ the Redeemer, and the Holy Spirit the Sanctifier.[1]

(2) (*α*) Those who hold the sacramentarian view that baptism remits all sin, original and actual; that it bestows regenerating grace and endows the soul with the germs of the Christian virtues (for this view see art. BAPTISM, vol. ii. pp. 390-400).

(*b*) There are some modern scholars who, trained in the rigour of modern exegetical methods, claim, in the light chiefly of recent research in the mystery-religions, that in his doctrine of baptism the apostle Paul was inconsistent with himself and with the rest of the NT; that he was indeed a sacramentalist; and that, while demolishing with one hand the efficacy of Jewish rites and ceremonies, he was with the other building up a doctrine of the mechanical efficacy of baptism, which was quite incongruous with his ordinary teaching.

'The latest exegetical phase,' says F. Rendtorff, 'is this, that with a frame of mind thoroughly disinclined to sacramental conceptions, so many feel themselves historically bound to ascribe such views to Paul. Such men as Gunkel, Heitmüller, and H. J. Holtzmann maintain that Paul held such views and that he derived them not from the OT nor from Jesus Christ, but from the trend of thought in ethnic religions current in his time.'[2] *E.g.*, W. Heitmüller says: 'Baptism, in Paul, is throughout a sacramental act, which works not *ex opere operantis*, but *ex opere operato*, in the Catholic sense. Its operation is not conditioned by the faith of the recipient or the administrator. Of course, faith is pre-supposed in the candidate. Only those who believed sought baptism, and yet, notwithstanding the mode of the operation baptism is not thought of in an ethico-psychological manner, but in a purely sacramental manner.'[3] H. Gunkel has laboured at the Osiris cult, and he expresses himself thus: 'In baptism (so Paul teaches) the believer is joined to Christ. Baptism is the symbol of dying and being buried. He who allows himself to be baptized into Christ experiences thereby the death of Christ. He comes out of the water, as one who has died, but been roused to a new life. He has put on Christ: that which happened to Christ on the cross completes itself again in the case of individuals.'[4] Percy Gardner writes in the same strain: 'St. Paul's view of baptism is distinctive. He speaks of burial with Christ in baptism, and of being baptized into the death of Christ, and of rising with him from the dead. . . . In his own way, he transforms the rite of baptism, not into a thaumaturgic process, but into a spiritual experience of a mystic intensity. To him baptism does not merely mean repentance for sin, and attempt at a purified life; it was burial with Christ and rising again with him; it was incorporation into the earthly [? heavenly] body of Christ, and becoming a new creature. There can be little doubt that in this matter, as in others, Paul innovates by grafting upon a Jewish rite a deeper meaning, of which the germs lay in the Pagan Mysteries.'[5] So Kirsopp Lake, after quoting Ro 6[3] and Gal 3[27], says: 'Baptism is here clearly indicated as effecting the union with Christ. . . . Baptism is, for St. Paul and his readers, universally and unquestioningly accepted as a "mystery" or sacrament which works *ex opere operato*; and

[1] This is the view usually held by Baptists and is represented in A. H. Strong's *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1907-09; T. Armitage, *A Hist. of the Baptists*[2], New York, 1890, *passim*; and T. G. Rooke, *Doctrine and Hist. of Christian Baptism*, London, 1894, ch. ii. etc.
[2] *Die Taufe im Urchristentum*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 15.
[3] *Ib.* p. 16 f.
[4] *Zum religionsgeschichtliche Verstandnis des NT*, Göttingen, 1903, p. 83.
[5] *Exploratio Evangelica*, London, 1899, p. 447.

from the unhesitating manner in which St. Paul uses this fact as a basis for argument, as if it were a point on which Christian opinion did not vary, it would seem as though this sacramental teaching is central in the primitive Christianity to which the Roman Empire began to be converted.'[1]

(3) It can hardly be doubted that Paul had some acquaintance with the mystery-religions, and that he intentionally used metaphors there in use; but there are many scholars, equally eminent with those named above, who cannot believe that the Apostle could be so illogical as to embitter his life for years by denying the efficacy of Jewish rites and ceremonies to secure salvation, and at the same time set up an external ordinance like baptism as having the efficacy to regenerate the souls of men.

Deissmann, *e.g.*, says: 'It is not correct to say that Paul considered baptism to mediate our access to Christ. There are passages, as Gal 3^{27}, which, read aloof from their context, might be thus interpreted, but it is more correct to say that baptism is not the restoration to fellowship, but the sealing of our fellowship with Christ. With Paul himself it was not baptism which was the deciding-point, but the Christophany at Damascus. He was sent not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel.'[2] Rendtorff maintains that 'the ground presupposition of all that Paul says on baptismal experiences is faith. Not that Paul always *mentions* faith, as the *causa medians*, but he does so frequently in express words, as in Gal $3^{26f.}$, Ro 6^{4}. The whole baptismal experience of Ro 6 culminates in the eminently ethical thought: "that we may walk in newness of life." This cannot refer to a natural physical-hyperphysical new creation, analogous perhaps to the Mithra magical liturgy with its ἀναβαναταισμός. It can only imply the restoration of a new religious-ethical life.' Quoting Col 2^{12}, he insists that 'the efficacy of the baptism rests on and consists in the forgiveness of sins.'[3] Clemen steadily opposes the attribution of sacramentarian views to the Apostle. He admits that the implications of 1 Co 15^{29} are magical, but denies that the text represents Paul's own views. As to Ro 6 and Col 2^{11}, he contends that the operation of baptism is based on the significance of the death of Christ. There is with the Apostle no reference to a sacrament. 'Certainly with him, union with the Lord, the receiving of the Holy Spirit, the renewal of life and the blotting out of sin are realities of religious experience. . . . This conversion comes to expression in baptism which is a symbol not only of what *is* to happen but also of what *has* happened already.'[4] There is much force also in the argument of J. C. Lambert when he maintains that from Ro 3^{22}–6^{1} the Apostle asserts and reasserts his fundamental doctrine of justification by faith, then in 6^{2-6} he abruptly introduces baptism, for the first and only time in the Epistle, and consequently 'it seems impossible, on the ground of this single reference to baptism in the course of his longest and most doctrinal Epistle, to set aside his cardinal thought that in the principle of faith itself there lies the whole potency of salvation.'[5] Later he says: 'The precise point which he wished to enforce was the intimacy of the union which faith brings about between the believer and the Lord.' Baptism suggests a being buried with Christ. 'But a burial is not a death: it is only a public certification and sealing of death. And, in like manner, baptism is not a dying with Christ, but rather a sealing of that death in Him and with Him which is immediately brought about by faith.'[6] The same view is ably defended by H. A. A. Kennedy, in *Exp* VIII. iv. [1912], and in his work on *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, ch. vi.

It remains now to examine what sort of constructive criticism the last-named scholars have to offer, having disposed of the other two views, for, of course, in repudiating sacramentarianism, they are equally pronounced in their conviction that the statements in Paul's Epistles as to baptism, such as Gal 3^{27}, Tit 3^{5}, imply more than that baptism is merely a symbol of spiritual facts. (1) It clears the air considerably that they all agree that all the persons whose baptism is recorded in the NT had avowed repentance and faith in Jesus as Christ and Lord before they were baptized.[7] (2) They agree that a candid exegesis of the passages in which Paul speaks of baptism obliges us to admit that he believed that in baptism 'something happens.' The believer 'puts on Christ'; he 'dies to sin,' he 'is raised to newness of life.' Paul was exhorted to 'be baptized and wash away his sins.' Christ 'cleansed' the Church 'by the laver of water by means of the word' (Eph 5^{26}). Clearly the early Christians were taught to expect that in their baptism they would receive some influx of spiritual power—some rich spiritual blessing. Lambert expresses it as 'a marked accession of spiritual life and power.'[1] Kennedy speaks of 'a wonderful spiritual quickening; a new enhancing of the power and grasp of faith.'[2] (3) They draw a very proper and vital distinction between 'cause' and 'occasion.' They do not believe that the literal act of baptism—contact with the water, or the utterance of the formula — in any sense causes these spiritual blessings; but they do believe that Paul taught that it was a divine appointment that those who obeyed their Lord by making a public confession of Him in baptism should receive therein a rich spiritual reward.

E.g., Clemen, speaking on Gal 3^{27}, says: 'Baptism as such is not the cause of the "putting on Christ" . . . for 3^{26} says, "Ye are all sons of God through faith": accordingly baptism can only be the *occasion* on which one confesses his sins, not a sacrament';[3] and Lambert is equally explicit: 'it was not with the baptismal water that men were sealed, but with the Holy Spirit of promise. Baptism was the occasion of the sealing, rather than the sealing itself. . . . Even this sealing of the Spirit is not a creative but a declarative act.'[4]

Baptism was not the cause of spiritual gifts, but the occasion of their bestowal. Baptism does not literally wash away sin, but NT believers were taught to expect a consciousness of pardon and a full sense of sin forgiven in connexion with their baptism. Nor does baptism regenerate in a causal sense, but NT baptism was normally the occasion of the bestowal of the gifts of the Holy Spirit—so much so that Paul was astonished that it was possible for any disciples who had been baptized not to have received them (Ac 19^{3}). Regarding Jesus as their great Exemplar and His baptism as the type of, and authority for, Christian baptism, it was natural that they should expect somewhat similar spiritual blessings to be conferred on them to those which were conferred on Him.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated by the numerous quotations throughout the article.

J. T. MARSHALL.

REINCARNATION.—See TRANSMIGRATION, SOUL.

RELATIONS (Buddhist). — Buddhist philosophy has from the outset resolved all 'things,' all 'states' of matter and mind, into a flux of 'happenings.' That which happens is a series in the flux of transient, even momentary, complexes of elemental factors, determined and determining, according to the fivefold law of cosmic order (*niyama*). And these complex happenings are determined and determining, both as to their constituent factors and also as to other happenings, in a variety of ways that we should express by the term 'relations.' The Buddhist term is *paccaya* (Skr. *pratyaya*). Etymologically the word is nearly parallel to 'relation' (*paccaya*=*paṭi*='re,' and *ay*, causative of *i*, 'to go *or* come,' in place of *latus*, 'borne'). A greater discrepancy, however, lies in the causal emphasis of the Pāli term, which is lacking in our word. The commentators emphasize this: '*paccaya* means because-of-that it-makes-to-come.' The prefix (*paṭi*) is here given the added force of *paṭicca*.[5] It is true that one of the most recent discussions of the notion of cause[6] expresses 'the general scheme of a causal law' in terms of relations. But this is only one among

[1] *Earliest Epistles*, p. 385.
[2] *Paulus*, p. [illegible], Eng tr p. 139 f. [3] Pp 32, 36.
[4] *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des NT*, Giessen, 1909, p. [illegible] Eng tr, *Primitive Christianity and its non-Jewish Sources*, Edinburgh, 1912, p. 223.
[5] *The Sacraments in the NT*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 169.
[6] *Ib.* p. 173.
[7] Rendtorff, p. 32; Lambert, p. 193; Kennedy, p. 249.

[1] Pp. 152, 168. [2] P. 249.
[3] *Primitive Christianity*, p. 217. [4] P. 176.
[5] Cf. art. PAṬICCA SAMUPPĀDA, and *Commentary on the Paṭṭhāna*.
[6] In Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, London, 1914, p. 216 ff.

the inevitable, if unconscious, approximations of modern European 'philosophies of change' to Buddhist ideas.

Another characteristically Buddhist definition of relations, beside that given above, is to assign them a place among the marks or characters of things (*i.e.* events) in general. Thus all things (except the philosophic Nibbāna) have (*a*) the three marks of impermanence, liability to suffering, and soullessness; (*b*) the threefold mark of the conditioned: genesis or birth, cessation or decay and death, and a relatively static point or interval between; and lastly, (*c*) the marks of causation, viz. relations, or correlation.

The third group of marks was developed under 24 heads in the last of the analytical works in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* of the canon, called the *Paṭṭhāna*, also 'the Great Book.'[1] They are the most—one may say the only—distinctively constructive contribution to Buddhist philosophy in those six analytical books. The 24 heads are developed at great length in application to the material and mental facts of experience. The commentary, ascribed to Buddhaghoṣa, adds some useful explanatory matter, especially in its insistence on the necessity of regarding the correlation, or *paccayatā*, in every one of the 24 modes as an 'assisting agency' (*upakāraka*):

'Where one *dhamma*[2] by its arising or persisting is a helper to another *dhamma*, that first-named is the (causally) relating *dhamma* to the last-named.'

It is impossible to say how soon after the closing of the canon, how long before Buddhaghoṣa's date, this aspect was evolved. But it is of the greatest importance to an understanding of the Buddhist philosophy of change, and it has remained a keynote in that tradition to the present day. Thus Ledi expands it as follows:

'Just as an heir normally inherits the property of his deceased parent, so does a succeeding unit of consciousness inherit all the energy, the functions, the impressions of the expired unit.'[3]

The same is believed with regard to material units. And the legacy itself came, in later works, to be spoken of as a force, *vim*, influence of the *paccaya*, or causally relating term, viz. the *paccaya-satti*.[4] Thus:

'In the exposition of the Paṭṭhāna relations there are three main features to be carefully noted, *i.e.*:
(i.) the relating thing (*paccayadhamma*),
(ii.) the related thing (*paccayuppannadhamma*),
(iii.) the distinctive function (or influence) of the relation (*paccaya-satti-visesa*).'[5]

The 24 *paccayas*, under the title *Paccaya-saṅgaha* ('Compendium or Category of Relations, or Causation'), occupy the eighth part of the standard manual, entitled *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*. This work (in which *-satti* does not occur) dates from the 9th, 10th, or 11th cent. A.D., and is translated in *The Compendium of Philosophy*. The author, Anuruddha of Ceylon, begins his exposition thus:

'Now let me tell e'en as is fit how such
And such a state of things[6] related stands
To other states conditioned like itself,'

and proceeds:

'In the category of relations we have two schemata:—the law of happening by way of cause[7] and the system of correlation.'[8]

Coming in due course to the second, he writes:

'The system comprises the following relations:

(1) condition	(6) co-existence
(2) object	(7) reciprocity
(3) dominance	(8) dependence
(4) contiguity	(9) sufficing condition
(5) immediate contiguity	(10) antecedence
(11) consequence	(18) means, way
(12) habitual recurrence	(19) association
(13) action	(20) dissociation
(14) result	(21) presence
(15) support	(22) absence
(16) control	(23) abeyance
(17) *jhāna*	(24) continuance.'

(1) is *hetu*, one of several synonyms for causal antecedent, or condition, in general; it is technically reserved for the six moral 'roots' (*mūla*) of personal character: appetite, enmity, ignorance or dullness, and their opposites, disinterestedness, amity, intelligence. (2) is object of consciousness, viz. five objects of the five senses, and one of intellect, namely, impressions and ideas. (3) refers to an overruling factor in consciousness at any given moment: intention, energy, volitional apperception, intellectual investigation. Of (4), (5), the latter applies to a sequence in time so apparently indivisible as that of mental states or moments. By (6) 'co-nascence,' or simultaneous and co-inhering genesis, is meant. In (7) both terms of the relation are mutually relating and related. (9) differs from (8) only as indicating a cause or group of conditions effective enough to bring about immediately a given result. (12) = repetition so as to form a habit.[1] (13), *karma*, is the relation between an act of will and its result. (14) is literally ripeness, maturity; causally conceived, it is a relation of effortlessness.[2] (15) implies mental or material nutriment. (16) refers to the influence of psycho-physical, mental, and moral faculties or controlling powers. (17) is concentrated energy physical and mental. (18) is thought or conduct under the aspect of a shaped course of procedure towards an end. (22), positively regarded, implies 'opportunity for a successor to arise.'[3] So for (23).

In comparing these groups with corresponding lists in European philosophy, we notice coincidences and discrepancies. The familiar relation of 'resemblance' is wanting, and one of its modes: 'equality, inequality.'[4] As explanation it may be suggested that (*a*) the Buddhist list claims to give not all, but only the most important, relations;[5] (*b*) resemblance is not so much an objectively valid relation as an impression of a dual or plural *object* on a subject, hence it is a species of (2); (*c*) resemblance, even if objectively valid, is not a causal relation, an 'assisting agency,' as is every *paccaya*. And this holds good as to 'equality.'

Two other relations—'subject-attribute,' 'container-content'[6]—indicate a standpoint that is opposed to orthodox Buddhist philosophy, viz. the positing of a substance or agent. It may be said in rejoinder that the second class of relations—'object'—involves a subject. This is true for our philosophic tradition and idiom, but not for those of Buddhism. *Ārammaṇa* (object) involves no correlate of metaphysical import, such as we are entangled with, in 'subject.' The ever-changing 'object' is regarded as the thing-which-relates (*paccaya*); the ever-changing mental aggregates are the thing-related (*paccayuppanna*).[7] The only constant factor is the concept of the specific relation.[8]

LITERATURE.—The *Tika-paṭṭhāna* and *Commentary on the Paṭṭhāna* will shortly be published by the Pali Text Society; *The Compendium of Philosophy*, tr. and ed. S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *PTS*, London, 1910; Ledi Mahāthera, 'On the Philosophy of Relations,' *JPTS*, 1915–16, pp. 21–53, *Paccayadīpanī*, Rangoon; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*. London, 1914, p. 194 f.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

[1] *Paṭṭhāna* means 'predominant cause': hence a specific form of *paccaya*.
[2] State, thing, presentation, phenomenon.
[3] *JPTS*, 1915–16, p. 37.
[4] S. Z. Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 42.
[5] From a letter by Dr. Ledi to the writer.
[6] *Dhammā*.
[7] *Paṭicca-samuppāda-nayo*.
[8] *Paṭṭhāna-nayo*.

[1] Cf. *Points of Controversy*, pp. 294, 362.
[2] *Com. on Paṭṭhāna*.
[3] Ledi, *Paccayadīpanī*.
[4] Cf. J. S. Mill's *System of Logic*, bk. iii. ch. xxiv.
[5] *JPTS*, 1915–16, p. 26.
[6] H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 155 f.
[7] Aung, *Compendium*, p. 2.
[8] *JPTS*, 1915–16, p. 25.

RELICS (Primitive and Western).—In the art. CANNIBALISM (vol. iii. p. 197 f.) it has been shown that by eating the dead or part of them the eater acquires their souls or their qualities, and thus obtains power over the soul or is united to it. It is not necessary to eat the whole man; to eat part is enough, because of the principle involved in sympathetic magic that the whole is contained in the part, or that the influence working in the whole works also in the part, although separate from it. On analogous grounds the dead man's soul or his powers or qualities may work from his body or from any fragment of it, from his clothes, or from any object or part of any object with which he has once been in contact. Any one who wears or carries these, who touches them, who prays to them, or who uses them in a variety of other ways, benefits by his action. The soul or power of the dead man is so far subject to him, or at all events aids him in varying ways. This is the explanation of the use and cult of relics, which of course are valued in proportion to the extent of the power, strength, miraculous gifts, or saintliness of the person to whom they originally belonged, as well as of the love or respect in which he was held. The supernatural virtues of relics, originating in such beliefs as have been referred to, may be traced through a series of examples in all religions and in all degrees of civilization, beginning with the lowest savages.

1. Relics in savage life.—(*a*) Just as enemies are eaten to obtain their qualities, so their kidney or caul fat, as a special seat of life, is abstracted and used as a lubricant for the body—a common custom among Australian tribes.[1] Similarly, relics of a dead enemy are sometimes worn for protection. In E. Africa, if enemies can unearth the body of a dead warrior, parts of it are used as charms — eyebrows, nose, little finger or toe, pudenda, etc. These are reduced to ashes, and, when not used in tatuing or mixed with food, they are sewn up in a bag and worn round the neck.[2] Among W. African tribes also parts of an enemy's body or sometimes of an ancestor are used in making a fetish—part of the brain to give wisdom, of the heart courage, the eye influence. A spirit is supposed to be lured by these to reside in the fetish.[3] The Tenimberese wear the vertebræ of an enemy round the neck as a charm in war-time.[4] Men of Mowat, New Guinea, after slaying a great warrior, wear his penis in order to increase their strength.[5] Another method is to attach the relic to the arms, etc., used in battle. Thus in Mexico, if any one could secure the middle finger of the left hand and the hair of a woman dying in childbirth, he tied these on his shield to make him brave and fierce and to blind his enemies.[6] Rubbing weapons with part of a dead man's body to give them his strength and skill is sometimes practised also, as among the Koniagas (piece of dead whaler used) and Aleuts.[7]

(*b*) With many tribes magical rites are performed with part of a dead man's body—*e.g.*, in healing, in rain-making, as love-charms, to keep off thieves, to rob a man of his strength. In one such instance practised in Queensland, where an enemy is flayed and his skin used to cover a sick man,[8] there is analogy to the use of a dead man's clothing or part of it as a relic in more civilized regions. Reference may here be made to the so-called 'hand of glory' used to produce sleep or inanition.[1] Other parts besides the hand were also used—*e.g.*, the skull to make one invisible like the ghost who owned it (Blackfoot Indians).[2] Another instance is found in the use of the pointing-stick or bone among Australian tribes to cause death. The bone is 'sung' and curses are pronounced while it is pointed in the direction of the victim. The most powerful form is made out of the femur or fibula of a dead man among the Gnanji and other tribes in the Gulf region. These tribes also attach the radius of a dead man to a spear when setting out to avenge his death. The spear cannot fail then to go straight and slay the murderer.[3] Analogous to this is the use in the Melanesian area of arrows tipped with human bone. These are much dreaded. After incantations are said over them, they acquire *mana*, or the ghost works through them. The danger of these arrows is proportionate to the power of the dead man whose bones are used.[4]

(*c*) The practice of head-hunting and scalp-taking, in which undoubtedly the purpose was to gain power over the ghost (the head being a seat of the soul[5]), illustrates these various uses of relics of the dead, and shows that the relics are vehicles of spirit-power, things through which the ghost still acts. Another illustration of the connexion of spirit and relic is found in a group of folk-tales in which a man, having stolen a skull from a churchyard, is haunted by the ghost until he returns it.[6]

(*d*) The custom of the widow carrying her husband's skull as a relic or amulet, and the widespread practice of preserving heads of relatives or ancestors for cult or magical purposes have been described in the art. HEAD (5 [*f*], [*g*]); cf. also DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Introductory), XXI. 5; CHARMS AND AMULETS (Mexican and Mayan), (1). The whole body is sometimes preserved as a relic. Herodotus relates this of the Ichthyophagi (Macrobioi), who offered sacrifices to the body for a year, afterwards removing it to another place.[7] So with the Kurnai the mummified corpse is carried about by the family, and later placed in a hollow tree.[8] Among some W. African tribes all the bones of father or mother are dried and kept in a wooden chest, for which a small house is provided, and to which son or daughter goes to hold communion with the spirit.[9] For other instances of preservation of the corpse in the family dwelling, with accompanying rites, see *ERE* iv. 418[a] (Australia), 423[a-b] (Tahiti, Muong of Tongking, Baoulé of W. Africa, Yumbos of S. America, Gilbert Islanders). In some instances the wife or nearest relative carries about the bones after they have been exhumed (Woodlark Islanders, Mosquito Indians; also ashes of the cremated body, Tacullies).[10] So among the Abipones the bones of medicine-men were carried about by the tribe in their wanderings.[11] Among the Andamanese necklaces are made of a child's bones (also of an adult's) and distributed among the relatives. The bones cure diseases and shield from attacks of evil spirits, through the intervention of the ghost, who is pleased by the respect paid to his memory.[12]

[1] Cf. art. ANOINTING, § 6; W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], Edinburgh, 1894, pp. 380, 383.

[2] D. Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 104, 169.

[3] R. H. Nassau, *Fetichism in W. Africa*, London, 1904, pp. 82, 111.

[4] J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, p. 298.

[5] *JAI* xix [1890] 162. [6] *NR* iii. 364.

[7] *Ib.* i. 76, iii. 145.

[8] L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, 1880, p. 223.

[1] See art. HAND, § 5 (*c*).

[2] G. B. Grinnell, *Blackfoot Lodge Tales*, New York and London, 1893, p. 238.

[3] Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 463.

[4] R. H. Codrington, *JAI* xix. 215. [5] See art. HEAD, § 5.

[6] A. Le Braz, *La Légende de la mort en Basse-Bretagne*[2], Paris, 1902, i. 289; W. Larminie, *Irish Folk-Tales and Romances*, London, 1894, p. 31.

[7] Herod. iii. 24. [8] Fison and Howitt, p. 244.

[9] Nassau, p. 159.

[10] A. C. Haddon, *FL* v. [1894] 320; *NR* i. 731, 744, 126; cf. *ERE* iii. 230[b].

[11] M. Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones*, London, 1822, ii. 284.

[12] E. H. Man, *JAI* xii. [1883] 86, 143, 145; cf. xi. [1882] 295 ff.

(*e*) Separate parts of the body are sometimes regarded as sacred.

(1) *Finger and toe.*—First joints of these, along with the nails, part of the lobe of the ear, and a lock of hair, are used to form a family fetish with which the spirits of the dead are associated. Fresh relics are added to the fetish as new relatives die. It descends by inheritance (Benga of W. Africa).[1] Finger-bones (also sometimes skulls or teeth) of important men are preserved in a shrine at the village in the Solomon Islands. The ghost haunts these relics.[2]

(2) The *arm-bone* is a sacred relic among the Mara, Anula, and other N. Australian tribes. After a year it is given to the messenger who summons to the final burial rites. The messenger carrying the relic is himself sacred, and, when he shows it to the tribesmen, they must begin their journey to the scene of the rites.[3]

(3) *Hair and teeth.*—These are used as amulets by the family priest in praying to the dead at places other than that where the skulls are stored.[4] In Florida, Solomon Islands, in the private cult of a ghost, the worshipper wears as a relic a lock of hair or a tooth of the helpful ghost when fighting; at other times it is kept in the house.[5] So also in the Loyalty Islands priests, when praying, tied to their foreheads or arms relics consisting of teeth, hair, or nails of ancestors. To these magical power was ascribed.[6]

(4) The *jaw-bones* are sometimes an important relic. They are carried by the Andaman widow along with the skull;[7] and among the Kiriwina (New Guinea) the widow suspends the jaw-bones, ornamented with beads, from her neck.[8] But the most striking use of the jaw-bones as a relic is found among the Baganda, who preserve those of kings as a precious heirloom, along with their umbilical cord, in temples, guarded by hereditary custodians. The ghost was believed to cling to them and to give help when they were duly honoured. Jaw-bones of very ancient kings were thus treasured.[9] This is undoubtedly connected with the idea that a king's or hero's body or head is a talisman upon which the safety of the tribe or state depends. They are carefully guarded lest they should be removed and disaster follow.[10]

(*f*) In savage custom certain articles are sometimes connected with the mythic life of gods and spirits, and may be regarded as relics. Of these the *churinga* of the Arunta and other Central Australian tribes form an example. Each one was associated in the Alcheringa (*q.v.*) period with a totemic ancestor and remained on earth as the abode of his spirit when his body entered the ground. Such *churinga* and those associated with reborn spirits are carefully preserved in sacred store-houses, or *ertnatulunga*. They are much venerated and are used in various sacred ceremonies. When ill, a man may send for a *churinga* of his totem, scrape off a little of it, and drink it in water, thus absorbing part of the essence of the stone endowed with attributes of the spirit. Besides being associated with ancestors, the *churinga* have 'feelings' which can be soothed by rubbing them with red ochre. The store-houses are sometimes solemnly visited, just as shrines with relics are elsewhere.[11] The Melanesian hero Qat left behind him the stump of a tree that he had cut down for a canoe, and men who cut down trees for canoes sacrifice at this stump for the preservation and power of these vessels.[12] Among the Creek Indians a powerful charm carried by war-parties consists of parts of the horns of a mythic snake; these preserve from wounds.[13] In other instances stones may be regarded as members of a divinity or supernatural being, or sacred places or instruments are thought to have been instituted or handed over to men by them, or sacred musical instruments represent a god or contain his voice.[14]

(*g*) In all parts of the world, both in the higher and in the lower culture, marks on rocks or hills are regarded as foot- or hand-prints of spirits, gods, or demons, and are in a sense their relics, which are sometimes regarded with veneration. Examples of this are found not only in savage, but also in classical, Teutonic, Celtic, Semitic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian folk-lore. Where divinities are mythically supposed to drive about in vehicles of one kind or another, and where their worshippers set the image of a divinity in a cart or chariot and drive it about for ritual or magical reasons, such a vehicle would be regarded also as a relic of the god himself—his property, once used by him as it is now used for his image. Examples of this ritual use occur in Teutonic religion,[1] as well as in Roman, Celtic, and Hindu cults.[2]

2. Greek.—(*a*) The cult of relics in Greece was inseparably connected with that of heroes, mythical or real, as that in turn was linked on to the worship of ancestral ghosts. The remains of the hero usually rested in the agora, and over them was erected the ἡρῷον, a kind of chapel, but sometimes the grave or ἡρῷον was in the temple of a divinity. The cult at the ἡρῷον was a cult paid to the hero's relics quite as much as to the hero himself, though these relics were generally not visible. Their presence within a town or district was a guarantee of safety. Sometimes not even parts of the hero's remains were visible. The head of Orpheus was buried in Lesbos or in Smyrna,[3] and the head of one of the Korybantes was buried at the foot of Olympus.[4] The supposed relics of Orpheus at Libethra were never to see the sun, or the city would be destroyed by a boar. When they were exposed, the river Sys (boar) came down in flood and overthrew it.[5] Nothing further need be said regarding the cult of heroes whose relics rested in a grave (see art. HEROES AND HERO-GODS [Greek and Roman]). There are occasional instances of bodily relics not buried in graves but otherwise preserved. The skin of Marsyas was suspended in the city of Celænæ—by Apollo, according to the myth.[6] The alleged shoulder-blade of Pelops was preserved in a bronze coffer in the temple of Zeus at Elis, after having been found by the fisher Damarmenos in the sea and identified by an oracle.[7] The bones of Tantalus were kept in a bronze vessel at Argos, over against the grave of Pelasgos.[8] The bones of Orpheus rested in a hydria on a pillar at Dion in Macedonia.[9] The hair of Medusa was preserved in a hydria at Tegea.[10] At the festival of Europa in Crete, where she was reverenced as Hellotis, her bones were carried in a great crown of myrtle.[11]

(*b*) When a hero died abroad, his remains were brought with pomp to the place of intended sepulture. From every city through which the remains passed priests, magistrates, and citizens thronged to meet them, or citizens were deputed to follow in mourning. Trophies, crowns, and armour were offered, chaplets were sent to adorn the urn, and finally the most honourable burial was given to the hero. Examples of this are found in the pages of Plutarch.[12] The possession of a hero's relics was important for the safety of a town or state; hence such relics were often eagerly sought for in times of danger, even when they were already possessed and honoured by another town or district. Generally an oracle

1 Nassau, p. 159.
2 R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 258.
3 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 549 f.
4 Le Père Lambert, *Mœurs et superstitions des Néo-Calédoniens*, Noumea, 1900, p. 288 f.; cf. G. Turner, *Samoa a Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, London, 1884, p. 342.
5 Codrington, p. 133 f.
6 Turner, p. 339.
7 Man, *JAI* xii. 86.
8 *JAI* xxi. 482.
9 J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 282 f.; see also art. BANTU, vol. ii. p. 357[b], and art. MOUTH, vol. viii. p. 870[a].
10 See J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, ii. 103; cf. §§ 2, 4.
11 Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 123, 132 ff., [b] pp. 150 ff., 257 ff.
12 Codrington, *Melanesians*, p. 141.
13 *ERE* iii. 403[b].
14 Cf. *ERE* iii. 407[a], v. 93[a, b], vi. 634[a], ix. 6[a, b].

1 J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882–88, pp. 107, 329; Tacitus, *Germ.* 40.
2 Amm. Marcell. xxiii. 3; Greg. Tur. *de Glor. Conf.* 77.
3 Lucian, *adv. Indoct.* 11; Conon, 45.
4 Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* ii. 3. 27.
5 Paus. ix. 30. 5.
6 Herod. vii. 26.
7 Paus. v. 13. 7, vi. 22. 1; Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 4.
8 Paus. ii. 22. 2.
9 *Ib.* ix. 30. 7.
10 *Ib.* viii. 47. 5.
11 Athen. xv. 678[a].
12 *Pelopidas*, 33 f., *Demetrius*, 53, *Philopœmen*, 21.

announced that it was necessary to obtain these relics and told in oracular fashion where they were to be found, as the place of sepulture was often kept secret by the owners. Sometimes the actual discovery of their position was the result of a prodigy, as when Cimon, seeing an eagle tearing at the ground with beak and talons, was inspired to dig there, and so found the bones of Theseus. Opposition was often offered to their removal; hence they had to be taken by force or by fraud; and sometimes the hero himself resented the removal of his relics. Once obtained, they were brought with great reverence, the citizens met them with processions and sacrifices, they were duly buried, and a shrine was erected over the spot. A festival day was annually or oftener held in their honour. Many examples of this occur even in the case of the relics of mythic heroes, and probably they originated as a means of explaining local cults.

Plutarch describes at some length the translation of the relics of Theseus from Scyros to Athens.[1] Herodotus tells how an oracle made known to the Lacedæmonians that they would never conquer the Tegeans until they had obtained from the Tegean territory the bones of Orestes, which were further said to lie where two winds by hard compulsion blew and stroke answered to stroke. This proved to be a blacksmith's forge—the bellows being the winds. The smith had found there a coffin seven cubits long containing a body of equal length. Having obtained the relics, the Lacedæmonians were now always superior to the Tegeans.[2] Other instances occur in Pausanias, who says, *e.g.*, that during a plague at Orchomenus the Pythian priestess announced that the only remedy was to bring back the bones of Hesiod from Naupactus. A crow would show them the place of burial; it perched on a rock, and the bones were there found in a cleft.[3]

(*c*) In numerous instances different regions claimed to possess the relics or bones of the same hero, who had thus more graves or shrines than one. In all these particulars there is a close resemblance to the data of the Christian relic cult, but one usual aspect of that cult is lacking—the translation of part of the bodily relics instead of the whole. This occurs only in the case of the mythic shoulder-blade of Pelops.

(*d*) Frequently where very large bones—probably fossil bones of large animals—were discovered, they were assumed to be those of heroes of the past, who were thought to have been of gigantic size. The Syrians, having found such bones in the bed of the Orontes, were informed by an oracle that they were those of a hero.[4] The bones of Orestes were seven cubits long, according to Herodotus.[5]

Huge bones, alleged to be those of the giants, were also shown in temples, *e.g.*, those of Hopladamos in the temple of Asklepios at Megalopolis, and those of Geryon among the Thebans.[6]

(*e*) Besides bones, other relics of heroes were preserved and honoured. Among these weapons were conspicuous—the spear of Achilles in the temple of Athene at Phaselis, the sword of Memnon in the temple of Æsculapius at Nicomedia, the shield of Pyrrhus over the door of the sanctuary of Demeter where his death took place.[7] Of other relics, the lyre of Orpheus was preserved in more than one temple, the flute of Marsyas in the temple of Apollo at Sicyon, the sceptre of Agamemnon in Chæronea, the sandals of Helen in the temple of Athene at Iapygia, at Cyzicus the stone which served as anchor to the Argonauts, as well as their ship and those of Agamemnon, Æneas, and Theseus in other places.[8] Elsewhere chariots, thrones, necklaces, and other things belonging to the mythic personages of antiquity were shown.[9]

[1] *Thes.* 36; cf. Paus. iii. 3. 6. [2] Herod. i. 67 f.
[3] Paus. ix. 38. 3; cf. iii. 3. 6, viii. 36. 8, ix. 29. 3.
[4] *Ib.* viii. 29. 4. [5] i. 68; cf. viii. 38.
[6] Paus. viii. 32. 5, Lucian, *adv. Indoct.* 14.
[7] Paus. ii. 21. 5, iii. 3. 8.
[8] Lucian, *adv. Indoct.* 11; Apoll. Rhod. *Argon.* i. 955, ii. 928, Paus. [illegible] 2, ix. 40. 11, Lykoph. 850 f.; Apollodorus, i. 9. 23, Porph. *de Abst. Gesch.* iv. [illegible]; Plut. *Thes.* 23.
[9] See the lists in F. Pfister, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, i. 331 f.

Other curious relics were the egg of Leda and the remains of the clay with which Prometheus had made man.[1] These relics were shown to admiring travellers and pilgrims, but there is little known of any cult of them. The sceptre of Agamemnon was much reverenced at Chæronea, and daily offerings were made to it.[2]

(*f*) Animal relics were also preserved—*e.g.*, the teeth of the boar of Erymanthus, the skin and teeth of the Calydonian boar, the bones of the monster to which Andromeda was exposed, and the like.[3]

(*g*) As has been seen, the possession of a hero's relics gave safety or victory to a city or district. They also promoted fruitfulness and fertility, warded off pestilence and famine, or caused rain to fall in time of drought. Many other wonders were related of them. Legends of their healing powers existed, and in many instances the sick were carried to tombs of heroes in order to be cured there by their power.[4]

3. **Egyptian.**—In Egypt the careful preservation of the mummy shows great reverence for the dead, but hardly amounts to relic-worship, as there was little actual cult of the dead, save in so far as the dead man was identified with Osiris. The cult of relics was largely associated with the worship of Osiris and with myths of his death or dismemberment. The burial-places of Osiris or of his members are mentioned in texts giving lists of 'the graves of Osiris.' The lists vary, and in some instances one member occurs as a relic in two or more places—numerous legs, the head at Abydos and at Memphis. Thus the honour of possessing some of the members was claimed by more than one city. These sanctuaries in Græco-Roman times were forty-two in number, each with its central shrine or Serapeum.

The Serapeums were so called by the Greeks 'without regard to the distinction between the tomb of a dead bull which had become an Osiris and the sepulchre of the god-man Osiris himself. But to the Egyptians they were the sanctuaries of Osiris, of him who dwells in the Underworld.'[5]

Abydos owed its importance to its possession of the head, and its symbol was a coffer containing it, surmounted by two plumes. But from the XIIth to the XVIIth dynasty the whole body was also supposed to be buried there, and an early royal tomb was regarded as that of Osiris. It became an important holy place, to which numerous pilgrimages were made, and burial near his relics was considered most advantageous. At Busiris was the backbone or 'pillar' of Osiris, the *ded*, kept there as a sacred relic. It had been discovered at Mendes and brought to Busiris.[6] Lucian also mentions the hair of Isis as an important relic preserved in Egypt.[7] Herodotus refers to a curious myth current in the Theban district regarding Perseus. Here the Chemmitæ had a temple in his honour, and here he sometimes appeared. A sandal worn by him was sometimes found after his visit. It was two cubits long, and its presence denoted prosperity for Egypt.[8] As in Greece, large bones were shown as those of giants.[9]

4. **Celtic.**—The Celtic cult of human heads and the myths respecting them show analogies with savage custom, and the presence of a hero's head in any given territory seems to have been regarded as a guarantee of safety against enemies and evil

[1] Paus. iii. 16. 1, x. 4. 4. [2] *Ib.* ix. 40. 11.
[3] *Ib.* viii. 24. 5, 46. 1; Pliny, *HN* ix. 5.
[4] Cf. Paus. ii. 38. 6.
[5] A. Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, p. 217.
[6] *Ib.* pp. 215, 289; A. Erman, *Handbook of Egyp. Religion*, Eng. tr., do. 1907, p. 16; E. A. W. Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, do. 1904, ii. 127, *Osiris and the Egyp. Resurrection*, do. 1911, i. 212, ii. 1, 8, 18, 83.
[7] Lucian, *adv. Indoct.* 14.
[8] Herod. ii. 91. [9] Phlegon, *Mir.* 15.

influences,[1] just as in classical and Christian belief about relics of hero or saint. Mythical relics of divinities seem to be referred to in a passage of the Rennes *Dindsenchas*, where the remarkable things in the Brug of Mac Ind Oc are enumerated. Among these are the monument of Dagda, the rampart of the Morrigan, the bed of Dagda, the two paps of the Morrigan, the comb and casket of Dagda's wife, the stone wall of Oengus, and many tombs and cairns of divine or heroic personages.[2] Certain things belonging to the Tuatha Dé Danann are also of the nature of mythical relics. The stone of Fal was brought out of Falias and used to roar under every king who would take the realm of Ireland. This is supposed to be identical with the present coronation stone. Out of Gorias came the unconquerable spear which Lugh had, and out of Findias the equally unconquerable sword of Nuada. Out of Murias came Dagda's miraculous cauldron. Possibly actual weapons, etc., in Ireland were thus connected with the gods as their relics,[3] like the *churinga* of ancestral spirits among the Arunta (§ 1 [*f*]).

5. Christian.—(*a*) *Origins of the cult.*—The early Christian use of relics, like the use of relics everywhere, may be traced to affection, which makes the survivors cling to the mortal remains of a relative or visit the place of sepulture, and to the instinctive reverence for or curiosity concerning any notable person. Added to this in the case of the early Christians was the desire to shield the remains from the malice of persecutors, while the belief in the resurrection and in the body of the living as a temple of the Holy Spirit naturally increased the reverence paid to the dead. It was also believed that spirits of saints hovered near their tombs and, later, the shrines where their relics were preserved[4]—a primitive survival which aided the reverence paid to body, relic, or tomb. Feelings of reverence for the martyr's body easily passed over to anything which had been in contact with him. In the case of the living, this principle is seen at work already in Ac 19^{12}. As to dead martyrs, an early example of the preservation of relics occurs in the case of Ignatius.

After he was eaten by the beasts, only his larger bones remained. These were carried to Antioch and there placed in a napkin, 'as an inestimable treasure left to the church by the grace which was in the martyr.'[5]

Another early instance is found in the reverence paid to a martyr's blood.

Prudentius tells how the witnesses of the martyrdom of St. Vincent (A.D. 304) dipped their linen vests in his blood, so that it might be a safeguard to their homes for generations.[6] This custom existed in still earlier years—*e.g.*, in the case of the martyrdom of St. Cyprian (A.D. 258)—and is often referred to in the *Acta* of the martyrs.

The extraordinary reverence shown in the matter of burial, care of the grave, and in the cult which went on there, especially on the anniversary of a martyr's passion, all aided the growth of the relic-cult. The Eucharist was celebrated at the tomb, often on the stone slabs which covered the body (see art. ALTAR [Christian]).

An early instance of this is found in the case of St. Polycarp. 'Taking up his bones, more precious than the richest jewels and tried above gold, we placed them where it was fitting. There, assembled as we shall have opportunity, with joy and gladness, we shall be permitted by the Lord to celebrate the anniversary of his martyrdom.'[7]

We can hardly doubt that the cult at the martyr's tomb, if it was not an actual continuation of the pagan hero-cult, was influenced by it.[8] Theodoret says that the Lord has substituted martyrs for heroes, and that churches were built over their tombs or relics just as temples were erected over tombs of heroes.[1] But, while the remains of the pagan hero generally rested in the grave and were not seen by the worshippers, the development in the Christian cultus was to a reverence of relics in reliquaries and to an occasional visible exhibition of the same.[2] Among Greeks and Romans reverence for the dead forbade the dividing of their remains, and severe laws existed against violation of tombs and bodies. These laws continued in force under the earlier Christian emperors. The prejudice against dividing the remains of the dead continued active in the Western Church, but both there and in the East the desire to possess the bodies of martyrs led to large sums being paid for them and to disputes concerning their ownership. But in the Eastern Church the division of a martyr's remains into relics began to prevail at a comparatively early period. Graves were rifled and bones stolen, and a traffic was begun in these, though the use of such relics was apparently a private one, as in the case of Lucilla (p. 654[a]). At what time precisely the dismemberment of bodies of saints began is uncertain. Possibly the practice was aided by the fact that, where martyrs were burned, nothing but a few bones and ashes remained, which might be regarded differently from a complete corpse or skeleton. But that it was already in vogue in the 4th cent. is shown by the law of Theodosius,[3] forbidding the translation of a dead body already buried, the selling (or dismembering? ['nemo martyrem distrahit']) or buying of a martyr's remains. A law of Valentinian III. speaks of bishops and clergy who were guilty of robbing graves, apparently for the purpose of obtaining relics. St. Augustine already speaks of pretended monks who went about selling relics of martyrs, if indeed they were martyrs, and refers to scandalous abuses in connexion with the cult.[4] Even in A.D. 593 Pope Gregory the Great was amazed at the Eastern custom of disturbing the remains of saints, and, when the empress Constantina asked him to send her the head of St. Paul for a new church to his memory, he refused, saying that he could not divide the bodies of the saints, and pointed to the danger of invading their tombs. It was not the Roman custom to do this. He therefore sent her a cloth which had been in contact with the body and had the same miraculous powers.[5]

Influences from the Jewish or Hebrew side are not discernible in the Christian relic-cult. Among the Hebrews any actual cult of relics of the dead was hindered by the idea of uncleanness which attached to a dead body (Nu $19^{11f.}$) and by the disgrace which attended lack of burial. Joseph's body, after embalming (a custom which is here Egyptian, not Hebrew), was by his direction carried up from Egypt to Palestine and there buried; but, though it would naturally be treated with reverence, there is not the least evidence of a relic-cult here (Gn $50^{25f.}$, Ex 13^{19}, Jos 24^{32}). The pot of manna and Aaron's rod within the Ark of the Covenant were not worshipful relics, but in the one case a memorial of God's mercy, in the other 'a token against the children of rebellion' (Ex 16^{33}, Nu 17^{10}, He 9^{4}). The 'brazen serpent that Moses had made' appears as an object of worship down to

[1] See art. CELTS, vol. iii. pp. 288[a], 300[a].
[2] *RCel* xv. [1894] 292. [3] *Ib.* xii. [1891] 57.
[4] Council of Illiberis, can. 34; Jerome, *Ep.* 109 'ad Riparium,' *contra Vigilantium*, 8.
[5] *Relation of the Martyrdom of S. Ignatius*, 12.
[6] *Peristeph.* v.
[7] *Ep. concerning the Martyrdom of St. Polycarp*, 18; cf. Ac 8^{2}.
[8] H. Delehaye, *The Legends of the Saints*, Eng. tr., London, 1907, p. 165, maintains that the relic cultus is an outcome not of hero-worship, but of reverence for the martyr. There was a logical and parallel development of the two cults, without interdependence—'the natural outcome of an identical state of mind under similar conditions' (p. 167).
[1] *Apoc.* vi. 3. [2] Cf. Pfister, i. 323, ii. 423.
[3] ix. 7 (A.D. 386).
[4] *de Opere Monachorum*, 28, *de Civ. Dei*, xxii. 13.
[5] Greg. *Ep.* iv. 30.

Hezekiah's day, but was destroyed by him. In all likelihood it was the image of an adopted serpent-cult rather than a relic (2 K 18[4]).

(*b*) *Growth of the cult in early times.*—Apart from the usual cult of a martyr at his tomb and the celebration of the Eucharist there, or the building of a shrine or church over the tomb, the use of separate relics was at first a private custom rather than a practice officially recognized. This is suggested in the statement made in the account of St. Polycarp's martyrdom[1] that care was taken by the Roman authorities to prevent the least part of his body being taken, although *many desired to do this* and to be made partakers of his holy flesh. The Roman governor, at the suggestion of the Jews, pretended that the Christians might forsake the worship of the Crucified and begin to worship this Polycarp. The *Acta* of St. Fructuosus and his two deacons tell how the brethren collected the ashes and divided them. But he appeared in a vision to some of them and bade them restore and bury them in one place.[2] At the beginning of the 4th cent. Optatus tells how Lucilla, a Donatist, was accustomed, before receiving the Eucharist, to kiss a relic of a supposed martyr which she had procured, and for this she was rebuked by Cecilian, archdeacon of Carthage.[3] In the time of Diocletian a Roman lady, Aglae, sent her favourite steward to the East with gold and aromatics to obtain relics of the martyrs. The evidence of St. Augustine to the traffic in relics is also important as a witness to the private practice. But there is no doubt that the cult of actual bodily relics, as well as dust from the shrine, and cloths which had been in contact with a martyr's body, was becoming general in the 4th cent., by which time St. Cyril of Jerusalem († 386) also speaks of the wood of the Cross as distributed piecemeal to all the world in his day.[4] The growing cult is also proved by the desire of the pagans to prevent it—*e.g.*, in the case of St. Polycarp, perhaps also in that of the martyrs of Lyons, whose ashes were thrown into the river that no fragment (λείψανον) might remain to give hope of resurrection, and in the refusal of sepulture to martyrs in the Diocletian persecution, lest the survivors should gain courage in worshipping those whom they regarded as gods.[5] References in the Fathers to the cult at tombs show how easily that could develop into a cult of separate relics.

Gregory of Nyssa says that to touch the tomb is a blessing, and, if it be permitted to carry off dust which has settled on it, this is a great gift. As for touching the remains themselves, only those who have done so know how desirable it is and how worthy a recompense of prayer.[6] St. Chrysostom describes how the faithful gathered in crowds round the martyrs' tombs, and he praises the power of the sacred remains. Not only their bodies, but also their vestments are objects of homage.[7]

The custom of dividing the remains of a martyr is certainly found in the East in the latter half of the 4th century. It, as well as the translation of the body, was now promoted for ecclesiastical and political reasons; *e.g.*, the enriching of Constantinople with innumerable relics from other parts gave it a high standing as against the old capital of the West. Eastern Christians liberally shared their relics with others as an honour to the martyr and a widening of his circle of admirers, while it also flattered their own pride. The custom was common among the Christians of Egypt, and Chrysostom refers to it.[8] The church of Sinope presented many places with relics of Phocas.[9] Basil tells how the church of Sebaste gave relics of its forty martyrs to other districts.[10] Paulinus of Nola placed in the church which he founded there (*c.* 400) relics of various apostolic martyrs, including also some of those of St. Nazarius sent by St. Ambrose.[1]

1 § 1. 2 *DCB* ii. 572.
3 Optatus, *de Schism. Donat.* i. 16.
4 Cyril, *Cat.* xiii. 4. 5 Eus. *HE* viii. 6 f.
6 *PG* xlvi. 745, 749.
7 *Expos. in Ps.* ix. 3, cxv. 5, *Hom.* 8, 'ad pop. Ant.
8 *Laud. Mart. Ep.* 1. 9 *PG* xl. 398 f.
10 *In Quadr. Mart.* 8.

As has been seen, the division of bodily relics was hardly known in classical Greece, or, where separate parts of a hero existed, they were still within a grave. Yet already in the East separate relics of Buddha were known and reverenced, his bones, after cremation, having been divided among eight clans or individuals, and mounds erected over them. Buddhist influences on the growing custom of dividing the remains of a saint may be regarded as remotely possible.

Theologians soon began to recognize the cult of relics and to supply reasons for it. They referred to such passages as 2 K 13[27], Sir 48[13f.], and Ac 5[15] 19[12] in support of the practice. The bodies of saints, formerly temples of the Holy Spirit, were now as worthy of reverence as their souls;[2] or, as their bodies were instruments which God had used and which were destined to share in future bliss, this suggested continued reverence to them.[3] Their bodies were endued with mystic power (δύναμις), or grace (χάρις πνευματική), and so also were their graves,[4] and this power was as much in the parts as in the whole. 'When the body is divided, the grace remains undivided.'[5] He who touched the bones of a martyr received a share of the sanctification (ἁγιασμός) from the grace dwelling in them.[6] This power was already inherent in saints while alive, as their alleged miracles showed, and it was even then apt to overflow upon other objects, which could produce wonderful effects also (Ac 5[15] 19[12]). If, then, argues Chrysostom, clothes, handkerchiefs, and even the shadow of saints on earth had wrought such miracles, a blessing is certainly derived from the relics of saints by those who devoutly touch them. The relic, as containing supernatural grace or power, was like a spring which overflows and never grows dry, or like a light always sending out beams, but never losing the power of shining, and this power passes over to all persons or things brought into contact with the relic.[7] These views, apart from their theological aspect, differ little from the theory implicit in savage magic, as far as that concerns the use of relics.

Lucius points out that the power in the relic forms a kind of ponderable stuff, and gives as an example the overflowing of oil in a lamp or vessel near a martyr's tomb, as if something material had passed into it from the remains. Such oil had miraculous virtues equalling those of the relic.[8]

A clear distinction was drawn, however, between worship paid to God and reverence to the relics of a saint. This was already recognized in the case of St. Polycarp's relics. Christians worshipped (σέβεσθαι, προσκυνοῦμεν) Jesus Christ, but loved (ἀγαπῶμεν) the martyrs and their relics; they did not worship Polycarp, as the pagans avowed.[9] 'We honour the martyrs,' says St. Augustine, 'but do not worship (*colamus*) them.'[10] St. Jerome, in contending against Vigilantius for the use of relics, maintains that relics are not worshipped, but honoured. 'We honour (*honoramus*) the relics of the martyrs, that we may worship (*adoremus*) Him whose martyrs they are.'[11] Popular practice probably went farther; and even now, in the opinion of leading Roman Catholic theologians, the supreme worship of *latria* may be accorded to relics of the Cross, the nails, the garments of the Saviour.

(*c*) *Variety of relics.*—A relic is first and foremost

1 Paulin. *Ep.* xxxii. 17.
2 St. John Damasc. *de Fide Orthodoxa*, iv. 15.
3 St. Aug. *de Cura pro Mortuis*, 5.
4 St. Cyril of Jerus. *Cat.* xviii. 16; St. Chrysos. *in St. Ignat. Mart.*
5 Theodoret, *Græc. Affect. Curatio*, 8.
6 St. Basil, *Hom. in Ps.* 115.
7 St. Basil, *Hom. in mart. Julittam*, 2; St. Chrysos. *in Sanctos Maccab.*, hom. i. 1.
8 *Die Anfänge des Heiligenkults in der christlichen Kirche*, p. 133.
9 *Mart. of St. Polycarp*, 17.
10 *Sermo* 101, 'de Diversis.' 11 *Ep.* cix. 1.

the bodily remains of a holy person—the whole of these or any part of them, even the most minute (*tantillæ reliquiæ*, in the phrase of St. Gregory of Nazianzus).[1] In later theology a division as far as rank was concerned was made between different parts of the body as relics. *Reliquiæ insignes* include the whole body, or its chief parts—head, arm, leg; *reliquiæ non insignes* include other parts, and these are again divided into *notabiles* (hand, foot) and *exiguæ* (teeth, fingers).[2] As already mentioned, the blood of a martyr was also a sacred relic, and the *Acta* describe how it was collected in napkins, sponges, etc., which were preserved as talismans. But anything which had been possessed by, or had been in contact with or in proximity to, a holy person or his relics might in turn become a relic. Among these were his books, his instruments of torture, his garments, of which St. Chrysostom says:

'How great is the power of the saints. For the homage of Christians is directed not only to their words and bodies, but also to their vestments.'[3]

Earth and dust from graves, coffins, and shrines; oil from lamps hanging there; pieces of cloth (*brandea*) laid for a time upon them, were all as efficacious as the remains themselves, as far as miraculous power was concerned. Flowers which had touched a relic were also reverenced. Many names were in use for *reliquiæ* besides the general term—e.g., *exuviæ, busta, beneficia, lipsana, insignia, cineres, pignora* or *xenia sanctorum*, etc.

A change similar to that of the elements in consecration was supposed to have taken place in pieces of cloth after contact with the relic. Pope Gregory the Great is said to have shown this to some sceptical Greeks; he cut such a piece of cloth, and blood flowed from it.[4]

Among other relics those associated with our Lord naturally occupied a high place, although in most cases (like many other relics) they were fictitious. The alleged discovery of the Cross was accompanied by a miracle, and a few years later the holy wood of the Cross had almost filled the whole world.[5] Paulinus says that the part of it kept at Jerusalem gave off fragments of itself without diminishing, having imbibed this power from the blood of that Flesh which underwent death, but saw not corruption.[6]

Calvin jeers at the quantity of wood in the relics of the Cross, so much that three hundred men could not carry them. But G. Rohault de Fleury maintains that existing relics would measure 5,000,000 cubic millimetres, whereas the whole Cross contained at least 180,000,000—an ingenious calculation. But was the 'true' Cross that on which our Lord was crucified? Honorat Nicquet, writing of the multiplication of the wood of the Cross, assimilates the latter to the Body of Christ in the Eucharist.[7]

The alleged letter of Christ to Abgarus preserved Edessa frequently from attack in the 4th century. The pillar to which our Lord was bound, the crown of thorns, the spear, sponge, and reed, the linen clothes, the stone of the sepulchre, and earth from the sepulchre or from the Holy Land, even our Lord's footprints, were all relics from the 4th cent. onwards, and are referred to in pilgrim itineraries and other writings. Later known relics are the much-multiplied *sudarium*, the boards of the manger in the church of S. Maria Maggiore in Rome brought from Bethlehem in the 7th cent. by Pope Theodorus, and the Holy Coat of Trèves, existing also at about twenty other towns. The nails of the Cross, found with it by St. Helena, became also much multiplied. Many nails, however, are said merely to contain filings of the originals, though they are usually alleged to be genuine.

[1] *Orat.* 1, 'contra Julian.'
[2] H. J. Wetzer and B. Welte, *Kirchenlexicon*², Freiburg i. Br., 1882–1901, x. 1039.
[3] *Hom.* 8, 'ad pop. Ant.'
[4] *Ep.* iv. 30.
[5] St. Cyril, *Cat.* iv. 10, x. 19, xiii. 4.
[6] *Ep.* 31.
[7] *Titulus sanctæ crucis*, new ed., Antwerp, 1870, vol. i. ch. 25.

Dust and earth from Palestine were most efficacious against demons, and were brought thence in large quantities and sold at high prices.[1] Some relics of the Passion and the like may at first have been part of the properties used in liturgical mystery-plays.

Relics of the Virgin are mentioned from the 6th and 7th centuries onwards. Among the early relics were a stone on which she had rested on her journey to Bethlehem, the pitcher and bucket which had been near her at the time of the Annunciation, and the stool on which she then sat, articles of her clothing, her girdle, and her headband.[2] These and the like were to be seen in Jerusalem, Constantinople, and other Eastern cities. But even at this period relics of the Virgin were known in Western churches or in the possession of private individuals.[3] Probably the legend of the Assumption prevented the existence of actual bodily relics, though a lock of her hair was treasured by Charlemagne, and her milk was a favourite relic all over Western Europe.

Innumerable relics of the Apostles came into existence as the cult increased, and at first none were so popular as the chains which had bound St. Peter and St. Paul. Chrysostom mentions St. Paul's chains, and in the 6th cent. they existed at Rome.[4] Those of St. Peter were given to the empress Eudoxia on her visit to Jerusalem in 439, and one of them was presented by her to her daughter, wife of Valentinian III., at Rome, who built the church of S. Pietro in Vincoli in its honour. Filings from these chains enclosed in keys or crosses were greatly valued, and Pope Gregory the Great was accustomed to send keys containing them as gifts.[5]

(*d*) *Abuses of the relic-cult.* — Many of these relics were fabulous, but, as the reverence for them increased, it was natural that innumerable new ones should be brought to light. The inventories in churches and references in religious literature during the Middle Ages show the extent and the absurdity of the cult. Relics of the patriarchs and saints of the OT became common from the 4th and 5th centuries onwards. Their graves and places connected with their lives were pointed out without hesitation, and are mentioned in itineraries[6]—*e.g.*, the rock smitten by Moses, the cave of Elijah, the place where David composed the Psalms. Among relics were Moses' rod and the horns attributed to him, parts of the burning bush, the bones of Isaac, hairs of Noah's beard, fragments of the Ark, soot from the furnace of the Three Children, portions of manna, Job's dung-heap, feathers from Gabriel's wings, and St. Michael's buckler. Equally absurd were the breath of St. Joseph, the Virgin's milk, our Lord's tears,[7] sweat, blood, tooth, even the *præputium Christi* (in several churches),[8] the wood of the three tabernacles which St. Peter proposed to make, and the corner-stone rejected by the builders! In vain were laws passed regulating the cult. The passion for relics became greater still, and the trade in them increased as the centuries passed. From at least the 4th cent. many burial-places of Scriptural and ecclesiastical saints and of martyrs were alleged to have been discovered by means of dreams and visions, in which the dead man appeared and revealed the

[1] Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, xxii. 8. 6.
[2] See reff. in Lucius, p. 467.
[3] Greg. Tur. *de Gloria Mart.* i. 9. 11.
[4] *In Eph. Hom.* viii. 1; Greg. *Ep.* iii. 30.
[5] *Ep.* vi. 6, vii. 28.
[6] P. Geyer, *Itinera Hierosolymitana Sæc. iv.-viii.*, Vienna, 1898 (*CSEL* xxxix.).
[7] See J. B. Thiers, *Dissert. sur la sainte larme de Vendôme*, Paris, 1669.
[8] A. V. Müller, *Die 'hochheilige Vorhaut Christi' im Kult und in der Theologie der Papstkirche*, Berlin, 1907. For the extraordinary mystical ideas associated with this relic see also O. Stoll, *Das Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig 1908, p. 684 ff.

place of sepulture in order that a *martyrium* might be built or due honour paid to him. Dream discovery of a saint's remains still occurs now and then.[1] Fraudulent persons early took advantage of this and produced bodies of alleged martyrs. On the other hand, the ghost of a thief whose tomb was honoured as a martyr's appeared to St. Martin at his prayer and avowed his real character and crimes.[2] Pilgrims to the East and to the holy places returned with such relics as water from the Jordan and earth from the Sepulchre, or with false relics imposed upon them in return for large payments. At a later period the Crusades, especially after the sack of Constantinople, gave an immense impetus to the traffic in relics, by bringing them from the East and by multiplying in the West relics already known in the East. Demand created an extensive supply, and traffic in relics became one of the greatest scandals of the pre-Reformation period, while imposture was freely practised upon credulous and ignorant people.[3] Although prohibitions were issued by 12th and 13th cent. councils, bishops sometimes permitted the existence of avowedly false relics, on the ground that to undeceive the people was not expedient—an argument still in use. Theft of famous relics was not uncommon and was soon regarded as praiseworthy—*e.g.*, when the people of one district or the members of one monastery wished to gain possession of a relic from another.[4] Hesychius stole the body of St. Hilarion after his death in Cyprus in 371, and carried it to Palestine, but the Cypriotes maintained that his spirit remained with them. Stolen relics still worked miracles. In other cases actual combats for the possession of relics took place, as when the people of Tours and Poitiers fought for the body of St. Martin.[5] The desire for relics, and for the marvellous in connexion with them, led also to the reduplication or multiplication of the same relic in different places—numerous bodies, heads, legs, etc., of the same saint; many holy shrouds, coats, and the like; innumerable thorns from the crown of thorns, and pieces of the Cross. Indeed scarcely any relic did not exist in duplicate or more.[6] Credulity and pious fraud, as well as intentional imposture, were responsible for many of these, though theologians sometimes explained them by a miraculous multiplication through divine intervention.[7] Others maintain that each relic is only part of a whole, conventionally described as entire, or that similar relics are those of different saints of the same name. These explanations do not cover all the cases, nor even the more important of them. Many relics, again, were admitted to be facsimiles of an original, and, having been brought into contact with it, are now possessed of all its miraculous virtues.

Some attempt was made by authority to distinguish false relics from true. The 5th Council of Carthage (A.D. 398) ordered bishops to remove altars raised over relics without authentic proof. Individual saints imposed tests, or notable ecclesiastics like Pope Gregory the Great[1] insisted upon the assurance of authenticity. Hence arose the custom of testing relics. Those possessed by Arians and found in Arian churches were subjected to the ordeal by fire by order of the Spanish Council of Cæsar Augustus in 592. This custom was common in later centuries, and liturgical forms were used in connexion with the test.[2] Before the 15th cent. the traffic in relics was forbidden, as well as the showing of them outside a reliquary and the stealing of them. No new relics were to be venerated without due authority, and bishops were to prevent fictions and false documents about relics from being circulated.[3] Where the cult was so deeply rooted, and where relics, whether true or false, had already wrought miracles, not even the highest authority could destroy popular belief in them. But, as their abuse was one of the grievances of the Reformers, the Council of Trent tried to regulate some of its more notorious aspects—their superstitious use, the association of filthy lucre with them, and the degradation of the visitation of relics into revels—while no new miracles were to be acknowledged or new relics recognized unless the bishop of the diocese had taken cognizance of and approved them.

(*e*) *Relics in churches.*—The custom of building a chapel over a martyr's body gave rise in the time of Constantine to that of building churches over tombs of great apostles or martyrs. From the middle of the 4th cent. it also became customary to build a church in memory of a martyr and to bring to it his relics, or to place such relics in an existing church. This gave rise to continual translation of relics. The translation, whether of whole or of partial remains, was effected with great reverence and pomp. It first occurred in the East, an early example being that of the remains of SS. Andrew, Luke, and Timothy to Constantinople The Westerns for some time shrank from meddling with bodies, once they were buried, although the remains of St. Stephen are found first at Calama and then at Hippo in St. Augustine's time, and even in 593 Pope Gregory the Great wonders much at the Eastern custom.[4] Even when the West accepted the custom, certain restrictions were imposed; *e.g.*, the sanction of the prince or bishop and permission of a sacred synod had to be obtained, as a council of Metz (813) appointed. In general, translation came to be preceded by miraculous circumstances attending the discovery of remains. When they were brought to the place appointed for them, crowds of all ranks came to welcome them and to accompany the procession with lamps and candles. The relics were enclosed in costly wrappings or in precious receptacles. Similar joyous scenes marked their passage through towns on the way. Usually the day was marked by a yearly commemoration besides the day of the saint. An early example of the manner of translation—that of the body of Phocas to Constantinople—is given by St. Chrysostom,[5] while a recent instance is that of the remains of St. Aureliana from the Catacombs of Rome to Cincinnati in 1870.

As the custom spread, the idea arose that no church was complete without relics. Traces of this are found in the 4th cent.,[6] and soon relics were carefully sought for to place in new churches. Where none could be obtained nearer, application was made to Rome in the 7th and later centuries, and a cloth (*brandeum*) consecrated by being held

[1] Sozomen, vii. 21; *Chron. Pasch.*, A.D. 406; Theod. Lector, ii. 2; E. Le Blant, *Les Songes et les visions des martyrs*, Rome, [illegible]; P. Saintyves, *Les Saints, successeurs des dieux*, p. 32.

[2] Sulp. Sev. *Vita S. Mart.* 8.

[3] J. Guiraud, 'Le Commerce des reliques au commencement du [illegible] siècle,' *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, Paris, 1892, p. [illegible]; 'Les Reliques romaines au ixe siècle,' *Questions d'hist. et d'arch. chrét.*, p. 235ff. An association of 'contrebandeurs en ossements sacrés' existed in Paris. Early examples of [illegible] are given by Augustine, *de Opere Monachorum*, 28; Greg. Great. *Ep.* iv. 30; Greg. Tur. *Hist. Franc.* ix. 6.

[4] E. Le Blant, *Le Vol des reliques*, *passim*.

[5] Greg. Tur. *Hist. Franc.* i. 43.

[6] [illegible] Second Book of Homilies of the Church of England, [illegible] pt. 3; C. de Plancy, *Dict. critique des reliques*, [illegible]

[7] J. Ferrand, *Disquisitio reliquiaria sive de suscipiendo et [illegible] in hoc numero reliquiarum quæ in diversis ecclesiis [illegible] conservantur medietatione*, Lyons, 1647.

[1] *Ep.* xi. 64.

[2] J. Mabillon, 'de Probatione Reliquiarum per ignem,' *Vetera Analecta*, Paris, 1723, p. 568.

[3] H. Siebert, *Beiträge zur vorreformatorischen Heiligen- und Reliquienverehrung*, Freiburg i. Br., 1907, p. 53.

[4] *Ep.* iii. 30.

[5] Chrysos. *in Phocam*, 1; cf. Jerome, *c. Vigilant.* 5.

[6] Ambrose, *Ep.* xxii. 1; Paulinus, *Vita Ambros.* 29.

over the relics of SS. Peter and Paul was sent. Old churches were also supplied with relics. Consecration of a church with relics under the altar was made obligatory by the 2nd Council of Nicæa (787). As the altar had previously been built over the body, so now relics were placed under it, or in a cavity within it. There was also a reference to the 'souls underneath the altar' of Rev 6[9]. Both in the Eastern and in Roman Catholic churches the consecration of a church is attended by the solemn placing of relics in the altar. The cavity in the altar is known as the *sepulchrum*, *loculus*, or *confessio*; and in the Latin Church it must contain relics of two or, since 1906, one martyr.[1]

In the Eastern Church *antiminsia*, or corporals, consecrated at the dedication of a church, are used, but several may be hallowed at the same time. Relics are pounded up with a fragrant gum; oil is poured over them by the bishop, and, distilling on to the corporals, is supposed to give them all the virtue of the relics. The Eucharist must be celebrated on them for seven days, after which they are sent forth as they are wanted. In use this corporal is spread out on the altar at the beginning of the liturgy. It is practically a portable altar.[2]

Relics were sometimes placed at doors of churches, where the faithful kissed them, and in various parts of the architecture of the building, and were also contained in precious reliquaries, in cupboards on the left or right of the altar, or in sacristies. They were also carried in processions, and were exhibited to the faithful, who were blessed with them, generally on a specific day. Numerous pilgrims flocked to the place for this purpose. Booklets which described the relics, and also aided the pilgrims to follow the ceremonies at their public exhibition, were for sale, and contained instructions as to the indulgences to be obtained.

Receptacles of relics, or reliquaries, had a variety of names (*arca*, *capsa*, *capsella*, *pixidula*, *sanctuarium*, *scrinium*, *theca*) and were made of different materials—wood, metal, bone, ivory, glass. Many of them were richly ornate. Their form was equally various. Some were made to imitate a church, house, ship, tower, or sarcophagus. Some had the form of a cross, others of a statuette, a bust, or a medallion. Still others were shaped to resemble their contents—foot, head, etc. Besides reliquaries for use in churches, a smaller kind was made for carrying on the person.

(*f*) *Customs in connexion with relics.*—Relics being so sacred and powerful, an early custom arose of taking oaths upon them. As prescribed by Dagobert in 630, the compurgators placed their hands on the *capsa* containing the relic. The accused put his hands above theirs, asking God so to help him and the relics under the hands which he holds that he may not incur guilt in the matter of which he is questioned.[3] Another custom was that of obtaining a saint's advice by laying on the altar where his relics were a letter with a blank sheet for the answer, which was sometimes given in writing, sometimes not at all.[4] There is some analogy here with modern methods of spirit-writing. The assistance of saints was also thought to be obtained at ecclesiastical councils by the presence of their relics.[5] While at first burial near a martyr's grave was avoided, it soon became a matter of strong desire to be interred near the relics of a saint or martyr. St. Augustine wrote a treatise in support of the practice.[6]

(*g*) *Relics and miracles.*—The veneration of relics soon led to the belief in them as powerful to work miracles. Being associated with the spirit of a dead saint or filled with his supernatural grace, they were naturally supposed to possess such miraculous powers as he had possessed in his lifetime. A comparatively early instance of this, but one which shows that the belief was already strongly grounded, is found in St. Augustine's account of the relics of St. Stephen first at Calama and then at Hippo. He mentions as many as seventy accounts of such miracles already written within two years after the coming of the relics. He describes the miracles as countless, and gives cases of the cure of blindness and other diseases even through flowers which had come into contact with the relics, of cures of gout, fistula, stone, and broken limbs, and of restoration of the dead to life. Augustine's theory is that the martyrs died for the faith of Christ and can now ask these benefits from Him. The miracles attest the faith which preaches the resurrection of the flesh to eternal life, whether God acts directly, producing effects in time, or by His servants, perhaps using their spirits as He uses men who are still in the body, or by means of angels—at the prayer of the martyrs. Augustine also refers to miracles wrought through relics as common in his time—*e.g.*, through those of Protasius and Gervasius.[1] Other early instances are the miracles ascribed to the relics of St. Cyprian by Gregory Nazianzen,[2] and those recorded by St. Gregory of Tours, especially in connexion with the relics of St. Martin or with dust from the tomb of the martyrs of Lyons.[3] He also tells how a nail of the Cross thrown into the Adriatic by Queen Radegund made it safe ever after for navigators. Pope Gregory the Great, whose veneration for relics was extreme, cites many miracles by means of relics in his *Epistles*. Where relics were possessed by churches and wrought miracles, it became common in the 5th cent. to hang up models of limbs which had been cured—a practice continued long after. At the translation of relics miracles were matters of frequent occurrence, as well as at their exhibition, and at the shrines of famous saints. From the 6th cent. onwards, with increasing force during the later Middle Ages, the credulity of the people increased, and miracles by means of relics, genuine or false, or by means of articles in contact with them, or at the shrines which contained them, were multiplied and were frequently of the most absurd nature. Not only were the sick healed, the blind given sight, the dead raised, and demons tormented or chased away, but relics cured or kept off poison, had power over storms, thunder, rain or floods, gave victory when carried in battle, or kept enemies at a distance,[4] overcame robbers, and supplied succour of every kind. See also art. CHARMS AND AMULETS (Christian), vol. iii. p. 427[b].

While miracle-working relics in any given church or monastery were usually welcomed as a source of revenue from the crowds which flocked there, these crowds were sometimes a source of annoyance to the course of monastic life.[5]

Relics were worn on the person as amulets from early times, usually hanging in a case from the neck or in rings. They warded off evil through the union of the wearer with the saint whose relics were worn. Warriors placed them in the hilts of their swords; kings wore them in their crowns and regalia, or parts of crowns were themselves made of most sacred relics—*e.g.*, the fillet of the iron crown of Lombardy from one of the nails of the Cross. St. Thomas Aquinas discusses the propriety of wearing relics round the neck as a protection, and approves of the practice, provided ostentation and superstition be avoided.[6] This opinion was challenged by other theologians.

[1] For the ceremony see Remigius of Auxerre, *de Ded. Eccl.* 9; *Pontifical of Egbert* [Surtees Soc. Publications, vol. xxvii.], London, 1853; E. Martène, *de Antiquis Ecclesiæ Ritibus*, Venice, 1783; *ERE* i. 341 f. and works cited there; *CE*, *s.v.* 'Consecration'; L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship*[4], Eng. tr., London, 1903, p. 399 ff.

[2] J. M. Neale, *Hist. of the Holy Eastern Church*, London, 1850, pt. i. Introd. p. 186. For the office used see J. Goar, *Euchologia*, Paris, 1647, p. 648.

[3] *Capitularia Regum Franc.* i. 60.

[4] H. Rückert, *Culturgesch. des deutschen Volkes*, Leipzig, 1853–54, ii. 263.

[5] Martène, iii. 1, 10.

[6] Aug. *de Cura pro Mortuis Gerenda.*

[1] *de Civ. Dei*, xxii. 8 f.

[2] *Orat.* xviii.

[3] *de Gloria Mart.* i. 50 and *passim.*

[4] Cf. Basil, *Hom. in SS xl. Mar.* 8; Greg. Naz. *Hom.* xviii.

[5] J. C. L. Gieseler, *A Compendium of Ecclesiastical History*[4], Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1848–56, ii. 311.

[6] *Summa*, II. ii. qu. 96, art. 4.

(*h*) *Opposition to the cult of relics.*—Cultured pagans taunted the Christians with the cult of the relics of martyrs—men 'hateful to gods and men'—and Julian inveighs with scorn against the practices in connexion with the tombs and relics of martyrs and the worship of the wood of the Cross. While some of the leaders of Christian thought protested against the extravagances of the cult, most of them admitted its value. Protests arose, however, from time to time against the whole practice. Vigilantius, a Spanish presbyter, wrote against the cult and its superstitions, and describes it as idolatry and insanity. His work is known only from the violent reply of St. Jerome, who maintains that the souls of martyrs hover round their relics, but that Christians neither worship nor adore but only venerate relics of martyrs, in order the better to adore the martyrs' God [1]—a statement hardly true of the popular attitude. In connexion with the iconoclastic controversy, the emperor Constantine Copronymus desired the abolition of the cult of relics, though the iconoclasts generally had no objection to them. Many relics were thrown into the sea, and popular feeling was aroused by the loss of such as had been highly valued. At a later date, in the West, Claude, bishop of Turin (*c.* 817), desired to see religion freed from superstition, and inveighed against the use of relics, intercession of saints, and pilgrimages to their shrines, while he caused the destruction of relics in his diocese. He was condemned by a local synod. In his work, *de Pignoribus Sanctorum*, Guibert, abbot of Nogent († 1124), attacked the worship of saints and relics, and its many anomalies and absurdities—*e.g.*, reduplication of relics—and, in particular, he proved the imposture of the tooth of Christ, alleged to be possessed by the monks of St. Medard.[2] Among the mediæval mystic groups faith in relics was sometimes set aside, though not by all. The pantheistic mystics of the 13th cent. scoffed at the reverence paid to the bones of martyrs.[3] Individual Reformers (*e.g.*, Wyclif) and reforming groups before the Reformation (Waldenses and Lollards) were opposed to all practices connected with relics, and the Reformers themselves indignantly repudiated their use. Calvin wrote a *Traité des reliques*, in which he pours contempt upon them and those who believe in them. The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England describe the Roman doctrine concerning them as 'a fond thing, vainly invented' (art. 22), and the Second Book of Homilies (1563) is still more emphatic. Since the 16th cent. the use of relics has been abandoned in all Reformed churches. Nevertheless, so strong is the instinctive feeling of reverence for anything pertaining to a great man that various things belonging to famous divines—letters, books, apparel, furniture, and the like—are carefully treasured, and are objects of interest and of some degree of reverence by both Protestant and Catholic admirers. Further, in all Protestant and Roman Catholic countries relics of interesting personages of the past, apart from saints, are often treasured with every sign of interest and respect.

The modern Roman Catholic doctrine of relics is based on that of the earlier theologians already cited, and is set forth by the Council of Trent. The bodies of saints and martyrs were the temples of the Holy Spirit and members of Christ, and will be raised to eternal life. Therefore the faithful should venerate them. Through them benefits are bestowed on men by God. Hence those who deny the power of relics and the folly of the veneration of them are to be condemned. Reference is also made by the Catechism of Trent to such passages as Ac 5[15] 19[12], 2 K 13[21], Sir 48[14]. J. H. Newman finds in the view which Christianity takes of matter as susceptible of grace, and in the fact that matter as well as spirit recovered through the Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection what it had lost as a result of the Fall, a sufficient reason for the sanctity of relics.[1] Although modern Roman Catholic theologians deprecate the extravagances of the relic-cult, they find some justification, *e.g.*, for keeping up that of doubtful relics in the scandal which might be given to ignorant minds long accustomed to regard them with devotion, if they were removed. Whether relics are authentic or fictitious, if the prayer made before them is sincere, that is all that matters.[2]

6. Conclusion. — Although reverence for the remains of the dead or the treasuring of some of their more personal belongings is natural and instinctive, the preservation of these remains in whole or in part for veneration, or as incentives to greater faithfulness and goodness, or as reminders of the example offered by the lives of their whilom owners, is a forcing of that instinct beyond its legitimate place. There is not a little that is barbaric in the dividing up into larger or smaller fragments of the mortal remains of a saint and disseminating them over a wide area even for purposes of veneration. The admitted great uncertainty which surrounds any relic, the certainty of impudent fraud in the case of many, the gross superstitions and abuses to which they have given rise and which have attended the cult from early times, far outweigh any positive good which they may ever have done.

There are some curious likenesses between the classical and the Christian cult of relics. Circumstances attending the discovery and translation of relics, the rivalry of different places for them, fighting for or theft of them, falsifying and reduplication, the respect shown to them, the miracles and prodigies associated with them, the safety expected from them, are instances of these.[3] But, while the influence of the pagan cult of relics upon the origin of the Christian cult may be affirmed, most of these likenesses owe their existence to similar results following from similar conditions, rather than to influence from the pagan side. There is also the fundamental difference already noted—viz. that pagan relics of heroes were almost invariably enclosed in a tomb, were not divided up, and were not visible, while those of saints were at an early date dismembered, enclosed in reliquaries, and made visible to the faithful.

LITERATURE.—Besides works on separate relics of note, see J. Calvin, *Traité des reliques*, ed. E. Fick and G. Revilliod, Geneva, 1863 (reprint of ed. of 1599); *CE*, art. 'Relics,' xii. 734 ff.; *Cornhill Magazine*, xix. [1869], three artt. on 'Ecclesiastical Relics' by 'the Undeveloped Collector'; *DCA*, art. 'Relics,' ii. 1768 ff.; H. Delehaye, *Les Origines du culte des martyrs*, Brussels, 1912; Guibert of Nogent, *de Pignoribus Sanctorum*, in *PL* clvi. 607 ff.; J. Guiraud, 'Les Reliques romaines au ixe siècle,' *Questions d'hist. et d'archéologie chrétienne*, Paris, 1906, p. 235 ff.; J. de Launoy, *de Cura Ecclesiæ pro Sanctis et Sanctorum Reliquiis*, Paris, 1660; E. Le Blant, *Le Vol des reliques*, do. 1886; A. Luchaire, 'Le Culte des reliques,' *Revue de Paris*, 1900, p. 195; P. E. Lucius, *Die Anfänge des Heiligenkults in der christlichen Kirche*, ed. G. Anrich, Tubingen, 1904; L. F. A. Maury, *Hist. des religions de la Grèce antique*, Paris, 1857, ii. 52 f.; W. Palmer, *Dissertations on Subjects relating to the 'Orthodox' or 'Eastern-Catholic' Communion*, London, 1853, p. 261 ff.; P. Parfait, *La Foire aux reliques*, Paris, 1879; F. Pfister, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, Giessen, 1909–12 (in *RVV*); J. A. S. Collin de Plancy, *Dictionnaire critique des reliques*, Paris, 1821; P. Saintyves, *Les Saints, successeurs des dieux*, do. 1907; E. A. Stuckelberg, *Reliquien und Reliquiare*, Zurich, 1896.

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RELICS (Eastern).—The worship, adoration, or veneration of relics is widely diffused in Asia, and is not wholly confined to the adherents of any one religion, although chiefly practised by Buddhists. The Tridentine definition of relics as comprising '(1) the bodies of the saints, or portions of them, (2) such objects as the saints made use of during their lives, or as were used at their martyr-

[1] *Ep.* cxc., 'ad Riparium,' *c. Vigilant.* viii. 4. 7.

[2] *PL* cxc. 66 ff., Gieseler, iii. 235.

[3] R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, London, 1909, p. 187.

[1] *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, London, 1845, p. 370 f.

[2] *CE* xii. 738; L. Duchesne, *Fastes épiscopaux de l'ancienne Gaule*, Paris, 1894–1900, i. 340.

[3] Cf. the examples in §§ 2, 3, and 5, and also the details in Saintyves, p. 28 ff.

dom,'[1] applies to non-Christian Asiatic usage. Class (1) is known to the Buddhists as *śarīrika*, 'body-relics,' while class (2) is termed *paribhogika*, 'objects used,' the term 'used' being understood in a wide sense as connoting 'closely connected with.'

In Asia relic-worship rests on the same foundations as in Europe. The relics may be venerated simply as memorials of the sainted dead, serving, like images, as points of attachment for the reverence and devotion of the pious; or they may be regarded as intrinsically possessing magical powers which enable them to work miracles. The treasuring of relics as memorials or souvenirs of the dead is a natural exhibition of emotion to which no objection can be taken, but, when the relics are believed to possess intrinsic magical properties, the veneration of them passes into rank superstition, open to every kind of abuse and fraud. The transition from the sentimental to the superstitious veneration of relics invariably takes place in all countries, so that the innocent sentiment is forgotten while the superstition develops a vast mythology. The Buddhists further hold that the honouring of relics is an act of the highest merit, conferring much personal benefit on the worshipper. In this article we propose to give a sketch of the most prominent features of relic-worship as practised in Asia throughout the ages by the followers of non-Christian religions.

1. Buddhism. — The Buddhist cult from the earliest age of Buddhism, as it is known to us from the most ancient remains and documents until the present day, has always been characterized by the prominence of relic-worship. The practice is older even than the historical religion of Gautama Buddha, and may be traced back to the time of the half-mythical 'former Buddhas' about whom so little has been ascertained. A great tower, or *stūpa*, a few miles from Śrāvastī enshrined the relics of Kāśyapa Buddha, the predecessor of Gautama. The relics comprised his entire body. That statement seems to indicate that in the remote times when Kāśyapa lived burial rather than cremation was the approved method for disposing of the remains of a notable saint.[2] The erection of the *stūpa* was ascribed to Aśoka, but his building must have been raised on the site of a more ancient memorial.

A footprint reputed to be that of Kāśyapa Buddha was venerated at a place to the west of the Indus.[3] Hiuen Tsiang saw a miraculous image of the same 'former Buddha' to the north-west of the Bodhi-tree. The pilgrims also note the commemoration of the birth-places of Krakuchanda and Kanakamuni (Konāgamana), the other semi-historical 'former Buddhas,' who preceded Kāśyapa. Aśoka, in or about 255 B.C., enlarged for the second time the *stūpa* of the last-named saint, and almost certainly that building must have contained relics of his body. Other notices of a similar kind exist. The inference is reasonable that relic-worship had been established as an element in the cult of the 'former Buddhas' centuries before the appearance of Gautama Buddha in the world. The religion of the 'former Buddhas,' whatever it was, seems to have arisen in the sub-Himālayan plain lying to the north of the modern Bastī District in the United Provinces. The origin of Buddhist relic-worship, consequently, may be assigned to the same region.

Relic-worship as practised by the followers of Gautama Buddha began with the proceedings connected with his funeral, when the relics of his burnt body were collected by the Brāhman named Droṇa and distributed among eight 'kings.' Droṇa himself retained the vessel in which the fragments were gathered together, while another Brāhman took the embers from the pyre as his share of the sacred spoil. Ten famous monuments were erected accordingly over the relics thus obtained, and in due course each appears to have become the centre of an important group of religious establishments. The story of the distribution of the relics, as told originally in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*[1] and retold in a multitude of other books, need not be repeated here.

The fragments of bone deposited with extreme reverence in the early *stūpa* at Piprāwā on the Bastī-Nepāl frontier by the Sākyas of Kapilavastu may represent one of the original eight shares. Relic-worship clearly must have been a well-established practice long before the death of Gautama Buddha. From the time of that event (*c.* 483 B.C.) until now it has always been one of the most prominent features of the external Buddhist cult, closely associated in India, Ceylon, and Burma with all holy localities and places of pilgrimage, and consequently with the development of religious art in every form. Buddhists believe that their Master himself directed the veneration of his relics as a pious duty. Whether he did so or not, the supposed duty has been zealously performed.

The four canine teeth, the two collar-bones, and the frontal bone of Buddha were termed the 'seven great relics.' The other fragments, which were numerous, were believed to comprise grains no bigger than a mustard seed.[2] The relics so collected were gradually dispersed all over the Buddhist world, the dispersal being associated by legend with the name of Aśoka. Some of the pieces, genuine or supposititious as the case may be, have become the subject of long histories, among which the story of the tooth-relic in Ceylon is the most famous. The reputed hairs and nail-parings of Buddha, which have supplied many reliquaries, are venerated as fervently as the relics believed to have come from his funeral pyre. The *paribhogika* relics, or objects in some way connected closely with the person of Buddha, command similar reverence. The Buddhist passion for relic-worship is so ardent that anything said to be a relic is certain to secure much popular attention, without serious criticism of its genuineness. The relics need not be either those of Buddha himself or objects associated with him personally; fragments of the bodies of the saints and things used by or connected with them are valued almost as highly. The Tibetans carry their interest in relics of recently deceased or even living Lāmas to a disgusting extreme.[3]

The smaller objects of veneration naturally were enclosed in suitable reliquaries or caskets, which were made of various materials, including among others soapstone or steatite, rock-crystal, bronze, silver, and gold. Many examples have been discovered in India, Ceylon, and elsewhere. Three specially notable examples may be mentioned. The earliest known specimen appears to be the steatite reliquary found in the extremely ancient Piprāwā *stūpa*, erected probably soon after the death of Buddha. There is reason to believe that the fragments of bone in that casket were genuine relics of Gautama Buddha, and that they were enshrined not long after his decease by his Sākya clansmen; but absolute proof of the genuineness of the relics is necessarily unobtainable, and the

[1] *Conc. Trid.*, sess. xxiv., as quoted in *EBr*[11] xxiii. 59.
[2] Fa-Hian, *Travels*, ch. xxi.; Hiuen Tsiang, in S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1906, ii. 13.
[3] *Voyage de Song Yun*, ed. E. Chavannes, Hanoi, 1903, p. 42.

[1] *SBE* xi. [1900] 131 ff.
[2] Bigandet, *The Life or Legend of Gaudama*[4], ii. 89.
[3] L. A. Waddell, *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, London, 1905, p. 397.

date of the monument is the subject of differences of opinion.[1] The reliquary, with a crystal bowl and other vessels, stood on the bottom of a massive coffer measuring 4 ft. 4 in. by 2 ft. 8¼ in. by 2 ft. 2¼ in. constructed with perfect skill from a single block of fine sandstone. Another exceptionally interesting reliquary is the gold casket from a *stūpa* at Bīmarān between Kābul and Jalālābād, enriched with Hellenistic repoussé figures. A third is the Kaniṣka casket made of an alloy of copper and found in the ruins of the great *stūpa* at Peshāwar.[2]

The pious people who deposited relics in carefully-prepared, costly receptacles usually honoured the precious fragments by placing with them a multitude of objects of intrinsic or artistic value, including jewellery of various kinds. All the known examples of ancient Indian jewellery seem to come from such honorific deposits. The workmanship both in metals and in gems is of high quality. We are thus indebted to relic-worship for the greater part of such knowledge as we possess concerning the jeweller's art in ancient India.

Relics, whether *śarīrika* or *paribhogika*, were usually secured against accidents by burial in a *stūpa* (*thūpa*, 'tope,' 'dagoba'), which in its early Indian form was a low solid cupola of massive masonry, with a relic-chamber in the interior, ordinarily placed near the base. Such buildings, although not so difficult to enter as the Egyptian pyramids, were sufficiently impenetrable to offer no small degree of security. Some ancient monuments of the kind preserve their secret inviolate to this day, some were despoiled ages ago, and others have yielded their treasures to keen archæologists in recent times. Although *stūpas* were built occasionally merely as memorial towers to mark sacred spots, and in that case contained no internal chamber, most of them in ancient times were erected specially for the purpose of enshrining in safety highly venerated relics of either Buddha or his saints. The modern *chorten* (*q.v.*), the equivalent of the *stūpa* in Tibet, rarely contains relics.

The story of the *stūpa* as an architectural form, beginning with the low solid hemisphere of Piprāwā and ending with the slender Chinese pagoda, is a long one. That long development would never have taken place but for the cult of relics. Most of the important groups of early Buddhist sacred buildings, especially in India and Ceylon, comprising monasteries, temples, and structures of many other kinds, were formed round a relic *stūpa* as the nucleus; and in that way the worship of relics may be described with approximate accuracy as being the foundation of the art of architecture in its application to the special purposes of Buddhist religion and public worship. Reginald Farrer justly observes:

'It is thanks to the cult of relics that Ceylon possesses such a store of ancient shrines. And the tremendous artistic impetus that the competition of shrine-building aroused was of inestimable service to national activities, to the consolidation and centralization of the Cinhalese Kingdom.'[3]

The same cause operated more or less in other countries of Asia in the same way; just as in Europe the cathedrals at Gloucester and many other places were built from the proceeds of the offerings of pilgrims visiting the enshrined relics of reputed saints and martyrs.

The *stūpas* erected in Buddhist countries to provide safe custody and permanent honour for relics include some of the largest buildings in the world. The most considerable structures of the kind still standing probably are those to be found in Ceylon and Burma. The ancient *stūpa* at Anurādhapura in Ceylon, commonly, although inaccurately, called the Jetawanārāma, stands on a stone platform nearly 8 acres in extent, and is still 251 ft. high. The Shwé Dagōn pagoda at Rangoon, a more modern building, 368 ft. high in its existing form,[1] is reputed to contain within its mass eight hairs of Gautama Buddha, as well as the bathing-garment of Kāśyapa, the water-dipper of Konāgamana, and the staff of Krakuchanda—*i.e.* articles used by the three latest of the 'former Buddhas.'

Among the destroyed *stūpas*, one of the greatest was the famous monument at Peshāwar constructed *c.* A.D. 100 by Kaniṣka (*q.v.*). The relic-casket excavated from its foundations has been referred to above.

The gigantic monument at Boro Budūr in Java is essentially a *stūpa*, but there is no record of its erection or of the relics which may lie hidden somewhere in its recesses.

Buddhist public worship in India and Ceylon during the early days centred in the relic-*stūpas*, which formed the goals of innumerable pilgrimages. Kings emulated one another in the lavishness of the ceremonial with which the relics were first enshrined and then from time to time exhibited to the faithful. The best descriptions of such ceremonies are those given repeatedly in the *Mahāvaṁsa*, a monastic chronicle of Ceylon, written about the 5th century A.D.

Ch. xix. relates how the site of the Mahāvihāra was consecrated in the presence of an enormous international assemblage of monks, including deputations from the foreign lands designated as Pallavabhogga (? Persia) and 'Alasanda the city of the Yonas,' probably meaning Alexandria in Egypt. Ch. xxx. is devoted to an exposition of the glories of the spacious relic-chamber, and ch. xxxi. describes fully the enshrining of the relics and the many miracles accompanying the act. The theory governing the proceedings is frankly stated at the end of ch. xxx. in these words:

'If the wise man who is adorned with the good gifts of faith, has done homage to the blessed (Buddha) the supremely venerable, the highest of the world, who is freed from darkness, while he was yet living, and then to his relics, that were dispersed abroad by him who had in view the salvation of mankind; and if he then understands—"herein is equal merit"—then indeed will he reverence the relics of the Sage even as the blessed (Buddha himself) in his lifetime.'[2]

The same intense belief in the efficacy of relics still prevails; and, when occasion arises, as on the presentation of the Piprāwā relics to the king of Siam, the sacred objects are welcomed with extreme enthusiasm, although the splendour of the ancient ceremonial in Ceylon may not be emulated.

In A.D. 1763 certain pagodas at Shwebo in Burma were dedicated by the four queens of the reigning monarch. At the close of 1902, thieves having rifled the contents of one of the buildings, the local authorities decided to open the other pagodas and remove the treasures enshrined in them to a place of safety. A silver scroll, forming part of the deposit and then taken out, records the motives which influenced one of the royal ladies to erect her pagoda.

'Finally,' she observes, 'by virtue of the merit acquired by me through building this pagoda, in which the relics of Buddha are enshrined, may I enjoy such happiness and prosperity as cannot be disturbed and detracted [from] in every form of existence counting from the present one till the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*, and, like Visākhā and Queen Anoja, may I attain *Nirvāṇa*, without the necessity of further transmigration, at the feet of the coming Buddha Ari Metteyya.' In the preceding sentences Her Majesty had invoked similar benefits for the king, the members of the royal family, the ministers and officials, and had prayed that 'the spirits of the pagodas, trees, the earth, and the sky, together with the ogres, *ghouls*, and ghosts, who inhabit the declivities of the earth,' might share in her merit and keep constant watch and ward over her pagoda.[3]

The document affords interesting and conclusive proof that the modern practice of relic-worship in

[1] See *J.A.* xxxvi. [1907] 117-124.
[2] V. A. Smith, *A Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford [illegible] pls lxxv and lxxv
[3] *In Ob[illegible]*, London, [illegible], p. 223.

[1] *EBr*[11] xxii. 891b.
[2] Tr. Geiger, p. 208.
[3] *Ann. Rep. Archæol. Survey of India*, 1903-04, p. 150.

Buddhist countries is turned to extremely practical purposes. The relics are regarded as an excellent and profitable investment. It is clear that in the Shwebo case no trouble whatever was taken to verify the alleged relics, because another scroll in one of the adjoining pagodas declares that the relics of Buddha consisted of 3001 large pieces, with the same number of small pieces, besides a multitude of other fragments still more minute—which is manifestly incredible. The so-called relics were placed in an amber bowl of great value, which was enclosed in a miniature pagoda made of silver, gold, and glass. The miscellaneous objects deposited in the relic-chambers as honorific and protective additions by the queens include an extraordinary variety of things, hundreds in number, and duly catalogued in the accompanying inscriptions. Besides many jewels and articles of gold and silver, the collection comprises copper or brass models of war-boats, cannon, and arms of various kinds. The figures of soldiers, horses, and elephants, with the miniature guns and weapons, were intended to protect the relics.

Thirty-four years later (1797) P. Hiram Cox, the British Resident at Rangoon, was allowed to inspect the collection prepared for deposit in another new pagoda, the relic-chamber of which measured no less than 61½ ft. square on the inside. The objects deposited, although not quite so varied in character as those collected by the queens, were numerous and included the strange item, 'one of Dr. Priestley's machines for impregnating water with fixed air.' Ancient honorific deposits were ordinarily restricted to jewellery—using that term in a wide sense—and coins, including specimens valuable as rarities or curiosities. That practice explains the frequent occurrence of Roman coins of various reigns in the *stūpas* of Afghanistan and the Panjāb.

Relic-worship attained its highest prominence in ancient India and Ceylon. Burma comes next in devotion to the cult. In all other Buddhist countries the adoration of relics is but a minor incident of popular religion. The Sera monastery to the north of Lhāsa prides itself on the possession of the metal thunderbolt (*vajra*, or *dorje*) of the god Indra, which fell down from heaven, and was used by Buddha; but Tibet, on the whole, sets little store upon ancient relics, while keen on the quest of relics, even the most offensive, of recent or living Lāmas, which are believed to possess magical curative properties of the highest value.

Certain monasteries in China rejoice in their custody of famous relics; but the number of notable places of the kind does not seem to be great. One of the most celebrated of such places is the temple, or *stūpa*, on the Five-peaked Mountain (U-tai-shan) in N. China, built by a Wai sovereign in the 5th century.[1] The absurdity of the cult of relics has not escaped the ridicule of Chinese scholars. In A.D. 819 Han Wan-kung, an eminent writer and statesman, deeply offended the reigning emperor by mocking at the honours paid to an alleged finger-bone of Buddha, preserved at a pagoda in the prefecture of Fung-tseang. His candour was punished by official degradation, and he narrowly escaped execution. But ordinarily, in all countries, sceptics have been content to preserve a discreet silence.

Japan, Korea, and Siam seem to care little for relics properly so called, although the Siamese venerate a much-esteemed alleged footprint of Buddha.

Burma excepted, most modern Buddhist countries prefer to expend their devotional enthusiasm on images rather than on alleged relics. Sometimes copies of the sacred books serve the same purpose as relics and are used to consecrate by their presence *stūpas* or pagodas, built primarily to gain a store of merit for the donor.

In Burma 'pagodas are built over relics of the Buddha, or models of them, over the eight utensils of a mendicant, or imitations of them, and over copies of the sacred books.'[1] 'No work of merit,' the same author observes, 'is so richly paid as the building of a pagoda,' and the structure, in order to have proper efficacy, must be sanctified by the inclusion of relics, if practicable, and, when they are not available, by the best procurable substitute. In ancient India also copies of sacred texts, such as the twelve *Nidānas* or the so-called 'Buddhist creed,' were often used as a substitute for relics in order to give the requisite sanctity to a *stūpa* or an image.

2. Brāhmanical Hinduism.—The veneration of relics seems to be practically unknown to Brāhmanical Hindus, one reason being that their ill-defined religion has no recognized founder like Jesus Christ, Buddha, or Muhammad. All accounts agree that the rude log which does duty as the image of Jagannāth (*q.v.*) at Purī encloses a mysterious deposit which is transferred when the image is periodically renewed; and, according to one story, the deposit consists of the bones of the demi-god Kṛṣṇa.[2] If the deposit really consists of bones, the fact may be regarded as a survival of Buddhist relic-worship. The cult of Jagannāth certainly is connected with Buddhism.[3]

It would be difficult to specify any clear instance of relic-worship practised by Brāhmanical Hindus. The honours paid to reputed footmarks of Viṣṇu (*Viṣṇu-pada*, *-pāduka*) resemble those rendered by the Jains to the vestiges of their Tīrthaṅkaras, and by Muhammadans to those of their Prophet, but are not exactly relic-worship.

3. Jainism.—The statement of Fergusson, that the Jains 'have no veneration for relics,'[4] although possibly true for the present day, is not quite correct with reference to ancient times. Jain *stūpas*, indistinguishable from Buddhist ones in appearance, were numerous, and some of them may have contained relics, although no record of the existence of such contents has been published. Bhagwān Lāl Indrajī, referring in general terms to Jain literature, asserts that the early Jains honoured bone relics of the Tīrthaṅkaras, corresponding to Buddhas, and that survivals of the ancient relic-worship may be traced in modern practice.

He states that 'at the present day the Jain *Sādhus* of the Kharatara *gachchha* use for worship a five-toothed sandal goblet called *thāpanā*, and this is a copy of the jaws of the Tīrthaṅkaras. So the Jaina nuns or *sādhvīs* use for worship as *thāpanā* a kind of shell (*śaṅkha*), which they take to be the knee-bones of Mahāvīrasvāmī.'[5]

A Jain *stūpa* was built in honour of Akbar's friend and teacher, Hīravijaya Sūri, who was cremated in A.D. 1592 at Ūnā or Unnatpur in the Jūnāgaṛh State, Kāthiāwāṛ. Various miracles having occurred at the spot, the *stūpa* was erected to mark the holy ground. It has not been described, and may or may not contain relics.[6] Recent European works on Jainism do not make any allusion to either relic-worship or *stūpas*. Mrs. Stevenson, however, mentions that childless women attending the funeral of a nun strive to tear a piece from the dead *sādhvī's* dress, believing

[1] Sylvain Lévi, *Le Népal*, Paris, 1905, i. 335; P. Landon, *Lhasa*, London, 1905, ii. 267.

[1] Shway Yoe (J. G. Scott), *Burma*, London, 1886, p. 123.

[2] W. Ward, *A View of the Hist., Lit., and Mythology of the Hindoos*, Serampore, 1815, ii. 163.

[3] See N. N. Vasu, *The Modern Buddhism and its Followers in Orissa*, Calcutta, 1911, p. 158.

[4] *Hist. of Ind. and E. Architecture*², ii. 3.

[5] *Actes du sixième congrès d'Orientalistes*, Paris, 1865, pt. iii. p. 142.

[6] *Jaina-Shāsana*, Benares, Vīra S. 2437, A.D. 1910, p. 128.

that it will ensure their having children.[1] That practice is a near approach to relic-worship.

4. Muhammadanism.—Although the treasuring and veneration of relics are hardly consistent with the spirit of Islām, Musalmāns have followed to some slight extent the example of their heathen neighbours and have been tempted occasionally to cherish and reverence tangible memorials of their Prophet. Such limited compliance with non-Muslim practice has not produced any considerable effects, and the few instances of Muhammadan reverence for relics which can be cited are detached phenomena with no special significance. Certain places pride themselves on the possession of hairs from Muhammad's beard. Two such relics (*āsār*) were brought to Bījāpur in the Deccan, India, at some time in the reign of Sultan Ibrāhīm II. 'Adilshāh of Bījāpur (1580–1626), and were deposited in a palace now known as the Āsār Mahal, 'Relic House,' where they are treated with much reverence. Even foreign Muhammadan potentates send rich offerings in honour of the relics, which are venerated by a special ceremonial on the Prophet's birthday, 12th Rabī' I.[2] The box in which they are kept is never opened, so that 'no one living has seen the relic.'[3] Rohrī (Rūrhī) in Sind boasts of a similar treasure, a single hair, which is kept in a jewelled gold case in a shrine named the Wār, or Wāl, Mubārak, a building erected for the purpose by Nūr Muhammad in or about A.D. 1745. The relic is exhibited to the faithful once a year, when, by means of some trick, it is made to rise and fall, the movement being regarded by the crowd as supernatural.[4]

'In the Mogul armies, before the introduction of European tactics, an elephant always marched in the van, bearing on its head a long pole, from which floated a large flag. Sometimes this was followed by another elephant carrying a rich howdah, on which was placed a box containing a priceless relic, which usually was, if one may believe it, an actual hair from Mahomet's beard.'[5]

Certain relics of the Prophet are kept in the Topkapu Palace at Constantinople and visited by the Sultan at the beginning of a new reign.[6]

The reputed footprints of the Prophet on rocks or slabs of stone are venerated in many places, which need not be specified. J. Burgess mentions examples at Ahmadābād, Gaur, and Delhi,[7] and many more might be collected from various countries. The honours paid to the tombs of numerous *pīrs*, or reputed saints, in Muhammadan lands are near akin to relic-worship, but are not quite the same thing.

LITERATURE.—Innumerable books dealing with the Buddhist cult treat more or less fully of relic-worship. Some of those books have been cited in the text. Works deserving of special mention are: trr. of the travels of the Chinese Pilgrims, especially Fa-Hian (*q.v.*) and Hiuen Tsiang (see YUAN-CHWANG), by various authors; P. Bigandet, *The Life or Legend of Gaudama*[1], popular re-issue, 2 vols., London, 1914; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896; R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, London, 1850, *A Manual of Budhism*[2], do. 1880; M. Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*[2], do. 1890, lect. xvii.; J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*[2], 2 vols., do. 1910; H. H. Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, do. 1841; *Mahāvaṁsa*, tr. L. C. Wijesiṁha, Colombo, 1889; tr. W. Geiger, *The Mahavaṁsa; or, The Great Chronicle of Ceylon*, London (PTS), 1912; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism*, do. 1895; A. Wylie, 'Buddhist Relics,' in *Chinese Researches*, Shanghai, 1897; W. P. Yetts, 'Notes on the Disposal of Buddhist Dead in China,' *JRAS*, 1911, pp. 699–725.

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[1] *The Heart of Jainism*, London, 1915, p. 232.
[2] G. Watt, *Indian Art at Delhi, 1903*, London, 1903, p. 431.
[3] *BG* xviii. [1884] 620–623.
[4] A. W. Hughes, *Gazetteer of the Province of Sind*[2], Bombay, 1876, p. 679; H. Cousens, *Archæol. Survey Progress Report of W. India, 1896–97*, do. 1897, p. 9; *IGI*, *s.v.* 'Rohrī,' with amended date.
[5] J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*[3], tr. H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906, p. 672 f.
[6] *Morning Post*, 29th April 1909.
[7] *Archæol. Survey of W. India*, viii. [1905] 20.

RELIEF CHURCH.—See PRESBYTERIANISM.

RELIGION. — I. *INTRODUCTION.* — **1. The subject.**—From time to time men find themselves forced to reconsider current and inherited beliefs and ideas, to gain some harmony between present and past experience, and to reach a position which shall satisfy the demands of feeling and reflexion and give confidence for facing the future. If, at the present day, religion, as a subject of critical or scientific inquiry, of both practical and theoretical significance, has attracted increasing attention, this can be ascribed to (*a*) the rapid progress of scientific knowledge and thought; (*b*) the deeper intellectual interest in the subject; (*c*) the widespread tendencies in all parts of the world to reform or reconstruct religion, or even to replace it by some body of thought, more 'rational' and 'scientific' or less 'superstitious'; and (*d*) the effect of social, political, and international events of a sort which, in the past, have both influenced and been influenced by religion. Whenever the ethical or moral value of activities or conditions is questioned, the value of religion is involved; and all deep-stirring experiences invariably compel a reconsideration of the most fundamental ideas, whether they are explicitly religious or not. Ultimately there arise problems of justice, human destiny, God, and the universe; and these in turn involve problems of the relation between 'religious' and other ideas, the validity of ordinary knowledge, and practicable conceptions of 'experience' and 'reality.'

The very nature of the subject, therefore, forbids any one-sided treatment. No one particular aspect or phase can form the basis; nor can it be ignored that upon no other subject are differences of opinion so acute, and the risk of causing offence and pain so great. The subject of religion inevitably involves both the 'non-religious,' or secular, and the 'anti-religious' (irreligious, blasphemous, etc.); and, while its very intimacy compels a restrained and impartial treatment, its importance demands an impartiality and objectivity which in turn may easily seem 'irreligious.' None the less, the actual problems are such that, if any critical or scientific treatment is once legitimate (and everywhere there is a tendency to treat quite freely the religion which is not one's own), it must be pursued as thoroughly as possible, with the consideration for the convictions of others that one would ask for one's own (the Golden Rule of criticism) and with the clearest recognition of the fact that the subject concerns the most vital beliefs and practices of human beings, all of whom may, on purely scientific grounds, be regarded as closely related—physiologically and psychologically.[1]

2. Definitions.[2]—(1) The term 'religion,' whatever its best definition, clearly refers to certain characteristic types of data (beliefs, practices, feelings, moods, attitudes, etc.). Its use presupposes criteria, and therefore some preliminary conception of what does and what does not come under the category. But it soon appears that there is no absolute gulf between religion and what, in some one respect or other, closely approximates it (*e.g.*, art, morality). Different people draw the line differently. A man will be swayed by his conception of what religion is or is not; but such conceptions vary, not only among individual members of the same society, but even in the lifetime of any one of them. Only in the course of his mental or psychical growth does a man acquire the conception and come to distinguish between

[1] On standpoints and methods of inquiry reference may be made to S. A. Cook, *The Study of Religions*, London, 1914.
[2] Two derivations are familiar, one from *relegere* (so Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 28: 'qui autem omnia, quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligentor retractarent, et tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi, ex relegendo, ut elegantes ex eligendo, tanquam a diligendo diligentes, ex intelligendo intelligentes, his enim in verbis omnibus inest vis legendi eadem, quae in religioso'), the other from *religare* (so Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* iv. 28: 'hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti deo et religati sumus; unde ipsa religio nomen accepit'). But, whether *religio* was what is re-read and reflected upon, or whether it had the idea of obligation, what was more to the point was the meaning of *religio* and its relation to *superstitio* (see Mayor's note on *de Nat. Deor.*, *loc. cit.*).

what is and what is not religion; and this development—which is of the greatest *personal* significance for the individual—finds an analogy in the history of the race, where the distinctions which we draw (*e.g.*, between religion and law or ethics) are not found among rudimentary or backward peoples. Herein lies the fundamental importance of such questions as: How and why do we come to distinguish the 'religious' from the 'non-religious'?, Is there a border-line?, and If we rely upon a prior definition, how did that definition originate? Consequently, the subject is seen to involve not only (*a*) the various beliefs and practices which obviously belong to the subject-matter, but also (*b*) the mental or psychical aspects of all the individuals concerned. In a word, besides the ordinary stock of religious data, one has to consider the individuals who, as a result of certain vicissitudes in their development, have the beliefs which are called 'religious,' or who, again as a result of their experiences, will differentiate between the religious, the non-religious, and the anti-religious.[1]

(2) A survey of the numerous definitions of religion would be more informing than any new one that might be proposed. Even the simple minimum suggested by E. B. Tylor (religion is 'the belief in spiritual beings') at once brings in the question of the nature of these beings, the origin of the belief, and its validity for every individual.[2] Every definition ultimately implies theories of reality and indicates the place that religion should hold in the world of life and thought.[3] Directly or indirectly, some very significant terms are involved (*e.g.*, 'death,' 'heaven,' 'sacred,' 'supernatural,' etc.). These require definition and justification, and, when pursued logically, the ideas ultimately concern man's whole body of thought, both religious and non-religious. In general, the definitions themselves are a valuable contribution to men's conceptions of what religion was, is, or should be. They convincingly demonstrate the *personal* interest in the subject: even the one-sided and unsympathetic definitions show how intimately the self feels itself at stake. They point to subjective convictions of the most vital importance; they characteristically recognize a gulf between man and the 'divine,' while at the same time emphasizing feelings of the closest relationship with or the most absolute dependence upon a 'higher Power.' Especially characteristic are (*a*) the admission of the strength, support, peace, and consolation afforded by religion, and (*b*) the intensifying and 'sanctifying' of otherwise non-religious phases of life and thought. The effects of religion are seen to be varyingly emotional and intellectual, leading to practical, social, æsthetic, speculative, and other efforts. The results for the individual are now narrow and egoistic, and now broad, self-less, and social; and while, on the one hand, religion typically has its 'supernaturalistic' aspects, on the other, all the profounder and more permanent values of life are in some way religious or quasi-religious, even though the characteristic supernatural or other typical religious features be wanting. In other words, there is that which is of supreme *personal* significance, whether it concerns the self (1) alone, or (2) in its relation to others, or (3) in its relation to a higher Power. Thus, as opposed to any efforts to set religion in a watertight compartment by itself, there is evidence which represents it as belonging to so many phases of life that religious data are, so to say, only a special form of otherwise non-religious data. Religion none the less claims to be *sui generis*; hence it is explicable why some observers see only the features which distinguish religion from that which is non-religious, whereas others do not recognize the distinctive features. The paradox of the immanent and the transcendent rests upon the fact that certain kinds of experience and evidence tend to destroy the distinctiveness of religion, whereas other evidence as unmistakably compels or enhances the subjective convictions of the transcendence and distinctiveness of the divine. Other paradoxes relate to 'this' world and 'the other,' to the ideals for mankind and 'this' life, and those for a future which is felt to transcend this world. Paradoxical features are also very marked in the varying normal, abnormal, and pathological aspects of religious life, which clearly prove that the problems are ultimately bound up inextricably with those of ordinary 'mundane' existence. In a word, the subject of religion inevitably involves the problems of personality and existence, and the deeper vicissitudes of life and thought.

3. **Method.**—(1) Every reader tends to approach the subject with certain more or less definite preconceptions touching some of the most essential terms or elements of religion. Herein is clearly seen the individual's implicit reliance upon his personal experience, reflexion, and ideas of truth and reality. But, since differences of opinion and of method at once arise in the problems of religion, it is impossible either to start with theories or convictions of the ultimate realities or even to adopt some one standpoint as opposed to another. Yet, though much may be disputed, there can be no dispute that men differ profoundly over the ultimate facts, and that their inmost convictions will tend to be entirely authoritative and to regulate their lives. So, *e.g.*, whatever be the ultimate realities underlying the data of 'psychical research' and the like (occultism, astrology, angelic visitations, etc.), no one can doubt that there are three typical attitudes: (*a*) believing, if not unduly credulous; (*b*) incredulous, if not contemptuous; and (*c*) discriminating, on the basis of some authority. These are real facts of importance for human nature and the history of religion, inasmuch as a *rational* conception of religion has to find a place for all the evidence and dare not ignore the inconvenient data, from whatever side they are brought. Now, all beliefs (theological, scientific, political, etc.), and whatsoever they imply, have a value as apart from questions of historical credibility, rationality, value, etc.; and in religion as in history much can be learned from the study of beliefs, explanations, and the like, as apart from their particular value for the inquirer and the ultimate facts themselves. Hence, although religion concerns the most vital truths of man and the universe, there can be a critical, objective, or

[1] On the 'genetic' and 'psychological' treatment of the subject see below, § 10. On the importance of tracing these differentiations cf. A. Sidgwick, *Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs*, London, 1892, *The Use of Words in Reasoning*, do. 1901.

[2] *PC*[4] i. 424. For criticisms of definitions see J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion: its Origin, Function, and Future*, New York, 1912, ch. ii. and appendix; E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Eng. tr., London, 1915, bk. i. ch. i.; G. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburgh, 1914, ch. iv. Durkheim's definition may be noticed: 'A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them' (Fr. ed. p. 65, Eng. tr. p. 47). Galloway (p. 184) suggests tentatively that religion is 'man's faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service.' C. C. J. Webb (*Group Theories of Religion*, London and New York, 1916, p. 59) asserts, on the other hand, 'I do not myself believe that Religion *can* be defined.'

[3] Cf. the words of E. Caird: 'A man's religion, if it is sincere, is that consciousness in which he takes up a definite attitude to the world, and gathers to a focus all the meaning of his life. Of course, the man's world may be, and in earlier times is, a comparatively narrow one' (*Evolution of Religion*[2], Glasgow, 1894, i. 81).

scientific treatment which considers, not the goal or destiny of things, but men's beliefs and theories on the subject; not the ultimate facts, but men's convictions of them; not the final objective reality, but religious and related conceptions of this reality.[1]

(2) Just as every religious individual has his non-religious side—and the term distinguishes certain data from those outside the category—so an objective treatment of religion can aim at a conception of religion which would find a legitimate place among the other conceptions which, forced by experience and reflexion, are necessary for a rational description of the entire range of human experience. In other words, the best conception of religion will not be severed from the best conceptions of all else that is relevant; for religion is not something in and by itself, but, in the whole world of life and thought, has a part which has to be determined. Now, as a matter of fact, quite characteristic of modern research has been the study of religion along non-religious and purely technical lines and from various points of view. But, owing partly to differences of method, scope, and aim, and partly also to the difficulty of controlling an enormous field, the more synthetical and comprehensive works have been no more convincing than the more analytical and specialistic. Still, the collection of material and the organization of it proceed *pari passu*; improved methods lead to a better treatment of the evidence, and the latter in turn discovers defects in past methods. Everywhere difficult problems arise, and the persistent crux is the conflict between the infelt conviction that religion can be handled in a way that satisfies the reason and the individual's refusal to go against his inmost convictions, even though these cannot be logically or consistently formulated. Preliminary questions of method thus become indispensable, for no one can approach the subject with an entirely blank mind. But these questions will also serve another purpose; for we have to assume that, between the ultimate realities (whatever they may be found to be) and current conceptions of them, there is no absolute gulf. Of these conceptions we can gain some notion by continued comparison and classification and by psychological interpretation. Moreover, only through some implicit or explicit theory of reality can we handle and interpret the data. Consequently the methodological questions contribute both to our own conceptions of reality and to a better understanding of those which have prevailed elsewhere; cf. below, § 16 (3).

II. *METHODS, PROBLEMS, AND CRITICISMS.*—**4. The comparative method.**—(1) Among the most conspicuous features of modern research has been the application, in their widest extent, of anthropological and comparative methods of inquiry.[2] The effect has been to break down racial, social, intellectual, and psychical boundaries, and to bring into relation all classes and races of men, all types of organic life, all forms of 'matter.' Step by step the most advanced and the most rudimentary of psychical and physical phenomena are related and classified; man is brought into connexion with the rest of the universe, and his conscious, purposive thought-activity comes into line with all types of psychical and other energy. New conceptions thus arise of man's place in nature, and these, in so far as they can be co-ordinated, correspond to the cosmogonies and cosmologies of rudimentary and early peoples, whose general body of religious and non-religious thought was more or less organized and coherent, but whose stock of knowledge was, relatively speaking, extremely small. Now, the comparative method is the unbiased co-ordination of all comparable data irrespective of context or age. It has led to the accumulation of much valuable material. As a popular, simple, and interesting inquiry, it has familiarized many people with the miscellanies of folk-lore and religion. It illustrates popular beliefs and practices, and reveals a remarkable resemblance among peoples all the world over. But, while it supports or suggests various theories and explanations, it does not prove that others are excluded. Moreover, similar practices can have different meanings or motives, and similar ideas and beliefs can be differently expressed. It does not follow that a belief or practice in one environment has precisely the range of feeling, meaning, or application that its parallel or analogy has elsewhere; nor is the apparent origin of any datum necessarily significant for its later meaning or function. In fact, everywhere mere comparison may be legitimate for some purpose—as, *e.g.*, between men and apes—but in every problematical situation the question of the validity of particular inferences is exceedingly urgent, and confusion has often been caused by naive comparisons and rash inferences. Hence, where sweeping theories have been suggested on the basis of comparison (*e.g.*, primitive promiscuity, ignorance of paternity, phallic, serpent, or astral cults, the priority of magic over religion), they must invariably be tested by other methods.[1]

(2) The comparative method is commonly bound up with certain persistent and prevalent notions of the 'evolution' of thought and the 'survival' of rude, superstitious or otherwise irrational beliefs and practices from an earlier and more backward stage in the history of culture. But every datum which can be regarded as a survival must be viewed psychologically; the individuals whose beliefs and practices are so stigmatized are not actuated solely by the mere fact that these belong to the past or have an ancestry. Some feeling of value is characteristically present. The 'survivals' have survived because, while much else has been neglected or forgotten, they have been selected and retained along with the entirely rational data which also have come down from the past. To regard certain data merely as survivals is to ignore the question of their origin, persistence, and function; for the type of mind or the conditions which explain their rise may also explain their continuance. Besides, comparison itself reveals innumerable subtle differences; and these indicate that there has been no artificial or mechanical borrowing or imposition, but a process of re-adjusting and reshaping for which the individuals concerned have a certain responsibility. In fact, whenever beliefs and practices can be compared, a distinction can invariably be made between what it is that recurs and the form in which it recurs. The types of beliefs and practices which are selected, assimilated, or reshaped are not to be confused with the external aspects which can be treated historically. Thus, beliefs in witchcraft everywhere contain similar elements, and one can distinguish (*a*) the subjective or psychological aspect (*e.g.*, the tendencies responsible for their persistence and retention), and (*b*) the more external details, which may be of traditional or legendary interest, due to borrowing, external influence, etc. Indeed, an analysis of typical survivals reveals a fundamental resemblance between data that are distinctly religious and those that usually rank as superstitions or survivals; but, while the latter will generally be sporadic, isolated, and out of harmony with current thought, the former will be more or less organized, socially and intellectually, and will at least claim to be in accordance with the 'best' thought.[2]

(3) The presence of survivals, superstitions, and other signs of cultural differences in an environment shows that, as a general principle, any apparently rudimentary or irrational datum need not

[1] Hence the terms 'truth' and 'reality' (or 'system of realities') must be used with a certain looseness, and with the assumption that every one admits that there are truths and realities of ultimate validity, even though men now differ as to what they are.

[2] On the no less conspicuous employment of psychology see § 10 f.

[1] *E.g.*, one may note the care taken by J. G. Frazer in *The Golden Bough*[3] to emphasize the difference between the great mass of material collected and classified in this monumental work, and the various important theories, conjectures, and explanations with which they are more or less closely interwoven; see, *e.g.*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. p. ix f., pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, do. 1913, i. pp. v. f., xi.

[2] On the fallacies in the current popular theories of survivals see, further, Cook, chs. v., vi.

on that account alone be older than one more advanced or elevated. Moreover, a culture can decay and be followed by one of a lower, ruder, or less organized type. Not only has this often happened in the East, but in Arabia, *e.g.*, the old civilization reflected in the Minæan and Sabæan inscriptions was followed by the pre-Islāmic Jāhiliyya, the age of savagery or barbarism, and this in turn by a new growth—the rise and development of the specifically Muhammadan culture. Facts of this sort bring intricate problems of the rise and fall of systems or cultures, and their consequences for the development of thought. There has undoubtedly been a profound advance from the first appearance of man onwards, but the persistence of all that is styled irrational or superstitious, and the frequent cases of decay, retrogression, and new growth, shatter all facile theories of a simple, continuous, mental or psychical evolution.

(4) Evolutionary ideas hold such a prominent place in conceptions of religious development that it should be noticed that there are really two types of theory. The one involves ideas of survival, retrogression, decadence, recidivism; and it lays the emphasis upon man's savage ancestry in an extremely remote past. The other does not measure the difference between the civilized and uncivilized by centuries or millennia, but it sees the savage 'beneath' the civilized man, the barbarian 'below' the veneer of culture, and so on. The former seems to offer an easy explanation of the presence of lower features (cf. Tennyson's 'the Ghost of the Brute that is walking and haunting us yet' [*The Dawn*]), but the latter is probably more important. The ante-natal stages have a profound significance for the development of man's psychical nature. These stages, and the dependence of the infant upon the mature experience of parents and environment, are as fundamental for his psychical life as the more complex and obscure factors of heredity, or the influence of human or animal ancestors 'hundreds of thousands of years' ago. The actual history of the ancient civilizations shows that there is no inherent momentum in a culture or a religion; its fate depends upon the individuals who are involved. Hence, whatever may be proved to be due to heredity and pre-historic evolution, more attention must first be paid to the traces of the ante-natal stages with all their suggestiveness for lower levels of psychical development which the individual may not have entirely outgrown.[1]

5. Historical and sociological methods.[2]—(1) The purely comparative method of inquiry has emphasized the necessity of constructing conceptions of religion upon a wide basis of data. While indicating resemblances between different religions and peoples, it has also brought to light many significant differences, whether in single environments, at some given time, or in the course of their historical development. Religions can be fruitfully studied in their relations to the political, economic, social, geographical, and other features of the people or area where they flourish. Here attention is paid to the influence of surroundings (mountains, plains, deserts, swamps, etc.), to the proximity of higher or lower cultures, and to means of intercommunication.[3] Of special importance are the food-supply and means of livelihood. Thus, hunting and agriculture conduce to different types of mental and therefore, also, of religious outlook; and, where the food problem is negligible, the religion is without the positive features that recur when the supply is limited or a source of anxiety. The influence of city-life and of political and social interests upon an earlier religion is especially noticeable in the vicissitudes of the Homeric gods. The differences among the various religions are thus due very largely to quite recognizable factors and vicissitudes; and a distinction can be drawn between the history of religions, which is that of definite systems, peoples, or areas (so far as the material permits), and the history of religion, *i.e.* of the development and advance of religious and related thought in human history generally. It is the task of the latter to determine the character and the principles of the development; but the two inquiries are interdependent, and it is a natural presumption that the various religions reflect the working of similar principles, which, moreover, will hold good in the future. But every treatment of the development of religion forces some recognition of 'lower' and 'higher' stages, of which the latter will irresistibly be related to our own ideals (whatever these may happen to be), and our own ideas of what must be the outcome of a progressive development. As for the 'lower' stages, primitive pre-historic men are unknown.[1] Nor can one estimate confidently all the religious and other ideas of, say, the pre-historic cave-painters.[2] If, on the one hand, primitive man once lacked the traditional experience of the lowest of modern savages, on the other, there are tribes so rudimentary that a lower level can hardly be conceived, while possibilities of development are recognizable. The latter may then be called (relatively) 'primitive,' even though their beliefs and practices are complex and have a history behind them.

(2) Thus the relation between a primitive religion and the actual religion of primitive pre-historic people is fairly analogous to that between the child or the savage and the actual 'childhood' of mankind; there will be certain parallels, but there will be essential differences, due to the fact that the environment in the one case has a history and an experience which in the other case are quite wanting. It should be observed that, although some typical developments can be discerned everywhere, we nowhere find the actual dawn of religion in an entirely non-religious environment. Further, all theories and ideals of religion implicate societies or systems, and not particular individuals or details. All significant movements have been collective, and development has been due, not merely to individuals (who often find no following), but to the tribe, society, church, organization, or people who were influenced by them. Consequently, every conception of the lowest stage of religion must refer, not to the first 'religious' individual, but to the group which could be styled 'religious,' not to separate ideas, beliefs, or concepts, but to the whole mental fabric or system in which these found a place. The earliest conceivable religion would necessarily be a system; behind this one can scarcely go. In like manner one can conceive exceedingly rudimentary or primitive groups of individuals, but not isolated human beings who had not yet associated with one another. Only in this way can the problems be *methodologically* pursued; and it is the great merit of sociological inquiries that they illuminate the relatively stable and coherent beliefs and practices of ordinary social groups, and not the individuals who may be exceptional, extreme, or even abnormal. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the individual and what society owes to him. The social group is not an absolutely homogeneous, undifferentiated, and self-moving unit. Every body that can be regarded as a unit moves through those who in some respect are outside it, and cannot be properly described without taking into consideration the environment. No group is actually a closed system, but it is necessary to regard it as a

[1] Cf., *e.g.*, the 'vegetative' soul of Aristotle and the Schoolmen; see M. Maher, *Psychology*, London, 1910, pp. 33 ff., 357, 556, 575 f.

[2] See, among other works, F. Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, Eng. tr., London, 1896–98, bk. i.; E. Meyer, *Einleit. Elemente der Anthropologie* (*Gesch. des Altertums*[2], i. 1, Stuttgart, 1907); Durkheim, bk. i. ch. i.; R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, London, 1912; C. H. Toy, *Introd. to the Hist. of Religions*, New York and London, 1913; G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, Edinburgh, 1914, i.

[3] Thus the old Indo-Iranian stock, as illustrated by a comparison of the *Rigveda* and the *Avesta*, divides into two markedly contrasting streams: the Zoroastrian, or Persian, which is strenuous, practical, and ethical; and the Indian, which is typically passive, mystical, pantheistic, and metaphysical. Differences of climate are adduced to account for the psychological differences. Moreover, the geographical and other features of Egypt and of Babylonia and Assyria favoured a certain unity and fixity of life and thought, in contrast to the broken nature of the lands of the Ægean and Hellenic cultures and the absence of physical links. See Moore, pp. 145, 201, 359, 411 f.

[1] 'A culture would be absolutely primitive if no antecedent mental development whatsoever could be presupposed' (W. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, Eng. tr., London, 1916, p. 20; cf. pp. 21, 32).

[2] All artistic and other human workmanship will imply some mental equipment, observation, and reflexion, with perhaps social, ethical, or moral interests. In any case the data will point to some 'psychical context,' and the task is to determine the certainties, probabilities, and possibilities, and not (say) to suppose that the artists of the Reindeer Period were in no degree inferior to modern artists. The necessity of determining the context of data is obvious when one observes the very different beliefs and practices which can be associated with any particular god (*e.g.*, Jahweh in the OT) or the divergent conceptions entertained of some particular significant term.

simple unit and to neglect provisionally the more complex and difficult details.[1] The group, like the concept, is a methodological necessity, and not an ultimate reality. See, further, § 13.

6. Social practice and myth.—(1) Sociological inquiries have thrown a vivid light upon the interconnexion of life and thought among rudimentary societies and upon the place that religious and related ('superstitious') beliefs and practices hold in the life of the individual or the social group.

The birth of the child brings ideas of legitimacy and kinship, incarnation or rebirth, tabus, and various 'superstitious' usages (cf. art. BIRTH [Introduction]). With the early training and initiation into the group all the deep values of the group are associated. Marriage and marriage-bars involve highly complex ritual and practice. Illness, death, burial, and the fate of the dead almost invariably bring beliefs of the relation between the dead and the living. Religion characteristically embraces all that is for the continuity and security of the social group—entrance into the group, adoption, expulsion, outlawry; vengeance, manslaughter, blood-feud; the protection of property (including women and slaves); the rights and responsibilities of prominent or representative individuals; defence and war; fear of famine and disaster; the preservation of the (animal and plant) food-supply and means of livelihood. Here are inextricably blended tabus and regulations which modern observers from their own standpoints will variously style religious, superstitious, mystical, irrational, rational, secular, and so forth.

A fact of the greatest significance is the increasing differentiation of departments of life and thought and the growing complexity of society.[2] At certain stages there is no clear division, *e.g.*, between ritual, moral, and religious requirements, or between religious, economic, and legal ideas. The appearance, disentanglement, and separate development of special departments of life and thought (*e.g.*, astronomy, anatomy, law, physics) continue on higher levels the early and rudimentary processes which at previous stages enabled men to differentiate and classify simple phenomena and thereby to describe their experience and organize their scanty knowledge. In this differentiation, specialization, and co-ordination there are typical processes which subsequently account for the coexistence of the various conflicting religious and non-religious views of the universe.[3]

(2) A special problem is that of the relative value of the evidence contained in ritual behaviour, social practice, etc., and that in myths, legends, and the like (see art. MYTHOLOGY). The controversy 'myth *versus* ritual' arose as a reaction against excessive reliance upon myths.[4] Myths appear to be of only secondary value in so far as they are intended to *explain*, and have secondary aims which are political, ecclesiastical, philosophical, etc. On the other hand, the ritual or practice may be a lifeless inheritance from the past, bereft of its original significance or motive, and modified by reflexion or myth. The same actions are not necessarily accompanied by the same feelings and ideas, and the latter in their turn can express themselves in very different forms. This is one of the clearest results of the comparative method (§ 4 [2]). Further, every behaviour or action is earlier than reflexion upon it or the desire to explain it; it presupposes feelings, impulses, and needs of which men may be barely conscious. But myths, however artificial they may be, are significant for some stage of thought and for its movement, even though their contents be useless for modern knowledge. Both ritual and myth bring difficult questions of the *meaning* of each for a people. The true meaning of a rite for us (*i.e. our* interpretation) is not necessarily that which it has for those who practise it; and the relation between (*a*) ritual, behaviour, action, etc., and (*b*) subsequent reflexion, explanation, myth, interpretation, etc., is analogous to that between impulsive, instinctive activities and the reflective, intelligent states of consciousness, or between any activity and the apparently obvious purpose which, however, was not recognized at the time. In fact, one of the most interesting features of the more rudimentary religions is the presence of earlier forms of what is fully explicit in the higher religions (*e.g.*, vegetation rites and the later belief in a resurrection), of apparently logical transitions, and of a striking continuity or development, such as to permit continued reinterpretation, and to suggest theories of a progressive revelation or the like (cf. also the view in Gal 3[24]). See, further, § 30.

7. The group unit theory.—(1) It is a fundamental postulate that social life and social-religious practices cannot be founded upon hallucinations; the basic feelings and convictions are both genuine and effective. Moreover, while, on the one side, all maxims, principles, and rules of life, business, recreation, etc., are for the better ordering and organization of activities, on the other side, all practical working life or activity *implies* principles which, however, may not be consciously realized or formulated. Systematized social religious organizations *imply* systems or principles of regulative ideas; and all social organization *or* disorganization corresponds to a sufficient equilibrium of the ideas involved *or* to an absence of the indispensable harmony. The interrelation between the constituents of any effective group, or between different groups, depends on the essential ideas which unite or disunite; and the development or decay of such a group (*e.g.*, a political party) is coincident with that of the constitutive ideas. An active group or body does not ask, 'Is it true?' but in the stress and conflict of life, as also in reflexion upon the ideas and principles that underlie or are implied in its activities, their 'truth' is put to the test. Hard events and explicit discussion thus try the effectiveness of the convictions and ideas; and every state of equilibrium, after a period of severe crisis or disintegration, points to some equilibrium of ideas, of greater or less permanence, uniting the group. Hence we may speak of a system of ideas, even though they are not necessarily consciously recognized.

(2) Now, at certain stages of development the social and religious ideas form an inseparable part of one and the same system—a practical system; life and thought are relatively undifferentiated, and every man is born into the nexus of beliefs and obligations which obtain throughout the group. Such a system, with its body of cults, practices, beliefs, and traditions, implies a system of ideas, ways of thinking, standpoints, explanations, etc. But, further, Robertson Smith, whose *Religion of the Semites* brilliantly illuminated the sociological aspects of religion, especially emphasized the important fact that 'the circle into which a man was born was not simply a group of kinsfolk and fellow-citizens, but embraced also certain divine beings.' 'The social body was not made up of men only, but of gods and men.' 'The gods are part and parcel of the same natural community with their worshippers.'[1] Here, then, ideas of gods and men and of the supernatural and natural, would tend to form part of a single coherent whole—a unitary system, so to say, of thought and practice. It is necessary to grasp this conception and contrast the 'psychical' solidarity of such groups with those situations where life and thought are extremely differentiated, where religion is kept quite apart from the non-religious, where the social system is undeveloped, or, finally, where (as in totemism) there are no clear ideas of gods as part of the social

[1] Cf. Marett, *Anthropology*, p. 169 ff.

[2] See, *e.g.*, W. H. R. Rivers, in *Science and the Nation*, ed. A. C. Seward, Cambridge, 1917, p. 310 ff.

[3] As these processes are of fundamental importance, it may be observed, at this point, that it does not follow that, historically, society goes back to an absolutely undifferentiated state, or that its earliest phase was wholly or essentially religious. What undergoes development can be regarded as an individual datum or detail which is a part or aspect of something, and what can be regarded as a system will be preceded by another system. Thus, *e.g.*, a distinction must be observed between some particular logical prerequisite (*e.g.*, an alphabet) and the actual earliest historical stage (*e.g.*, of intercommunication).

[4] See W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 17 ff.; A. Lang, art. 'Mythology,' in *EBr*[11], xix. 128; M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], Paris, 1905, pp. 28–40. For an intermediate position see D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, New York, 1897, chs. iii., v.

[1] See *Rel. Sem.*[2], pp. 11, 20 ff., 28 ff., 51, 68, 74, 255, 263 ff. Note also p. 32: 'The principle that the fundamental conception of ancient religion [and of all religion at a certain stage (*ib.* p. 31)] is the solidarity of the gods and their worshippers as part of one organic society [with common interests and common aims (p. 31)], carries with it important consequences.' This may be supplemented by Durkheim's purely sociological investigation (esp. bk. ii. ch. iii.), and by his argument that the ideas of the social group, the sacred beings, and the outside world are interrelated in one solid system all parts of which are closely united. In the present article, also, the attempt is made to develop Robertson Smith's remarkably suggestive statements.

system. In a word, the conception of a system of belief and practice where gods and worshippers are very closely related and belong to the same system of ideas serves as a standard or type. All views of divine immanence and transcendence, of the nearness or remoteness of a Supreme Power, of the permanent or negligible part that this Power takes in mundane affairs, and therefore all views, both of the necessity of a *distinctive* concept 'God' and of its meaning, depend essentially upon the coherence or systematization of the leading relevant conceptions of life, and upon the interrelation between the differentiated aspects of life and thought.

8. Totemism and exogamy.—(1) Some extremely interesting questions are raised by totemism and exogamy. Totemism (*q.v.*) is especially remarkable for its striking contrast to all anthropomorphism or anthropopathism, where the spirits or gods who are venerated, respected, or feared are thought of or described as partly or wholly human and with human traits. In totemism the social group, and particularly an exogamous one (see § 9), stands to a species of animal or plant (generally edible), or to an object or class of objects, in an intimate relation of friendliness or close kinship; and the totem is treated, not precisely as a deity, but as a cognate and one to be respected (*e.g.*, not to be eaten or used, or at least only under certain restrictions).[1] Totemism is essentially a social cult (with some remarkable forms in Central Australia); but 'individual' totems are also found (notably the 'spirit-guardians' of N. America). There are many variations, and it is disputed (*a*) which particular variety is to be treated as typical, and (*b*) whether totemism is a primary and invariable stage in all human evolution.[2] Animal features (theriomorphism) frequently recur on higher levels; of this there are noteworthy examples in Egypt of the Hellenistic age. But here we have not so much pure totemism as totemistic tendencies and modes of belief and practice analogous to those which among really rudimentary peoples characterize totemism as a social or individual system. As for anthropomorphism, it is certainly not absolutely primitive; it represents a stage typically later than theriomorphism; and, when the latter appears on the higher levels, it is not the thoroughgoing system of the lower levels. While typical totemism has not reached the level of typical anthropomorphism, the latter can become indefinite, inadequate, and crude. The late Egyptian theriomorphism is best regarded, not as a mere survival, but as a popular and unsystematized tendency at a period when the national religion was decadent and unsatisfying. What is really most characteristic of all totemism is its non-anthropomorphism (below, § 17 ff.); but, while the totem is impersonal or 'sub-human' to the outside observer, to the totemist it is as personal as is the doll or toy-animal to the child. Totemism and all theriomorphic features involve problems of symbolism, imagery, and the consciousness of human personality in its relation to animal and other life. A feeling of peculiar affinity with animal or plant life is by no means confined to totem-clans or rudimentary peoples; but the characteristic *systems* distinguish totemism from all those cases where the theriomorphic details might seem, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to point to totemism or its survival. In any case, the alleged survival or re-appearance of totemism on a generally higher level of society will indicate typical modes of feeling and expression which help to explain the undeniable totemism of the lower levels. Here are data of the greatest significance for the development of the consciousness of human personality.[1]

(2) In Babylonia there is a characteristically 'unstable anthropomorphism.' The imagination in its highest exaltation is, on the whole, anthropomorphic, 'but often in the ecstasy of invocation the religious poets felt the human image too narrow and straitened for their struggling sense of the Infinite. Then the expression becomes mystic, and . . . avails itself of theriomorphic imagery.'[2] Thus, totemism is not merely an extremely curious animal (and plant) cult, but it illustrates systematized and socialized modes of thought which recur 'outside' as well as 'below' the anthropomorphic mode of thought. The anthropomorphic ideas—perfectly familiar and intelligible in the higher religions—are not only not of primary origin, but they do not always do justice to human experience, *and that on many different levels.* The tendency then is to find an outlet in ideas which are non-anthropomorphic and, for this reason, are often spoken of as 'mystical'; but, strictly speaking, it is always a question whether mystical ideas are then really superior or inferior to those that they repudiate.[3]

9. Exogamy and kinship.—(1) Although exogamy (marriage outside the group) in contrast to endogamy (marriage within it) concerns the history of kinship and society rather than that of religion, certain points require notice. Especially noteworthy is the classificatory system of kinship, where a man's status and marriage-rights are the criterion, and the social practices and the terms of relationship refer to a group or class as a whole, and not to individuals (see art. KIN, KINSHIP). The point of view is collective: the group thinks of itself as a single unit, and the feeling of solidarity readily tends to be absolute. Hence it can happen that the fact that a child is a member of a group is more important than the identity of the father, or even of the mother. Now, while exogamy proper avoids the close and incestuous marriages which occur in an endogamous society, exogamous *tendencies* sometimes appear, and even to the extent of forbidding marriage between persons of the same district or name. Moreover, endogamous *tendencies* appear, and are sometimes influenced by the desire to preserve unity, to keep together property, or to prevent a clan from dying out. Hence the tendencies which re-appear in different forms are not to be confused with the special cases of exogamy and endogamy proper. On the other hand, definite ideas are implied throughout: endogamy made for solidarity, unity, and oneness, whereas exogamy avoided the physical and psychical effects of any close unity and made for the movement and exchange of ideas.[4] In any case, the physical or material aspects, however conspicuous, are not so fundamental as the feelings and convictions which now allow what a later generation will reject, and now enforce, on occasion, a chastity and restraint for no obvious 'rational' reason. In other words, the practical working group is not necessarily united by ties of blood-kinship as we reckon it.[5] Any group of individuals united by profound ideas may look upon themselves as one, and the bond will be closer as regards the particular functions of that group than

[1] See the definition of W. H. R. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914, ii. 75. This section confines itself particularly to animal totems; other aspects of totemism are noticed below, § 17 ff.

[2] See, generally, F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896; Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv.; Durkheim, bk. ii. The methodological question is: What conception of totemism best enables us to handle the relevant facts? (Similarly the methodology of religion has to determine the conception of religion that best answers all the facts of life and thought.)

[1] See artt. ANTHROPOMORPHISM, PERSONIFICATION, and, for a suggestive treatment, Caird, i. 213 f., 264 ff., 270 ff., 294 ff.

[2] L. R. Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 55, also p. 13 f., and all ch. iv.

[3] On the general relation between totemism and mysticism cf. J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, *passim*, and *Ancient Art and Ritual*, London, 1913.

[4] Marriage into another group constantly forces adjustment of beliefs and practices; on the lower levels the wife may be dedicated to the husband's deity (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 72; cf. iv. 242), or the bridegroom may discard his own totem and paint on his face that of the family of the bride (E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1909-10, ii. 44).

[5] Note the prevalence of adoption, blood-covenant, artificial kinship, the levirate, etc.

the bond between the members and actual blood-relations who are not members. The group feeling, it is true, can kindle extreme ideas of communism and oneness; but, although physical and sexual factors are near at hand, and grave excesses can occur, the unit or group idea is not logically or fundamentally physical, and in fact, in social-religious systems, sexual aspects of life are explicitly regulated and subordinated to what may be called the ideal (cf. also below, § 23 [3]).

(2) The distinction between exogamy and endogamy proper, as primitive social systems, and exogamous or endogamous tendencies is analogous to that between totemism and totemistic or theriomorphic tendencies (above, § 8 [1]). The history of society and that of thought do not advance *pari passu*; none the less, the social vicissitudes and the religious ideas constantly interact. The closer the social unity, the more do gods and men form a single whole—the gods are 'our' gods, and not of the royal, priestly, or any other exclusive class of society. Moreover, the conception of a dominant goddess implies ideas of dominant women, and the entire psychology of sex will reflect itself in ideas concerning female saints and deities. Hence also the paradoxical extremes, where goddesses and priestesses are prominent—chastity and gross impurity, tenderness and fierceness. Again, the conception of the Fatherhood of God would be meaningless where paternity was of little account; and the notion of divine sovereignty is hardly intelligible where there is no experience of overrule or lordship. So ideas of social equality and democracy influence the way in which men think of a deity; and, conversely, every adequate conception of deity involves adequate views of the relations between both man and man and man and God. Convictions of a 'chosen' people or of some particularistic and narrowly 'national' God reflect in their turn the interrelation between current sociological, historical, and psychological conditions; and they emphasize the fact that man's religious ideas and conceptions, where genuine, cannot be torn away from his ordinary life and thought, but all form some sort of a system, however imperfect.

10. Psychology.—(1) Theories of religious development must be based upon observation of actual historical vicissitudes and the psychological aspects of religion. Complexity of thought, found even in Central Australian totemism and other primitive cults, points to complexity of history; for complex history makes complex thought. Here, principles of historical criticism are indispensable. There is a common tendency to focus upon outstanding persons, events, and periods changes more numerous and greater than those for which they are actually responsible, and to assume periods of almost absolute stagnation (*e.g.*, the 'Dark Ages'). On the other hand, movements of thought are, alternately, relatively slow and fast; sweeping and sudden changes are not permanent in themselves, though they can leave permanent results, and they are the outcome of slow preliminary steps which may not be recognizable. The whole environment invariably moves more slowly than the reformers or the reforming tendencies, which are usually local, one-sided, partial, specialistic, or extreme. The actual facts of religious development, and the relationship between different stages of the process, can be directly ascertained by historical study.[1] Against the apparently obvious cases of immediate and deep influence must be placed the cases of drastic adjustment, cataclysm, and relapse and failure.[2] These prove that beliefs and customs are not mechanically accepted or assimilated, and that the ethnological and historical factors have their psychological side (cf. § 4 [2]). From a psychological point of view, questions of external influence are not necessarily so important as the mental factors and processes which are involved—*e.g.*, the ability of the individual to accept, retain, and utilize certain ideas, the preliminary mental development necessary, his psychical, moral, or spiritual needs and aspirations. The psychological method is concerned with men, their mental states, their interests and values, and the relation between the religious and other aspects of their life and thought. It considers the *subjective* value of the beliefs and practices of the individual. Many relatively simple inquiries must be made before complete synthetic statements can be ventured, and consequently no 'superhuman' or 'supernatural' factors, causes, or elements can be presupposed. That men have experiences which compel them to distinguish what they call the 'divine' from the 'human' no one can dispute; but the psychological method can deal only with the human side of the great questions, as apart from the problem of the actual underlying realities.

[1] Note, *e.g.*, the history of religion in W. Asia and India (cf. esp. Alfred C. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies: Religious and Social*[2], London, 1907), the influence of invading Romans and Normans upon England, the effect upon Japan of the thought of China and W. Europe.

[2] See, for a notable example, the monotheistic reform of Amenhotep IV. (art. PHILOSOPHY [Egyptian], vol. ix. p. 858).

(2) To the psychological department belong many extremely important inquiries: (*a*) the growth of the mind (the mind of children and of savages), the relation between human and animal psychology; (*b*) the dawn of religion in the young, and notably the data of 'conversion,' as regards both the psychical states of the individual and the effect of the 'regeneration' upon his ideas, attitudes, and conduct; (*c*) 'the varieties of religious experience' (the title of a striking work by William James [London, 1902]), together with the facts of religious revivals, mysticism, spiritism, occultism, ecstasy, and prophetism; (*d*) the 'subconscious,' a field with many pitfalls, although the elementary facts show that that of which the individual is conscious at any time is part of a larger whole, that he can attend only to partial aspects, and that *theoretically* there must always be a less imperfect synthesis than that which he gains by his fragmentary glimpses, and, therefore, that there must be the possibility of a less imperfect, less undeveloped Self than the present one; (*e*) noteworthy also are the elementary facts of the effect of mind upon body (faith-cure, Christian Science, New Thought [*qq.v.*], etc.), and *vice versa*, all of which are significant for the ultimate relationship between what we distinguish as the physical and the psychical. Further, (*f*) through abnormal and pathological phenomena a clearer idea is obtained of the sound and healthy mind-body, and the evidence is instructive for all conceptions of personality (normal or 'dissociated'), for alienation of personality and double consciousness, the danger of weak control, of absence of homogeneity and of continuity of interests, of extreme and morbid egotism, and of persistent obsession. Finally, (*g*) the interconnexion of the physical and the psychical sides of the individual (illustrated especially at adolescence, in the sexual life, and in ideas associated with birth, marriage, and death) involves facts of which account must be taken by any science of religion. No doubt the enormous stock of data from which to reach a just conception of religion includes much that belongs to the extreme, the irrational, and the abnormal. There is much that is without the elements of practicability, permanence, and progressiveness, and that forces a contrast with those conditions where these elements recur, and there is a certain equilibrium of religious and social life and thought. All inquiry which is scientific, and not purely antiquarian, has the future in view, and a just conception of religion must treat religion as a persisting phenomenon; hence it must determine the elements in question, and distinguish them from the features which, however frequently they recur, do not make for endurance or advance. Proceeding in this way, we have to consider man as the outcome of a lengthy evolution, a progressive, thinking animal, able to speak, to form concepts, to preserve his experiences in oral tradition and in writing, to reflect upon the past, and, by so doing, able in greater measure to shape the future. Man is thus part of other organic life which has made its appearance in the course of the history of the universe; and as a result of development he is able to differentiate the human and the non-human, the psychical and the physical, the religious and the non-religious. From these biological, anthropological, and evolutionary points of view, the development of man is that of increasing knowledge, function, and ability, though what is most significant is the individual's increasing consciousness of the past, of the self, and of the universe; for this development in consciousness is one of quite another type.

11. The psychological method.—Characteristic of the psychological treatment of religion are (1) the insistence upon the human aspects, and (2) the association of data, however unusual, with familiar beliefs and practices. The general aim is to fasten upon the features which unite the religious and non-religious sides of our common human nature. Thus, the deification of kings, saints, and heroes in the past finds analogies in ordinary modern hero-worship; the individuals throughout are personalities *qualitatively* different from others. Again, the psychological efficacy of the fetish and that of the modern mascot are akin. Moreover, all initiation ceremonies involve similar typical ideas, which recur wherever it is a question of entrance into privileged groups or private societies jealous of their rights and of their solidarity; even

'hazing' is in some respects reminiscent of the torments and tortures inflicted elsewhere upon the novice. Also, it is *à propos* to note the 'best clothes' feeling, the impressiveness of uniform and ceremonial, and the attitude of the average individual to his treasured souvenirs and all other centres of deep feeling. Instructive, too, is the spontaneous, unreflective, and unsystematized behaviour of him who kicks the table 'which has hurt him' (not 'against which he has hurt himself') and the attitude of children to inanimate dolls and toys. The strange effectiveness of tabu and magic can be psychologically associated with everyday facts of conscience and with ordinary features of suggestion, telepathy, and hypnotism. Especially interesting from a psychological point of view are such topics as sin, confession, forgiveness, sacrifice, communion, prayer, and ritual. Whatever be the reader's conception of religions or of religion in general, there are everyday facts of human nature of the first importance for the study of the nature of man. All enduring religion has specific psychological aspects, material for the science of human nature; and, conversely, the psychological study of man is of the first importance for a better knowledge of his religious and other 'deeper' sides. In general, the psychological method emphasizes (*a*) the essential and fundamental resemblances throughout mankind, underlying the many different beliefs and practices, (*b*) the undoubted *subjective* value to the individual of his religious and other convictions, as apart from their value for his or another environment, and (*c*) the tendency of religion, when it is genuine or effective, to be inextricably bound up with what is not specifically religious.[1]

12. The theory of interpretation.—(1) Important methodological problems at once arise. It has been urged that savage or rudimentary men are psychologically so different from the civilized individual that the latter's interpretations of them are inapplicable. But the savage is, by definition, a human being; some intercommunication is possible between him and the civilized. Besides, all men share certain instincts, and on ordinary biological and other grounds *some* essential resemblances must recur among all men. The problem is obviously the extent of the resemblances. Everywhere there are differences; no two leaves or stones are absolutely identical in all respects. But ordered thought must invariably start with the points of resemblance — otherwise there can be no further progress; and what is necessary is to ensure that these justify the conclusions one draws, and that the latter are not invalidated by the differences. There are undoubted psychological differences, even in the same family, circle, or environment; but these are not so important for preliminary inquiry as the undoubted points of similarity, and no sound reasons can be given for denying a fundamental psychological resemblance between the highest and the lowest individuals.[2]

(2) In interpreting another mind (savage, child, animal-pet, etc.) it is easy to ascribe to it a consciousness or knowledge which it does not possess, or to discern in its activities a meaning or purpose of which it is ignorant (cf. above, § 6 [2]). Here the data on one level or in one environment are interpreted from the point of view of the observer. This, however, is an everyday normal process, and there is everywhere some risk of more or less serious misinterpretation. But the risk may be lessened by considering the data in their own context, and by determining whether the interpretation demands facts outside the scope of the subject under consideration. The interpretation may lie between two extremes, as when the care of animals for their young is too closely paralleled with that of parents for their children, or, on the other hand, is treated as merely mechanical and devoid of all suggestion of feeling. Every interpretation involves some notions of reality, which of course may be ultimately erroneous. Now, if other levels were psychologically quite distinct from our own, not only would they be entirely unintelligible, but every theory or interpretation, however absurd or incredible, could defend itself by declaring that our conceptions of reality did not apply. But we intuitively demand an intelligible interpretation, and thus implicitly assume a psychological relationship (see above, [1]). If every theory of the beliefs and practices on levels other than our own may legitimately be tested by our logic and by our own conceptions of reality, this psychological and humanistic type of interpretation is sounder than a crude rationalism which betokens a mentality utterly different from that of those whom it condemns or opposes, and would implicitly ascribe to savages and others mental processes and ideas so different from those we can understand that they would really lie outside the scope of criticism. See below, § 15.

(3) Every interpretation represents the observer's conception of the true meaning, and it may have involved some significant psychical development on his part to reach it. Moreover, every sympathetic appreciation tends to discern the features felt to be permanent and worthy, and to pass over those which have lost their value. Thus, the data always become much more significant for the observer and his level than for their own. In fact, what some other level or mind *really* is often eludes us; nor is it always so important for us as what it contributes to us or what it can or did develop into. A perfect interpretation—to see things as another mind sees (or saw) them—is often impossible, unnecessary, or of secondary importance. What is essential is a sympathetic comprehension which can retain its independence, objectivity, and power of criticism. Such a combination would find an illustration in the attitude of parent to child or of teacher to pupil. The mental or psychical situation involves the co-existence of mutual intelligibility and the consciousness of a psychical difference. Now these two represent phases of immanence and transcendence. Consequently, the principles of the relation between mind and mind (and especially when there are significant differences between them) are extremely suggestive for the religious problems of a divine (transcendent) mind in immediate (immanent) relationship with man. All ideas of the unknown, including those of the relation between God and man, are influenced by the known (by conditions, data, etc., which are felt to be suggestive and analogical); hence, not only are the principles of the interpretation of minds, and of the relationship between minds, of very great importance for the theoretical study of religions—and also for the practical and political problem of the attitude to minds which are felt to be inferior—but the very tangible problems which they bring have a real bearing upon the more ultimate religious problem of the interrelation between personality human and divine.[1]

13. The individual and the group.—(1) It has also been objected that there is an essential difference between the psychology of the individual and that of the group. Certainly, the spontaneous contrast of society and the individual is the recognition that society is more than a mere aggregate or sum of separate individuals. But, while society is a working system or unit, every man of individuality is measured by his value to society, and a man with no social instincts whatever would scarcely be a human being. Society moves only through the constituent individuals who differ and who initiate movement; men of some individuality are found on low levels, and it is obvious that the first pre-historic social group was sooner or later disturbed by men whose beliefs and practices differed from those of the rest.[2] Hence, from the very first, human progress has depended upon individuals who differed in some particular respect from their fellows. Now, the psychology of a group is that of individuals *qua* social beings. Whether in the madness of the 'Terror,' in joint religious service, or in quiet normal intercourse, there are seen merely different states in the life-history of individuals. When all has been said of 'the psychology of the mob,' and of its ultra-emotional and irrational aspects, the fact remains that there can be no absolute gulf between (*a*) the normal states of an individual, and (*b*) the unusual or even abnormal states when, as he may afterwards protest, he was 'not himself'—states which may be repudiated, or which, again, may manifest some rare, profound, and unsuspected depths. Thus, man's modes of thought and action are varyingly individual or collective, normal or intense (abnormal, etc.); and he who is now entirely one with the mob, the team, or the social group, and now markedly egoistic or individualistic, is one and the same individual at different points of one and the same life-history.

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[1] The most important literature on religious psychology is French and American. Among recent works may be mentioned: I. King, *The Development of Religion: a Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology*, New York, 1910; E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, do. 1910; J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion; Its Origin, Function, and Future*, do. 1912; G. A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, Chicago, 1916. It should be observed that a psychological study of religion can treat religion as a human phenomenon, and in its functional, individual, sociological, and other aspects, but it cannot nullify the subjective distinctiveness of religion, nor can its theories of the objective source or foundation of religion (*e.g.*, in humanity) be more than merely theories.

[2] See G. S. Patton, *The Philosophical Review*, xxi. [1912] 455–462; J. M. Baldwin, *Thought and Things: or Genetic Logic*, London and New York, 1906–11, vol. iii. p. xff.; W. H. R. Rivers, *HJ* x. [1911–12] 393 ff.; Webb, ch. vi.

[1] It is to be observed at this point that the resemblances which the comparative and psychological methods emphasize are not to be allowed to obscure the differences. Where comparisons are made (between religions, minds, etc.), there is, logically, something which appears in varying forms, which might re-appear in some new and as yet unknown form, or which might be supposed to exist in some ideally perfect form. Logically, therefore, religious data could conceivably take new forms without the limitations found or alleged in those that are current, old interpretations of data could be replaced by new ones, and the existence of minds varying in powers of comprehension and sympathy will suggest the possibility of a Mind infinitely wiser than that of man. Further applications of this principle (on which cf. § 4 [2]) will be found below.

[2] Men of distinct individuality may be found low down in the ethnological scale; see Spencer-Gillen[3], pp. 12, 14 ff.; Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 354.

(2) Although nothing seems more real than the individual with all his self-consciousness, there must be some more ultimate reality of which he is but a part. A group or organization may appear more real than the individuals upon whom it depends, and who in turn operate through it. But it is not a complete or ultimate reality, because it is only part of an environment which is indispensable to it, and there are other individuals outside it. Moreover, the human group came into existence at a relatively late stage in the evolution of the universe, and such is the relationship between human and other life, and between the organic and the inorganic, that ultimate reality must be sought, not in society, the state, or any other organization, nor even in mankind (as in some modern types of ethical religion), but in something of which all that which is shown to be ultimately interconnected forms a part (cf. § 10 [2], end). Here, however, we have all kinds of convictions, theories, and so forth, so that while, on the one side, the self-conscious individual has no doubt of his own real existence, it cannot be doubtful, on the other side, that there are ultimate realities concerning which opinions differ. Hence we may say that (*a*) between the real self-conscious individual and the ultimate realities there come all the sociological, naturalistic, religious, and other conceptions of the place of the individual in the universe, and of the nature of the realities; and further, (*b*) that these supply material for perfectly objective investigation.

(3) Sociological inquiry has already emphasized the indebtedness of the individual to his social environment. He is born into and grows up in the current thought of his age, and he both selects from it and contributes to it as his own body of thought develops. But he does not 'become' a member of society; rather, as an integral part of some larger whole, and starting from an inconceivably rudimentary individuality, he gradually manifests an ever more distinctive and complex self, the real value of which depends upon his relation to his fellows. The more conscious and purposeful selection and choice of his later years are preceded by a less conscious procedure, which, however, is generally effective and beneficial; and the conscious efforts to co-ordinate mental and physical activities and to prepare for the future follow upon stages where co-ordination and preparation have already been at work. The growth is one of awareness and consciousness, and of deeper and wider realization of existing facts and possibilities. It brings the possibility of greater effectiveness, and not only can the individual take an objective attitude towards many of his own beliefs and practices, but he can even realize the painful difference between an ideal self and that congeries of dispositions, convictions, practices, and so forth, wherein he manifests himself and which he may desire to remedy, improve, or even escape. Consequently, one can view the life-history of the individual as a great complex series of vicissitudes, differing in their significance for his development—like the events in the history of a country; beneath its manifestations lies the self that undergoes development, and the individual will recognize realities profounder than the most real events of ordinary experience. Thus, not only must the individual be regarded as a part of some larger whole, but the nature of his development points to an 'ultimate' self underlying all its manifestations, to a reality transcending ordinary knowledge, and to an increasing consciousness of that which is felt to be most essential for the further progress of the self. The psychology of the individual and that of the social group are not opposed, although the man as a distinct individual or as a fraction of society manifests himself differently. What is of supreme importance throughout is the individual, for he contributes to society, he is for or against his environment, he accepts or opposes current ideas, and he is a living personality; on the other hand, the society, group, or state depends for all effective purposes upon a body of principles, ideas, practices, and institutions, and these again and again prove to stand in need of reconsideration and correction by the constituent individuals.

14. **Psychological truth.**—(1) Among the individual's states of consciousness are those which differ so profoundly from the rest that they compel some distinctive description. Through them the individual comes to have convictions of 'another' world, as distinct from the world of ordinary experience of time and space—the empirical world of which, however, his knowledge is based only upon partial aspects. While all 'religious' and related experiences are felt to be entirely different from those of 'ordinary' life and thought, they occur interspersed amid the latter, and are interpreted and described through them. All the intenser experiences are typically of the profoundest personal significance and of abiding value; they are visions to be realized, starting-points for further reflexion and explanation, and intuitions authoritative for subsequent conceptions of the universe. But the experiences, viewed broadly, are not all necessarily religious, or even beneficial in their results, and one may distinguish between similar types of psychical state and the content—whether it belongs to this or the other religion, or has no religious characteristics, or is without permanent ethical value. Throughout, prior experience and knowledge condition both the content of the new experience and the subsequent reflexion which elaborates it. A criticism of the form, expression, or content does not necessarily affect the fundamental psychical facts, and between the most intense and abnormal states and the normal and healthy examples there are many stages, but no impassable gulf. Religious literature abounds in evidence which is of the greatest importance for the psychical nature of man; and it emphasizes the fact that all the religious states, whatever their content, are natural, integral, and inseparable parts of existence and experience. Consequently, the psychological investigation of religious and related (æsthetic, etc.) experience does not find that the relationship with the divine, the knowledge of higher truths, or the consciousness of a transcending happiness or grandeur is only for the chosen few: what is psychologically applicable to the normal individual has a virtually universal application—for all individuals. Indeed, this relationship, especially among rudimentary and naive religions, is almost mechanical (below, § 18 [3]). Nor is this altogether unexpected (cf. Mt 7^{7-11}). But this experience of a relationship, as also the familiar ideas of God's need of and love for man, must be balanced by the recognition that not every religious expression or practice is *effectively* religious (cf. v.$^{21ff.}$). Religion characteristically tends to set an exceedingly high standard of motive, thought, and conduct; it demands an absolutely sincere manifestation of the inmost self, and an absence of selfishness and guile (cf. 1 Co 13). Hence religion must be regarded as involving all that which is profounder, more constructive, and more permanent than all the ephemeral, casual, and superficial things of life; it is bound up with a development of personality which is to be in all respects 'whole' and 'healthy.' Consequently, to determine the essential nature of religion, it is necessary to look beneath the surface of men's beliefs and practices and determine what is dynamic. The problems of ultimate truth and reality, whether among rudimentary or among advanced peoples, are bound up with our knowledge of the depths of human personality; and the familiar religious conviction, that a Supreme Power to whom all 'reality' is known can see into the hearts of men and distinguish 'true' religion, really implies that ideas of a Supreme Power, of Ultimate Reality, and of the underlying self must be essentially interconnected. The goal of the science of religion is to see religion as God would see it!

(2) The religion that is most effective involves the very depths of man's personality, and inevitably concerns the greatest realities which he can conceive. But, although the religion of every sincere individual may be subjectively conclusive, its objective value will unhesitatingly be tested by the men and knowledge of his or of a later day. The truth of an individual's religion cannot therefore be necessarily regarded as ultimate, complete, objective truth. Even the savage can find peace and strength in his religion, and fetishes and mascots can be psychologically efficacious. But the progress of knowledge and all thought cannot be set aside with impunity. No religion has ever been able to remain aloof from the trend of thought without suffering the penalty; and, although again and again the religion and thought of some environment may be in conflict, the recurring periods of harmony have been more significant for progress. It is necessary to recognize the persistent efficacy and persuasiveness of religious and other (*e.g.*, superstitious) beliefs and practices, even where they represent a knowledge or a mode of thought very different from one's own. Hence, a distinction must be maintained between the fundamental psychical tendencies, underlying convictions, and the like—which are proved by the comparative method to recur in manifold different forms (cf. § 4 [2])—and the particular forms, arguments, etc., which may no longer retain their old validity (cf. p. 663^{b}, n. 1). This is to distinguish between some expression and what it is intended to express, and between a conviction and the various ways in which it is substantiated (*e.g.*, beliefs in a soul, or in a superhuman guardian, or in an approaching 'new age,' etc.).

Here another important distinction is to be drawn, viz. between that which has a psychological basis in immediate experience and the further secondary more or less logical elaboration of it. Thus a genuine belief in the kinship of a deity can rest primarily only upon certain experiences which seemed to find a natural expression in terms of relationship (cf., *e.g.*, the 'Fatherhood of God'). But they are symbolical or analogical, and errors multiply whenever the origin of such terms is forgotten, and the words, taken in a literalistic manner, form the basis of argument unchecked by resort to the original data of experience. Similarly, the idea of a 'Kingdom of Heaven' will primarily be justified by psychical facts (aspirations, longings, etc.), although it is at once capable of development suggested by the experience of earthly kingdoms. The words, 'the kingdom of God is within you' (Lk 17^{21}), represent a profound transition from concrete imagery, which was open to misunderstanding, to a more psychological statement, and this in turn is capable of a certain psychological development which, however, can go astray.

15. The theory of reality.—(1) On sociological, biological, and even chemical grounds, the individual is in various respects a 'part' of that which is greater and more permanent than his growing and dying body. Not only do his intuitions and convictions testify to some greater and more permanent reality, but these are the mainspring of his life and they take into their service all that we call material and physical, and that belongs to space and time. The various polytheistic and monotheistic convictions of men, like the conflicting religious, philosophical, and other conceptions of the universe, indicate either that there are no stable or dependable realities or that it is men's convictions and conceptions of the realities that vary and develop. The latter is the only rational view if there is to be any effort to think coherently about the world; and a distinction must be drawn between the ultimate realities and the conceptions, formulas, etc., which may be felt to *be* the realities themselves. Thus, the mystical experience, *e.g.*, is felt to be reality itself, although the striking and conflicting varieties of experience indicate that it must be of subjective and not objective validity. That variation and development are to be expected is shown also by the vicissitudes of religion, due to individuals who are unable to accept what to others has absolute validity, and who have convictions which are felt to be more real than those already current. Human personality is profounder than any given system of life or thought, and consequently the soundest theory of reality must be based upon the existence of (subjective) convictions of reality which obtain among men. These and their vicissitudes provide the material for the most logical theory of reality.

(2) Explanations, interpretations, theories, and the like all imply some notions of ultimate reality. Thus, *e.g.*, the popular theories of primitive or universal serpent, stone, phallic, or astral cults, if taken seriously and rigorously pursued in their implications, would have the greatest significance for all conceptions of God, man, and the universe. As a general rule, even sweeping theories may seem immediately plausible or absurd, as the case may be, but the logical aspects are invariably complicated, and the theory will be favoured, because it explains a certain number of facts, or condemned, because of the facts which are ignored or interpreted in some forced manner. Indeed, the most absurd theory covers some unimpeachable facts; but, when it has once been obtained, evidence is forthwith more or less ingeniously twisted to it and it becomes Procrustean. Concepts, theories, systems, methods, attitudes, and positions have this twofold aspect—their *origin* in the presence of data which have been experienced and must be interpreted and organized, and their subsequent *application and employment* when the data, instead of being used to test or control them, are tested by them and viewed or interpreted in their light. This holds good of (*a*) modern theories, beliefs, convictions, concepts, etc., which flourish because of the sound elements they contain, and are injurious when their origin is forgotten and they become Procrustean; and (*b*) those of old, which in like manner must have flourished only because of their effective elements.

(3) Of the first importance for the theory of reality is the problem of religion and magic. It is obvious that any persistence of both must be due psychologically to certain effective elements (*e.g.*, subjective satisfaction). But, since magic is admittedly impermanent and unprogressive, and religion admittedly has had its periods of decay and revival, both contain certain ineffective elements which, in the case of religion, were not irremediable. Both include elements which are often styled irrational; and both involve convictions of man's relationship with the powers and processes of the universe and of the possibility of utilizing or of co-operating with them. But magic typically involves attitudes of compulsion and coercion; there are processes in the universe which are *not* beyond man's control; whereas dependence and humility are characteristic of religion. Yet the latter are not the only notes in religion (cf. § 18 [3]), and there is frequently a behaviour and attitude which can be styled magico-religious, being magical in its 'irrational' and external aspects and religious in its temper and spirit. Thus, we find convictions of a really profound relationship between man and the universe which are not confined to crass magic, but there are two fundamentally different attitudes (direct coercion or command, *or* indirect appeal or prayer), and, where the contemporary religion and magic are in conflict, the latter is typically anti-social and individualistic (cf. art. MAGIC [Introductory]). Here, magic is felt to be not so much untrue as a wrong handling of the truth; and it is regarded as irreligious and blasphemous, and is feared and dreaded. Consequently the problem of magic and religion involves (*a*) our own views, both of religion and of what is antithetical to it and to the progress of society, and (*b*) our own views of causation and reality; for we rely upon our own ideas of the relations between ourselves and the universe, and we must assume that the ultimate realities are the same everywhere. It follows, therefore, that the concept 'God' is fundamental: (1) because, from a theistic point of view, God is the ultimate judge between religion and magic, and (2) because, unless we have definite ideas of the ultimate realities and of God's place in the processes of the universe, the crassest magic cannot be finally estimated—for to hurt a rival by sticking pins into an image, and to expect rain by sympathetic magic or by prayer to a rain-god or a Supreme Deity, is to imply a theory of some ultimate interconnexion and causation, and upon this we have to make up our minds.

16. The concept 'God.'—(1) The value of all convictions and theories of God, man, and the universe must be at the mercy of the ultimate realities themselves, whatever these may prove to be; and this fact obviously conditions all critical inquiry. The concept 'God,' however it originated, both influences and is influenced by conceptions of reality and truth, and the fundamental problem concerns the necessity of the concept and its content. The theist will naturally accept the concept which, however, will tend to control his argument and as a rule will be only imperfectly analyzed. On the other hand, a procedure which seeks to be purely inductive and to construct a systematic view of the universe will, if it admits the concept, tend to use it illogically and without the wealth of significance which characterizes it for the theist. All the theories of the origin of religion are, therefore, extremely instructive for what they both spontaneously concede and imply. They are usually obliged to assume some most essential features (*e.g.*, awe, reverence, sacredness); or they confuse what *evokes* a religious feeling with the *origin* of it. It is meaningless to suggest to the true theist that his belief in a living God originated in the ancestor-worship, animism, or animatism of the past; such a notion is part of the fallacious theory of survivals (§ 4). However persuasive be the parallels, however striking the links between theistic and other beliefs, the external observer can easily overlook

the qualitative differences and the different 'systems' involved in each. The most rudimentary form of a feature is not thereby the origin of what appears in more advanced forms, and the data of totemism suffice to prove that the origin of a religion is not so practicable a problem as the interpretation of the rudest type of it.[1]

(2) The qualitative differences between the child's care for the doll and that of the mother for the babe, or between mere affection and genuine love, override any attempt to trace an actual linear or serial development from lower to higher, or the like. No intense or new experience (evoked by love, religion, crisis, war, etc.) can be successfully imagined, grasped, or calculated before its arrival; love is not a magnified affection, and religious experience is *sui generis*—save to the outsider. All intenser experiences are typically private, ineffable, and incommunicable; and ordinary language is admittedly a description in lower terms. So, in religion the 'Fatherhood of God' is —from a theistic point of view—an analogical expression of an experience, and, if it is developed in a purely literalistic manner, it loses its distinctiveness and is without the elements of development and progress. From another standpoint, the term might seem to be a construction, a figment, a theory, suggested primarily by mundane experience. But this will not explain the qualitative difference for the theist and the typical system of thought in which it appears.[2] In other words, the concept 'God' is inexplicable save as the result of a growth of consciousness, a realization, an awareness of that of which man can find only an imperfect and inadequate description. It is only in the secondary stages of each moment in the process that the term is treated as itself an object of knowledge; primarily the concept can be justified only as representing a reality of which man has come to have some conscious experience, and which he has been able to express only in a partial and limited way.

It is self-evident that, if we assume the existence of the reality whom man conceives of as God, this Supreme Power does not depend upon man's recognition. Wherever the conception makes its appearance, it must owe its authority and validity only to the consciousness of something distinctive and unique, something not covered by other terms; at the same time, it will be intelligible only because the new experience is blended with what is known and familiar. These are among the elements which go towards forming man's idea of God's transcendence and immanence (see § 31). The blend of old and new is significant, for, if man is ever to become aware of the (objectively) ultimate realities, his new conceptions cannot, for psychological reasons, be absolutely disconnected from those which he previously possessed; the realities to be intelligible cannot be absolutely unrelated to the prior experience. Finally, the fact that conceptions of God or of the ultimate realities have undergone development does not justify the supposition that either or both conceptions develop. The objective existence and nature of God do not depend upon this or the other theory or thinker; on the other hand, the great variety of religious beliefs and convictions would justify the theistic view that any 'divine revelation' must take up the individual as it finds him; it must come 'through the medium of our own mental and moral experience and equipment,' and 'this medium fashions its form.' Consequently, from a purely critical point of view, the remarkable variation in men's beliefs and practices, and the impossibility of reconciling many of the theistic and non-theistic convictions, make it necessary to approach even the profoundest and most sacred questions from the human side.

(3) Without a preliminary survey of some introductory questions it would not be possible to thread a way through the mass of data. The ultimate realities touching man, God, and the universe must be such that the different conceptions of them and their development can be in some measure explained; otherwise we imply innumerable realities and ignore both the results of careful comparison and the psychological relationship among all men. The data of religion can be handled methodically only on the assumption that there are certain profound truths, principles, and realities which are apprehended (*a*) in ways that can be shown to be related to one another, and (*b*) among men who are psychologically more alike than unlike: either experience and existence must be entirely irrational or some way of organizing and co-ordinating the diverse data can be found. The method is both deductive and inductive. The simplest classifications, even the merest beginnings, involve postulates and assumptions; all organization of data is due partly to prior selection—not to chance—and to some view which will be replaced later by other and more developed views. There is continuous alternation between the 'structure' or 'content' of a standpoint or of an attitude to things or of a 'world-view' and the things themselves, between the concept and its material, between the theory and the facts it embraces, between the method and the evidence it handles, between the vision of the goal and the method of reaching it. Neither member of each pair remains unchanged. Man has a consciousness, an awareness, a mode of experiencing, which is capable of progressive development; and in the history of religion we discern the vicissitudes of men's conceptions of what to them were the supreme ultimate realities. Just as data cannot be handled unless we are given methods of classification, postulates, etc., so we cannot 'construct' or 'invent' conceptions of reality, but must test, verify, and develop those which we find already in our possession, and which, such as they are, are the result of past experience. And, so long as the best description of reality depends upon men, and personal experience and convictions control both men's life and thought and their attitudes to one another, so long must a critical inquiry seek the road to reality in their conceptions of reality and in human personality.

III. *THE ELEMENTS OF RELIGION.*[1]—**17. Totem and other names.**—(1) For the classification of the 'elements' of religion it is necessary to observe the psychological identity of all religions, including even totemism, and the general similarity of the psychological, the historical, and the other factors in their development. Especially significant is the close connexion between theistic religion and totemism and all other cults or religions which are not theistic. The explicitly theistic convictions, when they enter the history of religion, produce, as in the history of the individual, a genetic development of thought, and not a stage entirely unrelated to its predecessor; and this allows the conclusion that theistic religious experience is not to be entirely separated from other religious experience. The theistic convictions undoubtedly cause a profound development, and there is no doubt a reshaping of the world of beliefs and practices. But there is none the less a genetic relation between earlier and later stages, and, consequently, it does not appear that the ultimate reality which we call 'God' was isolated from the consciousness in which He had not before been explicitly present. That is to say, it is a development in the human consciousness which—however caused—is the fundamental fact, and this conclusion is of vital significance for all interpretation of religion, especially on the 'lower' levels (cf. §§ 16 [2], 24 [1]). Totem-groups naturally owe their unity to the implicit or explicit recognition of principles and ideas which make for unity. The

[1] Cf. p. 629[b], n. 1. It should be observed, therefore, that although it may be possible to see a certain continuity or sequence in data, it does not follow that there has been a simple development from any one of them to the next in the series.

[2] A theistic system is not a belief in God *plus* a system fitted to it, but an organic whole; cf. similarly the problem of the origin of totemism (§ 17), and of all else that can be regarded as a single unit.

[1] Although this division of the subject forms the real inductive starting-point, there must be preliminary ideas of method, classification, and so forth, otherwise (as can be seen from the conflicting results of the application of the 'comparative method') the evidence cannot be critically handled (see § 16 [3]). Here, only the merest outline can be represented, and further reference must be made to the works of Tylor, Frazer, Toy, Durkheim, etc., and, for §§ 17 ff. in particular, to the artt. HOLINESS, TABU.

totem is the emblem, badge, symbol, or link; it is more than the mere animal or plant species, and its value lies in the meaning that it has for the group, in the system of beliefs and practices of which it is the centre. Though it has been denied that totemism is a religion, it is undeniably on the border-line, and there are variations such that, in Samoa, *e.g.*, the totems are almost, if not quite, gods.[1] No single element by itself is a proof of totemism; *e.g.*, animal names alone have no weight. The point lies in the context or system of thought, even as any given name compounded with Baal or Nebo does not necessarily prove the existence of a contemporary belief in those gods.

The suggestion that totemism arose through a literal interpretation of metaphorical, symbolical, or similar names, or that an animal or plant nickname was the origin, does not explain the organic *system* of cult. This suggestion emphasizes 'the usual savage superstition which places all folk in mystic *rapport* with the object from which their *names* are derived.'[2] But it begs the question; for a name could originate totemism only provided we grant the psychological and other factors which await explanation—viz. the meaning of 'superstition,' 'mystic,' and 'rapport.' What is important, however, is the assumption that a system can come into existence at a bound, since the fact of its being a system, and the presence of many gradations of totemism, as also the close parallelism between it and other cults, tell against the view that it can be explained by pointing merely to a particular element (viz. the name) and not by regarding the cult as an organic whole.[3]

(2) In fact the names of totems usually function similarly to those in other types of cults. For (*a*) not only will a particular stock of names often be reserved for the members of a totem-group, but (*b*) sometimes the names refer to the totem, as truly as compounds of Jah(weh), Baal, or Nebo indicate some sort of relationship between the god and the people.[4] Sometimes it is a solemn duty to keep the names in use, for otherwise the totem will feel neglected and be angry. Sometimes a native on lying down or rising up will murmur the name of his totem, which is believed to be helpful only to those who belong to the particular group. Again, the name of a totem must not be spoken heedlessly, or it is referred to indirectly; thus the Warramunga of Australia tell of a huge world-snake which is not called by its proper name, because to mention it too often would cause them to lose control over it, and the reptile would come and eat them up.

(3) Characteristic everywhere are not merely the associations of the name of revered or sacred objects, and what they betoken or presage (*nomen, omen*), but also the claims involved when names are conferred or assumed ('Name spells claim'). The name indicates the known, and there is a common tendency to identify the name with that for which it stands, to connect the name and the nature of a thing. So it is that change of name often suggested or indicated change of nature or personality, or a new stage in the history of an individual or a place.[1] As indicating a claim, the name is the written symbol or mark representative of the owner. A name will be kept secret lest an enemy by knowing it should have power over the holder of it; and the greater the owner, the more potent the name and the greater the need for care. To name the dead is to bring them vividly before one; hence the names of venerated and sacred beings, as also of harmful and evil ones, may not be used freely. The customs are psychologically quite intelligible. Consequently, the names that have valued or treasured associations, that mean much, are neither to be ignored or forgotten nor used carelessly and heedlessly. Two transitions are possible: the one is to keep the name secret, to avoid it, to replace it by another which will not have the old psychical force; in this way it falls out of use, or it is retained among the few, or it has a magical value—it is self-effective, automatic; the other makes the name too familiar and robs it of its earlier worth. Two stages can therefore be recognized—one where a name is effective on psychological grounds, as being part of a system of interconnected feelings and ideas, and the other where it is becoming or has become isolated and barren, with little or none of the former psychological, social, and intellectual significance. The latter stage is evidently ineffective and impermanent, whereas the former must have recurred from time to time; for, whether the name stands for what is visible (*e.g.*, the totem species) or for the invisible (the distant, the dead, a spiritual deity, etc.), it has an effective value only because of the appropriate feelings or ideas which it evokes. The first stage, then, is essential for all progressive development.

(4) Tabus against looking at or touching things are rarely applicable to totems, because the species is generally common; but they apply to the objects or vessels used in the totem cult. Everywhere there are sacred objects which may not be heedlessly gazed at or handled. Just as a sacred name calls up that to which it refers (*i.e.* typically, the reality itself, as it is apprehended), so objects are sacred and effective because of the associations. Thus, relics, bones of saints, etc., are used for magic; and parts of a man's body, or even his shadow or footprint, are regarded as essentially himself.[2] If, on the one hand, an object may lose its sanctity (cf. the vicissitudes of the bull-roarer and of sacred masks), on the other hand, an object that is treated as sacred appears as an organic part of an entire rite, cult, or system.

18. The sacred relationship.—(1) Psychologically, the sacredness of things (names, visible objects, etc.) is akin to the natural delicacy where one's treasured souvenirs and memories are concerned, where one's inmost personality is felt to be at stake, and where there are ideas which are neither to be obliterated or forgotten nor treated with familiarity and tactlessness. The fear of gazing heedlessly upon sacred objects applies also to particular individuals (priests, kings) who must be kept in seclusion because of the tabus.[3] The OT, in turn, illustrates the real danger felt in being in the presence of a divine being. The psychological foundation throughout is similar; there are some things which are too closely bound up with ideas of ultimate reality and personality to be lightly handled, or even to be treated objectively—the thought and the reality fuse into one.[4] That 'the pure in heart shall see God' (cf. Lk 5[8]) is

[1] This is only to be expected, for, where we find the earliest stage of what we agree to call 'religion' (or 'ethics,' § 18 [1]), the distinctive features will appear in an environment which admitted of the development, and, as is the case wherever the necessity for a new concept appears, there must be a combination of the old and the distinctively new.

[2] Andrew Lang, in *EBr*[11] xxvii. 86, *Secret of the Totem*, London, 1905, pp. 121, 125.

[3] This reliance upon single elements and not upon their context or their system is a common cause of fallacious argument, when the comparative method is uncritically employed. Cf. also the erroneous view that theism originates in the superaddition of the belief in a God (above, p. 672[a], n. 2). For the 'birth' of systems cf. the sudden rise of eikon cults (*e.g.*, A. J. B. Wace, *Annals of Archæology and Anthropology*, Liverpool, 1910, iii. 22 ff.), of new religious cults in British New Guinea (E. W. P. Chinnery and A. C. Haddon, *HJ* xv. [1917] 448 ff.), of new castes in India (with an entire caste system), of cults of deified men in India and elsewhere, and the strange cult around the ideas of Fatherland, Liberty, and Reason at the French Revolution (Durkheim, p. 214).

[4] For (*a*) and (*b*) respectively see Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 343, 473, iii. 13, 329, 360, and i. 58 f., ii. 473 f., iii. 34 f., 77, 101 f., 272.

[1] Hence the idea of changing a name in order to change the personality finds a concrete parallel in the custom of changing clothes in times of crises (see W. R. Halliday, *BSA* xvi. [1909–10] 212 ff.). The tendency noted above finds its parallel in the higher (conceptual) development of thought when thought or description is confused with actual existence or reality.

[2] Cf. the evidence collected by Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 174 ff.; pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, pp. 77 ff., 258 ff.

[3] Cf. *GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, chs. i., iv. § 1.

[4] Cf. Emerson, in his essay on Intellect: 'I would put myself in the attitude to look in the eye an abstract truth, and I cannot. I blench and withdraw on this side and on that. I seem to know what he meant who said, No man can see God face to face and live.'

the complement of the fear of an Isaiah (Is 6[5]), and the convictions herein involved are quite inexplicable unless they were based upon certain intense experiences and endorsed throughout the ages by those who had similar types of experience and could realize their validity. The evidence naturally varies in significance and spirituality. From totemism and upwards purificatory ceremonies on all solemn occasions abound. Among rudimentary and simple people the practices are extraordinarily concrete: fire, water, abrasion, scarification, change of clothing, etc., prepare the individual for the sacred ceremony. So, too, guilt is treated as something physical or material, to be washed away, removed by an emetic, or dispatched upon a scapegoat. The data represent a pre-ethical rather than an ethical stage. What we call 'ethical' was not born in a day (cf. p. 673[a], n. 1); and practices which were purely external could have no psychical or subjective efficacy. Ritual can be accompanied by its appropriate psychical, moral, or spiritual accompaniment, and can readily lose it; and the difference is between an apparently magical (or rather magico-religious) rite and a purely magical one (§ 15 [3]). Of the two, the former and not the latter can permit progressive development.[1] The apparent edification, the psychical transitions from feelings of fear, grief, or unworthiness to those of relief, forgiveness, and the like, and the persistence of the rites in practical social groups are incomprehensible unless the data are treated as entirely *bona fide* and rational within their limits. It is to be noticed that the purificatory and similar ceremonies are for practical purposes, when great values are at stake, and the welfare of the people is concerned. They have the effect of producing or strengthening a certain psychical state, a desired relationship; and, in point of fact, genuine feelings of confidence and security recur even among rudimentary religions in the midst of strange and apparently quite irrational tabus.

(2) Even the totem is supposed to help and succour the clansmen who respect it, and the individual totems or spirit-guardians are ready to strengthen those who own them. The help may be of a very general character, or the beliefs may be shaped by the attributes of the object: thus the eagle gives keen sight, and the bear gives strength—but the bear is slow and clumsy, and hence the protégé may suffer! The central object of the religious feelings and beliefs will thus stimulate thought; hence it is possible to consider separately (*a*) its objective nature, character, reputation (whether totem, deified ancestor, etc.), and (*b*) the feelings, needs, and psychical nature of the worshipper (see § 31 [4]). Throughout there is a reliance upon some explicit source or centre of definite or indefinite efficacy; and it is not unrelated to the perfectly vague and implicit reliance upon 'something' in the universe which will respond to the flung-out curse, the earnest adjuration, and the resort to lot or divination (cf. § 29 [1]). Whether the individual has explicit convictions or no, and however they may be shaped, the underlying ideas are essentially similar in spite of their profoundly different shapes and their effects upon his intellectual development.

(3) Especially noteworthy is the intuitive idea of reciprocal relationship; the evidence is strong enough to suggest the *do ut des* formula of sacrifice (*q.v.*). Yet the idea of a mutual undertaking which may seem a veritable bargaining (cf. in the *Rigveda*; also Jacob's vow [Gn 28[20ff.]]) is not necessarily so crude and unethical as it may appear (cf. the ideas in the Deuteronomic threats and rewards—*e.g.*, Dt 28 f.). But the conception of a god as unswerving and unalterable is the parting of the ways for religion and for magic. There are convictions of a certain uniformity, and a free response (cf. Mt 7[7f.]), which make the promises of religion a free gift to 'everyone that thirsteth' (Is 55[1]), and a reward for importunity (Lk 11[5ff.]). In striking contrast to the tendencies of the tabu to maintain a gulf between the sacred and the profane is the respectful friendliness, or the easy, confident, and even naive behaviour, as reflected, *e.g.*, in popular stories in the OT (Abraham [Gn 15[8]], Moses [Ex 3[12]], Gideon [Jg 6[17. 22. 36f. 39]], Hezekiah [2 K 20[8]]). The childlike attitude in all its phases—good and bad—has parallels in personal religion and mysticism, and stands in the strongest contrast to the attitudes of subservience, humility, resignation, and submissive faith. So, in the OT itself, quite opposed to the spirit of the popular narratives in question is the Deuteronomic teaching which sternly forbids man to 'tempt' the Deity (*i.e.* put Him to the test).[1] The data are exceedingly instructive, especially when viewed in their historical development, because (*a*) the attitude to all that is delicate, intimate, and sacred readily passes from naive, free innocence to an attitude that is blameworthy—in this manner a relationship with one who is felt to be psychically superior can pass through familiarity to one with loss of respect; and (*b*) the institutional religion, like all organized thought, has commonly to restrain a certain individualism which from being markedly individualistic becomes extreme, antinomian, and irreligious.[2]

[1] Intermediate steps in the advance are illustrated when the rites are explicitly associated with appropriate sentiments; cf. He 10[22], and the Saxon story of the woman who in the ceremonial washing cleansed her thoughts also (F. C. Burkitt, *Euphemia and the Goth*, London, 1913, p. 156).

19. Ideas of imitation and identification.—(1) Signs, symbols, and tatu-marks can be used, like names, to indicate relationship, claim, or possession; and they are effective, provided they have an appropriate meaning and call up the required feelings and ideas. The symbol which stands for the totem, spirit, or god may be carved upon weapons, boundary-stones, utensils, etc., to signify the presence of a protective being, to warn off the evil-doer, and so forth. The symbol may even be cut or painted upon individuals, or the latter may wear skins, helmets, etc., to represent or symbolize the totem, spirit-guardian, or other protective power. Whether we find a realistic imitation or a symbol more or less conventional or no longer intelligible, the individual is very closely associated with a being who, however superior, stands in an intimate personal relationship with him. In war, *e.g.*, the wooden images of dead ancestors may be invoked or taken into the fight; and there may be an appeal to old heroes or to war-gods (who are sometimes deified heroes). But, when the warrior in some way imitates his protective genius, there is a virtual identity—the warrior does not fight *for* his god, but *with* or rather *as* his god. Sometimes the totem is painted on the dead, or otherwise associated with the corpse—a fitting climax when the individual and his totem are supposed to be of the same 'substance,' and the man is born of the totem stock. Even in totemism there is a certain identity of nature of man and his totem, together with the realization of a difference, and this co-existing 'immanence' and 'transcendence' faithfully reflects feelings of the paradoxical relationship between what we call the 'human' and the 'sacred' or 'divine.'

(2) The various imitative practices occur in commemorative ceremonies (*e.g.*, where dead ancestors are supposed to be present); but of far greater interest are those which represent needs or wants and their fulfilment. There are mimetic ceremonies to effect cures, to bring rain, to further the

[1] Cf. Driver's note on Dt 6[16] in *ICC*.

[2] Psychologically, and apart from any theory of ultimate realities, it is significant that human personality develops, in religion, as in human life, where great values are concerned. A path has to be found between (*a*) utter familiarity, with the loss of the earlier recognition of one's own psychical inferiority, and (*b*) feelings of aloofness, remoteness, and of the gulf between the self and another self; see § 31 (3). Just as sacred objects are to be named, seen, or handled only with respect, so in religion there is an experience of a relationship which has to be treated similarly, and, although the relationship has human analogies, yet it is characteristically more vital than any in ordinary human life.

increase of edible animal and plant totems, etc. In these cases (especially in Central Australia) the groups or the headmen, by virtue of their relationship with the totem, are supposed to be able to exercise some control over it for their own purposes.[1] The practices are noteworthy for the solemnity, self-denial, and restraint which accompany them and forbid us to style them purely magical. Elsewhere it is not uncommon for groups or individuals to be ascribed power and authority over some one department of nature (rain, winds, crops, etc.), and the general principle implied is twofold: A can control B because of some relationship (resemblance, etc.) between them; or, to control B, or gain B's help, A must first enter into some close relationship.[2] The manifold beliefs and practices turn upon ideas of likeness, resemblance, and identity; and the main lines of development are: (*a*) a testing and verifying of the ideas, (*b*) the choice, on the one side, of special individuals, and the recognition, on the other, of special sources of activity such that, instead of a rain-totem *group*, we find (*α*) *individuals* credited with the power of controlling the rain, and (*β*) spirits and gods, either of rain or of less restricted powers (see § 25).

(3) Throughout, what is fundamental is the imitation, whether of the venerated being, the particular need, or the activity required. Now, the idea of imitating the holiness or perfection of a deity (*e.g.*, Mt 5^{48}) could not spring up suddenly; the desire for a spiritual, ethical, and *inward* resemblance cannot be separated psychologically from the rudimentary rites where men, *externally at least*, in some way assimilate themselves to their sacred beings, and not rarely with every sign of earnestness and solemnity. In this psychical state there is a communion, approaching identity, with the object of the profoundest ideas; there is a typical desire to reach the state and to profit from it. All imitation gives a certain reality to the conception entertained of the person who is being represented. Moreover, intense ideas and desires will tend to realize themselves in appropriate gestures and activities.[3] Hence the apparently magical representation of rainfall is not unintelligible from a psychological point of view, and it is significant that some of the ceremonies typically involve attitudes which are characteristic of religion. It is true that there is in religion a characteristic submission (not necessarily an attitude of passivity) to the supremacy of the divine will—'Thy will be done.' On the other hand, in magic 'there is too much "My will be done" about it all.'[4] But there is the third attitude, naive and confident, and for this the formula would be 'Our will be done.' This corresponds to the group-unity where men and their sacred beings form part of the same social system, and it is taken as a matter of course that the gods and men perform one another's will (cf. § 7 [2]). Moreover, logically speaking, this is a primary attitude and one that tends naturally to become that in which the individual acts as though he had only to control, coerce, or set in motion the required activities. The first attitude ('Thy will') is certainly not primary; and, while it is easy to understand the transition from an implicit 'Our will' to 'My will,' it is impossible to explain, psychologically and logically, any transition if the magical attitude is original. This is vital for all conceptions of religion; the apprehension of a qualitative difference must be taken as primary and fundamental. All human activity implies that there are processes in the universe with which man is co-operating; man in the course of development tests and purges his more unconscious presuppositions. The religious conception of reality involves the recognition of some ultimate interconnexion between the human and the divine, between man and the Supreme Power of the universe.[1] Even the crude imitative rites imply something worthy of imitation with self-denial, sacrifice, etc.; and the practices, together with the vague curse and the lofty prayer, imply a certain belief in their efficacy. To achieve his ends, man must make the necessary preparation and use the necessary factors; hence comes the need of concentration, discipline, self-control, and self-sacrifice, and the progress of thought consists in the better knowledge of what is indispensable if effective results are required (see, further, § 29). Here the efficacy of prayer and sacrifice comes under consideration.

20. Sacrifice and prayer.—(1) The data of sacrifice undoubtedly include some gross ideas of mere bargaining, and of cajoling and feeding the gods; they typically point to a relationship for utilitarian purposes, and thus the sacrifice appears as a preliminary gift in order to win the favour of the gods, or as a thank-offering afterwards. But, in its more suggestive form, the sacrifice is communal—it is a ceremony in which members of a unit participate, one which creates between them, for a time at least, a stronger bond of connexion than ties of blood.[2] In such a unit or bond the profoundest ideas are realized, and men and their sacred beings are brought into the closest relationship. The ceremony is psychically impressive, it is an intensifying and strengthening experience; and the state typically involves feelings of union and solidarity, and of communion or even identity with the sacred being. While sacrifice is felt to be effective, conversely, effective results are to be obtained by sacrifice and self-sacrifice. Hence extravagant asceticism, torture, and extraordinary self-mutilation (the last even before a fight [*GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 160 ff.]) can produce a state of exaltation, infelt strength, and the conviction that the desired help *must* be forthcoming. Indeed, violent measures may be adopted in times of crisis or distress; and gloomy rites can reappear or be more intense in order to bring help or to stave off disaster or decay. Healthy asceticism, sacrifice, and self-denial—all psychically and physically beneficial—can thus take perverse forms in order to ensure, or virtually to *compel*, the benefits that are sought. That man by these measures can achieve his ends is in keeping with what proves to be a common presupposition: that the efficacy of 'nature' and the course of 'natural events,' in general, are connected with the behaviour of men, and particularly of such powerful and representative individuals as semi-divine kings and priests (cf. § 25 [3], and art. BRĀHMANISM, vol. ii. p. 800). Sacrifice has as its central idea the implicit or explicit assumption that there is some connexion between human behaviour and natural causation, whether directly or indirectly (*e.g.*, through a deity), and such an assumption goes behind the usual differentiation of man and nature, human and divine. Hence, the distinctively religious and the obviously magical aspects are often closely akin, although their significance for the development of thought is essentially different.

(2) Similarly as regards prayer.[3] The spell or

[1] See the critical summary by Durkheim, bk. iii. ch. iii.

[2] Cf. therefore the semi-magical character of the symbolical toilet or dress of old Oriental priests and kings, etc.

[3] See art. MAGIC, and cf. G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*[3], London, 1913, pp. 166, 392 f., 602 f.

[4] Marett, *Anthropology*, p. 208.

[1] The fact that we distinguish human and divine (and other antitheses—*e.g.*, man and animal) means, not that the two are absolutely distinct and unrelated, but that we realize a distinction between the constituents of some larger realm.

[2] For the latter cf. A. Barth, *Religions of India*, p. 274, and see, in general, W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2]

[3] See especially L. R. Farnell, *The Evolution of Religion*, London, 1905, pp. 163–231; F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the*

charm involves ideas of self-sufficiency and compulsion, and of a mechanism which has only to be set working, whereas the prayer primarily means a call upon the inner self, and is typically a communion with or an appeal to a Superior Power. But from the explicit prayer to a Heavenly Father for the daily bread there cannot be isolated the deeply-felt earnest wish, as when the Gold Coast negro cries: 'Heaven! grant that I may have something to eat this day.' On the one side is the psychical nature of man, whose appeal is formulated to a sacred being who either is the centre of a systematized body of thought or is perfectly vague and unsystematized; and on the other side is the question of the ultimate realities—whether the prayer or wish has any effect save upon the man himself, his courage, confidence, etc., and whether a Supreme Power pays heed to the appeal, be it systematized or vague. Moreover, the earnest prayer or wish cannot be severed from the earnest behaviour which requires or manifests needs to be satisfied. That prayer easily decays and becomes the spell, charm, or magical formula is well known in the history of religion; the efficacy is then thought to lie in the expression itself, as apart from the psychical state which is typical of prayer. This primary psychical aspect of prayer is fundamental, and it is instructive to observe among rudimentary peoples indications of it in practices of an apparently magical character.[1] Under the stress of emotion men help out their ideas with gestures, and there is always a tendency for feelings and ideas to realize themselves in action; children commonly 'play' at that which impresses them (see p. 675[a], n. 3). So it is that upon the lower levels of mankind there are mimetic rites for explicit needs, whereas on the higher levels there will be explicit prayers, and also a recognition of explicit powers to whom an appeal can be made. But all earnest, sincere activity is purposive, implying wants and aims, and the growth of knowledge and the development of religion are marked by better conceptions of the necessary factors and means to achieve success. Hence we can scarcely sever genuine purposive activity and a prayer for some effective activity.

Sooner or later the need is felt of some theory of reality to connect, rationally, human activity and the processes at work in the universe. The vicissitudes of thought—the periods of scepticism and of credulity, of doubt and of faith—do not affect the underlying realities, whatever they may prove to be; and what is implied in religious, magical, scientific, and philosophical conceptions points, not to many different realities, but to different and even contradictory apprehensions of one reality or system of realities. It is because the religious conceptions claim to be the nearest to truth, and because the consequences of an infelt conviction are so potent, that serious differences between religious and non-religious conceptions are feared or resented; and indeed the history of religion from the rudest types upwards proves that these differences are vital for the progressive development of life and thought (see § 25 f.).

21. Ideas of soul and spirit.—(1) A survey of the whole field of religion brings to light two fundamental convictions or, rather, presuppositions: (*a*) there are ideas of agency, causation, activity, or function in the universe, such that man can enter into relationship with the effective processes and utilize them; (*b*) man is more than the sensible body; there is a part which is separable, which can leave the body temporarily (a common explanation of dreams, fainting, illness), is not annihilated at death, may go far away or remain in the old haunts, or may enter another body, or be reborn.[1] These ideas overlap: the ideas of a soul or of some non-bodily part of man are extended and refer to the life after death and the unseen; and the ideas of power or causation are connected with powerful individuals (especially dead ancestors and heroes), saints, spirits, deities, and powers of nature.

But the ideas are never consistent, nor are the categories distinct. Life, feeling, consciousness, mind, spirit, and soul are confused; and physiological, psychological, æsthetic, theological, and other points of view are unreflectively mingled. The progress of differentiation marks the progress of observation and classification. The 'spiritual' part of man may be thought of as a double, material, minute, and ethereal, or it may be identified with certain parts or constituents of the body. Modern Western thought, with its attempt to distinguish the material from the non-material, goes beyond the common conception of body and spirit as a grosser and a finer material.[2] But it in turn is scarcely consistent when it distinguishes at the same time mind and matter, living and non-living, organic and inorganic. Consequently, it is impossible to determine clearly the ideas of those whose thought is not the same as ours, the more especially as our modern categories are confused and not co-ordinated. It is sufficient to observe that everywhere it is possible to distinguish systematically some A and non-A (*e.g.*, organic and inorganic), but every separation of an A and a B (*e.g.*, the living and the dead, body and mind) invariably raises the question whether the two are rightly kept apart or are to be related and regarded as different forms of some one underlying substance.[3]

(2) Ideas of soul and spirit are not to be treated as 'survivals,' though special beliefs and practices may be traced historically (§ 4 [2]). There is a tendency to accept the ideas and to justify them—*e.g.*, by reference to dreams, of which, however, only those will be cited which are actually in harmony with the predisposition. Much also depends on the extent of the individual's experience and knowledge by which he is able to discriminate between the waking hours and the dreams, or any unusual subjective experiences (*e.g.*, 'ghosts') which may seem to have objective reality. The ordinary familiar theories of the 'origin' of the ideas do not account for the great social and intellectual systems with which they are organically interwoven, and which could not in any case be based upon isolated ideas or dream-experiences (cf. Durkheim, pp. 56–60, 268). Moreover, no theory of the spiritual world can be considered satisfactory which applies solely to a particular age, land, or sect; and a careful distinction must always be drawn between the particular ideas under consideration and the common psychological aspects which indicate that the essential features of the ideas of soul and spirit are logically *a priori*.

(3) All the world over there are many words to denote a power manifested in special or general forms, material or other, whether in human, animal, or 'nature' phenomena.[4] The Melanesian term *mana* (*q.v.*) is often used typically by modern writers; but, while this more especially restricts the power to one originally manifested in human activity, other terms are not necessarily limited in this way (cf. our use of [Holy] Spirit and Power). The words are characteristically applied (*a*) to what has an emotional effect, exciting surprise, wonder, marvel, admiration, reverence, and awe;

Study of Comp. Rel., New York, 1908, pp. 139–174; R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*[2], London, 1914, p. 58 f.

[1] E.g., in one case a mimetic rite is employed when a woman desires a child and a father of a family is called in to offer up a prayer (Babar Archipelago). But, while this is magico-religious rather than magic, elsewhere we hear of a similar rite but no explicit prayer or appeal is recorded (*GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 72; Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, i. 139 ff.). To conclude that whether the latter is really pure magic or not depends on the record of the observer is extremely unsatisfactory. For all critical inquiry the issue concerns the psychical state (which determines whether we are to style the evidence magical or not) and our view of the ultimate realities—in other words, (1) what is the rite in the eyes of God? and (2) how much efficacy is there in it, according to our own conception of the universe (*cf.* §§ 15 [3], 32 [4])?

[1] As is quite intelligible, it is especially when an individual has been powerful or famous that the continuance of his presence and effectiveness is commonly and quite spontaneously assumed.

[2] Cf. mediæval ideas of a more or less material soul (Telesio, Bacon); cf. also the Jainist views above, vol. vii. p. 468.

[3] Cf. the controversies between the dualistic and monistic systems, and the relation between polytheism and monotheism.

[4] See especially A. E. Crawley, *The Idea of the Soul*, London, 1909; E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, do. 1914, pp. 36–160; I. King, *The Development of Religion*, New York, 1910, ch. vi.; Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, pp. 13, 129 ff.; Durkheim, p. 192 ff.; J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, chs. iii. and iv.

and (*b*) to the unusual, impressive, striking, and inexplicable examples of all kinds of causation. Religious, non-religious, and magical aspects are interwoven; and everywhere the tendency is to differentiations (religious, moral, æsthetic, physical) which depend upon the current tradition, knowledge, and stock of categories. The psychological aspect of this 'power' is more primary than the logical, and this is illustrated, *e.g.*, when a real (psychological) reverence for the Sabbath leads to tabus wherein the (logical) question enters whether such-and-such an act does or does not break the Sabbath.[1] There is an *a priori* readiness to recognize a mysterious or profound cause or activity outside the run of ordinary experience; increase of knowledge may seriously disturb the beliefs, by making the activities 'natural,' but a distinction must be drawn between the psychological tendencies and the particular beliefs which prevail. Hence, theories of naturism and the like do not really explain origins, but only show how the religious ideas could be engendered and brought to the birth. In like manner, theories of the transition from polytheism to monotheism, or (as can be suggested in the case of India) to pantheism, overlook the important fact that the recognition of a number of phenomena which can be classed together and given one name, because they are similar in some one respect (*e.g.*, as being gods or spirits), logically implies an apprehension of some underlying undifferentiated unity. It seems impossible for the observer to draw any line objectively, save with the help of some prior presuppositions, and consequently it is necessary to admit the prevalent and normal apprehension of some 'power,' or the like, the nature or quality of which is realized only when it is identified, and that on the basis of current categories and in accordance with current thought—although the very act of categorizing or naming shapes the apprehension and interpretation and gives it a form. And, while continued comparison of the data of religion tends to weaken the barriers between the manifold manifestations of *mana*, etc., it is solely through the categories, differentiations, and distinctions that the progress of knowledge is possible, even though the underlying unity be ignored from time to time.[2]

22. Life and death.—Among other ideas which are presupposed and which rule and control human activity, conscious and unconscious, is especially that of the persistence or continuity of the individual. No rational description can be given of oneself or of others without implying it, even though the arguments which are conclusive proofs of existence after death to one man may make no impression on another whose personal experience and body of thought are different. But the conviction, instead of being distinctively 'religious,' is one taken up by religion, regulated by it, and sometimes even abused. The firm conviction that death is merely the gateway into another realm, or that the individual cannot escape some sort of continuity of existence, is not in itself religious; it has justified barbaric cruelty and irrational practices, and in India religion is devoted partly to remedying the evils of rebirth. The wide prevalence of initiation or of baptism ceremonies illustrates the tendency to prepare the individual for a life of which bodily existence is only the prelude. Here the crucial point is not death, but the ceremony during his lifetime when the individual becomes an integral part of an enduring body—the group, brotherhood, society, church.[1] The persistence of the individual is felt to be in some way ensured by becoming part of a larger, tangible, or intelligible unit. Who dies if his country lives? Now, death is the occasion of feelings of grief and distress (significantly rare, however, among the dying), of peace and sublimity, of doubt and uncertainty. Moreover, the life after death is also a matter of perfect assurance (allowing, among rudimentary and barbaric peoples, horrible sacrifice and callousness), and even an astonishing self-complacence (as being one of the 'elect,' and so forth). Again, the 'next' life has often been regarded as essentially a replica of the present, so that even gods and men are thought to enjoy only a limited existence and not an eternal one. Thus, everywhere psychological and logical factors intermingle in the history of the ideas; but those which represent the apprehension of a *qualitatively* different state are in every respect more vital than those which view the other world as a mere 'super'-world. Indeed, the fact of some qualitative difference alone explains the analogical character of the results of the intuitions, experiences, and feelings. It would be impossible to attempt a rational description of man unless there were fundamental psychical facts which transcend the ordinary conceptions of 'this' world. Conceptions of 'another' or the 'next' world are inexplicable unless man is already in touch with a larger existence, and unless 'this' world, as he understands and describes it, is the empirical description of some part, phase, or aspect of a profounder reality the full comprehension of which transcends human mental processes.[2]

23. Synopsis of the evidence.—(1) It is a common belief that the 'soul' (vital principle, etc.) can be, temporarily at least, separable from the body; it can depart when a man dreams or is ill; it can be lost, enticed, or stolen (*GB*[3], pt. ii., *Taboo*, ch. ii.). It can also be transferred; hence the common idea of the 'external soul,' where a man believes himself to be secure as long as the 'soul' is hidden or guarded in some safe, remote, or unknown spot (*GB*[3], pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, ii. 95–278). The idea is akin (*a*) to the belief that one's name may be written, or a piece of one's person (*e.g.*, hair) or property left, in some holy place as an essential part of oneself and for one's welfare, (*b*) to the conviction (on a higher level of thought) that the soul can be entrusted to a saint or deity or be in his care (see a curious form of this in 1 S 25[29]). Moreover, a man's life may be intimately connected with a tree, which becomes an 'index' or 'sign' of life, indicating his strength, weakness, or death; or, again, the weakling may be symbolically united with a tree to gain thereby something of its strength and vigour.

(2) Trees, like animals, plants, and even inanimate objects, may be ascribed a 'soul'; deities may eat the 'spiritual' part of the food-offerings presented to them, and utensils may be broken ('killed')in order that their 'soul' may accompany the dead. Animate and inanimate objects can contain a man's 'external' soul or his 'twin' soul; they can also be the vehicle of some power or spirit (see art. FETISHISM). Both among men and among inanimate objects the 'spirit' can be ceremonially transferred; and it is necessary to distinguish between any object (human, etc.) viewed (*a*) as a vehicle, a representative of some power or spirit, or (*b*) as the actual power itself.[3] It is

[1] The Dakota Indians, who believe that the mysterious whirlwind must be endowed with *wakonda*, proceed to associate with it analogous phenomena—*e.g.*, the fluttering moth, and the buffalo bull pawing the earth and throwing up dust in the air (I. King, pp. 139 f., 161).

[2] Differentiation tends to obscure the logical unity which is more obvious (*a*) on rudimentary levels of society, (*b*) in particular psychical states (concentration, mysticism, etc.), and (*c*) as a result of any stringent comparison of the manifestations; but it does not follow that there was or is in existence an absolutely undifferentiated unity (cf. similarly p. 666[1], n. 3).

[1] The practice of associating oneself with that which outlives one is illustrated by the means whereby men endeavour to make their name 'live' (so notably in ancient Oriental thought), by building enduring works (*e.g.*, a pyramid), by inscribing their name upon lasting objects, by beneficent and other deeds, which will not soon be forgotten, and so forth.

[2] The point of view (explicit or implicit) according to which (bodily) life is only 'part' of a larger existence represents a psychological and logical *suppositio*, 'unit' or 'universe of discourse' more comprehensive than that which confines itself only to 'this' world, and refuses to go beyond it consciously. Every description of 'this' world at length shades off into a theoretical account which goes far beyond actual knowledge, involves metaphysical problems, and leaves out the prime fact—the development of the individual who has become conscious of the world.

[3] For the transference cf. *FL* viii. [1897] 325 ff.; J. H. Breasted, *Anc. Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905–07, iii. 179, n. *c*; Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, p. 55.

an especially common belief that the vital essence of some powerful being can be found in anything belonging to or associated with him; hence the virtue of relics, the dust from the tombs of saints, etc. Human life can be vitally bound up with animals, trees, fire, and inanimate objects, and the dead can reappear in another human form (whether in the family or not) or in animal shape. But amid all these variations it is to be observed that, while the fetish tends to be of private and temporary value, the idol is generally the centre of a more permanent cult; and, while the spirit-guardian represents a relatively stable but individual cult, the totem is rather the affair of the clan. The question of the stability and clientèle of the sacred object is always important for the body of beliefs and practices involved. A sacred object may be shared by father and son, by mother and daughter, or by the whole family; it may be inherited, accepted by other families, or imposed upon them. There are many gradations between the purely individual cult of a spirit-guardian and the cult accepted by a confederation of clans or a whole people, between the most ephemeral of cults (cf. art. MOMENTARY GODS) and those which are a fundamental part of a people's life and thought.

(3) Thus, the ideas of a 'spiritual' relationship between the individual and *something* outside him are extremely variable, and everything depends upon the social and logical co-ordination. Throughout, the ideas tend to overrule the crudely physical or literal aspects. The beliefs are usually far from simple, and the common ideas of rebirth and re-incarnation make it difficult to distinguish (*a*) the individual who will be reborn, and (*b*) the maintenance of his own individuality, which now seems to be partially admitted and now seems to be entirely merged with the family or group. Sometimes the dead are supposed to rejoin some sacred stock or nucleus, as it were; and from birth to death the man is periodically in touch with the 'essence' from which he came and to which he will return.[1] A great deal of evidence, it is true, might seem to support the theory of a primitive ignorance of paternity.[2] On this theory there was a primitive belief that every birth was due to supernatural causes; every child was a 'spirit child.' The theory implies the existence of an appropriate body of thought connected with it and outweighing the purely physiological considerations. Now, the OT illustrates the explicit conviction that the Deity can restrain child-bearing or grant it (*e.g.*, Gn 15^3 $16^{2.10}$ etc.), *i.e.* that the 'supernatural' considerations are stronger than the 'natural.' This co-existence is in harmony with the evidence elsewhere among rudimentary peoples.[3] In fact, rites of puberty, initiation, marriage, and adoption indicate not only that certain physical aspects are not unknown, but that 'ideas' implicitly predominate. So, also, the collective or social feeling which treats questions of parentage as secondary, provided the child is one of the group, does not necessarily point to ignorance of paternity, but to the fundamental importance of the ideas which are implied in the social life. The theory of spiritual conception clearly assumes the predominance of regulating beliefs or convictions, but is needlessly hampered by the inference that the physiological facts were not known. The evidence rather proves the significance of ideas which, on a higher level, become explicit and would be called 'spiritual'; and, if rudimentary man thus falls into line with the higher levels (cf., *e.g.*, the OT), where the co-existence of physical and psychical ideas is at once obvious, it has to be added that the greater importance of the psychical aspects appears not only in the practices and beliefs relating to the dead, but even in totemism, where the totem and totem-clan may be said to be 'consubstantial' (cf. Durkheim, bk. ii. ch. viii.). Thus, even on the lower levels, the system of behaviour implies some system of ideas, which, however, has not yet become explicit, though we must describe it in such terms.[4]

(4) The ideas of soul and spirit are extremely complex, but they reduce themselves to a few fundamental principles: (*a*) there is no *absolute* individual—he is always bound up essentially with something outside himself; (*b*) he is constantly becoming conscious of a relation with something 'not himself,' stronger, vaster, more enduring—he is what one may call 'psychically incomplete,' a part of some larger psychical whole; (*c*) the difference between life and death, between 'this' world and the 'other' or the 'next,' is not absolute, and the ideas concerning these depend essentially for their origin upon states of experience and their interpretation; (*d*) finally, while the ordinary facts of sympathy, interest, and enthusiasm indicate the ease with which limits of space and time are felt to be removed wherever deep *personal* feeling is aroused (viz. in reference to distant or past events, people, etc.), there is everywhere a network or pattern of *particular* beliefs and convictions, conventions and prejudices, categories and classifications, such that the particular character or expression of the underlying feelings is thereby shaped and guided. There is an (logically) *a priori* feeling of kinship and oneness with something of which one is a part; it is ready to be evoked and shaped, but it is shaped, limited, and obscured—usually inconsistently—by current clan, social, tribal, and national circumstances, and by the current body of thought. These determine man's 'kinship' with the rest of mankind, with the 'lower' orders, or with nature.

24. Analysis of the concept 'God.'[1]—(1) The widely different conceptions touching the validity and content of the concept 'God' prove the difficulty of making any statement that can be considered adequate. What is most prominent is the characteristic conviction (feeling, doctrine, etc.) of a profoundly vital *personal relationship* between the individual and an external transcendent Power (see § 18). But convictions of *some* relationship are wide-spread, and there is remarkable variation touching (*a*) that with which the individual is very intimately related, and (*b*) the ethical, social, intellectual, æsthetic, and other ideas involved. Moreover, although the data of mysticism, ecstasy, and the like, point to a psychical state of such intense subjective value that the experience will be felt to be 'divine,' yet the common recognition of a difference between 'true' and 'false' religion, prophetism, mysticism, etc., forces the necessity of distinguishing between the subjective and the objective value of every such experience. Besides, the individual who feels a close and intimate relationship with an external protective Power does not necessarily regard it as a deity. Here the experience and the interpretation may tend to interact, and the various beliefs in the reality of spirit-guardian, genius, ancestral spirit, or deity combine essentially similar types of experience with essential differences of form and expression, which are obviously of great importance for the history of religion. The ordinary facts associate the human and the divine in such a way that a criticism of them may seem almost blasphemous, and this in itself is an indication that the depths of human personality are concerned with the realities which the experiences involve.

(2) Moreover, the great concept involves ideas of *causation*, the manifestation of power, etc. The belief in a divine Power is typically in its effectiveness. This will commonly depend upon man's behaviour, and will entail ideas, not of magic (automatic or mechanical working, coercion, compulsion), but of religion (dependence, prayer, sacrifice, necessity of moral behaviour, etc.). While, on the one hand, the concept 'God' raises the question, What do men expect from their Deity?, on the other hand, all important functions, operations, and departments of life and nature will often be attributed to a patron or effective power.[2] Especially is this the case where men's personal needs and interests are concerned; this is true not merely of concrete activities (*e.g.*, corn-goddesses), but also of those which we treat as abstractions, but which none the less could be regarded as evident causes, sources, etc. (*e.g.*, deities of piety, concord, righteousness). In this way we also obtain the results of continued observation of operations, the classification and co-ordination of functions and processes, the deter-

[1] The religious and philosophical systems of India are especially important for the different ways in which essentially similar ideas are developed.

[2] For this see Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, ch. i. 'Spiritual Conception,' ch. ii. 'Magical Practices'; Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv. 61 ff., 155.

[3] Cf., *e.g.*, the corporeal and spiritual husbands of the Akamba women (Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 423 ff., *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 317 f.; see, further, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. [illegible], 576, ii. 83, 90 ff., iv. 287; Hartland, *Prim. Pat.* i. 55, ii. 275 f., 278 ff.; Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 265; Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 606; B. Spencer, *Native Tribes of the N. Territory of Australia*, London, 1914, p. 263 ff.; and especially B. Malinowski, *JRAI* xlvi. [illegible] 403 ff.

[4] Cf. above, §§ 6, 9 (1). The complexity and inconsistency of ideas of life and soul, even among so rudimentary a people as the natives of Central Australia, emphasize the futility of any attempt to present a perfectly logical and co-ordinated picture of all their ideas. More important is the fact of their presence, the recurrence of similar types of problems on different levels (viz. in totemism, fetishism), and the necessity of a more methodical treatment (*e.g.*, of co-ordinating logically all the evidence together with modern knowledge and conviction.)

[1] See especially, among recent literature, W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, London, 1912.

[2] Cf. the Roman *indigitamenta* (*q.v.*); also the *genius* permeating and actuating all that is highly organized (see W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity*, London, 1914, p. 17 ff.).

mination of classes and categories, and the arrangement of the contents of the universe. By the side of this rudimentary 'logical' process is the more psychological tendency to respect, admire, and venerate significant operations and organizations in the abstract, or the concrete objects or persons associated with or representative of them (cf. the Navy, Army, Church, etc.). The psychological aspect is also illustrated in the attitude to those who 'know' or 'do' (cf. the derivations of 'wizard' and 'fetish'). Individuals of unusual personality or ability are outside the normal, and, as frequently seen in India, tend to be regarded as more or less divine. The fusion of psychological and quasi-logical factors (potent and therefore divine, divine and therefore potent) has complicated the history of men's conceptions of the Deity. On the one hand, the attribution of deity to operations and processes of nature readily explains polytheistic features (gods of rain, sun, etc.); while, on the other hand, intense feelings of relationship encourage a monotheistic or rather a henotheistic attitude (as in the hymns of the *Rigveda*). Consequently, gods of similar or related functions are easily associated, as also are the departmental and other gods of tribes or districts which coalesce or federate themselves. But, while the functional god is typically that and nothing more—and the problems involved are those of knowledge and observation—the part played by feeling (*e.g.*, in the relations between peoples and their gods) has to be considered; and, when the gods are felt to be *personally* related to man, depth of feeling forces the individual to co-ordinate his ideas, to consider the relation between this 'our' god and the gods of causation, who are gods of function rather than of relationship. In this way men's ideas of the universe and of the ultimate realities constantly have new and different patterns which can be objectively compared and traced, and the vicissitudes of which would be inexplicable unless account were taken both of the more logical processes of ordinary thought and of the more obscure problems of the immediate consciousness of some underlying reality (see § 25).

(3) Moreover, the concept embodies ideas of co-ordination and the systematization of ideas of climax and limit. It 'completes' the needs of feeling and reflexion; it answers the grievous and perplexing experiences of life and the deep-reaching questions of the intellect. In this way conceptions of 'God' (according to their nature) tend to satisfy human personality on all its sides, and they will respond to religious, moral, æsthetic, and intellectual demands. But everywhere there arises the necessity of co-ordinating conceptions of 'God' with conceptions of nature, physical science, society, the State, etc. For, while, on the one hand, the conception inevitably concerns the ultimate facts and values of life, on the other hand, everywhere there is an absence of strict co-ordination, and a man's conception of God influences other conceptions, and *vice versa*. Viewed as an 'ultimate' concept, beyond which the mind cannot proceed, it involves ideas of extreme intensity and limit (as when the Psalmist speaks of the mountains and trees of God). It is then easy to regard it as expressing a superlative or infinite form of the ordinary and finite (*e.g.*, God as infinite love, justice, etc.). By this linear, serial, or semi-mathematical mode of thought the Deity has been regarded merely as a Superman, even as heaven has been thought of as a superior copy of mundane life. But in all new religious experience the concept is typically transcendent, involving that which is *qualitatively* different—that of which thought is a very imperfect representation—and compelling (characteristically) some systematic re-organization of one's earlier body of thought. 'Linear' development is an aid to thought, but it does not answer the experience where a new stage of consciousness forces a development of the whole body of thought, comparable in some cases (*e.g.*, of 'conversion') to the more or less drastic developments of organisms. The 'linear' symbol does not explain that awakening and new vision which justify the conception of a 'transcendent' God; and only an undiscerning comparison will suggest to the outsider that the ideas concerning a Supreme Being are 'constructions' made up of everyday sensuous experience (cf. § 16 [2]). It is precisely when one considers the relationship between human personality and the meaning of the concept that the problems of each are seen to be interrelated, and with both are interwoven the problems of the development of ordinary life and thought.

(4) It is evident that the development of *personality* in its totality and that of the conception itself are interconnected. Group-totemism is more in harmony with the undeveloped ideas of individuality among rudimentary peoples, whereas the individual totem or spirit-guardian, although it is a man's private possession, is on the road to become a personal Deity—at the same time as the man's own personality is becoming more marked.[1] There is an inter-relation between a man's personality and his conception of the universe and its ultimate realities. It is true that he may fail to recognize any ultimate authority outside himself, but this phase cannot be permanent. Characteristic of religion is the recognition of an external Power *personally* interested in the individual; and, consequently, from both the psychological and the metaphysical points of view, this phase, together with the ideas of the 'fall of Lucifer' type, will require a closer criticism (see below, p. 688[b], n. 2).

25. Social-religious development.[2] — (1) The growth and differentiation of society, its internal development, and the relation between different societies combine to shape the development of religion. The religious ideas extend to all that is for the preservation of existence; hence food-supply, livelihood, trade, war, and government are commonly found associated with religious ideas (§ 6 [1]). But, when there is a differentiation between the religious and the non-religious, the modern inquirer is hampered because he may be (perhaps unconsciously) swayed by some differentiation (*e.g.*, law and religion) which is not recognized by the society under consideration, or he may fail to observe another particular mode of differentiation (*e.g.*, magic and religion). Throughout the history of religion there has been no continuous, orderly, logical development; periods of greater cohesion and unification of thought have alternated with periods of greater incoherence and incompatibility. There are, however, some typical features of importance for the trend of thought, and these can be sketched in outline. Specialism of function, with its inevitable disintegrating effect upon the collective social thought, occurs when, instead of a group as a whole officiating in some solemn ceremony, special individuals or representatives are employed. In the Kei Islands, *e.g.*, girls are chosen and must submit to extraordinary restrictions for the benefit of a trading expedition; but elsewhere tabus and restrictions of a sympathetic and telepathic character are frequently imposed upon a people as a whole (*GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 126 ff., and pt. ii., *Taboo*, ch. iv. § 4). In Central Australia each clan performs ceremonies for the increase of the totem (if edible), whereas in the north, where the organization is more advanced, a headman will officiate, and he assumes the responsibilities and privileges of the group.

[1] See § 8, and cf. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, iii. 452 ff. The sense of personality was vaguer among the Romans and the Semites than among the Greeks, and in Buddhism one may observe the absence of a personal God (from the theistic point of view) and of distinctive individualism.

[2] An interesting attempt to work out the 'psychological history of the development of mankind' is made by W. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, tr. E. L. Schaub, London, 1916.

Now, men of elevated position are commonly felt to be *psychically* superior, and those to whom important or valuable powers are ascribed tend to acquire position and authority. Such individuals, all the world over, have a significance which is both psychical (because of the ideas entertained of them) and material (because of their actual abilities); and in this way the authority acquired by the 'magician' or any other potent individual and the powers ascribed to chiefs, kings, and other authorities are factors that are continuously at work in the history of society and thought (see especially *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i.).

(2) The Central Australian totem-group that officiates for the increase of its totem (*e.g.*, the emu) stands to the rest of the tribe like some departmental god (viz. emu-god) on another level. The group is almost wholly debarred from tasting the totem-food, except on the occasion of the ceremony. But among the Dieri it is the headman of the seed-totem group who is effective, and who boasts of being the stay of life; while on higher levels not only are there gods especially associated with particular departments of nature, but the firstfruits will be the property of the god or his representative, the priest. In this development of the different constituent features of the once simple cult the office of headman, or of the man selected for his powers, readily becomes hereditary; and frequently there are religious rulers, chiefs with priestly powers, or priests with secular authority —a circumstance which soon leads to rivalries between religious and secular classes. Meanwhile, the chief's abode and the sacred place are most closely associated, and the claims of the palace (or the king) and of the temple interact in the history of taxation, of royal and priestly regalia and ceremonial, and of the structure of the buildings, of the *personnel*, and the pantheon. It is in the course of such social development that initiation ceremonies are no longer for the group as a whole; they are for special classes, or for entrance into brotherhoods, sects, gilds, or secret societies (*q.v.*).

The development from totem-species to the single specimen, or to an image of it, is easy, and the anthropomorphic treatment of the object can turn the latter into the god of the tribe or district. Conversely, although gods with remarkable animal-elements in their cults or myths are not necessarily derived from totems, sometimes the ancestry can be clearly traced (cf. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 19 ff.). Further, a very significant but as yet obscure development is that of ideas of group-marriage (§ 9 [1]). Sometimes the men of one group will have marital rights over the women of another, and these may be exercised before a woman marries away. But elsewhere there has been the *jus primæ noctis*—the claim asserted not by a group, but by a local head or representative, or by a priest (who is the representative of the god)—or there has been a preliminary dedication to the god. It is conceivable therefore that the earlier rights of the group were taken over by a representative (*a*) of the group, or (*b*) of the group's deity, and that the custom on the higher levels is connected with what is found on the lower. That the custom has a primary psychical explanation is suggested also by the law of the Council of Carthage in 398, on which cf. *EBr*[11] xv. 593.

(3) Where a group and its sacred object (totem and totem-group, god and tribe) practically form, as it were, a single unit (§ 7 [2]), the selection of a representative (headman, priest, king) would tend to disturb it. The effect of the development is illustrated in the varying relations between a people or land, a ruler or priest, and the god or gods. The intermediary is the representative of the people before the god, or *vice versa*; and in the religions of China, Egypt, and Babylonia there are many examples of the consequences. Moreover, the king is often regarded as the source of the people's prosperity and is responsible for disasters. He is the central figure, and therefore there are tabus to protect and safeguard him; he may be kept in seclusion or supplemented by a secular partner. In fact, the representative individual, king or priest, is so essentially associated with processes in the universe that his death may be a sort of cosmical catastrophe. Hence it may be thought necessary to ensure that he is always vigorous, and even to kill him before his powers weaken.[1] The 'divine' chiefs or kings are of cosmical significance, like the Brāhman priests elsewhere; hence these visible and accessible functionaries exercise a great influence over the course of thought. As ethical ideas prevail, such men must possess moral attributes; and, when things go wrong, they — like all representative individuals and functionaries — are the obvious and most tangible scape-goats.[2] Throughout there is interaction between ideas of the effective gods (the ultimate realities) and the very human representatives, incarnations, and the like; men's ideas of the gods are swayed by the good or bad behaviour of these individuals as truly as, in course of social development, conceptions of the moral nature of the universe are influenced by the good or evil which men find in their environment.

(4) Intercourse with other groups, the rise of a central authority, and the vicissitudes of history invariably force movements in religious thought. The local god, the chief, and the district find their parallels in the national god, the king, and the land; there are units within a larger unit, and complications arise in the effort to co-ordinate the various gods of the local districts and of the whole area. This co-ordination can be regarded as one of convictions, ideas, etc. The local gods, patron deities, and saints (cf. the Muhammadan *walīs*) are felt to be near at hand, and directly interested in their small circle—like the local chief; and often, while a land, viewed from without, seems polytheistic, the average individual is henotheistic. The problems of co-ordinating the local cults are illustrated in the relation between the Israelite Jahweh and the Baals, the Muhammadan Allah and the *walīs*, or the Deity and the saints and Madonnas in Roman Catholic lands. When the local being was identified with the national god, the result was partly to drag the latter down to the popular level, partly to elevate the former, and partly also to remove the former away from popular veneration to the court and temple. In the many vicissitudes that occur, and in the ebb and flow of ideas, there are complex problems (*a*) of the psychological consequences for the individual whose sacred being had once been 'personally' related to him, and (*b*) of the quasi-logical developments of doctrines and theories of the gods. Personal experiences and the theories of the universe and the gods have to be adjusted to each other. Especially significant are the vicissitudes of the intimate relationship between the gods and their representative individuals; for, although the latter are, properly speaking, subordinate to the former, yet, because they are visible, accessible, and more 'real' than the unseen powers, there is a tendency to regard them as actual gods (cf. *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 397, 401). This tendency is in harmony with the readiness of all individuals with functions and powers to ignore their subordinate position and (when they become increasingly conscious of their value) to be a law unto themselves. The data point to profound vicissitudes in the beliefs and convictions of the men concerned, and are of the

[1] This is the *motif* of the *Golden Bough*; see Frazer, *Totemism*, ii. 529 f., 608; *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 5, 322, pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, ch. ii. Although the remarks above are not everywhere applicable as a whole, they refer to interrelated bodies of ideas which recur, in one form or another, almost universally.

[2] Hence, in the development of society, one of the most difficult of problems is to fix responsibility and determine just conceptions of responsibility. Such problems are much less serious in undeveloped communities, where there is little differentiation of function and religious ideas are not separated from social life.

first importance for any attempt to deduce the nature of the ultimate realities (see § 32 [2]).

(5) The necessity of maintaining the unity and security of every group, tribe, and people explains the various means that are taken (*e.g.*, in rites of adoption). Ideas outweigh purely physical or material considerations. There is a deep-seated feeling that powerful representative individuals should be above chance and change; hence there are innumerable practices and beliefs which refer to their immortality, rebirth, re-incarnation, etc., while, later, attention is directed not to the individual, but to the stability of the function, agency, or office. If the death of the semi-divine king was more or less a cosmical disaster, royal marriages and births, too, had a national or even greater significance for current thought, and ideas of increase and growth were associated (in an undifferentiated sort of way) with the course of nature generally. Moreover, the superior significance of representative individuals explains the early importance attached to their participation in religious ceremonies—*e.g.*, in solemn acts of confession. Hence, also, the greater interest attached to records, ritual, hymns, etc., relating to them, and to the careful preservation of them (cf. the priestly hymns of the *Rigveda*, Babylonian ritual, and penitential hymns). While the life and thought of the ordinary people are generally colourless, with few distinctive features, the representative and other outstanding individuals leave their mark upon a people's history, although they, in their turn, are far more subject to change than the ordinary level of thought which pursues its way, rejecting what it cannot assimilate and rehabilitating, though no doubt in a new form, beliefs and practices which well-meaning prophets and reformers had sought to eradicate.

26. Eras of crisis and transition.—(1) As the vicissitudes which we have been noticing break up the social or national unity, with it disappears the congruence of thought. The loss of collective feeling and the absence of a feeling of harmony of aims and interests proceed *pari passu* with a great increase of individualism. Individualism is already present in some degree where there are individual totems or spirit-guardians, or where the man has his own protective genius and does not share that which either is common to the group or is tended by a recognized representative. But the differentiation of society, labour, intellectual and all other work, steadily increases the heterogeneity of convictions, modes of thought, interests, etc.; and, as it disintegrates the thought of the environment as a whole, there is the more urgent need for some new strong unifying impulses. Now, there is always a logical relationship between the character of a people and their religious convictions; thus one may note the combination of fanaticism, gloominess, and fear of divine anger both among the barbarous Assyrians and among the fiery zealots of early Arabia. And, as regards individuals, the psychology of Calvinist and Puritan, of a Francis of Assisi and a Luther, of a Paul and a John, of a Hosea and an Isaiah, illustrates varieties of religious character which will be even more varied, though naturally of very different value, whenever individualism becomes excessive. In other words, where there is excessive individualism, there is every opportunity for markedly different varieties of religious and other strongly subjective convictions, and also for a dangerous amount of extremeness, which at other times would be checked and suppressed by the great body of average thought. The experiences, ideas, etc., will always be subjectively impressive, but there will be no coherent body of objective thought whereby to test their real value.

(2) In the disorganization that ensues coherence of social life and of the fundamental ideas gives way to an incoherence which has a disturbing effect upon the religious conditions. The early social-religious beliefs and practices lose both their practical and their traditional authority; religion tends to be severed from life and is often mechanical or magical. Scepticism, agnosticism, and pessimism find fertile soil; and the needs once nourished by the current religion now atrophy or find other supplies. Old beliefs return, foreign and incompatible ones are admitted, fanaticism and superstition balance trustful faith and a new spirituality. The vision shifts to the 'next' world, or it ignores it—only the 'visible' is real; there is a deeper insight into social conditions and a freer attitude to sacred things. Amid many extreme tendencies in all directions there will be found dangerous excesses (cf. the frightful human sacrifice of the Aztecs, gross licentious cults, irrational and suicidal tabus), which, like all features that are incapable of development or persistence, are not to be regarded as typical of normal religion or life.

(3) Meanwhile there is a general levelling. The divisions which had disturbed the earlier solidarity are blurred, the privileges of the few are claimed by the many and become less distinctive, and exclusive ideas are common property and are popularized. In Egypt, *e.g.*, the belief in a life after death, once demanded on behalf of the king, was extended to ordinary men; it involved their recognition of the moral requirements once imposed upon the monarchs, but at the same time the belief was loaded with popular superstition. The general effect of the transitional process with its 'secularization' can be seen in the history of the drama, of certain toys (*e.g.*, the bull-roarer), and of games. The traces of a foundation-sacrifice have been found in the game 'London Bridge is broken down,' and echoes of grim rites lingered on in the stories of wells and woods which it was dangerous to pass. European folk-lore has thus preserved remains of old barbaric religion; and elsewhere traces of earlier organized cultures can be recognized by their incompatibility with the current systems of thought.[1] Thus, too, the great gods among rudimentary peoples may sometimes be the last fragments of earlier and even more advanced cultures; and, where the religious vicissitudes can be traced over many centuries (as in the East), considerable complexity of beliefs and practices is caused by the recurring periods of decay and new growth.

(4) The factors which, taken by themselves, would make for change and disintegration, and those which, by themselves, would lead to conservatism and stagnation, interplay and produce new growths, the inauguration of new ages, periods, cycles, etc. They involve a harmony of the deepest ideas, and thus affect the history of religion. Characteristic of every new harmony and solidarity is the religious spirit by which, first, individuals and then whole peoples are stimulated and undergo development. When, as in the history of Judaism, Buddhism, and Christianity, the religion of exceptional individuals becomes that of a people, it must adapt itself to many different classes, minds, dispositions, and needs. The tendency then is for the religious and other aspects of life and thought to become harmonious, an adjustment is made between new and old, and the religion is a socialized one, as distinct from the theosophical, ethical, or philosophical cults of select minds.[2] Everywhere these transitional periods are profoundly significant both for individuals and for peoples. The line of development is not necessarily snapped; a land will undergo periods of new reorganization, as, *e.g.*, in India and in early Babylonia and Egypt. On the other hand, the teaching of the Israelite prophets apparently caused a drastic revolution in the old Hebrew religion, whereas Babylonia and Egypt sought to satisfy their unrest by a conscious and artificial return to the conditions of a happier and distant past. Centuries later, one line of development ceases

[1] Cf., *e.g.*, W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 452 ff.

[2] It is now a religion which the diverse minds of the social body can understand and elaborate; the whole environment thus receives a new stimulus, although the steps from the ideals of individuals to the practical social-religious results in the environment as a whole may seem to mark a retrogression.

with Rabbinical Judaism, while a fresh growth begins with Christianity; but both passed outside the land of their home. The rise of Islām is virtually a new beginning, just as Arabic itself represents the 'proto-Semitic' language more closely than do any of the other languages. After many centuries of the old native religions, after Hebrew ethical monotheism, Hellenistic syncretism, and the conflicts between Rabbinical Judaism and the young Christianity, there is seen a new religion. It is in harmony with the psychology and cultural level of the people as a whole, and is thus in contrast both to earlier Jewish and Christian doctrine, which was above their level, and to the remarkable syncretism which in fact appealed only to the educated and governing classes. The new religion re-introduced God (Allah), not new conceptions of God or new developments in earlier ideas. Yet, although Islām thus begins at an earlier point than Judaism or Christianity, it speedily developed beyond the grasp of popular thought; and, although the lands were, as a whole, culturally below the level of the earlier ages, Islām quickly reached a high level, since it was able to utilize in some measure the theological and philosophical work of Greek and Christian thinkers. In such vicissitudes (illustrated in other ways in India and China) there is a recurrence of similar steps, though under different circumstances, and the earlier stage of a (chronologically) later religion can be more advanced, in certain respects, than a later stage of an earlier one; just as, in the psychical growth of the individual, the youth will certainly represent an earlier stage than his mature parents, but in various respects may be more advanced. Hence the danger of unchecked comparison and of facile theories of evolution, and the necessity of a deeper analysis of the content of religious thought (see § 4 [3]).

27. The advance of thought.—(1) Throughout, the social-religious development can be suggestively viewed in terms of thought, the organization and disorganization of every social body corresponding to that of the implicit or explicit ideas which prevail (§ 7 [1]). That there has been some great advance is shown (*a*) by the fact that, even though cultures and civilizations disappear and sweeping reforms fail, the apparent retrogression is not without traces of the beneficial influence of the preceding stage. Moreover, (*b*) although theriomorphic and low anthropomorphic cults may be prominent in times of decadence or relapse, there is not that characteristic totemism which is essentially pre-anthropomorphic (§ 8). Again, (*c*) the serious crises and hard vicissitudes have put the current ideas to the test and have compelled practical, adequate, and acceptable solutions of the difficult problems of life and thought. Consequently the recurrence of similar types of belief and practice is significant, and more especially when the old reappears in some new form—the new testifying to the positive progress of thought. The crises that bring scepticism and despair also bring new faith and hope, and the history of religion is the repeated justification and re-expression of old values (§ 33 [2]). The death of a member of a totem species was to be deplored; but, when a single animal was venerated, the death was then a catastrophe, until in some way (*e.g.*, in ideas of rebirth or re-incarnation) the disturbance of beliefs was remedied. But the former case, with its less disastrous consequences, belongs to a lower stage; and, in like manner, endogamy, with its good and bad consequences of close group-solidarity, is relatively lower than exogamy, which at once brought new and often difficult problems. The problems become more complex as life and thought develop; they take new forms and require new solutions in harmony with the thought of the time. At one stage there is a natural relation between the group and its sacred being; and, when this is viewed as an automatic or mechanical condition, it is psychologically harmful—it is 'magic.' But at another stage it is God who graciously chooses man, and who uses him as His instrument; the ideas are more advanced, and there is a logical development which, whatever be the ultimate realities, is extremely important both for deducing their nature and for the study of the human mind. There is a continuity between rudimentary and higher religions no less than between the different stages of the individual mind (§ 17 ff.). There is an ever more conscious awareness of current beliefs and practices, and reflexion can make explicit what had been implicit in behaviour.

'Redemption, substitution, purification, atoning blood, the garment of righteousness, are all terms which in some sense go back to antique ritual.'[1]

Rudimentary religion already accustomed men to facts of self-control, self-denial, the sacrifice of valued objects, the forgiveness of sins, and atonement. Already the road was taken for the later deepening of ideas of mutual interdependence, sacrifice, and the relationship between man and the universe. In mimetic and other ceremonies man represented sacred beings, or acted a rebirth or a resurrection; on higher levels the imitation is definitely in the spiritual realm, and the ideas of a new life are worked out in the world of thought. At one stage men fight, clad with the symbols of totem or god; they fight *as* or *for* the god. Later the principles and ideals associated with their sacred Being are more explicitly recognized. Men acted and behaved as though there was a life after death before they discussed the possibility and embarked upon speculation. In Egypt the Pharaoh lived again because Osiris came back to life, while the ordinary man subsequently found safety in identifying himself with a saving god.[2] Identification, whether as ritual, imitative behaviour, etc., or as the vivid realization of thought and the experiencing of a belief, is profoundly effective, and points the way to both religion and magic. Mental concentration, absorption, and surrender lead to results subjectively final, thought and the absolute conviction of reality become one, and hence every religion is hostile to what is felt to be an irreligious attitude to or treatment of the great truths.

(2) Where life and thought are in harmony, the profound concepts have each a sufficiently similar meaning. But widely different conceptions—*e.g.*, of the term 'God'—will represent a very secondary stage, because the terms must previously have been used to denote that which was distinctive and which had a certain identity of meaning for all concerned. Only as complexity of life and thought increases do the differences in meaning and application have serious consequences; and it is only in those periods where the religious and non-religious concepts become harmonious that the varied aspects of life and thought are in a state of equilibrium. The presence of some body or system of thought at one time guides and regulates, and at another it represses. It is weak or lacking at critical periods of the development of both individuals and peoples. Then it is that men, being without the help of a system tested by past experience, are at the mercy of ideas—new, original, extreme, and outside the limits of what had been normal. The nature of personal experience is profoundly varied, and of great subjective significance, whatever be its value for the environment. The less normal

[1] W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], p. 439. See, generally, G. Galloway, *The Principles of Religious Development*, London, 1909.

[2] G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, i. 174, 194.

experiences and convictions which abound at the critical periods resemble the rarer examples at other times, when, instead of a prevailing dislocation and incoherence of life and thought, there are relatively few individuals out of touch with the system and conventional thought of their day. That men of conspicuous religious and other genius are not always normal (*i.e.* not in harmony with the average life and thought) is well known; and for the science of human nature it is significant that (*a*) the great figures to whom the world's thought is indebted often had unmistakable human frailties and shortcomings, even of a sort that shock the average 'conventional' thought, and that (*b*) the 'religious' life itself is characteristically described as a constant struggle and fight.

(3) Religious and all deep experience points to profounder realities than ordinary human thought can realize; and in fact the institution of special individuals (priests), places, and seasons is due partly to the necessity of regulating man's life in a socially beneficial manner, so as to adjust ordinary life and the consciousness of some overpowering ultimate truth. Did not religion express some realization of what was felt to be overwhelmingly vital, it is impossible to find an explanation of the facts and the vicissitudes of religion, or of the relation between them and man's knowledge of the universe. The more intense experiences are the basis of reflexion, and they develop the experiences of others. The great religious works represent a limit or height which men continue to find stimulating and satisfying to feeling and thought, to aspirations and ideals. They are intelligible because of the similarity of men's psychical nature; they are supreme because they are not surpassed. The religious aspects continue to appeal, and, although there can be a phraseology which makes them lose their value, because they belong to a different world of knowledge and thought, yet by looking beneath the letter it may be possible—by the comparative and psychological methods—to recover the spirit. So, too, rude savage ritual may prove to embody an idea which can be appreciated, though not necessarily tolerated, in the form which it takes. Similar experiences and periods understand and interpret each other; and the fundamental psychical similarity of all men accounts for the similarity in the great recurring ideas and in the convictions of the ultimate realities, and allows the possibility of a certain genuine process of re-interpretation and reshaping of old beliefs. But mere archaizing or a mechanical return to the old—as in Babylonia and Egypt—is decadence, whereas the recovery of the real psychical value of the old and its restatement in accordance with the progress of knowledge, mark an advance, and correspond to what has happened in the history of religion.[1] By the comparative and other methods the religions can be brought into one focus, and the inquirer can go, not only to the great orthodox or classical utterances (Bible, Talmud, Qur'ān, Vedānta, etc.), but also to the experiences, tendencies, and all the facts of man's psychical nature which lie beneath them, and explain their origin, acceptance, and persistence. In this way the relationship between a sacred book and the environment which found in it its highest truths is replaced by that between the re-interpretation of it and the modern environment. In other words, the positive advance of religious thought is always part of that of the total world of thought in which it is embedded; and it remains, therefore, to turn to some points in the relation between religious and non-religious thought.

[1] But this does not mean that some one department of thought is wholly adjusted to another. Rather, in every advance, individuals are so stimulated that every department (such as it is) undergoes a development which, like that of the individual himself or of his country, may be either orderly or somewhat drastic.

(4) Psychological comparison, it will be noticed, brings a reconsideration of the old familiar typology and symbolism of Scripture. There are fundamental similarities relating to a past or future Golden Age, an Armageddon and Last Judgment, and especially to the re-appearance of popular heroes and religious saviours—an *avatār*, Buddha, or Messiah. Moreover, not only are there similar psychological experiences among those who are conscious of a mission, but they are not unnaturally influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by such knowledge as they have of their predecessors.[1] And, as regards the OT and the NT, psychological as well as historical similarities (*e.g.*, the Suffering Servant and the Crucified Christ) enhance the familiar insistence in the history of Christianity upon the connexion between the NT and the 'Messianic' passages in the OT; and this interconnexion is of supreme importance for man's religious nature, as apart from the historical data which, in the case of the OT, are entirely problematical, and, in the case of the NT, stand in need of criticism. Further, observation of and reflexion upon the recurrence of similar types of events have suggested the notion of cycles or world-periods. Yet there is always the demand for something permanent, and the Scriptural identification of Alpha and Omega symbolizes a common intuitive feeling of duration or continuity underlying development, of permanence in spite of change. It may perhaps be regarded as the counterpart in time of the idea of the One and the Many in space. Although modern evolutionary ideas seem to favour a 'linear' movement, there is no single line of progress continually shedding old beliefs and truths, and leaving behind what is outgrown. In history, too, the most revolutionary changes appear less drastic when a sufficiently long view is taken, and a continuity is discovered beneath the dislocation of life and thought. What is fundamental is the readiness of the mind to discover continuity, permanence, unity, and structure; and, while religion involves an apprehension and conception of an ultimate reality which is superior to all catastrophes, the vicissitudes of history and knowledge in the past have never caused more than relatively temporary disturbances of the convictions. Only in such unity and continuity has man been able to find a practical working solution of his difficulties and problems; and, since the religious view of the universe claims to be the nearest to reality, it is necessary, therefore, to note some features in the vicissitudes of the religious and non-religious conceptions.

IV. *RELIGIOUS AND NON-RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.*—**28. The differentiation of thought.**—(1) The foregoing sections would, at this point, be properly followed by some account of the steps which lead from the more rudimentary stages of thought to the highly differentiated and specialized thought of modern life (see § 6 [1] *ad fin.*). But it must suffice to say that the comparative study of religion not merely affects the ethical, theological, and philosophical ideas of the inquirer; it also leads insensibly and logically to the comparative study of ethics, theology, philosophy, etc. The typical prevailing religious beliefs and practices imply principles, ideas, and convictions which become explicitly recognized and shaped; they represent the experience, observation, and reflexion of men of different temperaments and at various stages of the history of thought. As a result of continued application of the comparative method similar fundamental and prevailing principles and ideas can be traced underlying the different religious, ethical, theological, and philosophical expressions. Such are, *e.g.*, the presuppositions or the conscious convictions of the individual's continuity, of his intimate relationship with something grander and more permanent than his brief bodily existence, and of a oneness underlying the many various differentiated aspects or divisions of life and thought. Only in the light of such unity can one gain any rational conception of the many complex temperamental and other variations and divergences of thought; these find their logical basis, not in any ultimate heterogeneity, but in processes of differentiation with developments in various specialistic, diverging, and individualistic directions.

(2) Especially noteworthy, therefore, is the comparative study of the phenomena of ecstasy, inspiration, mysticism (*qq.v.*; cf. also artt. POSSESSION, ṢŪFĪISM, and YOGIS). Here are

[1] Cf. M. Anesaki, *Nichiren, the Buddhist Prophet*, Cambridge, Mass., 1916, pp. 67 f., 72 ff., 95, 97, 100.

involved the rarer psychical states where the individual has intense convictions of a deeper and profounder self, of the One behind the Many, of the Reality beneath all phenomena, or of the Ultimate Truth as set forth in his religious beliefs. The state is always exceedingly impressive and potent; and, all the world over, means are taken to induce it artificially. At a higher stage of development the passage from the more normal state to the rarer is considered more carefully, with a more conscious recognition of the roads, the goals, and the results. In Indian and Buddhist thought, in particular, the problems have been diligently studied; and, instead of the old mythological reification of the illusion (see MAYA), or the veil severing ordinary life from the profound states, there have been psychological and philosophical inquiries of a suggestive and fruitful character. The problem as to what stands between man and his inmost self, and between the outside world of appearance and the ultimate truth, is a very real one, forced by actual experience (§ 13 [2]); and efforts were made to analyze and classify (*a*) the constituents and processes of the mind that has the experiences, and (*b*) that which was experienced. While Indian thought went its own way, Western thought found its 'spiritual home' in Greece, where the problems were apprehended and treated at a higher and more differentiated stage of development. Consequently the East has preserved more of a primary undifferentiated experience; it has a more immediate view of its reality; whereas Western thought has become highly specialized and 'scientific,' the tendency being for the unity to be obscured, if not ignored. Yet it is soon found that no adequate synthesis can be made by combining the results of extreme specialistic analysis of experience; there is a unity in experience and in the experiencing mind which analysis destroys. None the less, although continued differentiation and specialization tend to destroy the unity and give scantier and more disparate conceptions of reality, every new and genuine synthesis is all the richer for the prior stage of disintegration. Just as all intuitions and immediate views are the fuller when the mind has had a laborious preparatory discipline, so the deep-searching introspection of Eastern thought is to be balanced by the less introspective, less subjective, but more specialistic training of the West; and, while the one has a nearer view of the problem, the other has the better tools, for what is fundamental in the development of religious and non-religious thought is the character of the concepts which both influence and are influenced by the interpretation of experience.

(3) Complexity of thought corresponds to the complex mental structure of individuals who are at a more highly differentiated stage than those in rudimentary society. All classifications, whether complex or not (law, morality, religion, etc.), are the result of growth, and they are not stationary. There is that in the conscience and in the ideals of the individual which tests, criticizes, and adjusts the legal, moral, religious, æsthetic, and other conceptions, principles, etc., of the environment. Such individuals go beyond current conditions and work for an unknown future. To say that they are ahead of their age is to beg the question, for their achievements, whatever their subjective impressiveness, become objectively valuable as they are adjusted to and assimilated by the environment. Hence the development of thought in history must undoubtedly be regarded as the collective result of the innumerable individuals concerned, and the ideals, aims, and processes in the whole environment will then represent some profounder 'whole' which transcends the conscious individuals themselves. At the same time, all existing systems, institutions, categories, and classifications — by which alone rational life is possible — are also transcended by the individuals who frame, accept, or amend them. Thus men are unconsciously shaped by processes, certain aspects or parts of which at least they are able to shape; they are an integral part of that of which they are more or less objective critics. Consequently, the most complete description of reality must take in the developing individual who both controls and is controlled by his conceptions of reality. It is a necessary assumption that of the ultimate realities men's conceptions are imperfect approximations, and consequently even the completest view of reality would have to be regarded as itself the outcome of a natural process of mental development still unfinished and always hampered by determinable limitations of the human mind. So, in all human development there is a combination of the transcendent and the immanent; there is a process which transcends the men who are consciously and unconsciously a part of it.

29. Fundamental ideas.—(1) Every activity has its necessary conditions and principles, which are indispensable if it is to be successful. Everywhere are to be recognized necessary fundamental principles, all closely interconnected, but recurring in various forms, and associated with our own ideas of efficiency, law, order, right, and truth. Every group and every activity which can be regarded collectively as a unit has its unifying and necessary principles upon which success and efficiency depend; consequently, freedom of action, even of existence, involves adherence to *some* indispensable requirements. Liberty and subordination to law, freedom and discipline, are thus correlative, and they also involve ideas of aim and purpose. In practical life the difficulties usually concern the precise requirements, the relative value of the units and their aims, and the relations between those that impinge or conflict. From the earliest times the social group has acted up to certain obligations upon which group-unity alone could depend; but often it is only periods of crisis and incoherence that manifest the vital significance of principles formerly unrecognized, obscured, or questioned. Now, every genuine feeling of group unity is commonly reflected in spontaneous feelings of collective privilege and responsibility; the members participate in one another's merits and misdeeds.[1] Among rudimentary peoples this unity will frequently include both the gods and the processes of nature (§ 7). Hence, when the gods are felt to be near at hand, the behaviour of the group is bound up with that of the processes of nature controlled by the gods; cf., *e.g.*, the common belief that great crimes will disturb the order of nature. But the action of the gods in thus requiting man's behaviour is only one form of a fundamental conviction uniting man with the rest of the universe. Often certain representative individuals are directly connected with the welfare of the people or land, and they are responsible for drought and other disasters (§ 25 [3]). But, if this applies to the evidently conspicuous men, who is to determine who are 'the salt of the earth' (Mt 5^{13})? The fundamental ideas, partly of common responsibility, partly of a profound interconnexion, re-appear in ritual, ethical, and other forms, in the ideas implicit in 'magical' control or in 'religious' prayer, in explicit curse or appeal, and in vague denunciation and adjuration, in instinctive ideas of retribution and recompense, and in emotional, poetical, and æsthetic feelings of man's kinship with nature or the universe. And notably in law and justice, and in the instinctive resentment to what is felt to be inimical to human welfare, the individual is no longer an 'individual,' but as his 'brother's keeper' implicitly associates himself with the progress of the universe as a whole and with the upholding of its principles, in so far as he realizes and can apply them.

(2) There is a continual rediscovery of a universal unity and interconnexion which specialized thought must necessarily ignore. But confusion arises when concepts, the result of such specialization, are criticized on account of what they lack, as, *e.g.*, when nature is spoken of as impersonal, blind, and morally and spiritually indifferent. Now, in so far as conceptions of nature have been based upon phenomena where personal, moral, and spiritual aspects are irrelevant or out of the question, such criticism is beside the mark. Moreover, it would ignore the order, uniformity, and regularity which are indispensable for the processes of nature, and which are the counterpart of the requirements of every effective and ordered human society. The behaviour of animals and young children cannot be discussed throughout in terms of adult psychical life (*e.g.*, ethics, insight, learning, etc.), but they commonly manifest

[1] Conversely, from an examination of customs, light can be thrown upon an otherwise barely recognizable social system (as by W. R. Smith, in his *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*[2], London, 1903).

what in their sphere corresponds, in a rudimentary way, to the attributes that we apply, in another sphere, to adults. Similarly, the processes of nature are the 'natural' counterpart of the anthropomorphic processes in the 'psychical' realm. The 'natural' and the 'spiritual' laws reflect essential similarities differently shaped according to their realm. Moreover, a law is from one point of view the essential principle of some effective process or activity, while, regarded subjectively, it is our most essential, reliable, and effective formularization of the regularity of phenomena. True, the concept law has undergone different vicissitudes as nature and human society are considered separately; but what appears to be fundamental is that in a 'natural' law there is involved the explicit recognition of some immanent and effective principle, while human law is not really 'man-made' and 'imposed,' but is the attempt to make explicit the conscious recognition of what is essential for the better efficiency of human life, although for this purpose laws as prohibitions of what hinders successful growth become more conspicuous than the positive requirements of what ensures it.[1]

(3) (*a*) The objective value of every group or activity lies in its relations to others, and ultimately, therefore, to the whole of that of which all of them are part. This applies equally to principles, ideas, concepts, and theories; their real value is tested by their relation to a larger field than that where they are first recognized. So the value of all that can be treated as a unit or whole lies in its place in the ultimate whole; and in practical life there are conflicting theories, activities, principles, groups, and so forth, which force the conclusion that either the ultimate realities are incoherent and discordant—which is clearly irrational—or there is a final solution which we shall judge rational. Of such conflicts those between law and mercy, or between 'nature' and the individual, may be specially mentioned. Yet the highest love is compatible only with the strictest regularity of cause and effect; and God's forgiveness of the penitent sinner is not arbitrary, but in conformity with some greater law, some profounder conception of justice. Moreover, in 'nature's' regard for the whole lies the hope of him who is an integral part thereof; for by nature's disregard of the individual we mean the conflict between our largest 'scientific' concept of order in the universe and the ever-developing individual who can command Nature only by obeying her. In either case there is a higher explanation, such that the absolute uniformity (order, justice, or love) is for the ultimate advantage, happiness, and consolation of those who can realize its sway, although offenders and others may suffer by rebelling against it. To pursue this further would be to turn aside to the 'burden' of the law, the question of free will, and the need for mediation and atonement.

(*b*) The power and responsibility of the individual are seen in the fact that, just as the total conditions at any time are the result of everything that has preceded, so all men are jointly and severally contributing to the good and evil conditions of the future. Consequently, the religious aspect is particularly significant, whether when evils and wrongs arouse the cry, 'Can there be a God to allow such things?' or when men more or less instinctively feel themselves the guardians of justice and order in the universe. An orderly and just universe is the underlying postulate. All insistence upon the worth of the individual is, therefore, a deeper and more personal expression of the fundamental interconnexion of the universe, of the autonomous value of all the constituents, and of the entire dependence of the efficiency and welfare of the whole upon all the constituents.[2] Throughout, we have to seek a rational explanation; for, as apart from the question whether the universe *is* ultimately rational, only by treating it as such can we find any basis for our ideas, avoid mental suicide, and develop in the future as we have in the past. The most perplexing vicissitudes lead now to doubt, scepticism, and despair, now to some firmer and wider conception of life; but the latter has been the line taken in the history of progressive thought. Self-sacrifice and renunciation of all that is most obvious and tangible find their rationality in the conviction that the unknown will bring a greater reality than the known. So, too, the frequent disturbing success of evil is a guarantee, not of lawlessness, but of the success of perfect good; for, when evil succeeds, there are, on analysis, factors which in themselves make for success, and, when good fails, once more analysis reveals factors which have not the elements of permanence and progress. And, when examples of this are clearly realized, one gains a more rational conception than if good and evil are treated as absolute, conflicting entities. The ultimate must be regarded as rational, else there can be no ordered life or thought.

[1] Another important example of specialization with tendencies to forget the undifferentiated aspects is afforded by the contrast between the terms 'psychical' and 'physical.'

[2] Cf. esp. the ideas as expressed in Mt $10^{29f.}$ 18^{12-14}, Lk 15.

30. Myth and knowledge.—(1) Ideas of the fundamental unity of the universe are implied also in the remarkable imitative and other ceremonies where men represent spirits, gods, etc., or perform the desired 'natural' processes themselves, or otherwise act on the assumption that the effective controlling powers can be moved (cf. § 19). In addition to this, the recital or description of processes or operations is often felt to be potent, so that, *e.g.*, myths are not things to be lightly or irreverently spoken, because they arouse the sacred beings to whom they refer. Hence the commemoration of stirring and sacred events in the past has a very real value for the future; it stimulates appropriate feelings and ideas, and gives a new and intense vividness to the reality of the sacred beings who are the sources of action.[1] A very great part is taken in religion by imitation and mimetic representation, and to these processes of absorption and identification can be joined the deep mental concentration and the effort to realize for oneself beliefs and truths. In this way ideas are realized, if not reified; they are so assimilated that, *e.g.*, in ancient Egypt an effective means of escaping the perils of death was to identify oneself with some saving god who had successfully overcome them himself.[2] From the myths and traditions which concern the great things of life it is an easy step to the esoteric aspects, the secrecy of all knowledge which is in any way potent. Not only are there innumerable examples of the fact that knowledge is power (cf., *e.g.*, the possession of the name of a god), but the psychological effect of increase of effective knowledge upon the individual is exceedingly instructive from the religious point of view. The inter-relations between knowledge, wisdom, reverence, and the 'fear of God' are, however, disturbed by the progress of thought and by the usual arbitrary and subjective distinctions between sacred and 'secular.' None the less, it will be freely admitted that moral and ethical qualities (sincerity, intellectual honesty, patience, sobriety, moderation, etc.) are requisite for the best 'secular' and 'scientific' labour; and in this way the whole self, and not a human intellectual machine alone, is involved. Thus the complete outlook (*Weltanschauung*) of the individual becomes, so to say, the mathematical function of his current stage of intellectual, ethical, æsthetic, and

[1] Cf. the influence of traditional history upon Israel, and note, *e.g.*, Hab 3, the commemoration of the Deity's deeds in the past, the present distress (v.[17]), and the brave confidence (v.[18]). Cf. also the naive attitude (between confident 'magic' and submissive religious 'humility') in Nu $14^{15f.}$, Dt $9^{27f.}$.

[2] Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, i. 174; cf. 162 f., 165, 194. The same psychological process appears in both Buddhism and Christianity. The numerous beliefs and practices which illustrate the connexion between thought, action, and reality are of the greatest interest for theories of causation and knowledge, for which it must suffice to refer to Durkheim (bk. iii. ch. iii. § 3, Eng. tr. p. 362 ff.).

spiritual development; and, in so far as 'like is known only by like,' the completest conception of reality requires the completest conceivable development of personality.[1]

(2) All myths and all conceptions of the universe, even the most extreme, have a threefold value: (*a*) they purport to add to our knowledge of reality; (*b*) they illuminate the mental structure of the inquiring, reflecting, realizing individual; and (*c*) they contribute to the further study of the way in which the mind experiences and interprets its experiences, and thus point to the nature of the objective realities which can be so variously apprehended. The emotional, poetical, metaphorical, and undifferentiated characteristics of myths correspond to the psychological character of those who frame and accept them. The spontaneous mythologizing, anthropomorphizing, and personifying mind always persists, and it contrasts with the careful intellectual efforts to be objective and impersonal, and to avoid irrelevant or misleading concepts. While myth is 'personally' interesting and intelligible, it is, when at its best, 'super-personal'—like the ballad—representing aspirations, ideas, and modes of thought that are collective, national, or universal, and not merely individualistic. In course of time the myth may become a fixed, authoritative statement, embarrassing the movement of thought; then its crudities and imperfections will perplex the faithful, fortify the sceptic, and even excuse the wrong-doer. It may then pass from being 'super-personal' to 'impersonal,' when it is no longer in touch with the people. There will be a failure to analyze and distinguish the permanent from the impermanent features—although this distinction is always made unconsciously by all who uphold any body of religious or other thought against their opponents. The more empirical knowledge, on the other hand, will avoid the arbitrariness and subjectivity of myth, but it tends to leave out human personality with all its richness of feeling and potentiality. It will present a synthesis which is in no sympathetic relationship with the experiences of the generality of mankind. It will acquire a false 'impersonal' objectivity, and become dogmatic, restricting personal development. Hence, although science and religion can exist for a time side by side, sooner or later the question arises of the validity of their several concepts and of their value for the further progress of personality.[2]

(3) The course of thought is directed by what is known, and it is in terms of familiar experience; so, *e.g.*, cosmical processes have commonly been thought of in terms of human vicissitudes (birth, conflict, marriage, death). In like manner, on other levels, democratic ideas, sovereignty, or an age of mechanism will be reflected in both the religious and the non-religious thought.[3] Conceptions of the universe are influenced by the current conditions, and *vice versa*; and in the development of thought the efforts to explain experiences and phenomena often proceed without the necessary reference to the primary data themselves. The psychological and logical paths then diverge, and the fluctuations in the progress of thought can be illustrated in the varying personal and impersonal conceptions of Providence, Nature, God (cf. the word 'agency' itself, used of both process and agent). The result is that isolated religious terms no longer have their primary subjective content, although there may be noble and quasi-religious feelings outside the religious phraseological framework, and associated, *e.g.*, with art, science, or humanity. The expression of feelings, it is true, may seem to partake of the nature of religion, yet, from a point of view which must be regarded as primary and ultimate, religion must be treated as *sui generis* and distinctive (§ 33 [3]).

A belief in a life after death has no ethical or religious value in itself, and a monotheistic religion is not always superior to a henotheism or to the polytheism which most practical religions are. The word 'God' may express more of a logical or intellectual necessity than the personal experience of a Supreme Being; yet the experience of some transcendent 'Presence' is not necessarily interpreted as that of a deity, and men have had their *daemon*, guardian-angel, or some psychologically effective experience, which has been identified in harmony with their conceptions of reality and the thought of the environment.

The interdependence between experience, interpretation, and the development of thought is well illustrated in the vicissitudes of such words as Heaven, στοιχεῖα (see *EBi*, *s.v.* 'Elements'), the Chinese *Tao*, *Tien*, *Li*, and the Buddhist *Dharma* and the various personal, ethical, universal, and metaphysical conceptions of Buddha himself. A simple and typical example of development is afforded by ceremonial washing, which is religious or magical according to the precise ideas that accompany it (cf. p. 674[a], n. 1). If it persists as a mere rite, the efficacy lies merely in the ritual, and not in the psychical state, and this is 'magic.' Proceeding to the other extreme, men avoid the ceremony with its beneficial and utilitarian aspects as a piece of worldly luxury, and misguided religiosity delights in afflicting and tormenting the body. Again, the utilitarian purpose can be retained and the religious aspect ignored, and this secularization is very common in the history of culture; cf. the rise of astronomy, anatomy, and medicine from the astrological and more or less 'magical' soil in which they once flourished. All such changes are significant for the relation between the psychical states of the individual and the ultimate realities.

(4) The developments in the history of religion furnish valuable material for all conceptions of the relation between the religious and the non-religious aspects of life and thought, and for the criteria of religion. One can scarcely allow with Schiller that he who has art and science has also religion, though religion should possess the immediacy and beauty of art, and both it and science should be in touch with reality; or with Matthew Arnold that religion is the application of emotion to morality, though religion without either would hardly be so styled. Thought cannot be treated so atomically, and the fact is that purely non-religious thought can or cannot find a logical place in a religious system, and *vice versa*, just as two departments of natural science may be in some respects entirely separable, but in others may so intertwine that the problems of the one cannot be severed from those of the other. Now, the evident seat of all the varying relations is the individual mind and the connexion (such as it is) between the entire contents involved in its concepts and ideas. Differentiate as one may the religious and the non-religious, the moral and the non-moral (where morality is irrelevant), and the emotional and intellectual, all these find an ultimate common ground in the whole individual; and it may well be the case that the final aim of 'science' is not the perfect systematization of the many diverse tendencies and departments of thought, but the systematic treatment of the systematizations—of the metaphysical, the philosophical, the theological, the scientific, and all other minds ratiocinative and naive. Co-ordination of different legitimate interests, and not a perfect homogeneity of interests throughout will then be the goal.

31. Immanence and transcendence.—(1) Characteristic of religion is the combination of the known and the unknown, the natural and the supernatural, 'this' world and 'the other,' immanence and transcendence (see art. IMMANENCE). Despite all that can be said against the second member of each pair, they are the outcome of experience; and, while the difficulty has been to give a rational statement and justification of the experience, counter-criticisms and objections, often of a crudely rationalistic kind, overlook the prevalence of similar types of experience, and attack the particular forms in which it is interpreted and presented. The members of each pair are correlative; and therefore, as regards the last, conceptions either of immanence or of transcendence taken separately have neither permanence nor progressive value. The belief in a transcendent Deity has led to religion falling into the hands of the few; the God of the State or of the Church has seemed remote from the ordinary

[1] So, too, the great religious and other leaders, through their own total personality, have enabled their disciples to gain deeper and more powerful conceptions of reality.

[2] On the whole subject of mythological and scientific thought, and on the influence of personalizing even in science, see Olive [illegible] Wheeler, *Anthropomorphism and Science: a Study of the Development of Ejective Cognition in the Individual and the [illegible]*, London, 1916, esp. p. 139 ff.

[3] Cf. § 9 (3), and see G. Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, New York, 1912, pp. 112 f., 115, on the conception of Fate as a goddess just at a period when men's fortunes seemed to bear no relation to their merits or efforts. Cf. also the interest in eschatology, the millennium, and a new age at the present day [illegible] S. A. Cook, *The Study of Religions*, pp. 139, n. 2, 302). For a methodical treatment of the inter relation of different [illegible] of thought and their vicissitudes the work of Wilhelm Dilthey may be especially noted.

individual, and the latter has relied upon some intermediary, or else in some more private or individualistic cult has found an outlet for that which the institutional religion would otherwise have guided and developed. In the course of this process his experiences, ideas, and conceptions of reality clearly undergo profoundly important changes. Again, in the Deism which makes God a supreme majestic Being with no place in ordinary life and thought, He becomes as remote as when He is thought of as unknown or unknowable. Thus the concept may be characteristically intellectual, and without the immediate personal significance which it has when God is felt to be near at hand. But, when in many forms of popular and personal religion God is felt to be near, this feeling of His greatness can subsequently be lost, and then the gulf diminishes between the frail individual of a few decades and the Supreme Power of an inconceivably vast universe. Through the experience of immediacy there is no need felt for priestly ritual, ceremonial, dogma, or mediator; even reverence may disappear. Thus both immanence and transcendence have their extreme logical sequels. The God who is solely transcendent becomes remote and unknown: to say that there is One whom man cannot know is at first to recognize an incompleteness; but the next step is to be unconscious of the gulf, and then to ignore how the experience of it could ever arise and persist. On the other hand, the conception of the immanent God is near to pantheism, and so can lead to the absence of any religious distinctiveness in the term. In this way the distinctively *religious* content of the concept God is lost; and, while it is easy to trace the secularizing process, it is impossible to explain the personal meaning and psychical value of this supreme concept, unless *some* immediate personal experience is regarded as logically primary. The history and vicissitudes of the concept become intelligible only if the immanent and transcendent aspects are retained, only if there are ultimate realities of the universe—of human existence—of which these apparently paradoxical terms attempt to interpret the experience.

(2) The religious ideas of immanence and transcendence are a fundamental part of human nature, and are but the most intense form of what otherwise is not peculiar to religion. They find some analogy in human relationships (*e.g.*, between parent and child), where complete understanding and friendliness co-exist with respect, reverence, and a consciousness of a psychical gulf (cf. § 12 [3]). Moreover, there is a similar co-existence as regards the attitude to those great human figures who are not isolated, unintelligible, or extreme, but who are at once on a much higher level than ourselves, yet are felt to be thoroughly intelligible and near to us. It corresponds with this that every individual can gain a more vivid realization of himself and a profounder and more potent personality when he sinks and subordinates himself to that with which he identifies himself, so that, in apparently becoming one with the environment, and therefore 'lost' in it, he rises above it and transcends it. It is the paradox of religious and other thought that, according to the view-point, the processes of the universe can be described 'naturally,' so that men have no need of the concept God, or 'in him we live, and move, and have our being,' and the experiences of immanence and transcendence co-exist.

(3) The key to the correlatives, mentioned above, lies in the progressive development of the individual, and in the phenomena of imitation and attraction which are familiar in personal, religious, and non-religious experience and are invariably significant for personality.[1] Development follows in man's striving to satisfy needs, reach goals, follow ideals, attain some psychical equilibrium, or bridge some gulf. It is essentially no passage from the known to the unknown, but a clearer or newer apprehension of that of which one was already in some degree conscious. But here the process of attraction, when there is a successful issue, is readily followed by a deadening satisfaction and complacence which would impede further progress. Not only in intellectual development (*e.g.*, the search after some hypothesis), but most significantly in personal relationships of all kinds, can the psychical gap which formed the attraction give place to indifference. Yet, however complete the subjective feeling of finality may be, the passage, transition, or development is not objectively complete, and especially in religion there prevails a spiritual pride, arrogance, or consciousness of 'election,' which is as harmful for the further progress of the individual as for religion itself (see § 32 [2]). Even the saint has still to strive and may yet fall; and various attempts are made to determine the final goal of human development, and to distinguish, *e.g.*, between conversion or baptism into a 'new life' and the state after death (*q.v.*), or to determine whether the final stage is reached immediately after death or after some purgatory.[1] The most intense consciousness of the ultimate realities appears readily combined, now with a greater complacence, but now with a profounder feeling of weakness and unworthiness, when the very nearness of the 'divine' enhances the frailty of the individual and his entire dependence upon God. Whatever be the best formulation of the experiences and their consequences, the 'healthy' and 'whole' development of the individual is at stake, for all development depends upon the possession of some transcendent object of attraction which shall call forth the utmost from the individual and be for the completest growth of his personality.

(4) All ideas, aims, needs, and quests are potent for personal development; but men's varying attitudes to some manifestation of 'divine' discontent, as it is felt to be, illustrate the difference between its singular impressiveness for the subject and its worth as viewed from the outside by others. Personal development is due both to the individual nature in its entirety and to the total environment. Thus the child is influenced in varying degrees by toys, animal-pets, playmates, parents, teachers, etc. His potentialities are actualized and shaped by the 'object'—by its psychical inferiority, equality, or superiority, and by its ability to respond to the child and to shape his growth. There is a subjective feeling of personal relationship even with the toy and the animal, as distinct from the objective personal or impersonal character of the 'object,' whatever it be. So, too, in the history of religion the centre of religious beliefs and practices has been inanimate or animate, totem, spirit-guardian, or ancestor; and there has been throughout a (subjective) feeling of 'personal' relationship, although in course of development we pass (objectively) from the totem, fetish, or idol to a Supreme Being. Whatever be the actual realities, whatever part a Supreme Power—or any process outside man—takes in shaping this development, it is at least possible to recognize that men's ideas will be shaped differently according to (*a*) their empirical knowledge of the totem-animal or bird, the deified ancestor, and so forth; and (*b*) the conceptions which they entertain of the sacred object or being, whether visible or not. The latter, (*b*), is fundamental, for in both religious and non-religious thought development depends on the full meaning of the concepts used.

(5) It is of course evident that neither the empirical objects nor the conceptions of any object can *in themselves* account for the phenomena of religion—it is precisely when the totem is

[1] Cf., *e.g.*, the *Imitation* of Thomas à Kempis, and the well-known words of St. Augustine, 'Lord, Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are ever restless till they rest in Thee'; also the frequent testimony of those who admit themselves led by degrees ('One step enough for me') towards a Supreme Personal Being or to some personally vital ideal or goal.

[1] Cf. in Buddhism the distinction between *Nirvāṇa* and *Parinirvāṇa*; see also vol. ix. p. 378b (4).

merely an animal, when the once deified ancestor is merely a dead man, or when the god is merely a name or an intellectual term, that the distinctively religious colouring is wanting. It is this colouring that is primary, and what is impressed upon the consciousness of the individual is that which is logically anterior to the phase where the distinctive religious colouring is wanting. The correlatives (immanence *and* transcendence, etc.) could not arise except together and in some sort of system (see § 32); and there must be some awareness of the as yet unknown and unattained, as apart from what is already known and attained, else there could be no consciousness of an incompleteness. What may be felt to be a whole is but part of some ultimate whole; for one can attend only to parts or aspects of things at a time, and the individual can present only the results of his own individualistic and partial development. By means of objective comparison, therefore, something can be determined of the ultimate worths and values which men collectively or individually feel to be essential for themselves or for the universe. Whatever the completest totality of experience and consciousness may be—and this would at least require the most ideally complete personality—exhaustive classifications can be attempted (*e.g.*, the categories of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True); and these point conclusively to the objective inadequacy of any conceptions of the ultimate facts which concentrate upon particular parts or phases (*e.g.*, humanity, nature, or art), and ignore values which other individuals insist upon conserving.

32. The religious system.—The greatest religious conceptions imply a system which is rational, disciplinary, and dynamic. (1) The psychical experiences which alone explain the origin and persistence of the characteristic religious concepts of the holy, supernatural, sacred, etc. (as opposed to the common, natural, secular, etc.), are followed by an assimilation wherein the primary immediacy, freshness, or uniqueness is deadened or lost. The actual process of secularization applies rather to parts, whereas the reverse process (idealization, sanctification) affects whole psychical states or systems of ideas (cf. p. 672[a], n. 2). Various steps have everywhere been taken to induce the valued psychical states and experiences; and the difference between the rarer states and the ordinary ones is between two phases, orders, or realms of existence—the real problem is to describe the data adequately—such that the sources of the conceptions of 'this' world and of the 'other' lie within the scope of the single individual, and the character and interpretation of the rarer states are conditioned by his prior development (cf. § 14 [1]). Individuals will usually connect the rarer states with the objectively 'divine' (cf. also 'divine' discontent, above, § 31 [4]); but the social, intellectual, and generally rational value of the consequences of the states is prevailingly tested, and every claim to inspiration and other divine privileges is, sooner or later, submitted to intellectual, practical, social, and ethical tests. Good and bad mysticism, true and false prophetism, beautiful spirituality and harmful religiosity exemplify the necessity of objective tests; and the environment or the course of history enables one to determine the result. Thus the supernatural and unknown in religion are not necessarily taken at their own valuation; the average prevailing type of mind insists upon passing its own judgment upon the data, and the holy is so, not because it happens to survive or is merely imposed upon men (cf. the notion of 'survivals,' § 4 [2]), but because in the long run the mind, of its own will, recognizes it as such. The natural and the supernatural, the known and the unknown, come within the horizon of the individual consciousness, and in the lengthy history of religion the prevailing, practical, average opinion spontaneously recognizes the necessity of distinguishing between good and bad religion—a distinction which again and again individuals are genuinely unable to realize.

(2) Entirely characteristic of the experiences of the 'divine' is the consciousness of uplifting power and strength, such that the self-confidence and mastery which characterize 'magic' have a certain kinship with religious confidence and conviction. But 'magic' has no place for transcendence; and a very striking feature throughout the history of religion is the recurring insistence upon the gulf between the human and the divine—an emphasis upon the transcendent rather than upon the immanent. In religion, generally, the two fundamental conceptions of *mana* and tabu (*qq.v.*) are correlative: on the one side, the wondrous power which man may, can, and should utilize and, on the other, the indispensable heed and caution; for *mana* without tabu becomes magic, and tabu without *mana* can lead to grovelling superstition.[1] This co-existence is the outcome of the need which is experienced for the two. It is extremely instructive to notice the data preserved in the Bible, for the religions of the Semites, as opposed to Indian quietism and pantheism, and to Chinese practical ethical religion, constantly manifest a passionate vehemence which in its religious aspects will at one time insist upon the might, jealousy, and arbitrariness of the Deity (corresponding to the psychology of the old Oriental despot), and at another will emphasize His favouritism for a people or for an individual who is the divine instrument, representative, or incarnation. The data in question are of the 'fall of Lucifer' type (Is 14^{12}), where the gulf between man and God is arrogantly or wrongfully ignored.[2] Hence, also, the Israelite conviction of divine privileges is very intelligibly balanced with ideas of greater responsibility, as in Am 3^{2}. Yet the religious data, profoundly vital as they are, are in harmony with the non-religious parallels in ordinary human nature, in the recognition of certain gulfs not to be bridged, in the detestation of arrogance, of conceit, and of ὕβρις, in the need of modesty in good fortune and success—even to the feelings underlying the 'evil eye' and 'touch wood.' So also, in taking too much for granted or in trifling with one's deepest realizations and ideas, there is a recognition of the vital necessity of dignity, respect, reverence, as regards both oneself and others, in order that personality may develop wholesomely. These disciplinary and dynamic features of human nature are only more comprehensive, personal, and ultimate in their religious counterparts, and they tend to form a system, and that a dynamic and not a static one.

(3) Among rudimentary peoples the initiation ceremonies not only prepare the youth for tribal life, but at a critical physico-psychical period provide him with regulative and steadying ideas.[3] Social-religious beliefs and practices cover the matters of everyday possibility, which, however, are of the deepest significance for the individuals concerned (§ 6 [1]). Where the individual is thrown back upon himself, so to speak, in all the great crises and occasions of life, a way is found between what would be utterly indifferent, callous, and animal-like and what would tend to be ultra-sentimental, emotional, or ascetic; for either extreme would preclude practical life and could not long persist. Thus, although the 'other world' is so near that death is naught, yet to act heedlessly upon this would be dangerous. Moreover, the intuitive feeling of disapprobation, fear, and dread as regards suicide is confronted with an intuitive appreciation of all self-sacrifice. Killing in war and murder are commonly distinguished even among the lower religions. There is a recurring average recognition of what is essential for continuous progressive movement, and the conventions touching sacred and delicate matters afford

[1] See especially R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*[2], ch. iii. f.

[2] Viz. the story of the expulsion from Eden (Gn $3^{22f.}$), the king of Tyre (Ezk $28^{14.19}$), Nebuchadrezzar (Dn $4^{19.31}$, Jth 2^{12} $(6^{2.4})$, the tower of Babel (Gn $11^{1.9}$), Moses and Aaron (Nu $20^{12.24}$ 27^{14}, Dt 32^{51}, Ps 106^{33}); cf. also the stories of Nadab and Abihu (Lv $10^{1.3}$) and Uzzah (2 S 6).

[3] See Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*[2], p. 169 ff., 'The Birth of Humility.'

many examples of one aspect of a self-educative and disciplinary process whereby life and thought are systematized so that with every new growth of consciousness the individual may be able to develop in a way useful to himself and others. Things may be true (*e.g.*, God's forgiveness of the sinner), but the truths do not and cannot exist in isolation, and the system of which each is part goes to the depths of the individual. Therefore the individual is now infinitesimally small and frail, and now one whose beliefs and practices unite him with the greatest and most ultimate realities. And truly life would seem irrational save as a part of some larger existence, and the severity of its discipline unjust save as a training; the audacity of man's aspirations would be childish or outrageous save as a genuine though imperfect apprehension of actual realities, and his humility and sense of unworthiness unintelligible save as an education for other responsibilities and privileges. The ideas in religion are not merely intellectual; they can be psychologically and subjectively effective.[1] The ideas are not merely cognate to those implicit or explicit in non-religious life and thought; they also represent the apprehension of realities which are nowhere set forth in completely systematized form, but which appear (when religious and other thought is compared) in many independent and variously differentiated forms. There is not some single body of truths 'imposed' upon men from without, but there are truths of which men become conscious in their own individualistic, specialistic, temperamental manner, and according to their own development and that of their environment.

(4) The common psychological effectiveness (*a*) of artificial means to produce mystical and similar states, (*b*) of magical beliefs and practices, and (*c*) of all else that could be styled superstitious or irrational brings up again the difficult question of ultimate and absolute rationality. Whether the answer be in terms of theism or not, conceptions of ultimate order, power, and rationality are involved: thus it is 'God' who sees into the hearts of His children, grants their legitimate wishes, consoles and guides them; or it is in 'the nature of things' that what is effective is so for reasons which, if we only knew them, we should judge rational. If the absolutely irrational or evil succeeds, there is no foundation for ordered life and thought; only the postulate of an ultimate and absolute good and rationality allows any systematization of experience, and our human nature is ultimately deceiving us if this postulate is not true and final (cf. above, §§ 28 [3], 29 [3]).

Moreover, it is evident that many beliefs and practices (*e.g.*, in oaths and curses), however irrational they may appear, are effective only when all share similar ideas or convictions.[2] The whole system of cause and effect becomes self-supporting, as it were, and a pseudo-rationalistic condemnation of the crudities of a past age is not so helpful as attention to the efficiency of the system in which one lives—the dead must be left to bury their dead. Besides, condemnation is not only the recognition of a standard by which one may be judged in one's own turn; it is due to a new development of consciousness which is significant for the individual himself. Finally, all condemnation seriously affects one's conceptions both of theodicy and the rationality of human nature and of the ultimate order of the universe; the choice lies between absolute justice and absolute chaos, but the latter is logically unthinkable.

33. The dynamical aspects.—(1) Fundamental in development is the explicit recognition of evil which apparently was not regarded as evil, and of all that which can no longer be done with impunity. When good comes out of evil, either evil has not been justly punished—and this would mean an ultimately irrational universe—or, in the midst of a complex process and among all the subsequent vicissitudes, good is seen to predominate. But to do evil that good may come is to assume a complete knowledge of and power over all the processes or factors that are necessary.[1] When, therefore, in religion God's grace or help is implored, the hope is implied that, as apart from man's own activities, the Supreme Being will ensure the co-operation of the totality of conditions necessary. The whole system of cause and effect is involved, and it is precisely in times of difficulty and crisis that, where religion enters, this union of human and non-human (and so divine) factors always persists. If the convictions are sincere, the subjective and objective aspects can be viewed separately. The unanswered prayers, and other instances of defeated hopes, are not necessarily followed either by despair or by unbelief; there are subjective psychical transitions and developments which are often more recognizably significant for the individual than would have been the objective fulfilment of the particular request. Throughout, the sincerity of the individual is at stake, and various developments are forced as his faith becomes blind, as his behaviour becomes 'magical,' or as he seeks to determine what processes are 'natural' and what are not. To expect God to act contrary to one's explicit convictions of Him, and of the inevitable processes of nature, is a mark of unsystematized thought which paves the way, not for simple faith (which has no theory of causation), but for crude superstition; and it easily happens that popular—and other—naturalistic and materialistic conceptions of the universe do not logically permit those subjective notions and convictions of the ultimate reality which are expressed in more or less religious terms. Man cannot have it both ways, and his conceptions of God's power or existence, if claimed to be rational, must be in harmony with those which he has of 'natural' processes, and *vice versa*. So—to mention only one point—it becomes irrational for the individual to protest against conditions without inquiring into the nature of that freedom and liberty which he claims for himself; he has first to see whether the fundamental principles upon which he is entirely dependent are not those which are working in that which he is condemning, and whether what he condemns is only another form of that upon which he himself relies.

(2) Men can justly be judged in the light of those principles which they consciously recognize, although their beliefs and practices imply a profounder system in which they are unconsciously participating. The growth of consciousness breaks down the current concepts; they are no longer taken as starting-points, but are first tested in the light of the individual's own experience. It is a 'deeper' self that criticizes the categories, terms, and thought of its environment, and all profounder experience transcends them and commonly finds them inadequate. Development results, not merely in the use of new terms and formulas, but more especially in the subjective changes, the attitudes, points of view, the contents of one's terms, and in all that fresh flow of experience which language seeks to interpret and express. Now all deeper feeling compels a certain modification and adjustment of thought, and all sincerity and intellectual honesty force a certain systematization—although unfortunately the data which are not readily amenable are easily handled in some new Procrustean manner (see § 15 [2]). In the long run sincerity and genuineness are more

[1] The pragmatic test—that the religious truths can be proved by the individual—is so far conclusive as against the objection that everything that we conceive (*e.g.*, Kant's case of the dollars in his pocket) must exist. The religious argument is that there are truths which are the outcome of actual experience, which can be elaborated and described, and which under certain conditions can be put to the test, so that the description (seemingly intellectualistic) in one case can be part of a living experience in another.

[2] To take a simple case: in 1 S 25^{32-39} (*a*) David commits his cause to Jahweh, (*b*) the guilty Nabal is conscience-stricken and dies, and (*c*) the *immediate* common ground is the body of convictions shared by David and Nabal. But the psychological effectiveness of witchcraft, black magic, etc., rests equally upon the system of ideas shared by the parties concerned.

[1] Thus it is recognized in common life that the sweetness of the reconciliation after a quarrel does not justify another quarrel to reproduce the experience, nor, in the religious sphere, does the 'grace abounding' for the penitent sinner justify continuance in sin (Ro 5^{20}-6^{1}).

potent than what is cynical, indifferent, and merely conventional; and throughout human history, wherever 'lower' and 'higher' alternatives were recognized, the latter alone caused progress. Were there no sense of the lower and higher, there could be no consciousness of progressive development. The lower and all less desirable features have no elements of permanence or progress in any rational universe, while the higher constantly elude an immediately natural explanation, and manifest themselves in self-sacrifice, renunciation, self-denial, faith, and confidence in the future or the unseen. These higher factors are familiar in both the religious and the non-religious life; and either one must infer that progress is due to the apparently irrational side of man, or—since this, again, allows no ordered conception of the universe—the factors must be treated as thoroughly rational, by regarding the individual as part of the environment, or rather as part of the realities of the universe itself—an ultimate rational and interconnected 'whole.' It is impossible in the long run to sever human activities from those throughout the entire universe, and, although it is necessary to differentiate for practical purposes, the differentiation is never consistently carried out, and there is throughout a virtual co-operation of processes, variously regarded as 'human,' 'divine,' 'natural,' 'supernatural,' and 'cosmical' (cf. § 28 f.).

(3) (*a*) The factors that make for progress and development do not exist in isolation and cannot be severed from the field where they are manifested. Further, all that makes for permanence and progress must form the basis of conceptions, not only of religion, but also of science, art, ethics, etc. Hence, though religion in the course of its history has had very many extreme, unlovely, unprogressive, and impermanent features, these cannot go to form any critical or scientific conception of what it has been, is, or will be. Men's ordinary working concepts are based upon the persisting and average conditions; and, although thought thus seems to move in a circle, apparently determining what to select for its purpose, not only is the process inevitable, but each concept has to be adjusted to the rest of the system of thought to which it belongs. And, further, not only is the process of selection one of which men are primarily unconscious, but concepts will have characteristic 'ideal' aspects, with standards and criteria which enable men to realize approximations and defects. The origin of such 'ideal' aspects or types is an especially interesting inquiry, because in the spiritual life there is a frequent conviction of a decline or 'fall'—a real experience which it has been difficult to express except in myth, poetry, or metaphor. There is no reason to believe that man is gradually rising from a state of maximum grossness—here all judgments are relative—or that man has 'fallen,' in the terms of the Biblical narrative. None the less, the consciousness of a certain deterioration and decadence is familiar, and man is usually 'below the best' of what he feels to be within his capacity. The experience, which has its spiritual, æsthetic, ethical, and other forms, is bound up with the principle of attraction and with a recurring consciousness or vision of some great worth, existence, and reality which can and must be attained.

(*b*) Actual development is not to be described as from a part to a whole; but, like that of the child, it is from a rudimentary system to one less so (cf. § 5 [2]). Nor can thought be traced back historically to single concepts or ideas, but only to very rudimentary systems of what may be called 'psychical ability.' Yet even here the legitimacy of the term 'psychical' will be questioned, and it may be observed that what can be regarded as developing (*e.g.*, 'mind' or psychical ability) will go back to some stage where it is non-existent, or where we are in another realm of conditions, or where our present thought cannot follow. Either the nature of what is viewed as developing, or the nature of our concepts, or, again, the limitations of our experience will preclude the solution which we seek. The limitations of the mind forbid more than a certain rough systematization of experience; the mind can determine the conditions of the solution, rather than the solution itself, of some great problems of which it becomes aware. Thus the question of the origin of religion can be treated only as a problem of method or logic. It is evident that, when 'God,' 'life,' or 'thought' first appeared in the history of the universe, the prior situation was such as to permit the development (cf. p. 673[a], n. 1), and it cannot be completely described without taking into account that which was shortly to affect it. The factors and conditions that make for development do not exist in isolation, and they cannot be conceived as entirely independent of the field upon which they are first recognized. Neither in the individual nor in history could the objective reality which we call 'God' enter upon a field from which He had before been isolated. The mind is unable to pierce to the ultimate realities themselves and, from primitive cosmologies and cosmogonies to the latest philosophical and other syntheses, it is confronted with a similar difficulty—an experience of the absolute transcendence and priority of a Supreme Being or Principle, and the necessity of some conception of the actual steps in the differentiation of the universe. Differentiation as a process leads back logically to a single undifferentiated unit; but so far as our evidence goes we reach more and more rudimentary types of differentiation until the mind can reach no further. The steps are from system to system, and consequently it is important to distinguish between a static system of thought, which can allow no real development, and a dynamic one, which, if true to the history of the individual and the race, would embrace all the constituent or contributing minor systems (*e.g.*, human society, the State, Church, etc.), which cannot be regarded as eternal. There are progressive steps from ideal to ideal and system to system, like the continuous development of methods (§§ 3 [2], 16 [3]). We can distinguish the vision and the reflexion upon it, the ideal and the effort to follow it up, the system and what it systematizes, the concept, method, and all that 'organizes' material, and the material itself. There is, however, a tendency to give a certain absolute priority to the former of each pair, and so also to the plan or purpose which appears to precede the development, but continuously undergoes development itself. This tendency reflects itself in static conceptions of an absolutely prior vision, a heavenly origin of the soul, primitive archetypal ideas, some primary all-containing concept or principle, and a pre-determined (static) reality which is slowly being recognized, and of which new portions are being discovered from age to age. On the other hand, there is in point of fact a continuous process which takes us back to earlier stages where thought can no longer follow, and it points forward to an 'unknown' which will blend with the already known, for this is characteristic of the growth of consciousness.

34. The rationality of the unknown.—(1) It is wholly in accord with familiar religious convictions of the ephemeral character of human life, as a prelude for a future, that human thought must not expect to comprehend the ultimate truths. If man cannot see God and live (cf. §§ 18 [1], 32 [2]), if perfect Truth is with God alone, he is confined by his mode of thought, although the significant fact is the mind's sure consciousness of its being limited. Hence what is truly rational is not the ignoring of the unknown, but the realization of all that is essential for every new step of development. Just as our knowledge of anything in space or time is fundamentally incomplete if we ignore the environment, prelude, or sequel, so the true point of view of human life must be based upon the most comprehensive ideas, and one must 'think universally' (cf. p. 677[b], n. 2). The terms 'supernatural' and 'miraculous' have some unfortunate associations, and need careful definition, but they can be used rationally when they imply a God who is not arbitrary, but One whose laws transcend those of which men are cognizant. A disbelief in the supernatural and miraculous can, at the best, only assume an ultimate *impersonal* law and order in the universe to which certain alleged phenomena would be entirely contrary. While an unchecked credulity hinders progress of thought, by giving facile explanations of all difficulties, an irrational incredulity, on the other hand, can be as repressive as the typical rationalistic treatment, for both burke inquiry or offer facile explanations of no rational or scientific value.[1] The issue is faith in a Supreme Personal Being who is absolute justice, or in a supreme impersonal process or principle. In the history of religion now the personal and now the impersonal ultimate stands at the head; and all exceptional occurrences and phenomena which disturbed current convictions have led typically to wider conceptions of *some* ultimate order.

(2) The multifarious phenomena of life are such as to allow diverging and conflicting opinions. Hence, as in compiling a grammar of a language, regularities and uniformities must form the starting-point. There must be an actual selection of data. The great fundamental truths do not lie *in* the phenomena themselves—this is very evident from the way men's opinions differ—but they manifest themselves in men's consciousness of them.

[1] Hence (*a*) alleged miracles cannot be accepted without preliminary examination of the evidence, but (*b*) they also cannot form the starting point of any rational argument; cf. Lessing's important remark: 'Accidental truths of history can never become proof of necessary truths of reason.'

They are in this respect *a priori*. He who avers that God's ways are just, or that honesty is the best policy, has neither counted the cases nor balanced the evidence with anything like logical adequacy. But he can make the principles his standard, part of his life, and he lives up to them. There is a common and largely unconscious recognition of regulative principles which might seem to find innumerable exceptions everywhere, but they become permanent and ultimate. Men make them so. Thus do men lay down the lines of their future and form the framework of the unknown; and, like the organism, they will tend to be 'true to type.' But, in addition to this, they will become explicitly conscious of the type to which they must be true, if their personality, in its ultimate development, is to be in every respect efficient (§ 29 [1]). When in the course of mental development the implicit becomes explicit, there is a rigid logical connexion between the old and the new; the lines upon which development will proceed have already been laid, and the data are viewed, selected, and systematized in ways conditioned by earlier processes of selection. Yet this selective process, as it appears, *e.g.*, among the young, is one of which they cannot be said to be conscious; and, while its extraordinarily beneficial character cannot be gainsaid, it is very common for the process, as a man's individuality becomes more distinctive, to be markedly biased, one-sided, and so forth. Development thus brings greater freedom and a more conscious choice of action, and the individual more deliberately shapes his personality. This increase of consciousness gives the impression that the early years were blind, unconscious, and so forth; but consciousness is never complete, as the developing individual can realize on retrospect. Even the very young have an individuality of their own. The selective process, with the gradual recognition of guiding principles, is at work in these rudimentary beings, and we may speak of some 'system' embracing the child, his immediate environment, and all the factors that make for development. Of some of these factors the individual becomes aware, and continued increase of consciousness makes acute the relation between the individual's conception of himself and the supreme realities, so far as he has apprehended them. Now, whatever these may be found to be, they must always have had a significance, such that that of which man becomes conscious was already existing and had some meaning for his earlier stages. The entire process in the midst of which man develops must embrace all that which comes under the category of the transcendent, the supernatural, and the unknown; and in the course of his purposive, self-guiding development he becomes a more responsible part of that co-operative and progressive process which he can now more deliberately help or hinder. It is at this point that the comparative and historical treatment of all ideas of sin, forgiveness, and atonement deserves fresh attention (see artt. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT, CONSCIENCE, SIN).

(3) In various forms there prevail beliefs and practices of entire surrender, whether to a Supreme Power or to principles in the universe, or of thoroughgoing asceticism or quietism. But self-suppression and surrender are in themselves normal. In entering upon any new system of thought, they are necessary in a greater or less degree, as against inhibition, objectivity, and insistence upon one's own individuality and point of view. Especially significant is the surrender of self to potent ideas or theories, to a body of thought or a Church, and, of course, in all cases where the self entrusts itself to another personality. Throughout, the step has its important consequences, and the realization of the step becomes more impressive until it is felt to be a veritable leap into the unknown. The ideas and theories may lead one one knows not whither; the person to whom one surrenders oneself will to a greater or less degree affect one's unknown future. The process, a normal one, thus involves the question of the objective value of that to which the surrender is made, of that which is to be assimilated and realized. Progress is throughout due to innumerable acts of faith, trust, surrender, and reliance; and, as the occasions vary in intensity and objective significance, some part of the self is affected and developed, and at times the whole self seems to be renounced only to gain a 'higher' or a better self. However intense the feeling of surrender in human relationships, it is in the religious sphere that the significance of the step is most profoundly felt, and here the leap into the unknown is no less an one, even though there is the confidence that 'underneath are the everlasting arms.'[1] Here are experiences varying in degree and uniting the individual and his ordinary life and thought with that which is most profound and ineffable in the universe, correlating uniquely the non-religious and the religious, the known and the unknown, and forming the basis of all adequate conceptions of existence, knowledge, and reality.

35. Reality.—(1) It will have been seen that the trend of thought has advanced the study of religion to a new stage, and has interwoven it with the progress of other departments of research. In this article the endeavour has been made to introduce the reader to the wider field in which the study of religion must be placed, and to indicate some of the more important questions. Much more might of course be said, but the central problem would still remain: the underlying ultimate realities. Here it must suffice to observe that by the religious consciousness must be meant a consciousness of reality. The realities of religion must be more personally vital than those recognized outside the realm of religion; in fact a religion that would live must be able to claim to approach nearest to the ultimate realities. But even in religion we have to do, not with reality itself, but with intuitions, apprehensions, or convictions of it. The religious mode of thought appears to be essentially a very intense form of otherwise non-religious thought, and the most characteristic features of religion are a highly distinctive form of what otherwise is not peculiar to religion. Religion is 'natural' because the ultimate realities must be a 'natural' part of the universe of which man becomes conscious. Ideas of 'this' world and of 'the other' originate in the mind of one and the same experiencing individual; and there can be only one total existence of which he has such varying intuitions and conceptions as his nature, temperament, and training favour. Moreover, not only is there an interconnexion between the progress of religion, its increasing wealth of expression, and the general development of thought; it is also self-evident that the deliberate effort to raise the level of thought and to improve the mental equipment (*e.g.*, in education) enables one to experience life more fully and to utilize its data more effectively. Indeed, one has only to consider the meaner life of primitive men to perceive that the positive advances of thought have conduced to the general advance of religion, and to a clearer apprehension of all that is felt to be profoundly real and true. Thus thought—especially in its dynamic aspects—and reality are not to be separated.

(2) But, while progress brings better conceptions

[1] Cf. also the 'dark night' of the mystical experience; see artt. MYSTICISM, NEO-PLATONISM.

of reality, at the same time it certainly increases men's abilities, duties, and responsibilities. It magnifies the possibilities of good and evil. The development, therefore, is extremely significant for the relation between men and reality, whether one considers (*a*) the actual progress of physical science and the strides taken in utilizing the realities of the physical world, or (*b*) the deepening recognition of the necessity of higher standards of moral, spiritual, and intellectual life. Thus, the development of conceptions of reality powerfully affects human welfare as a whole. Moreover, they correspond in their remarkable variety to the variation of individual temperament, training, experience, and so forth. It is obvious that the striking differences—ethical, spiritual, and intellectual—in men's conceptions of God are due to differences, not in the nature of God Himself, but in human nature. 'God' is the name given to that sublimest of realities, of which man becomes conscious as standing in a uniquely 'personal' relationship with him. Whatever be the true *objective* reality, it is evident that both the Reality and man's own individual nature contribute to the resultant varying conceptions. And, in general, all the ultimate realities, *as formulated*, are man's imperfect conceptions of them, conceptions whose vicissitudes can be objectively studied, and which can develop further and, in so doing, lead to newer and more effective convictions of reality. Consequently, it is necessary to observe, on the one hand, the evident significance for the individual of his own conceptions of reality, and, on the other, the problem of the part taken by reality throughout. To the genuine theist God is the most essential, if not the only, reality, and it is impossible to isolate His working in the universe from the man who has an erroneous conception of God, or, perhaps, no consciousness of Him at all. None the less, it is of essential importance whether men's conceptions of any reality are adequate or not, and, to some extent at least, God's influence upon men is admittedly conditioned by men's conceptions. Hence the question is vital, how far God can influence man as apart from man's explicit consciousness of Him, how far God Himself is affected by human activities (*e.g.*, by gross evil) contrary to man's consciousness of His nature. (For we must evidently distinguish between human activities not yet recognized by men to be evil and those which they know within themselves to be wrong.) Moreover, since 'God' is the theistic consciousness of reality, the problem is essentially that of the relation between the ultimate realities in general and men with their varying consciousness of them. Vitally significant as this is on practical grounds, it is also a problem of the greatest methodological importance, *i.e.* if the data of the growth of consciousness, of religion and magic, and of science and philosophy are to be rationally and thoroughly handled. Reality must always be significant for men; it must have some effect, as apart from a man's particular conception of it. Only in this way can one gain a coherent view of the universe. Consequently there is need both of (*a*) an adequate conception of the ultimate realities to take the place of those felt to be imperfect, and of (*β*) a scientific and more theoretical treatment of such conceptions in human history, the development and differentiation of thought, and all that makes for the greater fullness and richness of life.

(3) All growth of consciousness brings increased power for good or for evil. The development is not so much of the self alone as of an environment or a system of relations of which the self is the centre. The development demands continued discipline and reorganization, for the consequences are harmful if the self is lacking in responsibility, morality, and all that encourages healthy progress. The limit of such development furnishes the conception of absolute coherence, perfection, truth, justice, etc., whether as regards (*a*) an absolutely self-conscious, supreme, and personal Self, or (*b*) an impersonal system of regulative principles and uniformities, as manifested in the universe—the ultimate 'environment.'[1] Now, the entire complex field of religion becomes more manageable and intelligible only when notice is taken of the beliefs and practices which connect human activities with those of the universe, whether directly (especially in magico-religious and magical data) or indirectly (*e.g.*, through prayer to the gods). But this fundamental underlying interconnexion, implicit in life and thought, becomes explicit only in the development and differentiation of thought—when, *e.g.*, spiritual and non-spiritual forms of energy are distinguished, and definitions or theories mark off matter from mind, and the physical from the psychical. The primary logical interconnexions are continually being obscured through the growth of special knowledge, which, however, brilliantly illuminates the varied departmental (moral, spiritual, æsthetic, intellectual) aspects of the universe.

There is a perilous kinship between religion and magic; typically and characteristically they are respectively right and wrong ways of dealing with what is regarded as fundamentally real and true. Since strong convictions and supremely intense states of consciousness are the more potent for good or for evil, there is a bifurcation such that what can take a religious form might also become magical or irreligious. Thus, there is a sane and an insane supernaturalism, a healthy and unhealthy mysticism, and genius has its cases of perversity and depravity. Accordingly, it is possible either to distinguish the good and the bad examples or to refuse to admit the latter within the category; that is to say, either we have good and bad religion, genius, etc. (or examples of these) or the bad cases come under another category, as, *e.g.*, in the antithesis of religion and magic, (good) mysticism and (irrational) occultism, and the like. Whatever course be generally adopted, it is extremely important to distinguish the psychological and subjective aspects of data from their logical and other more objective value. It is important to distinguish religion, genius, etc., as a whole or absolute feeling and the more specialized forms which are examples of religion, genius, etc., and which can be more objectively regarded. In this way, the fact can be emphasized that, although the ultimate realities are in a sense religious (*e.g.*, as relating to a Supreme Deity or to life after death), they are not religious in themselves, although religion is directly concerned with their apprehension and formulation. For the subjectively impressive experiences so easily lead along beneficial or harmful roads, either to religion or to its worst enemy, that a careful disciplinary and regulative system of belief and practice is at once required for the sake of both the individual and society. In other words, reality—*i.e.* our own subjective conceptions of it—at once requires a formulation, a logical theory, an embodiment.

(4) From one point of view, then, religion, mysticism, etc., are one of many phases, aspects, and departments of the totality of existence. The most 'religious' individual has his non-religious times, and many 'good' men have had their anti-religious or rather irreligious occasions. The test of a religion lies in its relation to what is, as such, non-religious, viz. to the best moral, spiritual, æsthetic, and intellectual consciousness of the age as manifested in conduct, thought, ideals, and so forth. But, owing to the differentiation and specialization of thought

[1] The latter is not the objective universe of the senses, but a logical construction, and the former depends upon man's present stage of consciousness. The ultimate which the mind can conceive depends upon the stage of development reached by the mind.

—with the corresponding (objective) incompleteness of individual minds—no one mind can form a logically adequate estimate. It is impossible for any individual to grasp totality as a whole, although it is possible to do justice to the various aspects under which the universe is apprehended, and to investigate their growth, development, and interrelation. Proceeding on these lines, one can realize the necessity of proving and improving current conceptions, definitions, and other tools of thought, for, in the advance of thought, and in the better organization of the data of experience, one comes to realize more vividly and truly the universe of which one is an integral part. While the actual religious life implies principles, ideas, and the rest, the scientific or critical treatment of religion is concerned in determining these and in maintaining the progress of thought, inasmuch as nothing is more potent than the continued knowledge of reality and the convictions which sway mankind. The apprehensions of reality unite man and objective reality itself, and, varying, as they do, according to the individual, they are a key to a science of human nature and experience. It is obvious that there must be realities of a sort to allow the prevalent types, although the ultimate realities of the universe are not to be confused with the realities of our human nature. Thus, a conception of 'God' can be formulated and accepted; it will correspond and answer to personal experience at a certain stage of psychical development; it can prove the most vital and stimulating truth that man can possess. There must be some objective reality such that men become conscious of it in ways varying according to their individual nature and stage of development. Moreover, human personality is such that the conception of a reality in a personal relationship to man, and alike immanent and transcendent, is not merely a subjective reality; it is demanded by the data of religion, by the characteristic features of personal development, by the consciousness of the necessity of continued development in every direction which man feels to be good, beautiful, and true. In a word, the objective reality of 'God' is demanded if man is to give a rational account of himself so far as his intellect allows him, and the most objective theory of reality must be based upon the facts of human consciousness.

(5) All the ultimate realities themselves lie beyond human vision (cf. 1 Co 13[12]). Between them and the self there are, as a psychical veil, the impulses, ideas, convictions, and theories, the whole body or world of thought which makes every man what he is, and enables him to say, 'Here is reality.' Some mysteries of reality, from a psychical point of view, are hinted at in the strange data of psychical research, occultism, and ecstasy, in all abnormal and pathological phenomena of the mind, in the disastrous effects of vagaries, or of doctrines and theories which healthy opinion repudiates. Although progressive thought may reject certain explanatory conceptions or theories—*e.g.*, now of evil spirits, and now of guardian angels—men require some organization of experience, some adequate body of thought, some tolerable outlook upon the universe, which will enable them both to direct and understand their experiences and to realize the significance of human existence so as to be able to live healthy and useful lives for the good of a universe from which they can never escape. Upon their body of thought depend their sanity and effectiveness. Even reality itself seems to some extent to be powerless against the will which we regard as bad and evil; while, on the other hand, how far reality can be objectively and positively influenced, under given conditions, is a vital problem which can at least be theoretically handled. Certainly religion has not been without daring conceptions of the practical relations between God and man—and, suppose religion proved to embody the truth about reality?

So the study of man's psychical tendencies, his ideas and ideals, his modes of thought, his beliefs and practices, his doctrines, theologies, and philosophies—all contribute to one's knowledge of human nature and of the universe. In the investigation of the development of conceptions and of the workings of the mind, whether in its immediate consciousness of reality or in its reflexion upon past experiences, one comes to know a little more of the realities themselves and of the objective relationship between them and man. If, then, it is judicious to venture upon a definition of religion on the lines upon which this article has proceeded, the following may be suggested, provisionally: Religion primarily involves some immediate consciousness of transcendent realities of supreme personal worth, vitally influencing life and thought, expressing themselves in forms which are conditioned by the entire stage of development reached by the individual and his environment, and tending to become more explicit and static in mythologies, theologies, philosophies, and scientific doctrines. But, as this article has tried to indicate, there is a positive development of consciousness and thought in history, and consequently it is possible to seek to correlate both the static aspects, which are essential for all stability, and the dynamic, which are indispensable for future progress. For to do justice to the ultimate facts of harmony and of development in the universe is one of the main functions of a living religion.

LITERATURE.—The more important special technical works have been mentioned throughout the article.

STANLEY A. COOK.

RELIGIOUS ORDERS.

Introductory.—See SECRET SOCIETIES (Introductory).
Christian (F. CABROL), p. 693.
Indian (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 713.
Japanese (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 718.
Mexican and Peruvian (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 718.
Muslim (E. MONTET), p. 719.

RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Christian). — I. *GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CLASSIFICATION.*—Under the title 'religious,' in the Christian Churches, are included all those who make profession of a life in conformity with the precepts and counsels of the gospel, and who withdraw from the world in order to practise this life more perfectly.

The art. MONASTICISM deals with the origin and chief characteristics of this form of life, of which monasticism is itself the principal species. In monasticism we have the religious life in its essential elements; and it may be said that, from the 6th to the 20th cent., it has been a question merely of combining those elements according to different methods to serve special purposes, and that no new conception, no essential difference, has been introduced—nothing, in fact, that was not already existing in germ in the monastic life of the earliest centuries. The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, the practice of mortification, labour, prayer, and silence—sometimes even preaching and other external work—were the obligations of religious life in all ages, whether under the cenobitical or under the eremitical form. We are concerned in this article with the different forms of the religious life distinct from monasticism. The first task of the historian, in presence of the number and variety of these forms of the religious life (they exceed 380 in number, even without counting certain religious societies of minor importance), is to attempt a classification. This is no easy task. Neither geographical nor chronological considerations will serve as a basis of classification, since, owing to the universal character of Christianity, these religious families are found in all nations, and some have put forth shoots in every age and thus belong to no one century more than to another. The attempt has been made to group them in families, placing side by

side those which offer analogous features or which follow the same Rule. Here, however, historian and canonist will not be in perfect accord.

If, *e.g.*, the attempt is made to place under the same rubric all the orders in which the Rule of St. Augustine is followed, the result will only lead to confusion, for these orders are in other respects quite dissimilar and belong to different groups. The Dominicans, hospitallers, and several congregations of women, *e.g.*, all alike follow the Rule of St. Augustine, but they differ entirely from one another as regards the end and object of their respective institutes. This results from the fact that the so-called Rule of St. Augustine consists in reality of a set of general principles of spirituality which can be adapted to any form of religious life. It is the constitutions of each order, rather than the Rule, that give it its distinctive character. The Carmelites originally followed the Rule of St. Augustine. Some orders have followed different Rules at different times. The Premonstratensians combine the Rules of St. Augustine and St. Benedict. The Dominicans, who also follow the Rule of St. Augustine adapted from that of the canons regular, especially the Premonstratensians, seem to belong, with practically equal right, to two very different forms of religious life—that of the canons regular and that of the mendicant friars. The Brothers of St. John of God, who are hospitallers, were attached to the mendicant orders by Urban VIII. It was the same in the case of the Jesuits to a certain extent, although these 'religious' belong to a totally different category—that of clerks regular. The title, in fact, of 'mendicant friar,' which distinguishes certain orders, came in time to be attached to those which were not originally comprised under this designation, such as the Augustinian Hermits, the Carmelites, as well as the hospitallers and others mentioned above. The Theatines and Barnabites, who are clerks regular, received the privileges of the canons regular of the Lateran. Some — *e.g.*, Vermeersch — regard the question from the point of view of canon law, and classify the orders according to whether they possess solemn vows, simple vows, temporary vows, or a mere promise. This method of classification, while legitimate in itself, has no historical foundation. Moreover, it leads to confusion, for some orders have adopted in turn temporary vows and simple vows, or have even practised both systems simultaneously for different members of the order. Finally, if we take as specially characteristic of an order the particular work undertaken by its members—education, care of the sick, preaching, etc.—it is not easy to judge to what class certain orders belong that exercise all these various activities at once.

Without flattering ourselves that it is in all respects a perfectly satisfactory system of classification, we shall adopt here, as the most practical for our purposes, one that is both chronological and pragmatic—one that keeps in view the different periods of time, while grouping together those orders which possess certain characteristics in common. We shall also keep to the traditional mode of designation.

1. From the 1st to the middle of the 3rd century: virgins, widows, and ascetics. — In primitive Christian society there were certain of the faithful who led a life more austere than that of their brethren and who formed a class apart. Among these ascetics there are even indications of an attempt at community life. They may be regarded as the earliest representatives of the religious life.[1]

2. From the middle of the 3rd to the end of the 12th century: the monks and the canons regular.—Under the title 'monk' are comprised the hermits and anchorites of all descriptions, the cenobites or monks living together in community, and those who combine both elements in a life partly eremitical and partly cenobitical. To the same period belong the canons regular, whose life has much in common with that of the monks, and who enjoy the same privileges.

For the different kinds of monks cf. art. MONASTICISM. The principal varieties of canons regular are: the Premonstratensians, Canons of St. Victor, Canons of the Lateran, Canons of St. Maurice (Agaune), Canons of the Holy Cross, Canons of St. Saviour, Canons of St. Rufus, Canons of the Holy Sepulchre, Canons of Verres, Canons of Marbach, Canons of Pampeluna, Canons of St. Antony, Canons of the Immaculate Conception, and the Gilbertines.[1]

The Brothers of the Common Life, Beghards, and Beguines form a category of their own, but may be classified together with the monks and the canons, since their life is founded on the principles of the monastic and canonical state.

3. From the 11th to the 16th century: the military orders and the knights hospitallers.—Strictly speaking, these orders might be classed with the monks, since they usually followed one of the monastic Rules (*e.g.*, that of St. Benedict). But they possess so marked a character of their own that it is better to treat them separately. They are as follows: the Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem, Templars, Teutonic Knights, Knights of Evora or of Aviz, Knights of St. James of Compostella, Knights of Calatrava and of Alcantara, Knights of the Order of St. Lazarus.

4. From the 11th to the 20th century: the hospitallers (non-military).[2]—These include the Order of Mercy, the Trinitarians, the Servites, the Paulinians, the Alexians, the Jesuati or Hieronymites, the Ambrosians, the Brothers of the Apostles, the Good Brethren, the Order of the Holy Ghost, the Brothers of St. John of God.[3]

5. From the 13th to the 16th century: the mendicant orders or friars (frati). — The friars adopted a mode of life differing in many respects from that of the monks or canons regular, viz. the absence of the element of stability in a particular monastery, and of perpetuity in the superior, the exercise of the sacred ministry, preaching and teaching, reduction of the solemnity of the choral office, suppression (at least originally) of all property and all power to possess lands or money even in the name of the community. They are called mendicants because, unlike the monks, having no possessions and no stable means of livelihood, they were obliged to live on alms.

The four principal mendicant orders are: the Dominicans, the Franciscans, the Carmelites, the Augustinians.[4] There are, besides, other lesser mendicant orders in some of which the Rule of St. Augustine is observed, in others that of St. Francis. Among the former are the Order of

[1] Cf. art. MONASTICISM.

[1] For other examples cf. Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche*, ii. 24–29.

[2] It must be remarked that several of these orders follow the Rule of St. Augustine and have obtained both the title and the privileges of the mendicant orders. Hence they are sometimes classed under one, sometimes under the other, of these two categories. Since, however, both their special object and their manner of life are practically identical in all these orders, and since they possess many of the characteristics of the military hospitallers treated above, it would seem to be as well to group them together under the rubric of hospitallers.

[3] Some of the hospitallers are also among clerks regular, like the Camillians.

[4] The Augustinians belong, by their Rule, to the canons regular rather than to the friars and, in some of their branches, have more affinity with the hermits or monks. They have been counted, however, among the mendicant orders since the day when they obtained a share in the privileges of the latter.

Mercy, the Trinitarians, the Servites, the Paulinians, the Alexians, the Hieronymites, the Jesuati, etc. These are already mentioned under the category of hospitallers, to which they also belong. Among those that follow the Rule of St. Francis are the Minims, the Third Order of St. Francis, and the Scalzetti ('discalced Friars'), or Order of Penance.

Orders of women are the Brigittines, Annunciades, Ursulines, Angelicals, Salesian Sisters, Penitents, etc.

6. From the 16th to the 17th century: the clerks regular.—These 'religious,' while practising the religious life in community (as the title 'regular' indicates), belong essentially to the clerical order, as shown again by the title 'clerk' and by their dress, their external life, and their exercise of the sacred ministry. They possess solemn vows, like the monks and canons regular, but have not, like the latter, the choral office, nor do they practise stability. Generally speaking, they have, in addition to the exercise of the religious life, some special object or particular line of work. Most of these societies admit only priests to their ranks, and lay brothers are received as 'coadjutors.' Some—*e.g.* the Theatines and the Barnabites—possess, as already remarked, the privileges of the Canons of the Lateran. The clerks regular are: the Jesuits,[1] Theatines, Barnabites, Clerks Regular of Somascha, Clerks Regular of the Good Jesus, Clerks Regular of the Mother of God, Camillians, Minor Clerks Regular.

7. From the 17th to the 19th century: religious congregations.—These religious congregations resemble the clerks regular, and they are called in canon law 'quasi-regulars.' They have usually only simple vows and are distinguished from the clerks regular proper by this fact and also by the more recent date of their foundation.

The principal congregations are: the Passionists, Redemptorists, Lazarists, Eudists, Oblates, Marists, Assumptionists, Salesians, Paulists, Sulpicians, Oratorians.[2]

8. From the 18th to the 20th century: missionary societies or congregations. — These societies, founded specially for the foreign missions, may be considered, as regards their manner of life, as clerks regular or quasi-regulars; but, since they all have a common end in view, we have placed them together in a group apart.

They are: the Society of Foreign Missions, the Society of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary (or Fathers of Picpus), the Fathers of the Holy Ghost, the Fathers of Scheut, the Fathers of Mill Hill, the White Fathers, the Society of the Divine Word, the Society of the Divine Saviour.

9. From the 17th to the 20th century: teaching brotherhoods and congregations of women.—These include the Piarists, Brothers of the Christian Schools of St. John Baptist de la Salle (Christian Brothers), Brothers of the Society of Mary (Marianists), Brothers of Lamennais, Brothers of St. Gabriel, etc.,[3] Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Sisters of Wisdom, Sisters of Evron, Sisters of Nevers, Sisters of the Good Shepherd, Sisters of Nazareth, Little Sisters of the Poor, Society of the Sacred Heart, Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny,[4] etc.

II. *CANONS REGULAR, BROTHERS OF THE COMMON LIFE, BEGHARDS AND BEGUINES, MILITARY ORDERS AND HOSPITALLERS.*—**1. Canons regular.**—(*a*) *The name.*—The name 'canon' is of ancient origin. The Councils of Antioch (341), Chalcedon (451), and 'in Trullo' (692), speaking of the clerics attached to the service of certain churches, say that they are ἐν τῷ κανόνι or ἐκ τοῦ κανόνος, *i.e.* inscribed in the κανών, the *matricula*, *tabula*, or *album*.[1] According to du Cange,[2] a *canonicus* is one who is inscribed *sub canone frumentario*, *i.e.* is maintained by the revenues of the Church. St. Athanasius employs the term τόν τε κανόνα τῆς ἐκκλησίας.[3]

In the West the 2nd and 3rd Councils of Toledo and that of Friuli (791) speak of clerics 'sub canone ecclesiastico.'[4] The 3rd Council of Orleans in 538 and Gregory of Tours make use of the term *canonici* to describe the clergy of a church.[5] The Council of Clermont in 535 extends this title to all priests and even deacons attached to a church, whether in town or in country. These priests and deacons were obliged, at great feasts, to assemble in the cathedral church to celebrate divine service together with the bishop. In 538 the 3rd Council of Orleans deprived of the title of 'canon' all clerics who refused to obey their bishop.[6] It may be gathered from these different texts that the term 'canon' was applied to two classes of people differing widely from one another. On the one hand were clerics, like those of the diocese of Hippo, who lived with their bishop in community and in the practice of monastic asceticism. On the other hand were those who lived in their own churches, practising neither the community life nor monastic poverty, and bound to their bishop by an obedience that did not press very heavily upon them. This vague use of the term lasted throughout the ages. In order to avoid confusion, the custom finally arose of distinguishing between the two classes of canons by calling the first 'canons regular' and the second 'secular canons' or 'canons' pure and simple. The latter cannot, of course, be regarded as in any sense belonging to the religious orders; it is with the canons regular alone that we are here concerned.[7]

(*b*) *Canons regular till the 10th century.*—In art. MONASTICISM we have shown that in the 4th cent. there was a tendency among many bishops to gather the clergy of their churches around them and to live with them in the exercise of asceticism according to the example of the monks. The attempts that have been made to find examples earlier than this date, in order thus to trace back the origin of the canonical order to the time of the Apostles, are entirely without value. St. Augustine, who was so well versed in the knowledge of the ecclesiastical institutions of the past, does not even mention the canonical life in his *de Moribus Ecclesiæ Catholicæ*, written in 388, although it would have afforded him an excellent and most natural opportunity for doing so, had any such institution existed before his time. Nor can any traces be found in the writings of St. Cyprian or any other writer of earlier times. St. Augustine was himself, in fact, one of the first to have the idea of gathering his clergy around him in order to live with them in common in the practice of poverty and religious discipline after the example of the cenobites. He made his first trial of this way of life at Tagaste, his second at Hippo (388

[1] The strictly chronological order is as follows: Theatines, 1524; Clerks Regular of the Good Jesus, 1526; Barnabites, 1530; Somascha, 1532; Society of Jesus (Jesuits), 1534.

[2] We include the Sulpicians and Oratorians among these congregations, although canonically they are not considered as such, since they have no vows. They may, however, be assimilated to societies such as that of the Lazarists by their object, the training of the clergy.

[3] For the detail cf. Heimbucher, iii. 356 ff.

[4] *Ib.* iii. 364 f.

[1] Socrates, *HE* v. 19 (*PG* lxvii. 613); cf. note of Valois (*ib.*); Leclercq, in *DACL* iii. col. 235.

[2] *Glossarium*, Niort, 1883–87, *s.v.* 'Canonicus.'

[3] *Vita S. Antonii* (*PG* xxvi. 837 f.).

[4] *Concil. Tolet. II.* can. 1, 2, *III.* can. 5; *Concil. Forojul.* can. 1.

[5] Greg. of Tours, *Hist. Franc.* x. 31 (*PL* lxxi. 570); *Concil. Aurel. III.* can. 11.

[6] Cf. F. Maassen, *Concilia ævi Merovingici*, Hanover, 1893, pp. 69, 77, etc.

[7] Cf. du Cange, *s.v.* 'Canonicus.'

and 391). We have accounts of the life led in his monasteries written by Possidius in his life of St. Augustine and also by St. Augustine himself.[1] It resembled to a great extent the life of the monks—life in common under a common discipline. The bishop was the head of this family of clerics, and obedience was doubly due to him—as bishop and as the quasi-abbot of the community. He was also the temporal administrator of the affairs of his 'monastery,' and the clergy were bound to abandon their personal property and to live in the practice of poverty and chastity. The chief difference between them and the monks lay, firstly, in the fact that these early 'canons regular,' instead of living apart from the world, had their dwelling in the midst of a town or city; secondly, in the fact that they were essentially the clergy of their churches and exercised the sacred ministry. Their régime and manner of dress were again different from those of the monks, and their practice of poverty and obedience was less severe. The example of St. Augustine was followed by other African bishops, at Carthage, Tagaste, and in other cities. We find the same custom in existence even beyond the confines of Africa, in the case of St. Paulinus of Nola, Hilary of Arles, and others.[2]

One of the most remarkable among these examples is that of St. Eusebius of Vercelli—an earlier case than that of St. Augustine—about whom we have a considerable amount of information.[3] But the life led by St. Eusebius and his clergy resembled far more closely than that of St. Augustine and his 'canons' the life led by the monks proper. In St. Augustine's case it was in fact a seminary for the clergy or a college of canons, rather than a monastery for monks as in Eusebius's institution. The clergy of Eusebius observed the monastic enclosure, celebrated the day and night hours of prayer, and practised all the austerities of the monastic life. St. Fulgentius, in the midst of the Vandal persecutions, and, no doubt, other African bishops also, went farther still and obliged monks and clerks to live together. But this attempt to unite two incongruous elements should be regarded as a mere expedient demanded by the special needs of the time.[4] This quasi-monastic form of life seems to have been practised only in certain exceptional cases by the clergy of the Eastern Church. St. Jerome, who was so well acquainted with all that concerned ecclesiastical life, does not mention any example of it. Cases have been quoted of monks living with their bishops, but these are not to be regarded as institutions distinct from that of the ordinary monastic life, and the only actual example is that of Rhinocorura quoted by Leclercq from Sozomen.[5]

In the West, however, at the end of the 5th cent. and during the 6th the canonical life became an official institution. The 4th Council of Toledo provides us with a picture of the bishop in his episcopal residence surrounded by his priests and deacons, while in a neighbouring dwelling the young clerics were educated under his supervision.[6] In Gaul the 2nd Council of Tours also laid down that the bishop should live with his priests and deacons in the episcopal palace.[7] Gregory of Tours makes frequent allusion to those clerics who shared the dwelling and the table of their bishop—*mensa canonicorum*, *convivium mensæ canonicæ*.[1]

Other councils, as we have already seen, laid down new regulations for these clerics, now called *canonici*—*e.g.* the Councils of Clermont and Orleans.

With regard to England, St. Gregory the Great advised St. Augustine of Canterbury to live in common with his clergy. But the latter apparently wished to go even farther than the recommendation of the holy pontiff. At Canterbury and in the greater number of cathedral churches founded among the Anglo-Saxons the chapter was formed by a monastic community properly so called. The clergy of the cathedral were monks and carried out the full monastic régime, to which they also added the exercise of the sacred ministry. These monastic chapters remained in force in the greater number of English cathedrals up to the Reformation in the 16th century. Certain churches, however, founded after the first Christian mission in England, were served by secular canons.[2]

Finally, it may be said that, outside the church of Hippo and certain others that had followed the example of St. Augustine, the word 'canon' was applied to a class of clerics whose obligations and forms of life varied from place to place. But in the 8th cent. a bishop of Metz, St. Chrodegang, gave the canonical life a more definite character by means of the Rule that he drew up for canons. This bishop (742–766) played an important part in the religious and political history of his time. He wrote for the clergy of his own church a Rule, *Regula Canonicorum*, which obtained the support of Pepin and Charlemagne and was given the force of general ecclesiastical law in the *Capitularies* of the latter monarch and by the Councils of Aix-la-Chapelle (802), Mayence, Tours, Rheims (813), Arles (813), and especially by that of Aix-la-Chapelle (817).[3] This Rule is largely founded on that of St. Benedict. It subjects the canons to the common life, enclosure, and the ordinary exercises of Benedictine life, while at the same time leaving them a certain amount of liberty and the right of possessing property.[4]

(*c*) *Canons regular from the 9th to the 20th century.*—The period of St. Chrodegang and that which immediately followed were the most flourishing in the history of the canons regular. Charlemagne and Louis the Pious endeavoured to impose his Rule on the clergy of their empire, and the Councils of Aix-la-Chapelle in 802 and in 817 followed suit.[5] Amalarius composed his *de Institutione Canonicorum* with the same intention. The Lateran Council in 1059[6] renewed these decrees and obliged the clergy attached to a church to live together and share their property in common.

The Rule of St. Augustine, although it is taken from his works, was in reality only drawn up in the 8th–9th centuries. It was followed side by side with that of St. Chrodegang, which was far more complete and precise in details. It was adopted by certain groups of canons and became for them the expression of the *vita apostolica*, *vita communis perfecta*. These canons came to be known as 'Canons of St. Augustine,' 'Augustinian

[1] *Vita S. Augustini*, v. (*PL* xxxii. 37); Aug. 'de Vita et Moribus Clericorum suorum,' *Serm.* ccclv., ccclvi. (*PL* xxxix. [illegible] ff.); L. Thomassin, *Ancienne et nouvelle discipline de l'Eglise*, Paris, 1725, i. 1330 f.

[2] Cf. art. MONASTICISM, IV. iii. 1 (*a*).

[3] Thomassin, i. 1341 f.; St. Ambrose, *Ep.* lxiii. (*PL* xvi. [illegible] ff.); Maximus of Turin, *Serm.* lxxxiii. (*PL* lvii. 697 ff.).

[4] Ferrandus, *Vita Fulgentii*, xxix. (*PL* lxv. 145).

[5] Sozomen, *HE* vi. 31 (*PG* lxvii. 1389); Leclercq, in *DACL* [illegible] col. [illegible]34.

[6] *Concil. Tolet. IV.* can. 23.

[7] *Concil. Turon. II.* can. 12.

[1] *Hist. Franc.* x. 31 (*PL* lxxi. 570), and *Vitæ Patrum*, ix. (*ib.* 1053).

[2] W. Stubbs, *Epistolæ Cantuarienses* (Rolls Series), London, 1865, Introd. p. xxii.

[3] Cf. C. J. von Hefele, *Hist. des Conciles*, French tr., ed. H. Leclercq, Paris, 1907–13, iv. 10, note 2; there are in reality two Rules of St. Chrodegang; the first, which is the shorter, in 34 chapters, appears to be the original Rule; the second, in 86 chapters, is only a development of the first, the work of an anonymous writer.

[4] For a comparison between the Rules of SS. Benedict and Chrodegang cf. Leclercq, in *DACL* iii. col. 241 f.

[5] Hefele, iii. 1117, iv. 9 ff.

[6] *Ib.* iv. 1160.

or Austin Canons.'[1] Their houses were at first independent of one another, but were later united in a congregation which had its general chapters, its statutes, etc. The decrees of the 4th Lateran Council and those of Benedict XII. in 1339 are concerned with the Austin Canons. In spite of all these decrees, however, religious life among them had but a short period of brilliancy.

In the 14th cent. new efforts[2] at reform were attempted by Cardinal Branda de Castiglione, by John Bush, and by Nicholas of Cusa.

The Protestant Reformation struck a fatal blow at the Canons Regular of St. Augustine properly so called. Other societies, however, had been formed on the Augustinian model under a severer Rule, and these were better able to resist the shock of the great upheaval. Some of them are still in existence at the present day, such, *e.g.*, as the Canons Regular of the Lateran, the Premonstratensians, and several other congregations. We can give here only an outline of some of the principal ones.[3]

Premonstratensians.—The Order of Prémontré is the most illustrious of all among the canons regular. Its founder was St. Norbert († 1134), a canon of Magdeburg, who established himself at Prémontré with a few companions in order to lead a retired and holy life and at the same time to give themselves to preaching and the sacred ministry. Their life was ordered according to the Rule of St. Augustine and guided by the example of the Canons Regular of St. Victor of Paris. This order developed rapidly, owing partly to the sanctity and personal influence of its holy founder, partly to its object and nature, which had a special appeal in an age in which the idea of clerical and monastic reform had given rise to institutions such as the Camaldolese, the Carthusians, and the Cistercians. St. Norbert founded, besides the canons regular, a second order for women, which also had great success, and a third order for lay people. At the present day the order possesses five provinces or circles (*circaria*), seventeen abbeys, five priories, eight convents of nuns of the second order and three of the third order, besides parishes, missions, and a few colleges. The members number 997 men and 258 women.

The Premonstratensians follow the Rule of St. Augustine along with special statutes of their own. At the head of the circle is the *circator*, whose rank and office correspond with those of the provincial in other orders. Their constitutions resemble those of Cîteaux. The abbot of Prémontré is abbot-general of the whole order and is assisted by the abbots of Floreffe, of Laon, and of Cuissy, the first houses of the order. The general chapter is held at Prémontré. This constitution came to an end before the Revolution, and in 1883 a new constitution took its place. The habit is white and resembles the monastic habit except that in choir a rochet, the badge of canonical dignity, is worn, and in winter a mantle also.

This order has rendered signal services to Christianity by its missions on the banks of the Elbe and the Oder and in the Low Countries, by the institution of hospices for pilgrims, the making of roads and canals, the foundation of libraries and schools, but especially by its reform of the clergy and the foundation of parishes. It even had an influence on architecture. It has produced also a certain number of chroniclers, historians, and ecclesiastical writers.[1]

Canons of St. Victor.[2]—From the point of view of theology and literature, the Canons of St. Victor hold the first place. Their founder, Guillaume de Champeaux, is known as one of the most illustrious doctors and professors of the 12th century. These canons take their name from a chapel erected in honour of St. Victor, the martyr of Marseilles, on Mt. Sainte Geneviève in Paris. They were, moreover, actually affiliated to the Canons of St. Victor of Marseilles. Their teaching reached its highest expression in the persons of Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, whose theological and mystical works may be counted among the most remarkable of the Middle Ages; while Adam of St. Victor, with his hymns, ranks foremost among the poets of his time. The Canons of St. Victor were established in a number of churches in France (notably in that of Ste. Geneviève in Paris, whence their name of 'Genovefains') and also outside France. St. Victor de Paris remained the centre of the institute. Unfortunately divisions soon arose within the order, and after the beginning of the 14th cent. it began to decline. On the eve of the Reformation it existed in a state of mere vegetation. The school of St. Victor is most important for the history of mediæval mysticism, and the works of its teachers are still of great value.

Like the greater number of canons regular, the Canons of St. Victor followed the Rule of St. Augustine, with their own special statutes composed by Gilduin, one of their abbots, and inspired to a great extent by the Rule of St. Benedict.

Canons of the Lateran. — The Augustinian Canons of the Lateran were founded shortly after the Lateran Council in 1059, and were attached to the celebrated basilica of St. Saviour in the Lateran. They possessed a considerable number of houses in Italy and Poland. They were obliged to leave the Lateran basilica for the first time in 1299, for the second and last time in 1471. They have to-day about 200 members and 24 houses and possess the Church of St. Peter ad Vincula in Rome.[3]

[1] The Rule of St. Augustine is divided into twelve chapters and contains only general principles (of an extremely elevated character) on the love of God and our neighbour, humility, prayer, fasting, duties towards the sick, purity of soul and body, obedience, etc.

[2] Cf. J. M. Besse, 'Augustins,' in *Dict. de Théol. cath.*, i. col. 2472–2483.

[3] Thomassin, *op. cit.*; Bonaventure de Sainte-Anne, *Monachatus Augustini ab Augustino potissimum propugnatus*, Lyons, 1694; Louis Ferrand, *Discours où l'on fait voir que Saint Augustin a été moine*, Paris, 1689; Leclercq, 'Chanoines,' in *DACL* iii. col. 223 ff.; J. Bingham, *Origines Eccles.*, London, 1840, bk. vii. ch. ii. n. 9; A. Ebner, 'Zur Regula canonicorum des heiligen Chrodegang,' in *RQ* v. [1891] 81–86; W. Schmitz, *Sancti Chrodegangi, Metensis episcopi (742–66) regula canonicorum, aus dem Leidener Codex Vossianus latinus 94 mit Umschrift der tironischen Noten herausg.*, Hanover, 1889; P. Paulin, *Études sur l'ordre canonial ou l'ordre des chanoines réguliers*, Avignon, 1885; Paul Benoit, *La Vie canonique dans le passé et dans l'avenir*, Arras, 1902; G. Morin, 'Règlements inédits du S. Grégoire VII. pour les chanoines réguliers (en Espagne),' *Revue Bénédictine*, xviii. [1901] 177–183 (reproduced in Hefele-Leclercq, v. 94–96).

[1] M. Dupré, *Annales breves ordinis Prœmonstratensis*, Namur, 1886; C. L. Hugo, *S. ordinis Prœmonstratensis Annales*, pt. i., Nancy, 2 vols., 1734–36; J. de Sermaize, 'L'Ordre de Prémontré: son hist. littéraire, ses écrivains,' in *Revue du monde cath.* xxiv. [1884] 728–746; I. van Spilbeeck, *De Viris sanctitatis opinione illustribus ex ordine Prœmonstratensi*, Tamines, 1895; cf. bibliography of the Order of Premonstratensians in F. Danner, *Catalogus totius sacri, candidi, canonici ac exempti ordinis Prœmonstratensis*, Innsbruck, 1894, pp. 7 ff., 130 ff.; J. Le Paige, *Bibliotheca Prœmonstratensis ordinis*, 2 vols., Paris, 1633; the Constitutions, Rule, etc., in Le Paige, i. 784, and Holste-Brockie, *Codex Regularum monasticarum et canonicarum*, v. 142 ff.; Hélyot, *Hist. des ordres*, ii. 156 ff.; Heimbucher, ii. 50–69 (with bibliography); Dugdale, *Monasticon Anglicanum*, vi. ii. 857–863; U. Chevalier, *Répertoire des sources hist. du Moyen Age: Topo-bibliographie*, Montbéliard, 1894–1903, *s.v.* 'Prémontré'; cf. note 3, p. 697[a].

[2] Heimbucher, ii. 26 ff.; and 'Victor (saint),' in Wetzer-Welte, *Kirchenlexicon*², xii. 913 ff.; Hélyot, ii. 149 ff.; Fourier-Bonnard, *Hist. de l'abbaye royale et de l'ordre des Chanoines réguliers de Saint-Victor de Paris*, Paris, 1904; *PL* clxxv.-clxxvii.; F. Hugonin, *Essai sur la fondation de l'école de Saint-Victor de Paris*, Paris, 1854, and *PL* clxxv. pp. xiv–xcix; B. Hauréau, *Les Œuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor*, do. 1886; Adam de S. V. Lejay, *RHLR* iv. [1899] 161 ff., 288; Dreves, *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, xxix. [1885] 278 ff., 416 ff.

[3] Besides Hélyot, Heimbucher, Chevalier (*s.vv.* 'Latran,' 'Chanoines réguliers'), see P. Cavalieri, *Biblioteca compendiosa degli uomini illustri della congr. de' canonici regolari del SS. Salvatore Lateranensi*, Velletri, 1836.

Canons Regular of St. Maurice. — The congregation of Canons Regular of St. Maurice of Agaune in Switzerland owes its fame to the martyrs of the Theban legion. An abbey existed at Agaune from the 6th cent., in close relation with that of Lérins and having, like the latter, the custom of the *laus perennis*. In 824 the monks were transformed into canons regular—an event of frequent occurrence at that time.[1]

2. Brothers of the Common Life.—This religious society, like that of the Beguines and the Beghards, forms a class apart in the history of the religious orders. From some points of view, it would seem to belong to the monastic order, from others, again, to that of the canons regular. In any case it forms one of the most interesting pages in the history of mediæval religious life and mysticism. It is treated separately under the title BRETHREN OF THE COMMON LIFE.

3. Beguines and Beghards.—These congregations originated in the Low Countries. According to some, they go back to the time of St. Begga, daughter of Pepin de Landen, in the 7th century. But it seems that their founder was, in reality, a priest of Liége, Lambert Beghe (or 'le bègue,' † 1187).

The Beguines are not nuns or 'religious' in the strict sense, for they take no vows. They are simply pious women living in community. In certain towns a special quarter was given up to them. They lived there in little hermitages, sometimes singly, sometimes several together, under the direction of a superior (known nowadays as 'la grande dame'). They had a common chapel, in which they met for their religious exercises. Some followed the Rule for the tertiaries of St. Francis, others that for the tertiaries of St. Dominic. The Reformation in the 16th cent. and the French Revolution put an end to many *béguinages*. Some, however, still exist in Belgium, Holland, and Germany. This institution never had a very wide vogue, but it presents certain original characteristics worthy of note.[2]

The institution of the Beghards was founded for men on the analogy of the Beguines. They soon underwent the influence of the Lollards and other heretics, and were condemned by several popes and councils.[3]

4. Military orders and hospitallers.—In the 11th cent. sprang up a new class of religious orders which, from a certain point of view, are connected with the monastic order, while possessing their own marked characteristics. Some of these were purely military in character; others were concerned also with the care of the sick (hospitallers). The hospitallers pure and simple form a third category, which will be treated apart.[4] The military orders were regarded by the Church as true religious orders. They had the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, celebrated the divine office, were under the discipline of a Rule and an observance of fasts and abstinence, and enjoyed the same privileges as the monks, being exempt from episcopal jurisdiction and immediately subject to the Holy See. Some followed the Cistercian statutes, others the Rule of St. Augustine, and others that of St. Benedict. It is for this reason that we regard them as belonging, in a sense, to the monastic order. Contemporary with the Crusades, their principal object was to fight against the Saracens and to protect the Christian pilgrims to the holy places. Their life may, in fact, be regarded as a permanent crusade against the Musalmān. In these orders, at their origin, we have united in one the ideal of the monastic life and of the life of chivalry of the Christian knight. This ideal stood them in good stead in an age when all institutions were so profoundly imbued with the spirit of religion. Unfortunately such an ideal proved to be too high, and elements so incongruous as the religious and the military could not long endure together.

Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem.—This is the most ancient of all the military orders. In 1048 some Italian merchants built a hospice or hostelry for pilgrims and for the sick in Jerusalem. Certain French noblemen who served it formed themselves into a religious congregation. This was the cradle of the order. Gérard de Tenque (of Martigues in Provence) organized it into a military order, *i.e.* an order in which there were brethren attendant on the sick and members who were knights, and who had as their special object to defend pilgrims against malefactors and infidels. The order was approved by Pope Pascal II. in 1113 under the name of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Later its members were known as the Knights of Rhodes and, later still, Knights of Malta, from the fact that they defended both these islands against the Musalmān. Foundations were soon established along the shores of the Mediterranean, and at one period of their history they possessed houses to the number of 13,000.

The knights acquired a wide-spread influence and power and also considerable riches, which enabled them to serve as money-agents or bankers to princes and kings.[1] They rendered great services to the Christian religion, and their prowess in the wars against the Turks won them great renown. Their heroic defence of Rhodes and of Malta against an enemy six times their number forms a veritable epic. The most illustrious of their grand masters were Pierre d'Aubusson, Villiers de l'Isle Adam, and La Valette. Napoleon confiscated their property in France, and Nelson annexed Malta for the English Government. The title of Knights of Malta still exists as a title of honour. Those who bear it form a society and give themselves to works of charity.

Knights Templars.—Although of more recent date than the Knights Hospitallers, the Templars soon became of greater importance and greater power. Their founder was Hugues de Payens, a French noble, who in 1118 gathered together a number of companions for the defence of the pilgrims to the Holy Land against the Saracens. The name of Templars, or 'Order of the Temple,' was given to them because their house in Jerusalem was built on the site of the Temple of Solomon. St. Bernard, in 1128, drew up a Rule for them, adapted from the Rule of St. Benedict and the Statutes of Cîteaux. The order comprised the knights (all of whom had to be of noble birth), 'sergeants,' who were of the bourgeoisie and who acted as esquires, and then the chaplains. The first grand master was Hugues de Payens.

[1] Helyot, ii. 78 ff.; Heimbucher, ii. 24 ff.; Chevalier, *s.v.* 'Saint-Maurice d'Agaune'; *DACL*, *s.v.* 'Agaune,' i. col. 850 ff.

[2] P. Coens, *Disquisitio historica de oriene Beghinarum et Beghinagiorum*, Liége, 1629; J. L. von Mosheim, *De Beghardis et Beguinabus*, Leipzig, 1790; Helyot, viii. 1 ff.; Heimbucher, iii. [illegible] ff., Chevalier, *s.v.* 'Béguines.'

[3] Natalis Alexander, *Hist. ecclesiastica*, Venice, 1778, viii. [illegible], F. A. Zaccaria, *Thesaurus Theologicus*, do. 1762, iv. [illegible], Mosheim (see above, note 2); Chevalier, *s.v.* 'Bégards.'

[4] We shall say nothing here of the secular orders of knighthood that were founded more or less on the model of the military orders but were in reality purely civil and instituted by kings and princes as a reward for the services of their subjects. Such, *e.g.*, are the Orders of the Garter, the Bath, the Thistle, etc.

[1] L. F. de Villeneuve-Bargemon (Marquis de Trans), *Monumens des grands-maîtres de l'ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem*, 2 vols., Paris, 1829; J. Delaville Le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers en Terre sainte et à Chypre*, do. 1904, *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem*, 4 vols., do. 1894–1905, *Les Archives, la bibliothèque et le trésor de l'ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem à Malte*, do. 1877 ('Bibl. des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome,' xxxii.), *Mélanges sur l'Ordre de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem*, Nantes, 1910, *L'Hospital des Bretons à Saint-Jean d'Acre* (Soc. des bibliph. bretons), do. 1880.

The order was purely military. We need not here enlarge on the great part played in mediæval history by the Knights Templars, on the influence which they wielded far and wide (they had in the 12th cent. 9000 manors distributed through every land in Christendom), on the services which they rendered to Christianity against the Saracens in Palestine and in Egypt, the riches which they accumulated and which were the cause of their downfall, the abuses which crept into the order, or, finally, their lamentable end under Philip le Bel and Clement V. after the cruel execution of their grand master, Jacques de Molay, and his companions in 1307.[1]

The Templars were succeeded in Portugal by the Order of Christ, and in Spain by the Order of Montesa.

Other orders were founded on the model of the Templars and the Hospitallers, but we shall speak only of the principal of these lesser orders—the Teutonic Knights, the Knights of St. James, and the Knights of Calatrava and Alcantara.

Teutonic Knights.—About 1128 or 1129 a rich merchant of Germany who had taken part in the siege of Jerusalem, struck with compassion at the sight of the sufferings of the pilgrims, built a hospital for them, in honour of the Blessed Virgin. He was soon joined by others, with whom he organized an order on the model of the Hospitallers of St. John, to care for the pilgrims and protect them against the Saracens. After the capture of Jerusalem by Saladin they were constituted one of the military orders (1190 or 1191) and changed their name from 'Hospitallers of the Blessed Virgin' to 'Teutonic Knights of the Hospitality of the Blessed Virgin.' They adopted a Rule similar to that of the Templars and the Knights of St. John. The order was composed of knights with their servants, esquires, and chaplains.[2] To the three vows of religion the Teutonic Knights added a fourth—to devote themselves to the care of the sick and of pilgrims, and to combat the enemies of the faith. They celebrated the divine office and other prayers, and were under a severe discipline. At the head of the order was the grand master, and under him the grand commander, the marshal, who was the lieutenant of the grand master in battle, and a grand hospitaller, who supervised the hospitals under the care of the knights. The members of the order were always of German nationality. The knights took part at first in the struggle against the Saracens, then joined forces with another military order, the Knights of the Order of Christ in Livonia, which had been founded to fight against the pagan nations of the Baltic. While thus devoting themselves specially to the war against these pagans, they did not cease to take a part in the Crusade against the Saracens in Palestine. The emperors of Germany, Frederick I. and Frederick II., gave the order their protection and endowed it with vast possessions.

When at the time of the Reformation the grand master became a Lutheran, the order was divided, one part following the grand master in his apostasy, the other taking up the cause against the Protestants. The order fell from its first fervour, and Napoleon took measures to abolish it in 1809. It still survives, however, as an order of hospitallers in Austria. There are 20 professed knights, who are bound to celibacy, and 30 knights of honour, not so bound. Both classes of knights must be of noble birth. The grand master is always one of the imperial archdukes. The order has charge of 50 parishes, 17 schools, 69 hospitals, for the service of which it supports two congregations of priests and four of sisters. Its members also do ambulance work in war-time. There is a Protestant branch of the order in Holland.[1]

Other military orders were founded at the same time in Spain and in Portugal, on the model of the above, in order to fight against the Moors. That of Aviz in Portugal arose in 1147, in the reign, it is believed, of Alfonso I. The knights followed the Rule of St. Benedict in its Cistercian interpretation. They were known at first as the 'New Soldiers,' then as the Knights of Evora, and finally of Aviz. Their campaign against the Moors was conducted with success.

The **Order of St. James of Compostella** was founded to protect the pilgrims to the shrine of that saint against the brigands and the Moors. Those of Calatrava and Alcantara had also as their aim to make war against the Moors.

The **Order of Calatrava** owed its origin in 1158 to a Cistercian abbot who became its first grand master, his monks being transformed into knights. It remained in union with Cîteaux and was victorious against the Moors. Unfortunately its members took part in the civil and political contests in Spain and ended by falling completely into the power of the Spanish kings, ceasing to be a religious order and becoming an honorary order of knighthood. Meanwhile it became united with the Orders of Aviz and Alcantara. The latter, founded probably in 1156, also followed the Rule of St. Benedict and was affiliated to Cîteaux. The knights also made war on the Moors, but, like the Order of Calatrava, they took part in politics and ended, like them, in becoming a courtly order of knighthood.[2]

Among less celebrated orders are the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, which claimed to go back to the time of St. Helena; the Order of Christ or of the Sword, founded by Guy de Lusignan, king of Jerusalem, for the defence of Cyprus against the Turks; the Sword-bearers, founded in Livonia to fight against the heathen in that country; the Order of the Cross or Army of St. Dominic, against the Albigensians; the Order of St. Thomas of Canterbury, an offshoot of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, for the service of pilgrims in England, etc. The innumerable orders of knighthood founded by kings and princes in order to confer honour upon and to reward their dependents were not religious orders and do not belong to our subject.

The **Order of St. Lazarus**, of which St. Basil was the reputed founder, and which was united with that of St. Maurice de Savoy for the care of lepers, had several dependencies and annexes in Palestine and was also an order of military hospitallers. It acquired its military character after the first Crusade, and resembled closely the Templars and the Knights of St. John. This order constructed a vast number of leper-houses

[1] C. G. Addison, *The Knights Templars*[3], London, 1852; L. Blancard, 'Documents relatifs au procès des Templiers en Angleterre,' in *Revue des Sociétés savantes*, vi. [1867] 414–423; P. Bourdillon, *Recherches historiques sur l'ordre des chevaliers du Temple*, Geneva, 1834; J. Delaville Le Roulx, *Documents concernant les Templiers*, Paris, 1883; L. Delisle, 'Mém. sur les opérations financières des Templiers,' in *MAIBL* xxxiii. ii. [1889] 1–248; P. du Puy, *Hist. de l'ordre militaire des Templiers*, Brussels, 1751; F. C. Woodhouse, *The Military Religious Orders of the Middle Ages*, London, 1879; cf. full bibliography in Chevalier, *s.v.* 'Templiers.'

[2] It was the custom at that time for knights to be accompanied, when on horseback, by esquires to serve and assist them.

[1] E. Lavisse, 'Chevaliers teutoniques,' in *RDM* xxxii. [1879] 319–340, 794–817; J. Voigt, *Gesch. des deutschen Ritter-Ordens*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1857–59; [(G. E. J. de) Wal], *Hist. de l'ordre teutonique*, Paris and Rheims, 1784–90; Chevalier, *s.vv.* 'Teutoniques' and 'Porte-Glaives.'

[2] For Alcantara cf. *Bullarium ordinis militiæ de Alcantara*, Madrid, 1759; Woodhouse, *op. cit.*; for Calatrava, *Bullarium ordinis militiæ de Calatrava*, Madrid, 1761; M. de Guillamas, *De las ordenes militares de Calatrava, Santiago, Alcantara, y Montesa*[2], do. 1858; Woodhouse, *op. cit.*; cf. Chevalier, *s.vv.* 'Alcantara,' 'Calatrava,' 'St. Jacques.'

(or 'lazar-houses') in France and in the other countries of Europe.[1]

The **Order of Mercy** presents an analogous case. Founded in 1218 by James, king of Aragon, for the relief of Christian captives and their deliverance from the hands of the Moors, it also became a military order and ended by dividing into two bands—the knights joining the military order of Montesa and the clerics and lay brethren the Order of Trinitarians (see below, p. 706).

Hospitallers (non-military).—These orders were exclusively concerned with the care of the sick. We can name only the principal ones here.

The **Hospitallers of the Order of the Holy Ghost** were founded by a certain Guy at Montpellier and were approved by Innocent III. in 1198. They devoted themselves, from their foundation, to the care of the poor and the sick. The order was confined at first to Languedoc; then it spread to other provinces and founded hospices in Italy, Spain, Poland, Hungary, and Scandinavia. There were hospitals belonging to it in most of the larger towns in France. Dijon possessed one with 40 dependencies; Marseilles had 30, etc. The historian of the order, Brune, has discovered 26 hospitals of the Holy Ghost in Germany, 11 in Austria-Hungary, 6 in Poland, 8 in Belgium, 40 in Denmark, 35 in Sweden and Norway, 110 in Spain, 18 in Portugal, nearly 280 in Italy, nearly 400 in France—*i.e.* nearly 1000 for the whole order. The hospitals of the Holy Ghost at Montpellier and at Rome are souvenirs of these foundations.[2] There were, besides the hospitallers, sisters of the order who had the care of foundling children, for whom they showed a solicitude that was truly maternal.[3]

The **Jesuati** offer certain curious characteristics. They were founded in 1360 by John Colombini, who showed so extraordinary an example of zeal and penance in Siena. He gave to the members of his society as their aim the practice of mortification and the love of their neighbour, especially by means of care shown to the sick and burial of the dead. At first its members were simple lay brethren. But Paul V. ordered them later to have a priest or two ordained for each house. Their name Jesuati came from the device of the society, 'Live Jesus.' They were also known as Hieronymites, and recognized St. Jerome as their patron.[4] Their constitutions were at first based on the Rule of St. Benedict and later on that of St. Augustine. They were suppressed in 1668.

There were **Jesuatesses** also, or **Sisters of the Visitation of Mary**, who were founded at the same time as the Jesuati, and who were remarkable for their practice of penance.

One of the most curious among the orders of hospitallers is that of the **Congregation of the Blind** in Paris, Chartres, and other towns in France. St. Louis gave them a hospital in Paris for 300 blind—the Hospital for 'Quinze-vingt Aveugles' (15 × 20 = 300).

The **Frères pontifes**, founded at Avignon in 1177 by St. Bénézet, were also hospitallers, and took their name from their special work of building bridges over streams and rivers for the convenience of travellers. They also built hospices for pilgrims and for the sick near the bridges and ferries. The famous bridge of St. Bénézet on the Rhône at Avignon was constructed by them.[1]

The **Alexians**, or **Cellites**, were founded in Flanders about the middle of the 14th cent., while the Black Death was raging, in order to care for those struck down by the plague. Originally they formed a society of simple laymen, but later they took solemn vows and were governed by the Rule of St. Augustine. They established houses in Flanders, in Brabant, and on the banks of the Rhine. In 1854 the order was restored at Aix-la-Chapelle and was given new statutes. There were also Cellitine nuns, or 'Black Sisters,' who are in existence at the present day.

The **Brothers of St. John of God** were founded at Granada in 1540 by the saint of that name. They adopted the Rule of St. Augustine and devoted themselves exclusively to hospital work. They had such success that in Spain, in the time of Urban VIII., they were in possession of 79 hospitals. They had others in Italy, France, and other countries. Divided at first into two sections—one under the general of Granada, the other under that of Rome—they were united in 1878. At the present day the order possesses 9 provinces and 103 hospitals with 14,562 beds. There are 1572 members.[2]

With the Brothers of St. John of God must not be confused similar congregations, some of them called by the same name, such as the Brothers of Montabaur, the Brothers of Mercy of St. John of God, the Brothers of St. John of God. These others were all local societies founded in the 19th cent., and have not the same importance as the Brothers of St. John of God strictly so called.

Two other congregations, the **Brothers of St. Hippolytus**, founded in the 16th cent. in Mexico, and the **Bethlehemites**, founded in Guatemala in 1655, were devoted, like the Brothers of St. John of God, to the care of the sick and also to educational work. The first of these societies still possessed 120 houses in 1885; the second was suppressed in 1820.

The **Camillians**, who were also occupied with the care of the sick, are treated below. There are, besides, a large number of other communities of hospitallers, mention of which will be found in Hélyot and Heimbucher.

III. *THE MENDICANT ORDERS.*—1. **Dominicans.**—(*a*) *Origin.*—The founder of the Dominicans, St. Dominic, was born in 1170 at Calaroga in Old Castile. He was thus only twelve years in advance of St. Francis of Assisi. He made a thorough study of theology at the University of Palencia, and in 1195 became a canon of Osma and gave himself to the work of preaching. He associated himself later with the reform of those canons upon whom the bishop imposed the Rule of St. Augustine. We find him next in close relation with the papal legates sent against the Albigenses, in the south of France, and it was there that his future vocation was to be decided. He preached against the heretics, not only by word of mouth, but also by his example of evangelical poverty. It was then that St. Dominic conceived the idea of founding a religious order for the conversion of the Albigenses—an order consecrated to the work of prayer, preaching, and

[1] Gautier de Sibert, *Hist. des ordres royaux, hospitaliers et militaires de Saint-Lazare de Jérusalem et de Notre Dame du Mont-Carmel*, Paris, 1772; cf. E. Vignat, *Les Lépreux et les chevaliers de Saint-Lazare de Jérusalem*, Orleans, 1884; L. Camario, *Dei Templieri e della loro abolizione, degli ordini equestri di S. Lazaro, etc.*², Firenze-Torino, 1868.

[2] Brune, *Hist. de l'ordre hospitalier du Saint-Esprit*, Paris, 1892.

[3] L. Lallemand, *Hist. des enfants abandonnés et délaissés*, Paris, 1885, p. 411 ff. This writer refers also to a number of hospitals of the same class served by other orders.

[4] The name 'Hieronymite' was borne also by an order of hermits founded in the 14th cent. which played an important part under Cardinal Ximenes. It was into one of the monasteries of these hermits at St. Just that Charles V. withdrew from the world. Philip II., who made use of them in the evangelization of the Indies, built the Escorial for them. The same name was also given to certain minor congregations in Italy.

[1] Brugmer-Roure, 'Les Constructeurs de ponts au moyen âge' (in *Bull. monumental*, iii. [1875] 225-249, 401-441); H. Grégoire, *Recherches historiques sur les congrégations hospitalières des frères pontifes*, Paris, 1818; 'Die Kirche und der Brückenbau im Mittelalter,' in *Hist. polit. Blätter*, lxxxvii. [1881] 89-110, 184-194, 245-259.

[2] A. Konig, 'Der Orden und die Genossensch. der barmh. Bruder,' in *Charitas*, i. [1896] 146 ff., 170 ff.; Hélyot, iv. 131 f.; Heimbucher, ii. 245 ff., 'Die barmherzigen Brüder.'

the study of divine things. In 1215 he went to Rome and obtained from Pope Innocent III., during the 4th Lateran Council, the approbation of the new order. The saint returned several times to Rome at a later period, and obtained fresh approbation from Honorius III. and also numerous privileges for his order. The order developed rapidly, and convents were founded in France, Spain, and Italy. During one of his journeys in Italy St. Dominic had a meeting with St. Francis, in whom he recognized a true spiritual brother. He died at Bologna on 6th Aug. 1221.

(*b*) *Constitution.* — The Dominicans follow the Rule of St. Augustine, with which St. Dominic had become acquainted while a canon of Osma, and with which he combined the usages of the Premonstratensians, who hold a place in the first ranks of the canons regular. From this point of view, the Dominicans form an order that is essentially clerical and hence differs from the monastic order. Their principal object is preaching, with which, as a logical consequence, was soon united the exercise of the sacred ministry and teaching in the schools. Unlike the monks, the Dominicans have no bond of stability to unite them to any particular monastery; they may be sent from one house to another as necessity or utility may dictate. Like the Franciscans, they are mendicants, *i.e.* they are forbidden to possess property and depend for their maintenance upon Christian charity. They are governed by a master general and the general chapter—an institution borrowed by St. Dominic from the Premonstratensians. The constitution of the order already established at the general chapter of Bologna in 1220 was confirmed by Jordan of Saxony and his successors. At the head of each convent or priory is the prior, at the head of each province the provincial. The general chapter is held every three years. It is composed alternately of provincials and definitors or delegates from each province, and has very wide powers. The general is elected by both provincials and definitors united in chapter—originally for life, now only for twelve years. He resides at the Convent of the Minerva in Rome. The provincials are elected by the provincial chapters composed of the priors of the province and delegates from each convent. Each house must have at least twelve members, and the prior is elected by the community for a term of three years. He has under him a sub-prior. The priors are confirmed in office by the provincial, the provincial by the master general. The actual constitutions given to his order by St. Dominic were curtailed and rearranged in better order by St. Raymund of Pennafort, and they are added to and completed by the decisions of the general chapters.

(*c*) *Studies.*—The Dominican Order gave itself from an early date to the study of theology. The general chapter of 1248 instituted four provinces—those of Provence, Lombardy, Germany, and England—in order to found, in these regions, a *studium generale* at the four cities of Montpellier, Bologna, Cologne, and Oxford. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas greatly promoted the element of study by the brilliancy of their renown. Each province was obliged to send two students every year to the *studium generale.* The convent of the Jacobins in Paris (situated in the Rue St. Jacques) soon formed the chief centre of Dominican studies. In each convent there was also a *studium particulare.* In 1259 the general chapter of Valenciennes (of which Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas were members) laid the foundations of a system of studies for novices and lectors to last eight years—two years of philosophy, two of fundamental theology, Church history and canon law, and four for the study of scholastic theology. At the end of this course those who merited it received the title of *lector.* After seven years of lectorate the student became *magister studentium,* then bachelor, and finally *magister theologiæ*—a degree equivalent to that of Doctor of Theology. For merit in preaching the title *prædicator generalis,* equivalent to that of Master of Theology, was bestowed.

The life of the Dominican is one of austerity, implying perpetual abstinence, fasting, and other practices of asceticism—silence, life in community, and the divine office in choir. His chief work is preaching and teaching.

In 1231 the Dominicans had a Chair of Theology at the University of Paris. They were the first of the mendicant orders to arrive at Oxford in 1221—the Franciscans did not come there till 1224, the Carmelites till 1254, the Austin Friars till 1268. They soon possessed chairs at Bologna, Padua, Salamanca, Cologne, Prague, and Vienna. Their activity as theologians and preachers was directed principally against the Jews, Moors, and Albigenses. They also played an important part in the tribunals of the Inquisition.

There are no fewer than 152 commentaries written by Dominicans on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and nearly 200 on St. Thomas. Under their influence colleges of Oriental languages were founded for the study of Hebrew and Rabbinic.[1]

(*d*) *History.*—In 1214 St. Dominic founded in Rome the convent of Santa Sabina, which has remained a centre of Dominican life. In Paris he founded the monastery of St. Jacques—whence the name of Jacobins by which his sons were sometimes known. He founded other houses also at Bologna, Seville, and other places in Spain. After his death the order continued to make rapid progress, and soon reckoned eight provinces — Spain, Provence, France, Lombardy, the Roman Province, Germany, England, and Hungary. Later, foundations were established in Norway, Sweden, etc. Under the generalate of Jordan of Saxony († 1237) a great advance was made. This master general founded nearly 250 houses in Europe, Asia, and the north of Africa, and received more than 1000 members into the order. At the beginning of the 14th cent. the order had 562 houses in 21 provinces—in Germany alone there were 49 houses of men and 64 of women. In 1821 the pope granted to the mendicant orders the privilege of preaching and hearing confessions in any church without having to obtain the special permission of the bishop of the diocese.

During the course of the 14th cent. the era of decadence set in, brought about chiefly by the Great Schism, which divided the order into two 'obediences,' each with its rival general chapter and master general. Unity, however, was restored in 1409, and from the time of the schism efforts were made at reform. To one of these reforms belong Fra Angelico and St. Antoninus from the cloister of Fiesole, as well as Savonarola. Another reform was started in 1389 by Raymund of Capua, in which St. Catherine of Siena took part. This reform had success in Italy and Germany. In the 15th, 17th, and 18th centuries reformed congregations arose in different countries —in Holland, the province of Toulouse, Brittany, Provence, and Italy. The best known of these reforms was that established in France by Lacordaire (1850), who won for himself a special place in the history of the order.

To the Dominican Order belong a considerable number of saints, authors, theologians, preachers, and artists. To those already mentioned we may add here St. Hyacinth, Peter of Tarentaise (who

[1] On Dominican studies cf. P. Mandonnet, in *Dict. de Théol. cath.*, *s.v.* 'Frères Prêcheurs (Les Etudes chez les),' vi. col. 863 ff.

became Innocent V.), John the Teuton, Humbert de Romans, St. Ceslaus, St. Vincent Ferrer, etc. The order numbers among its members four popes, 80 cardinals, and a large number of archbishops and bishops.[1]

(*e*) *The Second Order.*—This order, founded for women by St. Dominic at Prouille in 1206, also follows the Rule of St. Augustine together with special constitutions. The sisters devote themselves to a life of prayer, silence, and manual labour in the cloister. Some writers give as the real date of the foundation of the Dominican nuns that of the establishment of their first convent in Rome, the Convent of San Sisto (1219). The Second Order spread rapidly.

(*f*) *The Third Order.*—The Third Order of St. Dominic comprises a number of different societies of brethren and sisters, some of whom are 'regular,' *i.e.* live in community and follow the religious life, others 'secular,' *i.e.* live in the world. It is impossible to go into their history here.[2] The best known among these societies is the 'Third Teaching Order of St. Dominic,' which was founded by Lacordaire in 1852, and had the direction of the famous colleges of Arcueil, Oullins, Sorèze, etc.

2. Franciscans. — Under the general title of Franciscans, Order of St. Francis, or Friars Minor, may be reckoned all those 'religious' who recognize St. Francis of Assisi as their founder. They are divided into a number of different groups—the result of the divisions that took place among the sons of the saint almost as soon as he was dead, and even during his lifetime.

(*a*) *Origin.*—St. Francis, born at Assisi in 1182, is one of the saints who have exercised the most profound influence on the interior life of the Roman Catholic Church. The son of a rich draper, in his youth he lived a somewhat dissipated life, but, being converted and in consequence cast out by his father, he gave himself to a life of voluntary poverty, depending for his support upon alms. His beautiful and fertile nature, his wonderful gifts, his generosity and heroic sanctity attracted numerous followers. The society thus constituted received an unwritten approbation from Innocent III. in 1209; in a few years' time it numbered thousands, and was spread all over the world in order to carry on the work of preaching the gospel of poverty and the love of God. In 1212 Clare, a daughter of one of the noblest families of Assisi, associated herself with this apostolate and founded the Poor Clares, the Second Order of St. Francis. In 1219, according to tradition, was founded an order for lay folk, who were thus affiliated to the Franciscans, while remaining in the world. This was the Third Order of St. Francis, which soon also numbered its thousands and exercised a vast influence far and wide. Francis himself longed to go and preach the gospel to the Saracens and thus gain the crown of martyrdom, but the divisions that so soon arose in his religious family obliged him to give up the idea and to return to Italy. He received the stigmata in 1224 on Mt. Alverno and died on 3rd Oct. 1226.[3] The name by which the Franciscans are usually known, that of Friars Minor, was given to them by St. Francis himself from motives of humility and is based on the words of his Rule: 'et sint minores et subditi omnibus.'

(*b*) *Rule of St. Francis.*—The first Rule of St. Francis is very simple. It was approved by Pope Innocent III. in 1209, but underwent frequent modifications in the chapters or general councils of the order held by the saint every year. During his journey in the East the order underwent a grave crisis, in consequence of which St. Francis drew up in 1221 another Rule, more complete than the first. This is known under the very incorrect title of 'First Rule' of St. Francis. The saint twice modified or rewrote this Rule, and it was solemnly approved by Honorius III. in 1223. Its most striking characteristic is its insistence on the practice of poverty in its most absolute form, not only by each 'religious,' but by the community. The friars could possess no fixed revenues, but lived upon the voluntary offerings of the faithful.

In 1242 fresh difficulties arose concerning the Rule. An authorized interpretation was given by the four chief authorities of the order, at the head of whom was Alexander of Hales. This did not, however, prevent the formation of two parties in the order—the Rigorists and the Mitigated. St. Bonaventura, who was minister general from 1257 to 1274, belonged to the latter party. The Rigorists, who called themselves 'spirituals,' ended by denying to the Church the right of interpreting the Rule of St. Francis and so fell into schism. The friars of the Mitigated Observance took for their distinctive title that of 'Conventuals.' The popes, Nicholas III. (1279), Martin IV. (1283), Clement V., and John XXII. (1317), were obliged to interfere in order to regulate the question of the observance of poverty, the source of all the divisions in the order. A party among the spirituals formed themselves into an independent congregation under the name of 'Poor Celestine Hermits'—a tribute to Pope Celestine V., who favoured them. Angelo Clareno, chronicler of the order, and Ubertine da Casale, also famous among Franciscans, belonged to this party. Under John XXII. part of the order took up the cause of Louis of Bavaria, and were even on the point of forming a schism with an anti-pope at their head.

(*c*) *Foundation of 'the Observance.'* — In 1334 certain hermitages and convents were established in Umbria and the Marches, in which the observance practised in the lifetime of St. Francis himself was revived in all its austerity. These houses belonged to what was called 'the Observance,' and the friars were called 'Observants.' St. Bernardine of Siena, St. John Capistran, and St. James of the March belonged to this branch of the order. The Observants, kept in the background under Benedict XIII., Alexander V., and John XXIII., succeeded in gaining their cause at the Council of Constance in 1415.

The other branch of the order, in which the primitive austerity had been mitigated, and whose members were known as 'Conventuals,' strove to form a reaction against the Observant element. All attempts at reunion came to nothing, and the two parties continued the strife against each other, sometimes with great violence, by means of pamphlets, lampoons, etc. In 1517 Leo X. made a new effort to reunite the divided order at the *capitulum generalissimum* of the Ara Cœli. The bull 'Ite et vos' only succeeded in accentuating the division

[1] B. M. Reichert, *Monumenta ordinis Fratrum Prædicatorum historica*, 11 vols., Rome, 1896–1904; T. M. Mamachi, *Annales ordinis Prædicatorum*, do. 1756; A. Danzas, *Études sur les temps primitifs de l'ordre de Saint-Dominique*, Poitiers, 1873–85; A. T. Drane, *Hist. of St. Dominic*, London, 1890, *The Spirit of the Dominican Order*, do. 1896; *Analecta ordinis Fratrum Prædicatorum*, Rome, 1892 ff.; *L'Année dominicaine*, Paris, 1860 ff.; J. A. Flaminius, *Vitæ patrum ordinis Prædicatorum*, Bologna, 1529; de Smedt, *Introd. generalis ad Hist. eccl.*, Ghent, 1876, p. 372 ff.; Helyot, iii. 108 ff.; Heimbucher, i. 93; 'Literatur über den Dominikanerorden'; Chevalier, *s.v.* 'Dominicains.'

[2] Cf. Helyot, iii. 235 ff.; Heimbucher, ii. 169 ff.

[3] L. Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, 8 vols., Lyons and Rome, 1625–4, 19 vols., Rome, 1731–45; D. Gubernatis, *Orbis Seraphicus*, 3 vols., Rome and Lyons, 1682–89; *Bullarium Franciscanum* (ed. Sbaralea, Rossi, etc.), vols. i.–iv. Rome, 1759–68, vols. v.–vii., ed. C. Eubel, do. 1898–1904; *Monumenta Franciscana* (Rolls Series), ed. J. S. Brewer, 2 vols., London, 1858–82; *Analecta Franciscana*, Quaracchi, 1885–97; *Documenta antiqua Franciscana*, do. 1901 ff.; *Études franciscaines* (periodical), Paris, 1899 ff.; Heimbucher, ii. 308, 'Literatur über den Franziskanerorden'; de Smedt, p. 375 ff.; Chevalier, *s.v.* 'Franciscains.'

by creating two distinct branches of the order—the Observants, with whom were united all the other reformed congregations under the title of 'Friars Minor of the Regular Observance,' with a minister general of their own, and the Conventuals, or 'Friars Minor Conventual.'

(*d*) *Capuchins, Discalced, Reformati, Recollects.*—New divisions soon arose in one or other of the two branches. Among the Observants arose in Spain the Discalced under St. Peter of Alcantara, in Italy the Amadeans (Blessed Amadeus de Silva) and the Poor Hermits of Angelo Clareno. But the most important of all these reforms is that of the Capuchins under Clement VII. in 1530, to whom we shall return shortly. Besides these were the Recollects, so called from their convents named 'recollection-houses,' where a stricter observance of the Rule was practised, and where the more fervent withdrew to renew their spiritual vigour.

The Conventuals also had their difficulties and their efforts at reform. Whole provinces broke off from them and attached themselves to the Observants. Nevertheless they continued to hold their own in Italy, France, Switzerland, and other countries. At Assisi it is the Conventuals who have the guardianship of the tomb of St. Francis and at Padua that of St. Antony.

The Capuchins, however, were destined to become the most prosperous of all the branches of the order. They were founded in 1525 by an Observant friar called Matteo di Bassi. In spite of the strong opposition directed against them from the first and the miserable end of their second founder, Louis of Fossombrone, who was turned out of the order, they continued to prosper and to spread abroad, in France, Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, etc. Their constitutions were approved by Urban VIII. in 1643. The name Capuchin, derived from their long pointed hood, has remained their characteristic title. Pius X. restored closer relations between the three Franciscan families—the Friars Minor of the Leonine Union, the Conventuals, and the Capuchins.

(*e*) *Activity of the order.*—In spite of its divisions and internal strife, the Order of St. Francis has taken an important part in ecclesiastical history. A number of bishops, cardinals, and even popes, have come forth from its ranks. Many of its friars have filled confidential posts at the courts of kings and popes and have been directors of their consciences. St. Francis carried on the apostolate among the infidels by preaching and by his own example. In 1230 the Franciscans founded a house in Jerusalem. Later they evangelized the north of Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Russia, Scandinavia, and Lapland. The travels of John of Plano Carpinis in 1247 in Mongolia, of William of Rubruck in Tartary and Tibet, of Odoric of Pordenone in China are well known. Not less known is the mission of John of Parma, sent by Innocent IV. to bring about reunion with the Eastern Churches. In India Thomas of Tolentino was martyred in 1321. The friars were the first to set out for the New World. In the 17th cent. the Capuchins were in the Congo, Brazil, Abyssinia, and the Levant. In the front ranks of the adversaries of the Albigenses, the Vaudois, and the Patarins we find the Friars Minor. St. John Capistran is celebrated for his opposition to the Hussites in 1456; St. Fidelis of Sigmaringen and many others were martyred by the Protestants in Switzerland, England, Holland—in the latter country we have the martyrs of Gorkum. A considerable number of Friars Minor have gained renown as preachers and missionaries—*e.g.*, St. Antony of Padua, St. Bernardine of Siena, St. James of the March, Joseph of Leonissa, St. Leonard of Port Maurice, Bernardine of Feltre, Ladislaus of Gielnow, Angelo d'Acri, etc. There were also theologians and savants among them.

In the early days of the order there was a certain degree of hesitation regarding the question of study. The spirituals were entirely opposed to it, but St. Francis never showed himself hostile. As long as the interior spirit of his children was not thereby endangered, study might well find its place in their life. Hence we find at an early period Franciscans teaching in the universities of Bologna, Paris, and Oxford. Certain houses, called *studia*, were established, as among the Dominicans, for purposes of study. The various branches of the order have produced a large number of theologians and of mystical and ascetical writers, whose names will be found in the works cited in the literature below.[1]

(*f*) *Minims.*—We may regard as belonging to the Franciscan order that of the Minims ('Fratres Minimi'), an order of mendicant friars founded in 1435 by St. Francis of Paula (Paola in Calabria) to whom he gave the name of Minims, or 'very little ones,' to teach them the spirit of humility and penance in which he wished them to live.[2] The Rule of the Minims does not differ in substance from that of St. Francis of Assisi, but is distinguished by greater severity. It was confirmed by Julius II. in 1506. Being called to France to assist at the last moments of Louis XI., Francis of Paula remained there till the day of his death, and his order took root in that country. It had a period of great prosperity, especially during the lifetime of the saint and the years immediately succeeding his death. At the beginning of the 16th cent. the order possessed 430 houses in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and even India. St. Francis of Paula, like his namesake and patron of Assisi, founded a second order for women and a third order for people living in the world.

3. Carmelites.—(*a*) *Origin.*—Long and fierce discussion has raged on the origin of the Carmelite order. From the time of the prophet Samuel there existed in Palestine a society whose members were known as 'the sons of the prophets' and who lived a quasi-monastic life as cenobites or hermits on Mt. Carmel. Among these pre-Christian monks lived Elias and Eliseus. The sons of the prophets disappear from the history of Israel before the fall of its kingdom, but in the 4th cent. of the Christian era (perhaps even in the 3rd cent.) Mt. Carmel was a place of pilgrimage for Christians. St. Basil and St. John Chrysostom, the great masters of the monastic life, represent Elias and Eliseus as the models of monasticism and as the ancestors of the Christian monks. Christian anchorites, moreover, had settled on Mt. Carmel as in other places in Palestine hallowed by their connexion with Biblical times, and early writers on the Carmelite order connect it through these hermits with the sons of the prophets and see in Elias and Eliseus the founders of the order. The Carmelite constitutions, their chronicles, their liturgy, and innumerable other documents unite in maintaining this tradition. The evidence on which it reposes is, however, without historical value (see the criticism of Zimmerman), and the negative argument—the silence of all pilgrims on the subject up to the 12th cent.—is of the highest significance.[3] It would appear that the Order of Mt. Carmel was in reality founded by St. Berthold about the year 1155. The pilgrim John Phocas (1185), Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela (1163), Jacques de Vitry, and others speak

[1] Cf. esp. U. d'Alençon, in *Dict. de Théol. cath.*, vi. col. 835 ff.
[2] Perhaps also in allusion to Mt 25^{40}.
[3] Cf. B. Zimmerman, 'Carmelite Order,' in *CE* iii. 354-370; 'Carmes (Ordre des),' in *Dict. de Théol. cath.*, ii. col. 1776 ff. On this discussion cf. D. Papebroch, *AS*, March, iii., and J. B. Pitra, *Études sur la collection des Actes des Saints*, Paris, 1850. It lasted thirty years and is not yet over, although the Holy See, in 1698, imposed silence on the rival parties.

of Berthold and the hermits who lived with him in Carmel under the patronage of Elias. The patriarch of Jerusalem, Albert de Vercelli, gave them a Rule which was a literal transcription of the Rule of St. Augustine. The hermits were to elect a prior, to live in separate cells, and give themselves to manual labour. They met together for the divine office in their oratory. Their life was, in fact, a blending of the cenobitical and eremitical elements, like that of the early monks and of the Camaldolese, Carthusians, and similar foundations of the 11th and 12th centuries.

Foundations were made from Carmel at St. Jean d'Acre, Tyre, Tripoli, and Jerusalem. They were, however, in part destroyed by the Saracens, some of the hermits suffering death at their hands. Other colonies were founded in Cyprus, in Sicily, at Marseilles, at Valenciennes, and in England. St. Louis of France paid a visit to Carmel in 1254 and brought thence with him some of the hermits whom he established at Charenton.

(*b*) *Migration to Europe.*—A new phase in the history of the Carmelite Order is marked by its migration to Europe. At the first chapter held at Aylesford in England St. Simon Stock, an Englishman, was elected general (1247–65). He modified the primitive Rule to a certain extent, and obtained for the order in 1247 an interim approbation of Innocent IV. The order was finally approved by the Council of Lyons in 1274, though not without some difficulty on account of the decree of the Lateran Council in 1215 which forbade the foundation of new orders. It now underwent a new development. Foundations were made in the towns; community life took the place of solitude; and various mitigations were introduced into the primitive Rule. The solitaries were transformed, in fact, into mendicant friars and obtained the privileges attached to the existing mendicant orders. The original title of 'Fratres Eremitæ de Monte Carmelo' or 'Eremitæ sanctæ Mariæ de Monte Carmelo' was changed into 'Fratres Ordinis B. M. de Monte Carmelo.' St. Simon Stock, the great partisan of the active life, founded houses in Oxford, Cambridge, London, York, Paris, Bologna, Naples, etc., choosing cities that possessed universities or schools, in order to secure instruction for his young 'religious' and also to obtain recruits for the order among the students. But this new and rapid development was not without its dangers; and, when St. Simon Stock died, he left to his successor a difficult situation to cope with. The latter, Nicholas Gallicus (1265–71), was opposed to the active life and wished to bring back the order to a more contemplative ideal, but was obliged to resign his office. In an unedited work entitled *Ignea Sagitta* he denounces strongly the practice among the Carmelites of preaching and hearing confessions. The order continued, however, to develop in this direction. It met with great success in England, where the kings themselves founded houses. Many of its members were in their confidence and carried out important missions for their royal masters. Among these was Thomas Walden, who accompanied Henry VI. to France. The English Carmelites never accepted the reforms introduced into other provinces of the order, as they were always well and strongly organized. Under Henry VIII. the greater number submitted to the Act of Supremacy and separated themselves from the other branches of their order. Only two of the English friars remained faithful, and suffered martyrdom for their faith. The submission of the others, however, did not prevent the suppression of their order in England, the plunder of their possessions, and the dispersal of their libraries. At the time of the Reformation there were 39 Carmelite monasteries in England.

(*c*) *Constitutions and studies.*—The earliest constitutions of the Carmelite order are those of 1324, but it seems that an earlier redaction existed in 1256. The constitutions of 1324 divide the order into 15 provinces according to the different nations. At the head of all is the general, elected by the general chapter. At each of these chapters he was obliged to give an account of his administration, and was then either confirmed in or deposed from office. His ordinary place of residence was Rome, and he had two assistants chosen by himself. The general chapters were held at first every three years, then every six years, and even as rarely as once in sixteen years. In England the court usually contributed towards the expenses of the general chapter—the journey, horses, hostelries, etc. The provincial chapter chose the definitors for the general chapter. It was the business of those officials to receive reports on the administration of the provinces, to confirm or depose the provincials, to audit the accounts, to nominate the professors for the universities, to revise existing laws and add new ones, and to reward or punish members of the order according to their merits or demerits. The acts of the general chapters of the past exist only in a fragmentary condition and, such as they are, have been published. The provincial chapter, which was usually held once a year, was composed of all the priors or vicars of the province. Four definitors were chosen at the chapter. These officials exercised in the province the same duties as those exercised by the definitors general in the whole order. They had power to depose the priors, to choose those who were to be sent to the houses of study (*studia generalia* or *particularia*) or to the universities, and to decide on the foundation of new houses. Each house had its prior, assisted by a vicar. The administration of the prior was controlled by three guardians. He could be confirmed in office every year, indefinitely. Certain monasteries were set apart for the study of philosophy, others for that of theology. In 1324 there were eight *studia generalia*—Paris, Toulouse, Bologna, Florence, Montpellier, Cologne, London, and Avignon. Their number increased until at last every province had its house of studies. The number of Carmelite students in Paris averaged 300, in London more than 100. Some students went through a short course only, others remained as long as twelve years in the universities. It may be said that the order, from its approbation at the Council of Lyons up to the Great Schism, continued to develop steadily. There were certain abuses against which the general chapter itself continually raised its voice, such as the entrance into the order of poor students who came for the purpose of pursuing their studies gratis, the seeking of ecclesiastical benefices or posts of honour outside the order by certain of its members, the attempts of superiors to make their office perpetual or the fact that they showed favour to nephews or other relatives. Again, the professors in the universities dispensed themselves from choir, took their meals outside the monastery, caused the lay brethren to wait on them as their servants, etc.

A first attempt at reform was made at Mantua in 1413 and embraced 52 houses. Another took place under the general John Soreth (1351–71); another at Albi in 1499, which issued from that of Mantua. In 1514 we have the reform of Mt. Olivet near Genoa; in 1604 that of Rennes, modelled on St. Teresa's reform, the last by far the most important (see below). The reform of St. Elias, or the Italian congregation inaugurated at the instance of Clement VIII., established itself in Genoa, Rome, and Naples, and also in France, Germany, Austria, Poland, and Lithuania. In

1731 this reform numbered 4193 members. It gave greater scope for activity and the exercise of the sacred ministry than the Spanish reform.

(*d*) *St. Teresa's reform.*—St. Teresa († 1582), assisted by St. John of the Cross, founded at Avila a convent in which a more austere observance of the Rule was carried out in the practice of poverty, penance, and the contemplative life. The account of her subsequent foundations and of the reforms carried out by her in several Carmelite convents, both of nuns and of friars, will ever remain unique in the annals of the religious orders. This reform was introduced into France by Madame Acarie (Blessed Marie of the Incarnation) and by the celebrated Cardinal de Bérulle. It has always possessed in France a special character of its own and has always been very prosperous. Among its most celebrated members are Louise de la Miséricorde (Louise de la Vallière), Thérèse de St. Augustin (Madame Louise, daughter of Louis XV.), and Anne of Jesus.

(*e*) *Affiliated members.*—The Carmelite Order has also its affiliated members. Several communities of Beguines in the 15th cent.—notably those of Gueldre and Dinant—were affiliated to the order and thus originated the Carmelite nuns. From these, foundations were made in France, Italy, and Spain. As among the Dominicans and Franciscans, there is a third order, of whose members some live in the world, while others live in community.

(*f*) *Missions.*—The Carmelites had some flourishing missions in America (Mexico, Peru, Florida, Rio de Janeiro, Guadeloupe, San Domingo). St. Teresa, although her great object was to bring back the contemplative life to her order, favoured missionary activity on behalf of heretics and pagans. In 1604 the reformed Carmelites sent a mission to Persia, which succeeded in establishing itself at Baghdad, at Basra, and in India. Flourishing missions were also founded at Bombay and at Goa; others in China, Turkey, Armenia, Syria, and North America. The Carmelite nuns of Spain founded convents in S. America—in the Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Among the Carmelite missionaries there were several martyrs. Colleges existed for the missionaries, which contributed towards the foundation of the famous Congregation of Propaganda at Rome.

(*g*) *Desert convents.*—An institution peculiar to the Carmelite order is that of the 'deserts,' or convents where the purely contemplative ideal was carried out. This institution owed its foundation to the memory of the eremitical life led by the early members of the order on Mt. Carmel and to the passages of the Rule and constitutions that encourage the contemplative life. In these and in other documents this form of life was recommended for certain convents to be founded apart from towns or cities, in forests or desert places. The idea of the 'desert convents' properly so called seems to have been originated by Thomas of Jesus, Discalced Carmelite of Spain. Certain of the brethren in these convents were destined to remain there always, but the greater number came only for a year and then returned to the houses whence they had come. The first 'desert' was founded in 1592 at Bolarque on the banks of the Tagus in New Castile, and soon after one was founded for every province. The total number was 22. These 'deserts' followed the plan of a charterhouse, and the life resembled that of the Carthusians, but was even more severe. The practice of strict silence, fasting, and other penitential exercises were held in honour. Attached to each 'desert' were separate hermitages, where the brethren could retire to lead a life more completely solitary even than that of the 'desert' itself. There were also anchorites and recluses attached to some convents, among whom were Thomas Scrope of Norwich and the Blessed Jeanne de Toulouse.

(*h*) *Activity.*—We have seen that in many of their provinces the Carmelite friars gave themselves to the active ministry and to teaching in the universities. There, however, their influence was disputed by the Dominicans and Franciscans, who were already in the field—there was no room for a third school of thought. The Carmelites then, instead of creating a school of their own, followed the Dominicans and were rigorous Thomists. They have had among their numbers theologians of renown. St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross were founders of a school of mysticism which has produced some remarkable writers.[1]

4. Hermits of St. Augustine.—We have already dealt with the Canons Regular of St. Augustine and other congregations of canons who follow the Rule of that saint. Here we are concerned only with the hermits of St. Augustine. These hermits, sometimes called simply Augustinians, date from the 12th–13th century. At that period there were certain communities of hermits who, either then or subsequently, followed the Rule of St. Augustine. Chief among these were the Williamites (Guillemites) (founded by William of Malval in 1155, near Pisa), who were spread abroad in Italy, Germany, Belgium, and France. Besides these there were the Bonites (so called from their founder, the Blessed Jean Buoni, † 1249); the Brittinians (founded by St. Blasius de Brittinis in the Marches of Ancona in the 12th cent.); the Tuscan Hermits of the Blessed Trinity; the Brothers of the Sack (Fratres Saccati, Saccophori, Sacceti, Sachets), so called from the shape of their habit. The last were also known as the Brothers of Penance.

So many different congregations, leading what was practically the same life with the same object in view, needed to be brought together; and Alexander IV., on 4th May 1256, promulgated the bull 'Licet Ecclesiæ Catholicæ,' which united them all in a single order under the title 'Hermits of St. Augustine.' He exempted them from episcopal jurisdiction. A general chapter of all the superiors was held in Rome in 1256; the Rule of St. Augustine, together with special constitutions, was imposed upon the hermits; a superior general was elected; and the order was divided into four provinces—Italy, Spain, France, Germany. In 1567 Pius V. included it among the mendicant orders, giving it rank after the Carmelites. At the period of its greatest prosperity the order possessed 42 provinces and 2 vicariates, numbering 2000 monasteries and about 30,000 members. The title of 'Hermits' was not altogether appropriate, at least in the case of some of the now united congregations whose members practised the conventual life and had their convents in the midst of towns and cities.

In the 14th cent. efforts were made to reform certain abuses that had crept into some of the houses. New congregations also were founded—*e.g.*, that of Iliceto in 1385, that of St. John ad Carbonariam (in the kingdom of Naples) in 1390,

[1] *Bullarium Carmelitanum*, 4 vols., Rome, 1715–68; *Regulæ et Constitutiones ordinis B. M. de Monte Carmelo*, Brussels, 1506; J. B. de Lezana, *Annales ordinis B. M. de Monte Carmelo*, 4 vols., Rome, 1645–56; Mathias de S. Jean, *Hist. de l'ordre du Mont-Carmel*, 2 vols., Paris, 1658; A. Le Mire, *Carmelitani Ordinis Origo atque Incrementa*, Antwerp, 1610; Martialis a S. Joanne Baptista, *Bibliotheca Scriptorum utriusque Congregationis et Sexus Carmelitarum excalceatorum*, Bordeaux, 1730; [Villiers a S. Stephano] *Bibliotheca Carmelitana*, 2 vols., Orleans, 1752; B. Zimmerman, in *CE* iii. 354–370; *Dict. de Théol. cath.*, *s.v.* 'Carmes (Ordre des),' iii. col. 1776–1792; *DACL*, *s.v.* 'Carmes (Liturgie de l'ordre des),' ii. col. 2166–2175; Heimbucher, ii. 535; Chevalier, *s.v.* 'Carmes.'

the Congregation of Lombardy in 1430, that of Our Lady of Consolation, and others.[1] Two reforms of greater importance were effected in Spain: the first, in 1430, imposed on all the houses of Castile; the second, more austere, in 1588, that of the Discalced Augustinians or Recollects, extended to the Spanish colonies, the W. Indies, and the Philippines. There were reforms also in France, among which must be mentioned that of the 'Petits Augustins.' Some of these congregations had flourishing missions in the E. and W. Indies, in Mexico, Peru, China, Japan, and India. In Spain, where they were always more prosperous than in any of the other provinces, the reformed Augustinians were favoured by Philip II. Among celebrated Augustinians we may mention St. Thomas of Villanova, Panvini, Lupus, Lancillot, Noris, Luis de Leon, one of the greatest writers in Spain, and Florez.

From the 15th cent. onwards efforts were made by the Augustinians to bring about the reform of their order in Germany. One of these efforts at reform—that of Andreas Proles († 1503)—was extended under his successor Johann von Staupitz by the desire of the pope to all the Augustinian friars of N. Germany. Seven houses opposed the reform, among them the monastery of Erfurt, to which Martin Luther belonged. The apostasy of Luther brought about the ruin of the Augustinians in Germany. Many followed the arch-Reformer in his revolt against the Church. But some of these German Augustinians were, on the contrary, determined opponents of the Reformation. In 1526 the communities that had remained faithful to the Roman Catholic Church were united to the province of Lombardy.

In France the Revolution of 1789 struck another blow at the Augustinians and destroyed the greater part of the 157 monasteries, while in Spain the Revolution of 1835 closed 105 out of 153.

In recent years the Augustinians have begun to flourish once again. Leo XIII. endeavoured to bring about greater unity among them in 1896. New constitutions were drawn up, and the order was divided into 23 provinces, distributed among two congregations, and it numbers about 2300 members. In Rome the Augustinians possess the church of St. Agostino. The famous Angelica library formed by one of their friars, Angelo Rocca († 1620), is now a public library. They have also, at Genazzano, in the neighbourhood of Rome, a celebrated place of pilgrimage.

Other saints of the order worthy of mention are St. Nicholas of Tolentino († 1305) and St. John a S. Facundo († 1479). Among its members must also be reckoned a certain number of theologians, dogmatic and moral, of erudites, and of missionaries.[2] The Assumptionists, who form a branch of the Augustinian order, are treated below, p. 708[a].[3]

The bull 'Licet Ecclesiae Catholicae' which in 1256 united the Hermits of St. Augustine in a single order was not enforced against the nuns. Each convent remained autonomous. To this congregation belonged St. Juliana of Mt. Cornillon at Liége († 1258). The reform known as the Recollects was one of its branches.

After the four great mendicant orders come a number of others known as the lesser mendicant orders. We have given a list of these above (I. 5) and can speak here only of the principal ones. The greater number of them follow the Rule of St. Augustine.

[1] Cf. for details Heimbucher, ii. 186 ff.

[2] See [illegible] in Heimbucher, ii. 190 ff.

[3] A. [illegible], *Ordo Augustinianus*, Paris, 1672; Pierre de Sainte Hélène, *Abrégé de l'hist. des Augustins déchaussés*, Rouen, 1672; [illegible] ff., Heimbucher, ii. 177 ff., Besse, 'Augustin, Règle de S.,' in *Dict. de Théol. cath.*; Chevalier, *s.vv.* 'Augustins, [illegible],' 'Augustins, ordre d'ermites'

5. Trinitarians.—The Trinitarians (or Order of the Blessed Trinity for the Redemption of Captives) were founded by St. John de Matha and St. Felix de Valois, at Cerfroid in the diocese of Meaux, in 1198. The object of this order was to ransom the numerous Christian captives taken by the Moors and Muhammadans. Its members follow the Rule of St. Augustine, and the observance prescribed by their constitutions is very severe. The members were obliged to be ready to offer themselves as slaves to the Moors in exchange for the captives whom they desired to ransom. The Trinitarians were approved by Innocent III., and soon took root in France, Italy, Germany, England, Ireland, Spain, and later in America. The order possessed 800 houses. The name of Mathurins, by which the Trinitarians are sometimes known, came from their monastery of St. Mathurin in Paris. A reform of the order was inaugurated in Spain, that of the Discalced Trinitarians. Members of this order delivered 900,000 captives from the clutches of the Moors. Their work received the praise even of Voltaire. Since the Revolution the order has greatly declined. It possesses the Convent of St. Chrysogonus in Rome. The Trinitarians offered themselves to Leo XIII. for the work of ransoming the slaves of Africa.[1]

6. Order of Mercy.—Another order founded with the same object as the Trinitarians was that of Montjoie in Spain, but it had only a short existence (1180–1221) and was incorporated, after a term of 40 years, with the Order of Calatrava. In 1218, however, St. Peter Nolasco founded in Spain an order that was to become a rival of the Order of the Blessed Trinity. This was the Order of Our Lady of Mercy (de la Mercede), whence the name of Mercedarians, or Fathers of Mercy. Like the Trinitarians, the Mercedarians devoted themselves to the work of ransoming captives—those taken by the pirates of Barbary—and were occupied also in the service of the galley-slaves and in missions to the heathen. Their special field of operation lay in Morocco, whereas that of the Trinitarians was in Tunis and Algeria. The Order of Mercy was approved by Gregory IX. In origin it was a military order composed of knights, chaplains, and serving brethren. The name of St. Raymund Nonnatus is one that is quoted with pride by the order. The Rule of St. Augustine is followed, whence the Mercedarians have sometimes been reckoned among the Augustinians.[2]

7. Servites.—The Order of the Servants of Mary, or Servites, so called from their special devotion to the Blessed Virgin, was founded in 1233 on Monte Senario, near Florence, by seven members of seven patrician families of the city. The Rule is that of St. Augustine together with special constitutions which were approved in 1249. St. Philip Benizi was the fifth general of the order. It was on the point of being suppressed in 1274 in consequence of the edict of the 4th Lateran Council renewed by the 2nd Council of Lyons, but it was finally approved by Benedict XI. in 1304. It spread abroad in France, Spain, Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, and even as far as India. In 1910 the order numbered 700 members and 62 monasteries.[3]

[1] M. Gmelin, 'Die Literatur zur Gesch. der beiden Orden SS. Trinitatis und B. Mariae de Mercede,' *Serapeum*, XXXI [1870] 81–94, 97–110, 113–123, 129–140; Calixte de la Providence, *Corsaires et rédempteurs*, Lille, 1884; P. Deslandres, *L'Ordre des Trinitaires*, Paris, 1903.

[2] F. de Guimeran, *Breve Hist. de la orden de Nuestra Señora de la Merced*, Valencia, 1591; J. A. Gari y Siumell, *Bibliotheca Mercedaria*, Barcelona, 1875; Gmelin, in *Serapeum*, XXXI. 129–140; Hélyot, i. p. liii; Heimbucher, ii. 212 ff.

[3] *Chronicon rerum totius sacri ordinis Servorum B.M.V. ab an. 1233 ad an. 1566*, ed. Michaele Poccianti, Florence, 1567, [2] 1616; A. Gianius, *Annales sacri ordinis Servorum B.M.V.*, 2 vols., do. 1618–22, [2] Lucca, 1719–25; Hélyot, iii. 296–323;

Considered as belonging to the mendicant orders are also certain congregations of women which follow the Rule of St. Augustine. Chief among these are the following.[1]

8. The Brigittine Order, founded by St. Brigit of Sweden († 1373), resembles in some respects that of Fontevrault (see art. MONASTICISM, vol. viii. p. 796). In each convent there were 60 nuns governed by an abbess, who had also under her jurisdiction, in a separate house, 13 priests, 4 deacons, and 8 lay brothers. There were houses of the order in Norway and Sweden, Flanders, Prussia, Poland, Russia, and England. There exist now only 9 convents, 8 in Germany, Holland, and Spain, and 1 in England—the last a pre-Reformation foundation.

9. The Ursulines, founded at Brescia in 1537 by St. Angela Merici, devote themselves to Christian education. St. Charles Borromeo gave them his protection. They were very successful. In France alone in 1789 there were 350 convents with 9000 members. At present there are about 7000 nuns in some 300 convents scattered throughout the world.

10. Order of the Annunciation, or Annunciades.—This order is divided into three branches: the Annunciades of Lombardy (or Sisters of St. Ambrose), founded at Pavia in 1408, the Annunciades of Italy (or Celestial Annunciades), founded in 1604 near Genoa, the Annunciades of France, founded by the Blessed Jeanne de Valois († 1505), daughter of Louis XI.

11. Order of the Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary.—These sisters, who also follow the Rule of St. Augustine, deserve a place to themselves in the history of the religious orders, both on account of their founders, St. Francis de Sales and St. Jane Frances de Chantal, and on account of the special spirit of the order and the wonderful fervour shown by its members during the early years of the foundation.

IV. *CLERKS REGULAR.*—**1. Jesuits.**—In order of time the Theatines, Barnabites, and Somaschi rank before the Jesuits; but in number and importance in the history of the Church the Jesuits occupy without dispute the first place among the clerks regular. See art. JESUITS.

2. Theatines.—Founded at Rome in 1524 by St. Gaetano di Tiene († 1547) and the celebrated Cardinal Caraffa, afterwards Pope Paul IV. (1555), the Theatines are in order of time the first society of clerks regular. From his entry into the ranks of the clergy, Gaetano was possessed with the desire of forming a community of zealous priests for the service of God and the work of preaching. He founded first the Society of Divine Love, then that of the Theatines,[2] which closely resembled the former foundation, but had a stricter Rule. Its object was the renovation of the priestly and apostolic life by means of prayer, the practice of poverty, and study. All its members were to be priests. Poverty was to be observed to an extraordinary degree and in an altogether new manner. The society must possess no revenues, and must not ask alms like the mendicant orders, but simply accept whatever was offered to it. It was approved by Clement VII. in 1524, who gave to its members the privileges of the Lateran Canons. He decided, moreover, that the Theatines should take solemn vows, follow the Rule of St. Augustine, and elect their superiors every three years. Caraffa was the first superior elected. The sack of Rome by the soldiers of Charles V. obliged the Theatines to leave the city for a time and to establish themselves at Venice and at Naples. Towards the end of the 16th cent. they had houses in many of the towns of Italy. In the 17th cent. they were very numerous in France and in other parts of Christendom. They exercised a salutary influence on the reform of the clergy and of Christian society in general, by means of their preaching, teaching in the confessional, and visitation of the sick, and by prayer and study. They had missions in Armenia, Mingrelia, Circassia, etc. Their constitutions, drawn up by Caraffa, eventually underwent certain modifications. In 1588, at the incentive of Pope Sixtus V., a general was elected for the whole order. The general chapter is held at Rome every six years. Among their distinguished members must be mentioned, besides the two founders, Verano, St. Andrew Avellino, Tomasi, Merati, etc.[1]

3. Barnabites.—The Theatines served as a model for other congregations founded soon after and also having as their object the reformation of the clergy. Chief among these congregations are the Barnabites, founded in 1530 at Milan by St. Antonio Maria Zaccaria. Nowadays their mother house is at San Carlo in Catinari in Rome. To them were also conceded the privileges of the Lateran Canons Regular. The name Barnabite is derived from one of their principal houses at Milan, S. Barnabas.[2] See, further, art. BARNABITES.

4. Somaschi.—This order was founded in 1532 by St. Jerome Emiliani and devotes itself chiefly to the education of orphans and the care of the poor and the sick. Somascha was the hermitage where the founder wrote his Rule and whence the name is derived. The Somaschi endeavoured unsuccessfully to amalgamate with the Society of Jesus in 1547, and then with the Theatines; in the latter case they succeeded, but the union lasted only eight years. St. Charles Borromeo was one of their protectors.[3]

5. Camillians.—The Camillians were founded to care for the sick by St. Camillus de Lellis († 1614). They rendered the greatest service in the hospitals and became renowned for their courage and charity during the plague, cholera, and other epidemics that devastated Italy.[4]

6. Piarists, or Scolopes (a contraction of their full title 'Cleri regulares scholarum piarum').—This order was founded by St. Joseph Calasanz († 1648). Its special work, as its name indicates, was the education of children and, in particular, of poor children. It was founded at Rome, whence it spread abroad in Italy and in other countries.[5]

V. *RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS FROM THE END OF THE 17TH CENTURY AND SOCIETIES OF SECULAR PRIESTS.*—i. RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS.—**1. Passionists.**—The Passionists (Clerici Passionis D.N.J.C.) were founded to honour the Passion of Christ. Their founder, St. Paul of the

B. M. Mayr, 'Serviten,' in Wetzer-Welte², xi. 204 ff.; Heimbucher, ii. 218 ff.

[1] For congregations of women occupied with the education of girls see below.

[2] The name 'Theatine' comes from Theate (Chieti), a city of the Abruzzi of which Caraffa was bishop.

[1] J. B. del Tufo, *Hist. della religione de' Padri chierici regolari*, 2 vols., Rome, 1609–16; Hélyot, iv. 71 ff.; Heimbucher, iii. 258 ff.; A. F. Vezzosi, *I scrittori de' chierici regolari detti Teatini*, 2 vols., Rome, 1780.

[2] A. Sicco et V. Madii, *Synopsis de clericorum regularium S. Pauli decollati institutione*, Milan, 1682; F. M. Barelli, *Memorie dell' origine . . . ed uomini illustri in Lettere ed in santità della congreg. de' chierici regolari de S. Paolo*, 2 vols., Bologna, 1703-07; Stahl, 'Barnabiten,' in Wetzer-Welte², i. 2030 ff.; L. von Pastor, *Gesch. der Päpste*, Freiburg i. B., 1886–1913, iv. ii. 626 ff.; Hélyot, iv. 100 ff.; Heimbucher, iii. 270 ff.

[3] J. H. Sementius, *Cronologia della congr. dei Somaschi dal 1481 fino a suoi tempi* († 1702); Hélyot, iv. 223; Heimbucher, iii. 275 ff.; C. Kienle, *s.v.* 'Somasker,' in Wetzer-Welte², xi. 486 ff.

[4] C. Lenzo, *Annales religionis clericorum regularium ministrantium infirmis*, Naples, 1641; C. Solfi, *Compendio istorico della religione de' chierici reg. ministri de gli infermi*, Mondovi, 1689; Hélyot, iv. 263 ff.; Heimbucher, iii. 280 ff.; D. Regi, *Memorie istorice del ven. P. Camillo de Lellis e suoi chierici regolari*, 2 vols., Naples, 1676.

[5] D. M. Casasnovas y Sanz, *José de Calasanz y su Instituto*, Saragossa, 1904; Kniel, 'Piaristen,' in Wetzer-Welte², ix. 2096 ff.; A. Brendler, *Das Wirken der PP. Piaristen seit ihrer Ansiedelung in Wien im Kollegium in der Josefstadt*, Vienna, 1896; Hélyot, iv. 281; Heimbucher, iii. 287.

Cross († 1775), was known for his great austerities and his zeal for souls. Pope Clement XIV. gave them the famous Church of SS. John and Paul in Rome. The congregation is spread abroad in many lands of both the Old and the New World, and is divided into thirteen provinces with 1400 members. The Passionists give themselves to preaching and mission work.[1]

2. Redemptorists.—The Redemptorists (Congregatio SS. Redemptoris) have as their founder the celebrated St. Alfonso Liguori (*q.v.*; † 1787), whose great theological knowledge has won for him the title of Doctor of the Church, and who exercised great influence on the Catholic doctrine and piety of his time. The members of his congregation devote themselves to the work of preaching in the towns and country districts. Like the Passionists, the Redemptorists are spread all over the world. They number at the present time 4000, possess 215 colleges or hospices, and are divided into 29 provinces.

3. Oblates.—The Oblates (of Mary Immaculate) were founded by Mgr. de Mazenod, bishop of Marseilles, at the beginning of the 19th century. Their work is preaching, the education of the clergy, and foreign missions. They have at the present day 301 houses and 3110 members.[2]

4. Marists.—This congregation was founded at Fourvières in 1816. The members follow the Rule of St. Augustine together with special constitutions. Like the Oblates, their work is preaching and foreign missions.[3]

5. Assumptionists.—The Assumptionists were founded in 1850 at Nîmes by P. d'Alzon († 1880). Their activity is employed in the direction of pilgrimages, the press, mission work, the education of children, etc. They form a branch of the Augustinian Order, and their official title is 'Augustinians of the Assumption.'[4]

ii. SOCIETIES OF SECULAR PRIESTS.—With these congregations may be compared, as regards date of foundation, manner of life, and special object, certain societies of priests, either with or without lay brothers (coadjutors), who usually take simple vows or are bound only by a promise. These societies, like the above religious congregations, are employed in the education of the clergy, the study of sacred science, preaching, and, some of them, in foreign missions. They have community life, but not the choral office, and they are under episcopal jurisdiction.

1. Oratorians.—This congregation has played an important part in the history of the Counter-Reformation of the last few centuries. It is divided into two branches—the French and the Italian. In the Italian Oratory (to which that of England owes its origin) each house is autonomous and independent, while in the French Oratory they are united under a superior-general. The former was founded by St. Philip Neri in Rome, about 1575, as a society of secular priests devoted to the exercise of the sacred ministry and to study, under the title of 'Patres Oratorii.' Most illustrious among its many well-known members is the historian Baronius. The names of Aringhi, Bianchini, and Gallandi also deserve mention, while, in England, those of Newman and Faber have given immortal lustre to the Oratories of Birmingham and London. Their centre in Rome is the house of La Vallicella with its magnificent library. The French Oratory, founded by Cardinal de Bérulle in 1611, vied with that of Italy in carrying on the work of clerical reform, and presents us with names such as de Condren, Bourgoing, Lejeune, Jean Morin, Amelotte, Cabassut, Thomassin, Richard Simon, Guénin, Lamy, Malebranche, Lelong, Le Brun, Massillon, Houbigant, Quesnel, and Duguet. At the Revolution the French Oratory had 70 houses and 751 members. There were numerous colleges, seminaries, and parishes under its control. It was restored in 1852 and counts among its members Pétetot, Gratry, Perraud, Ingold, Largent, Baudrillart, Lecanuet, Laberthonnière, etc. It possessed houses also in Belgium and Spain. The Italian Oratory, besides its offshoot in England, has foundations in Spain, Austria, India, and America.[1]

The Lazarists, Eudists, and Sulpicians worked along with the Oratorians for the education and sanctification of the clergy, and exercised themselves in the sacred ministry, preaching, and mission work.

2. The Lazarists, founded by St. Vincent de Paul in 1625, took their name from the priory of St. Lazare in Paris, which had been handed over to them. They form a congregation under a superior-general with assistants, a general chapter, and visitors. They have missions in Abyssinia, Persia, Mexico, Chile, Tibet, Constantinople, and Palestine. They possess 240 houses and 3000 members.

3. The Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul, or Sisters of Charity, were founded by that saint with the assistance of Mlle. de Marillac (Madame Le Gras) in 1634. They are the largest of all the congregations of religious women and form an army of 35,000 members with more than 3600 houses. They are to be found in almost all the countries of Europe and America and in the greater number of the colonies. They nurse the sick and the poor in hospitals, orphanages, schools, etc.

4. The Eudists, founded by Jean Eudes at Caen in 1643, and dispersed at the Revolution, were afterwards brought together again and now number about 400 members.

5. The Sulpicians devote themselves exclusively to the training of the clergy. Their founder, M. Olier († 1657), belonged to that company of zealous priests who were the friends of St. Vincent de Paul and Père de Condren. In 1903 the Sulpicians possessed 24 seminaries in France and others in Canada and the United States. They number about 300.[2]

6. The Salesians, founded in 1859 at Turin by Don Bosco, are occupied with mission work and schools, especially for poor children in order to fit them for the different trades. They developed rapidly, and exercise a wide influence. At the death of Don Bosco 130,000 pupils had passed through the schools of the institute. In 1888 it had 956 members; to-day there are 4137. There are 34 provinces with 320 hospices, schools, oratories, orphanages, schools for the arts and crafts, seminaries, printing-presses, and mission-stations. The last are found principally in Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego, and other parts of S. America.

The Sisters of Mary, Help of Christians, or Salesian nuns, also founded by Don Bosco, are engaged in the education of girls, and number more than 2000. They have 250 foundations.[3]

[1] Heimbucher, iii. 309.

[2] R. Sarrat, *Die Kongregation der PP. Oblaten der U. J. Maria*, Hiltrup, [illegible] ff.; *Jahresb. der Missionare Oblaten*, do. 1891; *Annales de la cong. des missionnaires oblats*, Bar-le-Duc, 1891 ff.; Heimbucher, iii. 3[illegible] ff.

[3] [illegible], *L'Année de l'Église*, 1900, Paris, 1901; Heimbucher, [illegible]

[4] *Annales des Assomptions de l'Assomption*, Paris (periodical); Heimbucher, iii. 343.

[1] I. Marciano, *Memorie istoriche della Congr. dell' Oratorio*, 5 vols., Naples, 1693-1702; Helyot, viii. 12 ff.; Wetzer-Welte[2], ix. 2019 ff.; *Linzer Quartalschr. fur kath. Theol.* iv. 965 ff.; A. Perraud, *L'Oratoire de France au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle*[2], Paris, 1866; M. Adry, 'Gesch. der Oratorianer in Frankreich' (ed. H. Reuchlin), in *Zeitschr. fur hist. Theol.*, 1859; A. Ingold, *Bibliothèque oratorienne*, 13 vols., Paris, 1880 ff.; Helyot, viii. 53 ff.; Heimbucher, iii. 413 ff.

[2] Helyot, viii. 159 ff.; Heimbucher, iii. 442 ff.

[3] *Brevi notizie su Don Bosco e sulle opere Salesiane*, San Benigno, Cavanese, 1906; Heimbucher, iii. 491.

7. **Paulists.**—In 1857–59 Thomas Hecker, with a number of companions, left the Redemptorists, to whose congregation he belonged, in order to found a new missionary society—that of the Paulists—whose principal object should be the conversion of Protestants in America by means of sermons, lectures and public discussions, the press, and social work. The number of converts made by the society from 1898 to 1904 was 1485; in the year 1905 alone it exceeded 1000. The society has to-day about 100 members.[1]

There are many other less important societies of priests, formed on the above models. For a list of these see Heimbucher, iii. 519 ff.

VI. *MISSIONARY SOCIETIES.* — Many of the congregations enumerated in the preceding paragraphs possess, as we have seen, missions in infidel lands. Those with which we are now concerned, while closely resembling the above in their organization and manner of life, are dedicated either exclusively or at least principally to this foreign mission work.

1. **Society of the Foreign Missions.** — Most important among these is the Society of the Foreign Missions founded at Paris, Rue du Bac, in 1660–63, by Mgr. Pallu, Vicar Apostolic of Tongking, and Mgr. L. de la Motte, Vicar Apostolic of Cochin-China. During the Revolution the seminary was closed, but it was re-opened in 1820. At the present day the society possesses 34 missions, episcopal sees, vicariates, and prefectures apostolic, numbers among its members 34 bishops, 1700 European missionaries, 710 native priests, 6279 sisters, and has numerous colleges, schools, hospitals, and other establishments. It has, in all, 1700 European members. Before 1869, 26 of its members gained the crown of martyrdom. Its chief missions are in Manchuria, Tibet, Korea, China, and Japan.[2]

2. **The Society of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary** is better known as the **Fathers of Picpus** from the Rue de Picpus in Paris, where the mother house was opened in 1805 by the Abbé Coudrin († 1837). Its chief work was at first the education of poor children. It then became possessed of seminaries and finally took up mission work, and has missions in Oceania—the Marquesas Islands, New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, and Tahiti. The society numbers about 600, has 12,000 pupils in its schools, 350 mission stations, and 6 hospitals.[3]

3. **The Fathers of the Holy Ghost** were formed in 1848 by the amalgamation of the Society of the Holy Ghost (founded in 1707) with that of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, founded by François Libermann. They possess missions in Senegambia, French Guinea, Nigeria, Congo, Zanzibar, Mauritius, and Madagascar. They have also seminaries, of which the best known is the French Seminary in Rome. The statistics of the congregation give 1643 members, 9 missionary bishops, and 203 foundations.[4]

4. **The Congregation of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, or Fathers of Scheut,** was founded at the town of that name in Belgium in 1863. It is an exclusively missionary society. Destined principally for the mission in China and Mongolia, the society has nevertheless missions in a part of the Belgian Congo. In China more than ten of its members have already suffered martyrdom. The Fathers of Scheut take simple vows. They number at present nearly 600. In their different missions there are 66,000 Catholics, nearly 50,000 catechumens, 228 churches or chapels, and 291 schools with more than 8000 pupils.[1]

5. **The Society of Saint Joseph for Foreign Missions.**—In England Roman Catholics have also seminaries for missionaries. In 1866 Father (later Cardinal) Vaughan founded the above society of priests and laymen at Mill Hill near London. The field of their labours lies chiefly among the negroes of Africa, America, and the Indies. They have novitiate houses in the United States, Holland (Rosendaal), and the Tyrol (Brixen), where missionaries from every nation receive their training. They have missions in Madras, Borneo, Uganda, the Congo, the Philippines, and New Zealand, where they have already met with great success.[2]

6. **The Society of Our Lady of Africa in Algeria** was founded by Cardinal Lavigerie. This title speedily gave place to the popular name **White Fathers,** given to the missionaries on account of the white burnous and cassock worn by them. Their object is the evangelization of the pagan population of Africa. They have had a rapid success. Soon after their foundation in 1868 they established Christian colonies of native orphans gathered together by Cardinal Lavigerie, which resembled, to a great extent, the famous 'reductions' of Paraguay. Their missionary activity embraces the Sahara, Morocco, the Sudan, Central Africa, and Tunisia, and has extended beyond the confines of Africa as far as Syria and Palestine, not to mention their seminaries and colleges at Jerusalem, Carthage, Mechlin, Antwerp, Rome, Paris, Lille, Marseilles, etc. According to the latest statistics, they possess in these different countries 158 establishments, 1706 schools with more than 70,000 children, 310 charitable foundations, such as orphanages, hospitals, leper-houses, etc., where more than 800,000 sick persons, abandoned children, and old people are cared for. They number 880 members, among whom are 9 bishops and 350 sisters. Travellers who have visited their missions speak with great praise of their zeal and the success of their methods. Several of their missionaries have published interesting works on the language and customs of the tribes evangelized by them.[3]

7. **The Society of the Divine Word** was founded in 1875 by Arnold Janssen at Steyl in Holland. From its very beginning this society has been in the front ranks of mission societies. For the training of its missionaries it possesses a course of studies extremely well organized at Vienna, Rome, and elsewhere. The scientific works produced by its members on the language and religion of savage tribes have a very high reputation. They publish reviews in German, Spanish, English, and Chinese, of which the best-known is *Anthropos.* They also possess printing-presses.

There is a congregation of sisters attached to the society known as Servants of the Holy Ghost.[4]

8. **The Society of the Divine Saviour.**—Similar to the above society, this institute (also, like it, of German origin) was founded in Rome in 1881. It has missions in India, the United States, and Brazil (with 35 stations). There are also Sisters of the Divine Saviour or Salvatorian Sisters. This society has a printing-press in Rome for the printing and spreading of Catholic literature.[5]

[1] Heimbucher, iii. 498 ff.

[2] A. Launay, *Hist. générale de la Société des missions étrangères*, 3 vols., Paris, 1894, *Hist. des missions de l'Inde*, 5 vols., do. 1898, *Hist. des missions de Chine*, do. 1907–09; Heimbucher, iii. 458–466.

[3] Heimbucher, iii. 471 ff.

[4] *Die Kongr. der Vater vom Heil. Geist*, Cologne, 1906; J. B. Pitra, *Vie du vénérable serviteur de Dieu François Marie Paul Libermann*[3], Paris, 1882; Heimbucher, iii. 477 ff.

[1] Heimbucher, iii. 500 ff.

[2] *Die kath. Missionen*, xxxii. [1903–04] 241 ff.; *St. Joseph's Foreign Missionary Advocate*, Mill Hill, 1883 ff.; *St. Josefs Missionsbote*, Brixen, 1896 ff.; Heimbucher, iii. 502 ff.

[3] *Bulletin des missions d'Afrique des Pères blancs*, Paris; *A l'Assaut des pays nègres*, do. 1884; Heimbucher, iii. 504 ff.

[4] Heimbucher, iii. 510 ff.

[5] *Ib.* iii. 516 ff.

VII. *TEACHING BROTHERS AND CONGREGATIONS OF RELIGIOUS WOMEN.*—i. TEACHING BROTHERS.—Ever since the 17th cent. there has existed an apostolate for the education of the poorer classes. For this purpose new congregations have been formed whose members are simply 'brothers,' bound usually, and even by vow, to give up all idea of aspiring to the priesthood. These brothers take simple vows, sometimes only temporary, and their activity is consecrated to the work of teaching, and especially of educating the poorer classes of society.

The Brothers of the Christian Schools, or Christian Brothers (to give them the name by which they are commonly known), is the best known of these institutes. They were founded by St. John Baptist de la Salle (1681–84) and have since served as a model for many other societies of the same nature. Before the founder's time there had been several similar attempts, notably that of St. Joseph Calasanz, none of which was so successful. The success of the Christian Brothers is due, no doubt, in the first place to the sanctity of their founder, his wonderful power of initiative, the excellence of his educational methods, and the wisdom and solidity of the constitutions that he gave to his congregation. At his death in 1719, in spite of the opposition of the Jansenists, schoolmasters, and others, his institute numbered 274 brothers and possessed 27 houses and 122 schools with about 10,000 pupils. It spread rapidly beyond France and founded primary schools, schools for the arts and crafts, agricultural schools, orphanages, and young men's societies in England, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Austria, Africa, the United States, and S. America. In 1904 there were 15,472 brothers, 2019 schools, and 326,000 students. The superior-general and his twelve assistants are elected by the general chapter, which is composed (besides the above) of the procurator-general, the secretary-general, the procurator of Rome, the provincial visitors, deputies from each district chosen by the professed members, and sometimes former superiors or assistants. The twelve assistants form the ruling authority and are placed over the different nations.

It is unnecessary to do more than mention the names of the other institutes of teaching brothers, since all are formed on the model of the Christian Brothers of St. John Baptist de la Salle, pursue the same object, and make use of the same methods. Among the principal are the Irish Christian Brothers (an independent foundation), the Brothers of the Society of Mary, or Marianists, in France, the Brothers of Christian Doctrine in Lorraine, the Brothers of Christian Instruction founded by Father Jean-Marie-Robert de Lamennais, the Brothers of St. Gabriel, and those of St. Vincent de Paul in France, the Josephites in Belgium, etc. For those congregations and for their bibliography cf. Heimbucher, iii. 356 ff.

ii. CONGREGATIONS OF RELIGIOUS WOMEN.—The greater number of the older orders have seen arise side by side with them foundations for women subject to the same Rule and inspired by the same spirit. Thus we have the Benedictine nuns, the Cistercians and Trappistines, Franciscans, Carmelites, Augustinians, and Recollects, besides the various orders of canonesses. These foundations are usually in close connexion with and dependent on the orders to which they are affiliated and, as far as the Rule and constitutions are concerned, possess no original characteristics of their own.[1] But from the 16th cent. onwards we find that, apart from certain institutes already referred to in treating of the Salesians, the White Fathers, and others, the greater number of sisterhoods or societies of religious women that have arisen since that period are entirely independent of any existing order of men. These institutes deserve a special place to themselves in the history of religious orders, since many of them owe their foundation to original ideas, and possess in their annals many an interesting page. But in an article like the present it is impossible to enter into a detailed history or even to give a complete list of these congregations; a few of the principal names must suffice.

1. **The Sisters of Wisdom** were founded in the year 1703 by Grignon de Montfort. Like the Sisters of Charity,[1] they devote themselves to the education of the poorer classes, to the service of hospitals, and to every work of mercy. In number about 5400, they are to be found in nearly every one of the Christian nations. The centre of their congregation is at St. Laurent-sur-Sèvres.

2. **Sisters of Evron.**—This institute was founded in the 17th cent. at Evron in the department of Mayenne, France. Their work is chiefly the education of children, but they also look after the sick.

3. **The Sisters of Nevers** were founded in the 17th cent. by a Benedictine monk, J. B. de Laveyne. They devote themselves to the care of the sick and to the education of poor children. The institute numbers about 2200 sisters.

4. **The Sisters of the Good Shepherd** were founded in the 17th century. The congregation was re-organized at Angers by Marie de Ste. Euphrasie Pelletier and possesses houses of refuge for women and young girls. In 1906 they had 248 houses and 7400 members.

The beginning of the 19th cent. witnessed a wonderful increase in new foundations of religious women. We give here some of the most important.

5. **The Sisters of Nazareth** were founded in 1820 by Madame de la Rochefoucauld. They are an institute of teaching and nursing sisters. They have houses in France, Palestine, and Syria.

6. **The Little Sisters of the Poor** were founded at St. Servan in Brittany for the care of the poor and of the aged. In 1906 they had 5400 members occupied with the care of more than 40,000 sick or old people, in 290 hospitals.

7. **The Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus** was founded by Madame Barat († 1865) in Paris and has 142 schools and 6500 members.

8. **The Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny** were founded for the education of young girls and poor children by Madame A. M. Javouhey. In 1886 they had more than 300 houses (several of which are situated in missionary countries) and 4000 members.

For all those congregations cf. Heimbucher, iii. 370 ff., 555 ff.

VIII. *ORGANIZATION.*—1. **Internal organization.**—The constitutional history of the religious orders may be divided into two periods: (1) the 3rd to the 13th cent., and (2) the 13th to the 20th century.

(1) In the first period religious life presents an aspect of great simplicity and appears in only two distinct forms or types—the hermits, who lived alone, and the cenobites, who lived in community. Somewhat later we find certain forms of religious life in which the eremitical and the cenobitical elements were combined—*e.g.*, the Camaldolese, Carthusians, and Vallombrosians. The canons, especially in the earlier part of their history, are hardly to be distinguished from the monks (cenobites), at least as far as their constitution is concerned. The military orders form a

[1] We have drawn attention above (p. 707a) to certain exceptions—*e.g.*, the nuns of Fontevrault, the Brigittines, etc.

[1] For the Sisters of Charity see above, p. 708b.

class apart. They came into existence, moreover, only towards the end of this period, and may be regarded as an exceptional form of religious life. Hence it may be said that, during the first nine or ten centuries of its existence, the religious state was characterized by its uniformity. We find everywhere the same life either under the monastic (eremitical or cenobitical) or under the canonical rule. There are, as yet, no distinct 'orders' or congregations; each monastery forms, with its superior and various officials, a unit of its own, autonomous and independent of any higher monastic authority. The first attempt to unite monasteries together in a kind of federation was made in the 9th cent. by St. Benedict of Aniane.[1] But it was unsuccessful and can hardly be regarded as even the beginnings of a congregation. Cluny, in the 11th cent., had more success, and united those monasteries which accepted its reform in a very close union under the supreme authority of the abbot of Cluny as head of the 'order.' Under this authority the autonomy of the monasteries—of those, at least, that depended directly on the great abbey — almost completely disappeared. The reform of Cîteaux was inspired by a principle of centralization differing from that of Cluny, but tending towards the same result. The close union of monastery with monastery was assured by means of a hierarchical organization that submitted some houses to the authority of others, while the unity of the whole order was guaranteed by the institution of general chapters, visitors, and a superior-general. This tendency towards centralization continued and increased from the 13th to the 20th century.

(2) The second period presents certain new characteristics. In substance the religious life remains the same as in the earlier period, but new forms begin to arise. We have now the foundation of the mendicant orders, or friars, whose life is very different from that of the monks. The clerks regular, again, who came into being in the 16th cent., differ as much from the friars as the latter from the monks. Certain congregations founded during the period from the 16th to the 20th cent. —*e.g.*, the Sulpicians, Oratorians, and the various missionary societies—form a new class distinct from the clerks regular. The congregations of religious women founded independently of any of the existing orders of men are a still more striking development of the religious state. The tendency to centralization is emphasized more and more during the course of this period of history. The friars have a superior-general, general chapters, visitors, provincials. The monastery, which in the preceding period represented the unit of monastic organization, loses all autonomy. The superior of each convent is elected, generally speaking, every three years. Often the nomination of the officials, or at least of some of them, is not in his hands. He is, in fact, but the representative (and that for only a short period) of an authority whose seat is elsewhere. The 'religious' themselves are not permanently attached to any one house, but can be sent from one to another of the houses of the order. These houses are united to form a province under the authority of a provincial. The various provinces united together form the order, which is governed by a superior-general and a general chapter, composed, in most cases, of the provincials and delegates elected by each province. The centralizing process reached its perfection in the 16th cent. with the Society of Jesus (see art. JESUITS), which has served, at least in its general outlines, as a model for a great many religious orders and has even been adopted to a certain extent by some of the older orders.

At the same time, it must be remarked that this law of centralization was not absolute, and it must not be forgotten that at this time certain societies were founded—*e.g.*, the Sulpicians or Oratorians—in which the bonds of union between the different communities were, as in earlier times, of a more or less elastic nature. Besides this, the general tendency towards centralization did not exclude another tendency which, at first sight, would seem to be opposed to it—namely, the tendency to develop new forms of religious life. This is, in fact, one of the most striking characteristics of the period with which we are concerned.

Down to the 13th cent., as we have already seen, all 'religious' were either monks or canons, the latter scarcely differing at all in their mode of life from the former. In each monastery a similar life was lived and practically the same Rule was followed, and yet, thanks to that autonomy which was the law of primitive monasticism, each monastery (especially before the new state of affairs introduced by Cluny and Cîteaux) possessed its own special physiognomy. The foundation of 'orders' like the Camaldolese, the Carthusians, the Vallombrosians, and the orders of Fontevrault and of Cîteaux brought new ideas into the old conception of religious life. The hospitallers, military orders, and mendicant orders (Dominicans and Franciscans) accentuated still more the growing tendency to variety, so much so that a reaction took place, and councils and popes in the 13th cent. issued decrees forbidding all further foundations[1]—a vain attempt. The movement was too strong; first one, then another new order—the Carmelites leading—forced the hand of authority and obtained recognition, in spite of the decrees of councils and of popes.

From the 16th cent. onwards the older forms of religious life seem to have sunk into the background, and hardly a quarter of a century goes by without the foundation of a new order corresponding to every separate need of society. There are orders whose object is to combat the attacks of heresy, orders for the education of youth, orders for the care of the sick, preaching orders, missionary orders, etc. In the 19th cent. it seems as though every sluice-gate had been opened to the flood, and the multiplication of orders attained to such a pitch that fresh attempts were made at the Vatican Council to set a limit to this love of novelty. At the same time efforts were made to amalgamate different religious families having the same object and to reunite those which had been divided into different branches. Hence we see that the tendency (perhaps excessive) towards centralization was counterbalanced by a tendency equally strong towards an excess of individualism.

2. Laws.—The laws of each religious order are to be found in a species of code known as the Rule. We have already discussed in art. MONASTICISM the origin of the monastic Rules. The chief Rules are those of St. Basil, St. Benedict, that attributed to St. Augustine, and that of St. Francis. These four may be regarded as the source from which all later Rules have been derived and the greater number of religious orders have adopted one or other of them. But, since they are usually somewhat general in character—*e.g.*, the Rule of St. Augustine—or because it has become necessary to modify some of their prescriptions, each order or congregation possesses in addition to the Rule its own special usages called 'Constitutions,' which

[1] For those attempts and for the origin of the congregations cf. U. Berlière, 'Les Chapitres genéraux de l'Ordre St. Benoit avant le IVe concile de Latran (1215),' 'Les Chapitres généraux O.S.B. du XIIIe au XVe siècle,' in *Revue Bénédictine*, viii. [1891] 255–264, ix. [1892] 545–557, xviii. [1901] 364–398, xix. [1902] 38–75, 268–278, 374–411, xxii. [1905] 377 ff.

[1] The 4th Lateran Council (1215) and the 2nd Council of Lyons (1274).

have the force of law. It is these constitutions, in reality, that give to each order its special characteristics; hence to attempt a classification according to Rules is not practical. The best-known constitutions are those of the Dominicans, the Carmelites, the Capuchins, the Theatines, and the Jesuits.

3. **Dress and costumes.**[1]—It might be said with some justice that the existence of the various tendencies above referred to could be gathered from the history of the costume of the religious orders alone. From the earliest days a special dress was worn by those leading the religious life, and this soon became traditional. It consisted of a tunic, girdle, scapular with hood, and a cowl, stockings, and sandals; sometimes a kind of breeches were also worn. All these garments were of an inferior quality (see art. MONASTICISM). Naturally, considerable variety existed with regard to shape and colour. This costume was the rule for many centuries and remains so still for the older monastic orders, having undergone but slight changes and modifications in the course of time. The mendicant orders adopted the monastic dress in part—tunic, girdle, scapular, and hood, cowl, or mantle—but attached perhaps greater importance to the details of shape and colour than the early monks. It was the colour of their habit that often gave to these 'religious' the name by which they were popularly known. Thus the Carmelites were known as the White Friars, from the white mantle which they wore; while the Dominicans, who wore a black mantle, were called Black Friars. In our own day we have the White Fathers, as the missionary fathers of Algeria are called; while the Cellitines bear the name of Black Sisters, and the Beguines are called Grey Sisters or Blue Sisters, after the colour of their habit. Sometimes it is the shape of part of the habit that provides the distinctive title. Thus, as already mentioned, the Capuchins are so called from the special shape of the hood worn by them, the Friars of the Sack from the sack-like form and stuff of their dress.

Some orders attribute the special form and colour of their habit to a divine vision, as, *e.g.*, the Order of Mercy. Again, the return to a more strict observance of the Rule outwardly symbolized by the practice of going barefoot has given the title of 'Discalced' to the reform in the Carmelite order for men and women, and to a number of other orders or divisions of orders.

The military orders adopted a costume that was more in keeping with their character and only distantly related to that worn by the monks, with whom, however, they were connected by their rule of life. It was quite an innovation when the clerks regular, in the 16th cent., forsook the monastic habit together with so many other monastic observances and adopted the costume of the secular clergy.

With regard to the nuns and sisters, those who belonged to the older orders adopted, as was but natural, a form of the habit worn by the monks or friars. The later and modern congregations have, on the other hand, too often allowed themselves to be guided by mere fancy, apart from all tradition. On this point, it is said, the Vatican Council had also intended to introduce a reform.

IX. *ACTIVITY: SCIENTIFIC, LITERARY, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC; SERVICES RENDERED BY THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS, DIFFERENT WORKS.* — We have already seen in art. MONASTICISM that the monks had no special object in entering that state of life beyond their desire to lead a life in closer conformity with the spirit of the gospel. But by force of circumstances and from the fact that both manual and intellectual work had from the beginning a special place in monastic life, they were led to develop their external activity and thus to exercise considerable influence on society at large. The monastery became in most cases a centre of civilization as well as of religious life and often a flourishing city rose up around it. Many monasteries had their schools of literature, and of grammar, their song-schools, and their schools for the arts and crafts. Libraries that often became famous were formed in the cloister. It was in the monasteries that MSS were copied and preserved. Thus they were for centuries a refuge for the sciences and the arts. The clearing of forests, the making of roads, bridges, and canals, the cultivation of the wide lands that belonged to them—all this was the work of the monks. It was in the cloister, too, that the great missionaries who went forth to conquer the pagan world for Christ were trained—Augustine, Boniface, Adalbert, Anschar, and many others.

In the 13th cent. the social influence of the monastic order, which had begun to decline, passed to the newly-founded mendicant orders. The latter came into being at a period when Christian society, disturbed and upset by the errors of the Albigenses and other heretics, had begun its process of disintegration. Their object was precisely to arrest this process—in the case of the Dominicans, by means of preaching, and teaching in the schools; in the case of the Franciscans, by means of a living example of evangelical poverty and by the exercise of the sacred ministry among the people. The Carmelites, the Augustinians, and the other orders that rose between the 13th and 15th centuries had their part also in this good work. Other orders founded about this time had a more special object in view: for the Order of Mercy and the Trinitarians this was the redemption of the Christian captives taken by the Moors; for the military orders, the protection of pilgrims to the Holy Land and the war to be waged against the forces of Islām; for the hospitallers, the care of travellers, the poor, the sick, and those stricken with leprosy. In the 16th cent., and onwards till the 19th, the activity of the religious orders was extended still further. The Jesuits set forth to fight the battles of the Church with all her foes, by means of their preaching, their schools, and their spiritual direction. The Oratorians, the Sulpicians, the Eudists, and the Lazarists devote themselves more especially to the education of the clergy. The Theatines, the Barnabites, the Passionists, and the Redemptorists show them the example of an austere and holy life, and assist them in the sacred ministry. The missionary societies are spread abroad in every quarter of the globe, to bear the teaching of the gospel to the heathen nations. The teaching brothers and sisters give themselves to the education of the poorer classes of society—each order or congregation has its part to fulfil in the carrying out of the Church's mission on earth.

We may give here a résumé of the services rendered to religion and society by the religious orders. The mission work and that of preaching and teaching, carried out in the earlier period almost exclusively by the monks, the canons, and the secular clergy, is from the 13th cent. in the hands of the mendicant orders—the Dominicans, Franciscans, and others founded at that time. From the 16th cent. the clerks regular, the religious congregations, and missionary societies — Jesuits, Lazarists, Assumptionists, the Fathers of the Holy Ghost, etc.—extended far and wide the domains of the Church. It was especially in the 19th cent.

[1] P. Helyot and V. Philippon de la Madelaine, *Hist. complète et costumes des ordres monastiques, religieux et militaires*, 8 vols., Paris, 1839-42; cf. also Helyot and Bonanni, *opp. citt.*

that the missionary movement began to spread. It is estimated that in 1792 of every 557 men 174 were Christians. At the present day for the same number the proportion is 186 Christians. This progress is due to the activity of the missionaries.[1] Out of 18,000 missionaries 15,000 belong to different religious orders. Besides these must be reckoned 120 congregations of women with 53,000 sisters, of whom 10,000 are natives.[2] During the period of their prosperity the monasteries served as schools for children and youths. The 12th cent. saw the foundation of the universities, which soon gathered round their chairs of learning students from every part of Christendom. In these universities, after a long and violent conflict, the Dominicans, Franciscans, and Carmelites succeeded in gaining a foothold and became renowned for the brilliancy of their teaching. In the 16th cent. the Jesuits, especially as regards teaching in the secondary schools, are found at the head of the movement, while the societies of teaching brothers take up the work of teaching the children of the poor the elements of learning and the various trades. Other societies, again, like the Sulpicians or Eudists, are founded for the education of the clergy, and the congregations of women that continually arise devote themselves to that of young girls.

Study, the copying of MSS, and literary work of every description remain, to a great extent, the prerogative of the monks, but, as time goes on, the new orders of mendicant friars, and, later still, the clerks regular dispute this prerogative with them. Dominicans, Franciscans, Carmelites, Augustinians, Jesuits, Oratorians, Sulpicians, Barnabites, and Redemptorists—all these can quote among their members the names of theologians, historians, critics, mystical writers, and savants of outstanding merit.

Special orders or congregations are founded to preach the Word of God to the country people, too long neglected, or to the poorer population of the cities and towns—the Lazarists of St. Vincent de Paul, the Oratorians of St. Philip Neri, the Piarists, the Barnabites, the Redemptorists, the Passionists, etc.

From the 11th cent. onwards it is chiefly works of charity that absorb the activity of the religious orders. Full justice has been done to the work of mercy carried on in early times by the monasteries and to the liberal hospitality shown to pilgrims and travellers in the guest-houses and hostelries that abounded along all the roads leading to the important places of pilgrimage, such as St. James of Compostella, Rocamadour, Rome, etc., and which marked out the various stages on the way and were to be found especially near bridges and ferries.[3] Besides these there were houses of refuge, leper-houses, and other charitable establishments that depended on the monasteries, and abundant alms in money or in kind were regularly distributed at the monastery gates. To give one example alone: we find in the *Monasticon Anglicanum* and the *Notitia Monastica* a list of about 115 leper-houses in England and Scotland.[4] The 11th cent. and the centuries that follow up to the 15th, with the foundation of the orders of hospitallers already spoken of and of the 'Maisons-Dieu,' the 'Hôtels-Dieu,' the leper-houses, and other charitable institutions, form together a glorious chapter in the history of Christian charity.[5] But it is especially from the 16th cent. onwards that the activity of the religious orders in works of charity is seen at its greatest and is found ready to cope with almost every ill that human nature is heir to. Vincent de Paul, Camillus de Lellis, and John of God are counted among the greatest benefactors of the human race. As an example we may notice that the Brothers of St. John of God, popularly recognized in Italy as the 'Fate bene fratelli' or 'Benfratelli,' who, besides the ordinary vows of religion, bound themselves by a fourth vow to care for the sick throughout life, possessed from the 17th cent. and in the generalate of Granada alone 138 hospitals with 4140 beds, while in that of Rome they had 155 hospitals with 7210 beds.

In the province of charity the congregations of women exercise a more important office even than the orders of men. In 1904 the statistics give us 457,000 sisters throughout the world devoted to works of mercy—in charge of orphanages, homes, hospitals, houses of refuge for penitents and Magdalens, infant asylums, homes for the old, for consumptives, and for lepers, and many besides who are occupied with the service of prisons.[1]

This is a very incomplete résumé of the manifold activity of the religious orders, but the subject, to be fully treated, would require volumes.[2]

LITERATURE.—P. Hélyot and M. Bullot, *Hist. des ordres monastiques, religieux et militaires*, 8 vols., Paris, 1860 (orig. ed. 1714–19); the same as a dictionary: *Dictionnaire des ordres religieux*, ed. M. L. Badiche, 4 vols., do. 1858–59 (forming ser. i. vols. xx.–xxiii. of J. P. Migne, *Encyclopédie théologique*, Paris, 1844–66); M. Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche*[2], 3 vols., Paderborn, 1907–08, i. 71–84, 'Literatur über die Orden und Kongregationen'; cf. literature in art. MONASTICISM; W. Dugdale, *Monasticon Anglicanum*, new ed., 6 vols., London, 1817–30; L. Holste and M. Brockie, *Codex Regularum monasticarum et canonicarum*, 6 vols., Augsburg, 1759; C. de Smedt, *Introd. generalis ad Hist. Eccles.*, Ghent, 1876, ch. v. 'de Documentis et Scriptis circa hist. monasticam'; H. J. Wetzer and B. Welte, *Kirchenlexikon*[2], ed. J. Hergenröther and F. Kaulen, 12 vols., Freiburg i. B., 1882–1903, *s.vv.* 'Orden,' 'Congregationen,' 'Ordensregel,' 'Ordensgelübde'; *CE*, *s.v.* 'Religious Life'; M. Verhoeven, *De Regularium et sæcularium clericorum juribus et officiis Liber singularis*, Louvain, 1846; De Buck-Tinnebroeck, *Examen historicum et canonicum libri R. D. Verhoeven*, Ghent, 1847; A. Vermeersch, *De religiosis institutis et personis*, 2 vols., Bruges, 1907–09; A. Mater, *L'Église catholique, sa constitution, son administration*, Paris, 1906, p. 205 ff.; P. Flaminio Annibali da Latera, *Compendio della storia degli ordini regolari existenti*, Rome, 1790; G. P. Fontana, *Storia degli ordini monastici, religiosi e militari e delle congregazione secolari dell' uno e l'altro sesso*, etc., Lucca, 1737 (tr. of Hélyot); Filippo Bonanni, *Catalogo degli ordini religiosi della chiesa militante*, Rome, 1712; *Hist. du clergé séculier et régulier, des congrégations de chanoines et de clercs*, . . . new ed., following Bonanni, Hermann, Hélyot, and others, 4 vols., Amsterdam, 1716.

F. CABROL.

RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Indian).—The religious orders in general are already partly treated in artt. ASCETICISM (Hindu), HINDUISM, MONASTICISM (Hindu), and some of the different orders in artt. AJIVIKAS, JAINISM, PATIMOKKHA, etc.; the doctrines which feed the religious life of the 'friars' are studied in such artt. as BHAGAVAD-GITA, BHAKTI-MARGA, JÑANA-MARGA, ŚAIVISM, VAISNAVISM, while the artt. AUSTERITIES, FASTING (Introductory and non-Christian), YOGI, DRAVIDIANS (N. India), vol. v. p. 16, etc., describe some of the outward features of this life.

The aim of the present article, therefore, is to draw up a general scheme. While avoiding the technicalities and especially the intricate and innumerable details of modern institutions, it is possible to state the most important features of asceticism as organized in the religious brotherhoods, and the most remarkable steps in this organization.

I. 'FAQĪRISM.'—1. Crude asceticism.—The chief

[1] *Hist. polit. Blatter*, cxxx. [1902] 911 ff.
[2] Cf. Heimbucher, i. 62.
[3] Cf. *Revue des questions historiques*, lx. [1896] 95 ff.
[4] Cf. L. Lallemand, *Hist. de la charité*, Paris, 1902–06, iii. 241.
[5] Cf. *ib.*, where numerous proofs of this wonderful activity in works of charity are given. See also art. CHARITY, ALMSGIVING (Christian).

[1] Heimbucher, i. 62 ff.
[2] A. L. Cauchy, *Considérations sur les ordres religieux*, Paris, 1844; J. M. Prat, *Essai hist. sur la destruction des ordres religieux en France au XVIIIe siècle*, do. 1845; G. Palma, 'Discorso in difesa degli ordini religiosi,' in *Annali delle scienze religiose*, 1st ser., iii. [1835] 406.

element—the raw material—of the Indian religious life is what we may conveniently style 'faqīrism.' This word is of course modern and its technical meaning is precise,[1] but it seems an appropriate term to summarize the crude ascetic, mystical, and orgiastic beliefs and practices which, as far back as our information goes, have been characteristic of the Indian people. Such beliefs and practices may be traced in almost all primitive civilizations.[2] Outside of India they have been crushed or chastened to a large extent by the progress of social life or of a religion which found its leading motives in ideas more human and more truly religious than a bare asceticism.[3] In India, on the contrary, the ascetic tendencies underwent an enormous development owing to certain climatic and racial circumstances, and, moreover, they were one of the chief factors of the religions and philosophies themselves. From time to time throughout history spiritual leaders succeeded in organizing and moralizing these tendencies, constructing 'theosophic' or devotional theories of no mean moral and spiritual value; but the starting-point of those theories is often to be found in raw asceticism. The Buddhist — the Jain or the Tridandin — is a philosopher, but he is also a chastened *faqīr*. The morbid devotee who practises catalepsy on the cross-roads for a living is the prototype of the Vedāntist who sinks his soul into the universal Self, and of the Buddhist monk, the *arhat*, who enjoys the meditations leading to *nirvāṇa*. To put it otherwise, the sorcerer, the saint, and the god form a continuous chain; all saints are ascetics and thaumaturges: Śiva is a penitent; the androgynous Śiva embodies the most morbid form of asceticism. It is certain that the religious leaders were able to educate a large number of professional devotees; but many ascetics remained outside the great orders and formed only lax associations for begging or not much more. Nowadays, even when he is backed up by a Church and professes to be a member of an order endowed with a literature and with half-divine and infallible *gurus*, the ordinary 'friar' is too often a man of a low intellectual level. His literary or doctrinal knowledge is frequently confined to a few *mantras*, or formulas; his sectarian peculiarities (form of dress, amulets, etc.) are not much more than a pretence or a mark of distinction. It is safe to infer that this state of things is an old one.

The Indian orders are apt to split up and to degenerate. The old crude faqīrism is eternal and really unmodifiable. When we compare the data to be found in the Buddhist *Piṭakas*, in the Jain *Aṅgas*, and in the Greek sources with mediæval and modern descriptions, we are struck by the constant recurrence of the (1) penitential (*tapas*), (2) mystical (*yoga*), and (3) orgiastic (*puṣṭimārga*, 'salvation through dalliance') practices.

The earliest references that we possess to ascetic mystical practices have been studied by A. Barth and H. Oldenberg. The long-haired ascetic, or *muni*, naked or dressed in rags of reddish colour, is 'possessed with the gods,' and, inversely, the god Sun is once celebrated under the aspect of a *muni*.[4]

'Here we have a living picture of the orgiastic outbreaks of the old Vedic world, still confined as they are in the narrow limits of Shamanism, not yet purified by the aspiration to the final deliverance.'[5]

(*a*) *Tapas*.—The 'religieux' of the old and of the new times is often a penitent (*tāpasa*) who indulges in extreme mortifications, or in morbid self-torture or mutilation—*e.g.*, the Bahikathas, feeding on excrements (Aghoris), holding the arms or the face upright until paralyzed;[1] imitating the cow, the horse, the dog, or the rook[2] (*govrata*,[3] *aśvavrata*, *kukkuṭavrata*, *kākavrata*).

Tapas culminates in suicide—a common practice in ancient times. While the Brāhmans forbid suicide as a religious act, they nevertheless admit it as an atonement for certain sins.[4] With the non-Brāhmans suicide, by starvation, drowning, fire, or exposure, is a regular way of salvation.[5] See also artt. ASCETICISM (Hindu), AUSTERITIES, FASTING (Introductory and non-Christian).

(*b*) *Yoga*.[6] — Mystical devices, comprehended under the general name of *yoga*, are as a rule associated with *tapas* or, at least, with a semi-penitential life. There are a number of *āsanas*, 'modes of sitting,' attitudes of the lower part of the body, and of *mudrās*, attitudes of the upper part of the body. In the *khechari mudrā* the ascetic inserts his reverted tongue into the gullet, while fixing the gaze between the eyebrows. There are many devices to induce trance—protracted rigidity of body, fixity of look, repetition of strange sets of formulas, counting the respiration or stopping it (*prāṇāyāma*).

(*c*) *Makāras*.—On the orgiastic side of faqīrism, the use for 'religious' purposes of the five *makāras* —the five things the name of which begins with *m* (meat, fish, alcohol, copulation, and *mudrās*)—we are only too well enlightened as regards mediæval and modern times; but we are rather in the dark as to old Hinduism. With the Jains (*q.v.*), before their reformation by Naṭaputta, and with the Ājīvikas (*q.v.*), continence was not one of the obligations of the ascetic. There are unmistakable signs that the unmorality of the modern Śāktas is not a new development. In the days of Patañjali (2nd cent. B.C.) the violence of the fanatical devotees was already a proverb; in the *Mṛchchhakaṭikā* 'nun,' or *religieuse* (*gosāviā*), is a synonym of 'harlot' (*veśyā*). The motto, 'Omnia sancta sanctis,' had many followers.[7]

By penance and trance a devotee obtains important advantages and is supposed to obtain some still more important ones.

(1) This mode of life, not always very uncomfortable, assures a living. No one will refuse alms to an ascetic mendicant. Further, the ascetic is able to render many services, either of white or of black magic. The mass of the ascetics practised the 'low arts' which are enumerated in the Buddhist *suttas* as unworthy of a monk.[8] The list is a long one and is as valuable for modern times as it is for ancient.[9]

(2) A religious mendicant, especially when

[1] See art. DERVISH; H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson: a Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial Words and Phrases*, London, 1886, *s.v.* 'Fakeer.' One of the earliest references (1653) describes the *faqīrs* as 'une espèce de religieux indien qui foulent le monde aux pieds et ne s'habillent que de haillons qu'ils ramassent dans les rues.'

[2] See art. INITIATION (Introductory and Primitive).

[3] See art. MONASTICISM, vol. viii. p. 786f.; the obligation of work, study, and active charity is fully recognized by the Western monk.

[4] *Ṛigveda*, viii. 17, 59, x. 136.

[5] See A. Barth, *Quarante Ans d'indianisme*, Paris, 1914, i. 42; H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1914, French tr. by V. Henry, Paris, 1903, p. 344f.

[1] See Strabo, xv. i. 61, 63; art. HINDUISM, vol. vi. p. 701b, on the Ūrdhvabāhus, Nakhin, Ākāsamukhin, Bhūmimukhin.

[2] See *Mahaniddeśa*, p. 29; *Majjhima*, i. 78, 388 (K. E. Neumann, *Gotamo Buddho's Reden*, Leipzig, 1896–1900, i. 124, ii. 78); *Mahābharata*, v. 99. 14, v. 121 *fin.*

[3] Cf. the βοσκοί. [4] Āpastamba, i. 25.

[5] Strabo, xv. i. 68, 73; Plutarch, *Alexander*, lxix. See artt. JAINISM, KEDARNATH.

[6] R. Garbe, *Sāṃkhya und Yoga* (*GIAP*), Strassburg, 1896; W. Hopkins, 'Yoga,' *JAOS* xxii. [1901] 333; Rai Bahadur Śrīś Chandra Vasu, *Yogaśastra*, Allahabad, 1915 (*Śivasaṃhitā*, *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā*); *Yogavachara-Manual*, London (PTS), 1896, tr. F. L. Woodward, *Manual of a Mystic*, PTS translation ser., no. 6, 1915.

[7] Barth, p. 181; see also R. Schmidt, *Beiträge zur indischen Erotik*, Leipzig, 1902, p. 740ff. For the earliest references, somewhat doubtful, to women leading a wandering religious life see Barth, p. 81.

[8] *Dialogues of the Buddha*, tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, London, 1899, i. 15ff.

[9] See art. KARĀ-LINGIS.

qualified in penitential observances, in ecstatic devices, or in thaumaturgic formulas, is supposed to possess magical powers — the *ṛddhis* of the Buddhists or the *siddhis* of the classical *yoga*, elsewhere *bhūtis*.[1] He was able to communicate with all sorts of supernatural beings, male and female. He was assured of a happy rebirth, as a god or a demon. But Śākyamuni states that by the 'practice of the cow' (*govrata*) a man is reborn, not as a god, but as a cow.

2. The task of the religious leaders.—This was in short (1) to group ascetics under a certain rule of life, and (2) to give a spiritual meaning to the ascetic, mystical, and orgiastic practices.

(1) We possess no information as to the earliest steps towards the organization of the orders. All the evidence points to the conclusion that religious non-Brāhmanic bodies had been flourishing for a long time when Indian history begins with the Jina and the Buddha. The former was only the reformer of an existing brotherhood and the latter adopted from the non-Buddhists some of the most important rules of the cenobitic life (fortnightly meetings, etc.). A dogma of both Jains and Buddhists is that there have been in the past a number of Jinas and Buddhas; this dogma is historically true.

(2) While a mendicant, who was hitherto his own master, has to become a member of an organized body, to undergo a novitiate, to submit himself to the authority of a fixed rule or of the elders (*thera*, *thaira*), he is expected to become at the same time a 'philosopher' who strives towards a supernatural goal. Penance, trance, and even the *makāras* are turned by the spiritual leaders into means of spiritual progress.

Some leaders try to check the exaggeration of penance and ecstasy and prohibit the *makāras*; others systematically approve of the most morbid form of asceticism. Nevertheless, the general standpoint of the leaders may be illustrated by two instances: (i.) the gods were scared by the penances and the pious deeds of the future Buddha, fearing that he would dethrone them by the magical power which was the natural fruit of such penances and deeds. The future Buddha comforted them: a saint does not care for 'secular' advantages; his only aim is *nirvāṇa*. (ii.) The 'mystic' discipline is twofold—*rājayoga*, an intellectual theosophy, and *haṭhayoga*, a theurgy or mechanical theosophy in which medicine and trance are mixed. The former represents the loftier side of Indian mysticism, and is the work of the thinkers; the latter embodies the immemorial tradition of the ascetics.

A few topics may be mentioned. (*a*) Ancient Brāhmanism regarded penance as a method of atonement for sin, and Jainism strongly emphasized this view, which is a general one. With the Buddhists penance, either moderate or severe, is expected to crush desire. With the devotional sects one pleases the gods by self-torture.[2] (*b*) As concerns trance, a Brāhman employs in the *grand œuvre* of 'deliverance in this life'[3] the very devices through which a *faqīr* induces trance and obtains magical powers. Since the immanent Absolute dwells in the heart, an ascetic might 'draw the self from the non-self' and concentrate his individual soul in the real soul. With the Buddhists trance does not directly work out *nirvāṇa*, but it is none the less necessary; in order to be really efficacious, it must be 'without content.' With the devotional sects the devotee realizes during trance a transitory union (*yoga*) with his god, a foretaste of heavenly happiness. (*c*) As concerns the *makāras*, no moral distinction can be made between, on the one hand, the Tantric (*śākta*, left hand) ceremonies, whether Buddhist,[4] Śaivite,[5] or Vaiṣṇavite,[1] which aim at the identification of the ascetic (*yogin*) with the god—by intercourse with a *mudrā*, a female, who, through 'baptism' (*abhiṣeka*) or 'marks' (*nyāsa*), has been transformed into a Bhagavatī (a female Buddha), into Bhairavī, into Rādhā, a Buddhist becomes the Buddha Vajrasattva, a Śaivite becomes Bhairava, a Vaiṣṇavite becomes Kṛṣṇa—and, on the other hand, the gross rites which have as female protagonists the fanatical girls known as 'mothers,' *yoginīs*, *ḍākinīs*, etc. But the Tantric ceremonies are looked upon as a 'path to deliverance': the orgy is a sacred orgy; moreover, we are told that some of the ascetics addicted to that 'worship' interpret even the most shocking obscenities of their books in an allegorical way.[2]

II. *ANCIENT BRĀHMANIC ASCETICISM.*[3]—The Brāhman asceticism was influenced by the established ideas on penance, but it remained foreign and hostile to faqirism. While it did not directly give birth to religious orders properly so called, it developed both the type of the Indian friar and, as far as the earlier period is concerned, the leading ideas of the religious life.

In short, the *brahmachārin* is the type of the Buddhist novice, *śrāmaṇera*, and the *sannyāsin* ('apotactite') is the type of the *bhikṣu* (Kern). On the other hand, the goal aimed at by the Brāhman ascetics (*nirvāṇa*, liberation from the sufferings of individual existence, identification with the Absolute) became, *mutatis mutandis*, the goal of the Buddhists and of the earliest orders.

The Vedo-Brāhmanic religion inherited from an early date both the ceremony of initiation (*q.v.*)—preliminary to marriage and to the exercise of the rights of a member of the clan—and the rules stating the duties of the youth to be initiated. The young Ārya had to remain some years in the house of a preceptor (*guru*) as a servant and as a student in the sacred lore (hence his name *brahmachārin*); he begged his food, avoided certain articles of diet, and practised continence. The last feature is important, and the very term for novitiate or studentship (*brahmacharya*) comes to mean continence and, in the time of Śākyamuni, religious life.[4]

When the speculations on rebirth and deliverance from rebirth were ripe, continence was regarded not only as the way to heaven, but as the best means of deliverance from death. While old men, after having paid their debts to the gods (by sacrifice) and to the dead (by the birth of a son), abandoned secular life (*sannyāsin*) in order to reach holiness before dying, young men agreed to spend their whole life as *brahmacharins* in the house of their *guru*.[5] This house was a hermitage. There are in the *Mahābhārata*, in Śakuntalā, and in the *Harṣacharita*[6] beautiful pictures of the quiet retreats of the ὑλόβιοι.

In contrast with the settlements of hermits devoted to meditation together with moderate asceticism, and not averse to sacrifice, early Brāhmanism had 'penitent hermits' (*tāpasa*), the *munis* or *ṛṣis* of the *Mahābhārata*, either of priestly or of kingly parentage. The *munis* have abandoned sacrifice; they feed strictly on roots and fruit;

[1] See Garbe, *Sāṃkhya und Yoga*, p. 43; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 88; art. MYSTICISM (Buddhist).

[2] Art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Hindu); J. Jolly, *Recht und Sitte* (*GIAP*), Strassburg, 1896, § 37; Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, French tr., p. 351.

[3] See art. JĪVANMUKTA.

[4] See, *e.g.*, L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Une Pratique des Tantras,' *Onzième Congrès des Orientalistes*, Paris, 1899, i. 240.

[5] See, *e.g.*, the *Śrichakra* or *Pūrṇābhiṣeka*.

[1] See, *e.g.*, the *Rāsmaṇḍalis* of the Vallabhāchāryas (*Hist. of the Sect of Mahārājas or Vallabhāchāryas in Western India*, Calcutta, 1865, where the proceedings of a famous trial in 1861 are to be found).

[2] See the *Gītagovinda*.

[3] See artt. ĀŚRAMA, MONASTICISM (Hindu), vol. viii. p. 804; *The Sacred Laws of the Āryas* (*SBE* ii. [1897] and xiv. [1882]), *The Institutes of Vishnu* (*SBE* vii. [1900]), and *The Laws of Manu* (*SBE* xxv. [1886]); H. Kern, tr. G. Huet, *Hist. du bouddhisme dans l'Inde*, Paris, 1901, ii. 1-22, *Manual of Indian Buddhism* (*GIAP*), Strassburg, 1896, p. 73 f.; A. Barth, *Quarante Ans*, i. 80; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 210; Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, §§ 54 and 55.

[4] See *Paramatthajotikā*, ii., vol. i. p. 43.

[5] *Chāndogya*, ii. 2, 23.

[6] Bāṇabhaṭṭa's *Harṣacharita*, tr. E. B. Cowell and F. W. Thomas, London, 1897, pp. xi, 161, 236.

they perform severe penances (the *tapas* properly so called, 'heat'), but they remain dignified and free from vulgar charlatanism.

There have been a number of Brāhmanical mendicants or wandering ascetics (*yati*, *bhikṣu*, *parivrājaka*), although we know only two associations of such men.[1] The law-books (in which is embodied the *smṛti*) regard this mode of life with little favour.

We possess a few details concerning the *jaṭilas*, *jaṭilakas*, or *dīrghajaṭa*, 'ascetics with matted hair,' who joined the Buddhist order when Śākyamuni proved his magical efficiency to them. Their Brāhmanical character is established inasmuch as they sacrificed to the fire.[2]

III. *RELIGIOUS ORDERS: GENERAL REMARKS.*—**1. Sects and orders.**—Apart from pure Brāhmanism—*i.e.* Brāhmanism freed from any tinge of Śaivism or Vaiṣṇavism, as it was at the beginning and as it has remained in certain circles—religious India is sectarian. On the whole (there are exceptions) each sect—a fluid group of the worshippers of a certain deity, or of a certain form of a deity—has its religious order, sometimes two or three religious orders. The *prima facie* view is that, in early times, the orders—*e.g.*, the Buddhist brotherhood—stood by themselves and had no intimate connexion with the mass of the people: a number of ascetics followed a certain discipline, both practical and doctrinal, and the good people who fed them were left to their own religious beliefs, a mixture of paganism and old inherited family, tribal, and trade rules. Such a view is not complete. It is true that, in the case of Buddhism or Jainism, the order came first, and the sect afterwards; and the same process was repeated through history more than once. But the leaders, the Buddha or the Jina, gathered adherents who did not join the order and who formed a body of laymen, a sect, whether Buddhist or Jain.[3] In contrast with the lax associations of wandering mendicants, like the modern Aghorīs, no organized monasticism could develop without being backed by a sect. The saints, especially the Master and his predecessors, the relics, the holy places, the symbols (tree, etc.), were the focus of a popular Buddhist devotion. The title of Rhys Davids' book, *Buddhist India*,[4] is somewhat misleading, for India, as a whole, has never been Buddhist, but the Buddhist sect has, for a long time, been one of the most important sects of India, and is really a Church.

If we are right on this point, we have to infer that the modern constitution of Indian sectarianism is really very old. There is a sect which finds its unity in the worship of a god, either a natural or mythological god (Śiva, Viṣṇu) or an euhemerist god (Buddha, Jina). The sect is divided into two sections: (1) the laymen, more or less initiated into the theology of the sect (*sampradāya*, *darśana*, *mata*), and (2) the ascetics, or *vairāgis*; some are hermits (*vānaprastha*, ἀναχωρηταί, ἐρημῖται); some lead a common life (κοινόβιοι, *mathdhārī*) in a convent (*vihāra*, *maṭha*), in the neighbourhood of a temple or a holy place as a rule; some wander from one *maṭha* to another, from one *chaitya* to another, from one place of pilgrimage to another (the Circumcelliones of the West).[5]

[1] Pāṇini, iv. 3, 10, Karmandinas, Pārāśarinas.

[2] *Vinaya Texts*, i. (*SBE* xiii. [1881] 124; *AMG* v. [1883] 128); *Aṅguttara*, iii. 276.

[3] On the nature of the sect see Barth, *Quarante Ans*, p. 140; see also art. KHAKIS.

[4] London, 1903. On Buddhist cult see Kern, tr. Huet, ii. 136-243; J. P. Minaeff, *Recherches sur le bouddhisme*, tr. from Russian, Paris, 1894, pp. 145-186.

[5] For description of the *maṭha* see *ERE* viii. 803; for contrast of the resident monks (*mathdhārī*) with the itinerant, art. KHAKIS; for rules for the initiation of foreign monks, *ERE* i. 74.

2. Evolution of the doctrines of the orders.—While emphasizing the permanent character of the Indian religious institutions—there is no great difference, from a certain standpoint, between the temple in the form of a *chaitya* and that in the form of a *liṅga*-shrine—it is necessary to avoid wild anachronism as well as pedantic chronology. The beliefs of the sects have not been completely modified; everywhere and always a certain monotheism, more or less devotional, kept asserting itself in spite of an overwhelming mythology and polytheism. It is quite unlikely that 'India fell asleep Vedic or atheist some centuries B.C. to awake devotional, Śaivite or Vaiṣṇavite some centuries later.'[1] But there has been a revolution in the leading ideas of the 'intellectuals' of the sects, *i.e.* of the ascetics. The institutions which we study (below, IV.) as 'ancient religious orders' are, as a rule, atheist; the Buddhist monk, like the Brāhman *sannyāsin* of old, aims at *nirvāṇa*, and he does not expect any help from any god or saint. Buddhism and Jainism, if the doctrines of the brotherhood only are taken into account, are not 'religions'; they are atheist paths of salvation,[2] like Sāṅkhya or Vedānta. With the mediæval or modern orders (below, V.) *bhakti*, an ardent devotion to a 'deity of election' (*iṣṭadevatā*), goes hand in hand with the doctrine of grace (*anugraha*).[3] The neo-Buddhism (see art. MAHĀYĀNA), contrasted with early Buddhism (see art. HĪNAYĀNA), illustrates the change: it aims at a rebirth in Sukhāvatī,[4] not at *nirvāṇa*, just as the devotee of Viṣṇu aims at a rebirth in Goloka, not at *brahmanirvāṇa* (losing oneself in the Absolute). But the idea of *nirvāṇa* has not altogether disappeared in neo-Buddhism, although it is kept in the background; and, in the same way, the monism or semi-monism (*advaita*, *viśiṣṭādvaita*) of the *Upaniṣad*-Vedānta schools furnishes the sects of *bhakti* with an esoteric or 'superior' theology.

3. Religious vows.—Of all the Indian orders, the Buddhists seem to have understood the nature of the religious life best. The theory of the vows in the *Abhidharmakośa* reminds us of Western theology.

A Buddhist is a man (or a woman) who has taken the vows of the religious life (*saṃvara*, 'restraint,' 'discipline'), *i.e.* who, after taking refuge in the Three Jewels (Buddha, *dharma*, *saṅgha*), has solemnly undertaken to live his whole life under the rule of Śākyamuni. The vows are either (1) the vows of a *bhikṣu* (the vows of a novice and of a nun are different in practice, but the same in kind), or (2) the vows of a layman (*upāsaka*) or laywoman (*upāsikā*): an *upāsaka* is not, as generally understood, a worshipper, but a 'religieux'; he is actually a member of the third order, a tertiary.

The *bhikṣu* binds himself to avoid all occasions of sin (*i.e.* of desire), and practises a mortification which develops the humility and the energy necessary to salvation. The *upāsaka* avoids the occasion of many sins and plants roots of merit which will ripen in a future life.[5] The difference between the two rules of life is characterized by the *saṃvara* on carnal desire: while the *bhikṣu* is absolutely continent and therefore remains untouched by the fire of passion, the *upāsaka* is to avoid only illicit love (*kāme mithyācāra*), either intercourse with an *agamyā* (neighbour's wife, nun, etc.) or illicit intercourse with his own wife.[6]

[1] A remark often emphasized by A. Barth.

[2] See L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Way to Nirvāṇa*, Cambridge, p. 191.

[3] See *Vajrachchhedikā*, § 2.

[4] See *SBE* xlix. [1894], pt. ii. pp. 1, 161.

[5] A *bhikṣu* follows the Ten Precepts (*ERE* vii. 320a). An *upāsaka* follows the first five of these precepts—the third, continence, being understood *mutatis mutandis*.

[6] In *Paramatthajotika*, ii. (vol. i. p. 43), the *sadārasantosana*, 'avoiding adultery,' is styled *brahmacharya*, 'continence.'

A point worthy of notice is that an *upāsaka* is expected to take the eight vows of an *upavāsastha* every fortnight, *i.e.* to live twenty-four hours as a monk (continence, not eating at a prohibited time, etc.).

The man who has taken the vows either of a *bhikṣu* or of an *upāsaka* is a 'disciplined one,' a 'restrained one' (*saṃvṛta*); he is not like other men, for the vows create the special sort of *karma* which is styled *avijñapti*.[1]

In Mahāyāna Buddhism the old organization of the order remains, theoretically at least, as it was; but a new *saṃvara*—the 'discipline of a future Buddha'[2]—comes to the front. *Bhikṣus* and *upāsakas* have to undertake the duties of a *bodhisattva*, *i.e.* to 'produce' the thought of becoming a Buddha and to practise the perfect virtues. Now, according to the dogma and the legends, a *bodhisattva* may be married; and it is a common fact that a man, after taking the vows of a *bhikṣu*, may 'exchange' these vows for the vows of a *bodhisattva* and marry. The consequence was that the Buddhist order in Nepāl—and partly at least in old Kaśmīr—became an order of married *bhikṣus*[3] (Banras, Gubharjus, Vajrācāryas).

4. The Church and the State.—An important point in the history of the orders is the intervention of the State. Buddhists, Jains, and Ājīvikas secured, through the zeal of Aśoka,[4] important advantages. On the other hand, while the religious orders carefully respected the rights of the kings, nobles, and parents[5] (no son, slave, or officer can be admitted into the Buddhist order without the permission of father, owner, or king), there are evidences that the civil power did not always respect the rights of the churches.[6] The history of the so-called persecutions remains to be studied. Scholars now believe that the Buddhist narratives on this subject are on the whole inaccurate.[7]

IV. *ANCIENT RELIGIOUS ORDERS.*—From about the 8th to the 6th cent. B.C. a number of religious leaders gave a regular form to the wandering ascetic life. The best of them had a high moral standard and a high intellectual standpoint; they condemned in theory, even when they were forced to tolerate in practice, the less honourable devices which were popular among their followers (magical performances, etc.); they preached a path to salvation, and contrived to adapt to this lofty aim the penitential and ecstatic practices. They were great organizers and also great men; while the brotherhoods which they had established were living, robust organisms, they themselves became the gods of new religions.

1. Buddhist and Jain.—The rules of the Buddhist[8] and Jain[1] brotherhoods are well known and may be easily studied both in the sources, the greater number of which have been translated, and in a number of summaries or essays.

It is often forgotten that the Saṅgha contains two classes of 'religieux': (*a*) the monks who follow the old rule of asceticism (the twelve or thirteen *dhutaṅgas* or *dhūtaguṇas*),[2] hermits, 'men of cemeteries'—they are often very holy men,[3] although they have a bad reputation and are even forbidden to approach the village; and (*b*) the monks of lax observance, the κοινόβιοι, who not only disregard the *dhutaṅgas*, but indulge in the 'extra-allowances' (*atirekalābha*) authorized by the Vinaya—*i.e.*, they are solemnly taught the four *niśrayas* (alms poured in the bowl as sole food, dress made of rags, a tree as a house, cow-urine as sole medicament), but they do not take any account of these rules.[4]

2. Other orders.—Side by side with the Buddhists, the Jainas, and the Ājīvikas (*q.v.*), there were several religious orders or associations which are known only by name. We may mention the followers of the teachers named in the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*[5] and the stereotyped list of *Aṅguttara*, iii. 276.[6]

While, in accordance with the rationalistic ideas which came into the foreground at that time (*Brāhmaṇas*, *Upaniṣads*), the earlier orders were mostly atheist 'disciplines of salvation' or 'paths to *nirvāṇa*,' there are evidences that many worshippers of some 'deity of election' (*iṣṭadevatā*) constituted themselves into congregations or orders. Such names as Devadhammika,[7] Indavattika, Brahmavattika, Vāsudevavattika, etc.,[8] point to that conclusion. Ascetics, to be sure, exerted themselves, both by penance and by ecstasy, to be reborn in some heaven. According to the Buddhists, Brāhmans have only such a rebirth in view; and the Buddhist Scriptures, which do not approve of the Brāhman sacrificial method of obtaining this rebirth, have a theory on the meditations through which such a rebirth may be obtained. The mediæval and modern orders (below, V.) have certainly had a long history previous to any information now available.

V. *MEDIÆVAL AND MODERN ORDERS.*[9] — **1.**

[1] See art. KARMA, vol. vii. p. 674, § 5. The *prātimokṣasaṃvara*, 'discipline according to the rules of the Prātimokṣa on the Vinaya,' is the essential condition of the *dhyānasaṃvara* and *lokottarasaṃvara* (see art. DHYĀNA), which, being the path to *nirvāṇa*, constitute the mystical side of the life of a monk. In Occidental language the *upāsaka* is a tertiary, the *bhikṣu* is a regular friar who is expected to be a mystic. In fact, only the *bhikṣu* is qualified for mysticism and *nirvāṇa*.

[2] See art. BODHISATTVA.

[3] See B. H. Hodgson, *Essays on the Languages . . . of Nepal and Tibet*, London, 1874, p. 139; S. Lévi, *Népal*, Paris, 1905, ii. 26. See also the 'predictions'—*e.g.*, Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛchchhā.

[4] See art. AŚOKA; E. Senart, *Les Inscriptions de Piyadasi*, 2 vols., Paris, 1881–86; V. A. Smith, *Aśoka*, Oxford, 1901. The history of Kaniṣka and Harṣa is also interesting in that respect (see V. A. Smith, *The Early Hist. of India*[2], Oxford, 1908).

[5] See *Vinaya Texts*, i. (*SBE* xiii.).

[6] See, *e.g.*, *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 59 f.

[7] Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 118, 124, 134; see Tāranātha, *Gesch. des Buddhismus in Indien*, tr. F. A. von Schiefner, Petrograd, 1869, p. 81; W. Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, do. 1860, p. 203; *Divyāvadāna*, ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil, Cambridge, 1886, p. 434.

[8] See artt. DISCIPLINE (Buddhist), CEYLON BUDDHISM, ELDER (Buddhist), INITIATION (Buddhist), MONASTICISM (Buddhist). Sources: *Vinaya Texts*, i.–iii. (*SBE* xiii., xvii. [1882], xx. [1885]); P. L. Wieger, *Bouddhisme chinois*, i., *Vinaya Monachisme et discipline*, Paris, 1910; L. Finot, 'Le Prātimokṣa des Sarvāstivādins,' *JA* xi. ii. [1913] 465; A. F. R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature*, i., Oxford, 1916, *Bhikṣuṇīkarmavācanā*, Oxford, Skr. MSS, no. 1442 (*Cat.* [1905] ii. 255); H. Oldenberg, 'Buddhistische Studien,' *ZDMG* lii. [1898] 613; S. Beal, *A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures*, London, 1871; *Ādikarmapradīpa*, tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, London, 1909, p. 1 ff.; I-Tsing, *Record of the Buddhist Religion in India and the Malay Peninsula*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896. Summaries: Kern, tr. Huet, ii. 38–135; M. E. L. van Goor, *De Buddhistische Non*, Leyden, 1915; Minayeff, *Recherches sur le bouddhisme*, p. 271 (appendix: 'La Communauté des moines bouddhistes'); R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, London, 1850; Hodgson, pp. 139–145 (see S. Lévi, ii. 26).

[1] See artt. JAINISM, MONASTICISM (Buddhist); sources in *Ācārāṅga* (*SBE* xxii. [1884] 1, 202 f.); Jagmanderlal Jaini, *Outlines of Jainism*, Cambridge, 1916; Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism*, London, 1915. The connexion between the monks and the 'tertiaries' is very close in Jainism.

[2] See, *e.g.*, Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 210; *Milinda*, p. 348 (*SBE* xxxvi. [1894] 244).

[3] See art. PRATYEKABUDDHAS.

[4] There are many points of controversy—*e.g.*, the use of meat, which is condemned in Mahāyāna and authorized (even obligatory [see I-Tsing, *Religieux éminents*, tr. E. Chavannes, Paris, 1894, p. 48]) in Hīnayāna; see W. Hopkins, 'Buddhist Rule against Eating Meat,' *JAOS* xxvii. pt. 2 [1907], p. 455.

[5] *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 66 ff.; also R. O. Franke, *Dīghanikāya*, Göttingen, 1913.

[6] *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 220; *JRAS*, 1908, p. 197; *Mahāvastu*, iii. 412; *Śikṣāsamuchchaya*, p. 331; *Lalitavistara*, p. 2; *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, i. 162; *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (*SBE* xxi. [1884] 263).

[7] *Aṅguttara*, iii. 276.

[8] *Mahāniddesa*, p. 39.

[9] A. Barth, *Quarante Ans*, i. 166, 'Religions de l'Inde,' i. 399, 'Bulletin des religions de l'Inde,' ii. 72, 206, 420; H. H. Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861; H. T. Colebrooke, *Miscellaneous Essays*, ed. E. B. Cowell, do. 1873; L. D. Barnett, *Hinduism*, do. 1906; P. Oltramare, *L'Hist. des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, Paris, 1906; R. Garbe, *Sāṃkhya und Yoga* (=*GIAP* iii. 4), Strassburg, 1896; R. Schmidt, *Fakire und Fakirtum im alten und modernen Indien: Yoga-Lehre und Yoga-Praxis nach indischen Originalquellen*, Berlin, 1908; M. Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*, London, 1875, 'Indian Theistic Reformers,' *JRAS* xiii. [1881] i. 281, 'The

Theology. — *Bhakti*,[1] *i.e.* devotion to God — a Heavenly Father, and often, like the Vaiṣṇavite *avatārs*, an incarnate Saviour—gave rise to a lofty mysticism,[2] a solid theology of divine grace. Meditation, when *bhakti* remains pure, has a reasonable object, and compares to advantage with the 'meditation without an object,' which is the highest stage in the 'disciplines of salvation.' Asceticism has a truly religious meaning. Religious orders have been the ornament and the focus of the powerful and intense sectarian worships which have been since the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*q.v.*) the leading forces of Indian religious thought.[3]

Bhakti, whether Buddhist or Hindu, has its drawbacks and its failures.

'It was deemed the essential condition of salvation; it became the unique condition. A single act of faith, a single sincere invocation to God, cancels a life of sin. Finally, the exaggeration of *bhakti* destroys *bhakti*.'[4]

To pronounce the name of Avalokiteśvara or of Kṛṣṇa, even by chance, even in a blasphemy, is enough. Further, the devotion due to God is due (1) to the *guru*, who is often regarded as an incarnation of God Himself; Hinduism, in that direction, went almost as far as Lāmaism (*q.v.*); and also (2) to specialized forms of God and to idols; hence all forms of superstition. Again (3) devotion is often paid to the *śakti*, or 'female energy,' of God; hence the 'religious' justification of the eroticism of the Śāktas (left-hand worship).

2. Classification. — The rôle of the religious orders has been sometimes to purify *bhakti* from its pagan features, sometimes to emphasize those features and to organize the *puṣṭimārga*, 'salvation by dalliance.' They may be described either as Vaiṣṇavite or as Śaivite, according to the name that they give to God.

(*a*) *Vaiṣṇavite.*[5] — (1) Rāmānuja (*q.v.*), and (2) Rāmānanda,[6] who belonged to the school of Rāmānuja and was possibly the immediate *guru* of (3) Kabīr (*q.v.*); (4) Ānandatīrtha, who originated the Mādhvas (*q.v.*); (5) Chaitanya (*q.v.*), and (6) Vallabhāchārya (*q.v.*; 16th cent.), with the (5[a]) Kartābhājās and the (6[a]) Charan Dāsīs (18th cent.), with the (5[b]) Rādhāvallabhīs, the Sakhībhāvas, etc.

With Kabīr are connected a number of sects: Dādūpanthīs, Bābā Lālīs, Sādhus, Satnāmīs, Prānnāthīs, Śivanārāyanīs (*qq.v.*); the *guru* of the last had a remarkable interview with Bishop Heber.

Nānak (*q.v.*) and the Sikhs (*q.v.*) also belong to the spiritual influence of Kabīr.[1]

(*b*) *Śaivite.*[2]—(1) The Tridandins or Dasnāmīs—all ascetics;—and (2) the Smārtas—ascetics and laymen—profess to be disciples of Śaṅkara. The religious order of the sect of the Lingāyats (*q.v.*), (3) the Jaṅgamas, are both cenobitic and itinerant; they were founded by Ekāntada Rāmayya (12th cent.); (4) the Kānphāṭas, 'split-eared,' are mendicants; (5) the Gosāīns (*gosvāmin*), Śivāchārins, Hamsas, Paramahamsas, and many other ascetics practise a phrenetic asceticism; some form real associations.

LITERATURE.—The literature has been given in the footnotes.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Japanese).—In the native religion of Shintō there have been from early times certain hereditary religious corporations which may be regarded as a kind of religious brotherhoods. The Nakatomi, though hardly a priestly caste, were recognized as vicars of the Mikado, and they also largely composed the officials of the Jingikwan, or department of religion. Another hereditary corporation was the Imbe, descended from the god Futodama. Their duty was to prepare the offerings and to exercise the most careful avoidance of impurity in so doing. A third order was that of the Urabe, or diviners, mentioned already in A.D. 585, and later divided into four branches belonging to as many provinces.[3]

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RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Mexican and Peruvian).—**1. Mexican.**—In the higher civilizations of America we find religious orders akin to the religious brotherhoods of higher faiths. In Mexico one of these orders was the Tlamaxcacayotl, an ascetic order attached to the service of the god Quetzalcoatl. The head of it was named after the god, and never issued from his seclusion except to speak to the king. The brothers dressed in black robes, lived on coarse fare, and worked hard. They kept a night watch, singing hymns to Quetzalcoatl. At times they retired to the desert for penance and in order to pray in seclusion. Children were dedicated to this order from birth, wearing a distinctive collar, called *yanuati*, until the age of four, when they might be admitted to the brotherhood.[4]

Another outstanding order was that of Telpochtiliztle, the 'congregation of young men,' youths who lived at home, but met at sunset in a special house to dance and sing praises to the god.[5] Each temple had also a monastery.

The Tlamacazqui, 'deacons' or ministers, and the Quaquacuiltin, 'herb-eaters,' dedicated themselves for life to the service of the gods. Both were ascetic orders performing acts of penance in imitation of their patron, Quetzalcoatl. These orders had monasteries for both sexes, and their head was the high-priest of Quetzalcoatl.[6] Female children were dedicated to the service of the gods when forty days old, by being presented to the priest in the temple, carrying a miniature broom and censer. At the required age they then

Vaiṣnava Religion,' *ib.* xiv. [1882] 287, 733; W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes*, Calcutta, 1896; M. A. Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes in Benares*, do. 1872-81; Jogendra Nath Bhattāchārya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, do. 1896; J. C. Oman, *The Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, London, 1905, *Cults, Customs, and Superstitions of India*, do. 1908, *The Brahmans, Theists, and Muslims of India*, do 1907; J. Murray, *Handbook of the Bengal Presidency*, do. 1882, *Handbook of the Bombay Presidency*[2], do. 1881, *Handbook of the Madras Presidency*, do. 1879; W. W. Hunter, *Imperial Gazetteer of India*[2], do. 1885-87; G. A. Valentia, *Voyages and Travels*, do. 1809-11; D. Shea and A. Troyer, *The Dabistán or School of Manners*, tr. from Persian, do. 1843; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], ed. H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906; R. Heber, *Narr. of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India, from Calcutta to Bombay, 1824-25*[3], London, 1828, [4]1843-44; R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious Systems* (*GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913; Rajagopalacharya, *Vaiṣṇavite Reformers in India*, Madras, 1909; S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, *Śri Rāmānujacharya, a Sketch of his Life*, do. 1908; C. M. Padmanābhāchārya, *Life and Teachings of Śri Madhvacharya*, do. 1909; Balarama Mallika, *Krishna and Krishnaism*, Calcutta, 1898, *Jagannatha's Worship at Puri*, do. 1892; Devendranatha, *Doorga Poojah*, do. 1897; F. Max Müller, *Ramakrishna, his Life and Sayings*, London, 1898; F. W. Thomas, *Mutual Influence of Muhammadans and Hindus*, Cambridge, 1892.

[1] See art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA.

[2] See, *e.g.*, *Śāndilyabhaktisūtras*, tr. E. B. Cowell, Bibl. Ind., Calcutta, 1878, also *Sacred Books of the Hindus*, vii. [Allahabad, 1911].

[3] See L. D. Barnett, *The Heart of India*, London, 1908, also *Hinduism*, do. 1906; on the Sittars, R. Caldwell, *Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages*, London, 1875, Introd. pp. 127, 146; C. E. Gover, *The Folk-Songs of Southern India*, Madras, 1871.

[4] [illegible], *Quarante Ans*, p. 139.

[5] See art. HINDUISM, vol. vi. p. 702 f.; also artt. GOSĀĪN, BHAKTI-MĀRGA, [illegible] 31 and 32), HARISHCHANDRIS, BAIRĀGĪ, CHARAN DĀSIS, KHATIS, DRAVIDIANS (S India), vol. v. p. 24, KA[illegible]

[6] See art. RĀMĀNANDIS.

[1] See artt. UDĀSĪS, NIRMĀLAS, two of the three religious orders of the Sikhs.

[2] See art. HINDUISM, vol. vi. p. 701 f.; also artt. KARARIS, KEDĀRNATH, KARA-LINGIS (Sevvaras, Khevaras), ATITS, GOSAIN, GANAPATYAS, BENGAL (§ 33), GORAKHNATH, DRAVIDIANS (S India), vol. v. pp. 22, 25.

[3] W. G. Aston, *Shinto: the Way of the Gods*, London, 1905, p. 201 ff.

[4] *NR* iii. 436. [5] *Ib.* iii. 436. [6] *Ib.* ii. 203.

entered the monastery, either for a period of years or for life-long continence. Under the care of a matron they were employed in weaving and embroidering temple-tapestries, filling the incense braziers, and preparing bread for the priests.[1]

The Totonacs had a strict order devoted to Centeotl. Its members were widowers over sixty, of irreproachable character, who lived a secluded and austere life. They dressed in skins and ate no meat. They were much respected by the people, who consulted them, and regarded their answers as oracles.[2]

2. Peruvian.—In Peru the most remarkable example of a religious order was that of the 'Virgins of the Sun,' girls who had been dedicated to the service of the god in infancy, and at the fitting age placed under the care of matrons in convents. Here they lived in absolute seclusion, for none but the Inca and his queen could enter. Their employment was to watch over the sacred fire and to weave and embroider temple-hangings as well as the dresses for the Inca and his household. They had to live a life of strictest continence, and any one who failed to do so was buried alive, while her lover was strangled and the village or town where he lived was razed to the ground. Yet from their numbers the most beautiful were selected as 'brides' or concubines of the Inca. The 'houses of the virgins of the sun,' or monasteries, were low ranges of buildings, surrounded by high walls, to exclude them from observation.[3]

3. Both in Mexico and in Peru there were orders of knights corresponding to the European religious orders of chivalry. The initiation to these orders was protracted and severe, testing both the bravery and the endurance of the candidates.[4]

LITERATURE.—See the works cited in the footnotes.

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RELIGIOUS ORDERS (Muslim).—In this article attention is confined mainly to the N. African orders. For the religious orders in other countries reference should be made to the series of articles on MUHAMMADANISM. See also artt. DERVISH, ṢŪFĪS.

I. *GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.* — 1. **Preliminary observations.**—In the East the religious orders of Islām are not numerous, but their members are subject to religious obligations of the most precise kind, to a most rigorous discipline alike in spiritual and in temporal things, and to a strictly defined procedure in political matters, so that they are at once initiates (in the exact sense of the term) and agents of their official head. In N. Africa, and especially in the Maghrib, on the other hand, the orders are found in large numbers, but their organization is lax. Thus, as we proceed from Morocco to the Far East, we notice that the orders gradually decrease in number and importance; while, in passing from East to West, we find an unmistakable ebb in the current of Pan-Islāmism. It would seem, in fact, that the ideal of the religious order is incompatible with that of Pan-Islāmism; each tends to exclude the other. In the East and the Far East the breath of Pan-Islāmism has sometimes excited, or threatened to excite, the Muslim populace to revolt; while in N. Africa, where the Pan-Islāmist idea is but little diffused, it is the orders that have now and again disturbed the public peace or provoked conflicts in the colonial or protected countries.

It should also be noted that in the Maghrib the fact that the Sharīfs, *i.e.* the real or supposed descendants of Muḥammad, are found in great numbers tends to diminish the importance of the orders. The Sharīfs form a highly-esteemed religious class, their descent itself providing a sufficient basis for their authority. As it is not to their interest that religious associations which may divert to their own uses some portion of the religious offerings should be making headway alongside of them, the Sharīfian families are essentially hostile to the orders, except those which they have founded and in a sense absorbed, thus appropriating the advantages and emoluments of both the Sharīfate and the order.

The orders are very numerous in N. Africa, and the majority of them have a large, some even an enormous, membership. Definite, or even approximate, enumerations of their adherents are altogether out of the question. In countries subject to European Powers, as Algeria, statistics have been compiled and published, but they have only a relative value. In independent Muslim countries, such as Morocco, the numerical estimates are purely fanciful. Questions put to native members of one and the same order or community will elicit the most remarkable diversity of estimates; thus, as regards a particular confraternity, one will speak of hundreds of members, another of thousands, while a personal investigation will perhaps reduce the total to a few dozens or even units. Still, after making all allowances, we are safe to say that the membership of the orders in N. Africa is very large; the present writer is of opinion that in Morocco about three-quarters of the male population belong to these communities.

Another noteworthy fact of a general character is that some orders are specially connected with particular districts or particular tribes. Thus the order of the Nāṣiriyyah and that of the Mbuoniin recruit their ranks almost exclusively among the inhabitants of the Wādī Drā'a (S. Morocco); while, as an instance of a group wholly confined to a certain ethnological stratum, and affiliated with a religious order, we may refer to the Bukhārā (plur. of Bukhāri), descendants of the famous Black Guard instituted by the sultans of Morocco, whose privileges were ratified by an imperial decree in 1697; this negro aristocracy belongs in the main to the 'Isāwiyyah (below, II. 1).

Finally, from the category of religious orders properly so called we exclude certain associations possessing a religious character (all associations in Islām may be said to have a religious character—corporations, trade gilds, shooting clubs, etc.), but having nothing else in common with the orders (of which religion is the sole *raison d'être*, and which have an essentially religious purpose). Thus we do not regard the acrobatic society of Sūs called the Ulād Sīdī Ḥammad u Mūsā as a religious order; still less the Ghnāwa, the negro jugglers of the public grounds and market-places. Their open-air performances and their manner of taking the collection do not suggest a religious fraternity.

2. Organization. — At the head of the order (called *ṭrīqa*, 'way,' or *ṭaifa*, 'band') stands the *shaikh*, who exercises absolute authority. Under the *shaikh* is the *khalīfah*, or *nāib*, who acts as his vicegerent or deputy, and, in more remote parts, represents him and his authority. Next come the *muqaddams*, heads of the various groups into which the order is divided, and engaged in the work of propaganda and management; they enrol new members, and initiate them, collect the offerings, and convey the instructions of the *shaikh* to members within their jurisdiction; in short, they are pre-eminently the agents of the order. The members, again, are styled *khwān*, *ikhwān*, 'brothers' (Algeria, etc.), *fuqarā'* (plur. of *faqīr*, 'poor') (Morocco), or, more rarely, *darwīshes*, which is rather an Oriental term; one also hears

[1] *NR* ii. 204 f.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 214, iii. 437.
[3] W. H. Prescott, *Hist. of the Conquest of Peru*, London, 1890, p. 52 f.
[4] *NR* ii. 194 f.; Prescott, p. 10.

the word *aṣḥāb*, 'companions.' The several chiefs of an order are kept in touch with one another by foot-messengers (*raqqāb*); the *naqīb* is a kind of master of ceremonies; the *shāush* is charged with temporal affairs.

The members of an order hold regular meetings, called *ḥaḍrahs*, at stated times, and at these they engage in their devotional practices—prayer, singing, dancing, etc.—and hear the instructions and counsels of their *muqaddams*. The order has also an establishment called the *zāwiyah*. This word is rather vague in its denotation, but in a general way it signifies an abode of *murābiṭ*, or monks, and is thus often rendered 'convent,' 'monastery,' or even (quite wrongly) 'hospital.' The *zāwiyah*, in fact, may be a group of buildings—sometimes a very extensive group—comprising a mosque, a school, apartments for disciples (*ṭalabah*), pilgrims (if it has a saint's tomb), dependents, travellers, the poor, etc., or it may be no more than a place of meeting and instruction.

3. Initiation and the chains.—The rite of initiation is called *wird*, lit. 'going down,' and so 'descent to the watering-place,' 'act of drinking,' and is administered to the novice (*murīd*) by the *muqaddam*. The *muqaddam* receives his investiture from the *shaikh*, who delivers to him a diploma styled *ijāzah*. The prerogative of the *shaikh* rests upon tradition and derives its sanction from the 'chains' in which the tradition is embodied. There are two kinds of chains: (1) the chain of initiation (*silsilat al-wird*), *i.e.* the series of 'saints' from whom the founder of the order received his instruction, and (2) the chain of benediction (*silsilat al-baraka*), or series of *shaikhs* who successively held the headship of the order, and so transmitted the divine benediction. The former goes back from the founder to Muḥammad through a complete series of real or supposed personages directly linked with one another, and then ascends, with the archangel Gabriel as intermediary, to Allāh himself.

4. Mysticism in the orders.[1]—Mysticism (*q.v.*), which is one of the fundamental elements of religion, if not indeed its very essence, was, in Islām, the needed, and in a sense the inevitable, recoil from the intellectualism of the Qur'ān. Mysticism is highly developed in the orders, and in some of them reaches its zenith. It takes various forms. It appears in the 'saints' chains' mentioned above, connecting the founders of the orders with Muḥammad, and through him with Gabriel and Allāh, thus securing for them their divine authority. The significance attached to these chains rests wholly upon the mystical element. It manifests itself strikingly in the religious language—formulæ of initiation (*wird*) and of prayer (*dhikr*, etc.), instructions and counsels of the *shaikhs*, speculations regarding the stages, and descriptions of the psychic states, through which the votary passes in order to attain to ecstasy and union with God—speculations and descriptions that recall in striking fashion the analogous theories and delineations of Christian mysticism and Buddhist asceticism.

5. Ritual and ceremonial.[2]—Mysticism, though in origin and principle a reaction against the systematizing and the abuse of rites and formulæ, has given rise in the orders to a ceremonialism of its own. This finds expression, first of all, in litanies—the manifold repetitions (extending to 50, 100, 1000, 10,000, and even 100,000 times) of the same religious affirmations or invocations. In some orders the members devote all their energies to the recitation of the *dhikr*, spending the day and sometimes the whole night in repeating the same forms of prayer. Ritualism and religious formulism, one would think, could hardly go any farther.

Ritualism appears also in the strange ceremonies and practices characteristic of special orders (see below, II. 1)—forms of ritual which secure for such orders an extraordinary influence over the mass of believers.

6. Political aspects.—The orders differ greatly from one another in their political aspects. We shall confine ourselves here to a single country, Morocco, where these communities, in contrast to the important political rôle which they formerly played, have now all but ceased to manifest any activity whatever in this respect—a fact well worthy of note. From the end of the 15th cent. till 1830—the beginning of the French conquest of Algeria—N. Africa was dominated by two rival authorities, viz. the Sharīfs of Morocco and the Turks of Algiers. These two powers had sprung into being almost simultaneously as the result of a religious movement against the Christian conquest of Muslim Spain and against the active designs of Portugal and Spain upon Morocco. This twofold activity on the part of Christian Powers aroused the fanaticism of the Berbers and the Arabs, and kindled a revolution which, directed by the orders, resulted in the overthrow of all the Maghribene dynasties, these being replaced by sovereignties established through the influence of the orders and the *murābiṭ*. In Morocco the first of the new dynasty, that of the Sa'adian Sharīfs, was Abū 'Abdallāh al-Qāim bi Amrillāh, who, after an understanding with the *murābiṭ* of Sūs, advanced a claim to the sovereignty *c.* 915 A.H. (A.D. 1509–10). In the eyes of the people this dynasty stood for a government constituted according to the purest traditions of Islām.

To-day, from a variety of causes,[1] these orders, in spite of the anarchy prevailing in Morocco, have all but ceased to exercise any influence whatever in political affairs. In essence the causes are two: (1) the divisions and rivalries existing among the orders, these being particularly rife in Morocco; and (2) the prerogative of the Makhzen, *i.e.* the Moroccan government, which is now able to have the highest positions in the leading orders conferred upon its foremost representatives—ministers, the imperial family, and even the sultan himself.

7. Place in social life.—As in Muslim countries religion is even more decidedly a social concern than it is among Christian peoples, the social rôle of the orders is closely connected with their religious aspect. Mysticism, which is cultivated more or less in all the orders, has a strong fascination for the African peoples, both those which labour under the violent and arbitrary administration of native governments (Morocco) and those which have been forcibly subjected to the rule of infidel Powers, such as France and Britain; and, by enabling its votaries to become absorbed in God, or at least to engage without restriction or hindrance in religious practices to which the authorities take no objection, mysticism offers to the oppressed not only an open gateway towards heaven, but also a means of deliverance from all the trammels and miseries of earth. Now, to this powerful attraction of mysticism in the orders is added the no less inviting aspect of their social function. The religious order is a form of association peculiarly congenial to the Muslim mind. Among the Muslims of Africa in particular the spirit of combination and co-operation is remarkably well developed. Every active form of social life tends to embody itself in associations—trade gilds, shooting clubs (which are very numerous), charitable societies, etc. This intense need of

[1] For full discussion of Muslim mysticism see art. SUFIS.
[2] Cf. art. DERVISH (Muhammadan), Pap.

[1] See E. Montet, *Les Confréries religieuses de l'Islam marocain*, Paris, 1909.

acting everywhere and in all things in conjunction and communion with one's fellows is then invested with a sacred character by religion. Thus, on the one hand, the mysticism of the orders acts as a social force in bringing individuals together under the ægis of religion, while, on the other, the orders, as religious associations, form one of the most active and most potent phases of the social entity known as Islām.

II. *THE SEVERAL ORDERS.*—1. **'Isāwiyyah.**—This order, one of the most important in Africa, was founded by Muḥammad b. 'Isā, who was born of a Sharīfian family in Mekinez (Morocco), where he also died (*c.* 1523–24) and was buried. Having become a member of the Shādhiliyyah Jazūliyyah (below, § 30), he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, and either in Arabia or in Egypt was in touch with certain dervishes who instructed him in the observances of the Oriental orders Ḥaidiriyyah and Sa'adiyyah. Returning to Morocco with the reputation of being thoroughly proficient in mystical theology and capable of performing the most wonderful miracles, he became so popular that the sultan himself took umbrage and gave orders that 'Isā and his disciples should quit Mekinez.

It was during his exile that, when on one occasion his disciples were in the last straits of hunger and crying out for food, the master bade them eat what was to be found upon the road. There was nothing but stones, snakes, and scorpions; yet such was their confidence in their leader that they devoured these without hesitation, and his miraculous powers warded off any ill effects of the unnatural meal. This incident was probably the origin of those singular practices of a similar kind in which the 'Isāwiyyah still engage. Legend ascribes a great number of miracles to 'Isā, and the report of these led the sultan to recall him to Mekinez.

The chief convent of the order is in Mekinez, and the supreme council of forty members is housed in it. The order has a loose organization, and appears to lack cohesion, though in Morocco, where it is strong in numbers and influence, it is more compact and better organized. As regards doctrine the 'Isāwiyyah are fundamentally at one with the Shādhiliyyah; and indeed their founder used to say that the life he lived was 'that of the Ṣūfīs, that of the Shādhiliyyah.' A Muslim savant has thus summarized their teachings:

'In religious things—continuous progress towards the deity, sobriety, fasting, absorption in God carried to such heights that bodily sufferings and physical mortifications are unable to affect the now impassible senses; in moral things—to fear nothing, to acknowledge no authority but that of God and the Saints, and to submit only to such as permit the principles of the Sacred Book to be carried into practice.'

In doctrine, accordingly, the 'Isāwiyyah are mystics.

The remarkable ritual practices for which the 'Isāwiyyah are noted have often been described. The German traveller, H. von Maltzan,[1] who had an opportunity of witnessing them at Mekinez, has given an account of an 'Isāwiyyah meeting, and this, being little known, we may give here, more especially because the present writer regards it as the most accurate and authentic of its kind, and because, having been present at similar functions in Morocco and Algeria, he is able to confirm the circumstantial character of its details.

'The religious ceremony opens with the nasal intoning of the formula expressing the Muslim confession of faith, *Lā Ilāha il 'Allāh* ('There is no god but God'), repeated over and over again. The sacred words are chanted in all tones to the point of satiety, yet always in measure. Then all at once, when the chanting and the outcry, accompanied by the regular beating of tomtoms and drums, are at their loudest, one of the brothers of the order rises up and begins the religious dance (*ishdeb*). The *ishdeb* is not in the strict sense a dance, but we have no better word by which to render the Arabic term. It consists in regular movements of the body—slow to begin with, then more and more rapid, and at length convulsive. At the outset there are rhythmic oscillations of the head and the upper part of the body, and deep and rapid bowing. The dancer having continued to perform these motions for some minutes, a second rises, then a third, until at last six of the 'Isāwiyyah are vying with one another in vehement swaying and bending. This preliminary scene lasts for about half an hour. Each of the actors in the strange performance carries on till he comes to the paroxysm of the *ishdeb*. The movements become more and more rapid, the bending deeper and deeper, the turnings of the head and the body more and more violent, until at length the exhausted 'Isāwiyyah are seized with vertigo, froth gathers on their lips, their eyes stand out of their sockets and roll with the shifting gaze of the insane, and the fanatical dancers fall staggering to the ground; they have attained the state of blissful ecstasy.

The state of physical prostration signifies that the spirit of the founder of the order has gained control over the disciple, so making him capable of swallowing with impunity the most virulent poisons and all things that lacerate or cut. Soon the six 'Isāwiyyah are wallowing upon the ground in wild disorder, giving vent to frightful yells of an altogether unhuman character, and resembling now the snorting of the wild boar, now the roaring of the lion. Some of them, like wild beasts, grind their teeth, from which drips a whitish foam. In their disordered and threatening movements, it would seem as if they were about to rend the onlookers in pieces.

A large dish is then brought forward, and is uncovered by the *muqaddam* who presides over the ceremony. It contains serpents, scorpions, toads, lizards—a jumble of loathsome and venomous creatures. Hardly has the *muqaddam* removed the cover when the six frenzied maniacs fall upon the foul mass of living things with the voracity of famished beasts of prey, and in a moment the whole is torn in pieces and devoured. No trickery here! I see the reptiles torn in pieces by the powerful teeth, while the blood of the serpents and the slimy secretion of the scorpions tinge the saliva at the corners of the mouth. This revolting meal is followed by another, possibly even more dangerous. A dish of broken glass, needles, and cactus leaves is brought forward, and its contents are immediately snapped up and swallowed. I hear the glass cracking between the teeth, and the sap of the cactus leaves trickles over the cheeks; the blood of the injured mouth mingles with the juice of the plant. Finally, a red-hot iron is brought in, and a negro, even more fanatical in appearance than the six Moroccans who have just played their part, takes it in his mouth and licks it on all sides. This ceremonial is followed by the reception of a new brother into the order. The neophyte is brought in by two members, and prostrates himself before the *muqaddam*. The latter exhorts the candidate and then performs the sacred rite which is an essential condition of joining the 'Isāwiyyah. The rite is as follows: the neophyte opens his mouth wide, and the *muqaddam* spits three times into his gullet. The miraculous saliva suffices of itself to endow the neophyte with the power of consuming poisons, glass, or cactus spines, without injury to himself.'

These curious and extraordinary performances are to be explained less as the tricks and devices of conjuring than as phenomena of a psychical kind—phenomena of which the ecstatic state has yielded countless examples in all ages, among all peoples, and in all religions. In 1900, at Rabat (Morocco), in the house of M. D——, formerly French consular agent in that town, the present writer saw a most interesting collection of instruments of torture used by the 'Isāwiyyah in their exhibitions—huge and heavy clubs studded with large nails, flagellants' rods formed of short supple sticks strung together in a ring, etc. It would, in fact, be quite wrong to speak of the 'Isāwiyyah as mere jugglers and tricksters. It is certainly the case that, *e.g.*, in Algiers and elsewhere they are ready enough to exhibit their performances for money, and at Kairwan the present writer was offered—on terms—a view of their frenzies; but the aberrations of a group should not throw discredit on the members generally, who (in Morocco, at least, where the present writer has studied their mode of life) are in the main honest and peaceable tradesmen and tillers of the soil.

The 'Isāwiyyah are very numerous in Morocco, being found in all parts of that vast country. They draw their members from all ranks of society. At Marrakesh, in 1900–01, certain exalted personages of the Sharīfian court were mentioned by name to the present writer as belonging to the order; the former sultan, Mūlāi Ḥasan, was a member (cf. also the reference to the Bukhārā above, I. 1). The order is also well represented through-

[1] *Drei Jahre im Nordwesten von Afrika*², Leipzig, 1868, iv. 276 ff.

out Algeria, where, in 1900, they numbered at least 3500. The most important of their *zāwiyahs* (of which they have about a dozen in this country) is that of 'Alī b. Muhammad in the Duar Uzara, where the panther's skin on which the founder of the order is said to have slept is preserved as a relic; a skin with the identical claim is preserved at Mekinez. The 'Isāwiyyah maintain a footing likewise in Tunis, and are found in almost all important localities; they are met with also in Tripoli, at Bénghazi (Barka), in Egypt, Syria, and the Hedjāz.

2. **Ḥamadsha.** — The Ḥamadsha or Ḥamadushia, a Moroccan order, though far behind the 'Isāwiyyah in influence and expansion, are closely akin to them in their peculiar usages, and are noted for their practices of striking the head with an axe and of throwing cannon-balls into the air and catching them on their skulls. They are often met with in company with the 'Isāwiyyah. Their name comes from that of their founder, 'Alī b. Ḥamdush, who lived in the 16th cent., and is interred near Mekinez.

M. Quedenfeldt[1] mentions religious orders or sub-orders related to the Ḥamadsha, but we have little information regarding them. The following four, more or less connected with the Ḥamadsha in origin or religious practice, have but a small membership:

3. **Daghughiyyīn.**—The patron saint of this group, Ḥamid Daghughī, who was near of kin to the founder of the Ḥamadsha, was born near Mekinez (Jebel Zerhun). A characteristic practice of his community is that of throwing cannon-balls and clubs into the air and catching them on their heads.

4. **Ṣādiqiyyīn.**—Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq, the patron saint of this order, came from S. Morocco (Tafilalt, Drā'a, Tuāt). The members in their dances butt their heads violently against one another.

5. **Riāhīn.**—Their patron saint is al-'Amir Riāhī, who belonged to Mekinez. His followers stick the points of knives or forks into the lower front of the body without drawing blood.

6. **Meliāiyyīn.**—Mūlāi Meliāna, the founder, was a native of Mekinez; his votaries are fire-eaters, and swallow live coals.

Of the following three communities, related to the foregoing in origin and tendency, scarcely anything is known to us but their names and the fact that their membership is exceedingly small:

7. **'Alamīn.**—Founded by Qaddur al-'Alamī, of Mekinez.

8. **Sejīnīn.**—Founded by Ḥamid Sejīnī, also of Mekinez.

9. **Qāsmīn.**—Founded by Qāsim Bū-Asria, who belonged to the neighbourhood of Mekinez.

10. **'Ammāriyyah.**—This Algerian order, whose religious practices are like those of the 'Isāwiyyah, is found in Algeria and Tunis, and in those countries has over 6000 members and 26 *zāwiyahs*. It was founded by 'Ammār Bū-Senna, born *c.* 1712 at Smala ben Merād in the Wādī Zenati (Alg.), and was reorganized *c.* 1815 by al-Ḥajj Embārek al-Maghribī al-Bukhārī († 1897), a Moroccan who belonged to the famous negro aristocracy referred to above (I. 1). It is reported that a dissenting branch exists in the district of Guelma (Alg.) under the leadership of a certain b. Nahal.

11. **Tuhāmiyyīn, or Ṭayyibiyyah.**—This Moroccan order, which in Morocco itself bears the former name and in Algeria the latter, was instituted in 1678–79 by Mūlāi 'Abdallāh b. Ibrāhīm, a member of the Jazūliyyah (below, § 30), and the founder of the *zāwiyah* of Wazzān, which subsequently gained such fame. The great political role once played by this order was due to the noble lineage of its founder and of his successors in the hierarchy. For the Sharīfs of Wazzān—such is the title given them—belong by blood to the house of Mūlāi Idrīs, a descendant of Muḥammad, who founded the first Moroccan dynasty in 788, and this lineage ranks in Morocco as, if not more genuine, yet purer and better established, than that of the sultans themselves.

The name Ṭayyibiyyah is derived from that of Mūlāi Ṭāyyib, the successor of Mūlāi 'Abdallāh in the government of the order, and a contemporary of Sultan Mūlāi Isma'īl (17th century). The order powerfully assisted the latter in his efforts to gain the throne. The name Tuhāmiyyīn, again, comes from that of Mūlāi al-Tūhāmī b. Muḥammad († 1715), who won distinction by his reorganization of the order.

From the time when Mūlāi 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Khajj al-'Arbī 'l Wazzānī, a former head of the confraternity († 1894), became a *protégé* of France,[1] it has in a manner been at the service of that country—a circumstance to which, it seems, it owes its subsequent decadence. Its influence in Morocco is nowadays quite inconsiderable, as was evident in 1904, when M. Perdicaris was a captive in the hands of Raisulī, and the intervention of the Sharīfs of Wazzān utterly failed to secure his liberation. 'Abd al-Salām had strong leanings towards European culture; he renounced his native wives in order to marry an Englishwoman; he liked to wear the uniform of a French general of artillery. His successor in command was his eldest son, Mūlāi al-'Arbī.

The Tuhāmiyyīn are found principally at Wazzān, where their parent institution is, and in N. Morocco; in the rest of that country the present writer has scarcely heard a word about them. In Algeria the Ṭayyibiyyah are represented mainly in Oran; in the whole country their membership has been computed at over 22,000, while they have only eight *zāwiyahs*—a fact that speaks well of their organization and cohesion. The order has a numerous following also in Tuāt.

12. **Tijāniyyah.** — This Algerian order was founded by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Mukhtār al-Tijānī, who was born at 'Aīn Mādhī, near Laghuat (Alg.), in 1737 and died at Fez in 1815. He was a descendant of a devout Moroccan Sharīf who built the *zāwiyah* of 'Aīn Mādhī. The order has spread far and wide; in Africa the majority of its members are found in Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli, the Sūdān, the Congo, and in Adamawa, Adrār, and Tuāt, with some even in Egypt, and it has *zāwiyahs* also in Constantinople, Beirūt, Medīna, Mecca, and Yambo. In Algeria, where its membership was found recently to be over 25,000, with 32 *zāwiyahs*, it has been split since 1875 into two branches—that of 'Aīn Mādhī and that of Temasin (Wādī Ghir). The direct descendants of the founder reside in the *zāwiyah* of 'Aīn Mādhī. The two rival divisions stand quite apart from the rest of the Algerian and foreign orders, and are crippled by their dissensions and (in the Temasin branch) by the personal conduct of some of their chiefs. The Algerian Tijāniyyah, however, have all along supported the French ascendancy, and have rendered great service to the Government, while, as an aristocratic society of liberal outlook, they have shown themselves markedly accessible to European influence.

The case is very different in Morocco, where the order, while certainly aristocratic, has assumed a narrow national character. Here, indeed, it is to be regarded as standing quite by itself. Its central convent is in Fez. Tijāniyyah resident in Tafilalt, Gūrara, Tuāt, the French Western Sūdan, and Senegal are under its control, and apparently

[1] *ZE* xviii. [1886].

[1] On the law of protection cf. the Treaty of Madrid, art. 16.

acknowledge its spiritual authority. In Morocco it recruits its ranks from the Arab (*i.e.* the Andalusian-Moorish) element, which forms the best educated and most intelligent, though the most fanatical, stratum of the population; and it has adherents also in the higher commercial class and even in court circles. It manifests considerably more internal cohesion than the other Moroccan orders, and, in virtue of its aristocratic character and its wealth, exercises a considerable social influence—an influence which, as the present writer can testify, is hostile to European civilization.

The Tijāniyyah of Adrār seem to have made notable progress, and their *zāwiyah* at Shingeṭi is said to have established branches at Walata and Kaarta, as also farther West, among the Moors of the right bank of the Senegal and in Toro. The founder of the order was a man of liberal mind. While taking his stand upon the rule of the Khalwātiyyah (below, § 34)—a ceremonial and ascetic mysticism—he drew his inspiration chiefly from the Shādhiliyyah (below, § 21). His teachings and principles are set forth in a work which he composed at Fez between 1798 and 1800, and which is commonly called *Kunash*, a corruption of its real title *Min kulli nashin*, 'Gathered from Everything,' *i.e.* a chrestomathy. The prevailing spirit of the book is a liberalism seldom met with in other orders; it counsels no macerations, no harsh penances, no prolonged retreats, and favours a simple ritual; and it presents generally a synthesis of temporal and spiritual interests that is conducive to broad-mindedness. We quote two characteristic sayings from the work.

'The law follows the law: all that comes from God is to be held in respect,' *i.e.* the law before all things, and tolerance. 'All that exists is loved by God, and in that love the unbeliever (*kāfir*) has a place as well as the believer.'

13. Derqāwā. — This is a Moroccan order of great importance. It was founded by Mūlāi 'l-'Arbī al-Derqāwī, who died in 1823 in his own *zāwiyah* of Bū Barīḥ (territory of the Banū Zarwāl, north of Fez, in the Jibāl). The chief convent of the order is situated there. The Derqāwā, who adhere to the traditions of the Shādhiliyyah, are found in great numbers throughout Morocco. The Sekhalliyīn, a Sharīfian gild at Fez, are connected with the order, which is largely represented also in Algeria (about 9500 members, with 10 *zāwiyahs*, nearly all in Oran), in Tuāt, in Gūrara, and in the Sahāra as far south as Timbuctu, while adherents are met with in Tunis, Tripoli (cf. Madaniyyah, below, § 14), Egypt, and Arabia. The Derqāwā are a mendicant order, and are noted for their ascetic practices and for the absolute submission which by oath they yield to their *shaikh*. Of all the Muslim fraternities the Derqāwā perhaps come nearest to the monastic orders of Roman Catholicism. The founder's final counsels to his disciples are as follows:

'The duties of my brothers shall consist in overcoming their passions, and, in performing these duties, they shall seek to imitate—

Our Lord Mūsa (Moses), in always travelling with a staff;

Our Lord Abū Bakr, and our Lord 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, in wearing patched clothes;

J'afar b. 'Abī Ṭalib, in celebrating God's praises by dances (*raqṣ*);

Bū Hariro (Abū Huraira), the Prophet's secretary, in wearing a rosary round the neck;

Our Lord 'Isā (Jesus), in living in solitude and in the desert.

They shall travel with bare feet, endure hunger, and associate only with holy men. They shall avoid the society of men occupying places of power. They shall keep themselves from falsehood. They shall sleep little, spend their nights in prayer, and give alms. They shall tell their *shaikh* of their more serious as well as of their more trivial thoughts, of their important actions as well as of the most insignificant. To their *shaikh* they shall tender unresisting submission, and shall at all times be in his hands as the corpse in the hands of those who wash the dead.'[1]

[1] From a text published by L. Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan*.

This final exhortation has been aptly compared with Loyola's 'perinde ac cadaver.' In Algeria and Morocco the Derqāwā have on the whole remained loyal to the spirit of their founder, renouncing all earthly ambition, and maintaining an absolute detachment from the goods of this world. Still, this attitude has at times shown itself capable of developing into fanaticism, and in both Morocco and Algeria they have now and again taken an active part in revolts against governmental authority.

The outward appearance of the Derqāwā is most characteristic: a stick or rod in the hand, chaplets of huge beads round the neck, the body covered with rags, and frequently—as a mark of pre-eminent devotion—the green turban upon the head. The tattered and offensively foul garb which they affect has in Morocco earned them the nickname of Derbaliyyah ('wearers of rags'), and explains the sarcastic saying of the *ṭalabah* (students) of the Jibāl—'The dog and the Derqāwī are one and the same.' In Morocco the order seems to have lost ground because of its divisions; it has three distinct branches there.

Its adherents are regarded as extreme devotees of monotheism. Their founder is said to have been so convinced of the divine unity and of the unconditional duty of giving glory to God alone that he commanded his followers to repeat aloud only the first part of the creed ('No god but Allāh') and to rest satisfied with a merely mental affirmation of the second ('Muḥammad is His Prophet').

14. Madaniyyah. — This is a Tripolitan order which, though an off-shoot from the Derqāwā, has come to exhibit a spirit diametrically opposed to the teachings of al-'Arbī. It was instituted by a Derqāwī named Muḥammad b. Hamzah Zāfir al-Madanī, who began to preach *c.* 1820; about that time, too, he founded the *zāwiyah* of Mezrata, which is still the central convent of the new order. The development of Sanūsīism (cf. below, § 38) about the beginning of the latter half of the 19th cent. arrested that of the Madaniyyah, which would have remained stationary but for the fact that in 1875 the turn of events brought the head of the order, Muḥammad Zāfir, son and successor of b. Hamzah, into touch with 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, the future sultan of Turkey. From that point the order became one of the most vigorous in the East, and one of the most hostile to European influence. With the support of Turkey, it has intermeddled on a vast scale with questions of Muslim politics. Its sphere of activity has gravitated towards the East, and it is now represented mainly in Turkey (Constantinople), Syria, and the Hedjāz, while, as regards Africa, its members are found in Egypt, Tripoli, and Algeria (where it has 1700 adherents and two *zāwiyahs*).

The doctrine of the order, as formulated by Muḥammad Zāfir, classes its members with the ecstatic mystics; they manifest an unusual intensity of religious exaltation. In the statement of their regulations[1] drawn up by Muḥammad Zāfir for his disciples he asserts that war upon the infidel is a no less imperative duty than the ordinary practice of religion.

15. Qādiriyyah.—This order is the most widely spread and most popular in all Islām; its domain extends from Morocco to Malaysia; or, to speak more precisely, the order has found its way into every region into which Islām itself has penetrated. It was founded by 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī ([*q.v.*] † 1166), born in Persia, and buried at Baghdād, where also is situated the central convent of the order. The Qādiriyyah are noted alike for their philanthropic principles and their mystical exalta-

[1] *Nūr al-Saṭā* ('The Sparkling Light'), Constantinople, 1885.

tion. 'Abd al-Qādir practised a boundless charity; he accorded a peculiar veneration to Sīdna 'Īsā ('our Lord Jesus'), and admired his measureless benevolence, though at the same time he preached and practised a doctrine of mystical ecstasy and the extinction of the human personality by absorption in God.

In Africa, except as regards Egypt, the order shows little homogeneity. In general, its members have remained faithful to the benevolent and tolerant spirit of the founder, but fanatics and irreconcilable enemies of European civilization are found among them. As regards the Egyptian Sūdān, the Mahdī of Khartum and his troops belonged to the Qādiriyyah, while in the immense region of the Western Sūdān the supreme head of the order there, the famous Shaikh Ma-al-'Aīnīn-al-Shingeṭī—a spiritual potentate of most extensive sway—who sometimes resides at Shingeṭi in Adrār, and sometimes to the south of Sagiat al-Ḥamrā, and has at present great influence in Morocco, is a determined antagonist of French activity in these various countries. The Qādiriyyah are specially numerous in Tunis and Morocco; in the whole of Africa, according to a recent return, they numbered 24,000 (of whom 2600 were women), with 33 *zāwiyahs*.

16. Bū 'Aliyyah.—This Tunisian order, an offshoot from the Qādiriyyah, and found only in Tunis and the province of Constantine (Alg.), was instituted by Bū 'Alī, whose tomb, as also the chief monastery of the order, is at Nefta (Tunis). The members engage in practices similar to those of the 'Isāwiyyah.

17. **Bakkāiyyah.**—This order, belonging to the Western Sūdān, and related to the Qādiriyyah, was founded by 'Umar b. Sīdī Aḥmad al-Bakkāi, *c.* 1552–53. Its central monastery is in Timbuctu, and it is represented also in Tuāt, in Adrār, and among the Tuāregs.

18. 'Arūsiyyah, or Salāmiyyah. — This is a Tunisian order, founded by Abū 'l-'Abbās Aḥmad b. al-'Arūs, who died in Tunis in 1460. The name Salāmiyyah comes from the celebrated 'Abd al-Salām al-Asmar, who reorganized the order *c.* 1796, and gave it the thaumaturgic character that it bears to-day. It is connected with the Qādiriyyah, and its typical features are a highly emotional mysticism and performances similar to those of the 'Isāwiyyah—frantic dancing, walking through flames, swallowing fire, etc. The order is well represented in Tunis, and especially in Tripoli, while in Algeria it can hardly claim 100 members (all in the extreme east of Constantine); a few are found also in Mecca and Medina.

19. Sa'adiyyah.—This is an Asiatic order, founded in the 13th cent. by Sa'ad al-Dīn al-Jabani of Damascus, and now represented both in Asia and in Africa. Its Egyptian branch was at the zenith of its prestige in the 17th cent., and at the present day that group, together with a body of adherents in the Sūdān, forms the leading ramification of the order. Another section is found in Syria, while members are also met with in the Hedjāz. The Sa'adiyyah are an ecstatic order; they are allied with the Rifā'iyyah, which have a regular, as well as a dissident, branch in Egypt, and which sprang from the Qādiriyyah in the 12th century.

20. **Badawiyyah Ahmadiyyah.**—This Egyptian order is connected both with the Qadiriyyah and with the Rifa'iyyah, and was founded by Ahmad al-Badawi, who died in 1276 at Tantah in Egypt. He was a scion of a Sharifian family belonging originally to the Hedjaz, but afterwards resident at Fez. Ahmad had gone from Morocco to Egypt, and settled at Tantah, where the chief convent of the order still is. The order is now split into three independent branches, found chiefly in Egypt and the Sūdān, while it has also members in the Hedjāz and in Syria. Legend ascribes to its founder the gift of working miracles, and in particular the power of making barren women bear children—hence the licentious orgies which take place round the saint's tomb on his festival day.

21. Shādhiliyyah. — This African order — or theological school, rather—was founded by Abū'l Ḥasan b. 'Abd al-Jabbār al-Shādhilī, who was born, as some report, in Morocco, or, according to others, in Tunis, in 1196–97. He was a pupil of the renowned 'Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh († 1227–28), a Moroccan disciple of Sha'aib Abū Madian al-Andalusī, a native of Seville, who died at Tlemsen in 1197–98. This Abū Madian had travelled in the East, where he had become one of the personal followers of the famous 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (cf. above, § 15). Al-Shādhilī settled at length in Egypt. At the outset he engaged in ascetic practices, but afterwards devoted himself entirely to teaching. He gained an extraordinary reputation and was highly venerated. The university of al-Azhar drew its inspiration exclusively from his teaching, which it disseminated throughout the Muslim world.

Al-Shādhilī imposed no distinctive rule or ritual upon his disciples, so that, having had no other bond of union than the dominating influence of his teaching, they found themselves at his death (1258) without a leader. This resulted in the formation of various groups among his disciples, and of a considerable number of orders animated by his spirit. Of a proper organization there is but little in the order, which is above all a mystical fellowship, its main characteristics being a pure spiritualism, an ideal elevation of thought and feeling, absolute consecration to God, the voluntary merging of one's being in God, moral purification, prayer at all times, in all places, and under all conditions, and an ecstatic mysticism springing out of fervid love to God. This high-wrought mysticism, impelling the disciple to lose himself in the divine, was regarded by al-Shādhilī as inconsistent with all fanaticism and intolerance, and it certainly bears the stamp of a genuine spiritual catholicity.

At the present day the Shādhiliyyah form not so much an organized order as a school of doctrine maintained by numerous orders and taught in numerous *zāwiyahs*. The most genuine representatives of al-Shādhilī's teaching are now those religious associations which, while untrammelled by any proper constitution, make a watchword of the master's name, and it is these—independent *zāwiyahs* — which most faithfully reflect the primitive community. We find them scattered throughout the whole of N. Africa, more particularly in Algeria (where there are over 14,000 adherents), Tunis, and Tripoli; also in the Hedjāz, Syria, and Turkey—countries in which they play an important rôle.

The following twelve orders (**22–33**) are of Shādhiliyyan origin.

22. Ḥabībiyyah.—This Moroccan order, mentioned by L. Rinn, was founded by Aḥmad b. al-Ḥabīb al-Lamit († 1752–53), a native of Tafilalt. We have little definite information regarding it. Its membership, confined to Tafilalt (in which stands the chief monastery) and the province of Oran (Alg.), is very small, and the order is said to be animated by a tolerant and unworldly spirit.

23. Wafaiyyah (Ufaiyyah).—The Wafaiyyah, an Egyptian order, was founded in the 14th cent. by the Wafa, a Sharifian family belonging to Egypt; its first chief was Muḥammad Wafa, and it has survived to the present day under the control of the same family.

24. **Nāṣiriyyah.**—This Moroccan order, now of diminished importance, was founded in the 17th cent. by Muḥammad b. Nāṣir al-Drā'ī († 1669), who claimed Aḥmad b. Yūsuf († 1524–25) as his spiritual master. The chief convent of the order and the founder's tomb are at Tamagrut (Wādī Drā'a), the headquarters of the brotherhood. The members are found mainly in the south of Morocco; outside that country a very few are met with in Algeria and Tunis.

25. **Shaikhiyyah.**—The Shaikhiyyah, or Ulād Sīdī al-Shaikh, belonging to the Sahāra, and holding to the doctrinal standpoint of the Shādhiliyyah, are not so much a religious order as an aristocratic caste of a political and religious character. Their founder was 'Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad, afterwards styled Sīdī Shaikh († 1615), a great feudal lord who had once been a *muqaddam* among the Shādhiliyyah. He erected at al-Abiod the first of the *qṣūr* (citadels) now found in the Sahāra, and exercised a strong moral and religious authority in that region.

The Shaikhiyyah are located principally in the south of Oran, in Tuāt, Tidikalt, and Gūrara. In Morocco, where a few are met with at Tafilalt and round the oasis of Figig, their influence is inconsiderable; they are here regarded as hostile to Europeans. In the main, feudal, family, and marabout influences prevail so largely among them that the bond of connexion between them and the Shādhiliyyah is now very loose.

26. **Karzāziyyah.**—This Saharan order, found in S. Morocco and S. Oran, was instituted by Sharīf Aḥmad b. Nusa († 1608), who belonged to Karzāz, an oasis to the south-east of the Figig, and taught the doctrines of the Shādhiliyyah. The members are noted for works of benevolence, and the *zāwiyah* of the founder at Karzāz is still a refuge for the poor, and, in times of adversity or oppression, for residents of the neighbouring *qṣūr*.

27. **Ziyāniyyah.**—This also is a Saharan order noted for philanthropy; it was founded by Mūlai b. Bū Ziyān († 1733), who belonged to a Sharīfian family resident in the Wādī Drā'a. The saint's tomb is at Kenatsa, between Tafilalt and the oasis of Figig, and there too is situated the central convent of the order. The Ziyāniyyah are found mainly in S. Morocco, Tafilalt, Figig, Tuāt, Gūrara, and the province of Oran; in Algeria, according to a recent computation, they numbered over 3000. They adhere to the doctrines of the Shādhiliyyah. They act as conductors of caravans, and in the Sahāra protect them against robbers and brigands. The order has always shown itself well-disposed towards French people and the colonial administration.

28. **Hansaliyyah.**—This Moroccan order was founded by b. Yūsuf al-Hansali († 1702), who, as his name indicates, belonged to the Hansala, a section of the Banī Mṭir, a tribe living in a district to the south of Fez. Formerly the order held a position of great influence in Morocco, but it is now almost extinct there; in Algeria it numbers more than 4000 members, belonging to the province of Constantine (the *zāwiyah* of Shettaba); and it is represented also in Tunis. Its adherents are noted for works of charity.

29. **Zarrūqiyyah.**—The Zarrūqiyyah, a Moroccan order, was founded by Abū'l-'Abbās Aḥmad al-Zarrūqī († 1494), who belonged to the Beranes, a tribe settled near Fez. In Morocco the order is dying out, but in Algeria it has about 2700 members, with a *zāwiyah* at Berruaghia.

30. **Jazūliyyah.**—This Moroccan order has almost ceased to exist as an organized community in Morocco, although the doctrines of its founder are still taught at Fez. Its founder was Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad al-Jazūlī († *c.* 1465), a native of Jazūla in Sūs, and the author of a famous work entitled *Dalail al-Ḫairat* ('The Best Arguments'), on which are based the teachings of the Jazūliyyah.

31. **Yūsufiyyah.**—This is an Algerian order, founded by Aḥmad b. Yūsuf, a native of Morocco or—more probably, as some hold—of Oran. This celebrated visionary (*majzūb*), to whom are ascribed numerous proverbs and epigrams, died in 1524–25 and was buried in Miliana (Algiers). There are few traces of the order in Morocco, but in Algeria there is at Tiūt, in the extreme south of Oran, a *zāwiyah* founded by Muḥammad b. Milūd († 1877), a descendant of b. Yūsuf, which can still claim some 1500 members. The order has little influence in Algeria, but has all along maintained excellent relations with the French authorities.

32. **Ghāziyyah.**—The Ghāziyyah, a Moroccan order, founded *c.* 1526 by Abū'l-Ḥasān al-Qāsim al-Ghāzī, is of feeble growth, has a very limited expansion in the Wādī Drā'a, and possesses a *zāwiyah* at Fez.

33. **Shabbiyyah.**—The Shabbiyyah is a Tunisian order, founded in the 17th cent. by Aḥmad b. Makhluf, a descendant of Muḥammad b. Nāṣir al-Drā'ī, the founder of the Nāṣiriyyah (above, § 24). This b. Makhluf had been sent to Tunis to extend the operations of the latter order, and had settled at Shabba, between Sfax and Sūs; hence the name borne by his followers. The actual organizer of the order was Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Hatif. It is found in Tunis, and also in Algiers (Aurès), where it has about 1500 members.

34. **Khalwātiyyah.**—This Asiatic group, the name of which is ultimately derived from the term *khalwa*, 'retreat,' 'solitude,' is a school rather than an order, and goes back to the philosophical school founded by the Persian thinker Abū'l-Qāsim al-Junaidī († 910–11), but its actual (or at least its eponymous) founder was 'Umar al-Khalwātī († 1397–98), also a Persian. At the outset the order had no graded organization, and in Asia, where its expansion was on a great scale, it soon broke up into various groups—independent and local branches. In Africa, about the end of the 17th cent., they formed for a time a religious association in the true sense; but there too, though the order made less rapid progress, it soon fell apart into divergent and independent branches or groups. The teaching of the Khalwātiyyah began to take root in Egypt as early as the 15th century. At the end of the 17th a Syrian Khalwātī called Mustafa al-Baqri, a professor in the university of al-Azhar in Cairo, endeavoured to incorporate the members of the order in Egypt, and the united body, having grown considerably in numbers, assumed the name Baqriyyah, to distinguish them from other Khalwātiyyah. This new organization, however, did not last long, for at the death of al-Baqri (1709) three fresh groups detached themselves from it, viz. the Khafnawiyyah, the Sharqawiyyah, and the Sammaniyyah. Further disruptions took place, giving rise to other independent branches and *zāwiyahs*, so that, as indicated above, the Khalwātiyyah do not so much form an order as represent a type of doctrine. They nevertheless exercise great influence in social life. They are ascetics, and mystics of a most fervid stamp; they have recourse to the retreat and the austerities which it involves; they engage in iterative prayers—repetitions of formulæ, names of God, etc.—sometimes continued for five or six consecutive hours. This intense religious fervour has often excited the members to fanatical outbreaks and, as in Egypt, the Egyptian Sūdān, etc.,

brought them into conflict with the authorities, both Muslim and Christian. Like some other orders (cf. §§ 15, 35, and 39), they admit women as members.

35. Raḥmāniyyah. — The Raḥmāniyyah is an Algerian order, found chiefly in Constantine, and elsewhere only in Tunis. It sprang from the Khalwātiyyah, and resembles them in doctrine, practice, and lack of cohesion. It was instituted by Muḥammad b. 'Abdarraḥmān Bū Qubrain († 1793–94), who belonged to the Kabyle tribe of the Aït Smaïl; his surname, Bū Qubrain ('with the two tombs'), goes back to the legend according to which his body was divided into two parts, buried respectively in Kabylia and at Hamma near Algiers. It is a most popular and influential order in Algeria, where it played the leading part in the great insurrection of 1871; its membership here is 156,000 (including 13,000 women), with 177 *zāwiyahs*, and comprises several independent groups. Like all other offshoots of the Khalwātiyyah, it is marked by a want of cohesion, of discipline, and of centralized control.

36. Emirghaniyyah.—This is an Oriental order, known also as the Mirghaniyyah or Marghania, founded by Muḥammad 'Uthmān al-Emir Ghanī, who was born in 1793 at Salamat near Taïf in the Hedjāz, and died at Taïf in 1853. He joined the then brilliant school of Aḥmad b. Idrīs, a native of Fez, who taught at Mecca from 1797 till 1833. At the death of the latter, in 1837, Emir Ghanī's standing among the Idrisiyyah enabled him to compete successfully with Shaikh Sanūsī for the leadership of that body. Presently, however, he began to modify the rule of Aḥmad, and then founded the order that bears his own name. When he died, dissensions and rivalries divided his followers into isolated sections and local branches. The order has a considerable expansion in Arabia, throughout the basin of the Red Sea, and in the Egyptian Sūdān.

By the founder himself the order was named al-Khatemia, 'the sealing'; hence the title Serr al-Khāttem, 'the secret of the seal,' given to his son Muḥammad, who became the head of the confraternity. It is a mystical and ecstatic order, and from the first—even in its very origin—it assumed a political attitude hostile to the Sanūsiyyah (§ 38). It was closely involved in the Mahdistic movement. In the Sūdān it has shown itself distinctly favourable to the Anglo-Egyptian government. The French traveller Bonnel de Mézières, when on a mission to the Sūdān in 1905–06, spoke of the order as entirely in the hands of the English, and this connexion has lowered its prestige both in the Sūdān and in the Hedjāz. A religious order that allies itself too openly with Europeans inevitably diminishes its influence among Muslims (cf. above, §§ 11 and 12).

37. Naqshbandiyyah.—An Oriental order, one of the most important in Islām, the Naqshbandiyyah has the largest membership of any in Central Asia. Its characteristics are contemplative mysticism and ecstatic ritualism; and, by reason of the varied and flexible forms of the mysticism which it inculcates, the purity of life for which its votaries are noted, and the supernatural powers ascribed to them, its influence is indeed great. It was founded at Bukhara by al-Khwajah Muḥammad Bahā al-Dīn[1] († 1390), an eclectic reformer (combining Sunnite orthodoxy, Shī'ism, and Ismā'īlian teachings). Etymologically the name Naqshband refers to the mystical delineations of the celestial life taken by Bahā al-Dīn from the philosophical theories of the Ismā'īliyyah Batheniyyah ('interior Ismā'īlians,' *i.e.* those practising internal meditation both ecstatic and contemplative). In Africa the order has only one *zāwiyah*, which draws its members exclusively from the Turkish element of the population.

38. Sanūsiyyah.—The Sanūsiyyah, an Algerian order, was founded in 1835 by Shaikh Sī Muḥammad b. Sī 'Alī 'l-Sanūsī († 1859), who belonged to the vicinity of Mostaganem, and claimed to be the Mahdī. The chief monastery was for a long time at Jarabūb (Jaghbūb) in Tripoli, but has been removed to the oasis of Kufra in the Libyan Desert. The order has a great influence in Tripoli and in part of the Eastern Sūdān; it has a firm footing also in Egypt and especially in Arabia; but its following is very small in Algeria (under 1000 members), Morocco, and the districts to the south of these countries. The founder claimed to be a reformer of Islām, one who would restore the primitive purity of morals according to the Qur'ān; he also maintained that he formed the synthesis of all the other orders, especially in their mystical aspects. The order of the Sanūsiyyah has nothing like the vast influence and the fanatically anti-Christian and anti-European character that have been ascribed to it. Its attitude to Europeans is friendly or hostile according to locality and circumstances; but it should be noted that al-Mahdī, the eldest son of Sanūsī, and his successor as head of the order, took up a position of direct antagonism as the Mahdī of Khartum.

39. Heddāwa.—This Moroccan order was first made known to Europeans by Auguste Moulières.[1] Its founder was Sīdī Heddī, who lived in the 13th cent., and was a contemporary and an admirer of Mūlāi 'Abd al-Salam b. Meshīsh, the great saint of the Jibāl; his tomb is at Tagzirth, among the Benī 'Arūs in the Jibāl, and there too stands the chief monastery of the order. The district in which he settled and had a *zāwiyah* built is now called Uṭa ('plain') Sīdī Heddī, and the fish of the stream that traverses the district have since ranked as sacred. The Heddāwa (pl. of Heddāwī) are a mendicant order of the lowest type, and have a most repulsive appearance. They are clothed in rags and go bare-headed, with the staff in their hand and the chaplet round their neck; they are a byword for filthiness, and are said to live in promiscuity; they admit women into their membership. They like to have animals, especially cats, about them; and they are great smokers of *kīf* (shredded hemp). Though few in number, they are spread over an extensive district. All our information regarding them tends to show that they form an antinomian order.

40. Mbuoniin.—The Mbuoniin, a little known Moroccan order, first noted by Jules Erckmann,[2] was founded by a devout man named 'Abdallah 'Alī, also called Mbuono (Bū Nūh), a native of the Wādi Dra'a, in which (at Tamagrut) his tomb is also situated. The central convent of the order is in Tafilalt, and there was recently at Marrakesh a community of Mbuoniin numbering about 200. The members—they seem to be relatively few—wear as a badge a white cap of knitted wool.

LITERATURE.—Of works dealing with the subject as a whole there are few, but monographs devoted to particular orders are constantly appearing. Of the former class we cite here only those that may claim to be of scientific or documentary value: L. Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan; Etude sur l'Islam en Algérie* (with a chart indicating the boundaries, the localities, and the importance of the orders), Algiers, 1885; O. Depont and X. Coppolani, *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes* (with a map showing the geographical sphere of the orders—Algeria, Africa, Asia, and European Turkey), do. 1897; A. Le Chatelier, *L'Islam dans l'Afrique occidentale*, Paris, 1899; E. Doutté, *L'Islam algérien en 1900*, Algiers, 1900; valuable information is supplied by A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries musulmanes du Hedjaz*, Paris, 1887, which gives a detailed bibliography of the subject down to 1887.

E. MONTET.

[1] See *ERE* viii. 886 f.

[1] *Le Maroc inconnu*, Paris, 1895–99.
[2] *Le Maroc moderne*, Paris, 1886.

REMORSE.—In its most general sense remorse denotes poignant sorrow for the miserable condition of oneself or of another, whether that involves personal responsibility or is merely due to circumstances. Writers of the 16th and 17th centuries often use it for 'pity' or 'compassion,' and this meaning survives in the negative form 'remorseless.' But in modern usage remorse means exclusively the intense feeling of grief or compunction for one's own acts and their consequences, as they affect oneself and others. It therefore implies responsibility and guilt and culminates in despair over acts that are irretrievable and a condition that is irremediable.

1. As a psychological phenomenon.—Remorse is an emotion. Although predominantly a very acute feeling of pain, it is also a complex mental state that can emerge only at the conceptual and self-conscious stage of mental development.

William James propounded a theory that, if we abstract from any emotion 'all feelings of its bodily symptoms,' nothing would be left, which is an exaggeration of the fact that bodily states are a necessary element in all emotion, though not the whole of any emotion. Moreover, they do not enter so largely into remorse as into emotions like anger and fear, which James analyzed, and that because it is a calm and deep, but none the less intense, rather than a violent, emotion.

It is described as having 'a certain positive colouring, in which organic sensations, notably in the throat and digestive tracts, are prominent. There is also a certain setting of the muscles of throat and brow. The "gnawing" of remorse, by which it occupies consciousness and torments, seems to arise from these sensations.'[1]

As a persistent mood it would undoubtedly change the entire tone of the visceral organs as well as the facial expression.

Remorse is to be distinguished from a general emotional mood, because it has a unique character of its own and involves some idea of the self and a judgment upon the self. It is a feeling of strife within the self, or of an irreparable breach between the ideal self that might have been and the actual self whose act has produced the conflict. But the feeling arises partly from a judgment of the difference between the two and of the inferiority of the actual self, but still more from a repression and a paralysis of the active side of consciousness. G. F. Stout traces the feeling quality in all emotions to 'occurrences which powerfully thwart or further pre-existing conative tendencies.'[2] Remorse is an apt illustration of this principle, because, while it is 'perhaps the very worst quality that can belong to suffering,'[3] it is the emotion that exercises the most deadening influence upon life.

'In it there is a collision between what we have actually done and what we now desire that we should have done. Thus in reflection on our past self, the free course of our present ideal activity is crushed and repressed by the memory of our actual behaviour.'[4]

But, as the developed self is conditioned by other selves, so are its emotions. There may be remorse for wrong done which apparently affects only ourselves, but it is more general and intense in respect of wrongs done to others, because the free intercourse of ourselves with other selves, whether God or men, is thereby restricted or stopped. Yet it always includes the utter misery and hopelessness of our own condition. Despair is always an element in it.

2. As an ethical quality.—It is obvious therefore that remorse is a moral feeling. It involves free agency and responsibility. One feels grief for misfortunes, regret for mistakes, remorse for sins, for acts which one has freely caused and ought to have prevented. It is a painful conflict between the ideal and the actual self, and it has been held to be the most original element of our moral nature. It is the most elementary form of that which differentiates between moral and non-moral nature. It is the root and beginning of the moral faculty.

Darwin, in his account of the rise of morality, almost identifies remorse with conscience.

'When past and weaker impressions are judged by the ever-enduring social instincts . . . [man] will then feel remorse, repentance, regret or shame. . . . He will consequently resolve more or less firmly to act differently for the future; and this is conscience.'[1]

This is not a very accurate use of terms, and Darwin has omitted the peculiar, unanalyzable, moral quality which pertains both to remorse and to conscience. But our view of the ultimate nature and source of remorse, whether it be the reproach of neglected self-interest, or of injured society, or of some transcendental authority insulted, will depend upon our theory of the moral criterion, whether that be self-interest, or social welfare, or some transcendental ideal.

Yet it is not strictly accurate to identify remorse with conscience. It is rather the result of conscience judging and condemning. While it is inseparable from moral judgment, it is peculiarly the feeling element that accompanies the reproach of conscience. On the other hand, it cannot be reckoned among the virtues or the vices, for it is too intimately bound up with the essence of moral nature, and with that which constitutes and defines right and wrong, virtue and vice. Its value therefore as a factor in moral life and in relation to the absolute moral ideal depends entirely upon the degree of enlightenment in conscience. One man may feel remorse for that which would afford the happiness of an approving conscience to another.

Darwin quotes the case of a savage who felt prolonged remorse until he went 'to a distant tribe to spear a woman to satisfy his sense of duty to his wife' who had died of disease.[2]

3. Theological significance.—Remorse assumes its acutest form and acquires religious significance when it is a sense of having violated the laws of God or of having outraged His love, thus in either case incurring His wrath. Its specific nature is then relative to the idea of God involved. Remorse was a frequent theme of the Greek drama, and the element of despair is here especially prominent because the Greek mind was apt to identify the divine in the last resort with inexorable fate. In the OT Cain and Saul are two notable examples of unavailing sorrow for sin. In each case there is a sense of guilt, a burden of penalty, a consciousness of complete and final alienation from God, and a paralysis of the spiritual life (Gn 4^{8-15}, 1 S 28^{15-25}). A NT writer also represents Esau as 'rejected (for he found no place of repentance) though he sought it diligently with tears' (He 12^{17}); and the first evangelist represents Judas Iscariot as having 'repented himself,' and, when he found repentance useless, 'he went away and hanged himself' (Mt $27^{3, 5}$).

But in the OT and NT sorrow for sin more usually appears as repentance (*q.v.*), because God is merciful and forgiving, able and willing to reconcile the sinner to Himself, to blot out his guilt, and to open before him a new door of hope. Remorse differs from repentance in that, while both are sorrow for sin, the former is unavailing and irremediable, but the latter is a first step to a new life wherein the mistakes and failures of the old may be retrieved. In Protestant theology remorse may be either (1) the first stage of conviction for sin, a work of the law unrelieved by the

[1] *DPhP* ii. 463 f. [2] *A Manual of Psychology*², p. 305.
[3] A. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, London, 1859, p. 136.
[4] Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, ii. 279.

[1] *The Descent of Man*², London, 1875, pt. i. ch. iv.
[2] P. 114 f.

hope of the gospel, but followed at length by repentance, faith, and justification—

'But the law doth rather shew sin, accuse and terrify the conscience, declare the wrath of God, and drive to desperation';[1]

or (2) a legal conviction of sin associated with permanent unbelief.

'Remorse for sin does certainly prove that the soul is not dead. . . . But remorse is not a sanctifying principle; on the contrary, it is an exceedingly dangerous one; and the soul may die of it, as truly as the body of acute pain. It often drives men to despair, to frenzied iniquity, and thus to final hardness of heart.'[2]

Such would be the condition of one who felt that he had committed the sin against the Holy Ghost or who had fallen from grace beyond recovery (He 6^{4-8}).

Almost parallel to the difference between remorse and repentance is the better-defined distinction in Roman Catholic theology between attrition and contrition.

Contrition, the first act in the sacrament of penance, is 'a sorrow of the soul and a detestation of sin committed, with the determination not to sin again.' When it is motived by love, and when it reconciles man to God, it is perfect contrition, and is to be distinguished from attrition or imperfect contrition, 'which arises from the consideration of the heinousness of sin or from the fear of hell or of punishment.' This also is 'a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Ghost, who does not as yet dwell in the penitent, but only moves him, whereby the penitent being aided, prepares his way unto righteousness.'[3]

Attrition is not quite the same as remorse, but it seems to occupy the same position in the progress of the soul from sin to salvation as remorse may do when the fear of God and the condemnation of the law hold a man under the conviction of sin and still in its bondage for a season, though at last he may emerge into repentance and faith. But Protestant theology would not ascribe to remorse such independent efficacy for salvation as Catholic theology does to attrition. Yet remorse does in many cases lead to conviction when the revelation of the grace of God supervenes.[4]

LITERATURE.—G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*[2], London, 1904, bk. iii. div. 1, ch. iv., *Analytic Psychology*, do. 1896, bk. ii. ch. xii.; W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, do. 1902, lects. vi.-x.; J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*[3], Oxford, 1891, ii. 419–422; F. W. Newman, *The Soul*, London, 1905, ch. ii.; T. M. Lindsay, *Hist. of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1906, i. 201, 219, 222 ff.; E. D. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, London, 1899, ch. iv.; R. Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, Oxford, 1628, pt. iii. sect. iv.; John Bunyan, *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, London, 1666.

T. REES.

RENUNCIATION.—In a sense the entire history of ethics might be said to turn on the question of renunciation. Every system has been forced to admit it as an element; it is the amount admitted that varies, and this varies enormously. Some reduce it to a minimum; there are others that have made it cover the whole ground. At the one extreme we have the thoroughgoing forms of Hedonism, such as Cyrenaicism and Epicureanism, which, taking the maximum of pleasure for the mere individual as the goal, are yet compelled to recognize that some pleasures must be renounced. And this because not only do desires conflict in the individual himself, but even those that are harmonious cannot be satisfied to the full in this world. At the other end we have the systems of self-denial, of which perhaps Buddhism might be taken as the type. Here renunciation seems pushed to its utmost limits, since the annihilation of all passion and desire is the supreme aim.

It may be a question as to whether this *nirvāṇa* of calm goes so far as to imply the death of all consciousness. If so, it would raise in an acute form the problem as to how it can be good for man to renounce everything, since by the very terms of the renunciation there is no longer anything living to possess a good. This might perhaps be answered by holding that conscious existence was intrinsically so miserable that the only 'good' that could be hoped for was the absence of 'bad.' And this, it would appear, would be the answer of Schopenhauer and of von Hartmann, the modern preachers of asceticism based on pessimism.

Between these two extremes lie the systems of the world. Greek ethics kept always in view the conception of a fundamental harmony as at least conceivable. Socrates and Plato demanded renunciation only of those illusory pleasures which an enlightened man would recognize as not what he really wanted. Aristotle, in admitting the possibility of utter self-sacrifice—say, death in battle without the hope of immortality—practically admits that a man may willingly give up what is most worth having from a purely individual point of view for the sake of serving others. This clash between the happiness of self and the happiness of others was to be felt more keenly as time went on. Meanwhile Aristotle was at one with Plato and Socrates in conceiving that the vast majority of our desires were reasonable, and in part at least to be satisfied. The work of renunciation lay not in killing them out, but in taming them and putting them to use, since use could be found for them in no way at variance with the highest good.

In Stoicism—developed under combined Greek, Roman, and Hebrew influences—renunciation becomes far more prominent. The mere consciousness of duty done was held to be enough to support man and give him happiness. What came to him from without was to be neither desired nor shunned; he must surrender once for all every clinging to the goods of circumstance. A modern parallel may be found in the view of Kant that there is nothing 'in the world or out of it' absolutely good 'except a Good Will' (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, sect. 1, *init.*), and that moral action consists in following the Imperative of Duty without regard to personal wishes.

With Christianity and Christian ethics the question enters on a new phase, and becomes extremely intricate. The definite recognition of the principle of love foreshadowed in Stoicism makes it impossible ever again to dissociate entirely an individual's highest good from that of his fellows; on the other hand, the hope of belief in an ultimate heaven of individual blessedness prevents renunciation from being the final word. Merely selfish pleasures have doubtless to be surrendered, but the compensation will be abundant. It is a further question, and one keenly debated, what these selfish pleasures include. Some have banished all the pleasures of the body and many of the mind. This was undoubtedly the view of the mediæval ascetics (see the writings of Bonaventura, published by the Fathers of Quaracchi), and it was to a certain extent repeated by Tolstoi in modern times, though it was the doctrine of non-resistance rather than of renunciation pure and simple that he made the keynote. All asceticism, however, seems at variance with the childlike spirit beloved of Christ—for no child is ever an ascetic—and indeed with the general impression which He made on His contemporaries as a man who 'came eating and drinking' (Mt 11^{19}).

The pressure and complexity of modern life have brought out further aspects in the problem. Many a philanthropist, *e.g.*, must give up pleasures which in themselves he admits to be high and desirable. Is this from his point of view reasonable? The difficulty of this question does not seem to have been fully realized by the older utilitarians, such as Bentham and Mill, but the sense of it has led the latest exponent of the system in England, Henry Sidgwick, to suggest that a heaven where such sacrifices will be compensated supplies the only means of reconciling

[1] Luther, *Commentary on Galatians*, Eng. tr., London, 1830, p. 12.
[2] F. W. Newman, *The Soul*, p. 129.
[3] *Decretum Concil. Trident.*, sess. xiv., cap. iv.
[4] E. D. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 52.

the divergences between the good of the one and the good of the many, and so completely rationalizing ethics (see *The Methods of Ethics*, bk. iv. ch. vi.). Others—*e.g.*, the followers of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer—are content to renounce the hope of permanent individual happiness altogether, if only the perfection of the race can be attained. Others, again, have developed what may be called a kind of Neo-Stoicism. Unalloyed good is impossible both for race and for individual, but sufficient compensation is to be found in the glory of an heroic struggle. This view has been common in England, finding distinct expression, for instance, in the writings of Huxley (*e.g.*, *Evolution and Ethics*). But the German Nietzsche, by virtue of his genius, might be regarded as the leader of the school. He is, however, distinguished not only by the exultant turn he gives to the creed, but by the intense hatred he feels for any subordination of the one to the many. The best good of life as yet known to him lies in the free development of the most splendid and forceful individuals, at whatever cost to the masses. In general it may be said that the modern attitude is one of ferment over the questions: How much is man bound to renounce for himself and for the race? How much should he insist on claiming for himself or for the race, as a worthy prize for life? See also artt. HEDONISM, CYRENAICS, EPICUREANS, ETHICS AND MORALITY (Buddhist), (Christian), and (Greek), STOICS, UTILITARIANISM, POSITIVISM.

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F. MELIAN STAWELL.

RENUNCIATION (Hindu).—1. The ideal and the motive.—To the Hindu the term 'renunciation' (Skr. *sannyāsa*, *sannyas*, 'lay down,' 'resign,' esp. to resign the world, become a *sannyāsin*, or ascetic)[1] conveys a meaning and carries with it an obligation very different from the Western idea. To the latter renunciation admits of degrees, and consists essentially in the surrender of a coveted aim or object, the abandonment of a cherished wish, or the suppression of a more or less definitely formed ideal of life. It is virtually equivalent to self-renunciation, and is conceived in terms of selfish purposes or desires which are to be set aside; it is the opposite of altruism, and implies no cessation of activities, but their diversion into new channels. Seldom if ever does it connote to the Western mind the abandonment of all for a life reduced to its simplest terms. The Hindu conception of renunciation is in almost every respect contrasted with this. *Sannyāsa* is the casting off, the abandonment, not of self but of all that is other than self; and the *sannyāsin* renounces home and friends together with all that to Western thought makes existence desirable, and engages himself to a life of absolute destitution of all possessions, that, undisturbed by worldly conditions or claims, he may cultivate communion with God. To break all the ties that bind to this world, to withdraw as far as possible from all worldly association and intercourse, to be dependent for daily support upon the charity of others—a charity in India never withheld—that no interruption may be offered by worldly cares or interests to meditation and the concentration of all thought and desire upon God, is the avowed ideal and purpose of the Hindu who adopts the life of renunciation and poverty.

[1] *E.g.*, *Laws of Manu*, vi. 94.

To a greater degree also than in the West this renunciation is dictated by religious motives. The mixed motives which among Western peoples lead to the renouncing more or less completely of cherished aims or convictions, often on trivial or even selfish grounds, have no place among the forces which in this particular urge the Hindu to action. Theoretically his sole purpose is to secure freedom for himself so that, untrammelled by worldly ties, he may pursue the one aim of union with God. The world with its attractions and its cares is an obstacle in the way which must be cast aside (*sannyas*). This duty is laid upon him by his religious faith and profession. Renunciation of the world is not a matter of choice, but a religious obligation and command incumbent upon all. It would appear, however, so obviously impracticable for an entire community to render literal obedience to an injunction of this nature that probably the author or authors of the codes of law did not conceive or intend that the rule should be universally observed.

2. Renunciation in practice.—This ideal of the renunciation of the world as a supreme religious obligation is of very ancient date and origin in India. In the oldest literature the figure of the hermit or ascetic who has broken through the fetters that bind to this world and has adopted a solitary and contemplative life is familiar. The motives that prompted the withdrawal from ordinary life were no doubt various, and in many instances not unmixed. The mere desire for a life of ease and irresponsibility actuated many, as it does at the present day, to seek release from burdens and duties that were rightly or wrongly felt to be intolerable. In ancient times probably the religious motive was for the most part at least predominant, and the longing for undisturbed communion with the divine; but it is perhaps more than doubtful whether so much can be claimed to-day for the great host of devotees and ascetics who cross the traveller's path in every part of India. A craving for notoriety and for the influence which a reputation for self-denial and the practice of the ascetic life gives in India prompts some; with many others it is sheer idleness and a disinclination to take the trouble involved in self-support or the support of kindred and relatives. The hardships and sufferings, however, that are voluntarily undergone, the laborious and dangerous journeyings to distant shrines, and the self-denial involved in the assignment of wealth and property to others often prove how sincerely, if mistakenly, truth and holiness are sought in a life of renunciation of all worldly ties and claims. In India such a life is and always has been facilitated by the generous fertility of the soil and the kindly climate, conditions under which bodily needs are few, and the simple requirements of a contemplative and unemployed mode of existence are easily met and satisfied. Moreover, the religious obligation to give alms to the wandering ascetic is never disowned by the Hindu housekeeper; and the *sannyāsin* is always sure of his daily food in whatever village he may present himself in the course of his wide and varied wanderings.

The numerous descendants and offshoots of Hinduism in later times adopted the ascetic motive and ideal. Buddhism in particular enforced the duty of renunciation, and extended the practice, carrying its doctrine and the enthusiasm for its ideal to Egypt and Western lands, where, according to some authorities, it was taken over into Christian usage and became a recognized feature of the Christian ecclesiastical order. If so, the genealogical descent that traces Western monastic

observance to an Eastern origin is of great interest. Too little, however, is known of the details of the history for a secure verdict to be pronounced on the extent of the indebtedness of the West to the East for teaching and example in this respect. Room must certainly be left for a not inconsiderable measure of spontaneity and initiative.

3. Conditions and obligations. — Accordingly, in theory at least, there is in the Hindu conception and practice no middle term or way between an unrestricted use and enjoyment of the things of the world and complete abstinence. Renunciation is of all or of none. Nor is the theory modified to any considerable extent in practice, as in many Christian monasteries of the Middle Ages, and as in a few instances in some Buddhist countries at the present day. Resignation of this or that pleasure or distraction, or severance of the one connexion with retention of others, has presented no attraction to the religious-minded Hindu; while, on the other hand, the ease with which a minimum of bodily wants was satisfied has always, and perhaps increasingly, drawn to the ranks of the ascetics many who were actuated by no higher motive than the craving for an indolent life free from anxiety and care. Of such there are not a few in India, of whom the better-class Hindus themselves are ashamed.

The Indian theory of renunciation, moreover, is closely connected with the doctrine and obligation of the four *āśramas* (*q.v.*; see also art. ASCETICISM [Hindu], vol. ii. p. 91 f.), the successive stages or periods of life through which, theoretically at least, every Hindu must pass from his early years to death. Here again the theoretical conditions and demands were greatly modified in practice; and in particular no restriction was placed upon the adoption of a life of abstinence and renunciation at any age, even the most youthful. The order of the *āśramas* was essential and invariable, that of the *sannyāsin* closing the series as the most exalted and refined. It was not necessary, however, to have reached an advanced age before renouncing the world. At any period it was admissible at will to withdraw from worldly pursuits, abbreviating or omitting altogether the preceding stages, and assuming even in early youth vows of unworldliness and poverty. Instances of return to a worldly life appear always to have been rare. On the other hand, recent history affords many examples of men of eminent piety and sincerity, who at the close of an honourable career have renounced the world, and, abandoning house and home, have given over their remaining years to a life of severe and self-imposed restrictions, to meditation and solitary communion with God. To a high-minded and devoted Indian gentleman of this class, Swāmī Śrī Saććidānanda-Sarasvatī, formerly prime minister of the Native State of Bhaunagar, Monier-Williams makes reference in the preface to his *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4] (p. xxi; see also frontispiece); and the late Debendra Nāth Tāgore might be cited as an example of the same gentle and self-denying spirit. Those, however, who adopt the ascetic life from mere idleness and a shrinking from responsibility and work are an undoubted loss and burden and even a source of danger to their country.

4. Effect of European teaching and example.— In this respect as in so many others the Hindu conception has been profoundly modified by the impact of Western and European teaching and example. It is perhaps not true that to any important extent the ancient ideal has been lowered or changed. In theory at least it is still recognized as best that a man should abandon the world, and seek his own salvation and the satisfaction of his spiritual cravings in a life of meditation, severed from his people and the pursuits of the busy crowd. An increasing number, however, endeavour to find that satisfaction in altruistic service in the world rather than in selfish aloofness. More or less consciously they have been influenced by Christian example and propaganda, by scientific and medical doctrines taught in the schools of the importance and interests of the body, by the emphasis laid upon hygiene and the obligations of social service. The example and initiative also of British officers and civil servants, and of professors in the colleges and schools, have counted for much. For the most part it is the members of the higher classes and castes whose conceptions of duty and of life have been thus transformed. The modes of living and the ideals of good of the middle and lower classes have undergone little change, and the convictions of the great majority of the Indian peoples with regard to the duty and efficacy of entire renunciation of the world remain the same; these, however, have neither time nor inclination to put into practice what is for the most part a dimly realized obligation of their religious faith. It is among the leaders of the people, present and future, the intellectual and leisured classes, that a new ideal has been created, and to many of them renunciation has come to mean renunciation of self and evil, that the good may be pursued not out of but in the world and for its benefit.

The motives that under these changed circumstances urge to a new renunciation and to real altruistic service are not always unmixed. In some instances at least, perhaps in many, rivalry with Christian methods and institutions, distrust of the intentions or disinterestedness of Christian activities, or emulation of British achievements and success in the amelioration of the lot of the common people has aroused a spirit of antagonism which has found expression in opposition. Moreover, it is by no means Christian converts alone or those who have avowedly submitted themselves to Christian influence that have proved thus capable of the highest forms of self-renunciation. It may be that in all instances there has been the inspiration, indirect and unacknowledged, of Christian example. Notably, however, the members of the Brāhma Samāj, of the Ārya Samāj, and of other native sects and Churches have not confined themselves to mere doctrinal propaganda, but frequently with a self-sacrifice and devotion worthy of all praise have turned aside from positions of worldly ease and emolument to serve their fellowmen, and that for the sake of definite religious and communistic aims which were not selfish. In the future, therefore, there can be little doubt that the ancient Hindu ideal of renunciation will give place slowly to one which appears thus to be more practical and in its present and general issues more helpful and beneficent. The earlier conception, however, is far from having lost its hold upon the imagination and affection of the people in general, nor, as far as judgment and comparison are possible, is the number of those who take upon themselves the vows of abandonment of the world less than in former years. But the practical spirit of the age is against them; and that will ultimately prevail, even in India, not without regret at the loss of an ideal which, self-seeking and unutilitarian as it might be, was not seldom productive of saintly character, and at least set the example of disregard of mere worldly good.

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A. S. GEDEN.

RENUNCIATION AT BAPTISM.—See ABRENUNTIO.

REPENTANCE.—In its broadest sense repentance describes the act of the soul in breaking away from its past as a preliminary step to the work of ethical reform. In this wide signification it is not peculiar to the Jewish or the Christian religion; on the contrary, it is implied in all the higher religions and in all systems of morality. Man's capacity for repentance is grounded in his nature as a moral being.

'We have a capacity,' says Bishop Butler, 'of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert.'[1]

It is because man has this power of self-judgment that he is also capable of the act of repenting. All moral advance takes the form of a breach with the past. Hence Socrates, in identifying virtue and knowledge, vice and ignorance, taught that only by a preceding conviction of ignorance could a man attain to knowledge. Plato held that in every man there is a potential faculty by which he can distinguish the lesser from the higher good, and renounce the former for the sake of the latter. He compares this change in the attitude of the soul to the turning of the eye from darkness to light. Just as the light of the sun evokes and strengthens the power of bodily vision, so spiritual truth has the power to educate man's faculty of knowledge. This is the meaning of the famous allegory of the cave.[2] A similar line of thought is also found in Buddhism as well as in pre-Buddhistic systems.

1. The idea and the term.—It is only in Judaism and in Christianity that the idea of repentance is developed, and is treated not as a merely preliminary step to the higher life but as a permanent condition of all spiritual achievement. Only within these religions, too, are the presuppositions of repentance in the deepest sense of the term made possible. Belief in a personal God, in the reality of sin, and in the freedom of the will—in the light of such principles repentance becomes a fundamental virtue and is seen to be at once ethical and religious. It has been recently stated that 'the idea is peculiarly Jewish, so much so that its ethical force is lost in the dogma of the atoning Christ.'[3] To this it may be replied that, as a matter of historical fact, one of the great motives to repentance has been and is a realization of the righteousness and the love of God revealed in the death of Christ. That death has proved itself to be a means of atonement by the very fact that it works repentance in him who understands its meaning and feels its power; and thus it removes the subjective hindrance to peace and forgiveness.

The noun *tĕshūbāh* ('repentance') occurs only in post-Biblical Hebrew, but the verbal form *shūb* is common in the OT. The latter word means literally 'to turn' or 'to return' in a physical sense. Running parallel with this use is the use of the word in a spiritual or ethical sense, 'to return from sin and evil to God or to righteousness.' In this usage the word means not merely to change the direction, but to turn right round and face in the opposite way (cf. the refrain in Am $4^{6ff.}$—'yet have ye not returned unto me, saith Jehovah'; for other examples cf. Hos 6^{1}, Is 1^{27} 55^{7}, Jer $3^{12.\ 22}$ 36^{7}, Ezk 13^{22}; the LXX translates *nihham* by μετανοεῖν; cf. Jer 18^{8}, which should be rendered 'I will change my mind *or* my purpose' rather than 'I will repent').

[1] Dissertation ii., 'Of the Nature of Virtue,' § 1, *Works*, ed W. E. Gladstone, Oxford, 1896, i. 397 f.
[2] *Republic*, vii. 514 f.
[3] K. Kohler, in *JE* x. 377.

The Syr. Bible has for μετανοεῖτε (Vulg. *pœnitentiam agite*) in Mt 3^{2} *tûbû*=Heb. *shûbû*. For the noun μετανοια (Mt 3^{11}) the Syr. Bible used *tĕyābutā*=*tĕshūbah*. In the NT 'repent' translates μετανοέω, and 'repentance' translates μετάνοια, but, as will be shown below, these renderings are far from adequate. The RV seeks to differentiate between μετανοεῖν, 'to repent,' and μεταμέλεσθαι, 'to regret,' by rendering the latter as a reflexive—*e.g.*, 'Judas repented himself' (Mt 27^{3}), which should rather be rendered, 'Judas was smitten with remorse.' The RV makes an exception to this rule in 2 Co 7^{8}, where μεταμέλομαι is translated by 'regret.' Cf. Ro 11^{28}, where ἀμεταμέλητος is translated 'without repentance.' The Amer. RV translates it by 'not repented of.' The RV would have done well to call attention in a marginal note to the difference in meaning between the word 'repentance' as commonly used and the Greek word μετάνοια. A satisfactory version of the NT must include a new translation of a word that expresses the initial and prevailing idea of Christianity.[1]

2. Repentance in the OT.—Two strains of thought run throughout the OT religion—the one priestly and legalistic, the other prophetic and ethical. Modern Judaism inherits the double tendency. The priestly conception of the relations between God and man is embodied in a Levitical sacrificial system which, in germ, existed from the earliest times in Israel. The expiatory element in sacrifice was developed into an elaborate system, but it laboured under one serious defect—the ritualistic and the ethical were not clearly distinguished. Unintentional transgressions and various impurities of a ceremonial character, such as leprosy or the touching of a dead body, needed an expression of repentance in the prescribed sacrifices. The main function subserved by the sacrificial system was to gain for the sufferer the divine favour or to avert from him the divine wrath (cf. Lv $4^{25f.\ 31.\ 35}$, 2 S 14^{25}). Hence the notion of repentance suffered through the defects of the prevailing notion of sin. Much that later Judaism, as well as Christianity, condemned as sin was not deemed to be sin in early Israel; and *vice versa*, a deeper spiritual view disregards as without moral significance many acts which were deemed to be offences against the holiness of God—*i.e.* against His character as One infinitely remote from contact with the human and the physical. On the other hand, it must be allowed that the systematizers of the post-Exilic worship believed it to be 'a very important means towards the great end of keeping the people of Israel faithful in heart and life to God.'[2]

The prophetic preaching marks a great advance in the conception of sin with a corresponding advance in the conception of repentance. For the prophets sacrifices were secondary to moral obedience. They cared little about the details of ritual, and insisted on the paramount claims of justice, truth, and social righteousness (Jer 7^{22}). In a word, they were the preachers of ethical and social reform, and they proclaimed the necessity of repentance as a necessary prerequisite to a new order of things. Still further, the call to repentance was made in close connexion with the idea of judgment. One of their most passionate convictions was belief in the day of Jahweh, on which an overwhelming retribution should strike a sinful people (Am 5^{20-27} 9^{8-10}, Is 2^{12-21} 13^{9}). The call to repentance was addressed primarily not to the individual but to the nation as a whole. The covenant of Jahweh was with Israel conceived as a personality with a continuous moral life, and therefore responsible alike for its sin and for its amendment. The sins charged against Israel were in the main social—cruelty to the poor, bribery of judges, immorality connected with idolatrous worship. On these the prophet invoked divine judgment, but the judgment can be turned aside by repentance, *i.e.* by a change of mind leading to a

[1] For a valuable note on the Classical, LXX, and NT usage of these words see *Hist. and Linguistic Studies*, 2nd ser., Chicago, 1908.
[2] A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics*, Edinburgh, 1892, p. 265.

change of conduct. 'Seek good, and not evil,' cries Amos, 'that ye may live: and so the Lord, the God of hosts, shall be with you, as ye say. Hate the evil, and love the good, and establish judgment in the gate: it may be that the Lord, the God of hosts, will be gracious unto the remnant of Joseph' (5[14f.]). Hosea through a bitter domestic experience had learned the need of repentance on the part of Israel. The root sin of Israel was disloyalty to God. She had gone after other gods and had broken the marriage covenant with Jahweh. But, just as the prophet would not let go the woman that he loved, but cared for her and through sorrow redeemed her, so he felt that Jahweh, who had chosen Israel as His bride, would not give her up, but would win her back by the greatness of His grief and His compassion (2[19]). Repentance will lead to restoration, and repentance comes through a deeper knowledge of God.

'It is because Hosea's doctrine of God is so rich, so fair and so tender, that his doctrine of repentance is so full and gracious. Here we see the difference between him and Amos. Amos had also used the phrase with frequency; again and again he had appealed to the people to seek God and to return to God. But from Amos it went forth only as a pursuing voice, a voice crying in the wilderness. Hosea lets loose behind it a heart, plies the people with gracious thoughts of God, and brings about them, not the voices only, but the atmosphere, of love. "I will be as the dew unto Israel," promises the Most High; but He is before His promise. The chapters of Hosea are drenched with the dew of God's mercy, of which no drop falls on those of Amos, but there God is rather the roar as of a lion, the flash as of lightning.'[1]

Jeremiah and Ezekiel repeat to their contemporaries the warnings of judgment and the call to repentance. Idolatry, unbelief, and formalism in religion are the evils that they most frequently denounce. They threaten the people with exile, but the impending doom may be turned aside if they repent: 'Amend your ways and your doings, and I will cause you to dwell in this place' (Jer 7[3]). Moved by a profound intuition Jeremiah breaks through the bonds of the moral solidarity of the nation, and glimpses the truth of individualism (31[29f.]). But the realization of this truth belongs to the future age. Ezekiel takes up the message of personal responsibility from his earlier contemporary, yet his message is addressed to the nation: 'Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?' (33[11]). He makes an advance upon earlier teachings by announcing that God Himself will take the initiative and give repentance to Israel (36[25-27]); but this is an idea alien to the genius of Judaism, which emphasizes the thought that in repentance man takes the initiative and God grants forgiveness because of man's changed attitude towards Him.

In Psalms and Job the feeling about sin is deepened. It is something in itself evil, breaking the bonds that bind the soul to God. Moreover, sin is now seen to be a universal experience of man. In such Psalms as the 32nd and 51st this deepened consciousness finds expression, even though we should accept the view of some critics that the primary reference is to the sin and repentance of the Church-nation. Still it is impossible to avoid the conviction that the Psalmists were thinking of themselves as sharers by personal experience in the spiritual acts described.

3. Later Jewish teaching.—The idea and practice of repentance receive a rich development in later Jewish thought. Repentance now becomes the fundamental feature of Jewish piety, and the penitential prayer is frequent in the literature of the time. The high value set upon this virtue is illustrated in the Prayer of Manasses. Even for the most wicked of Jewish kings the gateway to life is opened by penitence. Other examples of penitential prayers are found in Dn 9, To 3[1-6], 3 Mac 2[2-20] 6[2-15]. In the book of Wisdom, which was written under the influence of Greek philosophy, we have the thought brought out that the forbearance of God is meant to give the sinner opportunity to repent. 'Thou overlookest the sins of men to the end that they may repent' (11[23]). We get a prelude to the teaching of Paul (Ro 2[4]) in another passage: 'Thou hast made thy children to be of good hope that thou givest repentance for sins' (12[19]). Throughout later Judaism the idea of suffering played an important rôle in developing penitential feeling. The old idea that suffering was a sign of divine displeasure still held its ground, and, the more keenly men felt suffering, the deeper was their consciousness of sin and their desire for reconciliation. Distress and pain were proofs that sin had been committed, whether it was possible or not to say what the sin actually was.

[1] G. A. Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, London, 1896, 238 f.

In the later rabbis the word *tĕshūbāh* ('repentance') has become a technical theological term. Sin, it is taught, is removed by good works, repentance, and confession. A consistent doctrine of repentance from a purely ethical standpoint is not to be looked for in the rabbis. A deep spiritual conception is found side by side with external legalistic views. As an example of the latter may be cited the Talmudic teaching that three books are opened on New Year's Day; the righteous are inscribed for life, the wicked for death, while the 'intermediate' remain in suspense till the Day of Atonement. By good works and repentance they can make the swaying balance incline in their favour. Of similar character is the interpretation of the words, 'Seek ye the Lord while he may be found, call ye upon him while he is near' (Is 55[6]), which are taken to mean 'Seek him especially between the New Year and the Day of Atonement when he dwells among you.' On the other hand, it is to the rabbis that we owe some of the most beautiful sayings about repentance to be found outside the Bible. C. G. Montefiore has collected much material of this kind in his article 'Rabbinic Conceptions of Repentance.'[1] The following are quoted:

'"God's hand is stretched out under the wings of the heavenly chariot to snatch the penitent from the grasp of justice." "Open for me," says God, "a gateway of repentance as big as a needle's eye, and I will open for you gates wide enough for horses and chariots." "If your sins are as high as heaven, even unto the seventh heaven and even to the throne of glory, and you repent, I will receive you."'[2]

The main differences between the rabbinical and the modern teaching about repentance are, according to this writer: (1) the rabbinical doctrine is on the whole particularist, while the modern teaching is pronouncedly universalist; (2) the rabbis are more stern towards the sinner, especially the religious sinner, the heretic, the apostate, the unbeliever; (3) whereas, according to the modern teaching, punishment after death can be only remedial and temporary, the rabbis held that for some sinners there was no share whatever in the blessedness of the world to come.

4. Repentance in Christianity.—Jesus, though opposed to the prevailing tendencies of the Judaism of His time, took over and developed the deeper motives of the OT prophetic teaching. Among these was the demand for righteousness which can be satisfied only by repentance. The Baptist had already echoed the cry of an Isaiah or a Jeremiah, 'Repent ye; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand' (Mt 3[2]). He was a preacher of the judgment to come and of repentance unto the remission of sins in view of this judgment. Thus the eschatological movement, which was destined to affect powerfully the history of Christianity, was begun by the Baptist's summons to amendment of life. Because

[1] *JQR* xvi. [1904] 209-257.

[2] P. 230, quoting *Pesahim*, 119 *a*; *Shir R.* on v. 2; *Pesiqta R.*, 185*a*.

of the approaching end of the age, which was to be signalized by the appearance of the Messiah, John called on men to renounce their worldly every-day life in order to fit themselves for entrance into the Kingdom. They were to bring forth fruits worthy of repentance. Jesus, on His first public appearance in Galilee after John's imprisonment, takes up the same message: 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe in the gospel' (Mk 1[15]). The whole ministry of Jesus may be described as a ministry of repentance. With grave irony He sums up the purport of His mission: 'I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance' (Lk 5[32]; cf. Mk 2[17], Mt 9[13]). What Jonah was to the Ninevites that Jesus was to His generation—a preacher of repentance (Mt 12[41], Lk 11[32]).

More specifically it is clear that His preaching of repentance stands in closest connexion with His preaching of the Kingdom and with His healing ministry. The ethical requirements for admission to the Kingdom as expounded in the Sermon on the Mount imply the profound change in mind and life which we try to express by the term 'repentance.' The mission of the Twelve had for one of its main purposes that of proclaiming the duty of repentance (Mk 6[12]). The parables of the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the lost son are motived by the thought that there is 'joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth' (Lk 15[7, 10]). The events of contemporary life, the calamities and tragedies that befell the world, bore a spiritual message and a solemn warning: 'Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish' (Lk 13[5]; cf. 13[3]).

Now, with this emphasis on the repentant attitude of mind, Jesus is in line with what we have already seen to be the prophetic doctrine. Like that of the prophets, His moral teaching is conditioned as a whole by the coming Kingdom; like them He sees that repentance is necessary as a preparation for the Judgment that in turn ushers in the Kingdom. Hence many NT students argue that the ethics of Jesus is conditional, an *Interimsethik*, and was proclaimed in indissoluble connexion with the eschatological expectation of a state of perfect blessedness to be supernaturally brought about. But, while the call to repentance was clothed with a terrible impressiveness and intensity, from the fact that the Kingdom was believed to be at the door, that call is permanently valid for man's life throughout all time. Instead of the idea of the Kingdom to be achieved by a cosmic catastrophe, Christians have been led to cherish the hope of immortal blessedness. With a view to the realization of that hope, repentance is as much as ever a demand of the spiritual life. Not only our Lord's preaching but also His healing ministry—itself the evidence that the Kingdom was in a sense already present—was designed to awaken in the hearts of men desires for a better life. It was the tragedy of His life that this design was frustrated by the dullness and indifference of those who witnessed His gracious activity in lifting the burdens of disease from body and soul: 'Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, because they repented not' (Mt 11[20]). But behind His preaching and His healing activity was His personality. Wherever He went, He awakened a consciousness of sin and a longing after a better life. It is to the third evangelist that we are especially indebted for the record of the effect which Christ's personal presence had upon the individuals by way of arousing in them a feeling of guilt and a desire for amendment. It is he who tells us of the saying of Simon Peter, 'Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord' (Lk 5[8]), of the 'woman that was a sinner,' of Zacchæus, and of the dying thief.

If the substance of Christ's message and mission may be described therefore as a gospel of repentance, it is obvious that the word 'repentance' is not used here in its etymological and popular sense. The truth is that the term needs to be transfigured before it can render the meaning of Christ's idea which the evangelists express by the word μετάνοια. Owing to its Latin origin and its ecclesiastical associations through the Old Latin and Vulgate versions, it is totally inadequate to carry the wealth of meaning implied in the Greek word. 'Repentance' has an emotional tone; μετάνοια is ethical and intellectual; the former is negative—a turning away from sin; the latter is positive—an enthusiasm for righteousness. But above all, the Latin word is retrospective — it looks back in revulsion of feeling to past sinful acts; whereas the Greek word is prospective—it speaks of a moral renewal with a view to the transformation of the entire man. As Matthew Arnold says,

> 'We translate it (*metanoia*) "repentance," the mourning and lamenting for our sins; and we translate it wrong. Of *metanoia*, as Jesus used the word, the lamenting one's sins was a small part; the main part was something far more active and fruitful, the setting up an immense new inward movement for obtaining the rule of life. And *metanoia* accordingly is *a change of the inner man*.'[1]

Jesus regards the piety of this age as fundamentally perverted and moving on false lines. A far-reaching reconstruction of the spiritual life is imperative. His word, 'Repent ye,' is a summons to build on new foundations, to develop a new consciousness out of which would come a new nature. In truth what Christ demands is what Paul describes in mystical language as a crucifixion and a coming to life again (Gal 2[20]), as the putting off of the old man as one would put off a soiled garment, and the putting on of the new man (Col 3[9f.]). Nothing less than this will satisfy the NT concept of repentance.[2]

The primitive apostolic preaching once more proclaims the call to repentance sent forth by the Baptist and by Christ. 'Repent, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out' (Ac 3[19]). This announcement received new emphasis and urgency from the fact that the Messiah had been crucified (Ac 2[22f.]); He would come again, if only Israel would repent of this the greatest of all crimes in history. In the Pauline Epistles the idea of repentance is merged in that of faith as a renouncement of one's merit and as surrender to Christ, or to God in Christ, which ends in mystical union with Him. Yet repentance occupied a conspicuous place in Paul's missionary preaching, as we may infer from his speech at Miletus in which he reminds his hearers that he testified 'both to Jews and to Greeks repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ' (Ac 20[21]). In the Fourth Gospel there is no mention of repentance, but the thought is expressed under the profound metaphor of a new or a second birth. 'Except a man be born again [or from above], he cannot see the kingdom of God' (Jn 3[3]). But generally throughout the Gospel the emphasis is laid on faith (3[16, 18] 6[47] 14[1]). Faith and repentance are two sides of one and the same spiritual process. If faith be the act of the soul in turning to God in Christ, repentance is the same act viewed as the soul turning away from sin. But the process is one and indissoluble, and may be described in terms of the one act or the other.

> 'Without faith,' says Coleridge, 'there is no power of repentance: without a commencing repentance no power to faith.'[3]

5. Theological signification.—Latin theology was incapable of rising to the full compass of the NT idea. It made the emotional element

[1] *Literature and Dogma*, ch. vii. sect. 3.
[2] See T. Walden, *The Great Meaning of the Word Metanoia*.
[3] *Aids to Reflection*, aphorism cxviii.

in repentance primary, whereas in reality it is secondary. Tertullian marks the beginning of the process. He defines repentance as an 'emotion of disgust' at some previously cherished offence.[1] In the course of time it became involved with questions of Church discipline and with the ecclesiastical doctrine of penance. This doctrine is that repentance is only part of the sacrament of penance, the two other elements being confession and satisfaction.[2] The Reformers went back to the NT idea. Luther's doctrine was that repentance consisted in sorrow for sin and faith in Christ. He maintained that the whole life should be a penitential act. The Reformation started as a protest against false or inadequate conceptions of repentance.

'Luther, it will be remembered, first saw the practical value of philological study, when he was puzzling over the expression *pœnitentiam agite*, "do penance," which the Vulgate uses for the Greek word that in the English translation is rendered "repent." Was it possible, he said to himself, that Christ and the Apostles could really bid men do penance? Did the New Testament really stand on the side of his opponents, and of all the gross corruptions which the doctrine of penance had introduced? Melanchthon solved this difficulty by showing to Luther that the Greek word μετανοεῖτε, which Jerome had translated "do penance," really and etymologically meant "change your mind." From that moment the Reformation entered into a conscious alliance with the new learning, to which it was already akin in its independent love of truth, its rebellion against human authority, and its interest in the Bible as a real living book.'[3]

The Evangelical revival of the 18th cent. emphasized the need of repentance, sometimes with undue stress on the emotional side of the experience, and with consequent injury to the interests of the spiritual life. On the other hand, philosophical moralists like Spinoza, Kant, and Fichte maintain that all emotion of sorrow for the past is wasted energy. And Oliver Lodge has recently remarked:

'The higher man of to-day is not worrying about his sins at all, still less about their punishment.'[4] Instead of brooding over past sins, he recommends 'the safer and more efficacious and altogether more profitable way, of putting in so many hours' work per day, and of excluding weeds from the garden by energetic cultivation of healthy plants.'[5]

This view is also advocated by the 'healthy-minded' schools of thought as represented by such cults as Theosophy, Christian Science, and New or Higher Thought. The words of Virgil to Dante are held to express the true attitude of the sinner to his sins. 'One glance at them and then pass on.'[6] Begin to think what is good and do what is good, and thereby change yourselves. Do not waste time in futile regrets, but employ it in the performance of right actions.

There is an element of truth in this contention, and a true conception of repentance will do justice to this modern feeling as well as to the testimony of the normal Christian consciousness. Sin, as interpreted in the teaching of Christ, is not only a blow at the moral order of the universe; it is also an offence against love. It is a wrong done to the Father of our spirits, who is ever pouring forth upon us the steady stream of His unbounded goodness and mercy. When we awake to the shame of our ingratitude, of our failure to live in harmony with His will, a feeling of sorrow must seize the soul analogous to the keen regret with which we contemplate the wrong that we may have done a kind and loyal friend. But this natural distress of mind may darken down into excessive remorse, which is barren pain robbed of all moral value, and which plunges the sufferer into the darkness of phantasmal fears and morbid imaginings. The sorrow of repentance reacts on the soul, strengthening it to meet the new task of moral reformation; the sorrow of despair paralyzes the moral energies, and hurries its victim, as in the case of a Lady Macbeth or a Richard III., into irreparable disaster. Paul, in his fine analysis in 2 Co 7[8-10], distinguishes carefully between a sorrow of the world that ends in death and a godly sorrow that issues in a repentance never to be regretted.

[1] *De Pœn.* 1. [2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv. 'Pœn.' ch. 3.
[3] W. Robertson Smith, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, Edinburgh, 1881, p. 45.
[4] *H.J.* in [1904] 102. [5] *Ib.* iii [1904] 7.
[6] *Inferno*, [illegible] 51.

A few words may be added on the relation of repentance to forgiveness. Sin is opposition to the divine will. This opposition inhibits the action of divine grace in the soul of the sinner and prevents that communion with God which is the source of spiritual life. In repenting the sinner tears down the barriers which his sin erects between him and the inflow of divine life and power. Thus the divine forgiveness, which is never a mere remission of penalty but always and essentially the restoration to the normal and filial relation of man to God, follows naturally and spontaneously on repentance. And, if it be asked what is the proof of forgiveness in any given case, the answer is: the fact of repentance itself is the proof. It is the 'goodness of God that leads us to repentance' (Ro 11[4]), but this very goodness implies that already God has forgiven us. Without repentance forgiveness would be immoral, and without the possibility of forgiveness the burden of sin would become intolerable, sinking the soul into a hell of despair and madness. It is not that repentance wins or merits forgiveness; such a thought is repugnant to a truly spiritual view. It is that repentance affords the necessary and natural condition on which the will to pardon can energize.

6. The ethical value of repentance.—From the point of view of ethics, it has been objected: Of what avail is repentance, seeing that the law of continuity holds good in all worlds, the spiritual as well as the physical? How can a man be freed from the burden of his past sins, since this burden is itself the creation of his own free spiritual activity? Must not a man reap as he has sown? Is not the consequence of an act really a part of the act and indissolubly bound up with it? The answer is that the law of continuity is not the only law that obtains in the spiritual realm. There is also a law of recovery or redemption. If the law of moral sequence alone held good, the very purpose of its existence would be frustrated, for it would paralyze all efforts to achieve a life of virtue and righteousness. Moreover, the very fact that man is capable of self-condemnation is proof that evil-doing is not an adequate expression of his personality. How could he condemn himself, if there was not in him the consciousness of an ideal to which he owes allegiance? In the very constitution of the soul it would seem that room is made for fresh starts, new beginnings. In condemning himself the penitent has already risen above the self that he condemns. The publican who said, 'God be merciful to me a sinner,' was already on his way to sainthood. For in repentance what does the penitent man really do? By an inward act he dissociates himself from his sin; he takes the side of God and of all good men in judging it unworthy of his nature and at war with the real order of life. He finds in his sin no expression of his real self—only a false show which he repudiates in language that sounds paradoxical but that in reality shadows forth a profound truth: 'It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.'

'Our chief concern with the past, that which truly remains and forms part of us, is not what we have done, or the adventures that we have met with, but the moral reactions bygone events are producing within us at this very moment, the inward being they have helped to form; and these reactions, that give birth to our sovereign, intimate being, are wholly governed by the manner in which we regard past events, and vary as the moral substance varies that they encounter within us.'[1]

Thus repentance, or revulsion against the past and a longing desire for a higher ethical experience,

[1] M. Maeterlinck, *The Buried Temple*, Eng. tr., London, 1902, p. 202.

may be originated by impressions received from contact with more highly developed personalities or through a bitter experience of pain and disillusionment. A new conception of duty, a revelation of the real meaning of evil as reflected in the pain of those who have suffered through our actions, the impress of a noble spirit that rebukes our weakness and that acts as a spur to all that is not dead within us, above all, the vision of the love of God incarnate in the life and work of Jesus Christ—any or all of these may enter as new factors into the stream of our experience and may set up there new causal connexions involving far-reaching consequences. The law of continuity still holds good, for these factors, once they have entered into experience, bring about their results in accordance with the laws that govern the psychic world.

There is in repentance a certain quality of infinitude. With the penitent mood comes new insight, fresh illumination leading to an almost painful anxiety to make atonement to the person or persons wronged, to society, to the spiritual order which has been violated. The repentant man stands ready for any task however great, for any service however distasteful. Repentance is thus transformed into a moral dynamic. It reinforces the will with boundless energy; its eye is ever uplifted to new visions and greater ethical achievement. Hence the marks of genuine, as distinguished from spurious, repentance are the presence of ever new and deeper insight into duty and of a passion for atonement, which is itself part of the redemptive process. Thus the virtue of repentance is at once a gift and a task, an inspiration and a deliberate movement of the will, a present possession and a future attainment.

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SAMUEL MCCOMB.

REPENTANCE (Muhammadan).—There are two words used to denote repentance in the theological vocabulary of Islām—*nadam* and *tawbah*. The former denotes merely remorse, regret, or vexation at having done something or at having left something undone. It is used especially in the poets. The 'repentance' of the satirical poet Farazdaq (A.D. 659–729), after he had divorced his wife Nawār, is proverbial.[1] The word is used also in the Qur'ān. After Cain had killed his brother, and a raven had showed him how to hide his crime, he became 'of those who repent' (v. 34; so frequently), *i.e.* he felt remorse (*nadam*), but it would not be said of him that he showed repentance (*tawbah*) in the religious sense. The latter word, which etymologically means 'returning'—it is, in fact, the Heb. *tĕshūbāh*, Aram. *tethūbah*—in point of law and religion is explained as synonymous with *nadam*.

It is defined as 'remorse for an act of disobedience (in respect of its being an act of disobedience), accompanied by a determination not to return to it, even if one has the power.'[2]

It must be for 'an act of disobedience,' because regret felt for doing something that is right or, at least, not wrong is not repentance. The phrase 'in respect of its being an act of disobedience' is added because regret for having drunk wine on account of its causing headache or loss of money or self-respect is not repentance. Mention of the 'determination not to return to it' is by some regarded as superfluous, seeing that that is always an element in remorse—whence they explain the traditional saying of Muhammad, 'Remorse (*nadam*) is repentance (*tawbah*).' The majority of the most ancient authorities do not admit the condition that ability to commit the sin again must be there. They think, *e.g.*, that the remorse of the sinner at the point of death may be repentance. In this they are in conflict with the Qur'ān.

In accordance with its etymology, *tawbah* means in the first instance 'turning' to God. Hence the complete phrase is 'repentance unto God.' Moses regretted his request to be allowed to look upon God and said, 'I repent unto Thee' (Qur'ān, vii. 141, and frequently). In the case of those who have been brought up in idolatry or polytheism this turning to God is synonymous with 'conversion' to Islām. The convert is represented as saying, 'I repent unto Thee and am of the Muslims' (xlvi. 14; cf. xi. 3, 114, and elsewhere). In this connexion, holding the doctrine of the Trinity—or, as the Qur'ān puts it, saying that 'God is the third of three'—is a form of polytheism (v. 77 f.). But, as perfection is unattainable by a mortal, penitence is a mark of the pious Muslim, not only at the beginning of his religious career, but all his life long (ix. 113, lxvi. 5). Repentance is necessary and will be accepted from all Muslims who have sinned in such ways as the following: hypocrisy, *i.e.* strictly the hypocrisy of the citizens of Medīna who pretended to acquiesce in Muhammad's authority there, whilst secretly working to undermine it (iv. 145); opposing Islām by force of arms, provided that repentance is made of free will, and not as a result of defeat in battle (v. 38); scepticism (ix. 127); idolatry (ix. 3, ii. 51); perverting or persecuting Muslims (lxxxv. 10); slandering honest women (xxiv. 5); taking interest (ii. 279); and other offences (vii. 153, iv. 20). The one sin after which there is no repentance (cf. He 6[6]) is that of apostasy (iii. 83), but this verse the commentators refer to the Jews,[1] and in any case the preceding verse appears to leave a loophole of escape even here. In the latest chapter of the Qur'ān, composed at a time when Muhammad could afford to be lenient, a door is opened even to the apostate (ix. 75). Apostasy is, of course, allowed under persecution. But those who die in unbelief, *i.e.* all non-Muslims, are lost.

'The world full of gold shall in no wise be accepted of any of them, even though he should give it for his ransom' (iii. 84).

Repentance must be sincere for sins committed through ignorance (vi. 54, xvi. 120). It should be preceded by intercession. 'Ask forgiveness, thereafter repent' (xi. 3, 54, 64, 92). The converse order, which one would expect, is also found (v. 78). True repentance is followed by faith and good works.

'Those who repent and believe and do good works (xix. 61, xx. 84, xxv. 70, xxviii. 67) repent unto God with (true) repentance' (xxv. 71).

Repentance has its counterpart in the forgiving nature of God. Man's repentance is always met by repentance on the part of God.

'Whoever repents after wrongdoing and does right, God repents over him. Truly God is forgiving and compassionate' (v. 43, and so regularly).

Man repents *unto* God; God repents *over* man. The latter phrase is equivalent to 'is sorry for

[1] *The Assemblies of Al-Ḥarīrī*, tr. T. Chenery, London, 1867, p. 350.

[2] Muhammad Tahānawi, *Kitāb Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt Funūn*, Calcutta, 1862, *s.v.*

[1] Baiḍāwī, *Asrār ut-tanzīl*, ed. H. O. Fleischer, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1846–48, *ad loc.*

him' (lviii. 14, lxxiii. 20). Al-Tawwāb ('the much-repenting') is one of the ninety-nine 'beautiful names' of God (ii. 35, and frequently; cf. Jl 2[13], etc.), though it is also used of men (ii. 222). It is also explained, however, as merely denoting 'much inclined to forgive,' or, transitively, as 'turning man to repentance'; but it is no doubt used in the same sense in both references. If God did not feel sorry for man in this way, He would always punish him. Hence the opposite of to repent (on God's part) is to punish.

'It is no business of thine whether God repent over or punish them' (iii. 123, and so elsewhere).

Fortunately God wishes to repent over men (iv. 32), but His repentance is voluntary. He repents over whom He will (ix. 15), so that it is folly in man to count upon His repenting (ix. 103).

The chief advantage following upon sincere and timely repentance is forgiveness—not as a matter of course, but as a result of the divine repentance or sorrow (ii. 51, etc.). The angels intercede with God on behalf of those who repent (xl. 7), and the Muslims are bound to treat them as brothers (ix. 11). The whole teaching of the Qur'ān on this matter is well summed up in the following verses:

'Repentance is incumbent upon God only towards those who do evil in ignorance and then repent without delay. Over such God repents, and God is knowing and wise. And repentance (on God's part) is not due to those who do evil until, when death comes to one of them, he says "Now I repent," nor to those who die in unbelief. For such we have prepared a painful punishment' (iv. 21 f.).

It is worth noting that it is never said in the Qur'ān of any one that he actually did 'repent unto God.'

The orthodox Muslim tradition takes little or no account of repentance. The more liberal Mu'tazilites and the Ṣūfīs, or mystics, have more to say about it. The Mu'tazilites distinguish three elements in repentance: (1) making restitution, (2) not returning to the offence, and (3) continuance of the feeling of remorse. The orthodox (Sunnis) do not regard these as essential. They say that repentance consists of three things: (1) leaving off disobedience in the present, (2) intending to leave it off in the future, and (3) regret at having done it in the past. They hold that a Muslim may go on repenting and sinning, that (and in this the Ṣūfīs agree with them) he may repent of one sin and go on doing others, and that his repentance of the one will count. The Mu'tazilites, on the other hand, hold that the penitent must keep himself aloof from *all* deadly sins. The Muslim who does not do so is neither a believer nor an unbeliever, but simply a reprobate, and, if he does not change, he will suffer eternal punishment.[1]

With the mystics repentance occupies an important place. It is the first 'station' on the 'mystic path.' They recognize three degrees of repentance. The first is called simply repentance (*tawbah*). It is an attribute of all Muslims (Qur'ān, lxvi. 8). It consists in turning from sins actually committed. Its motive is fear of divine punishment. The second degree of repentance is called *inābah* ('returning'). It is an attribute of the saints and 'those brought near' to God (l. 32). Its motive is the desire for the reward. The third and highest form of repentance is *awbah* (which also means 'returning'). It is an attribute of the apostles and 'sent ones' (xxxviii. 44). Its motive is neither fear of punishment nor desire for the reward, but the love of obedience. In it, for the mystic, everything ceases to exist except God. Otherwise repentance is said to be that of the many, that of the few, and that of the very few (*'amm*, *khāss*, and *khāss khāss*). The mystics, however, are very loose in their use of terms.

Inābah is elsewhere defined to be 'turning from the all to Him whose is the all,' or 'turning from negligence of God to its opposite and from estrangement to friendship.'[1]

In regard to its quality, repentance is either (1) sound, when one sins, repents sincerely, and yet falls again into sin; (2) clear or sincere (*nasūḥ*), when the heart becomes estranged from sin and finds it hateful, so as to be no further attracted by it (Qur'ān, lxvi. 8); and (3) corrupt, when one repents with the tongue and all the while the love of sin is in the mind.

Muhammad's cousin Ibn 'Abbās defined 'sincere' repentance as 'remorse in the heart, asking forgiveness with the tongue, leaving off with the body, and resolve not to sin again.'[2]

Repentance is a favourite subject of homilies and theme of religious poems, such as those of Ghazālī, Bahā al-Dīn al-'Āmilī, Zamakhsharī, and others. Stories in which repentance is inculcated are frequently told in connexion with Jesus.[3] The idea of repentance bringing its reward in the present life does not seem to have occurred to the pious Muslim.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned in the article, see Ibn 'Arabi, *Futūḥāt al-Makkiyah*, Cairo, A.H. 1329 (A.D. 1911), § 74 f.; al Ghazālī, *Iḥyā al-'Ulūm*, Cairo, A.H. 1326 (A.D. 1908), pt. iv. p. 1 ff.; R. A. Nicholson, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, and *Kitāb al-Luma'* (both in Gibb Memorial Series), do. 1914.

T. H. WEIR.

RESISTANCE AND NON-RESISTANCE.

—1. The teaching of the NT.—The term 'non-resistance' is applied to the refusal to use force sometimes only in war, sometimes under any circumstances. As we shall see, the two positions, though often confused, are by no means identical. The origin both of the term and of the idea is to be found in Christ's command not to resist evil, and the main object of this article will be to examine the teaching of the NT on the subject, together with the ethical principles involved.[4]

The chief arguments in favour of the view that it is wrong to appeal to force under any circumstances are derived (*a*) from the recorded teaching of Christ, (*b*) from the general principle of the supremacy of love involved in Christianity. Though in many cases, particularly in recent times, it is argued that the position does not depend so much on the interpretation of isolated texts as on the general tenor of Christ's teaching, there is no doubt that His actual words have in fact been the starting point. In any case we need the reminder, which is useful in many connexions, that it is impossible to arrive at the true meaning of any passage in the Bible so long as it is taken in isolation. The Sermon on the Mount itself is not the whole of Christianity, and it can be rightly understood only if interpreted in the light of the practice and teaching of Christ and His immediate followers, taken as a whole. A primary fault of Tolstoi and many of his followers is to confine themselves to a handful of arbitrarily selected sayings. Such a limitation involves not merely a lack of proportion, but also a failure to understand rightly even the passages to which attention is directed.

The central passage is:

'Resist not him that is evil [or 'evil']: but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go one mile, go with him twain. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not

[1] Jurjānī, *Ta'rīfāt*, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig, 1845, *s.v.*
[2] *Ib.* p. 74.
[3] *'Iqd al-Farīd*, Cairo, A.H. 1305 (A.D. 1887), pt. i. p. 29[illegible].
[4] An interesting example of non-resistance on quite different grounds is to be found in the refusal of the Jews to fight on the Sabbath (1 Mac 2[29f.], 2 Mac 6[11]). The logic of facts compelled the abrogation of the scruple (1 Mac 2[41] 9[43]).

[illegible] *Kitāb al Milal' wan Nihal*, 2 vols., ed. W. [illegible] 1846, i. 55; Germ. tr. T. Haarbrucker, Halle, [illegible]

thou away. Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you,' etc. (Mt $5^{38ff.}$; cf. Lk 6^{29} and the Beatitudes).

With this may be compared the recurring stress on forgiveness, in the Lord's Prayer and elsewhere, even 'unto seventy times seven.' Similar teaching, though in a milder form, meets us in the Epistles—*e.g.*, Ro $12^{14ff.}$ ('Render to no man evil for evil . . . Avenge not yourselves,' etc.), Eph $4^{26.\ 32}$, Col 3^{13}, 1 Th 5^{15}, 1 P $2^{20ff.}$. These passages, taken in combination with Christ's own example of meekness and non-resistance, and the general insistence on the principles of love and brotherhood, do constitute a *prima facie* case against the appeal to force, and pre-eminently against war. We should note, however, that among the passages of this type that from the Sermon on the Mount stands alone as the most extreme and uncompromising.

We ask what indications are afforded by the rest of the NT as to a different and complementary type of teaching. Too much stress need not be laid on Christ's employment of the scourge to cleanse the Temple. It is recorded in St. John alone (Jn 2^{15}), and the force was apparently used only against the animals. But the whole incident shows that, when Christ found Himself confronted with an abuse, He was prepared to take active measures to remedy it. More important is His attitude and that of the NT in general towards soldiers (Mt $8^{5ff.}$, Ac 10, etc.). As is well known, they nearly always appear in a favourable light; there is no hint that when converted they are expected to abandon their profession, or that that profession is regarded as in itself wrong and unChristian. Once more, the general attitude towards life adopted in the parables is significant as interpreting the hard sayings of the Sermon on the Mount. There is in fact no parable which turns on the virtue of non-resistance; the ordinary discipline and penalties of life are assumed throughout. The slothful servant or dishonest steward is dismissed; even forgiveness is not unlimited to the slave who cannot forgive others.

Finally, it is clear from the NT that force or coercion of some kind forms an important element in God's dealings with men. Without adopting the belief in a hopeless and never-ending 'hell,' penalties and discipline after death are undoubtedly contemplated for the sinner. We may believe that these will be remedial; if so, they become part of the armoury of love and forgiveness themselves. They further follow from the very gift of independence and free will. God respects man's personality and does not compel him to do right. This implies that, when he obstinately refuses to yield to the promptings of love and higher motives, force must step in, at least for the time, in order to prevent him from using his independence indefinitely to the injury of his fellow-man. And, if man is made in the image of God and is called to imitate his Father's perfection (Mt 5^{48}), what is right and consistent with love in God must also, with due qualifications, be right for man. If God under any circumstances can use force and compulsion, so may man; when he may do it, and whether he does not appeal to it too readily and lightly, are questions which do not affect the main principle.

It is therefore clear on the evidence of the NT itself, without appeal to any difficulties of interpretation or application, that the more extreme sayings about forgiveness and non-resistance cannot be understood quite literally as forbidding recourse to any form of force or penalty under any circumstances. We are free to ask what these sayings mean in the light of the general teaching of the NT, and are justified in applying to them those canons of interpretation which are recognized as valid in the case of other 'hard sayings.' Orientals are wont to speak in proverbs which isolate one side of a truth. Christ constantly used the method of startling sayings worded in such a way as to force men to think. His teaching had not the precision of legal formularies; it was never His purpose to lay down a new code of fixed law or external rules. We recall sayings such as 'If any man cometh unto me, and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife . . . he cannot be my disciple'; 'When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen'; 'Call no man your father upon the earth.' None of these sayings can be, nor were they meant to be, applied literally; and the same principle holds good of the non-resistance sayings. We may note that in the quotation given above from Mt 5 the apparent absolute prohibition of force occurs in the same context as equally absolute commands to unlimited giving of goods and service which have never been consistently applied *au pied de la lettre*, even by those who have attempted to follow out the one saying about non-resistance quite literally.

These considerations hold good even of the sphere of private relationships, which our Lord evidently had primarily in mind.[1] Much more are they true of those international relationships which He did not and could not have directly before Him. (*a*) Without adopting the extreme eschatological view, according to which Christ's whole teaching and career were dominated by the belief in an immediate end of the world's history, it is clear that He did not deliberately contemplate or provide for a long period of historical development, nor did He legislate with a view to the relationships of independent Christian or semi-Christian communities. (*b*) The historical conditions of the day excluded international problems and the claims of patriotism in our modern sense. The Jews had no independent existence as a nation, and the last thing that Christ or His followers desired was rebellion in order to regain it. The Gentile was a member of the Roman Empire, and war between its constituent elements did not come into purview. It is idle to seek for a direct answer to the modern difficulties connected with war from a period in which the conditions were so completely different.

2. Ethical application.—We may hold, then, that, in spite of the *prima facie* impression made by single texts of the NT, the question of the legitimacy of the use of force, whether in war or in other forms, is really an open one, and must be decided on the general principles of Christian ethics. It will be useful to distinguish three stages:

(1) The degree to which non-resistance may rightly be carried when one's own personal interests and safety alone are directly involved must be a matter for the individual conscience to decide according to the circumstances of each case. The moral effect of a refusal to resent a blow or to resist injustice is often very great, both in dealing with those who may be treated as Christians and therefore as immediately open to the appeal of higher motives and also in dealing with the outcast or criminal, on whom the very strangeness and unexpectedness of the attitude adopted may have a startling effect. There are, however, two caveats to be borne in mind: (*a*) it must be clear that the meekness is really due to the higher motive of love and not to cowardice or cynical

[1] That He was not, as is sometimes maintained, thinking only of the relation of Christian to Christian is shown by the command to go two miles with the representative of the heathen government.

indifference; in other words, it must be in keeping with the general character; (*b*) it must be remembered that ultimately nothing that we do has a purely private bearing, since every action has its indirect effect upon society as a whole. If an act of non-resistance, instead of converting, merely encourages the wrong-doer, obvious harm is done. To yield to blackmail in any form or, it may be, to refuse to prosecute a criminal will involve a mischief to society at large which will outweigh the good done.

(2) A further set of considerations arises when the interests of others are directly involved. It may be right in this connexion that a man should require some degree of sacrifice from his wife and family, but he is not justified in carrying it to the point where their whole welfare or even their lives are involved. Still less can he impose such sacrifice upon others on whom his claim is more remote. What would have been the duty of the Samaritan in the parable if he had come upon the scene at the moment when the robbers were about to attack their victim? It is hard to believe that Christ intended the principle of non-resistance to be applied in such a case as this. He certainly cannot have intended that a man should not use force to save his wife or family, or women and children in general, from gross outrage. And, with regard to questions of property and rights, while a man may do what he will with his own, he cannot practise an unlimited generosity when he acts as a trustee for others.

(3) The case of war, where national interests are involved, follows naturally on this principle. The responsible rulers of the State are trustees, not only for the nation as a whole, but also for future generations. If, as we have argued, the use of force is sometimes legitimate, the community cannot be debarred from using it to protect its own members, to secure their fair interests, and to defend weaker nations. Primarily this principle covers the operations of the police and criminal law, but it also extends to war. The fundamental difficulties with regard to war do not really lie in its being an appeal to force, but are due to the facts that there is no guarantee that force will be always used to uphold the right, or that it will succeed in doing so, and that the coercion is applied not merely to the actual offenders and transgressors, but to comparatively innocent members of the nation drawn into the net of war.

3. **The case of war.**—It is considerations such as these that have driven some who do not adopt the extreme Tolstoian attitude of refusing to use force under any circumstances to regard its use in war as always wrong. And it will be generally agreed that the efforts of Christianity and of civilized society in general must be far more definitely directed in the future than they have been in the past to the elimination of this method of settling disputes. The various suggestions for a League of Nations are really attempts to apply to the relations between peoples the principles which civilization has developed within the State as controlling the relations between individuals. In other words, the object is to substitute for the appeal to the might of the stronger the appeal to impartial justice, ascertained as completely as may be among fallible men. But it must be clearly realized, in connexion with the particular problem before us, that such schemes do not adopt the principle of non-resistance in place of force. The ultimate sanction of a League of Nations against a recalcitrant member or outsider would still be force, whether applied by economic boycott or by war, but it would be force directed as nearly as possible by the principles of law and justice. Nations will not be applying the principles of the Sermon on the Mount in any literal sense any more than does the private individual who invokes the aid of the policeman or magistrate instead of attempting to defend or avenge himself by his own physical strength.

Meanwhile wars fought under ordinary conditions are still a fact of life, and the conscientious citizen has to decide on the attitude which he will adopt. War is admittedly at best a very rough and unsatisfactory method of securing justice between nation and nation, but from the beginning of history to the present day it has been in the last resort the only method. The appeal to war, like our existing competitive social system, has its roots deep in a past which the individual inherits and for which he is only very partially responsible. He can and should modify the future, but at any given moment he has to do his best under the actual circumstances in which he finds himself. The case is analogous to that of one who, in a country where law and police do not exist, is compelled to take into his own hands the defence of the life and property of himself and his dependents. It is quite true that the assailant may be too strong for him, but he is bound to do his best. So the citizen, when his country is involved in a war, which we must assume is regarded as a just war, must either choose the course of non-resistance and stand aloof or play his part in whatever way his capacities allow; there is no third course. One difficulty with regard to non-resistance is that the man who stands aside seldom envisages his example as followed by the majority of his fellow-countrymen, or thinks out logically the consequences which would ensue if this were to happen. He is salving his own conscience and saving his own soul, while allowing others to take what he regards as the lower course—a course which actually protects him from the result of his own action.[1] A distinction is drawn by the adherents of pacificism 'between the duty of the State and that of a pacifist individual.'[2] And in fact we note historically that the examples of anything like combined non-resistance have come from communities such as the early Christians, the Waldenses, and the Doukhobors, who have not felt themselves responsible for the preservation of the State under which they lived. There is, indeed, some reason in the reproach of Celsus that, if all were to follow the example of the Christians, the control of worldly affairs would pass into the hand of the barbarian and Christianity would be unable to exist; it owed its peace to the Roman Empire. Such a position cannot be final or satisfactory. The Christian is also a citizen; if it is right for a State to engage in war, it is not only right but also a duty for its citizens to support it. The State in the end consists of the citizens who compose it; it is not ethically permissible for one section to contract itself out of its obligations in obedience to a supposed higher law and at the same time to reap all the advantages gained by the rest who are following the 'lower course.' In other words, if non-resistance in war is right, it must be thought of as the attitude of the whole nation and not of a negligible minority, and the results of such an attitude must be definitely faced. If it be decided that these results would be disastrous for the nation and the world as a whole, if they would involve grave evils and sacrifices for others and for future generations, together with the triumph of injustice and the oppression of the weak, active participation in war becomes the

[1] It is admitted that the apparent success of the Quaker experiment in Pennsylvania is not decisive, since all the time the Friends were in fact protected by the British forces in the background (J. W. Graham, *War from a Quaker Point of View*, p. 46).

[2] J. W. Graham, *HJ* xiv. [1916] 811.

only alternative. And, if so, it should be clearly recognized that from the point of view of ethics this is not, as is often supposed, the choice of the 'second best.' The problems of ethics consist in choosing the best course which is open under given circumstances; if it is really the best, it is in the absolute sense 'right.' To say that war, or indeed any appeal to force, would be unnecessary if all men acted up to the principles of Christianity is true, but irrelevant; this is only to say that evil will not exist when the Kingdom of Heaven is fully come. We are concerned here and now with the right course to take in a world where evil does exist and where men do in fact do wrong. It takes only one to make an attack; if, as is the case under existing conditions, war is the only means of resisting such an attack, it becomes right in the fullest sense, however unsatisfactory it may be as a method of establishing justice. The mistake arises when the admission of this principle is held to absolve men from the duty of trying to work out some better method for the future, or when, with regard to the use of force in any form, it is regarded as the final solution of the problem. As against the evil-doer who refuses to obey the voice of love, force is necessary and therefore right, no less for his own sake than for that of others. But the ultimate purpose is not that he should be prevented from doing wrong, but that he should cease to desire to do so. In all cases this should be kept before the mind as the goal, and the conscience should not rest content till it is reached.

4. Historical examples. — For examples of attempts to apply the principles of non-resistance reference must be made to the relevant artt., esp. ANABAPTISM; DOUKHOBORS; FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF; TOLSTOI. Some account of the mediæval sects will be found in H. C. Lea, *History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages* (London, 1888). The Waldenses held homicide to be unlawful under any conditions;[1] though sometimes provoked by persecution to break this rule, they generally fell an easy prey to their enemies.[2] The Bohemian Brethren were in line with the Waldenses.[3] In the case of the Cathari such tenets were connected with theories of transmigration; they refused to take the life even of animals.[4]

On the early Christians and their attitude to service in the army see especially Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*.[5] It should be noted that the refusal to serve was by no means universal, and that where it existed it was due as much to the various compliances with heathen rites and unlawful practices required of soldiers as to a belief in the unlawfulness of war *per se*. Objections were felt to the holding of civil office no less than to service in the army. With regard to the whole question, what has been said above as to the historical conditions and the absence of national wars must be borne in mind.

LITERATURE.—Reference may be made to the lists of books given in the artt. just quoted, esp. FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF; the subject is treated with more or less fullness in most works on ethics; see esp. **W. E. H. Lecky**, *Hist. of European Morals*[8], London, 1888, ii. 248 ff.; **H. Rashdall**, *Theory of Good and Evil*, Oxford, 1907, i. ch. ix.; **D. G. Ritchie**, *Natural Rights*[3], London, 1916, p. 238 ff.; **J. Keating**, 'The Ethics of Resistance to Law,' in *British Review*, i. [1913], no. 2, p. 31 ff. War from the Christian point of view is discussed by **J. Martineau**, 'Right of War,' in *National Duties and Other Sermons and Addresses*, London, 1903, p. 72 ff., and **J. B. Mozley**, *University Sermons*, do. 1876, p. 110 ff. Discussions in recent years (1914–17) have been abundant, chiefly in the form of magazine articles. Reference may be made to **C. W. Emmet**, 'War and the Ethics of the New Testament,' and **W. M. Glazebrook**, 'What is a Christian Nation?' both in *The Faith and the War*, London, 1915; **W. E. Wilson**, *Christ and War*, do. 1913, *Atonement and Non-Resistance*, do. 1914; **J. W. Graham**, *War from a Quaker Point of View*, do. 1915; **W. L. Walker**, *The War, God and our Duty*, do. 1917, p. 101 ff.; **H. L. Goudge**, in *The War and the Kingdom of God*, do. 1915, p. 26 ff.; **L. S. Thornton**, *Conduct and the Supernatural*, do. 1915, p. 199 ff.; **R. B. Perry**, 'Non-Resistance and the Present War,' in *IJE* xxv. [1915] 307 ff.; **D. J. Bolton**, 'The Fulfilment of the Law,' *ib.* xxvii. [1917] 200 ff.; **P. Gavan Duffy**, 'War and the Christian Ethic,' *ib.* p. 213 ff.; **R. K. Richardson**, 'Resist not Evil,' *ib.* p. 225 ff.

C. W. EMMET.

RESPONSIBILITY. — Responsibility is the human sense of answerableness for all acts of thought and conduct. Christian responsibility is answerable to the ideal set up by Jesus. About responsibility two things have to be considered: its relation to freedom of choice, and the object to which it is answerable; and of Christian responsibility two further matters require elucidation: the extended sphere of answerableness in the light of Christ's teaching, and the unique attitude of Jesus to the human conscience.

i. *Responsibility and freedom of choice.*—With the various theories invented to explain or account for freedom (see art. FREE WILL) the religious consciousness has little to do. Any theory which leaves free choice a real function of man is consistent with the Christian view, as any explanation which would destroy its reality is out of harmony with Christian experience. The pleas urged, the sanctions offered, and the rewards promised by Jesus have no force unless men are able to accept or to refuse higher duties. 'Without real freedom of choice there could be no real moral responsibility; and the sense of it, if it were still felt, would have, like the sense of freedom, to be classed as an illusion' (Shadworth H. Hodgson, *The Metaphysic of Experience*, London, 1898, iv. 120). In His dealing with men as free agents Jesus acknowledged and endorsed the ordinary sense of responsibility.

To the religious mind this is never, however, an absolute freedom; for over, around, and within the religious state is the immanent presence of God. It is a freedom within gracious boundaries, within the full tide of Divine love and mercy. As the founder of a new religion, Jesus was conscious of the Divine power working in His favour; if men believed in Him, it was the result of the Father's drawing (Jn 6^{44}); if He can count on the devout discipleship of some of His followers, it is because God has given Him these sheep (10^{29}); and, if humble Christians credit their faith in Jesus, without peril to human responsibility, to the election of God, they are of the same mind with their Master (Ro 8^{28-39}). How human freedom and the kindly control of God can comport together in any philosophical theory has not concerned the religious, who have with extraordinary persistency declared both, and held them somehow reconcilable.

Jesus further acknowledged the impoverishment of personal freedom by continued moral indifference. To the Jews who boasted of Abraham as their father Jesus replied that their inability to recognize His message as a deliverance from God was due to their kinship with the devil (Jn 8^{44}). There is here no reference to any original difference in the natures of men, but an assertion of the obvious moral fact that minds debauched by low motives may become insensible to the attractions of the heavenly offer. This fatal obstacle was one of their own making, and was not their misfortune but their fault. Moral insensibility may not absolve from responsibility.

ii. *The object to whom or to which responsibility is owing.* — Modern teachers have described the object to whom answerableness is due as either oneself or one's neighbour or one's God; but, as the enforcement of each of these spheres of duty lies with the conscience, the subject is really

[1] Lea, i. 80. [2] *Ib.* ii. 150. [3] *Ib.* ii. 562.
[4] *Ib.* i. 99. [5] Eng. tr., London, 1904–05, ii. 204 ff.

responsible to conscience as the authority which imposes commands. For the most part Jesus accepted the popular Jewish sense of responsibility, which was essentially answerableness to God. For every idle word men shall give account in the day of judgment (Mt 12[36]); the obligation to seek perfection rests upon men because they should be as their Father in heaven (5[48]); and, though our Lord lays down strict duties to our neighbour, love to enemies, almsgiving to the poor, and feasts for the hungry, these duties are substantially obligations to God, for so men will be 'the children of the Father which is in heaven.' All duties to neighbours clothe themselves in our Lord's mind with the august authority of duties towards God.

After the same manner He conceives obligations for which a man is responsible to himself—these are indeed duties towards God. Men owe it to themselves to accept the higher ideal when they see it. So Jesus went preaching the Kingdom of Heaven and summoning men to repent. Blessedness, the chief aim of ordinary life and the perennial cry of self-preservation, was to be sought, according to Jesus, in such states as meekness, poverty of spirit, and peace-making—all these, however, that they 'may be called the children of God.' Responsibility to self may imply the subordination of every interest to that of the Kingdom of Heaven; and the reason offered is, 'Thou shalt have treasure in heaven,' *i.e.* with God. (Here again the religious consciousness is pre-eminent, and responsibility for self-culture is obligation to God, who provides men with opportunities rich in moral possibility.)

In one word, duty to God absorbs duty to self and to neighbours; for self is conceived as always and only properly a child of God; and neighbours, whether good or bad, desirable or otherwise, are conceived as deserving of our benefaction because they are all the recipients of God's loving-kindness (Mt 5[45]).

iii. *Extended sphere of answerableness in the light of Christ's teaching.*—It is the unique distinction of Jesus to have at once enlarged the sphere of responsibility and intensified the feeling of it. Our Lord expanded the idea of one's neighbour, who is not only the man of one's own nation, but any person whom circumstance gives one an opportunity of helping (Lk 10[25-37]). With the parable of the Good Samaritan vanish all the artificial boundaries by which men have sought to confine their neighbourly obligations. Among friends, again, the Master has included the poor, whom He obliges us to ask to our feasts, though they cannot ask us in return (Lk 14[14]). A new set of obligations to hospitality are thus laid upon the disciples of Jesus. Still more wide does the horizon of responsibility become when He obliges us to include in our friendship all men, friend and foe alike, those who persecute us and those who despitefully use us (Mt 5[44]). No man may be treated by us otherwise than in love. The last acre of foreign territory is brought within the sphere of human obligation when Jesus, who expects to be taken as an example, announces that He came to call not the righteous, but sinners (Mt 9[13]). Among those to whom we owe duties for which we are answerable to God must be included the outcast and the degraded. So extensive a field of responsibility may be the despair of a moralist, but it is the free-chosen territory of the disciple of Jesus.

Having annexed all mankind under the obligation of love, Christ proceeds to enhance the sense of responsibility. Not only the outward act, but the inner thought has to be answered for. As well as for murder, so also for the angry thought from which murder issues, a man must hold himself answerable (Mt 5[22]). Not only for licentious deed, but also for unholy imagination is there responsibility (v.[28]). To offer prayer is good; but, if popularity has been the motive, only punishment can follow (6[5]). High and insolent deeds will provoke a just reward; but high thoughts are in no better state, for humility is a duty (18[4]). As a matter of fact, the obligation to be moral is an obligation to preserve the heart in purity and love, 'for out of the heart are the issues of life' (15[19]). The culture of morality is the culture of the heart.

Besides extending the sphere, Jesus adds a higher quality to moral responsibility. The idea of self-preservation is enhanced when the things which are worthy of our search are meekness, mercifulness, purity, and peacemaking. Indeed, the duty of self-culture is so described by Jesus as to include the lofty conception of a sacrifice of the lower nature—a sacrifice not only desirable but necessary (Mk 8[35]). In the same way the obligation to forgive enemies is enhanced. An enemy is to be forgiven not only seven times, but 'until seventy times seven' (Mt 18[22]). To an unstinted and uncalculating forgiveness the disciples of the Master are bound. And, with the demand for love towards all men, human duty is raised to the height of Divine perfection. The kind of affection which Christians are to entertain towards each other and, by inference, to all men is a love such as existed between the Father and the Son (Jn 15[9]). In this way Jesus has both extended and intensified moral responsibility.

The secret of this new moral content and new moral intensity must be sought in Christ's high conception of God's fatherly relation to men. It is God's loving-kindness that obliges men to seek first the Kingdom of Heaven (Mt 6[33]); the same reason is given for the duty of unstinted forgiveness (18[35]); a similar ground provides the obligation to a cheerful acceptance of God's will (7[11]); and the same tender mercy calls men to the exercise of a gracious and thoughtful love (Lk 7[47]). God loves His creatures, desiring above all that they should become His children; and in that tender, holy desire lies the secret of that sense of responsibility which Jesus has at once extended and intensified.

With the sense of childhood in God's family and in enjoyment of the Divine favour, the burden of responsibility, felt so heavily under all merely moral systems, is greatly eased. Love makes obligation light; the love of God turns duty into pleasure. In that relation the yoke of sonship becomes light, and the strictest obligation easy. Whom Jesus makes free are free indeed (Jn 8[36]). By turning the hearts of men to the love of God, Jesus at once increased the sense of responsibility and relieved its burden. How easily a child of God carries this enhanced moral obligation may be gathered from St. Paul's magnificent claim of perfect freedom in Ro 8.

iv. *The unique attitude of Jesus to the sense of human responsibility.*—Jesus has somehow contrived to thrust Himself in between a man and his conscience, or—for it is the same thing—between a man and his God. At the outset of His public career every hearer recognized the moral superiority of our Lord, and felt a weighty pressure in His commands (Mt 7[29]). Nor was this authority denied by Jesus; on the contrary, He emphasized His right to impose new commandments. The fathers of Israel had given certain orders, but Jesus gave new ones, introducing the opposite duty with these words, 'But I say unto you' (5[22]). Passing through the gamut of accepted commandments, Jesus quietly enforced new and, in some cases, opposing responsibilities. As His public career advances, Christ identifies Himself more completely with the moral law, demanding of men an obedience such as was due only to the supreme moral Governor of the

world. Confession of His name He describes as a moral obligation, for such He will confess before God (Lk 12[8]). Responsibility to Himself Jesus accepts as superior to any other moral obligation; indeed, His word has the right of a moral imperative; so children are, if need be, to renounce duty to father and mother (14[26]). The right to become a conscience to every man is fully claimed by Jesus, and men are invited to take upon themselves His yoke (Mt 11[29]). Indeed, Jesus may say that the only true good can be found in life by that man who yields Him such unflinching obedience as is due only to the moral law (Lk 14[27]). Not to obey Jesus, at whatever cost, is to miss being His disciple, and that is, in Christ's judgment, equivalent to moral suicide. Finally, Jesus wholly identifies Himself with the moral law, for He makes fidelity to His person the supreme test of men. Describing the last judgment, always considered the dread function of God alone, Christ speaks of Himself as returning in glory to judge the world, when the sole criterion of blessing or condemnation will be, 'Ye did it unto me,' or 'Ye did it not unto me' (Mt 25[40, 45]). In the whole history of the study of human responsibility this is a unique claim—a claim which was not only not resented, but openly and frankly recognized by men and women who found His authority the exact equivalent of God's. In this lonely isolation Jesus stands pre-eminent in the record of morals.

The Fourth Gospel presents this extraordinary claim in a different and more winsome light. Here Christ's sonship with God is the basis of the gospel message; and the moral obligation to Jesus takes on the familiarity and the sweetness of brotherly affection. Jesus does not in this Gospel so much demand obedience as the representative of the moral Governor of the world as He asks for love and trust in Himself as the complete manifestation of the heavenly Father. For obedience the warmer attitude of trust or faith is demanded. The story of the Samaritan woman is evidently told to show how this love to Jesus may come to birth (ch. 4). Honour to the person of Jesus is honour done to the Father (5[23]). The will of God is conceived by Jesus as an obligation to believe on the Divine Son (6[29]). Judgment was passed on the unbeliever by the very words which Jesus spoke, for He spoke the words of the Father (12[46-49]). The final appreciation of any man's life is decided by his attitude to the Person of the Redeemer. 'He that believeth not is condemned already' (3[18]). The crown of this high claim is the assurance that a friendly knowledge of Jesus is necessary to eternal life, *i.e.* to the sum of human blessing: 'This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent' (17[3]). This claim for loving trust, and this identification of Himself with the Father God in the Fourth Gospel, are clearly the brighter and more attractive equivalents for the unhesitating obedience and the identification of Himself with the Supreme moral Ruler of the world in the Synoptics. Towards Jesus every man has a duty, and on the correct sense of responsibility to Him depends the final prize of life.

LITERATURE.—The subject is not treated by itself in any book of Christian ethics. The only books, besides Commentaries on the various NT passages, are Newman Smyth, *Christian Ethics*[2], Edinburgh, 1893, pt. ii. ch. i., 'The Christian Conscience,' and H. H. Wendt, *The Teaching of Jesus*, Eng. tr., do. 1892, sect. iii. ch. iv., 'Righteousness of the Members of the Kingdom of God'; but even these are only indirectly useful for the subject.

DAVID FYFFE.

REST-DAYS.—See SABBATH (Primitive).

RESURRECTION. — See ESCHATOLOGY, STATE OF THE DEAD.

RETALIATION.—The term 'retaliation,' as its etymology indicates, means paying back in kind, like for like, whether benefits or injuries—though very significantly for human nature it has come to be used almost exclusively in the worse sense of returning evil for evil, blow for blow. The term 'requital' may be regarded as almost equivalent in connotation to 'retaliation'; it, however, rather emphasizes the more friendly aspect of reciprocity, the returning good for good, and it may even be employed to convey the notion of the return of good for evil, though in 1 S 1[25] it is used in the worse sense: 'He hath requited me evil for good,' and in Gn 50[15] Joseph's brethren contemplate that he will requite them the evil they have done him.

1. Ethical signification.—From the ethical point of view, retaliation seems to interpret punishment as retribution; a man's evil-doing is to be returned upon his own head; he is to receive the just reward of his deeds from the injured society or individual as a *quid pro quo*. There is in this view an apparent appeal to that primitive idea of justice which contained an element of vengeance. The modern common theory of punishment does regard the infliction of punishment as a penalty upon wrong-doing of this nature, but judicially imposed, and without any element of personal resentment. Retaliation, however, implies the existence of some personal feeling, and a desire to balance the account with an amount of loss or suffering equivalent to that inflicted. In warfare the principle of retaliation takes the form of meting out to an enemy like treatment to that which he has practised—plunder, outrage, burning and destroying, etc. In this connexion its usage conveys only an evil import; the ruling maxim is injury for injury, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth': whatever methods of a hostile kind are adopted by one party call forth reprisals, and *en revanche* the principle of retaliation justifies the infliction of injuries like in kind and degree to those which were committed. A similar connotation is implied in its application to all cases of rivalry, struggle, and competition; whenever the action of one party exceeds the bounds of reasonableness, fairplay, or good taste, it may, by creating resentment, provoke retaliation, *i.e.* a like departure from the methods of fair and honourable competition.

The problem involved in this aspect of retaliation has been raised in an acute form by the conduct of Germany in the European War—by her brutalities, murders of citizens, ruthless cruelties, starvation of prisoners, raiding of villages, diffusion of disease-germs. Are these methods of warfare to be copied and adopted by her opponents for self-defence on the plea that it gives an enormous advantage to the enemy if there be no reprisal in kind? On ethical grounds the answer is that practices cruel, brutal, and abhorrent to human sentiment cannot be met by retaliation in kind. We may not adopt methods of warfare which are condemned by the moral sense of the nation as inhuman; such proceedings can be countered only by the sternest and most determined efforts to vanquish the enemy through the employment of every legitimate mode of warfare, to destroy his powers, and so render such barbarities impossible in the future. We could not hope to be finally successful by measures which destroyed our own self-respect and reduced us to the same level of savagery; such a victory would be worse than a defeat. Our real aim in the conflict should be to establish such conditions as will render it impossible for such a war ever to recur.

2. As a fiscal policy. — The operation of the principles of retaliation, however, finds its strongest

illustrations and its most significant application in the domain of international commerce. Here it is apt to arise whenever a nation sets up tariff barriers which obstruct international trade, with the avowed object of promoting certain home industries by the exclusion of foreign competition.

The direct economic result of this fiscal policy is to diminish foreign trade, to stimulate the production at home of certain kinds of goods previously imported, and thus to check their production for exportation by their foreign commercial rivals. Naturally this proceeding rouses a feeling of resentment and wrong in the countries whose trade is injured, which often finds vent by calling into existence retaliatory tariffs.

The retaliatory spirit is favoured by the apparently militant attitude of the protective country, and the cry is raised, 'They strike us with their tariffs; let us strike them back again.' The movement gains support from some who, while professedly believers in free trade, yet entertain doubts as to the advantage of what is described as 'one-sided' free trade. Retaliation is then adopted either for the purpose of punishment, and to gratify the feeling of resentment, or with the deliberate aim of placing the offending nation in a position deemed favourable for compelling it to reduce the objectionable tariff. In either case the real object of trading, which is the satisfaction of wants by means of imports, is lost sight of, and the attention is riveted on exporting. The tariff of A checks the exports of B to A; this is regarded by B as a hostile act, and one to be met with a retaliatory tariff, which will hit A back; perhaps it may become a basis for bargaining with A and for inducing A to lower the tariff in some degree. Both countries alike in this conflict overlook the fundamental fact that the whole object of trading is to increase the power of consumption and the amount of enjoyment by obtaining commodities on the best terms; also that exchange (whether home or foreign) increases this power by adding to the productivity of labour, and eases life by enabling individuals to use their own skill and natural gifts to the fullest advantage. They further ignore the fact that their own products are the means by which alone they can purchase the products of others, and that the highest efficiency for both parties is attained by specialization of labour and the free exchange of the results of their own industry. The deeper analysis of the advantages of trading places the emphasis upon *imports* of desirable things, for the obtaining of which *exports* must be offered in exchange. Trading is seen to be thus a mutual benefit; the relative superfluities of each country are given in exchange for the cheaper or more desirable products of other countries; and, as the exchange is voluntary, it will not take place unless both countries find their benefit therein. Protective tariffs, by limiting this power, lower efficiency and injure the country which imposes them; they administer a blow to its own powers of consumption. Retaliation, whether as a penalty or for gaining concessions, means the adoption of the same tariff policy as is resented in the foreign country, which has had the effect of contracting mutual trade. It is an illogical proceeding and a delusion. For, if tariffs are beneficial to the nations that impose them, why should they ever remove them? If they are not beneficial, but are admitted to be an economic blunder, why should other nations copy them? And in what sense can it be profitable to put up barriers that are mischievous, merely in order to lower them under a compact with other nations to do the same? The defence is usually on political grounds, but experience has fully demonstrated two invariable results of this tariff policy: (1) that, when tariffs have once been adopted, it is extremely difficult to remove them, since interests are created that are always opposed to their reduction; that tariffs beget tariffs is the lesson from every country; (2) since tariff legislation is deemed an unfriendly proceeding on the part of those who thus exclude the goods of other countries, it creates ill-feeling, provokes resentment, and leads to retaliation and tariff wars, which destroy trade, create discord, and may incite to other forms of strife. Notwithstanding the fact that retaliation is a double-edged weapon, recoiling upon those who use it, it has been employed very frequently, and by most civilized nations.

3. An economic fallacy. — One of the most cogent arguments for the imposition of tariffs is the erroneous belief that taxes may be extracted from foreigners by means of duties on imports. Even were it the fact that the exporter paid the duty by a reduction of price (which can, however, occur only in the very exceptional circumstance that the importing country possesses a market monopoly), a system by which two nations levy taxation upon each other can be only a very expensive and clumsy system of raising revenue, and one that inevitably offends every canon of taxation.

Much of the prevalent fallacy respecting international trading rests on the mistaken supposition that trade is a species of gambling, in which the gains of one nation are invariably made at the expense of another. When it is fully realized that all trade is but exchange, entered into voluntarily on both sides because it is profitable, and further that different countries can secure a larger amount of enjoyment from their industrial efforts by devoting themselves more exclusively to those tasks in which they respectively excel, then only will the belief in retaliation as an instrument for regulating foreign trade disappear.

4. Evils of protective tariffs. — It should be noticed that all tariffs of a protective character are a cause of great and unproductive expense: they involve elaborate machinery for the collection of duties that realize little as revenue; and, since they tend to call forth evasion and smuggling, they also call into existence other modes of expenditure which are necessarily incurred to check and punish those offences. Further, nothing is more convincingly proved in connexion with protective tariffs than their demoralizing influence upon the public; they tend to become the instruments of persons unscrupulous in the pursuit of gain, who seek to employ them as means for securing monopolies.

It is admitted that retaliatory methods do often lead to the adoption of commercial treaties between nations, which by special mutual concessions reduce in some degree the mischief created by the tariffs; but, inasmuch as the operation of these treaties is limited to certain countries, they generally give offence to countries excluded from them, and thereby give rise to other retaliatory tariffs by those nations; the favoured nation system thus tends to produce different results in the two directions. But retaliation is by no means a necessary antecedent to commercial treaties; most countries raise some part of their public revenue from duties upon luxuries, imported or home-produced; *e.g.*, Britain raises revenue upon imported wines and spirits. There is scope for arrangements under commercial treaties to modify such of these duties as may be found to act in a peculiarly onerous manner, without entering upon the unprofitable field of protective duties. Thus retaliation or reciprocity is possible even through the agency of revenue duties, though it is much

more difficult in application, limited in scope, and less effective, since the objects of taxation in such cases are generally either luxuries or monopoly products.

5. **After-war relations.**—The fierce conflict in which Germany has involved Europe by her violent and unprovoked attempt at conquest has for a time destroyed all possibility of trade relations between her and those whom she has made enemies.

The question has been raised, Will trade relations be renewed after peace? Does not this war demonstrate the dangers of international trading and dependence upon other countries for products? Is it not wiser and more economic to be self-contained and independent, especially for a great nation with colonies which produce many necessaries and are capable of constituting a large market for her manufactures? Shall we not retaliate upon Germany by refusing trade relations after peace has been proclaimed and rather develop our own resources and independence?

Anti-Free Traders have seized the opportunity to advocate this exclusiveness on the ground that it will be economic by developing our own resources, and will enrich the country by the growth of many industries for whose products we have hitherto depended upon Germany.

To discuss this project is to repeat the whole argument for free exchange, the economic advantages of which have been demonstrated.

War is by its nature destructive, abnormal, wasteful; it admits of no economic justification; it is based upon hostility, and its aim is utterly uneconomic. If enmity and hostility between nations were to become the chronic relation, there would be no object in discussing the advantages of trade, for such trade could not exist. But a different set of conditions is created by peace. Well-being, progress, and development are then the aim. Progress demands specialization of faculty and resources, and implies exchange and mutual dependence; and it can be shown that the wider the area of economic relations the greater the economic gain. Therefore no argument against free trading can be deduced from a state of war.

The only problem is how intercourse can be renewed after the war with a nation which has committed such gross offences against civilization and morality. It is conceivable that Britons might decline trade relations with a nation guilty of such depravity on moral grounds and from a feeling of resentment. This is a different motive from that which demands that trade with Germany should be checked in the economic interests of Great Britain. Any limitations of free exchange must be a reduction of economic advantage and a loss; but individuals and nations may be willing to suffer loss for conscience' sake. Increase of trade is not the only aspiration of nations, or indeed the highest; its benefits stand after those of morality. Economic advantages, however, tend on the whole to peaceful relations among nations who wish for mutual peace and prosperity. While, therefore, the bitter feelings created by German methods of war remain, they will be an impediment to renewed trade relations, and thus may favour the views of protectionists; this does not demonstrate the economic desirability of fiscal retaliation; it illustrates the bitterness and distrust created by German aims and methods. When peace is assured and time shall have modified these bitter feelings, the advantages of intertrading will assert themselves. Free trading is both a result and a cause of friendly relations; it postulates peace and makes for peace. But men will often sacrifice profit rather than deal with those whom they distrust.

6. It is almost superfluous to add that retaliation in the rarer and nobler form of reciprocity in good works can result only in mutual benefit and esteem, whether between individuals or between nations; it tends to the creation of an *entente cordiale*, which is a source of confidence, goodwill, and happiness, and is a state productive of moral and material well-being to all whom it embraces.

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G. ARMITAGE-SMITH.

RETREATS.—The object of a retreat is that a soul in solitude with God may learn more of His being and truth and will, and may become more completely dedicated to Him and His service. Some effect has been given to the underlying principle in many forms of religion. There are instances both in the OT and in the NT. Retirement, with its opportunities for prayer to God, was used by Moses, Elijah, St. John the Baptist, our Lord Himself, and probably by St. Paul in Arabia. In the early Church and in the Middle Ages the advantages of solitude for communing with God were abundantly recognized. But the systematization of retreats and the organization of them as carefully arranged aids to spiritual life are among the religious practices which are due to the Counter-Reformation. The beginning was in the method described in the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola (*q.v.*).

The plan of the *Exercises* contemplates a period of four weeks, the word 'week' indicating not necessarily seven days but such a time as may be needed for the course of meditations in consideration of the spiritual faculties and condition of the person making the retreat. The plan contains a scheme for the disposal of time and rules for occupations and prayer. The meditations for the first week, after defining the end of man to be the service of God and the attainment of salvation in this service, are on sin as seen in the sin of the angels, of Adam and Eve, of the retreatant himself; on hell; on death; on the last judgment. The meditations for the second week are on the Incarnation and the events of our Lord's earthly life as far as Palm Sunday and the preaching in the Temple. Those for the third week are on the Last Supper, the Agony in the Garden, the Arrest, the Trial and Condemnation, the Crucifixion and Death, the Burial. Those for the fourth week are on the Resurrection, the Appearances after the Resurrection, and the Ascension. The series for the first week concerns the Purgative Way, the object of which is to increase hatred of sin and to deepen penitence. Those for the second and third weeks concern the Illuminative Way, and the object is to set before the soul the example of Christ and to lead it to closer imitation of Him. That for the fourth week concerns the Unitive Way, which has as its aim to bring the soul into closer union with God. An important place is filled in the second week by the consideration of the two standards under which man has the choice of enlisting—the first that of Christ, the other that of the devil—and of the three classes of (1) those who are reluctant to bear the consequences of following Christ and desire to postpone the sacrifices which are involved, (2) those in whose desire to follow there still are reserves, and (3) those who are prepared at once to make all the surrenders which the following of Him may require. The director is instructed to vary the details and the proportion in the use of the *Exercises* according to the capacities and the needs of the person using them.

In the system founded by St. Ignatius Loyola a retreat of thirty days spent in silence and prayer with meditations on the *Exercises* was a preliminary to entrance into the Society of Jesus; a retreat of eight days similarly based on the *Exercises* became a yearly custom in the Society; and retreats were conducted in houses of the Society for others than its members. Following the example of St. Ignatius, many leaders in religious life promoted retreats for clergy and the laity, men and women. Notable among these were St. Charles Borromeo,

St. Francis de Sales, St. Vincent de Paul, Pierre de Bérulle, and Jean Jacques Olier. During the 17th cent. the use of retreats spread rapidly throughout the Roman Catholic Church. In the closing years of the 19th cent. and the early years of the 20th a great development took place, beginning in France and extending thence to Belgium, Holland, England, and elsewhere, by which retreats, from having been for the most part confined to clergy or lay people of special devotion or passing through some special crisis in life, came to be extended to large multitudes and especially to men and boys, women and girls, of the working classes. These have naturally been of a less severe character than the earlier retreats, lasting for a shorter time, such as three days or one day, with times for conversation and recreation allowed.

Retreats of a definite character were introduced into the Church of England soon after the middle of the 19th century. In Feb. 1856 a retreat for clergy, lasting from Monday to Saturday in one week, was held at Chislehurst under the auspices of the Society of the Holy Cross. In July 1856 a retreat for clergy, lasting for the same time, was held in E. B. Pusey's house at Oxford. An element in both these retreats was that, in addition to their devotional setting and practices, there were conferences on theological and spiritual subjects. One result of the Oxford Movement (*q.v.*) was that many clergy and some devout laymen and women formed the practice of making a retreat from time to time. The general features of these retreats were taken from those customary in the Church of Rome. In many cases they have lasted for three or four days; there have been two or three or four addresses on each day; silence has been preserved throughout; the time has been devoted to prayer and communion with God. Much work in promoting such retreats was due to the Society of St. John the Evangelist at Cowley and its first superior, R. M. Benson, and to the English sisterhoods. Retreats for business men from Saturday night to Monday morning have long been a prominent part of the work of the St. Paul's Lecture Society at St. Paul's Cathedral. In the 20th cent. many retreats and devotional gatherings or conventions bearing some resemblance to retreats have been organized on a wider scale.

In the last few years the meetings for spiritual help and edification which have long been customary among Nonconformists have in some cases assumed a form more like that of a retreat, though usually without the continuous silence and with discussions or conferences forming part. There have been instances of these among the Wesleyans, the Baptists, and the Congregationalists.

Experience has shown the high practical value of retreats in their influence on spiritual life. The present tendency is largely to extend their sphere and to lessen their intensity. Obviously there is need of great differences as to their length and as to the degree of completeness which is to be observed in the withdrawal from the world and its ordinary occupations which is their most distinctive feature. The severity which may be most valuable for those called to special kinds of life, and for those far advanced in the use of prayer, would only be crippling to many of those living an ordinary life in the world or to the young. But it is essential that the more complete and severe retreats should be maintained for those for whom they are suitable; and the special point of a retreat is lost unless the devotion in it is sustained and empowered by continued solitude of the soul with God.

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DARWELL STONE.

RETRIBUTION.—See REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, ESCHATOLOGY.

REUCHLIN.—Johannes Reuchlin (Capnio)[1] was a pioneer and a leader of the humanist movement in the early stages of the Renaissance, especially as regards the study of Hebrew. He was a man of varied gifts, interests, and activities—a striking and attractive personality. He was an accomplished scholar and teacher of Classics and Hebrew, and wrote important works on these subjects; he was a professional lawyer and held appointments as a judge; he was a man of affairs and acted as confidential adviser and agent of some of the leading German princes.

1. Scholar and legalist.—Reuchlin's career may be briefly sketched as follows:

He was born at Pforzheim in Baden, 22nd Feb. 1455; his father was an official of the Dominican monastery there; his Latin studies in the monastery school laid the foundation of his classical scholarship. After a brief stay at the University of Freiburg, he was appointed in 1470 companion and tutor to Frederick, son of the Markgraf Charles I., of Baden, and accompanied his pupil to the University of Paris. Here he began Greek, was a pupil of John à Lapide, and made the acquaintance of Rudolf Agricola. In 1474 he went to the University of Basel, where he took his B.A. in 1475 and his M.A. in 1477. He studied Greek under Andronicus Kontoblakas, had relations with Sebastian Brant and John Wessel, and began his career as a public teacher by lecturing on the Greek language and on Aristotle in the original. He then returned to Paris for a while, and read Greek with George Hieronymus. Next he adopted law as a profession, and studied at the University of Orleans in 1478-79, taking his LL.B. in the latter year, and maintaining himself by teaching Greek and Latin. In 1481 he was made licentiate of laws at the University of Poitiers.

He now went to Tubingen, intending to become a lecturer there, but, on the invitation of Count Eberhard of Württemberg, he became confidential secretary and agent to that prince. From this point till 1520—*i.e.* till towards the close of his life—he continued in such employment and in the pursuit of the legal profession as advocate or judge. In 1484 he became doctor of laws. He remained with Eberhard at Stuttgart till the death of the latter in 1496. Reuchlin's marriage may probably be placed early in this period; he had no children, but was greatly attached to his sister's grandson, Melanchthon. In 1518 he recommended Melanchthon to a post at Wittenberg, and so brought him into connexion with Luther. Later, however, Reuchlin's attitude towards Luther was unsympathetic.

His political and legal duties did not prevent Reuchlin from continuing his work as a scholar. Indeed, his journeys in the service of his patrons gave him fresh opportunities of study and brought him into contact with many of the most distinguished leaders of literature and learning. In company, first with Eberhard in 1481-82, then with a son of that prince in 1490, he twice visited both Florence and Rome, came under the influence of the brilliant scholars of the Medicean Academy and especially of Pico della Mirandola, and profited by the learning of the Greeks, John Argyropulos and Demetrius Chalkondylas. From about 1485 he was busy studying Hebrew; in 1492 he went on a mission to the Emperor Frederick at Linz, who conferred on him a patent of nobility. On this and on a later visit to the imperial court he studied Hebrew with a court physician, a learned Jew, Jacob ben Jehiel Loans, and utilized his newly-acquired knowledge to study the Kabbala; later, while visiting Rome in 1498, he was indebted for further instruction in Hebrew to the Jew, Obadiah Sforno.

On the death of his patron in 1496 Reuchlin lost the favour of the court of Württemberg. He removed to Heidelberg, and eventually entered the service of the Elector Philip. A revolution in 1498 brought him back to Württemberg, where he held an important judgeship till 1512, when he gave up this office, and devoted himself to scholarship for the remainder of his life, having his home in the neighbourhood of Stuttgart—except that in 1520 he was Professor of Greek and Hebrew at Ingolstadt

[1] 'Capnio,' as an alternative name, was Græcized from 'Reuchlin,' after the fashion of the times; it did not, however, supersede the original, as 'Melanchthon' did 'Schwartzerd.'

under the auspices of William, Duke of Bavaria, and in the winter of 1521–22 he lectured at Tübingen. In the early summer of 1522 he died at Bad Liebenzell, whither he had gone for his health.

2. The Reuchlin controversy.—Unfortunately the last years of Reuchlin's life, from 1509, were harassed by the famous controversy which is named after him, but in which he was involved without any fault or desire of his own. A converted Jew, Johann Pfefferkorn of Cologne, anxious for the conversion of his fellow-countrymen, initiated a movement to deprive the Jews of all their books except the OT. He asked Reuchlin for his support, but was refused; a little later the emperor Maximilian instructed the archbishop of Mainz to form a commission of scholars, including Reuchlin, to report upon the matter.

Eventually the archbishop obtained written opinions from the members of the commission; most of them were favourable to Pfefferkorn, but Reuchlin was adverse. A bitter controversy arose, adorned with the usual personalities. The two antagonists mutually accused each other of heresy and appealed to the emperor, the pope, the universities, and other authorities. The universities condemned Reuchlin; the emperor and the pope sought to mediate; Reuchlin was warmly supported by the humanists in the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum* (Tübingen, 1514–17) and in other writings. He had also the enthusiastic support of Luther and Karlstadt. The dispute took the shape of formal litigation, which continued with varying fortunes till 1520. Decisions were given in favour of Reuchlin at Rome in 1516 and at Frankfort in 1520; the former finding was quashed, the latter reversed by the pope. In 1517 Luther had published his theses, and thus his support was disastrous for Reuchlin. In the rising storm caused by Luther's agitation, however, the minor controversy was lost sight of, and the veteran scholar was left in peace for his few remaining days.

3. Chief works.—Reuchlin's more important works may be classified as follows:

(*a*) *Linguistic.*—A Latin dictionary, *Vocabularius Breviloquus*, 25 editions between 1475 and 1504; *de Rudimentis Hebraicis*, a Hebrew lexicon and grammar, first published in 1506.

(*b*) *Mystic.*—*De Verbo Mirifico* (1494), *de Arte Cabbalistica* (1517), which attempt to extend the Jewish theosophy of the Kabbala to Christianity and to apply it in the interests of apologetics.[1] These works are mere literary curiosities, and have no permanent value. Waite believes that Reuchlin 'was the first to point out that the Hebrew name of Jesus was formed of the consonants of Jehovah = יהוה with the addition of the third letter *Shin* = ישוה—*i.e.* Jehoshuah. He quotes a large number of post-Zoharic writers on Kabalism.'[2]

(*c*) *Controversial.*—Mainly in connexion with the polemic against Pfefferkorn and the Dominicans, especially *Aulenspiegel* (1511), which includes his report to the archbishop of Cologne on the question of the confiscation of Jewish literature. Pfefferkorn had previously written *Judenspiegel* (1507), a fairly moderate discussion of the Jews, and *Handspiegel wider und gegen die Juden* (1511), an attack on Reuchlin.

(*d*) *Various.*—A pamphlet, *Liber Congestorum de Arte Predicandi*, mentioned by E. C. Achelis[3] as a pioneer work in modern homiletics; two Latin comedies, *Sergius* and *Henno*, in the style of Terence.

4. Services to Hebrew and Greek learning.—The chief importance of Reuchlin for the history of religion lies in the services that he rendered to the study of Hebrew and in the fact that he bore the brunt of the first great controversy between the humanists and the obscurantists; these two features of his work were closely connected, but it is convenient to treat them separately.

Since the time of Jerome Hebrew learning had been rare among Western Christians, though it flourished among the Jews, but there occasionally appeared Christian scholars, especially converts from Judaism, who were proficient in Hebrew.

[1] R. C. Jebb, in *Cambridge Modern History*, i. 572.

[2] A. E. Waite, *The Secret Doctrine in Israel*, London, 1913, p. 6.

[3] *Lehrb. der prakt. Theologie*, Leipzig, 1898, ii. 101.

The most distinguished among the immediate predecessors of Reuchlin were John Wessel (1420–89) and Pico della Mirandola (1463–94). Reuchlin owed much to their influence. But he himself was the 'Father of Hebrew philology amongst Christians.'[1] His *de Rudimentis Hebraicis* was rightly characterized by Melanchthon as entitling its author to the highest praise from the Church and from all posterity, *i.e.* as an epoch-making book.

But Reuchlin's zeal for Hebrew learning had effects far wider than its immediate objects; nor was his influence confined to such studies. He did much to promote the study of Greek, and even in his early days at Basel his activity provoked the hostility of obscurantists, who objected to the language as impious and schismatic—*i.e.* that of the Eastern Church. The controversy as to Hebrew literature involved questions that are permanently crucial for religion. Here, as often since, matters that primarily concerned the OT provided a field of battle on which larger issues were fought out. In supporting Reuchlin, the humanists were maintaining the freedom of thought and learning against the obscurantist demand that nothing should be taught or published that they chose to consider at variance with traditional orthodoxy—that the ignorance of the dark ages and of the uninstructed multitude should determine how far scholarship should be tolerated. As A. Duff says,

'Graetz is not wrong when he counts his fellow Jews as largely responsible for the Reformation. He writes (*Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, iv. 452): "The Talmud indirectly had a great share in the awakening of these slumbering forces [in Germany]. We can boldly assert that the war for and against the Talmud [wherein Reuchlin was its champion] aroused German consciousness, and created a public opinion, without which the Reformation, as well as other efforts, would have died in the hour of their birth, or perhaps would never have been born at all."'[2]

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W. H. BENNETT.

REVELATION.—1. What is the meaning of revelation?—The word stands either (*a*) for the process by which God makes known to man the truth which he requires, or (*b*) for the body of truth which God has made known. Revelation presupposes the existence both of a living God, able and willing to bestow it, and of intelligent beings, able to receive and to make use of it. Thus, though revelation, as will presently be seen, is God's gift to the world, to know it as revelation belongs to theists alone.

2. How does man's need of revelation come to be felt?—It is felt in face of the practical problems which life presents to him. Man is essentially a religious being, but his desire for union and communion with his god is in close connexion with his practical needs. Just as he desires to make use of a power greater than his own, so he desires to make use of a knowledge greater than his own. Much that he desires to know he finds himself unable to discover, and he turns to his god to seek from him the knowledge which he requires. So it was in the early days of Hebrew history. Saul, seeking his father's asses, David, uncertain as to the intentions of the men of Keilah, Ahab, anxious as to the issue of the coming campaign, alike turned to the seer or the diviner to learn that which they could not themselves discover (1 S 9^{6} 23^{12}, 1 K 22^{6}). Moreover, even when the knowledge which man desires is the knowledge of the

[1] Bleek, *Introd. to the OT*, i. 125; W. Gesenius, *Hebrew Grammar*, ed. E. Kautzsch, Leipzig, 1889, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1898, p. 20.

[2] *Hist. of OT Criticism*, London, 1910, p. 99.

will of his god, his purpose in seeking for it is at first equally practical. Believing that such material blessings as an abundant harvest and victory in war are dependent upon good relations with his god, he desires to know what his god requires of him in order that those good relations may continue, if they exist, or be restored, if they have been interrupted (cf., *e.g.*, 2 S 21[7]). Primitive man desires neither truth for the sake of truth nor righteousness for the sake of righteousness; he desires both because, for practical ends, he desires the favour of his god. Now it is important to observe the practical character of the desire for revelation, because it continues almost unaltered throughout human history. Men are made to 'seek God,' and 'feel after him,' like children feeling for their parents in the night (Ac 17[27]), because they are made dependent upon God and unable to do without Him. As, in the long course of history, men have risen to higher things, far deeper needs than those of which the savage is conscious have come into view. Though the old selfish desire for supernatural information still remains to-day, and is ministered to by the palmist and the crystal-gazer, it is for nobler ends that the best men now desire revelation. What they feel is the mystery of the world and the contradictions of their own nature, the mysteries of sin and sorrow and pain and death. They desire to know God and His purpose, that they may understand their life and the use which they should make of it. But even here the desire for revelation is still mainly practical. Truth for truth's sake may be the watchword of the scholar, but truth for life's sake is the watchword of the ordinary man. He cannot say, with Browning's Grammarian, 'Actual life comes next.' His actual life is being lived now, and he needs revelation that he may know how to live it.

3. Is such revelation possible or verifiable?—This is a question which haunts the minds of many who desire it. How can the secret of the universe—so vast in space and time—be made known to the minds of men? The eye can see only what it brings with it the power of seeing. Is it possible that any conception of God and His ways which our minds can grasp can correspond to the reality? To this difficulty there are two answers to be made. (*a*) To deny that God can be known is not merely to take a low view of our own nature; it is, in fact, also to take a low view of His. It is to deny to Him the power of self-revelation, and with it the power of influence which self-revelation brings. No one claims to know God perfectly; indeed, it is in the unfathomability of His nature that we find one great source of our reverence for Him. Our knowledge of God is at best a *theologia viatorum*, not a *theologia beatorum*. But our knowledge of God may none the less be true, as far as it goes, and be capable of a growth to which no limit can be set. Our instinctive longing after God is itself a prophecy of its satisfaction; God 'creates the love to reward the love'; we can hardly believe that the instinct would have survived, had it not been in touch with reality. (*b*) The question whether anything can be known must be decided, as Bacon says, not by arguing, but by trying. Religion starts with the assumption that God is to be known, as science starts with the assumption that the world is to be known, and both are ultimately justified by the fruitfulness of the results obtained. Of course it is always possible to suggest that our apparent knowledge may not be real knowledge, since it is necessarily relative to the mind which claims it. But, if we reject such scepticism in the sphere of physics, we ought also to reject it in the sphere of religion. The instinct of the mind is to believe itself in touch with reality, and there is no reason for setting this instinct aside. The true verification of knowledge lies in the practical use which we are able to make of it. The claim to know God is made now, as of old, by a multitude of the sanest and best of mankind, and they ascribe to this knowledge all that is best in their life and activity. If the knowledge of God is increasingly fruitful in power and joy and goodness, we need no other proof of its reality. Though we see God but 'in a mirror,' the mirror does not obscure the outlines of His features; though we know Him but 'in a riddle,' the riddle is one that His Spirit enables us to interpret (cf. 1 Co 2[9f.] 13[12]).

4. How can revelation be given to us?—No *a priori* answer should be given to this question. Rather it should be asked, How has revelation actually been given? All knowledge rests upon experience—our own or the garnered experience of other men. But no limit can be set to the possibilities of experience, nor can we know in advance of what methods God may make use. The dream, the vision, the oracle, the beauty and order of the world, the course of human history, the highest types of human character, the voice of reason and of conscience, the dialectics of the philosopher, and the intuition of the saint—all may be 'alike good' in varying stages of human development. 'There is one river of truth, which receives tributaries from every side.' Serious loss may arise from drawing too strong a contrast between one kind of experience and another, and attaching importance to one to the exclusion of another.

Thus (*a*) no valid distinction can be drawn between subjective and objective experience, since all experience contains both subjective and objective elements. On the one hand, the mind can discover nothing by its own activity; indeed, apart from the material given to it, there could be no activity of the mind at all. The effort of the mystic to empty his mind of all its existing content is but an effort to make room for a new content, which he looks to God directly to bestow. The pageant of nature and of history, on the other hand, objective as it is, derives all its meaning from the interpretation which the mind gives to it. Though 'the heavens declare the glory of God' (Ps 19[1]), they declare it only to the mind of man; the cow in her pasture sees the same spectacle, and makes nothing of it.

Nor (*b*) can any valid distinction be drawn between discovery and revelation. Experience may indeed come sought or unsought. But no revelation can be received without attention being paid to it, nor would the effort to attain truth be successful, unless the one Source of truth were willing to reward it. Indeed, as we have already seen, our impulse to seek itself presupposes God's willingness to be found.

Once more, (*c*) there is no valid distinction to be drawn between natural and revealed religion. Strictly speaking, what is revealed is not religion but truth. But this contrast is besides doubly misleading, since it suggests both that there is a religion possible which does not rest upon revelation and that the higher means of revelation are in some way less natural than the lower. Both these suggestions are false. The witness borne to God by the world, by human history, and by the nature of man is none the less God-given because it is in large measure common to all (cf. Ac 14[17], Ro 1[18-20]), while the highest revelation which the Bible records is in the best sense natural. If it is natural for God to be revealed in human history as a whole, so is it for Him to be specially revealed in the history of the people brought nearest to Him, and, above all, in the history and experience of His Son. If it is natural that the

consciousness of all should witness to God, so is it that a more abundant witness should be borne by the consciousness of the Soul that knew no sin. Indeed, the supposed 'natural' basis of religion is inseparable from the basis which, in distinction from it, is described as 'revealed.' The world of nature and of history is a world in which the Lord, and the Church both before and after His coming, have been prominent actors, and human consciousness is only seen at its highest in the consciousness of the Lord. Thus it is that 'natural religion' ever maintains but a precarious existence when 'revealed religion' is repudiated. The Hebrews had come to know God through their national experience long before they recognized that the heavens declared His glory, and it is ever those to-day who have seen 'the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ' (2 Co 4[6]) that most easily recognize and interpret His action in nature and in history.

Are there, then, any real distinctions to be borne in mind, as we consider the subject before us? There is one of the greatest importance —the distinction between the divine revelation itself and the human recognition and acceptance of it. All revelation ultimately depends upon the will of God. But its effectiveness does not depend upon God's will alone; man has his part to play in seeking after it, in preparing himself for it, in welcoming it, in yielding himself to it. It is on the reality and interplay of these two elements that the acquisition of truth depends both for the race and for the individual. Neither can be ignored without misunderstanding the whole. Thus (*a*) the initiative is always God's. It belongs to God to reveal Himself when and how He will. If He reveals Himself to one nation more fully than to another, and to one person more fully than to another, that belongs to God's 'management of His household' (Eph 1[10]); we cannot, in view of the facts of history, ascribe it altogether to a special responsiveness in those for the time specially favoured. It was not for lack of trying that 'in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God' (1 Co 1[21]), nor was it as the reward of a great spiritual effort on the part of Israel as a nation that God was specially revealed to it. So the prophets and the Lord of the prophets ever declare: 'I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes: yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in thy sight' (Mt 11[25f.]). This is not to say that God's action is arbitrary, or that we may not seek to understand it, so far as we may. It is only to say that God's action depends upon God's will, not in contrast with His wisdom (for there can be no such contrast), but in contrast with human effort and desert. But (*b*) to say this is in no wise to deny the importance of human effort and response. Though it is for God to bestow the light, it is for man to open his eyes and ears to that measure of revelation which by the divine good pleasure is vouchsafed to him. It is 'he that hath ears to hear' that will hear, and to him that hath that more will be given (Mt 13[9-12]). It is not merely that effort and attention are required for the attainment of any knowledge; there is more than this. 'Things human must be known to be loved,' says Pascal; 'things divine must be loved to be known.' All revelation of character demands a certain power of appreciation in those to whom the revelation is made. 'The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him' (Ps 25[14]), and 'every one that doeth ill hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, lest his works should be reproved' (Jn 3[20]). Moreover, there is another fact, which is here important. As we shall presently see, divine revelation without needs ever to be supplemented by divine inspiration within; and, though revelation may fall, like the rain, upon the evil and the good, with inspiration it is not so. Now it is upon these two facts taken together—the good pleasure of God and the response of man—that the course of revelation has depended. God has spoken as He has seen well to speak, but also 'as men were able to hear it' (Mk 4[33]). He has spoken 'by divers portions and in divers manners' (He 1[1]), not only because it is His way to proceed step by step, but also because different portions of the one truth were needed, or could alone be received, by those to whom the revelation was given. Israel in the days of Amos needed the revelation of the divine justice, and in the days of Hosea the revelation of the divine love; and God sent each revelation at its appropriate time. But it is surely also true that Amos was incapable of receiving the message entrusted to Hosea, and Hosea incapable of receiving the message entrusted to Amos. The knowledge of God, like all knowledge, is at first confined to the few, and bestowed by methods by which only the few can be reached. But each element of truth, though it may at first be received in isolation, is consistent with each other element; and, when the fuller revelation is given, the fragments fall, each into its true place, and throw light upon one another.

Accommodation in revelation.—It is precisely the fact that revelation is bestowed according to our capacity for receiving it that should give us confidence in its reality. All communication between a higher and a lower mind demands a certain accommodation. The teaching which a parent gives to a child must be expressed in the child's language, and must attach itself to the child's thought and experience. A wise parent will not attempt to tell his child all that he knows, nor will he try at once to correct all the child's errors, or hinder the exercise of his imagination. But such accommodation does not in any way mislead the child. Its whole purpose is to convey as clearly as possible such truth as he immediately needs, without confusing his mind with extraneous matter. When, *e.g.*, after a birth in the family, a child is told that God has sent him a new little brother, he is told both what is entirely true and exactly what he needs to know for the guidance of his own thought and conduct. No doubt the child will picture the arrival of the gift in his own way; he may even, in passing on to another what he has been told, fail to distinguish between what he has been told and the way in which he has pictured it. But all this is quite unimportant. What he has been told is the truth, and no subsequent enlargement of his knowledge will at all affect it; rather, it will lead the child to admire the more the wisdom and the love which told him just so much and no more. Now so it is with divine revelation. It is wisely accommodated to human capacity; it does not correct all errors at once or check the action of the imagination. The prophets, *e.g.*, conceive of the divine kingdom of the future according to their hearts' desire, and think of it as far nearer than it has proved to be. But fuller revelation would have confused rather than enlightened them; it would have deprived the truth conveyed of its practical power. What we see is the wise Father at work, and our recognition of His method gives us but the greater confidence in the reality of His desire to reveal.

Now it is here that we find the solution of a difficulty which is found by some in the Gospel story. Our Lord always speaks as if He shared the beliefs of His contemporaries on such matters as the facts of the physical world and the authorship of the OT literature (cf., *e.g.*, Mt 22[41-45] 24[15]). Sometimes He speaks in a way which suggests that He expected the Kingdom of God immediately to appear (*e.g.*, Mt 10[23]). Now the question of our Lord's human knowledge cannot here be discussed, but it matters little for our immediate purpose how we regard it. What we see in any case is God's method of accommodation. Our Lord's teaching had an immediate practical purpose, and it would plainly have hindered the accomplishment of that purpose had He turned aside from it to make premature revelations in physical science and historical criticism. The only question is at what point the accommodation took place. If, as Christians in the past have generally supposed, our Lord knew the facts, the accommodation took place when He spoke to His contemporaries. If, as modern scholars generally suppose, He did not know them, the accommodation took place when the divine message was conveyed to the human mind of the Lord. In any case the accommodation was necessary, if the minds of men were to receive the truth. The revelation itself is an abiding possession, and each generation may clothe it in its own forms of thought.

5. How has revelation actually come to us?—It is actual revelation that best shows us both its meaning and its possibility. What has been done

it was possible to do, while much that may seem possible to us may not actually be so. Three points are of special importance. (*a*) Revelation is primarily of God's reality, character, and purpose. All other revelation is subordinate to this, and to a large extent included within it. (*b*) Revelation is made in act rather than in word. God reveals Himself by what He does, and the trend of His purpose by His partial fulfilment of it. But the word of God is important in its own place. Inspiration (*q.v.*) goes hand in hand with revelation. The word of God, spoken by the prophets, points to the facts and declares their significance. (*c*) Revelation culminates in Christ and the Spirit-bearing Church, who at once reveal in act God's reality, character, and purpose, and declare it in word. In them God's purpose is partially fulfilled and also moves forward to complete fulfilment.

(*a*) Revelation centres from the first in God's abiding Name, or revealed character, and that Kingdom of God which it is His purpose to establish. It has not primarily consisted in the promulgation of a code of laws to be obeyed without understanding their purpose, or in the conveyance of information, guaranteed by miracles, as to the facts of the unseen world. What God has primarily revealed has been Himself and the purpose for which He is working, though, in revealing these, He has necessarily revealed what we must be and do in order to co-operate with Him, and the future which union with Him necessarily assures to us. When St. Paul maintained that the promise was primary and the law secondary (Gal 3^{15-24}), he was profoundly true to the highest teaching of the OT. All that is highest in the moral appeals of lawgiver and prophet witnesses to this. The children of Israel are to be holy because their God is holy (Lv 19^{2}), and merciful because their God is merciful (Dt $10^{18f.}$); the claim of God upon the obedience of His people ever rests upon the great things that He has done for them, and the great things that He still will do (1 S 12^{24}, Hos 14^{1-8}). So it was when the confident expectation of the Resurrection and the future life of bliss arose among the people of God. It did not rest upon any detailed picture of the future drawn by an infallible hand; it rested upon the knowledge that had been acquired of the justice and faithfulness of God, and of all that was involved in union with Him. He was the God not of the dead, but of the living, and the bond that had been formed with Him was one which time and death had no power to break (Ps $49^{14f.}$ 73^{23-26}, Is 25^{8} 26^{19}). The same characteristic of revelation appears in that given by the Lord and continued in the Church. The Lord by word and act is essentially the Revealer of the Father (Jn 14^{9}), the Declarer of the Name of God (17^{6}), and the Preacher of the Kingdom of God. His moral teaching is no legal code, but, like the highest teaching of the OT, rests upon the character of God and the hope of the future (Mt 5^{43-48}, Lk 12^{22-34}), while the fulfilment of the hope for the individual is bound up with union with God through the Lord Himself (Jn $6^{57f.}$ $16^{25f.}$).

(*b*) Existence and character are made known by action; and purpose comes to be understood by the partial and promissory fulfilment of the purpose itself. To the Hebrews God was revealed in the facts of their history and experience. Though at first they may have thought of their God much as other Semitic peoples thought of their own, the facts convinced them that He was far other than the gods of the heathen. He had a purpose, and in the working out of His purpose there was nothing that could say Him nay. He had brought them out of Egypt with a mighty hand and a stretched-out arm; He had planted them in their own land. He had revealed His will, and showed Himself able to vindicate it when they set it aside. And all through their history this revelation of God by the facts of His action went on. Chasten His people He might with awful severity, but He would never destroy them. That would be to abandon His purpose. Always 'the remnant' was left to 'take root downward, and bear fruit upward' (Is 37^{31}). So by the witness of facts the Hebrews came to know the Name of their God—'Jahweh, Jahweh, a God full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy and truth; keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin: and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation' (Ex $34^{6f.}$). So it was with the divine purpose of establishing the divine kingdom. God revealed His purpose to establish it by actually establishing it in Israel, so far as the obstinacy of His people allowed, and extending it through Israel over others, so far as Israel was ready to be the instrument of its extension both by doing and by suffering. But to say this is not to say that the facts were left to speak for themselves. Though words without acts are vain, acts without words are misunderstood. In Israel's history revelation went hand in hand with inspiration, the act of God with the word of God. At each crisis of Israel's history the prophet was raised up and inspired to declare the Name of God that was being manifested, and to interpret His action. So in the manifestation of God's ripening purpose. To the inspired vision of the prophets the divine purpose ever shines through the darkest facts of the present. What God has done and is doing reveals what He still must do, and the very disasters which human wilfulness occasions reveal what God must one day make of men, if they are to be the instruments of His unfaltering purpose. Nowhere do we see this more plainly than in the promise of the Christ. It is the Kingdom, not the Christ, that the prophets primarily proclaim; but, as the facts of Israel's history make clear the divine method of working through great personalities for the benefit of the community, the great personalities whom God raises up to act and to suffer for His people become the prophecy of the great Actor, the great Sufferer, whom God must yet raise up.

Nor (*c*) is there any change in God's method when the Christ appears, lives and acts, suffers and is glorified. In one aspect the Christ is the greatest of the prophets, and the Church, as the Spirit-bearing body, is the abiding witness to the Name and purpose of God. But in another both the Christ and the Church are God-revealing facts. The mighty works of the Lord's earthly life are not so much external proofs of a revelation which is distinct from them as themselves the revelation. The Lord reveals the Father, because in His activity the Father is seen actually at work (Jn $14^{9f.}$ $15^{23f.}$). If a Kingdom is proclaimed in which all evil is to pass away, its reality is certified by the present operation of the powers of the Kingdom in the Lord Himself (Lk 11^{20}; cf. 7^{18-23}). Moreover, when the Lord's life is crowned by His death and glorification, by the gift of the Spirit and the transformation of the Church, both the Name and the Kingdom of God are revealed far more perfectly. It is still the facts that are eloquent. God Himself is seen 'in Christ reconciling the world unto himself' (2 Co 5^{19}). He is seen to be One who saves by taking and removing the burden of human sin, lifting men up by the communication of Himself. Sin is found to be actually removed and the Spirit given. The Kingdom is assured in the future, because in the Church it is found

already existing, and He who has begun 'a good work . . . will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ' (Ph 1[6]). When, in one of the latest of the books of the NT, we read that 'God is love,' the words are no mysterious oracle resting upon St. John's authority; they are the summary expression of all that, in the experience of the Church, God has been found to be (1 Jn 4[7-10]). It is this revelation in fact that the gift of the Spirit of God inspires the Church in word to declare. The whole purpose of the gift of the Spirit, as the Fourth Gospel describes it, is not to make a new revelation, but to light up, and enable the Church to declare, the revelation already made in the Christ Himself and the facts of His experience. The Spirit is to take of the things of Christ, to declare the meaning of the great redeeming acts, which, when the Lord spoke, were still 'to come' (Jn 16[13f.]), and through them all to tell men 'plainly of the Father' (16[25]). That conviction of the world which the Spirit is to bring about is a conviction that will rest upon an inspired witness to revealing facts (16[8-11]). It is here that the culmination of divine revelation lies. The revelation contained in the person and work of the Lord and the present experience of the Church is through the Spirit's inspiration declared to the world. 'That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of life . . . declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us: yea, and our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ' (1 Jn 1[1, 3]).

6. What is the relation of this historical revelation to and by and through the people of God to other means by which men may come to the knowledge of God?—To assert the reality and perfection of the higher is in no way to deny the reality or the value of the lower. If the Greek philosopher or the Indian sage has indeed attained by his own methods to a knowledge of God fruitful in power and holiness, it is by divine revelation that he has done so, and, we doubt not, by divine inspiration also. So the wisest Christian thinkers have held from the first. To the Christian indeed it may seem that even the highest teaching of all who went before his Master is 'lost, like the light of a star, in the spreading dawn of day.' In 'the mystery of God, even Christ, . . . are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden' (Col 2[2f.]). But the teaching of other masters, whether of ancient or of modern days, is not necessarily valueless to the Christian. Not only may it give to him much that the higher revelation has not in fact given to him, though it might have done so; he has no *a priori* reason for denying that it may add to his knowledge. In the traditional theology of the Church there are real elements which have come to it from Greek philosophy, and not from the revelation recorded in the Bible. If to-day we desire to get rid of them, it is because we think them baseless and unfruitful, and not because of the source from which they have come. Equally generous should be our appreciation of all the light which modern investigation has thrown upon the past history of the world and of man, and upon the record of the revelation, which God has made to us. Physical science, historical criticism, comparative religion, have all played their part, and have it still to play, in widening and deepening our appreciation of the 'increasing purpose' which runs through the ages, and in correcting and uplifting our thoughts of God and His ways. Here too there is revelation, and, we doubt not, inspiration also to recognize and make use of it. If there has been seeming loss, there has also been real and abundant gain.

> 'Let knowledge grow from more to more,
> But more of reverence in us dwell;
> That mind and soul, according well,
> May make one music as before,
> But vaster.'[1]

7. How does the historic revelation reach the individual to-day?—The Church comes before the world, not primarily to lecture upon revelation as a process, but to proclaim the name and purpose of God, as the Lord proclaimed it, and to be like the Lord, in her life of service and sacrifice and spiritual glory won through sacrifice, herself the revelation of God and of His power to fulfil His purpose. Divine knowledge and life are hers, that she may fail neither in the one nor in the other. Thus (*a*) through the presence of the Spirit the Church is in the divine intention both the witness to the truth and the interpreter of the truth. The gospel is contained in facts, interpreted as the Church is inspired to interpret them. But the interpretation, though essentially invariable, must be given in the language and forms of thought of different peoples and ages of the world; and, as new questions have arisen, and new errors have required to be excluded, the Church in the power of the Spirit has drawn out of the facts and their interpretation much that does not lie immediately upon their surface, and must continue to draw it out in the days to come. Christian theology, like the Christian gospel itself, is to be accepted because of the appeal which it makes, not only to the mind, but to the personality as a whole. The Church speaks with authority, as those always speak who know. 'Verily, verily, I say unto you.' 'We speak that we do know, and bear witness of that we have seen' (Jn 3[11]). But this authority is not an authority which overbears reason and conscience; it appeals to both, and is accepted because of the response which they make to it. The revelation which the Church offers to the world no more affords a substitute for thought and effort and divine inspiration than the first dawn of revelation in the days of old. Deep must answer to deep, the Spirit within us to the Spirit without us. (*b*) The Church, as the Body of the Christ and the Temple of the Holy Spirit, is, in the divine intention, sent to reveal the Name and purpose of God, not in word only, but in act also. Though she witnesses to Another, that Other is One who dwells in her, and acts through her, and so reveals His reality and character and purpose. As he that saw the Christ saw the Father, so he that saw the Church should see the Christ, and the Father also. In the life of the Church given for men, and ever renewed by being given, the revelation of God's method and purpose made once for all in the Lord's Death and Resurrection should be continually made present to the world; in the Kingdom of God here should be seen the promise of the eternal kingdom.

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REVELATION (Muslim).—See INSPIRATION (Muslim), QUR'ĀN.

REVENGE.—Revenge is the expression and continuation of resentment. Resentment is the

[1] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, Introduction.

feeling of anger aroused by a hurt or injury inflicted. But the anger aroused may be, as has been pointed out by Bishop Butler and many moralists after him, of two kinds—sudden anger and settled or deliberate resentment. The first prompts a man to defend himself when hurt or attacked; the second continues and often grows more intense when the immediate attack is over and the smart of the hurt is no longer felt. The first is presupposed in, and grows into, the second; so it is often hard to fix the exact point where the one ends and the other begins. A hurt which gives occasion to, and is warded off by, an outbreak of sudden anger does not necessarily lead to, nor is it always followed by, a fit of settled resentment, still less of revenge. After a fight, though one of the two combatants must have been the aggressor, we constantly see men make it up and shake hands; it is when resentment, once aroused, is nursed and cherished that it is sure in most natures to give rise to revenge. Butler further maintains that the settled anger or resentment which gives rise to revenge has for its proper object injury or intentional harm, as distinguished from mere hurt which, at any rate in reasonable men, may cause momentary anger, but should not, and ordinarily does not, arouse the deeper feeling. But the distinction is by no means always true. There are many natures so wrathful and resentful that a hurt inflicted, though quite innocently and even unintentionally, does give rise to settled anger, and sets going plans for the infliction of revenge; this is apt to be especially the case when the hurt inflicted is of a kind that seems to indicate contempt on the part of the injurer, or when it wounds in some marked way the self-esteem of the injured party.

This feeling of settled resentment and consequent love of, or lust for, revenge is a feeling deep-rooted in human nature and, as we shall see, hard to eradicate. It is found to some extent in some of the higher animals, which have been known to devise and execute apparently carefully thought out plans of revenge; yet revenge is not very common in animals—it seems to involve a more sustained course of reflexion than most of them are able to carry out, and also a clearer apprehension of the distinction between intended and unintentional wrong than most of them can attain. What generally seems to happen among animals is that an animal fiercely resents any attack made upon its person, and in some cases even upon what it considers its rights, and does its best to defend itself against such attack; but, if the animal which is the aggressor proves itself too strong, the defeated animal takes refuge in flight; and, for the future, fear takes the place of vengeance; an animal once thoroughly worsted avoids a renewal of the fight rather than seeks to avenge itself upon its more powerful foe.

But with man this is by no means equally the case. Worsted in one direction, man constantly seeks revenge in another; he may indeed cower before his adversary and seek safety in flight, as the animal does; but more often, though knowing himself physically the weaker, he seeks methods of avenging himself on his enemy by superior cunning or in some other way, and revenge among early races of men becomes in consequence very prevalent. The natural satisfaction of resentment and revenge is to repay tit for tat, to restore a balance of rights or position that has been upset. The securing of such a balance furnishes a primitive conception of justice:

εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο,

says Aristotle,[1] quoting, perhaps, a line of Hesiod.[2]

[1] *Eth. Nic.* v. 1132.

[2] Frag. 214, see J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, London, 1900, p. 234.

δράσαντι παθεῖν,
τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ,

says Æschylus,[1] and implies that this is just.

If the retaliation stops at this point, no great harm is done; indeed, as already remarked, some such idea of reparation or restitution as a debt due to the injured person lies at the very root of justice; but, if resentment is once nursed and allowed to take full possession of the mind and develops into plans for revenge, it seldom does stop at this point. There grows up then in the mind a passion for, and a fearful joy in, revenge. Much indulged in, such a feeling is apt to banish every higher and gentler emotion, so that the man who yields himself to it has his whole nature perverted. Savage men, men who have little else to occupy their thoughts, are specially apt to suffer in this way. It is something of this sort that St. Paul has in his mind when he says: 'Be ye angry, and sin not: let not the sun go down upon your wrath: neither give place to the devil.'[2] Clearly here the anger in itself is not wrong; it is the playing with it and nourishing it that bring the devil into the soul; but this is just what he who indulges in the passion for revenge does; and the passion for revenge, if yielded to and encouraged, becomes one of the most terrible of fiends. Thus it comes about that, while the original feeling of resentment may be regarded as innocent and even desirable, the lust of revenge is properly regarded by the legislator as anti-social, by the moralist as immoral, by the religious man as a sin and an offence against God—and that though this desire is very widely spread and very deep-rooted in human nature. It may be well, perhaps, to look at revenge from each of these points of view.

1. Legislative and political.—From the point of view of the legislator and political philosopher, the whole growth of criminal law is due to the desire of society to free itself from the disturbing force of private revenge and to substitute for this public retribution and the appeal to public law. In this change consists the great development in the protection of the weak against the strong. As long as revenge is left in private hands, the strong are apt to escape with impunity because the injured person will often be debarred by fear from taking revenge upon the aggressor; and, if the weak does take revenge himself, his revenge is apt to be powerless or inadequate; whereas it is the very essence of the law that all should be equal before it.

In the beginning, as is proved by many of the formulæ and practices of ancient law, the intervention of the State is a mere substitute for the private revenge or punishment which would be inflicted by the injured individual,[3] but soon this stage is left behind, and the punishment inflicted by the State becomes the expression of the disapproval felt by the community at large towards the offence which has been committed. No doubt individuals are slow to accommodate themselves to the change, and private revenge often lingers on long after a system of criminal law has been established. But, directly such a system has come into force, an act of revenge for a wrong committed becomes itself a criminal act, and is visited by the same penalty with which a wrongful act of the same kind, not prompted by revenge, would be visited; and the craving for revenge, except in communities in which, as in Corsica, public sentiment approves of private revenge, is greatly checked. It may be, indeed, that, even when a system of law has been long in force, the feeling of resentment entertained by the injured man against the wrong-doer finds in the legally inflicted punishment a certain satisfaction; and, if the punishment

[1] *Choeph.* 314.

[2] Eph. 4[26].

[3] H. S. Maine, *Ancient Law*, ed. Pollock, ch. x. pp. 379-384.

inflicted seems either inadequate or unduly deferred, dissatisfaction is sure to arise in those who have felt themselves injured and may even express itself in illegal acts of private vengeance; but this is after all an exceptional case—one which in course of time tends to disappear altogether. Still it is a consideration which cannot altogether be left out in assessing the amount of punishment to be inflicted for crime committed. Yet, while this is so, in every progressive community the security of society becomes more and more the object held in view in the infliction of punishment, and the measure according to which punishment is regulated. Moreover, in time a new motive as modifying the theory of punishment comes into prominence, which still further limits the importance of revenge as an element in it, viz. the moral improvement and cure of the offender. While no State can with safety make this its only object in the infliction of punishment, or the only rule by which its amount is to be determined, yet that it can be taken at all into account, and that it becomes in the more highly civilized nations an increasingly important element in determining its direction and the kind of penalty to be inflicted, is a proof of how far the ultimate theory has departed from the primitive cause in which it originated; and, if an element of revenge still enters, as it sometimes does, into the appeal to the law against the offender, the harm of it is greatly lessened, in that the private feeling is necessarily merged in, and largely moralized by, the wider concern for the community as a whole which has taken its place. The bringing about of this change forms one of the greatest triumphs of the prevalence of the reign of law and of advancing civilization.

2. Moral.—Looked at from a moral point of view, revenge has in more enlightened times almost universally been regarded as an evil passion and been condemned. If the effort of the legislator has been directed towards substituting for the act and temper of revenge a less objectionable form of action and a more social temper, the object of the moral philosopher has been to eradicate the temper altogether. Yet it must be confessed that it is a hard task that he has set himself; for the revengeful temper is very deep-rooted and wide-spread in human nature, and is apt to break forth again, when reason has demonstrated its ill effects and philosophy has tried to point out a better way. Still philosophers of every sort and every age have done their best to deprecate it and ban it. Confucius,[1] Plato,[2] Cicero,[3] Seneca,[4] Muhammad,[5] Thomas Aquinas,[6] and Butler[7] have all had their say against it; each has reprobated it or denounced it in turn; but each also has had to confess that it is a temper which is widely prevalent, an evil which it needed all their force to combat. But why, we may ask ourselves, is it so reprehensible? In what does the evil of it consist?

(1) Revenge is an anti-social quality; it aims not at promoting human happiness, but at increasing human misery. To inflict pain upon our enemy, to diminish his happiness or virtue, are the objects at which revenge directly and necessarily aims. This alone must make the prevalence of revenge a temper to be deprecated.

(2) As Butler points out with great force,[8] the revengeful temper is almost necessarily an unjust temper. We constitute ourselves judges in our own cause, and take accordingly an exaggerated estimate of the injuries which are inflicted upon us. We are apt, as already remarked, to neglect the all-important distinction between intentional and unintentional wrong; and, the more we nurse our revenge, the more prejudiced do we become, the less willing are we to listen to the dictates of fair play and reason. Every one will have noticed this in one of whom a spirit of revenge has taken possession. He is a man dominated by one idea.

(3) No temper acts more injuriously on the character of him who indulges it. For the desire for revenge is essentially a selfish desire. It keeps us occupied with ourselves, our own grievances, our own wrongs; in the concentration on them and suchlike objects a man becomes callous to the interests and happiness of others, so that the revengeful man develops not infrequently into the misanthrope.

(4) This is the more readily the case because the revengeful spirit makes us incapable of exercising the noblest and best of all spirits, a charitable and forgiving temper. To such a temper the spirit of revenge is, of course, the exact opposite; its presence makes the other impossible. But a character in which such a temper is entirely absent cannot but be a selfish, a maimed, and a distorted character, one far removed from the nobler heights to which the human character is capable of being elevated.

3. Religious.—But, seeing that the laying aside of revenge and the desire for it altogether is a virtue hard to attain and comparatively seldom reached, it is at this point that religion, if the struggle against revenge is to be made in any way effective, has to be called in. While other religions have indeed not been altogether silent on the subject, Judaism partially, Christianity entirely, have alone succeeded in extirpating it. In the OT generally vengeance is deprecated as interfering with the prerogative of God. 'Vengeance is mine, and recompence' (Dt 32^{35}), 'Thou God, to whom vengeance belongeth, shew thyself' (Ps 94^{1}), are verses which illustrate how completely the Jews regarded vengeance as properly belonging not to man but to God; and St. Paul quotes the first of them to enforce his teaching of forgiveness on his Roman converts (Ro 12^{19}). In Sir 28^{1-5} a higher line is taken: 'He that taketh vengeance shall find vengeance from the Lord; and he will surely make firm his sins. Forgive thy neighbour the hurt that he hath done thee; and then thy sins shall be pardoned when thou prayest. Man cherisheth anger against man; and doth he seek healing from the Lord? . . . He being himself flesh nourisheth wrath: who shall make atonement for his sins?' The principle here laid down clearly is that, if we cherish a revengeful temper, it is impossible for us really to pray for, still less to expect, forgiveness for our own sins. To do so is almost like a contradiction in terms.

This principle is of course enunciated afresh and carried further in the teaching and in the example of our Lord. Instead of the doctrine of retaliation inculcated in at least one passage of the Mosaic Law, our Lord says: 'Resist not him that is evil: but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also' (Mt 5^{39})—*i.e.*, wrong is to be conquered, at any rate in our own case, not by meeting wrong with wrong, but by patient submission. He teaches us to pray: 'Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us' (Mt $6^{12, 14f.}$). He tells us that, if our brother trespass against us and repent, we are to forgive him not up to seven times, but unto seventy times seven (Lk $17^{3f.}$, Mt 18^{22}). His example went even farther than this. No more unprovoked wrong could be imagined than was done to Him. Yet He speaks no word and entertains no thought of vengeance against His enemies. 'Father,' He prays, 'forgive them; for they know not what they do' (Lk 23^{34}).

[1] *Lun Yu*, xiv. 363.
[2] *Crito*, 49, *Rep.* 335.
[3] *De Off.* i. 25.
[4] *De Ira*, i. 5, 16, 55 f.
[5] *Qur'ān*, ii. 178, xxii. 61.
[6] *Summa*, II. ii. 108.
[7] *Sermons*, viii. and ix.
[8] *Sermons*, viii. (11).

Vengeance, then, as a personal principle is set altogether aside in Christian ethics. There is no place for it. As St. Peter says, 'If, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye shall take it patiently, this is acceptable with God. For hereunto were ye called: because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, that ye should follow his steps' (1 P $2^{20f.}$). It would be absurd to maintain that all Christians attain to this height of virtue; but some go some little way towards it; the best reach near to it. In any case the teaching and example of Christ have done much to alleviate and supplant by a higher feeling and motive the thirst for vengeance which has been so common and so destructive in the world.

For the question of blood revenge see art. BLOOD-FEUD.

LITERATURE.—The main authorities are Plato, *Crito*, *Rep.*, bk. i.; Seneca, *de Ira*, bk. i.; St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, II. ii.; J. Butler, *Sermons*, London, 1726, viii., ix.; E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, do. 1906, vol. i. chs. ii.-iv., xx., xxii.; H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Oxford, 1907, bk. i. ch. ix.; H. S. Maine, *Ancient Law*, new impression, ed. F. Pollock, London, 1907, ch. x.

W. A. SPOONER.

REVERENCE.—Without attempting a formal and exhaustive definition, it is true to say with J. Martineau[1] that reverence is at bottom our recognition of 'transcendent goodness.' It is the impression that we owe to character rather than to intellectual and physical forms of greatness, and in the highest instance it 'proves to be identical with devotion to God.'

1. Reverence and religion.—Some theorists, in tracing the beginnings of religion, have accepted the view of Statius, 'Primus in orbe deos fecit timor,'[2] but this explanation misconceives the character of religion, from which reverence is inseparable.

'It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion in the only true sense of the word begins.'[3]

The Hebrew expression 'the fear of the Lord,' as the equivalent of religion, indicated that reverence was based, not on servility, but on a foundation of fellowship and trust.[4] In the course of development religious reverence has not kept clear of error and exaggeration. The custom of the Jews in not pronouncing or reading aloud the sacred Name in their Scriptures was the sign of excessive and superstitious zeal. Their later tendency to dwell on the transcendence of God and to fill up the gulf by the introduction of angels, as afterwards Roman Catholics filled it up by the invocation of saints, was due to abstract ideas of the divine honour which find no place in Christianity. Jesus in calling God 'Father' corrected Jewish modes of circumlocution, and made that name the natural symbol of worship and homage (Mt 6^{9}).

2. The ethical value of reverence: its authority in the Greek mind.—In early times, when war was the chief school of virtue, and might was in danger of overbearing right, reverence appeared as the guardian of civilization and was the organ of the social conscience or of public opinion as then formed. Homer's term for reverence (αἰδώς) has many shades of meaning.

'It is essentially the virtue of a wild and ill-governed society, where there is not much effective regulation of men's action by the law.'[5]

One or two illustrations from the Homeric world will suffice. In the opening scene of the *Iliad* the Greeks demand reverence for the aged priest Chryses, who had been insulted by Agamemnon, as even an inferior had rights that should be respected. It is suggestive that, in early Greek poetry, the classes thought worthy of consideration were not kings and others of high station, but those disinherited and injured, the helpless and the dead, and special sanctity belonged to strangers, suppliants, and old people. In the name of reverence, or respect for manly and military honour, the fighters in the ranks are urged to show spirit and valour.[1] When Achilles burnt the body of Eëtion without stripping him of his armour,[2] he exhibited this virtue in a form prized by antiquity, but afterwards the dragging of Hector behind his chariot[3] betrayed a lack of ruth and compassion, which reverence for a dead and helpless enemy should have inspired. True to this early Greek ideal of reverence, Ulysses restrained the old family nurse from shouting aloud in the hour of triumph—'for it is an unholy thing to boast over slaughtered men.'[4] Reverence is also named as the highest religious duty—'Revere the gods, Achilles';[5] and in the scene where the cup is first handed to Athene, in token of her age, the line occurs—'All men stand in need of the gods'[6]—which Melanchthon thought the most beautiful verse in Homer. It was the sign of a later degenerate age when Hesiod feared that reverence, one of the white-robed angels, had fled from the earth.[7]

3. Reverence as a principle in education.—In the Hebrew moral code, which saw the necessity of implanting this virtue, respect for parents, rulers, and elders was enjoined.[8] Indeed, according to the Talmud, parents occupied the place of God's earthly representatives, and were to be given corresponding honour. Where an elaborate social machinery did not exist, this training was invaluable for a people's order and well-being, as is seen also in the strict family life of China and its long-established ancestral worship. Among thinkers, Plato showed his practical insight by fixing on youth as the impressionable period when reverence should be stamped on the mind of the learner and freed from the admixture of unworthy teaching, so that the future guardians of the State might grow up as god-like and god-fearing as possible.[9] Plato trusted to reverence, as a plant of native and inward growth, to check the rise of insolence in the young—'for there are two warders that will effectually interpose, namely, fear and shame.'[10] In modern times Goethe introduced in his sketch of an ideal education his famous illustration of reverence (*Ehrfurcht*), expressed in three forms and with appropriate gestures—reverence for God and what is above us, for the earth and what is beneath us (the ground of the Christian religion), and towards our equals in society, with whom we should stand and act in combination.[11] Goethe's view that reverence is not an innate virtue, and is the one thing which no child brings into the world with him, vitiated his plan of education in the judgment of Ruskin, who held strongly that this faculty is inherent in every well-born human creature.[12] In his educational sketch, as in his moral career, Goethe regarded reverence and other virtues with too much detachment. Like Voltaire, he cultivated his intellect at the expense of deeper qualities. Reverence is not a higher form of

[1] *Types of Ethical Theory*[2], Oxford, 1886, ii. 160, 221.
[2] *Thebaid*, iii. 661.
[3] W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, new. ed., London, 1894, p. 54 f.
[4] Cf. *JE* v. 254.
[5] Gilbert Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*[2], Oxford, 1911, p. 112. For the like action of this instinct and the tribal sense of 'shame' among Semitic nomads and in early Israel cf. G. A. Smith, *Jerusalem*, London, 1907-08, i. 426.

[1] *Il.* v. 529-532, xiii. 95.
[2] *Il.* vi. 416-418.
[3] *Il.* xxiv. 15.
[4] *Od.* xxii. 412.
[5] *Il.* xxiv. 503.
[6] *Od.* iii. 48.
[7] W. E. Gladstone, *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age*, Oxford, 1858, ii. 435.
[8] Ex 20^{12} 22^{28}, Lv 19^{32}.
[9] *Rep.* ii. 377, 383; cf. Pindar, *Ol.* i. 35.
[10] *Rep.* v. 465.
[11] *Wilhelm Meister*, tr. T. Carlyle, London, 1874, vol. iii. ch. x.
[12] *Time and Tide*, Letter xvi. § 96.

egoism, or the all-round development of our powers, 'for no man can venerate himself.'[1]

4. Growth and decline of reverence.—The thesis maintained by Macaulay, in his essay on Milton, that, 'as civilization advances, poetry almost necessarily declines,'[2] may be thought applicable to this virtue. We should not, however, identify reverence with the spirit of superstition and submission characteristic of a time when ideas and institutions were not called in question, and when habits of deference prevailed. In the ferment of modern conditions, and as the result of the revolutionary, democratic, and levelling spirit that has intruded everywhere, old forms of reverence inevitably disappear. A type of goodness once so simple and attractive seems left behind.

'Its most beautiful displays are not in nations like the Americans or the modern French, who have thrown themselves most fully into the tendencies of the age, but rather in secluded regions like Styria or the Tyrol.'[3]

Recent observers have noticed the increasing part played by religion in the growth of the social organism.

'A preponderating element in the type of character which the evolutionary forces at work in human society are slowly developing, would appear to be the sense of reverence.'[4]

Science may thus take the place of superstition in upholding this virtue. How far misgovernment in Europe has destroyed this faculty in the very classes that need it most is a serious question.[5]

'Thoughtful Americans have said, that, amid all the material greatness of their country—and it is sufficiently astonishing—their gravest anxiety for her future is caused by the absence of reverence among all classes of her people.'[6]

This danger is not confined to one country. The fault of democracy, according to Lord Morley, has been that it did not always feel or show reverence.

5. Reverence in some of its relationships.—Some types of excellence, like certain flowers, are intolerant of others in their neighbourhood, but this virtue fosters the best qualities.

(*a*) *Reverence and truth.*—'It is the penalty of greatness that its form should outlive its substance: that gilding and trappings should remain when that which they were meant to deck and clothe has departed.'[7] True reverence should cease using empty ceremonies and sounding titles, when they are out of touch with reality. Kant, in heralding the age of criticism, rightly saw that the greatest subjects, including religion and laws, could not claim respect unless they stood the test of free and thorough examination. The Arian theologians, in their contest with Athanasius, made reverence a pretext for adhering to their views of the divine unity and immutability. We should not trade upon this virtue in carrying on controversy. 'After all the greatest reverence is due to truth.'[8]

(*b*) *Reverence and love.*—Newman, whose ecclesiastical instinct may have exaggerated the importance of the feelings and objects of awe and veneration, says truly: 'No one really loves another, who does not feel a certain reverence towards him.'[9] Dante saw in Beatrice not only a figure that excited his senses but also an ideal that drew forth his highest faculties. Hence his resolve to wait and write something worthy of her, and his recognition of the law that 'love intends the welfare mainly of the thing it loves.'[1] To veil some things is to ennoble them, and in literature and life we may desecrate truth and love by too familiar handling of them.

(*c*) *Reverence and character.*—The worth of reverence is to be weighed by the worth of those whom we think deserving of it. It is a sure index of the moral value of any society. The Christian rule, 'Honour all men' (1 P 2[17]), is to be followed, but with discrimination. Our appreciation will vary with varying forms of excellence.

Nathaniel Hawthorne's picture of Puritan New England recalls admirably how the settler in that old day, 'while still the faculty and necessity of reverence were strong in him, bestowed it on the white hair and venerable brow of age; on long-tried integrity; on solid wisdom and sad-colored experience; on endowments of that grave and weighty order which gives the idea of permanence, and comes under the general definition of respectability.'[2]

A society in which the ruling types are of this sort is healthy and progressive. Character thrives best in an atmosphere of appreciation, and while, as Dr. Johnson said, we cannot pay 'civilities to a nonentity,' it always does a man good to show him respect.

LITERATURE.—In addition to works cited above, see artt. in Grimm-Thayer's *Lexicon*; *DCG* ii. 527; *OED*, *s.v.*; R. C. Trench, *Synonyms of the NT*[8], London, 1876, § 19; J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (Gifford Lectures), Edinburgh, 1908; F. Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, tr. F. Thilly, London, 1899, pp. 431–433; T. G. Rooper, *School and Home Life*, do. 1896 (opening lecture, 'Reverence or the Ideal in Education'); J. S. Simon, *The Three Reverences* (Addresses to Girls), do. 1889; J. H. Newman, *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, do. 1868, i. 295–308; Phillips Brooks, *The Light of the World*, do. 1891, pp. 253–269; T. G. Selby, *Lesson of a Dilemma*, do. 1893, pp. 123–144; G. H. Morrison, *Flood-Tide*, do. 1901, pp. 103–114; W. M. Macgregor, *Some of God's Ministries*, Edinburgh, 1910, p. 175; C. Lamb, *Essays of Elia* ('Modern Gallantry'); T. Carlyle, *Miscellaneous Essays*, London, 1872, vii. 169–198 ('Inaugural Address'); J. Brown, *Horæ Subsecivæ*, 3rd ser., Edinburgh, 1882, pp. 177–197 ('Thackeray's Death'—instances of 'his reverence and godly fear'); Tennyson, *In Memoriam*; M. Arnold, *Rugby Chapel*.

W. M. RANKIN.

REVIVALS OF RELIGION.—1. Periodicity in religious life.—It does not require much observation to be assured that the course of religion, in either the individual or the community, is not uniform, but has its ups and downs, its seasons of greater and less intensity. To what these variations are due may be a deep question; but that they occur is a fact lying on the surface. There are times of flood-tide in the soul, which are accompanied with great happiness and leave a deep impression on the memory, and there are seasons in the life of the Church when there are given from on high what the Scripture calls 'showers of blessing.' The psychology of the human spirit may have its own reckoning to render for such phenomena; but in the last resort they are to be traced to the Spirit of God, blowing where it listeth.

One cause of revival is to be found in personalities of original religious genius. Such were, in the OT, Moses, Samuel, Hezekiah, Ezra, and the like, with each of whom a rise in the tide is connected. But there was provision made in the economy of that period for bringing crowds together, with their minds bent on religious exercises, at the annual feasts. The Feast of Tabernacles especially, with its booths of green branches, must have resembled a camp-meeting. In the NT the public ministries of John the Baptist, Jesus, and St. Paul exhibited many features always associated with revivals. The book of Acts can hardly be understood by a reader who has never lived in a revival, but every chapter contains notices and expressions which appeal to the experience of one who has.

Many Church historians have observed a rhythm in the successive periods, like wave following on wave. Thus the elevation of the Apostolic Age

[1] Martineau[2], ii. 161.
[2] *Critical and Historical Essays*, London, 1874, p. 3.
[3] W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals*[8], London, 1888, i. 143. For a different estimate of the superstitious reverence noted by a traveller in the Tyrol cf. S. A. Brooke, *Life and Letters of F. W. Robertson*, London, 1865, ch. iii.
[4] B. Kidd, *Social Evolution*, London, 1894, p. 287.
[5] Ruskin, *The Crown of Wild Olive*, lect. iv. § 137.
[6] H. P. Liddon, *Easter in St. Paul's*, new. ed., London, 1892, p. 327.
[7] J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*[7], London, 1880, ch. xix. p. 356.
[8] Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bk. i. ch. iv. § 23.
[9] *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, i. 304.

[1] *Purgatorio*, canto xvii.
[2] *The Scarlet Letter*, ch. xxii. (*Works*, Boston, 1884, v. 283).

was followed by the depression of the subsequent period; the intellectual and spiritual greatness of the age of the Christological Councils formed a contrast to the dark age which followed, though the latter was illuminated also by the work of the great missionaries; the age of the Crusades and the friars was one of greatness in many directions, but it was followed by two centuries of disintegration.

2. The Puritan awakening.—In writing the history of Protestantism, Dorner divides the centuries into three revivals—that of the Reformation, that of Pietism, and that of Evangelicalism. Puritanism (*q.v.*) might be described as a season of wide-spread revival in England; and no better representative of its operation could be named than Richard Baxter, who, in *The Reformed Pastor* (1656) and his autobiography (*Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, 1696), has left an incomparable record of the methods by which he made the field of labour in which he was settled to rejoice and blossom as the rose. When he went to Kidderminster, only two or three families in each street had domestic worship, but, before his work was finished, not more than two or three in a street were without it. He anticipated the methods of modern revivalists—or, rather, invented something better—by getting his people to visit him, family by family, at the manse, and confide to him the secrets of their spiritual condition, so that he could apply the best advice to every case. As he was zealous in recommending his methods to other ministers, his example created wide-spread imitation.

One of the men of the Second Reformation in Scotland, John Livingstone, was privileged to witness such an awakening under his ministry as has ever since, in his native land and beyond it, kept alive a spirit of expectancy in preachers of the gospel. When assisting at a communion season at the Kirk of Shotts, he preached at an extemporized gathering on the Monday after, and was the means of the conversion of about 500 persons, whose subsequent life made them a leaven in the neighbourhood to which they belonged. About the same time another divine of great learning and fine character, David Dickson, was the principal instrument in a movement in the west of Scotland to which was given by opponents the nickname of 'the Stewarton sickness.' This epithet was due to certain physical phenomena accompanying the spiritual impressions, of which Dickson himself, however, made nothing, being doubtful whether they might not be the work of the enemy, to discredit the movement.

The effects of Puritanism were not confined to England, and Holland especially participated in the blessing through the presence of exiled Puritans in its pulpits and university chairs. A quickening of spiritual life ensued, especially in the universities, one of the features of which was the holding of prayer-meetings among the students. The same feature appeared in the revival, bearing the name of Pietism (*q.v.*), which occurred soon after in Germany in connexion with the labours of such men as Spener, Francke, and Bengel. Spener gave the name of *collegia pietatis* to the meetings, at which laymen were encouraged to speak and take part in prayer, and these exercises he regarded as manifestations of the spiritual priesthood of all believers, which Luther had proclaimed but the Lutheran Church had forgotten. A development of revivalism in several ways unique was due to the activity of Count Zinzendorf, the founder of the Moravian Church (see art. MORAVIANS). In origin, however, it was closely connected with the movement under Spener, and it had a direct and determining influence on the origin of Methodism (*q.v.*); for not only John Wesley himself, but his brother Charles and his friend George Whitefield, were converted under Moravian influences. Zinzendorf's piety was of a brighter type than that of Spener, and this was manifested particularly in the cultivation of hymn-singing, which has been one of the marks of all modern revivals.

3. The Evangelical revival.—What Puritanism gave to the Continent in the movements just described came back to England in the vaster movement of Methodism, of which the primary spring is to be sought in the thorough conversion of its leaders. These men felt themselves to be the depositories of a truth so divine and blessed that they could not keep it to themselves or confine their preaching of it within the bounds of a parish. In the spirit of Him who said that they that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick, they flung themselves on the most wicked and degraded portions of the population, and, when churches were refused to them or proved too small to hold the crowds, they went to the open air. Recognizing the obligation of all to whom the joyful sound had come with power to transmit the deposit to others, they employed a ministry beyond that of the regularly educated and ordained, and demanded the witness-bearing, by word and life, of all to whom the secret of the Lord had been revealed. This is the most fruitful of all the ideas of the revival; nothing has so delayed the evangelization of the world as the notion that the work belongs only to an official class; and there is no reason to hope that the world will ever be won to Christianity on these terms. It is through the operation of the truer view that legions of Sabbath School teachers have been won for the service of the Church.

The Evangelical revival came to Wales through the ministry of Whitefield himself and the simultaneous but independent efforts of such natives as Howel Harris and Daniel Rowlands, and it found in the Welsh temperament a congenial soil. It entered Scotland through a thorough change taking place in the soul of Thomas Chalmers (*q.v.*), in whose big brain and heart it obtained the assurance of diffusion through the country. His associates in the ecclesiastical struggle which led to the Disruption were keenly interested in revival work. While Robert Murray McCheyne, *e.g.*, was absent in Palestine, in quest of a site for a Jewish mission about to be founded by the Church of Scotland, a revival broke out in his congregation at Dundee under the ministry of his *locum tenens*, William Burns, subsequently the famous China missionary, and it continued to the end of McCheyne's life. Horatius Bonar, subsequently noted as a hymn-writer, republished in 1845 a work on revivals originally issued in 1754 by John Gillies of Glasgow, under the title of *Historical Collections relating to Remarkable Periods of the Success of the Gospel*, and brought it down to date, inserting not a few letters from friends of his own about hopeful movements in their parishes at the time. Another member of the McCheyne circle, A. N. Somerville of Glasgow, developed in later life into a modern apostle, going round the world as an evangelist and succeeding in delivering his testimony even in such unlikely quarters as Berlin and Petrograd. The anticipations of revival mentioned in the work of Bonar had become more general, as time went on; and it was in answer to wide-spread prayer that, in the years 1859 and 1860, times of blessing were experienced in many different parts of the three kingdoms. Ireland was the first part visited; and a classical record of this movement will be found in the work of an Irishman, William Gibson's *Year of Grace* (Edinburgh, 1860).

4. Work of D. L. Moody. Still more extensive was the work of the American evangelist, D. L.

Moody, in 1873–75, 1881–83, 1891–92. He was thirty-six years of age, a layman, without university education, practically unknown, when he appeared in Edinburgh in the end of 1873; only a few ministers interested in such work had been informed of his successful efforts in the north of England, and, having gone there to see and hear him, they extended to him an invitation to come to Edinburgh. But it was not long before Scotland became aware that it had found an evangelist whom it could take to its heart, and, before the year ended, the whole country was full of the rumour of what was going on in the capital. He had brought with him a coadjutor, Ira D. Sankey, who 'sang the gospel' to his own accompaniment on an American organ, these being novelties at the time and forming an element of attractiveness. But it was soon manifest that the centre of power was the evangelist himself. He was of stout and heavy build, yet full of activity and business capacity. He had the shrewdest perception of character, and knew how to utilize all available forces. He held three meetings a day—one at noon for prayer, testimony, and praise; a Bible-reading in the afternoon for the building up of Christians; and an evangelistic meeting at night. From the first these were well attended, and soon every meeting was crowded, wherever he went. His doctrine had a wide range, not omitting the sterner aspects of truth, but culminating in the love of God. There was not much eloquence, but unfailing freshness, the most remarkable feature being abundance of illustrations, drawn not from nature or art or literature, but from his own experience in dealing with human beings. He had the power of attracting young men and inspiring hero-worship; and, as there happened to be a theological college next door to the place where most of the meetings were held, the students not only assisted in the inquiry meetings but carried the news of what was going on to all parts of the country, and so prepared the way for the visits of the evangelist to other places. Moody angled for decisions at the close of his addresses with remarkable tenderness and skill, but he did not put undue pressure on any to make known their anxiety. There were no physical manifestations of any kind, and he exhibited promptitude and sometimes not a little humour in restraining attempts at extravagance. He was singularly free from the weaknesses sometimes imputed to men of his class, such as personal vanity and love of money. He seemed to be always sensible that he owed his opportunity to the labours of the regular ministry before him in the field, as well as that the perpetuity of his work would depend on the sympathy and fidelity of the same labourers in the field after he had left. Though ultimately a Pactolus for him and his colleague began to flow from the sale of hymn-books, his unselfishness had been fully established before he became aware of this, and he made an unselfish use of the riches flowing from this source, devoting large sums to the equipment of colleges for young men and women which he opened in his native place in later life. The classes chiefly affected by his mission were not the poor and ignorant, though these ultimately benefited largely from the labours of those in whom the desire for altruistic effort had been begotten, but those who, though connected with churches, were still undecided and living a prayerless and worldly life. Such, however, are perhaps the proper subjects of a revival; and the power of a revivalist lies in the summons to them to bring their conduct into harmony with their convictions. The remark is often quoted of some one who said that Moody was the biggest 'human' he had ever met, and this is an estimate which would commend itself to those who were acquainted with him. But it was an afterthought: at the time the prevailing impression was the sense of a movement directed from above, in which all the human agencies concerned were swallowed up and forgotten.

Among the students of the New College who assisted Moody in Edinburgh the one destined to prove most useful was Henry Drummond, who for years accompanied the American evangelists from one great city to another, devoting himself especially to meetings for young men, in the management of which he unfolded qualities of rare distinction. When settled subsequently as professor of Natural Science in Glasgow, he became an evangelist to the universities of Scotland, working chiefly in Edinburgh, where his labours were facilitated and seconded by Principal Sir William Muir, Sir Alexander Simpson, and other members of the faculties. He succeeded in winning for religion a new place in the universities of his native land, the change being embodied in the Christian Unions established within their walls. His evangelistic labours on behalf of young men, and especially students, extended all over the world; and at one time he found a remarkable entrance for the evangelistic message among the upper classes of London society. Between him and Moody there subsisted a beautiful and lifelong friendship; and, when the younger man was charged with heretical views, the older constantly declared that he had listened to his friend far oftener than had his accusers, but had never heard from him anything with which he did not agree.

5. Welsh revival of 1904–06.—In 1904 a revival of great intensity occurred in Wales and lasted for about two years. It seemed almost to rise out of the ground, so little was it the result of definite teaching and so primitive were the forms in which emotion exhibited itself; yet it had wide-spread practical effects of the most definite kind, such as the diminution of drunkenness, the abandonment of feuds, and the restitution of property. It subsided, however, as unaccountably as it arose, and for its promoters there was not a little disillusionment. A French student of religious psychology, Henri Bois of Montauban, was so affected by the rumours reaching him that he visited the scenes of revival, thoroughly investigating everything, including certain occult physical manifestations, and the results were embodied in a large work entitled *Le Réveil au Pays de Galles* (Paris, 1906), as well as a subsequent volume entitled *Quelques Réflexions sur la psychologie des réveils* (do. 1906). In the latter much use is made of the crowd-psychology of his countryman, Gabriel Tarde; and it would be a singular fact if the best literary monument of the Welsh revival should in future have to be sought in a foreign language.

6. American revivals.—America is the land of revivals. Nowhere else have these been so frequent as in the United States; nowhere else have the Churches owed to them so much of their increase and prosperity; and nowhere else have they been subjected to so much philosophical and theological discussion. It is to the atmosphere of revival in which they live and move that American thinkers owe the position of pre-eminence in religious psychology conceded to them even by the Germans; and it is not surprising that the American book which has attained most notability throughout the world since the beginning of the century should be of this type, William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* (London and New York, 1902).

What is known as 'the Great Awakening' began in 1734, and broke out again in 1740 at Northampton, Mass., under the preaching of Jonathan

Edwards (*q.v.*), pastor in the Congregational Church of the place, and it extended through the greater part of New England, George Whitefield, from England, being one of those who assisted in the later stages. It began with Edwards preaching a series of sermons in which attention was concentrated on sin, with the purpose of awakening the conscience; and the power of producing deep conviction of personal guilt remained one of the leading features of his ministry. But he was a man of high character and philosophical grasp, to whom his countrymen fondly look back as their deepest thinker in theology. He was the author of numerous works, most of which were connected with the revival, and one of them is a classic, *A Treatise concerning Religious Affections* (1746), being written to show which features of the prevalent excitement were healthy and ought to be encouraged, and which were morbid and needed to be restrained. He fell out with his people over the question of debarring the unworthy from the Lord's Table and had to quit the place; but he finished his course in honour as president of Princeton College.

Times unfavourable to religion followed in connexion with the War of Independence; but, about the turn of the century, chiefly through the preaching of James McGready and two brothers of the name of McGee, a remarkable awakening passed through the Cumberland country in Kentucky and Tennessee—a region which had long been notorious for irreligion and violence. Taking place in such a population, assembled in huge camp-meetings, it was attended with physical manifestations of a remarkable order, which, under the name of 'bodily exercises,' are fully described in a curious but obviously well-informed article in the *Princeton Theological Essays* (1st ser., New York, 1846, Edinburgh, 1856), under the title of 'Bodily Effects of Religious Excitement.' To these the leaders of the movement do not appear to have attached undue importance, but such experiences must have produced among the masses of the people an overpowering sense of supernatural agency. Similar phenomena have often since appeared, but they tend to diminish before the advance of education.

When Timothy Dwight, in 1795, became president of Yale College, religion among the professors and students was at a very low ebb; but, under his powerful preaching from the pulpit of the college chapel, revivals took place again and again among the students; and, it is said, no fewer than seventeen such visitations could be counted in the course of a century. Ever since, such movements in colleges have been a prominent feature of the revivalism of the country; and E. D. Starbuck, in his *Psychology of Religion* (London, 1899), has thereby been led to connect conversion with the physiological changes of puberty. Certainly there are affinities between religion and the awakening of the youthful mind to such sentiments as patriotism and altruism; but in some at least of the American revivals, such as that conducted by C. G. Finney, the average age of the converts was much more mature. The Young Men's Christian Association has obtained in American universities a position of great importance, its building being generally on the campus and forming the social centre of the place; and this has afforded opportunities of a unique description for the diffusion of religious sentiments among the student body.

The Irish revival of 1859, above referred to, was an importation from the United States, where it had been prevalent for two years previously; and of course Moody had learned his methods in his own country, before coming to the British Isles. But his success in the old country gave him a standing in his own land such as no evangelist before him had enjoyed, and he was going up and down the States evangelizing till his death. Nearly all the evangelists who have since come into prominence, such as G. F. Pentecost, B. F. Mills, R. A. Torrey, J. W. Chapman, and W. A. Sunday, may be looked upon as his disciples and imitators, though some of them have developed novel methods in certain directions, such as awakening interest before their arrival, uniting the religious forces of the place for a general effort, securing the public testimony of converts, and getting the results which have been harvested well preserved after their departure. While Moody was attended only by a single coadjutor, the more successful of these recent men move from place to place with a following of something like a dozen, ready for every kind of assistance such as secretarial work, singing, advertising, and the rest.

7. Horace Bushnell's protest.—This triumphant progress of revivalism in the United States did not take place without challenge. Certain denominations held aloof, especially the Episcopalian, although the 'missions' carried on in recent times not only among Episcopalians but even among Roman Catholics may be regarded as a concession to the popularity and utility of methods which these bodies have been slow to acknowledge. Almost exactly a century after the appearance of Jonathan Edwards' classical work mentioned above there was published by another minister of the same denomination, Horace Bushnell (*q.v.*), a book, *Christian Nurture* (Hartford, U.S.A., 1847), which traversed the prevailing practice in thoroughgoing fashion; and, though small in bulk, this is one of the great works of American theology. Bushnell was not opposed to revivals as such; indeed, he had taken part in them and had, at a not very tender age, passed through a marked conversion himself. But he was irritated by the disposition in multitudes to assume that nothing could be happening in religion unless a revival were going on, by the exaggerated importance ascribed to conversion, as if it were the only religious experience, and by the invasion of the sacredness of personality in certain practices of the revivalists. He charged revivalism with exaggerated individualism, no comprehension being displayed for the functions of the Church, the family, and the State, or for the significance of baptism among the experiences of life. He struck at the very heart of the system by maintaining that, normally, those who have had the advantage of Christian culture in the home should grow up Christians, without requiring such a change as is insisted on in revivals. Bushnell's strong point was never the evidence from Scripture, and he did not do full justice to the teaching of our Lord Himself on the new birth, on taking up the cross, and on making confession before men. When it is to experience that the appeal is made, opinions may differ widely as to the proportion of those receiving a Christian training who subsequently appear as undeniably Christian, but it would be a fatal mistake not to recognize that multitudes of those who have enjoyed the best of nurture grow up alienated from God and with their heart in the world; and these are the proper subjects of a revival. To regard as true Christians all who have undergone such rites as baptism and confirmation is to be content with a nominal and Pharisaic type of Christianity. The communication of religion from the outside through tradition and instruction is not enough without a reaction from within by the personality itself and a grasping of the truth by the mind's own activity. Bushnell's protest, however, enabled those to breathe who had no story of their own conversion to tell; and these have included even prominent revivalists like Zinzendorf and Drummond. The test for every one is not whether at some past

moment he passed through a spiritual crisis, capable of being related as a testimony, but whether at the present moment he is prepared to receive the Saviour and to surrender all to His love and service. There will always be minds to which catastrophic experiences in religion are congenial and others to which the methods of nurture are more acceptable; there is plenty of room within the Kingdom of God for work inspired by both of these ideals; and with the progress of time each side may be trusted to understand the other better.

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JAMES STALKER.

REVOLUTION.—See REBELLION.

REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.—1. Preliminary.—In considering the attitude of the ethical or religious man, as such, towards rewards and punishments, we are met at the outset with certain questions which involve the whole nature of law. Those thinkers, *e.g.* (nowadays fewer than formerly), who treat law in the Austinian fashion as an authoritative command, claiming a more or less unreasoning obedience, will naturally reduce to a minimum the potential influence upon it of religion and ethics. In the famous phrase of Samuel Horsley, we shall have nothing to do with the laws but to submit to them; and the punishments and rewards assigned by them we must accept with at least an external show of accommodation. On the other hand, it is a perfectly tenable position, and has indeed been maintained by some, that the infliction of punishment is not permissible to man, and least of all to the State. Those who hold this opinion point out, with much appearance of reason, that fallible humanity is incapable of exactly measuring the guilt of the criminal or of tracing the causes and effects of the crime beyond its narrowest surroundings. For many, perhaps for all, offences society itself, or the unreachable past, may well be far more responsible than the so-called offender—not to add that, in the words of Angelo in *Measure for Measure*,[1] the jury often 'may in the sworn twelve have a thief or two guiltier than him they try.' For these and other reasons men of the most various religious views have deemed it necessary to take punishment altogether out of the hands of erring human tribunals. Some base their conclusions on an interpretation of certain words of Jesus; of this class are Tolstoi and his followers. Others, like Kropotkin, taking an anarchistic view of the world, adapt their conception of punishment to their general idea of the illegitimacy of all ordered government. Some bid us leave penalty to the divine court that cannot err; others, rejecting all idea of the divine, see no reason on that account for subjecting the individual to the judgment of his fellows.

[1] II. i. 20.

In the opinion of the present writer these arguments admit of no direct answer; they can only be met on the principle of *solvitur ambulando*. 'Common sense' (in the Aristotelian acceptation of the phrase as the general opinion of enlightened men) holds, and will apparently continue to hold, that one way to decrease crime is to punish it; and it is only a small minority which holds that the sole legitimate way to decrease crime is either to ignore it or to meet it by active benevolence or non-resistance. We are far from denying that the elimination of punishment may be considered a desirable ideal; but a philosophy that is to have any practical value must take account of actually existing conditions; and it is with these that the present article will mainly concern itself, leaving maxims of the kind described to play their part exclusively in the inward life.

On the other hand, the Austinian theory seems to fail chiefly through not taking account of the fact that law, as an expression of one side of humanity, is a product of evolution, and cannot be understood without a consideration of its origin and growth in and through past ages. Therefore, although this historical aspect is fully dealt with in the artt. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, we shall keep it in view throughout this article; for law, regarded as a growth, is at once seen to fall under the effective criticism of a constantly growing moral and religious feeling in the community.

2. Basal elements of punishment.—Law is the product of society, and, at least partially, of society in its religious aspect.

'Those ways of action,' says Durkheim,[1] 'to which society is strongly enough attached to impose them upon its members, are, by that very fact, marked with a distinctive sign provocative of respect.'

Authority springs from social opinion: indeed, 'it might even be asked whether all authority is not the daughter of opinion.'[2] But society soon finds that mere opinion will not exert sufficient authority to influence all its members; and the very earliest customary laws make us familiar with sanctions and rewards.[3] Punishment, whatever shape it may assume, is clearly seen to be an evil.[4] In the sense of penalty inflicted under the sanction of law, it has at least one of its roots in the primitive instinct of revenge, precisely as reward is partly based upon the primitive instinct of gratitude. 'Revenge,' said Bacon, 'is a kind of wild justice'; and conversely justice, in one of its most important aspects, is but a tamed and civilized revenge. Now revenge (*q.v.*), superficially viewed, is a pure 'evil'; it seems to be nothing but the impulse to return blow for blow. Because you have been injured, anger prompts you to ensure that whatever has injured you shall suffer in the same way and to the same extent. But it is not long before you discover a thousand circumstances that may complicate this simplicity. In your anger you may easily deal a heavier blow than the one received. You may often wish to avenge the wrong, not of yourself, but of another. You may

[1] *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 207.
[2] *Ib.* p. 208.
[3] By some the word 'sanction' is made to include rewards; by others, such as Austin, it is used of penalty only.
[4] Bentham, *Works*, i. 390.

have to call in external aid in order to accomplish your revenge. You may be unable to reach your enemy, and you may desire to attack some one else in his stead. Or, again, your injurer may retort to your reply, and an indefinite series of retaliations may be thus set up; nor is it by any means certain that the original aggressor will in the long run get the worst of it. Revenge is thus perceived to have a very awkward tendency to defeat its own end. Yet, despite all this, the claim that he who injures another should receive at least an equal injury in return is by no means negligible. It is indeed arguable that the straight hit from the shoulder is ethically more justifiable than the cold-blooded infliction of a judicial sentence. Again, the frequent necessity of calling in outside aid tends to enlarge personal revenge into that wider emotion which, in its later developments, becomes patriotism. The family, the tribe, the nation desire to inflict on a whole community a punishment for an injury done to a single member of their community; and this is one expression of that sense of solidarity which is the ultimate basis of ethics. Revenge, therefore, must by no means be treated as non-moral or even as non-religious. So soon as the mere application of the *lex talionis* is perceived to be impossible; so soon as the idea of vicarious action and of vicarious suffering enters in; so soon as injuries to intangible values (such, *e.g.*, as honour or reputation), which cannot be assessed at a definite price, are taken into account; so soon does the apparently non-moral principle of revenge take upon itself an ethical aspect. Without entering in detail into historical or anthropological questions,[1] we may safely assert that this primal instinct of human nature demands, in society as it is, not suppression or extinction, but regulation and limitation.

We see in revenge the working of two impulses, anger and fear. Primarily, the return blow involves (*a*) an automatic reflex-action, (*b*) an attempt to clear danger out of the way. In both we have the germ of a moral feeling. In (*a*) we see resentment, in (*b*) that demand for a free unfettered existence which is the condition of a moral life. Hence neither by legal codes, even the most humane and rational, nor by some of the most religious-minded of philosophers has the element of revenge been altogether ruled out. Thus of resentment Martineau observes that it is justified if 'it retains its primary form of legitimate instinct, without added taint of artificial malignity';[2] and, while Sidgwick and John Grote[3] wish the desire to inflict pain to be diminished, thinkers so opposite as Stephen[4] and Rickaby[5] see in that desire a perfectly legitimate emotion. Rickaby, indeed, representing a Roman Catholic point of view, is particularly strong on the point.

'Vengeance undoubtedly prompts to many crimes, but so does the passion of love. Both are natural impulses. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to set down one third of human transgressions to love, and another third to revenge; yet it is the abuse in each case, not the use, that leads to sin.'

Quoting Aristotle[6] and Augustine,[7] he points out the necessity of this retributive and retrospective element in justice. To Bentham the matter appears in a different light; but to him also that law is the best which secures that punishment and reward shall automatically follow disobedience and obedience; thus to him one of the best of all laws was Burke's famous Act regulating the payment, by the Lords of the Treasury, of their own salaries out of the public funds—an Act so drawn that the receipt or the loss of the salary automatically followed care or neglect. Resentment, similarly, is the basis of that public opinion which is the automatic reward or punishment appropriate to the moral law.[1] In fact, as this automatism is developed, it emerges into that lofty ethical conception in which the sin is viewed as its own punishment—a conception adumbrated by Origen,[2] and admirably exhibited by Martensen[3] and others; and one which lies at the base of the *Divina Commedia*.

Nor is the other aspect of revenge, that of fear, without its distinctly ethical side. For this instinct of self-protection is inseparably linked with the group-instinct.

'Pure anarchy or self-redress is qualified first by the sense of solidarity within the primary social unit.'[4]

Fear leads to the search for help; and without this sense of solidarity no truly ethical emotion can arise. It leads, first, to preferential group-treatment, the typical instance of which is the blood-feud. Of this examples still remain in the Corsican vendettas and in the so-called punitive expeditions against 'inferior' races, the object of which is to exact the blood of many 'inferiors' for that of one or two of the 'superior' race. This example is by itself sufficient to show that preferential group-treatment may act to depress as well as to heighten the moral standard. It makes, on the one hand, for an enlarged and enormously powerful selfishness, and, on the other, for a sense of obligation beyond oneself; it makes alike for privilege and for brotherhood. It is, of course, the root-principle of 'civilization'; but it has not always meant moral advance.

E.g., 'at lower levels of savage society, punishment has some proportion to the offence. It is at higher levels, in barbaric and despotic societies, that punishment is most cruel and disproportionate.'[5] 'Increasing severity has been a characteristic of European legislation up to quite modern times.'[6]

The treatment of the slave as a chattel, again, is largely due to the solidarity of the free population. And, as 'civilization' advances, certain crimes develop which were unknown to earlier stages of the world.

Yet, on a larger view, these drawbacks are seen to exhibit the power of morality in a clearer light. It was the realization that a slave had no rights that led to the movement for his emancipation;[7] and, as Maine points out,[8] the colossal frauds of modern times merely show how the bad faith of the few is facilitated by the confidence given and deserved by the many. Ancient Roman law recognized only one form of dishonesty, namely, theft. English law punishes defaulting trustees. But it would be a great mistake to conclude that the ancient Romans practised a higher morality than ourselves.

And, indeed, the principle of discrimination which leads to these evils leads also to immense good. The bounds of the group or clan, *e.g.*, cannot remain rigid. For all sorts of reasons they are constantly altering. Outlaws from other groups are admitted; whole clans unite for convenience or for protection. Judah admits into its ranks the Calebite or the Jerahmeelite; Rome confers its citizenship on the Gaul and the Spaniard. When once, for any reason, you have conceded privileges to your group, it is always open to you to draw an outsider within the sacred fence; and he then receives the privileges from which he was excluded. Indeed, the very fact that a group has been formed involves to some

[1] See again art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.
[2] *Types of Ethical Theory*², ii. 198. [3] *Moral Ideals*, p. 264.
[4] *Crim. Law of England*, ch. iv. p. 99.
[5] *Moral Philosophy*, p. 175 ff. [6] *Rhet.* i. x. 17.
[7] *Serm.* 125, n. 5, on the punishment of Judas.

[1] Cf. Pollock, *Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics*.
[2] *De Princ.* ii. x. 4 (Ante-Nicene Library, x. 149).
[3] *Christian Ethics*, p. 359 ff.
[4] Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 130.
[5] Art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Primitive and Savage), vol. iv. p. 249a.
[6] *MJ* i. 187.
[7] See van Ness Myers, *History as Past Ethics*, p. 203.
[8] *Ancient Law*, p. 321.

extent the breakdown of the solely self-regarding emotions; the group may, it is true, have been formed through hate or fear of another group, but it necessarily induces self-sacrifice on the part of those who join it; and self-sacrifice, once set in motion, has a tendency to enlarge itself. From the conception of love of a neighbour and helper, the step is possible, and even likely, to love of a stranger. Opportunities of such a step constantly arise: old enmities may be forgotten under the stress of circumstances, and, once forgotten, they are not always remembered again. Normans and English, *e.g.*, were fused into one by the French wars.

This fluidity in the boundary of the group leads not only to a constantly-changing conception of political duty generally, but specially to an infinite complexity and variety in the ideas of punishment and reward. Anger and fear are subject to constant modifications under the influence of affection or love; and a new line of ethical growth is seen emerging under that influence. To take a simple example: when it is perceived that it is on the whole advantageous to the community to allow the slave, who has hitherto been a chattel, to work for a reward, the community is on the way towards a recognition of the slave's rights, and we are not surprised to find a class of manumitted slaves appearing in its midst. Similarly with the criminal. At the first moment of anger he is thought of merely as an object to be hurt or destroyed; but, when it is realized that he too may have his utilities—that in fact it may be undesirable utterly to cast him out—then we find all sorts of precautions taken to prevent his hasty destruction. Thus arise the cities of refuge, trials by ordeal, sanctuaries, advocates, 'the King's Mercy,' until ultimately we reach the whole apparatus devised by a Beccaria and worked by a Howard for the elimination of any suffering over and above what is necessary for the public safety. Love has begun to work; the criminal is recognized as a member, if an erring member, of the group; and, indeed, the principle entered fairly early into the social order. For a long time past some tribes, and almost all organized States, have reserved a prerogative of pardon, lodged in the chief magistrate, the purpose of which is to cast the ægis of protection over the criminal himself, as one who, despite his lapse, may yet be of service to the community. This gradual enlargement of the social group to include within it those who were formerly shut out is part of a general movement on the part of the group to assume responsibility over a wider and wider area; and there seems to be no limit to the growth of this tendency. Already we see the State throwing its shield over children, imbeciles, and the lower animals; it has long protected the alien; and where it will stop none can say. In the 20th century movement for penal reform the scientific and the humanitarian lines are seen to converge; and the tendency is to transform mere punishment into a converting discipline, beneficial alike to State and to individual.

To the two elements of anger and fear, then, that are involved in the primary conception of punishment we must now add a third, which tends ever to become the dominant one—that of affection or love.

3. Manifestation of these elements in modern theories of punishment.—Inheriting the tradition of these three emotions of anger, fear, and affection, the modern State, more or less consciously, applies them in its system of punishment. It is true that the ethical element is not always prominent in the application of law to practice; but the three aims of punishment as so far understood (retributive, deterrent, and reformatory) nevertheless underlie our criminal law, and the tendency is for the ethical aspect gradually to assume a dominant position.

'As social order,' says Hobhouse, 'evolves an independent organ for the adjustment of disputes and the prevention of crime, the ethical idea becomes separated out from the conflicting passions which are its earlier husk.'[1]

The judge has before him, at least theoretically, the accuser, the community, and the accused, each of them preferring a claim. These claims (though not always in practice separable) may be roughly defined as (*a*) the indignation of the accuser, (*b*) the fears of the community, (*c*) the appeal of the accused to consideration as a member of a group united by solidarity of interest and good-will. These claims correspond alike to the three primary emotions and to the three aims of punishment. But the fact that the three claimants are not left to themselves to settle the dispute brings to light a fourth element. For, although it might at first glance appear that the judge is merely the representative of the community as against accuser and accused, yet this is not really so; he is the representative, not of one party, but of all the three; and his task is to apportion the relative values of the three claims. Thus, with the calling in of an outsider as arbitrator, there is a notable development, which (despite strong arguments that might be brought forward on the other side) seems on the whole to mark an ethical advance. In the first place, to adjust the demands of the emotions reason is called in as umpire; and reason, in the fine phrase of Milton, is the law of law itself. Again, the presence of this umpire assures finality; the cause is brought to some sort of conclusion. And, thirdly, a power is brought into play of the highest ethical importance—the power of leadership in things of the mind. It was thus that Deborah, by judging Israel under her palm-tree, acquired that capacity and influence which enabled her to rescue her country from the oppressor. In a well-known passage Maine describes how, in the early days of Rome, a *vir pietate gravis* may have first come to intervene as arbitrator in disputes. Passing accidentally by, he is asked to decide the case; a sum of money is staked on the decision; and at the close the loser pays the sum, not as a penalty, but as remuneration for the arbitrator's trouble.[2] The judge is chosen as *pietate gravis*; and his *pietas* and *gravitas* cannot but grow with exercise.[3]

Yet, as we have hinted, some ethical weaknesses lurk in the procedure as now carried out. The arbitration is now compulsory, at least to one of the disputants; and the arbiter is no longer a kindly spectator, but a professional. The 'sum of money' has become a penal infliction; and the infliction is made by proxy. We have, in fact, not merely restitution, but penalty. As to the evils of professionalism, they are obvious to all. 'A profession is essentially a conspiracy.'[4] In the weighty words of Lord Loreburn, 'Lawyers are against legal reform: *it is an interested professional opposition.*'[5] Nor is the effect, upon the class that awards or inflicts punishment, by any means always beneficial. In actual fact, perhaps, the judge himself may escape these effects; but it would be difficult to find a harder-hearted class than the set of lawyers, clerks, and apparitors who surround him. It is here that public opinion must always be awake; and here too lies one of the chief merits of an unprofessional jury-system.

The judge, fallible as he is, is not without guidance; and that guidance is tradition. This tradition acts both towards width and towards limitation. The judge's principle must always

[1] P. 130. [2] P. 384 ff.
[3] But see Pollock's note on Maine, p. 407.
[4] See *The Nation*, 16th June 1917. [5] *Ib.*

tend to push him beyond his boundary; his tools keep him within it.[1] In place of haphazard custom, a code has appeared as a kind of standardized tool; but that standard is always subject to modification. Spontaneous modification largely ceases with the introduction of a code; but deliberate change, due to the conscious desire for improvement, never ceases.[2] It was thus, *e.g.*, that Mansfield, by ingenious interpretations of the law, saved Roman Catholics from the penalties of the Test Act, which, again, was actually repealed fifty years later. We become aware, then, of another power behind the judge, corresponding to the impalpable power behind his predecessor, the primitive king. Tradition (and also the unescapable spirit of the age) compels the judge to a perpetual re-adjustment of the scales of justice. The old simple idea of equality inevitably gives way, with the growth of knowledge and imagination, to the more complicated notion of proportion.[3] Behind strict law and also behind tradition we detect the regulating presence of equity[4]—a conception so rooted in human nature that it appears in the most primitive of fairy-tales. By obscure stages law herself begins to subsume equity into her realm, until at last we perceive a formal alliance between the two; and who can doubt that this alliance springs from the desire that law shall not be too visibly divorced from the developing ethical standard of the times? In a similar fashion, the old legal theology has gradually adapted itself to the ethical requirements of an ethically advancing society.

'Nothing,' says Maine,[5] 'is more distasteful to men . . . than the admission of their moral progress as a substantive reality. . . . Hence the old doctrine that Equity flowed from the king's conscience—the improvement which had in fact taken place in the moral standard of the community being thus referred to an inherent elevation in the moral sense of the sovereign.'

But this very fiction of the king's conscience marks the existence in the mind of the community of a type or pattern to which the constitution is seen to conform only partially;[6] and this pattern may in many minds be regarded as a divine order, which uses human society as its means of expression. Other minds may exclude the divine, yet all alike conceive this pattern as an ethical ideal.

We may now add to the emotions of anger, fear, and love, as producers of social punishment, the following elements: the conception of an umpire, who brings reason to regulate the emotions; the conception of tradition, the accumulation of human judgments, limiting the action of the judge; the conception of equity, or of a set of principles which must adjust the rulings of tradition; and the conception of an ideal, whether regarded as divine or viewed as human, to which communities of men have a tendency to conform. Of these we may observe that all involve an ethical element; that they must all be present in a righteous decision; and that they are closely bound up with the progress of mankind, admitting indeed, to a certain extent, of being arranged in historical sequence.

'Plurima est et in omni iure civili, et in pontificum libris, et in XII tabulis, antiquitatis effigies.'[7]

4. Religious aspect.—When this conception of a type or pattern takes the form of a belief in a divine order revealed to man, then the subject of punishments and rewards becomes distinctively religious. Religious, of course, in some sense it has almost always been. Even before the sense of 'order' was evolved, when religion was scarcely to be distinguished from magic, the disorder was conceived as a divine disorder: the god was capricious, but men endeavoured nevertheless to understand his caprices and to propitiate his strange anger. Step by step the god is conceived as punishing and rewarding on an intelligible system; and here we see the gradual emergence of the pattern.

'We are told,' says Bryce, 'that the sun and the wind killed Laoghaire, because he broke his oath to the men of Munster.'[1]

Here the god is seen acting physically, but punishing an offence that weakens the social bond. A step in advance is taken when spiritual agencies arise who take an interest in certain moral acts as such[2]—when, in fact, a certain stability is seen in the divine judgments. Zeus, invariably punishing a wrong done to the guest or suppliant, is already a religious conception; and from that point we can trace the growth of the idea of a righteous God into its modern stages. A man who has attained this view of a righteous God must, when faced with the fact of punishment as an integral part of the social order, ask himself the question, Is it in accordance with the will of God that man should punish his fellow-man? He may seek enlightenment from revelation; and in this case his answer will depend on the interpretation that he gives to the sacred traditions. Or he may inquire of philosophy (supposed here to be more or less theistic); and in this case the answer will vary according to the form of philosophy which appeals to him. Should the answer be in the negative, we have already pointed out that this article will be of little utility. If, on the other hand, it be in the affirmative, the seeker will at once be led to discuss the right relation of human justice to divine. (1) Shall it consciously endeavour to follow the principles on which, so far as can be seen, God rules the world? Or (2) shall men, while duly reverencing the divine law as a norm for the individual, refuse to regard it as a model for regulations dealing with the social order? Shall the State, in other words, be theocratic or secular? There is no lack of communities of either kind; still less is there lack of communities with something of both. Of systems that have worked on theocratic lines, perhaps the most familiar and striking example is the Jewish; but many Eastern States have conformed more or less fully to the type, and the Christian Church in the Middle Ages made a determined effort to realize the ideal. Many theorists also have held this view in varying degrees. Arnold, *e.g.*, and Gladstone in his *Church and State* propounded doctrines of this kind, while Martensen[3] speaks of 'the divine authority which manifests itself in the law, . . . and is postulate and background for all earthly human authority.' To him religion is 'the inmost nerve of obligation, which knits us to responsibility.' The ideal has in fact attracted saintly minds since the Akkadian psalmist, seventeen centuries before Christ, addressed his goddess as her 'whose will makes contracts and justice to exist, establishing obligations among men.'[4] But the verdict of experience is fatal to it. As a matter of historical fact, the deadest, the most repressive, and the least enlightened of all forms of government have been the theocratic.[5] Islam, *e.g.*, declares plainly that law is religion and religion law—with the result that the law of Islām is a mass of enactments, unalterable because dictated by God or His mouthpiece, instead of a living and growing body of principles. The history of our own land provides us with instances full of warning. Barebone's Parliament, endeavouring

[1] Martineau, p. 253.
[2] Maine, p. 26.
[3] Martineau, p. 249.
[4] Maine, p. 49 ff.
[5] P. 314.
[6] Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*[7], p. 295 ff.
[7] Cicero, *de Orat.* i. 43.

[1] *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, vol. ii. ch. xiii. p. 212.
[2] Hobhouse, p. 30 ff.
[3] P. 351.
[4] Quoted by Cheyne, *The Book of Psalms*, p. x.
[5] See Bryce, ii. 236 ff.

to rule England in accordance with the Law of Moses, is not an edifying spectacle. The identification of religion and law, indeed, has been baleful to both; religion has become frigid and ceremonial; law has been treated as infallible, and has therefore been unprogressive. True, such a system is often successful in securing obedience (or at least an external conformity), but at a terrible expense; nor is there any limit to the cruelty which may be practised in the name of some god or other. It is the attempt to punish as God is supposed to punish that largely accounts for the hideous record of religious persecution.

Hence we are not surprised to find that the majority of the noblest publicists, even among men of deep religious feeling, have utterly refused to permit religion, in this sense, to intrude into the domain of punishment. The illustrious Beccaria—to take but one great name—knew too well the dangers of theological interference to permit to 'religion' the slightest visible power over civil jurisdiction. All penalties, he held, must be dictated by State utility.

Is, then, religion to be totally excluded? Far from it. There is nothing to prevent the religious man from being a good citizen; on the contrary, his religion tends to make him the best of servants to the State. Accustomed to look on the improvement of character as the highest of aims, he refuses, in his rôle of citizen, to accept as a satisfactory form of punishment one that does not further that aim. Religious men, it is true, differ widely in their views. Some hold that the retributive element should be upheld; others, looking upon punishment as a necessary evil, to be tolerated solely for the safety of society, will have none of that element, and turn their energies towards furthering the good of the criminal. But their differences are, after all, but matters of varying emphasis.

5. Attitude of the religious man to law.—No question is at once more important and more difficult than that of the due attitude of religion and morality towards punishment.

'All theories on the subject of punishment,' says Maine, 'have more or less broken down; and we are at sea as to first principles.'[1] 'The question as to the true principles on which penalties should be awarded for crime is still an unsolved one,' says Lord Russell of Killowen; and Sir Robert Anderson, a man of almost unequalled experience in criminal investigation, maintains that our whole system of punishing crime is false in principle and mischievous in practice.[2]

It is thus plain both that reform is necessary and that it is very difficult. The wise reformer will walk warily. Yet we are not without some fairly certain principles which may form the basis of our views as to the proper forms and methods of punishment. Putting aside all sophistical argumentation, we must recognize the necessity of a proportion between penalty and offence, and also between penalty and offender. Exact measurement of crime is of course impossible; but a healthy ethic revolts against a Draconian severity. Hanging for the theft of five shillings we will not have; and first offenders must be treated leniently.[3] Most of us would also uphold the principle of the indeterminate sentence. Again, a true morality will not be satisfied to discuss punishment on the grounds of mere social convenience. There is something to be said, *e.g.*, for a plentiful use of the punishment of death. A nuisance is easily got rid of, and with the least possible expenditure of public money; the dead criminal cannot repeat his crimes, and (though experience does not say so) it is arguable that others, by the sight of so terrible a retribution, may be deterred from imitation. But religion and ethics will be moved by no such considerations. By death the criminal (who is by no means to be treated as wholly unserviceable) is deprived of the power of further service; and to this religion, here reinforced by science, will no more agree than will the economist now agree to make no use of the so-called 'waste-products' of the coal-mine. It may, like the pope in Browning's poem, be compelled to admit the advisability of death as a punishment in certain exceptional cases, but not on the grounds above mentioned; and it is possible that it may come to reject the death-penalty altogether.

[1] Maine, *Indian Speeches*, ed. M. E. Grant Duff, London, 1892, p. 125.
[2] See Kenny, *Outlines of Criminal Law*, ch. xxxii. p. 498.
[3] *Ib.* p. 508.

Outlawry, so common in former times, tends to lose its meaning as the world tends to become one; but in any case it is a confession of weakness and an evasion of responsibility which religion is loth to make. Imprisonment and the social boycott, to some extent, take its place; but in the application of these we must insist on the constant treatment of the criminal as a potentially valuable citizen. The imprisonment must not be such as to degrade him yet more; and, on his release, he must not be shunned like a pariah, but given a fair chance; Beccaria indeed goes almost farther than this.

'The degree of the punishment,' he says, 'and the consequences of the crime, ought to be so contrived as to have the greatest possible effect on others, with the least possible pain to the delinquent.'[1]

Law being useless without a sanction, and sanction being an evil, the religious man will desire to diminish the number of laws and the number of legal crimes. More and more he will aim at the substitution of public opinion for legal penalty; for, if experience shows anything clearly, it proves that a healthy public opinion does more in a year to prevent crime than the severest penalties in a century. Duelling, *e.g.*, has ceased in Britain, not by being treated as murder, but by being proclaimed as immoral, or even by being ridiculed as absurd; and, were the laws against it to be dropped, it would none the less remain in abeyance. Adultery, again, has not flourished least in those countries where it has been punished by the law.[2]

This attitude does not imply any insensitiveness to the evil of crime. Religion does not regard sin as a mere disease, nor does it relieve the criminal of responsibility.[3]

'One system (the Philadelphian) had approached the problem from the mental side, aiming to solve it by making men *think* right. The other (the Auburn) approached the problem from the physical side, aiming to solve it by making men *act* right. Both failed; for the problem of crime is a moral one. No man can be reformed except his conscience be quickened.'[4]

Some methods employed at present in the detection or prevention of crime the religious man will probably regard as pernicious and to be renounced. The *agent provocateur*, *e.g.*, cannot be used but at the cost of moral deterioration to himself and to the Government that employs him. He may diminish one form of villainy, but he adds to another that is probably worse. The ordinary spy is little better; and the offering of rewards to criminals who will betray an accomplice can only increase, in the society as a whole, the most loathsome of vices, that of treachery.[5]

Improvements of the kind here hinted at, and many more, may be accomplished by the ethical and religious man, acting quietly as a citizen of ordinary influence. There are, however, occasions when it may be his duty to set himself in direct opposition to what he regards as a bad law. Of these cases the classical example is Antigone; the

[1] *Crimes and Punishments*, p. 7 f.
[2] Kant, *Phil. of Law*, p. 203.
[3] See Mott Osborne, *Society and Prisons*, ch. i. p. 32.
[4] *Ib.*
[5] See Beccaria, p. 147.

Biblical, Peter and John preaching the gospel in Jerusalem. Quite recent times, of course, supply famous examples. Here, by the nature of the case, no precise rules can be laid down. The conscientious rebel (or, as Westermarck[1] calls him, the 'moral dissenter') must seek all the enlightenment at his disposal, and then, after carefully balancing against his scruples the claims of the State and the evils involved in disobedience, act accordingly. For such men other moral and religious men will desire the punishment to be as light as possible; for conscience is not so common that even a mistaken conscience can be suppressed except at a heavy loss to the community. Nor is the dissenter ever acting, in a strict sense, alone. 'He feels,' says Westermarck,[2] 'that his conviction is shared at least by an ideal society'; in the words of Pollock, he regards his own opinion 'not as peculiar to himself, but as what public opinion ought to be.'[3] An ethical judgment of such men will further take into account the fact that the great reformers of the past have in their time been moral dissenters of precisely this kind.

Finally, the religious man is, almost *ipso facto*, an optimist. He believes in the inherent power of good and in its ultimate triumph; and he looks forward therefore to a time when virtue will be so predominant that punishment will be unnecessary; the attractions of goodness will be by themselves sufficient to ensure just action on the part of societies and their members. But meanwhile the moral or religious man will give his support to all agencies for the eradication of crime, measuring that support by the degree in which those agencies involve more of the reformative element and less of the retributive.

A word here seems desirable as to punishments in the next world. Here the religious man's views cannot help being coloured by his views as to earthly punishment. He may, it is true, be compelled by his belief in revelation to admit the existence of certain forms of future penalty which may, *per se*, seem purely retributive; and he may be compelled to answer to objections by the simple argument, 'Man cannot judge God.' Nevertheless, we trace a growing tendency to reject the merely retributive penalty as unworthy of the Deity. Men dare, like Abraham, to ask, 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?', and they tend more and more to claim from divine justice the same end and character as from their own. The Roman Catholic has long had his Purgatory; the liberal theologian believes in a universal restoration; the orthodox Protestant no longer preaches the deterrent judgment sermons of a hundred years ago; and he tempers his view of eternal punishment by manifold accommodations. The flame is not a literal fire; or the sinner, even 'between the saddle and the ground,' may have sought and received mercy.

6. Rewards.—Punishments and rewards divide between them the whole field of legislation.[4] But the division is very unequal; for, though the field of reward is far the larger, being in fact co-extensive with the whole field of service, it naturally demands far less attention from the lawgiver. As punishment is an 'evil,' so reward may be defined as 'a portion of the matter of good, which, in consideration of some service supposed or expected to be done, is bestowed on some one, in the intent that he may be benefited thereby.'[5] By 'benefit,' as might be expected, Bentham means 'pleasure'; but, as he well points out, reward cannot ensure pleasure; it is meant, however, to enlarge the opportunities of pleasure at the disposal of its recipient. If we prefer the word, we may substitute 'happiness' for Bentham's phrase.

As we analyze reward, we shall discover ample scope for the exertion, by religion and ethics, of influence over its distribution. It is hard, perhaps, to improve on Bentham's division, according to which it may assume one (or more) of four forms: (1) wealth, (2) honour, (3) power, (4) exemptions. Of these 'wealth,' according to Bentham's utilitarian view, 'is in general the most suitable.'[1] Thus successful warriors have often been directly rewarded by gifts of money or estate; and in modern communities the whole course of legislation has been generally conducted with a view to providing wealth as a reward for service, and to securing it, when once acquired, against violence or fraud. But 'honours,' at least as direct gifts of the State, are equally common; and in some countries civil servants of a certain rank are ennobled as a matter of course. We are all familiar with titles as a gratification for at least theoretical services. Exemptions, again, are common, whether in the form of exemption from civil burdens or in that of exemption from punishment. Thus, under the *Ancien Régime*, the nobles and clergy, in return for more or less fictitious State services, were freed from most kinds of taxation. 'Previous good conduct' is almost everywhere admitted as a plea in mitigation of punishment.[2] Sometimes, indeed, the exemptions have been even anticipatory: a Roman citizen, *e.g.*, knew beforehand that he was free from capital punishment, a Russian deputy from corporal. 'Benefit of clergy' secured 'clerks' from certain penalties; and in former times English noblemen were exempt from penalties for even atrocious crimes.

But it is with regard to power that religion and ethics have most to say; for there can be no doubt that of all rewards power ought to be the commonest; and it is in the direction of increasing the range of power as a reward that reform should certainly proceed. Both on religious grounds and on grounds of expediency it is eminently desirable that he who has been faithful in a few things should be made ruler over many things; and it is to be hoped that men will be diminishingly anxious for rewards of other kinds; that, in fact, men who have been useful should ask to be paid merely by being granted greater opportunities of usefulness. Here lies the true reconciliation between the view of Pericles, that 'where there are the greatest *rewards* of merit, there will be the best men to do the work of the State,'[3] and that of Plato, that there can be no sound government while public service is done with a view to remuneration.[4] Whether, *e.g.*, a school should give prizes may well be doubted; but it is beyond dispute that the boy who has shown capacity and merit should be made a prefect. It is true that, as Bentham observes,[5] we do not make him who has produced the best piece of artillery the head of the Ordnance; for the capacity of invention is not necessarily the capacity of administration. But this is beside the point. That to which we desire to promote the inventor is the fuller opportunity of invention; and that to which we desire to promote the good ruler is the fuller opportunity of rule; the reward is to consist precisely in a wider field for service of the kind which a man has shown himself able to give. And here is one great and obvious advantage, from the point of view of the community, held by reward over punishment. Both alike 'belong to the automatic element of

[1] *MI* i. 132. [2] *Ib.* [3] p. 309.
[4] Bentham, p. 192. Bentham's opinion is here slightly different from that of the present writer.
[5] *Ib.* ii. 192.

[1] ii. 194.
[2] *Timon of Athens*, iii. v.
[3] Thucyd. ii. 46.
[4] *Laws*, xii. 955.
[5] ii. 196.

social life';[1] but the working of reward is far more automatic than that of punishment, and is achieved with a far less wasteful expenditure of machinery. We do indeed find many a Galba, 'omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset';[2] we do indeed find men, with none of Galba's claims, promoted to high positions; yet, with all these unfortunate exceptions, the capable man tends, by the mere virtue of his capacity, to come to the top—granted that, in present circumstances, vastly too much influence is exerted by powers of rhetoric and 'pushfulness,' by audacity and chicane, worst of all, by wealth. 'Slow rises worth, by poverty depressed.' But it is exactly here that religion and ethics find their chance. The moral and devout man is accustomed, as we have said, to regard character as the really important thing. Free from the distorting power of envy, he is also (as we believe) gifted with a special *flair* for the discovery of high character; and he will use his growing influence for the exaltation of the truly serviceable and the depression of the merely blatant. With the abolition of the retributive penalty and the establishment of enlarged service as the appropriate reward, religion and morals will be in the way to achieve their highest ends. 'But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.'

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[1] Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 218.
[2] Tac. *Hist.* i. 49.

REYNARD THE FOX.—In the Middle Ages beast-fables and apologues were largely used by preachers—beasts symbolizing men or particular qualities or failings, and their words and actions being intended to teach a lesson. These fables were partly drawn from Eastern sources, and Buddhist literature abounds in them, though they are also used there to express the doctrine of reincarnation, and they describe the acts of Buddha in previous animal existences. Most folk-tale collections contain specimens of them, and some are still told among the peasantry. But they were not invented for the purpose of pointing a moral. They existed already as *Märchen*, and the moral was a later addition. All savage collections of folk-tales are full of stories of animals which it would take little alteration to turn into genuine beast-fables. Animal folk-tales, in which animals act and speak like men, descend from an age when it was actually believed that they could do so, and in which also men had already noted the characteristic traits of different kinds of animals—traits which had human parallels. Such savage stories are of the Brer Rabbit class, and tell how this or that animal successfully tricked the others. As a rule each people has its favourite rogue-animal—Hottentots, Bushmen, and Berbers the jackal; Bantus, Negroes, Mongols, and Koreans the rabbit or hare; Malays and Dayaks the moose-deer and tortoise; American Indians the turtle, coyote, or raven; while in the north of Europe as well as in Oriental stories the fox (or the jackal) dupes the bear or the lion.[1] The humour of these stories is obvious, but they reveal a curious pleasure in astuteness, cunning, and villainy, though often dire vengeance is depicted as overtaking the offender. The long and complicated story of Reynard the Fox is a literary example of the folk-tale of beasts which act as men, raised to an epic grandeur. It is a *Märchen* on a large scale in which a large number of animals are the *dramatis personæ*, and many incidents are brought together into a more or less complete whole. Undoubtedly its roots are in the popular tales rather than in the moral apologues current in ecclesiastical circles. See also artt. FABLE, PARABLE (Ethnic).

1. Variants of the Reynard story.—Apart from apologues and fables, the first known *literary* versions of the Reynard story are found in Latin poems of monastic origin, in which greater amplitude than was possible in a fable is given to the incidents recounted. One of these, which presupposes a popular original, is the *Ecbasis cujusdam captivi*, the principal subject of which is the healing of the lion by the fox, found in the later versions. It contains over 1200 verses and was written by a monk of the abbey of St. Evre à Toul in the 10th century.[2] Another short Latin poem is the 11th cent. *Sacerdos et Lupus*, corresponding to the twelfth branch of the French *Renart*.[3] A third is the *Luparius*—the wolf as monk, an episode found again in the *Renart*, and dating from the late 11th or early 12th century.[4] Better known than these is the *Fabella Lupina* or *Isengrimus* or *Reinardus Vulpes* (*c.* 1150), a poem of over 6000 lines, divided into four books, with a certain unity and sequence of episodes, in which for the first time the animals appear with the

[1] See *CF*, p. 39 and reff. there, and cf. W. H. I. Bleek, *Reynard the Fox in S. Africa*, London, 1864; K. Krohn, *Bär und Fuchs*, Helsingfors, 1888, *Mann und Fuchs*, do. 1891.
[2] J. Grimm and A. Schmeller, *Lateinische Gedichte des X und XI Jahrhunderts*, Göttingen, 1838, p. 340 f.; E. Voigt, *Ecbasis Captivi, das älteste Thierepos des Mittelalters*, Strassburg, 1875.
[3] Grimm-Schmeller, p. 340; W. J. Thoms, *The Hist. of Reynard the Fox* [Percy Society], London, 1844, pp. xxviii, lxxxix.
[4] J. Grimm, *Reinhart Fuchs*, Berlin, 1834, p. 410 ff.; Voigt, *Kleinere lateinische Denkmäler der Thiersage aus dem XII bis XIV Jahrhundert*, Strassburg, 1878, p. 58 f.

characteristic names of the Reynard epos.[1] Of this poem there is a short abridgment, the *Isengrimus*, containing the incidents of the lion's sickness and his healing by the advice of Reynard, and the pilgrimage of Bertiliana the goat.[2] The *Fabella Lupina* is probably of Flemish origin, but from French originals or traditions, and its authorship is attributed to Magister Nivardus in a 14th cent. MS of the poem. He is a pious monk, who nevertheless satirizes the pope, priests, and religious orders, and is bitterly opposed to St. Bernard. Its subject is the adventures of Isengrimus and Reinardus, the lion's sickness and healing by Reinardus, and the outwitting and death of Isengrimus through the craft of Reinardus. The poem is charged with irony and is full of humour as well as moral allusions.

The earliest (Middle) High German version is the *Reinhart Fuchs* of Heinrich der Glichesaere (*c.* 1180).[3] This work forms a complete whole without lapses or lack of order and connexion in the parts of the narrative, and with every evidence of having been clearly planned and executed.

The fox is here brought into relation with several inferior animals, then with the wolf, until the last, disgusted with Reynard's successes over him, seeks justice along with the other animals from the lion, who is ill. Reynard heals him, and turns the tables on his accusers. His healing potion, however, is a poison, and kills the king. In O.F. *poison=médecine, breuvage*. Possibly Glichesaere misunderstood the word, unless this treatment of the episode of the healing is his own conception. Unknown to other versions is the cause of the king's illness, viz. revenge on the part of the king of the ants when these have been destroyed by King Lion because they would not acknowledge his supremacy.

It can be proved that Glichesaere's work is due to French originals, and he himself alludes to French poems on the subject. Of his twenty-one adventures, five only are not paralleled in the French *Roman de Renart*. The *Roman*, however, has nothing of the completeness or unity which is a chief characteristic of Glichesaere's version, and a French poem of similar scope and harmony, now lost, has been postulated as his source, or a MS containing various 'branches' in the order of his episodes, or, more probably, a traditional arrangement of separate narratives. Such a grouping is already found in the *Reinardus Vulpes* (c. 1150).

Meanwhile in Flanders a poet, Willem van Utenhove, or Willem die Matoc, basing his work probably on a French poem in which the scene of the judgment of Reynard at the court of the lion had received original treatment, composed a work in Flemish, *Reinaert de Vos*, some time in the 13th century. A continuation, *Reinaert's Historie*, by a later unknown writer, supplied large additions and an element of satire, and the whole was now regarded as one complete work.[4] Willem's expanded work is the source of the many translations and prose versions which have been so popular in various lands since the invention of printing. A popular prose version appeared in print at Gouda, by Gheraert Leeuw, in 1479, *Die Hystorie van Reynaert die Vos*, and its popularity caused Willem's poem to be forgotten. In 1481 Caxton's English rendering of this version with omissions and abridgments was published at Westminster. But the story of Reynard must have been known already in England, as is shown by references in Chaucer's *Nonnes Prestes Tale* and in earlier Anglo-Norman poets, and by the existence of actual stories of the Reynard group in Latin and English verses of the 13th–14th centuries.[1]

A Saxon or Low German version of the *Reinaert*, written in verse, appeared in 1498, and has been variously attributed to Heinrich van Alkmar or to Nicolaus Baumann. This work, called *Reynke de Voss*,[2] was the source of the High German versions of *Reineke Fuchs*, the first of which was published at Frankfort in 1545, and also of Danish, Swedish, and other translations. Goethe's well-known poem, based on J. C. Gottsched's version (1752), appeared in 1794.

The surviving French versions of the Reynard story are the poems of the *Roman du Renart*. These date from the 12th-13th cent., and are the work of different *trouvères*, though undoubtedly based on existing compositions or traditional versions. The separate poems, or 'branches,' of the *Roman* consist of numerous episodes which do not form a complete whole and have often little connexion with each other. One adventure follows another without transition—so much so that the number of the 'branches,' their order, and their contents vary in different MSS. In spite of the lack of order, it is fairly evident that the basis of the episodes of the *Roman* is the complaint laid before King Noble (the lion) against Reynard by Isengrim, the wolf, regarding the fox's villainies, and especially his violence to Hersent, Isengrim's wife. The fox is always the chief actor. The authors of some of these *Renart* poems were the early 13th cent. *trouvères*, Pierre de St. Cloud, Richard de Lison, and an unnamed 'Prestre de la Croix en Brie.' Of the other authors the MSS say nothing, but the provenance of the poems seems to have been Normandy, Champagne, Picardy, and Flanders.[3] The complexity of the *Roman* is in striking contrast with the unity of the poem of Heinrich der Glichesaere, who nevertheless worked upon French sources. The *Roman* contains some 30,000 verses, and undoubtedly several 'branches' have been lost.

While the bulk of the 'branches' make the animals act and speak in character, others are full of the manners of the age of chivalry, and the animals act and speak as knights, with little regard to their own characters.

Another *Renart* romance is the independent *Le Couronnement de Renart*, dating from the second half of the 13th cent., which departs further from the Reynard tradition, and which has been attributed to Marie de France, though this is a matter of considerable doubt.[4] To the same romance cycle belongs the *Renart le Nouvel* by Jacquemart Gielée de Lille, 1288.[5]

Its subject is the strife of Reynard against King Noble, represented as a strife of evil against good. The work shows traces of scholastic learning and classical knowledge; its tendency is to allegory, and it satirizes the clergy as does also *Le Couronnement*, for their corruption, while its author strives to exhort to a purer faith.

Still another poem is the long *Renart le Contrefait*, an imitation or reproduction of the older tales,

[1] F. J. Mone, *Reinardus Vulpes*, Stuttgart and Tübingen, [illegible] summarized in A. Rothe, *Les Romans du Renard, extraits, analyses et comparés*, Paris, 1845, p. 40 ff.

Grimm, *Reinhart Fuchs*, p. 1 ff.; summarized in Thoms, p. xxxii ff. This poem was formerly supposed to be earlier than the longer *Reinardus Vulpes*. See Thoms, pp. xxix, xxxvi.

[3] Published by Grimm in his *Reinhart Fuchs*, p. 25 ff. Later [illegible] published fragments of an earlier and original recension in [illegible] *Proben an Karl Lachmann*, Leipzig, 1840. See also K. [illegible] *Reinhart Fuchs*, Halle, 1886.

[4] Willem's work is given in Grimm, p. 115 ff. For the con[illegible] see J. F. Willem, *Reinaert de Vos*, Ghent, 1826. See [illegible] J. Martin, *Willems Gedicht 'Van den Vos Reinaerde' und die Umarbeitung und Fortsetzung 'Reinaert's Historie,'* Paderborn, 1874.

[1] See Thoms, p. lxxiii ff.; T. Wright, *Selection of Latin Stories from MSS. of 13th and 14th cent.* [Percy Society], London, 1842, p. 55, and Introd. *ad fin.*, where an English metrical version of one of the branches of the French *Renart* is printed.

[2] Analyzed in Rothe, p. 73 ff.

[3] L. Sudre, *Les Sources du roman de Renart*, Paris, 1892, p. 23. The *Roman* was ed. by D. M. Méon, *Le Roman du [de] Renart, publié d'après les manuscrits de la Bibl. du roi, des XIIIe, XIVe, et XVe siècles*, 4 vols., Paris, 1826. A supplementary vol. was published by P. Chabaille, *Le Roman du Renart: Suppléments, variantes, et corrections*, Paris, 1845. A definitive ed. is that of E. Martin, *Le Roman de Renart*, 3 vols., Strassburg and Paris, 1882–87; see also his *Observations sur le Roman de Renart*, do. 1887. An analysis of the poem will be found in Rothe, p. 106 ff.

[4] Published in Méon, vol. iv., and analyzed in Rothe, p. 302 ff.

[5] Méon, vol. iv.; Rothe, p. 364 ff.

by a clerk of Troyes, writing in the 14th cent., which satirizes the monastic and chivalric orders and displays a vast encyclopædic knowledge of the learning of the age.[1]

2. Characteristics of the Reynard cycle.—While the different versions of the Reynard story differ in literary worth, and while some have an obviously moral purpose or exhibit satire directed against some particular abuse, the work as a whole is one of the great monuments of literature. The picture of the age, its manners, its ideals, is a vivid one. A satiric criticism of life—life as a whole, as well as of particular aspects of life—is always present; but the telling of a story, the desire of literary expression, was probably the first purpose of the authors, and the humorous element—'broad rustic mirth,' to quote Carlyle — coarse, brutal, and cynical as it often is, pervades the whole work. The fox is the clever villain all through, astute, evil, both as an animal and as a representative of man, yet he tends to be sympathetically regarded by the reader, like many of Dickens's villains. The other animals usually act in keeping with their nature, and are more than men disguised. While styled a romance, the poems and, later, the prose version have little of the romantic element, although fancy plays round all the episodes, coarse, hard, and cynical as they often are. The element of parody enters into the whole cycle, parody even of the most sacred things, and Carlyle truly calls it a 'wild parody of human life.' His characteristic summing-up of the whole epos can never be bettered.[2]

Caxton's version avows its moral purpose: 'This booke is maad for nede and prouffyte of alle god folke, as fer as they in redynge or heeryngе of it shal mowe understand and fele the forsayd subtyl deceytes that dayly ben used in the worlde, not to thentente that men shold use them, but that every man shold eschewe and kepe hym from the subtyl false shrewis that they be not deceyvyd.' But humour is none the less the main characteristic of his version.

3. Sources.—Grimm and others believed that the Reynard story was of Germanic origin, based on an old German animal epos. But no trace of this exists, and it is certain that the existing German versions are based on French originals. The provenance of the cycle is probably those regions of France and Flanders bordering on Germany, or the region between the Seine and the Rhine[3]—a supposition which would account for the Germanic form of such names as Ragenhard (Reynard), Isengrim, Richild, etc., of which Grimm made so much.[4] While Reynard has been for four centuries one of the most popular heroes in Germany, the soil in which during the 12th-13th cent. the romance flourished most was undoubtedly France, and especially its northern part. The oldest text is a Latin one; then follow the older French branches of the *Renart*. These are followed again by the version of Heinrich der Glichesaere, a Middle High German version translated from or based on French originals, and that again by the Flemish and Low German versions. The sources of the Reynard stories are probably much less the apologues so much beloved in the Middle Ages than oral and folk tradition. Sudre has devoted a work of great research to an investigation of the sources, and has made this conclusion practically certain. In spite of certain resemblances of some 'branches' of the *Renart* and of the early Latin versions to the apologues, beast-fables, and the stories of the long popular *Physiologus*, all of which had a great vogue in the cloisters and schools, the affinities between them are rare, distant, and indirect. The allegorical, symbolical, and didactic aspects of the apologue are lacking in *Renart*, and the circumstances of the age were such that these would hardly have been omitted by authors working directly upon existing fables. The Reynard stories have been mainly derived from the folk, and only indirectly from literary sources. Thus they stand parallel to the *Jātakas*, the *Pañchatantra*, the fables of Æsop and Phædrus, all of them also rooted in current folk-tales in their respective ages and places of origin. The link with apologue and fable is slight; the link with the vast edifice of folk-tales of animals, intended to amuse rather than instruct, is strong. From both, but mainly from the latter, the authors of the *Renart* stories with great art produced a work which in its different forms has had an extraordinary popularity.

[1] *Le Roman de Renart le Contrefait*, ed. F. Wolf, Vienna, 1862; analysis in Rothe, p. 474 ff., and in A. C. M. Robert, *Fables inédites des XIIe, XIIIe et XIVe siècles*, 2 vols., Paris, 1825, p. cxxxii ff.

[2] 'Early German Literature,' *Miscellanies*, iii. 204 ff. (*Works*, People's Ed., London, 1871–72).

[3] G. Saintsbury, *The Flourishing of Romance and the Rise of Allegory*, London and Edinburgh, 1897, p. 289.

[4] Cf. P. Paris, *Les Aventures de maître Renart et d'Ysengrin son Compère*, Paris, 1861, p. 323 f.; Sudre, p. 45 f.

LITERATURE.—The various edd. of the stories of the Reynard cycle and various works dealing with it have been sufficiently indicated in the notes. See also W. J. A. Jonckbloet, *Etude sur le roman de Renart*, Groningen, 1863; E. Martin, *Examen critique des manuscrits du Roman de Renart*, Basel, 1872. E. Arber's reprint of Caxton's *Hist. of Reynard the Fox*, London, 1895, is a useful ed. of the tale (English Scholar's Library of Old and Modern Works).

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

RIDDLE.—1. Definition. — 'Riddle' is a comprehensive term for a puzzling question or an ambiguous proposition which is intended to be solved by conjecture. Obscure terms are employed on purpose, in order to conceal the meaning, and thereby to stimulate the intellect and imagination of the reader or listener. Rhetorically the riddle is closely related to the metaphor, and in fact it may be defined as a metaphor or a group of metaphors which have not passed into common usage and whose significance is not evident. Aristotle[1] insisted on the close connexion between the riddle and the metaphor, maintaining that, when the metaphor is employed continuously in the discourse, a riddle is the result. This conception of the riddle closely associates it with the allegory and fable, and was the Greek view; for the term αἶνος, from which αἴνιγμα ('riddle') is derived, was applied to Æsop's fables. As a symbolical mode of expression, in which the real sense is obscured, it becomes an important instrument for the cultivation not only of wit, but also of man's intellectual capacities.

From one point of view the riddle is a product of humour, from another it is the result of man's ability to perceive analogies in nature; its capacity to puzzle is due very largely to analogies which are unconsciously stored up in metaphorical speech. While a genuine riddle possesses the quality of obscurity—the more obscure the better—yet at the same time it must be a perfectly true description. Every term ought to be as accurate and exact as in a logical definition, but put in a form to baffle and puzzle. All these characteristics of a genuine enigma are well exemplified in the riddle of the Sphinx, which is worthy of being quoted, not only as a normal example, but because of the large part which it played in Greek legend and literature:

'What walks on four legs in the morning, on two at noon, and on three in the evening?'[2]

In this question the Sphinx takes the day metaphorically for the span of human life.

The power of a riddle to arrest the attention and make truth impressive is largely due to an element

[1] *Poet.* 22.

[2] τί ἐστιν, ὁ μίαν ἔχον φωνὴν τετράπουν καὶ δίπουν καὶ τρίπουν γίνεται. The poet Pindar is the first Greek writer to employ the term αἴνιγμα in the sense of 'riddle,' and uses it to designate this saying.

of incongruity which is usually present, the irreconcilable and incompatible being associated together. Aristotle has brought this feature out in one of his statements in regard to riddles:

αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συναψαι.[1]

Samson's enigma, the one folk-riddle preserved in Scripture, distinctly embodies this characteristic of incongruity:

'Out of the eater came forth meat,
And out of the strong came forth sweetness' (Jg 14[14]).

2. Types.—The general term 'riddle' covers several different types of enigmatical questions and sayings.

(*a*) *Logogriph.*—The difficulty may be concentrated in a single word, when the puzzle lies in the double sense which the word bears. For this kind of riddle the French employ the term *calembour*, the Germans *Worträtsel*; a favourite designation for it is 'logogriph.' A modern example may be cited:

When Victor Hugo was elected to membership in the French Academy, Salvandy bitterly remarked to the distinguished author: 'Monsieur, vous avez introduit en France l'art scénique (l'arsenic).'

The Greeks also employed this type of riddle, and a well-known instance of it is found in the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, where the word *ἀσπίς* occurs in the double sense of 'shield' and 'asp.'[2]

This type of riddle may be spontaneous and natural, or, with the development of the literary art, it may be worked out artificially until the logogriph proper is developed. Strictly speaking, the logogriph covers a class of riddles in which the puzzle is based upon the addition, subtraction, or transposition of letters. A more familiar term for the case when the letters are transposed is 'anagram.' An example of a Latin logogriph is:

'Tolle caput, simile aetati tum tempus habebis.'—*Puer; Ver* (J. C. Scaliger).

A simple one in English runs:

'There is a word in the English language the first two letters of which signify a male, the first three a female, the first four a great man, the whole a great woman.'—He-r-o-ine.

The ancient Hebrews, in disguising a word or name by substituting the last letter of the alphabet for the first, the next last for the second, and so forth, formed what may not inaptly be termed an anagram. By this method שֵׁשַׁךְ stands for בָּבֶל (Jer 25[26]), and לֵב קָמַי for כַּשְׂדִּים (25[1]). With these may be grouped the famous handwriting on the wall (Dn 5[25]).

(*b*) *Enigma.*—Less mechanical and more important is the enigma proper, Aristotle's *αἴνιγμα*, in which the obscure intimation runs through an entire passage, sometimes of considerable length. This type of riddle is very closely allied to both the allegory and the parable.[3] The Greeks would have regarded Nathan's famous parable (2 S 12) and Isaiah's song of the vineyard (Is 5) as riddles. The prophet Ezekiel (ch. 17) works out an allegory in which the monarchs of Babylon and Egypt are described as eagles. The prophet himself designates his allegory a riddle as well as a parable,[4] and the art revealed in his working out of the imagery indicates that Hebrew writers were masters of the symbolical riddle. The conversation of Jesus with Nicodemus is an example of an enigmatical discourse employed for the purpose of making profound religious truth impressive (Jn 3).

(*c*) *Rebus.*—The rebus is a third type. Originally it was a riddle put in the form of a picture of things in words or syllables.

According to Plutarch, Alexander the Great, during the siege of Tyre, saw in a dream a satyr (Σάτυρος) who could be caught only with difficulty. The wise men interpreted the dream for him very quickly: Σάτυρος = Σὰ Τύρος.

Another type of the rebus was put in the form of an object-lesson. Let us note an example of it in the political sphere:

The Emperor Marcus Aurelius finds that his revenues are steadily decreasing and sends messengers to Judah, the patriarch, for counsel. Instead of giving a verbal reply, the latter takes the imperial emissaries out to his garden, where he uproots the larger plants and replaces them with smaller. The royal ambassadors return without any message, but report the strange actions of the rabbi to their royal master, who fully comprehends the symbolism of the act and follows the advice given to him in this strange manner.

A notable rebus in the historical sphere revolves about the person of Cyrus.

The Scythians, attacked by Cyrus, sent the Persian monarch a messenger with arrows, a rat, and a frog. By these gifts they meant to tell Cyrus that, unless he could hide in a hole like a rat, or like a frog in water, he could not escape their arrows.

(*d*) *Charade.*—The charade[1] is a later development of riddle-making, a product of literary activity rather than of primitive efforts at poetry or rhetoric, and thus is essentially artificial. The charade usually turns upon letters or syllables composing a word, sometimes on words composing a phrase. It has not inaptly been termed a 'syllable-riddle' (*Silbenrätsel*). Examples will indicate its character better than a formal definition. Here is one taken from Greek sources:

νῆσος ὅλη, μύκημα βοὸς, φωνή τε δανειστοῦ, 'the whole an island, the lowing of an ox, and the voice of an usurer.' The interpretation is ῥό + δός, the island of Rhodes.[2]

We owe a beautiful ancient Latin charade to Aulus Gellius:

'Semel minusne, an bis minus, non sat scio,
At utrumque eorum, ut quondam audivi dicier,
Iovi ipsi regi noluit concedere.'[3]

Its solution lies in the equation: *Semel minus + bis minus = ter minus* = god Terminus, whose symbol, a boundary-stone, remained in the temple of Jupiter erected by Tarquinius Superbus.

A famous charade on 'cod,' which, according to most authorities, has been incorrectly ascribed to Macaulay, runs as follows:

'Cut off my head, and singular I act;
Cut off my tail and plural I appear;
Cut off my head and tail, and, wondrous fact,
Although my middle's left, there's nothing there.
What is my head? A sounding sea.
What is my tail? A flowing river.
'Mid ocean's depths I fearless stray,
Parent of softest sounds, yet mute forever.'

A. Führer has called attention to the existence of charades in Sanskrit poetry; and, singularly enough, many of these have a religious significance.[4]

(*e*) *Epigram.*—According to the Greek view, the epigram, in its original sense of a poetical inscription on votive offerings or grave-stones, was closely related to the riddle. In many instances the resemblance would have been complete if the epigram had suggested a challenge to solution.[5] An

[1] *Poet.* 22.

[2] Line 15 ff.:

οὐδὲν ἄρα γρύφου διαφέρει Κλεώνυμος,
πρόφασ[illegible] προφρέ τις τοῖσι συμποσταῖς λέγων
'ὅστ' ἐ[illegible] τοῦτον εἰ γῆ τ' ἀπέβαλεν κἀν οὐρανῷ
κἀν τῇ θαλάττῃ θυρίον τὴν ἀσπίδα;'

[3] Gerber (*Die Sprache als Kunst*, ii. 485) terms it 'das allegorische Rätsel.'

[4] The Hebrew word for riddle is חִידָה, and for parable מָשָׁל. Both of these occur in Ezk 17[2], and may be regarded as descriptive of the passage which follows. Among the Greeks *αἶνος* was a designation for a riddle like those current under the name of Æsop; *αἴνιγμα* is derived from *αἶνος*, in like manner all obscure proverbs were designated *αἰνίγματα*.

[1] 'Charade' is a word of French origin. In his *Dict. de la littérature* (1770) Sebastien gives the following definition: 'Ce mot vient de l'idiome languedocien et signifie, dans son origine, un discours propre à tuer le temps; on dit en Languedoc: allons faire des charades, pour allons passer l'après-soupé, ou allons veiller chez un tel, parce que, dans les assemblées de l'après-soupé, le peuple de cette province s'amuse à dire des riens pour passe temps' (quoted from Littre).

[2] Quoted from Ohlert, *Rätsel und Gesellschaftsspiele der alten Griechen*, p. 167.

[3] *Noctes Atticae*, xii. 6.

[4] See *ZDMG* xxxix. [1885] 99 ff.

[5] Ohlert, p. 108: 'Zahlreiche Epigramme konnten als Rätsel gelten, wenn man ihnen die Ueberschrift nimmt; zahlreiche Rätsel als Epigramme, wenn man die Aufforderung zum Raten entfernt.' This statement is made especially of the Greek field.

illustration taken from a grave-stone is interesting:

τοὔνομα θῆτα ῥῶ ἄλφα σάν ὖ μῦ ἄλφα χῖ οὖ σάν
πατρὶς Καλχηδών, ἡ δὲ τέχνη σοφίη,

'My name is theta rho alpha sigma u mu alpha chi u sigma; Chalcedon was my native land; to be wise is art.'

This Thrasymachus was a sophist mentioned by Plato.

(*f*) *Arithmetical riddle.*—The arithmetical or numerical riddle is next to be noted. Many of these are very trivial and are based upon the form of the numeral.

E.g., 'How does twenty remain when one is subtracted from nineteen?' The solution depends upon the form of the Roman numerals XIX and XX.

A serious form of arithmetical riddle was developed, especially by the Jews, through the numerical value of the letters of the alphabet. Many Jewish commentators made נָחָשׁ (= 'serpent') one of the names of the Messiah because the numerical value of the letters is the equivalent of קָשֶׁת. In Gn 14[14] the reader is supposed to find the name of Abraham's steward because the numerical value of the Hebrew consonants making up the word Eliezer equals 318, the number of the patriarch's attendants. Jewish writers developed this method of writing and interpretation into a system and termed it 'Gematria.'[1] Instead of the intended word, its numerical value was produced by permutation of the letters; in course of time this developed into the kabbalistic method of interpreting OT Scripture. One numerical riddle appears in the pages of the NT; it is the number of the beast, 666 (Rev 13[18]). The custom of taking the letters of a word in a numerical sense was a part of every Gnostic system. As a prominent example we may take the word *Abraxas*, used by the Gnostics as an amulet because the numerical value of the Greek letters totalled 365, the number of days in a year.[2]

Another form of the arithmetical riddle is found in the OT, and was much cultivated by the Jews of post-Biblical days and termed by them the *middah* (מִדָּה). A typical example occurs in Pr 30[15b. 16]:

'There are three things that are never satisfied,
Yea, four that say not, Enough.'

These two lines contain the riddle proper; the answer is given in the following verse:

'Sheol; and the barren womb;
The earth that is not satisfied with water;
And the fire that saith not, Enough.'

The numerical riddle in this form is the favourite type among the Arabs, and instances of it have also been found in Sanskrit literature.[3] It was also much affected by the Jews of Talmudic times. The Jewish scholar A. Wünsche has published a collection of the *middah* type of numerical riddles under the title, 'Die Zahlensprüche in Talmud und Midrasch.'[4]

3. Origin and development.—The riddle originated in the infancy of the human race. J. G. Herder, in his *Vom Geist der hebräischen Poesie*,[5] remarks that 'all peoples in the first stages of culture are lovers of riddles.' The same spirit which gave birth to the folk-song and folk-proverb likewise produced the riddle. A genuine folk-riddle is a spontaneous expression, coming from the depths of the soul of a people or race, not from the mind of an individual, and consequently is anonymous (cf. art. PROVERBS). Riddles are therefore in a real sense the *vox populi*. Many profound mysterious truths were expressed in the form of riddles by primitive man, who also frequently used the same literary device in his description of an occasional accidental occurrence, when it constituted a mystery for him. That Greek writers had occasion to discuss the relation between *αἴνιγμα* and *γρῖφος*, two common designations for riddles, and the two terms *μῦθος* and *λόγος* is a clear indication that Greek enigmas touched the domain of mythology. These two spheres would of necessity come together when the mystery of a natural phenomenon furnished the puzzle for the riddle-maker. Mythological speculation actually forms a part of the riddle-hymn of the *Rigveda* (see below).

A sharp distinction ought to be made between the original folk-riddle and those more or less artificial ones which have come down to us through the channels of literature. Rolland[1] lays stress upon this distinction by dividing riddles into two classes: (1) *l'énigme vraiment populaire*; (2) *l'énigme savante ou littéraire*. It is, however, doubtful whether any of the folk-riddles of remote antiquity have come down to us in their original form. We possess them, if at all, in the polished (and in a sense artificial) form resulting from the labours of literary men. The writings of the great literary geniuses of Greece are liberally sprinkled with such riddles; many involving subtle metaphysical discussions are found in the *Rigveda*. Modern investigators have made collections of riddles current among people of primitive culture. In a recent edition of Rolland[2] the editor has added an appendix giving a number of riddles current among the Wolofs of Senegambia, and similar collections are to be found in the journals of learned societies and missionary periodicals.

Chronologically the riddle may be followed to a remote antiquity. A very ancient Semitic riddle is preserved in a Babylonian tablet:

'Who becomes pregnant without conceiving?
Who becomes fat without eating?'

The answer is 'Clouds.'[3]

The oldest recorded Greek riddle is associated with Minos, king of Crete.[4] When his son, Glaucus, disappeared, the monarch consulted an oracle; the reply was in the form of an enigma which was solved by the seer, Polyidus. There are many allusions to this riddle in Greek literature, especially in the great tragedians.

Pre-eminent among *énigmes littéraires* are the riddles of the Vedic writings. The spontaneity and *naïveté* of the folk type have entirely disappeared, and instead of these characteristics they distinctly reflect metaphysical speculation of an abstruse order (see below). The same qualities characterize the enigmas with which the Greek philosophers were accustomed to enliven their banquets. At certain periods of literary activity there have been revivals of the art of riddle-making; writers distinguished for their efforts at serious literature have amused themselves by producing riddles usually trivial in subject-matter, yet frequently beautiful in form. Riddle-making was an affectation with the Greeks of the Byzantine period, and their production of *αἰνίγματα* and *γρίφοι* was reduced to rules. Ohlert mentions three poets of the 11th cent.—Psellus, Basilius Megalomitis, and Aulikalamus—who devoted themselves almost exclusively to the writing of riddles. The

[1] Cf. *JE*, *s.v.* 'Gematria.'

[2] In the Sibylline verses we have a numerical enigma. The answer is the word Ἰησοῦς = 888:

Ι = 10 + η = 8 + σ = 200 + ο = 70 + υ = 400 + σ = 200.
ἥξει σαρκοφόρος θνητοῖς ὁμοιούμενος ἐν γῇ
τέσσερα φωνήεντα φέρει, τὰ δ' ἄφωνα δύ' αὐτῷ.
δίσσων ἀστραγάλων ἀριθμὸν δ' ὅλον ἐξονομήνω
ὄκτω γὰρ μοναδὰς ὅσσας δεκάδας ἐπὶ τούτοις
ἠδ' ἑκατοντάδας ὄκτω ἀπιστοτέροις ἀνθρώποις
οὔνομα δηλώσει.

[3] Cf. F. Delitzsch, *Comm. on Proverbs*, tr. M. G. Easton, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1874–75, *ad loc.*; Jacob, *Altarabische Parallelen zum AT*, p. 17 f.

[4] *ZDMG* lxv. [1911].

[5] 2 vols., Weimar, 1782–83, reprint, Gotha, 1890.

[1] *Devinettes ou énigmes populaires de la France.*

[2] 1877, originally published in 1628.

[3] Rawlinson, *WAI* ii. table 16, lines 48–50.

[4] Apollodorus, III. iii. 1 f.

Anglo-Latin poets of the 6th cent. and their Anglo-Saxon successors collected and wrote riddles extensively. In France of the 17th cent. men like Boileau delighted in penning riddles—Boileau's riddle on the flea is famous—while Voltaire and Rousseau did not disdain to try their skill in making them. Fénelon tests the sagacity of Télémaque by propounding riddles to him. The popularity of this form of literary expression in France, during the period covered by the name just mentioned, may be judged by the publication of the *Recueil des énigmes de ce temps*,[1] under the editorship of C. Cotin. The *Mercure de France* was a vehicle for the publication of riddles, and Duchesne edited a *Magasin énigmatique*.

In England riddles were much affected by literary men in the age of Swift, who produced many of them. The trivial subject-matter of Swift's riddles —'On Ink,' 'On a Pen,' 'On a Fan'—indicates that they were merely the by-products of literary activity and employed for the purpose of whiling away idle hours. But it was left to Schiller, after going back to the age of the Sibyls and learning the art of riddle-making from them, to develop the riddle into a beautiful poem, a work of literary art. One may be quoted to show that, while the subject-matter is trivial, the verse bears all the marks of the genius of the German poet.

'Auf einer grossen Weide gehen
Viel tausend Schafe silberweiss:
Wie wir sie heute wandeln sehen,
Sah sie der allerält'ste Greis.

Sie altern nie und trinken Leben
Aus einem unerschopften Born,
Ein Hirt ist ihnen zugegeben
Mit schon gebog'nem Silberhorn.

Er treibt sie aus zu goldnen Thoren,
Er überzählt sie jede Nacht,
Und hat der Lammer keins verloren,
So oft er auch den Weg vollbracht.

Ein treuer Hund hilft sie ihm leiten,
Ein muntrer Widder geht voran.
Die Heerde, kannst du sie mir deuten?
Und auch den Hirten zeig' mir an!'[2]

Triviality as to subject-matter is the outstanding characteristic of modern literary riddles, and in this particular they are wholly unlike those of antiquity. With the ancients, as is noticed below (§ 6), riddles touched the serious issues of life. Life and death were involved in unravelling them; weighty policies of State depended on their solution; and even the sacred rites of religion were enlivened by the proposing and guessing of riddles.

4. Form.—Riddles are usually expressed in rhyme or verse. Goethe sets forth this characteristic:

'So legt der Dichter ein Rathsel,
Kunstlich mit Worten verschrankt, oft der Versammlung ins Ohr.'[3]

Samson's enigma, the only popular riddle preserved in the OT, bears all the marks of ancient Hebrew poetry (Jg 14[14]). The Greek riddles scattered through the works of the poets and philosophers are usually in metre. The Anglo-Latin poets of the Middle Ages put their enigmas into hexameter verse, and the riddles of the Anglo-Saxon period are in metrical form. Many Jewish poets of the Middle Ages exercised their muse by putting riddles into poetic form. The length and character of these may be judged by a production of the poet al-Harizi (13th cent.), in which he takes 46 lines to describe the ant in enigmatical form. It was a favourite custom of the native Arabic grammarians to put their rules in poetical riddles. Many examples of these have been collected by G. Rosen.[4] Schiller's riddle quoted above shows how this poet invested it with the peculiar charm of rhythmical expression. It is the poetical form in which it is couched that lends the riddle much of its impressiveness and stimulates the intellect to solution.

5. Occurrence.—As riddles are rooted in metaphors, it is not surprising to find that they are of universal occurrence. They have been discovered among the peoples of primitive culture the world over. Abbé Boilet, in writing of the Wolofs of Senegambia, says that these savages at the evening time in the hut or by the camp-fire ask each other riddles. The Bedawi, as he sits by his tent door, whiles away the evening hours by proposing them, and the Russian peasant enlivens the long hours of a winter's evening by attempting their solution. The Vedic writings abound in them, and they occur in the remains of the literature of ancient Persia. A race like the Greeks, specially gifted with literary genius, delighted in them. Greek literature furnishes abundant material for estimating the influence and popularity of riddles among a race whose achievements in literature have been unsurpassed. Greek poetry is especially rich in them; they are found frequently in Homer and were popular because of the high place which the Homeric poems had in the esteem of the Hellenic race. Riddles naturally played a large part in Greek tragedy, because the solution of the riddle influenced the course of events. Every poet who in any way touched the Theban cycle of myths was compelled to bring in the riddle of the Sphinx. The comic poets delighted in entertaining their audiences by formulating riddles in which they castigated the follies of society. The titles of some of the comedies suggest that they were written in mockery of an affectation for enunciating enigmas; *e.g.*, Eubulus gave one of his comedies the title *Sphingokarion*, *i.e.* a slave who, like the Sphinx, is full of riddles. Theocritus puts enigmatical sayings into the mouths of his shepherds, and Virgil imitates him. The Jews of mediæval times cultivated them with zest as a means of intellectual gymnastics and made them an important part of social entertainment.

An interesting scientific problem is the occurrence of the same riddle among peoples far removed geographically, and belonging to distinct ethnological groups. Gaston Paris, in his preface to Rolland's *Devinettes ou énigmes*, calls attention to this striking phenomenon. One of his examples is a folk-riddle. Its French form is:

'Je vais, je viens dans ma maison,
On vient pour me prendre;
Ma maison se sauve par les fenêtres
Et moi je reste en prison.'
Answer: Le poisson et le filet.

The Scotch form is:

'The robbers cam tae oor hoose
When we were a' in;
The hoose lap out at the windows
And we were a' ta'en.'
Answer: Fishes caught in a net.

Gaston Paris states that this riddle circulates in Russia and among the Lapps; that it has been found among the Chinese and the Negroes of W. Africa; that it is also current among the Basques. Three hypotheses have been propounded to explain the occurrence of a riddle like that just quoted among peoples far removed from each other. (1) A common origin has been postulated. (2) The transmission of the riddle from one race to another has been suggested. Both theories are inadequate to explain the occurrence of the same riddle among two races as far separated as the Scottish and Chinese. (3) The hypothesis which attributes the similarity to the identity of the constitution of the human mind is now very generally accepted.

This view does not entirely exclude the possi-

[1] Paris, 1646.
[2] F. Schiller, *Parabeln und Räthsel*, 3 (*Sämmtliche Werke*, 12 [illegible] 5 f., Leipzig, n.d. [illegible])
[3] *Alexis und Dora*, line 25 f.
[4] Cf. *ZDMG*, xiv [1860] 97 ff., xx [1866] 89 ff.

bility of literary borrowing, which is quite probable in the case of riddles with a prominent place in literature. Writers have undoubtedly helped themselves to what tradition furnished and have not hesitated to refurbish an older enigma. A notable example of this is the riddle which, according to tradition, Homer failed to solve (see next col.).

ὅσσ' ἕλομεν λιπόμεθα, ὅσ' οὐχ ἕλομεν φερόμεθα,
'What we had we lost, what we did not have we kept.'

The same riddle circulated in the Middle Ages in Latin and the popular vernacular;[1] for these versions the hypothesis of literary transmission is more reasonable than that of the identity of the human mind. K. Simrock[2] calls attention to the fact that many Greek riddles also circulate in German and Scandinavian versions. The resemblances may usually be traced to literary influences, but great caution should be used in accounting for these similarities especially in the case of the spontaneous folk-riddle.

6. Uses.—The riddle played an important part in the intellectual and social life of antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages. With the ancients it was a literary form employed for serious purposes in the spheres of politics, philosophy, and religion. Many of the most prominent figures of history are renowned because of their ability either to formulate riddles or to interpret them. Of Biblical characters Solomon and Daniel live in history as skilful in the solution of dark sayings and enigmas.[3] The esteem in which such skill was held among Jews of a later time may be judged by the ascription of similar gifts to hypostatized Wisdom.[4] Monarchs of renown are represented as engaged in contests with one another in the solution of riddles. Solomon and Hiram of Tyre engaged in such competition; the former was continuously successful until his rival called in the assistance of a famous magician Abdemon.[5] A Greek legend tells how Amasis, king of Egypt, engaged in a similar contest with the king of the Ethiopians.[6] The Egyptian monarch sent for aid to Bias, the wisest of the Greeks. In the life of Æsop we read of a riddle contest between a Babylonian king Lycurgus and Nectanebo of Egypt; the former is continuously victorious through the assistance of Æsop. Alexander the Great, during his campaign in India, summons Hindu sages before his throne and challenges them to solve riddles of his own propounding. Even the gods are represented as indulging in this pastime; Jupiter proposes a riddle to King Numa.[7] The Longobards had a custom of propounding riddles to their deity Gwodan which they expected him to solve—a custom suggesting the seeking of oracles.

Frequently the contest by riddle was serious enough to involve life and death. The contestant who was vanquished lost his life. Competitions of this kind occurred among the rhapsodists, both Indian and Greek. The epic poem, *Melampodie*, attributed to Theognis, contains an account of a riddle contest between the two famous seers, Calchas and Mopsus. According to one tradition, the former is victorious; according to another, the latter; but in either case the vanquished loses his life. The authority of Plutarch supports the legend of a struggle of this type between Theognis and Homer, in which the latter is worsted and dies of mortification. In the Theban legend the Sphinx destroys those who fail to solve her riddle, and, when Œdipus is successful, the monster hurls herself over a precipice. There are modern Greek legends in which the failure to solve a riddle costs a man his life. A monster living in a castle propounds a riddle and gives forty days for its solution. Unfortunate is the person who fails, for the monster devours him. The resemblance to the story of the Sphinx is evident. In the *Mahābharata* the legend takes another form: the hero Yudhishthira frees two brothers from the fetters of a monster by the solution of a riddle. Teutonic legends are of similar import: in the so-called *Wartburg-Krieg* there is a deadly riddle contest between Odin and the giant Wafthrudhnir, and another instance has been immortalized by Schiller.[1] In certain parts of Germany the boy who fails to solve a riddle is greeted with such expressions as: 'Er ist des Henkers,' 'Muss sich zum Henker scheeren,' 'Kommt in die Hölle,' 'Ist todt.'[2] These expressions may be relics from the times when the unsuccessful competitor actually lost his life.

In other legends the winning of a bride is made to depend on the solution of a riddle by the suitor. This custom was known in the India of Vedic times, and also appears in the Norse legend which represents Thor as promising his daughter to the dwarf Alvis on condition that the latter answers a long list of perplexing questions. This feature is present in the Theban Sphinx legend, for the hand of Queen Jocasta was promised to the man who would be successful in solving the famous riddle and thereby freeing the land from the ravages of the monster. On the other hand, failure to solve the riddle often cost the suitor his life.[3]

7. Riddles in social life.—The propounding and solution of riddles was included in the merry-making that formed a part of wedding festivities. Samson's riddle, already quoted, is not the only instance of such a use preserved in literature; Samson's Greek compeer Hercules, although uninvited, goes to the wedding of Keyx and joins the rhapsodists in the solution of riddles.

Plato is responsible for the statement that riddle-making was a favourite pastime with lads in his day;[4] when the Romans came under Greek influence, the boys were instructed in the forming of enigmas.[5] In the best days of their history the banquets of the Greeks were something more than drinking-bouts; intellectual pleasures were cultivated, and prominent among these was the riddle, which was the delight not only of poets and philosophers, but also of the masses. The banquet was under the control of a symposiarch, under whose direction the riddle passed from person to person. The successful guesser won a prize; those who failed paid a penalty. Usually the prize was the laurel-wreath, and the penalty consisted in drinking unmixed wine or wine mingled with salt water.[6] Aulus Gellius[7] describes an Athenian dinner-party of his day (A.D. 2nd cent.): the host propounds a riddle to each of his guests; the winner receives the laurel-wreath or the copy of a

[1] Symphosius (6th cent.) gives it in Latin:

'Est nova notarum cunctis captura ferarum
Ut si quid capias, id tecum ferre recuses,
At si nil capias, id tu tamen ipse reportes.'

Pierre Grognet gives it in Latin and French as it circulated in the Middle Ages:

'Ad silvam vado venatum cum cane quino:
Quod capio perdo, quid fugit hoc habeo.'

The French version runs:

'A la forest m'en voys chasser
Avecques cinq chiens à trasser.
Ce que je prens, je pers et tiens,
Ce qui s'enfuyt ay et retiens.'

[2] *Das deutsche Rathselbuch*, 3 vols., Frankfort, 1853–63.
[3] 1 K $10^{1\,13}$, 2 Ch $9^{1ff.}$, Dn $5^{12,\,25}$, Sir 47^{15}; Jos. *Ant.* VIII. v. 3.
[4] Wis 8^{8}. [5] Jos. *Ant.* VIII. v. 3, *c. Apion.* i. 18.
[6] Plutarch, *Conviv. Sept. Sap.* viii.
[7] Ovid, *Fast.* iii. 339–346.

[1] Cf. *Turandot*.
[2] E. L. Rochholz, *Alemannisches Kinderlied*, Leipzig, 1857.
[3] Cf. Schiller's *Turandot*. [4] *Rep.* v. 479.
[5] Grammarian Pompeius.
[6] We are indebted to Athenæus for these details (xi. 457).
[7] *Noctes Atticae*, viii. 2 ff.

rare book. Sometimes a money prize was offered. With the Jews of the Middle Ages, according to Abrahams,[1] riddles were a regular table game, and all the great Jewish poets of this period composed acrostics and enigmas of considerable merit.

8. Riddles in religious ceremonies. — The strangest use of riddles to the modern mind is in connexion with religious rites and ceremonies. Among peoples of primitive culture enigmas are asked and answered in the proximity of a corpse or at harvest time. Among the Bolang Mongondo (Celebes) riddles are never asked except when there is a corpse in the village. In the Aru archipelago, while a corpse is uncoffined, watchers propound riddles to each other or think of things which others are to guess. This practice is evidently rooted in animism, and enigmatical language may be used to puzzle the spirit of the departed. A reminiscence of this custom seems to linger in Brittany, where old men are accustomed to seat themselves on grave-stones and ask each other riddles after the friends of the deceased and the mourners have gone home. Among the Akamba of British E. Africa boys and girls at the time of circumcision interpret pictographs which are termed riddles. At harvest time the riddle is looked upon as a charm which may make or mar the crops. The Alfoors of the Central Celebes engage in riddle-guessing during the season when the crops are tilled and are growing. On the solution of a riddle they exclaim: 'Make our rice to grow, make fat ears to grow both in the valley and on the heights!' Animistic conceptions probably underlie this custom, and the prayer is to be regarded as addressed to the spirits of the ancestors.

(*a*) *Oracles.*—The answers of the Greek oracles were usually couched in a riddle or enigmatical statement. In this connexion it is exceedingly suggestive to note that Aristophanes[2] terms the answers of oracles γρῖφοι, a word commonly used for riddles. The oldest Greek riddle is the answer of the oracle to Minos, king of Crete. As oracles were consulted before important political undertakings and military campaigns, the significance of the enigma in Greek life cannot be overestimated.

E.g., immediately before entering upon the disastrous Sicilian expedition, the Athenians consulted the Delphic oracle; as a reply the Pythia commanded the Athenians to bring the priestess of Athene from Erythræa. This enigmatical reply turns about the name of the priestess Ἡσυχία ('Rest').[3]

The riddle was specially adapted for oracles because it was puzzling and consequently impressive, and at the same time concealed ignorance of the future.

(*b*) *At festivals.*—Riddles formed a part of the ritual at the festival of Agrionia, sacred to Dionysus. In the rites of this festival women first sought for the god as if he had been lost. When they had ceased their quest, they exclaimed: 'Dionysus has betaken himself to the Muses.' Then there followed a sacred meal at which these worshippers propounded and answered riddles (*αἰνίγματα καὶ γρίφους*).[4] It is probable that a similar custom prevailed at other religious festivals; at least an allusion has been discovered to it in a fragment of the poet Diphilus. A riddle contest between three maidens in connexion with a feast of Adonis on the island of Samos is referred to in his comedy entitled *Theseus*. The *Laws of Manu* enacted that riddles were to be asked at the *śraddha* feasts. One of the enactments may be quoted:

'Whatever may please the Brâhmanas, let him give without grudging; let him give riddles from the Vedas, for that is grateful to the manes.'[5]

(*c*) *In Vedic hymns.*—Vedic literature reveals a unique use of riddles in religious ceremonies and in metaphysical speculation. It is most suggestive that the Vedic word *brahmodya*, or *brahmavadya*, is a designation for a poetic religious riddle, as well as a term descriptive of speculative discussion. Etymologically the word denotes 'analysis of the Brahma.' In one of the Vedic hymns[1] the description of Agni is put in the form of a riddle:

'Who among you has understood this hidden (god)? The calf has by itself given birth to its mothers. The germ of many (mothers), the great seer, moving by his own strength, comes forward from the lap of the active ones.' (The mothers are waters.)

The famous riddle hymn of Dirghatamas is a part of the *Rigveda*.[2] It contains 52 verses, of which all except one are riddles. The theme of this hymn is theosophy and theosophical speculation which revolves about cosmic phenomena, mythology, and human organs. The hymn may be characterized as a poetical expression of primitive Hindu philosophy in enigmatical language. It was intended to be used by priests as they offered sacrifices. The most striking use of poetic riddles or charades, to 'enliven the mechanical and technical progress of sacrifice by impressive intellectual pyrotechnics,' was in connexion with the famous horse-sacrifice, or *aśvamedha*. This part of the ritual was conducted by two priests, one asking the riddle and the other giving the answer.[3] These riddles are so unique in the history of religion that they are worthy of special notice.

At the horse-sacrifice one priest asks: 'Who, verily, moveth quite alone; who, verily, is born again and again; what, forsooth, is the remedy for cold; and what is the great (greatest) pile?'

The answer is: 'The sun moveth quite alone; the moon is born again and again; Agni (fire) is the remedy for cold; the earth is the great (greatest) pile.'

The priest called *hotar* asks the priest called *adhvaryu*, 'What, forsooth, is the sun-like light; what sea is there like unto the ocean; what, verily, is higher than the earth; what is the thing whose measure is not known?'

The answer is: 'Brahma is the sun-like light; heaven is the sea like unto the ocean; (the god) Indra is higher than the earth; the measure of the cow is (quite) unknown.'

Again, the following questions and answers: 'I ask thee for the highest summit of the earth; I ask thee for the navel of the universe; I ask thee for the seed of the lusty steed; I ask thee for the highest heaven of speech.'

'This altar is the highest summit of the earth; this sacrifice is the navel of the universe; this *soma* [the intoxicating sacrificial drink] is the seed of the lusty steed [god Indra?]; this Brahman priest is the highest heaven [*i.e.* the highest exponent] of speech.'

(The translation is that of Bloomfield.)

LITERATURE.—I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896, p. 384 ff.; *GB*[3], pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, do. 1913, p. 121 ff. and *passim*; J. B. Friedreich, *Gesch. des Rathsels*, Dresden, 1860; G. Gerber, *Die Sprache als Kunst*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1885; G. Jacob, *Altarabische Parallelen zum AT*, do. 1897, p. 18 f.; M. Jäger, 'Assyrische Rathsel und Spruchworter,' in *BASS* ii. [1894] 274 ff.; F. E. König, *Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 12 ff.; L. Löw, *Die Lebensalter in der jüdischen Literatur*, Szegedin, 1875, p. 346 ff.; K. Ohlert, *Rätsel und Gesellschaftsspiele der alten Griechen*, Berlin, 1886 (indispensable for a study of Greek riddles); E. Rolland, *Devinettes ou énigmes populaires de la France*, originally published, Treviso, 1628, new ed., with preface by Gaston Paris, Paris, 1877 (valuable); A. Wünsche, *Die Rathselweisheit bei den Hebräern*, Leipzig, 1883 (an important monograph). Other literature has been mentioned either in the body of the art. or in the notes.

JAMES A. KELSO.

RIDICULE.—See ABUSE.

RIGHTS.—T. E. Holland, as a preliminary to his account of rights in the legal sense of the term, has defined 'a right generally' as 'one man's capacity of influencing the acts of another, by means, not of his own strength, but of opinion or the force of society.'[4] The definition is useful as bringing out the complex character of the idea of

[1] *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, p. 132.
[2] *Birds*, 976.
[3] Plutarch, *de Pyth. orac.* xix.
[4] Plutarch, *Convir. Sept. Sap.* viii.
[5] iii. 230.

[1] i. xcv. 4.
[2] i. clxiv. 46.
[3] M. Bloomfield, *The Religion of the Veda*, New York, 1908, p. 215 ff., also an art. in *JAOS* xv. [1892] 172; cf. M. Haug, 'Vedische Rätselfragen und Rätselsprüche,' *SBAW*, 1875, ii. 4.
[4] *Elements of Jurisprudence*[9], p. 82.

right. It implies, as he goes on with excellent lucidity to indicate, the fourfold relation between (1) the subject or person who has the right, or the 'person entitled'; (2) the person who has the corresponding duty, or 'the person obliged'; (3) the object over which the right is exercised; and (4) the act of forbearance which is exacted. The definition further emphasizes the important fact that for the existence of a right in the full sense of the word recognition is necessary, and it properly distinguishes between those rights which rest merely on the approval of public opinion (subsequently by an unfortunate choice called 'moral rights') and those which are protected by legal enactment, or 'legal rights.' On the other hand, the definition fails in so far as it uses 'society' in a sense either too wide or too narrow—too wide in so far as it ignores the different forms of social organization, each with its own system of rights and duties, of which society in general consists (family, school, church, etc.), too narrow if it is intended to exclude reference to the rights of nations. And this criticism leads to another. The definition contains an implicit denial not only that, besides the rights actually recognized by society, whether by its law or by its public opinion, there are rights founded on the requirements of human nature itself—things that are rights simply because they are 'right'—but also that there is any essential relation at all between the adjectival and the substantival meaning of the word.[1] A science like jurisprudence has of course a right to define its terms in the way most convenient for its own special purpose. But that is a different thing from claiming that its use expresses the only legitimate or the most fundamental use of the term. In opposition to this it may be claimed that any definition of right generally must be defective which fails to indicate what this relation is. In the present article, written from the point of view of ethics and religion, the main object will be to supply this omission. In the attempt to do so it will be convenient to preface the main subject with a short statement (1) of the origin and development of the idea of individual rights, and (2) of the chief theories that have been held as to the ground of rights, with the view of leading up to (3) a more inclusive definition, and suggesting some deductions and applications to current problems of the rights of individuals and nations which may serve as a verification of its conclusions.

I. *DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS.*—It is by this time a commonplace of sociology that in early forms of society, so far from finding a stage at which individual thought and action are free from the pressure of the social environment, we have one in which the mind and will of individuals are dominated by the collective mind as expressed in the customs of the group. This subordination is nowhere better illustrated than in the history of the idea of right. If we turn to the early use of δίκαιος in Greek literature, we find it in Homer[2] simply in the sense of possessing rules or customs, and as in this sense the mark of civilized life, in contrast to the mannerless Cyclops. Between this and the use in Thucydides and Xenophon in such phrases as δίκαια ποιεῖν and δίκαια ἔχειν there is a wide gap. In these a moral reference to things that not only is it the rule to do, but that may be claimed by the individual as by right, has emerged, and we might think (particularly in the latter phrase) that we have reached an explicit acknowledgment of the idea of the 'rights' which the individual in turn 'possesses.' But the student of Greek ethics knows that in its classical exponents there is as yet no word corresponding to either 'rights' or 'duties' in the modern sense. We have to wait another generation before, in the Stoic τὰ καθήκοντα, we have the definite specification of things that are right to be done as definitely 'belonging' to the individual. Even here we are still far from the idea of these as implying corresponding 'rights.' In early Roman law itself, which did so much to develop the idea of personality, the idea of duty, as Maine has pointed out, is far more prominent than that of rights.[1] What Roman law effected was to translate the Stoic idea of personality and the 'law of nature,' which personality embodied, into terms of civic relationships and so, by conceiving of a universal justice or right of nations,[2] to pave the way for the recognition of the further idea of rights that belonged to an individual independently of his membership in a particular society. Thenceforth one might say that the development of the two ideas, the legal and the moral, proceeds *pari passu*, seeing that the idea of the individual as a personality with rights as *against* society is at once the creation of the recognition of him as endowed with rights *in* society and an important factor in the development of the claim for this recognition itself.

The story of the spectral analysis of the law of nature into the prismatic colours of 'natural rights' is a long one.[3] The chief influence was undoubtedly the Christian religion, appealing on the one hand to a primitive state of freedom and equality, on the other hand to a relation of man to God which was essentially a personal one. But these seeds of the idea of the rights of man had to await a soil congenial to them, which was first found when English tradition and temperament led to a revolt against social and political despotism in the time of Wyclif.[4] By the middle of the 17th cent., and still more by the 18th, the claims of rights, in both Old and New England, were already deeply tinged with individualistic theory as to the nature of government. It was under this influence that Milton declared that 'all men were naturally born free . . . born to command and not to obey';[5] that a century later Blackstone wrote:

> 'The principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature';[6]

and that even Burke, in the midst of his violent protest against the doctrine of absolute rights, formulates a doctrine of society laying stress on the idea of rights rather than duties:

> 'Civil Society is an institution of beneficence, and law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule. Men have a right to justice; they have a right to the fruits of their industry, and to the means of making industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents; to the nourishment and improvement of their offspring; to instruction in life and consolation in death. Whatever each man can separately do without

[1] On p. 84 the writer congratulates the English language on having two words, 'law' and 'right,' which enables it to keep those meanings apart, and commiserates other languages which, like German, have only one, and have thus involved writers in endless disputes as to their relation to each other. The reader, however, may compare this contrast with Bentham's even more pungent strictures on the ambiguity of English as compared with French usage, enabling it to slip from the moral to the political use of 'right,' as Don Quixote from one saddle to another without changing horses (*Works*, ii.).

[2] Liddell and Scott, *s.v.*

[1] Holland, who quotes this view, refers to the interesting illustration of the same priority in Japanese law, which had no word for 'right' until the suggestive phrase 'power-interest' was coined by a Japanese writer on Western public law in 1868.

[2] It is important to realize that the Roman *ius gentium* is the right common to all nations, not *international* right.

[3] Reference should be made to artt. INDIVIDUALISM and INDIVIDUALITY.

[4] See art. INDIVIDUALISM, vol. vii. p. 221b. On the influence of Scriptural ideas on the Peasant Revolt see D. G. Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, p. 8, and on the men of the Commonwealth, *The Clarke Papers*, ed. C. H. Firth, 4 vols., London, 1891–1901, *passim*.

[5] Quoted in W. Wallace, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, p. 215.

[6] Quoted *ib.*

trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society with all its combinations of skill and force can do in his favour.'[1]

These passages are sufficient to show the close connexion between the development of the idea of right in its later phases and the development of theory.

But, before turning to this, we may notice how the circumstances which made religion the main influence in the development of the idea of rights in the middle period explain also (what otherwise might seem an inversion of the natural order) why, looked at from the side of the nature of the rights themselves, the claim to spiritual rights should have preceded the claim to political rights and the claim to economic rights should have lagged behind both. While it may appear that the movement here is from the more inward to the more outward and material, in reality it was in the first place from condition to the conditioned, and in the second from the more formal and abstract to the more substantial and concrete. Doubtless the instinctive sense of human capacities in the individual, as dependent for their development on the active assistance of society 'in the removal of all removable obstructions,' was operative from the first. But it was only through freedom of thought and speech and some measure of political power that this sense could make itself articulate and the way could be prepared for the establishment of the conditions of substantive freedom. Add to this once more the influence exercised upon the development of men's ideas as to their rights by powerful forms of abstract theory as to the ground of rights in general and as to the sphere of law, and it is not difficult to understand why, from the side of the content, the fuller idea of the rights of the individual, and of his claim to the active assistance of society in the recovery of the 'lost title-deeds of humanity' in the sphere of material well-being, has been so late in developing.

II. *THEORIES OF THE GROUND OF RIGHTS.*—**1. Theory of the Social Compact.**—If what has been said as to the history of the idea of rights is sound, we may expect to find that, while ancient theories of the nature of justice as we find them from the time of the Sophists downwards are susceptible of translation into terms of rights, the problem of the ground of rights in explicit form is essentially a modern one. It was not till the question of the rights of the subject was definitely raised in 16th cent. England that theories as to their origin and ground came to be central in political thought. It must be sufficient here to select the more typical. From the outset responsible thinkers have worked under a profound sense of the moral or inward reference contained in the conception of rights. It was in this spirit that modern theory at its outset sought for the source of legal rights, not primarily in the will of another, but in the will of the members of society themselves expressed in a compact.

The theory of rights as founded on compact has taken two forms according to the view of human nature from which it starts.

(*a*) '*Might is right.*'—Starting from the conception of a state of nature (as in Hobbes's well-known account of it) as a war of all against all, not only law and government but society itself is conceived of as resting on a compact whereby individuals agree to resign their natural but barren right to all things in order to secure a limited portion guaranteed by the overruling might of the sovereign. The ground of a man's rights on this view may be said to be his own will to peace and security; but, as he has renounced all right to control of the actual conditions of peace, it is only by a fiction that he can be said to will the rights that are actually assigned to him. These depend on the will of another. But, as on the side both of sovereign and of subject there exists no other reason for loyalty to the contract but fear, the logical outcome would seem to be that rights resolve themselves into mights. This was concealed from Hobbes by his ambiguous use of 'natural rights.' Spinoza perceived the ambiguity and, by purging the theory of this inconsistency, claimed to have 'preserved natural right safe and sound in the civil state'—robbed it, in other words, of its saving grace.[1]

The view that right rests on no other basis than might, however contrary to men's instinctive judgments, once suggested, has much to support it in the violent origin of many forms of society and in the imposition of conditions of life that depend on the will of the stronger; and, under the influence of some modern ideas of the meaning of the struggle for existence, it has recently assumed a new importance as applied to the rights of nations. It must be sufficient here to notice the objection to it that is at once the most obvious and the most fatal.

If we look at society as it actually is at any stage of its development, instead of a community of crouching slaves it presents the appearance of a willing and orderly interchange of services involving mutual rights and duties, however little consciously recognized in this form. In all societies at some stage of their development there are conditions so remote from the ordinary interests of individuals that their place in this order of mutual service is obscured and they are resented as 'interferences' with them. But, if the mass of the conditions of life were of this kind, no society would hold together for a day. Custom in society, like habit in the individual, which has been called 'the great fly-wheel of life,' may reconcile to isolated inconveniences, but customs as a whole (as sociologists are now agreed) represent ways of action that have been more or less consciously selected as the best adapted to secure, under the circumstances and beliefs of the time in which they arise, the satisfaction of fundamental instincts and to further common interests. Impotent to mould customs, the power of the stronger is more likely to be broken by than to break them if it measures itself against them, and it remains true that the system of rights and duties under which men live is supported in the last resort not by might but by the general sense that it is in harmony with their ideas of the kind of life which they desire to live.

(*b*) *Natural rights.*—It was the perception of this fact that led to the second form of the social contract theory as it was held by Locke and profoundly influenced political thought for a century and a half after him. According to this theory, society is natural. Law and government are instituted, not to hold it together, but to guarantee certain fundamental rights which are endangered by the weakness of the social element in its members—chiefly those of life, liberty, and property. The contract here is not of the citizens with one another, but between the citizens as a body and the sovereign for the time. The substance of it is that law and government shall concern themselves with the maintenance of the conditions which may preserve these rights to the individual. A theory of this kind would appear to involve a purely utilitarian idea of the basis of the rights which society recognizes, but the idea of a law of nature which had fixed these fundamental rights as some-

[1] Quoted in Wallace, p. 215.

[1] *Ep.* l. For the clearer statement of his view see the posthumous *Tractatus Politicus*, ch. ii. There are of course other elements in Spinoza's philosophy which lead to a totally different conclusion.

thing absolute and imprescriptible in the individual was by this time too strong and was for the present sufficient to overpower the appeal to general happiness, which in England was more congenial to the temper of the succeeding age.

On this view an antithesis is set up between the quite definite standard of social enactment and the quite indefinite idea of rights inalienable from the individual. It was vain to try to define these rights as life, liberty, property. Such words are only the names of things entirely indefinite in meaning and scope until we know what is the kind of life, what use is to be made of liberty, wherein the 'right' to property precisely consists. In the result the claim to natural rights was merely the removal from the meaning of right of any reference to a standard other than what Ireton had long ago called 'that wild and vast notion of what in every man's conception is just or unjust.'[1] Any attempt to translate such a view into practice could only end in despotic forms of government—Cromwellian or Napoleonic, as the case might be. When pressed in theory, it was no less bound to issue in reaction in favour of the claim of the State to assign the limits of individual right on its own principles and so lead back by another route to might as the one standard of right.

2. Utilitarian theory.—The way to this reaction was prepared by the appeal to utility in such writers as Jeremy Bentham, who could see nothing in the doctrine of natural rights but 'anarchical fallacy.' It was metaphysics, and that worst form of metaphysics, 'metaphysics upon stilts.'

'Rights are the fruits of the law, and of the law alone. There are no rights without law—no rights contrary to the law—no rights anterior to the law.'[2]

Law doubtless is the declaration of a will on the part of individuals to whom other individuals are generally disposed to render obedience; but this disposition to obedience is the result, not of any harmony of the law with natural rights, but chiefly of habit supported by a sense or 'calculation' which each individual makes for himself as to what he stands to gain or lose by breaking away from it.[3]

The theory thus stated has the advantage over natural right in perceiving that rights must be relative on the one hand to actual concrete interests, and on the other to the good of society. But, in conceiving of the one concrete interest as consisting in the sum of satisfactions of desires that are qualitatively identical, and of the control of society as concerned merely with the arrangements that will give each individual the maximum of freedom in the pursuit of such satisfactions with a minimum of the inconvenience which any interference involves, this advantage is counterbalanced by the disappearance of all distinction between interest and right. From the side of ethics, this means that duty becomes an empty word; from the side of politics, that there can be no appeal to a 'right' in contradistinction to convenience. True, the convenience is that of society. But this convenience is merely what is required to produce an average of satisfaction among the individuals and is without claim on any one of these except in so far as it coincides with his own. It is not to be wondered at that such a view should be employed to justify alternately the purest anarchy, as in the once popular doctrine of *laissez-faire* (*q.v.*), and the purest tyranny, as in the exaltation of the State as the creator of all right. Utilitarianism does not of course escape the necessity of appealing to an 'ought' or a 'to be' as opposed to what is. There is to be 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'; with a view to it, 'everybody is to count as one, nobody as more than one.' But for whom is this a 'to be'? Not for the individual, to whom 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' is nothing. Not for society, which, apart from the individuals who compose it, is nobody at all. If 'natural rights' are metaphysics upon stilts, 'utility' is metaphysics in the air.

3. Idealistic theory of rights.—The development of what for want of a better name may be called the idealistic theory of rights is the history of the attempt to do justice to the partial truths which these one-sided theories represent. We know from **Plato's** dialogues how far current theory had gone in the assertion of the doctrine that might is right and of the contractual theory which we have seen is required to supplement it.[1] His own theory of justice he develops as a direct answer to it. But his treatment of justice as a general feature of the good life rather than a particular phase of it obscures its application to the question of rights. What emerges is that the aim of civic society is to do the fullest justice to the capacities of individuals by assigning each his place in an organized system of social purposes. **Aristotle's** treatment of the same subject enables him in a well-known passage[2] to face more directly the issue raised by the Sophists as to the existence of a natural or, as it would be better expressed, an essential right. His conclusion amounts to the denial of any hard and fast line between the natural and the conventional. Law is partly natural, partly conventional. In all laws there is an element that is universal and one that is particular to the circumstances: they all, *e.g.*, condemn theft, but the penalty will be different. In the same spirit a distinction is made elsewhere[3] between universal, or common, law and the ἴδιος νόμος of the particular community. Some have seen in this an anticipation of the 'law of nature' as understood by 18th cent. writers. Aristotle's treatment of law and government elsewhere, as having for its aim the realization of what is best in man,[4] must exonerate him from all responsibility for what D. G. Ritchie has called the 'turgid river of rhetoric' on this subject that has flowed through modern politics.

While the Epicureans reverted to the Sophistic theory of right as founded on convention, the **Stoics** rose to the conception of human law as an imperfect embodiment of a law of nature identical with the Divine Reason. We have already seen how this conception was more fertile on the negative than on the positive side—in the condemnation of artificial distinctions between races and castes than in the assertion of the rights of individuals as souls of infinite possibilities. To the Roman lawyers the appeal to a *ius naturale* meant merely the appeal, as in Gaius, to laws that were common to all nations.[5]

In **Aquinas** the law of nature appears, not only side by side with civil law, but as the foundation of it. As something deeper than human law and institution, forming a pattern on which they should be modelled, it thus receives new authority. From a mere statement of what is common to nations it becomes a precept 'to use those means by which life is preserved, to marry, educate children to know the truth about God and live in society.'[6]

[1] *Clarke Papers*, i. 264. In this sense it merges in what is sometimes called the 'intuitional theory' of rights, but is only a tame expression of the other.

[2] Jeremy Bentham, *Works*, iii. 221.

[3] *Ib.* p. 219.

[1] *Rep.* bks. i.–ii.

[2] *Eth. Nic.* v. 7.

[3] *Rhet.* i. 13.

[4] Particularly *Pol.* i.

[5] Ulpian extended the *ius naturale* to all living things. This enabled him to assert that, while slavery existed 'iure gentium,' 'by the law of nature all men at the first were born free.' We have here a transition point from the idea of natural law as merely a fact and natural law as providing an ideal of human life. If we take the codification of law by Justinian as the last act of the ancient world, we may call this idea the sacred legacy of the dying civilization.

[6] *Summa*, i. 2, qu. xciv. art. 2.

In other respects he leaves the doctrine very much as he inherited it from Aristotle.

If not, as he has been called, the discoverer of natural rights, **Grotius** (*q.v.*) was the first clearly to assign them a ground in man's social nature, to map them out, and more particularly to apply them to the life of nations. In opposition to Ulpian, Grotius maintained that law and right apply in the proper sense only to human beings: 'no one is properly capable of right who does not by nature use general precepts.' Animals may have rights in the wide sense that there is a right and a wrong attitude of mind towards them, but not in the sense that they can share in a common purpose involving correlative rights and duties. The natural law on which natural rights are based is defined as 'the dictum of right reason indicating that any act from its agreement or disagreement with the rational and social nature of man has in it a moral turpitude or a moral necessity, and consequently that such an act is forbidden or commanded by the law of God.'[1] From this and from his further definition of human nature, here referred to as the nature that was 'created at the beginning and restored first after the Flood, then by Christ,' he makes it abundantly clear that he has in mind an ideal right, after the pattern of which the actual body of rights has to be moulded, and to which God Himself must conform His will.[2] However true Rousseau's criticism[3] of him may be respecting the details of his great work, it is wide of the mark as to the principle from which he starts. His weakness rather is one that is shared by Rousseau himself—his inability to free himself from the current ideas of a state of nature and of the State as 'an artificial body' founded on a 'treaty of subjection' which modifies natural rights. To this we must add a certain ambiguity in his treatment of society itself, which sometimes is conceived of as possessing a continuous life of its own 'like a waterfall,' at other times as a mere aggregate of individual wills. What was of enduring value in his work was the first clear assertion in modern philosophy of social good as the basis of all law and justice, and the application of this principle to the life of nations at a time when Europe was aghast at the horrors of the Thirty Years' War. As Plato asks us to look at justice writ large in the State before looking at it in the individual, Grotius writes his claim for natural or essential rights in the large letters of international law.

Rousseau (*q.v.*) has frequently been treated as the chief modern representative of the theory of the social contract. Carlyle disposes of him with the satirical remark that he unfortunately omits to tell us of the date of the contract. As a matter of fact, Rousseau's idea of the social contract is entirely different from Locke's, involving as it does a 'total surrender' of the individual to the general will. Moreover, it seems doubtful whether he conceives of it as an historical event at all. It forms, indeed, his starting-point, and is the title of his great book, but it becomes more and more obvious that it is merely 'an idea in the form of history.' Similarly the state of nature from which it is the release is little more than a name for the natural passions which have to be transformed in the civil state which first reveals man's true nature and puts him in possession of himself as a moral being. Finally, natural law as it appears in Rousseau is more properly called the law of reason,[4] seeing that the rights to which it gives rise are the dictates, not of a state of man antecedent to society, but of the moral nature to which civil society has raised him. It is this transformation that allies Rousseau with Plato rather than with Hobbes and Locke and entitles him to be considered the founder of modern idealistic politics. It only remained to clear away the last adhesions of these cruder theories and to bring into decisive prominence the relation between the ethical ideal of a completely human life and the system of rights as actually recognized whether by public opinion or by legal enactment.

[1] *De Jure belli et Pacis*, bk. i. ch. i § x. 1. [2] *Ib.* 2.

[3] 'Sa plus constante manière de raisonner est d'établir toujours le droit par le fait' (*Du Contrat social*, bk. i. ch. ii.).

[4] C. E. Vaughan, *Political Writings of Rousseau*, Cambridge, 1915, i. 17.

III. *MODERN THEORY.*—In taking this step modern theory has been aided by the growth of the historic spirit enabling it to see that, while we must reject the idea of a voluntary engagement laying down conditions of acquiescence in social control, there has yet been operative from the first something more than power to enforce the particular will of individuals or classes upon society, something more also than the mere habit of acquiescence in forms of control that accident has created. By whatever name this is called, whether an imperative of the practical reason and personality (Kant and Fichte), the Idea (Hegel), the will to self-perfection (T. H. Green), it is their conformity to this and the scope that is given by them to its operation that are the ultimate ground and standard of rights. While the system required by it is an ideal, it must be conceived of, not (as it was apt to be by the first of these writers) as belonging to another order than actual political society and unrealizable in it, but as the very spirit and substance of the existing order. From this point of view, right presents two aspects. It may be defined, on the one hand, as 'that which is really necessary to the maintenance of the material conditions essential to the existence and perfection of human personality'; on the other, as 'the universal condition of action through which the ethical whole as a differentiated structure is enabled to preserve and develop itself.'[1] But these two definitions are only different ways of expressing the same thing, seeing that the personality to which all rights are relative is not something merely individual, but is actualizable only in the medium and through the opportunities that the organized whole of society provides, while, on the other hand, this whole, as an 'ethical' one, can attain its full differentiation and perfection only through the fullest development of the personality of its members.

The theory thus shortly stated has the advantage of combining the elements of truth which other more one-sided theories contain. With the theory of might it recognizes *on behalf of the State* that there must always be a reserve of force to guarantee rights in general against the invasion of force, *on behalf of individuals and classes within the State* that under particular circumstances the use of force may be necessary in order to procure the recognition of moral rights not otherwise procurable. It insists, however, that the use of force requires justification and that the justification can come only from the nature of the ends for which force is used. It recognizes with the contract theory that all rights are the expression of a will. But it adds that this cannot clothe them with any moral significance if it is only the 'scattered will' of individuals bent on their own ends with no really common interest in the form of life that civil society makes possible. What gives actual rights moral significance is that they are the conditions which each, when he understands the meaning of his own life, must will for the full realization of what he seeks to be. Similarly the element of truth represented by utilitarianism is recognized in so far as the validity of any claim of right is denied which is not founded on some concrete requirement of a social well-being. Where

[1] See T. H. Green, *Works*[3], ii. 341.

this theory parts company with it is in rejecting the conception of social well-being as consisting merely in the possession by the members of equal security in the pursuit of ends essentially individual. The idea which it substitutes will best be illustrated if we proceed to notice some corollaries which follow from the above statement.

The principles underlying the conception of rights, to repeat, are (1) that rights in the full sense of the word are relative to human personality as it may be at its best; (2) that personality expresses itself in activities that are in essence social. From these it follows (i.) that there is no 'level rate' of rights. Rights vary according to the power of performing social functions and to the character of the function that is performed. The rights of the child differ from the rights of the adult as possibility differs from actuality; the rights of a doctor from the rights of a layman; of a member of Parliament from those of an ordinary citizen, and so on. From this point of view, we can see that *rights imply duties in a deeper than the legal sense. They are correlative not only to the duties of another, but to the duties of the subject of right himself.*[1] (ii.) What holds of the occupants of different stations in society holds also of the individual in so far as he performs different functions in the different relations in which he stands to his fellow-citizens in different spheres of activity. His rights as a parent differ from his rights as a member of a trade; his rights as a trade unionist from his rights as a member of the State; his rights as a citizen from his rights as a member of the brotherhood of humanity. (iii.) From this again it follows that *conflict of rights arises not so much (as in the older view) between an abstraction known as the individual on the one hand and an abstraction called society on the other, as between the rights and duties that attach to an individual in virtue of his membership of different social groups.* This, it may be claimed, corresponds to what has actually taken place in modern times when the chief problems arise from the adjustment of conflicting claims of organized societies rather than of individuals with the State. But it may also be said that, by interpreting all rights as alike concerned with the conditions of human perfection, the above theory raises new problems peculiar to itself which call for particular treatment in an article like the present.

1. **The rights of conscience.**—The principle is that the ground of all rights is the opportunity that they afford for the betterment of human life. So regarded, they are seen to constitute a system or hierarchy corresponding to the system of interests which constitute the contents of human life and stand to one another in the relation of importance according to their comprehensiveness. It is this that justifies a man in sacrificing his duty and his right to support his family by the labour of his hands to his duty and rights as a trade unionist in a strike, or, again, his rights as a trade unionist to the State. The latter has priority over the former as the more inclusive. The principle here seems clear, however difficult the application to practice may on occasions be. But a difficulty remains which seems to be one of principle rather than of application in the case of rights that appear to fall outside of the hierarchy of social functions altogether and concern a man as interested in objects—truth, beauty, and goodness—that may be called supra-social. On any one of the other theories it is possible to cut the knot, whether by the frank subjection of the individual to the State, or of the State to the individual, or by a distinction between the temporal and the spiritual whereby the spiritual is assigned to conscience and religion, the temporal to civil law. But on a theory like the present, which sees in all rights, civic or other, the conditions of a spiritual perfection, no such resource is available. Such a solution must end either in irreconcilable antagonism or in a new form of subjection of conscience and religion to the State founded on some arbitrary or speculative consideration of superior right.[1] For the fuller discussion of the rights of conscience and the age-long controversy between Church and State see artt. EMANCIPATION, CONSCIENCE, CHURCH. But two points here call for mention as further implied in the conclusions of this one. (1) With regard to the rights of conscience, we must be prepared to insist that no solution is possible which fails to recognize from the point of view of the individual the claim of the modern State to be the trustee, not only of law and order in the ordinary sense, but also of all that man has already willed of the good within its own borders and therewith of the conditions under which both individuals and Churches can realize their aims. On the other hand, it is equally essential for the State to realize its own profound interest in the improvement of the system of rights already established so as to make it a fuller expression of the personality of its members, and particularly its interest in the widest possible extension of a liberty of thought and speech and action as the primary condition of the development of the best in its members.

'What policy,' asks Spinoza, 'more self-destructive can any nation follow than to regard as public enemies men who have committed no crime or wickedness save that of freely exercising their intelligence?'[2]

(2) From the side more particularly of religion and the Church, we have to note that theory here only justifies what as an actual fact has taken place in the transference to State and municipality of functions that previously belonged to the Church, and that this fact contains the promise of reconciliation. For may it not be asked whether the claim of the modern State to interest itself in the active promotion of the good life through education and the encouragement of activities and institutions that have the spiritual welfare of its members at heart, is not one of the most valuable fruits of the awakening of conscience and religion in recent times? And, if this is so, whether there is not a certain perversity in the view that the recognition of State and Church as engaged in a common enterprise of redemption is a source of rivalry and conflict rather than of sympathy and friendship? A more reasonable view surely is that it has removed the ground for antagonism of aims and laid the basis of a more fruitful co-operation. In view of this change there is doubtless all the more pressing need for agreement as to the particular nature of the services which each can best perform, and much remains here for the statesmanship of the future, particularly in the spheres of education and charitable administration. But agreement will be helped and not hindered by a theory such as the above which interprets the rivalry as one, not for the possession of abstract rights, but for opportunities of service in a common cause. As in any other attempt at the assignment of spheres of co-operation in the achievement of a corporate end, the chief condition of success is good will, the desire to see the Kingdom of Right extended in the way and by the agency best fitted to that end.

[1] 'Since the general and the particular will are identical, right and duty coincide. By virtue of the ethical fabric man has rights so far as he has duties and duties so far as he has rights' (Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, § 155).

[1] See Hegel's claim for the State against *Moralität* on the one hand and religion on the other (§ 270, note).

[2] *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. xx., the first and still perhaps the best philosophical statement of this interest.

2. **The rights of nations.**—We have already seen how the idea of the 'right of nations' was launched by Grotius and his successors as a challenge to the barbarities of the Thirty Years' War. In the centuries which followed its wide acceptance may be said to have been the greatest triumph of civilization since the establishment of the general idea of law in the Roman world. But the term itself, along with the phrase 'international law,' invented by Bentham, was in reality a misnomer, not only in the sense already noticed (that it was a mistranslation of the Roman *ius gentium*), but in the sense that it referred primarily to societies as political units and not to nations in the modern sense of the word. So interpreted, idealistic theory, with its conception of the body politic as the trustee of the conditions under which individuals and subordinate societies are free to exercise their capacities of contributing to the fulfilment of human destiny, has had no difficulty in accepting it, and, in spite of apparent exaggerations of State right, may be said to have only set its seal to this advance. But the question does not end there. Since the rise in the second part of the 19th cent. of the idea of nationality, in the strict sense of the word, a new problem has emerged and in recent years has become acute. Granted that States are personalities in the sense explained and share the rights of personality, many of them may be said to be multiple personalities, inasmuch as they include a variety of groups whose members are united by the deeper ties of community of blood, language and literature, religion and historical tradition.[1] When these suppressed personalities rise to consciousness of themselves, does not the claim, it may be asked, to be the guardian of a particular form of civilization entitle them to that political independence which alone enables them to realize their own particular destiny?

'What form of human life,' asks J. C. Bluntschli,[2] 'could have a better natural right to existence than the common spirit of a nation?'

What guarantee, we may add, of *purposeful* existence can there be short of a self-chosen political constitution corresponding to its own peculiar genius? Other things being equal, it would seem that a nation-State will be stronger and happier, not only, as Lawrence puts it,[3] than a State which is not a nation, but than a nation which is not a State. And, if for strength and happiness we substitute, in accordance with our principle, the test of contribution to human good, the plea would appear to be indisputable, and we are face to face with the problem of rights in its most recent and acute form. No detailed discussion of so large a question is here possible; it must be sufficient to notice one or two of the chief difficulties in the recognition of the rights of nations, and to indicate the line of solution that is most in harmony with our theory.

Not only do language and nationality in themselves, apart from territorial unity, appear to be a principle far too shifting to afford the coherence necessary to constitute a corporate personality, but in themselves they fail to give any guarantee of the political capacity necessary to give effect to it. Even if territorial unity and a true political sense exist in a subject nation, there remains the difficulty that its history and ideals may be such as to provide no guarantee that, in case of its obtaining political independence, it will continue to contribute to the strength of the State from which it has been separated. While constituting the most serious problem that the statesmanship of the future has to face, these difficulties seem to offer no insurmountable obstacle to the application of the principle. On the contrary, the only fear of failure to solve them comes from the side of the denial or half-hearted acceptance of it. With reference to the first of them, admixture of population is undoubtedly an obstacle to any complete adoption of the principle of nationality as the basis of the State of the future. But it must be remembered that, powerful as is the case for the nation-State, there is no reason to hold, apart from obsolete theories of natural right, that nationality is the only ground of citizenship. The cases of France, Great Britain, and Canada, to go no farther, are sufficient to show not only that it is possible to leave large room for national ideals under a sovereign State, but that the State itself may be the gainer from the diversity of nationalities which it holds in solution.

The other difficulties which we have mentioned bring us again to the question of the whole conception of the State. It was the grave defect of older theories, resting as they did on the assumption of a limited fund of rights, in the sharing of which the gain of one was the loss of another, that they were bound to bring the State into conflict with the idea of nationality, when this should rise to consciousness, as they were bound to bring it into conflict with other forms of individuality. The conflict is reconciled in the case of the latter when this assumption is seen to be false, and the function of the State is conceived of as the development in its parts of a personality in its members, which adds to its inherent life and strength. It only remains to apply the same principle to nationalities. Nations not less than individuals are the children of the State. It is under its wing that they grow up and reach maturity. Whatever the independence they claim when they reach majority, it is with the parent State that an alliance is most natural and is most likely to result in some new form of political union, which shall at once protect them against aggression from other nationalities and open out means of contact with them to the furtherance of the organic unity of mankind.[1]

From this standpoint there is no more inherent difficulty in recognizing the political majority of nations than in recognizing the civil majority of individuals. True, there can be no conventional limit to the minority of nations and it will always be difficult to assign one. In the past the question has too often been left to be decided by 'the judgment of God'—in other words, by war. But modern precedents have made us familiar with all degrees of personality in communities,[2] and it may be hoped that, with the development of international law and the diminishing risk of experiments in self-government, other tests than that of the sword may be discoverable. Here, too, it should be noted that, apart from disputable theory, there is no reason to deny the possibility of circumstances arising under which the claim of nationality may have to give way to the general interests of humanity, on which it is itself in the last instance founded. In such a case the readiness of a nation to recognize this limit and to exercise the required degree of patience and self-control would itself be the surest proof that it was ripe for independence, when these circumstances change.

Under the same supposition, finally, the fear of danger to the parent State from the grant of independence would largely disappear. Even as things are, we pay far too little regard to the power of ties other than force, and of the additional affection between peoples likely to be born of a franker confidence in one another's loyalty to the elementary con-

[1] See art. NATIONALITY.
[2] *The Theory of the State*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1885, p. 93.
[3] *The Principles of International Law*[4], p. 55 n.

[1] See C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, ch. iv., 'The State and Nationality.'
[2] See Lawrence, § 37, 'The kinds of fully sovereign international persons,' and the following sections.

ditions of human good, to guarantee the desire for the maintenance of some form of political union.

It is considerations such as these that provide a solid basis for the hope that, just as the horrors of the Thirty Years' War prepared the way for the general acceptance of Grotius's idea of international right in the old sense of the word, so the horrors of the Great War may result in the general recognition of it in the new sense. Given such a recognition, it will be impossible to stop short of the attempt to provide the necessary sanctions to the new order, and so, in the words of a great statesman of the time, 'to translate the idea of public right from abstract into concrete terms' by substituting 'for force, for the clash of conflicting ambitions, for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, a real European partnership based on the recognition of equal rights established and enforced by a common will.'[1]

LITERATURE.—No exhaustive list of books could be attempted. The following may be consulted:

i. *LEGAL VIEW OF RIGHTS.*—T. E. Holland, *Elements of Jurisprudence*[9], London, 1900; J. Lorimer, *Institutes of Law*[2], Edinburgh, 1880; F. Pollock, *Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics*, London, 1882.

ii. *HISTORY OF THE IDEA AND THEORIES OF RIGHTS.*—Hobbes, *Leviathan*, London, 1651; Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Amsterdam, 1670, tr. R. Wallis[2], London, 1868; Grotius, *de Iure Belli et Pacis*, Amsterdam, 1621, tr. W. Whewell, 3 vols., Cambridge, 1853; Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, London, 1690, bk. ii., 'Of Civil Government'; Rousseau, *Du Contrat social*, Amsterdam, 1762, tr. J. Tozer[2], London, 1902; Bentham, *Works*, 11 vols., ed. J. Bowring, Edinburgh, 1838–43, *passim* (see references above).

iii. *MODERN THEORY.*—Kant, *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, i., 'Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechtslehre,' Konigsberg, 1797; Fichte, *Grundlage des Naturrechts*, 2 pts., Jena, 1796–97, tr. A. E. Kroeger, London, 1889; Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Berlin, 1820, tr. S. W. Dyde, London, 1896; T. H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, London, 1895, also in *Works*[6], do. 1896, ii. 334–553; D. G. Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, do. 1895; W. Wallace, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, Oxford, 1898, 'Natural Rights'; B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*[2], London, 1910; J. N. Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius*, Cambridge, 1907; T. J. Lawrence, *The Principles of International Law*[4], London, 1910; C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, do. 1915; *An Introd. to the Study of International Relations*, by various authors, do. 1916; art. NATIONALITY.

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[1] Henry Asquith, Speech in the House of Commons, 20th Dec. 1917.

RIGHT AND LEFT.—See CIRCUMAMBULATION, vol. iii. p. 658; SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Introductory).

RIGHT AND WRONG.—See ETHICS AND MORALITY.

RIGHTEOUSNESS.

Babylonian (T. G. PINCHES), p. 777.
Buddhist (E. J. THOMAS), p. 778.
Christian—
Old Testament (A. R. GORDON), p. 780.
Christ's teaching (W. C. ALLEN), p. 784.
St. Paul's teaching (J. DENNEY), p. 786.
Christian theology (A. F. SIMPSON), p. 790.
Egyptian (A. M. BLACKMAN), p. 792.
Greek and Roman (P. SHOREY), p. 800.
Hindu (A. B. KEITH), p. 805.
Jewish (J. ABELSON), p. 807.
Muhammadan (B. CARRA DE VAUX), p. 810.

RIGHTEOUSNESS (Babylonian).—In a new study, such as that of Assyriology, in which the meanings of the words have to be determined, there is naturally a certain amount of doubt as to their precise force; and it may even be that words which the Assyro-Babylonians would have regarded as of the utmost importance remain unrecorded in our lexicons, because they have not been found in the inscriptions, do not occur often enough, or have been incorrectly transcribed.

1. The words generally rendered 'righteousness.'—These are *kittu* (*kêttu*) and *mîšaru* (*mêšaru*), 'righteousness' and 'justice,' which are, in a measure, interchangeable terms, the former being from *kânu*, 'to be firm, fixed,' and the latter from *êšēru*, 'to be straight, right,' the Heb. *yāshar*, the root of such names as Jasher (2 S 1[18]), Jesher (1 Ch 2[18]), 'uprightness,' etc. Both *kêttu* and *mîšaru* are common attributes of gods and men, the deities more especially connected with the idea being Šamaš, the sun-god (who, as his light penetrates everywhere, was regarded as knowing best all that took place on the earth, and who became the impartial judge of men), and Rammānu (Rimmon) or Addu, in Assyrian Adad (Hadad), the storm-god, whose air, pervading all things, had the same property, and perhaps to a more satisfactory degree.

2. What the Babylonians understood by righteousness.—One of the most interesting, though probably not one of the most important, inscriptions dealing with this question is that formerly called 'Warnings to Kings against Injustice.' This inscription, which is published in *WAI* iv.[2] pl. 48 [55], shows what righteousness on the part of the ruler was expected to be. He was to favour justice and to be well-disposed towards his people, his princes, and the intelligent ones of his land. He was not to favour roguery. When the king was favourable to the work of Êa (the god of wisdom), the great god would set him in the knowledge and understanding of righteousness (*šitultu u tudat mîšari*). If he rejected the Sipparite, and decided in favour of a stranger, Šamaš (patron-god of Sippar), judge of heaven and earth, would set up a foreign law in his country, and princes (counsellors) and judges who did not decide against the law.

Much in this inscription is still obscure, mainly on account of the damage which it has sustained; but it seems that, among the Babylonians, as with the Hebrews, failure to fulfil the righteous requirements of the deity might, and sometimes did, entail that the rule of the land fell into the hands of foreigners, a noteworthy example being the rule of 'the dynasty of Babylon,' to which Hammurabi belonged. This great king, as is now well known, collected and greatly improved (to all appearance) the laws of Babylonia, and he calls himself, in the concluding paragraphs of the great stele on which his laws are inscribed, the 'king of righteousness' (*šar mîšarim*). Minor rulers, and even states, could come under the displeasure of the deity on account of unrighteous acts.

3. The importance of righteousness in the State.—Naturally in the remote ages of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires, when good government was less common than now, corruption and injustice were often rife, and it was needful, in cases where the angered populace might get the upper hand, for the king and all others in authority to have at least a reputation for righteousness, justice, and all the virtues which might at the time be regarded as connected therewith. This, with the Assyro-Babylonian ideal of their gods, caused the people to attach great importance not only to justice in the legal sense of the word, but also to everything that made the person of the king sacred in their eyes—uprightness, integrity, love for his people, and fair and benign conduct with regard to them. Divine beings, in the minds of the Babylonians and Assyrians, were perfect in righteousness by nature, and (with the exception, perhaps, of Nergal, the god of war, plague, and disease, and

others similar) probably could not do anything which might be regarded as unrighteous, though capable of acts of which the righteousness could not be understood. Whatever they did, they were just in all their dealings, and the king generally shared, though in a smaller degree, this immunity from unrighteousness. Indeed, it is probable that the deification of the earlier Babylonian kings was due to the reputation which they had for righteousness rather than to any divine nature that they might have inherited independently thereof.

4. Gods of righteousness.—As has already been noted (above, § 1), the gods of righteousness and justice in the highest sense were Šamaš, the sun-god, and Hadad. The two children and constant attendants of Šamaš were Kêttu and Mîšaru, perhaps best translated here 'Truth' and 'Righteousness.' Another form of the sun-god was Tammuz, the Sumerian Dumu-zi, for Dumu-zida, 'the righteous son,' or the like—a name which may be connected with the legend that he passed the summer months of his year on earth with his spouse Ištar and the remainder in the under world with Ereš-ki-gal (Persephone), righteous in the fulfilment of what the Semites of old must have regarded as at least an irksome obligation. It was probably this that appealed to the women who lamented for him, whether Hebrews (Ezk 8[14]) or Babylonians.

5. Righteous kings.—One of the earliest kings renowned for his righteousness seems to have been Sargon (Šarru-kên) of Agade. It is this ruler who is apparently intended in *WAI* ii. pl. 48, l. 40ab, where the archaic sign for 'king,' written twice, one over the other, and glossed *Dadrum*, is explained as *Šarru-kên, šar kêtti, dabib kêtti, dabib damqāti*, 'Sargon, king of righteousness (justice), speaker of righteousness (justice), speaker of good.' Eight hundred years later (*c.* 2000 B.C.) ruled Ḫammurabi, and fourth in descent from him came Ammi-ṣaduga (Ammi-ṣadoqa), whose name is translated, in the explanatory list of royal names, as *Kimtu*^{m}-*kêttu*^{m}, 'the righteous family,' or the like (the Babylonians did not recognize the name of the Arab god 'Amm in the element *ammi*). In Assyria one of the kings claiming the virtue of righteousness was Sennacherib, and his grandson, Aššur-banî-âpli, 'the great and noble Asnapper,' it may be noted, calls himself *šar mîšari, raim kêtti*, 'the king of righteousness,' 'the lover of uprightness,' or the like.

6. Other references showing the estimation in which righteousness was held.—Among these are the final words of the record of Bel-nadin-âpli:[1] *Limutta zêr-ma kêtta raam*, 'Hate evil and love right (or righteousness)'; such names as Nabû-kêttu-uṣur, 'Nebo, protect righteousness (or justice)'; *Itti šalme u kîni kasap-šu ilaqqi*, 'He will receive his money from the honourable and the righteous.'[2] 'The star of justice and righteousness' (*kakkab kêttu u mêšar*) seems to have been the slow-moving planet Saturn (^{d}*Sag-uš*), identified, seemingly, with the sun, and called, in Sumerian, *mul Gi-gi* (for *Gin-gin*)—a reduplication capable, apparently, of being translated by *kânu* and *êšêru* (see § 1), and illustrating, therefore, the likeness in meaning which *kêttu* and *mîšaru* to all appearance have.

LITERATURE.—W. Muss-Arnolt, *A Concise Dict. of the Assyr. Language*, Berlin, 1905, *s.vv.*

T. G. PINCHES.

RIGHTEOUSNESS (Buddhist).—There are several words in the Buddhist writings which coincide more or less completely with the idea of righteousness; but the principles in which they are embedded are so fundamentally distinct from the Jewish and Christian background of Western ethics and religion that a mere comparison of terms would do little to elucidate the significance of righteousness in the Buddhist system. The term 'righteousness' (δικαιοσύνη), as descriptive of conduct in human relations, coincides with morality. For this purely ethical sense see art. ETHICS (Buddhist). The term is generally used, however, with a religious implication. In Christian thought it is the notion, not of ideal human inter-relations, but of the conformity of the individual to a divine standard. God as absolute moral perfection is the ideal of righteousness.

'The NT presents the idea of righteousness mainly in two ways: (1) as a quality of God's nature and action, and (2) as the character which God requires of man.'[1]

Buddhism differs from this in two ways: (1) it recognizes no God in the sense of an ultimate reality of ontology or morals; (2) it makes salvation consist not in the attainment of a moral ideal, but in escape from existence. The rejection of works in both systems is merely a superficial resemblance. Christianity rejects works because of the inability of unaided human effort to reach the standard of ideal goodness. Hence the need of justification, the bringing of the individual into a state of righteousness by a higher agency. Buddhism rejects them because no amount of merit attained by good works will lead to the goal.

But in the conception of righteousness as a law of the universe, a divine standard to which all beings should conform, there is a close parallel in the Buddhistic teaching as to *karma*.

'In the organic universe, right and wrong, and those consequences of actions which we call justice, retribution, compensation, are as truly and inevitably a part of the eternal natural or cosmic order as the flow of a river, the process of the seasons.'[2]

The ideal of the Christian consists in attaining the character required by God and thus winning 'the chief end of man'—the being made 'perfectly blessed in the full enjoying of God to all eternity.' Buddhism is quite as definite in teaching that the order of the universe is such that wrong-doing leads to punishment and right-doing to reward. Good actions done according to this conception are as much a form of righteousness as when done according to the will of God. Such teaching, however, so far as it exists in Buddhism, is intended merely for the unconverted man. The universe is not of such a nature as to make future existence, with even the highest rewards that it can offer, a desirable goal. A much more prominent fact is the existence of pain, and this to the Buddhist is a truth of such significance that, when it is realized, it inevitably results in renunciation of the world—not of this world as contrasted with heaven, but of any form of existence in the universe. Moral actions then cease to have the meaning that they had for the unconverted man. He who has renounced the world no longer makes conformity to the law of the universe his end. He seeks to cut himself off from it absolutely. He has another ideal of attainment, which is the true Buddhist ideal of righteousness—the state of the saint, or *arhat*, who has become independent of the universe and free from any desire for it. This is the ideal of the Hīnayāna schools, and it will be necessary to discuss the later Mahāyānist developments separately.

1. The Hinayāna ideal.—It is not in particular terms that we find righteousness expressed in the Buddhist writings. The term 'righteousness' is often used in translations, where the force is purely ethical. We are told of the virtuous king who ruled 'in righteousness' (*dhammena*), but nothing more is meant than that he ruled according to his

[1] H. V. Hilprecht, *Assyriaca*, Boston, 1894, p. 184, l. 24.
[2] P. Haupt, *Akkad. und sumer. Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1882, p. 66, ll. 24-26, tr. from the Sumerian.

[1] G. B. Stevens, in *HDB* iv. 284[b], *s.v.* 'Righteousness in NT.'
[2] C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 118.

dhamma—the principles of morals that he professed to follow.[1] He is also called *dhammika*, 'righteous,' in the same sense. Similar terms are *dhammaṭṭha*, *sīlavat*, 'virtuous,' 'obeying the commandments' (*sīla*), and *charaṇa*, 'righteousness,' also translated more exactly as 'conduct.' The blessings of the virtuous man are that he becomes wealthy, famous, has self-confidence in any assembly, dies without bewilderment, and is reborn in heaven.[2] All this is part of the popular teaching to the laity, to those who have not grasped the first truth of Buddhism. But, except in the high ethical level of the teaching due to the founder, there is nothing distinctively Buddhistic in it.

The Buddhist ideal of righteousness is the ideal aimed at by the monk, the man who has realized at least the first Truth, the existence of pain. To realize the other three Truths involves a course of training, whereby he attains to the perfect state of the saint. He aims no longer at meritorious actions, but at developing in his character the qualities that lead to salvation and abandoning those that hinder it. The latter are seen most clearly in the list of the ten fetters (*saṃyojana*).[3] Not merely must vicious acts be avoided, but sensuality itself (*kāma*), ill-will (*paṭigha*), pride (*māna*), and arrogance (*uddhachcha*) must be uprooted. And so among the positive qualities to be acquired we find friendliness, compassion, sympathy, equanimity. Here is a process which, if carried out, would lead to righteousness in the sense of the attainment of moral perfection, but it is not the final goal. These qualities are important because they lead to it—*i.e.*, to absolute cutting off from existence and craving for existence in the world of birth and death. Besides the desire for existence here or in the sensual heavens there are other fetters which must be destroyed—desire even for all supersensual existence (*rūparāga*, *arūparāga*), belief in the efficacy of good works and ceremonies, as well as the intellectual errors, belief in a permanent self, doubt, and, last of all, as the ultimate fetter, ignorance. So, too, the chief positive quality to be attained is knowledge—knowledge, not of an ideally pure being, but of the true nature of compound things, that they are painful, impermanent, and soulless; and the truth of their soullessness (*anattatā*) is the Buddhist way of asserting that there is no higher reality behind them.

Earlier than these schematized lists of the fetters, or bonds (*nīvaraṇa*, *āvaraṇa*),[4] is the picture of the monk given in the *Sutta Nipāta*. Intent on the extinction of craving, he wanders alone like a rhinoceros (35), free from affection for wife and children, without even a companion, unless he finds one who keeps the *Dhamma* (46). He practises absolute continence (*brahmachariya*), avoids all theories and disputations (780), abandons doubt and heresies, aims at purity (*visuddhi*)—not at mere moral purity, but, as the other terms show, at being independent (*anūpaya*, *anissāya*) and undefiled (*anūpalitta*) by contact with mundane things—and he is purified by knowledge or wisdom (*paññā*, 184).

2. Mahāyāna developments.—The chief ethical change in Mahāyāna was due to the growth of the view that it is possible to attain, besides the knowledge of the Path, also the omniscience of a Buddha. Every one is potentially a Buddha, and by the thought of enlightenment (*chittotpāda*) he may begin to become one by passing through numberless existences in which his aim is not merely to become a Buddha in order to teach, but also to acquire merit, which may be transferred to others. He is then a *bodhisattva* (*q.v.*), and is thus described:

'He has for numberless æons practised the good conduct of well done *karma*, alms, morality, patience, fortitude, meditation, wisdom, resource, learning, conduct, vows, and penance; he is endowed with great friendliness, compassion, and sympathy; in his mind has arisen equanimity, and he strives for the weal and happiness of all beings.'[1]

This, although it reintroduces the doctrine of works, at least as a temporary resource, is a much fuller and loftier conception than that which makes the practice of friendliness and compassion merely a means to one's own release. But the practical result was not to make this the ideal for all. It opened at the same time an attractive way for the ordinary man to obtain happiness, not by effort of his own, but in reliance on the *bodhisattvas*, who have accumulated merit for his benefit. Rebirth in Sukhāvatī ('the Happy Land,' the heaven of the Buddha Amitābha) is the reward of those who call upon the name of Avalokiteśvara (see art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Buddhist]).

The prayer of a *bodhisattva* in the *Bodhicharyāvatāra*,[2] x., is:

'May all those in every quarter, who are afflicted with pain of body and mind, win through my merits oceans of delight and happiness. Throughout worldly existence may loss of happiness never be theirs. . . . In whatever hells there are in the world-regions may there be the bodies of beings rejoicing in the happiness and delights of Sukhāvatī, those who suffer in the cold hells obtaining heat, and those pained with heat becoming cool.'

This is the ideal of self-sacrifice aimed at by a *bodhisattva*, but the centre of the teaching comes to be devotion to such saviours of men. They become more and more raised above the level of common human beings, till they are even identified with the popular gods of Hinduism,[3] and are worshipped with gratitude and adoration as great beings, through whose merits all may reach Sukhāvatī.

'Those beings become happy in the world who keep in their minds the name of Avalokiteśvara. They become released from old age, death, sickness, sorrow, lamentation, pain, dejection. They suffer not the extreme pain of saṁsāra. Robed in pure white, like royal swans flying with the speed of the wind, they go to the region of Sukhāvatī to hear face to face the Doctrine of the Buddha Amitābha. And having heard the Doctrine, the pain of saṁsāra no longer torments their bodies; nor does old age and death with lust, hate, and delusion, nor the pain of hunger and thirst torment them. . . . They abide in that region as long as the firm promise of Avalokiteśvara is not fulfilled to release all beings from all pains, as long as they are not set in the highest perfect enlightenment.'[4]

The latent antinomianism goes on increasing. In the larger *Sukhāvatīvyūha* rebirth in Sukhāvatī is ensured by ten times repeating the name of that country, but those who have committed the five sins that bring retribution in this life, or who have obstructed or abused the Good Doctrine, are excluded. In the smaller *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, however, we are told:

'Beings are not born in that Buddha country of the Tathāgata Amitāyus as a reward and result of good works performed in this present life,' but all shall attain it who 'shall hear the name of the blessed Amitāyus, the Tathāgata, and having heard it, shall keep it in mind, and with thoughts undisturbed shall keep it in mind for one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven nights.'[5]

The ideal of the *arhat*, though it suffered from the abuses common to all organized forms of asceticism, did maintain for long a noble ethical standard. In the legends of the Buddha given by the commentaries on the *Dhammapada* and *Jātaka* we find a series of examples, which, if they are without historical basis, are all the more important in

[1] *Jātaka*, 51.
[2] *Dīgha Nikāya*, iii. 236.
[3] See T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism: its History and Literature* (American Lectures), New York, 1896, pp. 142–150.
[4] *Dīgha Nikāya*, iii. 216, 234, 254; *Dharmasaṃgraha*, cxv., lxvii.

[1] *Lalita Vistara*, Calcutta, 1877, vii. 128.
[2] Petrograd, 1894, tr. L. D. Barnett as *The Path of Light*, London, 1909.
[3] In the *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, p. 22 (Calcutta, 1873), Avalokiteśvara is said to take the form of different gods, Maheśvara (Śiva), Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu), etc., in order to teach the Doctrine to the worshippers of these deities.
[4] *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, p. 21.
[5] *SBE* xlix. [1894] pt. ii. p. 99.

showing how the Buddhist church interpreted the ideal of its founder. There is the story of the monk abandoned by his fellows because of his loathsome illness, but visited by Buddha, who heated water, washed and dressed him, in order that by caring for his body he might fit his mind for instruction; of the weaver's daughter for whose sake the Master made a journey of thirty leagues, so that she should not die without enlightenment; of the poor man whose one cake Buddha accepted before the hospitality of the whole city.

The Mahāyāna developments were not an explicit contradiction of the Hīnayāna teaching. The *arhat* ideal was recognized, but disparaged as being merely a temporary stage to be succeeded by the ideal of becoming a Buddha, the perfect enlightenment of whom, indeed, includes the enlightenment of the *arhat*. But the change destroyed the older ideal, so far as it opened a way to happiness through the merits of others. The conception of merit is also unethical. The *bodhisattvas* do not give aid to becoming good, but confer upon others the enjoyment of the results of goodness. Merit is an external source of good, the accumulation of the beneficent result of so much good action, which can be imputed to others who have not, and are not required to have, the moral ability to perform it themselves.

LITERATURE. — The main sources are given throughout. Modern studies on the subject are: T. W. Rhys Davids, *Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by Indian Buddhism* (*HL*), London, 1881, pp. 205–214; H. Kern, *Geschiedenis van het Buddhisme in Indië*, Haarlem, 1882–84, vol. i. bk. ii. ch. 4 (unsympathetic and based on inadequate material), French tr., 2 vols., Paris, 1901; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, London, 1912, ch. v., 'The Norm as Moral Law'; P. Dahlke, *Buddhist Essays*, Eng. tr., do. 1908, ch. viii.; N. Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, do. 1915, pt. i. ch. 4; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *The Way to Nirvāṇa*, Cambridge, 1917.

EDWARD J. THOMAS.

RIGHTEOUSNESS (in the Old Testament). —**1. Terms.**—The technical term for 'righteousness,' צֶדֶק, *ṣédek*, or fem. צְדָקָה, *ṣᵉdāḳāh*, is connected with the Arabic *ṣidḳ*, 'truth,' 'sincerity,' 'firmness,'[1] and denotes generally what is true, right, fitting, or conducive to the end in view. The corresponding adj. צַדִּיק, *ṣaddīḳ*, 'righteous,' is applied only to persons, except in Dt 4[8], where the 'statutes and judgments' of God are described as *ṣaddiḳim*. The denom. vb. צָדַק is used mainly in the forensic sense of being 'in the right,' the Hiphil הִצְדִּיק, 'justify,' conveying the several ideas of declaring the just man in the right (Dt 25[1], 2 S 15[4] etc.), helping the innocent to the vindication of his cause (Is 50[8]), and bringing the sinner into right relations with God (Is 53[11], Dn 12[3]). In AV יָשָׁר, *yāshar*, 'straight,' 'upright' (√יָשַׁר, 'be even *or* smooth'), is frequently translated 'righteous,' RV following this looser practice only in Nu 23[10]. Nearly related terms are מִשְׁפָּט, *mishpāṭ*, originally in the sense of 'custom,' afterwards specifically of judgment or justice; תָּמִים, *tāmîm*, 'spotless' (in the ceremonial sense), hence also 'perfect' (from the moral point of view); נָקִי, *nāḳî*, 'innocent'; נָכֹחַ, *nākhôᶜh*, 'straight,' 'honest,' 'right'; and כֵּן, *kēn*, 'firm,' 'true,' 'just,' 'fair.'

2. The consuetudinary conception of righteousness.—As among other ancient nations, in Israel righteousness is primarily interpreted in terms of social usage. The righteous man is he who adheres loyally to the moral and religious customs of his people, while the 'wicked' sets them at naught. Thus Abraham's righteousness consists in a scrupulous regard for Jahweh and His commands (Gn 12[1ff.]), combined with signal manifestations of that lavish generosity towards one's kindred (13[5ff.]) and hospitality to passing strangers (18[1ff.]) which have always been reckoned among the most sacred obligations of the dutiful tribesman. David also identifies 'righteousness' with the magnanimity which he has shown towards Saul, in refusing to 'stretch forth his hand against the Lord's anointed,' even when the Lord has 'delivered him into his hand' (1 S 26[23]). In both cases righteousness is perfectly consistent with prevarication or deceit (Gn 12[10ff.]) and deeds of fiendish cruelty (2 S 8[1f.] 12[31]) towards the foreigner.[1] On the other hand, the wicked do violence to the just prerogatives of God and their fellows (Gn 6[5] 18[20ff.]), working 'folly [*i.e.* godlessness] in Israel' (Gn 34[7], Jos 7[15], Jg 20[6, 10], 2 S 13[12]), and staining their hands by deeds such as have neither been 'done nor seen from the day that the children of Israel came up out of the land of Egypt unto this day' (Jg 19[30]).

As social life became more complex, it was needful that judges—'able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating unjust gain' (Ex 18[21] [E])—should be appointed to determine the rightful customs and apply them to changing conditions. The decrees of these judges (*shôphᵉṭîm*) were in due course collected as a body of written 'judgments' (*mishpāṭîm*) in the Book of the Covenant (Ex 20[22]–23[19]). At the same time righteousness was invested with an increasingly forensic significance. The righteous man was no longer the loyal tribesman, who held fast to the ways of his fathers, but the successful litigant, who won his case in court, and thus acquired the legal status of the 'innocent' (Ex 23[7]), or he who found approval at the bar of impartial human judgment (Gn 38[26],[2] 1 S 24[17]), or passed the supreme test of Divine justice (Gn 7[1] 20[4] etc.), or enjoyed a right standing before God through faith (15[6]).

3. The prophetic ideal of righteousness.—The 8th cent. B.C. saw a violent breaking down of the old landmarks. Through the increase of wealth and luxury which followed in the wake of military success, rich and poor were parted by an ever-widening gulf. Forgetful of the Covenant, rich men used their wealth to 'trample the face' of the poor, refusing him an honest wage, ousting him from field and home, and for the debt even of a pair of shoes selling him into slavery (Is 3[14f.] 5[8f.], Am 2[6f.], Mic 2[2, 9] 3[1ff.]). The merchants in the market-place robbed him equally of the just return of his wages, 'making the ephah small, and the shekel great, and forging scales of deceit' (Am 8[5]). Against such oppression in high places there was neither security nor redress. The judges at the gates openly accepted bribes and perverted justice (Is 1[23], Am 6[12], Mic 3[11]), while religion itself was made a cloak to cover wrong-doing and cruelty (Is 1[11ff.], Am 2[7f.]).

In the moral chaos that ensued Amos raised a stern call to righteousness. Jahweh had no desire for sacrifice or offerings. To Him the very profusion of their gifts was but multiplied transgression (Am 4[4]). Away then with the din of their songs and the strumming of viols! 'But let justice (*mishpāṭ*) roll down as waters, and righteous-

[1] The word *ṣidḳ* and its cognates are applied not merely to words and actions that are honest and true, but likewise to eyes that see clearly, ears that are quick to hear, lances that are true in battle, and even knots that hold firmly. From the last instance Skinner is disposed to find in the idea of hardness the point of transition to 'the higher developments of the idea both in Arabic and in Hebrew' (*HDB* iv. 274). But the different shades of meaning can most easily be comprehended under the general notion of trustworthiness, or fitness to purpose. The hard knot and the strong, unerring lance are as true to their function in battle as the seeing eye and the hearing ear to their place in the bodily structure, or the honest man and his deeds to their office in furthering the social welfare.

[1] It is interesting to observe that the more sensitive conscience of the Elohistic writer regards Abraham's act of deceit as one of those deeds 'that ought not to be done,' bringing 'great sin' upon Abimelech and his innocent people (Gn 20[9]).

[2] צָדְקָה מִמֶּנִּי, 'she is more in the right than I,' the only instance where either vb. or adj. is found in the fem., a woman not being considered a 'person' in the eyes of the law.

ness (*ṣᵉdāḳāh*) as an everflowing stream' (5[24]). In this great statement of principle Amos has advanced far beyond earlier conceptions of morality. With him righteousness is no mere body of customs, still less a legal status conferred by fallible authority; it is the living essence of social ethics, embracing alike honesty in business—fair weights and balances, standard wages and prices—and impartial justice in the law-courts. It may be defined, in a word, as 'the straight thing' (*nᵉkhôḥāh*), by which alone the nation can be saved (3[10] 5[14f.]). Around this hard, cold imperative of duty Hosea throws a warmer atmosphere of emotion. As Jahweh has betrothed Israel to Himself 'in righteousness, justice, love and compassion' (Hos 2[19]), He expects them to be actuated by the same spirit towards one another. What He demands above all is love (חֶסֶד, *ḥesed*, brotherly love and kindness), which is the fulfilment of righteousness (6[6]), the ripe fruit of righteousness (10[12]). In Isaiah's keynote of holiness also justice is blended with mercy. The man holy in God's sight must 'put away the evil of his doings' from before His eyes, 'cease to do evil: learn to do well' (Is 1[17]). If a judge or counsellor, he must keep his hands clear of bribes—which lead men to 'justify the wicked,' and deprive the innocent of their right standing in court (5[23])—and not merely seek to judge honestly, but take an active, energetic part in furthering the cause of the widow and fatherless (1[23]).[1] The prophet's ideal for Zion is that of a 'city of righteousness,' whose king and princes exalt justice as the lodestar of government, and whose people dwell together in mutual confidence and security (1[26f.] 9[7] 11[3ff.] 16[5] 32[16ff.]). Micah holds before the rulers and judges of Israel the same pure standard of judgment (Mic 3[1]), and inculcates on all men respect for the threefold principle of a righteous life—'to do justice, and to delight in love, and to walk humbly with thy God' (6[8]). These notes are repeated in Jeremiah and later prophets. The good man is he who 'doeth justly, and seeketh truth' (Jer 5[1]), who 'thoroughly executeth judgment between a man and his neighbour, oppresseth not the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow, and sheddeth not innocent blood' (7[5f.]), who 'delivereth the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor' (21[12] 22[3]), who 'speaketh the truth with his neighbour, executeth wholesome judgment in the gates,[2] deviseth no evil in his heart against his neighbour, and loveth no false oath' (Zec 8[16f.]), who 'walketh with God in honesty and integrity, and turneth many away from iniquity' (Mal 2[6]). II Isaiah uses 'judgment' (*mishpāṭ*) as the virtual equivalent of religion in its practical aspect (Is 42[1-4]). In Ezekiel's more atomistic conception of righteousness there is a characteristic recrudescence of the ritual element; but the prophet has a true feeling for justice and humanity as the test of righteousness with God. The righteous man, who 'doeth judgment and righteousness,' has not merely kept himself free from idolatry and uncleanness, but 'hath restored to the debtor his pledge, hath spoiled none by violence, hath given his bread to the hungry, and hath covered the naked with a garment; hath not given forth [*sc.* his money] upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, hath withdrawn his hand from iniquity, hath executed true judgment between man and man, hath walked in my statutes, and hath kept my judgments, to do truly . . . saith Jahweh' (18[5-9]). And on the princes, who are to uphold the banner of righteousness in the better Jerusalem that is to come, the injunction is laid: 'Put away violence and spoil, and execute judgment and righteousness; lift off your exactions from my people, saith Jahweh. Ye shall have just scales, and a just ephah, and a just bath. The ephah and the bath shall be of one measure,' etc. (45[9-11]).[1]

[1] This positive conception of judicial righteousness, which throws the stress on the vindication of the innocent but defenceless poor, acquires an increasing importance in the later literature. Cf. Dt 24[17] 27[19], Jer 5[28] 22[15f.], Ps 10[18] 82[3] etc.

[2] The simple force of this phrase has suffered from the intrusion of a second אמת in MT.

4. Righteousness by the Law.—With Ezekiel we find prophecy passing into legalism. But the definite step in this direction had already been taken when Deuteronomy was accepted as the canon of faith and morals (621 B.C.). The book itself is steeped in the spirit of the greater prophets. Like them, it insists on justice, humanity, and love—especially towards the widow, the fatherless, and the stranger—as the vital expression of religion, which is identified with love to Jahweh (6[5]). But, in exalting the duties of humanity into 'commandments, statutes, and judgments, which Jahweh your God commanded to teach you' (6[1] 10[12f.] etc.), it shifts the emphasis from willing, cheerful pursuit of moral goodness to the painstaking effort to obey an external Law as the only ground of acceptance with God. The tendency towards nomistic righteousness received a still more powerful impetus from the Law of Holiness (Lv 19–26) and the full-blown Priestly legislation (P), in spite of the former code's sympathy with the poor and needy, and its summing up of the whole Law in the Golden Rule, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' (Lv 19[18, 34]). Life now became a rule, a yoke of obedience, which pressed ever more heavily on burdened consciences. The pathway to righteousness lay in the keeping of 'all these commandments' (Dt 6[25] 24[13]). To this end the study of the Law was enjoined as the first principle of success in life (Jos 1[8]). Kings were judged good or evil according to the measure in which they kept 'the statutes and judgments' of the Law (1 K 11[9, 33ff.], 2 Ch 7[17ff.] etc.). And men claimed 'good' at God's hand for the 'good deeds' which they had done in observing the Law themselves, and imposing it on others (Neh 5[19] 13[14, 22, 31]).

This nomistic ideal of righteousness more and more pervades the literature of the age. The piety of the Psalms is, no doubt, strongly influenced by the preaching of the prophets. Thus the perfect man of the Psalmists 'walketh uprightly, and worketh righteousness, and speaketh truth in his heart' (Ps 15[2]), 'hath clean hands, and a pure heart; hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, and hath not sworn deceitfully' (24[4]), 'keepeth his tongue from evil, and his lips from speaking guile; departeth from evil, and doeth good; seeketh peace, and pursueth it' (34[13f.]), 'is gracious, and giveth' (37[21]), 'disperseth, and giveth to the poor' (112[9]).[2] Even so the thought is near at hand that only by such conduct can one become a guest in Jahweh's tent, and dwell in His holy hill (15[1]), secure the Divine blessing of 'righteousness,' *i.e.* the right standing before Jahweh (24[5]), win many days of good (34[12]), even 'inherit the earth' (37[9, 11, 22]), and have his righteousness 'endure for ever' (112[9]). The nomistic ideal finds still clearer expression in Ps 1, 19, 119, where the Law is celebrated as the subject of the good man's meditation by day and night, his joy and crown, the fountain of light and purity, peace, freedom, and defence against evil, and the standard of judgment in the end of the days. In Job, too, the perfect man 'feareth God, and escheweth evil' (1[1, 8]), and rests his claim to appear before God, and be justified, on the ground that he has refrained from all vanity, deceit, and idolatry, and been the constant

[1] With Ezekiel's demand for just scales and measures cf Lv 19[35f.], Dt 25[13-16], Pr 11[1] 16[11] 20[10, 23].

[2] In the last citation there is a distinct approach to the Judaistic identification of righteousness with almsgiving (see art. RIGHTEOUSNESS [Jewish]).

friend and upholder of the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow ($31^{1ff.}$). The same idea prevails in Proverbs, though more ethical conceptions are frequent. Righteousness is primarily intellectual, 'to know wisdom and instruction; to discern the words of understanding; to receive instruction in wise dealing [conduct], in justice, probity, and equity' ($1^{2f.}$). The beginning of such knowledge is 'the fear of the Lord' (1^{7} 9^{10}), and this is learned through obedience to the revelation of Wisdom, the foster-child and deputy of God ($7^{1ff.}$ $8^{1ff.}$), who rewards all those who love her with riches and honour, 'yea, durable riches and righteousness' (here equivalent to prosperity, or good fortune, the result of a right standing before God), but the wicked with calamity, which sweeps over them like a whirlwind ($1^{24ff.}$ $3^{13ff.}$ $8^{17ff.}$).

In books like the above righteousness is not identical with sinlessness. Even the best men are guilty in God's sight. If He were quick to mark iniquities, none could stand in His presence; but with Him there is forgiveness, that He may be feared (Ps $130^{3f.}$). Thus Job can maintain his 'righteousness' ($6^{29f.}$ 10^{7} 13^{15} etc.) in spite of the fact that 'mortal man cannot be in the right before God' (4^{17} $9^{2.\ 20f.}$ $19^{6ff.}$ etc.). In Proverbs, too, righteousness is used in the sense of general rectitude. The righteous man is he who fears God and follows truth and uprightness, even though some measure of sinfulness may cling to him, while the wicked man despises both God and wisdom. Ecclesiastes, on the other hand, seems to identify righteousness with the perfect keeping of the Law, though he warns his readers against being 'righteous overmuch,' lest the spring of life be lost in the endeavour, for 'there is not a righteous man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not' (Ec $7^{16.\ 20}$). His ideal is the *via media* of moderate well-doing, which avoids extremes on either side (2^{24} $3^{12f.}$ $7^{16f.}$ $9^{7ff.}$). The editor of the book, however, insists on the full nomistic rule of life: 'Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every hidden thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil' ($12^{13f.}$).

5. The righteousness of God. — Primitive morality is never merely human. Society includes gods as well as men, and the gods are conceived as the upholders of social order, the source and sanction of public justice. Thus righteousness rests fundamentally on the Divine character and will. This idea runs through the whole OT. Jahweh is the fountain-head alike of the rightful customs of His people and of the later 'statutes and judgments' imposed by the authority of judges and lawgivers. In interpreting these customs and statutes, the judge is His mouthpiece (Ex $18^{13ff.}$ [E], Dt $17^{8ff.}$). The moral codes likewise are His 'words,' which reflect His character and express His will (Ex 20^{1}, Lv $18^{1ff.}$, Dt 6^{1} $7^{8ff.}$ etc.). The prophetic expositions of righteousness are equally the oracles of Jahweh and spring from the righteousness which is His by nature. Jahweh demands 'justice and righteousness' because He is faithful and righteous (Is 5^{7}, Am $5^{23f.}$, Zeph 3^{5}), love because His righteousness is seasoned with love (Hos $2^{14f.}$ $11^{1ff.}$ $14^{1ff.}$), tenderness and compassion because the devouring fire of His holiness is a spirit of redeeming grace as well as judgment (Is $1^{18f.}$ $4^{3f.}$ $6^{6f.}$). The plummet by which Jahweh is to rebuild Jerusalem is a plummet of righteousness (1^{27} 28^{17}), and the line of peace and abiding prosperity for her and all the world is the line of 'judgment and righteousness' ($11^{5f.}$ $32^{16f.}$ $33^{5f.}$). But nowhere is righteousness divorced from love and mercy. Jahweh will be gracious unto His people and will have mercy upon them; 'for Jahweh is a God of judgment' (30^{18}). He is a God that 'exerciseth love, justice, and righteousness in the earth' (Jer 9^{24}) and correcteth His people 'with judgment, not in anger' (10^{24}). Love and justice are, as it were, the two poles of the Divine character, each essential to the full harmony of His nature. In various passages of the Psalms they appear in poetic parallelism, as though love were the twin-sister of justice (Ps 33^{5} $36^{5ff.}$ 89^{14} 101^{1} 103^{17} $111^{3f.}$ 116^{5} 119^{149}).

With the prevalence of the forensic conception of righteousness, Jahweh came to be regarded as the Supreme Judge of men and nations. And it was felt from the first that 'the Judge of all the earth' must do right (lit. 'act according to *mishpāṭ*') in distinguishing sharply between the righteous and the wicked (Gn 18^{25}). This thought of an impartial Judge, putting the just man in the right and condemning the wicked, appears in many different contexts. Thus He wipes out the sinful world, but saves 'righteous' Noah ($6^{5ff.}$). He overwhelms Sodom and Gomorrah, but rescues Lot ($19^{12ff.}$). He smites Pharaoh and the Egyptians with all manner of wonders, but lets His afflicted people go free (Ex $3^{20ff.}$). He blesses them so long as they keep the Covenant, but takes vengeance upon them when they depart from it, even to the extent of driving them from the land which He has given them to inherit (Dt $7^{12ff.}$ $11^{1ff.}$ etc.). He is a jealous God, who visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of such as hate Him, but showeth mercy unto thousands of them that love Him, and keep His commandments (Ex $20^{5f.}$ $34^{6f.}$, Nu 14^{18}, Dt $7^{9f.}$). He 'judges' between David and Saul, requiting David for his 'righteousness and faithfulness,' but bringing the kingdom of Saul to an end (1 S $24^{15.\ 19f.}$ 26^{23}). He 'enters into judgment with the elders and princes of his people,' because they have 'devoured the vineyard,' and 'grind the faces of the poor' (Is $3^{14f.}$). He visits His people for their deceit and treachery (Jer $9^{9.\ 13ff.}$). He 'executeth judgment' in their midst for the abominations they had done before Him (Ezk 5^{10} $9^{1ff.}$ etc.). On the wicked He 'raineth down coals of fire,' making their portion 'brimstone and burning wind,' while the 'upright behold his face' (Ps $11^{6f.}$). He even makes Himself good [godly] to the good [godly], perfect to the perfect, pure to the pure, perverse to the crooked ($18^{25f.}$). In the punishment which He thus metes out for unrighteousness the guilty themselves must admit that He is 'in the right' (Ex 9^{27}, Ps 51^{4}). But, as the good judge showed his righteousness in actively promoting the cause of the defenceless, so Jahweh puts forth His righteous arm to help the poor and down-trodden (Dt 10^{18}, Mic 7^{9}, Ps $37^{6.\ 32f.}$ etc.). As Israel itself is the supreme type of the 'righteous' oppressed by its enemies, His righteousness is manifested chiefly in its vindication. The 'righteous acts of Jahweh,' which the joy-makers celebrate 'around the water-troughs' in the days of Deborah (Jg 5^{11}), are His saving acts on the battle-field of Megiddo. So also in Samuel's farewell address (1 S 12^{7}) the 'righteous acts of Jahweh' are His acts of deliverance from the day when He brought their fathers out of Egypt. Thus 'righteousness' is frequently equated with 'salvation' (Is 56^{1}, Jer 51^{10}, Dn 9^{24}, Ps 4^{1} 37^{6} 51^{14} etc.).[1] The 'sun of righteousness' (Mal 4^{2}) is a striking figure for Jahweh's saving grace soon to shine forth upon His people. The Messianic title, *Jahweh Ṣidḳenu*, 'Jahweh is our righteousness' (Jer $23^{5f.}$), is to be interpreted in the same sense. The sprouting of the righteous Branch is the

[1] 'Of course, we must not identify righteousness with salvation. . . . Salvation is, so to speak, the clothing, the manifestation of Jehovah's righteousness' (A. B. Davidson, *Theology of the OT*, p. 396f.).

spring-like promise of Israel's redemption (*ib.*). In like manner the judgment in the valley of Jehoshaphat, 'Jahweh judgeth' (Jl 3[12]), means salvation for Israel.

This connotation of the term, however, is peculiarly associated with the great prophecy of restoration in Is 40–55, where Jahweh's whole dealings with His people are viewed in the light of His and their 'righteousness.' The people Israel have sinned and paid the penalty of their sin. The verdict of history has proved them absolutely 'in the wrong.' Nevertheless, they feel that they have a 'case' (*mishpāṭ*), which cannot for ever be 'passed over' by their God (Is 40[27]). Israel is Jahweh's people, bound to Him by the everlasting Covenant—His Servant, chosen by Him to 'send forth judgment to the nations' (42[1ff.]). Though too often 'far from righteousness' (the conduct which befits Jahweh's people), and blind and deaf to its high calling as His Servant, Israel is yet more completely 'in the right' than the peoples that have 'robbed and spoiled' it. From the ideal point of view, the Israelites may even be regarded as the innocent victims of oppression, who may therefore boldly claim 'justification,' or recognition of their just rights, from Jahweh (50[6-9]). In answer to the claim, Jahweh is pleased 'for his righteousness' sake'—His loyalty to the covenant of grace—to bring them deliverance, and so to 'magnify the revelation' of His righteousness through them (42[21]). Throughout the past He has been righteous (true to His word) in all that He has promised to do (41[26] 45[19]); and His righteous word will not fail Him now (45[23]). Already He has raised up Cyrus, 'whom righteousness [here in the sense of victory][1] followeth at every step' (41[2]); and He will continue to uphold him until Jerusalem and its temple have been rebuilt, and the waste places of Judah raised up (44[26-28]). For He is 'a just God and a saviour' (45[21])—a righteous God, whose righteousness is made manifest in salvation (46[13] 51[5f. 8] 54[17]). With salvation will come 'righteousness [the power that makes for victory] and strength' (45[24]), peace [prosperity] flowing 'as a river' (48[18]), and abounding joy and gladness (55[1ff.]) welling up from hearts that know and follow after righteousness [in the prophetic sense of right-doing], because the law [revelation] of Jahweh is within them (51[1. 7]). And this blessing will be shed over all the earth. For it is too light a thing for Jahweh merely to restore the exiles of Jacob. He has sworn by Himself, 'Unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear' (45[23]), and for the accomplishment of His oath He has given His Servant Israel for a light to the nations, 'that my salvation may reach to the end of the earth' (49[6]). The sufferings that caused the Servant such perplexity and despair are to be the means of this salvation. 'By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many [bring many to a right standing with God]: for he shall bear their iniquities' (53[11]). Thus the redemptive righteousness of Jahweh reaches the fulfilment of its purpose in the conversion of the world to Him.

6. The challenge of Divine righteousness.—In the heyday of national prosperity it was easy to believe in Divine righteousness. But amid the general disorder which accompanied the downfall of the nation keen questions arose. If the Judge of all the earth did right, why must the righteous suffer, while the wicked enjoyed such long and prosperous days? These questions first become vocal in Jeremiah, whose ministry for righteousness was one continuous martyrdom. 'Too righteous [too completely in the right] art thou, O Lord, that I should contend with thee [*sc.* at the bar of justice], yet would I lay my case before thee: Why doth the way of the wicked prosper? Why are they all at ease that deal very treacherously?' (12[1]). When Jahweh answers only with the promise of yet graver trials, the prophet breaks into bitter expostulations, even charging Jahweh with deceiving him: 'Why is my pain perpetual, and my wound incurable? . . . Truly thou hast been to me a deceitful brook, as waters that are not sure' (15[18]). 'Thou hast fooled me, O Lord, and I let myself be fooled; thou art stronger than I, and hast prevailed. I am turned to a laughing-stock all day long, every one doth mock me' (20[7]). The same poignant cry bursts from the lips of Habakkuk in the agony of the Chaldæan oppression: 'Thou that art too pure of eyes to look upon evil, who canst not behold iniquity, why dost thou look on the work of wrong-doers, why be silent when the wicked man [the Chaldæans] swalloweth up the righteous [Israel]?' (1[13]). From prophets the challenge is caught up and re-echoed by the people under the bondage of exile and in the barren days that succeeded the restoration: 'My way is hid from Jahweh, and my cause doth pass unheeded by my God' (Is 40[27]); 'Every one that doeth evil is good [acceptable] in the eyes of Jahweh, and he delighteth in them. Where then is the God of judgment?' (Mal 2[17]); 'It is vain to serve God: and what profit is it that we have kept his ordinances, and walked in mourning before him? For behold now! the arrogant are blessed [happy],[1] and the doers of wickedness are built up; yea, they tempt God, yet escape' (3[14f.]).

To these heart-breaking appeals of earnest souls there came no direct answer, but only the exhortation to stand fast by the line of duty (Jer 15[19-21]), or wait with patience till the 'vision' should reach its appointed end (Hab 2[3f.]), and the 'sun of righteousness' should rise 'with healing in its wings,' when the righteous should 'skip as calves of the stall,' and 'trample down the wicked' under their feet (Mal 4[1-3]). But bolder spirits fought out the fight and lifted the problem to a region where the troubles of the righteous melted away in the eternal sunshine of God's face.

The most heroic of these conflicts is reflected in the book of Job. A perfect pattern of righteousness, Job is suddenly plunged into overwhelming suffering and misery. Trained in the ancient dogma that suffering is the penalty of sin, yet firmly convinced that he has done nothing to merit these calamities, and goaded to despair by the orthodox 'consolations' of his friends, he fiercely arraigns God's rule. 'I am innocent, but it is all one. God destroyeth the innocent and the wicked alike.' There is no justice in His reign. 'The earth is given over to the power of the wicked; and God blindeth the eyes of its judges,' so that they can no longer distinguish between right and wrong. And God cannot deny the charge. 'If it be not he, who then is it?' (9[21-24]). The poet reaches no intellectual solution of the problem thus raised. Salvation is found only in a dazzling vision of Jahweh's majesty, wisdom, and goodness in nature, before which Job and all his sorrows are swallowed up (42[2ff.]). He does, however, rise to the thought that, after he is dead, God will appear upon his dust, as Goel, or Champion, to bear witness to his innocence, and that he will rise from Sheol, if but for a moment, to see the vindication of his cause (19[25-27]). The door which he has thus unlocked behind the veil is pushed wide open by later psalmists, apocalyptists, and sages. By the time of Jesus immortality had become an assured hope of Judaism. And the problem of Divine

[1] With צְדָקָה, used in the sense of 'victory,' we may compare Syr. *zᵉkha*, which means 'conquer' as well as 'be pure *or* innocent,' and the opposite, *ḥāb*, 'be conquered *or* guilty.'

[1] For אֲנַחְנוּ מְאַשְּׁרִים, 'we count happy,' read מְאֻשָּׁרִים, 'happy are.'

righteousness was solved in a view of God's government which embraced both this age (עֹלָם, *'ōlām*; αἰών, 'æon') and that which was to come.

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A. R. GORDON.

RIGHTEOUSNESS (in Christ's teaching).—**1. Method of inquiry.**—It is not unusual with writers on this subject to gather out of the Gospels all that may be thought to have any relation to that term in any and every sense in which it can be used. This results in an article on 'righteousness' becoming a more or less complete theology of the Gospels. In the present article it is proposed to limit the inquiry to the few passages in which the term actually occurs. This will have the advantage of bringing into clear relief the very small part which the actual term plays in Christ's teaching. It occurs seven times in the First Gospel, twice in the Fourth, and no more.

2. Data.—Mt 3[15], 'to fulfil all righteousness.'—The words are very ambiguous. How could the baptism of Jesus by John be a fulfilling of 'all righteousness'? The meaning generally given is 'to fulfil every righteous ordinance,' John's baptism being regarded as a divinely sanctioned religious ordinance, which no pious Israelite could disregard; and δικαιοσύνη being interpreted as though it were δικαίωμα (cf. Lk 1[6]). This is perhaps supported by Mt 21[32], where it is said that John came 'in the way of righteousness.' This seems to mean 'came as a representative and preacher of righteousness,' and the thought in 'righteousness' will be in particular of the 'repentance' which John preached.

Mt 5[6], 'who hunger and thirst after righteousness.'—It seems clear that here 'righteousness' may have any or all of the senses which could be ascribed to it. There was the Divine righteousness. There was the Divine righteousness in so far as it had been revealed in Law and Prophets. There was this righteousness as appropriated by man. In the latter sense it comes to mean something like 'right conduct,' and to the Jew this right conduct was conditioned by observance of the Law,[1] and expressed itself in repentance, almsgiving, prayer, and acts of humanity. It may well be that Christ had particularly in view those who spent their lives in the endeavour to fulfil the requirements of the Law and thus to obtain the 'righteousness' which God required, and which He had revealed (cf. Ro 9[31] Ἰσραὴλ δὲ διώκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης).

Mt 5[10], 'who are persecuted for righteousness' sake,' *i.e.* 'who in their hunger and thirst for righteousness so act as to draw down upon themselves persecution.'

Mt 5[20] and 6[1]. Here we must examine the relation of these verses to the whole section 5[17]–6[18]; 5[17] lays down the permanent validity of Law and Prophets as re-interpreted by Christ. [Vv.[18, 19] seem to be an interpolation giving another view of the permanence of the Law in the sense of permanent obligatoriness of the letter of the Law.] V.[20] 'For I say to you, that except your righteousness surpass that of the scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of the heavens.' Now what is this 'righteousness'? It is (*a*) a condition of entry into the kingdom. It is (*b*) brought into connexion with the Law (and the Prophets). And the contrast implied seems to be this: the scribes have what they call 'righteousness,' which is dependent upon observance of the Law; they are right, but, since the understanding of the Law which I give you goes deeper than does theirs, your 'righteousness' will necessarily be in some sense more abundant than theirs.

Vv. 21-48 give a twofold series of three illustrations of the way in which Christ 'fulfilled' (*i.e.* gave a deeper meaning to) the Law.

I. (*a*) 21-26.—The law, 'Do not murder,' implies, 'Do not have angry thoughts.' Therefore, if your brother has a matter against you, go and be reconciled to him.[1] This seems to imply that righteousness is a right condition of the heart, caused by right appreciation of the Law and taking effect in right conduct.

(*b*) 27-30.—The law, 'Do not commit adultery,' implies, 'Do not have impure thoughts.' Therefore exercise moral discipline. This also seems to imply that righteousness is a right condition of the heart, caused by right appreciation of the Law, taking effect in moral control and discipline.

(*c*) 31, 32.—The Law sanctioned divorce, but limits this to cases of πορνεία. This seems to imply that righteousness will not insist upon supposed legal rights which are not consistent with the highest morality.

II. (*a*) 33-37.—The Law said, 'Do not swear falsely,' but carry this farther, 'Do not swear at all.' This seems to imply that righteousness will sometimes fulfil the Law by extending its scope.

(*b*) 38-40.—The Law commanded retaliation. Turn this into a retaliation of love.

(*c*) 43-48.—The Law said, 'Hate your enemy,' but do the contrary—love him. This, again, seems to imply that righteousness will sometimes reverse the letter of a particular precept.

These illustrations are very different in kind. In I. (*a*) and (*b*) they imply an exegesis of the Law which penetrates beneath the letter and seeks to find and to carry into effect the spiritual principle which is logically involved. Murder presupposes anger; therefore avoid anger as well as murder. Adultery implies lust; therefore put away lust. We might suppose that the 'greater righteousness' of the disciples is either the moral state caused by obedience to the Law thus spiritually interpreted or the moral acts in which this morality of the heart expressed itself, viz. reconciliation to the brother, moral discipline, or both taken together. But in I. (*c*) the limitation given to the sanction of divorce is quite arbitrary; *i.e.*, whilst the disciples might take the illustrations I. (*a*) and (*b*) as examples of a general method of interpretation, I. (*c*) would give them no principle of exegesis by which they could deal with any other law. Righteousness here therefore must be conduct based on a given interpretation. II. (*a*) and (*c*) might perhaps be regarded as illustrative of a method of interpreting the Law by arguing from the particular to the general. If false swearing is wrong, so must any kind of swearing be. If love to one's neighbour is commanded, this must be held to imply love of all men. But II. (*b*) is again a quite arbitrary cancelling of a law, by substituting for it its exact opposite. Here righteousness is certainly not moral condition created by obedience to the Law. It may be right moral condition which revolts against the Law and substitutes for it something different, or right conduct due to such reversal.

These facts would lead us to suppose that the idea of righteousness implied in these illustrations was that of conduct rather than of the moral condition which gives rise to conduct; that is to say, Christ is dealing with 'righteousness' as a term with a definite meaning (= 'right conduct') which He presupposes. The right conduct of His disciples was to take a far wider range than that of the scribes and Pharisees, just because the methods of interpreting the Law which He taught them would enable them to widen out almost every single command to cover a far greater area of conduct than did the Pharisaic exegesis.

But, whatever the idea of the 'greater righteousness' which these illustrations are intended to convey, it is noticeable that the term 'righteous-

[1] For 'righteousness' as equivalent to obedience to the Law see F. Volz, *Jüdische Eschatologie*, Tübingen, 1903, p. 316; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*, Berlin, 1903, p. 357. For 'righteousness' and 'righteousness' see Bousset, p. 358. For 'almsgiving' and 'acts of humanity' in connexion with 'righteousness,' see Volz, p. 316.

[1] The application does not seem quite consequent. The point would be clearer if the words ran, 'If thou hast aught against thy brother.'

ness' is not actually used to describe it. That is probably due to the fact, noticed above, that Christ seems to be dealing with the term in its Pharisaic meaning of 'right conduct.' He states that the right conduct of His disciples, just because it is based upon a more spiritual interpretation of the Law, will be far wider in range than the scribal righteousness. But He will not in formal language apply the term 'righteousness' to the results of obedience to the Law in its more spiritual interpretation. To have done so would have been contrary to His whole view of human conduct, which never was or could be 'righteousness.' 'When ye have done all that is required of you, say, We be unprofitable servants' (Lk 17^{10}).

In ch. 6, however, we come back to the actual term 'righteousness.' Whatever be the idea of righteousness implied by contrast with the Pharisaic 'righteousness' in 5^{21-48}, it would seem that Christ now at least remembers that in contemporary Judaism 'righteousness' was often equivalent to 'right conduct,' especially in the sphere of the performance of acts of religion. And to this He now turns in 6^{1}, 'Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men,'[1] and then proceeds to illustrate the term under the three heads of almsgiving (vv.$^{2-4}$), prayer (vv.$^{5-15}$), and fasting (vv.$^{16-18}$). This section seems to be very loosely connected with the preceding, for the connexion in thought between righteousness and the Law drops out of sight. The precepts now given about righteousness are not drawn from the Law, but are mainly confined to the command to avoid ostentation and publicity. That is an additional argument for supposing that all through the Sermon 'righteousness' is being used in a technical sense = right conduct based on the Law. Ch. 5^{21-48} is concerned mainly with the right method of interpreting the Law, and only secondarily with righteousness as based on it. Ch. 6^{1-18} is concerned primarily with the latter idea, and presupposes the insistence upon the permanence of the Law stated in 5^{21-48}. 'Almsgiving, fasting, and prayer' are assumed to be acts of righteousness because they are commanded in the Law.

The term 'righteousness' occurs once again in the Sermon in 6^{33}, 'Seek first the kingdom and his righteousness,' or, by emendation, 'Seek first the kingdom and its righteousness,' *i.e.* the righteousness which alone qualifies for entry into it.[2]

3. Results. — If we now ask what light the Sermon on the Mount as a whole throws upon the term 'righteousness' as used by Christ, one or two important results emerge.

(*a*) The illustrations of the interpretation of the Law seem to suggest that, by way of contrast with the Pharisaic righteousness, true righteousness is a right condition of the heart, caused by a right understanding of the spiritual tenor of the Law, which issues in right conduct. But this is never called 'righteousness.'

(*b*) Throughout the Sermon Christ seems to be employing the term as a known conception, using it therefore, as it were, in inverted commas. The Jews sought for righteousness by the method of obedience to the Law taking effect in religious acts. All who really desired it from the bottom of their hearts would ultimately be satisfied, however misguided the method by which they sought for it (5^{6}). The righteousness of Christ's disciples (*i.e.* their religious conduct) was not to be less than that of the scribes (5^{20}). Obedience to the Law, almsgiving, prayer, fasting—all these were obligatory upon them (6^{1-18}). But they were to be practised in a different spirit, based upon a better understanding of the Law, and void of the ostentation which marred the Pharisaic devotion.

These results are not unimportant. All through the Sermon we are dealing with Christ's teaching about conduct as related to the Law, and this conduct is termed 'righteousness' just because that was a current usage. It is a technical term used by Him in its technical meaning. All that He is concerned with here is the relation of His disciples to righteousness as compared with the relation to it of the Pharisees. In both cases it is to be based on the Law, but in the case of His disciples it will assume a more far-reaching character due to the better method of dealing with the Law which He gave to them.

In other words, we have no real clue here as to Christ's own doctrine of righteousness, no new definition of it, no attempt to give its content and scope and range. We may, if we please, select from His words such ideas as love and purity, and say that these constitute righteousness in His doctrine. But they are never actually so termed, and His silence suggests rather the view that He would not willingly have predicated righteousness of men at all.

It will be seen that in the Sermon 'righteousness' seems to be used with reference to a meaning which it had in contemporary Judaism, that of the righteousness based on observance of the Law which good men exhibited in such exercises of religion as almsgiving, fasting, repentance, and prayer. What Christ is reported to have taught about it did not change the entire content of the word, but spiritualized and deepened it. If His disciples rightly understood the Law, they would not neglect such ordinances as almsgiving, fasting, and prayer, but would exercise them in a spirit which would make them to be real righteousness, which God would reward. In this conception of the 'reward of righteousness' we are still in the circle of current Jewish conceptions. So far as this Gospel is concerned, Christ does not sweep away the conception of reward, but purges it. The unostentatious and unseen righteousness would receive a reward from God, who sees the unseen.

[1] For 'doing righteousness' cf. *Test. Levi*, xiii. 5, 'Do righteousness therefore, my children, upon the earth'; *Psalms of Solomon*, ix. 9, 'He who does righteousness treasures up for himself life with the Lord.'

Since the Heb. צְדָקָה, Aram. צדקתא, acquired the signification 'almsgiving,' ἐλεημοσύνη has been substituted for δικαιοσύνη in some MSS in Mt 6^{1}. But no doubt δικαιοσύνη in this verse is the general term for righteousness, which is then subdivided in the following verses into alms, prayer, and fasting.

[2] 'The kingdom and his righteousness.' The text here is uncertain. That just given is the reading of the best MSS. It might also be translated 'His kingdom and righteousness.' With the first translation the reference to God in an indirect way by the use of a pronoun is unexpected and difficult. 'Righteousness' must then mean 'the righteousness required by God.' This meaning is not far removed from that of vv.$^{5.6.10}$. There is no need to introduce a so-called Pauline meaning into the word (Wellhausen). With the second translation it is possible to relate the pronoun to 'kingdom' only, and to take 'righteousness' absolutely. But it is more natural to refer the pronoun to both nouns. The meaning will then be 'Your Father . . . knoweth what you need. Therefore seek first his kingdom [cf. 'thy kingdom' in 6^{10}], and righteousness.'

The variant readings seem to be attempts to avoid a difficult phrase. Thus B transposes 'righteousness' and 'kingdom,' whilst E and other Uncials and the Curetonian Syriac add 'of God' after 'the kingdom.'

It may be conjectured that αὐτοῦ is a mistranslation of the original Aramaic and should be αὐτῆς. 'Seek the kingdom and the righteousness without which you cannot enter it' (cf. 5^{20}).

It may be objected that this limitation of righteousness to the conception of concrete right conduct cannot be all that Christ meant by righteousness. But we are not dealing with 'all that Christ meant,' but with what the editor of the First Gospel records Him to have taught on the subject. This writer seems to have written for an early Palestinian or Syrian community, the members of which were Jewish Christians. He wished to assert and prove the Messiahship of Jesus, and to show that the kingdom in which that Messiahship would be exercised was imminent. He was therefore also concerned to record what Jesus had taught as to the conditions under which men would be admitted into it. Of course, recognition of the Messiah was one. But Christ had laid down a number of principles for the guidance of His disciples until His kingdom should appear. The editor is particularly interested in those principles

which deal with the relation of Christians to the older Judaism. He regards the new community as the true Judaism, and is at pains to record such teaching of Christ as showing how the representatives of the older Judaism had distorted their religion, and how the Messiah had re-interpreted for His disciples the true meaning of the Law and the ordinances. When recording, therefore, the teaching of Christ on righteousness, he has in mind chiefly such sayings as brought into contrast Christ's teaching and the most current and popular conception of contemporary Judaism. This was of righteousness as equivalent to 'the exercises of religious acts.' These still retained their obligation, but were to be void of the spirit of ostentation which characterized them as practised by the Pharisees. To find in all the qualities commended in the Sermon on the Mount 'the characteristics which constitute true righteousness,'[1] as does the writer of the art. 'Righteousness in NT' in *HDB*, is to miss the whole point of the First Gospel. These many qualities may perhaps constitute 'righteousness,' if that word be used in a sense which permits it, but they are never called 'righteousness' in the First Gospel, and indeed are carefully distinguished from it. Ch. 5^{20} speaks of the righteousness which is to characterize the disciples, but, when next we come to the word, it is in 6^{1}, and in the rest of that chapter righteousness is illustrated as consisting in such religious devotions as almsgiving, prayer, and fasting, *i.e.* in concrete, not internal, righteousness.

It will perhaps be said that $5^{21ff.}$ shows how the righteousness of the disciples is to exceed that of the Pharisees, and must therefore bear on the conception. These verses show how exegesis of the Law is to be deeper, directed more to the spiritual content than to the surface meaning of its precepts. But this spiritual appreciation is not called righteousness, though it might be so termed by any one who cared to use the word in that sense. This deeper insight into the meaning of the Law is only the soil from which a more abundant righteousness, in the sense of the word as used by the editor of the Gospel, can spring.

Righteousness therefore in Christ's teaching, as recorded in the First Gospel, means conduct, in respect of religious ordinances, and of moral relation to others, which is the outcome of a right understanding of the OT. In what relation does it stand to Christ's personality? In this, that the Messiah had given a new method of interpreting the OT.

This, of course, is not the whole of Christian teaching on righteousness, but it is all that the First Gospel has given to us. That is only an additional proof that this Gospel springs from a Jewish Christian society which only partially understood Christ's teaching and His person. For them He was the Messiah, who was soon to inaugurate His kingdom. He was also the true interpreter of the Law. Those who followed His teaching would hold fast to the Law and to the ordinances of religion. They would then become the righteous who alone would enter the kingdom.

How closely the conception of righteousness in the First Gospel follows the Jewish conception of it may be seen from a study of the cognate adjective (δίκαιος). This means, generally speaking, a 'pious,' 'religious' person. Thus Joseph is a 'righteous' man, and this quality would have led him to put away his betrothed wife, when she was found to be with child (1^{19}). Jesus Himself is called a 'righteous' man by Pilate and his wife ($27^{19.24}$). The Pharisees appear to men to be 'righteous' (23^{28}). 'The righteous' can be spoken of collectively as a class,[2] whether the thought is of the pious heroes of the past ('adorn the tombs of the righteous,' 23^{29}; cf. 'Abel the righteous'[3] [23^{35}]), or of 'the righteous' who will enter the Messianic kingdom[1] ($13^{43.49}$ $25^{37.46}$).

Of course there is the same vagueness here as there is about the use of the word in Jewish literature. But one prevailing characteristic of 'the righteous' in Jewish literature is piety based upon conformity to the Law, which takes effect in outward action, especially in such religious exercises as almsgiving, prayer, and fasting. To the editor of the First Gospel 'the righteous' were those who would be admitted into the kingdom. But who were 'righteous'? Not all Jews (3^{9} 8^{12}), not the scribes and Pharisees with their hard and literal interpretation of the Law, but the true disciples of the Law, who received the clue to its meaning given to them by the Messiah. For them the Law was not in one jot or tittle abolished (5^{18}). Rather it was permanently valid. But they had a clue to its meaning which would make their righteousness exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees in so far as it had a deeper soil into which to strike its roots.

Neither St. Mark nor St. Luke has recorded any saying of Christ containing the term 'righteousness.' The adjective occurs in Mk 2^{17}, whence Mt 9^{13} has borrowed it. St. Luke places the adjective in the mouth of Christ in the following sayings: 5^{32} = Mk 2^{17} = Mt 9^{13}; 14^{14} 'the resurrection of the righteous' (here it is used, as in Mt $13^{43.49}$ $25^{37.46}$, of the inheritors of ultimate blessedness); 15^{7} 18^{9} and 20^{29} (in the same sense as in Mt 9^{13}); 23^{47} (applied to Christ by the centurion); 23^{50} (of Joseph of Arimathæa). We learn therefore nothing fresh from these Gospels as to the teaching of Christ on the subject of righteousness.

In the Fourth Gospel the term occurs in one connexion only. That is in $16^{8.10}$. The Holy Spirit is to convince the world of righteousness, 'because I go to the Father.' The meaning may be that righteousness in the widest sense of the term had been completely manifested in the life of the incarnate Son of God. When He returned to His Father, this manifestation was completed, and by that return it was proved to have been a real manifestation. And that manifestation would henceforth be the standard by which all other conceptions of righteousness would be tried and proved to be faulty. The adjective is used three times in the Gospel—once of Christ's 'judgment' (5^{30}), once of human 'judgment' (7^{24}), and once of God the Father (17^{25}).

Of course, it is not possible to discuss the bearings of Jn 16^{8} on the whole conception of Christ as to righteousness. For that would lead us into a re-statement of the whole Johannine theology. If Christ taught that He was the incarnate righteousness of God, the question is at once raised, How does this affect men? That leads to the doctrine of the relation between Christ and men in all its many bearings, including the doctrine of sin and of its removal, and of the mystical union between Christ and the believer. All that we can do is to note the fact that, whilst the First Gospel deals with righteousness from the human standpoint and regards it as closely connected with a right view of the Law, the Fourth Gospel, in the one passage concerned, deals with it from the standpoint of the divine righteousness perfectly manifested in the eternal Son of God.

LITERATURE.—To the literature quoted in the article add E. A. Abbott, '*Righteousness' in the Gospels*, London, 1918.

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RIGHTEOUSNESS (in St. Paul's teaching).

1. Importance of the term.—Righteousness, as a popular term in universal use, is of course sometimes employed by St. Paul in its current and popular sense. Thus, when he asks, What partnership

[1] G. B. Stevens, in *HDB* iv. 282.

[2] Peculiar to the First Gospel is the collocation 'prophets and righteous men.' So in 13^{17} 'Many prophets and righteous men,' and in 10^{41} 'He who receiveth a prophet . . . and he who receiveth a righteous man'; cf. *Test. Levi*, xvi. 2, 'You will set at nought the words of the prophets . . . and will persecute righteous men;' *Test. Dan*, ii. 3, 'Though it be a prophet . . . though it be a righteous man.'

The other passages in the Gospel in which 'righteous' is used of persons are 9^{13}, 'I came not to call righteous but sinners,' where 'righteous' seems to be used in a half ironical sense (cf. 'sons of the kingdom'); 8^{12}, of those who asserted 'righteousness' of themselves, and 5^{45} 'rains upon righteous and unrighteous' (cf. *Test. Judah*, xxi. 6, 'Just as on it [the sea] righteous' 'and unrighteous,' some MSS] are tossed about').

[3] 'Enoch the righteous' (*Test. Levi*, x. 5, xviii. 2, *Test. Dan*, ii. 3, v. 6), also *Test. Ben.* vii. 4, 'Abel the righteous, his brother.'

[1] Similarly in the Apocalyptic literature 'the righteous' are those who are to inherit the kingdom (cf. Volz, p. 315).

have righteousness and lawlessness with one another (2 Co 6[14])?, or speaks of himself as equipped with the weapons of righteousness on the right hand and on the left (2 Co 6[7]), or says that the Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit (Ro 14[7]), it is most natural to suppose that he uses the word in the large and somewhat indefinite sense which every one understands. What it signifies is that there is a standard for conduct—a standard determined not simply by the nature of the person who is to exhibit the character or quality of righteousness, but by his relation to other persons or things—and that the requirements of this standard have been met. But two things demand special consideration of the term in St. Paul. One is the extreme frequency with which δικαιοσύνη and the cognate terms (δίκαιος, δικαιοῦν, δικαίωμα, δικαίωσις) occur in his writings. If we discount the Pastorals, the examples of these words amount to 101. This alone would show their peculiar importance for him. Besides this, there is the undoubted fact that he uses some of them in a technical or quasi-technical sense, with the correct understanding of which is bound up the correct understanding of his gospel. Thus δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is rightly spoken of by Holtzmann[1] as a 'technische Abbreviatur' for St. Paul's conception of Christianity; in the mathematical sense it is a 'symbolic' expression of his gospel.

The difficulties connected with the term are like those which in modern times are connected with the relations of religion and morality. Most people admit that religion and morality can be and must be distinguished, but most religious people would say that religion, as they understand it, is ethical through and through, and that apart from it morality has no adequate inspiration or safeguard. The peculiarity, and sometimes the perplexity, of St. Paul's writing is due to the fact that he does not distinguish religion and morality as a modern does. Morality is for him much more bound up with a right relation to God than it is for the ordinary modern, and religion is much more easily conceived as something on which the verdict of God has to be pronounced—in other words, as something of which a moral estimate has to be made in a legal or quasi-legal form. The appreciation of this difference is made the harder by the fact that St. Paul has not two vocabularies to express the different elements or aspects of reality, moral or religious, with which he is dealing. He has to represent them all in terms of δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοῦν.

2. The righteousness of God. — The formal presentation of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ as the sum and substance of the Christian message is made in the Epistle to the Romans. St. Paul is not ashamed of the gospel, for it is the power of God to salvation for all who believe—the explanation of this being that in it there is revealed δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. The genitive case can be used to express various relations; and, so far as grammar goes, δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ might mean the righteousness which belongs to God (*i.e.* which is His character as a righteous being); or such a righteousness as God requires of men, and will acknowledge as answering to His requirements; or, again, a righteousness of which God is the source or author. Obviously also some if not all of these ideas might be combined; and, if the expression is in any sense technical or symbolical, it has probably condensed or accumulated into itself shades of meaning which would originally have taken different grammatical forms.

In modern times there have been three main lines of interpretation. In the first the genitive, θεοῦ, is taken as a simple possessive, and the righteousness which is revealed is God's own character. The gospel shows men what God is. They may have imagined that they knew Him before, and even that they knew what was meant by His righteousness. But they misconceived the attribute which they called by this name. To them it was merely a retributive or distributive virtue—the attribute in virtue of which God renders to every man according to his work. As such it was a ground of fear rather than of hope to the sinner, and it hardly could be conceived as the content of a gospel. But, when God's righteousness was actually revealed in the gospel, it turned out to be quite different from this. It was not retributive or distributive, but self-imparting or communicative. It streamed out ceaselessly from God, and overflowed upon men and into them, becoming their righteousness also. That is why the news of it is gospel. It is glad tidings to the sinful that it is the very nature of God, in spite of their sin, in entire indifference to their sin, conceivably even on account of their sin, to beat against their sinful nature with His searching self-communicating righteousness till sin is overcome and God's own righteousness fills the once sinful nature of man. That sinners are saved by God imparting His own character to them is true, but it does not follow that this is what St. Paul means when he uses the expression δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. The problem which the gospel had to solve was for him a moral problem, but here the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is conceived simply on the analogy of a physical force. It flows out as unconditionally from God towards all men as water flows from a spring, or as heat radiates from the sun. But moral problems cannot be stated, let alone solved, by merely physical categories; and, when St. Paul wrestles, intellectually, with his problem in Ro 3[25], it assumes quite another character. Further, while an attempt may be made, in consistency with this view of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, to make room for Christ in the gospel—to point to Him as a conspicuous proof that divine righteousness has the self-imparting quality here claimed for it—it is quite impossible to give Him the place that He has in St. Paul. For the apostle He is not a conspicuous illustration of the nature of divine righteousness; except in Him and in His Cross there is no revelation or knowledge of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ at all.

3. OT usage.—A more impressive and suggestive interpretation of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is that which, while still treating the genitive as possessive, finds the key to the meaning in those OT passages in which God's righteousness is spoken of, not as distributive or as self-imparting, but as doing right or justice by His people. In the OT generally the functions of ruling and judging are closely connected; and, when the king judges, he is conceived as helping his people to their rights rather than as administering statutes. In books like the Psalms and Deutero-Isaiah the people of God are generally represented as wronged and oppressed by a wicked world, and God manifests His righteousness when He vindicates them and delivers them from their enemies. Hence God's righteousness is His people's hope; it is in it that they trust, and to it they appeal; by the manifestation and exercise of it they are justified and saved. In a real sense, it is one with His grace and faithfulness. It puts His wronged people in the right in the eyes of all intelligent spectators. The Lord is their righteousness, their vindication, their salvation, as against all who condemn and oppress them or put them in the wrong.

Passages like Ps 35[24, 28] 51[14] 71[2, 15f, 24], or like Is 51[5] 54[17] 56[1], illustrate this. In most of these the subject spoken of is the nation, and it is

[1] *NT Theol.*[2] ii. 139.

easier, of course, for a nation than for an individual to feel that it is in the right, and that, if God's righteousness were manifested, the result would be its justification and salvation. A comparison of vv. [1, 2] in Ps 143 shows how this national reliance on God's righteousness as that which must vindicate the people can be combined with an individual sense of sin which cannot face the judgment of God. The just (but wronged) nation can be saved by the manifestation of God's righteousness; its justification is an 'analytical' proposition, declaring it to be what it is by putting it into the position which is its due; but, if the sinful individual, who cannot face God's judgment, is to be justified, the process must be different. His justification cannot be the declaration of what he is—the demonstration of the righteousness of the righteous; it must be a synthetic proposition, which not only declares something about the sinner, but also does something for him, securing for him a *new* relation to God. It is worth noticing that those who attach to these OT passages about the nation, or the faithful community at the heart of it, the explanation of St. Paul's δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ—Ritschl, *e.g.*—also connect justification in the NT sense with the Church rather than the individual. The writer can only confess himself baffled with this. When St. Paul preaches his gospel of δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, it is not to an oppressed people of God who, whatever their shortcomings, are still in the right as against their pagan oppressors, and who can depend on God's righteousness to put them in the right—*i.e.* by one and the same divine act to justify and save them; he preaches to individual sinners, Jew and Gentile alike, who are in no community but that of guilt, and of whom it must be said, if they are eventually justified, not that God has justified His injured people and vindicated their righteous cause, but that He has justified the ungodly (Ro 4[5]). This would of itself be enough to show that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, as embodying the sum and substance of St. Paul's gospel, is not equivalent to God's faithfulness to His covenant obligations, or to His action regarded as the consistent carrying out of His purpose to bless and save His people. It is something more original and startling—more congruous with the idea of a new revelation—than this.

4. St. Paul's meaning.—But there are other reasons which forbid us to attach St. Paul's δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ to such OT passages as are referred to above. For one, St. Paul himself refers to none of these passages in expounding the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. He declares it to be witnessed to by the Law and the Prophets, and his favourite references are Gn 15[6] and Hab 2[4]. There is not an allusion even to Ps 98[2]. Further, as W. Bousset has pointed out,[1] this conception of the righteousness of God fell, in later Judaism, wholly or almost wholly into abeyance.

'In place of the merciful righteousness of God [the righteousness of God sympathetically interested in his wronged people], we find predominant the distributive, forensic, disinterested righteousness.'

The last epithets not only describe the change, but convey an unsympathetic judgment of it; but the fact referred to is indubitable. St. Paul had to preach his gospel of a δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, not to people who could lose the sense of their own demerit in the sense of membership in a community which could appeal to God as having a righteous cause, but to people who had to meet the living God standing alone, or only in a community of guilt with others. Such a righteousness of God as is exhibited in Is 54[17] or Ps 98[2] would mean nothing for such people. If it were not unintelligible, it would be irrelevant; and, in spite of the powerful pleas that have been made for it by many scholars, it cannot be regarded as the key to St. Paul's mind.

This key can be found only if we concentrate our attention on the passage in which St. Paul not only mentions but expounds the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, and if we observe the place that it holds in the connexion of his thoughts. This passage is Ro 3[21ff.]. The δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is preached to a world which is ὑπόδικος τῷ θεῷ, liable to God's judgment—a world, not of people who can appeal to God's righteousness to vindicate them, but of condemned and unsheltered men, who need a righteousness of God because they have none of their own. It is a righteousness bound up with and inseparable from Jesus Christ in His character as ἱλαστήριον. It is not something that we can seize and understand, apart from Christ, and inside of which we can then, consistently, make room for Christ. It is not enough to say with W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam:

'There is one signal manifestation of righteousness, the nature of which it is difficult for us wholly to grasp, in the Death of Christ.'[1]

The death of Christ is not 'one signal manifestation of righteousness'; in the sense in which St. Paul uses the term to sum up his gospel, the death of Christ is the whole and sole revelation of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ as the hope of sinful men. Apart from it there is no manifestation of a δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ at all. And it is so because God has set forth Christ in His blood as ἱλαστήριον—*i.e.* either as a propitiatory sacrifice or in propitiatory power. There is a cautious way of declining to think out passages like this, illustrated, *e.g.*, by J. B. Lightfoot in his *Notes on Epistles of St. Paul* (London, 1895, p. 272), and an impressionist or emotional way, illustrated conspicuously by G. A. Deissmann in ch. 6 of his *Paulus. Eine kultur- und religionsgeschichtl. Skizze*, Tübingen, 1911; but nothing is more certain than that St. Paul in Ro 3[21-26] was exerting his whole intellectual force, consciously and deliberately, and with a daring which drew back at nothing, in an effort to comprehend and explain the way of salvation for sinners abridged as δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ. This δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ and the ἱλαστήριον are correlative terms. There would be no δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ for sinners but for the ἱλαστήριον. The ἱλαστήριον has two characters. It deals with sin *for its removal*; that is its gracious side—the side which answers to God's will to forgive and save sinners. But it deals with sin *as it is*—as that terrible thing which, in St. Paul's conviction and in God's judgment, is one with death. When Christ died for sin—when God set Him forth, in His blood, a propitiatory power or sacrifice—then, and not till then (ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, Ro 3[26]), was the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ revealed to men. The way of salvation, as a way in which God gets sinful men right with Himself, and at the same time deals with sin as nothing less than the awful reality it is, now lies open for the world. From God's side the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ covers the double truth that God is δίκαιος (*i.e.* not indifferent to the sinfulness of sin) and δικαιῶν τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ (*i.e.* a gracious sin-forgiving God).[2]

We may put this otherwise by saying that what is manifested at the Cross as the ultimate truth in the universe—the divinest thing in the divine—is love bearing sin. To whom does this appeal? It appeals to sinners, not to those who trust in themselves that they are righteous. For what does it

[1] *Religion des Judentums im NT Zeitalter*[2], Berlin, 1906, p. 429.

[1] *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*[5] [*ICC*], Edinburgh, 1902, p. 35.

[2] There is clearly visible here, what has played so large a part in doctrines of atonement, the idea of a harmonization of the divine attributes of justice (holiness) and mercy in the work of Christ. The δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ includes both.

appeal? It appeals for faith. When a sinner is confronted with the divine love in Christ bearing in death the sin of the world, what is he invited to do? What is the right thing for him to do? The only right thing for him to do is to trust that love unreservedly, to cast himself upon it, to abandon himself to it, to stake and invest his whole being in it as the final reality in the universe. He is not to open negotiations with God, and see whether something less wonderful might not meet the requirements on both sides. He is not to make himself worthy of such love before he trusts it. He is not to offer guarantees that, unworthy as he is, he will prove worthy in the long run. He has simply, immediately, unconditionally to trust it: that is the one right thing for him to do. When he does so, then, in spite of all his sins, it brings him right with God. What he is, as a believer in Jesus, annuls what he was, as a sinner under God's condemnation. His faith in Christ the propitiation is reckoned to him for righteousness; and, in so reckoning it, God's judgment of the believing sinner is according to truth. There is no legal fiction when God justifies any more than when He condemns; for, when the propitiation has evoked faith, the sinner is another man. God justifies the ungodly when in the propitiation He puts forth a power, or makes an appeal to the ungodly, which makes his true description henceforth 'him that believeth in Jesus.' And we must not minimize faith by arbitrary definition. Faith in St. Paul's writings is what faith was in his life—not a mere assent, not the attitude of a moment, but something in virtue of which his whole being was permanently absorbed in Christ who died. It includes entering into the mind of Christ with relation to sin, accepting the divine sentence on sin as it is brought home to the conscience in this way; and it is in this character that it is the basis of God's verdict. As believers in Jesus we are *δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ* (Ro 2^{13}), or *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ* (2 Co 5^{21}).

5. **The Pauline gospel.**—The inference from this is that the true explanation of the genitive in *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* is that which regards it as the genitive of the author or origin. God provides the *ἱλαστήριον* which deals righteously with sin for its removal, and so appeals to men that they are brought into the right relation to Himself. This is the key to the passages in which the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*—the righteousness revealed in the gospel—is contrasted with any righteousness of our own, which we might have achieved out of our own resources. Twice St. Paul formally emphasizes this contrast. In Ro 9^{30}–10^{10} he speaks of the Jews as wanting to establish 'their own' righteousness—to come to God, so to speak, invested in a goodness which they had achieved by statutory obedience (*δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου*, Ro 10^{5}), and which rather made God their debtor than rested on a fundamental debt to God; and he formally opposes to this the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* of his gospel. So also with special reference to his own case in Ph 3^{2-11}. Once he, like his countrymen in general, had sought to establish a righteousness of his own, and by human standards had been strikingly successful (*κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐν νόμῳ γενόμενος ἄμεμπτος*). But there is always a profound delusion in the idea that we can be good without God. For a sinful man to think so is indeed the sin of sins as well as the most fatal of errors. But St. Paul had been delivered from this sin and error, and as a believing Christian his one desire was to win Christ and be found in Him, renouncing every other hope—'not having a righteousness of my own,' viz. that which comes of the Law (*τὴν ἐκ νόμου*), but having that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which comes from God (*τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην*) on the basis of faith. Righteousness is a gift, not an achievement; not as though it were a material thing, which could be handed over or put to our credit apart from our consent, but because it is the love of God which has made Christ the propitiation part of our world, and through Him has made the appeal to sinners in yielding to which they enter into the right relation to God. Apart from the faith which yields to this appeal, sinners have no righteousness, they stand condemned at God's bar; but on the basis of it they are accepted by God as *δίκαιοι*; the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* has taken effect for them.

It cannot be said too strongly that this is the whole of St. Paul's gospel. With Christ the propitiation on one side, and faith in Christ on the other, we have a situation which cannot and need not be supplemented. All the interests of 'righteousness,' in whatever sense the term may be taken, are covered by the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, which becomes ours through faith in Christ. Faith in the Pauline sense makes the tree good; and, when the tree is good, there need be no anxiety about its fruits. Protestant theology has undoubtedly erred in making so much of the distinction between justification and sanctification. The connexion is even more important than the distinction. In reality, all that Protestants mean by both terms is included in the Pauline *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*. The sinner who has faith in Christ the propitiation not only comes into the right relation to God (and is 'justified' accordingly), but in the very same act and instant he gets the one adequate inspiration for a holy life—the love of God is shed abroad in his heart through the Holy Spirit given to him. Experimentally or psychologically, indeed, there is no difference between these two things. To have an overpowering assurance of the love of God as it is revealed in Christ the propitiation and to be filled with the Holy Spirit are the same thing; and in that one thing lie the promise and potency of all forms of Christian goodness. Such goodness is never imposed; it is always inspired. It is never a matter of statutory obedience, but always of spontaneous inner impulse. It is a mistake, in speaking of it, to contrast faith and the Spirit, as if men were 'justified' by faith and 'sanctified' by the Spirit, according to a common construction of Ro 3–5 and 6–8. In St. Paul faith and the Spirit are never contrasted; they imply each other. They are, indeed, the same thing contemplated in its human and its divine relations. Every Christian experience is at one and the same time an experience of faith and an experience in the Spirit. Faith itself is the gift of God; yet we can always say of it '*I* believe.' It is this experience that has the power and virtue of all Christianity—or, if we choose to say so, of all righteousness—in it. The only contrast in St. Paul is not one between faith which justifies and the Spirit which sanctifies; still less one between faith which justifies and the sacrament of baptism which regenerates; it is the contrast between coming under obligation to God from the very beginning for all that is called righteousness (whether justification or sanctification)—an obligation which is acknowledged from different points of view when we speak of faith or the Spirit—and refusing to come under initial obligation to God, aiming rather, by the method of statutory obedience ('works of law'), at winning a righteousness of our own, for which we may then challenge God's approbation and so lay Him, as it were, under obligation to us. This is what St. Paul fought to the death in his own time as Pharisaism, and in essence it survives. It may survive even as a mode of religion—a moderate moralistic religion, emphasizing the importance of keeping the commandments—yet for sinful men it is a hopeless road. Chalmers spoke of it as 'that

independent natural religion which disowned Christ.'[1] For St. Paul to disown the propitiation, to lose its inspiration, to stand boastfully on one's own feet, was (for a sinner) the negation of every possibility of becoming δικαιος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. If righteousness came in this way, Christ died for nothing (Gal 2[21]). Christ Himself—Christ who fulfilled the Law, who kept the commandments of God, and who died at last bearing our sins in His own body on the tree—is the only νόμος δυνάμενος ζωοποιῆσαι (Gal 3[21]); and it is because men are *quickened* through faith in Him that the just demand of God's law is fulfilled in them (Ro 8[4]). To say fulfilled *in* them, not *by* them, is to speak from the religious, as contrasted with the ethical, point of view; but the end attained is at once religious and ethical. God's justification is always justification characterized by life (Ro 5[18]).

6. Difficulties of interpretation.—'Righteousness' may be considered as an actual or only as a possible experience of men, as a thing of the present or the future, as realized or contingent, and then certain questions arise in the interpretation of St. Paul which are at least formally difficult. Ordinarily the apostle speaks of the blessings of the gospel as enjoyed in the present. Men believe in Christ the propitiation now, and in doing so they become right with God. Justification—God's acceptance of believers as righteous—is spoken of in the past, and exhortations are based on it. 'Having therefore been justified by faith (δικαιωθέντες), let us have peace with God' (Ro 5[1]). But sometimes the eschatological conception of salvation imposes itself on the apostle's thoughts; he thinks of Christians as having yet to stand at the judgment-seat of God or Christ, and of their open acknowledgment or acquittal—in other words, their justification—as therefore still in suspense. There is no more characteristic sentence in his writings than Gal 5[5]: ἡμεῖς γὰρ πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα. The emphatic ἡμεῖς means we who are Christians, as opposed to the Pharisaic Jews. This is *our* religion, and the only true one. Πνεύματι, 'in the spirit,' and ἐκ πίστεως, 'in virtue of faith,' indicate respectively the divine and the human basis of the standing Christian experience, each implying the other. In ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης we see that δικαιοσύνη, implying primarily God's verdict of δίκαιος on the believer, is the care of Christianity; and in ἐλπίδα ἀπεκδεχόμεθα we see that, in spite of the pricelessness of the experiences of those who live by the Spirit and in faith, there is still a supreme blessing which keeps the soul eagerly expectant. That blessing too is God's final verdict in our favour. Perhaps there is no formal solution of the difficulty that we *are* justified by faith, and that our ultimate justification is in suspense—that we cannot be too sure of the pardoning love of God now, and yet that our final benefit from it is involved in unknown contingencies. It is an aggravation of the difficulty that the very apostle who is so insistent that righteousness is of faith apart from works of law is equally emphatic that men are judged at last according to their works (Ro 2[6-12] 14[11ff.], 1 Co 3[13ff.], 2 Co 5[10]). It may be said that he himself mitigates the difficulty by such arguments as we find in Ro 5[9f.], and that the 'works' by which we are to be judged are not 'works of law'—acts of statutory obedience—but simply the moral fruits of our life. This is true, but does not entirely meet the case. The wider truth seems to be that the judgment at the close of the Christian life on earth, just like the propitiation at the beginning of it, is a way of making it indubitable that this religion is transacted in the world of moral reality from beginning to end. There is a sense in which religion transcends morality. Christ is the end of the Law; believers are not under law, but under grace; their righteousness is not dictated and demanded, but evoked and inspired. But, if any one thinks on these grounds that in Christianity he comes into a non-moral region, or one in which morality can in any way be discounted, the Cross and the Judgment-Seat are there to correct him. The whole system lies within the moral order, and the Law is not only (formally) annulled; it is (really) established. We have the same problem to face in the teaching of our Lord. In the reception of the Prodigal Son we see an illustration of justification by faith without works of law—a man put right with his father simply by trusting to his father's love, and yielding to its inspiration. In the builders on the rock and the sand we see men judged according to their works, and we know that both parables are true. The difficulty is to realize that grace is inexorable, that 'all's love and all's law'; but this is the supreme lesson of Christ and His apostle. It is involved in everything that St. Paul has to say of the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, alike as related to the ἱλαστήριον and to the βῆμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

[1] W. Hanna, *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thomas Chalmers, D.D., LL.D.*, 4 vols., Edinburgh, 1849-52, ii. 49.

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RIGHTEOUSNESS (in Christian theology).

1. Term and definition.—The conception of righteousness holds a conspicuous place in Christian literature, and, though it varies in content according to the nature of the subject spoken of, the central part of the conception is generally in sight. It frequently stands for virtue generally as implied in 'conformity to the requirements of the divine or moral law.' In English we have the advantage of a separate term for that part of the conception which belongs to the sphere of law, but 'justice' is often practically a synonym for 'righteousness' in the wider sense, as may be seen in various instances in the English Bible.

The distinction between the narrower and the wider sense of the term is discussed by Aristotle.[1] In the former aspect he regards it as the highest of the ethical virtues, being 'virtue towards another,' and therefore the chief virtue of civil life (*justitia civilis*). As the principle which regulates the relationships of men to each other within a community or the State, it is both 'distributive' and 'corrective.' This is the restricted sense which the term usually bears in the language of jurisprudence—*suum cuique tribuere*, 'to give to each his own.' This sense of the word is frequent also

[1] *Ethics*, bk. v.

in theology, especially when the relation of man to God and the moral order of the world is in question.

2. Righteousness in the history of Christian thought.—As to the conception as it appears in the course of Christian thought, it is, perhaps, a surprise to find that the line followed does not begin at the point reached in the Gospels and by St. Paul. The starting-point is rather to be found in the popular morality of the time as it may be seen in Cicero and among the Stoics. Christianity, though continuing to give full proof of its power as a life to renew the world, undoubtedly fell to a lower level when the manifold gifts and activities of the first age had passed away. The lofty consciousness which had been purified and exalted by the new relation to God and the sense of divine sonship which Christianity had established now became obscured, and a general drift towards a legalistic moralism set in. The tendency to regard Christianity as a new law had powerful support in many influences, both Jewish and heathen, but most of all in the common view of religion, which regards the relation to God as determined externally by the observance or non-observance of religious duties—a view which is probably the average level of religious thought generally, in which righteousness falls to be measured by external standards. Thus down to the Reformation the prevailing conceptions that come to light now and then wear the complexion of the Church system, which stood before the conscience as the supreme authority in religion.

Two aspects of the subject have been much discussed which it is important to keep in view (the connexion between them was not apparent for a while, yet it is of the closest kind and has come to the front of late): (1) the place or function of righteousness in God, *i.e.* as an attribute of the Divine nature, and (2) righteousness as a quality required of man in the scheme of salvation. The course of thought on each of these points has been guided largely by previous assumptions in regard to God and man, partly ethical or philosophical. These will come in sight as we proceed.

(*a*) *Righteousness in the ethics of the ancient Church.*—The general tendency to regard righteousness from the standpoint of law and moral or religious observance was in the ascendant all over the ancient Church. This drift was inherent in Jewish Christianity from the first; and it grew more and more predominant as the Church system was developed and claimed regulative authority over faith and conduct. The fall from the level of apostolic days is very perceptible in the early literature. Apocryphal and apocalyptic books which were widely read, the growth of the ascetic ideal, and other influences of the time led to an excessive emphasis on traditional ideals. We are safe in assuming that in the mind of the people righteousness was identified with the highest excellence according to current ideals. This had long been the common way of regarding it, and it continued to be so regarded even after philosophy set about defining the idea. The speculation of the schools had led to little positive result. The principle of a twofold morality, which was introduced by Aristotle in his classification of the virtues as intellectual and ethical, and which was taken up by the Stoics in their virtues of the wise man and those of the masses, had hindered the unity of the moral ideal. The complication was further increased when the ascetic ideal rose to dominance. If monasticism furnishes the highest type of Christian excellence, there must be a lower standard open to common people. Thus it became necessary to say either that the monks were the only righteous people or that there were different degrees or grades of righteousness.

While, however, we look in vain for any definite scientific conception in the ancient Church, there is no difficulty in ascertaining how it was commonly viewed. A few examples will suffice. It was natural that the practice of charity, so conspicuous among the Christian communities, and so great a power in winning the heathen, should be regarded as a means to, if not as righteousness itself. Chrysostom glorifies the sin-forgiving power of alms, and praises the giving of alms as an effectual intercession against a multitude of sins. This view is as old as Daniel (4^{27}). It is a commonplace in most of the early literature, Jewish and Christian. It appears as a variant on Mt 6^{1}, where some editors accept δικαιοσύνην for ἐλεημοσύνην.

It is in Lactantius, who has been called the Christian Cicero, that we find the fullest expression of the common view. Bk. v. of the *Divine Institutes* is devoted to 'justice':

> 'Although justice embraces all the virtues together, yet there are two, the chief of all, which cannot be torn asunder and separated from it—piety and equity. . . . But piety and equity are, as it were, its veins: for in these two fountains the whole of justice is contained; but its source and origin is in the first, all its force and method in the second.' 'To injure no one, to oppress no one, not to close his door against a stranger, nor his ear against a suppliant, but to be bountiful, beneficent, and liberal.' 'This truly is justice, and this is the golden age, which was first corrupted when Jupiter reigned.'[1]

The influence of Cicero and the ancient way of thinking is apparent in Ambrose, who adopts the four cardinal virtues of the ancients, and maintains that the Christian fulfils the ideal of the just and wise man. He has also adopted the Stoic distinction between 'perfect' and 'middle or common duties,' identifying the former with the content of the monastic vow. In Aquinas the varying elements of the moral ideal which floated before the ancient Church are reduced to apparent system, but without internal coherence. To the moral and intellectual virtues of Aristotle he adds the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Adopting the four cardinal virtues, he assigns to justice the duties of religion and neighbourly love. We have thus an ascending scale of three degrees, in which the highest is to be reached only by way of 'poverty, chastity, and obedience.'

(*b*) *Righteousness in doctrinal controversy.*—Turning now to the discussions which figure in the history of dogma, we strike on a path which leads towards more definite results as to the nature and place of righteousness in God and in the salvation of men. That righteousness is somehow manifest in the death of Christ and that this righteousness is a main factor in the Christian salvation has always been felt and acknowledged in Christian faith; and it is chiefly in the course of thought upon the doctrine of atonement and reconciliation that the principal aspects of righteousness in the Christian sense have slowly come to view. In the beginnings of speculative thought in this field it was perceived that there was an apparent antagonism between the love and the righteousness of God involved in the death of the Redeemer. The antagonism might be explained in Gnostic fashion by supposing that the God of justice was not the Father of Jesus Christ, or by assuming, as the Fathers of that time did, that the death of Christ was the ransom paid to the Devil in view of his supposed rights over men. In this standpoint there is latent the idea of an objective righteousness or justice whose claims were somehow met and satisfied by the Christian redemption. The next step was to define the sphere and the nature of this justice, but definite ground was not reached till Anselm. The argument in *Cur Deus Homo* is to the effect that righteousness is an immanent and necessary attribute in the being of God to which satisfaction has been made in the sufferings and

[1] *Works*, tr. W. Fletcher, Edinburgh, 1886, i. 325, 306.

death of the Son of God, who for this purpose became incarnate. The position is thus reached that all divine action must be subject to the law of righteousness, which is the supreme ethical principle in the Godhead. This step has the greatest significance in the progress of theology, but it did not receive adequate recognition till the Reformation. In the confusion characteristic of the older ethics the true ethical ideal both for God and for man had not come fully to light, but, once it was seen that power, will, and love in God are subject to an eternal law of justice which guards the order of the universe, a principle was found, fruitful in the best results, which casts a significant light upon the righteousness required of man. So long as the theory of a double morality held the field, moral obligation rested on external authority, on the will of superiors, and as a consequence the moral ideal lacked unity and coherence. This is seen in the Roman Catholic view of an 'original righteousness' given to primitive man and in the doctrine of an 'infused righteousness' assumed as the ground of justification. Both points were long the subject of keen debate, and they came ultimately to mark the dividing-line between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The chief point in the controversy for us here lies in this, that the conception of righteousness is reduced to what is after all its essential elements, as *that by which man is accepted and justified before God* — the central problem of St. Paul's theology. This is the main conception which figures in all subsequent theology. The Catholics affirmed that man is justified in virtue of a righteous disposition produced in his heart through prevenient grace, the Protestants maintaining that justification is grounded solely in the righteousness of Christ imputed to faith, and is not procured by merit in man. We thus arrive at the point where the NT leaves the problem and discover that the righteousness required of man is after all the righteousness of God.

(*c*) *Righteousness in Reformation creeds.* — In general outline the Reformation doctrine has held the field in all Protestant churches down to the present. The modifications which have come in, in the course of thought, belong mostly to the harsher forms in which it has sometimes been maintained. Opinion has varied considerably about 'imputation,' about the legal and forensic aspects implied in the satisfaction theory. Modern and especially recent theology shows a notable advance upon the systems of the 17th and 18th centuries. Theory has come to follow more closely the lines of a living faith and experience. It is seen that Christianity secures not merely forgiveness and reconciliation, but righteous character and life.

3. Modern developments.—(*a*) *The Grotian view.* —The Grotian and Arminian view has significance as a protest against the harsher aspects of the Reformation theory to which we have referred. But the principle that law in God may be relaxed or set aside as His wisdom may determine, and that the Atonement is not a satisfaction to justice but a relaxing of penalty, fails to explain the necessity implied in the death of Christ. Grotius maintains that, 'so far as God is concerned, He might have forgiven men without atonement, but it would have been unsafe to do so in the interest of creation' — a view advocated in some modern theories of atonement.

(*b*) *The Socinian.*—The Socinian theory denies altogether that justice is a necessary attribute of God, and maintains that forgiveness is open to all on repentance and obedience.

(*c*) *Schleiermacher.* — Schleiermacher's view is suggestive as opening lines which recent thinking has followed. With him justice belongs exclusively to the 'connexion between sin and evil.' It is known to us through the consciousness of sin, and covers the whole sphere of human experience, and thus far it is involved in the order of man's world, but, in proportion as sin is overcome, the function of justice is diminished or displaced through the redemptive agencies which radiate from Christ.

(*d*) *Ritschl.*—With Ritschl retributive and punitive justice has no place in the moral and religious sphere. The righteousness of God is 'simply the consistency with which His love provides for the good of men.' This view subordinates justice to love to such an extent that the former cannot have a separate function in the moral order of the world. Yet, if it is maintained that the love of God in creation and redemption always reaches wise, holy, and righteous ends, righteousness must be implied in all manifestations of love. Thus all the data of the problem, when fully considered, favour the contention that justice is an immutable quality in God and the world. See, further, art. RITSCHLIANISM.

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In recent theology may be noted books on atonement where aspects of righteousness are given, especially those of R. W. Dale, *The Atonement*[7], London, 1878, J. McLeod Campbell, *Nature of the Atonement*[3], do. 1878, and R. C. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*[2], do. 1907; also T. Erskine, *Letters*, 2 vols., ed. W. Hanna, Edinburgh, 1877, and W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *The Epistle to the Romans*[5] (*ICC*), do. 1902, where the 'exegetical tradition' on St. Paul's doctrine is discussed.

A. F. SIMPSON.

RIGHTEOUSNESS (Egyptian). — **1. Introductory.**—For the three conceptions which we express in three distinct words — righteousness, truth, justice—the Egyptians had only one word, *mĕ'et* (Copt. ⲘⲈ : ⲘⲎⲒ). *Mĕ'et* is apparently derived from a verb *m;'*, 'be straight,' 'be even.'[1]

E.g., *iw m;ḥt m;'ty ḥr sp'k*, 'the balance is even in thy case';[2] *m;' ṯn*, 'straight as to the hair';[3] *mḥ;t mtt m;'t nt Ḏhwty*, 'the accurate and even balance of Thôth.'[4]

2. The practice of righteousness, truth, and justice.—The Egyptian was never tired of asserting that he practised these virtues.

(1) *Righteousness.* — The frequent claims to righteousness made by Egyptians of all classes and periods are well illustrated by the following quotations:

'I came forth from my city, I came down into my nome and I spake the truth therein, I did righteousness therein.'[5] 'I am one who loves good and who hates evil. . . . There is no iniquity that has issued from my mouth, there is no evil that my hands have wrought.'[6] 'I was a righteous man upon

1 See also art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 2.

2 E. Naville, *Das ägyp. Todtenbuch* (hereafter cited as *TdB.*), 2 vols., Berlin, 1886, ch. clxxxviii. line 29; F. Vogelsang, *Kommentar zu den Klagen des Bauern*, Leipzig, 1913, p. 166.

3 *TdB.* ch. cx. line 10.

4 K. Sethe, *Urkunden des ägyp. Altertums*, iv. [Leipzig, 1905–09] 337, line 13; see also J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York and London, 1912, p. 166.

5 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. [1903] 164.

6 *Hieroglyphic Texts from Egyptian Stelæ, etc., in the British Museum*, London, 1911–14, i. pl. 47, line 11 f.

earth.'[1] 'Never did I any evil thing unto any people.'[2] 'I am a noble pleased with righteousness, conforming to the laws of the Hall of the Two Rights.'[3]

(2) *Truth.*[4]—Truthfulness seems to have been highly esteemed, and was particularly looked for in the great and powerful. 'Speak not falsehood, thou art great,' says the Eloquent Peasant to the high steward Rensi;[5] indeed such an one must 'destroy lies and create truth [or 'right'].'[6] An Old Kingdom noble asserts that he was straightforward in the royal presence and free from falsehood.[7] Says another: 'I spake the truth which the god loves every day.'[8] The sage Ptahhotp recommends one to act in accordance with right, free from falsehood.[9] A well-known XVIIIth dynasty official claims to have been free from iniquity, accurate of mind, with no lie in him.[10] 'Speak the truth (*mē'et*), do right (*mē'et*), for it is great, it is mighty, it is enduring,' was an utterance ascribed to the sun-god Rē' himself.[11] 'I have not spoken lies knowingly,' says the deceased to Osiris.[12] 'I have not spoken lies' is one of the statements in the 'Assertion of Sinlessness.'[13]

(3) *Justice.*[14]—The viziers, nomarchs, and high officials who governed and administered the laws were expected to exhibit a high standard of justice. We are informed that 'men expect the exercise of justice in the procedure of the vizier.'[15] The vizier must not be wroth with a man wrongfully; he should be wroth only with what one ought to be wroth with.[16] He must deal with petitioners in accordance with the law and equity and help them to their rights.[17] The petitioner must not be able to say when the verdict is pronounced: 'My right has not been given me.'[18] Again, the vizier must not be a respecter of persons or show partiality,[19] for that is what the god abhors.[20] He must not, however, go to the other extreme and act like the vizier Akhthoi, who discriminated against some of his own kin in favour of strangers, in fear lest it should be wrongly said of him that he favoured his kin dishonestly; 'that,' we are informed, 'is more than justice.'[21] The ideal judge must be 'a father of the lowly (*nmḥ*),[22] a husband of the widow, a brother of the forsaken, the garment of the motherless . . . one who comes forth at the voice of him who calls.'[23] If such an one veil his face against the violent, who shall repress crime?[24] A judge must be as unerring and impartial as the balance.[25]

[1] A. Erman, 'Denksteine aus der theban. Gräberstadt,' in *SBAW* xlix. [Berlin, 1911] 1098=B. Gunn, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, iii. [1916] 86.
[2] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 40, 49, 70; see also H. O. Lange and H. Schafer, *Grab- und Denksteine des mittleren Reichs*, Berlin, 1908, ii. no. 20729, *a*, line 3; *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* ii. pl. 24.
[3] *RTr* iv. [1882] 132.
[4] Cf. also art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (14).
[5] Vogelsang, B 1, 159 f., p. 136 f.
[6] *Ib.* B 1, 62 f., p. 72 f.
[7] A. H. Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlv. [1909] pl. v. line 11 f.
[8] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 57, line 14.
[9] *Pap. Prisse*, 16, 2.
[10] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 970, lines 8–11.
[11] Vogelsang, B 1, 318 ff., p. 215 f.
[12] E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Dead* (Hieroglyphic Text), London, 1898, p. 17, line 6; see also p. 39, line 9 f., p. 70, line 3 f.
[13] *Tdb.* ii. ch. cxxv. (Confession) 9; Budge, p. 253, line 12 f.
[14] Cf. also art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (15).
[15] Sethe, *Die Einsetzung des Veziers unter der 18 Dynastie*, Leipzig, 1909, p. 27=J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought*, p. 242.
[16] Sethe, p. 24=Breasted, p. 242.
[17] *Ib.* p. 7 f.=Breasted, p. 241; cf. *Pap. Prisse*, 9, 3–5=Breasted, p. 233.
[18] *Ib.* p. 12=Breasted, p. 241.
[19] Cf. *Pap. Prisse*, 13, 1–4=Breasted, p. 234.
[20] Sethe, pp. 5 f., 18 f.=Breasted, p. 242.
[21] *Ib.* p. 14=Breasted, p. 241 f.
[22] See B. Gunn, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, iii. 83, n. 3.
[23] Vogelsang, B 1, 62–68, p. 72 f.
[24] *Ib.* B 1, 167 f., p. 137=A. H. Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxvi. [1914] 71.
[25] *Ib.* B 1, 148–51, p. 128=Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxvi. 70 f.; Vogelsang, B 1, 161 f., p. 137.

Accordingly, the Eloquent Peasant, addressing the seemingly unjust Rensi, ironically asks:

'It is not wrong, I suppose, a balance that is awry, a tongue of a balance that is faulty, a righteous man that has swerved (from the right path)?'[1]

An official describes himself as:

'A man of truth (or righteousness) before the Two Lands, equitable and righteous like Thōth . . . more accurate than the plummet, the likeness of the balance.'[2]

A frequent boast of the high official of the Old Kingdom is:

'Never did I judge two brothers in such a way that a man was deprived of his father's property.'[3]

An Old Kingdom noble asserts that he 'saved the weak from the hand of him that was stronger than he,' and that he 'held forth justice to the just.'[4] Sirenpōwet, a nomarch of Elephantine in the VIth dynasty, says:

'I did not deal roughly with him who made petitions. . . . I did not deprive a commoner (*nḏs*) of his property.'[5]

Another feudal lord asserts not only that he had not deprived any one of his possessions, but that he had never flogged anybody.[6] An official who administered justice in the reign of Waḥ-'onkh Intef thus describes his conduct:

'I did not pursue after mischief for which men are hated. I was one who loved good and hated evil, a character who is loved in the house of his lord. . . . Now as for any commission which he (the king) bade me attend to, viz. giving a petitioner his right, attending to the claim of one who has been wronged, I always did it in reality. . . . I was not passionate against violent persons. I did not take a thing (*i.e.* a bribe) wrongfully in order to conduct a transaction.'[7]

The famous XVIIIth dynasty vizier Rekhmirē' claims that he judged the petitioner impartially and did not turn his face (lit. temples) to rewards. He also maintains that he rescued the fearful from the froward.[8] Intef, another notable of the same period, describes himself as follows:

'Turning his face towards him who speaks truth; disregarding him who speaks lies; . . . not discriminating between him whom he knew and him whom he knew not; going about after righteousness; indulgent in hearing petitions; judging two men so that they are satisfied; . . . free from partiality; acquitting the righteous; driving away the plunderer from him whom he plunders; the servant of the oppressed.'[9]

Menthwoser would have us believe that he was one who 'did not show partiality to the possessor of rewards.'[10] King Akhthoi, in his 'instruction' to his son Merikerē', gives the future king excellent advice on how to govern successfully, pointing out to him, among other things, that the under-payment or poverty of responsible officials is a fruitful source of corruption.

'He who is wealthy in his house does not deal partially, he is a possessor of property, one who does not lack.' On the other hand, 'the poor man does not speak in accordance with his (sense of) right. He who says "Would that I had!" is not fair; he is partial to the possessor of rewards.'[11]

Judicial corruption was, of course, rampant in ancient Egypt; the constant claims to incorruptibility made by the administrative officials who acted as judges (see § 12) point only too clearly to that.

A writer of the New Kingdom speaks of the helplessness of him 'who stands alone in the court of justice, who is poor while his oppressor is rich. The court oppresses him saying: Silver and gold for the scribes! Clothing for the servants!'[12]

3. The Egyptian conception of the righteous man.—A summary of the Egyptian conception of righteousness is to be found in ch. cxxv. of the

[1] Vogelsang, B 1, 95–97, p. 91=Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxv. [1913] 275.
[2] Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20538, I. *c*, line 4 ff.
[3] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 123, line 3 f.; cf. 133, line 4 f.
[4] W. M. F. Petrie, *Dendereh*, London, 1900, pl. 11 A.
[5] A. H. Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlv. 125.
[6] F. Ll. Griffith, *The Inscriptions of Siût and Dêr Rîfeh*, London, 1889, pl. 11, line 9.
[7] *Egyptian Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* i. pl. 49.
[8] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 1082. [9] *Ib.* iv. 971.
[10] C. L. Ransom, *The Stela of the Menthuweser*, New York, 1913, line 14.
[11] Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, i. 26.
[12] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 353.

Book of the Dead, both in the 'Introduction' and in that part of it which is sometimes called the 'Assertion of Sinlessness,' but more often, and wrongly, the 'Negative Confession.'[1] Among the sins there denied are murder, incitement to murder, robbery, theft, oppression, impiety, lying, slander, dishonesty, avarice, hasty temper, pride, loquacity, eavesdropping, impurity (adultery and masturbation), and a number of ceremonial transgressions.[2] A more detailed picture of a righteous man according to Egyptian standards can be obtained from the laudatory accounts of the dead inscribed upon their tombstones and upon the walls of their tomb-chapels, and also from the statements scattered about the literary compositions of the Middle and New Kingdoms. The good qualities most usually claimed by or assigned to the dead, or commended by the sages and men of letters, apart from those already fully discussed, are: (1) generosity and beneficence, (2) avoidance of slander, (3) honesty and fair dealing, (4) faithfulness to superiors, (5) hospitality, (6) piety towards the dead, (7) sexual morality, (8) regard for old age, (9) regard for parents, wife, and near relatives, (10) good temper, (11) avoidance of rancour, (12) gratitude, (13) humility and avoidance of pride, (14) discretion and avoidance of loquacity, (15) avoidance of crimes of violence.

(1) *Generosity and beneficence.*[3]—These qualities were admired in ancient no less than in modern Egypt. Assertions like the following formula frequently occur in inscriptions of the feudal and subsequent period: 'I gave bread to the hungry, clothing to the naked, I ferried him whom I found without a boat.'[4] Sometimes in addition the deceased claims to have 'given sandals to him who was without them';[5] to have buried the aged;[6] to have given cattle to him who was without a yoke of oxen, and corn to him who asked for it.[7] A high official of the Middle Kingdom tells us that he gave corn to the whole land and so rescued his city from hunger. 'No other,' says he, 'has done what I did.'[8]

The nomarchs of the feudal age constantly boast of their beneficence. One of them thus describes his rule:

'I gave bread to every hungry person of the Cerastes-Mountain nome (his domain). I clothed him who was naked therein. Moreover, I filled its shores with large cattle, and its water meadows (?) with small cattle. I never deprived a man of his property so that he complained of it to the god of his city. . . . Never did a man fear because of one stronger than he, so that he complained about it to the god.'[9]

Another nomarch, after making similar claims to beneficence, asserts that he gave to the widow as to her who possessed a husband, and that he did not favour the great above the little in all that he gave.[10] A great official in the reign of Thutmōse III. depicts himself as:

'Father of the lowly; judge of the orphan; protector of the weak; avenger of him who has been deprived of his possessions by one who is stronger than he; husband of the widow; shelter of the orphan; place of repose for the weeper; . . . praised because of his character; one whom respectable persons thank because of the greatness of his merit; one for whom health and life are besought by all people.'[11]

(2) *Avoidance of slander.*—Ḥarkhuf, nomarch of Elephantine, says of himself:

'Never spake I anything evil unto a powerful person against any people, for I desired that it might be well with me in the presence of the great god.'[1]

'It was good that I was accustomed to speak to the king about people,' says a Vth dynasty notable. 'I never said anything evil against any people to the majesty of my lord.'[2] 'I spake not lies against another,' Paḥeri assures us, 'for I knew the god who is in men.'[3]

(3) *Honesty and fair dealing.*[4]—'I was afraid for the surplus,' says Paḥeri, 'I did not turn a deaf ear [lit. 'face'] because of bribes. I did not receive bakshish from outgoings.'[5] Ameni of Beni Ḥasan informs us that he carried all the dues for the loan-herds to the king's house, and that there were no arrears against him in any of the royal offices.[6] On the tombstone of a man of the Middle Kingdom period who describes himself as a 'commoner' (*nḏs*) we read:

'I took not the daughter of a man, I took not his field. . . . I served my great lord and I served any plebeian (*nḏs*) lord, and nothing was lost therein.'[7]

See also the statement in the Assertion of Sinlessness:

'I have not added to or subtracted from the corn-measure, I have not subtracted from the palm. I have not falsified the cubit of the fields. I have not added to the weights of the hand-balance. I have not tampered with the plummet of the balance.'[8]

Honesty in the construction of a tomb was a virtue often claimed by the Old Kingdom magnates.

'I made this tomb from my rightful possessions. I did not take the property of any man for it.'[9]

The owner of a tomb-chapel sometimes asserts that the craftsmen who constructed it were adequately remunerated.[10] The following statement occurs on the base of a statue found at Gîzeh:

'I caused these statues to be made for me by the sculptor, and he was satisfied with the payment which I assigned him.'[11]

(4) *Faithfulness, obedience, and deference to superiors.*[12]—'I was a hound that slept in the kennel,'[13] says a faithful servant, 'a dog of the couch whom his mistress loved.'[14]

(5) *Hospitality.*[15]—A deceased person sometimes describes himself as 'one who said "Welcome" to every comer.'[16]

(6) *Piety towards the dead.*[17]—Apart from making offerings to the departed or, in lieu thereof, repeating certain formulæ,[18] piety towards the dead consisted in respecting the funerary property and endowments of preceding generations,[19] in not defacing the inscriptions, etc., in a tomb-chapel or injuring it in any way,[20] in not defiling a tomb-chapel by entering it in a state of ceremonial impurity.[21]

(7) *Sexual morality.*[22]—Pre-nuptial morality was apparently very lightly regarded, though the

1 Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 301.
2 See artl. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 8, CONFESSION (Egyptian).
3 See also art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (4), (6).
4 *Egyptian Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* ii. pl. 24; see also Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 123, 133; Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20506, *b*, line 1 f.
5 Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20537, *b*, line 4 f.
6 *Egyptian Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* ii. pl. 24.
7 Petrie, *Dendereh*, pl. 11 C.
8 Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20537, *b*, line 5 f.
9 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 77 f.
10 P. E. Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, London, 1893, i. pl. viii. line 24 f.
11 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 972.

1 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 123; cf. also 72, 133; *Tdb.* ch. cxxv. (Introd.) line 11.
2 Sethe, i. 57.
3 *Ib.* iv. 199, line 14 f., *Urkunden der 18 Dynastie*, Germ. tr., Leipzig, 1914, p. 58, note 5.
4 See also art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (14).
5 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 118 f.
6 Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, i. pl. viii. line 16 f. p. 26; Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1906-07, i. 522.
7 Lange-Schäfer, i. no. 20001, *b*, line 3 ff.
8 *Tdb.* ii. ch. cxxv. (Introd.) line 16 f.
9 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 72; see also 50 f., 69, 71.
10 *Ib.* 23; Petrie, *Dendereh*, pl. 11 B, p. 51.
11 G. Steindorff, *ZÄ* xlviii. [1911] 156.
12 For further particulars see art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (14), (16).
13 *Ḫn*; the same word is used of the cabin or receptacle in which Ḥarkhuf's dancing pygmy passed the night (Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 130, line 12).
14 Lange-Schäfer, ii. no. 20506, *b*, line 2 f.
15 See art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (6).
16 Lange-Schäfer, ii. nos. 20499, *b*, line 9, 20530, *b*, line 17.
17 See art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (18).
18 See N. de G. Davies and A. H. Gardiner, *The Tomb of Amenemhêt*, London, 1915, p. 92, note 1.
19 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 14, 30, 71, 117.
20 *Ib.* 35, 70, 72 f.; Griffith, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, ii [1915] 5 ff.
21 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 49, 50, 58, 122; art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 8.
22 See art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13 (1), (10).

moralists warn the young against prostitutes. A VIth dynasty nomarch of Cusæ maintains that he 'never passed a night of shame.'[1] Another Old Kingdom notable asserts that he never, since he was born, caused any man to pass a night of shame, *i.e.* never committed sodomy.[2] A person named Akhthoi, who lived during the Middle Kingdom, 'did not lust after the wife of a man nor covet her whom the poor man loved.' 'Verily,' he adds, 'a man of good birth who does this—his father deserts him in the law-court.'[3]

(8) For the remaining qualities see art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 13.

4. The Pharaoh as the upholder of righteousness, truth, and justice.—The righteousness, truth, and justice that characterized the sun-god (see below, § 6) also formed part of those qualities which were supposed to be innate in the Pharaoh, as that god's son and representative on earth.

It is significant in this connexion that the Horus-name of Userkaf, founder of the Vth dynasty, is 'Doer-of-righteousness' (*Ir-m'ʿt*), for it was the kings of this dynasty who raised the sun-god to the position of State-god, and, moreover, the doctrine was then first promulgated, and henceforth accepted for all time, that every Pharaoh was the sun-god's physical offspring.

(1) The Pharaoh was said to 'live on righteousness (or truth)' like the sun-god.[4] 'Onkh-em-mē'et, 'living on righteousness (truth, justice),' it will be remembered, formed one of the characteristic attributes of the Aton-worshipping Ikhnaton.[5] The courtiers of Ramesses II. assure him that, like the sun-god, he is endowed with authoritative utterance and knowledge and that the seat of his tongue is the 'shrine of right' (*mē'et*).[6]

(2) The Pharaoh was expected to display these qualities in his actions. Accordingly, the sage Ipuwer, when rebuking his sovereign for his weakness and misrule, points out to him that it is true that he possesses the solar qualities of 'authoritative utterance, understanding, and righteousness,' but (and here comes the reproach) it is confusion that he puts throughout the land together with clamour and strife.[7] A Pharaoh thus admonishes his son and successor:

'Speak thou Truth in thy house, that the officials who are upon earth may fear thee. Uprightness of heart beseems the Sovereign.'[8]

The prophetic papyrus at Petrograd predicts that with the advent of a strong ruler, who is to triumph over disorder and to restore Egypt to her former prosperity, 'right shall come to its place and Iniquity be cast (?) forth.'[9] King Akhthoi thus instructs the prospective king, his son Merikerē':

'Do right (or justice) that thou mayest live long upon the earth. Soothe the weeper. Oppress not the widow. . . . Take heed lest thou punish wrongfully.'[10]

The same Akhthoi tells his son not to distinguish between the son of a noble and a man of low birth, but to choose a man because of his capacity.[11] It was, indeed, accepted as a truism in the XVIIIth dynasty that 'the sovereign should love the fearful rather than the arrogant.'[12] To secure the heir his inheritance especially became the Pharaoh,[13] and Akhthoi exhorts his son not to drive out a man from the possession of his father.[14] In accordance with his solar qualities Amenemḥēt I. is described as 'gloriously appearing like the sun-god' to deal out justice to his quarrelsome feudal lords and to settle their conflicting claims to one another's territories.[1]

5. Development of the belief in a posthumous judgment. — According to the earliest religious writings that we possess, the so-called Pyramid Texts, the chief qualification for admittance to the realm of the sun-god was physical purity.[2] Magic also played a great part in furthering the welfare of the dead, the Pyramid Texts themselves being for the most part a collection of powerful spells which enabled him for whom or by whom they were recited to enter the celestial kingdom. But even in these very ancient texts more than mere physical cleanliness or magical power is sometimes demanded; the deceased must also be righteous. Thus we find that the ceremonial washing of the dead king by the four gods who preside over the Pool of Kenset, or by the Worshippers of Horus, has also an ethical significance. During or following the ablutions a spell asserting the righteousness of the deceased is recited.[3] The ghostly ferryman who conveys the dead over to the Field of Earu is thus addressed:

'O thou who ferriest over the righteous who hath no boat, ferryman of the Field of Earu, this N. is righteous before the sky, before the earth, this N. is righteous before this island of the land whither he hath swum and whither he hath arrived.'[4]

The claim of the deceased to be righteous had of course to be tested, and in the imagination of the Egyptians, with their innate love of litigation, the test naturally took the form of a legal process. There are already in the Pyramid Texts allusions to the posthumous trial;[5] but many of the inscriptions on tomb-stones and tomb-chapel walls of officials and private persons from the VIth dynasty onwards are explicit on this subject. On the one hand, the deceased threatens with judgment at the hands of 'the great god, the lord of judgment, in the place where judgment is had,'[6] those who injure his tomb-chapel,[7] enter it in a state of ceremonial impurity,[8] injure its inscriptions,[9] or violate its endowments.[10] On the other hand, the deceased himself claims to have been virtuous, 'because I desired that it might be well with me in the presence of the great god,'[11] or 'in order that I might offer righteousness to the great god, the lord of heaven.'[12]

For the rewards of the righteous after death and the punishment of the unrighteous see below, § 9 (1) (ii.)–(v.).

6. The sun-god and righteousness.—(1) *The sun-god as the creator and champion of righteousness.*—Breasted has clearly shown that 'the great god' of the above-quoted texts, the divinity who first came to be regarded as the champion of righteousness and the judge of the dead, was not Osiris, but the Heliopolitan sun-god Rē'-Atum;[13] indeed the sun-god is said to be he 'who fashioned (*ms*) righteousness.'[14] Accordingly we read in a Middle Kingdom Coffin Text:

'I am Rē' who came forth from Nun. . . . My detestation is wickedness, I behold it not. I am he who made righteousness.'[15]

[1] A. Kamâl, *Annales du Service des antiquités de l'Égypte*, xv. [Cairo, 1915] 213.
[2] This interpretation is supported by the determinative of the verb *sdr*, 'pass the night'; Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 46, line 14 f.
[3] E. R. Ayrton, C. T. Currelly, A. E. P. Weigall, *Abydos*, iii. [London, 1904] pl. xxix. p. 43.
[4] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 993, line 9; see below, § 6 (2).
[5] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 337.
[6] Breasted, *Ancient Records*, ii. 288.
[7] A. H. Gardiner, *The Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage*, Leipzig, 1909, 12, 12 f.; *PSBA* xxxviii. [1916] 51.
[8] Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, i. 26, § 11.
[9] *Ib.* 103–105. [10] *Ib.* 26, § 12. [11] *Ib.* 27, § 15.
[12] Sethe, *Einsetzung des Veziers*, p. 30.
[13] Newberry, i. pl. xxv. line 72 ff.; Breasted, *Ancient Records*, i. 629.
[14] Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, i. 26, § 12.

[1] Newberry, pl. xxv., line 36 ff. = Breasted, *Anc. Records*, i. 625.
[2] See art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 2.
[3] K. Sethe, *Die altägyptischen Pyramidentexte* (hereafter cited as *Pyr.*), Leipzig, 1908–10, 921*a–c*, 1141*a*–1142*b*.
[4] *Pyr.* 1188*a–c*; Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 172.
[5] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 173 f.
[6] *E.g.* W. M. F. Petrie, *Deshasheh*, London, 1898, pl. vii. line 8 f. p. 43.
[7] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 35, 49, 72 f.
[8] *Ib.* 49, 50 f., 58, 122, 142. [9] *Ib.* 71.
[10] *Ib.* 14, 117. [11] *Ib.* 123, 132 f.
[12] Petrie, *Dendereh*, pl. ix.
[13] *Religion and Thought*, p. 170 ff.
[14] N. de G. Davies, *The Rock Tombs of El-Amarna*, London, 1903–08, vi. pl. xv. line 8, p. 26.
[15] Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxviii. 45.

(2) *The sun-god lives on righteousness.*—The sun-god not merely created righteousness, but is said to 'live' (*i.e.* feed) on it, just as the Nile-god, Ḥapi, is said to live on fish.[1] In a hymn to the sun-god we find:

'I have come unto thee, lord of gods, Atum-Rē'-Harakhte, that I may present unto thee righteousness, for I know that thou livest thereon.'[2]

It was the business of certain gods to present, or lift up, righteousness to the sun-god (*i.e.* keep him supplied with his mystic sustenance?).

Thus the deceased is said to 'ascend to heaven with the gods who offer righteousness to Rē'.'[3] We also hear of 'these four apes who sit in the forepart of the boat of Rē', who lift up righteousness unto the Lord of All.'[4] The goddess Sakhmet-Ut-tset is said to 'stand in the prow of the boat of the Father (the sun-god), overthrowing his enemies and placing righteousness in the forepart of his boat.'[5]

(3) *The sun-god loves righteousness.*—The sun-god, we are told, loves righteousness and truth,[6] and what he abominates is wickedness.[7] 'More acceptable' in his eyes 'is the nature of one just of heart than the ox of him that doeth iniquity.'[8]

(4) *The sun-god and the balance.*—The Middle Kingdom Coffin Texts and the *Book of the Dead* depict the sun-god, in his capacity of judge of the dead, as weighing righteousness in a balance, *i.e.* testing the righteousness of the dead.[9] In the Osirianized version of the posthumous judgment the balance occupies a very prominent place.[10]

(5) '*The place in which judgment is had.*'—The texts of the early feudal age which speak of 'the place in which judgment [by the sun-god] is had' do not inform us where that place is, and the Pyramid Texts are equally unenlightening. According to a Middle Kingdom Coffin Text,[11] the posthumous trial took place in the cabin of the sun-god's celestial ship.

Perhaps it was owing to this idea that the two ships of the sun-god are named the Two Rights in the Pyramid Texts.[12] Cf. also the statement: 'The tongue of this Pīōpi is as that of the Righteous One who belongs to the (boat called) Right.'[13]

(6) *The sun-god as the ideally righteous king.*—The sun-god, according to the myths, was the first king of Egypt. Owing to his close association with righteousness and with the kingship, he came to be regarded as the prototype of the Egyptian sovereigns, the pattern for all would-be just and righteous Pharaohs.[14]

Thus Amenemhet I. is described as coming 'that he might abolish iniquity, gloriously appearing as the sun-god (Atum) himself.'[15]

In a literary composition of the feudal period a sage is represented as contrasting the disastrous reign of a weak Pharaoh with that golden age when the sun-god, the ideal king, ruled over Egypt. He describes the sun-god as the 'shepherd [lit. 'herdsman'] of all men, with no evil in his heart.' 'Where is he to-day?' he asks. 'Does he sleep perchance? Behold his might is not seen.'[16] Judging from these words, the sage is looking forward either to a return of the sun-god to reign once more on earth or to the advent of a king whose rule will be like that of his divine prototype.[17]

[1] Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxviii. 45; *Tdb.* ch. lxv. line 11 ff.; H. Grapow, *ZÄ* xlix [1911] 51.

[2] Budge, *Book of the Dead* (Hieroglyphic Text), p. 4.

[3] *Tdb.* ch. clxix. line 25 f. [4] *Ib.* ch. cxxvi. line 1 ff.

[5] C. R. Lepsius, *Das Todtenbuch der Ägypter, nach dem hieroglyphischen Papyrus in Turin*, Leipzig, 1842, ch. clxiv. line 3 f. pl. 78.

[6] See the, *Urkunden*, i. 50, 57, 71.

[7] Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxviii. 45.

[8] Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, i. 34.

[9] P. Lacau, *Textes religieux égyptiens*, Paris, 1910, i. p. 87, line 3 f.; *Tdb.* ch. xii line 2 f.; cf. Lacau, *RTr* xxxi. [1909] 23.

[10] See art. Ethics and Morality (Egyptian), § 8.

[11] Lacau, *Textes religieux*, i. 113.

[12] *Pyr.* 1785*b*, 1315*b*; Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 173.

[13] *Ib.* 1346*c*.

[14] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, pp. 174 f., 211, 245.

[15] Newberry, i. pl. xxv. lines 36 ff.

[16] Gardiner, *Admonitions*, 12, 1–6.

[17] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 211 f.; Gardiner, *Admonitions*, p. 14. On the 'Messianic' tone of this utterance see Breasted, *loc. cit.*

7. Osiris and righteousness.—(1) *Osiris originally the type of all dead kings.*—In the earliest religious literature Osiris appears most usually[1] in the rôle of a dead king, or rather the dead king *par excellence*,[2] the ethical nature and judicial functions of the sun-god not being accredited to him till the period after the VIth dynasty, when we find that, owing to the growing popularity of his cult, he has passed from the position of dead king to that of king and judge of the dead.[3]

(2) *Osiris as king and judge of the dead.*—The Pyramid Texts sometimes depict the dead Pharaoh as administering justice,[4] and Osiris, as a dead king, would have acted in a similar capacity. His promotion to the kingship of the dead was naturally accompanied by a corresponding advancement of his judicial status, which also would have been further facilitated by the myth that depicts him as the prototype of all who have emerged triumphant from their posthumous trial (see below, § 10).[5]

(3) *The influence of the Osiris myth on Egyptian ethics.*—It cannot be doubted that the Osiris myth, with its account of the god's murder, of the unjust accusation brought against him, and of his final triumph before the judicial council at Heliopolis, inspired the Egyptians with the conviction that righteousness and justice, not unrighteousness and injustice, must ultimately prevail. The myth, therefore, must have played a great part in the development of those highly ethical ideas which find frequent expression, as we have already seen, in the inscriptions and literary compositions of the feudal and subsequent periods.[6] Thus Ptaḥḥotp could say with confidence:

'Great is righteousness, lasting, and prevailing; it has not been disturbed since the time of Osiris.'[7]

(4) *Osiris as the god of righteousness.*—Osiris, having assumed the judicial office of the sun-god, acquired likewise his ethical character. He is therefore called 'the great god, the lord of righteousness, who lives thereon';[8] or the sole god, who lives on righteousness.[9] 'I present righteousness before thy face,' says the deceased Hunofer, 'for I know that thou livest thereon.'[10] Osiris is described as 'satisfied with righteousness . . . thou whose abomination is lies.'[11] A Middle Kingdom official named Akhthoi says: 'I received him who made petition to me. It is what the god (*i.e.* Osiris) loveth upon earth';[12] and Khentemsemti, a magnate of the same period, informs us that he 'gladdened the god (Osiris) with righteousness.'[13]

Finally Osiris appears like Rē' as the creator of righteousness, for a Middle Kingdom Coffin Text represents him as saying:

'I am he who created Ḥu, my abomination is iniquity. . . . I am Osiris, the god who made righteousness, I live thereon.'[14]

8. The solar quality of righteousness ascribed to divinities other than Rē' and Osiris.—(1) Like earthly judges,[15] the judge of the dead, in the person whether of Rē' or of Osiris, had a body of

[1] In *Pyr.* 1520*a*, *b*, Osiris is called the 'lord of righteousness' (see also Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 175).

[2] See Davies-Gardiner, *Tomb of Amenemhēt*, p. 55, note, and p. 87; *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, ii. 122, iv. [1917] 206.

[3] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 255. [4] *Ib.* p. 174.

[5] For a detailed account of the judgment of the dead by Osiris see art. Ethics and Morality (Egyptian), §§ 8, 9; F. Ll. Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, Oxford, 1900, p. 46 ff.

[6] Cf. Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 256.

[7] *Pap. Prisse*, 6, 8–5.

[8] *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* i. pl. 10; see also *Tdb.* ch. cxxv. (Introd.) line 2.

[9] *Tdb.* ch. clxxiii. line 3. [10] *Ib.* ch. clxxxiii. line 40.

[11] Budge, *Book of the Dead* (Hieroglyphic Text), p. 39, line 3 f.

[12] Ayrton, Currelly, and Weigall, pl. xxix.

[13] *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* ii. pl. 9, line 9 f.

[14] *Annales du Service des antiquités de l'Égypte*, v. [1904] 248.

[15] Cf. Vogelsang, p. 61; art. Priest, Priesthood (Egyptian), § XVIII.

advisers to assist him[1]—the *dʾdʾt*, or judicial council over which he presided.[2] Probably the passage, 'those who weigh with the balance on the day of reckoning,'[3] refers to that body. The same ethical qualities and judicial functions were attributed to these assistant councillors as to the presiding judge.

(2) Thōth, the 'scribe of the gods,' and vizier of the sun-god,[4] who acted as recorder to the solar and Osirian tribunal, describes himself thus:

'Pure of hands, lord of purity, who drives away evil; the scribe of righteousness, whose abomination is iniquity . . . the lord of laws . . . the lord of righteousness; who makes triumphant the weak, who protects the oppressed.'[5]

(3) The four apes in the boat of Rē', in which, according to one account,[6] the posthumous trial took place, are thus described:

'Who judge between the oppressed and the oppressor, who live on righteousness, who swallow righteousness, who are devoid of lying, whose abomination is iniquity.'[7]

(4) The celestial ferryman 'Turn-face'[8] loves righteousness and hates iniquity.[9]

(5) The assessors of Osiris in the Broad Hall of the Two Truths are those 'in whose bodies there is no lie, who live on righteousness in Heliopolis.'[10] The same gods are addressed as 'lords of righteousness, free from evil.'[11]

(6) The crocodile-gods, who wound the sinners that are behind Ḥetepeskhus, are also entitled 'lords of righteousness.'[12]

(7) The appellation 'righteous ones' is given to the inhabitants of the Osirian kingdom.[13]

(8) The local gods, who for political reasons[14] were identified with the sun-god, naturally acquired his ethical qualities, which in process of time might be ascribed to any divinity.

All this would have created a general feeling that the gods were on the side of righteousness and opposed to evil.

A deceased person, *e.g.*, speaks of his city god as 'a lord of righteousness';[15] accordingly one who was oppressed would appeal to his city god to right his wrong.[16] Ptaḥ of Memphis is commonly entitled 'lord of righteousness.'[17] It is said of him that 'he will not ignore the deed of any man,' and he is represented as righteously chastising sinners, smiting with blindness him who swears falsely.[18] The Theban Amūn, who is said to be 'contented with righteousness,'[19] likewise punishes the sinner.[20] 'He assigneth him that sinneth against him to the fire, and the just to the West.'[21] Of the 'righteous man' it is said that he 'sets Amūn in his heart.'[22] 'The Peak of the West,' we read, 'smites with the smiting of a savage lion; she pursues him that transgresses against her.'[23] Sirenpōwet of Elephantine, it should be noted, states, in an enumeration of his virtuous deeds, that he did 'what all my gods love,'[24] and the deceased in the presence of Osiris and his assessors claims to have 'done that wherewith the gods are pleased.'[25]

See also art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 11.

[1] Cf. Erman, *Gespräch eines Lebensmüden mit seiner Seele*, Berlin, 1896, line 23 ff.
[2] W. Golénischeff, *Les Papyrus hiératiques . . . de l'Ermitage impérial à St. Pétersbourg*, Petrograd, 1913, pl. x. line 53.
[3] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 253. [4] *Ib.* p. 255.
[5] *Tdb.* ch. clxxxiii. line 41 ff.; cf. Erman, *Gespräch eines Lebensmüden*, line 23 ff.
[6] See above, § 6 (5). [7] *Tdb.* ch. cxxvi.
[8] Erman, *Handbook*, p. 94; *Pyr.* 383, *a*, *b*. In a papyrus in the Bodleian Library, which the present writer hopes shortly to publish in *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, this divinity is depicted as mummiform (cf. *Tdb.* i. pl. cxxxv.), with a crocodile's head, the face of which is averted and looks over his back.
[9] Lacau, *Textes religieux*, i. 112.
[10] *Tdb.* ch. cxxv. (Conclusion) line 6 f.
[11] *Ib.* ch. lxxii. (*Pe*) line 2.
[12] H. Grapow, *Urkunden*, v. [1915] 41 ff.
[13] *Tdb.* ch. lxxii. (*Ac*) line 4; Budge, *Book of the Dead* (Hieroglyphic Text), p. 433, line 14 f.; Grapow, *Urkunden*, v. 26.
[14] See Erman, *Handbook*, p. 56 f.
[15] *Tdb.* ch. clxxxiii. line 36. [16] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 78.
[17] *E.g.*, A. M. Blackman, *The Temple of Derr*, Cairo, 1913, p. 106.
[18] Gunn, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, iii. 88 f.
[19] Erman, 'Denksteine aus der theban. Gräberstadt,' in *SBAW* xlix. 1095, line 16.
[20] *Ib.* p. 1092, line 8; Gunn, p. 84.
[21] Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 354.
[22] Gunn, p. 88. [23] *Ib.* p. 86.
[24] Gardiner, *ZÄ* xlv. 125, line 19.
[25] *Tdb.* ch. cxxv. (Conclusion) line 10.

9. Incentives to righteousness.—(1) *The posthumous judgment.*[1]—Breasted rightly points out how great an incentive to the practice of virtue was the belief in a judgment after death.[2] 'I desired that it might be well with me in the Great God's presence,' says Ḥarkhuf, a VIth dynasty nomarch of Elephantine, when recounting his righteous acts.[3]

(i.) The judge of the dead, in the person whether of Rē' or of Osiris, loves righteousness and hates evil.

Ḏḥuthotp, when stating that he has not injured anybody, informs us that 'the god loves righteousness.'[4] Seshemnofer 'spake the truth, which the god loves every day.'[5] 'I am one who loves good and hates evil. What the god loves is the doing of righteousness,' says Inti of Deshāsheh.[6] Says Khentemsemti: 'I have not done evil, I have gladdened the god (Osiris) with righteousness.'[7] Intef, son of Sont, 'wrought not evil against men; it is what the god hates.'[8] A certain Akhthoi 'received him who made petition. . . . (For) it is what the god loveth upon earth.'[9]

(ii.) Bliss after death was for those who have done 'what their gods praise,'[10] 'what men command and that wherewith the gods are pleased.'[11] When the deceased entered the judgment-hall of Osiris, he must be able to offer righteousness before the face of the god;[12] his heart must be righteous, without iniquity.[13]

'Righteousness,' says the Eloquent Peasant, 'is for eternity; it descends with him who does it into the necropolis, when he is wrapped and laid in the ground. His name is not effaced on earth, he is remembered because of the good. That is the summing-up of the god's word.'[14]

(iii.) The following remarkable passage gives us considerable insight into the ideas about future accountability entertained by the religiously disposed during the feudal period:

'As for the Judicial Council that judges oppressors (*sʾryw*), thou knowest that they are not lenient on that day of judging the wretched one, at the hour of performing (their) functions. Unhappy is he who is arraigned as one conscious (of sin). Fill not thy heart with length of years. *They* regard a life-time as an hour. A man remains over after death; his sins are laid beside him as wealth. Now eternal is the existence yonder. He is a fool who has made light of it. As for him who has reached it without doing unrighteousness, he shall abide yonder like a god; stepping forward boldly like the lords of Eternity.'[15]

No less highly ethical conceptions about rewards and punishments after death are to be found in the so-called *Second Tale of Khamuas*, a composition of the Græco-Roman age:

Setme (Khamuas) saw two funerals—that of a rich man, who, furnished with a magnificent mortuary equipment, was being carried to the necropolis amid the loud lamentations of the (hired?) mourners, and that of a poor man, who was wrapped in a mat and had none to walk after him. Setme then exclaimed: 'By Ptaḥ, the great god, how much better it shall be in Amenti for great men, for whom they make glory with the voice of wailing, than for poor men whom they take to the desert-necropolis without glory of funeral!' However, Setme's son Si-Osiri took his father down into Amenti in order that he might see what really did befall these two men in the hereafter. 'And Setme saw [there, *i.e.* in the seventh hall of the Tēi] a great man clothed in raiment of byssus, near to the place in which Osiris was, he being of exceeding high position (?) . . . And Si-Osiri said . . . to him, "My father Setme, dost thou not see this great man who is clothed in raiment of royal linen, standing near the place in which Osiris is? He is that poor man whom thou sawest being carried out from Memphis, with no man following him, and wrapped in a mat. He was brought to the Tēi and his evil deeds were weighed against his good deeds that he did upon earth, and it was found that his good deeds were more numerous than his evil deeds. . . . And it was commanded before Osiris that the burial outfit of that rich man, whom thou sawest carried forth from Memphis with great

[1] See also above, §§ 5, 6 (4 f.), 7.
[2] *Religion and Thought*, pp. 169 f., 177.
[3] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 122 f. [4] *Ib.* p. 50.
[5] *Ib.* p. 57. [6] *Ib.* p. 71.
[7] *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* ii. pl. 9, line 9 f.
[8] *Ib.* pl. 24.
[9] Ayrton, Currelly, and Weigall, pl. xxix.
[10] Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 430, line 15; cf. 62, line 3 ff.
[11] *Tdb.* ch. cxxv. (Conclusion) line 10.
[12] *Ib.* ch. clxxxiii. line 40; cf. Budge, *Book of the Dead* (Hieroglyphic Text), p. 4, line 13 f.; Petrie, *Dendereh*, pl. ix.
[13] *Tdb.* ii. (*Ac*) ch. cxxv. (Conclusion) line 1.
[14] Vogelsang, B 1, 307–11, p. 211 f.
[15] Golénischeff, *Pap. hiératiques*, pl. x. lines 53–57 = Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, i. 27, § 13.

lamentation, should be given to this same poor man, and that he should be taken among the noble spirits as a man of God that follows Sokaris Osiris, his place being near to the person of Osiris. (But) that great man whom thou didst see, he was taken to the Têi, his evil deeds were weighed against his good deeds, and his evil deeds were found more numerous than his good deeds that he did upon earth. It was commanded that he should be punished in Amenti, and he is that man whom thou didst see, in whose right eye the pivot (?) of the gate of Amenti was fixed, shutting and opening upon it, and whose mouth was open in great lamentation."[1]

(iv.) Very interesting is the account that this *Tale of Khamuas* gives us of the treatment in Amenti of people whose lives have been contemptible and aimless:

'The kind of men on earth who are under the curse of God, and do work day and night for their living, while moreover their women rob them and they find not bread to eat. They came to Amenti; their evil deeds were found to be more numerous than their good deeds; and they found that what happened to them on earth happened to them in Amenti.'[2]

(v.) According to the *Book of the Dead*, the deceased person who was adjudged unrighteous was handed over to the 'Devourer,' *'mmt*,[3] or to a demon called Babi, 'who lives upon the entrails of the great on that day of the Great Reckoning.'[4] In the *Second Tale of Khamuas*, side by side with the view that the unrighteous are tortured exists also the older belief in the 'Devourer.'

'He of whom it shall be found that his evil deeds are more numerous than his good deeds is delivered (?) to the "Devourer" (*'m*) of the Lord of Amenti; they destroy his soul upon his body, she (the "Devourer") does not allow him to breathe ever again.'[5]

The unrighteous, the *Book of the Dead* likewise informs us, might fall a victim to the swords of the gods forming the judicial council.[6] The same authority speaks of crocodile-gods 'that are in the water,' who are entitled 'lords of righteousness,' and who wound sinners,[7] and of a god 'who binds the unrighteous to his slaughter-block, who cuts souls in pieces.' This god is Horus, according to one ancient commentator, who says:

'He has two heads, one carrying righteousness, the other iniquity. He gives iniquity to him who does it, righteousness to him who brings it.'[8]

This sentiment finds expression, though in a less theological guise, in the already thrice quoted *Tale of Khamuas*:

'Find it at thy heart, my father Setme, that he who is good (*mnḫ*) upon earth, they are good to him in Amenti, while he that is evil, they are evil to him.'[9]

But there were other motives for leading a righteous life than the dread of what might happen at the judgment after death.

(2) *Fear of God.*—A vague fear of God might in itself be a sufficient incentive to good conduct.

'I did not pilfer the divine endowments on the day of weighing the corn,' says Inêni, . . . 'The fear of God was in my heart.'[10]

(3) *Rewards or punishments during life.*—The Egyptian expected to reap a reward for his virtue during his earthly existence, and 'the good word which issued from the mouth of Rē' seems to encourage this expectation:

'Speak right, do right, because it is great, it is mighty, it is enduring. The reward (?) thereof shall find thee, it will bring thee to honour.'[11]

Long life and material prosperity were especially regarded as rewards for righteousness.

'How happy is he who hath done right for the god therein (*i.e.* the place whence the deceased has come); he grants old age to him who hath done it for him so that he attains honour.'[12]

An XVIIIth dynasty magnate thus admonishes visitors to his tomb-chapel: 'Have regard unto my character and do the like; it shall be profitable unto you. Your life shall be long upon earth, ye being in health; ye shall pass your years in happiness.'[1] An official of the Old Kingdom informs us that he 'held forth justice to the righteous for the sake of long life upon earth.'[2] His father's advice to King Merikerē', 'Do right that thou mayest live long in the land,' has already been quoted in § 4. 'Long lived is the man whose rule is righteous,' says the sage Ptaḥḥotp, 'who walks according to its (the rule's) way.' As a further inducement to be virtuous, this eminently practical teacher asserts that 'the righteous man is wont to make a will [or, as we should express it, make his fortune], whereas there is no house for the covetous.'[3] 'Wrong-doing,' Ptaḥḥotp tells his hearers, 'stealeth away riches. Never hath wickedness brought its venture safe to port.'[4] The Eloquent Peasant warns Rensi that the reward of unrighteousness and injustice is death. 'Beware lest eternity draw nigh, and prefer to live, according to the saying: The doing of right is breath for the nose.'[5]

The reward for unrighteousness was also meted out during the life on earth, at the hands of the gods who 'will not ignore the deed of any person.'[6] They bring misfortune upon the sinner,[7] cause him to fall a victim to a crocodile in the water or to a snake on land,[8] or smite him with disease.[9] However, they show mercy to him that repents and restore him to health.[10]

(4) *Other rewards.*—(i.) The righteous man was said to be rewarded with a 'goodly burial.'[11] King Akhthoi says to Merikerē':

'Make stately thy castle in the West, adorn the palace in the Necropolis; even as one who is just, as one who doeth righteousness.'[12]

Those who have regard to the character of Inêni and follow his good example will rest in their 'seat of eternity.'[13]

For the importance attached by the Egyptians to a properly conducted funeral see the oft-repeated request in the funerary formulæ that the deceased may be 'buried well' or granted a 'goodly burial.'[14]

(ii.) The heir or heirs of the righteous man succeed to his possessions and offices,[15] and his house abides for ever.[16]

'Make righteousness to flourish and thy children shall live, says Ptaḥḥotp.[17]

(iii.) The righteous man's name endures in the mouth of men;[18] it 'is not effaced on earth, and he is remembered because of the good.'[19]

Dḥout prays, 'May the memory of me abide upon earth,'[20] and Inêni, who did 'what his city god loves,' tells us that 'he who passes years as a favoured (or praised) one—his name is good in the mouth of the living, the remembrance of him . . . is for ever';[21] he also tells us that 'his name will abide because of his character, in accordance with what he has done on earth.'[22]

(5) *The desire to stand well with the Pharaoh.*—The source of all promotion and honour was the Pharaoh. As representative of the sun-god on earth, he was the 'lord of righteousness.'[23] Men must therefore work righteousness to win his favour.

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1 Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests*, pp. 44–49.
2 *Ib.* p. 49.
3 E. Naville, *Book of the Dead* (Hieroglyphic Text), p. 16; see also art. Ethics and Morality (Egyptian), § 8.
4 *Tdb.* ch. cxxv. (Conclusion) line 8.
5 Griffith, p. 47.
6 *Tdb.* ch. cxxv. (Conclusion) line 3 f.; Erman, *Handbook*, p. [illegible]
7 Gardiner, *Urkunden*, v. 41 ff.; cf. *Tdb.* ch. lxxii. line 1 ff.
8 Gardiner, p. [illegible]
9 Griffith, p. 50.
10 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 64; see also art. Ethics and Morality (Egyptian), § 6.
11 Vogelsang, B 1, 319–322, p. 215 f.
12 *Tdb.* ch. clxxxii. line 38 f.

1 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 66.
2 Petrie, *Dendereh*, pl. xi. A.
3 *Pap. Prisse*, 10, 4 f.
4 *Ib.* 6, 6.
5 Vogelsang, B 1, 145 f., pp. 124–127; Gardiner, *PSBA* xxxvi. 69 f.
6 Gunn, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, iii. 89.
7 *E.g.*, Golénischeff, *Pap. hiératiques*, pl. xi. line 70 f. = Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, i. 23, 28.
8 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 23; *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* i. pl. 43, no. 71.
9 Gunn, pp. 86, 88 f.
10 *Ib.* pp. 85, 87.
11 *Tdb.* ch. clxxxiii. line 38 f.; see also (5) below.
12 Gardiner, *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, i. 34, § 27.
13 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 66.
14 *E.g.*, C. R. Lepsius, *Denkmäler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien*, Berlin, 1851–59, ii. pl. 98*a*, *c*; *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* i. pl. 41, no. 86; cf. also A. H. Gardiner, *Notes on the Story of Sinuhe*, Paris, 1916, pp. 65 ff., 173; Griffith, *Siut and Der Rifeh*, pl. 8, line 2 f.
15 Griffith, *Siut and Der Rifeh*, pl. 11, line 14 f. = Breasted, *Ancient Records*, i. 395; Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 66.
16 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 131, line 16.
17 *Pap. Prisse*, 18, 1 f.
18 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 131, line 17.
19 Vogelsang, B 1, 307 ff., p. 211 f.
20 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 480, line 8.
21 *Ib.* 62, line 3 ff.
22 *Ib.* 66.
23 *Ib.* 941.

'I did righteousness for the Lord of Righteousness,' says an XVIIIth dynasty official, 'for I knew that he is pleased with it.'[1] Another official of that period tells us that he was beloved of his lord (the king) because of his excellence.[2] A XIIth dynasty magnate 'did the right that the king loved';[3] and of a XIIth dynasty court lady it is related that 'she was of honourable estate with the king because of her righteousness.'[4]

One of the results of winning the royal favour was the much coveted 'goodly burial.'[5]

Dḥôut says: 'My heart was excellent for my lord (the king), that I might rest in the high land of the noble ones who are in the Necropolis.'[6]

(6) *The desire to stand well with the community.*—The Egyptian was intensely anxious, not only to stand well with the king, but also to have the esteem of his fellows. This was another powerful motive for displaying at least outward rectitude. 'I am one who spake good and who repeated what is loved,'[7] and similar assertions, occur over and over again in inscriptions of the feudal period.

E.g., 'I said what the great love and what the commonalty praise.'[8] 'I am one who was beloved of all the people. . . . I am one who did that which all men praise.'[9] 'I never did what all men hate.'[10] 'There was not found one who hated me in this city.'[11] 'I am one beloved of his father, praised of his mother, honoured by his companions, dear to his brethren, whom his servants loved.'[12]

One man, after enumerating his virtues, declares that men when speaking of him exclaimed: 'Would that the earth were full of people like him!'[13] An official of the Middle Kingdom openly asserts that he was beneficent in a year of scarcity 'in order that my name might be good.' 'I was a shepherd [lit. 'herdsman'] of the serf,' he adds, 'in order that my name might be good in the mouth of his [the serf's] city.'[14] Khnemerdi says: 'I gave provision unto him who begged it, herbs to him whom I knew not as to him whom I knew, that my name might be good in the mouth of those who are upon earth.'[15]

Public esteem not merely gratified a man's pride while he was yet alive, but it was of practical value to him after death. If his name were good in the mouth of the living and the remembrance of him eternal, because of his virtues,[16] visitors to his burial-place would the more readily present him with those offerings upon which his welfare after death was imagined so largely to depend, or, in lieu of material gifts, would at any rate repeat for his benefit certain prescribed formulæ. Accordingly we find:

'O ye who live and exist . . . as ye love life and hate death, ye shall offer to me that which is in your hands; if there be nothing in your hands, ye shall speak with your mouths, "A thousand of bread and beer, etc."'[17] 'May my name be good unto men who come in after years,' says Dḥôut, 'may they give me praises at the two seasons by the favour of the gods.'[18]

The desire to secure these advantages was undoubtedly one of the chief reasons for inscribing upon his tombstone, or upon the façade of his tomb-chapel, the enumeration of the deceased's virtues and the account of the esteem in which he was held by his fellow-men.

(7) *Conscience.*—On the conscience as a stimulus to virtuous living see art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian); see also Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, pp. 297 f., 354.

10. Justification of the dead.—(1) *Osiris the prototype of the justified dead.*—The epithet 'justified' (*m; ḫrw*=lit. 'righteous of voice') is a legal term,[19] and was applied to Osiris when, thanks to the skilful pleading of Thôth, he had won his case against Sēth before the tribunal of gods at Heliopolis.[1] After the VIth dynasty all dead persons were identified with Osiris and from that period onwards had the Osirian epithet 'justified' appended to their names.[2]

(2) *Methods of obtaining justification.*—All manner of means were adopted by the Egyptians to obtain justification at the posthumous trial, most of them utterly inconsistent, from our standpoint, with the ethical theory of the hereafter, and yet, in view of the prevailing magico-religious ideas, a natural consequence of that theory having been accepted.

The deceased, who was identified with Osiris, would inevitably have come to be regarded as righteous, though without any special claim of his own to sinlessness—his personality and acts would have tended to become merged in those of the god.

(i.) *The pilgrimage to Abydos.*—Probably with a view to ensuring this identification after death and securing the benefits resulting therefrom, it was considered advisable to associate oneself with Osiris during life. Hence the pilgrimages to Abydos and the setting up of memorial tablets at the god's supposed burial-place.[3] We are definitely informed in one instance that the object of the pilgrimage was the 'fetching of justification.'[4] If the pilgrimage were omitted during life, it might be undertaken after death with the same desirable results.[5]

(ii.) *The mysteries.*—Similar advantages accrued to him who had participated in the Osirian mysteries.[6]

(iii.) *Purifications.*—People could also be made righteous, and so obtain justification, by means of ceremonial ablutions. A person could perform them for himself during his life-time in special sacred pools,[7] or they could be performed for him after death by divinities, human beings impersonating divinities,[8] or even by himself. According to the *Book of Breathings*, the deceased, before he enters the Hall of the Two Rights, is cleansed from all evil, from every abomination, by the goddesses Uto and Nekhbet, and receives the name 'Stone of Righteousness.'[9]

(iv.) *Magical formulæ, etc.*[10]—Spells were considered to be specially efficacious in obtaining justification for the deceased. The famous ch. cxxv. of the *Book of the Dead*, as the colophon and opening words of the 'Introduction' show, was a spell that enabled the deceased to appear blameless in the eyes of Osiris and his assessors.

Similar spells are the claims of the deceased to have participated in the Osirian mysteries,[11] to have undergone purificatory ceremonies,[12] or the assertion that he is this or that god and therefore righteous.[13] Again, he would be justified if, to the accompaniment of the prescribed formula, his head were crowned with the 'wreath of justification.'[14] Cf. also the so-called 'heart-scarab' with the incantation inscribed upon it.[15] So powerful were these formulæ that the things alleged in them, however untrue they might be, became actualities.[16]

11. The triumph of evil over good.—This aspect of the problem of good and evil is treated in art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), and very fully dealt with by Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 188 ff.

Certain stanzas of the *Gespräch eines Lebensmüden* clearly

1 Sethe, *Urkunden*, 941; cf. 993, line 9. 2 *Ib.* 465, line 1.
3 *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* ii. pl. 34.
4 Lange-Schafer, ii. 199.
5 See Davies-Gardiner, pp. 81 f., 83 ff.; see above (4) (i.).
6 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 430, line 4 f.
7 *Ib.* i. 123, 132, 150; *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* ii. pl. 14.
8 Petrie, *Dendereh*, pl. ix. 9 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 75.
10 Lange-Schafer, ii. no. 20500. 11 *Ib.* ii. no. 20507.
12 Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 46 f.
13 *Egyp. Stelæ in the Brit. Mus.* ii. pl. 24.
14 Lange-Schafer, ii. 94.
15 Petrie, *Dendereh*, pl. xv. p. 52.
16 See above (4) (iii.), and art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 5.
17 Lange-Schäfer, i. no. 20003, *a*, line 1 ff., *ap.* Davies-Gardiner, p. 92, note 1.
18 Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 430.
19 Davies-Gardiner, p. 47, note 4; Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 35.

1 *Tdb.* ch. xviii. line 1 f.
2 See art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 7.
3 Erman, *Handbook*, p. 135 f.; Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 285 ff.
4 Davies-Gardiner, p. 47 f.; art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), vol. v. p. 478ᵃ, note 2.
5 Davies-Gardiner, *loc. cit.*
6 *E.g.*, *Tdb.* ch. cxxv. (Introd.) lines 21–24 (Conclusion), lines 12–14; art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 8 (*c*).
7 Art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 8 (*b*).
8 *Ib.* v. 2 (*c*)–(*e*).
9 P. J. de Horrack, *Le Livre des respirations*, Paris, 1877, pl. i. § 2; cf. also *Pyr.* 921*a–c*, 1141*a*–1142*b*.
10 Formulæ increased the efficacy of the manual acts and would have been pronounced during the performance of all the above-mentioned rites (cf. *Pyr.*, *loc. cit.*).
11 *E.g.*, *Tdb.* ch. i. lines 3, 8–10, 13 f.; ch. cv. line 8; ch. cxxv. (Conclusion) line 13 f.; ch. clxxxi. line 13 f.
12 Art. PURIFICATION (Egyptian), V. 2 (*b*).
13 *E.g.*, *Tdb.* ch. clxxxiii. line 41 ff.
14 Davies-Gardiner, p. 111 with note 3; art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), vol. v. p. 478ᵃ, note 1.
15 Davies-Gardiner, p. 112 f.; Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 308.
16 For this hoodwinking of the gods by means of magic see art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 9; Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 307 ff. For the magical value of the pictorial representation of the pilgrimage to Abydos see Davies-Gardiner, p. 48; cf. also the models of boats placed in tombs during the Middle Kingdom (*ib.* p. 116, note 4).

show that one of the reasons why the author of this 'pessimistic' poem desired death was that he looked to have his wrongs righted in the hereafter.[1] This point has been passed over by Gardiner in art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian).

12. Administration of justice.[2]—(1) *During the Old Kingdom.*—There was no clearly defined class of professional judges, all judicial functions being performed by the administrative officials, who were supposed to be learned in the law.[3] Certain of the Upper Egyptian provincial governors bore the title 'magnate of the ten of Upper Egypt,' as if they were members of a special council of ten. The officials who acted as judges in the provinces were formed into six courts of justice, the so-called 'six great houses.'[4] At the head of these courts, as indeed of the whole judicial administration, was the vizier in the capacity of the chief justice.[5] Many of the judges bore the predicate 'mouth of Nekhen.'[6] Disputes about the ownership of land seem to have been a frequent cause of litigation.[7] It seems that, even at this early period, all cases had to be submitted to the court in writing.[8] Special cases of a private nature were heard by the chief justice and a 'mouth of Nekhen.'[9] When the queen of Piōpi I. was accused of treason, she was tried by a specially constituted court, consisting of two 'mouths of Nekhen,' without the chief justice.[10] Under certain circumstances a litigant could appeal directly to the king.[11]

(2) *During the Middle Kingdom.*—As in the previous age, the administrative officials acted as judges, while the vizier still held the position of chief justice.[12] There was probably a court of justice at the capital of every nome, presided over by the local prince.[13] We learn that the 'six great houses,' with the vizier at their head, sat in Ith Tōwe.[14] There existed at this period officials with the sole title of 'judge.' These possibly exercised their functions within a restricted local jurisdiction.[15] There were now more than one 'ten of Upper Egypt,' and 'magnates of the tens of Upper Egypt' were entrusted with various executive and administrative commissions by the king; we do not know with any exactitude what was their connexion with the judicial administration.[16]

The *Story of the Eloquent Peasant* shows us how a high official dispensed justice during the feudal age. He was assisted by a council of minor officials, to whose advice, however, the great man paid little heed.[17] This council, be it noted, is depicted as being thoroughly in sympathy with the defendant, the thievish Thutnakht, probably because he was a member, though quite a subordinate one, of the 'official' class.[18]

(3) *Under the New Empire.*—As during the Old Kingdom, there was no class of judges with exclusively legal duties, justice was still dispensed by the administrative officials.[19] The vizier was, as before, the chief justice. He held a daily 'sitting' in his audience hall, the great council.[20] The first step in all legal proceedings was for the claimant to lay his case in writing before the vizier in this court,[1] where also the vizier tried all crimes committed in the capital.[2] The 'magnates of the tens of Upper Egypt' had lost their old importance, and now formed merely an attendant council, retaining, apparently, little or no advisory functions.[3] The 'six great houses' no longer existed, the ancient title 'chief of the six great houses' being retained only as a traditional title of the vizier.[4] In addition to the vizier's hall, the great council, there were local courts composed of the 'notables' of the town—the administrative officials in each district. On occasions the great council and the local court investigated a case together. When the great council required detailed information about a case that only a local court could supply, it sent out a commissioner, who, together with the members of the local court, held a joint inquiry, hearing the evidence of both parties.[5] The number of the local courts is uncertain. The members of the board of judges composing the local court were largely priests,[6] and at Thebes they seem to have varied from day to day. In cases where a member of the royal house was concerned the composition of the board was in the hands of the vizier. In a case of high treason the appointments to it were made by the king himself.[7] There seems at present to be no means of determining what was the exact relation of the local courts to the great council. We know of a case where a petitioner lost his case in the vizier's great council, but obtained satisfaction afterwards at a local court.[8] We probably have the latest existing reference to the great council at Thebes in a Demotic papyrus of the XXVth dynasty.[9]

13. Personification of Mē'et.—For full particulars about the goddess Mē'et, her priests, and as to whether she possessed an organized cult or not,[10] see artt. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 11. and PERSONIFICATION (Egyptian), §§ 4, 7, 9 (*c*) (2).

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted in the footnotes.

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RIGHTEOUSNESS (Greek and Roman).—'Righteousness' is the translation of δικαιοσύνη in the NT and in the LXX, where it corresponds to the Hebrew *ṣedaqah*. The word thus gets associations that differentiate it from the idea of justice, which is derived from δικαιοσύνη by way of Greek philosophy and Roman law.

The justice or righteousness of God in the Bible is sometimes His loving-kindness to the just and the unjust. 'Righteousness' is an apt rendering of δικαιοσύνη in passages of moral eloquence in Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*. It is not once used in Welldon's translation of the fifth book of Aristotle's *Ethics*, 'On Justice.' Aristotle first explicitly distinguished the special meaning of justice as one of the cardinal virtues from its vaguer use as a synonym of all virtue or righteousness. He first established the quasi-legal meaning which until recently has found general acceptance. He conceived justice as the recognition of a definable equality or proportion in respect of rights assumed to be ascertained or ascertainable. It was not the limitation of such rights by 'equity,' nor their renunciation by generosity, nor their equalization in the interests of a social ideal. Some of these concep

[1] Erman, *Gespräch eines Lebensmüden mit seiner Seele*, pp. 27, 71 ff.; Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 197.

[2] See also artt. LAW (Egyptian) and ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 12.

[3] Breasted, *A Hist. of Egypt from the Earliest Times to the Persian Conquest*, London, 1906, p. 80 f.

[4] *E.g.*, Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 99, line 6.

[5] Breasted, *History*, pp. 79-82.

[6] See Gardiner, *ZÄS* xlii. [1905] 121 ff.

[7] Sethe, *Urkunden*, i. 36, line 17, 13, line 3.

[8] Breasted, *History*, p. 81 f.

[9] Sethe, p. 99.

[10] *Ib.* p. 100.

[11] Breasted, *History*, p. 81 f.

[12] *Ib.* pp. 164, 166.

[13] *Ib.* p. 164.

[14] *Ib.* p. 164.

[15] *Ib.* p. 165.

[16] *Ib.*

[17] Vogelsang, p. 61 f.

[18] See Breasted, *Religion and Thought*, p. 219 ff.

[19] Breasted, *History*, p. 240.

[20] *Ib.* p. 241. Throughout the New Kingdom, from the reign of Tuthmosis III. onwards, there were usually two viziers, one for Upper, and one for Lower, Egypt. There were then two great courts, that of the Upper Egyptian vizier being situated at Thebes, and that of the Lower Egyptian vizier at Heliopolis (Gardiner, *The Inscription of Mes*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 33 f.).

[1] Gardiner, *Inscription of Mes*, p. 36.

[2] Breasted, *History*, p. 240.

[3] *Ib.* p. 239 f.

[4] *Ib.* p. 240.

[5] Gardiner, *Inscription of Mes*, p. 37; Breasted, *History*, p. 241.

[6] See art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Egyptian), § XVIII.

[7] Breasted, *History*, p. 241.

[8] *Ib.*

[9] See Griffith, *Catalogue of the Demotic Papyri in the John Rylands Library*, Manchester, 1909, iii. 16.

[10] In this connexion it might be pointed out that Nesp[illegible], whose *Funerary Papyrus* in the Bodleian Library will be published shortly in *Journ. of Egyp. Archæology*, bears among other titles that of 'god's father of Mē'et, daughter of Rē'' (see also J. Lieblein, *Hieroglyph. Namenwörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1871-72, p. 997, 69).

tions are latent in the Stoic and Christian χρηστότης, and recently philosophy has used them to transcend or confound the Aristotelian distinctions. This is only in appearance a return to the broader and more spiritual treatment of 'justice' in Plato's *Republic*. Platonic justice, it is true, is not confined to Aristotelian or legal formulas, and it is in a sense 'social.' But Plato does not lose himself in generalities with modernist humanitarianism. He recognizes in anticipation the legal and Aristotelian rules of justice, and tests his own broader definition by them. But for edification and the portrayal of his ideal he prefers to define justice in terms of 'Be this' rather than 'Do this.'[1] Objectively his justice is social. But he emphasizes equality of service in the voluntary acceptance of natural inequalities, not the equalization of rights and rewards.

With these clues we shall not lose our way in the labyrinth of the historical evolution, which for sober students begins with Homer. Homer does not use the abstract δικαιοσύνη. But we cannot infer[2] that he lacks the idea. For he has the abstract εὐδικία,[3] and in Æschylus and Sophocles also the metrically more convenient δίκη stands for δικαιοσύνη, which does not occur in Greek tragedy. Homer uses δίκη both of the administration of justice and of ethical justice. In *Od.* ix. 215 it is bracketed with θέμιστες, 'dooms,' in the concrete sense of judgments. In *Il.* xxiii. 542 the entire context of its use suggests the 'later' meaning of strict right as opposed to the promptings of pity or generosity in the judge. The word also means 'way,' 'manner,' 'custom'—this is the way of the gods, the way of mortals, the way of kings.[4] The survival of this sense in fixed prepositional phrases —'dog-wise,' etc.—leads plausibly to the assumption that it was the earlier meaning, and that for Homeric or pre-Homeric man the just way was the customary way known to the elders.[5] The systematic exaggeration of this by the followers of Henry Maine provokes rival systems. Rudolf Hirzel[6] maintains that the legal meaning is the earlier, and that δίκη is by etymology the casting down or stretching out of the judge's staff to part the contestants and proclaim his decision. His collections are helpful, but his interpretations of the texts will not bear scrutiny. Jane E. Harrison is equally confident that δίκη is 'the way of the whole world of nature' and that in Euripides' *Medea*, 411, it is 'the circular course of the whole cosmos.'[7] Dismissing these fancies, we find in Homer δίκη and the derivatives δικάζω and δικασπόλος already used of a simple primitive administration of justice by a king or a council of elders.[8] The adjective δίκαιος occurs fifteen times or more as a broad term of ethical approval. We might try to elicit a definition by noting its synonyms or associates — 'sensible,' 'reasonable,' etc.—and its antonyms— 'insolent,' 'savage,' 'harsh.'[9] But this would be an uncritical pressing of the texts. 'Just' and 'god-fearing' are comprehensive categories of all virtue or righteousness for the Homeric Odysseus,[10] as they are for the writer of Ac 10[35] 'He that feareth him, and worketh righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), is accepted with him.'

In Hesiod's *Theogony*, 901 f., Dike appears with the Seasons, Peace, and Eunomia ('good order') as daughter of Zeus and Themis.[11] This seems conscious allegory. And later Greek poets freely adapt to their purposes the parentage, the kin, and the functions of Dike.[1] The frequency of the word in the first 300 lines of the *Works and Days* arises from the constant reference to the crooked decision of the bribe-devouring judges in the lawsuit between Hesiod and his brothers, which is the text of the poet's moralizing and admonitions about justice in general. As in Homer, Dike is the antithesis of Hybris[2] and Violence, and the poet repeats the Homeric blessing on the land whose kings give just judgments.[3] Dike occurs in the 'later' sense of punishment.[4] The negative ἄδικος, 'unjust,' is found,[5] and the neuter plural τὰ δίκαια.[6] The opposition of justice and violence is expressed in the interesting compound χειροδίκαι.[7] And there are hints of other ideas developed by later Greek reflexion. Birds and beasts may devour one another, for there is no δίκη among them.[8] Here is the germ of the myth in Plato's *Protagoras*,[9] that Zeus established civilization by sending αἰδώς and δίκη to mankind.[10] Hesiod also anticipates[11] the complaint of Job, Theognis,[12] the Sophist Thrasymachus, Sophocles,[13] the speaker in Plato's *Republic*,[14] and Euripides,[15] that the righteous man is not visibly rewarded. It is commonly said that the personification of Δίκη begins with the description of her banishment by wicked men.[16] But no absolute line can be drawn between this and the phrasing of Homer in *Il.* xvi. 388.

The word is fairly frequent in the fragments of Greek poetry between Hesiod and the drama, but only a few passages are significant. In a fable of **Archilochus**[17] there is an appeal to Zeus who regards both the Hybris and the Dike of beasts. This may be little more than the literary tone of Kipling's 'law of the pack' and Aristophanes' 'laws of the birds.' **Pindar**[18] echoes Hesiod with the compound beasts 'unwitting-of-justice.' Mimnermus[19] says that the truth (between man and man) is the most just of all things. Later Greek ethical feeling generally made truth-telling a form of justice rather than an absolute and independent virtue.[20] In LXX 'truth' in a list of virtues is often merely a periphrasis for the reality or sincerity of those virtues.

The idea of justice is especially prominent in **Solon**, the earliest Attic poet. He speaks in almost Æschylean metaphor of those who regard not the august foundation of Dike.[21] He associates the doctrine of the late punishment of the wicked with the omniscience of silent Dike, who sees and knows all things, and surely overtakes the evil-doer at the last.[22] He prays for wealth—but not unjustly gained (a Greek commonplace).[23] He boasts that he has harmonized might and right,[24] and amuses Plutarch by the archaic *naïveté* of his saying that the sea is the most 'just' of things when the winds do not vex it.[25] In such transferences of the moral

[1] Cf. *Rep.* 442 E, 443 A, with Leslie Stephen, *The Science of Ethics*, London, 1882, pp. 155, 163, 376, 285.
[2] With R. Hirzel, *Themis, Δίκη, und Verwandtes*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 169, n. 1.
[3] *Od.* xix. 111.
[4] *Ib.* xix. 43, xi. 218, iv. 691.
[5] Cf. Pindar, frag. 215 (Christ).
[6] *Op. cit.* p. 94.
[7] *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 517.
[8] R. J. Bonner, in *Classical Philology*, vi. [1911] 12 ff.
[9] For δίκη βία cf. Hirzel, p. 130 f.
[10] *Od.* ix. 175 f.
[11] Cf. *Works and Days*, 256.

[1] In Eurip. frag. 223 (Nauck) she is the daughter of Time—a transparent allegory; cf. frags. 305, 559; see also Bacchyl. xiv. 54.
[2] 212–218, with triumph of justice 'in the end'; cf. Plato, *Rep.* 613 C.
[3] 225 ff.; Homer, *Od.* xix. 109 ff., *Il.* xvi. 386; cf. Lv 26, Dt 28.
[4] 239, 249.
[5] 334.
[6] 280.
[7] 189; cf. German *Faustrecht*, and A. C. Pearson, on Soph. frag. 977.
[8] 277.
[9] 322 C.
[10] For the connexion of αἰδώς and δίκη see Hirzel, p. 57, n. 4.
[11] 270.
[12] 377, 743; cf. Hom. *Il.* xiii. 631.
[13] Frag. 107.
[14] 358 C, 364 B.
[15] Frag. 288.
[16] *Works and Days*, 255 ff. and possibly 220.
[17] Frag. 84 (6).
[18] *Nem.* i. 63.
[19] Frag. 8.
[20] See commentators on Plato, *Rep.* 389 B, and the uncritically used collections of Hirzel, p. 110 ff.
[21] Frag. 2 (13), l. 14. For similar images cf. Pindar, *Ol.* xiii. 6; Æsch. *Ag.* 383, *Eumen.* 539, 564, *Choeph.* 646; Soph. *Antig.* 854; Eurip. *Hippol.* 1172.
[22] Frag. 2 (13), l. 15; cf. frag. 12 (4), l. 8.
[23] Frag. 12 (4), l. 7.
[24] Frag. 32 (25), l. 15; cf. the noble lines of Æschylus, frag. 381.
[25] Frag. 11 (17). Hirzel (p. 172, n. 2) also misapprehends this; cf. Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, act i. sc. iii. l. 38 f.: 'But let the ruffian Boreas once enrage the gentle Thetis.'

order to inanimate objects it requires the nicest discrimination to distinguish between 'survivals,' *naïveté*, and the conscious spiritual allegory of Sophocles,[1] of Platonism, and of Wordsworth's 'Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong.' 'The rivers flow into the sea, but the sea doesn't overflow, for it isn't *just* that it should,' says the speaker in Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 1292. 'All things that are born must die,' said **Anaximander**,[2] 'paying the penalty to one another for the injustice (of individual existence?).' 'All things are just in the sight of God,' said **Heraclitus**,[3] 'but men conceive some things to be unjust and some just.' And again: 'The sun will not pass his bounds, else will the Erinyes, the helpers of Δίκη, find him out.'[4] 'Wise men tell us,' says **Socrates**,[5] 'that it is love and order and sobriety and justice (δικαιότητα) that hold together gods and men and the whole world, which is therefore a cosmos—an order, not a licentious disorder.' And the kindly earth in **Virgil**[6] is *justissima tellus*, perhaps because, like the just man in Plato,[7] she returns a deposit.[8] These are suggestive passages. But until literary and linguistic psychology has defined their precise intentions in their context, they cannot be combined in the support of pseudo-scientific theories about the origin of the idea of justice. The abstract δικαιοσύνη seems to occur for the first time in a line of **Phocylides**, 'In justice is comprehended all virtue,'[9] which Theognis repeats with the added pentameter, 'Every man is good who is just.'[10] A theme of endless comment was Theognis' distich, 'The most beautiful thing is justice, the best is health, the most delightful, to win what one loves.'[11] The conception of the beauty of justice was developed out of the ambiguity of the Greek καλόν. Its culminating expression is Aristotle's 'Neither the evening star nor the morning star is so admirable.'[12]

Pindar, the student of Hesiod and conservative, associates Dike with Eunomia and Eirene, conservators of States, and benign Tranquillity, her daughter.[13] The prepositional phrase, ἐν δίκᾳ, occurs in his vision of judgment to come,[14] though not in the legal and Æschylean sense 'at compt.'[15] Pindar emphasizes the idea of justice in his praise of commercial cities—Corinth and his beloved Ægina, that deals fairly with the stranger. Ruskin's 'Tortoise of Ægina' brings this out fantastically, but beautifully.[16] Later writers find texts for the justice of the 'superman' in *Nem.* ix. 15, 'The stronger man puts down the former right,'[17] and frag. 169 (151), 'Custom (law) lord of all things makes just the most violent deed.'[18]

We can only glance at other writers before Plato. In **Æschylus** Dike, the daughter of Zeus,[19] the embodiment and the accomplishment of the moral law, is frequently personified with bold metaphor.[20] The *Prometheus* raises the theological problem of the justice of Zeus who keeps justice in his own hands.[21] The *locus classicus* for the old superstition that God confounds the righteous with the guilty is *Sept.* 598 ff.[1] The *Agamemnon* trilogy emphasizes the awfulness of sin, the certainty of retribution, the irremediability of spilt blood, the law that the doer must suffer.[2] The Furies, the ministers of the older law, claim to be strictly and straightly just (εὐθυδίκαιοι).[3] But already in the *Agamemnon* we hear of another law, that wisdom comes through suffering;[4] and in the final symbolism of the *Eumenides* the Furies become the gracious goddesses, and the letter of the old law of an eye for an eye is superseded by a law of grace and atonement.

In **Sophocles** Dike is the avenger,[5] the ally of the right,[6] the assessor of the throne of Zeus by laws eterne.[7] Her eye is as the all-seeing eye of God;[8] her high throne is a stumbling-block to the bold transgressor.[9] Antigone, in a famous passage,[10] appeals to the unwritten law and the Justice who dwells with the gods below against Creon's unrighteous decree. This cannot be pressed, with Hirzel and Miss Harrison, to prove any special connexion of Dike with the lower world.[11] The interpretation that Dike equals 'custom' in frag. 247 is a characteristic error of modern ethnological philology.

Neither Æschylus nor Sophocles was apparently affected by the Sophistic 'enlightenment.' The Sophists presumably discussed the origin, nature, and validity of the idea of justice, as of other ideas. There is no evidence that any of them worked out a serious scientific theory of ethics and justice, as is sometimes affirmed by modern critics hostile to Plato.[12] But the unsettlement of traditional moral faith, in conjunction with the cynical and Machiavellian politics of the Peloponnesian War, presented to Plato his main problem—the finding of a reasoned 'sanction' for ethics, for justice and righteousness.[13] From this point of view **Thucydides** and **Euripides** are an indispensable introduction to the study of Plato. In addition to his dramatic or personal exposition of this ethical nihilism, or the 'superman' philosophy of justice,[14] Euripides' scattered *sententiæ* about justice could be quoted in illustration of nearly every edifying or cynical Greek commonplace, and in anticipation of many points made by Aristotle and the Stoics.[16]

Plato.—We have already touched on the Platonic conception of justice and referred to other articles in this work. A more detailed exposition would involve the Platonic philosophy as a whole,[16] and its first prerequisite would be the removal of the misconception that Plato commits fallacies in elementary logic, and is presumably unaware of any Aristotelian distinction which it does not suit his immediate literary purpose to labour with painful explicitness. The artistic design of the *Republic* required him to regard justice in its subjective aspect as entire righteousness, the harmony, unity, and right functioning in division of labour of all the 'parts' or 'faculties' of the soul.[17] But he did this consciously and with due recognition of other popular or possible meanings of the word. And there are few valuable or

1 *Ajax*, 669 ff.; cf. Eurip. *Phœn.* 535 ff.
2 H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin, 1903, i. 9.
3 Frag. 102 (Diels). 4 Frag. 94.
5 Plato, *Gorgias*, 508 A. 6 *Georg.* ii. 460.
7 *Rep.* i. 331 E. 8 Cf. Hirzel, p. 186, n. 1.
9 Frag. 15. 10 147.
11 236; cf. L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, Berlin, 1882, i. 291, 338.
12 *Eth. Nic.* 1129b 28, repeated by Plotinus, i. 6. 4; for the justice of visiting the sins of the fathers on the children and other details see art. THEOGNIS.
13 *Ol.* xiii. 6, *Pyth.* viii. 1 14 *Ol.* ii. 16. 15 *Choeph.* 987.
16 See *Ol.* viii. 22, where the use of θεμις shows the reader that Pindar was not acquainted with Hirzel's and Miss Harrison's rigid distinctions between θεμις and δικη.
17 Missed by Hirzel, p. 83, n. 2.
18 See commentators on Plato, *Protag.* 337 D, *Gorgias*, 484 B, *Laws*, 690 B, 890 A.
19 *Sept.* 672, *Choeph.* 949.
20 *Sept.* 646, *Ag.* 774, *Choeph.* 311, 646.
21 187; cf. *Suppl.* 167 169

1 Cf. Shorey on Horace, *Odes*, iii. ii. 29.
2 *Choeph.* 310 314. 3 *Eumen.* 312. 4 175-181.
5 Pearson, on frag. 107. 9; cf. *Electra*, 475, 528, *Trach.* 807.
6 *Œd. Tyr.* 274. 7 *Œd. Col.* 1382. 8 Frag. 12.
9 *Antig.* 854; cf. above, on Solon. 10 450 ff.
11 See Jebb's sensible note.
12 Cf. F. Dümmler, *Akademika*, Giessen, 1889, p. 247 ff.; A. W. Benn, *The Philosophy of Greece*, London, 1898, p. 143, and P. Shorey's review of it in the New York *Nation*, 20th July 1899, p. 35.
13 See artt. PHILOSOPHY (Greek) and SUMMUM BONUM.
14 Cf. *Phœn.* 524 f. with Cicero's comment, *de Offic.* iii. 21; Eurip. frag. 288 (Nauck).
15 Cf. in particular frags. 508 and 257, on immanent justice, and frag. 1030, on justice as opposed to lax equity.
16 See also art. PLATO
17 H. Höffding, *Problems of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., New York, 1905, p. 109, still prefers this method.

valid ideas about legal, ethical, or social justice to be found in Aristotle or in later Græco-Roman literature that are not sufficiently indicated somewhere in the *Laws* or the *Republic*. One confirmation of this, for which space is lacking here, would be furnished by the still unappreciated extent of Cicero's dependence on Platonic ideas of justice in his *de Officiis*, as well as in his *de Legibus* and *de Republica*. There are few, if any, sentences in *de Officiis*, i. 7 ff., to which the most refined ethical thought of to-day could take exception.

Plato, like the writers of the Bible, Cicero, and the English ethical philosophers of the 19th cent., was intensely interested in the ultimate 'sanction' of righteousness or justice. This problem is the framework of the main discussion in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*.

Aristotle was indifferent or sceptical. As Gomperz puts it,[1] 'he does not trouble himself about any eudæmonistic foundation.' Why Gomperz should deem this indifference to what Leslie Stephen calls 'the problem which is at the root of all ethical discussion' an advance beyond Plato's 'artificial reasoning' is as hard to understand as his statement that 'altruism appears for the first time in Aristotle's recognition without circumlocution that justice is not directed to the good of the agent but to another.' This is merely the formula of Thrasymachus canvassed in the first book of the *Republic*.[2] The real problem was and is how the good of another becomes the good of self, and an adequate motive. Aristotle, though not unaware of this problem, does not share Plato's passionate interest in its solution as an answer to ethical nihilism.

He is here merely, or at any rate mainly, making a logical distinction between self-regarding virtues and virtues relative to another. Burnet actually renders πρὸς ἕτερον 'relative,' as if it were πρός τι.[3] There is still less justification for Gomperz's statement that Aristotle's treatment of justice as a principle of equality cuts away the ground from Plato's identification of political justice with the subordination of one class to another contrary to that principle. Equality for Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and all sober Greek thinkers included the 'equality of proportion,' which takes account of natural and existing inequalities.

The technical interpretation of Aristotle's book 'on Justice'[4] requires an elaborate commentary. There are some unsettled problems which cannot be apprehended in translations or made intelligible to any student who does not bring to them an intimate knowledge of Greek idiom and of Platonic and Aristotelian terminology. But the gist of the matter is quite plain. After recognizing and dismissing the broader sense of justice as fulfilment of the entire law, Aristotle develops the more specific idea of justice as a kind of equality by the use of Plato's and Isocrates'[5] distinction between the 'arithmetical' equality of radical democracy and the geometrical or proportional equality of more conservative thinkers. There are, he says, with his eye on the actual life of a Greek city, two kinds of justice. Distributive justice apportions honours, wealth, and other social or political 'goods' in proportion to some assumed claim and scale of merit. Contractual justice—the justice of relations of obligation whether of contract proper or of *ex delicto*—treats individuals as equal units. Whether a 'good' citizen wrongs a bad, or a bad a good, this kind of justice aims by award of damages, fine, or punishment to reinstate the violated equality of rights, 'between man and man,' as we should phrase it. The emphasis on obligations *ex delicto* leads Aristotle to designate this kind of justice as 'corrective,' and the extension of this term to the whole domain of contractual as opposed to distributive justice has created some confusion.[1] But Aristotle's central idea is sound and simple. Modern difficulties are due mainly to insufficient scholarship, or to the still persisting superstition of Aristotle's infallibility. As a matter of fact, though the idea is sound, neither the terminology, the metaphors, nor the endeavour to fit it into the schematic definition of virtue as a mean will endure analysis. The term 'distributive,' *e.g.*, seems to refer to the distribution of spoils or grain to the citizens—where, whatever the military or Homeric practice, Greek democracy would have demanded arithmetical equality with few exceptions. But Aristotle also illustrates it by the distribution of profits in a partnership of unequal capitals, which is really a kind of contractual relationship.[2] Further confusion arises from the reference of distributive justice to the conflicting claims of different classes for predominance of political power in the organic constitution of the State. This conception of the problem of justice Aristotle derived from Plato's ἀξιώματα τοῦ ἄρχειν.[3] But we cannot enter into these details, or delay to interpret Aristotle's attempt to extend the mathematical analogy to the equalities and proportions of economic exchange—a speculation as obscure and presumably as fallacious as similar modern endeavours. The 'Pythagorean' or Rhadamanthine justice of retaliation or requital fails, he thinks, in not taking due account of persons and proportions. Aristotle does not anticipate the theory of the psychological origin of the idea of justice in the passion for revenge. And, though Greek poetry furnishes many illustrations of that natural feeling, and though δίκη early and easily takes the meaning 'punishment,' Greek literature as a whole does not support the pretentious generalization that justice and punishment are nothing but revenge.[4] Gomperz[5] approves Herbert Spencer's not very intelligent ridicule of Aristotle's doctrine that justice, like the other virtues, is in some sense a mean. But Aristotle admits that his formula applies only in the sense that justice (*i.e.* especially the administration of justice)[6] tries to hit the mean. And his endeavours to show that the 'equality' which is justice is also a mean strain language no more than any Procrustean system does.

In pure theory the post-Aristotelian systems added little to the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. The **Epicurean** ethics bases itself on the art of measuring pleasures set forth in the *Protagoras* and the theory of a social contract expounded by Glaucon in the *Republic*.[7] Animals, being incapable of the social contract, were *ipso facto* excluded from justice. Man has no obligation to them.[8] The educated Epicureans took these ideas for granted, and did not waste time on Platonic idealism or Aristotelian refinements.

'Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et aequi. . . .[9] Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necesse est.'[10]

[1] *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., London and New York, 1901–12, iv. 258.
[2] 343 C; cf. 392 B. Pearson rightly rejects the interpretations that find it in Eurip. *Heracl.* 1–3.
[3] *The Ethics of Aristotle*, London, 1904, p. 202.
[4] *Eth. Nic.* v.
[5] *Rep.* 558 C, *Laws*, 707; Isoc. iii. 15, vii. 21.

[1] Both Gomperz and Burnet would prefer the schoolmen's 'directive' for 'distributive.'
[2] *Eth. Nic.* 1131b 29, generally misunderstood; cf. *Pol.* 1280a 29.
[3] *Laws*, 690 A, 714 D; cf. also *Rep.* 432 A; Hirzel, p. 162, speaks only of this.
[4] Cf. Hirzel, pp. 40, n. 2, 104, 126, 145.
[5] P. 546.
[6] Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 464 B, where δικαιοσύνη is virtually δικαστική.
[7] 359 A.
[8] So also the Stoics; see the references in Hirzel, p. 214, n. 2.
[9] Horace, *Sat.* I. iii. 98.
[10] *Ib.* 111; cf. Plato, *Rep.* 360 D; διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον.

It was easier to reaffirm this simple dogma than to study Plato's refutation of it.

The famous third book of Chrysippus, 'On Justice,' is no longer, as in Plutarch's day, 'to be found everywhere.'[1] The fragments of the older **Stoics** add little to the Platonic and Aristotelian theory. Justice, the Stoics taught, is a cardinal and 'social' virtue. It is the virtue of due distribution.[2] It pertains neither to the accuser nor to the defendant, but to the judge.[3] Among its subordinate species are kindliness (χρηστότης), democratic sociability (εὐκοινωνησία), and square dealing, or the quality of being easy to deal with (εὐσυναλλαξία).[4] Much of Chrysippus' discussion was captiously critical of his predecessors. He repeated Aristotle's captious censure of the innocent Platonic rhetoric about injustice to one's self.[5] He rebuked Plato for appealing to the theological sanction in the closing myth of the *Republic*,[6] but maintained against Epicurus that justice becomes impracticable and inconceivable if pleasure is the good.[7] He rejected the Aristotelian qualification of justice by equity for reasons that would have appealed to Selden,[8] and which were anticipated by Aristotle himself.[9] But he reinstated equity as a form of kindliness or good-fellowship. The influence of Greek, and particularly Stoic, philosophy upon Roman law has often been pointed out, but cannot be studied here. The very first sentence of Justinian's *Institutes*, 'Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens,' reads like a sentence of Plato's *Republic* stiffened by Stoicism (*constans*).[10]

In **later Græco-Roman literature** the somewhat pedantic sage of the Stoics became, under the joint influence of Platonism and the old Roman virtue, an impressive ideal of righteousness—the just man made perfect—serving humanity (as Hercules), unterrified by the tyrant or the mob (as Socrates),[11] unsubduable in soul (as Cato).

The subtleties of **Neo-Platonism** (*q.v.*) distinguishing the cathartic and the paradigmatic virtues do not concern us. Plotinus repeats the definitions of the fourth book of the *Republic*. Justice is the minding its own business by every faculty of the soul—the willing subordination of lower to higher.

Instead of thus associating righteousness with the theory of justice, we might have studied more broadly in ancient literature and life the approved type of man—the good man, the pious man, the καλὸς κἀγαθός, the sage, the kindly or popular man.[12] 'Vir bonus est quis?' asks the citizen in Horace.[13] 'Qui consulta patrum, qui leges iuraque servat'—that is one ideal. 'What a good kind helpful man to take pity on us in this crowd!' exclaim the two Syracusan ladies in Theocritus' realistic idyl[14] (χρηστοῦ κοικτίρμονος ἀνδρός). It is a singular coincidence that Justin Martyr[15] brings together the same two words from Lk 6[35f.] to commend the religion of service and mercy to the philosophic emperor: Γίνεσθε δὲ χρηστοὶ καὶ οἰκτίρμονες, ὡς καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ὑμῶν χρηστός ἐστι καὶ οἰκτίρμων. A history of the words χρηστός and χρηστότης in popular and later Stoic usage, strangely neglected by Hirzel, would show that this is more than a coincidence. We are in presence of a different ideal of the good or approved man from that implied by the Græco-Roman theory of justice or in the main by the righteousness of the OT. It is an ideal in which what Renan calls *bonté* predominates. It is true that the OT ṣᵉdāḳāh, 'righteousness,' came to mean largesse or alms, and that it is often also a general synonym of virtue or of the qualities that find acceptance with God and so justify a man in His sight—the fulfilment of the law both moral and ceremonial. But it also bears in relation to law and social order the specific meaning of legal justice between man and man. There are even texts which warn against the perversion of legal justice by pity or sympathy for the poor (Ex 23[3]; cf. Lv 19[15], Dt 1[17] 15[9]). This idea is foreign to the spirit of the Gospels, and some of the chief parables are directly pointed against it. St. Paul returns to the justice of the law only to show its impracticability. It is impossible to fulfil the entire law, ceremonial or moral. In the course of justice none of us would see salvation. Only the freely bestowed grace of God through Jesus Christ can save or justify man. It does not belong to this study to examine Matthew Arnold's contention in *St. Paul and Protestantism* (London, 1870) that St. Paul's essential meanings throughout are ethical, spiritual, and symbolic. We may note only that St. Paul's word δικαίωμα, 'justification,' presumably came to him from the LXX, which is peculiarly rich in abstracts in -μα loosely and rhetorically used in vaguer meanings than those given to them by the classic poets and philosophers of Greece. Coined apparently in the age of the Sophists, the sonorous abstract δικαίωμα, a convenient synonym for the awkward τὰ δίκαια *c. gen.*,[1] meant at first a claim of right and only incidentally a plea of justification.[2] Plato and Aristotle sometimes use it more precisely for the result of just action, as ἀδίκημα is the result of unjust action.[3] The LXX employs the word scores of times, often in lists of synonyms, such as 'my commandments, judgments, and *dikaiomata*.' The meaning 'plea of justification' occurs, but not frequently or with much technical emphasis. Deissmann[4] says somewhat too absolutely that the word in St. Paul means simply 'acquittal.' There appears no philological necessity for holding St. Paul to a much more definite or consistent use of the word than we find in the LXX. It would seem, then, that the more technical meaning of 'justification' must be collected from our interpretation of St. Paul's theology as a whole. However this may be, the entire development of post-classical ethical feeling and of early Christian thought made against the strict legal conception of justice worked out in Greek philosophy and Roman law, and latent in the OT ideal of rigid fulfilment of the law. The development of modern law and the renewed study of the Roman law and the theology of Calvinism in part counteracted these tendencies. But to-day the literature of widest appeal is anti-legal in sentiment. And by invocation of the phrase 'social justice' the philosophy of our time strives to abolish the distinction between justice and benevolence, or justice and equity, and indeed to suppress the idea of justice or righteousness altogether, except as edifying synonyms for the entire social or ethical ideal. Whether this is a genuine return to the spirit of Jesus or a temporary confusion of thought the future historian of philosophy may decide.

LITERATURE.—See the works mentioned in the footnotes. The topic is discussed incidentally in the literature on Aristotle's *Ethics* and Plato's *Republic*, and in the systems or histories of ethics or law in so far as they deal with the idea of justice. The subject is treated popularly in W. de Witt Hyde, *From Epicurus to Christ*, New York, 1904, *The Five Great Philosophies of Life*, do. 1911.

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[1] *De Comm. not.* 1070 D.
[2] H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1903-05, iii. 39, 63, i. 49.
[3] *Ib.* i. 64. [4] *Ib.*
[5] *Ib.* i. 70; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1138[a].
[6] Plut. *de Stoic. repugn.* 1040 A ff.
[7] v. Arnim, iii. 67. [8] *Ib.* iii. 162.
[9] *Eth. Nic.* 1137[b]; space falls for a history of the interesting idea [illegible]
[10] [illegible], this *suum cuique* is frequent in Cicero and later literature.
[11] H. [illegible], *Odes*, iii. iii. 1-4.
[12] [illegible] Hirzel, p. 181. [13] *Epist.* i. xvi. 41.
[14] [illegible] [15] *Apol.* i. 15.

[1] Plato, *Laws*, 715 B. [2] Thuc. i. 41; Isoc. 121 A.
[3] Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1135[a] 12. [4] *St. Paul*, London, 1912, p. 145.

RIGHTEOUSNESS (Hindu). — **1. Vedic.**— The conception of righteousness in the *Rigveda* finds its expression in the term *ṛta*, the equivalent of the Avestan *aša*, which denotes primarily the cosmic order, and then the order of the moral law, on the one hand, and of the performance of the sacrifice, on the other. The conception of moral order is doubtless Indo-Iranian, and it is a fair conclusion from the occurrence of Arta- as the first element in names of princes referred to in the Tell-el-Amarna correspondence that the conception cannot be more recent than the 15th cent. B.C., and that it was developed before the Vedic Aryans entered India. Despite the predominantly sacerdotal character of the *Rigveda*, it reveals abundant evidence of the importance of the conception : the gods themselves are not merely born of the *ṛta*—a conception in which physical origin may be chiefly denoted—but they follow the *ṛta* (*ṛtasap*); they are practisers of the *ṛta* (*ṛtāyu*) and knowers of it (*ṛtajña*). The special guardian of the *ṛta* is of course Varuṇa, the great guardian of morality, who moves about discerning the truth and the unrighteousness of mankind (*satyānṛté janānām*);[1] and in a curious phrase[2] Agni is declared to become Varuṇa when he strives for the *ṛta*. Accordance with the *ṛta*, therefore, becomes the sacrificer: the priest assures Agni that he invokes the gods without witchcraft, and offers his devotion with righteousness.[3] Especially characteristic is the famous dialogue[4] in which Yamī seeks to persuade her brother Yama to commit incest with her in order to propagate the human race. Yama's reply to her pleadings is in effect that her claims of advocating the right would merely lead them into unrighteousness of action; to her assertion that their father Tvaṣṭṛ had formed them in the womb to be husband and wife he replies by an assertion of ignorance of the purpose of creation, but an assurance of the existence of the law of Mitra and Varuṇa, and of the current view that incest is evil. Righteousness is thus accordance with general opinion, and with this agrees its constant association with truth (*satya*) considered as correspondence with reality. This opinion demands the virtues of a simple society — consideration in domestic relations, political loyalty, truth in friendship, abstention from crimes such as theft and murder, and from women faithfulness in wedded life; not unnaturally in hymns closely associated with the sacrifice much more stress is laid on the merits of liberality than on such manly virtues as courage in war.

In Īrān speculation on the cognate idea of *aša* led to the deepening of the moral force of the conception and the evolution of Zoroastrianism, but in India the period of the later *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* reveals not an advance, but a retrogression in moral outlook. Insistence on the ordering of the sacrifice has elevated the ritual into a substitute for morality; the priest who in the *Rigveda* primarily invokes the gods as a suppliant has become possessed, through a knowledge of the details of the sacrifice, of the power to compel the gods. At the same time he is exempted from the moral duty, which is recognized freely in the *Rigveda*, of seeking by his action the good of the sacrificer. It was, indeed, still contended by some that the priest was under an obligation to aim only at securing the desires of the sacrificer by whom he was employed, but the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*[5] emphatically rejects that doctrine, and instead gives minute details of the manner in which by his performance of the offering the priest may ruin, if he thinks fit, the sacrificer in whose service he is. Even the heinous crime of the slaying of a Brāhman, which naturally ranks in the priestly mind as almost the most deadly of sins, can be expiated, not by repentance on the part of the slayer, but by the performance of the horse-sacrifice with its accompaniment of the bestowal of enormous largesse on the priestly performers.[1] Truth still remains the attribute of the gods, but truth is no longer simple: the gods are *par excellence* lovers of what is obscure, and for man as opposed to the gods the duty of speaking nothing but the truth is recognized as impossible and equivalent to enjoining silence.

The *Brāhmaṇas*, textbooks of a priesthood which by total absorption in meditation on the ritual had lost touch with the realities of life, do not represent fairly the development of the conception of duty among the people generally. This is given to us far more clearly in the *Gṛhya-* and *Dharma-sūtras*, manuals of rules for religious and civil life, which reveal in full detail the elaborate structure of Indian life as it had developed from simpler conditions of the Rigvedic period. Not only are the respective rights and duties of the four great classes—priests, rulers and warriors, peasants, and serfs—clearly laid down, though with such variation in detail as is inevitable in works of varying date and representing different localities, but within the classes the plan of the different stages of life is mapped out. Among many rules of no moral value these treatises inculcate the observance of all the normal laws of simple morality—truth, abstention from injury to the persons or property of others, charity, hospitality, courage, and devotion to duty—and threaten those who disregard them with pains and penalties in the future life. This more normal outlook on morality is shared by the *Upaniṣads*. The voice of Prajāpati in the thunder is interpreted as an order to be self-restrained, charitable, and merciful;[2] as the fee in the great sacrifice of life are enumerated in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*[3] asceticism, liberality, right dealing, abstention from injury (*ahiṁsā*), and the speaking of truth. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*[4] has a list of virtues which includes self-restraint, asceticism, tranquillity, truthfulness and right dealing, hospitality, courtesy, and duties to wives, children, and grandchildren. The prince Aśvapati Kaikeya claims[5] that in his realm there is no thief, niggard, drunkard, adulterer, or courtesan.

Not only, however, do the *Upaniṣads* recognize and adopt current conceptions of morality, but they provide for the first time a reasoned basis for moral action by the doctrine that a man's place in life is determined by his former deeds—a principle which at the same time serves as a rationale of the rigid class-divisions of Indian society. In its purest form, associated with the name of Yājñavalkya,[6] the doctrine is rigidly one of rebirth on earth after death in a station depending exactly on a man's previous deeds, but already in the *Upaniṣads*[7] this idea is blended with the doctrine of reward in heaven or punishment elsewhere; and in this form, with variations in detail, the conception becomes part of the general Hindu belief. But no criterion of righteousness is suggested, though among those condemned to an evil fate in the *Chhāndogya* are expressly included the murderer of a Brāhman, the defiler of the teacher's wife, the drinker of spirits, the thief of gold, and the man who associates with such sinners. The reason for the omission of any inquiry into morality is the extreme intellectualism of the *Upaniṣads*, which are concerned beyond everything else with the determination of the nature of existence, and

[1] VII. xlix. 3. [2] X. viii. 5. [3] VII. xxxiv. 8.
[4] X. x. [5] III. 3.

[1] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XIII. v. 4. 1.
[2] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, V. 2.
[3] III. 17. [4] I. 9. [5] *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, V. xi. 5.
[6] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III. ii. 13, IV. iv. 4 ff.
[7] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, VI. ii.; *Chhāndogya*, V. x.

regard as the highest aim the merger of the individual soul in the absolute spirit (*brahman*), which is to be brought about by an act of intellectual insight. The possession of moral qualities is not inconsistent with the attainment of such insight, and the later *Upaniṣads* make a determined effort to reconcile the claims of ordinary life with those of philosophy by the development of the ideal of the four *āśramas*, or stages of life through which a member of the three higher classes in the community should in theory pass—a youth of learning as a *brahmachārin*, a middle age of performance of social obligations as a householder (*gṛhastha*), a period of asceticism as a dweller in the forest (*vānaprastha*), and a final resort to the life of a wandering beggar (*sannyāsin*) who has resigned all connexion with worldly things. This scheme, however, is clearly a compromise; the necessity of passing through the first two stages, and the distinction which it is sought to draw between the second two in such texts as the *Jābāla* and the *Āśrama Upaniṣads*, are not laid down in the older texts, in which there is apparent a tendency to contrast the search for the true knowledge with all earthly interests and to regard the attitude of the seeker as essentially one of renunciation of all terrestrial concerns. In the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*[1] is even enunciated the non-moral doctrine that knowledge of Indra, who is declared to be truth, prevents retribution for parricide, matricide, the slaying even of an embryo, or theft; but this doctrine is isolated in the *Upaniṣads*.

2. **Post-Vedic.** — Though later in its records than the Vedic period, Jainism reveals to us a form of belief which was evidently widely spread in the period of the early *Upaniṣads*, though these texts do not adopt it as completely satisfactory. The doctrine of Mahāvīra in effect appears to have been little more than a definite enunciation and stereotyping of the principles which were practised by those who had concluded that the true happiness was to be found in renunciation of all earthly attachments. Of the five great vows which form the basis of the system the first four forbid the taking of life, the speaking of untruth, the taking of anything not given, and sexual enjoyment—all rules for which Brāhmanical parallels and prototypes are present; and even in the fifth, the forbidding of any attachment to any worldly object, though Mahāvīra may have adopted it in opposition to the duty of liberality preached by the *Brāhmaṇas*, there is nothing but a consistent carrying out of the principle involved in the first four rules. The rationale of the commands is clearly the doctrine that the soul is defiled by all contact with the things of the world, and that the ideal is to free it from such contagion. In essence the doctrine is purely egoistic; in practice, however, it has been found possible to convert the Jain tenets into a basis for active philanthropy, which can be reconciled with the doctrine of Mahāvīra by the argument that such philanthropy is the most sure method to secure for the soul that freedom from misery which it is its essential aim to achieve.

In Brāhmanism itself a more successful effort is made in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* to find a positive basis for the practice of virtue. In general the *Mahābhārata* in its popular philosophy leans decidedly to the school of renunciation, and inculcates that indifference to the things of the world which enables King Janaka to contemplate with calm the possibility[2] of the destruction of his capital Mithilā.[3] But the *Gītā*, amid all the confusion of its semi-pantheism and its semi-theism, remains true to the doctrine that it is essentially man's duty to carry out without desire of reward the obligations of his station in life, which is enunciated by Kṛṣṇa when he sees Arjuna unwilling to commence the attack on the host of the Kauravas at Kurukṣetra. A positive basis for the performance of duty of a non-egoistic character is provided by the doctrine of the unity of the universe in the Īśvara; he who sees the Īśvara as pervading all things cannot be guilty of injury to them, for such action would mean injury to himself as identical with the Īśvara[1]—a view which is not open to Jainism, in which there is no bond of unity between one soul and another. The good which one does to another, on the doctrine of the *Gītā*, is done directly to oneself through this community of existence, while Jainism cannot recognize such action as valuable without serious modification of the essential basis of its renunciation of activity.

Neither the more formal philosophy nor the doctrine of faith succeeds in providing a more satisfactory doctrine of righteousness than the *Gītā*. To Śaṅkara the ordinary world, and its virtues and vices alike, are unreal, and release from transmigration is attained not by virtue, but by insight into the fundamental unity of the soul and the *brahman*. Works cannot produce this insight, which exoterically is deemed a gift of the Īśvara, but which in reality cannot be ascribed to any cause whatever, as it lies beyond all causal conceptions. While, however, Śaṅkara makes it clear that works are not the cause, nor the necessary preliminary, of enlightenment, he readily finds a place for them as serving normally, though not essentially, to counteract hindrances which might otherwise impede the appearance of the saving knowledge; and in like manner the observance of the rule of the *āśramas* is a normal requisite for the seeker after truth. The essential indifference of morality, however, appears in the position of him who has attained in this life the consciousness of release (*jīvanmukta*); no acts of his after this attainment have any concern for him, for the doctrine of the fruition of action (*karman*) ceases to apply to one so enlightened. The logical consequence, that evil deeds may with impunity be performed by the enlightened man, is expressly recognized by the *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda, which even contemplates[2] the possibility of the *jīvanmukta* resorting to the use of such unclean food as a dog might eat. Even in the exoteric doctrine works have no great value; morality and worship produce only temporary rewards in heaven and favourable rebirth on earth, and no attempt is made to evolve any principle by which value can be ascribed to different classes of works. Nor is any other system more effective in inculcating righteousness: the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* develops to its logical conclusions the doctrine of the *Brāhmaṇas* which sees in the sacrifice the only source of future gain; the *Sāṅkhya* proposes for its end the purely intellectual recognition of the distinction of the souls from nature; the *Yoga* aims at effecting this by processes of abstraction which are indifferent to morality; and the interests of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* are logical and metaphysical.

As little as the philosophies can the schools of *bhakti* find place for the development of a doctrine of morality. Among many differences in detail, Vaiṣṇavas and Śaivas alike, as well as the minor sects, place morality and good works merely among the means of cultivating *bhakti*, and rank them no higher than ceremonial observances of all kinds: good deeds are inadequate to produce *bhakti*, and similarly the possessor of *bhakti* is removed from other considerations. The logical outcome of these doctrines is the Tantric ritual,

[1] iii. 1 [2] Cf. O. Franke, *WZKM* xx. [1906] 352 ff.
[3] *Mahābhārata*, xii. clxxviii. 2.

[1] xiii. 27 f. [2] § 236.

in which, in conscious opposition to the normal standard of morality, the use of meat, involving the violation of the rule of *ahiṁsā*, the drinking of liquor, and promiscuous sexual intercourse are used as means of securing that unity with the deity which is the final aim of the system.

The philosophical systems and the popular religions thus set before them the ideals either of intellectual insight or of a mystic and ecstatic union with the deity, and neither could make any progress in developing a theory of morality or in distinguishing morality from ceremonial observance. Hence the development of customary law, as reflected in the numerous *Smṛtis* and *Nibandhas*, reveals no distinction between ritual and morality; the topic of penances is expanded almost without limits, but the sins to be expiated are as often ritual omissions as moral defects, and no discrimination is even attempted between them—a condition of thought natural enough in the *Brāhmaṇas*, but strangely stereotyped in India. Not only, however, had morality to suffer from competition with ritual; the rich and attractive *Nīti* literature, which is the source of books of so universal an appeal as the *Pañchatantra* and the *Hitopadeśa*, often in its rules of conduct enunciates the purest morality, but places alongside of such precepts, without consciousness of incongruity, rules of polity and practical expediency of doubtful or not rarely of positively immoral character.

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A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

RIGHTEOUSNESS (Jewish). — **1. General connotations.** — The connotation of the term 'righteousness' (צֶדֶק and צְדָקָה) varies with the different epochs embraced in the literature of the Jews. To discuss the question of what acts, motives, intentions, ceremonies, symbols the Jew designated as falling into the category of righteousness, or as helping to bring it about, is to pass in review a host of cardinal Jewish theological teachings on all kinds of allied themes in all their developments and ramifications from the earliest days of the OT down to the latest spiritual product of the modernist Jew, viz. Liberal Judaism. In the OT alone the root צדק, counting all its inflexions, occurs over 500 times; and, over such a large space of time as the OT covers, it is impossible to assume that the term always stood for the same ideas to the various successive writers who used it. The Mishnaic, Talmudic, and Gaonic branches of Jewish literature, although admittedly dealing largely with legalistic lore, nevertheless contain a considerable element of theological matter—far more than the Christian theologian is prone to give them credit for; hence, as is inevitable, the term crops up there with great frequency and assumes a new set of meanings in accordance with the then prevalent Jewish views on life, death, duty, religion, and God. The mediæval Jewish philosophers, as followers of either Aristotle or Plato, aimed at placing the ideal Jew and the ideal Judaism in quite a new setting unknown to the unphilosophical Jew of the earlier periods, and righteousness with them came to assume a new set of connotations. In the religious movement which arose among the Polish Jews of the 18th cent., and which has existed down to the present day under the name of 'Ḥasidism,' the leading ecclesiastic is invariably called the צדיק (*ṣaddîḳ*, 'righteous one' or 'saint'), and, as one of his chief qualities is an ability to work miracles, it is clear that further meanings have from time to time been imported into the term in question.

2. In the early Pharisaic and Rabbinic literature. —Throughout the whole vast realm of the Rabbinical literature the 'righteous' man, the צדיק, is judged by one invariable norm—conformity to the Tôrāh. Righteousness is an uninterrupted series of loving and loyal obediences to the *mizwôth* of the Tôrāh. These *mizwôth*, or 'precepts,' are 613 in number, according to the calculation of the Rabbis, who held that it should be the aim of every man who aspires after righteousness to come as near as possible to the carrying out of these 613 precepts both in letter and in spirit. The Tôrāh was looked upon as a divine embodiment on earth. Expressions like 'Tôrāh,' 'God,' 'Holy Spirit,' are often used interchangeably in the Talmud and Mishnāh. To love the Tôrāh with all one's heart and to cleave to it with all one's might was tantamount to the highest and closest communion with the Deity which was possible to the saint. Such was the ideally righteous life. This exaltation of the Tôrāh into the apotheosis of all righteousness is already hinted at in Ec 12[13], but grows more apparent in much of the Pharisaic literature of pre-Talmudic times, notably the book of *Jubilees* and the *Psalms of Solomon*. Thus, Psalm xiv. of the latter work, after alluding to 'them who walk in righteousness in His commandments,'[1] summarizes by saying: 'He has given us the Law for our life; and the saints of the Lord shall live thereby for ever.' To the minds of the Rabbis the highest type of righteousness is that evinced by what they called the *ṣaddîḳ gāmūr* ('complete saint'), the class who in T.B. *Shabbath*, 55*a*, are styled *mekūddashīm*, 'sainted ones,' *i.e.* 'they who fulfil the whole Tôrāh from its first letter (Aliph) to its last (Tāv).' The Tôrāh was the embodiment of Judaism, the first and last word in earth and heaven, possessing nothing superfluous or unimportant. The world was actually called into being through the instrumentality of the Tôrāh, and, should the Jew ever reach so low a pitch as to lay aside the Tôrāh, then will the cosmos be broken up and revert again to its primeval state of chaos.

As has already been hinted, the degree of righteousness possessed by a man is dependent upon, and corresponds to, the degree of his conformity to the Tôrāh. The latter situation involves far more than a mere theoretic attitude of mind or heart. It means much more than verbal or mental assent to this or that dogma. It comprehends the whole domain of human thought, character, and action. Man must not be content with merely following out the rigid letter of the law, a ritual holiness tied down to a book. His ideal must be a righteous living, which can be brought about only by a long-cultivated process of self-sanctification. In the Jewish view, man can never be, he can only become, righteous. To speak of 'Pharisaic self-righteousness' is to falsify the general trend of the Rabbinic ethics. Righteousness was a high peak which the Jew must, during his whole lifetime,

[1] See Syriac version in J. Rendel Harris, *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon*[2], Cambridge, 1911.

patiently and painfully climb. It is an infinite task, an endless striving. With each achievement there comes the need for a higher achievement; the summit reached only discloses to the eye farther summits to be reached and surmounted. With so high a standard in view, it is no surprise that the Rabbis, as we see from many indications throughout the Talmud and Midrāshim, were none too quick to accord the title of 'righteous' to any but the most unquestionably approved. Righteousness was the exception rather than the rule; hence the mere fact of the existence of *one* righteous man at some time or some place might work an unexpected salvation for the world. Thus, T.B. *Yōmā*, 38*b*, says: 'One righteous man can ensure the existence of the world' (based on Pr 10^{25} 'but the righteous is an everlasting foundation,' as well as on 1 S 2^{9} 'He will keep the feet of his saints'). The same Talmudic passage, quoting Gn 1^{4} 'And God saw the light that it was good,' says that 'good' refers to the righteous man; and that the meaning is: 'God determined to let the world's light exist by reason of the merit of the righteous man who is unalloyed good.'[1] The same rarity of righteousness, and its incomparable prowess when found, is expressed in T.B. *Sukkāh*, 45*a*: 'There are never less than 30 righteous men at any given period for whose sake the world escapes destruction.' But the world must exist. It is God's world, and He willed it. Only through it can the divine purpose 'which rolls through all things' be realized. Hence, with a glaring inconsistency which is often so characteristic of Talmudic ethics, the Rabbis declare, in a more generous vein, that the reason for the continued existence of the world is the fact that it is always being replenished by a succession of righteous men in every generation. 'No sooner is one righteous man removed from the world,' says T.B. *Yōmā*, 38*b*, 'than he is succeeded by another righteous man as good as he; for thus Scripture says: "The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down" (Ec 1^{5}).' But there is one supreme pitfall on the road to righteousness, one mortal enemy ever lying in wait to entrap the would-be righteous man in its snares. This is the *yezer ha-ra'* ('evil impulse'), whose challenge calls forth the most strenuous efforts on the part of its would-be victim. No righteousness is possible until this innate dragging-down impulse in man is subdued and scotched. But the genuine man of righteousness cannot but be the final victor over this wild beast within him, seeing that, as the Rabbis said (T.B. *Ḥāgīgāh*, 15), 'God created the evil impulse and also its antidote, viz. the Tôrāh.' The righteous man is he who is, *par excellence*, saturated with Tôrāh and thus possesses within himself the instrument for dealing the deadly blow to the assailant.

3. Pauline and Rabbinic views compared.—The Christian theologian, reared on the polemics of Paul and his bitterly hostile denunciation of the Tôrāh as that through which 'cometh the knowledge of sin' (Ro 3^{20}), will probably be not a little astonished to notice the gulf which yawns between these cheery Rabbinic characterizations of the ever-open door to the attainment of righteousness and the despairing pessimism of the Pauline description of the hopeless sinfulness of all flesh, of man's complete bondage to sin (which is increased rather than decreased by the Tôrāh), and hence his utter inability ever to execute righteousness—except by quite another method, viz. a warm and living faith in Jesus Christ. 'Fulfil every jot and tittle of the Tôrāh,' say the Rabbis in effect, 'and thus you will become a saint.' 'No,' says Paul, 'not only is it vain and profitless to try to adopt such a course, but it is also wrong, because the more loyal you are to the Tôrāh, the worse man do you become.' To the Jewish scholar familiar with the theology of his own race the whole argumentation of Paul about righteousness, law, faith, and grace is as unacceptable as it is unintelligible.

'No Rabbinic Jew,' says C. G. Montefiore, 'could ever have accepted the force, or the argument, of that seventh chapter [of the Epistle to the Romans]. For it was precisely the Law which to his mind enabled him and all others to attain to any measure of human goodness' (*Judaism and St. Paul*, p. 103). Or, as another modern writer has said, 'That the Torah was not such as Paul represented it to be is a statement which is true, both positively and negatively. He ascribed to it a character which it did not possess, and he left out of his description features which it did possess, and which were essential to it' (R. Travers Herford, *Pharisaism*, p. 194).

As a matter of fact, one is inclined to endorse Montefiore's view that Paul, living at the time he did, could not have been familiar with what is generally understood by the Rabbinic position, and therefore ought not to be regarded as a responsible exponent or critic of it. No Rabbinic Jew was ever worried, as Paul was obviously worried, by the thought that real righteousness was unattainable by him, seeing that the demands of the Law are too multifarious to be ever fully met by any one; nor is there any trace in Rabbinic literature of a distinction between 'righteousness of faith' (Ro 4^{13}) and righteousness of works. Where there are works in the Rabbinic sense, there must be faith, seeing that the prime motive to the execution of works was the invincible belief in the divine origin of the Tôrāh, which is the revelation of God's will and the means for securing salvation to mankind; and such a belief must presuppose faith in the existence of a God, the simple faith such as Abraham possessed and which gave him the title to righteousness and a claim to the honour of all men. Faith and works together make up, for the Jew, the real as well as the ideal life, the life of righteousness before God. The guide to such a life is the Tôrāh, whose multifarious precepts the aspirant after righteousness has to fulfil both in letter and in spirit, but not in the way in which Paul (either consciously or unconsciously) travestied it when he spoke of the physical impossibility of any one obeying so burdensome a code. For, according to *Sifrē*, 133*a*, 'even the truly righteous are not wholly without blame because they too may have committed some minor transgressions (*'abērōth kâlōth*).' It was the honest striving after righteousness that the Rabbis really had in mind. The seeker after the realization of the ideal of righteousness must resolve to order his life in the way leading to it. If he kept himself up to the same unswervingly high level, fulfilling the precepts of the Tôrāh 'through love and joy of soul' (T.B. *Sôtāh*, 31*a*; T.B. *Shabbāth*, 88*b*), then this very scheme of life was righteousness—no matter what occasional minor lapses occurred in between. Even granted that the Rabbinic Jew may occasionally have felt the pain and pang of the consciousness of a duty omitted here and a duty omitted there, what was this in comparison with the ineffable rapture of what the Rabbis termed *simḥāh shēl mizvāh* ('the joy of a precept fulfilled')—a joy which inevitably brought in its train other joys of other precepts fulfilled, thus making life an unbroken exercise in the joyous search after a true union with the Divine through a righteously-ordered life? It is of those who have attained this pitch of righteousness that T.B. *Sukkāh*, 45*b*, says, 'They behold the Sh'khīnāh as in a clear mirror.' They are the righteous who, as is said in T.B. *Bᵉrākhôth*, 17*a*, will in the future life 'sit with their crowns upon their heads, delighting in the splendour of the Divine Presence.' To quote a phrase from Lazarus, *Ethics of Judaism*, righteousness is 'unlimited aspiration joined to unlimited capacity to reach higher and ever higher stages of achievement' (pt. ii. p. 280). Paul's haunting dread of the

[1] See Rashi, *ad loc.*

constant danger of an intervening lapse plays no part whatsoever in this Rabbinic programme of righteousness sought and attained. His picture of Rabbinic Judaism is marred by its total ignorance of the Rabbinic doctrine of divine grace. The effort after righteousness is helped and encouraged by heaven, and this because of the very fact of man's frailty, because of the very fact that man's liability to err is so well within the divine ken. 'Let man but sanctify himself only a little,' runs a favourite Rabbinic belief, 'and then God will help him to sanctify himself much.' As a famous Jewish theologian of the 18th cent. (Moses Ḥayyim Luzzatto, 1707–47) has put it:

'What man has it in himself to do is to persevere in the pursuit of the true knowledge of the Divine and in a wisely-ordered constancy in holiness of action. God will be his guide on this path which he essays to tread, shedding His holiness upon him and keeping him holy. In the result, his upward striving will surely come to fruition by this very fact of his constant clinging to the Highest, seeing that the obstacles which nature puts in his way will be removed by the help and support given him from on High. It was this that King David meant when he said, "No good thing will He withhold from them that walk uprightly" (Ps 84[11])' (*Mĕssīlăt Yĕshārīm*, Amsterdam, 1740, ch. xxvi.).

Jewish theology looked upon Jews never as a series of isolated units, but always as one consolidated body, a community, a nation, an indivisible entity, shot through with one paramount ideal—righteousness before God. Hence it follows that a life of righteousness on the part of the individual Jew must always involve consideration for the wellbeing of others. Once dissolve the communal cohesiveness, and the communal holiness disappears. It is probably owing to some such conception as this that the term צְדָקָה, 'righteousness,' came, in the Talmud, to mean 'charity' or 'almsgiving'—a meaning which has remained in popular use among the Jews down to the present day. The Qur'ān, it will be remembered, uses a similar word, from the common Semitic root, to denote 'almsgiving'—an undoubted borrowing from Judaism. Almsgiving is righteousness, because thereby does Jew help Jew to sustain himself and become one more servant of God.

When asked by Tinnius Rufus: 'Why does your God, being the lover of the needy, not Himself provide for their support?,' R. Akiba replied: 'By charity wealth is to be made a means of salvation; God, the Father of both the rich and the poor, wants the one to help the other, and thus to make the world a household of love' (T. B. *Bābhā Bathrā*, 10*a*, quoted by K. Kohler in *JE* iii. 668[a], *s.v.* 'Charity and Charitable Institutions).'

4. The sufferings of the righteous; their destiny; their influence on the world.—As one of the cornerstones of Rabbinic theology is the doctrine of divine retribution—that God rewards those who keep His commands and punishes those who transgress them—it is only to be expected that the question of why the righteous suffer should crop up with frequency and find many attempted solutions. The Rabbis developed no systematic philosophy on the subject. Varying opinions are expressed in the Talmud and Midrāshim—opinions echoed and shared with very little modification of the originals by the mediæval Jewish theologians and philosophers—but these are tentative and experimental, invested with no dogmatic binding importance. Yet it is true to say that they all cluster round one fundamental assumption which certainly is a prominent and dominating dogma of Rabbinic and later Jewish thought generally, viz. the reality of a future life. The present world and the world to come are indissolubly linked together. They are mansions of one and the same house. Death, to the righteous, is merely a passing from one life to another; therefore their sufferings in the present life ought really to give us no occasion for surprise or question, because in all probability a joyous recompense awaits them in the Beyond. Sorrow here will be joy there. Nay, the greater their sorrow in the present existence, the surer is their abounding happiness in the existence which 'eye hath not seen.' The righteous *must* suffer here, because suffering is the one portal through which they are enabled to reach out to the final inheritance of heavenly bliss which their good works have earned for them. Illustrations of these teachings are the following:

In T.B. *Qĕddūshīn*, 40*b*, R. Eliezer b. Zadok says: 'To what may the righteous be likened in this world? To a tree which stands on clean soil but one of whose branches inclines towards an unclean spot. Cut the branch away and then the whole tree stands upon cleanliness. In the same way, God brings pain to the righteous in this world in order that they may inherit the world to come, as it is said, "Though thy beginning was small, yet thy latter end shall greatly increase" (Job 8[7]).' The analogy between death and the lopping off of one branch of a tree—the tree still remaining practically in its entirety—is a particularly happy one because it so well brings out the idea of the life here and the life hereafter as one continuous unbroken whole. In T.B. *Hŏrāyŏth*, 10, R. Naḥman b. Rab Ḥisda discourses thus: 'What is the meaning of the words in Ecclesiastes 8[14] "There is a vanity which is done upon the earth; that there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked; again, there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous"? The meaning is this: Ecclesiastes wants to tell us that happy are the righteous whose reward in this world is like the reward of the wicked in the next world (*i.e.* evil). Woe to the wicked whose reward in this world is like the reward of the righteous in the next world (*i.e.* good).'

Another aspect of the same train of theological thought is presented by the many Rabbinic assertions about the deathlessness of the righteous.

'The righteous even when dead are called living,' says a passage in T.B. *Bĕrākhŏth*, 18*a*; and the statement is supported by a Biblical text. 'They are like lost pearls of great price,' says T.B. *Mĕgillāh*, 15*a*, 'lost only to their owner. They are not really lost, because they exist somewhere—and in all their original preciousness and beauty.' All these views are distinctly mirrored in ch. iii. of the Apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon. It is only 'in the sight of the unwise' that 'they seemed to die,' but in reality 'their hope is full of immortality' and, 'having been a little chastised' on this mortal earth, 'they shall be greatly rewarded' and God will find them 'worthy for himself.'

Invested with so inimitable a sanctity, it is no wonder that the righteous should shed a spirituality over their surroundings—a spirituality which is helpful and uplifting to others generally. The *Zōhār* elaborates this theme repeatedly.

'Come and see what God does on behalf of the righteous, for although punishment is divinely decreed upon the world, it is held back for their sake and does not come,' runs a Zōhāric comment (on Gn 41[1]). 'The righteous are the foundation and mainstay of the world,' says another Zōhāric passage (on Gn 41[14]). 'They create peace in heaven and peace on earth and thus unite the bridegroom to the bride,' runs a third (on Gn 41[14]), deeply tinged with erotic mysticism; whilst a fourth (*ib.*) tells of the great worth of the righteous in so far as they 'draw goodness down from above in order to do good to us and to all the universe.'

Quite in keeping with these sentiments are the Talmudic sayings to the effect that the coming of the righteous into the world means an influx of light and glory into the world (T.B. *Sanhedrīn*, 113*a*), and that the death of the righteous works atonement for their people (T.B. *Mō'ēd Kātān*, 28*a*; *Tanḥūmā, Aḥāre Mōth*, 7). Glimpses of a wide universalist conception of this efficacy of righteousness are afforded by the Rabbinic comment on Is 26[2] 'Open ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth truth may enter in'; it is not the righteous Israelite that is here referred to, but the righteous nation, any people among whom righteousness resides (*Sifra*, ed. I. H. Weiss, Vienna, 1862, ch. 13). There is a similar comment on the words, 'This is the gate of the Lord; the righteous shall enter into it' (Ps 118[20])—not priests, Levites, or Israelites, but the righteous, though they be non-Jews (*Sifra, loc. cit.*).

5. Views of the mediæval Jewish theologians.—The host of textbooks and manuals on ethics and philosophy produced by the brilliant Jewish literary men of the Middle Ages—notably those of the Spanish-Jewish school which flourished from the 10th to the 15th cent.—all adopt conformity to the Tōrāh as the norm of righteousness. The interpretation of righteousness as given by the old

Talmudic masters was upheld and reiterated by those moralists and theologians, with, however, many an added variation in obedience to the demands of the changed conditions of Jewish life as well as out of a desire to bring the ideal of Jewish conduct more and more into line with the prevalent philosophy of the day. Typical illustrations are afforded by Baḥya ibn Pakudah (who flourished at Saragossa in the first half of the 11th cent.) and Moses Maimonides (*q.v.*). That the ideal righteousness was attainable only by an unswerving loyalty to the Law was to Baḥya an incontestable truth. But Baḥya, like his somewhat younger contemporary Solomon ibn Gabirol (*q.v.*), was an adherent of the Neo-Platonic mysticism, and the picture that he gives in his famous work (*Duties of the Heart*) of the roads leading to the attainment of righteousness is tinged with many an idea borrowed from non-Jewish sources. In fine, Baḥya envisaged Rabbinic righteousness from the standpoint of the general culture in which he was himself steeped. Maimonides was an Aristotelian. Rigid dogmatist as he was in his insistence upon the old Talmudic programme of the real and ideal life of righteousness, it is fairly obvious to every student of his writings that the picture that he had in his mind's eye of the Jewish saint and follower after righteousness was a compound of Rabbinism and Hellenism. One has a lurking suspicion that Maimonides' man of righteousness would have been a somewhat unintelligible character to a Rabbi of the Talmudic epoch.

6. Ḥasidic interpretations of righteousness.—In the 18th cent. a new religious movement known as Ḥasidism ('pietism') arose among the Jewish masses in Poland — a pantheistic movement in which the mystical element in Judaism, the teachings of the *Zôhār* and the Ḳabbālā generally, overshadowed and largely crushed out the ceremonial and ritualistic formalism belonging to Rabbinic Judaism. The spiritual head of each Ḥasidic community was known as the צדיק, 'righteous one,' whose claims to the possession of righteousness on quite a superlative scale were based upon the peculiarly mystical connotation given to the term 'righteousness' in the *Zôhār*. Earth is an exact pattern of heaven, and between the 'upper' world of the Deity and the 'lower' world of humanity there is a constant and unbroken intercourse. This intercourse, in its intensest sense, can be called into being only by the ecstatic prayers of the צדיק, the man who wields real influence with the Divine Source of all life, the man whose prayerful 'righteousness' enables him to become a sort of mediator between God and the ordinary folk, bringing down to them from on high not only spiritual bliss but also material help, miraculous cures from disease, good luck in commerce, family joys, and such like. To select for special esteem a 'man of righteousness,' and to look upon him as a power able to bring heaven down to earth, argues a truly noble conception of Judaism's mission and function. But the movement unfortunately carried in itself the poison which proved its undoing. The desire to reach an ecstatic state of mind in prayer came often to be stimulated by artificial means, such as the excessive drinking of intoxicating liquors. Moreover, the צדיק would often seek to impose upon the credulity of his public by unjust claims to the possession of latent powers; and the gifts in money and kind which would come to him from an adoring clientèle could not but exercise upon him a demoralizing influence and serve to bring the whole institution into disrepute. Still, the צדיק has survived down to the present day in many a Ḥasidic community in E. Europe. Many a one has left behind him an honoured name and an honourable record; and among no sect of the Jews was religion more a matter of life and death than among the disciples of this particular branch of Jewish mysticism.

7. In modern Judaism.—In modern times the 'orthodox' follower of Judaism finds his ideal of righteousness in a self-adaptation to the standards of living and thinking inculcated in the Tôrāh as interpreted by the great Rabbis of the Talmudic ages. Such a self-adaptation grows obviously more and more difficult—and hence more and more rare—with the flow of time and the consequent changes in social and political standards. Modern 'Reform' Judaism and modern 'Liberal' Judaism (*q.v.*) lay great stress on the vital necessity of making every allowance for these inevitable developments and changes in the thought and outlook of the Jew. The general science and theology of to-day as well as the dominant critical theories of the nature and authorship of the Bible obtain a large meed of acceptance among these Jewish 'modernists,' thus causing them to make many a breach with the old 'orthodox' ideal and materially altering their standards of Jewish religious values.

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J. ABELSON.

RIGHTEOUSNESS (Muhammadan). — Although righteousness—comprising faithfulness to one's pledges, loftiness of character, and sincerity towards oneself and others—was a wide-spread and highly esteemed quality among Oriental peoples, it does not occupy a very important place in their ethics. Indeed, in the scholastic ethical treatises of the Hellenistic and Neo-Platonic school—*e.g.*, the fine Persian work of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsi, the *Akhlāqi-Nāṣiri*—we find that righteousness becomes merged in justice, which is divided between the idea of the 'tempering' of feelings and passions so as to preserve the golden mean between two extremes and that of social justice, which belongs to political philosophy. On the other hand, in an ethical treatise of the ascetic type, like the *Būstān* of Sa'adi, righteousness is passed over in silence, either as a virtue that is too elementary to require discussion or as being too cold and uninteresting for the sentimental mysticism of the Ṣūfīs. History, anecdotes, and proverbs, however, as well as the stories and appreciations of travellers in the East, furnish much information on the subject of righteousness.

In the Qur'ān there are some important passages directed against certain disciples whom Muhammad terms 'hypocrites.' These people called themselves Muslimans, but were treacherous, and wavered between the different parties. Their attitude aroused the indignation of the Prophet, and called forth some sayings of striking psychological interest. He reproaches them for continuing to consort with the unfaithful.

'"We are believers," they say, but when they go aside with their devils [the adversaries of the Prophet] they say to them, "We are with you; we were but mocking these others!"'[1]

These are the people who wait to see the turn of events.

'If the victory be yours from God, they say, "Were we not with you?" And if success goes to the unbelievers, they say to

[1] *Qur'ān*, ii. 13.

them, "Have we not served you against the believers?" . . . They waver between the one and the other, belonging really to neither.'[1]

The Prophet condemns them severely:

'Verily the hypocrites are in the lowest depths of hell-fire, and thou shalt not find for them a help.'[2]

Most of the great personages in Muslim history have been men of upright character. The first *khalīfah* (lit. 'successor' of Muhammad), Abū Bakr, received a surname which shows how much his uprightness was appreciated and the great importance that was attached to this quality. He was called *al-siddīḳ*, 'the righteous one,' 'the upright one,' 'the sincere one.' Celebrities of an opposite character are the exception in Islām. In the earliest times we might mention Mu'āwiyyah, a clever politician but a man of crafty disposition; and, in modern times, Muhammad 'Alī, who smiled on reading Machiavelli and said, 'Is that all?'

The proverbs offer some good formulas:

'Truth has abandoned me, and I have no longer a sincere friend'—a lament which recalls those of the Psalms: 'When truth arises it scatters falsehood.'[3]

They also contain some subtle psychological remarks:

'The unjust man gives nothing to anyone without getting double in return.'[4]

The fine collection of anecdotes called the *Mustaṭraf* contains interesting allusions to sincerity, probity, and righteousness:

'If you say "yes" about something, do it, for the word "yes" constitutes a debt which is obligatory on well-born souls.'[5]

This work quotes Aristotle on the merit of telling the truth:

'The finest discourse, according to this philosopher, is that in which the orator expresses himself frankly, and from which the audience receives benefit.'[6]

At the same time, the author of the *Mustaṭraf* does not carry the love of justice and truth beyond certain limits. There are times when the practical spirit gains the ascendancy:

'To be just towards some one who is not just' may have disadvantages. 'In this case the unjust measure will be the better course.'[7]

And farther on he raises a point in casuistry which recalls the famous disputes of the Jesuits and the Jansenists.

'It is said,' he writes, 'that lying is laudable when its aim is to reconcile persons who have quarrelled, and that truth is blameworthy when it carries prejudice.'[8]

He gives this opinion as interesting, but takes no side.

If we turn to the accounts of historians and travellers, we find numerous passages in praise of the righteousness of Orientals, especially of the peasants and nomads. This virtue in them is connected with the ancient patriarchal traditions. Let us give two or three passages at random.

'The Arabs,' says A. de Lamartine, 'carried respect for hospitality to the point of superstition. Their most irreconcilable enemy found shelter, security, and even protection as soon as he succeeded in touching the cord of their tents or the hem of their wives' dress. They were brave, generous, heroic. All the virtues, even all the tenderness of chivalry, unknown in Europe until later, had passed into their customs from time immemorial.'[9]

Baron d'Avril[10] cites the mediæval romance of *'Antar*[11] and the travellers Niebuhr and Guarmani, on the fidelity of the Arab Bedawin in the matter of hospitality. In *'Antar* a young shepherd takes a horseman into his cave to shield him from the pursuit of his enemies. These arrive and demand that he give him up. The shepherd says: 'Withdraw forty cubits and I shall make him come out.' He then changes clothes with the man and makes him flee. The hostile Arabs, recognizing the stratagem, admire the fidelity of the shepherd and let him go free.

An Englishwoman, Mrs. Hortestet, who has written a very interesting account of her adventures at the time of the Sepoy rebellion, praises the integrity of the Musalmāns of India, and relates how her elephant-driver, although himself a Musalmān, hid her so that she might escape the rebels.[1]

Such examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

LITERATURE.—See the works mentioned in the footnotes.

B. CARRA DE VAUX.

RIGORISM.—1. Early phases.—In its philosophical sense the term 'rigorism' is applied to that form of ethical idealism which rates reason as the dominant power of the moral life, to the exclusion or subordination of the element of sensibility. Rigorism is thus the ethics of reason. The roots of rigorism lie far back in early Greek philosophy, notably in the naturalistic Cynic and in the transcendental Stoic schools. By the Stoics especially was rigoristic theory developed. The moral rigour of Christianity came to be widely embodied in the discipline and demands of the various monastic orders. As thus applied, rigorism stands in opposition to laxity. Monasticism (*q.v.*), as a system, is founded on a profession of rigour. In the East Basil the Great did much to promote ascetic stringency and disciplined monasticism within the Church. But, in spite of rigid regulations, Eastern laxity in morals grew. In the West the great Benedictine system soon came to absorb all the monachism of that region. It maintained a rigorous discipline, but was more practical and less contemplative than the monasticism of the East. Ascetic rigour assumed a dualistic view of the world (see art. ASCETICISM [Christian]); matter and spirit were to it incompatible. Its fault was to rest content with a negative ideal. The rigours of overstrained asceticism often passed into self-indulgence or were attended by spiritual pride and fanaticism. The Middle Ages were marked by the rigorous poverty of St. Francis and the fanatical scourgings of the Flagellants (*q.v.*)—a strange externalizing of the doctrine of penitence. The moral experience of the monastic life came at length to be fairly well represented in the 'seven deadly sins' and in the significant presence of the moral lassitude, inertness, and discontent which were summed up in the word 'accidie' (*q.v.*).

2. Jansenist asceticism.—Rigorism was applied, in the 17th cent., to the Port Royalists as a byword from the outset of their history. They were called 'rigorists' because, at the Port Royal des Champs establishment, life was very simple and austere, and free from the grave laxity which had invaded the cloistered life. The term 'rigorist,' however, came to stand for a Jansenist. Jansenism (*q.v.*) in its piety, which was of an ascetic rigour, stood over against the worldly spirit of Molinism (*q.v.*). The increasing hold of Jansenism, and the power of the Port Royal press, led to firm persecuting measures against the rigorists. Pascal, says Voltaire, 'was intimately connected with these illustrious and dangerous recluses.'[2] Pascal (*q.v.*) sought an ethical valuation of his ascetic rigour in the strength brought to man through mortification of his pride and desires, carrying his view, however, to an extreme. The Protestant view of mortifications was only that of their being a means in the warfare against the flesh, but not in themselves meritorious. The rigorism of Christianity is dissolved in the love which is the fulfilment of the law.

3. The Kantian view.—In modern times rigorism is chiefly associated with Kant (*q.v.*), who used it to denote an ascetic or anti-hedonist view of ethics.

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[1] *Qur'ān*, iv. 140, 142. [2] *Ib.* iv. 144.
[3] G. W. Freytag, *Arabum proverbia*, Bonn, 1838–43, iii. 107.
[4] *Ib.* p. 338.
[5] *Al-Mostaṭraf*, tr. G. Rat, 2 vols., Paris and Toulon, 1899, ii. 608.
[6] *Ib.* p. 757. [7] P. 488. [8] P. 762.
[9] *Hist. de la Turquie*, Paris, 1854–55, i. 10.
[10] *L'Arabie contemporaine*, Paris, 1868, pp. 128–131.
[11] V. Chauvin, *Bibliographie des œuvres arabes*, Liége, 1892–1909, iii; *Antar, a Bedouseen Romance*, tr. T. Hamilton, 4 vols., London, 1819–20.

[1] *Narr. of Mrs. Hortestet, an English Lady, in the Indian Mutiny of 1857*, Persian autograph ed., Teheran, 1857.
[2] *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, p. 353.

The rigorism of Kant, however, was by no means without lapses of momentary character in hedonistic and utilitarian directions. The happiness of others could be to him an end which was also a duty. But, speaking generally, the rigorism of Kant rejected from the outset every hedonistic reference as a motive to morality, which must be free of every eudæmonistic taint or trait (see artt. EUDÆMONISM, HEDONISM, UTILITARIANISM). This initial rigorism proved somewhat one-sided and extreme, since a certain happiness or satisfaction is the natural result of the fulfilment in morality of all the highest instincts of man. Great, no doubt, was the service rendered by the rigorism of Kant, in making the moral independent of empiric motives of utility and of all externalities, and in basing it on reason, whose demands are unconditionally obligatory and universally valid. But his conception of reason, however just in this connexion, was too abstract and formal, too isolated from feeling and desire; hence it lacked the force which should have belonged to it. The basis of his rigorism was too narrow and subjective, and non-percipient of the concrete character and relations of reason. Such an idealism (*q.v.*) was too transcendental, and lacking in vital elements. Its merit lay in its form; its defect was in its content, from which sensibility had been quite shut out. Hence the Kantian rigorism has had to be transformed by later idealists, as by Hegel, T. H. Green E. Caird, and others, from the standpoint of organic connexion.

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JAMES LINDSAY.

RIGVEDA.—See LITERATURE (Vedic and Classical Sanskrit).

RINGS.—See REGALIA, CHARMS AND AMULETS.

RITSCHLIANISM.—I. *LIFE OF RITSCHL.*—Albrecht Benjamin Ritschl was born in Berlin in 1822. He studied theology in Bonn, Halle, and Berlin (1839–44). Unsatisfied by the mediating theology (Nitzsch, Müller, Tholuck), he felt the influence of Hegel, and, without becoming fully a Hegelian, he attached himself to the school of Baur. After six weeks' military service and a term at Heidelberg, he went to Tübingen, where in 1846 he issued his first writing, *Das Evangelium Marcions und das kanonische Evangelium des Lukas*. His defence of the theory of the dependence of Luke's on Marcion's Gospel gave great satisfaction to Baur. In 1846 he passed his examination as a licentiate in theology at Bonn, and soon after became a privatdocent. His monograph on the origin of the Old Catholic Church (*Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche*, Bonn, 1850) showed that he was forsaking his old teacher; and the breach, which took place in 1856, was made public in the second edition of this work in 1857. In 1852 he had become an extraordinary, and in 1859 he became an ordinary, professor; he removed to Göttingen in 1864, where he lectured not only on Biblical subjects, but also on dogmatics, ethics, and symbolics. Calls to Strassburg and Berlin were refused by him, and he died at Göttingen in 1889.

Ritschl's fame as a theologian rests mainly on his book, *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, published at Bonn in three vols., 1870–74, 2nd ed. in 1882, 3rd in 1888, 4th in 1895–1902 (an unaltered reprint of 3rd, cheap ed. in 2 vols. in 1910). In the first volume (Eng. tr., *Critical Hist. of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, Edinburgh, 1872) he gives the history, in the second the Biblical material, and in the third (Eng. tr., *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, Edinburgh and New York, 1900) the constructive statement. Less noted, but still valuable, is his *Gesch. des Pietismus*, 3 vols., Bonn, 1880–86. Lesser works are his lecture on Christian perfection, *Ueber die christliche Vollkommenheit*, Göttingen, 1874; *Unterricht in der christlichen Religion*, Bonn, 1875, a summary, difficult to understand, of his system (Eng. tr. by A. T. Swing in his *Theology of Albrecht Ritschl*), and *Theologie und Metaphysik*, Bonn, 1881 (a defence of his epistemology). Lectures and essays were collected in two volumes (*Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Freiburg, 1893–96) by his son Otto, who also wrote his Life (*Albrecht Ritschls Leben*, 2 vols., do. 1892–96).

Only after thirty years' activity as a teacher did Ritschl begin to gather a school around him in 1875; and from 1881 onwards he was exposed to the cross-fire of criticism from orthodoxy and pietism on the one hand, and from liberalism on the other. In his treatment of the problem of the Old Catholic Church he asserts in opposition to Baur the essential unity of the attitude of the apostles to Christ, the insignificance of Jewish Christianity for, and the dominant influence of Gentile Christianity on, the development of Old Catholicism. His attitude to pietism is unsympathetic; and yet he succeeds in showing its historical significance, while maintaining that its merits have been exaggerated, and that it did contain reactionary Catholic elements. Even this work has the characteristic excellence that he seeks to get to the root of doctrines and institutions in living piety. His influence as a theologian, however, does not rest on these works, but on his discussion of *Justification and Reconciliation*, which contains an exposition of his dogmatic system.

II. *THEOLOGY OF RITSCHL.*—Ritschl's position may be fixed in relation to that of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher on the one hand, and to physical science and literary and historical criticism on the other. While he shared Kant's practical tendency, as is shown in the prominence that he gives to the Kingdom of God as one of the foci of the ellipse to which he compares Christianity, he does not accept the subordination of religion to morality, but strives to assert its independence. His reaction against Hegelianism is seen in his rejection of speculative theism, his condemnation of the intrusion of philosophy into Christian theology in ecclesiastical dogma, and his antagonism to religious mysticism as a philosophically determined type of piety. The emotionalism of mysticism too is uncongenial to him; and, while according a place to emotion in religion, he yet does not follow Schleiermacher in making feeling the distinctive feature of religion, or in emphasizing dependence as its characteristic relation, as he lays stress rather on the assertion of personality over against nature. By his theory of value-judgments he seeks to ward off the intrusion of the principles or the methods of science into the realm of religion

as well as the dominion of philosophy there. Although trained in the school of Baur and for a time an adherent, he does not fully recognize the transforming influence on theological method which literary and historical criticism exercises and cannot but exercise. In throwing all the weight that he does on historical revelation, he fails to recognize how much its supports in the literary records have been exposed to attack by this movement.

Ritschl's system may be described by four characteristics: (1) religious pragmatism, (2) philosophical agnosticism, (3) historical positivism, and (4) moral collectivism; and, even if we cannot present the whole content of his teaching in the discussion of these features, we shall emphasize what is distinctive of it.

1. Religious pragmatism. — (*a*) *Definition of religion.*—We must first of all examine his definition of religion. He refuses to make it dependent on morality or to mix it up with metaphysics, and claims for it a realm of its own. He wrote before the modern branches of knowledge — religious psychology and the comparative study of religions —had proved how universal and necessary a function of mankind religion is; and doubtless, had he been influenced by these disciplines, his definition would have been more objective and less subjective. Unlike Kaftan, who attempts to define the common element, Ritschl, on the ground that such a definition would be too vague, seeks to determine the common tendency in religion, what in some religions may be so rudimentary as to be scarcely perceptible and can be detected only because it is seen more fully developed in other religions.

'In all religion,' he says, 'the endeavour is made with the help of the exalted spiritual power which man adores, to solve the contradiction in which man finds himself as a part of the natural world, and as a spiritual personality, which makes the claim to rule nature.'[1]

He recognizes an intellectual factor in religion.

'The religious world-view in all its kinds has the aim, that man in some degree distinguishes himself in value from the appearances which surround him and from the operations of nature which press in on him. All religion is interpretation of the course of the world in whatever compass it is recognized—in the sense that the exalted spiritual powers (or the spiritual power) which rule in and over it, maintain or confirm for the personal spirit its claims or its independence against the limitations by nature or the natural operations of human society.'[2]

As regards this world-view, he is altogether pragmatist.

'It can be shown regarding all other religions, that the knowledge of the world, which is made use of in them, is not constituted theoretically without interest, but according to practical objects.'[3]

This position the most recent thought supports; it is now generally admitted that religion does not primarily gratify intellectual curiosity, but satisfies practical necessity. In it man seeks some good for himself, however he conceives it (goods, goodness, God) by aid of the gods (or God). Ritschl's definition of the good is, however, too limited, and accords with a temporary phase rather than a permanent feature of human thought and life.

(*b*) *The ideal religion.*—The tendency of all religion is completed in Christianity as the ideal religion.

'Christianity is the monotheistic, completely spiritual, and ethical religion, which, on the basis of the life of its Founder as redeeming and as establishing the Kingdom of God, consists in the freedom of the children of God, includes the impulse to conduct from the motive of love, the intention of which is the moral organization of mankind, and in the filial relation to God as well as in the Kingdom of God lays the foundation of blessedness.'[4]

The ideal more than completes the tendency; the spiritual element of the filial relation to God and the ethical element of the motive of love go beyond the removal of the contradiction between man's knowledge of himself as a spiritual personality and his sense of his dependence on (as part of) nature; and yet, in working out his system, Ritschl gives prominence to the consciousness of dominion over the world as resulting from the confidence in God's universal providence which the assurance of God's forgiveness of his sins brings to the child of God.

(*c*) *Doctrine of sin.*—While he represents redemption and the Kingdom of God as the two foci of the ellipse of Christianity, in his conception of redemption an inadequate estimate of sin and its consequences results in an insufficient emphasis on the cancelling of the guilt and the deliverance from the power of sin; and accordingly his representation of the Christian salvation does not correspond with what has been most distinctive of the evangelical type of Christian experience. He denies the doctrine of original sin, and regards sin as pardonable because due to ignorance; and yet he affirms the reality of guilt as disturbing the relation of man to God, and of the sense of guilt as the feeling which corresponds to this fact. The standard for the judgment of sin is not a primitive perfection of man, or even an absolute law of God, but the historical purpose of God, the Kingdom of God, of which sin is the contradiction, and to which the totality of the sins of mankind may be regarded as a rival rule in history. There is no present wrath of God against sin; it is only a future possibility—the resolve of God to end the existence of those (if any) who finally oppose themselves to His Kingdom; there is, therefore, nothing in God corresponding to man's fear of His judgment or man's view of the evils of life as God's punishment of sin. God can and does pardon sin, so long as it is ignorance—*i.e.* so long as God's purpose is not finally rejected.

(*d*) *View of forgiveness.*—As is the view of sin, so also is the view of forgiveness. While there is no hindrance either in God or in man to forgiveness, God is moved to forgive men—*i.e.* to restore their filial relation with Himself—by His intention to establish the ethical community of men, or the Kingdom of God on earth. This forgiveness (or justification, for Ritschl identifies the two) comes to men in the work of Christ as the Founder of the Kingdom of God. He maintained His religious unity with God through all tests and trials of it even unto death; and the relation to God, thus maintained, He reproduced in His community. This common good the individual believer makes his own by faith, being dependent both logically and historically on the community (to this point we must return in dealing with Ritschl's moral collectivism). Reconciliation, as the removal of man's distrust and hatred of God, and not as any change in God, is consequent on forgiveness or justification. The believer has reached the certainty of salvation only when, conscious of his relation to God in Christ as justified and reconciled, he is also conscious that his relation to the world has changed; and dominion over has taken the place of dependence on the world. In his exposition of Christian experience Ritschl thus returns to his starting-point in the tendency which he finds common to all religions.

Much had to be rejected which has hitherto been regarded as essentially Christian, in order that this conception of religion might be consistently maintained throughout the presentation of Christianity. One-sided as it is, it can be understood as a rejection of and opposition to naturalism, which reduces man to an insignificant result of the cosmic evolution, and even as a recoil towards the Kantian exaltation of moral personality from an absolute idealism, which makes the individual man but a

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*[4], iii. 189, Eng. tr., p. 199.
[2] *Ib.*, Eng. tr., p. 17. [3] *Ib.* p. 186, Eng. tr., p. 195.
[4] *Ib.* p. 13 f., Eng. tr., p. 13.

moment in the evolution of the Idea or Spirit. As the heart makes the theologian, so the theology of Ritschl reflects his independent, vigorous, even aggressive, personality.

2. Philosophical agnosticism. — This religious pragmatism — this subordination of cognition to conation, of the interpretation of reality to the practical purposes of man, the maintenance of his own personality despite nature's challenge—results in, and so explains, the second characteristic of his theology, viz. its philosophical agnosticism.

(*a*) *Phenomenalism.* — The speculative interest must be repressed, and the practical must dominate. Ritschl cares to know only what he needs to know. The attitude is similar to that of Confucius, who declined to discuss the subject of spirits or of the future life as not immediately useful. An individual peculiarity here betrays itself as well as a reaction from the extremes of Hegelian speculation. About Ritschl's metaphysics (in fact only epistemology) we need not concern ourselves, as it is really an afterthought, and not the basis of his system. His philosophical attitude may be very briefly indicated. It is at bottom a phenomenalism, which, while not denying the reality of the noumena, and even asserting that the noumena are apprehended in the phenomena, refuses, though not consistently, to pass from the empirical apprehension (the *Vorstellung*) to the rational conception (the *Begriff*) of reality. He is ever trying to arrest theological inquiry when it passes from the phenomenal to the noumenal. Inconsistently he deduces the phenomenon, the Kingdom of God, from the noumenon, the love of God; but consistently he permits theology to discuss only the phenomenon, the work of Christ, and tries to stop its course before it reaches the noumenon, the person of Christ, although, it must be added, not quite effectively.

(*b*) *Speculative theism rejected.*—Unlike Schleiermacher, in whom mystical and metaphysical elements blended, Ritschl throws all the stress on the experience of the moral personality. He is not less opposed to pantheism than to naturalism or materialism; and over against both he sets a definite personal monotheism, which, however, he rests on an exclusively religious basis (with an inconsistent lapse to a moral argument), rejecting entirely speculative theism either as incompetent to deal at all with the problem or as offering only a solution which is irrelevant for Christian faith; for his mind wavered between those opinions regarding the question whether philosophy could or could not reach any conception of God. In denying the competence of philosophy to reach a world-view, he not only had the whole history of philosophy against him, but he could not even maintain his own position consistently, for he did attempt philosophically to defend Christian monotheism against both pantheism and materialism; and he did seek to show the inadequacy of the theistic arguments. His polemic against speculative theism was carried much farther than his purpose to defend the Christian idea of God against speculative modifications required, and than the truth in the matters in dispute justified. Further, he himself, in arguing against Strauss for a personal God, asserted the rational principle in both the cosmological and the teleological arguments.

'A law [*Gesetz*], a thing posited [*Gesetztes*],' he says, 'points back the understanding to the positing [*setzenden*] Spirit and Will, the moral order of the world to a law-giving [*gesetzgebenden*] and purposefully guiding Author.'[1]

While in the first edition of his great work Ritschl accepted the argument for the existence of God in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, and maintained that 'the acceptance of the idea of God is not a practical belief, but an act of theoretical knowledge,'[1] in the third edition he concluded the same argument with the contradictory statement:

'This acceptance of the idea of God is, as Kant observes, practical faith, and not an act of theoretical knowledge.'[2]

His inconsistency is due to conflicting aims. Distrusting philosophy, and desiring to assert the sole claims of faith, he yet wanted theology to be regarded as a science, and not to be ignored by philosophy. Refusing the alliance, he tried to ward off the antagonism of philosophy.

(*c*) *Theory of value-judgments.* — To the statement just quoted he adds:

'If, accordingly, the correspondence of Christianity with reason is hereby proved, it is always with the reservation that the knowledge of God finds expression in another kind of judgment than that of the theoretical knowledge of the world.'[3]

Here he gives his alternative solution of the problem of the relation of philosophy and theology, reason and faith. There need be neither alliance nor antagonism; there may be neutrality. Even if philosophy and theology be both competent to deal with the doctrine of God, their conclusions need not be put in rivalry or conflict, because due to the exercise of different mental functions upon one object. Thus we come to the well-known, but much misunderstood, theory of value-judgments.

To meet a common objection, it may be affirmed at the outset that the value-judgment is not less true, and is not meant to be taken as less true, than the theoretical judgment; it is just as much a judgment about reality, and not illusion, as is the other. The distinction between the two kinds of judgment Ritschl expresses as follows:

'Now to seek the difference in the sphere of the subject. I recall the double way in which the spirit further appropriates the sensations excited in it. These are determined in the feelings of pleasure and pain, according to their value for the ego. On the other hand, the sensation is in the representation judged in respect of its cause, of what kind it is, and what is its relation to other causes.'[4]

The first way of regarding an object—its relation to, and value for, the self—yields the value-judgments; the second—its nature and relations—the theoretical judgments. As, however, even in knowledge there is, and cannot but be, interest, we must distinguish between accompanying and independent value-judgments. In science we have the former, in religion the latter.

'Independent value-judgments are all perceptions [*Erkenntnisse*] of moral purposes, or hindrances to such purposes [*Zweckwidrigkeiten*], in so far as they excite moral pleasure or pain, especially as they set the will in motion to appropriate good [*Güter*] or to protect itself against what is contrary.' Not only are moral judgments value-judgments; so also are religious. 'Religious knowledge moves in independent value-judgments, which refer to the position of man in regard to the world, and excite feelings of pleasure or pain, in which he either enjoys his dominion over the world accomplished by God's help, or grievously feels the lack of the help of God for that end.'[5]

Religious value-judgments are concerned not with individual feelings, but with the universal relation of man to God as helped by God to gain dominion over the world; they are not merely subjective as feelings are, but objective—*i.e.* true for all who stand in this relation to God. What is true in the theory is that moral and religious judgments are conditioned by personal character and experience, unlike the theoretical judgments, in which methods of reasoning, common to all sound minds, are applied to data of perception apprehended by all sound senses. The pure in heart shall see God. If a man will to do the will, he shall know the doctrine. Although Ritschl's unguarded statements of the theory offer some

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*[4], iii. 219, Eng. tr., p. 231. (Observe the play on words.)

[1] P. 192. [2] P. 214, Eng. tr., p. 224 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 214, Eng. tr., p. 225.
[4] *Ib.* p. 194, Eng. tr., p. 203 f.
[5] *Ib.* p. 195, Eng. tr., p. 205.

justification for the charge, the theory does not necessarily involve an intellectual dualism—that, *e.g.*, the philosophically true might be the theologically false, or *vice versa*. The unity of all truth must be maintained, and it must be our endeavour so to unify our knowledge as to approach that unity as closely as we can; and Ritschl was wrong in attempting to arrest the process. But this does not exclude our recognizing that different methods of knowledge are necessary for different objects. The use that Ritschl made of the theory to prevent the thorough intellectual interpretation of the objects of Christian faith is to be condemned—not the theory itself. Religion by its very nature is concerned with ultimate reality. Its quest can end only when the eternal God is its refuge and underneath are the eternal arms; and therefore to use a theory of religious knowledge to shut up faith within the phenomenal, and to shut it out of the noumenal, is to deny it its full and abiding satisfaction. In religion the value of the object for the subject may be the starting-point, but its goal can be the assurance of its reality, and its harmonious relation to the totality of reality; *e.g.*, Christ loses His value for faith as God, if there lingers the doubt, and there lacks the assurance, that He is God in reality.

(*d*) *Ecclesiastical dogma.*—Rejecting the aid of philosophy on the one hand, and limiting the scope of religious knowledge to value-judgments on the other, Ritschl is necessarily opposed to the method of ecclesiastical dogma. In the first volume of his great work he gives an account of the history of the doctrine, and dissents not from results only, but also from methods; in the third volume he criticizes as he constructs. It is Harnack, however, who in his *Dogmengeschichte*[4] (3 vols., Tübingen, 1909, Eng. tr., *Hist. of Dogma*, 7 vols., London, 1894–99) has most fully carried out the Ritschlian condemnation of ecclesiastical dogma. Into the details of this criticism it is not necessary for the present purpose to go.

(*e*) *The doctrine of Christ.*—An instance, but a crucial one, of the application of the Ritschlian method is the doctrine of Christ. Here we can test most thoroughly its adequacy as an interpretation of Christian faith. The place that Ritschl assigns to Christ in the Christian religion puts it beyond doubt or question that he means to affirm the divinity of Christ in reality and truth, although as a value-judgment, *i.e.* on the basis of Christian experience. His criticism of ecclesiastical dogma is very severe; and he intends to affirm that Christ is divine even more adequately and correctly than it has done. Whatever we may think of his result, we must assume this intention, if we are to do him justice. He modifies the current teaching about the work of Christ, from which, he insists, we must start in dealing with the person in four respects: (α) he puts personal vocation for office; (β) he lays stress on the likeness of the Founder and the members of the Christian community on the ground that 'what Christ is *for* us must be verified in the transfer of His worth *to* us';[1] (γ) consistently with the prominence that dominion over the world has in his conception of Christian life, he subordinates the priestly (or Godward) and the prophetic (or manward) function to the kingly; (δ) instead of assigning the three functions to different periods, he insists that there is a continuity in the exercise of all the three in the state of humiliation and of exaltation. The perfect fulfilment, in doing as in suffering, of His vocation yields us the ethical estimate of His person. His vocation being what it is, the revelation of God to man and of man to God, *i.e.* wholly within the mutual relation of God and man, the religious valuation inevitably follows on the ethical in the predicate of His divinity. He who in all respects perfectly realizes the relation of God to man and of man to God is God. As He in His vocation identifies Himself with God, so God in His mind and will identifies Himself with Him.

'The personal purpose of Christ for Himself has the same content as is included in God's purpose for Himself, which Christ knew and willed as such: and accordingly He as the bearer of the divine purpose for self [*Selbstzweck*] is in anticipation known and loved by God.'[1]

Even although He brings men into the same relation to God as He holds Himself, He nevertheless in our religious estimate of Him as God is unique.

'As He as the Founder of the Kingdom of God, or as the bearer of the moral dominion of God over mankind, is the Unique One [*Einzige*] in comparison with all others who have received from Him the same final determination [*Zweckbestimmung*], so is He that Being [*Grösse*] in the world in whose self-end God makes His own eternal self-end in an original manner operative and manifest, whose whole activity in His vocation accordingly forms the content of the complete revelation of God present in Him, or in whom the Word of God is a human person.'[2]

So far many theologians would heartily go with Ritschl, but he bids them stop here. Christ is given to men as the Revealer of God that they may believe in Him; and this faith in Him can be disturbed only by vain attempts to offer a scientific explanation of His relation to God His Father. That the theologian cannot arrest his inquiry at this point Ritschl himself shows by going beyond it at a later stage of his discussion. The reasons for which the predicate of divinity may be ascribed to Christ are: (α) His grace and truth, (β) His dominion over the world in His independence of it alike in action and in passion, (γ) His success in establishing on earth a community in which He reproduces His own relation to God, which, original in Him, is imparted to others by Him. At this point Ritschl makes his speculative attempt to get from the phenomenal to the noumenal, from the temporal to the eternal. His statement must be given in his own words, lest a paraphrase might put too much or too little into them:

'The unity and the similarity with God, which the Kingdom of God must command in order to be understood as the objective of the love of God, belongs to the same only in so far as it is evoked by the Son of God, and subordinates itself to Him as Lord. Accordingly, the love of the Father is in the first place directed to the Son of God, and only for His sake to the community of which He is the Lord. If these relations, further, are eternally posited in the loving will of God, then it arises from this our knowledge, that the specific significance of Christ for us is not already exhausted in this, that we value Him as a revelation temporally limited. But it further belongs to this—that He as the Founder and as the Lord over the Kingdom of God, is in the same way the object of the eternal knowledge and volition of God as is the moral union of men, which through Him becomes possible, and which possesses in Him its type, or rather that He, in the eternity of the divine knowledge and volition also precedes His community.'[3]

This statement might mean only an ideal preexistence of the community as of the Founder. While Ritschl, on the one hand, re-affirms his conviction of the mystery of the relation of the Son to the Father—'the eternal divinity of the Son of God is completely intelligible for God Himself alone'[4]—yet, on the other, he asserts the necessity for our thought of setting aside as regards God the difference which we can make in man between willing and fulfilling, since we cannot conceive a volition of God, as it were, eternally suspended from action; and accordingly he draws the inference:

'Christ exists for God just such as ['als derjenige,' 'als der'] He is revealed to us in temporal limitations. But this only for God; for as pre-existing, Christ is hidden from us.'[5]

He cannot mean that the historical circumstances of the person and work of Christ exist eternally

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versohnung*[4], iii. 395, Eng. tr., p. 418.

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versohnung*[4], iii. 425, Eng. tr., p. 450 f.
[2] *Ib.* p. 425 f., Eng. tr., p. 451.
[3] *Ib.* p. 441, Eng. tr., p. 468 f.
[4] *Ib.* p. 443, Eng. tr., p. 471.
[5] *Ib.*

for God as they are recorded for us; for he does recognize that as pre-existing Christ is a mystery to us, and cannot, therefore, be in all particulars just as He is known in history. What characterizes Him as divine, that and that only we may suppose to exist eternally in God. This falls short but moves in the direction of the doctrine of the Trinity as speculatively construed, in which stress is laid on the necessity of a personal object of the love of God. An eternal object of knowledge and volition might be ideal; must not an eternal object of love be personal? And does not Ritschl in the statement quoted speak of God's love as first directed to the Son? The conclusion of the matter seems to be that he goes as far in affirming real pre-existence as his phenomenalism allows.

3. Historical positivism.—Rejecting the aid of philosophy in giving objectivity to the judgments of value, Ritschl seeks to escape the subjectivism which his theory of knowledge in religion seems to involve by his historical positivism. What is often forgotten in the criticism of Ritschl is that the judgments of value do not give themselves their own content; in them through religious appreciation there is intellectual apprehension of an objective reality; and that reality is given in a historical revelation.

(*a*) *Attitude to revelation.*—In his attitude to historical revelation there are both attachment to, and detachment from, his intellectual environment. With Hegel he values history in relation to the moral and religious life of man, as the 18th cent. with its abstract naturalism had failed to do. To this his religious pragmatism also led him; the religion which achieves dominion over the world must have firm footing in the world. Nevertheless, though he was for a time an adherent of the school of Baur, and preserved the methodical critical discipline of that school, one must admit that his treatment of the Scriptures is not always critical; his exegesis is sometimes dogmatic rather than historical. Further, he isolates the Christian religion and its forerunner, the Hebrew, from the general movement of man Godward in human history; he is unaffected by the influence of religious psychology and the comparative study of religions, which dominate the religious-historical school.

(*b*) *Use of the Scriptures.*—Ritschl does not use the Bible, as the Protestant scholastics had done, as an inspired textbook of theology. His conception of religion limits his appreciation of revelation; the divine supply in revelation corresponds to the human demand in religion. His conception of the Kingdom of God, as we shall see, is not historical, but dogmatic, and may be taken as an instance of how he uses the Scriptures as the basis of his system. The person and work of Christ as the Revealer of God, and so the Founder of the Kingdom of God—that is his dominating interest. But he recognizes the value of the interpretation of Christ by the primitive community. As the Founder of the community, He can be understood only as we know what the community, in its historical beginnings, thought of Him; and the inquirer must even assume the same relation to Him within the community of his own time.

'The full compass of His historical reality one can reach only from the faith in Him of the Christian community; and even His intention to found the same cannot be understood historically in its completeness if one does not subordinate oneself to His Person as a member of that community. . . . It would be a falsely understood purism if one were to prefer the less developed indications of Jesus in this respect to the forms of the apostolic representations. Further, one will be justified in not levelling down the most developed forms of the Pauline structure of thought, but in maintaining them erect in theological use, because they serve the purpose of expressing most distinctly the contrast of Christianity and Judaism.'[1]

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*[4], iii. 3, Eng. tr., p. 3.

Thus the idea of the Kingdom of God is interpreted not at all eschatologically, and not only ethically, but soteriologically. The Pauline circle of ideas is included in the historical revelation. This does not involve, however, that Ritschl sets up Paul as an infallible theological authority. When he does not agree with Paul, he does not hesitate in setting aside his teaching; an apostolic idea is not necessarily a theological rule.[1] There is even something arbitrary in his use of the Scriptures. A doctrine is true, not because it is in the Bible, but because it verifies itself experimentally and practically.

(*c*) *Pragmatic view of the Bible.*—Ritschl does not deal with the apologetic problem of proving the value and authority of the Scriptures. He writes for and within the Christian community, for which the problem does not press for solution. With all that is included in Christian evidences he does not concern himself. Maintaining as he does the independence of religion, it is probable that the answer which he would have given to the question of the authority of the Scriptures would have been that they are the records of the historical revelation which meets the religious need of man. Here again is pragmatism; what works as religion is true as revelation. His historical positivism explains his antagonism to the two types of religion which depreciate history—mysticism and philosophical theism. The problems that now press on us most are those for which he offers no solution directly.

4. Moral collectivism.—As a historical revelation gives the content to the value-judgments (the formal principle), so the Kingdom of God gives the regulative idea (the material principle, as the doctrine of justification had been at the Reformation).

(*a*) *The primacy of the doctrine of the Kingdom.*—It is true that he speaks of the Kingdom of God and redemption as the two foci of Christianity; but there can be no doubt that in reality he subordinates the doctrine of redemption to the doctrine of the Kingdom as the means to the end on account of 'the recognized teleological character of Christianity.'[2] The account which he gives of the relation in the mind of Christ between the two ideas points to such a subordination:

'The purpose recognized by Christ of the universal moral Kingdom of God evoked in Him the recognition of and the resolution for the kind of redemption which He accomplished by maintaining His fidelity to His vocation, and His blessed communion with God in suffering unto death.'[3]

So also does his speculative deduction of the Kingdom of God from the love of God as its necessary object. Further, in his treatment of sin and salvation the conception of the Kingdom of God dominates; he is concerned not with man's actual condition of sinner, but with his possible destination as a citizen of the Kingdom of God. While Christian theology must be pistobasic, resting on personal faith, bibliospheric, getting its contents from the Scriptures, and Christocentric, having Christ as its standard, it is as the Founder of the Kingdom (the King) that He reveals God (the Prophet) and redeems man (the Priest).

(*b*) *The Kingdom defined.*—It has already been pointed out that Ritschl's use of the idea of the Kingdom of God is quite unhistorical, as the recent discussions have shown. In his *Unterricht* he so defines the term as to bring to it as the centre the two foci:

'The Kingdom of God is the highest good assured by God to the community founded by His revelation in Christ; yet it is regarded as the highest good, only inasmuch as at the same time it is reckoned as the moral ideal, for the realization of which the members of the community bind themselves to one another by a definite mode of reciprocal action.'[4]

[1] See *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii. 341, Eng. tr., p. 359.
[2] *Ib.* p. 9. [3] *Ib.* p. 10.
[4] *Unterricht in der christl. Religion*, p. 3, Eng. tr., p. 174 f.

While the religious good (justification and redemption) is put in the fore-front, yet the second clause shows that the religious good is subordinated to the moral ideal. It is quite in accord with Ritschl's religious pragmatism, with its emphasis on action rather than thought or feeling, with its detachment from philosophy and its attachment to history, that his theology should issue in this moral collectivism. His affinity is with Kant rather than Hegel or Schleiermacher; but he advances beyond Kant's individualism to collectivism. It is to the community that the religious good of justification or redemption belongs, and the individual appropriates the good for himself only as he reckons himself a member of that community and within it sets himself, by actions from the motive of love, to the realization of its common ideal. If redemption is a means towards the Kingdom of God, Ritschl is quite consistent in maintaining that the individual can make this good his own only as he enters the community and accepts its common tasks. While, of course, he is not thinking of an ecclesiastical organization exclusively, he so far identifies Church and Kingdom that it is the same community of believers which as the one worships God and as the other acts, in the relations of its members, from love, the Church being as it were the Kingdom on its knees with hands folded in prayer, and the Kingdom the Church on its feet with the tools for work or weapons for warfare in its hands. As identical with the Kingdom, Ritschl would say of the Church: 'Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.' The individual is not forgiven by God's grace, immediate and direct, when he repents and believes; but these isolated acts of justification 'are only the temporal appearances of the one eternal resolve of justification for mankind for Christ's sake';

for 'there is one Divine predestination according to which out of the totality [*Gesammtmasse*, total mass] of the human race the totality [*Gesammtheit*, organic total] of the new creation will be evoked.'[1]

Ritschl does not in these words teach a restricted election, as he admits that God's wrath conditions God's love only as the resolve of God finally to extinguish the life of those who ultimately oppose themselves to His purpose in the Kingdom; but still it is the community rather than the individual that is his interest as a theologian. Further, in developing this argument he maintains that God's purpose is realized in nations rather than in individuals, so that it is in his citizenship and consequent participation in the national religion that the individual becomes a member of the Christian community; and that only the historical nations of the West seem capable of realizing that purpose. This is a trait characteristic of German theology, which since the days of Luther has identified nation and Church, patriotism and piety, in a way which recalls the national religion of the OT rather than the individualism (already reached by Jeremiah and Ezekiel) and, therefore, the universalism (presented even in the Deutero-Isaiah) of the NT.

(*c*) *The* κοινωνία *of the Spirit.*—We may fully recognize the merit of Ritschl in emphasizing Christian character and conduct against a mere religious dogmatism or emotionalism (orthodoxy or pietism) and in giving prominence to the Christian community. The NT demands the fruits of the Spirit as the test and proof of faith; and the love of the Father through the grace of the Son has for Paul its issue in the κοινωνία of the Spirit (not the individual possession of a common Spirit, but the common participation in one Spirit). Yet Ritschl is one-sided; Christian experience as the realized relation of God and man has its own intrinsic value, and not merely as the δύναμις, of which character is the ἐνέργεια, even although faith is energetic in love (Gal 5[6]); and the Father, as Christ has taught us, cares for, seeks, and saves each and all of His children. Ritschl's antagonism both to mysticism and to pietism is due to this moral collectivism.

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii. 123, Eng. tr., p. 128 f.

III. *THE SCHOOL OF RITSCHL.* — Although Ritschl had many grateful scholars, it was not till after thirty years' activity that his school began to be formed. It was a letter of W. Herrmann (Jan. 1875) that Ritschl himself regarded as the beginning of a common theological movement. Herrmann had not been a student of Ritschl, but of Tholuck and Julius Müller (both mediating theologians), and yet he confessed that Ritschl's writings had had a decisive influence on his theological development.[1] In 1876 Harnack extended his influence to Leipzig. Schürer as editor of the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* in 1876 also made it the chief organ of the school, until it came to be represented also by the *Christliche Welt* in 1887, and the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* in 1891. From 1876 appeared the *Zeitschrift für die Kirchengeschichte*, of which Ritschl himself was an editor and contributor. By the influence of Stade there was formed in Giessen, in 1878, a theological faculty largely inspired by Ritschl, and including, besides Stade, F. Kattenbusch, E. Schürer, A. Harnack, and J. Gottschick. In Göttingen itself Ritschl did not enjoy any general popularity; but many of the best students came to him. Although his personality impressed those who came into contact with him, his influence was exercised mainly by his writings, and continued as great after his death as during his life. His theology was dominant in Berlin, Marburg, Tübingen, Bonn, Jena, and (for a short time) Leipzig. Hermann Schultz and J. F. T. Brieger, though not his students, associated themselves with Ritschl. To the first generation of his students, besides those that are mentioned above, belong J. Kaftan, T. Häring, P. Lobstein, and H. H. Wendt; to the second circle of those who had either heard Ritschl himself or been influenced by some of his followers belong S. Eck, O. Kirn, F. W. B. Bornemann, F. A. Loofs, M. W. T. Reischle, P. M. Rade, Otto Ritschl, F. Traub, J. Weiss, and even Troeltsch, who has, however, since followed other paths. By the end of the 19th cent., however, divergences of interest and conviction showed themselves, and the unity of the school was broken. Some of the older Ritschlians, whose interests were critical, have gone over to the religious-historical school; others, whose interests were in dogmatics, have attached themselves to the modern positive school, which seeks, on the one hand, to retain the orthodox inheritance, and yet, on the other hand, by restatement to meet the demands of literary and historical criticism. It must be admitted then that, while Ritschl has permanently enriched theology in his writings, the school which was formed by his influence has run but a short course.

1. **Features common to all disciples.**—Although ready to acknowledge their indebtedness to Ritschl, yet his disciples are also so given to asserting their independence even by criticism of the master that Pfleiderer has asked the question:

'Do not their opinions now already differ in so many ways that it appears perilous to bring them together under a common label?'[2]

Nevertheless there are several common features:

'[1] The exclusion of metaphysics from theology; [2] the rejection consequently of speculative theism; [3] the condemnation of ecclesiastical dogma as an illegitimate mixture of theology and metaphysics; [4] the antagonism shown to religious mysticism as a metaphysical type of piety; [5] the practical

[1] O. Ritschl, *Albrecht Ritschls Leben*, ii. 267.
[2] *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie*, p. 77.

conception of religion; [6] the consequent contrast between religious and theoretical knowledge; [7] the emphasis laid on the historical revelation of God in Christ as opposed to any natural revelation; [8] the use of the idea of the kingdom of God as the regulative principle of Christian dogmatics; [9] the tendency to limit theological investigation to the contents of the religious consciousness.'[1]

Not all the adherents of the school have concerned themselves with all these features; some were attracted to Ritschl in one way, others in another; and yet there is such organic unity in Ritschl's system that we may claim in these respects a general agreement.

2. Herrmann.—Herrmann has in his *Metaphysik in der Theologie* (Halle, 1876) and in his *Die Religion im Verhaltnis zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit* (do. 1879) treated with vigour and rigour the relation of metaphysics to theology. His book, *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott* (Stuttgart, 1886, [2]1892, Eng. tr., *The Communion of the Christian with God*[2], London, 1906), which may be described as a religious classic, expresses unreservedly, in its critical discussion, the antagonism to religious mysticism, and yet in its positive treatment of the relation of the Christian to God through Christ it is marked by what many would call mysticism; for it very closely resembles what has been called Paul's faith-mysticism. It is true that it confines 'the inner life' of Jesus, in which the Christian is found of God, to the historical representation; but it is to empty the book of meaning to suppose that Herrmann confines communion with God to the recall, however vivid, of the earthly Jesus, and excludes experience of the heavenly Christ as a present reality, although in the form of 'the inner life' of Jesus. It is against a metaphysical and a non-historical mysticism that Ritschlianism sets itself; but it goes beyond the NT when, as in Ritschl and Herrmann (not Kaftan), it excludes the Risen and Exalted Lord as the object of knowledge. In the same book Herrmann develops the doctrine of revelation most fully. Without excluding, and ultimately admitting, the Scriptures generally as the channel of revelation, he holds that it is in the fact of the 'inner life' of Jesus that God primarily reveals Himself to us. His moral and spiritual perfection, on the one hand, and His grace to sinners, on the other, give us certainty of, and confidence towards, God as love. He so lays stress on the personal experience of inward transformation by this 'inner life' of Jesus as God's act of revelation that he obscures the truth that there is preserved and diffused in the Holy Scriptures the permanent and universal historical revelation, as the ever available source of this personal experience (see *Der Bergriff der Offenbarung*, Giessen, 1885, *Warum bedarf unser Glaube geschichtl. Thatsachen?*, Halle, 1884). While Ritschl offers no proof of the truth of the Christian revelation, Herrmann answers the question as follows:

'There are *two objective bases* on which the Christian consciousness of communion with God rests. *First, the historical fact of the person of Jesus.* This fact is a part of our own reality . . . *Secondly, the fact that the moral demand lays claim to ourselves.* . . . God brings it about that the good ceases to be a grievous problem for us, and begins to be the element in which we live. . . . Other objective bases there are not for the truth of the Christian religion.'[2]

There is a warm glow of personal devotion to Christ in Herrmann which is somewhat lacking in Ritschl himself. He has latterly given more attention to the subject of Christian ethics (*Römisch-kathol. und evangel. Sittlichkeit*, Marburg, 1900 [Eng. tr., in *Faith and Morals*, London, 1904], *Ethik*, Tübingen, 1901, *Die sittlichen Weisungen Jesu*, Göttingen, 1904).

3. Kaftan. Kaftan, to whom Ritschl was indebted for the term 'value judgment,' often takes quite an independent course. He admits a mystical element in Christian faith, and objects to the narrowing of the term by Ritschl and Herrmann;

he insists that 'the highest good of Christianity is the kingdom of God *above the world*,' and that consequently 'to this religion there is accordingly equally essential a mystical side, turned away from the world, and an ethical side turned towards the world.'[1]

Kaftan also differs from Ritschl in his definition of religion. Instead of describing the common tendency, he claims to be able to determine the common element—man's feeling of dissatisfaction with this world, and the search for a satisfying good, either natural or moral, in or beyond the world. On the postulate by the practical reason of a highest good he rests his proof of the truth of Christianity. In *Das Wesen der christl. Religion* (of which the first edition appeared in 1881) he deals with the nature of the Christian religion; in the companion volume, *Die Wahrheit der christl. Religion* (Basel, 1888, Eng. tr., *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1894), he offers the proof of its truth: (*a*) first of all he gives a criticism of ecclesiastical dogma in order to expose its failure as an apologetic; (*b*) next, insisting on the primacy of the practical reason, he rejects the traditional speculative method; (*c*) lastly he offers his own proof.

(α) 'Only the Christian idea of the kingdom of God as the chief good of humanity, answers to the requirements which must be made of the true, rational, absolutely valid idea of the chief good.' (β) There has been 'a special revelation of that kingdom of God in history.' (γ) As these two postulates of the practical reason have been fulfilled in the Christian revelation, 'the reasonableness and the absoluteness of the faith reposed in it' have been proved.[2]

As the second stage of the above argument shows, Kaftan also attaches importance to the historical character of revelation. He has turned his attention to the restatement of the Christian faith in the new intellectual situation (*Glaube und Dogma*, Bielefeld, 1889, *Brauchen wir ein neues Dogma?*, do. 1890, *Zur Dogmatik*, Tübingen, 1904; specially noteworthy is his *Dogmatik*, do. 1897). As these titles show, he does not accept Harnack's restriction of the term 'dogma.' What he means by it is the intellectual expression of the contents in faith.

4. Other writers.—Kaftan and Herrmann represent the more positive tendency in the Ritschlian school, and on many points of doctrine desire to come to an understanding with the evangelical theology; still more so Häring. Harnack, whose manifold interests and activities as a scholar cannot be noted here, represents the more critical tendency, and his point of contact with the school has already been discussed. So also does Wendt. Popular accounts of the theology of the school are W. Bornemann, *Unterricht im Christentum* (Göttingen, 1890), and, although more advanced in its critical standpoint than the school as a whole, Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Leipzig, 1900, Eng. tr., *What is Christianity?*, London, 1901). Reischle discusses the same problem as Harnack in his pamphlet 'Der Glaube an Jesus Christus und die geschichtliche Erforschung seines Lebens' (*Aufsatze und Vortrage*, Tübingen, 1906) but from a more positive standpoint. His *Christliche Glaubenslehre* (Halle, 1902) is a brief summary of Christian doctrine of a constructive tendency. He, as it were, stretched one hand backward in his helpful exposition of the theory of value-judgments in his *Werturteile und Glaubensurteile* (Halle, 1900), and one forward in his critical discussion of the methods of the now dominant religious-historical school in his *Theologie und Religionsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1904). Ritschl's son Otto has also expounded the

[1] Garvie, *The Ritschlian Theology*, p. 23 f.
[2] *Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*[2], p. 50 f., Eng. tr.[2], p. 102 f.

[1] *Das Wesen der christl. Religion*[2], Basel, 1888, p. 202 f.
[2] *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, ii. 325, 383 f. The writer has not the German original within reach to give the references to it.

theory of value-judgments in his pamphlet *Ueber Werthurtheile* (Freiburg, 1895). Both he and Reischle have done much to remove misconceptions and to introduce modifications so as to get rid of objections to this characteristic feature of the Ritschlian theology.

IV. *THE INFLUENCE OF RITSCHL.* — What gave Ritschl his influence over so many notable scholars and thinkers? His strong personality and his wide learning would not have sufficed, had not the theological situation given him his opportunity. The service which he rendered, according to Rade,[1] was fivefold: he broke the Hegelian yoke; he ended the confusion and compromise of the mediating theology; he was more fully the exponent of Luther than the Neo-Lutherans; he was truly a Biblical theologian; and he had regard both to the interests of the Church and to the claims of practical life.

1. The new theological position. — Since his influence in his school was dependent to some extent on these temporary conditions, the changed intellectual situation has necessarily lessened that influence, as the differences within the school itself show. Three changes may be specially mentioned. There has been a philosophical revival—a neo-idealism which takes due account of the progress of knowledge. The literary criticism, of which Ritschl did not take full account as it existed in his own day, has developed into a historical criticism, against the negative conclusions of which Ritschl's system is not protected, but which, as has already been indicated, has affected members of his school; so that those who have not identified themselves with the tendency have been compelled to offer a defence of their faith against it. Probably the greatest contrast between the theological position in Ritschl's and the present time is due to the study which is now given to the religions of the world (the history of religions, the psychology of religion, the comparative study of religions).

2. Weaknesses of the Ritschlian teaching.—Weaknesses in his theology, apart from its irrelevance to the problems and needs of the hour, have been more clearly recognized with the lapse of time. The epistemological foundation is not solid rock, but shifting sand. His conception of religion seems now far too narrow, too much affected by 'the personal equation,' in view of the extensive and varied knowledge which we now have of the religious life, especially what we may call its enthusiastic aspects, the place and power of emotion in it. While he accepted the modern critical position as regards the Bible, he was not thorough in the application of the method, and so much of his exegesis now seems arbitrary, even dogmatic, imposed on rather than evoked from the text. For those to whom the evangelical type of Christianity makes the strongest appeal Ritschl's treatment of sin and salvation must now seem quite inadequate. For those to whom the Bible, even when studied from the modern standpoint, still approves itself the literature of divine revelation and human redemption the treatment of the Holy Scriptures by Ritschl must often prove disappointing; there seems much more to be got out of this treasure-house than he has found in it. To the mystical type of Christianity Ritschl must be an offence: and it must be admitted that he does not recognize what is true and worthy in mysticism. The speculative type of Christian will not be satisfied with the essays in speculation that he inconsistently made, and will desire such an interpretation of reality as Ritschl even rudely turned his back upon. To the practical type of believer he will make his strongest appeal, although there are many practical problems of to-day of which he betrays no knowledge whatever.

[1] *RGG* iv. 2336.

3. Ritschl's merit.—Has his theology then only a historical interest, and no present value? So vigorous a personality in a masterly way shaping a system which, apart from some inconsistencies, has an organic unity so lacking in much of the theological thought of to-day commands respect. In a time when there are so many cross-currents in religious thought and life much is to be learned from the independence and solidity of his religious attitude; and against the many challenges of religion his assertion of its place and power as giving sure footing to the soul is reassuring. This appeal to the Christian experience can never lose its force. That he rescued theology from its precarious support in philosophy and discovered for it securer foundations in history remains his merit, even if historical criticism makes the defence of his position more difficult than it ever appeared to be to him. From him too theologians may learn to construct as they criticize—to advance to new positions not by disregarding the thought of the past, but by rethinking and, when needful, reshaping that thought. A theology will bear richest fruit for the future which strikes deepest root into the past. Here learning is the servant of insight. Ritschl's stress on the Christian community is not only in harmony with the modern conception of society as organic, but is a necessary corrective of an individualism within the Christian churches which has not yet recognized the significance of that conception. While his representation of Christianity as an ellipse with two foci may well be forgotten, his inability to maintain it is a convincing proof of the need of some one regulative principle in theology. If modern scholarship forbids his unhistorical use of the term 'Kingdom of God,' some other conception more central still must be sought for. Can it not be found in the Christian doctrine of God as expressed in the apostolic benediction — the love of the Father through the grace of the Son in the community of the Spirit?

4. British appreciation.—In Britain Ritschlianism at first had a very hostile reception; but soon the tide turned, and, although the movement never gained any popularity, and no prominent British theologian has avowed himself a disciple of Ritschl, the interest has continued and the appreciation increased; it is probable, however, that, as in the land of its birth, so here, the influence of the school is at an end; but in the matters mentioned above it has made a permanently valuable contribution to Christian thought.

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RITUAL.—See PRAYER, WORSHIP.

RIVER, RIVER-GODS. — See WATER, WATER-GODS.

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. — See WESTERN CHURCH.

ROMAN RELIGION.—The religion of the Roman people is a very complex subject; and this complexity is mainly due to the extraordinary development of a small city-State (with its own religious ideas and organization, and composed of families and *gentes* each practising its own simple religious rites) into a great Empire, which gradually absorbed all the peoples, civilized and semi-civilized, lying around the basin of the Mediterranean, and which at all times was ready to admit the religious ideas and cults of foreign peoples, under certain conditions, within the circle of its own religious operations. It will be obvious that, if by the Roman people we understand the inhabitants of the Roman Empire after its complete development, no sufficient account of it can be given in a single article; but, if our subject be limited to the religious ideas and practices of the Roman citizens who acquired and governed that Empire down to the 2nd cent. A.D. and the age of the Antonines, it will be possible to treat of it with tolerable succinctness. Even considered thus, however, it must be taken historically, as a growth, for at no period of its existence can it be said to be wholly free from foreign influences; and the real native ideas of the primitive Romans had, by the time when Roman literature begins, either become entirely obsolete or survived only in a fossilized form, in rites of which the original meaning had been completely forgotten. The position of Rome at the mouth of the chief river of central Italy, and on the west coast, which offers suitable harbours to immigrants, laid the city open at a very early period to the invasion of these foreign influences; and we now know that even before the 8th cent. B.C. this coast was settled by Greeks, bringing with them works of art, in which their own religion and mythology were depicted. Then the Etruscan people, whose origin is still matter of doubt, and who were themselves largely indebted for their religious ideas both to Greece and to Egypt, spread over the same region, and added to the confusion. Later a fresh influx of Greek rites and deities gained entrance into the city, and in many cases transformed the native ones in ways which make them extremely difficult to detect; and, finally, the religions of the East began to make their appearance, and rapidly gained ground as the Roman population became less pure in descent and less Italian in feeling.

It will be convenient at once to indicate the periods into which, by the common consent of inquirers, the history of the Roman religion falls. They are four: viz. (I.) from the earliest times (no more definite expression will serve) down to the end of the regal period—an age lasting, we may presume, for several centuries, in which the religion was in the main that of the city-State proper, answering to the *jus civile* in the sphere of law, and in fact constituting a part of it; (II.) from the reign of the last king, Tarquinius Superbus, to the war with Hannibal—a period of nearly three centuries (507–218 B.C.), in which the increasing commercial and political intercourse with foreign peoples and the spread of the Roman dominion in Italy brought in new worships and began to cause the neglect of the old ones; (III.) from the Hannibalic war to the age of Augustus, in which the same process was continued with ever increasing strength, while the intellectual awakening under the influence of Greek philosophy sapped the faith of almost all educated men in the efficacy of their cults, and in the very existence of their deities; (IV.) from the age of Augustus to that of the Antonines—a period which is marked, on the one hand, by a partially successful attempt to revive the old cults and, on the other, by the introduction of a new one with a wide political meaning, viz. the worship of the Emperors. The characteristics of these four periods will be traced in detail in the course of this article; but it will be necessary first to give some account (*a*) of the sources of information on which we depend for our knowledge of the Roman religion, and (*b*) of the principal modern works in which those sources have been utilized with good results.

(*a*) *Ancient authorities.*—The most important evidence that we have of the original character of the religion of the Roman State is contained in the surviving religious calendars, or Fasti, of which we have fragments of about thirty, and one almost complete. These exist chiefly on stone, but for four of them we have to depend on written copies of lost originals; they were edited together by Mommsen in vol. i. of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, and we have the benefit of a revision of this edition by the same hand, published in 1893, with one or two newly found fragments. They all date from between 31 B.C. and A.D. 51, and thus represent the calendar as revised by Julius Cæsar; but most fortunately the skeleton of the original Republican calendar, first published, according to Roman tradition, in 304 B.C., is fully preserved in them, as Mommsen conclusively showed. This skeleton is easily distinguished from later additions by the large capital letters in which it is inscribed or written in all the fragments that we possess; it gives the days of the month with their religious characteristics as affecting State business (*e.g.*, F. = *fastus*, a day on which legal business may lawfully be transacted, and N. = *nefastus*, on which such business is unlawful and ill-omened), and the names of the great religious festivals which concern the whole State, including the Kalends, Nones, and Ides, or days of the new moon, the first quarter, and the full moon. Excluding the latter, we have the names, in a shortened form, of forty-five great festivals, from the Equirria on March 14 to the festival of the same name on Feb. 27, the last day of the old Roman year; and, though it is not in every case by any means possible to recover the meaning of the name, yet it is obvious that these festivals, thus placed by an absolutely certain record in their right place both in each month and in the year, must be the foundation of all scientific study of the religious practices of the Roman State, taken together with the additions in

smaller capitals, which date from the Republican period. (For fuller information about the Fasti see Mommsen's commentary in *CIL*[2] i. 283 ff., condensed in Fowler's *Roman Festivals*,[1] p. 11 ff.)

This invaluable record would, however, be of little use to us, were it not for other evidence of a varied character supplied by Roman literature and by Greek writers on Roman subjects, to which must be added a few *additamenta* preserved in the Fasti themselves, and chiefly in those found at Præneste and in the grove of the Fratres Arvales. Two men of real learning, who lived and wrote at the end of the Republican period and at the beginning of the Empire, would, if we only had their works complete, furnish us with an immense amount of detail, both on the public religious calendar and on the religious life of the family and *gens* at Rome: these are Varro and Verrius Flaccus, who, though deeply affected by ideas in reality quite foreign to the Roman religion proper, took great pains to investigate the facts and the meaning of the ancient rites. Earlier writers are of comparatively little use to us, for Roman literature began in an age when men were far more interested in politics or in Greek philosophy than in a religion which was fast losing its meaning; and it was only with the revival of that religion under Augustus that scholars, poets, historians, and writers on law began to interest themselves in it once more. The works of Varro and Verrius have come down to us only in a fragmentary condition or embedded in the works of later writers, such as Servius, Nonius, Gellius, Macrobius, Plutarch, and some of the Christian Fathers, especially Tertullian and Augustine. Three other writers of the Augustan age, whose works are more completely preserved, need special mention: Livy, who in religious matters, like Varro and Verrius, made some use of the books of the Pontifices, the sacred archives of the old religion; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who was for some time in Rome, and occasionally records what he saw as well as what he had learnt of Roman rites; and Ovid, whose six books of poetical commentary on the Fasti contain a great deal that is curious and interesting about the festivals from January to June, mixed up with stories of late Greek origin and fanciful explanations which call for very cautious criticism. Of inscriptions and works of art we have very few until the Empire, and the few we have are difficult of interpretation; nor is it likely that modern excavation will produce anything that will throw much light, except indirectly, on the problems with which we have to deal. Thus it may fairly be said that at every point in the detail of this religion we are met by very serious difficulties, owing not only to the fragmentary condition of our authorities, but to the difficulty of explaining and piecing together what survives of them (Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, ch. i.).

(*b*) *Modern research.*—Until the 19th cent. very little progress had been made in this work of reconstruction and interpretation; but the new impulse given by Niebuhr to the study of early Rome produced a long series of valuable researches, and the names of Hartung, Ambrosch, Schwegler, Preller, Marquardt, Jordan, Wissowa, and Aust are now familiar to all students of the subject. Of these the most important are Marquardt, who first struck the right note by taking the facts of the worship of the Romans as the only legitimate basis for arriving at any conclusions as to their religious ideas (*Römische Staatsverwaltung*, iii., ed. Wissowa, Leipzig, 1885); Preller, whose *Römische Mythologie* (ed. Jordan, Berlin, 1881–83) is indispensable, but needs careful handling, inasmuch as it is based on a conception of the Roman deities as impersonations of natural forces which is now generally admitted to be in great part misleading; and Wissowa, whose *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (Munich, 1902 [2nd ed., much improved, 1912],[1] vol. v. pt. 4 of Iwan Müller's *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*) is at present the most complete, and at the same time the most cautious, account of the subject that we possess, its only considerable defect being the author's unwillingness to recognize the value of the tentative efforts of folklorists and anthropologists to explain Roman ritual by the comparative method. To these works must be added the edition of the Fasti by Mommsen already mentioned, and many other valuable contributions by the same great scholar made in the course of his indefatigable researches into Roman history; and, lastly, the *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, ed. Roscher, in which the Roman articles, though of varying value, taken as a whole, indicate an important advance in our knowledge. The new ed. of Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*, by Wissowa, has already rehandled some of the articles in Roscher's work.

We proceed to consider in succession the four periods into which, as has been explained, the State religion may be historically divided. In dealing with these, and especially with the first, the characteristics of the Roman attitude towards the supernatural should be made tolerably plain.

I. First Period

(From the earliest times to the end of the regal period).

It has already been said that the Fasti, *i.e.* the skeleton of the oldest religious calendar, must be the basis of our inquiry, and that this was first published, according to tradition, in the year 304 B.C. But, just as Domesday Book is a record which carries us back for centuries before it was drawn up, so with the Fasti, which the Romans themselves attributed to their priest-king Numa, and which bear unmistakable internal evidence of a very high antiquity. Though no actual date can be assigned, it is important to notice two facts which indicate the age in which it must have been drawn up. (1) The *terminus ad quem* is the date of the building of the Capitoline temple, universally attributed to Tarquinius Superbus, since there is no festival in the calendar which has any relation to the trias of deities (Jupiter, Juno, Minerva) which was worshipped there. (2) The *terminus a quo* is the absorption of the Quirinal hill in the limits of the city, for the Quirinalia and the cult of Quirinus on that hill are included in the Fasti (see Wissowa[2], p. 31). Thus, abandoning the doubtful names of legendary kings, we may say with confidence that the Fasti came into existence, in the form in which we have them, in the period of the city which included the Palatine and Quirinal hills, with the Subura, the Esquiline, and part of the Cælian hill. That is, when the city-State had grown into the form in which we know it, when Roman history may be said to begin, the work of religious as well as political organization (and the two were at no period wholly distinct) had begun with a definite catalogue, for the use of the religious-political rulers of the people, of religious ceremonies which concerned the welfare of the State as a whole.

We have thus gained a firm footing in a definite period of the development of the Roman city-State; but the Fasti then drawn up do actually carry us back still further; as we might naturally expect, we find embodied in them, as organized

[1] Hereafter cited as 'Fowler'

[1] Hereafter cited as 'Wissowa[2].'

parts of the worship of the city, cults and rites which beyond all question arose in an age when there was no city-State as yet, and which belong to the life of the shepherd and the agriculturist. It is not, indeed, too much to say that the native Roman religion had its roots in the mental attitude of the men of that early age towards the powers to whom they believed themselves indebted for the prosperous issue of their labour spent in procuring subsistence from crops, flocks, and herds, or to whose ill-will they fancied they owed its failure. Almost all genuine Roman ideas of the supernatural can be referred to this principle of origin, and it must be carefully borne in mind throughout the following pages. In order to make this clear, a list of the festivals (*i.e.* holy days of special religious importance) is here given, in the order in which they stood in the oldest calendar, beginning with March, which was the first month of the old Roman year (see Fowler, p. 5, and reff. there given):

Mar.	14.	EQUIRRIA.
,,	17.	AGONIA, LIBERALIA.
,,	19.	QUINQUATRUS.
,,	23.	TUBILUSTRIUM.
April	15.	FORDICIDIA.
,,	19.	CEREALIA.
,,	21.	PARILIA.
,,	23.	VINALIA.
,,	25.	ROBIGALIA.
May	9, 11, 13.	LEMURIA.
,,	21.	AGONIA.
,,	23.	TUBILUSTRIUM.
June	9.	VESTALIA.
,,	11.	MATRALIA.
July	5.	POPLIFUGIA.
,,	19, 21.	LUCARIA.
,,	23.	NEPTUNALIA.
,,	25.	FURRINALIA.
Aug.	17.	PORTUNALIA.
,,	19.	VINALIA.
,,	21.	CONSUALIA.
Aug.	23.	VOLCANALIA.
,,	25.	OPICONSIVIA.
,,	27.	VOLTURNALIA.
Sept.		——
Oct.	11.	MEDITRINALIA.
,,	13.	FONTINALIA.
,,	19.	ARMILUSTRIUM.
Nov.		——
Dec.	11.	AGONIA.
,,	15.	CONSUALIA.
,,	17.	SATURNALIA.
,,	19.	OPALIA.
,,	21.	DIVALIA.
,,	23.	LARENTALIA.
Jan.	9.	AGONIA.
,,	11, 15.	CARMENTALIA.
Feb.	15.	LUPERCALIA.
,,	17.	QUIRINALIA.
,,	21.	FERALIA.
,,	23.	TERMINALIA.
,,	24.	REGIFUGIUM.
,,	27.	EQUIRRIA.

Now, though there are in this long list many festivals of which the origin and meaning are obscure, yet we can distinctly trace in it the course of the operations of agriculture, and may conclude that those festivals in which this feature appears were taken into the State organization from a purely agricultural population. Thus all the April festivals have to do with the safety of the crops and herds; at the Fordicidia pregnant cows were slaughtered, and the unborn calves torn from the womb and burnt by the Virgo vestalis maxima, with the object, as the Romans themselves believed (Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 633), of procuring the fertility of the growing corn; the name of the Cerealia speaks for itself, though the ancient ritual was obscured by later *ludi Cereales*; the Parilia was a survival on the Palatine hill of the ceremony of purifying (*i.e.* averting evil from) the sheep, by driving them through burning straw, laurel, etc.; and the Robigalia had a kindred object in averting the dreaded mildew (*robigo*) from the growing corn. In June the ritual of the Vestalia clearly indicates a time when the Vestal virgins, whose origin, as we shall see, is to be found in the daughters of the agricultural household, cleansed the *penus Vestæ*, the representative of the storehouse of the State, and made it ready for the reception of the grain about to be reaped; this work was finished on the 15th, which day is marked in the ancient calendar by the letters Q. St. D. F., *i.e.* 'Quando stercus delatum fas' (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 32); when the refuse had been cleared away, public business, which had been forbidden since the 7th of the month, might be resumed. In August we meet with the true harvest festivals, after the corn had been brought home; for both the Consualia and the Opiconsivia, in honour of deities or spirits closely connected with each other (*consus* and *consiva*, from *condere*, 'to store up'), show traces of harvest customs. Harvest over, we find few festivals till December, when a second Consualia points to an inspection of the stored grain, and is followed by another festival of Ops, the deity of the material wealth of the community; between the two comes the Saturnalia, which retained throughout Roman history the features of a mid-winter rejoicing of farm-labourers, in connexion with the worship of an obscure deity of agriculture who afterwards became mixed up with the Greek Cronos. Thus, without venturing further here into the difficult questions which beset the inquirer into the original meaning of other festivals, we have ample evidence that the Roman ideas of religion were largely influenced by their life as an agricultural people. The movable feasts also, and those which were not included in the calendar as not undertaken on behalf of the State as a whole (Festus, p. 245), point in the same direction. In the beginning of January we have the Compitalia, a survival in the city of the sacrifices made by *rustici* to Lares at the crossroads when the season of ploughing was over (schol. on Persius, iv. 28); and the Ambarvalia at the end of May was in the same way a survival of the processional ritual by which the crops were purified from hostile influences (see also Fowler for probable explanations of other rites—*e.g.*, the *Argeorum sacra*, May 14 or 15, p. 111 ff., and the 'October-horse,' p. 241 ff.).

If the evidence of the most ancient calendar is clear as to the agricultural character of the life whose religious side it embodies, we next proceed to interrogate it as to the nature of the supernatural beings who were the objects of worship. Here we at once meet with disappointment. Very few of the festival names give us any clear indication of a deity, and, even where deities seem to be suggested, they are not those which are familiar to us in Roman literature. The Vestalia, Neptunalia, Volcanalia, Saturnalia, Quirinalia, and one or two others, do indeed suggest names that we know; but of these all but Vesta are in reality extremely obscure as genuine Roman deities. Neptunus, Volcanus, and Saturnus are familiar names only because they became identified in later times with Greek gods of a polytheistic system; Quirinus seems to be a form of Mars, either an independent deity identified with him or an adjectival name of Mars which took shape eventually as a separate entity. The cult of Vesta was so perfectly preserved throughout Roman history that we seem to have no doubt as to her existence as a definite deity; yet the Romans themselves were not agreed as to her real nature, and we cannot safely distinguish her as a deity from the sacred fire itself which was the chief object of her cult. Again, it is easy to say that the Cerealia in April were in honour of Ceres; but a very little investigation will dispel all possibility of discovering under this name any clearly conceived goddess of the type to which we are accustomed, *e.g.*, in the Greek forms of religion (see art. 'Ceres,' in Roscher; Wissowa[2], pp. 192 f., 297 ff.). The Robigalia of April 25 was supposed to be the festival of a god Robigus, and a note in the Prænestine fragment of calendar, almost certainly from the hand of Verrius Flaccus (cf. *CIL*[2] i. 236), runs: 'Feriæ Robigo via Claudia ad milliarium v ne robigo frumentis noceat'; yet it is impossible to be sure that, when the calendar was first drawn up, many centuries before Verrius' note was written, Robigus as a god was clearly distinguished from *robigo*, the mildew on the corn. So with the Terminalia in February: *terminus* was a boundary-stone between two properties, and we have explicit accounts of the ritual used in fixing the stone, which bears the mark of a high

antiquity, yet does not indicate any clear conception of such a deity as became associated with Jupiter in the legend of the Capitoline temple (Fowler, p. 324 ff.). Once more, the Lupercalia, which became famous owing to a well-known event in the life of Julius Cæsar, is generally believed to have been in honour of Faunus; but the Romans themselves were not agreed on the point; and it is extremely doubtful whether in this case, as in others, we need to associate the rites with the name of any deity at all. Lastly, it will be noticed that the names of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, the great trias of the Capitoline worship of later times, as also those of Mars and Janus, are not indicated in the names of the festivals; and it is only from the additions made to the calendar under the Republic, and from Roman literature, that we learn that the Kalends of each month were sacred to Juno and the Ides to Jupiter, that the rites of March and of the 'October-horse' had some special connexion with Mars, and that at the Agonia (which is probably an ancient name for sacrifice) of Jan. 9 a ram was offered to Janus.

These examples will be enough to show that we should not be justified in supposing that the most ancient Romans had any very clearly defined ideas about the supernatural beings whom they invoked, and that it is better to rid our minds at once of the impression conveyed by both Greek and Roman literature, that each deity was a clearly realized *personality* with distinct attributes. It seems certain that to the Romans the cult appealed as the practical means of obtaining their desires, of warding off evil influences from all that they most valued, while the unseen powers with whom they dealt in this cult were beyond their ken, often unnamed, or named only by an adjective significant of their supposed functions, and visible only in the sense of being seated in, or in some sense symbolized by, a tree, stone, animal, or other object, such as the mildew, the fire, a spring, etc. Had they been as personally conceived as we are apt to suppose, we may be sure that they would not have been so easily superseded and absorbed by Greek and other deities as we shall see that they were. They are often multiplex, as the Fauni (on this point Wissowa[2], p. 208 ff., holds a different opinion), Silvani, Lares, Penates, Semones, Carmentes, and they are apt eventually to run into one another, as do Tellus, Maia, Ceres, and the Dea Dia of the Arval Brotherhood (G. Henzen, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, Berlin, 1874, p. 48). In fact, we have beyond doubt in this oldest stratum of Roman religious thought a dæmonistic and not a polytheistic type of religion, such a type as has been shown by J. E. Harrison (*Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903) and others to have existed in Greece before the great deities of Olympus occupied the attention of the Greek mind, and such as is known to have existed not only among savage peoples but in Europe (*e.g.*, Lithuania) and in China (see Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 80 f., and P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Freiburg, 1887–89, i. 240 ff.). The Roman objects of worship were spiritual powers (*numina*, in the Latin tongue); they were beings whose undefined nature made them very hard to invoke with certainty or security—a fact which in the history of this religion gave rise to an elaborate priestly system of invocation (see below).

It is obvious, too, that in such a theology there could have been little chance for even a people more naturally imaginative than the Romans were to find material for myth; and we may fairly conclude with Aust (*Religion der Römer*, p. 19) that, though there were Roman deities and Roman worship, there was no Roman mythology.

'The deities of Rome,' he goes on, in a very instructive passage, 'were deities of the cult only. They had no human form, they had not the human heart with its virtues and vices. They had no intercourse with each other, and no common or permanent residence; they enjoyed no nectar or ambrosia, . . . they had no children, no parental relation. They were, indeed, both male and female, and a male and female deity are often in close relation to each other; but this is not a relation of marriage, and rests only on a similarity in the sphere of their operations: so we have Faunus Fauna, Cacus Caca, Jupiter Juno, Liber Libera, Consus Ops, Lua Saturni, Salacia Neptuni, Hora Quirini, Maia Volcani, Nerio Martis.[1] The expressions *pater* and *mater* that often occur in the cult (Janus pater, Jupiter, Mars pater, Mater Matuta, etc.) point to a creative or generative power only in the region of nature. These deities never become independent existences: they remain colourless cold conceptions, *numina* as the Romans called them, that is, supernatural powers whose existence only betrays itself in the exercise of certain powers. The Roman did not trust himself to mark clearly the sex or name of his deities, as we see in the custom of invoking all deities *confuse* or *generatim* after prayer to a particular one, in order not to pass over any from ignorance or to give him a wrong name. In the formulas of prayer we meet with expressions such as "sive deus sive dea es," "sive mas sive femina," "quisquis es," "sive alio quo nomine te appellari volueris."'

Again, after what has been said, it will easily be understood that such *numina* could not have resided in temples made with hands, or have been represented in iconic form; what Tacitus says of the German Suevi may be taken as adequately describing the ideas of the early Romans themselves: 'nec cohibere parietibus deos, neque in ullam humani oris speciem adsimulare, ex magnitudine cœlestium arbitrantur: lucos ac nemora consecrant, deorumque nominibus appellant secretum illud, quod sola reverentia vident' (*Germania*, ix.). This is well illustrated in the cult which was probably the oldest form of Jupiter-worship at Rome, that of Jupiter Feretrius, whose *numen* seems originally to have resided in an oak on the Capitoline hill, on which oak Romulus is said to have fixed the first *spolia opima* taken from a conquered enemy; underneath this oak, as we may guess, a small altar was in course of time erected within a consecrated enclosure, the two forming what was called a *sacellum*, or small piece of holy ground; and only in later times was this again enlarged into a building with a roof, of the kind called an *ædes*, or house of the god.

So far we have been interrogating the oldest calendar as to the religious life and ideas of the Romans before their organization into a city-State, and have ventured to conclude: (1) that these were the life and ideas of an agricultural people; (2) that the objects of their religious thought and worship were not definitely conceived personal gods, but spirits, or *numina*, active in certain special functions (all of them, we may now add, in immediate relation to man, and otherwise non-existent), but having no human personality or affections. But beyond this it would be rash to venture in attempting to divine the religious conceptions of the oldest Romans; and we will now turn to consider the Fasti as the ordered record of the yearly recurring religious procedure of a fully developed city-State, from the union of the Palatine and Quirinal cities to the time of the Etruscan dynasty of the Tarquinii.

The following specimen of the Fasti is here reproduced in order to show better than could be done by any description the high state of religious organization which the Roman State had attained when the calendar was drawn up; it is taken from the Fasti Maffeiani (*CIL*[2] i. 223):

1. K(al) Feb. N.	8. N.
2. N.	9. N.
3. N.	10. N.
4. N.	11. N.
5. NON. NP.	12. N
6. N.	13. EID. NP.
7. N.	14. N.

[1] In these last examples the female name probably indicates no more than some aspect of the activity of the male *numen*.

15. LUPER(calia). NP.	22. C.
16. EN.	23. TER(minalia). NP.
17. QUIR(inalia). NP.	24. REGIF(ugium). N.
18. C.	25. C.
19. C.	26. EN.
20. C.	27. EQ(uirria). NP.
21. FERAL(ia). F.	28. C.

Here it must be obvious that the fixing of Kalends, Nones, and Ides, and of the great festivals, together with the distinction of the days as proper (F. or C.) for State business, or improper (N. or NP.), or proper only after certain sacrificial rites were over (EN, Q.R.C.F., and Q. St. D.F.), proves that the State whose religious life it regulated had already gone through a long process of development, and was in the hands of capable and clear-headed religious rulers. We have to see, now that we have reached this stage, who these rulers were; what deities they admitted as specially concerned with the welfare of the Roman State; what holy places they reckoned as proper for their religious functions; and what sacrifices they performed there, and in what insignia of office.

i. *THE PRIESTHOODS.*—At the head of the whole religious system was the King (Rex). This is made certain by what may be called the method of survivals, by which alone we can conjecture safely the details of administration in the regal period. When that period came to an end, the sacrificial functions of the Rex passed to a Rex sacrorum or sacrificulus (cf. the ἄρχων βασιλεύς at Athens), who continued to hold the first rank in dignity (Festus, p. 198 [ed. Lindsay]). We may be almost as sure that other functions exercised in Republican times by the Pontifex maximus also belonged originally to the Rex, viz. the selection of the Vestal virgins and the Flamines, and the superintendence of these, who were in his *potestas* (Marquardt, p. 240). The Vestals had the care of the sacred fire, the symbol of the unity of the State, while the Flamines were sacrificing priests attached to particular worships; thus it is now generally admitted that the State in this early form represents the discipline of the earliest Roman household, the Rex taking the place of the *paterfamilias*, the Vestals of the daughters of the family, and the Flamines of the sons. Further, in accordance with a Roman practice which also had its origin in the life of the family, the Rex was assisted by competent counsellors in all matters relating to religious law or custom: one *collegium*, the Pontifices (five in number, according to tradition), was specially concerned with the administrative details of the *jus sacrum*, and another, the Augures, with the science of omens, now apparently beginning to be developed out of the crude superstitions of an original peasantry. In matters relating to alliances, truces, declaration of war, etc., in which the relation of the State with other peoples was concerned, the Rex was assisted also by a *collegium* of Fetiales. Lastly, there were certain associations whose activity was confined to particular occasions: the Luperci, of whom we hear only at the Lupercalia; the Salii, or dancing priests of Mars (active only in March and October); the Fratres Arvales, whose grove was at the fifth milestone, *i.e.* the boundary of the original *ager Romanus* on the road to Ostia, and who were concerned chiefly with the lustration of the crops in May; and the Sodales Titii, of whom nothing is known but their name. Cf. art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD (Roman).

ii. *DEITIES.*—The *numina* with whom the State had to do—the divine inhabitants, so to speak, of the city and its territory—were known, in later times at least, as *di indigetes*, and were thus distinguished from the *di novensiles* (or *novensides*), *i.e.* new inhabitants, in a manner analogous to the familiar distinction between *patricii* and *plebeii* (Wissowa², p. 18). Wissowa has elaborated a list of these on the evidence of the Fasti and of the names and functions of the priesthoods; and this list may be accepted, if we bear in mind the characteristic ideas of the Romans about their deities, as already explained; such a caution is here necessary because this writer is apt to regard all Roman deities as clearly conceived in too polytheistic a sense.

Anna Perenna	March 15 (not in Fasti, but known from Ovid).
Carmenta (Flamen Carmentalis)	Carmentalia, Jan. 11, 15.
Carna	June 1.
Ceres (?) (Flamen Cerealis)	Cerealia, April 19.
Consus	Consualia, Aug. 21 and Dec. 15.
Diva Angerona	Divalia, Dec. 21.
Falacer (Flamen Falacer)	
Faunus (?) (Luperci)	Lupercalia, Feb. 15.
Flora (Flamen Floralis)	(Not in Fasti).
Fons	Fontinalia, Oct. 13.
Furrina (Flamen Furrinalis)	Furrinalia, July 25.
Janus (Rex sacrorum)	Agonium, Jan. 9.
Jupiter (Flamen Dialis, Fetiales, Augures)	All Ides: Vinalia, April 23 and Aug. 19. Meditrinalia, Oct. 11. Poplifugium, July 5, Dec. 23.
Larenta	Larentalia, Dec. 23.
Lares	Compitalia (movable festival).
Lemures	Lemuria, May 9, 11, 13.
Liber	Liberalia, March 17.
Mars (Flamen Martialis, Salii)	Equirria, Feb. 27 and March 14, March 1. Agonium Martiale, March 17. Quinquatrus, March 19. Tubilustrium, March 23 (and May 23?). October-horse, Oct. 15. Armilustrium, Oct. 19. Ambarvalia (movable festival).
Mater Matuta	Matralia, June 11.
Neptunus	Neptunalia, July 23.
Ops	Opiconsivia, Aug. 25. Opalia, Dec. 19.
Pales, Palatua (Flamen Palatualis)	Parilia, April 21.
Pomona (Flamen Pomonalis)	
Portunus (Flamen Portunalis)	Portunalia, Aug. 17.
Quirinus (Flamen Quirinalis)	Quirinalia, Feb. 17.
Robigus	Robigalia, April 25.
Saturnus	Saturnalia, Dec. 17.
Tellus (?)	Fordicidia, April 15.
Terminus	Terminalia, Feb. 23.
Vejovis	Agonium, May 21.
Vesta (Virgines Vestales)	Vestalia, June 9.
Volcanus (Flamen Volcanalis)	Volcanalia, Aug. 23.
Volturnus (Flamen Volturnalis)	Volturnalia, Aug. 27.

This table is most useful in enabling us to see at a glance, in conjunction with the order in rank of the priesthoods, the worships which were most prominent in the Rome of this period. The Rex, it will be remembered, was at the head of these; then came the Flamen Dialis, the Martialis, and the Quirinalis, and lastly the Vestals. Now we find that the Rex sacrificed to Janus on Jan. 9; he was also, no doubt, concerned in other rites—*e.g.*, at the Regifugium on Feb. 24 (see Fowler, p. 327) and in those of the Vestals which afterwards fell to the Pontifices; but this is the only one of which we have certain evidence. The Flamen Dialis was the special priest of Jupiter, and sacrificed the *ovis idulis* on all Ides to the god; on many other occasions—*e.g.*, at the Vinalia both in April and in August, and at the Lupercalia—he was present; in the latter case he may, however, have taken the place of the Rex after the abolition of the kingship. The Flamen Martialis and the Quirinalis were obviously connected specially with the cults of Mars and Quirinus, though we are in need of more explicit evidence; it is probable that the Martialis took part in the rite of the 'October-horse' (Oct. 15) and in the Ambarvalia in May, and of the Quirinalis we know that he officiated at the Robigalia and the Consualia (for details see Marquardt, p. 332 ff.). The Vestals were, of course, chiefly occupied with the cult of Vesta, though in Republican times they seem to have taken part in many other ceremonies (cf. Marquardt, p. 336 ff.).

The most prominent deities, then, were Janus, Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, and Vesta. These form the core, so to speak, of the Roman ideas of the supernatural in relation to the State; others which we find in Wissowa's table will grow faint and lose vitality—*e.g.*, those to which the Flamines minores were attached—or will take a different shape under foreign influences; but these five, or four, if we take Mars and Quirinus as two aspects of the same deity, the one belonging to the Palatine, the other to the Quirinal city, remained at all times leading Roman religious conceptions, and must now be briefly considered as the characteristic deities of this period.

1. **Janus and Vesta.**—These two may be taken together, for in Roman ritual they were the first and the last deities in all invocations, public and private (Marquardt, p. 25 and notes). There is no conjugal relation between them (that, as we have seen, is foreign to Roman ideas), but they had beyond doubt a common origin, which left its traces on their cult to the last. Originally they were the *numina* residing in the doorway and the hearth of the house, *i.e.* they symbolize (if the word can be safely used) the sacred entrance to the house and its sacred inmost recess, where the sacred fire was. As the house and the family were the foundation of Roman civilization, so were Janus and Vesta the foundation of Roman worship. The temple of Janus, famous in later times, was in reality no temple at all: it was a gateway, with the sacred associations of all entrances; it was under the special care of the king, as the doorway of the house had been in the care of the *paterfamilias*, so that no evil thing, natural or supernatural, might pass through it into the house. This position of Janus in the house and in the State may safely be taken as the origin of all the practices in which he appears as a god of beginnings: he was the oldest god, *deorum deus*, the beginner of all things and of all acts; he is an object of worship at the beginning of the year, the month, and the day; but all this arose out of the characteristic Roman association of a *numen* with the doorway of the house and the gate of the city (see Wissowa², p. 103 ff.; art. 'Janus,' in Roscher; Fowler, p. 282 ff.).

2. **Jupiter.**—In contrast with Janus and Vesta, who represented the sacred character of the house, Jupiter (*Diovis pater*, from root *div*, 'shining') was the great *numen* of the open heaven under which the Italian, then as now, spent the greater part of his time. He was the *numen* of that heaven at all times and under all aspects, whether by night or by day, in clear weather or in storm and rain. In the Salian hymn, one of the two oldest fragments of Roman invocation that we possess (Macrob. *Sat.* I. xv. 14), he is addressed as *Lucetius*, the deity of light; the Ides, when the moon was full, were sacred to him; when rain was sorely needed, his aid was sought under the name *Elicius*, by a peculiar ritual (Fowler, p. 232); as Jupiter *Fulgur* or *Summanus* he was the power who sent the lightning by day or night, and all places struck by lightning were sacred to him; the festivals of the vintage (Vinalia and Meditrinalia), which specially needed the aid of the sun and the light, were dedicated to him, and his Flamen was on all such occasions the priest employed. This conception of the deity was not only Roman, but common to all the Italian peoples who were of the same stock; and everywhere we find him worshipped on the summits of hills, where nothing intervened between the heaven and the earth, and where all the phenomena of the heavens could be conveniently observed.

In Rome the oldest cult of Jupiter was on the Capitoline hill, and on the southern summit, where it became overshadowed in the next period by the great temple of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. This was the cult of Jupiter *Feretrius*, already mentioned in another connexion. The tiny temple (only 15 feet wide, Dion. Hal. ii. 34) contained no image of the god, but it has been thought that he was supposed to reside in a stone (*silex*) which may have been believed to be a thunderbolt (but see *JRS* ii. [1912] 49 f.); this stone the Fetiales took with them on their official journeys; and the oath by which treaties, etc., were ratified by them was said to be 'per Iovem (lapidem).' Here we get an early glimpse of that moral aspect of Jupiter which was retained in one way or another throughout Roman history; as *Dius fidius* (Fowler, p. 138), and perhaps also under the clearly Greek name *Hercules*, he was the deity in whose name oaths were taken ('mediusfidius,' 'mehercule'); his Flamen presided at the old Roman marriage ceremony of the *confarreatio*, where he seems to have been regarded as a kind of witness of the solemn contract entered into (Wissowa², p. 118); and on the Alban hill his cult, though overshadowed like that of the Capitol by the later innovations of the Tarquinian dynasty, was doubtless from the beginning of Rome's relations with other Latin cities the centre-point of the religious aspect of the Latin league. (For the many forms of the Jupiter-cult, of which only the prominent features in the earliest period can be here described, see the exhaustive article by Aust in Roscher, condensed in Wissowa², p. 113 ff.)

A word must here be said about **Juno**, who does not seem at all times to have been closely associated with Jupiter, certainly not as his wife, until Greek anthropomorphic conceptions gained ground at Rome. That she, too, represented the light seems probable from the name (Juno=*Jovino*, also from root *div*); but at some early time she became specially associated with the moon, as is shown by the formula used by the Pontifex in announcing the date of the Nones as soon as the new moon has appeared—'dies te quinque (or septem) calo, Juno Covella' (Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 27). Either from the supposed effects of the moon on women or from some other cause at which we can only guess, Juno was at all times peculiarly the *numen* of the female sex: Juno *Lucina* was invoked at the moment of childbirth (as, *e.g.*, in Virgil, *Ecl.* iv. 10), and the genius of a woman was called her Juno.

3. **Mars and Quirinus.**—Mars is the specially characteristic deity of the early Roman State, and was intertwined with the foundation legend of the city: it was the wolf of Mars that suckled the twins Romulus and Remus. Why this was is on the whole clear, though the etymology of his name and the original conception which it indicated are quite uncertain, and we only know that, like Jupiter, he was worshipped by all the peoples of Latin and Sabellian stock. Agriculture and war were the two chief occupations of the early Romans, and it is precisely these with which the Mars-cult is most closely connected, as a careful examination of the Fasti plainly shows. These two occupations, it should be noted, are also closely related to each other on their religious side; during the same period of the year, from March to October, the State was specially liable to the attacks of enemies—not only the human ones who attacked the Roman people and the crops and herds which sustained it, but also the divine enemies who might damage the growing or the harvested crops, and might also work havoc on the human population by disease or hindered fertility. It was in this period, March to October, and especially in these two months themselves, the first of which (also the first of the year) bears the

name of Mars, that the cult of this deity was most prominent.

In March the dancing warrior-priests of Mars, the Salii, whose antiquity as a *collegium* is proved by the fact that they must be of patrician descent, dressed in the costume of the old Italian warrior, performed a series of processional dances, clashing their shields and spears as if to avert some evil influence, and singing the songs of which a fragment has come down to us (J. Wordsworth, *Fragments and Specimens of Early Latin*, Oxford, 1874, p. 567). The table given above shows that the 1st, the 14th (originally probably the 15th, as no other festival was on a day of even number), and the 17th were also great days in his cult, though we are more or less in the dark as to the rites performed; but on the 23rd, the Tubilustrium, the *tubæ* used in war seem to have been made ready for the war season by the religious process of *lustratio*; and it may be that the horses of the cavalry were treated in the same way at the Equirria on the 14th. At the Ambarvalia in May, where Mars was eventually ousted by Ceres or Dea Dia, the Fratres Arvales went in procession for the lustration of the *ager Romanus*, and the hymn they sang, so far as we can judge from what we possess of it (Marquardt, p. 457; Henzen, p. 26), had a direct reference to Mars as the *numen* capable of averting noxious influences. This is confirmed by the prayer of the Roman farmer preserved in Cato (*de Agricultura*, 141), which begins, 'Father Mars, I pray thee to be willing and propitious to me, my household, and my slaves,' and prays him to avert all evil from crops and herds, and to bring the farmer's labour to a successful issue. From May to October we lose sight of Mars; but at the end of the agricultural and military season we find him again prominent. On October 15, which probably corresponded with the Equirria of March 14 (or 15), a horse was sacrificed with very curious ritual in the Campus Martius; in this rite we may perhaps see a survival of an old harvest custom, which took a new shape and meaning as the State grew accustomed to war, just as Mars himself, originally perhaps the protector of man, herds, and crops alike, became the deity of war-horses and warriors (Fowler, p. 249). The Mars-season was completed on Oct. 19 by the festival called Armilustrium, at which the Salii again appeared with their *arma* and *ancilia* (sacred shields), which were then subjected to *lustratio* and put away until the ensuing March. This short sketch of the ritual connected with Mars will suffice to show that the leading ideas in it are, as we said, agriculture and warfare; it is needless to distinguish the two more precisely, for we cannot separate the Roman warrior from the Roman husbandman, or the warlike aspect of his deity from his universal care for his people. (For more detail see Roscher's art. in his *Lexikon*; art. 'Salii,' in Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*; Fowler, pp. 1–65 and 241 ff. with reff. there given.)

Of Quirinus all that need be said here is that it is probable that this very obscure deity was a form of Mars belonging to the community settled on the hill that still bears his name; he seems to have had the same two characteristics as the Palatine deity, though these are difficult to trace with any certainty (see Wissowa², p. 153). The most convincing evidence for the essential identity of the two lies in the fact that there were twelve Salii *Collini*, *i.e.* of the Quirinal hill, concerned in the worship of Quirinus, answering to the twelve Salii *Palatini* of the Mars-cult (Liv. v. 52).

iii. *CULT OF THE DEAD.* The Romans do not seem to have had, in early times at least, any idea of an under world tenanted by deities; Orcus and Dis Pater are not conceptions of home growth, and Vejovis, in spite of Wissowa's reasoning (p. 237), is far too obscure to be reckoned in such a category. Nor is this surprising: the deities of the Romans have always a direct relation to the *life* of the people, and in fact, as has already been said, exist only so far as they were supposed to have some direct influence for good or evil upon the activity of that life. As death brought with it an end of that activity, and the dead man was free from all responsibility for it, subject to no sentence of punishment or reward, there was no call upon the imagination of the Romans (which was never strong or inventive) to create an under world like that of the Greeks, and the splendid picture of such a world which we find in the sixth Æneid is wholly the result of Hellenic fancy.

But the Fasti supply us with certain evidence that the dead, when duly buried with the proper rites, were the object of an organized cult. In February, the last month of the year, and one specially appropriated to what we may call, for want of a better word, purification, nine days were set apart for this cult (*dies parentales*), of which the last, the 21st, appears as a State festival, the Feralia. Whether the dead were cremated or buried (both customs existed in this period, as we know from the XII Tables, 10) was indifferent; in either case the dead man was believed in some sense to live on, to have entered into that world of spirits which contained all the Roman deities, and thus the dead came to be *di parentes* or *di manes*, the latter word being explained by the Romans themselves as meaning 'the good.' On these days in February the rites of burial were, as it were, renewed, to make sure that the relation between the living and the dead should be a happy and wholesome one. The dead had long been buried in the family tomb in the city of the dead outside the city of the living, had been well cared for since their departure, and were still members of the family. They had their *jura* (*jus manium*) under the supervision of the Rex and later of the Pontifices; experience has taught the citizen that the State must regulate his conduct towards the *di manes* for the benefit of both parties. In May too, another month of purification and apparently of ill omen, we find three days, the 9th, 11th, and 13th, styled *Lemuria*, *i.e.* 'festivals' (if the word may be here used) of the Lemures or Larvæ, the ghosts of ancestors who had died away from home in war or otherwise, and had not been buried with due rites; these were probably supposed to be apt to return to the house which they once tenanted, and had to be got rid of again by special ceremonies, of which Ovid has given us a specimen in his *Fasti* (v. 432). These days of the Lemuria are marked 'nefasti' in the calendar, while the *dies parentales* of February are—some of them at least—'C.' (*comitialis*), and the Feralia is 'F.P.'; hence it has been inferred with justice that the Lemuria was the older festival, representing a conception of the dead as hostile to the living, which is not consistent with the organized life of a city-State, where the majority of human beings would die at home and in peace. This view (Fowler, pp. 107, 308) may account for the fact that of the Lemuria we hear hardly anything but what Ovid tells us in the passage just quoted, and even that belongs rather to the private life of the household than to the *jus sacrum* of the city. It would seem that the cheerful character of service of the dead which we find in February had entirely taken the place of the older and ruder rites. (For other indications in the calendar of the cult of the dead see Wissowa², p. 236; and, for the whole subject, Marquardt, p. 310 ff.; Aust, p. 225 ff.; and De Marchi, *Il Culto privato*, p. 180 ff.; cf. art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Roman].)

iv. *HOLY PLACES.*—All places in the city and its *ager* which, for want of a more exact word, we should term 'holy' were of two kinds, according as they were or were not authorized by the State; if they had been, in accordance with the directions of Rex and Senate, subjected to the process of *dedicatio* and *consecratio*, *i.e.* devotion to a deity by the Pontifices, they were *loca sacra*. If, on the other hand, they were objects of fear or reverence from their own nature only, and as a consequence of the common feeling of the people or any part of it, they were *loca religiosa*. The best authority for this distinction is Ælius Gallus, *ap.* Festus, p. 424 (ed. Lindsay): 'Gallus Ælius ait sacrum esse quodcunque more et instituto civitatis consecratum sit, sive ædis sive ara sive locus sive pecunia sive quid aliud, quod dis dedicatum atque consecratum sit; quod autem privati suæ religionis causa aliquid earum rerum deo dedicent, id pontifices Romanos non existimare sacrum.' We may thus infer that before the completion of the city-State and its organization, and probably for some time afterwards, the spots supposed to be inhabited by *numina* were *loca religiosa*, and this is borne out by the fact that places such as those which had been struck by lightning, the Lacus Curtius in the Forum, and others to which popular superstition attached ill omen, were *loca religiosa*. The term, therefore, though often applied to objects simply because they had not undergone the rites necessary to make them *sacra* (*e.g.*, tombs, *sacella*, etc.), seems to take us back to a time when the civilizing and reassuring influence of the State had not yet fully done its work in bringing the divine inhabitants of the city into happier relations with the human population. But, when once a deity had been successfully settled in a particular spot, with ceremonies about the efficacy of which no one could have any doubt, since they were authorized and carried out by the State authorities, there was no further cause for any vague apprehensions about his attitude to the people; if duly propitiated, and especially on the anniversary of the dedication of the spot, he would be retained as a member of the community, unless, indeed, some enemy could persuade him to desert it (*evocare*); and his attitude should be beneficent. All places in which deities were thus settled were designated by the word *sacer*.

Strictly speaking, it was the ground they occupied that was thus styled; and it was matter of no moment what might be erected on it. When a temple or altar had been destroyed, the ground still remained *sacer*. The general word for such a place, without any special reference to what was erected there, was *fanum*; the simplest kind of erection was a *sacellum*, *i.e.*, as Trebatius defined it (Gell. VII. xii. 5), 'locus parvus deo sacratus cum ara,' and without a roof (Festus, p. 422); there were many of these in the city, even in the time of Augustus. But the holy place might be a grove or an opening within it (*lucus*), a cave like the Lupercal, a hearth like that of Vesta, or an archway, as that of Janus. All these were *loca sacra* if they had been duly dedicated and consecrated. The oldest example, so far as we know, of a house erected for the dwelling of a deity is the Ædes Vestæ, which was round, like the earliest form of Italian house (*A Companion to Latin Studies*[2], ed. J. E. Sandys, Cambridge, 1913, p. 217); this was dedicated to the deity and consecrated, but wanted the *inauguratio* of the augurs, which was necessary for a *templum*. This word was applied to a building erected on a *locus sacer*, which had been not only dedicated and consecrated, but also inaugurated according to the technical system of which the augurs held the secrets, and of which we have but little definite knowledge. When a building with its site had been dedicated by the State, consecrated by the Pontifices, and inaugurated by the augurs, it was not only the dwelling of the deity, but was in all respects of good omen, and might even be used for what we should call secular purposes—*e.g.*, for the assembling of the Senate. A document, in later times at least, in the form of an inscription, was drawn up by the Pontifices, recording the dedication, the amount of consecrated land, the rites to be performed, and other points; this was the *lex dedicationis* or *lex templi*. (See Marquardt, p. 270 ff.; and, for the whole subject of *loca sacra*, *ib.* p. 145 ff.; Wissowa[2], p. 467 ff.; Aust, p. 209 ff.)

As the *collegium* of augurs was certainly in existence in this first period of the Roman religion, it is possible that a few *templa*, in the proper sense of that word, may have come into being before the end of it. But, if we once more interrogate the Fasti, we shall find that the oldest festivals (see above, p. 822), with hardly an exception, are connected with places that had not been subjected to *inauguratio*, though they were *loca sacra*. The Robigalia, for example, was held at a grove, the Vestalia at the Ædes Vestæ, the Lucaria at a grove, the Consualia at an underground *ara*, the Opiconsivia in the Regia, as also the Agonia of Jan. 9, the Opalia at an altar in the Forum, the Feralia at burial-places, the Lupercalia at the Lupercal, and the Regifugium in the Comitium (see Fowler under head of these festivals). The evidence seems convincing that, when the Fasti were drawn up, there were no *templa* technically so called. Where, as at the Quirinalia, we hear of a sacrifice at a spot where a *templum* is known to have existed in later times (Fowler, p. 322), we are not justified in inferring that it took place originally in such a building; there, as in other cases (Aust, *de Ædibus sacris Populi Romani*, Marburg, 1889, p. 33), the temple was without doubt preceded by a *sacellum*.

v. *RITUAL OF WORSHIP.*—The basis of the Roman's ritualistic dealing with his deities consisted in sacrifice and prayer, the two being, so far as we know, invariably combined. On important occasions, and for particular reasons, these were performed in the course of a procession or circuit round some object—land, city, army, or instruments, such as arms and trumpets—or, again, the whole Roman people, if supposed to be in need of 'purification' from some evil influence; in this extended form the ritual was called *lustratio*; and this ceremonial was perhaps the most characteristic, not only of the Roman, but of all ancient Italian forms of worship.

Sacrifice (*sacrificium*), as the word itself implies, was an act of making over to the deity some property more or less valuable, the meaning of *sacer*, as has already been explained, being 'that which belongs to a deity.' The nature of the *sacrificium*, as Marquardt puts it (p. 169), depended partly on the functions of the deity, partly on the object to be attained by the worshipper. The Roman husbandman offered the firstfruits of all his crops to the *numina* who were concerned with their welfare (Wissowa[2], p. 409), and this practice survived in the State in various forms; *e.g.*, the Vestals plucked the first ears of corn in May for the purpose of making sacred cakes, and the Flamen Dialis did the same with the grape-crop in August, with prayer for the safety of the whole vintage (Fowler, p. 204). Unbloody sacrifices of a similar kind also survived, not only in the daily private worship of the family and at the resting-places of the dead, but in the ritual of the festivals which descended directly from an earlier pastoral and agricultural life; *e.g.*, at the Parilia in April we hear of baskets of millet, cakes of the same,

pails of milk, etc. (Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 743 ff.); and at the Vestalia in June the Vestals offered sacred cakes made, in antique fashion, of the ears which they had plucked in May (*mola salsa*). But the evidence of the Fasti shows that we cannot get back to a time when animal-sacrifices were not also in use; and this is in entire accordance with the nature of Italian husbandry, which was always more occupied with the rearing of cattle than with the raising of crops. The wealth of the ancient Roman farmer consisted chiefly of cattle, and in State festivals we are not surprised to find that animal-sacrifices formed the staple of the worship. The animals most commonly sacrificed were oxen, sheep, and pigs; but the pig, as the cheaper and less honourable animal, was rarely used except in conjunction with the other two, or as a piacular sacrifice—a term to be explained below. The technical word for the slain animal, if ox, bull, or cow, was *victima*; if any kind of sheep, *hostia*. Male victims were employed in the worship of male deities and female victims in the worship of female deities, in later times at least; but, in view of the uncertainty of sex in the most ancient deities, it may be doubted whether this held good in our first period. But, so far as our information about the ritual of the earliest festivals reaches, we know that a ram was the sacrifice to Janus, a heifer to Jupiter (this was Jupiter Feretrius [Festus, p. 204]), and at the Fordicidia, presumably to Tellus, a pregnant cow; to Mars in the *lustratio agri*, presently to be described, ox, sheep, and pig. Of ancient usage also was the sacrifice of a dog at the Robigalia in April, and of a horse to Mars, as has already been mentioned, on Oct. 15. Of human sacrifice in the usual sense of the term there is no trace; but it might happen that in a season of great peril or pestilence the children born between March 1 and May 1 were made over to the god (*ver sacrum*), and, when they had grown up, were driven out of the Roman territory (Festus, p. 519; Liv. xxii. 10, xxxiii. 44).

The sacrificial ritual of the altar was extremely elaborate in later times, and it is impossible to say how much of it was in use at the time of which we are now treating; it may best be studied in Marquardt, p. 180 ff. All that need be said here is that the victim, which must be unblemished, was slain by the assistants of the priest, after its head had been sprinkled with fragments of the *mola salsa*, or sacred cake (*immolatio*), and with wine; that in all ordinary sacrifices its internal organs were carefully examined, and, if of good omen, were placed upon the altar, while the rest of the animal was eaten. We can have little doubt that the examination of the liver, etc., formed a part of the ceremonial in the earliest period, since the object was to determine whether the deity would be satisfied with the condition of the animal offered him, and especially with those vital parts which were to be his share; but the extraordinary development of the minutiæ of this practice belongs to a later time. At what precise point in the ceremony the prayer was said does not seem to be known; but it was probably during the laying of the *exta* on the altar. The priest or other person who uttered it had his head covered, to shut out all evil influences or omens from his eyes, while a *tibicen* played the *tibia* in order to secure the same result for the ears; all bystanders maintained a strict silence (Marquardt, p. 175 ff.). As is seen below, the prayer was the expression of a desire, if not a claim, on the part of the sacrificers, that the deity would consider favourably such wishes and interests of theirs as were within the range of his activity, either by averting evil or by doing positive benefit. To obtain the desired result, every detail, both of sacrifice and of prayer, had to be gone through correctly; and a slip in either or any accidental hindrance, such as the stopping of the music of the flute-player, made it necessary to begin the whole ritual over again, and to offer a *piaculum*, or apologetic sacrifice. In this case the victim was usually a pig, and there was no necessity to examine its entrails; it was offered whole or consumed by the priests (Marquardt, pp. 179, 185). On great occasions such a *piaculum* was offered on the day before the festival, in order once for all to expiate any omission that might happen; but it is possible that this was one of the later developments of the *jus divinum* (the victim in this case was a *porcus præcidaneus* [Gell. IV. vi. 7].) Undoubtedly, however, it was in the first period of religious organization within the State that this extraordinary precision in ceremonial detail had its beginning. It was itself the result of that peculiarly Roman conception of the supernatural which has already been touched upon. It was the outward expression of that vague fear of the unknown which we must attribute to the early Roman: he did not know his deities intimately, did not of himself know how to approach them with confidence, and might at any moment, for all he knew, be doing or saying things which would put them in evil mood towards him. It was just here that the State came to the rescue; and the unbounded confidence of the early Roman in his State authorities, both civil and religious, his habit of unquestioning obedience to them, and his sense of obligation or duty, in both private and public life, are largely, perhaps mainly, due to his feeling of helplessness as an individual in his relation with the unseen world. We shall have to trace later the decay of this confidence and sense of duty (*pietas*), as the Roman mind became subjected to new influences, and as the extreme formularization of the old cults gradually destroyed all their life and meaning. But in these early stages of the Roman State the religious discipline of minute ritual unquestionably had certain good and useful results (see Fowler, p. 344 ff.).

Before we leave the subject of ritual, it may be as well to illustrate it, in the most highly developed form which it took in this period, from the ceremony of *lustratio*, in which sacrifice, prayer, and procession were combined. The most remarkable record which we have of such a ceremony is not indeed Roman, but belongs to the Umbrian town of Iguvium; it is an inscription of great length, containing a mass of detail for the instruction of the priests taking part in the *lustratio* of a sacred hill (*ocris fisius*); it is in the Umbrian dialect, and difficult of interpretation, but it entirely confirms all we know of this religious process from Roman sources (Bücheler, *Umbrica*, 1883). The object of this process of *lustratio*, as explained by Wissowa (p. 390), was twofold: (1) to purify the object round which the procession went from all evil that might be lurking there, and so to obtain the goodwill (*pax*) of the deities concerned with it ('pacem deum exposcere'); (2) to protect it, by the aid of the god thus obtained, from all hostile influences, the circuit taken being a boundary within which no evil could come if the victims before their slaughter were driven round it according to the prescribed traditional order. This explanation may be taken as representing the Roman idea of historical times, and it is not necessary here to try to penetrate behind it into the notions of primitive man; but it may be remarked that one at least of the lustrations of the old Roman calendar, that of the Palatine hill by the Luperci on Feb. 15, presents very peculiar features, which cannot altogether be explained in this way (see Fowler, p. 310 ff.), and also that the boundary line of city or *ager*, being carefully followed each year on

these occasions, was thus kept accurately in remembrance.

But the typical *lustratio* of which we know the details is that of the Ambarvalia in May, itself developed beyond doubt from the *lustratio* of the farm by the Roman husbandman, of which the detail has been preserved to us in Cato's treatise on agriculture. We have to follow Cato, applying his account to the developed festival of the city; but we have sufficient evidence that the latter was conducted on the same lines (Cato, *de Agricultura*, 141). The procession of victims, bull, sheep, and pig—the most valuable property of the Roman—passed all round the fields just as the crops were ripening, and therefore most liable to injury from storm or disease. Three times they went round the land; at the end of the third round they were sacrificed, and a solemn prayer was recited, which, according to Cato's formula, ran thus (we must suppose that the Fratres Arvales, who were the priests presiding at the Ambarvalia, used a similar formula, on an extended scale, for the State land):

'Father Mars, I pray and beseech thee to be willing and propitious to me, my household, and my slaves; for the which object I have caused these victims to be driven round my farm and land. I pray thee, keep, avert, and turn from us all disease, seen or unseen, all desolation, ruin, damage, and unseasonable influence; I pray thee, give increase to the fruits, the corn, the vines, and the plantations, and bring them to a prosperous issue. Keep also in safety the shepherds and their flocks, and give good health and vigour to me, my house, and household. To this end it is, as I have said—namely, for the purification and making due lustration of my farm, my land cultivated and uncultivated—that I pray thee to bless this threefold sacrifice.'

At all these religious ceremonies the sacrificing priest, and all magistrates who had the right of sacrificing (in this period the Rex only), wore a peculiar dress. The most regular and characteristic one was the purple-bordered robe called *toga prætexta*, which was also worn by children, both boys and girls, up to the age of puberty, probably because they had originally taken part as acolytes (*camilli, camillæ*) in the sacrifices of the family (see Fowler, in *ClR* x. [1896] 317 ff.). But the most ancient priests, who were attached to particular cults, and whose sacrificial functions were continuous throughout the year, had special insignia of their own, which they wore at all times to distinguish them, and so to avoid the many causes of pollution with which they might accidentally meet. The Flamines had an *apex*, or leathern cap, in which was fixed an olive twig with a wisp of white wool (Serv. *ad Æn.* ii. 683), and their wives (*flaminicæ*) a *tutulus*, or raised head-dress, bound with a purple fillet. The Vestals wore a white robe, and, when sacrificing, a thick white veil with purple stripe (see, for this *suffibulum*, J. H. Middleton, *Ancient Rome in 1885*, London, 1885, p. 199). The Salii, when performing their dances, etc., wore a primitive military dress, the *trabea* and *tunica picta*; the Luperci ran round the Palatine hill at the Lupercalia, girt with skins, probably those of the victims (Marquardt, p. 444, note 3); the Fratres Arvales were conspicuous by a crown of corn-ears made fast with white fillets (Gell. VII. vii. 8).

From what has been said in this sketch of the Roman religion in its earliest form as a concern of the State, the following characteristic points should have become conspicuous.

1. The Roman believed himself to live in the midst of a population of spiritual beings (*numina*), whose attitude towards him was a doubtful one, and continually influenced by what he did or said.

2. As a consequence, it was necessary for him to be on good terms with them, and this could be securely accomplished only by the constituted authorities of a State who by experience and tradition had learnt how to deal with them.

3. This being not only an essential, but *the most essential*, part of the duties of the State, there was no real distinction between the *jus sacrum* and the *jus civile*; the former was a part of the latter, and always continued so (cf. Cic. *de Legibus*, bks. ii. and iii.).

4. So, too, there is no original distinction between priest and magistrate; they were both alike concerned in conciliating the divine inhabitants of the city. 'It was not a poet or prophet, but a King, and a priest-king, to whom the Romans attributed the origin of their religious organization' (Aust).

5. This inseparable union of State and religion had important and valuable effects on the Roman character; the State was more to the individual than perhaps in any community ancient or modern. But the religion, as a religion, had an insufficient vitality.

6. This was chiefly because it was originally based on a feeling of fear, which was never wholly shaken off. It was mainly negative in character; *i.e.*, the range of its prohibitions was far larger than that of its precepts. It can hardly be said that the moral law was enforced by it; and there was a distinction between what was due to one's fellow-men (*jus*) and what was due to the gods (*fas*).

7. The one feature of this religion which had a moral value was the constant and indispensable attention to the details of duty; if these were not duties to a deity who is righteous, and the source of all righteousness, yet they were duties that must be fulfilled; and they constituted a righteous dealing towards the divine beings, which created a claim upon them to deal righteously towards the Roman, and to hinder and destroy his enemies, human and material. Beyond this we cannot go. the *pietas* of the old Roman was a valuable quality in itself, but it never led him to base his daily conduct upon higher motives than obedience to the State and its authorities as mediators between himself and a dangerous spiritual world. It would always have been difficult for a Roman to appreciate the story of Antigone.

II. Second Period

(From the Etruscan kings to the war with Hannibal).

The religious system which has been described belonged exclusively to the State proper, *i.e.* to the patricians, or members of the old patrician *gentes*; no plebeian or 'outsider' had any part in it whatever, either as priest or as worshipper. This will be easily understood after what has already been explained as to the relation of the divine and the human members of the State; the former had no existence apart from the latter, and, as the State consisted of the patrician *gentes*, the deities who had taken up their abode in that State had, of course, no dealings with any others, and could be approached only by those who had entered into relations with them. But by the 7th cent. B.C. a considerable population was growing up in the city and its territory which did not belong to the old *gentes*, and whose cults and deities were altogether outside of the religion of the State proper. With the origin of this population we are not here concerned; what is of importance for our present purpose is to note that there is very strong evidence that the last three kings of Rome were not Romans but Etruscans, and that the patrician State succumbed for a time to an invasion of that great Etruscan power which at this time spread itself over central Italy, entering into relations

not only with the Latins of the Campagna, but with the Greeks of Cumæ and the western coast. The consequence was a great and permanent revolution, not only in the political institutions, but in the religious system of the State. The second of these kings, generally known as Servius Tullius, admitted the plebeians to the army, and divided the city and its territory into four tribes, comprising all free men, whether patricians or plebeians, who occupied a certain amount of land. The last king, Tarquinius Superbus, has all the characteristics of the tyrant: the Roman territory was extended, the aristocracy of the patrician *gentes* was oppressed, while the unprivileged classes were brought forward and utilized. A great religious development accompanied the political one, of which we can distinctly trace two features: (1) the admission of the plebeians to a share in the worship of the State; (2) the introduction of new deities and worships, of one new and important priesthood, and of new methods of approaching the divine protectors of the State, both old and new. In the period we have now before us the old worships continued to exist as before, for the Romans held tenaciously to every custom and cult which they had at any time recognized; but the Rome that in the three following centuries extended her dominion over Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia could not but extend at the same time the range of her deities and her worship. Conquest, commerce, alliance, and, we may add, even peril and pestilence brought new additions to her divine population. If a community was conquered by her, its deities and their cult came into her hands, and she must either continue their worship within the conquered city or invite them to take up their abode at Rome (Marquardt, p. 35 ff.). Again, if the State was in peril, either from enemies or from pestilence, it might be necessary to call in the aid of new deities where the old ones seemed to be of no avail; for, as the dominion and intercourse of the State were extended, it came into contact with deities of whom the Roman authorities knew nothing, and who needed special invocation by experts in the right methods. Thus, while the list of the *di indigetes* was closed for ever, that of the *di novensides*, the new-comers, was continually being increased; new and startling forms of worship were seen in the city, and temples were frequently being vowed and dedicated both to old deities and to new ones—to old deities under new names and forms, and to new ones who consented to take up their abode in or just outside the city. It is a period of religious activity as constant and vigorous as the political; but it can be sketched in this article only in outline.

1. The first and perhaps one of the best authenticated examples of the introduction of new cults at Rome is the foundation on the Aventine, outside the *pomerium*, of a temple of Diana. This was universally attributed to Servius Tullius, and is described by Varro (*de Ling. Lat.* v. 43) as 'commune Latinorum Dianæ templum.' Now, the famous cult of Diana at Aricia, which has become familiar to us since the publication of Frazer's *Golden Bough*, was undoubtedly the centre-point of a Latin league which succeeded that of Alba Longa; and the inference is that the headship of that league was now transferred from Aricia to Rome, and with it the cult of Diana, who will not be found (see above) in our list of the *di indigetes*. This was a temple in the full sense of the word, and its *lex dedicationis*, or *lex templi*, became the model for all later ones (*CIL* xii. 4333). Later on it contained, after the fashion which began in this period, a statue of the goddess modelled on the type of the Ephesian Artemis, and borrowed from her cult at Massilia (Strabo, iv. 180). (For further details and references in connexion with this important event in the history of the Roman religion see Wissowa's exhaustive art. 'Diana,' in his ed. of Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*.)

2. To the same period of Etruscan influence, and traditionally ascribed to Tarquinius Superbus, belongs a far more famous sanctuary, and one destined to be for ever the central religious point of the Roman dominion; this is the temple of **Jupiter Optimus Maximus, Juno, and Minerva,** at the north end of the Capitoline hill, where its foundations, showing unmistakable signs of Etruscan design, may still be seen (Middleton, p. 232). The combination of three deities in a single cult and a single temple was foreign to Rome, though not uncommon in Greece; and, though we do not know why Juno and Minerva shared this great temple with Jupiter (who was at all times the great object of worship there), we infer that the trias came with Italian names from Etruria, where it represented an original trias (Tinia, Thalna, Minerva) introduced under Greek influence. The temple was on a scale of magnificence utterly unknown to the primitive Roman builders: it was divided into three parts by two lines of pillars, and three *cellæ* at the north-western end contained statues of the three deities, with Jupiter in the middle holding his thunderbolt. Such a foundation indicates a very great change in the religious ideas of the Romans, and the researches of recent times have placed it beyond all reasonable doubt that it was meant to overpower all the old cults of the patrician *gentes* by exhibiting in the utmost splendour one which should be common ground for patrician and plebeian alike, and which should symbolize the unity of the Roman State in its new form—the form in which it was destined to advance in fame and dominion till it overshadowed all the States of the civilized world (see J. A. Ambrosch, *Studien und Andeutungen*, Breslau, 1839, p. 205 ff.). At the same time, in all probability, was also built the temple of Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban hill, which henceforward took the place of the temple of Diana in uniting the members of the Latin league in a religious worship (Fowler, p. 95 ff.).

In close connexion with this great temple there came in new usages of the utmost importance in the history of the Roman religion. The *dies natalis*, or dedication day, of the temple was Sept. 13, and on this day took place the *epulum Jovis*, when the images of the three deities were decked out as for a feast, and the face of Jupiter was painted red with minium; the magistrates and Senate partook of a meal in which the deities were supposed also to share. We do not know for certain at what date this practice began, but it is by no means impossible that in one form or another, though hardly perhaps as a completely anthropomorphic conception of the deities concerned, it may be attributed to the same period as the temple (Marquardt, p. 348; cf. Fowler, p. 218). This temple also was the goal of the triumphal procession of the victorious king or consul, who was then dressed and painted like the statue of Jupiter himself; and the games (*ludi votivi*, afterwards *ludi Romani*), which he had vowed to hold in honour of the god if victorious, were originally celebrated on the same day.

3. The most important of all the innovations of this age was the introduction into the temple of the so called **Sibylline Oracles**, under the influence of which an entirely new system of ritual was brought into vogue. This must now be explained in some detail. (For the Capitoline temple and

Jupiter see esp. Aust's art. 'Jupiter,' in Roscher, iii. 705 ff.)

According to the familiar Roman story, these 'oracles' were pressed on the last king of Rome by the Sibyl of Cumæ herself, and he finally took from her three books of them, which were preserved in the Capitoline temple. It may be that the Romans first made acquaintance with the Cumæan Sibyl at this time; but it is highly probable that the story was invented to give credit to the verses which from time to time were invented by the Roman priests themselves to suit particular exigencies of the State (H. Diels, *Sibyllinische Blätter*, Berlin, 1890). What is certain is that these verses contained not prophecies of future events, but religious 'prescriptions' as remedies for alarming prodigies, pestilences, etc., and that these had nothing to do with the old Roman worship of the *di indigetes*, but involved the introduction of new deities, or of old ones in a new form, and of new ceremonies of a kind much more sensational, if the word may be used, than any yet seen in the city. The intercourse with Cumæ and the Greek cities thus led directly to great changes; and, though it was the immediate result of the Etruscan dynasty, there can also be no doubt that the change it brought about was accepted by the patrician aristocracy which succeeded that dynasty, and that they manipulated the new 'oracles' with far-reaching effects. The verses were committed to the care of a new patrician priesthood, consisting of two members, the *duoviri sacris faciundis*; on the authorization of magistrates and Senate they were from time to time consulted by these priests, who then announced (without divulging the verses themselves) the result of their inquiries, and recommended certain rites as the necessary remedies for the evils to be averted. Thus it is at once clear that the governing class acquired in this way the legal means of metamorphosing the whole Roman religious system; and it is hardly too much to say that they succeeded in doing it.

4. It was just after the abolition of the kingship, according to the Roman chronicles, that the new priesthood first introduced a new worship; in 493 B.C. was built the temple of the Greek trias Demeter, Dionysus, Persephone, under the Roman names **Ceres, Liber, Libera. Apollo**, with whom the Sibyl had always been closely connected, followed soon, in 431 B.C. Among other Greek deities introduced in the same way were Artemis as **Diana**, Aphrodite as **Venus** (the latter an old Italian deity of the garden), and **Æsculapius**. All these were worshipped with the *ritus Græcus*, which henceforward was recognized as equally legitimate with the *ritus Romanus*; *e.g.*, the head of the sacrificing priest, which in Roman usage was always covered, as has been described above, was in the *ritus Græcus* uncovered (Marquardt, p. 186). This is the only detail of the new sacrificial ritual of which we have certain knowledge; but there were other ceremonies introduced by the same agency which had a more important bearing both on the Roman religion and on its character. In the year 399 B.C., as we learn from Livy (v. 13), what was called a *lectisternium* was for the first time ordered by the Duoviri 'ex Sibyllinis libris,' in consequence of an alarming pestilence. For eight days Apollo and Latona, Hercules and Diana, Mercurius and Neptunus, were seen reclining on couches in Greek fashion, and appearing to partake of a meal laid out on a table in front of each of them; the figures were wooden puppets richly robed, and rested with their left arms on cushions (*pulvinaria*). Here there seem to be at least one or two of the old Roman deities; but we soon discover that Diana is really Artemis; Latona, Leto; Mercurius, Hermes; Neptunus, Poseidon; and we can guess that, though the experts may have believed that the foreign gods were more efficacious for the purpose in hand, it was desirable to propitiate the people by introducing some of them at least under familiar names. These *lectisternia* were frequently repeated, and came to form the essential part of the *supplicationes*, or festivals of prayer and intercession, which were also ordered by the Duoviri 'ex Sibyllinis libris,' though sometimes also by the Pontifices and Senate (Marquardt, p. 48), and consisted of processions and worship at each place where the gods were exposed to view, as described above. It is noticeable that, while on the old Roman system the priest alone took part in religious rites and was alone admitted to a temple, here the whole populace was expected to view the processions; men, women, and children prostrated themselves in prayer before the images of the gods, or crowded into the new temples (Liv. iii. 5, 7).

These rites mark the first appearance of a tendency, constantly recurring in later Roman history, to seek for a more emotional expression of religious feeling than was afforded by the old forms of sacrifice and prayer, conducted as they were by the priest on behalf of the community without its active participation. It would seem as if the sensitiveness of the human fibre of a primitive community increases with its increasing complexity and with the greater variety of experience to which it is exposed; and, in the case of Rome, as if the simple ancient methods of dealing with the divine inhabitants who had been induced to settle on the site were felt to be no longer adequate to the needs of a State which was steering its way to empire among so many difficulties and perils. It is not, indeed, certain that the new rites, or some of them, may not have had their prototypes in old Italian usage (see Marquardt, p. 46; Fowler, p. 218); but what we can be sure of, so far as our evidence can carry us, is that the emotional element was wholly new. In Livy's accounts we seem to see a sense of sin, or at any rate of pollution—a something wrong in the relation of the State to the supernatural, which did at times show itself in the ancient world, as, *e.g.*, at Athens in the 6th century B.C. No doubt it indicates, both at Rome and at Athens, the presence of a new population, or at any rate of one outside of political privilege, which cannot rely upon the efficacy of methods in which it has no share and of which it knows nothing—a population left out of account to a great extent in the dealings of the State with the gods, and therefore the more liable to anxiety and emotion. If we can judge of this period of Roman religious history by the general tendency of the policy of the Roman Government, we may see here a deliberate attempt to include the new population in worship of a kind that would calm its fears and satisfy its emotion, while leaving uncontaminated the old ritual which had served the State so long.

But there are not wanting signs in this period that the old religious forms were being cared for and developed in new ways; and this is more particularly obvious in the last century before the war with Hannibal. This brings us to a consideration of the part played after the expulsion of the last king by the two great colleges of Pontifices and augurs, who, as we have seen, were during the regal period only the consulting staff of the Rex in religious matters. The patrician aristocracy used them with consummate skill in establishing their control over all religious aspects of the State's business; and it was not till the year 300 B.C. that plebeians were admitted to them, though long before that date (in 367, Liv.

vi. 37) the Duoviri had been increased to ten, half of whom must be plebeians.

5. **The Pontifices.**—This *collegium* was originally of the sacred number three (Marquardt, p. 241), was increased to nine in this period as the business of the office grew, and later rose to fifteen. Of these members the Pontifex maximus was at all times both nominally and really the head, while the others formed his *consilium*, according to Roman magisterial practice; on him devolved, when the kingship was abolished, the whole of the functions of the Rex in relation to the *jus divinum*; *i.e.* the *sacra* of the State, in the widest sense of the word, were in his care. The Vestals, the Rex sacrorum, and the three great Flamines were selected by him under a process which placed them in his *potestas* as they had been in that of the Rex (see above); and he succeeded to the Regia which had been the king's dwelling, and which was close to the temple of Vesta, the heart of the State, on the Via Sacra. As he held his office for life, and as under his presidency the *collegium* co-opted its own members when vacancies occurred, it may fairly be said that he was the most important and influential personage in the State during this period; and this will be still more obvious if we consider his powers and duties. These were chiefly administrative, and may be explained under two heads, as they affected (1) the State in general, and (2) the life and interests of families and individuals.

(1) *State authority.*—The special sacrificial functions of the Rex, which were traditionally associated with his title, passed to the Rex sacrorum; but much ritualistic work remained for the Pontifex maximus and his colleagues. For example, all piacular sacrifices, except those which were undertaken after inspection of the Sibylline books by the Duoviri, were ordered by, and carried out under the supervision of, the Pontifices; the books of Livy abound with examples of this practice. Events were constantly happening which required such expiation, and it was only in extreme cases that the Pontifices gave way to the Duoviri. All *prodigia*, and especially the striking of any spot or building by lightning, called for their action (*procuratio fulguris*), and such places were under their directions walled in and remained sacred. Again, all vows (*vota*) made by magistrates—*e.g.*, in undertaking to build a temple, or to hold *ludi*, in case of the successful issue of a war or other enterprise—were subject to the approval of the Pontifices, who dictated the exact wording of the *votum*, and superintended its fulfilment.[1] No temple could be made over to a deity without their sanction, and the terms of dedication as well as the whole ritual to be followed were laid down by them in the *lex dedicationis*. The reception or admission of new deities lay within their sphere of action; and, though we do not hear of collisions between them and the Duoviri sacris faciundis, we can hardly suppose that the latter could have resisted objections on the part of the higher *collegium* to any new cults brought in under their auspices. But, as we examine the list of temple foundations of this period (see Aust, *de Ædilibus*), we seem to see that those which were due to the Duoviri and the Sibylline books were most numerous in the first two centuries after the expulsion of the last king, while a new period of pontifical activity in this department seems to begin after the opening of the *collegium* to the plebs in the year 300 B.C. Between 273 and 264 B.C. we find four temples dedicated to gods not of Greek but of Italian origin: to Consus, Pales, Tellus, and Vertumnus; and during the first Punic war to the Tempestates, to Janus, to Juturna, and to Fons, all deities connected with water, who were perhaps utilized, in the absence of any distinctively Roman god of the sea, at a time when Roman fleets were in continual peril. The Pontifices seem, too, at this time to have been very active in inventing new deities on Roman lines and in harmony with Roman ways of thinking of the divine; thus abstractions, such as Salus, Fides, Spes, Pudicitia, are provided with habitations, and a deity Argentinus, according to a highly probable conjecture of Mommsen, was introduced when silver coins were first struck in 268 B.C. In fact, the Pontifices, under the headship for many years in this 3rd cent. B.C. of plebeians (Ti. Coruncanius [Liv. *Epit.* xviii.], Cæcilius Metellus, from 243 to 224), were so extremely active in this way that it is not unreasonable to ascribe to them that strange catalogue of deities called the *Indigitamenta*, which is usually referred to a much earlier time, and which is constantly quoted to prove that the Romans of the earliest age invented and named deities who presided over every action of their lives. Varro copied this list from the *libri pontificum*, and St. Augustine (*de Civ. Dei*, iv. 8 ff.) copied them from Varro to show the absurdities of the Roman worship. If, as the present writer believes, these lists were merely the results of pontifical invention in the age of which we are speaking, and, though based on the ideas of the spirit-world which were explained under period I., were never really popular, there is no need to examine them here; we may be content with noting that they exemplify well the tendency to what we may call a scientific theology, built up on popular ideas, but coming far too late to have any permanent effect on the Roman conscience—if, indeed, they ever could have had any. We may see in Cunina, the cradle deity, in Iterduca, the deity who attended the children to school, in Sterculina, the dunghill spirit, and the rest, a pontifical classification which probably had no other effect than to assist in taking the life out of the old Roman's feeling towards the *numina* around him—an example of the process by which a religious system was gradually killed by the exaggeration of its own methods (see art. INDIGITAMENTA; and, for the view given above, Fowler, p. 341, and *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, p. 159 ff.).

Two other functions pertaining to public administration remain to be mentioned. First, they had the entire charge of the calendar with its course of religious festivals. It is not necessary here to go into the history of the Roman measurement of time or the nature of their astronomical year; but all such matters, as well as the adjustment of religious rites within the year, were absolutely in the hands of this college, and the frequent necessity for intercalation put a power into their hands which, in later times at least, was often used for political purposes. Secondly, the archives of the State were in their keeping, and consisted of records drawn up by themselves, both of religious and of political events.

(2) *Authority over private life.*—Every Roman family had, like the State, its own *sacra*, which it was bound to keep up as long as it existed, and which ceased to exist when it came to an end; we have already noticed the worship of the door and the hearth, and that of the dead ancestors, and to these were no doubt added in some families special cults of particular deities, as, *e.g.*, that of Vejovis at Bovillæ in the Julia gens. Thus every marriage, every death of a *paterfamilias*, and every testament made by persons *sui juris* was of importance not only in the way in which we regard them at the present day, but as affecting the maintenance of

[1] Liv. iv. 27 'dictator, præeunte A. Cornelio pontifice maximo, ludos . . . vovit.'

these *sacra*, which became eventually so often a burden upon the family that a *hereditas sine sacris* was a proverbial instance of good luck. The supervision of all these matters, originally so immensely important for the integrity and perpetuity of the Roman family, was the work of the Pontifices. The old patrician form of marriage by *confarreatio*, a rite of distinctly religious character (De Marchi, p. 147 ff.), could be completed only by the consent and in the presence of the Pontifex maximus; for by this process a new family was created, of which the new *sacra* had to be organized by him. For much the same reason the making of a will was a process of a sacred character, to which the consent of the *collegium* was necessary. In the days of the kings the Rex had presided on these occasions twice in the year, on March 24 and May 24 (Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, iii. 375) at the Comitia Curiata (called on these days *Calata*), no doubt with the Pontifices as assessors; and to the Rex succeeded the Pontifex maximus, as we may infer, though we have no direct evidence (cf. Marquardt, p. 307). Once more, the whole *jus manium*, *i.e.* the rules under which the rites of burial were conducted, and the yearly renewal of these at the Parentalia, the choice of the last resting-place, and all questions as to the right of a dead person to burial—these matters were also wholly under the jurisdiction of the *collegium*. If we try to appreciate the fact that such things were infinitely more important in the eyes of the early Roman population than they are for us—that the least flaw in carrying them out might lead to very unpleasant consequences for the family—we shall begin to understand how great and far-reaching was the power of the Pontifices over the conscience of the *privatus homo*: it can be compared only to the power of the mediæval priest, and might have become a yoke on the popular mind as heavy and as continuous, if the Romans had been sensitive to threatened terrors in another life, or if they had not come into contact with the unbelieving Greek even before this second period came to a close. (For further details see art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD [Roman]; A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Les Pontifes de l'ancienne Rome*, Paris, 1871; Marquardt, pp. 235–320; Wissowa², p. 501 ff.)

6. The Augures.—The *collegium* of Augures, originally, like that of the Pontifices, three in number with the Rex at the head, was also increased to nine, and opened to the plebs in the eventful year 300 B.C. by the Lex Ogulnia. It stands apart from the other priesthoods, inasmuch as it had nothing to do with the actual worship of the gods; its activity was entirely concerned with the interpretation of omens, which were supposed to affect all State business, including the appointment of priests, the consecration of temples, the reaping of the crops, and the meetings of assemblies for the election of magistrates and the passing of laws. Doubtless the Italian husbandman, before he had become the citizen of a State, had been wont to observe carefully all signs of weather, among which would naturally be reckoned the movements of birds and other animals; in part such omens would be based on experience and of some practical value, in part also on fancy and superstition. The work of the augurs in the city-State was to reduce these signs to a system, as the Pontifices reduced to a system the details of worship and religious law. Conflicting interpretations would lead to delays and quarrels; and it is most characteristic of the Roman ideas of government that the whole authority in such vital matters should be placed in the hands of a *collegium*, in whose decisions the State and all its members should have absolute confidence as the *interpretes Jovis*, who could construct a system of their own, hold their meetings in strict privacy (on the Nones of each month), and so relieve the minds of the people from constant scruple and doubt.

Every Roman magistrate of the highest rank had the right of *spectio*, *i.e.* of taking the auspices; but the college of augurs was the referee in all doubtful cases, and in the city the magistrate was accompanied by an augur when, rising at midnight, he took his position at the proper place in order to observe the heavens (Marquardt, p. 401 and reff.). The details of augural lore which were strictly followed on these occasions are very complicated, and imperfectly known; and they have in reality little to do with the religious beliefs of the people. As an example we may cite the fact that, apart from the observation of the flight of birds and of lightning, which was the chief subject of the elaborate systematization of this *collegium*, that of the manner of feeding of the sacred chickens was also developed under their superintendence: if the chickens refused to feed, the omen was bad; if they so greedily devoured that they dropped grains out of their bills, the omen was good (Cic. *de Divinatione*, i. 15). It is needless to say that such absurdities led to a disbelief in the whole system among educated men, though it was kept up for the benefit of the ignorant and superstitious multitude; and before the close of our period we have a Consul in command of a fleet throwing the sacred chickens (which every fleet and army carried with it) into the sea because they would not feed (in 249 B.C. [Liv. *Epit.* xix.]).

Before we leave these two great *collegia* of the Pontifices and Augures, it is necessary to point out that these 'priests' were in no sense what we should now call ecclesiastics, set apart from the world of laymen to live a holy life, to teach, and to preach; they might be magistrates as well as priests, they taught no doctrine, they practised no asceticism. The religion which they represented was one of works and not of faith; so long as the cults were properly carried out and the omens duly observed, all was done that need be done for the safety and prosperity of the State and its members. As the *jus divinum* was part of the *jus civile*, so were the priests to be reckoned among the officials of the State. Only the most ancient ones, the Vestals and the Flamines, were kept apart from the rest of the population as being engaged in daily sacrificial operations which would be ineffectual if they were liable to contamination, and of these the Vestals alone maintained their exclusive priestly character to the last.

To sum up the characteristics of this period, we notice:

1. The introduction of numerous new deities and their cults, both of Italian and of Greek origin, and of a more showy and emotional ritual, the latter more especially under the direction of the Sibylline books and their keepers, the *duoviri sacris faciundis*.

2. The systematization of the *jus divinum* as an essential part of the *jus civile*, or law of the State, to such a degree that all the important acts of a Roman citizen, both public and private, were regulated in their relation to the divine inhabitants of the city.

3. The rise to paramount power in the State of the two great colleges by whom this regulation was effected, and especially of the Pontifices.

III. THIRD PERIOD

(From the war with Hannibal to the Empire, 218–31 B.C.).

The religious system which we have been so far examining may be described as the sum-total of

all those cults which were recognized and maintained by the State: this maintenance by the State was the unifying principle in it. In the period now to be dealt with we shall find the care of the State for the old cults becoming rapidly relaxed, while at the same time new and foreign ones are introduced of a kind much more incompatible with the old Roman ideas than any that had been adopted in the previous age, those old ideas themselves being used more and more for political purposes only, as the governing class discovered that under the influence of Greek philosophy it ceased to share them, while the lower population remained at least as superstitious as ever. Here, then, the Roman State-religion might be said to come to an end, so far as it was an honest supervision of the relations between the human and the divine population for the mutual benefit of both—a work of *pietas*, a performance of duty from genuine motives, with the object of safeguarding the best interests of the community. As Aust has well said (p. 57), the subject now branches in three directions, if we are to follow the history at Rome of those ideas which may broadly be termed religious, though they no longer combine to form a characteristic national religion. We should have to trace the decay of the old cults; the growth of new beliefs or speculations about the nature of the gods, Fate, divination, and duty; and, thirdly, the superstitious notions of the masses and their increasing sensitiveness to the influence of exciting foreign worships. But to work all this out in detail would be quite beyond the scope of this article. It will be better (1) to give a brief account of the immediate effects of the war with Hannibal, both during its continuance and afterwards, on the religious feelings of the people and on the policy of the governing class; (2) to sketch briefly the influence of Greek literature and philosophy in disintegrating the old religious ideas; (3) to summarize the actual results of these causes on the national religion in the last two centuries B.C. Even the decay of a religion is a valuable study; and perhaps there is no other example of decay so well attested and so easily admitting of explanation. (For detailed accounts of this period see Marquardt, p. 57 ff.; Wissowa[2], p. 60 ff.; L. Krahner, *Grundlinien zur Gesch. des Verfalls der römischen Staatsreligion*, Halle, 1837, *passim*; Fowler, *Religious Experience*, pp. 314–356.)

i. *THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE HANNIBALIC WAR.*—To those unaccustomed to reflect on the course of Roman history it may seem strange that a single war should be so far-reaching in its results; and it is indeed true that our comparative ignorance of the civil history of the First Punic war, owing to the loss of Livy's second decade, may incline us to attribute too much to the Second. Yet there can be no doubt that the prolonged struggle with Hannibal (218–204 B.C.), carried on nearly all that time in Italy itself, forms a turning-point in the history of the Roman people and therefore of the Roman religion. It was, in fact, a civil war as well as a struggle with a foreign enemy; the population of Italy as well as of Rome suffered terribly, from pestilence as well as slaughter; the economy of the whole peninsula was upset; and at the end, when rest and recuperation were so sorely needed, it was found that another great war with Macedonia was the necessary result of that with Hannibal, and that Rome was but beginning a course of conquest which was destined to change her whole being, leaving hardly a trace of the old Rome whose religious ideas we have been examining.

At all the most critical moments of the war Livy records a number of ill-omened occurrences (*prodigia*) which were announced from various places in the *ager Romanus*, together with the directions given by the Decemviri or the Pontifices for expiating them (*procuratio*). These *prodigia* seem to have been first made matter of record during the First war with Carthage, for the work of Julius Obsequens (*Prodigiorum liber*) originally began in the year 247 B.C., as we gather from its title, and it must have been at that date that Livy was first able to embody them in his history. It would seem, then, that in stress of war and public danger the nervousness of the people was great, and was met by special measures taken by the religious authorities; and it is to be noticed that these measures are almost without exception derived from the Sibylline books; *i.e.*, they were not the old Roman methods of expiation, but appeals to new methods and often to foreign deities. It was the belief of the people that the old methods were insufficient, and the Roman deities angry or indifferent. It will suffice here to mention the most remarkable of the new prescriptions which are recorded during the Hannibalic war.

Livy tells us that in 218 B.C., after the battle on the Trebbia, almost the whole community was busy with the *procuratio* of a number of *prodigia*; the city was lustrated; forty pounds of gold were carried to the temple of Juno at Lanuvium; the *matronæ* dedicated a bronze statue to Juno in her temple on the Aventine; a *lectisternium* was ordered at Cære, because the *sortes* of the oracle there had 'shrunk'; Fortuna in Algidum had a *supplicatio*; at Rome Juventas had a *lectisternium*, and Hercules a *supplicatio*; then the whole people held a *supplicatio* 'circa omnia pulvinaria'; and a prætor was directed to undertake the fulfilment of certain vows if the State should be in existence ten years later. 'Hæc procurata votaque ex libris Sibyllinis,' adds Livy (xxi. 62), 'magna ex parte levaverant animos religione'; *i.e.*, these measures served for the time to quiet popular scruple and anxiety. But almost directly a new trouble seized men's minds; for the Consul Flaminius, the victim of Trasimene, left the city to assume his command without taking the auspices or making the usual vows in the Capitol, fearing that for political reasons the Senate might detain him by falsifying the auspices—a significant fact, if it be a fact; and his subsequent defeat and death thus served only to increase the general panic. In the first chapter of bk. xxii. Livy records a new series of *prodigia* of all kinds, and recourse was again had to the Sibylline books, and fresh directions were given for expiation, among which we notice the growing Greek influence in the prominence of Juno, the legendary enemy of the Trojans, from whom the Romans were now beginning to believe themselves descended. After the disaster at Trasimene the record becomes still more astonishing. Besides *lectisternia* and *supplicationes*, the Sibylline books directed the general vow of a *ver sacrum* to be made (Liv. xxii. 9); *i.e.*, if five years later the State still existed in integrity, all sheep, oxen, pigs, goats, etc., were to be dedicated to the gods, according to the ancient Italian practice; and *ludi* were also vowed, to cost 333,333⅓ asses, the number three having a special religious significance. Lastly, the Decemviri ordered a *lectisternium* of three days, in which the twelve great Greek gods and goddesses appeared under Roman names: Zeus and Hera, Poseidon and Athene, Ares and Aphrodite, Apollo and Artemis, Hephæstus and Hestia, Hermes and Demeter (Liv. xxii. 10). After the crushing defeat at Cannæ envoys were sent to Delphi to inquire whether there was to be any end of these disasters; and during their absence the Decemviri ordered

'sacrificia aliquot extraordinaria' (Liv. xxii. 57), among which Livy mentions that of a Gallic man and woman and a Greek man and woman, who were buried alive in the Forum Boarium—a horrible rite which is said to have survived even into the Empire (Wissowa[2], p. 421).

These examples will have made it clear that the strong fibre of the Roman people was giving way under constant peril and anxiety; their belief in supernatural agency was profound, but they knew not what deity was persecuting them, or where to turn for help, and were in danger of complete demoralization. All the religious expedients which Livy has recorded are the attempts of the governing classes to quiet the minds of the people by convincing them that no effort was being spared to set right their relations with the unseen world, to vindicate themselves as mediators with the hostile deities; but so far all had been in vain, and the devices of the great colleges must have been put to a very severe test. Fortunately the worst was over, and only once during the course of the war was the danger again so imminent. When Hasdrubal was nearing Italy in 207 B.C., a fresh outbreak of *prodigia* was announced (Liv. xxvii. 37), and again new measures were taken, in which we once more note the prominence of Juno (Regina) and the predominance of Greek features in the steps taken to appease her. Two years later (206 B.C.) the Decemviri took a singular step in the hope of persuading the people to hold out a while longer until Hannibal should have evacuated Italy; twelve years had passed and he was still there, and both Rome and Italy were exhausted. They said that they found in their books an assertion that Italy could be freed from the enemy only if the sacred stone of the Magna Mater Idæa, the great goddess of Pessinus in Phrygia, were brought to Rome. The king of Pergamus, to whom the place and stone belonged, gave his consent, and the sacred symbol was conveyed to Rome, and received with relief and rejoicing by an excited and now hopeful people. 'Scipio was about to leave with his army for Africa; a fine harvest followed; Hannibal was forced to evacuate Italy the next year; and the goddess did everything that was expected of her' (Fowler, p. 70). The day on which the stone arrived was made a festival (April 4), called by the Greek name *Megalesia*. No Roman was allowed to take part in the service of the goddess, for such Oriental worships were of a dangerously orgiastic character; it was, in fact, a dangerous remedy, though a potent one. Nevertheless, the Government was willing within a few years to admit this stone into the very heart of the ancient city; it had been placed at first in the temple of Victoria, but in 191 B.C. was transferred to a temple of the Magna Mater herself on the Palatine hill, dedicated in that year (Aust, *de Ædibus sacris*, p. 22). With the introduction of this cult, which was freely taken up by all classes, we may connect the fashion of consulting Oriental astrologers, called by the Romans *Chaldæi* or *mathematici*, which continued far into the period of the Empire, in spite of frequent attempts to restrain it, as in 139 B.C., when they were expelled from Rome and Italy (Val. Max. I. iii. 3; and see the new Epitomes of Livy's sixth decade brought from Egypt by Grenfell and Hunt, line 192 [*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, pt. iii.]). The worship of Ma or Bellona from Cappadocia, and those of Isis and Mithras, were to follow in due course.

There can, indeed, be no doubt that both Romans and Italians found their own narrow system of religion quite inadequate to express what we may call their religious experience of the last twenty years; they had longed for aid and protection, and for knowledge of the right way to address themselves to the supernatural powers in whose existence the great mass of them still profoundly believed; and they had invoked in vain, on the old rigid methods, their own local and native deities. Undoubtedly the times had aroused strong emotion of a religious kind, and this had found no legitimate outlet. A still more striking proof of this than even the introduction of the Magna Mater is the extraordinary rapidity with which the rites of Dionysus-worship, surreptitiously introduced at this time, seized upon the minds of men and women of all classes in the year 186 B.C., spread over a great part of Italy, and drove the Government to interfere forcibly to save the State from the moral disintegration which accompanied it. The story is told in full by Livy (xxxix. 8 ff.), and we still have a part of the decree by which the Senate commissioned the Consuls to investigate and check the mischief (*CIL* i. 43). This object was achieved; yet the Bacchus-cult was allowed to remain, under strict supervision—the best of proofs, as Aust observes (p. 78), that the State religion no longer possessed the power to satisfy the cravings of the masses. It must, indeed, be remembered that the population of the city was by this time of a very mixed character; the true Roman people had suffered severely in the wars and by pestilence, and their place was largely taken by liberated slaves who were practically without any religion of their own. To such, and to their descendants, even Jupiter Optimus Maximus himself could hardly appeal, for he was, in fact, a political rather than a religious conception. We may take it as a fact that this population found little comfort in the cults provided for it, and little or no aid towards right conduct. All that could be done was to keep it amused with constant games and shows, which had been originally of a religious character and limited to single days, but now were secularized and freely extended in length, and to keep it provided with the means of existence. To provide it with a common religious belief or worship was utterly beyond the power of the Government. The old dying religion could indeed be used, so far as its forms went, for political purposes, to control the naturally superstitious masses; but it had lost its unifying and comforting power.

ii. *THE INFLUENCE OF GREEK LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY.*—The Hannibalic war affected the beliefs and the morale of all classes alike; the critical spirit of Greek thought was to affect chiefly and directly that upper stratum which was more or less capable of comprehending it. This critical spirit had long been acting as a solvent in Greece, not only on the ideas of the gods derived from the old mythology, but on the local cults of the Greek πόλεις and the belief in their efficacy; and in this process it had been greatly assisted by the conquests of Alexander and the wars of his successors. With the break-up of the keen individual life of the Greek city disappeared the genuine relation of the polytheistic Greek religion to the life of the citizen; though the old city-cults lingered on in outward form, they lost their real meaning under the overshadowing power of deified kings and the attempts of philosophers to provide a rational basis for the daily conduct of the individual. Thus the Roman governing class, when it came rapidly under the influence of Greek thought in the period with which we are now dealing, when it began to develop a literature and to think, found nothing to learn from the Greeks which could act otherwise than as a solvent of its old religious ideas.

The very first example that we meet of this destructive process is too striking to be omitted

here, though it is no doubt possible to exaggerate its importance. Ennius, the first man of real genius who wrote in Latin, among his many works translated the rationalizing treatise of Euhemerus, in which he attempted to explain the Greek gods as merely ancient kings who had been deified—an idea quite in harmony with the prevailing practice of the post-Alexandrian period; and this translation does not seem to have met with any disapproval at Rome. It is characteristic of the age that the man who did more than any one before Virgil to glorify the Roman character and dominion should have struck the first direct blow at the popular belief in the gods; but Ennius was no Roman himself, and he was perhaps only expressing his personal views (Krahner, p. 44). It is doubtful whether the book became popular; it is mentioned only once in Roman literature (Cic. *de Nat. Deorum*, i. 42, 119), and the methods of publication were then but little understood; but in other works Ennius shows the same tendency (cf. the famous lines in his *Telamo*, based on the teaching of Epicurus: 'Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam cælitum, Sed eos non curare opinor quid agat humanum genus,' etc. [O. Ribbeck, *Trag. Rom. Frag.*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 54]); and in his Pythagorean work entitled *Epicharmus* he introduced the Romans to naturalistic ideas of the gods which became the common property of educated men, and can be traced in the writers of plays, in Lucilius, Cicero, and Varro.

But the two great systems of post-Aristotelian philosophy which found place at Rome in the last two centuries of the Republic had a far more profound and lasting effect on Roman religious ideas. (The third, the New Academy, being neither positive nor constructive, but critical only, need not be considered here; see art. ACADEMY.)

Epicureanism was first in the field, but was slow in gaining ground, and Rome produced no great Epicurean but Lucretius the poet; nor did even he become popular, for his direct and enthusiastic denial of the value of *religio*, and his appeal to the intellectual faculty of man to rid himself of the degrading bondage of that *religio*, were not in harmony with the Roman genius. Epicureanism was to some extent popular on its practical side (Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 3, *de Div.* ii. 50), with bad moral effects; but, as taking no account of gods or cult, except to put them aside as useless, it suited neither the class that was responsible for the surviving forms of the State religion nor the lower orders still steeped in superstition. See art. EPICUREANS.

Stoicism, on the other hand, laid a strong grasp on the best Roman minds; its ideal man was in many ways in keeping with the ideal Roman character, and its cosmopolitanism suited the wide range and the varied populations of the Roman Empire. It did not deny the existence of the divine, or even, as did the Epicureans, the interest of divine beings in the affairs of the world; it postulated a Supreme Deity, identical with Reason, Law, or Destiny, and left place for the existence of subordinate deities by making them functional emanations from the Supreme One. As has often been observed, it had a strong religious side, and with some of the ablest Romans the teaching of an earnest and learned Stoic like Panætius, the intimate friend of Scipio the younger, and founder of what may be called Roman Stoicism, became almost a substitute for religion. While Stoicism did nothing directly to save the old cults from neglect or extinction, it did much to save the educated Roman from the contempt of all religion which Lucretius had expressed so vehemently, and even did something to save him from moral disintegration. And at the very end of this period we meet with a very curious attempt, on Stoical principles, to harmonize the old religious beliefs with philosophic theories of the universe. We have lost Varro's *Antiquitates Divinæ*, the counterpart of his *Antiquitates Humanæ*; but we know enough about it from surviving fragments, and from the criticisms of Augustine and Tertullian, to be confident that it was written not only from antiquarian interest, but from a genuine desire to reconcile Stoic theology with the prevailing ideas of the gods. Krahner was the first to point out the importance of Varro's work in the history of the decay of the Roman religion, and he has been followed by Marquardt and other writers. See art. STOICS.

Varro assumed the Stoic doctrine of the *animus mundi*, the divine principle permeating all material things, which, in combination with those material things, constitutes the Universe, Nature, God, Destiny, or whatever other name the Stoics used to express it. The *mundus* is made up of the four elements, and these *partes mundi* are also divine, as are the various phenomena which they underlie. In the 16th book of his work Varro co-ordinated this Stoic theory with the Græco-Roman State-religion of his age. The chief gods, *di præcipui* or *selecti*, represented the *partes mundi* in various ways; and even the difference of sex among the deities was explained by regarding all male gods as emanating from the heaven, and all female ones from the earth, according to a familiar ancient idea of the active and passive factors of generation (Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, vii. 23). The Stoic theory of dæmons was utilized in the same way to find an explanation for semi-deities, heroes, Lares, Genii, etc., and thus another feature of the old Italian religious mind was to be saved from contempt and neglect. At the head of the whole system was Jupiter, who seems to have been recognized by the Stoics of the Roman school as representing not only the heaven but even the *animus mundi* itself (Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 1, 4); and the various functional activities of this supreme god multiplied him under innumerable titles (Tertullian, *Apol.* 14). So, too, with the other chief deities; and thus another tendency of the old Roman religion was skilfully worked into the new system, viz. that tendency to see the supernatural manifesting itself in innumerable ways expressed by adjectival titles, and affecting all the details of human action and suffering, of which the Pontifices had taken advantage to construct their so-called *Indigitamenta*. But the deities of the Roman cults had become so worn and indistinct with age that in many or most cases their functions were no longer clearly to be discerned, even by a learned antiquarian like Varro; and he was compelled to include in a large class of *di incerti* those of whose functional activity he could not be sure (Wissowa[2], p. 72).

Thus the one system of philosophy which could really appeal with effect to the best type of Roman mind was harmonized with the leading features of the old beliefs in a way which was neither unreasonable nor ludicrous. The people, Varro seems to say, have neither time nor ability to reason on these matters, and there are indeed some things which it is better that they should not know (Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, iv. 31); but they have been on the right track in their ideas and worship, wanting only the philosophical basis and warrant for what they do and think. For the educated it is necessary to have this basis and warrant clearly defined, so that they combine the religious practice of their ancestors with reason and knowledge. This surely was a far more healthy and useful position to take up than that of the Epicureans and Lucretius, who looked on all religions as mere folly

and mental bondage; and, to judge from the attacks made on it by St. Augustine and the Fathers, and from the temporary revival of the old cults which Augustus succeeded in achieving shortly after Varro's death, it was probably not without some substantial practical result. But it could have affected only the higher and educated classes; and even they were never quite in earnest in dealing with such questions. Varro himself, a Sabine of the sturdy old-Italian type, with an extraordinary interest in matters of religious antiquity as well as religious philosophy, was probably more in earnest than any other Roman of that age; but the ordinary attitude of the cultivated Roman to such speculations may be well seen in Cicero's three books, *de Natura Deorum*, which followed the work of Varro, and were to some extent influenced by it. Cicero's attitude to religion was simply sceptical and eclectic; he inclined to the Stoic view, but treats the whole subject as a matter for pleasant discussion, without showing any conviction of its importance to Rome or mankind. In all his voluminous writings, including his correspondence, there is no sign that his life was in any way affected either by belief or by cult; the only way in which *religio* interests him is its use for political purposes. And Cicero is a type of the educated Roman of his day (see some good remarks in Boissier, *Religion romaine*[2], i. 56).

iii. *THE ACTUAL RESULTS ON THE NATIONAL RELIGION.*—We have now to illustrate the actual results for the old religion of these two main causes of disintegration—the Hannibalic war and the influence of Greek philosophy.

(*a*) *The cults.*—The most striking evidence of the decay of those worships which we examined in the first period is suggested by our present ignorance of the meaning and the details of so many of them (see above, p. 820[a]). Had they been maintained or fully credited with efficacy, the literature of the last century B.C. would assuredly have contained allusions to them sufficient to give us some idea of the nature of the deities and the details of their worship. But neither Cicero nor any of his contemporaries but Varro has anything important to tell us of them. Varro was the only Roman really interested in them. A little later, Greeks like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, or foreigners like the Mauretanian Juba, took some trouble to understand them, also from antiquarian or philosophical motives. But by the time of Varro and these antiquarians the decay had already gone so far that many of the old cults were quite neglected and forgotten. A few examples will suffice.

The name Agonia, which stands for a festival four times in the ancient calendar, was so much a mystery even in Varro's day that we do not know for certain the meaning of the word, or what rites were performed on those days. The Furrinalia, Lucaria, Divalia, are almost entirely lost to us, as they were to Varro (so far as we can guess from what we know of his writings). The Regifugium in February and the Poplifugia in July were even then wholly misunderstood, being explained by false etymologies (see Fowler, pp. 174, 327). It is quite possible that we should be equally in the dark about the Lupercalia, one of the most singular of all the Roman rites, if it had not been brought into fresh prominence by the famous celebration just before Cæsar's death. It can hardly have been one of the wholly neglected festivals, yet the fact that no writer mentions it before that date shows conclusively how little interest such old customs excited. With the cults the old deities, of course, vanished in many cases, though this is less astonishing, since the Romans, as we have seen, at all the early stages of their religious life paid far more attention to worship than to the objects of it. No one knew the true nature of Vejovis, nor do we know ourselves; so, too, with Summanus, of whom Augustine says, no doubt following Varro, that he was at one time a greater deity than Jupiter himself (*de Civ. Dei*, iv. 23); 'quisquis is est,' writes Ovid in speaking of him (*Fasti*, vi. 731), from which we may infer that Varro was equally in the dark. Consus survived only because he had become oddly identified with Poseidon Hippios, and we are left to conjecture from stray facts of the cult that he was originally a harvest-god. Even so great a god as Janus, whose so-called temple by the Forum was matter of public interest owing to the practice of keeping it open whenever Rome was engaged in war, became the subject of vain philosophical speculation, no one suspecting that his origin was really as simple and humble as we now believe it to have been (see above, p. 825); and Ovid fancifully 'interviews' the old god in the vain hope of discovering his nature (*Fasti*, i. 89 ff.). Vesta survived at all times, with her cult and her virgin priestesses; the latter could not become secularized, and the ever-burning sacred fire which it was their duty to maintain was too well recognized as a symbol of the State's vitality to be subject to neglect like other less significant cults. Yet, if we turn to the list of deities represented in the rites of the Numan calendar (see above, p. 824), we shall find on examination that Vesta is almost the only one of them who has not been either forgotten or metamorphosed in one way or another under the influence of Greek literature and mythology.

Further, it is a well-attested fact that, in the general indifference to religion and the paralysis of orderly and detailed administration, the temple-buildings of the city were fast going to ruin in the last age of the Republic. Augustus has told us himself that he restored no fewer than eighty-two (*Monumentum Ancyranum*, iv. 17); and the ode of Horace (iii. 6) which begins, 'Delicta majorum immeritus lues, Romane, donec templa refeceris,' etc., is familiar to everyone; and Propertius and Ovid tell the same tale (Marquardt, p. 67 and reff.). The greed of capitalists and the want of space for building had long before this begun to override the sacred character of shrines in the city; thus in 179 B.C. the censors had to rescue a number of *sacella* from private occupation (Liv. xl. 51. 8; cf. Cic. *Harusp. Resp.* xv. 32); and in his dialogue *de Natura Deorum*, supposed to have taken place in the year 75 B.C., Cicero writes of thefts of statues and other property from temples (i. 29, 82)—sacrileges which we may probably attribute to the demoralization caused by the social and civil wars. A number of new temples were founded in this period, but they seem to mark the fancy of those who vowed them rather than any fixed religious policy such as we traced in the previous age; and, before the end of the period with which we are now dealing, we find a temple which ominously forecasts the future, that of *divus Julius*, begun the year after his death. (For these foundations see Aust, *de Ædibus sacris*, p. 18 ff.)

(*b*) *Priesthoods.*—The oldest of these, the Rex sacrorum and the Flamines, which were attached to particular worships, fell into partial or complete neglect during this period. From the nature of their duties they could not be held together with any office which might take the holder away from Rome; according to the old ideas of the relation of the State to its deities, their absence would have been detrimental to public interests. But from the Hannibalic war onwards every ambitious member of the governing class looked to office and military command to procure him both wealth and influence; and as a consequence he avoided all

employment which would keep him at home. Attempts were made to break the rule, but for a long time the Pontifex maximus forbade such action; and, as these priests were in his *potestas*, disobedience was practically impossible. In 190 B.C. a Flamen Quirinalis was Prætor peregrinus, but was not allowed to hold a foreign command (Liv. xxxvii. 47). In 180 a Rex sacrorum tried to hold his priesthood together with a naval command (*duumvir navalis*), but was compelled to resign it (Liv. xl. 42). In 131 a Flamen Martialis was Consul, and wished to have a command in Sardinia, but again the Pontifex maximus interfered (Cic. *Phil.* xi. 8, 18); yet this same Pontifex maximus, P. Licinius Crassus, later in the same year went to Asia with an army, 'quod nunquam antea factum erat,' says Livy's epitomist (*Epit.* 59).

Perhaps the most remarkable instance of the degradation of the old sacrificial priesthoods is one which has been worked out by the present writer in *CIR* vii. [1893] 193 ff. from records in Livy: a youth of bad character belonging to the great family of the Valerii Flacci was made Flamen Dialis by the Pontifex maximus at the urgent request of his family in order to place him under the innumerable restrictions to which that important priesthood was subjected. Strange to say, this seems to have had the effect of reforming his character, and he became Curule ædile and Prætor later on, his brother being allowed to take the oath of office for him, as the Flamen was not allowed to swear.

The general tendency was undoubtedly to shirk these priestly offices with their awkward restrictions, and it is almost certain that the *flaminium Diale* was vacant from 87 to 11 B.C. (Wissowa², p. 71, note); the *flamines minores* are not heard of in the last century of the Republic, and, as Marquardt justly argues (p. 67, note 1), if they had survived, Varro would hardly have been at a loss for information about the cult and nature of those deities to which they were attached (Furrina, Falacer, etc.). So with the Fratres Arvales, of whom we have no record till they were revived as a corporation by Augustus; the Rex sacrorum alone seems to have survived (Cic. *Harusp. Resp.* vi. 12; Lex Julia Municipalis, sect. 62; *CIL* i. 121).

The great *collegia* of Pontifices, Augures, and Decemviri sacris faciundis were no bar to political advancement and the accumulation of wealth, and during this period we are frequently surprised by the eagerness with which a pontificate or augurship is sought after; *e.g.*, Cicero was immensely pleased at becoming augur, and Cæsar took extraordinary trouble to become Pontifex maximus. The fact was that these offices brought both political and social influence; but as trustees of the old *jus divinum* they were by this time almost useless. The famous Pontifex maximus, Mucius Scævola, Consul in 95 B.C., held that there were three kinds of religion, the poetic, the philosophical, and the political, and that only the last of these was of any consequence—and that one was not true (Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, iv. 27; Krahner, p. 47 and note). Cæsar as Pontifex maximus can have paid no attention to his duties, though he eventually took advantage of the office to reform the calendar: he was away from Rome some fifteen out of the twenty years during which he held it, and neither he nor Cicero makes any allusion to his pontifical functions. All these posts had become completely secularized, and were filled by popular election like the magistracies. The Pontifex maximus seems to have been elected in Comitia as early as the Second Punic war (Mommsen, *Rom. Staatsrecht*, ii. 35); the other priesthoods, those of Pontifices, Augures, and Decemviri (Quindecemviri in the last century B.C.), were thrown open to election by a Lex Domitia in 104 B.C., though by a method peculiar to themselves (Cic. *de Lege Agraria*, ii. 18). The last thing that a Roman thought of at this time, when he gave his vote for a Pontifex or an augur, was the qualification of the candidate to perform the traditional duties of his office; the Pontifices let the calendar get into a state of chaos, and failed to keep up the sacrificial priesthoods which were under their control, while the augurs, as Cicero expressly tells us (*de Divinatione*, i. 15, 25, *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 3, 9), had become entirely ignorant of the ancient science of augury. This is indeed not to be wondered at, if we consider how severely the art of divination was criticized by the philosophers, and, on the other hand, how simple was the process by which it might be turned to account for political purposes. If a Consul, even without calling in an augur, announced that he was going to 'observe the heavens,' *i.e.* for lightning, that alone was sufficient in the eyes of constitutionalists like Cicero to put a legal stop to all business for that day; this was the consequence of the Lex Ælia Fufia of 153 B.C., passed in order to give extra legal strength to a Senatorial Government which was beginning to lose its moral weight. Cicero, though himself sceptical about the whole business of divination, repeatedly speaks of this law as a great bulwark of the constitution, and of its abolition in 58 B.C. as a fatal blow to the cause of Republicanism (Cic. *pro Sestio*, xv. 33, *in Vatinium*, ix. 23).

Of the *collegium* in charge of the Sibylline books we do not hear so frequently in this period; but, whenever the books are consulted, it is in the interest or against the interest of some party or family. To give a couple of examples: in 139 B.C. recourse was had to this device to prevent the great family of the Marcii from having the honour of bringing a new water supply into Rome, without effect in this case (Frontinus, *de Aq.* i. 7; cf. the new Epitt. of Livy, Grenfell and Hunt, line 188); again, in 56 B.C. the Quindecemviri found an oracle that forbade the invasion of Egypt by a Roman armed force, at a time when such an expedition was obnoxious to more than one party in the State; in this case the object was successfully achieved by this intrigue. The destruction of the old Sibyllines in the burning of the Capitoline temple in 81 B.C. had compelled the Government to acquire a new collection by diligent search in Greece and the East (Marquardt, p. 352, note 7), and this had naturally given opportunities for much forgery and double-dealing (Suet. *Aug.* 31; Tac. *Ann.* vi. 12). Of expiations ordered by this *collegium* we hear now little or nothing; the conscience of the people was blunted and callous; if the State was in danger, as in the Cimbrian war, the people hardly realized it. But in 113 B.C. a temple to Venus Verticordia was ordered 'ex Sibyllinis libris,' 'ob incesta Virginum Vestalium'—a significant fact (Aust, *de Ædibus*, p. 28).

Thus, when the Republic came to an end, all real life, all incentive to dutiful conduct, all unifying influence, had departed from the religion of the Romans, and all honesty of purpose, all genuine belief in its efficacy, had vanished from the minds of those who were entrusted with the supervision of it. It must, however, be confessed that, historically speaking, little damage was done by this decay of the old cults and priesthoods, which had no permanent vitality in them, and, for a cosmopolitan population like that of Rome, no saving health. But, like all the striking phenomena of this period of transition from city-State to Empire, the decay set in too rapidly, as the result of the unique struggle with Carthage. It set in before even the governing classes had had time to learn to think, much less to think with due reverence for the past. It came so quickly that no efficient substitute had time to grow up among its ruins as a sanction for morality. If Stoicism could save some men, or a natural sense of duty to the State, as with Cicero, or even only

the love of hard work, as with Cæsar, the ordinary individual, if ritual were neglected, and all trust in a spiritual world failed him, had no moral ballast, no bond of conduct to keep him from evil-doing. Hence, in spite of noble exceptions, there was a real lowering of the level of morality in this age; that there was wickedness in high places we know; and we have every reason to believe that all classes were equally selfish and equally callous.

IV. Fourth Period

(From the accession of Augustus).

It will be our object, in dealing with the last period of the life of the religion of the Roman State, to examine (1) its resuscitation by Augustus, and (2) the traces of its survival in Rome and the provinces during the next three centuries. We shall leave out of account the foreign religions which became fashionable in this period, as being fully dealt with in other articles; and also the worship of the Cæsars, the most remarkable feature of the religious practice of the early Empire, except so far as it was superimposed upon the older cults and inextricably intertwined with them. This worship was, in fact, in both origin and character foreign to Rome and Roman ideas, for the true Roman conception of the divine, as has been shown throughout this article, was quite inconsistent with the cult of living human beings; and, though officially, no doubt for this reason, only dead emperors were allowed to be worshipped by the State, as dead ancestors had been by the family, the actual practice went far beyond this, and the ideas connected with the practice do not really belong to our subject. See artt. Cæsarism, Deification (Greek and Roman), vol. iv. p. 529 ff.

i. *The Revival of the State Religion by Augustus.*—This is not only the most remarkable event in the history of the Roman religion, but one that is almost unique in religious history. We have seen how completely the belief in the efficacy of the old cults had vanished among the educated classes, and how the outward practice of religion had been allowed to decay; and to us it may seem almost impossible that the practice, and to some extent also the belief, should be capable of resuscitation at the will of a single individual, even though that individual represented the best interests and the collective wisdom of the State. The explanation lies in the fact that, though it was too late to revive the old religion in its primitive simplicity, it was not too late to revive the idea, common to all ancient States, that the morality, the political tranquillity, and the physical efficiency of the State were intimately bound up with the attention paid by the State to the divine beings who were interested in it. Right conduct, public concord, and the fertility of men, animals, and crops could not be secured to that State, it used to be firmly believed, unless its divine inhabitants were properly and continually propitiated. Thus the religious revival of Augustus is a part, and a necessary part, of his whole political scheme. He had learnt from the experience of his predecessors in political power that reform on political lines only was quite insufficient and without any element of stability, because it did not appeal to any deeply rooted feeling in the popular mind. The Roman people were tired of political quarrels, of constitutional changes, of endless party legislation, of civil wars; Augustus gradually came to understand that the only healing medicine he could prescribe for the State was not so much of a political as of a moral and religious nature. Real political convictions had long been evanescent; but there still remained the inherited conviction, especially among the masses, of the power of the gods to give or withhold prosperity, and it was this conviction that Augustus determined to use as his chief political lever. This will be appreciated by any one who will take the trouble to read and meditate upon the famous hymn which Horace wrote, at the request and doubtless almost at the dictation of Augustus, for the celebration of the Secular Games in 17 B.C.; there the ideas of religion, morality, and fertility are deftly woven together, and seem to express exactly this remedial policy of the Princeps. Whether Augustus himself shared those convictions on which he determined to work it is impossible to say, nor is it of much importance for our present object. But, inasmuch as a man's religious beliefs are largely the result of his own experience and that of the society in which he lives, it would not be unreasonable to guess that in his religious revival he was expressing naturally a popular conviction in which he shared, rather than standing entirely apart and administering a remedy which he thought of as mechanical and not organic in its operation. And this view is confirmed by the tone and spirit of the great literary works which he stimulated or inspired.

There is another aspect of the popular feeling of the age about which a few words must be said in order to explain more clearly this strange revival of an almost obsolete religion. It can hardly be doubted that there was more than a sense of weariness and material discomfort abroad among the people; there was also what we may almost call a sense of sin, or at least of moral evil—such a feeling, though doubtless less real and intense, as that which their prophets from time to time awoke in the Jewish people, and one not unknown in the history of Hellas. This is very clearly reflected in the poets and historians of the time—*e.g.*, in the preface to Livy's history, in the fourth *Eclogue* of Virgil and the conclusion of his second *Georgic*, and in some of the earlier poems of Horace, notably in the 16th *Epode* and *Odes*, iii. 6; and it was accompanied, as so often happened in the ancient world, by a tendency to superstitious beliefs and practices unauthorized by the State—astrology, magic, etc. (Boissier[2], i. 76). This consciousness of neglected duty—duty both to gods and to men, such as alone could enable the Roman State to fulfil its destiny, to carry out the will of Jupiter and the Fates—is, in fact, the *raison d'être* and the moral of the great representative poem of the time, the *Æneid* of Virgil, without a careful study of which it is impossible to understand either the work of Augustus or the temper of the age. It is an emphatic appeal to the Roman to put away from him individual passion and selfishness, and to respond to the call of Fate—of those moral forces which had wrought through the Roman dominion such mighty changes in the world. In the very years when Augustus was endeavouring to restore the old sense of *religio* and *pietas* by rebuilding temples and resuscitating cults Virgil was leading his hero towards the accomplishment of his mission in Italy, developing in him the true quality of *pietas*, *i.e.* not only the due performance of service to gods and ancestors, but the sacrifice of self to the interests of the community, submission to the divine will in full confidence of ultimate success. The real meaning of Roman *pietas* is as clearly expressed in the poems of Virgil as the best spirit of Puritanism is expressed in those of Milton; but it is expanded far beyond the narrow bounds in which we have so far been tracing it, in accordance with the expansion of the State from a city into an Empire, and it is accompanied by the idea that a great future is yet in store for the State, of which the initial moments are close at hand. Whoever contemplates closely the work of Augustus in combination with Virgil's poem will find the same essential elements in each

of them: an appeal to the past as the only safe basis of reconstruction, and a confident hope for the future on new lines of progress and civilization. In the poem, too, is to be found the conviction that the man who was thus reviving the past and at the same time securing the future was not only *divi filius*, but in fact himself divine.

Much more might be said on this subject, but this may be enough to explain the ideas underlying what has often been wrongly described as a gigantic piece of deception. It is now, however, generally acknowledged that, even if Augustus was himself an unbeliever, he was reflecting and expressing a strong popular feeling (see Boissier², vol. i. chs. i. and iv.; Wissowa², p. 73 ff.; cf. his paper on the 'Ludi Sæculares' in his *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, p. 192 ff.; and Aust, p. 90 ff.). The one point steadily to keep in mind is that this strange movement was not merely a revival of religious rites, but an appeal through those rites to the conscience of the people. A revival of religious *life* it certainly was not, for what we understand by that term had never existed at Rome; but it was an attempt to give expression, in a religious form and under State authorization, to certain feelings and ideas not far removed from those which we in these days describe as our religious experience.

We may now proceed to a brief account of the revival of the old cults and priesthoods, noting the changes introduced to suit new circumstances, such as the expansion of the Empire into a cosmopolitan State, and the elevation of a single Roman family to the first place in outward dignity as well as in actual influence.

Augustus did not become Pontifex maximus till the year 12 B.C., *i.e.* nineteen years after the battle of Actium; he waited with scrupulous patience until the great priesthood became vacant by the death of Lepidus. This, however, did not prevent him from pursuing his religious policy with great earnestness before that date, for he had long been a member of the college of Pontifices, as well as of the Augures and Quindecemviri. The year 12 B.C. may, however, conveniently serve as a landmark, dividing the consummation of his religious authority from a comparatively limited form of it.[1] A good example of his earlier reversion to religious methods is the fact that in declaring war against Antony, or more strictly against Cleopatra, he had revived the old college of the Fetiales (see above, p. 824), with its curious ceremonial. On his return to Rome two years after the victory he began his great work of temple restoration, which he has himself put on record (*Monumentum Ancyranum*, iv. 17): 'duo et octoginta templa deum in urbe consul sextum (28 B.C.) ex decreto senatus refeci, nullo prætermisso quod eo tempore refici debebat.' The great importance which he attached to this work is thus made abundantly clear; and it is confirmed by the prominence given to the subject in the poems and histories of the period (*e.g.*, Liv. iv. 20. 7; Hor. *Odes*, iii. 6; Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 59), and by the energy with which it was followed up by his successors (see below). Nothing could so well answer his purpose of bringing his policy before the very eyes and minds of the Roman people: the employment of workmen, the adornment of the city, the solemn processes of dedication and consecration—all served the same general end in different ways, and must have done much to rekindle the old feeling that there were divine as well as human inhabitants of the city, and the sense of duty in regard to them. But even from the outset it is most interesting to notice how this astute reformer contrived to combine the ideas of the Empire and of his own supremacy with the purely civic worships; his family, *i.e.* the Julii, had always had a special connexion, not only with Venus but with Apollo, the Greek substitute, as it would seem, for the mysterious Roman Vejovis (*CIL* i. 807, xiv. 2387; Wissowa, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, p. 198); and it was Apollo of Actium who had assisted him in that decisive moment of his fortunes. It was Apollo, too, who had become the authorized Roman deity of prophecy, and with his cult were connected the Sibylline books and the idea of a new and better age (Virg. *Ecl.* 4); Augustus therefore, in the year 28 B.C., dedicated to Apollo Palatinus a splendid temple on a site which belonged to himself and not to the State (Velleius, ii. 81), thus founding a cult which, though beginning as a private concern of his own family, was destined (as he doubtless well knew) to become one of the most important in Rome.

Another great temple which he built, also 'in solo privato' (*Mon. Anc.* iv. 21) in his own Forum Augusti, S.E. of the Forum Romanum, was that of Mars in the capacity of Ultor, *i.e.* as the avenger of the murder of Julius. The *lex templi* of this foundation is in part preserved by Dio Cassius (lv. 10), and shows that its founder intended that even the great Jupiter of the Capitol himself was to cede some of his honours to this old deity of a new dynasty; here the members of the Imperial family were to sacrifice after assuming their *toga virilis*; here the *triumphator* was to deposit his *insignia* after the triumph which had been decreed him by the Senate in the same building; here, too, after each *lustrum*, the Censors were to drive a nail into the wall (Wissowa², p. 126). And this temple also stood in the closest relation to the Imperial house, for it contained not only a statue of Mars, but one of Venus (a Greek combination long familiar to the Roman mind, as we have already seen), thus bringing together the characteristic foundation-deity of the city with the reputed ancestress of the Julian family (Wissowa², p. 292). It is interesting to notice that this temple was not dedicated until some years after Augustus had become Pontifex maximus (Aug. 1, 2 B.C.); he had meanwhile been content with a small round temple to the same deity in the Capitol (Mommsen, *Res Gest. Div. Aug.* 126). For another curious and characteristic step he also waited, and took it within a few weeks of his election to the great priesthood—viz. the dedication of a new temple of Vesta on the Palatine hill, immediately connected with the house of the Imperial family (*CIL*² i. 317; Wissowa², p. 76). This did not supersede the old temple below, with its ancient associations, but it signified none the less that the heart and life of the State, in one sense at least, was bound up with the hearth and home of the reigning Princeps.

It was going only one step farther when Augustus a few years later took the opportunity of his reorganization of the city, and its division into fourteen regions, to introduce the figure of the Genius Augusti between those of the two Lares Compitales at each *compitum*, or meeting of two streets, thus combining with singular skill the police regulations of the city with the inculcation of the idea that the Princeps stood to the public religion as the *paterfamilias* stood to that of the household (G. M. Rushforth, *Latin Hist. Inscriptions of the Early Empire*, Oxford, 1893, p. 58 ff.; Wissowa², p. 171 f.).

We do not know how far Augustus went in restoring the old temple cults; we can only suppose, on the evidence chiefly of Ovid's *Fasti*, that with the restoration of the temples the old forms of worship were as far as possible rescued from oblivion. But we do know that he contrived

[1] His policy was at all times the same, but the new position gave him greater moral weight in the maintenance both of public and of private religion.

to revive the old sacrificial priesthoods, as distinguished from the flourishing semi-political colleges of Pontifices, Augures, and Quindecemviri. In spite of all its disabling restrictions, it was possible once more to fill the post of Flamen Dialis; of Rex sacrorum and the other Flamines we also hear in the early Empire (Marquardt, pp. 326–336); and, as these were in the *potestas* of the Pontifex maximus, *i.e.* of the Princeps himself, it was not likely that they would be allowed to neglect their duties. Other ancient colleges were also revived, or confirmed by the inclusion of the Emperor himself among their members (*Mon. Anc. Gr.* 4)—the Fetiales, the Sodales Titienses, the Salii, the Luperci, and above all the Fratres Arvales, the brotherhood whose duty it had once been to lead a solemn procession round the crops in May, and so to ensure the blessing of the gods on the most important material of human subsistence (see above, p. 824). A priesthood of this kind was after Augustus' own heart, for it combined in its operations the ideas of agriculture and religion, prosperity and morality, which, as we have said, are so prominent in the *Carmen sæculare* of Horace; and the fortunate survival of large fragments of its records, dating from shortly after the battle of Actium, shows that it continued to work and to flourish down to the reign of Gordian (A.D. 241), and from other sources we know that it was still in existence in the 4th century (Henzen, p. 25). These records have been found on the site of the sacred grove which from the time of this revival onwards served as the centre of the activity of the brotherhood; it was doubtless originally one of the points on the boundary of the *ager Romanus* at which the Fratres paused in their procession, and lay at the fifth milestone on the Via Campana between Rome and Ostia. See art. ARVAL BROTHERS and literature there cited; and short accounts will be found in Wissowa[2], p. 561 f.; Fowler, *Religious Experience*, lect. xix.

The Brethren were twelve in number, with a Magister at their head and a Flamen to assist him; they were chosen from distinguished families by co-optation (Henzen, p. 154), the reigning Emperor always being an ordinary member. Their duties fell into two divisions, which most aptly illustrate the two sides of Augustus' religious policy: (1) the performance of the yearly rites in honour of the Dea Dia, who has taken the place of Mars in the ceremonial (see above, p. 824), probably as a result of the abandonment of the *lustratio agri Romani* as the State enlarged its boundaries; (2) the vows, prayers, and sacrifices for the Emperors and other members of the Imperial house.

The reader of the *Acta* will not fail to be struck by the occurrence of the old Roman piacular sacrifice, which was duly performed and recorded whenever iron was used in the grove, or any damage done to the trees of the grove by lightning or other accident; and on one occasion, in A.D. 183, when a fig-tree sprouted on the roof of the temple (Henzen, p. 142 ff.), *piacula* of all appropriate kinds were sacrificed to Mars, Dea Dia, Janus, Jupiter, Juno, Virgines divæ, Famuli divi, Lares, Mater Larum, 'sive deus sive dea in cuius tutela hic lucus locusque est,' Fons, Hora, Vesta Mater, Vesta deorum dearumque, Adolenda Commolenda Deferunda, and sixteen *divi* of the Imperial families. This will serve to show the extent to which the revival of detailed ritual had been carried by Augustus, and the extraordinary tenacity with which it held its ground.

The second part of the activity of the Brethren illustrates the adroit way in which the revival of this priesthood (as doubtless of the Salii and others also) was made to mark the sacred character and political and social predominance of the Imperial family. All events of importance in the life of the Emperor and his family were the occasion of vows, prayers, or thanksgivings on the part of the Fratres—*e.g.*, births, marriages, the succession to the throne, journeys and safe return, and the assumption of the consulate and other offices or priesthoods. These ceremonies all took place at various temples or altars in Rome, or at the Ara Pacis, which has recently been excavated in the Campus Martius. A single example taken at random from the *Acta* will suffice to illustrate this. The following is a 'votum susceptum pro salute novi principis' on his accession (Henzen, p. 105):

'Imp(eratore) M. Othone Cæsare Aug(usto), L. Salvio Othone Titiano(iterum) co(n)s(ulibus) III. k(alendas) Febr(uarias), mag(istro) imp(eratore) M. Othone Cæsare Aug(usto), promag(istro) L. Salvio Othone Titiano: colleg(i) fratrum Arva(lium) nomine immolavit in Capitolio ob vota nuncupata pro salute imp(eratoris) M. Othonis Cæsaris Aug(usti) in annum proximum in III. non(as) Ianuar(ias) Iovi b(ovem) m(arem): Iunoni vacc(am), Minervæ vacc(am) Saluti p(ublicæ) p(opuli) R(omani) vacc(am), divo Aug(usto) b(ovem) m(arem), divæ Aug(ustæ) vacc(am), divo Claudio b(ovem) m(arem): in collegio adfuerunt, etc.'

This record, which belongs to the year 69 and the accession of Otho, shows the *divi*, *i.e.* the deified Emperors Augustus and Claudius, together with the deified Livia, associated with the trias of the Capitoline temple and the Salus publica in the sacrificial rites, Otho himself being the magister of the college, but represented by his brother as pro-magister (Henzen, p. v, note 1). Under the Flavian dynasty which followed, this association was, however, judiciously dropped.

No account of Augustus' work in the sphere of religion would be adequate without some allusion to the Secular Games (*ludi sæculares*) of 17 B.C., in which beyond doubt he endeavoured to express in outward show, in the space of three days, all his views and hopes for the political, moral, and religious future of the Roman world. That year, in which his faithful colleague Agrippa was still spared him, and no serious misfortune had as yet fallen upon the State or the Cæsarean house, may be taken as the zenith of his career, and is aptly marked by this singular celebration, of which the details have come down to us almost complete. To the Sibylline oracle which indicated the rites to be used (printed, *e.g.*, in the *Sibyllinische Blätter* of H. Diels, p. 131 ff., from Zosimus, ii. 6, who also in ch. 5 gives a detailed account of the *ludi*) we have now to add the contemporary account in the form of an inscription (*Monumenti Antichi*, 1891, p. 601 ff.; *Ephem. Epigr.* viii. 255 ff.) found in Sept. 1890 in a mutilated condition near the Tiber in the Campus Martius, the scene of the nightly part of the rites. This document contains a letter of directions from Augustus, two *senatus consulta*, and full instructions from the Quindecemviri as to the details of the ceremonial. In a popular lecture printed in his *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* Wissowa has reproduced the contents of this document with much skill and sympathy. The most important part of it is now easily accessible to students in H. Dessau, *Sylloge Inscr. Lat.*, vol. ii. p. 282 ff. If to these authentic sources of information we add the hymn which Horace wrote for the occasion in accordance with the views of Augustus, and which is mentioned as his composition in the inscription, it must be acknowledged that there is hardly another vital moment of ancient history which can be so clearly reproduced in imagination, and with all its meaning as well as its minutiæ of detail.

According to certain old Roman ideas, of which it is hardly possible to trace the origin, a *sæculum* was a period stretching from any moment to the death of the oldest person born at that moment, and a hundred years was the average period so conceived. A new *sæculum* might thus begin at

any time, and might be endowed with special religious significance by certain ceremonies. The idea seems to have been that a new leaf, so to speak, might in this way be turned over in the history of a people, all past evil, material or moral, put away and buried (so the expression 'sæculum condere' is now explained), and a new period of innocence and prosperity entered on. This idea has manifestly something in common with that underlying the many curious rites first collected by Mannhardt in his *Baumkultus*, and familiarized to English readers by Frazer in his *Golden Bough*, in which objects are thrown into the water or buried after certain ceremonies to represent the cessation of one period of vegetation and the beginning of another. It is easy to see how exactly it would suit Augustus' policy, and how it might be manipulated to further his aims. Ever since his active life had begun, the idea had been in the air, and had won general recognition through the 4th *Eclogue* of Virgil and the fashionable mysticism of the age, while at the same time, as we have already seen, the popular feeling of depression and the desire to make a new start were so strong as to give it real meaning and force. But Augustus did not work it out merely on old lines; he did indeed retain for the rites to be performed by night the underground altar of Dis and Proserpina in the Campus, which had been the scene of the *ludi* since their initiation by the Sibylline Oracles in the First Punic war (249 B.C., a period of great depression and danger), but the place of these sombre deities was taken by such as would more exactly suit the lessons that he wished to inculcate: the Greek Mœræ, the Greek birth-deities (Ilythyiæ), and on the third night Mother Earth, the deity of all fertility. Thus the fortunes and destinies of the Empire and the fertility of man and of crop were brought in combination to the notice of the people. It was in keeping with this that the date selected for the celebration was the end of May and the beginning of June, when the crops were fast ripening, a time when the Ambarvalia used to be held, and the preliminary harvest festival of the Vestalia was about to begin; and it was also arranged that the people should make offerings of ears of corn to the acting priests on those three days at the end of May (May 29–31), before the high ceremonies followed on June 1–3.

But the bright prospects and hopes of the coming *sæculum* were represented, not by night or at an underground altar where the old *sæculum* might be supposed to be buried, but by day, and on the Capitoline and Palatine hills. On the first and second days the Emperor, with his colleague Agrippa, sacrificed on the Capitol to Jupiter and Juno (Minerva is not mentioned), and prayed for the preservation of the State; on the third day, after the sacrifice to Apollo and Diana on the Palatine, *i.e.* to the protecting deities of the Imperial house in their private dwelling, Horace's hymn was sung by choruses of twenty-seven boys and as many girls, on the Palatine, and on the Capitol, in the areas of the temples of Apollo and Jupiter (see Fowler, *Religious Experience*, lect. xix.). The spectacle must have been extremely beautiful; and so anxious was Augustus to make it universally popular that he even allowed the unmarried, who were excluded as a rule from *ludi*, to be present on this occasion, as we learn from the inscription, line 54. The Principate was to initiate a new era of peace and goodwill, of prosperity and populousness, of agriculture and plenty and all of these were to be acquired and secured by faithful performance of service to the gods. This is the idea that lies at the root of this famous celebration, as it lies also at the root of the *Æneid*, whose author had died but two years earlier.

Many details might be added to this account of Augustus' revival; but what has been here said will be enough to indicate the general outline and meaning of it. It remains to sketch the survival of the old Roman State religion in the Imperial period; but the material for this is as yet imperfectly gathered together from the volumes of the *CIL*.

ii. *Traces of survival of the old Roman State religion in the Imperial period.*—(*a*) *Rome and Italy.*—Though the old Roman religion was now beset, as we have seen, by three formidable enemies which tended to destroy it even while they fed upon it, like parasites in the animal or vegetable world which eat up their host, viz. the rationalizing philosophy of syncretism, the worship of the Cæsars, and the new Oriental cults, yet, strange to say, it continued to survive in outward form, and to some extent, no doubt, in popular belief, for more than three centuries. This is the result partly of the tenacious conservatism of the Roman mind in regard to forms and customs, partly of the fresh stimulus which had been given it by Augustus and his men of letters, and the conscientious care with which the successors of Augustus carried out his policy in this department. Tiberius himself had a curious interest in matters of religion, and seems to have endeavoured even to check the growth of the parasites, while scrupulously adhering to the old religious forms; a good example will be found in Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 58), where he is seen exercising his authority as Pontifex maximus to enforce the ancient restrictions on the life of the Flamen Dialis, or (*ib.* vi. 12) where he expounds the proper method of consulting the Sibylline books. Claudius added to the same tendency a pedantic antiquarianism which made him also a faithful follower of Augustus' policy. With the Flavian dynasty, which was without the religious prestige of the Julian house, the tendency is rather to revert to those cults which were not specially connected with the Imperial house. The great trias of the Capitol—Jupiter, Juno, Minerva—seems to overshadow the Apollo of the Palatine hill and the Mars Ultor of the Forum Augusti; not, indeed, that the trias had ever lost its place as the foremost protecting power of the State (Wissowa², p. 128), but there is no doubt that the advent of a new family to power tended to diminish the prestige of those worships which were associated in the popular mind with the Julii. Domitian made a special point of the worship of Jupiter; he built temples on the Capitol to Jupiter Conservator and Jupiter Custos, and added to the prestige of the cult of the trias by the institution of a festival, the Agon Capitolinus (Tac. *Hist.* iii. 74; Aust, in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Jupiter,' p. 749; for his fanciful devotion to Minerva see Wissowa², p. 255). The Antonines, even Marcus Aurelius himself, in spite of a grandeur of religious and moral belief which has rarely been equalled, were most careful in keeping up the ancient forms; Marcus did not hesitate in times of public distress to put in action the whole apparatus of the old religion (*Jul. Capit.* 13).

During all this early period of the Empire the temples were kept in repair assiduously, as is proved by inscriptions (*CIL* vi. 934, 962, 1001, etc.; Antoninus Pius is thus honoured 'ob insignem erga cærimonias publicas curam ac religionem,' *CIL* vi. 1001); and that there was no falling off in this respect seems to be shown by the well-known story of Constantius in A.D. 329 being shown round the temples when he visited Rome for the first time, and the curious interest which he took

in them in spite of his Christianity (Symmachus, *Rel.* iii.). And there can hardly be a doubt that this spirit of conservatism was not merely an affair of the Government, but that the Government was acting in harmony with popular feeling. In the Theodosian Code (xvi. 10. 2) we find that the worship of the family, *i.e.* of Lares, Penates, and Genius, had to be forbidden. But, in order to appreciate this tenacity, the student will do best to become acquainted with *CIL* vi., so far as it preserves the votive inscriptions of that age; for the number is legion of those which attest the surviving belief in the great deities of the old time, and especially (apart from the Capitoline trias) in Mars, Minerva, Mercurius, Venus, Apollo, Diana, Ceres, Liber, Fortuna, Hercules, and others. A more concise survey of these inscriptions will be found in the selection by H. Dessau, *Sylloge Inscr. Lat.*, vol. ii. Again, the student of the Christian Fathers will not fail to note that their tendency is to attack the absurd minutiæ of the old Roman religion rather than the philosophy or the Oriental worships of their time; and this is more especially the case with St. Augustine, from whose *de Civitate Dei*, as has already been mentioned, we thus incidentally learn so much that is of value for our subject (see esp. bks. iv. and vii.). The very necessity under which the leaders of Christianity found themselves of suiting their own religious calendar, and in some instances even their ceremonies, to the habits and prejudices of the pagans tells the same story; the Christian calendar of feasts is obviously based upon that of the Romans, and to this day there are many practices of the Roman Church, especially in Italy and Sicily, which remind the student of the Roman religion of both the forms and the ideas that are familiar to him. (This very interesting subject, which lies outside the sphere of this article, is handled with great learning by H. Usener in his *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*; cf. his *Götternamen*, p. 116, for the way in which the Christian doctrine of saints and angels fastened itself upon the gods of the *Indigitamenta*, aided perhaps by the philosophic doctrine that had explained these same gods as dæmons [Aust, p. 103]. To this process the Roman idea of the genius of an individual contributed not a little. But we need not here pursue the stages of the death of Roman paganism; nothing is to be learnt from them as to the nature of the old religion, except its extraordinary tenacity of life. The reader may be referred to some interesting chapters in Dill's *Roman Society in the last Century of the Western Empire*[2], London, 1899, bk. i., and to Boissier's *La Fin du paganisme*, Paris, 1891.)

(*b*) *In the provinces.*—The volumes of the *Corpus Inscriptionum*, especially those which collect the inscriptions of the northern and western provinces, show us the names of Roman deities with which we have become familiar in the course of this article, continually recurring in large numbers, and serve to remind us that the Roman soldier and the Roman merchant were to be found in all parts of the Empire still worshipping the ancestral deities of the State. But here a great difficulty meets us, which it is not possible entirely to overcome. It was the Roman practice to note the points of similarity between the gods whom they found existing in the provinces they acquired and those of their own religion, *i.e.* points both in the cult and in the conception: thus both Cæsar and Tacitus use this 'interpretatio Romana' instead of giving us the local names of the strangers (Cæs. *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 17; Tac. *Germania*, 9). As Romans became more permanently settled in distant parts, and as the army came to be recruited almost entirely from provincials, the distinction between the deities of the Roman pantheon and those of the native provincials was gradually lost sight of, and even for the period of the early Empire it is extremely difficult to be sure to which category a name should be referred. Often, indeed, a cult-title added to the name of the deity enables us to be sure that the conception underlying the name is foreign and not Roman; and in the articles 'Mars' and 'Mercurius' in Roscher (ii. 2395 ff., 2828 f.) will be found a list of all such titles applied to these deities (which chiefly represent the spread of the Roman arms and Roman commerce respectively in the provinces), which may mark them as foreigners under Roman names. But it would be rash to assume that where such titles are not found the deities are always genuinely Roman; and, in fact, we know from other sources that Roman names became permanently attached to local deities, and were so used even by the provincials themselves. Thus in *CIL* vii., which contains the British inscriptions, we find the goddess of the hot springs of Bath addressed as 'Minerva' (no. 43); 'Liber' is the name for the chief god of the Dacians (*CIL* iii. 792, 896, etc.; cf. von Domaszewski, *Die Religion des römischen Heeres*, p. 54); 'Hercules' represents the German 'Donar'; and 'Silvanus,' whose cult is widely spread over the Empire as a deity of gardens, boundaries, and clearings (cf. Wissowa[2], p. 215), and belongs especially to the life of the Roman settler and farmer, was in Dalmatia undoubtedly the representative of a native deity. The legions, however, retained in the provinces the genuine worship (combined with that of the Emperor) of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, of whom the *aquila* was the symbol (von Domaszewski, p. 12), of Mars, and of Victoria (*ib.* p. 4 ff.); the auxiliary corps, who were not necessarily Roman citizens, continued to worship their own gods, whether under Roman names or not; but the legionary was a citizen, and the very nature of his oath and his service compelled him to the cult of the deities who protected the Roman State by its armies, though in the great majority of cases he was neither a Roman nor an Italian by birth. It is curious to find that in the middle of the 3rd cent. A.D., as a reaction against the Orientalizing tendency of recent Emperors, a new military Mars-religion appears, the work of the legions themselves (cf. von Domaszewski, p. 34: 'No god is so often found on the coins of the Emperors of the decaying Empire').

But the religions of the Roman Empire are a study in themselves, and one still incomplete; for the evidence is even yet not entirely collected. A great advance has been made in J. Toutain, *Les Cultes paiëns dans l'empire romain*, Paris, 1907–11.

The Religion of Roman Private Life.

So far we have been dealing with the religion of the Roman State. But we have seen (above, p. 822) that this religion of the State was developed out of the worship of the family, and in certain of its most primitive and characteristic features, such as the cult of Vesta, always retained the marks of its ancestry. Other festivals, such as the Paganalia and Compitalia, clearly reflect the common worship of a union of families before the era of the State was reached; these were taken up into the religious life of the State, and became *sacra publica*, according to the definition of that term in Festus, p. 245. But the religion of the family is included in the term *sacra privata*, and, in fact, forms the greater part of such *sacra* ('At privata [sacra] quæ pro singulis hominibus, familiis, gentibus, fiunt,' Fest. *ad loc.*); nor need we here go into

the question how far the individual was or could be the subject of religious rites, nor into the obscurer one of the cults which had become the hereditary property of particular *gentes* or clans.

Of the religion of the family we have considerable details surviving, and these have of late been well put together and discussed by De Marchi in his work, *La Religione nella vita domestica* (Milan, 1896; the sequel, *La Religione gentilizia e collegiale*, appeared in 1903). Other modern authorities are Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, iii. 121 ff., and *Privatalterthümer*, vol. i., where the private life of the Roman may be best studied in connexion with his religious practice. See also articles in Roscher on 'Lares,' 'Penates,' 'Genius,' etc., and later ones on kindred subjects in Pauly-Wissowa. E. Samter, in his *Familienfeste der Griechen und Römer* (Berlin, 1901), has interesting discussions of certain practices from the point of view of comparative religious practice; and a short account will be found in Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity*, London, 1914, p. 14 ff. It hardly needs to be said that the material from which our information is drawn on this subject is scattered over the whole range of Roman literature from Plautus and Cato to the Christian Fathers, and that the *Corpus Inscriptionum* and archæological research have of late years added very important matter, which is still increasing, and still imperfectly sifted and absorbed.

Two preliminary remarks seem necessary. (1) There is no question here of periods of development, as in the religion of the State; development, or in one sense degeneration, worked upwards *from* the worship of the family and but little within it. True, the wealthy Roman families towards the end of the Republican period doubtless felt the influence of the general carelessness, but the *sacra privata* were so closely connected legally with the continuity of the family and its property that the natural conservatism of the Roman was here strongly and for the most part successfully appealed to. On this point, and on the duty of the Pontifices to see that the *sacra privata* were duly maintained, see esp. Cicero, *de Legibus*, ii. 46 ff. So far as we know, the only important change in the character of domestic worship was the iconic representation of the 'household gods,' which came in at the end of the Republican period; *e.g.*, the Penates came to be represented by images of the Dioscuri (Wissowa, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, p. 95 ff.); otherwise in the country and in families of ordinary means the religious forms remained always much the same. (2) It is not to be supposed that the religion of the family was entirely independent of the State authorities. In the older forms of marriage, and in the superintendence of the public cemeteries and the private rites there performed, the Pontifices, and especially the Pontifex maximus, had a legitimate right of interference, and could prevent the contamination of *sacra privata* as well as *sacra publica*, as in the case of the Bacchanalia in 186 B.C. As Cic. *de Leg.* ii. 46 ff. shows, the Pontifices were the source of all exact knowledge of the *sacra privata*, and the general referees in all matters relating thereto. In other words, the State was responsible through its authorities for the due maintenance of the religious duties of all its members, including the private ones, just as with us it is responsible for the maintenance of moral duties towards women, children, and animals. This was the result of the inseparable union, so to speak, of Church and State at Rome.

The centre-point of the religion of private life was the house, and the centre-point of the house was the *atrium*, or hall, as we should call it, which represented the original form of Italian dwelling out of which all the additions of the later house were developed. Here the family met for all purposes but that of sleeping; here, in all houses but those of advanced city life and luxurious country villas, the deities of the household had their abode. As the *atrium* was the centre of the house, so was the hearth (*focus*) the centre of the *atrium*—the hearth, 'the natural altar of the dwelling room of man' (Aust, p. 214). This was the seat of Vesta, and behind it was the *penus*, or store-closet, the seat of the Penates. Thus Vesta and the Penates are in the most genuine sense the protecting and nourishing deities of the household. Here, too, in the *atrium* was the Lararium, or altar of the Lar familiaris, the deity of the land which the family tilled as well as of the house in which they dwelt; and here, too, was worshipped the Genius of the *paterfamilias*, on whose aid the family depended for its fertility and continuance. A few words about each of these deities or spirits will help to make clear the character of this simple and beautiful religious life. They were all quite distinct conceptions, and, in spite of all the web-spinning of later Greek and Roman syncretism, we can feel fairly sure about the essential meaning of each one of them.

1. **Vesta** was beyond doubt (see above, p. 825) the spirit of the fire on the hearth; she thus represented the most essential part of the domestic economy, the power to keep the body warm and to cook the food—the maintenance of the physical vitality of the family. It has been said, not without reason, that Vesta represents this vitality rather in the abstract, while the other deities represent it in one or another more concrete form (De Marchi, p. 67, following Herzog, in *Rhein. Mus.* xiv. 6). Perhaps it would be more exact to describe her as the centre-point round which the others are set; for she was at least as concrete a conception as any of the others, and more so than the Genius of the head of the house. ('Nec tu aliud Vestam quam vivam intellige flammam,' says Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 291; cf. J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 200 ff.) In front of her dwelling—the hearth—was the table at which the family took their meals, provided with salt-cellar (*salinum*), sacred salt cake, baked according to primitive fashion (*mola salsa*; Fowler, p. 110) by the daughters of the family, as for the State worship by the Vestals, and the little sacrificial dish (*patella*). After the first and chief course of the midday meal silence was enjoined, and an offering of a part of the meal was thrown on to the fire (Serv. *Æn.* i. 730; Marquardt, iii. 126 note). Thus it is certain that this offering was made to the spirit of the fire (Vesta); whether also originally to the Penates may be doubtful, but so it seems to have been understood in later times, if Servius is right in stating that the *focus* was the altar of the *di Penates* (*ad Æn.* xi. 211). The Lar was also included in historical times (Ov. *Fasti*, ii. 633), and the deities of the household were reckoned all together in the offering (so the plural *dei* is used in Serv. *ad Æn.* i. 730); but the practice of casting it into the fire points to a primitive usage in which Vesta alone was concerned, and supports the view taken above that she was the centre-point of the whole group, and the most essential representative of the life of the family. A well-known Pompeian painting (De Marchi, p. 67, tab. iii.) shows Vesta sitting between two Lares, with the ass, her favourite animal, behind her; but this only serves to illustrate the anthropomorphic influence of Greek art on the Roman religion even in domestic life. Cf. also art. HEARTH, HEARTH-GODS (Roman).

2. **Penates** are the spirits of the household store (*penus*, which word Cicero explains as 'omne quo vescuntur homines' [*de Nat. Deor.* ii. 28; cf. Gell. *Noct. Att.* iv. 1. 17]). The religious nature of this store is well shown by the fact that no impure person was allowed to enter it, and the duty was especially that of the children of the family (see Fowler, *CR* x. [1896] 317), whose purity and religious capability were symbolized throughout Roman history by the *toga prætexta* which they wore. It is perhaps as well to point out that the Penates are not to be understood as representing

the ancestors of the family; they are purely spiritual conceptions of the genuine Roman kind, attached to a particular spot, and capable of being moved to another spot with the family, as Æneas carried his Penates from Troy to Italy. (The termination *-as*, of which *Penates* must be the plural, though the singular is nowhere found, always implies position in a fixed spot.) *Penates* is not, like *Lares*, a substantival name, but an adjective; thus we find *di penates* but never *di lares* (Wissowa², p. 164), and the adjectival form admits of an indefinite number of deities being included under it. Pompeian paintings show many different deities thus included; and in that referred to just above, where Vesta and the Lares are found together, they may all represent the *di penates* ('penates sunt omnes dei qui domi coluntur,' Serv. *ad Æn.* ii. 514). But this elasticity is, no doubt, a later growth; and in the simple Roman family of the country, as in the house of the primitive farmer, the Penates must have been, as their name implies, simply the spirits of the household store.

3. Lar familiaris.—The origin of Vesta and the Penates admits of little doubt; but that of the Lar is still a matter of dispute. It is now generally agreed that there was originally but one Lar of the household, as, *e.g.*, in the prologue to the *Aulularia* of Plautus; but beyond this there is no consensus of opinion among scholars. Varro, so far as we know, was the first to suggest that Lares were the same as Manes (Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, vii. 6; Wissowa², p. 174), and recently this idea has been again in favour, since the subject of the worship of ancestors has been matter of comparative investigation. It has generally been believed that the Lar represented the reputed founder of the family, who (as has been assumed) was originally buried in the house, and continued to reside there. This was the view of F. de Coulanges in his remarkable book *La Cité antique*, and it has of late been maintained by both De Marchi and Samter in the works referred to above. But archæological research in Italy has failed to discover any trace of burial in the house, or even within the walls of a settlement (see Fowler, *ClR* xi. [1897] 34). At all times the dead had a settlement of their own outside that of the living; and there is no evidence that the Romans ever thought of their duly buried ancestors as having any place in the dwelling of the living. As among other peoples, they may have been conceived as having a desire to return to their abode, especially if deprived by some accident of funeral rites, but in that case the great object of the living was to expel them (Fowler, p. 107 ff.). A convincing argument is that the Lares, as has already been mentioned, were never addressed as *di*, as the Manes invariably were; *i.e.*, they cannot have been human beings who became divine at death. Of late Wissowa has claimed for the Lar a different origin, and his view, in spite of criticism (*e.g.* Samter, p. 105 ff.), may be said to hold the field at present. The Lares, he argues, were not originally household gods at all, but deities presiding over the several holdings of a settlement; they were originally worshipped at the *compita*, or crossways, where several such holdings met; there stood the shrine, with as many altars as there were Lares and holdings over which they presided (see Wissowa², p. 167 ff.; art. CROSS-ROADS [Roman]). Thus they fill a place in the private worship which would otherwise be vacant—that of the holding, and its productive power—while the buried ancestors are quite sufficiently represented by *di manes*, *di parentes*, etc. Thus, too, it is easy to account for their occurrence in the Arval hymn, one of the oldest Latin fragments we possess (Henzen, p. 26), for they would naturally be objects of invocation at the lustration of the crops of the settlement (see above, p. 841). Nor is it difficult to understand how the Lar of the holding found his way into the house: he became the object of the worship of the whole *familia*, *i.e.* the workers on the land, both bond and free, and passed (perhaps as the bond-workers grew more numerous and important) into the circle of Vesta-Penates-Genius, with which, strictly speaking, slaves had nothing to do. It is true that we cannot trace this passage historically, and we know that the Lares of the *compita* retained their seat there and remained as *Lares compitales* even in the growing city; but we may be sure that the Lares were attached to the land and not, like the Genius, to the person of any man, and, as so attached, their presence in the house can hardly be explained in any other way. The arguments for this theory will be found in full in Wissowa's art. 'Lares' in Roscher, in his *Rel. und Kult.*², p. 167 ff., and in a reply to Samter in *ARW* vii. [1904].

4. Genius.—The last of the deities of the household was the Genius of the *paterfamilias*, not to be identified, as in the age of syncretism, with the Lar familiaris (Censorinus, *de Die Natali*, iii. 2); even so late as the Theodosian Code the two are distinguished in the practice of the cult (see *Cod. Theod.* xvi. 10. 2). The Genius was in primitive conception the generative power of the man—that mysterious power which maintained the continuity of the family, yet belonged to the individual for his lifetime only, and to him alone; and apparently as inherent in this power was conceived to be all his masculine capacity of enjoyment and vigour of body and mind. The Genius is not the soul of the man, but the *numen* residing in him, whose power exhibits itself chiefly in the continuance of the family, and who must therefore be an object of veneration for all its members. The seat of the Genius was more especially the marriage bed (*lectus genialis*); and the festival of the Genius was the birthday of the head of the house, in which the whole *familia* took part, slaves and freedmen included (see Wissowa², p. 176; De Marchi, p. 176 ff.). This is the strict meaning of Genius in domestic worship: for further developments of the conception see Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity*, pp. 17 ff., 158 ff.

As might be guessed from all that we have seen of the Roman ideas of the supernatural, all the important epochs in human life, and the ceremonies connected with them, had, originally at least, a religious character.

5. Marriage.—See art. MARRIAGE (Roman).

6. Birth and early years.—If we are to believe Varro as quoted by St. Augustine (*de Civ. Dei*, iv. 11, 37; cf. Tertull. *ad Nat.* ii. 11), the processes of birth and bringing up were under the protection of a multitude of spirit-deities, all of whom should be invoked at the proper time and in the proper terms; but, as has been said above (p. 832), it may be doubted whether these lists were not the invention of a comparatively late age of priestly activity, and whether these *numina* were, in fact, recognized in ordinary practice. The chief deity of birth was Juno Lucina; in the fourth *Eclogue* of Virgil, which is a prophetic *carmen* sung at the actual moment of birth (see Fowler, in J. B. Mayor, Fowler, and R. S. Conway, *Virgil's Messianic Eclogue*, 1907, p. 69), this is the only deity invoked. Immediately after the birth, if the infant were *sublatus*, *i.e.* acknowledged by the father and destined to be brought up, we are told by Varro (Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, vi. 9) of a custom so curious that it may be mentioned here as possibly primitive in its original form and dating from the early agricultural age of Roman life. Three men at night

came to the threshold of the house and struck it respectively with a hatchet, a mortar, and a besom, that 'by these signs of agriculture Silvanus might be prevented from entering'; from these actions arose three deities, Intercidona, Pilumnus, Deverra, by whose guardianship the infant is protected against the power of Silvanus (cf. art. BIRTH [Greek and Roman], § 2). This idea of the force of cultivation in keeping off wild and evil spirits may be illustrated from Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*, lect. iii. We need not follow the infant through the stages of his commitment to the care of other *numina*; it will be sufficient to observe that, though the accounts of these which have come down to us from Varro are doubtless exaggerated, the earliest tender age was, no doubt, matter of the greatest anxiety, and consequently of the utmost endeavour to avert evil influences and omens. That this is the meaning of the children's *bulla*, or amulet, is almost certain, and probably the *toga prætexta*, which was worn by both boys and girls, had an originally religious or quasi-religious meaning (see Fowler, *ClR* x. 317). But the one really religious ceremony of which we know in the first days of infancy is that of the *dies lustricus*—the ninth day for boys and the eighth for girls—on which, as the name implies, the child was purified and adopted into the family and its *sacra*, and received also its name. After this the boy or girl grew up under the protection of the household gods, and performed various religious duties in their service. On reaching puberty the boy laid aside the *bulla* and the *prætexta*; the former was hung on the images of the Lares in later times (Persius, v. 31), while the latter was taken off finally at the festival of the Liberalia in March, when the youth went to the Capitol and sacrificed there to Jupiter and to Juventas (De Marchi, p. 176; Fowler, p. 56). The girl when about to be married also laid aside her *prætexta*, with her dolls and other marks of childhood, and, if Wissowa guesses rightly (*ARW* vii. 54), offered them to the Lares at the Compitalia. The tender and dangerous age of childhood being then passed, and youth and maiden being endowed with new powers, the peculiar defensive armour of infancy might be dispensed with.

7. Death, burial, and cult of the dead.—As Aust has well observed (p. 225), religion had no part to play at the Roman deathbed; the dying man had no reckoning to make with heaven, and had no need for the forgiveness of sins in order to depart this life in peace. His responsibility for his actions ceased with this life, and after death he had nothing to fear or to hope from the gods; thus he had no need of any mediating priest in his last moments. The miserable fears which haunted him through life, painted by Lucretius in such glowing colours of contempt, ceased altogether at his death; his peace and comfort in his grave depended on the right legal and religious conduct of his living family, in respect of proper burial and yearly renewed offerings to the *di manes* of the family at the common tomb. The house which he had left for the last time, and all who had been in contact with the deceased, must be duly purified by lustration, in this case by fumigation and the sprinkling of water, but the true religious rites only began at the grave. It may be observed in passing that both burial and cremation were in use at Rome in historical times, and had been so, as we know from the XII Tables, since at least the 5th cent. B.C.; the religious rites in each case were practically the same; the details of difference in other respects will be found in Marquardt, *Privatalterthümer*, i. 365 ff.

When the body or ashes had been consigned to the last resting place, the mourners partook at the grave of a meal called *silicernium*, which had a religious character. The meaning and derivation of the word are uncertain, but there seems to be little doubt that it indicates some kind of sacramental meal, first offered to the dead and then partaken of by the survivors (De Marchi, p. 192), since Tertullian (*Apol.* 13) parallels it with the *epulum Jovis* of which the magistrates and Senate partook in the visible presence of the three deities of the Capitoline temple (Fowler, p. 218). Thus it would seem to have bound together the living and the *manes* of the deceased in the same mystical way as deity and worshipper were thought to be made one when the victim was not only killed but consumed. The rites at the grave continued till the ninth day; on one of these days occurred the *feriæ denicales*, of which the meaning is uncertain, but they may have included, as De Marchi has suggested (p. 196), a sacrifice of sheep to the Lar familiaris of which Cicero speaks in *de Legibus*, ii. 22, 55. The 'finis funestæ familiæ,' or conclusion of the mourning, mentioned in the same passage, is the *sacrum novendiale* on the ninth day, which consisted of a sacrifice at the grave, and was followed by the *cena novendialis*, at which the partakers appeared no longer in mourning but in white, and celebrated with good cheer the end of their sorrow; in rich families this might again be followed by *ludi funebres novendiales*, as Æneas in *Æneid*, v., after the *parentatio*, or renewal of these rites in the cult of the dead, refreshed the spirits of his men by athletic contests.

As the dead continued to exist as spirits or deities after due burial, it was necessary to renew every year the rites at the grave which we have described. This took place under the direction of the State on what may be called the Roman All Souls' Days, nine in number, as were the days of original mourning (Feb. 13–21, Parentalia; Fowler, p. 306 ff.). On Feb. 22 was the family festival of the Caristia, described by Ovid (*Fasti*, ii. 617 f.) as a kind of reunion of the living members of the family after they had done their duty by the *di manes*, when all quarrels were forgotten in a general harmony. This took place not at the grave but in the house, and the household gods shared in the sacred meal. Cf. art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Roman).

8. Agricultural rites.—A word must be said about those religious observances of private life which were so important for the prosperous prosecution of the daily labour of the ordinary Roman. Of such observances in the great city itself we know nothing indeed, and it may be that they were obsolete at a very early period, or were never followed out, as in the leisured life of the farm; the 'busy idleness' of town life probably had a damaging effect upon simple piety, as has been the case in modern Europe. But of the religious ritual of the farm we fortunately have valuable records in Cato's treatise on agriculture, compiled in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C.; these records are in all probability drawn from the books of the Pontifices, and are included by Cato in his work as giving the genuine and correct formulas of invocation to the gods for those about to undertake certain agricultural operations. One of them has already been quoted above, in connexion with sacrificial ritual and prayer; they have been carefully studied of late by De Marchi (p. 128 ff.), and translated by him into Italian, with notes. Here it is possible to give only a general account, and a single specimen of invocation.

For the safety of his oxen the farmer is directed (Cato, *de Agricultura*, 83) to offer to Mars Silvanus in the wood (presumably the woodland where they grazed), and by daylight, for each head of cattle a fixed amount of meal, lard, flesh, and wine. The

offering might be made either by a free man or by a slave, *i.e.* by the *villicus* in the master's absence; but no woman was to take part in it, or even to see the ceremony. The offerings were to be consumed by the persons present (cf. Fowler, p. 194). Again, when the pear-trees were in blossom, another offering, called *daps* (cf. Festus, p. 68), was to be made for the oxen, in this case to Jupiter Dapalis (cf. Jupiter Farreus in the rite of *confarreatio*). The day was to be a holiday for the oxen and the herdsmen, and for those who took part in the rite; and afterwards it was legitimate to sow various kinds of seed (Cato, 131 f.; cf. Fowler, p. 218). Once more, when wood was cut, or clearing made, or any digging done in a wood which might be inhabited by some unknown deity, a piacular sacrifice of a pig had to be made, and the following prayer recited: 'Si deus, si dea, cujus illud sacrum est, ut tibi ius siet porco piaculo facere illiusce sacri coercendi [*i.e.* violating] ergo. Harumque rerum ergo sive ego, sive quis iussu meo fecerit, ut id fecerit, recte factum siet. Eius rei ergo te hoc porco piaculo immolando bonas preces precor, uti sies volens propitius mihi domo familiæque meæ liberisque meis; harumque rerum ergo macte hoc piaculo immolando esto' (Cato, 139 f.; for this kind of *piaculum* cf. Henzen, p. 136 ff.).

The singularly interesting directions for the *lustratio agri* have been already alluded to and in part quoted (above, p. 828). Here we may substitute for it another piece of ritual, to be enacted before the harvest is begun, which is given by Cato in ch. 134. Before the harvest it is necessary to make a sacrifice of a *porca præcidanea* in the following way (for this sacrifice of a sow and its connexion with the cult of the dead, from which it may have passed into the common usage of the farm, see Wissowa[2], p. 193; De Marchi, p. 135, note). The offering must be made to Ceres before the harvesting of wheat, barley, beans, and rape. Janus, Jupiter, Juno are to be invoked with incense and wine before the immolation of the sow; and to Janus a sacred cake (*strues*) is to be offered with the following prayer: 'O Father Janus, with the offering of this cake I pray thee to be propitious to me, my children, my house, and my *familia*.' Then another kind of cake (*fertum*) was to be presented to Jupiter with the same formula of prayer. Next, wine was to be offered to Janus with the words, 'Father Janus, as I have prayed thee good prayers in offering the *strues*, so for the same object let this offering of wine succeed'; so also a wine offering was to be made to Jupiter. Then the *porca præcidanea* was to be slain; and, when the entrails had been laid bare, another *strues* was to be offered to Janus as before, and another *fertum* to Jupiter, and to each of them an offering of wine. Afterwards both the meat and the wine were to be offered to Ceres.

With this specimen of ritual, which so well illustrates the peculiar character of the Roman religious practice, whether public or private, this article may fitly be concluded. Like all such formulæ, it suggests questions which are not easy to answer, and which it is not possible to attempt to explain here. But it may serve to remind the reader of what was said at the beginning of this article as to the origin and essential character of the genuine *religio* of the early Romans, which had its roots in the mental attitude of an agricultural people towards the powers to whom they believed themselves indebted for all success in procuring food and clothing by agricultural labour.

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ROMANTICISM.—See CULTURE.

ROSARIES.—I. *ORIGIN.*—A rosary is a string of knots or beads, designed as an aid to the memory, and, when used in religious exercises, providing a convenient method for counting the recitation of prayers or the repetition of the names and attributes of the Deity. The use of the rosary is very widely spread, but its earliest home seems to be in Asia, where it can lay claim to a fairly venerable antiquity. In dealing with its origin we can do no more as yet than put forward suggestions.

The use of knots (*q.v.*) as mnemonic signs is almost universal, and such a simple device may have been invented again and again; its appearance in many parts of the world does not prove that it was invented in one country and transmitted thence to other centres. The highest development of a system of knots as a means of aiding the memory and for keeping records is seen in S. America, where the *quipu* (a Peruvian word meaning 'knot') served as a means of record and communication in a highly organized society. It was a system of knot-writing, each kind of knot having a separate meaning, the different coloured cords also having each its own significance.[1] In China, in the times of Yung-ching-che, it is stated, the people used little cords marked by different knots, which, by their numbers and distances, served them instead of writing.[2] This seems to point to the early use by the Chinese of a contrivance similar to the *quipu* of the Peruvians. In the rosary used by the Shingon sect of Buddhists in Japan there is a knot formed by the union of two strings which hang from the main string of beads, and it is said to resemble an ancient Chinese character which means 'man,' being one of a combination of characters used in representing one of the many attributes of Buddha.[3]

The use of knots as mnemonic signs for purely secular purposes still persists in many countries. Among the Indians of Guiana, when a *paiwari* feast is to be held, the entertainers prepare a number of strings, each tied into knots, the number of which corresponds with the number of days to the feast. The headman of each settlement is presented with one of these strings. Every day a knot is untied, and in this way the hosts know on which day to expect their guests.[4] Among the

[1] E. B. Tylor, *Researches into the Early Hist. of Mankind*, London, 1865, pp. 154–158.

[2] A. Y. Goguet, *Origine des lois, des arts et des sciences*, Paris, 1758, iii. 322; J. A. M. de Moyria de Maillac, *Hist. gén. de la Chine*, Paris, 1777–85, i. 4.

[3] *Journ. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, ix. [1881] 177.

[4] E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 319 f.

Wagogo of Central E. Africa the time of a woman's pregnancy is reckoned by knots; at each new moon one knot is untied.[1]

In this country it is a common practice to tie a knot in a handkerchief as an aid to memory. The same custom is found in India, the knot being usually tied in the strings of the *pâejamas*.[2] Such customs are apt in time to disappear with the advance of culture and the introduction of less cumbrous methods, being retained only for religious purposes. Such a survival of the use of knots for keeping records is seen in some rosaries at the present day in the Greek Orthodox Church, in Egypt, and in India. These will be noted below under the various headings.

Notched sticks are also of universal use for record-keeping, such as the tally-sticks which were utilized in England and Ireland almost up to the present day. In Ireland in quite recent times these sticks have been employed to record the number of prayers uttered, and the suppliant would leave such a stick as a votive offering at some sacred well. These sticks have been called 'votive rosaries.'

II. *AGE.*—The oldest reference to rosaries to be found in the literature of India is in the Jain canon. Here they are referred to as forming one of the appliances of Brāhmanical monks. In this literature the two names given to rosaries are *ganettiyā* and *kañchaniyā* (Prakrit names = Skr. *ganayitrika*, 'the counter,' and *kañchana*, 'gold,' also 'bright' or 'shining'). References in later literature occur in Brāhmanical works only, and here two more names are given—*mātā* (or *mālika*), 'garland,' and *sutra*, 'string.'[3] These names refer to the shape of the rosary. Some of the deities are represented as carrying rosaries in their hands. The following passage from the Buddhist 'Forty-two Points of Doctrine,' art. 10, alludes to the rosary:

'The man who, in the practice of virtue, applies himself to the extirpation of all his vices is like one who is rolling between his fingers the beads of the chaplet. If he continues taking hold of them one by one, he arrives speedily at the end. By extirpating his bad inclinations one by one, a man arrives at perfection.'[4]

III. *DISTRIBUTION.*—The rosary is found to be in use among Hindus, Buddhists, Muhammadans, and Christians. It also has a use among some Jews.

1. Hindu or Brāhman.—It is generally considered that the Hindus were the first to evolve the rosary.

'It is called in Sanskrit *japa-mala*, "muttering chaplet" (and sometimes *smarani*, "remembrancer"), because by means of its beads the muttering of a definite number of prayers may be counted. But the pious Hindu not only computes his daily prayers as if they were so many rupees to be added to his capital stock in the bank of heaven; he sets himself to repeat the mere names of his favourite god, and will continue to do so for hours together.'[5]

This operation of counting is used by ascetics as a means of promoting contemplation.

The rosary differs according to the sect to which the user of it belongs. The materials of which rosaries are made vary greatly, and each has a specific purpose. The number of beads also varies according to the sect. A worshipper of Śiva is supposed to use a rosary of 32 beads, or double that number; a votary of Viṣṇu, on the other hand, is supposed to use one with 108 beads. This number is also sometimes found on a Śaivite rosary; indeed the beads may run into several hundreds, irrespective of the sect. There are usually one or more terminal beads to each rosary; they are not generally counted in with those on the main string.

(*a*) *Materials, etc.*—A favourite bead of the Śaivites is that called *rudrakśa*, 'eye of the god Rudra (or Śiva).' This is generally supposed to come from the *Elæocarpus ganitrus*. In the Panjāb, however, the name *rudrakśa* appears to be applied to the seeds of the jujube-tree, and importance is here attached to the number of facets on the seeds. These slits, running from end to end of each seed, are called 'mouths' (*mukh*). A one-mouthed *rudrakśa* is considered a very valuable amulet, and the owner of such a bead also 'possesses' the goddess Lakśmi and all kinds of blessings. If nothing will tempt the possessor to part with it, it must be stolen from him, and it should be encased in gold and carefully preserved as a family relic. It is only from the most accomplished Yogis that such beads can be obtained, and any price that they demand must be paid by the would-be owner of such a treasure. *Rudrakśa* seeds with eleven facets are worn by celibate Yogis, while the married ones wear those with two; and those with five facets are sacred to Hanumān, the monkey-god.[1] The rough surface of the *rudrakśa* seeds may possibly symbolize the austerities connected with Śiva-worship. The seeds, according to a Śiva legend, are said to be the tears of Rudra (or Śiva) which he let fall in a rage (some say in grief, some in ecstasy) and which crystallized into this form. The five facets are also sometimes thought to stand for the five faces or the five distinct aspects of the god.[2] The worshippers of Viṣṇu, on the other hand, prefer smooth beads, and favour those made of the *tulasi*, or holy basil (*Ocimum sanctum*), this shrub being sacred to Viṣṇu. The Śāktas count up to 100 on the three joints of each finger on the right hand, each ten being marked off on the joint of one of the fingers on the left hand. The number of recitations having reached 100, they place that number of millet grains before them. This is repeated till the required number is reached. The Atīts of Bengal break up their rosaries into separate parts, using them as ornaments also. They wear a string of 27 beads from the elbow, a wristlet with five beads, and hanging from each ear is a pendant of three beads.[3] In the Jain sect the laity generally use the rosary when repeating the *navakar mantra*. The materials vary according to the use to which they are put and the wealth of the owner. The poorer Jains generally use rosaries made of cotton thread and sandal-wood; the richer use beads of red coral, crystal, cornelian, emerald, pearl, silver, and gold. In this sect there are two special uses of the rosary.

(1) Rosaries of five different colours—red, yellow, green, white, and black—are used for the repetition of certain mystical formulæ and incantations to appease and propitiate Navagrāhās, ten Dikpālās, Ashtamangalās, and other deities on the following occasions: (a) *Śānti-snātra* (pacifying and propitiatory rites); (b) *ashtottari-snātra* (bathing an image 108 times); (c) *anjana-salākā* (ceremony of sanctifying images); (d) *chaitya-pravisha* (first occupation of a newly built Jain temple); (e) *pratistha* (installation of images in temples). The *tirthankaras* are believed to have been of different colours, viz. red, yellow, green, white, and dark; hence the use of rosaries in these five colours. Red is represented by the red coral rosary; yellow by the amber or gold; green by the emerald; white by silver, white pearl, or crystal rosaries. The cotton thread rosaries do not represent white and cannot be used as a substitute for silver, pearl, or crystal. The dark, or dark blue, colour is represented by the *akikalbaher* rosary.

(2) Rosaries of these five different colours are also used for the repetition of mystical formulæ, charms, spells, and incantations, with a view to obtaining certain benefits from the deities. On the other hand, they may be used for harmful purposes—to injure hostile or obnoxious people, to disable them, to make them ill, to kill them, to subdue them, to obtain their affections, to make them inert, or to summon them.

There are also small rosaries called *boberkhas*. These are used when the more costly rosaries with the usual number of beads are not obtainable, or when the user cannot afford to buy the more expensive beads. These *boberkhas* generally contain 6, 9, 12, 18, 27, 36, or 54 beads—*i.e.* any sub-multiple of 108.[4]

Devotees attach much importance to the size of the beads—the larger they are, the more effective is the rosary, and the greater the merit attained by the user of it. Monier-Williams[5] gives the following account of the use of such rosaries by an

1 H. Cole, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 323.
2 R. C. Temple, *PNQ* ii. [1884-85] 571.
3 E. Lehmann, 'Rosaries mentioned in Indian Literature,' *Oriental Congress Report*, 1891, p. 34.
4 Quoted by G. G. Zerffi, in *Journ. of the Soc. of Arts*, 1873, p. 469.
5 M. Monier Williams, *Modern India and the Indians*[3], p. 108 f.

1 W. Crooke, *Things Indian*, London, 1906, p. 408.
2 Monier-Williams, p. 110.
3 Crooke, p. 409.
4 *NINQ* iii. 84.
5 P. 113 f.

old hermit who was living in the neighbourhood of Kaira in a hut near a rude temple:

'He was engaged in his evening religious exercises, and, wholly regardless of the presence of his European visitor, continued turning with both hands and with evident exertion a gigantic rosary. A huge wooden roller, suspended horizontally from the posts of the shed, supported a sort of chain composed of fifteen rough wooden balls, each as big as a child's head. As he kept turning this enormous rosary round and round, each bead passed into his hands, and whilst he held the several balls in his grasp he repeated, or rather chanted in a low tone, a short prayer to the god Rama. All the wooden balls underwent this process of pious manipulation several times before he desisted. The muscular exertion and consequent fatigue must have been great, yet the entire operation was performed with an air of stoical impassiveness. Then the devotee went into another shed, where on another cross-beam, supported by posts, were strung some heavy logs of hard wood, each weighing about twenty pounds. Having grasped one of these with both hands, he dashed it forcibly against the side post, and then another log against the first. Probably the clashing noise thus produced was intended to give increased effectiveness to the recitation of his prayers.'

The rosary plays a part in the initiation ceremony when children, at the age of six or seven years, are admitted to the religion of Viṣṇu. Such a rosary is usually made of *tulsi*-(*tulasi*-) wood, and it is passed round the necks of the candidates by the *guru* (priest), who teaches them one of the sacred formulæ, such as 'Homage to the divine son of Vasudeva,' 'Homage to the adorable Rama,' or 'Adorable Krishna is my refuge.'[1]

A high-caste Brāhman employs the rosary merely as a means of counting his daily prayers. He is careful to conceal his hand in a bag, made for this purpose, when telling his beads, so that he may not 'be seen of men.' The bag, which is often beautifully embroidered and is of a particular shape, is called *gaumukhi*, 'cow's mouth.' The favourite *mantra* thus repeated is the *Gāyatrī* from the *Rigveda*—'*Tat savitur varenyam bhargo devasya dhimahi dhiyo yo nah pracodayat*,' 'Let us adore that excellent glory of the divine Vivifier: may he enlighten our understandings.' Only those who have been invested with the sacred thread may repeat this *mantra*.

'A Brahman may attain beatitude by simple repetition of the *Gayatri*, whether he perform other rites or not,' and 'having repeated the *Gayatri* three thousand times he is delivered from the greatest guilt.'[2]

In the monasteries a novice is instructed to be careful not to lose his beads; should he do so, he is allowed no food or drink till he has recovered them, or, failing this, till the superior has invested him with another rosary.

Further special uses for the different kinds of beads are given by K. Raghunathyi:[3]

'If a rosary be used in honour of a goddess the beads should be of coral (*prával*); if in honour of Nirgun Brahma, they should be of pearls (*muktamala*); if with the object of obtaining the fulfilment of wishes (*wásná*), they should be of *rudrakshas*; . . . if with the object of obtaining salvation (*moksha*), they should be of crystal (*spathik*); and if with the object of subduing the passions (*stambhan*), of turmeric roots.'

The Sikhs have a rosary which consists of knots instead of beads. Possibly this is a survival of an early method of keeping count by a system of knots. It is made of many strands of wool, knotted together at intervals—108 knots in all. This kind of rosary is not very durable, the material of which it is composed being liable to the ravages of moths. Another kind of rosary used by Sikhs is made of iron beads, arranged at intervals and connected by slender iron links. They have a rosary also which is peculiar to them and is worn like a bracelet on the wrist. It is made of iron and has 27 beads. Sometimes these beads are strung on a rigid iron ring, sometimes they are connected by links like the longer rosary mentioned above. The rosary with 27 beads has a particular name (*Lohe ká Simarna*), and it forms also a tribal mark.[1]

The Śāktas use rosaries made of dead men's teeth and similar relics.

A Hindu rosary called *baijanti mala* (*baijanti*, 'flag [or standard] of Viṣṇu') consists of five gems produced from the five elements of nature—sapphire from the earth, pearl from water, ruby from fire, topaz from the air, and diamond from the ether or space.

(*b*) *Charms.*—It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the rosary proper and a charm; in fact, the rosary is often itself a charm. The Badi Nats of S. Mirzapur have a sacred musical instrument which is called *nag-daman* ('subduer of snakes'). Rosaries of snake-bones are tied to it, and, until it is furnished with two such rosaries, it does not become sanctified. This instrument is occasionally worshipped, and the beads of the rosaries hung on it are often used to cure diseases by being tied on to the wrist of the sick person.[2] Snake-charmers in other parts of India make use of similar rosaries as a protective charm, by hanging them on to the pipes on which they play before the snakes. The *faqīrs* also make use of a rosary composed of the vertebræ of a snake; they carry it to show that they know of a charm to cure snake-bite. Sometimes the rosary is worn tied to the turban, and a special *mantra* is recited on these beads called the *garur-mantra*, to cure snake-bite. This is an example of the universal belief in the 'doctrine of signatures.' The *faqīrs* also cure quartan ague by tying a bead from such a rosary round the wrist of the sufferer.[3]

There is a rosary much used by Hindus of the Śākti sect which is called *putr jiwa* ('which gives life to sons'). It is composed of beads made of light-coloured seeds, oval in shape, which grow very plentifully. This rosary is used when a Hindu wants a son. No doubt the idea of fertility is involved here.

The following method of obtaining a son is given by Pandit Ram Gharib Chaubé:[4]

'Most Hindus believe that their failure to obtain male issue is due to the unfavourable position of the stars. . . . If it be owing to Sanischara Mangala, Rahu or Ketu, the Sráddha rite must be performed either at Gaya or Narayani Sila at Hardwar, and a Pandit must be employed to recite the *Sri Mad Bhagwat Katha* for seven days. But the most popular plan is to get the following mantra repeated one hundred and twenty thousand times at a temple of Rama or Siva and to have a *Homa* or fire sacrifice done at the end of it: "O Govinda, son of Devaki, lord of the universe, give me a son; I have taken refuge in thee."'

Another rosary, used by Hindus who wish to get rid of their superfluous flesh, is made of small, almost black seeds, dry and shrivelled looking, being rather like dried currants in appearance. Doubtless the user hopes that by repeating prayers on it he may obtain a likeness to the seeds, and shrivel up and decrease in size himself. A rosary from the Partabgarh district, which is in the collection at the Pitt-Rivers Museum, Oxford, consists of 213 very small beads, *plus* the terminal, and is finished with a tassel of pink wool. This rosary is stated to be used to prevent the effect of the 'evil eye.'

2. Buddhist.—The Buddhist rosary is probably of Brāhman origin, and here again the number of beads on the string is usually 108. This is said to correspond with the number of mental conditions, or sinful inclinations, which are overcome by reciting the beads.

Moreover, 108 Brāhmans were summoned at Buddha's birth to foretell his destiny. In Burma the footprints of Buddha have sometimes 108 subdivisions; in Tibet the sacred writings (*Kahgyur*) run into 108 volumes; in China the white pagoda at Peking is encircled by 108 columns, and in the same country

[1] See Monier-Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India*, p. 117.
[2] Manu, ii. 79, quoted by Monier-Williams, *Modern India*, p. 111.
[3] *PNQ* iii. 608.

[1] Cf. J. N. Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*, Calcutta 1896, p. 510.
[2] *NINQ* iii. 56. [3] Crooke, p. 408. [4] *NINQ* iv. 378.

108 blows form the ordinary punishment for malefactors. Again, in Japan, at the *bommatsuri*, or *bonku* (festival of the dead), observed from 13th to 15th July, 108 welcome fires are lighted on the shores of sea, lake, or river; and 108 rupees are usually given in alms.[1]

Besides the full rosaries of 108 beads, smaller ones are also used, the number of beads representing the chief disciples of Buddha.

(*a*) *India.*—In India the Buddhist rosaries do not seem to differ very much from many of those used by Hindus. Some are made of more costly materials than others, the more valuable being of turquoise, coral, amber, silver, pearls, or other gems. The poorer people usually have their rosary beads made of wood, pebbles, berries, or bone, and they are often satisfied with only 30 or 40 beads.

(*b*) *Burma.*—The Burmese rosary also has 108 beads. It seems to be used merely as a means of counting the repetitions of the names of the Buddha trinity, viz. *Phra* (Buddha), *Tara* (*Dharma*), and *Saṅgha*. On the completion of a round of the rosary the central bead is held and the formula '*Anitsa, Dukka Anatha*,' 'All is transitory, painful, and unreal,' is repeated.[2] The monks sometimes wear a rosary called *bodhi*, with 72 beads. The beads are black and sub-cylindrical in shape, and are said to be made of slips of leaf on which charmed words are inscribed. These leaves are rolled into pellets with the aid of lacquer or varnish. The rosary is not mentioned in the Southern Scriptures as one of the articles necessary for a monk, and it is not so conspicuous among Southern Buddhists as it is among their Northern co-religionists.[3]

(*c*) *Tibet.*—The rosary, *phreng-ba* (pronounced *theng-wa*, or vulgarly *theng-nga*), 'a string of beads,' is an essential part of a Lāma's dress, and is also worn by most of the laity of both sexes. The act of telling the beads is called *taṅ-c'e*, which means literally 'to purr' like a cat, the muttering of the prayers being suggestive of this sound. The rosaries have 108 beads on the main string. The reason given for this number is that it ensures the repetition of a sacred spell 100 times, the eight extra beads being added for fear of omission or breakage. There are three terminal beads to the rosaries, which are called collectively 'retaining (or seizing) beads,' *dok-'dsin*. These symbolize 'the Three Holy Ones' of the Buddhist trinity. The *Gelug-pa*, or established church, have only two or three terminal beads to their rosaries, the pair being emblematic of a vase from which the other beads spring. But an extra bead is often strung with those on the main string, bringing the number up to 109.

The Tibetan rosaries usually have a pair of pendent strings on which are threaded small metal beads or rings. These serve as counters. At the end of one of these strings is a *dorje* (the thunderbolt of Indra), the other string terminating in a bell. Sometimes there are four of these strings attached, in which case the third string often ends with a magic peg (*purbu*), and the fourth with a wheel (*k'or-lo*). The counters on the *dorje* string register units, those on the bell string marking tens of cycles. These terminal ornaments are frequently inlaid with turquoise. The strings are usually attached at the eighth and twenty-first bead on either side of the large central bead, though there is no rule about this and they can be placed anywhere on the string. By means of these counters 10,800 prayers may be counted, but the number uttered depends largely on the leisure and fervour of the devotee. Old women are especially zealous in this respect. Sometimes the beads have been so worn with constant use that their shape has been changed. Besides those pendent counter-strings, various odds and ends often hang from the rosaries, such as metal toothpicks, tweezers, small keys, etc.

The materials of which the beads are made vary according to the sect, the god or goddess addressed, and the wealth of the owner. The abbots of some of the wealthy monasteries have their rosary beads made of valuable gems and precious stones.

Importance is often attached to the colour of the rosary, which should correspond with the complexion of the god or goddess to be worshipped. Thus a devotee of the goddess Tara, who is of a bluish-green complexion, would use a turquoise rosary; a worshipper of Tam-din would choose a red rosary; a yellow-coloured rosary is used in the devotion to the yellow Mañjuśrī; and for Vriṣravan, whose complexion is of a golden-yellow colour, an amber rosary would be used. This applies to rosaries used by the Lāmas. The laity use rosaries made of any kind of bead, and they are not tied by rules as to colour. They usually use glass beads of various hues, mixed with coral, amber, turquoise, etc., and the counter-strings attached to their rosaries generally end with a *dorje*, the beads on both strings recording units of cycles only, this being sufficient for the bead-telling of the laity. The number of beads on the main string is, however, the same as on the rosaries of the Lāmas.

The Lāmas use certain mystical formulæ which are prescribed for repetition, each formula having its own special rosary. Different formulæ are used for different deities, and they are supposed to act as powerful spells as well as to contain the essence of a prayer. These *mantras* are more or less unintelligible to the worshipper, and are indeed usually gibberish. They are probably of Sanskrit origin. The laity, on the other hand, seldom make use of any other formula than the well-known '*Oṁ maṇi padme Hūṁ!*'

The rosary is used in Tibet for other purposes than that of prayer, as, *e.g.*, divination. The account of this practice is given by Waddell.[1]

The ceremony is performed by the more illiterate people and by the Bon priests. First a short spell is repeated, and then the rosary is breathed upon and a fairly long prayer is recited in which the petitioner begs various religious protectors and guardians that 'truth may descend on this lot,' that light may descend on it, and 'truth and reality appear in it.' After the repetition of this prayer 'the rosary is taken in the palm and well mixed between the two revolving palms and the hands clapped thrice.' Then, closing his eyes, the devotee seizes a portion of the rosary between the thumb and finger of each hand, and, after opening his eyes, counts the intervening beads from each end in threes. The result depends on whether the remainder is one, two, or three in successive countings.

(1) *If one as a remainder comes after one* as the previous remainder, everything is favourable in life, in friendship, in trade, etc. (2) *If two comes after two*, it is bad: 'The cloudless sky will be suddenly darkened and there will be loss of wealth. So Rim-hgro must be done repeatedly and the gods must be worshipped, which are the only preventions.' (3) *If three comes after three*, it is very good: 'Prosperity is at hand in trade and everything.' (4) *If three comes after one*, it is good: 'Rice plants will grow on sandy hills, widows will obtain husbands, and poor men will obtain riches.' (5) *If one comes after two*, it is good: 'Every wish will be fulfilled and riches will be found; if one travels to a dangerous place, one will escape every danger.' (6) *If one comes after three*, it is good: 'God's help will always be at hand, therefore worship the gods.' (7) *If two comes after three*, it is not very good, it is middling: 'Legal proceedings will come.' (8) *If three comes after two*, it is good: 'Turquoise fountains will spring out and fertilize the grounds, unexpected food will be obtained, and escape is at hand from any danger.' (9) *If two comes after one*, it is bad: 'Contagious disease will come. But if the gods be worshipped and the devils be propitiated, then it will be prevented.'

(*d*) *China.*—The full Buddhist rosary in China has the usual number of 108 beads, with three dividing beads of a different size or colour. As in other countries, the materials composing them vary. There is also a smaller rosary of 18 beads, corresponding to the 18 *lohans* (chief disciples of Buddha). In some rosaries each of these 18 beads is carved into an image of a *lohan*. Sometimes the laity wear this smaller rosary at the waist, when it is perfumed with musk and bears the name *heang-chu*, 'fragrant beads.'[2] The Chinese name for rosary is *su-chu*. The ends of the rosary strings are usually passed through two retaining or terminal beads, one being large and globular in shape, the other small and oval. Sometimes the larger one contains a sacred relic or a charm.[3]

[1] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 335 f.
[2] *JASB* lxi. 33
[3] *Gazetteer of Sikkim*, p. 282.

[1] *Gazetteer of Sikkim*, p. 330 f.
[2] J. F. Davis, *The Chinese*, i. 353.
[3] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 338.

Part of a Chinese official's costume consists of a rosary with 108 beads which are often of large size, with dividing beads. The latter are sometimes made of richly enamelled silver. This rosary has usually three pendent strings with counter-beads. From the retaining beads sometimes hangs a silk ribbon embroidered with different-coloured glass beads, the patterns being symbolic. Attached to this ribbon there is generally a medallion, and finally an oval bead of some size. One of these oval beads also forms the terminal to each of the three pendent strings, the four being called the 'dewdrops,' the 'disciple beads,' or the 'regents of the four heavens.' They represent the emperor, father, mother, and teacher, to whom a Chinese owes reverence and obedience.[1] These official rosaries are sometimes very costly, and are worn only by dignitaries on State occasions. They are not apparently of religious significance.

As a religious instrument the rosary seems to be chiefly used to count the repetition of set phrases, whereby the devotee stores up merit for himself. If these repetitions are performed at temples, the greater the merit of the votary.[2] The rosary is also used as a means of counting prostrations and prayers. The devotee will prostrate himself and strike the ground with his forehead, at the same time muttering a formula. At the end of each prostration and repetition a bead is moved along the rosary string which hangs round his neck.[3] On occasions of sickness and death there is a ceremonial performance with the rosary. The officiant must either be taken from a certain class of Taoist priests or be a priest of Buddha. On these occasions the priest chants in a monotonous sing-song certain quotations from the sacred books. Count of these repetitions is kept by means of a rosary, and the benefit and merit obtained by them accrue to those who employ the priests and pay for them.[4]

(*e*) *Korea.*—The Buddhist rosaries of Korea have 110 beads, though, according to the classics, the number is 108, the two extra beads being large ones—one at the beginning or head of the rosary usually containing a *swastika*, the other dividing the rosary into two parts. Each of these beads is dedicated to a deity. Every bead on the string has its own special name. The devotee, when using the rosary, repeats the 'Hail thou jewel in the Lotus!' (*Om maṇi padme Hūṁ!*), holding each bead till he has counted a certain number. On laying the rosary aside he repeats the following sentences:

'Oh! the thousand myriad miles of emptiness, the place which is in the midst of the tens of hundred myriad miles of emptiness, the place which is in the midst of the tens of hundred myriads of emptiness, eternal desert where the true Buddha exists. There is eternal existence with Tranquil Peace.'

There is also a small rosary which, if used every day in the four positions or states, viz. going forth, remaining at home, sitting, and lying down, enables the votary to see the land of bliss in his own heart.

'Amita will be his Guardian and Protector, and in whatever country he goes he will find a home.'

The materials of which the rosaries are made have all their intrinsic value, as may be seen from the following:

'Now you can calculate that in repeating the rosary once you will obtain tenfold virtue. If the beads are of lotus seeds you will obtain blessings a thousandfold. If the beads are of pure crystal you will obtain blessings ten thousandfold. But if the beads are made from the Bodhi tree (*Ficus religiosa*) even if you only grasp the Rosary the blessings that you obtain will be incalculable.'

The *Chyei Syek* classic gives certain rules to be observed in connexion with the rosary:

'When you begin chanting the Rosary repeat *Om Akcho Svaha* ("Hail Akchobya [a fabulous Buddha], may the race be perpetuated!") twenty-one times. When you string the beads, after each one repeat *Om mani padme Hum* twenty-one times, and, after you have finished, repeat *Om Vairochana* (the personification of essential bodhi and absolute purity) *Svaha* twenty-one times. Then recite the following poetry:

The Rosary which I take includes the world of Buddha
Of Emptiness making a cord and putting all thereon.
The Peaceful *Sana* where non-existence is
In the Nest being seen and delivered by Amita.'

[1] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 339.
[2] J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, ii. 386 f.
[3] *Ib.* p. 458. [4] *Ib.* p. 387.

On the walls of many of the Buddhist temples in Korea may be seen the classic of the rosary. A copy of one of these was obtained by E. B. Landis, who says:

'The date and authorship I do not know, but it is evidently very old, as it contains many Chinese characters that are now practically obsolete. The copy in my possession was printed from blocks cut at *Pong Eui Sa* (The Temple of the Receiving of Benefits) located at Kwang Chyou. The expense incurred in cutting these blocks was paid by a virgin by the name of *Pak*, who wishes to obtain for herself and parents an abundance of merit.'[1]

(*f*) *Japan.*—It is in Japan that the Buddhist rosary reaches its most complicated form, each sect having its own special rosary. There is also the one known as the *sho-zuku-jiu-dzu*, or the rosary used by all sects in common.

It consists of 112 beads, divided into two equal parts by two large beads, called the upper parent bead (*ten-no-oya-dama*) and the lower parent bead (*chi-no-oya-dama*). From the upper parent bead hang two strings on which are threaded 21 beads smaller than those on the main string, with terminal beads of elongated form called *tsuyu-dama* (dewdrop beads). They are strung in the following way. Just below the upper parent bead on the left pendent string is a solitary bead; below this the strings are knotted. Then, on each string, are five more beads and another knot; again other five beads on each pendant, both of which terminate in a dewdrop bead. The collective name for these pendent beads is *kami-deshi* ('superior disciples'). The solitary bead is used to show how the rosary should be held. This bead should be on the left hand, thus ensuring the right signification to each bead during prayer.

From the lower parent bead hang three strings, two with five small beads each and the terminal dewdrop beads. These two strings are called the *shimo-deshi* ('inferior disciples'). The third string has ten beads, but is without a dewdrop bead. These are used merely as counters and are called *kadzu-tori*. The four dewdrop beads are also called *shi-ten-no*, the four regents who are said to preside over the four quarters of the universe. The rosary represents metaphorically the Buddhist pantheon, and the position of the dewdrop beads is thought to symbolize their actual positions of power and authority, as, according to Buddhist philosophy, they preside for good or evil over this and all other worlds. Throughout all the Japanese rosaries names of deities or saints are assigned to certain beads.

On the main string of this rosary are dividing beads. At an interval of seven beads on either side of the upper parent bead is a small bead, usually of a different material from the other beads, and again at a further interval of fourteen beads are two more dividing beads, one on each side, similar to the other dividing beads. These beads show where a special invocation should be uttered, the rosary being at the same time raised to the forehead with a reverence.

The materials of which Japanese rosaries are made vary considerably according to fashion or the taste or wealth of the owner. In former times they were made from the wood of the *bodhi*-tree (*pipal*-tree in India), for under its shade Śākyamuni is said to have attained supreme and universal enlightenment. The difficulty of obtaining this wood probably accounts for the fact that common rosaries are now often made of the wood of the cherry- and plum-trees.

The *sho-zuku-jiu-dzu* is the rosary usually carried by monks and laity of all sects, on all occasions of religious state, on visits of ceremony, at funerals, etc.

Besides the rosaries of the separate sects there are three ceremonies performed for special purposes in which the rosary plays an important part. They are known under the names of *kanō*, *ki-tō*, and *goma*.

(1) *Kanō.*—This ceremony is for the recital of 'prayers of request' (of a just nature) to a deity who has the power of acceding to or refusing the petitions of the devotee. It involves a special manipulation of the rosary, which is held by both hands, the petitioner raising it very reverently and slowly to the forehead or to the chin as the 'prayers of request' are repeated. Also during prayer the beads are rubbed up and down between the hands in a more or less energetic manner, according to the fervour of the petitioner, causing an unpleasant and grating noise. The members of the orthodox school, however, prefer to keep to the 'Middle Path,' considering too extreme an exhibition of this sort to be vulgar.

(2) *Ki-tō.*—This ceremony is peculiar to the Tendai, Shingon, and Nichiren sects—Riyō-bu—or those Buddhist sects which have accepted certain Shintō formulæ.

[1] All the information on Korean rosaries is obtained from E. B. Landis, in *The Korean Repository*, vol. ii. no. i.

(3) *Goma.*—There are two varieties of this ceremony, the first being that of *go-ki-to* and *goma* combined, which is confined to the Tendai and Shingon sects. The ritual is as follows. In front of the altar in the temples of these two denominations stands a large square wooden box, lined inside with metal, and bearing the name of *goma-dan*. In this box a fire is lit with pieces of a certain kind of wood which crackles a good deal and sends out a number of sparks on all sides. While this is in progress, the monk who is officiating repeats the prayers with great vigour, using the rosary in the way described above under *kanō*. This ceremony is believed to cure and prevent disease, and also to dispel evil spirits.

The second variety of this ceremony is called the *go-ki-to*, being performed without the *goma*. This form is peculiar to the Nichiren sect, and the method of manipulating the rosary is also characteristic. The rosary itself differs somewhat from that in ordinary use. The procedure is as follows. The rosary is tied to a short wooden sword of about five inches in length, the large beads being fastened near to the point. The sword is inscribed with the *dai-moku*, or original prayer of the creed, together with other incantatory prayers. The monk holds the sword in his right hand and repeats the first article of the creed, making at the same time nine passes in the air with the sword. These passes are supposed to correspond (mentally) with the written character which means 'Mysterious!' 'Wonderful!' though the figure sometimes varies. The metre of the prayers recited harmonizes with the nine passes used in making these figures. This is called *ku-ji wo kiru*, cutting the nine figures or words, and breaking the spell. The sword cuts are delivered in a short jerky way, the rosary at the same time clicking against the sword, thus helping to mark time. Only monks who have undergone a special training may officiate in this rite. The monks are trained at a celebrated monastery of the Nichiren sect in Shinōsa. The course lasts for 100 days and generally takes place in the winter. The curriculum prescribed is very severe, and, at the end of the course, should the candidate be successful in passing the test examination, he is granted a diploma by the abbot.[1]

According to one authority,[2] the rosary in Japan plays an important part in social as well as in religious life. In the tea-room there is always a hook on which to hang a rosary; a rosary of value, historical or other, is much appreciated as an ornament for this room. It is said that rosaries were carried by all the soldiers in the late Russo-Japanese war. The dead also have a rosary slipped on the wrist, whether they are buried or cremated.

At some of the larger temples and at all places of popular pilgrimage there are special shops for the sale of rosaries, having as their sign an enormous rosary hung outside. The devout attach especial value to a rosary that has been consecrated over the sacred flame and incense smoke of a venerated temple.

3. Muhammadan.—The rosary used by followers of Islām generally consists of 99 beads with a terminal bead called the *imām*, 'leader.' Its chief use is for counting the recital of the 99 names, or attributes, of God, the *imām* being sometimes used for the essential name, Allāh. This rosary is divided into three parts, 33 beads in each, by beads of another material or shape, or by tassels which are often made of gold thread or of bright coloured silks. According to some authorities, there is another variety of the rosary, not often used, which has 101 beads to correspond with the 101 names of the Prophet.[3] A smaller rosary of 33 beads is very commonly used, and the devotee will go round this three times to get the full repetition of the 99 names. In Persia and India the Muhammadan rosary is called *tasbih*, in Egypt *subhah*, from an Arabic verb meaning 'to praise,' 'to exalt.' At the present day it is used chiefly by the older or more devout Muhammadans; among the younger people it is tending to become merely something to hold in the hand and finger during leisure hours.

[illegible] says that the Prophet attributed great merit to the [illegible] the names of God and repeated certain formulæ. 'Verily,' he says, 'there are ninety-nine names of God [illegible] whoever recites them shall enter into Paradise,' and, 'Whoever recites this sentence [the *tasbih*, "I extol the holiness of God," and the *tahmīd*, "God be praised"] a hundred times, morning and evening, will have all his sins forgiven.'[1]

'Umar ibn Shu'aib relates that the Prophet said: 'He who recites "God be praised" [*al Hamdu li-'llāh!*] a hundred times in the morning and again a hundred times in the evening shall be like a person who has provided one hundred horsemen for a *jihad*, or "religious war."'[2] At another time the Prophet promises, as a reward for the repetition of a sacred formula, that the devotee 'shall receive rewards equal to the emancipating of ten slaves, and shall have one hundred good deeds recorded to his account, and one hundred of his sins shall be blotted out, and the words shall be a protection from the devil.'[3]

The date of the introduction of the rosary among Muhammadans is uncertain. It has been often assumed that it was taken over by them in a fully developed form from Buddhism. But tradition and various passages in the early literature point to a primitive form of rosary, such as would not have been used if borrowed from a people who had it already in a highly developed form.

Muhammadan tradition points to a very early use of the rosary, dating it back even to the time of the Prophet himself. In support of this belief it is related that Muhammad reproached some women for using pebbles in repeating the *tasbih*, etc., suggesting that they should rather count them on their fingers.[4] Another tradition, collected in the 9th cent. A.D., relates that Abu Abd al-Rahman, on visiting a mosque and seeing some of the worshippers engaged under a leader in the recitation of 100 *takbirs*, 100 *tahlīls*, and 100 *tasbihs*, keeping count of these by means of pebbles, reproached them and said: 'Rather count your sins and I shall guarantee you that nothing of your good works will be lost.'[5] Again, Abdallah, son of Khalīfah 'Umar, who died in A.D. 692, on noticing a man picking up pebbles as a means of counting his petitions while he prayed, said: 'Do not do that, for this comes from Satan.'[6] The last two quotations seem to show that, though a very primitive method of counting prayers was resorted to, the practice was still more or less looked down upon by those of rank or education.

The materials of which the rosaries are made are numerous, though each sect tends to have its own specially sacred form of bead. The Wahhabis, who are followers of the reformer Abd al-Wahhab, use their fingers on which to count their repetitions, their founder regarding a more developed form of rosary as an abomination and its use as a practice not sanctioned by the Qur'ān.[7] Wooden beads are used by all sects, and beads made of clay from Mecca are highly valued. Pilgrims from this sacred city sometimes bring such rosaries back with them.[8] Date stones are also much used, as are also horn and imitation pearls and coral. Beads made of earth from Kerbala, where Ḥusain is buried, are sacred to the Shī'ahs and are used by members of this sect only. They are often of a greenish-yellow colour. These beads are believed to turn red on the 9th day of Muḥarram, the night on which Ḥusain was killed. A rosary from India used by Arabs of the Sunni sect has beads made of the seeds of the *Cannabis indica*. These seeds are black in colour and are inlaid with silver. The terminal to this rosary is a complicated knot in bright coloured silk, the knot being of a form characteristic of Muhammadan rosaries. This rosary is said to have been made in Mecca. Another material often used is camel bone. Sometimes these beads are dyed red in honour of Ḥusain, who was slain in his conflict with Yazīd, the seventh Khalīfah, the red colour representing his blood. Sometimes the beads are dyed green, this being Ḥasan's colour. Ḥasan, Ḥusain's elder brother, met his death by poisoning. The poison turned his body green after death; hence these beads are in memory of his tragic end. *Faqīrs*, on the other hand, prefer glass beads of various colours, and also amber or agate.[9]

In Egypt on the first night after a burial certain ceremonies take place at the house of the deceased, among them being that of the *subhah*, or rosary.

[1] *Journ. Anthr. Soc. of Japan*, ix. 173-182.
[2] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 347.
[3] *Ib.* [illegible], note 1. Dr Crooke, on the other hand, has informed the writer of this article that the 101 beads correspond not with the names of the Prophet, but with 101 names of Allah.

[1] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 348.
[2] *DI*, p. 625, *s.v.* 'Tahmīd.' [3] *Ib.* p. 625, *s.v.* 'Tahlīl.'
[4] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 349.
[5] H. Thurston, *Journ. Soc. Arts*, l. 265.
[6] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 349. [7] *Ib.*
[8] E. W. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, p. 444.
[9] Crooke, p. 410.

After nightfall a certain number of *faqirs*, sometimes as many as 50, assemble, one of them bringing a large rosary of 1000 beads, each bead being about the size of a pigeon's egg. Certain passages from the Qur'ān are recited, after which the formula 'There is no deity but God' is repeated 3000 times. Count of these repetitions is kept by one of the *faqirs* by means of the rosary. They often rest and refresh themselves with coffee at the end of each round of the rosary. Certain other sentences are recited after this and then one of the officiants asks his companions, 'Have ye transferred [the merit of] what ye have recited to the soul of the deceased?' They reply, 'We have transferred it,' and add, 'and peace be on the Apostles, and praise be to God, the Lord of all creatures.'

Thus ends the ceremony of the *subhah*, which is repeated on the second and third nights if the family can afford it. A similar performance takes place when news of the death of a near relative is received.[1]

A further interest is attached to this ceremony in Upper Egypt, because a primitive form of rosary is often used on this occasion.

A *faqir* will bring a plain cord with him, and, as he recites each formula or passage from the Qur'ān, he makes a knot in his cord till he has reached 1000. The merit in this case also is conveyed to the deceased. The cord with its knots is afterwards thrown away.

The rosary is also used in Egypt in what is called making an *istikhārah*, 'application for the favour of Heaven, or for direction in the right course.' Lane[2] describes it as follows:

The performer takes hold of any two points of a rosary; after reciting the *Fātihah* (1st chapter of the Qur'ān) three times, he then counts the beads between these two points, saying, as he passes the first bead through his fingers, '[I extol] the perfection of God'; in passing the second, 'Praise be to God'; in passing the third, 'There is no deity but God,' repeating these formulæ in the same order to the last bead. If the first formula falls to the last bead, the answer is affirmative and favourable; if to the second, indifferent; but, if to the last, it is negative.

4. Christian.—The introduction of the rosary among Christians has been attributed to various people, among them being St. Aybert de Crespin, Peter the Hermit, and St. Dominic. The Roman Breviary says of the last-named that he 'was admonished by the Blessed Virgin to preach the rosary as a special remedy against heresy and sin.'[3] There has been a fairly widely accepted theory that the rosary was introduced into Europe at the time of the Crusades, having been imitated from Muhammadans. But later research seems to show that, though it is possible that such a means of counting prayers may have become more popular at this period, an earlier date should be assigned for its use in Western Europe. It is stated by William of Malmesbury[4] that the Lady Godiva of Coventry, wife of Count Leofric, bequeathed to the monastery which she founded 'a circlet of gems which she had threaded on a string, in order that by fingering them one by one as she successively recited her prayers she might not fall short of the exact number.' Lady Godiva died before 1070, so that some mnemonic device seems to have been in use prior to the preaching of the Crusades. The case of the Egyptian abbot Paul, who died in 341, is related by Sozomen (*c.* 400–450) in his *Ecclesiastical History*,[5] where it is stated that the saint daily recited 300 prayers, keeping count by means of pebbles gathered in his cloak, dropping one of them at the end of each prayer. Here is seen a much earlier and more primitive system of record-keeping, which suggests that the rosary had evolved independently in some centres, and had not been taken over from others, where presumably it was already in a fairly developed form.

By the 13th cent. the making of paternosters, as the beads were then called, had become a specialized industry both in Paris and in London. In the former city the workers were divided into four different gilds or companies, each company being distinguished according to the material in which its members worked. In London, at the same period, certain citizens were known as 'paternosterers.' These craftsmen probably resided in Paternoster Row and Ave Maria Lane, being thus conveniently close to the great devotional centre of London, under the shadow of St. Paul's cathedral.[1]

That the rosary probably arose from a practice in early Christian times of making repeated genuflexions and prostrations, sometimes combined with prayers or sacred formulæ, has been shown by the last-named authority.[2] This form of self-discipline was practised in Eastern Europe and in Ireland, spreading from these two widely separated centres over the greater part of Europe. Such a form of asceticism survives in the Greek Church at the present day, as will be seen below.

(*a*) *Roman Catholic.* — The complete Roman Catholic rosary of the present day consists of 150 beads, these being divided into decades by fifteen beads of larger size, sometimes of slightly different shape. These beads form the chaplet. A pendant is usually attached consisting of a cross or crucifix, and one large and three smaller beads, the latter being similar to those on the chaplet forming the decades.

This pendant is little used in practice, but the devotee, after making the sign of the cross, generally begins at once to recite the Pater, followed by ten Aves and a Gloria. This process is repeated for each decade, the Paternosters being recited on the larger beads, the Aves on the small ones. As the 150 Aves correspond to the number of the Psalms, the name 'Our Lady's Psalter' was given to this devotion from an early period. This is the full Dominican rosary, the institution of which a tradition of the order ascribes to St. Dominic himself.

To each of the fifteen decades is assigned for meditation one of the principal mysteries in the life of Christ or of the Virgin Mary. These fifteen mysteries are divided into three parts, viz. five joyful, five sorrowful, and five glorious mysteries.

The five joyful mysteries are: (1) the Annunciation, (2) the Visitation, (3) the Nativity, (4) the Presentation, (5) the Finding of the Child Jesus in the Temple.

The five sorrowful mysteries are: (1) the Agony in the Garden, (2) the Scourging, (3) the Crowning with thorns, (4) Jesus carrying His Cross, (5) the Crucifixion.

The five glorious mysteries are: (1) the Resurrection, (2) the Ascension, (3) the Descent of the Holy Ghost, (4) the Assumption, (5) the Crowning of the Virgin Mary, the last two mysteries being accepted on the authority of tradition.[3]

In practice the recitation is commonly limited to one of these sets at a time, and the rosary itself usually consists of five decades only and five Paternosters. The fifteen decades may, of course, be said by going round the rosary three times.[4]

There are other special rosaries in use, among them being the following:

The Crown of Jesus, with 33 Paternosters to commemorate the 33 years of Christ's life on earth, and five Aves in honour of the five wounds.[5] This devotion was first promoted by St. Michael of Florence, in 1516. The beads used must be blessed and indulgenced by a Camaldolese monk or priest with special power from Rome.

Chaplet of the Sacred Heart, with five large beads in honour

[1] Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, p. 531 f. [2] *Ib.* p. 270.
[3] Lessons for the feast of the Rosary, first Sunday of October.
[4] *Gesta Pontificum* (Rolls Series), bk. iv. ch. ii., quoted by Thurston, *Journ. Soc. Arts*, l. 266; H. P. Feasey, *The Reliquary*, vol. v. no. 3, p. 168.
[5] vi. 29.

[1] Thurston (*Journ. Soc. Arts*, l. 262) says that there was also in the 14th cent. another Paternoster Lane located beside the Thames in the Vintry ward, close to the church called Paternoster Church, or St. Michael's the Royal. This quarter of London was then inhabited by Gascon vintners who brought their goods by ship up the Thames. They would require their own forms of this devotion, and Thurston suggests that French *patenôtriers* settled in this locality in order to supply this want.
[2] Thurston, 'Genuflexions and Aves: A Study in Rosary Origins,' *The Month*, cxxvii. [1916] 441 ff., 546 ff.
[3] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 351.
[4] *Ib.* [5] *Ib.* p. 358, pl. 30, fig. 3.

of the five wounds, and 33 small beads in honour of the 33 years of His life.

Chaplet of Thanksgiving.

Chaplet of the Five Wounds.

Chaplet of the Seven Dolours, consisting of 49 Aves divided into seven groups of seven by seven Paternosters, and three more Aves in honour of the tears shed by the Virgin Mary. The Seven Dolours are as follows: (1) the prophecy of Simeon, (2) the flight into Egypt, (3) the loss of Jesus for three days, (4) the Virgin's meeting Jesus carrying His Cross, (5) her standing beneath the Cross on Calvary, (6) her receiving beneath the Cross the sacred body of Jesus, (7) her witnessing the burial of the body of Jesus.

The Crown of the Twelve Stars, or *Rosary of the Immaculate Conception*, consisting of twelve small beads in three sets of four, divided by three larger beads. This rosary was composed by a Capuchin Friar of Bologna and approved by a brief of Pope Pius IX., 22nd June 1855.

Chaplet of the Dead, with 40 small beads, divided into four sets of ten by three larger beads. It is used in honour of the 40 hours during which Christ's body lay in the Sepulchre.

The Bridgettine Rosary, with 63 Aves and seven Paternosters. St. Bridget was a Swedish saint, and the 63 small beads in her rosary are to commemorate the 63 years which the Virgin Mary is said to have lived, the seven Paternosters to commemorate her seven sorrows and seven joys.[1]

There are several other varieties of rosaries used by particular religious bodies or for special devotions.

Rosaries are blessed with prayers and holy water by some authorized priest in order to make them 'instruments of grace.'

The name 'rosary,' now given to this devotion, seems to be of comparatively late date—not appearing, according to one authority, till the 15th century.[2] In earlier times other names were applied, such as *patriloquium*, *serta*, *numeralia*, *calculi*, etc.

The word 'bead' (Anglo-Saxon *beade* or *bede*) meant originally 'a prayer.' In the *Vision of Piers Plouman* the expression *bedes byddyng* is found. Cf. Spenser's *Faerie Queene*:

> 'All night she spent in bidding of her bedes
> And all the day in doing good and godly deeds.'[3]

The expression 'a pair of beads,' sometimes met with in early literature, means 'a set of beads.' This term is used in the Prologue of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, where the Prioress carries her beads upon her arm:

> 'Of smal coral aboute hir arm she bar
> A peire of bedes, gauded al with grene;
> And ther-on heng a broche of gold ful shene,
> On which ther was first write a crowned A,
> And after, *Amor vincit omnia*.'

'Gauded al with grene' means having the gawdies green. These gawdies were the larger beads.

The beads were sometimes worn by ladies as a girdle. One set of beads belonging to Isabella Hylls, in 1497, is spoken of as 'a payr of bedes of corell. with six gawds ovyer gylt, and a green gyrdyl with boculle and penant and fourteen studs therein.'[4]

Early representations of prayer-beads on tombs sometimes exhibit the rosary not as a circle but, especially in the case of men, as a single string of ten beads with the two ends unattached and hanging free. Occasionally the two ends are attached at two different points of a girdle. Such a form is also seen in some old pictures.[5]

In the Middle Ages various objects were sometimes attached to the rosary, such as signet rings, cameos, and brooches. This led to a certain amount of extravagance, and efforts were made to check it; the price to be given for a rosary was limited, and no one person could possess more than three or four.[6]

Sometimes beads were carried as a sign of penance, this being often done by pilgrims who visited various holy places in Rome, and the wearing of such beads at the girdle became a distinctive sign of membership of a religious confraternity.

[1] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 354; cf. Thurston, 'The So-called Bridgettine Rosary,' *The Month*, c. [1902] 189–203.

[2] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 354 f., cf. Thurston, 'The Name of the Rosary,' *The Month*, iii. [1908] 518 ff., 610 ff.

[3] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 352.

[4] Feasey, *The Reliquary*, vol. v. no. 3, p. 167.

[5] *Cf. ib.* pp. 162–164, figs. 1, 3, 4, 5.

[6] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 354 f.

Beads were most highly valued if they had originally belonged to a person of renowned sanctity, or if they had touched the relics of some saint. In this case they were believed to possess a healing virtue.[1] Eastern Christians specially valued rosaries which had been made in Jerusalem or other sacred spots in Palestine.[2]

The materials composing the beads varied, and still vary, very much, often depending, as is the case among other religions, on the wealth and rank of the devotee, some being so valuable that they were left as legacies. Chaplets of wood were used at funerals by poor bedesmen, and in 1451 Lord John Scrope wills that 'twenty-four poor men clothed in white gowns and hoods, each of them having a new set of wooden beads,' should pray (on them) for him at his funeral, with the liberty to 'stand, sit, or kneel' at their pleasure.[3]

The Living Rosary.—This is a pious exercise founded on the Dominican rosary. It was instituted by Sister Maria Jaricott, to whom the Society for the Propagation of the Faith owes its existence. It was approved by Pope Gregory XVI. in 1832 and has since that date been established all over the world. Fifteen persons associate together for the purposes of this devotion. One of their number is elected president, and his duty is to superintend the association. Once every month he selects for himself and for his fellow-members one of the fifteen mysteries of the rosary. Each member recites daily one decade, with the Gloria Patri, meditating on the mystery allotted to him. The person to whom the first mystery is given recites, in addition to the above, the Creed once and the Ave thrice. At the conclusion of the decade each person recites the following: 'May the Divine Heart of Jesus and the most pure Heart of Mary be ever known, loved, honoured, and imitated in all places throughout the world.'

The Feast of the Rosary.—This feast is observed on the 1st Sunday in October, in memory of the battle of Lepanto, which took place on this day in 1571. This battle was won while the confraternity at Rome were praying for Christian success. Thereafter Pius V. ordered an annual commemoration of 'St. Mary of Victory,' and, by bull in 1583, Gregory XIII. set aside this particular Sunday as the Feast of the Rosary of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which was to be observed by all churches which maintained an altar in honour of the rosary. Finally, Clement XI., by bull of 3rd Oct. 1716, decreed that the feast should be observed by all churches throughout Christendom.[4]

The rosary in witchcraft.—In S. Italy the rosary, among other things, is used by witches who undertake to break spells. Certain objects are hung under the bed of a man made impotent, and the witch provides herself with a packet of unwashed herbs and a rosary without the medals or other blessed objects. She then tears open the packet and scatters its contents on the ground, meanwhile saying, 'Come io sciolgo questo mazzo, cosi sciolgo questo c-o.'[5]

Rosary rings.—Another method of counting prayers is by means of the rosary or decade rings. These rings are worn on the finger and usually have ten bosses or knobs for the ten Aves, with occasionally an eleventh for a Paternoster, and sometimes an additional twelfth boss for the repetition of the Creed. The earliest date assigned to these rings by one authority is the 14th century.[6] Such rings were worn by some classes of devotees during the hours devoted to repose, so that, should they wake during the night, they might repeat

[1] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 355. [2] *Ib.*

[3] Feasey, *The Reliquary*, vol. v. no. 3, p. 173.

[4] *EBr*[11], *s.v.* 'Rosary.' [5] *FL* viii. [1897] 7 f.

[6] G. F. Kunz, *Rings for the Finger*, Philadelphia, 1917, p. 34.

a certain number of prayers, keeping count by means of the bosses on the ring.[1]

The Knights of Malta frequently wore chaplet rings of gold or silver, with ten bosses in relief and a cross. These rings were said to have been invented by them. Their use, in place of the ordinary rosary, was spreading rapidly, till in 1836 the matter was referred to the tribunal of penitentiaries by Pope Gregory XVI. This tribunal then decided that such rings could not be blessed 'with the appropriate indulgences.'[2]

(*b*) *Orthodox Churches.* — In both Greek and Slavic monasteries part of the investiture of the Little Habit and the Great Habit is a knotted cord which is bestowed ceremonially upon the monk or nun.

The Superior takes the *vervitsa* (knotted cord) in his left hand, and says: 'Take, Brother N., the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, for continual prayer to Jesus; for thou must always have the Name of the Lord Jesus in mind, in heart, and on thy lips, ever saying: "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy upon me a sinner." Let us all say for him "Lord have mercy."' '*And, blessing the Vervitsa with his right hand, he giveth it to the Candidate; while the Brethren sing thrice,* "Lord have mercy." *And he, taking the Vervitsa, kisseth it and the right hand of the Superior.*'[3]

The knotted cord, as has already been pointed out, is possibly a very primitive form of rosary, and, in this case, it is seen surviving in a highly ceremonial function.

The Greeks call the knotted cord a *komvoschinion* (κομβοσχίνιον); the Russians give it the old Slavic name of *vervitsa* ('string'). In popular language it bears the name *lestovka* because of its resemblance to a ladder (*lestnitsa*).[4] There is also a string of beads called *komvologion* (κομβολόγιον) by the Greeks, and *chotki* by the Russians. This does not appear to be a religious appliance, it being used by ecclesiastics and laity alike merely as an ornament or as something to hold in the hand.[5]

The *komvoschinion* used by the monks on Mount Athos at the present day has 100 knots, divided by three beads of large size into four equal parts. It has a pendant with three more knots, and terminates with a small cross-shaped tassel. This rosary is used by the *megaloschemos* (monk of the highest grade, called *skhimnik* in the Slavic monasteries) to keep count of a definite number of prostrations every day, viz. 12 × 100 prostrations down to the ground, and in the evening 300 more, meanwhile repeating the following prayer: 'Lord Jesus Christ, Son and Word of the Living God, through the intercessions of thine all-pure Mother and of all thy Saints, have mercy and deliver us.' Sometimes these prostrations are imposed on a monk as a penance, in which case the accompanying prayer is: 'Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy upon me, a sinner.' The prostrations may vary in character thus: ten great metanoias (down to the ground), thirty little metanoias (down to the hips), and the prayer 'Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy upon me, a sinner,' repeated sixty times. This has to be done five times a day. The *komvoschinion* is also used for counting any kind of prayers or devotional exercises.[6]

The reason assigned for the adoption of the number 100 × 3 is as follows:

It corresponds 'with the number of the Psalms and Little Doxologies said at the Canonical Hours. The whole Psalter is divided into 20 portions, each of which is a *kathisma* (κάθισμα, seat), because it is followed by a rest or pause. Each *kathisma* consists of three parts, each part ending with the Little Doxology ("Glory be," etc.) and a threefold Alleluia. For the sake of those unable to read, St. Basil directed that, instead of a *kathisma*, one of the following prayers might be said 300 times: "Lord, have mercy," or "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy upon me a sinner," or "Lord Jesus Christ, for the sake of Theotokos, have mercy upon me a sinner." In other words, the prayer is to be said 100 times for each little Doxology of the *kathisma*, *i.e.* for each of the three parts of the portion of the Psalms ending with the "Glory be," etc., and the Alleluia. The large beads which separate the knots are merely intended to represent the ending of the three parts of the *kathisma*, and no prayer is connected with them.'[7]

[1] *Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. 355. [2] Kunz, p. 35.
[3] N. F. Robinson, *Monasticism in the Orthodox Churches*, London, 1916, p. 159 f.
[4] *Ib.* p. 155. [5] *Ib.* 154 f.
[6] *Ib.* p. 155. [7] *Ib.* p. 155 f.

This form of *komvoschinion* is used by Hellenic monks in Greece, Turkey, and the East generally, as well as on Mount Athos.

Among the Russian monks the knotted cord used is the old Slavic *vervitsa.* It has 103 knots or beads, which are separated into unequal groups by larger beads. The groups of beads are as follows: 17 + 33 + 40 + 12, and an additional small bead at the end. In the Slavic *vervitsa* the lower ends are fastened together; they terminate in three flat triangles, inscribed and ornamented. Sometimes these rosaries are made of little rolls of leather chain-stitched together, divided into groups by larger rolls. The terminals are also of leather, triangular in shape, inscribed in Church Slavic (ancient Slavic) with the words 'Jesus Christ, have mercy upon me, a sinner.' This kind of rosary calls to mind the popular name for it, viz. *lestovka*, as it certainly might be thought to resemble a ladder in shape.[1] This rosary is also used for counting a large number of prostrations. For instance, if a monk is prevented from saying the Typica (the selection of Psalms sung at certain offices), he makes instead 700 metanoias; he makes 500 instead of Hesperinos (Vespers), 200 in place of Apodeipnon (Compline), and 500 in place of Orthros (Lauds).[2]

The use of the *komvoschinion* or *vervitsa* is a purely monastic or ascetic devotion; it is not indulged in by the Orthodox laity, though the laity of the Russian sects called Old Believers have adopted it. Whenever this devotion is seen in use among the Uniates outside the monasteries, it has been copied from the rosary as used among the laity in the West.[3]

The rosary as a charm.—In certain parts of Poland, namely in the districts of Piotrkow, Czenstochowa, and Plock, the following custom is in use to keep off lightning:

During a storm a rosary—either a genuine one made of cedar-wood from the Holy Land or one made in imitation—is carried round the house three times, together with a little bell called 'the bell of Loreto' (associated with the Holy Mother of Loreto in Italy) and sometimes also a lighted candle, blessed on Candlemas Day (2nd Feb.). The bell is rung, and the rosary is used with the words 'God save us' at the large beads and 'Holy Mother, be our mediator' at the small ones.[4]

(*c*) *Coptic.*—The rosaries used by the Copts in Egypt have 41 beads, or sometimes 81. They are used for counting a similar number of repetitions of the 'Kyrie eleison.' This petition is repeated in Arabic or Coptic, with the addition, at the end, of a short prayer in Coptic. Sometimes the Copts resort to what is, presumably, a more primitive method of keeping record of their prayers, and count on their fingers.[5]

5. Jewish. — Among the Jews the rosary has lost all religious importance, having been taken over by them from the Turks and Greeks. They use it merely as a pastime on the Sabbaths and holy days. No manual labour being permitted on those days, they occupy themselves with passing the beads through their fingers. These rosaries sometimes have 32 beads, sometimes 99.[6]

LITERATURE.—i. *India.*—*Proc. U.S. National Mus.* xxxvi. [Washington, 1909]; M. Monier-Williams, *Modern India and the Indians*[3], London, 1879; W. Crooke, *Things Indian*, do. 1906, pp. 407–419, *NINQ* iii. [1893], iv. [1894]; Monier-Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India*, London, 1883; *PNQ* iii. [1885]; G. Watt, *Dict. of the Economic Products of India*, London and Calcutta, 1889–93, iv.

[1] Specimen in Tylor Coll., Pitt-Rivers Museum, Oxford.
[2] Robinson, p. 156 f. [3] *Ib.* p. 157.
[4] The writer of this article is indebted to Miss Czaplicka for this information.
[5] Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, p. 541.
[6] Dr. Gaster has suggested to the writer of this article that there may be a kabbalistic reason for the number 32. It is the mystical number for the 'ways of wisdom' by which God created the world. They stand at the beginning of the so-called Book of Creation, and they play an important rôle in the kabbalistic literature. It may be that this has influenced the number of beads on the smaller rosaries.

ii. *Burma.* — See L. A. Waddell, *JASB* lxi. [1893] 33, *Gazetteer of Sikkim*, Calcutta, 1894, p. 282.
iii. *Tibet.* — *Gazetteer of Sikkim*, Calcutta, 1894; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, *JASB* lxi.
iv. *China.*—J. F. Davis, *The Chinese*, 2 vols., London, 1836; J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, do. 1866, ii.
v. *Korea.*—*The Korean Repository*, vol. ii. no. 1 [Jan. 1895].
vi. *Japan.*—*Journ. Asiatic Soc. of Japan*, ix. [1881].
vii. *Muhammadan.*—*DI*, London, 1885; H. Thurston, *Journ. Soc. Arts*, l. [1902]; E. W. Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, new ed., London, 1895.
viii. *Christian.*—H. P. Feasey, *The Reliquary*, vol. v. no. 2 [1899], no. 3 [1899], 'The Instrument of the Rosary,' pts. 1 and 2; H. Thurston, *The Month*, xcvi. [1900] 403 ff., 513 ff., 620 ff., xcvii. [1901] 67 ff., 172 ff., 286 ff., 383 ff., c. [1902] 189 ff., cxi. [1908] 518 ff., 610 ff., cxxi. [1913] 162 ff., cxxvii. [1916] 441 ff., 546 ff.; F. T. Esser, *Unserer lieben Frauen Rosenkranz*, Paderborn, 1889, 'Zur Archäologie der Paternoster Schnur,' in *Compte rendu du quatrième Congrès Scientifique International des Catholiques*, Freiburg, 1898; H. Holzapfel, *St. Dominikus und der Rosenkranz*, Munich, 1903; *EBr*[11], s.v. 'Rosary.'

WINIFRED S. BLACKMAN.

ROSICRUCIANS. — When considering the history of the Rosicrucians, we have to bear in mind that members of that body were, and are, pledged to secrecy, and that the paucity of records is a proof of their sincerity and devotion. But it is permissible to give some data of the history of the Society since its foundation about the year 1420.

Christian Rosencreuz was born in the year 1378. His parents were noble, and he was educated at a monastery. His education being completed, he travelled in the Holy Land, taking with him as companion and guide a certain P.A.L., who, however, died on reaching Cyprus. After a delay caused by this untimely event, Rosencreuz proceeded on his travels alone, and, on reaching Damascus, he placed himself in the hands of certain wise men with whom he continued his studies, and from whom he derived much information respecting their philosophy and science. Thence he journeyed to Egypt, to Fez, and to Spain, gathering in each place a store of learning which he was to use in the development of the fraternity which afterwards bore his name. In the year 1413 he reached Austria, and after five years' preparation, during which he collated his knowledge, he chose three companions, Fratres G.V., I.A. (who, it was noted, was not a German), and I.O.; to them he imparted his knowledge and the invaluable results of his travels, which included religion, philosophy, and the science of medicine. These four were the original members of the Society of the Rose and Cross. Their communications with each other were made by means of a magical alphabet, language, and dictionary, which assured secrecy; their books *M* (*Magicon*), *Axiomata*, *Rota Mundi*, and *Protheus* are known. They built from their own designs a home for the fraternity, which they named 'Domus Sancti Spiritus,' and a few years later increased their number by the creation of a second circle consisting of four other fratres, namely R.C. (a cousin of Rosencreuz), B. (a draughtsman and painter), G.G., and P.D., who was appointed secretary, thus completing the scheme of work. Their declared object, as narrated in the *Confessio*, was, without interfering with the religious or political actions of States, to improve mankind by the discovery of the true philosophy. While two of the fratres were always with the founder, the others went about doing good works, relieving the poor and attending to the sick. Thus the fraternity was composed of students of religion, philosophy, and medicine, who also practised acts of benevolence.

They were bound by six rules: (1) to profess nothing, but to cure the sick, and that freely; (2) to wear only the dress of the country in which they were; (3) to assemble at the Domus Sancti Spiritus once a year on a certain day (the festival C.C.), or send a reason for absence; (4) each frater to select a proper person to succeed him; (5) the letters C.R. to be their seal, mark, and character; (6) to maintain the secrecy of the fraternity for at least 100 years.

It was Frater I.O. who, being a learned kabbalist, doctor, and author of the book *H*, visited England, and laid the foundation of the Rosicrucian system which has ever since existed in this country. He it was who cured the young Earl of Norfolk of leprosy, and he was the first of the original members to die.

In the year 1457 Rosencreuz wrote an interesting and curious tractate entitled *Chymische Hochzeit*, which was published at a later period; and in 1484 the founder of the fraternity died and was buried in a vault of seven sides decorated with symbols, which had been erected about eight years previously for his resting-place. The body was embalmed and placed in this specially prepared tomb, which was then closed, and upon the door was fixed a brazen plate upon which was engraved an inscription of a prophetic exclamation of his own, that in 120 years after his death his tomb should be re-opened and his doctrines, in a modified form, once more made available, and that not only to a few, but to the learned in general.

Frater D. was chosen as the successor of the founder, and after his death Frater A., at an unknown date. Frater A. died in 1600. To him succeeded Frater N.N., who in 1604 disclosed the entrance to the vault and caused it to be opened. In it was found the body carefully preserved under an altar; in the right hand was the parchment roll called the book *T* (*Testamentum*); there were also found copies of other valuable books of the fraternity—a *Vita*, and an *Itinerarium* of the founder, together with certain songs (*mantras*), mirrors, bells, lamps, etc. On a brass table were engraved the names of all the brethren who up to the time of the founder's death had been members of the fraternity.

In 1610 a notary named Haselmeyer wrote that, while staying in the Tyrol, he had seen a copy in MS of the history called *Fama Fraternitatis*; the name of its author is not known, but four years later this *Fama* was printed and published at Cassel, in Germany. This narrative of the founding of the Rosicrucian fraternity was re-issued at Frankfort-on-the-Main in 1615, together with an addition called *Confessio Fraternitatis*. The authorship of these tracts has been variously attributed to Johann Valentin Andrea, to Joachim Junge (a philosopher who died in 1657), to the mystic Giles Guttman, and to a comparatively little known writer, one Tauler. Although these works gave to the world a knowledge of the existence of the Rosicrucian fraternity, it is probable that they were not written by any one with a real personal knowledge of the affairs of the brotherhood; neither is there any evidence that they were authorized; but, although they lack literary ability, they may be accepted as founded on facts obtained from current conceptions of the work of the fraternity, since the necessity for strict secrecy had to some extent abated; for between the death of Rosencreuz in 1484 and the opening of the tomb in 1604 the Protestant Reformation had been accomplished by Martin Luther and his coadjutors about the year 1517.

An Echo of the God-illuminated Brotherhood of the R.C., issued at Danzig in 1615, and written by Julius Sperber, rendered high praise to the learning of the fraternity, while the *Chymische Hochzeit Christiani Rosenkreuz*, claimed by Andreæ to be his own work, was published at Strassburg in 1616, and an English translation, under the title *The Chemical Wedding*, was issued in the year 1690 by R. Foxcroft, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge.

The publication of these works caused a great sensation among the learned in Europe; they were widely criticized, notably by such men as Libavius and Menapius; those anxious to be admitted to the fraternity were loud in their praise, while others, having failed in their attempts to secure reception, denounced the brotherhood unsparingly.

Michael Maier (1568–1622), a notable philosopher and Rosicrucian Magus, the author of many learned works describing the Rosicrucian system, visited England and admitted Robert Fludd to Rosicrucian adeptship. Fludd was born at Milgate House, Bearstead, Kent, in 1574, and was the son of Sir Thomas Fludd, Treasurer of War to Queen Elizabeth. For many years he practised medicine in the city of London, and on his death was buried in Bearstead church, where there is a monument to his memory with a long inscription recording his many virtues. Near the house of his birth are the rose farm and other gardens where he cultivated the plants used in his pharmacy. He was the Magus in this country, and during his life wrote many learned works on kabbalistic theosophy and Rosicrucian doctrines, the most notable being his *Apologia Compendiaria pro fraternitate de Rosea Cruce* (Leyden, 1616), *Tractatus Apologeticus, integritatem Societatis de Rosea Cruce defendens* (Leyden, 1617), and *Summum Bonum* (Frankfort, 1629). His successor was Sir Kenelm Digby (1603–65), philosopher and poet. Among his published works are *Two Treatises: the Nature of Bodies . . . the Nature of Man's Soule* (Paris, 1644), books on medicine and the cure of wounds by sympathy. The jewel and chain of his office as chief of the English Rosicrucians are in the possession of one of his descendants in the south of England. Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam (1561–1626), was influenced by his friend Robert Fludd and became a Rosicrucian.

It is believed that Elias Ashmole (1617–92), the antiquary and astrologer, who was a Rosicrucian, was associated in the introduction of mysticism into the masonic body, and that his influence is felt in modern speculative freemasonry. Towards the end of his life he derived much occult knowledge from William Backhouse, a Rosicrucian of renown and a chemist. In 1646 Ashmole, William Lilly, the astrologer, Thomas Wharton, the eminent anatomist, Sir George Wharton, the astrologer, together with John Hewett, the royalist divine, and John Pearson (afterwards bishop of Chester and author of the famous *Exposition of the Creed*), formed a Rosicrucian lodge in London; this is referred to in *Occult Science*, which forms vol. xxxi. of the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana* of 1845; while in the *New Curiosities of Literature* (2 vols., London, 1847) George Soane writes at length upon Rosicrucians and Freemasons.

Thomas Vaughan (1622–66), twin brother of Henry Vaughan, 'Silurist,' was a celebrated mystic; under the name of Eugenius Philalethes he published an English version of the *Fama* and *Confessio* (1652). In this he was associated with Sir Robert Moray, the first president of the Royal Society.

In 1710 an adept named Sigismund Richter published, under the pseudonym 'Sincerus Renatus,' a work entitled *Die Warhaffte und Volkommene Bereitung aus dem Orden des Gulden und Rosen Kreutzes*, giving 52 rules of the Rosicrucian fraternity of that period. In 1777 the Reformed Rite of the Brethren of the Rose and Golden Cross was established.

Many important works were published during the succeeding years, among them a theosophic book, with coloured emblematic plates, at Altona, *Geheime Figuren der Rosenkreuzer aus dem 16ten und 17ten Jahrhundert* (this work, issued in 1795, contained the German text of the *Aureum Sæculum Redivivum*, originally printed in 1621, together with *The Golden Tractate of the Philosopher's Stone* and the original *Prayer of a Rosicrucian*). A portion of this volume, translated into English by Franz Hartmann, a member of the German fraternity, was published in 1887.

Among the English Rosicrucians of the last century were Frederick Hockley, Godfrey Higgins, author of *Anacalypsis* (2 vols., London, 1836), Lord Lytton, author of *Zanoni* (London, 1842), William James Hughan, the chief Masonic historian, Robert Wentworth Little, Kenneth R. H. Mackenzie, author of the well-known *Royal Masonic Cyclopædia* (London, 1877), William Robert Woodman, and the present Supreme Magus, William Wynn Westcott, the author of many learned essays on kabbalistic and mystic lore.

In 1866 the strands of the Rosicrucian rope were gathered together, when, under the direction of R. W. Little, the 'Societas Rosicruciana in Anglia' was founded, consolidating the system and erasing some false impressions that had been created during the centuries. At the present time duly authorized Rosicrucian colleges are at work in England, British India, Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa, and S. America, all under the authority of the English body; and there are daughter groups in Scotland and the United States of America working in complete harmony with the parent body. The Continental Rosicrucian system was reorganized in 1890, and its branches were very active up to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. This body insists upon complete privacy, and its members are forbidden to acknowledge their status; but they had been, until the war, very active in good works, especially in carrying on investigations into the uses of vegetable drugs and the relief of disease by means of coloured lights and by hypnotic processes; there are numerous physicians using these means, which are freely supplied, but these doctors are not necessarily pledged members of the fraternity.

As in the earliest times the Rosicrucians not only studied, but went about ministering to those in distress, so the fratres of to-day are concerned with the study and administration of medicines and with their manufacture upon the old lines. They believe that this world and indeed the whole universe is permeated with the essence of the Creator, that every rock is instinct with life, that every plant and every tree is imbued with a sense derived from the Master Mind that caused it to exist, and that each living thing moves, acts, and thinks in accordance with the supreme design by which all things were made, by which all things exist, and by which they will continue to function till the end of time. At no period did the Rosicrucians declare the transmutation of metals to be a part of their practice, nor did they ever promise indefinite prolongation of life by mysterious drugs, but they did speak of these in parables with the full and complete knowledge that all things are possible, and that, with the forces of nature under their control, they could do even these. They were content, however, to act and to trust to the future, when, the minds of men having been cleansed, the redemption and absorption should be accomplished.

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ARTHUR CADBURY JONES.

ROTHE.—1. Life.—Richard Rothe was born in Posen on 30th Jan. 1799. His father, a man of striking character, held an important official position under the Prussian Government, and was powerfully influenced by that idea of the State which subsequently found expression in the works of Gustav Freytag. His mother, the daughter of the Hofrath Müller in Liegnitz, was a woman of considerable intellectual culture and of a deeply religious nature. Soon after the birth of Richard, their only child, the parents removed to Stettin, and a few years later to Breslau, in Silesia, with which Rothe's boyhood was chiefly associated. A delicate child, of a shy and retiring disposition, he occupied himself up to the age of eight largely with picture-books and stories of travel, whereby his imaginative faculties were awakened and nurtured. A tendency towards mysticism early exhibited itself, and the Bible, as soon as he was able to read it, made a deep impression upon him. At the age of ten he was sent to the reformed Friedrichsgymnasium in Breslau and at once proved himself to be a pupil of great industry and perseverance. He was fond of the poetry of Schiller, Goethe, Jean Paul, the two Schlegels, Tieck, and Fouqué, although, when he reached the age of sixteen, Novalis became his favourite author.

In April 1817 he entered the University of Heidelberg as a theological student. Heidelberg was at that time at the height of its fame as a seat of learning. Hegel had settled there the year before as Professor of Philosophy, only, however, to migrate to Berlin in Jan. 1818. Rothe attended Hegel's lectures on Logic and Metaphysics, which, he writes in his Diary, although most of the numerous auditors complain of them, he hopes will not remain unintelligible to him. Karl Daub, the 'Talleyrand of German thought,' who was Professor Ordinarius of Theology and a speculative thinker of unusual insight and power, became the teacher to whom Rothe owed his greatest debt.

'Daub,' he writes to his father, 'is a man of whom not only Heidelberg but our whole German Fatherland can be proud. I hesitate not to say that he is the first of all living academical teachers. The enthusiasm with which he is here spoken of is absolutely universal, as also is the love of him on the part of students of all Faculties.'[1]

Daub was attempting to work out a philosophy of religion along the lines of the idealism of Schelling and Hegel, and one can understand the fascination that a mind of his bent must have had for the youth of mystic propensities and brooding temperament. Yet the pupil was not a blind hero-worshipper. Towards the end of his student life in Heidelberg he expresses dissent from certain of Daub's contentions. Probably he had come to distrust the perverse tendency in his teacher of finding in the persons and events of the Gospel narratives embodiments of metaphysical ideas. Daub, he complains, yields too much to the philosopher, more than the theologian ought to yield, and when the philosopher has been allowed to have so much of his own way he only laughs at the theologian and then disarms him.

After Daub the man who chiefly succeeded in winning Rothe's affection was Abegg, a lecturer on New Testament Exegesis—

a man, he writes, 'in whom Christ is formed, as the Scripture puts it, who is penetrated through and through with all that is most fundamental in Christianity, who can look at nothing but with Christian eyes.'[1] 'To me,' he declared in 1840, speaking over Abegg's grave, 'he was one of the first whose personality set the seal of overwhelming certainty upon the essence and reality of Christian devotion.'[2]

Not only in the class-room did Abegg inspire the ardent young student; Abegg's simple homilies from the pulpit, bearing no trace of art, but full of genuine religious experience, seemed to him models of what true sermons should be. Other teachers of his were F. H. C. Schwarz, who also lectured on the NT, and of whose interpretation of the Johannine writing he speaks with admiration; Friedrich Creuzer, the classical scholar and archæologist; and F. C. Schlossen, the historian, who appeared to him to know Tacitus by heart. The five semesters spent in Heidelberg were undoubtedly fruitful in every respect. It was here that his mind was moulded; it was here that the interests were engendered which were to be his throughout life. Just before leaving Rothe preached, at a little village in the neighbourhood, called Mauer, his first sermon—a sermon, he tells his father, with which he was utterly discontented, but which convinced him that it was only through diligent practice that one could ever expect to succeed in giving true and unweakened expression to the life which lives in us.

For the winter-semester of 1819 Rothe went to Berlin. The Theological Faculty of the then recently founded University had at its head men of world-wide reputation — Schleiermacher, Neander, and Lücke. And, in the Philosophical Faculty, Hegel had commenced the work which made him the acknowledged leader of philosophical thought in Germany. Looking back upon that period, Rothe wrote in 1862:

'It was a new birth of the German people through the power of the gospel that had again become living, a new formation of its entire life.'[3]

Yet at the time, and after his Heidelberg experience, he never felt at home in Berlin. He heard Schleiermacher's lectures, delivered for the first time that semester, on *das Leben Jesu*; but they gave him the impression that the great man was troubling himself with artificially constructed difficulties. Schleiermacher's sermons, too, he contrasts unfavourably with those of his beloved Abegg; they lacked, to his mind, the inner spiritual grasp of the Heidelberg preacher, and from them he gained little inspiration, although he admits their ingenuity and scholarly character. He gives his father an interesting account of Schleiermacher's seminar. The work was done mainly by essays written by the students, one of which was discussed at each of the weekly gatherings. To Rothe there had been assigned the theme of determining whether in the reported sayings of Christ traces could be found of His having possessed knowledge of the OT Apocrypha and of His having devoted special attention thereto. Rothe complains *more suo* that, before one could begin to deal with a problem of that sort, a host of prior questions would have to be answered, for the answering of which the necessary historical data were completely wanting. In regard to Neander, who was lecturing on the history of dogma, the young scholar confesses, however, that his expectations had not deceived him.

'He is a wonderful man,' he writes, 'externally altogether dried up, but internally fresh and vigorous in Christian life although it does not stream forth joyfully, but only gleams through sadly as the moon between graves.'[4]

And he draws a woeful picture of his aching fingers trying to take down the prodigiously rapid dicta-

[1] Nippold, *Richard Rothe*, i. 43.

[1] Nippold, *Richard Rothe*, i. 112. [2] *Ib.* p. 35. [3] *Ib.* p. 153. [4] *Ib.* p. 156f.

tion which the learned theologian was giving to his class.

'Happiest of all I still feel myself,' he tells his father, 'amongst the old Heidelberg acquaintances, and the well-known, though not exactly melodious, voice of Hegel is for my ear a delicious music from the banks of the Garonne.'[1]

Hegel was lecturing five times a week on *Naturrecht*, but had started by dismissing the term as wholly unsuitable because of its implication of a so-called state of nature, and was giving in fact a *Rechtsphilosophie*—an account, namely, of the immanent determinations of the Spirit from the point of view of its necessary development in the form of the State. A second semester was spent in Berlin, during which Schleiermacher was lecturing on Ethics, Neander on Church History, and Marheineke on Symbolics. But Rothe was still yearning for release from the Prussian capital. A considerable number of relatives and family acquaintances resided there, and a good deal of his time had to be spent in visiting.

'It's no wonder,' he exclaims, 'that people of the world get inwardly stunted, for when we have so much to do with outward things we become in fact heathens, and our pure human consciousness grows ever weaker in us.'[2]

Probably it was recoil from what seemed to him the prevailing worldliness of the Lutheran churchgoers that led to his interesting himself at this time in the Pietist movement, then in its earlier and healthier phase. His letters show that his religious nature was craving for a deeper earnestness and sincerity in the spiritual life, for a simpler and more genuinely personal devotion. And he found a companionable feeling among the devotees of the revival movement.

On 6th Nov. 1820 Rothe entered the theological seminary at Wittenberg, then under the superintendence of Karl Ludwig Nitzsch, 'an old and genial man, of unusually kindly nature, who is full of love for his work.'[3] Here he was plunged into a course of preparation for the practical work of the ministry—Bible study with a view to homiletical application, the composition of sermons and of sermon-schemes to be criticized by his teachers, preaching to rural congregations in the district, and visiting people in their homes. Rothe threw himself *con amore* into the work, and yet found time for the studies for which his university training had specially equipped him. Of the teachers at the seminary he was at once drawn to H. L. Heubner, a man of singular simplicity of character, with a wealth of ideas and an insight into the means of applying them such as he had not met with since the days when he had sat at the feet of Abegg. Heubner became his life-long friend, and it was largely due to his influence that Rothe was persuaded, at first very much against his inclination, to keep in view the possibility of devoting himself to an academical career. In March 1821 a former fellow-student at Berlin, Rudolf Stier, entered the seminary, and he was in large measure instrumental in inducing Rothe, already tending in that direction, to espouse warmly for the time being the Pietist propaganda. In his letters home of this period Rothe relates the chilling effect produced upon his mind by the prevalent ecclesiasticism, with its dreary orthodox propositions and verbal formularies. He goes to a church on Easter Sunday and cannot rid himself of the feeling that he is in a Greek temple. Over the altar-table he finds the words 'Friede, Hoffnung, Ruhe und Eintracht allen guten Menschen' inscribed, and they strike him as more fitted for a hall of English deists than for a Christian house of God.

Returning to his parents' house at Breslau in Oct. 1822, he remained there about six months, during his licentiate period. In Breslau he had much intercourse with 'the Awakened'—J. G. Scheibel, Henrik Steffens, Julius Müller among them—who helped to strengthen his belief in Spener's proposal for restoring the life of the Church. These friends met together frequently for devotional reading and prayer; and, in letters to Stier, Rothe describes the help that he was thus obtaining in his spiritual needs. His days were fully occupied; he was busily engaged with laborious researches into the development of early Christian doctrine, and in addition he was preaching regularly in the place of a pastor who was ill.

On 29th July 1823 he received an invitation from the Government to undertake the work of chaplain to the Prussian embassy in Rome, of which Baron Bunsen was at that time the head. After anxious reflexion Rothe accepted the offer, recognizing that it afforded opportunities for carrying on the historical inquiries to which he felt himself specially called. He was ordained in Berlin on 12th Oct.; and a month later he married Louise von Brücke, to whom he had become engaged while in Wittenberg—one of whose sisters was the wife of his friend Heubner and the other of August Hahn. It was a happy marriage, and he had by his side henceforth a true helper in all his aims and endeavours. Early in Jan. 1824 he arrived with his wife in Rome, and entered at once upon the duties of his office.

'The little flock which I have to shepherd presents,' he writes, 'a peculiar appearance. Externally it is composed of a few so-called upper-class people and a not unimportant number of artists.'[1]

With characteristic zeal he plunged into the work, organizing week-day evening services, and lecturing on various phases of Church History and on the origin and growth of Christian institutions. He preached regularly on Sunday, and of his great power and influence in the pulpit there is abundant testimony. He combined in his utterances a simplicity and a depth of spiritual experience that speedily made their appeal to and touched the hearts of his hearers. Bunsen was at once attracted to the young chaplain, and a warm friendship sprang up between the two men. Bunsen's own studies in ecclesiastical history had been extensive, and he was then engaged in an attempt to bring about the compilation of a liturgy that should be for the evangelical churches of Germany what the Book of Common Prayer was for the Anglican Church. Full of activity as the years in Rome were, Rothe was enabled to continue his theological studies and to lay the foundations for his work on the early Christian Church. Under the many influences of the city his religious views gained in catholicity and broadness; he became convinced that Christian faith could fulfil its mission only by feeling itself at one with reason and with the history of the world.

Towards the end of 1827 Rothe received, partly through the aid of Bunsen, the offer of a professorship of Church History in the theological seminary at Wittenberg; and, after visiting Naples and Florence, he returned to Wittenberg in Sept. 1828. His lectures in the seminary were on the history and constitution of the early Christian Church, and also on selected sermons of ancient and modern times. Besides lecturing, he superintended much of the practical work of the college, and preached frequently. In 1831 he became second director, and, in the following year, *ephorus*, of the seminary. He was thus brought into close personal touch with the students, and their affection for him was unbounded. During these years he devoted himself to literary work. There appeared in 1836 his commentary on Rom. 5^{12-21}; and in the

[1] Nippold, *Richard Rothe*, i. 155.
[2] *Ib.* p. 157.
[3] *Ib.* p. 191.

[1] Nippold, *Richard Rothe*, i. 357.

following year the first volume of his great undertaking entitled *Die Anfänge der christlichen Kirche und ihrer Verfassung*. During this Wittenberg period Rothe found himself diverging more and more from the ways of thought represented by the Pietists, and, when the two books just mentioned appeared, his secession from Pietism was an acknowledged fact. Though sympathizing with the religious tendencies of the Pietists, he was alienated by their narrow attitude to historical investigation and speculative reflexion.

A new theological seminary was founded in Heidelberg in 1837, and Rothe was chosen to be its first director. The institution started with only fourteen students, and Rothe was discouraged by the absence of any religious interest in the congregations of the district no less than by the prevalent *vis inertiæ* among the clergy themselves. He speedily, however, made his presence felt in the circle of the younger theologians, and the influence that he exerted as University Preacher was profound and wide-spread. He concentrated his attention now more than he had done hitherto upon the fundamental principles of religious philosophy, and in 1845 there appeared the first two volumes of the *Theologische Ethik*, which he recognized to be his main contribution to theological science. The third volume appeared in 1848. In the summer of the year 1848 he was called upon, at a time of great unrest and turmoil, to fulfil the duties of Rector of the University. On 22nd Nov. he delivered his rectorial address *Ueber die Aussichten der Universitäten aus dem Standpunkte der Gegenwart*, in which he vindicated the necessity of exact and methodical scientific investigation, as opposed to the superficial tendencies of the past thirty or forty years, whilst emphasizing the dangers attending increasing specialization of losing sight of the ideal of science as a whole.

Rothe accepted in 1849 a call to one of the theological chairs in the University of Bonn, and he was also appointed University Preacher. He had Dorner and Bleek as his colleagues, and the Theological Faculty rapidly increased in numbers; Rothe's lectures on the life of Christ and on ethics awakened the keenest interest. He made few disciples, however, and created no school, as Dorner succeeded in doing. His influence was of a deeper and more enduring kind—that of a man who was constantly feeling his way along the thorny path of speculative theology. He was present at the Synod of 1850 in Dinsburg; and he continued to be largely occupied with ecclesiastical matters.

After five years' residence in Bonn Rothe returned in 1854 to Heidelberg as Professor of Theology in the University. He took part in the General Synod of 1855, at which important issues came up for decision as regards the *Bekenntnissfrage* and the *Katechismusfrage*, and with reference to both he stood for the position of freedom and liberty of thought. The following years, though full of activity, were saddened by the long and depressing illness of his wife, who died in 1861. After her death he was filled with a consciousness of the needs of the age in respect to religion; and he threw himself with great earnestness into several ecclesiastical questions. He took a prominent part in the General Synod of 1861 at Karlsruhe and became a member of the Oberkirchenrath. He was largely instrumental in founding the Protestantenverein, which held its first meeting at Eisenach in June 1865. The aims of the Verein were these: that the Church should frankly recognize the culture and science of the time, that perfect freedom should be accorded to both clergy and laity to search for and to publish the truth in entire independence of external authority, that the clergy and the laity should stand upon a mental and spiritual equality, that the laity should have a greater share in Church matters, and that a National Church should be established upon the basis of universal suffrage. Rothe read an introductory paper at the meeting upon the means by which the estranged members of the Church might be reclaimed. He urged that the Church becomes useless as soon as she loses the moral power to win and keep the hearts of her members, that she had lost this power by opposing modern progress, and could regain it only by becoming progressive.

The last few years of his life were spent in going over once more the ground of his *Theologische Ethik*, but he succeeded in rewriting only the first two volumes. Although his health had been gradually failing, he continued lecturing until a month before his death. He died, after a severe illness, on 20th Aug. 1867.

2. Writings.—As a theologian, Rothe may be said to belong to the so-called 'right wing' of the Hegelian school, although no doubt he was largely influenced by Schelling's later writings. The bent of his mind had been set in his early student days by the teaching of Daub, from whom he inherited the theosophic mysticism that characterizes so much of his thinking. Moreover, he imbibed from his study of Origen and the early Fathers many of the ideas which he contrived to incorporate in his speculative system. Schleiermacher's mode of reflexion seems to have attracted him but little. He had no sympathy with those traits of Schleiermacher's philosophy which were derived from Spinoza—such, *e.g.*, as the identification of God with the infinite variety of His manifestations making up the world. He saw too that, for the solution of the problems which religious experience forces upon us, the appeal to feeling was unavailing, and that it was only the patient labour of reason that would enable us to clear up and to systematize our conceptions. And he differed fundamentally from Schleiermacher's view of the relation between religion and morality.

Rothe's earliest work, published in his thirty-sixth year, *Neuer Versuch einer Auslegung der paulinischen Stelle Römer V. 12–21*, illustrates the principle that he consistently sought to apply in the interpretation of the New Testament. He repudiates here with equal decisiveness the orthodox exegesis of Tholuck, in which the text was hidden under a wealth of Patristic quotations, and the rationalizing exegesis of Rückert, in which a number of preconceived theories were brought to bear upon the exposition. As against both, he insists upon the necessity of approaching the epistle with perfect freedom from dogmatic prejudice, of resolutely grappling with its difficulties, and of determining to rest content with no half-solution of these difficulties. He tries, in other words, to set an example of what a genuinely critical treatment of Biblical literature ought to be.

The important work, *Die Anfänge der christlichen Kirche und ihrer Verfassung*, of which only the first volume was issued, is an attempt to trace the course of man's historical development as affected and determined by Christianity. The volume is divided into three books. In the first the relation of the Church to Christianity is dealt with; in the second the rise of the Christian communities and the gradual formation of a Church constitution are handled; whilst in the third the development of the Christian Church in its earlier stages is traced. The book is full of significant suggestions towards a really historical treatment of the history of the Church and of dogma. To

Rothe, as Harnack expresses it,[1] belongs the undiminished credit of thoroughly realizing the significance of nationality in Church History, and to him also we owe the first scientific conception of Catholicism. One characteristic feature of Rothe's later teaching is already foreshadowed in the *Anfänge*—namely, that it is in the State and in civilization rather than in the Church that the ideal of Christianity will ultimately find realization.

Rothe's chief claim, however, to a place in the history of theological science rests undoubtedly upon his *Theologische Ethik*, the first edition of which appeared in three volumes (1845–48), and the second edition in five volumes (1867–71), the last three of the latter being edited and published after his death by Heinrich Holtzmann. This work is the result of a prolonged effort on the part of a comprehensive and logical mind to think out a system of speculative theology that should furnish a rational basis for the religious life of a Christian community. The fundamental ideas are not, indeed, new. No one who is familiar with Daub's *Philosophische und theologische Vorlesungen* (ed. P. C. Marheineke and T. W. Dittenberger, 7 vols., Berlin, 1838–44), which unfortunately are now but little known, can fail to discern the extent of Rothe's indebtedness to his old teacher. And the exhaustive notes to well-nigh every section of the book indicate the many other writers to whom he was under obligations. In the earlier and more metaphysical sections Schelling is the thinker who is most frequently alluded to, but to Fichte and Hegel there are also numerous references. Lotze's *Mikrokosmos* yields him many apt quotations, while Fechner, Weisse, and the younger Fichte are often mentioned. None the less the work as a whole bears the impress of an independent and honest inquirer, of a vigorous intellect wrestling with the greatest problem of human reflexion.

The author starts by making a sharp distinction between speculative thinking and thinking that takes the form of empirical contemplation. The latter must always be directed upon an outer object which is given to it, and in virtue of which this object is interpreted. It is reflexion upon the given object, not self-thinking of it. Speculative thinking, on the other hand, is self-thinking in the strictest sense of the term. It begins with what is purely *a priori* and proceeds by following the dialectical necessity with which each notion produces out of itself new notions. There cannot be, therefore, single, isolated speculations, but only one organic whole of speculation, a speculative system. The success of thought, so conceived, depends upon the fact that the human thinker is a microcosm—that in him the whole of the rest of creation is, so to speak, recapitulated. When, however, speculative thought has completed its task of construction, it must turn its attention to the empirically given facts and ascertain whether the speculative result is in accordance with those facts. If it is not, the system in question will of necessity collapse, and the effort must be commenced afresh with the resolve to carry it through with more rigid dialectical caution and conscientiousness. All the same, the thinker will remain true to the method of thinking out his own thought, as though there were no world around him and nothing in his experience except thought.

Now, in the devout or religious man, according to the measure in which his devoutness is living and healthy, there is immediately contained in his thought as pure thought the notion of being determined by God. The religious man's feeling of self is at the same time a feeling of God, and he cannot come to a distinct and clear thought of self without coming to the thought of God. In him, that is to say, the consciousness of self is as such the consciousness of God. There is thus provided for the devout subject a twofold point of departure for his speculative thinking and the possibility of a twofold method of speculative inquiry. His thinking can proceed either from the consciousness of self as an *a priori* fact or from the consciousness of God; and, according as he follows the one or the other of these paths, his speculation will take a specific direction. The former will be that of philosophical speculation, the latter that of religious—or, in so far as it is scientifically pursued, of theological—speculation. However near these two may approach each other in certain respects, they will in form inevitably deviate from one another; each will construe what it has to deal with purely *a priori*, but philosophical speculation will think and conceive its subject-matter by means of the notion of the human self, theological speculation by means of the notion of God. Theological speculation is in essence nothing else than the attempt to express in conceptual form the immediately certain content of the devout consciousness, the content of its feeling of the divine. It falls into two main divisions—(*a*) theology in the strict sense, and (*b*) cosmology, which again falls into the two subdivisions of physics and ethics. The body of Rothe's treatise is, of course, concerned with the last-named.

The starting-point of theological speculation is, then, the fact that the religious man in thinking of himself thinks likewise, in and through the same act, of God. The primordial form of the religious consciousness is doubtless feeling, the basis of the thought of God is the *Gottesahnung*, just as the basis of the thought of self is the *Ichahnung*. But the primary step in reflective knowledge is to translate this feeling of God into the form of a concept, to express it in a perfectly clear and distinct idea, which shall completely and exhaustively represent it. And the thought in question can be formulated, in its most abstract and elementary aspect, as the thought of the Absolute Being. God, as absolute, is the Unconditioned; whatever else there may be, it is conditioned by Him and does not condition Him. He is numerically one—containing within Himself all that there is of being. Moreover, as being absolute in an absolute way, or the absolutely right, He is the absolutely good Being, or the absolute Good. For the Good is that which is truly perfect, truly eternal and self-dependent. If, however, God as the Absolute is to be really thought by us, it can be only through the application of that category by means of which alone thought is possible—the category, namely, of ground and consequent. And, since in thinking of the Absolute we are thinking of an existing, and not merely of an ideal, reality, the category of ground and consequent assumes in this application the form of cause and effect. But the Absolute can be thought of only as *causa sui*, as the simply self-determined. This implies, further, that in God there is absolute and harmonious union of necessity and freedom; as self-determining, that is to say, God is a living activity.

The concept of pure being is as such the concept of absolute negativity; it is for our thinking purely negative; yet in and for itself it is none the less the most positive of all concepts, only under the form of absolute negativity. It is negative, not in the sense of the absolutely nought, but in the sense of the absolutely not-this-or-that (*das Nichtetwas*). Herein two moments are included; God is the fullness of all being, while the being of this or that appertains to Him only in a negative significance.

[1] A. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Eng. tr., i. 39.

Now, what is contained in Him only negatively is contained in Him not as posited, not as existent or actual, but only as possible; in Him is to be found the totality of all possible realities, yet such totality can be expressed only as possibility. The thought of real possibility is equivalent, however, to the thought of pure potency or power; and potency or power is in essence causality, which cannot be otherwise conceived than as a bringing forth of effects, *i.e.* as creative (*wirksam*). God, in other words, as absolute potency or power, must be thought of as issuing forth from mere potentiality, and as realizing His absolute power. The absolute life must be a process of self-realization. Again, self-realization presupposes that the ideal and the real are recognized and distinguished; God, that is to say, must be *actu* a spirit, the Absolute Spirit. And the notion of God as spirit implies that everything real had for its presupposition an ideal subsistence—a thought alone can become and be real. The timeless development of God as spirit includes within itself a twofold immanent development — on the one hand, God becomes conscious of Himself, subjectifies Himself, determines Himself as personality; and, on the other hand, God determines Himself in and through the divine nature which furnishes the means or instrument of His self-activity. But these two immanent processes in God — determination of Himself as personality and as nature—are one and the same process; they can be thought of only in correlation. God, then, as personality posits a nature as His objective counterpart; but this nature is originally ideal, a world of thoughts. Its contents are not originally in Him as operating entities; they are raised from possibility to actuality by His self-activity. And the results of His activity are moral results; His determinations are at the same time commands. As self-determining, God is completely master of His own will; and His will is necessarily at the same time an act of thinking—a thinking, namely, of that which He wills, although the converse is not true, for God is under no necessity to will whatsoever He thinks.

In that God determines Himself to absolute personality He necessarily sets over against Himself the thought of an Other which is all that He is not. Yet He is under no necessity to posit this thought; the fact that He does not forgo the power of positing it is due to His perfection—a perfection which requires that He should realize Himself in and through that which is other than Himself. Thus we reach the notion of creation: God posits, namely, as real a sphere of being opposed to His own, and yet in union therewith, in order to have His own being expressed or manifested in His Other, the world. In what precisely this act of creating consists—what, namely, is thereby *added to* possibility that it should attain the level of actuality—Rothe is as little able as Leibniz, faced with a similar problem, to say. He confines himself to maintaining that the divine causality in producing the world is not active as an entirety, but divides its activity—in other words, that God created the world not as a finished but as a primitive and unfinished product, a product which could only successively be brought to perfection. The primordial act of creation is the contrapositing by God of a non-ego; and what is thus contraposited must be the exact opposite of spirit—namely, pure matter, in the notion of which is implied infinite divisibility. Pure matter is not, however, nature; and the divine creation evinces itself, therefore, as a continuous process, proceeding from one stage of material forms to another — bringing forth a graduated scale of existences that together constitute an organic whole. Rothe tries to trace the evolution from pure matter, which is virtually identical with space, first of mechanical nature, consisting of atoms conceived as centres of force, then of the chemical properties of these constituents, later of mineral products, and finally of vegetable and animal organisms, until in the human organism the soul differentiates itself from the body as having the relation of subject to itself as object. The gradual process of creation takes, in short, the aspect of a continuous incarnation of the divine Spirit within His non-ego, or matter—a continuous putting forth of divine activity in order to spiritualize that which is the opposite of spirit, and to transform it into an organ of its own life.

'It is no proof of God's omnipotence that He creates pure matter; the proof rather consists in His doing away with matter merely as such.'[1]

The progressive creation is just the mode, and the only possible mode, of bringing about that consummation. But creation is creation only in so far as there is exhibited in it no sudden bound, only in so far as each of its links evinces itself as a real development from the preceding links of the chain. Herein is to be discerned the reason of the incompleteness of each successive stage of the world's evolution. That which is defective in the created universe, that which to the human consciousness wears the aspect of evil, is to be traced back in the last resort to matter—matter that is not yet transmuted, not yet done away with merely as such. Moreover, inasmuch as in creation each stage always arises from the dissolution of the stage below, so that the lower, by means of the creative influence, always forms the substratum for the generation of the higher, there must always remain, in every epoch of the world's history, a residuum of matter still unspiritualized—a 'kind of slag,' as Pfleiderer calls it.[2] The consequence is that the consummation of one epoch of creation requires that another epoch supervenes, and the world-evolution must be thought of as an endless series of stages following each other in time.

The natural man is conceived by Rothe to have been developed according to the natural laws of animal evolution. In the animal sphere there is no definite contrast between the soul, which emerges out of and rises above matter, and nature, which is in direct union with it. The soul of the animal is entirely under the sway of nature, although even in the animal the merely physical has been transmuted to the extent of exhibiting the power which we call instinct. But with the appearance of human personality a new order of created being enters the world. Matter has given birth to a mode of finite existence in which it is transcended, to a creature whose essence and principle are its direct opposite. Looked at from the genetic point of view, the finite personality is the product of material evolution; considered in and for itself, it is just as certainly not material. That the finite spirit could not be created directly, but only through aid of the creature itself, only through the non-spiritual creature coming to posit itself as spiritual—all this appertains to the essence of spirit as self-determining. The only true power of self-determination is that which determines itself to be so. It follows, therefore, that the creature to whom it belongs cannot have been endowed at its creation with this self-determining power, but can only have been created indirectly—by the creation, namely, of a material non-ego of God so specifically organized as to be able to transubstantiate itself from materiality into spirituality. As a self-determining personality, man acquires the status of a free agent. He is at once a thinking being, whose thoughts find everywhere objects corresponding to them, and a volitional

[1] *Stille Stunden*, p. 66.
[2] *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr., ii. 288.

being, whose autonomous acts find realization in the outward world. A finite spiritual ego or person thus has it for his function to become, in a literal sense, a co-worker with God in the eternal process of creation—the process, namely, of getting rid of matter in so far as it is the mere opposite of spirit.

The process of creation finds, then, its continuation in the human world through the self-determination of finite persons. Hence it is that the life-process in man necessarily assumes a moral character. Man cannot live even the animal life except as a moral life. The formal principle of moral action may be expressed as the elevation of human personality out of its natural state of bondage or external determination to full freedom in itself; the material principle of moral action may be expressed as the appropriation of the natural environment to subserve the ends of personality. Three special features of the moral life call for detailed treatment in any scientific account of its essence and contents: (*a*) the results or products to be produced by self-determination, (*b*) the forces which constitute self-determination, and (*c*) the modes of activity which emanate from self-determination. The science of ethics will consequently comprise a *Güterlehre*, a *Tugendlehre*, and a *Pflichtenlehre*; and it is only through following these three correlative branches of inquiry that a comprehensive science of the moral is possible. Of the three the first is the logically prior, for apart from the notion of the moral Good neither a system of virtues nor a system of duties can be constructed.

Since moral action is in itself a continuation of the divine creative action, it follows, according to Rothe, that the moral life and the religious life really coincide, and, when normal, are identical. The object of both is the realization of the highest good—*i.e.* the absolute communion of man, individually and socially, with God, and, by means thereof, the perfected Kingdom of God on earth. Only in so far as the world is made the theatre of moral purpose is the truly religious life conceivable; apart from that it is an empty dream. Religion, in order that it may become truth and reality, demands morality as its fulfilment, as the only concrete way in which the idea of fellowship with God can be realized; morality, in order that it may find its perfect unfolding, demands the aid of religion, in the light of which alone it can comprehend its own idea in all its breadth and depth.[1] In the moral process of human evolution the religious process is included as a necessary factor; the perfect development of human personality can be no other than its absolute determination by God, and consequently its perfect consciousness of God. When, then, mankind reaches its full moral stature, the antithesis between the religious and the moral will have disappeared; the moral life will be the religious life, and *vice versa*. The Church, as a community of the devout within the State, must, accordingly, be regarded as a transitory institution; the full realization of the Church's aim can never be reached in abstract severance from the social organism as a whole. Ultimately the Christianized State, embodying, as it will, all the functions of the human spirit, will absorb the Church into itself; in so far as the Church fulfils its mission, it will tend more and more to fall away as a Church and to be the cause of its own dissolution. Its work, as a Church, will be accomplished when the whole social life of man has advanced to a form of worship higher than it can awaken—that, namely, of a religiously moral community.

Five years after Rothe's death a collection of isolated and miscellaneous reflexions which he had left in various notebooks was published by his pupil, F. Nippold, of Bern, under the title of *Stille Stunden*. The volume is a rich storehouse of penetrative thoughts and suggestive ideas. One of these aphorisms sums up in a few words the burden of much of Rothe's teaching.

'In this world,' he says, 'all Good, even the noblest and fairest—such as Love—rests upon a "dark ground," which it has to consume with pain and convert into pure spirit.'[1]

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ROUSSEAU.—1. Life.—Jean Jacques Rousseau was born on 28th June 1712, in Geneva. His family was Protestant by tradition: his ancestors had migrated from Paris to Geneva nearly 200 years before his birth, and they adopted the Protestant form of religion from the time of its first beginnings in Europe. His mother was of a well-to-do family, and the birth of her son cost her her life. The boy was thus left to the care of his father, Isaac Rousseau, a watchmaker, who was, as his son tells us, of an ardent and sensitive nature. He was thus early subjected to influences of an emotional kind which affected his whole life. His father and he spent nights in reading romantic literature to one another, and exciting their sensibilities in a way which must have surprised their more stolid Genevese compatriots. After having hastily made their way through certain romantic works of fiction which were inherited from the dead wife and mother, they tackled more serious literature, including a number of classical works of history; and, while still a young boy, Rousseau became devoted to the study of Plutarch, who remained all his life a favourite author. Unfortunately, when about ten or twelve years of age, his happy time with his father and a devoted aunt came to an end. The father, who was probably passionate and unrestrained, got embroiled in a quarrel, and, thinking himself aggrieved, resolved to leave Geneva rather than suffer under what he conceived to be unjust laws. Consequently the lad was placed by an uncle at a school kept by a pastor in the village of Boissy.

At this school there awoke within the boy a sensual consciousness which affected his outlook on life to the end. He tells the whole circumstances in his *Confessions* in a way which alike astonishes and disgusts a modern reader. In this

[1] Cf. *Theologische Ethik*, § 991 ff.

[1] *Stille Stunden*, p. 136.

extraordinary book, published in his later years, we have a soul laying bare its inmost feelings, faults, and experiences, and the result in Rousseau's case is astounding. At Boissy, also, he experienced his first sense of personal injustice, being accused of a petty misdemeanour of which he was not guilty. This early experience made him intensely sensitive throughout his life to wrongful suffering by others. After leaving Boissy he returned to his uncle in Geneva for a few months, and enjoyed a happy out-of-door life with a young cousin. About 1725 (though this does not tally with his own account) the lad was placed in a notary's office, and, when dismissed from it, he was apprenticed to an engraver. The latter proved to be a brutal master who by his cuffs and blows constrained his apprentice to engage in many reprehensible practices. At the age of sixteen he took the law into his own hands and ran away—a step which, he says, completely altered the whole course of his life. Had he remained where he was born, he might, he considered, have been a peaceful Christian citizen; now came his wanderings into strange lands and devious courses. He made his way into Savoy, where the faith and politics of the people were very different from those of the republic of his birth, and his immediate surroundings always exercised the deepest influence upon his outlook and character. It must, however, be allowed that he had already cut himself adrift from his family ties and caused himself to be regarded as somewhat of an alien.

At once he came into contact with the rector of Confignon in Savoy, who was able to make him an apparent convert to Roman Catholicism without much difficulty, after giving him an excellent dinner. He was then sent to a Madame de Warens of Annecy, a young woman considered zealous in the faith. From her he went to a monastery in Turin, where, after a certain show of protestation, he was formally received into the bosom of the Church. Once satisfactorily converted, he was (in 1728) thrust out to find his way for himself with only twenty francs in his pocket. After various adventures he became a lackey in the house of the Countess de Vercellis, who died three months after he entered her service. After her death a piece of ribbon was missing, which Rousseau had stolen. He basely put the blame on a young girl in the house, and persisted in his accusation. The deed was the cause of the most overwhelming remorse on Rousseau's part, which haunted him to the end of his life. We must, however, recollect that the whole story is told by himself, and that he may more than likely have morbidly exaggerated both the crime and its effects.

After further efforts in service his youthful restlessness took him back over the mountains, this time with a young companion as destitute as himself, and at length he once more reached Annecy and his patroness Mme. de Warens, who still lived there. With this strange figure he took up his abode; indeed, from 1729 to 1738 he was more or less in close touch with her. His friendship for this woman was of a curiously sensuous and mysterious kind. He called her 'Maman,' but he was only about twelve years his senior. She had married early, disagreed with her husband, and become a convert to Roman Catholicism, thus by securing a small pension from the king of Sardinia, Victor Amadeus. Rousseau learned much at this time, and lived in an ecstasy of happiness with the attractive and strange woman of thirty. He received certain instruction with a view to entering the priestly office; then in a desultory way he turned music. Deserted for a short time by his patroness, he wandered about in adventurous fashion, and finally settled in Lausanne and there announced that he was a teacher of singing, whereas he was ignorant of the first principles of the art. Naturally his imposture was soon discovered, especially as he undertook to perform his own composition. After further wanderings he returned in 1732 to Mme. de Warens, who was living at Chambéry, and took up some clerical work which she found for him. He soon tired of this, and tried music-teaching again, but that, in so far as it involved a certain regularity of hours, was also soon dropped. The final result was that a curious establishment was set up, consisting of Mme. de Warens, Claude Anet, her factotum, and young Rousseau—a happy family party which was broken up by Anet's death. An imaginary illness caused Rousseau to pay a visit to Montpellier at his patroness's expense either before (as Faguet thinks) or after his stay at Les Charmettes (see below). This was, as usual, the occasion of a love affair with a certain lady, and for some reason Rousseau chose to pass himself off as an Englishman. On his return to Mme. de Warens he found a stranger installed in his place, to whom, however, he soon became accustomed. This was about 1737, though dates in the *Confessions* are somewhat vague and confused. Rousseau, who was far from strong, and constantly gave evidence of unhealthiness of mind and body, persuaded Mme. de Warens to go to the country and live in a charming farmhouse named Les Charmettes. His stay here (about 1738) was perhaps the happiest part of his life, for he lived in communion with nature and passed his time in comparative rest and peace. He also began to study seriously, and, more especially, as he tells us in the *Confessions*—the source of most of our knowledge of his life—he began to read Voltaire and the *Spectator*, and these and other books belonging to Mme. de Warens were the means of opening his mind to many things undreamed of. He read philosophy too, Locke's *Essay* and Leibniz, and tried to accept the point of view of each writer in turn and then to formulate his own ideas. He also endeavoured to master the Latin tongue.

The *ménage à trois* became strained, and Rousseau's next occupation was to act as tutor with a certain M. de Mably in Lyons. But, despite his interest in education, the practical drudgery of teaching proved impossible to him. He therefore returned to Mme. de Warens, but, life with her being misery, he went to Paris, vainly attempting to get a new system of musical notation taken up there. He came, however, into relationship with certain great ladies who befriended him, and by whose means, at the age of twenty-nine, he was sent to act as secretary to the French ambassador at Venice. This episode in his life lasted only eighteen months, for it was soon clear that he could not get on with his new master, who was apparently difficult enough to deal with. On his return to Paris in 1745 he united himself to Thérèse le Vasseur, an unlettered serving-girl in the small Hôtel St. Quentin at which he lived. This strange union at least gave satisfaction to Rousseau, since he did not ask for more than sympathy and cared little for permanent companionship of an intellectual sort. Sixteen or seventeen years later, in 1762, their relations changed, as Thérèse's sentiments towards him altered altogether, and Rousseau wrote piteously of his grief on this account. The woman appears to have naturally enough resented the treatment of her offspring, for, much against her will, five children were in turn deposited in the box for receiving foundlings, without any reason being given except that the father was in straits for money. At least certain specious

arguments in defence of his conduct were not developed till later, when Rousseau pretended that he suffered the deprivation of the joys of fatherhood in order that his children might be brought up in a healthy and simple life. We are glad to know that remorse came in the end. The pair were not actually married until 1768, when a certain form was gone through.

Rousseau spent twelve years in Paris — from 1744 to 1756—and it was during this time that his children were born and deserted. It was at this time also that he wrote his *Discourses*. For the rest, he acted as secretary to Mme. Dupin and her stepson, M. de Francueil. Through the latter he received an important and lucrative post, which, however, he resigned about 1750 in favour of the pursuit of a simple life. In 1754 he once more visited Geneva and his former friend Mme. de Warens, now sunk in poverty and misery. To her he showed kindness, even going so far as to offer her a home, but he always blamed himself for not having done more to relieve her unhappy lot. His visit to Geneva caused him to adopt the Protestant religion once more in order to procure the benefit of citizenship. At the same time he was much interested in the religious discussions of the day, which centred in the Deistic position. He did not remain in Geneva, but went to a cottage in the forest of Montmorency provided for him by Mme. d'Épinay, and accepted only when he felt sure that he could do so without sacrificing his independence. His choice of this 'Hermitage' was a great surprise to his friends in Paris who did not love solitude, but, once his mind was made up, he fled to his refuge with all haste. This was the time (the spring of 1756) when plans of future work pressed upon his mind. He made a vain endeavour to edit the papers of the Abbé de Saint Pierre, and this abortive effort was followed by an unwholesome condition of sensuous excitement which culminated in an ecstatic state of intoxicating passion for Mme. d'Houdetot, sister-in-law of Mme. d'Épinay. There was a strange relationship between these two and Saint Lambert, the lady's lover, which finally came to an end by mutual consent. In the winter of 1757 Rousseau hopelessly quarrelled with Mme. d'Épinay, his benefactress, and moved to Mont Louis, in the neighbourhood of Montmorency. While there, he became incensed at an article on Geneva written by d'Alembert in the *Encyclopédie* expressing regret that the Genevese provided no theatres. This expression of opinion was indeed attributed to Voltaire, who had not been permitted to have comedies played in the town. This was the origin of the *Lettre à d'Alembert sur les spectacles*. The work was an immense success, but it lost Rousseau Voltaire's friendship for ever. At this time there were also breaches with Grimm and Diderot as well as with Mme. d'Épinay, Grimm's mistress, which entailed much bitterness and ill-feeling. But it was also a time of great productiveness on Rousseau's part. *La nouvelle Héloïse*, written mainly at the Hermitage, was published in 1760, and the *Contrat social* and *Emile* in 1762. Rousseau dwelt in his new home in tolerable contentment, and he had many devoted friends among the great, despite his strange temper and physical condition.

All kinds of difficulties in those days confronted a would-be author before his books could be duly printed and circulated. In 1762 *Emile* was condemned to be burned and its author to be imprisoned. Flight was the only mode of escape, and the fugitive made his way to the canton of Berne. But again he had to depart. Frederick II. of Prussia had the credit of allowing him to take refuge in his territories of Neuchâtel, where Thérèse joined him, and he there came into touch with Gibbon and Boswell. Rousseau entered upon controversial correspondence at this time with great effect. In 1764 appeared his famous *Lettres de la montagne*, wherein he fully proved the iniquity of his treatment by the republic of Geneva. The *Lettres* were publicly burned by the Parliament of Paris. The Church at Neuchâtel turned against him, and he was persecuted to such an extent that he fled to an island in the Lake of Bienne. He was not suffered to remain there, went to Strassburg, and after much indecision accepted an invitation to make his home in England. Hume brought him to London in Jan. 1766; in London, as in Paris, he had a great reception. In March he settled in the Peak of Derbyshire (at Wootton) with Thérèse. It was cold, and Rousseau had nothing to do, and he soon broke into a quarrel with Hume, accusing him of every kind of perfidy. Hume was, not unnaturally, indignant at this ingratitude, and the quarrel became a vehement one, in which many literary men engaged. Rousseau himself became morbid, upset, and miserable. He set to work to compose the first part of his *Confessions*—that extraordinary revelation of a man consumed with egotism, undisciplined, and living on the feelings of the moment, which yet produces in the reader a sense of reality such as few autobiographies have done before or since. Finally he fled to France in a condition almost distraught. Mirabeau (the father of the more famous statesman) and then the prince of Conti gave him hospitality, and he composed the second part of the *Confessions*, while also pursuing botanical studies, during the year 1767–68. Again he fled, this time to Grenoble and other places. At length in 1770 he settled in Paris, where he remained for the last eight years of his life. He had been temporarily estranged from the unfortunate Thérèse, but became reconciled again, and he occupied himself in copying music and writing his *Dialogues*; indeed, he seems to have lived those last years more peacefully than any that went before, despite constant and uncalled-for quarrels with his friends. He was extremely poor, and would not draw upon the pension granted him by George III. of England. The last months of his life were miserable. He would not accept of help, was subject to delusions, and now untended by Thérèse; some suspected suicide when the end came on 2nd July 1778. His remains were in the first instance buried on an island, but in the Revolutionary days were moved to the Pantheon.

2. Works.—The first of the *Discourses* was written for a prize offered in 1749 by the Academy of Dijon on the question of whether the progress of the sciences has contributed to the improvement or to the corruption of manners. Rousseau was on his way to visit Diderot, then in prison because of his *Lettre sur les aveugles*, when he was seized with an inspiration to enter the competition and deliver himself of his opinions. The paradox of the answer which he designed entranced him. It was to show simply and convincingly that man is good by nature and that by institutions only is he made vile. This original contention really proved to be the basis of the writer's later work; it proved also to be the expression of ideas which must have been latent in the minds of the people of France, for it was laid hold of as though it were a new gospel opened up before them and indicating the beginning of a new epoch in history. It seemed, indeed, to bring fresh possibilities into the life of every citizen. Rousseau won the prize. Three years later he competed for another prize, the subject being the origin of inequality among men and whether it is authorized by natural law. This essay, though unsuccessful in gaining the

prize, proved almost as successful as the first. By these two essays the world came to realize that a new gospel was being preached to it, and an artificial age was called upon to return to simplicity and truth. To us the argument seems shallow, and we feel that a little thought would show, for instance, the value of acquiring new knowledge in a social sense as well as in a material. Still, if it was a one-sided doctrine that Rousseau taught, it was the one of which the nation felt in need. Men longed to return (or thought they did) to the ancient times when humanity was rude and unlettered but natural and unspoiled by the arts of civilized life. From this time onwards the writer of the *Discourses* was a famous man, even though his fame might partly be accounted for because he was the preacher of the paradox that a barbarian was superior to a European of modern days. He established the predominance of feeling over the patient investigation of fact—a doctrine that brought fresh life while it brought fresh dangers to his own and other countries.

La nouvelle Héloïse is a love story of a highly emotional kind—the story of a tutor enamoured of his too attractive pupil. To the modern reader the tale, which is of the slightest so far as events are concerned, seems tame, in spite of a sensuousness which repels though it does not, now at least, corrupt. The epistolary form in which it is written is tedious to those who have come to expect swift action, and the style seems forced and stiff. But when it was published the interest in the tale knew no bounds, and the effect produced by it on an emotional public was incalculable both in Germany and in France. The second part of the book, in which the happiness of the married state is vaunted, was just as much applauded as the first.

The *Contrat social* opens with the famous words, 'Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains,' and strikes the keynote of the rebellious spirit that animated men of a rebellious age. To Rousseau it was not a time for careful analysis of facts or investigation of the growth of custom, nor had he the necessary knowledge to enable him to do this. To him it was essential that the 'state of nature' should be declared to be the true state of freedom—the freedom which is based on reason. He did not trouble to inquire whether this state of natural freedom has ever yet been realized, and whether man can be independent of the environment in which he is born. The time was ripe for his doctrines, crude as they might seem, and they laid hold of the imagination of the people as no scientific investigation of fact could have done. Therefore this became one of the most notable and influential books of the period.

Emile was virtually a treatise on education set forth in the story of a youth brought up on ideal lines. The theme is an ancient one, but is dealt with in a way that brought conviction and enthusiasm to a generation which was awakening to new ideas in regard to the upbringing of the young. France has ever since Rousseau's time been alive to the essential unity of the family, and to this is probably due the close relationship which exists between the parent and the child. Rousseau brings his readers back to Nature and her teaching, makes the mother realize her primary duties to her offspring, and feel it to be her pleasure as well as her duty to suckle her child. The doctrine of original sin had no attraction for Rousseau. The child was born into the world prepared to be good and happy and healthy, and it was the parents' duty to allow him to attain these ends. We must sweep away the artificial restrictions of an artificial society which prevent the development of the best in a man. Rousseau applied his theories even to the simplest matters of food and clothing. In fact, he was the forerunner of many of the modern views of infant nurture, and he deserves much credit for awakening the world to the desirability of natural methods of upbringing and instruction based on the development of the reasoning faculties. It is only in respect of the upbringing of girls that his theories are almost Oriental in their obscurantism.

The *Confessions* is perhaps the best known of Rousseau's works and the most extraordinary. Jules Lemaître[1] says of the writer that he was a creature of nerves and weakness, passion and sin, sadness and visions. But along with all the unhappy qualities that Rousseau possessed Lemaître recognizes the good side that is always present, and bears no hatred to his person. He is right in saying that Rousseau is the most 'subjective' of all writers, since all his writings are but betrayals of himself. And it was a strange undisciplined soul that he revealed to that brilliant collection of famous men and women who received his outpourings with mingled admiration and derision. Probably these outpourings were in their way sincere and true, though inaccurate in many common details. But, in reading them, we must always recollect that Rousseau was born unhealthy in mind and body, and his upbringing by an excitable and sentimental father did not help him towards self-restraint, though the Protestant Genevan strain was always to be traced in his character and throughout his writings. The world in which he lived was no real world, but one created by his inward fantasies and later by his morbid imagination. As might possibly be expected, the mingling of diverse irreconcilable elements, Protestant and Roman Catholic, Genevan and Parisian, brought about an untoward mixture, while it also resulted in the production of a genius.

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RṢIS.—See BRĀHMANISM, INSPIRATION (Hindu).

RŪḲHARS, SŪKHARS, ŪKHARS.—These are all Śaiva mendicants or Yōgīs (*q.v.*), occasionally found wandering over N. India. They are said to be branches of the Aughar or Ōghar sect of Yōgīs founded in Gujarāt by a Śaiva mendicant named Brahmagiri, a disciple of Gōrakhnāth (*q.v.*). Brahmagiri founded five branches of his sect, named respectively Rūkhar, Sūkhar, Bhūkhar, Kūkar, and Gūdar, of whom the first two are those most commonly met with. They are ordinary Yōgīs, differing from others and among themselves only in apparel and appurtenances. Thus the Rūkhars and Sūkhars wear earrings in both ears—the former of copper or pewter and the latter of *rudraksa* (olive-nut) seeds—while Gūdars wear a ring in only one ear and a flat copper plate bearing the footprint of Gōrakhnāth in the other. Bhūkhars and

[1] *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, pp. 318, 356.

Kūkars do not burn incense in their alms-pot, while the others do. The Kūkars collect alms in a new earthen pot, in which they also cook their food. Sūkhars carry a stick three spans in length, and Rūkhars do not, and so on. The cry of all these, as in the case of many other Śaiva mendicants, is 'Alakh' (see art. ALAKHNĀMĪS).

Ukhars are said to form a sixth class of these Aughars. The name, however, seems merely to denote those members of the five classes already mentioned who are given to indulgence in flesh and strong drink.

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GEORGE A. GRIERSON.

RULE OF FAITH.—See CREEDS, CONFESSIONS, FAITH.

RUSSIAN CHURCH.—I. *HISTORY.*—The history of the Russian Church falls into four periods, the character of each being defined by its chief events.

1. **Primitive period and down to the Mongol invasion (1st to 10th cent., A.D. 988–1237).**—Nestor, in his *Chronicle*, gives an ancient tradition, rejected by modern historians, that the beginnings of Christianity in the southern parts of what is now Russia go back to the time of the apostles. According to this, St. Andrew, as he spread the gospel along the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea, came to the hills above the Dnepr upon which Kiev afterwards arose, blessed them, and foretold that upon them the grace of God should shine forth. In the 4th cent. there were already several bishops' sees in the south of Russia—Bosporus, Cherson, and others, founded for the Christians of the Greek colonies existing in that region. From them the seeds of Christianity might easily have been brought into the limits of the land that is now Russia, but it is unlikely that they took root at that distant time. More favourable conditions for the spread of the gospel in Russia came with the establishment of Slavic tribes within its borders at an epoch that we cannot exactly define. The Slavs had long been well acquainted with Greece, whither they went as traders or mercenaries, and there they not infrequently adopted Christianity. In the middle of the 9th cent. the southern Slavs listened to the gospel preached to them by the 'apostles of the Slavs,' SS. Cyril and Methodius. About the same time Prince Rurik (862–879), invited from among the Varyags, laid at Novgorod the foundation of the Russian State, decreed by Providence to profit more than any other Slavic land by the labours of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Of the Russian princes, the Varyags Askold and Dir, the earliest to rule in Kiev (862–882), were the first to fall under the influence of Christianity, and after their raid against Constantinople they accepted the holy faith. Under Prince Oleg (879–912) there was already no small number of Christians among the Russians, and under his successor Igor (913–945), in the treaty with the Greeks concluded at Kiev in 944, the Russians are already divided into baptized and unbaptized; while the latter confirmed their agreement by swearing before the idol of Perun, the baptized swore by the Holy Cross and the Gospels. Igor's widow, Princess Olga (945–969), herself desired to be baptized, and in 955, when she was 67 years old, she journeyed to Constantinople and there, according to the *Chronicle*, accepted Christianity. Many of her following were baptized along with her. On her return to Kiev Princess Olga (baptized as Elena) journeyed through the towns and villages and preached the faith, shining 'like the moon in the night' in the darkness of the heathenism around her. She tried to persuade her son, Prince Svyatoslav (946–972), to accept Christianity, but in vain. Her grandson, Svyatoslav's son, Prince Vladimir (973–1015), accepted the faith in 987. In 988 the men of Kiev were baptized, and after that Christianity began to spread to the other towns of Russia. The first metropolitan of Kiev, Michael († 991), began by baptizing the people in the towns and villages round about Kiev; afterwards, with bishops and Dobrynya Nikitich, he preached in Novgorod, Rostov (N.N.E. of Moscow), and the surrounding districts, and baptized no small number. Vladimir himself visited Volhynia to preach the faith, and even had several princes of the Kama Bolgars and the Pechenegs baptized at Kiev. Vladimir's sons, sent to the various principalities, also spread the new faith among the people under their rule. So, during the reign of Vladimir, Christianity spread to the feudal centres of Murom, Polotsk, Vladimir-in-Volhynia, Smolensk, Pskov, Lutsk, Tmutarakan (opposite Kerch), etc. For his zeal in spreading the faith of Christ Prince Vladimir received the epithet of *isapostolos* and was canonized by the Russian Church.

Under Vladimir's successors the Christian faith continued to spread. The preaching was specially helped by the fact that in Russia the message was delivered in a Slavic tongue akin to the people's own.

After Vladimir's baptism Christianity became in the full sense of the word the ruling religion in Russia. Accordingly, even in his time there followed the establishment of a special local church, for the existence of which all the conditions were present. At the same time the relations of the Russian Church to the Greek Mother-Church and also its internal local relations to the State and the community began to be defined. In relation to the Greek Church the Russian was established as a special metropolitan see, forming part of the patriarchate of Constantinople and consequently subject to the patriarch's authority. The attempts of Roman Catholic scholars to prove that originally the Russian Church was subject to the pope are absolutely futile. At the head of the Russian Church stood the metropolitan. The whole time of the tenure of St. Michael, the first metropolitan, was taken up in simply spreading the elements of Christianity, so that the Russian Church did not reach complete organization under him. This was achieved by his successor Leontius († 1008). In 992 he divided the Church into dioceses (Novgorod, Chernigov, Vladimir-in-Volhynia, Polotsk, Turov, Belgorod, Rostov, and Tmutarakan), and appointed the first diocesan bishops. Their own see the early metropolitans fixed at Pereyaslav (S.E. of Kiev), and afterwards, under Prince Yaroslav (1017–54), they transferred their place of abode to Kiev. The Russian metropolitans were chosen and consecrated at Constantinople by the patriarch himself with the assent of the emperor. Accordingly the majority of the first rulers of the Russian Church were Greeks. But the metropolitan of Russia, though chosen from among the Greeks, was by no means so dependent on the patriarch as were the other Greek metropolitans. In consequence of the wide extent of his province and the fact that the Russian principality was independent of the Greek Empire, the metropolitan of Russia enjoyed special dignity and almost complete independence of the patriarch; he was in the position of an exarch rather than of a metropolitan. The dependence of the Russian metropolitan upon the patriarch of Constantinople meant no more than that he was chosen and consecrated by the latter and was bound as far as possible to attend the patriarchal synods. Within the Russian Church the metropolitan had an independent jurisdiction

over ecclesiastical affairs, exercised either directly or with a synod of his suffragans, which he often convened at Kiev. His decisions were recognized as final, and recourse to the patriarchal court at Constantinople was very rare—only in specially important cases. The link between the Russian metropolitan province and the patriarchate amounted to this, that the patriarch was prayed for by name in the Russian service, that contributions were often sent from Russia for the needs of the Greek Church, and that there were founded in Russia so-called 'stavropegial' monasteries under the direct jurisdiction of the patriarch. These relations continued till half-way through the 15th century. From the very first days of its existence, however, the Russian Church showed a tendency to complete independence of the patriarch of Constantinople. This appeared in attempts to elect the metropolitans from among native Russians and to enthrone them in Russia. In the period before the Mongols two cases are known of such election and enthronization of Russian-born metropolitans—Hilarion in the middle of the 11th cent. (1051) and Clement a hundred years later (1147); and these were among the best bishops of the Russian Church.

In his relation to the bishops the Russian metropolitan was the elder, counsellor, and guide. He appointed the bishops, summoned them to synods, judged them in synod with the other bishops, and made arrangements concerning the Church as a whole.

The metropolitan of Russia stood in the same relation towards the grand prince as that in which the patriarch of Constantinople stood to the emperor. He was not only the protector of the Church and her interests, the supreme teacher of the faith and religion, but also the guide in many civil affairs. As he always lived near the grand prince, he naturally supported him in his struggle against the vassal princes, and thereby contributed to the strengthening of his authority and the unification of the nation. Being a Greek, he knew the Byzantine laws and customs and thus was enabled to help the grand prince in organizing the life of the Russian State. Furthermore, in accordance with the customs of the Greek Church and the 'Codes' of Princes Vladimir and Yaroslav, the metropolitan was the champion of all the oppressed, the protector of the sick, of widows and orphans, of liberated slaves or prisoners of war who had returned to their own country, and such like. But, although he held so high a place, the metropolitan remained duly conscious of the limits of his rights and obligations. Accordingly, the Russian Church never saw such conflicts between the ecclesiastical and the civil powers as the Western Church shows.

The most eminent metropolitans before the subjugation by the Mongols were St. Michael († 991), the first metropolitan of the Russian Church, who laboured zealously to spread Christianity through the land and encouraged learning, and St. Hilarion (1051–55), remarkable for his ascetic life and labours on behalf of education.

The most important event in the Russian Church during Hilarion's episcopate was the foundation in 1051 of the Pechera Lavra (monastery) at Kiev by Antony († 1073) and Theodosius († 1074). As Kiev was the cradle of Christianity in Russia, so its Pechera monastery became the mother of a large number of other monasteries and gained enormous influence on the general trend of religious life. From it the ascetic outlook spread through Russian society. From it were taken the abbots for other monasteries and bishops for the dioceses. More than fifty of its monks were raised to bishops' sees. The men whom it sent out spread abroad its piety, spirit, rule of life, and the writings of its ascetics. To it gathered those who desired religious instruction. In it were collected the monuments of ecclesiastical literature; here, too, was begun the Russian *Chronicle*.

After the Pechera monastery there arose monasteries in other places. They were the chief points for the concentration and diffusion of piety in the land, which had indeed been converted, but was far from having cut itself loose from survivals of paganism. Outside the walls of the monastery rude passions had full play; within the monastery was quite another world, where the spirit ruled over the flesh, a world of wondrous tales of monks' ascetic exploits, of visions, of miracles, of supernatural help in the conflict with the power of devils. This explains the desire of the best Russians of the time to enter a monastery, or at any rate before death to don the habit of a monk—so strong that the Church itself very often had to restrain it. Many of the monasteries, like the Pechera Lavra, possessed landed estates. The property of such monasteries went not only to support the religious houses, but also to charitable objects. Almost all the monasteries, besides being quiet havens of asceticism, were also refuges for book learning. In them lettered men gathered and wrote their chronicles, histories, tales, and lives of saints; in them schools were founded. This gave them great importance in the community and increased the tendency of Russian society to monasticism. This tendency to monasticism and the saving of one's soul through ascetic exploits shows that during the first two centuries of its existence in Russia Christianity had made no small progress in the task of changing the old heathen society by education. Further advance in the same direction would have been natural. But in the first half of the 13th cent. Russia suffered a great catastrophe, which for long interrupted the regular development of both civil and ecclesiastical life.

2. From the Mongol invasion to the division of the Church into two metropolitan provinces (1237–1461).—In 1237–40 Russia suffered the devastating invasion of the Mongols; the population was extirpated; the churches and monasteries were ruined or desecrated; the Pechera monastery was destroyed and its monks were scattered into forests and caverns. The calamity did not, however, affect all parts of the land with equal ruin. N.E. Russia was less devastated, and, when the first terrible storm had passed, it recovered. But S. Russia was laid absolutely waste. After devastating it, the Mongols continued their nomadic life upon its borders towards the steppes and were a perpetual threat to its population. Accordingly, the people moved towards the north. The current of Russian historical life set towards the land between the rivers Oka and Volga, and there at Moscow it built up for itself a new centre for the State, to take the place of Kiev. Thither also was transferred the centre of Church life—the metropolitan see of Russia.

When the Mongols subjugated Russia, they left entirely untouched the organization of both the State and the Church. Being at the time heathens, they showed complete religious tolerance both to the adherents of various faiths among themselves and to the Russians. Although they destroyed churches and monasteries at the time of their first incursion, they were not persecutors of the Church, but rather in their subsequent dealings with it proved themselves more than well disposed. Some of the khans were actually protectors of the Church. They paid attention to the petitions of the metropolitans, freed the clergy and churches from taxation, forbade blasphemy against the Christian faith, and put no hindrance in the way of Tatar

princes adopting Christianity. If some of the Russian princes, bishops, and others died martyrs' deaths at the hands of the Mongols, it was only because, not sharing the Mongols' latitudinarianism, they found it impossible to fall in with their demand that they should perform certain superstitious rites practised at the khan's court, such as passing through the fire of purification, worshipping the images of deceased khans, and so on. Christianity itself was not attacked by the Mongols. Later, when in 1313 the Mongols adopted Islām, their attitude to the Russian Church underwent hardly any alteration.

The comparatively favourable attitude of the khans to the Russian Church was due not only to the religious tolerance of the Mongols, but also largely to the behaviour of the rulers who stood at the head of the Church during those troublous times. The most remarkable metropolitans under the Mongol domination were: St. Cyril III. (1242, 1249–81), who laboured hard for the building up of the Church and spent almost all his episcopate in journeys through his province; Maximus (1283–1305), who in 1300 transferred his abode from Kiev to the town of Vladimir on the Klyazma; St. Peter (1308–26), a zealous worker for the good of the Church, who chose as his residence what was then the unimportant town of Moscow, the principality of his friend Ioann Danilovich Kalita (1328–40), thereby contributing in no small degree to its rise. At that time S. Russia, including Kiev, fell into the power of the Lithuanian pagan prince, Gedimin (1315–41), and finally lost its first place in Church matters. This now passed to Moscow, although the metropolitans continued to style themselves 'of Kiev' and not 'of Moscow.' The next specially eminent metropolitan was St. Alexis (1354–78), who devoted himself to making successful petitions to the khan on behalf of the Russian land and Church, contributed to the rise of the prince of Moscow, laboured for the good order of ecclesiastical and monastic life, founded monasteries, worked at translating the NT from Greek into Slavic, and wrote pastoral epistles.

After the death of the metropolitan Alexis great disorder arose in the Church, due to certain men who sought to gain the metropolitan see by dishonest means. The disorder continued for eleven years till the time of the grand prince Vasili Dmitrievich (1389–1425), who accepted Cyprian (1381–82, 1390–1406) as metropolitan of Kiev. The time during which Cyprian ruled the Church passed peaceably. He gave zealous attention to religious education and worked hard to eliminate certain abuses which had crept into the Church services. In his time also there was a break in the long continued attempts on the part of Lithuania to have S.W. Russia erected into a province with a special metropolitan. But after the death of Cyprian division again took place in the Russian Church. Vitovt, grand prince of Lithuania from 1392 to 1430, refused to accept the newly appointed metropolitan Photius (1408–33) and insisted on the election of a second metropolitan for the Lithuanian principality. Gregory Tsamblak (1415–19), a nephew of Cyprian, was elected, a learned man, and zealous for orthodoxy. When Gregory died, Vitovt acquiesced in Photius, and so the unity of the Russian metropolitan province was re-established. But it did not last long. The successor of Photius was St. Jonas (1448–61). He was elected by a synod of Russian bishops in 1434, and set out for Constantinople to be installed. But his installation was long delayed. Half-way through 1436, not long before Jonas arrived, there had been installed as metropolitan of Russia a certain Greek named Isidore, known for his attempt to introduce the Union of Florence into the Russian Church. Jonas was promised the succession to the metropolitan see only after the death of Isidore. Isidore, on his return from the Council of Florence, met with a most hostile reception in Moscow in 1441, and in the same year fled to Rome. But, even after this, Jonas remained only a bishop and was not enthroned as metropolitan till 1448.

The enthronement of Jonas as metropolitan at the wish of the grand prince Vasili Vasilievich (1425–62) was performed at Moscow by a synod of Russian bishops. This event was of great importance as a long step on the road to the Russian Church's gaining complete independence of the patriarch of Constantinople. From the time of Jonas and his successor Theodosius (1461–64) the Russian metropolitan province was entirely independent, but even after this it did not break off its connexion with its Mother-Church of Greece. When, in 1453, Constantinople was taken by the Turks, Jonas comforted the patriarch Gennadius by sending him presents, and asked for his blessing. It was at this time that the Russian Church is reckoned to have received the right of appointing its metropolitan independently of the Constantinopolitan patriarch.

The final partition of the Church into two provinces took place in the time of Jonas. Isidore, who had fled to Rome, would not give up his pretensions to the Russian Church and wished to take away from Jonas at least the south-western dioceses which were under the rule of the Polish king Kazimir (1440–92), a zealous Catholic. His attempts were not successful, it is true; but through his influence the Constantinopolitan patriarch, Gregory Mammas, who had been deprived of his see for his Latin tendencies and was living in Rome, in 1458 consecrated as the metropolitan of Lithuania a pupil of Isidore, by name Gregory († 1472). After this the council of Russian bishops held in Moscow in 1459 acknowledged the final division of the Russian Church into two provinces—Moscow and Kiev.

3. From the division into two provinces to the establishment of the Holy Synod (1461–1721).—(*a*) *The province of Moscow.*—In the middle of the 15th cent. Russia was divided into two political aggregations—the eastern, under the rule of the Moscow autocrats, and the western, under the Lithuano-Polish government.

The Moscow province, under the protection of an Orthodox government, advanced both spiritually and in externals. With regard to spiritual things, it successfully overcame the heresy of the Judaizers which troubled it during the latter half of the 15th cent., and in the 16th cent. took up the important task of correcting various abuses which had crept into the divine service and into Church life as a whole. Externally it continued to extend its boundaries and to adorn itself with outward magnificence, and at the end of the 16th cent. it rose to the dignity of an independent patriarchate.

The Judaizing heresy, besides its bad consequences, had its good side. The struggle with the heresy raised various questions as to the abuses at that time rife in the Church and occasioned attempts to remove them. These abuses dated from early times, being due to insufficient education, but they had greatly increased owing to the disorders of the feudal period and the weight of the Mongol yoke. Side by side with their Christian rites the early Russians had retained various pagan usages: together with the holy books they used to read sundry 'rejected' books full of apocryphal stories and superstitions; many of them visited wizards for divination and took part in pagan festivals; the carelessness and ignorance of scribes had introduced into the Scriptures and liturgical books many false readings and doubtful expressions with

ambiguous or even heretical meanings; into the rites of the Church there had crept many innovations unknown to the Greek Church, such as the singing of 'Alleluia' twice (instead of thrice), the circulation of processions 'with the sun' (from east to west), and the use of only two fingers in making the sign of the Cross. The rectification of these abuses had long been aimed at by the metropolitans Hilarion, Cyril III., Peter, Alexis, Jonas, and others. For the same purpose, at the beginning of the 16th cent., there was summoned to Moscow from the Vatopedi monastery on Mount Athos Maximus the Greek († 1556), a pious and learned monk, who worked hard on the translation of the Holy Scriptures from Greek into Slavic and the correction of the Russian liturgical books. Later, in 1551, there was summoned to Moscow the so-called Stoglav ('Hundred Chapter') Council, and from its time care was devoted to the setting right of various faults in the religious and ecclesiastical life of Russian society, not only of individuals, but of the whole Church. An event of great importance for this period was the foundation by Sergius († 1391) of the Trinity monastery (Troitse-Sergieva Lavra) near Moscow. This had the same significance for N. Russia as the Pechera at Kiev had for the South. The other chief monasteries of the time were Solovetsk, Volokolamsk, and that on the river Sora; these were the refuges of asceticism and of piety and the nurseries of Christian education for all Russia. The Russian monasticism of the time showed two special tendencies—one practical and political, under the headship of Joseph of Volok († 1515), who defended the holding of landed property by monasteries; the other critical and ascetic, led by Nilus Sorski († 1508)—so called after the cell which he founded on the river Sora—who refused all communion with the world. The contest between these two points of view kept cropping up in connexion with all sorts of questions and found its way into all departments of the Church and community. After various discussions the former school triumphed, and in 1503 it was actually approved by a synod at Moscow. In 1480 the grand prince Ivan III. Vasilievich (1462–1505) threw off the Tatar yoke; more and more of the Russian land was united under the power of the Moscow princes, and in 1547 they assumed the title of tsar. All this combined to strengthen their power not only in civil but also in ecclesiastical affairs. In their use of this power some of the Moscow tsars, especially Ivan IV. Vasilievich (the Terrible, 1533–84), reached the limits of despotism. In the second half of the 16th cent. the Muscovite State entered upon an aggressive movement towards the east and subdued the kingdoms of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556). These conquests had a most important effect upon the Church, as they opened the way to the preaching of Christianity among the Musalmān and pagan tribes inhabiting those kingdoms. The most remarkable men produced by the Church at this time were the metropolitan Macarius (1542–63), who compiled the famous *Menæa*, St. Philip (1566–69), who fearlessly rebuked Ivan the Terrible, and Guri (1555–63), the first archbishop of Kazan, who illumined that part of the country with the light of the Christian faith.

Since the time of the metropolitan Jonas the Russian Church had in practice lived its own life, independently of the Greek patriarch; the only evidence of its tie with the Greek Church was the aid which it rendered to the Orthodox East when it was suffering under the rule of the Turks. The Russian metropolitan, however, continued to be nominally dependent on the patriarch. At the end of the 16th cent. even this seemed out of place, since Russia had become a mighty power, while the patriarch was a subject of the Turkish sultan. Tsar Theodore Ivanovich (1584–98) accordingly formed a desire to establish for Moscow a patriarchal see of its own. Jeremy II. (1572–79, 1580–84, 1586–95), patriarch of Constantinople, who had come to Moscow in 1588, fulfilled Theodore Ivanovich's desire, and in January 1589 consecrated as patriarch the then metropolitan of Moscow, Job (1589–1605). Two years later (1591) the Eastern patriarchs sent Job an instrument of confirmation and gave him precedence next after the patriarch of Jerusalem.

The establishment of the patriarchate produced no essential changes in the rights of the ruling bishop of the Russian Church. The difference came merely to this, that, whereas he had long been governing his Church independently and enjoying within it rights identical with those of the ruling bishops of the Eastern Church, he was now put on a level with them in his title and hierarchic precedence. In his administrative entourage the patriarch employed more pomp and magnificence than before.

The raising of the ruling bishop of the Church to the rank of patriarch was only in accordance with the Church's dignity and magnificence. Unfortunately the tenure of the first two patriarchs coincided with a time of hard trials for the State. This prevented them from leading the Church along the normal road of gradual advance. On the other hand, the patriarchs at that time saved Muscovite Russia from what seemed to be inevitable destruction. In 1598 Tsar Theodore Ivanovich died without issue. His death cut off the ancient Russian dynasty of princes and tsars of the house of Rurik, and there followed the so-called 'Troubles.' The 'Troubles' were specially rife after the appearance of the first pretender, pseudo-Demetrius I. († 1606), who was a tool of the Poles, Jesuits, and Roman Catholic propaganda, and therefore as serious a menace to the Orthodox Church as to the State; he threatened both the political independence of Muscovite Russia and Orthodoxy. Having accepted Roman Catholicism himself, pseudo-Demetrius energetically prepared, with the help of the Poles, to bring Russia over to Latinism.

It was the patriarch Job who came forward in this anxious time as the champion of the independence of the Russian State and the inviolability of pristine Russian Orthodoxy. With fearless courage Job defied the usurper, whose partisans, when they took Moscow in 1605, unfrocked him and banished him to the Staritski monastery, where he died in 1607.

After a certain Ignatius, a Greek inclined to Roman Catholicism (1605–06, † 1640), had occupied the patriarchal throne for a short time, Hermogenes (Germogen) became patriarch (1606–12). During the 'Troublous Times' he stood fast for Orthodoxy and was an 'unshakable pillar' of Church and State. When, after the deposition of Vasili Ivanovich Shuyski (1606–10), a mission was sent to the Polish king Sigismund III. (1587–1632) to invite his son Wladyslaw to be tsar, Hermogenes insisted that in all negotiations concerning Wladyslaw the envoys should lay down as an indispensable condition that he should adopt the Orthodox faith. Hermogenes also took an active part in raising the so-called first land-levy (1610–11) to oppose the Poles. For this some of the Moscow nobles, partisans of the Poles, shut him into a cold, damp cellar in the Chudov monastery (in the Moscow Kremlin) and he died of starvation. In 1913, in view of his martyr-death and of the miraculous healings which had taken place through the intermediation of his prayers, Hermogenes was canonized by the Russian Church under the name of Ermogen.

The inviolability of Orthodoxy and the independence of the State were also championed by other representatives of the Church — metropolitans, bishops, and ordinary priests. The religious and patriotic achievements of the monasteries, especially the Troitse-Sergieva Lavra, were also notable at this time. The latter was besieged for sixteen months from September 1608 by a Polish army of 30,000 men. The defenders in this famous siege numbered in all only 2300, some of whom scarcely knew the use of arms.

The first patriarch after the 'Troublous Times' was Philaret Nikitich (1619–33), the father of the newly elected tsar Michael Feodorovich (1613–45). It was during his tenure of the patriarchate that the patriarchal power attained its highest development. The patriarch now shared with his son the title of 'Great Lord' (*Gosudar*). All acts of the supreme power ran in the name of both 'Great Lords': to both reports were addressed; to both foreign ambassadors were accredited. The Church attained complete independence in its affairs. Under Philaret the ecclesiastical courts had respect for no persons, however mighty. In 1625 the patriarch obtained from the tsar the grant of a charter under which all the clergy of his diocese, the monasteries and churches, with their servants and peasants, were placed under the civil jurisdiction of the patriarch. At the same time the patriarch arrayed himself in imperial state and thereby added majesty to his office. Philaret also devoted no little attention to the organization of the Church.

After Philaret the patriarchal throne was occupied by Joasaph I. (1634–40) and Joseph (1642–52). Under them the patriarchal power noticeably weakened, but under the patriarch Nicon (1652–66) it shone forth once more in all its brilliance and dignity. Unbounded friendship united Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich (1645–76) and the patriarch Nicon through almost all the time that the latter ruled the Church. Without the patriarch no political decision was made; during the tsar's absence from Moscow at the Polish wars (1654–55) the patriarch took personal direction of all the affairs of the State. But the high position to which Nicon had attained and certain peculiarities of his character brought about the formation of a strong party opposed to him, consisting of nobles and many others, mostly persons attached to old ways. The numerous mistakes in the Russian liturgical books and the various abuses in ritual had already been clearly pointed out by Maximus the Greek, and also by the Stoglav Council. All admitted the necessity for correction, and throughout the whole period, from the Stoglav Council to Nicon, there had been a series of attempts at emendation—with little success, inasmuch as the actual method of emendation had been faulty. The correction had been carried out according to old Russian texts, themselves erroneous, and rarely by comparison with the Greek originals. Under Nicon the correction of the books was carried out by experts working with Greek and Slavic MSS, and constituted an epoch in the history of the regulation of Church order in Russia. Later times had little left to do in the way of emending either the text of the service-books or the ritual ordering of the services. But this great historic achievement of Nicon aroused the bitter hatred of his contemporaries. Consequently, when in 1658 a difference arose between Nicon and Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich, he left the patriarchal throne and retired to the Monastery of the Resurrection. Meanwhile the movement against Nicon's innovations spread and embraced many people in all ranks of society—from peasants to influential noblewomen. To restrain false teachers and to prevent the further spread of false teaching, Alexis Mikhailovich summoned in 1666 the so-called 'Great Council' (1666–67) of Russian bishops with the participation of the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch. This Council began by considering the case of the patriarch Nicon, and, after examining various charges against him, condemned him and deprived him of the patriarchate. Nevertheless, when Nicon died in 1681, Alexis Mikhailovich ordered him to be buried with patriarchal rites, and within a year an instrument was received from the Eastern patriarchs freeing him from the Council's condemnation and restoring him to the rank of patriarch. The Council went on to examine the corrections made in the service-books and ritual during Nicon's patriarchate, entirely approved them, and condemned their chief opponents, certain of whom made public repentance and received absolution, while the unrepentant were anathematized and banished to distant exile. The chief schismatic teachers, Avvakum, Lazar, and Theodore, were later, in 1681, burnt upon a pyre. So appeared in the Russian Church the schism of the Old Believers, who subsequently divided into two sects, the Popovtsy (with priests) and the Bezpopovtsy (priestless), and these again split into a large number of sects and schools. Taking its rise from adherence to the letter of the Church service-book and from faith in the saving power of the rite in itself without any understanding of its sense and meaning, the schism is in its essence faith in ritual, jealously guarding from changes and corrections all that is 'ancient' in the Church books and rites. Of the particular points upon which the tenets of the Old Believers differ from those of the Orthodox the most important are: (1) services must be conducted according to the old books published before the time of Nicon; (2) the eighth article of the Creed must read: 'And in the Holy Ghost the *true* Lord and Giver of Life'; (3) 'Alleluia' must be said twice and not thrice; (4) Church processions must go with the sun, not against it; (5) the sign of the cross must be made with two, not three, fingers; (6) the only cross to be honoured is the eight-pointed (*i.e.* the Russian cross, in which the title and the slanting foot-rest have become extra cross pieces); (7) the name of Jesus Christ must be written and pronounced *Isus*, and not *Iisus*; (8) the liturgy must be celebrated with seven prosphoræ instead of five.

After its condemnation by the Church the schism at once began to be persecuted by the ecclesiastical and civil governments and took up a hostile position towards both Church and State. Hiding from persecution, the Old Believers filled all the forests of inner Russia with their secret cells. The spread of the sect was still further helped by the strict measures taken against it. Only in 1905 did the sectaries gain the right to religious freedom.[1]

(*b*) *The metropolitan province of Kiev.*—Whilst the province of Moscow enjoyed political independence, the province of Kiev was under the oppression of a Roman Catholic power.

The Polish-Lithuanian Government found it inconvenient that its orthodox subjects should gravitate towards Moscow, which had become the special centre of political life in N. Russia; and, even before it had become Roman Catholic, it had striven energetically towards an ecclesiastical separation from Moscow. But from the time of the grand prince Yagello (1377–1386–1434), during which Lithuania and Poland had been united under a Roman Catholic Government (1386), the position of Orthodoxy in those parts became yet more disadvantageous. In spite of the fact that the greater part of the Lithuanian principality

[1] Cf. art. SECTS (Russian).

consisted of lands inhabited by Orthodox Russians, and that all the notables of the Russian regions held to the Orthodox confession, Yagello made several attempts to spread Roman Catholicism in Lithuania. These attempts completely failed, and even led to Lithuania's absolutely breaking away from Poland under a separate prince, Vitovt (1392–1430); nevertheless they went on with more or less energy according to circumstances. The prudent Vitovt, understanding how predominantly important the Orthodox population was for the Lithuanian State, did not persecute it, but directed all his efforts towards cutting off the Orthodox Church in Lithuania from the province of Moscow—a project realized in 1459 under Yagello's son, Kazimir (1440–92). The separation of S.W. Russia from the power of the metropolitans of Moscow was a definite step towards the establishment of religious union between the divers confessions of the Lithuanian population. After this separation the Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lithuanian State found itself in a most dangerous position—isolated, deprived of all outside support, face to face with strong Catholicism. Kazimir's successor, Alexander, Prince of Lithuania and king of Poland (1492–1506), under the influence of the Catholic clergy, oppressed the Orthodox in every way. But the persecution cost Lithuania very dear. Many notable Orthodox families and even whole towns began to go over and become subject to Moscow. Alexander's successor, Sigismund (1506–48), treated the Orthodox with more tolerance. Profiting by this, the Orthodox bishops of Lithuania held a council at Vilna in 1509, at which were promulgated certain canons, intended to restrict arbitrary lay interference in the affairs of the Church. The next king, Sigismund II. (1548–72), under the influence of a Protestant chancellor of Lithuania, Nicolas Radziwill († 1588), also refrained from persecuting the Orthodox for their faith; but, being in need of money, he plundered the Orthodox churches and imposed excessive taxes upon the people. Under this king also the first forerunners of new misfortunes for the Orthodox Church appeared — the Union of Lublin (1569), which joined the two States of Lithuania and Poland, the coming of the Jesuits, and, soon after, the ecclesiastical Union of Brest (1596).

In spite of the wiles of the Jesuits and the pressure of the Roman Catholic Government, the Orthodox Church in its own districts of Poland and Lithuania held fast to its creed. In the struggle with its foes it was actively supported by the Eastern patriarchs, by the best representatives of Russian society of the time, and by the Orthodox Church brotherhoods. The patriarchs, either in person or through their exarchs, righted abuses in the Church, appointed metropolitans and bishops, and blessed and encouraged the champions of Orthodoxy. The best representatives of Russian society, such as Princes Andrew Kurbski († 1583) and Constantine Ostrozhski († 1608), and the Orthodox brotherhoods, especially those of Lemberg and Vilna, took part in electing the clergy, looked after Church courts and government, helped the clergy to root out disorders in the Church, defended its interests with the Government, set up schools, printing-presses, and almshouses, and collected funds for the maintenance of the churches and clergy. Unfortunately these activities, advantageous though they were to the Church, found no favour with certain of the Orthodox bishops, as they encroached upon their independence. Hence ensued frequent collisions between the bishops and the representative laymen, and these the Jesuits were quick to use for their own ends. At their instigation in 1591 certain of the south-western bishops secretly laid a petition before King Sigismund III., asking that the South-Western Church should become subject to the papal see as a Uniate Church. Next, in 1595, Bishops Cyril Terlecki († 1607) and Hypatius Pociej († 1613) set out for Rome, where Pope Clement VIII. (1592–1605) met them with great joy, and with solemn ceremony declared the Union of the South-Western Russian Church with the Roman Church. In 1596 there was held at Brest-Litovsk a council of local bishops to which the patriarch of Constantinople sent exarchs, Nicephorus († 1596) and then Cyril Lucaris, afterwards patriarch (1612–38, with interruptions). The purpose was to promulgate the completion of the Union, but strong opposition to it arose among the Orthodox. From the very beginning the council was divided. The Orthodox, as they had no church at their command, met in a private house. They excommunicated both the metropolitan Michael Rahoza († 1599) and the bishops who had joined the Union. The Uniates answered in like manner, and afterwards executed a deed of submission to Rome. So the Union was introduced into S.W. Russia. The bishops who had remained faithful to Orthodoxy were deprived of their sees; the priests were driven out of their parishes; the brotherhoods were declared assemblies of insurgents; townsmen were restricted in the exercise of trade and handicraft; peasants were oppressed with services to their lords and other dues; the churches were leased to Jews. The effect of these restrictions was to lessen the number of Orthodox bishops, and the Orthodox were compelled willy-nilly to have recourse to Uniate priests for the performance of occasional offices. But the Uniates themselves were in no better case. They were looked down upon by both Roman Catholics and Orthodox. So matters stood under Sigismund III. His successor, Wladyslaw IV. (1632–48), though well disposed to the Orthodox, could not help them, as he had not the power to make headway against the turbulence of the nobles and the fanaticism of the Roman Catholic clergy.

When it became clear that the State of Poland and Lithuania either would not or could not satisfy the just aspirations of its Orthodox populations, the defence of their interests was taken up by the Cossacks of that region. One after another came Cossack insurrections. These were unsuccessful and merely served as new excuses for persecuting the Orthodox; but their failure made the champions of Orthodoxy turn to Moscow for defence. In 1654 Little Russia, under the hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky († 1651), joined the Muscovite power. In 1657 the patriarch Joachim († 1690) appointed Prince Gideon Chetvertinsky († 1690) metropolitan of Kiev, and in 1687 the patriarch of Constantinople, in conjunction with the other patriarchs, recognized the metropolitan of Kiev as under the patriarch of Moscow. From that time the metropolitans of Kiev became dependent on the All-Russian patriarch, and accordingly the W. Russian Church, torn away by Vitovt from alliance with Moscow, was once more united to the All-Russian Church. But the position of the Orthodox who were left in the districts of Poland-Lithuania was, as before, exceedingly wretched. Suffering under the yoke of Roman Catholicism, they tended to join either the Uniates or the Roman Catholics, and it was only later, when Russian influence was firmly established in those parts, that they began to return to the bosom of the Orthodox Church.

Among the men who were most active in promoting Orthodoxy and religious instruction in the S.W. province mention should be made of the metropolitan Peter Mohila (1633–46), who rendered great services to the Orthodox Church. He championed both Orthodox persons and the rights of

Church institutions many times before the Polish-Lithuanian Government; he laboured for the restoration of monuments of ecclesiastical antiquity, richly adorned the Pechera Lavra, and restored from almost complete ruin the cathedral of St. Sophia at Kiev and other churches recovered from the hands of the Uniates. He also wrote and published works in defence of Orthodoxy, corrected the service-books, and laboured to spread education in the Orthodox Church. His most important educational work was his remodelling of the Clerical Academy at Kiev (on the model of a Jesuit college) and his improvement of the instruction given in it. From that time dates a special theological tendency in the Kiev Academy, the mark of which was the influence of Roman Catholicism and the Scholastic philosophy.

4. From the foundation of the Holy Synod to the present time (1721–1917).—Among the most important reforms due to Peter the Great (1682–1725), the transformer of Russia, is the change in the supreme administration of the Church. In his task of organizing the life of the State and the community upon new principles, Peter the Great made straight for his aim without letting anything stand in his way. The administrative organization of ecclesiastical life, as it had existed up to his time, he regarded as producing conditions unfavourable to his transformations. On the one hand, he recognized that the Church and its clergy had a great influence on every part of the people's life; on the other hand, he saw that among the clergy his reforms met with little sympathy. Starting from these premisses, he came to the conclusion that, to secure success, he must change the form of the supreme administration of the Church and for the rule of one man substitute that of a 'college,' or board. Accordingly, when in 1700 the patriarch Adrian (1690–1700) died, Peter refrained from nominating a successor to him and assigned his duties to the metropolitan of Ryazan, Stephen Yavorski († 1722), with the title of *locum tenens* of the patriarchal see. This manner of administering the Church continued until 1721, when the ecclesiastical administration came up for reform. In 1718 Peter the Great had promulgated an edict for the foundation of a 'clerical (spiritual) college,' and entrusted to Theophan Prokopovich, bishop of Pskov († 1736), the work of drawing up a scheme for its governance, the so-called *Clerical Regulations* (*Dukhóvny Reglament*). In 1720 the *Regulations* were ready, and in 1721 the Clerical College itself was solemnly opened under the name of the 'Most Holy Governing Synod.' In 1723 the Eastern patriarchs sent a deed of confirmation to the synod, and in it they named it their 'Brother in Christ' and allowed it the rights and authority of a patriarch.

By the *Clerical Regulations* the synod took its place in the general system of higher administration; its members took an oath of allegiance to the emperor and bound themselves to observe all the interests of the State. The synod was at first composed as follows: Stephen Yavorski; two vice-presidents, Theodosius Yanovski (archbishop of Novgorod, deprived of his see in 1725) and Theophan Prokopovich; four councillors; and four assessors. Besides the representatives of the superior clergy there were representatives of the monasteries and of the secular clergy. In its rights it was held equal to the senate and in the same manner was directly subject to the emperor, represented in the synod by the chief procurator (*Ober-Procuror*), a layman, who watched the progress of business, and held up unsatisfactory decisions, reporting upon them to the emperor. The synod was given the right to promulgate new laws touching the Orthodox Church and its members. It was also its duty to see to the purity of the faith and the due celebration of public worship, to root out superstition, heresies, and schisms, to test reports as to saints (whom it was proposed to canonize), to certify miraculous ikons and relics, to examine books on religious subjects, to survey the building of churches and monasteries, and to care for the religious education of the people and the material support of the churches. The composition of the synod, its rights and duties, as laid down in the *Clerical Regulations*, have remained in the main unchanged up to the time of writing.

After the reign of Peter the position of the Russian Church throughout the 18th cent. was very difficult, especially during the reign of the empress Anna Ioannovna (1730–41), when great influence over Russia was gained by the Germans. Under Catherine II. (1762–96) a secularization of Church property took place (1764). It was opposed by Arsenius Matseevich, metropolitan of Rostov, who died in the fortress of Revel (1772). At the beginning of the 19th cent., under Alexander I. (1801–25), a mystic movement spread in Russia and was supported by the procurator of the Holy Synod, Prince Golitsyn († 1843). Under the influence of this movement the Russian Bible Society was founded in 1812. But by the end of Alexander's reign the mystic tendency gave place to a reaction.

The most important facts of the synod period in the history of the Russian Church have been the establishment of clerical and parish schools, the foundation of missions and of the Edinoverie ('One Faith,' a compromise to bring back the Old Believers), the reconciliation of the Uniates, the restoration of the activity of Church brotherhoods, and the foundation of church and parish wardenships (*popechitelstva*). The necessity of educating the clergy became evident from the time of Peter the Great's reforms. In his need of enlightened bishops Peter first of all directed his attention to the Moscow Academy, which had formerly been the only source of clerical education for the north of Russia, and reorganized it after the pattern of the Kiev Academy, giving it a Latin instead of its former Græco-Slavic tendency. He also improved the financial position of the Kiev Academy. Next he required the bishops to establish, in connexion with their sees, clerical schools with primary and secondary courses, also organized with a Latin tendency. On these lines clerical schools were established all through the 18th cent., and organized after the pattern of the S. Russian schools; and, in spite of lack of funds, they increased in number At the end of the century there were in Russia three clerical academies (Kiev, Moscow, and Petrograd), 36 seminaries, and 115 clerical schools. From these there went forth a succession of remarkable bishops, ecclesiastics, and writers. In 1808 at the command of Alexander I. the clerical educational institutions were recast and divided into four grades: (1) academies for higher education; (2) seminaries (one in each diocese) for secondary education; (3) district schools; and (4) parish schools for primary education, opened in towns and villages. In 1814 new regulations for the clerical schools were promulgated, according to which they were organized as schools for the clerical caste, with courses of general and of specialized instruction. In 1867–69 and in 1884 the regulations underwent certain changes dictated by experience; these were directed towards improving the material position and regularizing the organization of the schools. At present these institutions are governed by the educational committee of the Holy Synod, established in 1867. Since 1843 schools have been opened for girls of the clerical caste. In 1884 a scheme for church schools in parishes was started,

for the education of the people in the Orthodox faith. These are divided into primary schools (for reading and writing, one-class and two-class schools, and Sunday schools), which give elementary instruction, and teachers' schools (secondary and training schools), which train teachers for the primary schools. These are all governed by the school council of the Holy Synod, established in 1885.

Until the 18th cent. the missionary activity of the Church corresponded closely with the expansion of the State. Its central and northern provinces had been illumined by the light of Christ's faith in the first centuries after the formation of the State; into its distant provinces—into the regions of the Caucasus and Siberia—Christianity penetrated later. Before the time of Peter the Great missionary activity lacked adequate financial support and had no regular organization. Consequently it could not have any very great success. On the non-Russian fringes of the Russian State the number of Christians was insignificant compared with that of the Muhammadans and pagans. But since Peter's time the spread of the gospel among the tribes has been more rapid. Peter himself, though he believed in toleration, supplied funds for the support of missionaries and encouraged converts by various civil privileges. Missionary work was promoted by the empresses Elisabeth (1741–61) and Catherine II., and by the succeeding emperors. The work of spreading Christianity among the non-Russian tribes was specially advanced in the 18th cent. by Tychon, metropolitan of Kazan († 1724), Philotheus Leshchinski, metropolitan of Tobolsk († 1727), St. Innocent, bishop of Irkutsk († 1731), and in the 19th cent. by Macarius Glukharev († 1847) and Innocent Veniaminov († 1879). Since 1870 this work has been the care of the Orthodox Missionary Society, which manages nine Siberian missions. In 1913 was founded a mission council of the Holy Synod, to act as the central authority for the missionary activity of the Church. The Clerical Academy at Kazan opened a separate department in 1854 for the special preparation of missionaries. From Siberia the preaching of the gospel made its way to China and Japan. In Japan the work of the mission was established on firm foundations by the labours of Nicolas, the remarkable archbishop of Japan († 1912). There is also an Orthodox Russian mission in N. America.

The Edinoverie ('One Faith') was established in the Church in order to combat the schism. It first began in 1783, when certain schismatics living about Starodub in the government of Chernigov sent a petition to the synod expressing their readiness to join the Orthodox Russian Church on the following conditions: (1) that the synod should raise the curse laid by the 'Great Synod' of Moscow (1667) upon the use of two fingers in the sign of the cross and upon the other schismatic customs; (2) that the synod should give them a bishop who should consecrate priests after the ancient rite; (3) that both this bishop and the priests should celebrate the services according to the old books; (4) that the synod should grant them some holy oil (*myro*); (5) that they should not be forced to shave their beards or wear European clothes. The desires expressed by the schismatics were recognized by the synod as permissible, except the assigning to them of a special bishop. In 1800 the schismatics who entered into communion with the Orthodox Church on the above conditions received the name of Edinovertsy.

The reconciliation of the Uniates to the Orthodox Church began in the latter part of the 18th cent. and was completed only at the end of the 19th. After the establishment of the Union at the Council of Brest-Litovsk (1596) the position of Orthodoxy in the west of Russia had become very difficult, and in course of time the Orthodox Russians were forced to join the Uniates and the Uniates to approximate more and more to the Roman Catholics. By the middle of the 18th cent. of the four Orthodox Russian dioceses in W. Russia only one—that of Mohilev, or White Russia—was left. During this period of stress the Orthodox Russians of the south-west found an active defender in George Konisski († 1795), bishop of White Russia, who impelled the empress Catherine II. to come forward as the protector of the Orthodox population of Poland, among whom a movement against the Union arose. Many of the Uniates returned to the bosom of the Orthodox Church. When the three partitions of Poland had successively taken place (1772, 1793, 1795), about two million Uniates, freed from Polish rule, returned to Orthodoxy (1794–96) and made up what is now the diocese of Minsk. A second mass movement of W. Russian Uniates joining the Orthodox Church took place in 1839; from that time the only Uniates left were in the Lublin and Siedlce governments of Poland; in 1875 these finally came over to Orthodoxy.

The Orthodox Church brotherhoods, which existed in ancient Russia, and afterwards, in the 15th and 16th centuries, were so specially important in S.W. Russia, had in the 18th cent. fallen into utter decay, and this continued till the middle of the 19th century. Only in 1864, when 'fundamental rules for the establishment of Orthodox Church brotherhoods' were laid down, did they begin to be restored and to spread throughout Russia. At the present time they exist in almost all dioceses. In the same year, in order to improve the organization of Church life in each parish, a new institution was established, that of church and parish wardenships (*popechitelstva*), which now exist in connexion with most churches.

In the last two centuries, as in earlier times, the Russian Church has produced a line of witnesses to faith and piety, who have been numbered in the canon of the holy saints of God. Such are St. Theodosius, archbishop of Chernigov († 1696); Pitirim, bishop of Tambov († 1698); Mitrophan, bishop of Voronezh († 1703); Demetrius, metropolitan of Rostov († 1709); Ioann Maximovich, metropolitan of Tobolsk († 1715); Innocent, bishop of Irkutsk († 1731); Ioasaph, bishop of Belgorod († 1754); Tychon, bishop of Voronezh († 1783); Seraphim of Sarov († 1833). In the spheres of ecclesiastical activity and religious education during the 18th and 19th centuries distinguished names are: Stephen Yavorski, metropolitan of Ryazan († 1722), the first president of the Holy Synod; Theophan Prokopovich, archbishop of Novgorod († 1736); Platon Levshin, metropolitan of Moscow († 1812); Eugene Bolkhovitinov, metropolitan of Kiev († 1837); Innocent, archbishop of Kherson († 1867); Philaret Gumilevski, archbishop of Chernigov († 1866); Philaret Drozdov, metropolitan of Moscow († 1867); Macarius Bulgakov, metropolitan of Moscow († 1882); Silvester, bishop of Kanev (1908). In religious education a high place belongs to B. Bolotov († 1900), V. Klyuchevski († 1911), E. Golubinski († 1912), N. Glubokovski, and others. The political reforms which took place in the Russian Empire in 1905 had also their effect upon Church life. The interests of the Orthodox Church were most nearly affected by the decree of religious tolerance issued in that year. By it subjects of the Russian Empire were granted the right freely to go over from Orthodoxy to other confessions. As a result, under the influence of Roman Catholic and Protestant propaganda, especially in the western provinces, there fell

away from the Orthodox Church several hundred thousand members. At the same time the question arose of the necessity of reforming the organization of the Russian Church and of summoning a council of the whole Church with that purpose. In order to do the preliminary work, a special 'preconciliary department' (*Prisútstvie*) was appointed, afterwards changed into a 'preconciliary consultation' (*Sovêshchánie*), and is still continuing its labours. In connexion with this consultation there must be mentioned as a reform in the Church a command given by the emperor Nicolas II. in 1916 to the effect that, when the procurator of the synod reports to the emperor on affairs touching the internal organization of Church life and the essence of Church government, the reports should be made in the presence of the senior member of the Holy Synod in order that each point should be duly considered from the point of view of canon law.

[It is too soon (Dec. 1917) to see what will be the effect of the Russian revolution upon the Church. There is little doubt that its special privileges will be taken away, and it will be disestablished. Also the Church and monastery lands will be taken by the State and granted to peasants; it is, however, intended that compensation be paid.

A council of the whole Church held in Moscow began on 3rd Sept. 1917. Elections had been held in June and July. All adults over 25 years of age took part in these: each parish elected one priest and four laymen to the deanery synod; each deanery sent two priests and three laymen to the diocesan convocation; each diocese sent two priests and three laymen to the council, making 320 in all. Metropolitans and bishops (64) sat *ex officio*. There were also nine representatives of the autocephalous churches of Japan, America, and Georgia (though the last is said to have thrown off its dependence on the Russian Church and refused obedience to the Russian exarch), sixteen from monasteries and academic bodies, ten from the Duma. The office of the procurator of the Holy Synod was abolished, but the synod was to be retained until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly of the Russian State. On 1st Nov. the council voted the revival of the patriarchate, and Tychon was elected. (See H. J. Fynes-Clinton, *Eng. Ch. Rev.* ix. [1918] 65.) E. H. MINNS.]

II. *STATISTICS.* — At the present time the Orthodox Russian Church reckons its members at 100,000,000 (98,534,800, according to the procurator's report for 1913), and in 1914 there were converted to Orthodoxy 18,966 persons, whilst there fell away from Orthodoxy 10,638.

At the head of the Church stands the Most Holy Governing Synod, whose numbers vary from time to time between eight and ten metropolitans, archbishops, bishops, and proto-presbyters. The Church is divided into 64 dioceses, governed by bishops with the help of clerical consistories. The boundaries of the dioceses mostly coincide with those of the governments or provinces. Besides these there are four mission-dioceses outside the empire —Aleutian Islands, Japan, Peking, and Urumia. Of the diocesans three bear the title of metropolitan (Petrograd, Moscow, and Kiev), one that of exarch (Georgia), the rest that of archbishop and bishop; the holders of the last two titles are not constant in number. A special point in the organization of the Georgian exarchate is the fact that to the exarch are subordinated three diocesan bishops, so that he really has the position of a metropolitan in the Russian Church. In the more extensive dioceses there are suffragan bishops (*vicarii*). In 1915 the Russian Church had 3 metropolitans, 26 archbishops, 40 diocesan bishops, 80 suffragans, and 20 retired bishops.

In 1914 there were 54,174 churches (besides military chapels); of these 40,746 were parish churches; in addition there were 25,593 chapels and oratories. Parishes to the number of 19,718 had wardenships (*popechítelstva*), with a total budget of 4,894,458 rubles (£500,000). In the different dioceses there were 711 brotherhoods. The churches possessed 110,307,793 rubles of capital; the expenditure on various needs of the Church was 40,438,134 rubles; contributions made to the Church for charitable and educational objects amounted to 261,209 rubles.

The secular clergy numbered 3246 arch-priests (*protoiereí*), 47,859 priests, 15,035 deacons, and 46,489 psalm-singers. The staffs of the churches possessed a capital of 63,158,366 rubles. The clergy held 2,075,098 *desyatíns* (5,400,000 acres) of land, with a rental of 13,000,000 rubles. The funds for supporting the clergy consist of fees, rent of glebe, interest on invested capital, and an annual grant from the State amounting to 54,000,000 rubles, made to about 30,000 parishes to the extent of between 100 and 300 rubles to each.

There were 550 men's monasteries and 475 women's, containing 11,845 monks, 9485 servitors, 17,289 nuns, and 56,016 serving sisters. Institutions for clerical education were: for males, 4 academies with 995 students; 57 seminaries with 22,734 students; 185 schools with 29,419 scholars; for females, 11 schools of the clerical office with 2177 girls, and 72 diocesan schools with 28,671. There were Church parish schools, 37,528 elementary with 2,079,891 scholars, and 418 teachers' training schools with 23,720 students.

The clerical academies publish learned theological monthlies; *Khristiánskoe Chténie* ('Christian Reading') at Petrograd since 1821; *Pravoslávny Sobesêdnik* ('Orthodox Conversation') at Kazan since 1855; *Trudý Kievskoy Dukhóvnoy Akadémii* ('Transactions of the Kiev Clerical Academy') since 1860; *Bogoslóvski Vêstnik* ('Messenger of Theology') at the Moscow Academy in the Sergius Lavra since 1892. The following reviews should also be noted: *Dushepoléznoe Chténie* ('Edifying Reading'), Moscow, 1860 ff.; *Stránnik* ('The Wanderer'), Petrograd, 1860 ff.; *Vêra i Rázum* ('Faith and Reason'), Kharkov, 1884 ff.; *Rússki Palómnik* ('Russian Pilgrim'), Petrograd, 1887 ff. The Holy Synod publishes the weekly *Tserkóvnyya Vêdomosti* ('Church News'), 1888 ff., and a daily *Prikhódski Listók* ('Parish Leaflet'), 1914 ff. These have an official character, as have the various *Eparkhiál'nyya Vêdomosti* ('Diocesan News'), published in almost all the dioceses.

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RYNSBURGERS (or COLLEGIANTS).—Rynsburg, a hamlet on the Old Rhine, six miles below Leyden, became in 1619 the meeting-place of a group of laymen who separated from the Dutch Reformed Church after the Synod of Dort. Similar societies for Bible study were soon formed in many towns of Holland and Germany, and became known generally as Collegia. The Collegiants diminished in numbers in the 18th cent., and the Revolution gave them the death-blow.

1. Origin.—The movement was essentially an assertion of the priesthood of all believers, taking shape positively in combined and systematic searching of the Scriptures, and negatively in a repudiation of all ecclesiastical office. It was doubly due to Dirk Volkertszoon Coornhert (1522–90), a notary of Haarlem, who won distinction as engraver, poet, statesman, philosopher, and translator. He was a careful Bible student, and declined to bow to the judgment of clerical theologians. In particular he criticized the famous Heidelberg Catechism with its views of predestination. A young minister of Amsterdam, Jacobus Arminius, was asked to convince him of his errors, but Coornhert won him over, and thus initiated a general leavening of the ministry through the work of Arminius at Leyden, which culminated in the disruption of 1619.[1]

Coornhert had also inherited a love of the vernacular Bible, which had been felt two centuries earlier by Gerard Groot of Deventer. The Brethren of the Common Life (*q.v.*) were not only opposed to ecclesiasticism and mendicancy; they devoted themselves to charity, and to education on the basis of the Dutch Bible. A boarder in one of their houses, Erasmus, when issuing a fresh Latin version of the NT, expressed in its preface a hope that others would do for their own people what he was thus doing for the literary world. The hope had hardly been fulfilled in Holland, and only poor versions were available, based on the Vulgate or Luther. Coornhert therefore began a new translation into living, unconventional language; and, as he is acknowledged to have lifted a mere dialect to the level of a literary tongue, creating modern Dutch, he would probably have been the Tyndale of his country, had he lived. He also sketched out a plan of Bible study by groups of people, not dependent on a set sermon, and thus he laid a second train.

The match was put to both by the Synod of Dort, which not only ignored the Remonstrance against persecution, but started the local synods on inquiries into the doctrines held by pastors and professors, demanding subscription to the Five Points of Calvinism in dispute.[1] The alternative was silence, deposition, and, before long, banishment. The ejected ministers were no more inclined to acquiesce than the priests ejected by Elizabeth, but, until they drew together at Antwerp and systematically mapped out the field for a new organization, their lay sympathizers were thrown on their own resources. Conventicles arose again as in the days of Alva, and it was from one of these that the Rynsburg congregation originated.

In this village lived four brothers van der Kodde, whose father, though but a shoemaker, had educated his large family so well that all were good linguists; a fifth brother, who was professor of Hebrew at Leyden, was ejected at this crisis. Although there was a church in the village, Gysbert van der Kodde was an elder of the church at Warmond, a small town to the north; and, when the minister there was ejected, Gysbert gathered those of like mind to a conventicle in an apple-orchard. This suited so well that, when the Antwerp committee sent other ministers, he dissuaded them from coming, pointing out that their presence rendered the meetings illegal, whereas meetings of laymen only were within the law. As this plea did not keep all the ministers away, the meeting was transferred to a flax-house belonging to Gysbert in Rynsburg. While it was nominally open for all to attend and take part, the four brothers took the lead, helped at first by a fisherman and by Jan Batten, a Leyden man.

They were soon joined by a far more important adherent, who left a deep impress on their methods. Jan Evertszoon Geesteran had been minister at Alkmaar, his birthplace, but, having sided with the Remonstrants, he was banished on 12th March 1618 (or 1619). His forefathers had been in Poland, and were familiar with the discussions provoked there by the appearance of Faustus Socinus and other Italians; his own views were at least tinctured with their characteristic theology. But something more superficial attracted greater attention at the time—his reproduction of their practice, the immersion of believers. He was baptized thus at Rynsburg in 1620, and it was commented on as an innovation in Holland. Next year the Poles offered him the rectorship of the university of Rakow, and, though he did not accept, the incident increased his reputation and led him to wider spheres of work. He founded similar societies at Haarlem, Amsterdam, Norden, and Leeuwarden, while Dirk Rafaelszoon Camphuysen established another at Rotterdam, and the movement attained more than local importance.

2. Development.—Thus, within three years, the Synod of Dort had broken up all outward uniformity by an attempt to secure it. Of earlier communions, Roman Catholicism had become negligible within the United Provinces; and the earliest reformers, the Doopsgezinden, or Anabaptists, had become relatively insignificant since Menno Simons had recalled them to the principle of non-resistance.[2] In the times of Alva the fighting Lutherans and Calvinists came to the front, and the Synod of Dort made it clear that the latter weighed heavier in the balance. The Remonstrants, however, unlike the contemporary Puritans in England, declined to submit, and defiantly organized a rival series of congregations;

[1] See vol. i. p. 808.

[1] See vol. i. p. 808b.

[2] See art. Mennonites.

thus it appeared as if there would be a variegated fringe of dissent, for the Doopsgezinden themselves were in at least two groups, the Flemings and the Waterlanders. Since these were all averse to Calvinism, negotiations were set afoot to check the divisive forces and to amalgamate into a sort of United Free Church. But the Doopsgezinden and the Remonstrant ministers believed strongly in the necessity of the pastoral office, whereas Coornhert's writings had aroused in many breasts the feeling that all Christians were priests. Hence in town after town similar societies originated, though with frequent disclaimers of any intention to found a new communion; all were welcomed to the meetings who desired to know the mind of the Spirit, and gave evidence of His working in their lives, even if they chose to remain in any other external fellowship.

At this juncture a new edition of Coornhert's works appeared, and crystallized the movement. His idea seems to have been suggested by events at Zürich, but had been clarified by developments in England, where the need for better knowledge of the Bible had been widely felt under Elizabeth. The necessity for providing sermons in place of the Mass pointed not only to the publication of official homilies, but also to the need for training preachers. Since no provision was made for this at the universities or in special seminaries, regular meetings were promoted by some bishops, when the clergy were convened for Bible study, and sermons were delivered to initiate discussion; Northampton is a well-known instance. Elizabeth indeed was suspicious, fearing that the Puritans would capture the meetings and convert them into synods; she therefore forbade them generally, relaxing her prohibition only in special cases, Manchester being a permitted centre. But in the Netherlands the idea had been welcomed, and synods at Wesel, Emden, and Dort had approved, so that similar meetings were held in the great towns for a generation. Coornhert therefore saw a plan actually in use, to which he gave a most important turn. He proposed that such meetings should not be confined to, or be led by, ministers, but should be open to all.

The suggestion was now taken up in earnest, and, while there was much local variety, meetings were often conducted on the following method. Printed lists of texts were prepared to be studied at home, and these were discussed at meetings held on Sunday and Wednesday. Exposition was varied by exhortation and prayer, and a solo was often found a means of edification. Then from the Doopsgezinden came in their attachment to congregational singing, and, while the Calvinist psalms were not favoured, another deposed minister led the way with paraphrases and original poems, till a large selection of hymns was compiled and passed into general use.

The meetings were usually held in private houses, and attendance was compatible with membership in some definite communion. In Amsterdam the numbers were so great that the largest meeting-house of the Doopsgezinden was borrowed, and many young ministers of that body attended to improve themselves. Men and women were encouraged to take an active part, especially in the Bible conference. University students from Leyden were often seen at Rynsburg, and it appears that Descartes, Catholic as he was, walked over once from Endegeest that he might hear how peasants and artisans dealt with the Bible.[1] The great cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam were naturally the chief centres, but the history has been recovered of other important societies, at Leyden, Haarlem, Hoorn, Krommenie, Wormer, Zaandam, Alkmaar, Harlingen, Grouw, Knype, and Groningen.

Nor was the movement limited to the Netherlands. Coornhert had lived for many years in Cleves, and before 1651 Hilarius Prache of Breslau knew of a society near Liegnitz in Silesia.[1] Extension in Germany was due to Philipp Jakob Spener, pastor at Frankfort from 1666. He gathered in his own house all who would listen to expositions of the NT and discuss them; and for such meetings he borrowed the name 'Collegia pietatis.' Nine years later, in a preface to Arndt's sermons, he made six proposals for reform, beginning with the thorough study of the Bible in private meetings and a fuller recognition of the universal Christian priesthood by the activity of the laity. These proposals were republished separately in 1678 as *Pia Desideria*, and inaugurated a new movement known in Germany as the Pietist.[2] In Saxony he found a wider sphere for his work, and from his influence arose 'Collegia biblica' in many places. Several young men trained by him at Frankfort became pastors or professors, and before long Halle was a centre of the German movement; here arose a university with popular vernacular lectures on the Bible, and philanthropic institutions of many kinds. From the orphanage went forth a godson of Spener, Count Zinzendorf, who revived the old Moravian Church, and inaugurated Protestant foreign missions.[3] While Halle was the centre, many societies sprang up on the lines advocated and illustrated by Spener. A study of the German Collegiants has been made by Theodor Sippell of Schweinsberg, who finds that they were rather more rigid than the Dutch: they abjured ordinary churches, confined the Lord's Supper to their homes, rejected baptism on the ground that John the Baptist foretold that the baptism of the Holy Spirit would replace water baptism, and were similarly literal in their refusal to take oaths, go to law, hold office, or enlist.

Sippell also suggests that the Seekers of Westmorland and Bristol, about 1650, were derived from the Collegiants.[4] Despite the similarity, no external evidence of any connexion is offered, whether by a book or by a man. On the contrary, the Friends, who did absorb many of the Seekers, came into contact with the Collegiants in Holland as early as 1656, and George Fox betrays no sense of indebtedness; even his references in his correspondence and journals are not always sympathetic, and he passed through Leyden without turning aside to see Rynsburg.

It has also been said that the English Baptists derived their immersion from the Collegiants; but this is an over-statement. A single group of London Particular Baptists did in 1641 send one of their number to Holland, where he was baptized by Jan Batten, then head of a congregation in Amsterdam,[5] a fact not found in Collegiant or kindred literature.[6] Before that date not only had Roger Williams and Ezekiel Holliman baptized one another, but William Kiffin seems to have been baptized in England independently. And, when discussion arose, it became clear that such baptism had originated in many ways,[7] many Baptists holding to the dictum of a generation earlier that 'succession was Antichrist's chief hold.'

It might have been expected that a movement of this kind, which originated close to Leyden in 1619, would have had some contact with the church of

[1] *Œuvres*, Paris, 1824-26, viii. 173.

[1] C. Fell Smith, *Steven Crisp*, London, 1892, p. 16.

[2] See art. PIETISM.

[3] See art. MORAVIANS.

[4] *Friends' Quarterly Examiner*, July, 1910, summarizing three arts. in *Die christliche Welt*.

[5] A. Ypey, *Gesch. der chr. Kerk*, Breda, 1819-27, ix. 189.

[6] J. C. van Slee, *De Rijnsburger Collegianten*, p. 381.

[7] T. Crosby, *Hist. of the Eng. Baptists*, London, 1738-40, i. 97.

John Robinson, and that the parallel societies would have attracted attention from Sidrach Simpson, William Bridge, and Jeremiah Burroughes in Rotterdam, if not from John Paget in Amsterdam. But the Collegiants were in revolt against Calvinism, and their deliberate ignoring of the ministerial office was hardly to be matched even among the Brownists.[1] Their latest historian is unable to trace any communication, whether at the origin or in later times, with either Puritans or Separatists. The main thread of their development is to be followed in the Netherlands.

When the university of Rakow was closed, many Polish teachers sought refuge in Holland, much to the alarm of the Calvinists. An edict of the States General was secured to limit their influence, and they found that the Collegiant gatherings were almost the only religious meetings which they might attend. They naturally made an impression on the character of the teaching, and involved the Collegiant movement in suspicion, till it became necessary to stipulate that those who frequented the conferences should acknowledge Christ as the Son of God.

The general tone being anti-Calvinist, the same constituency was appealed to whence the Remonstrants drew followers, and from which the Doopsgezinden had long recruited. A pamphlet of 1663, *Lammerenkrygh*, shows a Fleming debating against a Remonstrant, a Waterlander, and a Collegiant; the characteristic difference of the last-named was that within the one great body of believers to which the baptism of the Spirit introduced men it was wrong to make distinctions, whether of sect and sect or of clergy and laity.

Those were the palmy days of the societies, and such excellent expositions were to be heard at their meetings, as by Laurens Klinkhamer, Abram Galenus, C. and M. van Diepenbroek, and Jacob van Rooyestein, that many attended who hardly considered themselves members. Mosheim avers that adherents were to be found in most of the cities and villages of Holland.

An important influence entered their circles about this time, that of Spinoza (*q.v.*). The young Jew had learned Latin from a physician in Amsterdam who had some connexion with them; and when he was excommunicated he took refuge with another Collegiant near the city, Herman Homan, whose home for the next four years was the centre of a band of young thinkers. In this period he elaborated his first book, the *Short Treatise on God, on Man, and on Wellbeing.* In 1660 his host moved to Rynsburg itself, and here he worked out his *Ethics* in correspondence with his friends at Amsterdam, chief of whom was Jan Rieuwertszoon, the Collegiant bookseller. He left the village in 1663, but continued the correspondence, so that his ideas filtered into the Amsterdam meeting. When the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* was published, it was canvassed by them, and a vigorous controversy began two years later between Johannes Bredenburg and Francis Kuyper. His posthumous works were actually edited in their Amsterdam headquarters, and were published by Rieuwertszoon. Feeling ran so high that the societies divided into two groups, and at Rynsburg itself a second meeting-house was erected. When, however, both leaders had passed away, the division healed itself as the century closed.

3. Stagnation and decay.—A decided fossilizing then set in. There was still an insistence, in words, on the absence of all officers and on the duty of all to take part in the meetings; but at the chief centres the Bible study was transferred to the Saturday, and a rota of speakers was drawn up for it; the only relic of the original state of affairs was a brief pause at the close of the address, nominally for any one else to speak.

The question of celebrating the Lord's Supper was answered in various ways. Very general reluctance was felt to participate at any ordinary church. Some preferred to regard it as a purely domestic ceremony, but, when the larger societies acquired premises of their own, and no longer met in private houses, the domestic character was inevitably obscured. Indeed, about 1700, all Sunday morning was devoted at Amsterdam, and doubtless at other places, to a combined service somewhat on these lines. The worshippers sat in pews around a hall, all facing inwards, a table occupying the centre. The president for the day gave an introductory address, disclaiming all authority and emphasizing the brotherhood of all, reminding his hearers also that they met to illustrate brotherhood not only between those present but between all believers. After silent prayer he invited all who wished to take their seats at the table, while a solo was sung. He recited the words of institution, and passed the plates to right and to left, each helping himself. They ate simultaneously, and the leader gave a few words of exhortation. After thanks for the cup they drank in turn. Then they went back to their pews, and others came to the table; as these partook, the leader told some story from the life of the Lord, or repeated some of His teachings, instead of exhorting further. When all the men had thus shared, the women came to the table, and the leader himself sat down to partake with the last sitting. A thanksgiving by him, and a hymn by all, closed the service. It will be seen that this method, despite the initial disclaimer, kept one man unnecessarily to the front at each service; the only others who lifted up their voices separately were the soloist—often a professional—and the treasurer, who announced for what purpose the alms were desired.

Another striking feature of the Collegiant worship was designed to unify the movement and keep the various societies in touch. At Whitsuntide and in August conventions were held, both at Leeuwarden in Friesland and at Rynsburg in S. Holland; these lasted usually four days. To accommodate the visitors, several buildings arose at Rynsburg, though it was within easy reach of Leyden; it had a sentimental attraction such as Mow Cop exerts on the Primitive Methodists or Keswick on members of many communions. The old flax-house was first disused in favour of a regular meeting-house; then arose another at the time of the Bredenburg quarrel; next came a Great House for visitors, supplemented presently by a Little House. A tract of land belonging to an abbey was leased and laid out as a park, with a grove of trees. It is not clear how these buildings were used for the greater part of the year, for the local adherents were so few that the Amsterdam society assumed the trust early in the 18th century.

A still rarer act of worship was the baptism of any who desired thus to confess their faith. In early days this took place at irregular intervals, in the brook near the village. But in 1736 a baptistery was excavated in the open air opposite the Great House, and was lined with brick, while a boiler-house was built close by to supply huge quantities of warm water. The rite of baptism was observed on the Saturday morning before the convention. After song and prayer an address was given to explain the ceremony, as a confession in deed, optional, non-initiatory; the candidate made an oral confession of faith, then, after many prayers, he went down into the pool with the baptizer, who bowed his head forwards as he knelt, and repeated the words of institution. All then adjourned to the meeting-house for an address,

[1] See artt. BROWNISM, CONGREGATIONALISM.

song, prayer, and thanksgiving. It must be emphasized that such a service was held only at Leeuwarden and at Rynsburg, and was exceptional even there. No baptism is recorded from 1738 to 1742, and, in the whole period of seventy-five years for which the registers of Rynsburg survive, only 116 entries are made. Another point illustrated by this register is the growing officialism; in all this period only seven men acted as baptizers.

Here, then, are many signs of waning zeal, such as indeed affected most religious bodies at the time. But, while the societies of Germany were revivified by the missionary zeal of Zinzendorf, and in England John Wesley was firing others with enthusiasm for home evangelization, the Collegiants proper were becoming more and more stereotyped. Moreover, instead of launching out in any new direction, they turned their eyes backward and began to write their own history, while hitherto they had been content with two criticisms on a prejudiced account given by Paschier de Fijne in 1671, and incorporated by Brandt in his general *History of the Reformation . . . in the Low Countries.*

As in Germany, they were philanthropic. A burgomaster of Amsterdam gave his house, the Orange-Apple, to the local society. It was used as an orphanage, while the Sunday meetings were held in the hall. Presently it was rebuilt, and it became the most important of their edifices. The combination of purposes was characteristic, and other similar institutions arose. Besides the weekly alms, offerings were taken at the conventions, and the figures show that 1728–33 was the high-water period, though 1742 saw the largest collection—400 florins at the August gathering.

By this time, whatever their generosity, they were decidedly decaying, and only eighteen places of worship were open next year. The contrast between wealth and low vitality was enhanced when in 1780 a legacy of 13,000 florins was left to the great orphanage, while the last convention met at Rynsburg on 27th May 1787. In the revolutionary era the societies ceased to meet, and John Rippon, when making elaborate inquiry into the religious condition of Holland in 1790, failed to hear of them at all. The latest to hold on was at Zaandam, but this collapsed by 1810. The meeting-houses were disposed of one by one to provide funds for the orphanages, and by 1828 these last relics of the corporate life had passed into other hands.

The Collegiants had always declared that they were no sect, and they had no ecclesiastical organization, whether of a single society or for the Conventions; therefore there were no minutes of meetings. Similarly there were no creeds or other formal documents. The literary remains are chiefly Bible expositions, and even these seem to date rather from the earlier period. The best collection is probably in the Amsterdam library of the Doopsgezinden, with whom their relations were always cordial.

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S

SA'ADYA.—See SEADIAH.

SABÆANS.—A century ago Arabia Felix was an unknown land. There were a few references to it in the OT, classical geographers had a little to say, and Arab historians told wonderful stories of it. That was all. To-day, after a hundred years of discovery and the self-sacrifice of a few explorers, it still plays the sphinx. A few phrases in the Bible have been set in a new light, the Greek and Roman tales have proved well founded, and the Arab traditions have been largely discredited. One or two, like Hamdānī, could spell out the inscriptions, but all that is valuable in their stories is a few names and some references to the latest history.[1] This has come from the discovery of the S. Arabian inscriptions and some monuments of its civilization.

1. **History of discovery.**—In 1811 Ulrich Jasper Seetzen brought to Europe five copies of inscriptions, but they were so full of mistakes that only one was of any use. In 1835 J. R. Wellsted and in 1838 C. Cruttenden brought home other texts. Then L. Arnaud made his adventurous trip to Marib, bringing back over 50 texts (1843). On this basis Æ. Rödiger, W. Gesenius, and E. Osiander deciphered the alphabet and laid the foundation of all future study. J. Halévy's journey to Negran in 1869 as a Jew from Jerusalem was made at great personal risk; indeed, his safety lay chiefly in the contempt which an Arab felt for killing a Jew. He gathered copies of nearly 600 inscriptions, and, though much of his work has been superseded, yet it made an epoch in the study of the Yemen. S. Langer gave his life in the search (1882). E. Glaser's journeys from that year on have provided the originals or facsimiles of 2000 texts, though most are still unpublished. His services were great; they should have been greater. Since then activity has been limited to the interpretation of texts already known.

[1] *Tubba'* never occurs as a title and is usually part of a compound name.

2. **Language.**—The inscriptions are in a S. Semitic language and are written with an alphabet of 29 letters—the 28 of Arabic *plus* the *samech* of N. Semitic. The alphabet is closely related to the Phœnician. Some letters are very like: קענ and ת; others are turned round or even upside down: ל and ש; while others are slightly altered: מור and ם. Which is the more original has not been decided. An attempt has been made[1] to derive this alphabet from the Greek. It would be almost conclusive, were not time and space against it. ב and ר are more like the Aramaic forms. Of the letters not found in Phœnician غ is formed from ط and ظ from ص. The old Ethiopic alphabet differs very slightly from the S. Arabian; some letters are clearly younger forms, while others are possibly older. So it appears that both descended from a common ancestor. The writing usually runs from right to left, but in some inscriptions, which from internal evidence and by analogy seem to be the oldest, it is boustrophedon. The oldest forms of ם and ש occur in boustrophedon inscriptions. Only one boustrophedon, Fr. lvi., is late and it is boustrophedon only for convenience' sake; it is in very long lines on a wall. Some development can be traced in the script; the older forms of ם and ש are angular, and ר is either an obtuse angle or the arc of a circle. Later forms become curved and more complex. These changes have nothing to do with the elegancies of form shown by the most artistic monuments.

[1] *PSBA* xxix. [1907] 123.

The inscriptions are mostly on stone, usually engraved, sometimes in relief and sometimes in hollow-relief. One is painted—an evident sign of haste. Many bronze tablets have been found with writing in relief, and all sorts of things—altars, censers, and statues—bear legends.

The language is closely akin to Arabic, especially in grammar, though the vocabulary has much in common with Ethiopic. As no vowels are expressed—in common with all early Semitic alphabets—no exact knowledge of the structure of the language is possible. Vowel letters are used, very sparingly in the middle of words and more freely at the end. Corresponding to nunation in Arabic, a final *m* serves as the indefinite article, and the definite is expressed by a final *n*. Broken plurals are usual, and two construct states can depend on one governing noun. The construct depending on a sentence is very common.

There are at least two clearly defined dialects. Minæan is much less regular in its writing. ה is often used to mark the presence of a short vowel, and it is inserted between a noun and its suffix. The root consonant of the third personal pronoun and the prefix of the causative stem are ש. There are many differences in vocabulary.[1] In Sabæan ה is the root of the third personal pronoun and is the prefix of the causal stem. There are syntactical peculiarities. When several perfects come together and the first is 3rd per. sing. masc., the others take *n* as a suffix. The perfect with *l* prefixed forms the optative, and the 3rd sing. imperf. always ends in *n*, except where it forms part of a proper name. שלה stands in Minæan and old Sabæan, but in later Sabæan הלה as in Arabic. In Hadramaut the word becomes שלם according to a general rule.[2]

Minæan inscriptions come from the Jauf, the centre of the kingdom of Ma'īn (the pronunciation is derived from Arabic), from the towns of Karna (which seems to have borne also the name of the kingdom), from Barākish, or Yathil, from Kamina, and also from el-Ula on the Hedjāz railway. In this dialect or a near relative of it are the monuments of Katabān (really Qatabān), who at one time held the coast north of Bab-el-Mandeb, and one from Hadramaut. The Sabæan come largely, though not exclusively, from Sirwāh and Marib, east of Sana, though many come from Nashq in Minæan territory and they have been found in Hadramaut. Sketch maps of the district are given in Hommel's *Chrestomathie*. Ptolemy is mistaken in putting Katabān east of Hadramaut.

3. History. — Some have found the earliest reference to the Yemen in Magan of the old Babylonian monuments, identifying it with מן of the Minæan inscriptions. Magan has been localized in so many places that this reference is doubtful.[3] In the OT various names occur—שבא, חצרמות, רעמה,[4] as being closely connected. סבא may be best explained as a doublet of שבא, being a fairly exact reproduction of the foreign name, whereas in שבא the sibilant has undergone the usual change. It is very doubtful if the Minæans are mentioned in the OT, and so far they have not been found in the Assyrian texts, though Asshurbanipal (*c.* 645) conquered Abyateh,[5] king of the Arabs. Abyateh is probably אבידע, a name that occurs on Minæan though not on Sabæan monuments. In 733 Tiglath Pileser III. refers to Taima Saba and Khaifa. In 715 Sargon[6] names Samsi, queen of Aribi, and Itamara the Sabæan.[7] So it is assumed that the people were then living in N. Arabia, perhaps as nomads, and that later they migrated southwards. Be that as it may, the Minæans and Sabæans of history were settled in the Yemen. This district was important because it was on the trade route from India and the East. Its kings owed their wealth to the customs which they levied perhaps more than to the products of their own land.

The names of about 30 kings of Ma'īn are found on the monuments, but, though the order of their reigns has been to some extent fixed, yet there are no data to settle the time limits of the kingdom. A son of a king of Ma'īn was king of Hadramaut, and *Hal.* 193 points to close intercourse between the two countries. Their relations with Saba were not always harmonious. More is known of their activity. They were a peaceful folk and their business enterprise was wide-spread. At el-Ula in N. Arabia was a big Minæan settlement on the caravan route to Gaza, and it has left inscriptions extending over a long period. A sarcophagus was found in Egypt with the epitaph of an Arabian agent in the incense traffic, and in the island of Delos an altar dedicated to Wadd. Controversy still rages over the date of this kingdom. Was it earlier than or contemporary with the Sabæan? Epigraphic considerations suggest that it was at least no earlier. Strabo's authority is quite familiar with the Minæans and regards them as one of the nations of the Yemen. On the other side it is argued that for several hundred years they held a commanding position in N. Arabia, and yet they are never mentioned—at least by name—in Assyrian records. Therefore their power must have come to an end before the arm of Assyria reached so far. But it has been mentioned above that Asshurbanipal probably came in contact with them. Possibly Itamara was the Sabæan official of a Minæan king. Saba is occasionally mentioned in Minæan inscriptions, but Ma'īn never in the Sabæan; therefore Ma'īn was finished as a kingdom. In view of the fragmentary character of the records and their predominantly religious contents, the argument from silence is risky. The attempt to put Ma'īn before Saba—beginning 1400 B.C. or earlier—may be due to the legendary wealth of Arabia Felix; the existence of two States side by side does not agree with the tales of the land of gold and incense.

The history of Saba is clearer; about 50 rulers are known, who fall into three classes: (1) 15 are called *mukarrib* (vocalization uncertain) and are obviously the earliest; the title means 'priest' and is parallel to the title *miswad* borne by some kings of Ma'īn; (2) 17 kings of Saba followed, and then (3) 26 kings of Saba and Raidan (*dhu Raidan*). Perhaps the *mukarribs* were vassals of Ma'īn. They dwelt in Sirwāḥ, their family fortress; when they took the title of king, they shifted their residence to Marib, the town famed in Arab story for its great dam, the ruin of which coincided with the fall of the kingdom. We do not know when Saba rose to power; it may have been *c.* 800 B.C. Some of the later monuments are dated according to an era of their own. One from Hisn-el-Ghurab refers to events that are known from other sources to have happened A.D. 525. That puts the first year of the Sabæan era in 115 or 114 B.C. It is only a guess, though plausible, that this is the year of the upheaval in the state when the new title, 'king of Saba and Raidan,' appears. The period that ended about this time was that of Saba's glory. To it we owe the references in the prophets to the omnipresent activity of Sabæan merchants. Then the legend of Sabæan wealth arose, and the Queen of Sheba—a gross anachronism—reflects popular ideas on the remote country. Contemporary with Saba were kings of Hadramaut. One inscription reads:[1] 'Ilsharḥ Yahdib and his brother Ya'zil Bayyin the two kings of Saba and Raidan, sons of Fara' king of Saba,' which suggests that the change of government corresponding to the change of title was peaceable and due solely to internal causes, possibly the need of being nearer the sea, the new trade route. Raidan is the Arabic Zafār, near Yerim. Or, if Ilsharḥ is the Ἰλσαρός of Strabo, the change may be a result of Gallus's expedition. About this time Aden was destroyed, and Mauza, on the Red Sea, took its place for a time. Some think that this change was caused or accompanied by the rise of the race of

[1] J. H. Mordtmann, *Beiträge zu minäischen Epigraphik*, Weimar, 1897.

[2] For further details of the dialect of Hadramaut see *ZDMG* xxxvii. [1883] 393.

[3] L. W. King, *Hist. of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, p. 241.

[4] The names respectively of a people, a land, and a town.

[5] Rassam prism. [6] *Annals*, ll. 97–99.

[7] Itamara is obviously יתעאמר of the Sabæan inscriptions.

[1] *CIS* 334: 'Sha'r Autar king of Saba and Raidan son of Alhan Nahfan king of Saba.' Probably this was a customary abbreviation of the second title.

Himyar. Others put the rise of Himyar in the 1st century A.D. The author of the *Periplus Maris Erythræi* (*c.* A.D. 77) calls Saphar the capital of Kharibael, king of the Homerites and Sabaites. Homerites corresponds to Himyar of the inscriptions, Hamer of the Ethiopians. Himyar is occasionally mentioned on the older monuments. The name was taken by the Arabs to cover the whole country and history, because it was the nearest and best known to them. In 27 B.C. fell the famous expedition of Ælius Gallus, the only time when Rome tried to conquer the Yemen. He reached Nejran and the Jauf, destroyed Nesca (Nashq), but failed to reach Marib. Yet Saba's greatest glory was past. What Alexander had tried to do the Ptolemys accomplished. They opened the sea route to India; so Saba, deprived of its customs duties, fell slowly into decay. Arab story has condensed the work of years—perhaps of centuries—into one event, the fall of the dam of Marib, though this was as much the result as the cause of the disappearance of Saba.

Here may be mentioned two other names known to the classics: the Gebanitæ and the Kattabani. Katabān was the name of a clan which held high rank under both Minæan and Sabæan kings. They then became independent; a *mukarrib* is mentioned, and one king apparently became overlord of Ma'in. Their capital was Thumna. Eratosthenes knew them, but in Pliny's time they had disappeared. Probably they were Sabæan by race. Gab'an was a clan which stood high in the favour of the Minæan kings. According to Pliny, they owned some of the incense-bearing districts and in later times held the lands of Kataban, ruling as kings in Thumna and Okelis (near Shaikh Saad). They used the Minæan dialect on their monuments.

The Abyssinians now play a part in the history of S. Arabia. Glaser believes that they dwelt originally east of Hadramaut and migrated in historic times to Africa, whence they returned to attack the Himyarites. On the authority of unpublished texts he says that there was in 75 B.C. an alliance of Saba and Habashat (Abyssinians) against Himyar and Hadramaut. There are difficulties in this view; perhaps the Habashat are the Abaseni of the classics. The last known king of Saba and Raidan was alive in A.D. 281. Then came foreign domination, for on the Axum monuments (middle of 4th cent.) the Abyssinian claims to be, according to the Greek text, king of the Axumites, Homerites, Raidan, Ethiopians, Sabæans, and Sile (Salhin?), and, in the Geez text, king of Axum, Hamer, Raidan, Saba, and Salhin (?). Then in 378 native rulers, of whom nine are known, again appear with the title, 'king of Saba, Raidan, Hadramaut, and Yemenat.' Arabia has now sunk to be a pawn in the game between Rome and Persia, and Rome works through Abyssinia. Religious strife has been added to other causes of unrest. After the destruction of Jerusalem Jews migrated to the Yemen and attained considerable influence. One inscription has been found referring to 'the Merciful One, God of Israel and Lord of the Jews.' Christianity was introduced — according to one account, about 350, according to another, about 500; but it was ill received, for it was the faith of the national enemies, the Abyssinians. From this time onwards the Byzantine historians are valuable. The tale is tangled, but the sequence of events seems to be that in 523 the Abyssinians attacked the Yemen and dethroned Dhu Nuwas, the Himyarite king, who took refuge in the mountains. In his hatred to Christianity he is said to have massacred his Christian subjects in Negran (probably the story is highly coloured in the martyrology), and in 525 he was defeated a second time and slain. Esimphæus (Sumaḍa') was installed as regent, though in 531 Abraha, an Abyssinian officer, overthrew him; and, after playing with the idea of independence, he remained faithful to his overlord in Africa. An inscription bearing his name and the date 543 tells of his turbulent subjects and of a breach of the dam at Marib.[1] This inscription is unique because it invokes Rahman the Merciful One and His Messiah and the Holy Spirit instead of the national gods. In 575 the Persians were called in, and S. Arabia was more or less a Persian province till the coming of Islām.

4. Religion.—As most of the monuments are votive inscriptions, the names of many gods are known. They fall into two classes, and each people had its own favourites. The Minæans honoured Wadd, 'Athtar, Nikraḥ, and in a lower degree Shams. According to Glaser, Katabān worshipped 'Amm, 'Athtar, Anbai, and Shams; Hadramaut served 'Athtar, Sīn, Khāl, and Shams; and Saba recognized 'Athtar, Haubas, Almaquh, and Shams. Haubas—the drier—is said to be the moon as the cause of ebb-tide. What Almaquh was is doubtful. He was a specially Sabæan deity. Hamdānī says he was Venus; and a summary of the theories about him is given in *CIS* ii. His name occurs alone and in connexion with 'Athtar and Haubas. He may be a form of one of these gods. There is nothing against this, for 'Athtar is often named twice in one invocation. He is also mentioned as Almaquh of Hirran. At present judgment must be suspended. Some of these deities are clearly celestial—Sīn and Shams; and 'Athtar, though masculine, is one with Ishtar (Venus). Arab authors tell of the star-worship of their forefathers. 'Amm is said to be the moon. While these are the chief gods, there are other forms of them: 'Athtar Sharqan, the eastern or rising, and 'Athtar Dhu Qabḍ, a title for which the meaning 'setting' has been suggested, but has found no favour. There are also thirteen different forms of 'Athtar in which the god is qualified by some place name like the Baalim of the OT. In the same way Shams, which is feminine, appears in many forms; she is Dhat Nashq, Dhat Ba'dan, Dhat Ḥimai, etc. Nikraḥ is assumed to be the god of hate and war—the counterpart of Wadd, the god of friendship—and his name is associated with the Arabic *kariha*.[2] One dedication may be quoted:

'To 'Athtar Sharqan and 'Athtar Dhu Qabḍ and Wadd and Nikraḥ the gods of Ma'in and Yathil and all the gods of their lands and tribes and all the gods of sea and land and east and west and the kings of Ma'in.'

In the other class is Ta'lab, the god of the clan Riyam, whose temple, Tur'at, on Mt. Itwa, was a place of pilgrimage. He seems never to have reached full divine rank, but to have been the patron of his worshippers. Possibly he is a development of tree-worship, as Ḥagr may be of a stone-cult. In the same way the tribe of Hamdan was specially devoted to Shams and Amir to Dhu Samawi, who may be the lord of heaven and who was worshipped in Haram. His name does not occur in Minæan texts. There are many other gods, but they are only names. In addition to Wadd, who is sometimes described as Shahran, Arabic tradition tells of 'Uzza, Yaghuth, and Nasr, which also occur on the monuments, the last also in the form N-s-w-r. The modern *jinn* finds its prototype in the spirits of wells and watercourses, *m-n-d-ḥ*. It is not clear whether we should speak of a S. Arabian pantheon. Shams does appear as Umm'athtar, and there is an inscription which may mean that Sīn is the son of 'Athtar; but, apart from these two indications, the gods stand alone.

Proper names are instructive; many contain divine names. The general Semitic Il is most common, though 'Athtar, Wadd, and others occur.

[1] Another inscription of 449 tells of a breach of the dam and its repair (Glaser, *Zwei Inschriften über den Dammbruch von Marib*, p. 7 f.).

[2] The change of guttural can be paralleled.

Various terms of relationship appear: Ab, Dad, and Akh. Those names that contain Wadd, 'Amm, Khal, might be so explained, but probably the gods are meant. Then in place of the divine name an abstract appears — righteousness, protection, salvation, or fear. In place of a god or his quality there often stands the name — Sumuh-'ali, 'the name is exalted.' From such names we learn that god or some god is exalted, is lord, or is wise; that he blesses, commands, or saves men who are in some sort his kin. In S. Arabian אלה is the common noun meaning 'god'; it occurs very seldom in proper names. אל is very common in proper names; it appears once or twice as a proper noun and sometimes as a common noun. The popular favourite, Almaquh, never forms part of a proper name. So it appears that Il went out of fashion as an object of worship, though habit remembered him in names. In Gn 10[26] Almodad is a son of Joktan.

'Athtar Sharqan was the guardian of temples and tombs; to him men pray that sacrilegious hands may not be laid on their offerings, though they make no gifts to him. In the lists of gods who are invoked the names of men (especially kings) are often inserted, and there are many references to the day of N.N. This day can hardly be anything but a memorial feast, and these facts point to some sort of apotheosis or ancestor-worship. The 'month of fathers' points to the same conclusion.

The antelope was sacred to 'Athtar, and the bull's head was the symbol of the crescent moon. It appears in all manner of forms, from realistic representations of the animal to a conventional object where only the horns are recognizable. Other symbols that may have a religious meaning are the sphinx and the date-palm in fruit. This is often pictured naturally, but sometimes the stem is a truncated cone recalling the pyramid that stands between the horns on the bull's head or that—in conventional designs—supports the horns.

Worship took place in temples that had names of their own. The god took a title from his temple; Almaquh is lord of Awwam. That outside Marib was an open space shaped like an ellipse surrounded by a wall. Various obelisks formed part of the equipment. It is not clear if there was any system of orientation.[1] Perhaps the native rock in the middle was the centre of worship. In other places there was an avenue of obelisks before the gate. Apart from *mukarrib* and *miswad*, several words denote 'priest'; the commonest is *r-sh-w*. It is usually determined by the name of a god or temple. In one place the chief of a tribe is also its priest, and sometimes the eponym also was. There are many inscriptions in which a man devotes himself, his children, his servants, and goods to some god; perhaps this happened when he was made priest. These men may be the 'people of 'Athtar,' the 'servants of Wadd,' who are often mentioned. The word *sh-w-'* is usually joined with Wadd; the root means 'to help.' In el-Ula occur the title *l-w-'* and its feminine. Arabic suggests that these persons correspond to the N. Semitic *qᵉdēshîm*, while the name recalls the Hebrew לוי. Nothing certain can be said about the functions of the priests. Another form of dedication is that in which a man dedicates some other person to the service of a god; these may be *qᵉdēshîm*.

The ideas of sacrifice and altar are expressed by the common Semitic root *dhabaha*, 'to cut the throat.' Oxen and sheep were offered, sometimes in large numbers; and incense played a great part in the worship. This is evident from the number of altars of incense that have been found and the various names in use for them. A special priest seems to have been in charge of the incense.[1] It was common to consecrate figures of men and animals in gratitude for favours received or to secure desired benefits. These may be the bronze figures of animals, four or five inches high, that have been discovered. Nothing is heard of images of the gods. Pilgrimage has already been mentioned in connexion with Ta'lab. There was a month of pilgrimage, apparently in the autumn. Their ideas on ceremonial purity were similar to those of other Semitic peoples; but the Minæan texts dealing with ritual are obscure and still unpublished. Tithes are often mentioned, and perhaps firstfruits, though the word usually has a more general sense.

[1] Description in Nielsen, *Die altarabische Mondreligion*, p. 100.

5. Civilization.—The wealth and luxury of the Yemen were proverbial among the Greeks and Romans, and their tales had a solid foundation. The monuments show the stools, chairs, and couches of which they speak, and tell of gold (gilded?) statues. The buildings and inscriptions that cover the country tell of its wealth, and show that the people were skilled masons. They must have been capable engineers to build the dam at Marib and the tanks at Aden. As sculptors they were not so advanced; for the finest lettering accompanies crude carving. The bas-reliefs are lively and show observation, but the execution is rough and clumsy. They succeeded better in sculpture in the round,[2] but there is always the suspicion that such figures may be of foreign origin; indeed, the *Periplus* speaks of an import of statuary from Egypt. A pair of eyes—that degenerate into circles—on a tombstone betrays Egyptian influence. Their work in metal was of a much higher level; much of it deserves to be called lifelike. In art they inclined to realism in a way that would not be tolerated now. They were probably fine potters, to judge by a terra-cotta rhyton ending in a goat's head (though this may be imported from Greece).

The coins are usually poor imitations of Athenian models, yet the standard is Babylonian. The oldest show the head of the goddess and the owl on the amphora. Later comes a male head, probably of a king, with long curls and a diadem, while the owl keeps its place on the reverse. Next the head has short hair and a wreath with fillets in imitation of the Roman emperors, while the reverse is unchanged. The expedition of Gallus may have had something to do with this change. Many coins bear the letter N, possibly a mint mark—Nejran? Various inscriptions and monograms occur. To these remarks there is one exception—an Attic tetradrachm with the head of Hercules and the lion's skin and, reverse, a seated figure with the lower limbs draped; the right hand holds a flower, and the hair hangs in curls, while the face is shaven; the name is אביתע, and א stands in the field. The type which served as model came into use about 200 B.C. The head of the god is hardly distinguishable from Greek work and displays the skill and imitative power of the metal-workers. 'Bright Hayyili coins' are named, but not identified; also a *sela'*. In late Hebrew the *sela'* equalled four *denarii*.

The year was solar, and in early times each was named after an eponym, though this custom dropped with the introduction of the Sabæan era. The names of at least twelve months are known, but none agree with those of Arab tradition, so some may be duplicates. Their order is unknown. Some are derived from the seasons, while others are religious, as the months 'of pilgrimage' and 'of fathers.' The year seems to have begun in the spring. There are interesting theories about the

[1] *Os.* 30. [2] *JASB* ii. [1845] pl. v.

calendar, but they are still too problematical to be mentioned here.

Strabo[1] says that the Minæans practised polyandry. This is borne out by the monuments if, as is probable, the same names in a group refer to the same persons. Elsewhere three men have a son in common. It is quite common to find father and son associated as kings of one state; this probably meant the recognition of the son as heir apparent. Two brothers are also found sharing the title. Governors (*kabīr*) are named, as the governor of Muṣri,[2] and the chiefs of the tribes were important people. The government was clearly feudal, and the line between vassalage and independence was not always sharp. The kings of Sama' were vassals of Saba. In Abraha's inscription the loyal chiefs receive honorary mention as kings. Women appear, sometimes in pairs, as chiefs. Most of the kings have some distinctive epithet—'glorious,' 'exalted,' 'saviour'—as part of their names.

Works of irrigation are often mentioned, but the accounts are usually unintelligible. Palms and vineyards played a great part in the economic life. The word for 'vineyard,' while it means 'grape' in classical Arabic, means 'vineyard' in the Yemen dialect. For details as to trade we must rely on classical authors. Pliny tells of the cultivation of myrrh and describes the collection of incense; it grew in one place only in the Yemen and on the coast of Africa opposite. There were only 3000 families who had the right to gather the gum, and they were held in religious awe. During the harvest they had to separate themselves from women and funerals, and by these religious precautions they improved the crops. There are several S. Arabian names for these aromatic gums, but some still wait identification. The incense was taken to Sabota (Shabwat in Hadramaut), where the priests took a tithe of it for the god. Then only could it be put on the market. It had to be carried through the land of the Gebanitæ, who took their toll. It is suggested that Gab'an comes from the root meaning 'to collect.'

The ancient inhabitants of S. Arabia borrowed on every hand, yet they were not slavish imitators. The name Arabia Felix seems to have been better merited than such titles generally are.

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SABAOTH (Babylonian).—1. The Babylonian sabu. The word 'Sabaoth' has not yet been found in Assyro-Babylonian, though the noun formed from its root, *ṣābu*, occurs not infrequently in both singular and plural. The meaning of *ṣābu* is 'man,' 'soldier,' and in the plural 'army,' 'host,' agreeing in some respects with the Hebrew cognate. The nearest approach to 'lord of hosts' would be *bêl ṣābê*, but this has not yet been found. In many historical texts *ṣābu* is replaced by its synonym *ummanu* (plur. *ummanāti*, expressed by the same ideograph, so that it is sometimes uncertain which word is intended). The Sumerian equivalent of *ṣābu* is *erim*.

2. Šar and its Semitic equivalent.—For the meaning 'hosts,' the equivalent word seems to be *kiššatu* (*kašāšu*, 'to be strong,' 'numerous'), in Sumerian *šar*. In many cases, however, some such rendering as 'host,' 'universe,' would be preferable, if, in translating, usage allows it. To all appearance the character *šar*, like that for Utuki, the sun-god, was originally the picture of a circle. This implies that it was intended to express the circle of the earth or the horizon of heaven. Other synonymous signs for *šar* = *kiššatu* are *šu*, composed of two wedges derived from a curve probably originally representing the vault of heaven, and *kiš*, a character seemingly used on account of its pronunciation. With the determinative prefix for 'god,' *šu* became one of the ideographs for Merodach, probably as god of the universe. *Kiššatu* is also expressed by the double square or enclosure *nigin*, meaning a collection of things.

3. Šar in the Babylonian lists of gods.—But the usage of the inscription gives information of a more interesting nature, the most important being the evidence of the lists of gods and the Semitic legend of the creation. According to a list in *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets*, xxiv. 1, the earliest deities were the two Ana, male and female personifications of the heavens. These occur afterwards as An-ki, 'heaven and earth,' and after this as Uraš and Nin-uraš, the two Ana (Anu and Anatu) as deities of fruitfulness. Sixth in the list is An-šar-gal, 'Anu,' the heavens, as 'the great host,' whilst the seventh is An-ki-šar-gal, Anu and Anatu as deities of the 'great host' of earth. The eighth and ninth lines have the names Anšar and Kišar, which give another combination of the root *šar* with a development of the idea, as these words apparently mean 'host of heaven' and 'host of earth'—divine personifications who appear in the Semitic creation-story as having been produced after Lahmu and Lahamu;[1] but in this legend Anu, the god of the heavens, is represented as Anšar's son. Later, in the same text, Anšar sends forth in turn Anu, Êa, and Merodach, to fight Tiāmat (Tiawath), the dragon of chaos. The next divine couple, in the list of gods, whose names contain the Sumerian equivalent of Sabaoth consists of En-šar and Nin-šar, the 'lord of the host' and the 'lady of the host.' This makes a total of six couples, the seventh being represented by the Sumero-Akkadian Duri and Dari, perhaps 'Age' and 'Eternity,' the two non-concrete forms or counterparts of *šar*, in which countless number is changed into illimitable time. Concerning the Babylonians we cannot speak with certainty, but the Sumerians at least seem to have realized, at a very early date, how multitudinous were the creatures produced and nourished by the earth, and they had evidently also formed the theory that the gods dwelling in the heavens (and this would include their divine servants and the angels) were at least equally so. As a confirmation of this, the British Museum tablet K.2100 gives (rev. 3, 4) as a synonym of *Dingir-galgalene*, 'the great gods,' the reduplicate word *Šaršara*, 'the very numerous,' or (as the prefix for divinity shows that we should translate) 'the divine host.'

[1] Strabo, xvi. 4. 19.

[2] *Hal* 535, revised text.

[1] See *ERE* iv. 1299.

4. Anu and his divine partners.—Naturally it was the really 'great' gods who exercised rule in heaven, where all divine beings obeyed them. In agreement with this, the account of the attack of the evil spirits upon the moon (this was supposed to be the cause of our satellite's eclipses) speaks of Sin, Šamaš, and Ištar having been set to rule the vault (*šûmuq*) of heaven, and 'with Anu they shared the dominion of the host of heaven' (Sum. *kiš ana*, Sem. *kiššat šamê*, *kiš* here replacing the seemingly more correct *šar*). Here, again, Anu appears as the god of the heaven-host; but it is to be noted that, when Merodach became king of the gods, power over the host was conferred on him, and, as stated in a well-known hymn to that deity,[1] 'the Igigi of the host of heaven and earth' (*Igigi ša kiššat šamê û êrṣiti*[m]) are said to wait upon his command. It was for 'the host of heaven and earth' that the new moon shone (*azkaru annuu ina šamî û êrṣiti ibbani*, 'this crescent among the host of heaven and earth was created'; in Sum. 'this crescent of the heaven-host [and] the earth-host,' *an-šar-ki-šar*). A deity named Kiššat appears in *WAI* ii. 60, line 32, as patron of a city which is doubtful, but which is possibly the Rabbi of line 30. If this means 'the city of the host,' it may be supposed that the 'host of heaven' was worshipped there.

5. The god Aššur as the leader of the Assyrian host.—It is to be noted that, in his abstract of Babylonian cosmology, although Damascius[2] gives the feminine principle preceding Ea and Dauké as Kissarē, the masculine companion of the same is not, as would be expected from the Babylonian, Ansaros, but Assōros (Ασσωρος). Now, as the name of the god Aššur is most commonly written with the characters An-šar, there is but little doubt that the Assyrian name had influenced the pronunciation, and changed it, even in Babylonia. Whatever may have been the original root of Aššur, therefore, the Assyrians had applied the name of the god to the compound group An-šar, and the Babylonian god of the host (of heaven and earth) became the god of the armies of Assyria. He is represented, in the sculptures of Aššur-naṣir-âpli (*c.* 880 B.C.), as a divine figure within the winged disk, flying in the air above the army, and drawing the bow against the foe.[3] We have here, apparently, an Assyrian parallel to the Hebrew 'Lord of Hosts, God of the armies of Israel.'

6. Šar=kiššatu in the titles of the kings.—As a title of the kings of Assyria, *šar kiššati*, 'king of the host' (of people or of nations), is fairly common. Adad-nirari I. (*c.* 1330 B.C.) bore it, and it seems to have been also adopted, more or less regularly, by his successors. In Babylonia Man-ištu-su (*c.* 2700 B.C.) calls himself *lugal kiš*, which, in its common acceptation, would be equivalent to *šar kiššati*; but *kiš* may stand for the city of Kiš, over which he ruled (though it is difficult to understand, in such a carefully-engraved text, how the determinative suffix could have been omitted). Perhaps the modesty of certain Babylonian kings did not permit of their using the *šar* which accompanies divine names. Among the later Babylonian rulers who used the title 'king of the host' (of men) were Nebuchadrezzar the Great and Cyrus. It is mainly the German Assyriologists who have discussed the meaning of the phrase *šar kiššati*. H. Winckler thought that it indicated 'king of a fixed definite state,' and was no mere title. C. P. Tiele was of opinion that it indicated 'something like world-lordship.' Leopold Messerschmidt suggested that *šar kiššati* and 'king of the four regions' signify the possession of two territories, and were not mere titles. F. Hommel holds similar views to the above. C. F. Lehmann-Haupt renders *šar kiššati* (sc. *niši*) as 'king of the totality of nations.' H. V. Hilprecht is of opinion that the title was first used by the kings of Kiš, and was due to word-play (see above).

To all appearance the Assyro-Babylonian idea of the host of heaven was that it consisted of all the divinities whom they regarded as dwelling in and beneath the sky; and the stars and heavenly bodies in general, identified, as they were, with the gods, were included therein. The host of the earth apparently included, in its widest sense, everything in the world which the god had created. In its narrowest sense, however, the latter stood either for all mankind or for the nations under the Babylonian or Assyrian kings, wherever they had made their rule effective.

LITERATURE.—W. Muss-Arnolt, *A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, Berlin, etc., 1901–05, p. 453 f.; also, for methods of writing the expressions, etc., J. N. Strassmaier, *Alphabetisches Verzeichniss der assyrischen und akkadischen Worter*, etc., Leipzig, 1886, p. 555 f.

T. G. PINCHES.

SABBATH.

Primitive (HUTTON WEBSTER), p. 885.
Babylonian (T. G. PINCHES), p. 889.
Biblical.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew).
Christian.—See SUNDAY.
Jewish (I. ABRAHAMS), p. 891.
Muhammadan (G. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 893.

SABBATH (Primitive). — **1. Introductory.**—The term 'sabbath,' in ordinary usage, is applied to a periodic rest-day, dedicated to a god and devoted to the exercises of religion. As such the term refers particularly to the Jewish *Shabbāth*, and its successor the Christian *Dies Dominica*, or the Lord's Day. The Muhammadan *al jum'ah*, 'the meeting' (for worship), which occurs on Friday, is derived from Christian and Jewish practice, but on this day labour is suspended only while services are being conducted at the mosque. In Buddhist lands the *Uposatha*, which usually falls on the day of the new moon, on the day of the full moon, and on the two days which are eighth from new and full moon, is marked by fasting and the cessation of secular activities. The *Uposatha* in its origin among the Aryans of ancient India could have owed nothing to Jewish or Christian influence, and in its diffusion throughout S.E. Asia it appears to have been unaffected by the influence of Islām. The question naturally arises how far these sabbaths of civilized peoples find a parallel in savage and barbarian society at the present time.

The observance of rest-days forms a fairly common custom in the lower culture, if exception be made of the Australian, Melanesian, and American areas. But the rest-day among so-called primitive peoples is as a rule not periodic in character, nor is it necessarily consecrated to a deity and employed for religious services. Furthermore, it is usually marked by various regulations which can only be described as superstitions. All public gatherings may be discontinued, the house or the village closed against strangers, lights extinguished, songs, dances, and loud noises forbidden, and abstinence from food and sexual intercourse required. The day of rest then presents itself as a day of complete quiescence.

[1] *WAI* iv. 29, 47–51.
[2] See *ERE* iv. 129[a].
[3] A. H. Layard, *Nineveh and its Remains*, London, 1849, ii. 448, *Monuments of Nineveh*, 1st ser., do. 1849, pl. 13, etc.

All these negative regulations find their clearest expression in the tabus which have been studied, first among the natives of Polynesia, then in some other parts of the aboriginal world, and finally among peoples of archaic civilization. Tabu, indeed, is a wide-spread institution, and evidence for its existence steadily accumulates with the progress of anthropological research.[1] A tabu may be defined as a negative regulation or prohibition which is supported by supernatural sanctions. The penalty meted out to the tabu-breaker is generally death or some physical ailment supposed to be inflicted by the offended spirits. In time the punishment for the violation of a tabu may come to be regarded as an important duty of the tribal god, whose chief concern is the maintenance of the customary moral rules.

Things or persons are tabued, primarily because they are considered mysterious, abnormal, dangerous—because they are felt to be potent for weal or woe in the life of man. Early psychology, refining these ideas and applying them to different classes of phenomena, produces the cognate notions of pollution and sanctity. The corpse is unclean; the shedder of human blood is likewise unclean; but the priest and king, who belong to a superior order of beings, are sacrosanct or holy. These characteristics are easily regarded as infectious, as capable of transmission, not only by physical contact, but also by sight and mere proximity. Hence prudence dictates a variety of precautions; the dangerous person or thing is removed to a safe distance, or is carefully isolated, or is subjected to a variety of insulating regulations. The entire community is interested in such proceedings, and on certain occasions may itself be placed under a rigid quarantine. When this happens, a period of abstinence, merging into quiescence, will be considered the surest means of avoiding spiritual dangers which threaten each and every member of the body politic. Moreover, when the impending danger is specifically attributed to the action of spirits or of gods, the observance of the rest-day readily develops into a method of propitiating, and even of honouring, the supernatural powers. The two conceptions of abstinence and propitiation are not, indeed, always sharply distinguishable in concrete cases, and with advancing culture they tend to become more and more closely conjoined.

It is not improbable that some of the communal regulations observed in connexion with primitive sabbaths have been modelled on the tabus observed by single persons and household groups at such critical seasons as birth, puberty, marriage, and death. Comparative studies have indicated how numerous are the prohibitions which attach to these occasions, and it is reasonable to suppose that, with the deepening sense of social solidarity, observances once confined to the individual only, or to his immediate connexions, would often pass over into rites performed by the community at large. However this may be, primitive sabbaths certainly present themselves as public ordinances which bear an obvious resemblance to the entire system of private tabus.

2. Sabbaths at critical epochs.—A survey of many rude societies shows that any time of special significance, inaugurating a new era or marking the transition from one state to another, any time of storm and stress, any epoch when untoward events have occurred or are expected to occur, may be invested with tabus designed to meet the emergency in the communal life and to ward off the threatened danger or disaster. Throughout Polynesia, in Indonesia, and in certain parts of S.E. Asia there exists, or until recently existed, an extensive body of communal rest-days, whose purpose appears to have been entirely prophylactic and protective. In that part of the world periods of abstinence and quiescence are imposed because of such unusual, and therefore critical, events as a conflagration, an epidemic sickness, or an earthquake; after a death; at the changes of the moon; at the end of the old year and the beginning of the new year; during a time devoted to the banning of ghosts and demons; and in connexion with such important undertakings as the commencement of a war, seed-planting and harvest, and the celebration of a solemn religious ceremony. The procedure in each case is much the same: the community subjects itself to a number of negative regulations, imposing idleness, fasting, and continence upon all its members.

These sabbaths at critical epochs formerly constituted a noteworthy feature of Polynesian life, especially in old Hawaii, where the institution of tabu perhaps reached its acme of development. Their observance varied according as they were common or strict. When a common season prevailed, the men were required only to abstain from their usual duties and to attend at the temple, where prayers were offered every morning and evening. During a period strictly tabued the regulations had a sterner character, and in consequence a general gloom and silence pervaded the whole district or island. Every fire and light was extinguished; canoes were not launched; no person bathed; and no one was to be seen out of doors, except those whose presence was required at the temple.[1] From another account we learn that any one found in a canoe on a tabu day incurred the death penalty, and that a like fate was reserved for the man who indulged in carnal pleasures or only made a noise at such a time.[2]

Communal tabus of the strict type that has been described were observed by the Hawaiian Islanders on a variety of occasions, particularly when a chief temple was consecrated and when the New Year's festival was celebrated. The Hawaiian religious system also included a remarkable approximation to the institution of a weekly sabbath. In every lunar month there were four tabu periods, dedicated severally to the four great gods of the native pantheon. The first was that of Ku, from the third to the sixth night; the second, that of Hua, at full moon, including the fourteenth and fifteenth nights; the third, that of Kaloa, on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth nights; and the fourth, that of Kane, on the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth nights. During these tabu periods a devout king generally remained in the temple, busy with prayer and sacrifice; women were forbidden to enter canoes, and sexual intercourse was prohibited.[3]

Seasons of communal abstinence and quiescence were enforced in the Society and Marquesas Islands in connexion with the bonito fishing, and in New Zealand at the time of planting of the kumara, or sweet potato.[4] In the Tonga Islands, when the sacrifice of firstfruits occurred, all work was forbidden, and even any one's appearance out of doors, unless for the purpose of the ceremony, was interdicted.[5] The natives of Samoa, who possessed a remarkably complex pantheon of divinities with animal and vegetable attributes,

[1] See art. TABU.

[1] W. Ellis, *Narr. of a Tour through Hawaii, or Owhyhee*, London, 1826, p. 366 ff.

[2] H. T. Cheever, *The Island World of the Pacific*, Glasgow, 1851, p. 63.

[3] W. D. Alexander, *A Brief Hist. of the Hawaiian People*, New York, 1899, p. 50 ff.; David Malo, *Hawaiian Antiquities*, Honolulu, 1903, p. 56.

[4] J. A. Moerenhout, *Voyages aux îles du grand océan*, Paris, 1837, i. 516 ff.; J. Cowan, *The Maoris of New Zealand*, Christchurch, N.Z., 1910, p. 116 ff.

[5] W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, Boston, 1820, p. 381 ff.

were obliged to suspend work on certain occasions devoted to their worship.[1] During December, when the god Ratu-mai-Mbulu was supposed to visit the Fiji Islands, a sabbatical period ensued.

'Throughout that moon it is *tabu* to beat the drum, to sound the conch-shell, to dance, to plant, to fight, or to sing at sea. . . . At the end of the month the priest sounds the consecrated shell: the people raise a great shout, carrying the good news from village to village, and pleasure and toil are again free to all.'[2]

The scanty records of aboriginal Polynesian society also contain some passing references to the observance of communal sabbaths on certain occasions when the social consciousness had been deeply moved by untoward and disastrous events.

In the island of Futuna 'they go so far as to *tapu* the day—*e.g.*, to interdict all work in order to please the gods, or to avert the hurricanes.'[3]

In Hawaii a tabued period was declared during the sickness of a chief.[4] In Samoa the death of a chief of high rank was followed by the suspension of all work in the settlement for a period of from ten to thirty days, until the funeral ceremonies were performed.[5] On the island of Yap, one of the Carolines, two aged wizards, before whom all important questions come for decision, have the power of laying tabus on an entire village. The periods of seclusion have been known to last for six months. The critical epochs, when such interdicts are imposed, occur at a time of drought, famine, or sickness, after the death of a chief or famous man, and before a fishing expedition.

'In short, any great public event is thus celebrated, and, in fact, there is always a tabu in full swing somewhere or other, to the great disgust of the traders, who only see in these enforced holidays an excuse for idling, drunkenness, and debauchery.'[6]

Seasons of communal abstinence are not found in Australia, and only faint indications of them exist within the Melanesian area. In New Guinea a few instances have been noted, all within the British possessions there. On the other hand, the Indonesian tribes of Borneo, including the Kayans, the Sea Dayaks, and the Land Dayaks, keep many sabbaths in connexion with agricultural operations and other critical occasions. The Bornean regulations disclose a fairly consistent effort to adjust the length of the communal tabu to the importance of the event which it commemorates. Thus, house-building imposes a shorter season of abstinence than does planting or sowing; a single death in the village may require the cessation of activity by the inhabitants for only one day; but an epidemic sickness may necessitate a three days' rest, as among the Sea Dayaks, or even an eight days' rest, as among the Land Dayaks. The restrictions themselves appear to be substantially the same in all instances.

The inhabitants 'remain in their houses, in order to eat, drink, and sleep; but their eating must be moderate and often consists of nothing but rice and salt. . . . People under interdict may not bathe, touch fire, or employ themselves about their ordinary occupations.'[7]

To these prohibitions should be added that of sexual intercourse, a tabu specifically mentioned for one Bornean tribe,[8] and probably found among others.

Communal sabbaths appear to be unknown to the nomadic hunting tribes which occupy the interior parts of Borneo and probably represent an aboriginal population. The custom under consideration must therefore be an Indonesian importation into Borneo—a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that similar observances prevail among the Indonesian inhabitants of the Nicobars, Bali, Nias, the Mentawi Islands, Formosa, and the Philippine Archipelago. A typical instance is afforded by the inhabitants of the Pagi Islands, which form the southern extension of the Mentawi group. These people worship the evil spirits which manifest their power in thunder and lightning, earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods. When confronted by some real or imaginary danger, they shut themselves up in their villages and exclude all strangers. During this period of separation from the world they may neither give nor receive anything, they must refrain from eating certain articles of food, and they may not engage in trade.[1] Another authority points out that, while all crises in the communal life of the natives are thus kept as periods of restriction, yet in some cases the rest-days have become joyous festivals and holidays.[2]

Assuming, with modern ethnographers, that the Indonesian peoples represent an admixture in various proportions of primitive Indian and S. Mongolian stocks, we need not be surprised to discover that in certain parts of S.E. Asia, and notably among the Tibeto-Burman tribes of Assam and Burma, communal sabbaths form a characteristic feature of the native culture. The word *genna*, which the Nāgas of Manipur apply to anything tabued or forbidden, also signifies the village rest-days imposed in connexion with the rice cultivation, after the occurrence of unusual phenomena, such as earthquakes, eclipses of the sun or moon, and the appearance of comets, the destruction of a settlement by fire, and the outbreak of an epidemic sickness.[3] Indeed, as an early writer remarks,

there is 'no end to the reasons on which a *kennie* must or may be declared, and as it consists of a general holiday when no work is done, this . . . Sabbath appears to be rather a popular institution.'[4]

The *genna* custom seems to have attained its most complicated and grotesque development among the Nāgas, but it is found among other peoples of Assam and may be traced in various parts of Burma.

The close resemblances which exist between these sabbatical observances in S.E. Asia, Indonesia, and Polynesia lend probability to the hypothesis that we are here in the presence of an institution which has been gradually diffused from its Asiatic home over the Indian Archipelago and thence into the islands of the Pacific. But it will not do to infer that the conceptions which in this part of the world have generated the tabued day are therefore local and confined. On the contrary, they underlie a wide range of social phenomena.

There are few superstitions with a wider prevalence among the lower races than that which requires the suspension of ordinary occupations after a death. The prohibition of work at this time usually forms only one of a number of regulations, which also impose partial or complete abstinence from food and place a ban on loud talking, singing, and the wearing of ornaments and gay clothing. The explanation of the tabus must be sought partly in animistic conceptions: the survivors ought to avoid all conspicuous activity, if they would not attract the unwelcome attentions of the ghost. But a more common belief is that in the pollution of death—a belief which leads to

[1] G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, pp. 29 f., 60.
[2] B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 114.
[3] S. P. Smith, in *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, i. [1892] 40.
[4] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, new ed., London, 1859, iv. 387.
[5] W. T. Pritchard, *Polynesian Reminiscences*, London, 1866, p. 149 ff.
[6] F. W. Christian, *The Caroline Islands*, London, 1899, p. 290.
[7] Spenser St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, London, 1862, i. 175 ff.
[8] R. S. Douglas, in *Sarawak Museum Journal*, i. [1911] 146 ff.

[1] P. A. M. Hinlopen and P. Severin, in *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde*, iii. [1855] 329 f.
[2] A. Maass, in *ZE* xxxvii. [1905] 155 ff.
[3] T. C. Hodson, 'The *Genna* amongst the Tribes of Assam,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 92–103, *The Naga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, pp. 164–186.
[4] J. Butler, in *JASBe*, new ser., xlv. [1875] i. 316.

many regulations as to the proper treatment of a corpse, of undertakers, of the dead man's family and friends, and of mourners generally. The polluting power of death extends to everything in its presence; hence the obvious conclusion that little or nothing should be done by the survivors, at any rate till after the funeral. These tabus are often confined to the family or to the relatives of the dead. Where, however, the sense of social solidarity is strong, the notion of abstinence at so critical a season may be extended to the entire community.

An inquiry into the geographical diffusion of this superstition shows it to be not unknown in Polynesia, Micronesia, New Guinea, Borneo, and some other parts of the Oceanic area. It is discoverable in Assam, Burma, various parts of India, and Tibet. Africa from north to south offers many instances of communal tabus following a death and imposing abstinence from work. In the New World the Eskimo tribes from Greenland to Bering Strait possess the custom in a marked degree. It is also found among some of the Asiatic Eskimo, thus strengthening the argument for the transmission of cultural elements between N.W. America and N.E. Asia. Since these tabued days are observed in many cases by unrelated peoples, who, as far as our knowledge reaches, have never been in cultural contact, it may be concluded that the beliefs underlying the superstition have not been narrowly limited, but belong to the general stock of primitive ideas.

3. Sabbatarian aspects of religious festivals.—The fact that most religious festivals are observed as holidays, when men give up secular occupations and devote themselves to joyful worship and relaxation of all kinds, should not lead to the assumption that the remission of labour at such times has generally been dictated by practical and non-superstitious considerations. It has already been pointed out that, in some fairly rude communities, abstinence from work forms a part of the regular procedure for facing a crisis and the spiritual dangers supposed to characterize such an occasion. The rest is a measure of protection and propitiation, quite as much as the fasts, the sacrifices, and the prayers by which it may be attended. Where ideas of this nature prevail, all labour is tabued.

As we pass from savagery to barbarism and from animism to polytheism, the notion of tabu, at first vague and indeterminate, tends to differentiate into the twin concepts of impurity and holiness. To the primitive mind the sanctity which attaches to the priest or king, to such objects of special reverence as bull-roarers, idols, and altars, and also to certain places and shrines is sufficiently material to be transmissible and to be capable of infecting with its mysterious qualities whatever is done at a particular time. The notion of the transmissibility of holiness may seem of itself to furnish a sufficient reason for abstaining from ordinary occupations on a sacred day. In practice, however, this idea appears to mingle quite inextricably with the opposite though related conception that what is holy can be contaminated by contact with the secular and the profane. Furthermore, when holy days come to be definitely consecrated to deities, who at such times are believed to be present among their worshippers, it is easy to see how the belief arises that a god is pleased and flattered by the enforced idleness of his devotees. Abstinence from work then takes its place among other rites as a recognized way of expressing a proper reverence for the divinity; while, conversely, to labour on his holy day implies a disrespectful attitude towards him.

The consecration of a particular day to a divinity is a common feature of polytheistic cults. Had we definite information concerning the origin and development of the great deities of the higher religions, it would probably appear that in most instances their connexion with particular days is a secondary rather than a primary formation. In other words, a period dedicated to a god, and observed by his worshippers with abstinence from labour, may once have been a season of tabu for other and quite different reasons. Some pertinent instances of tabued days which developed into holy days may be noted. Thus, in the comparatively well-developed religious system of the Hawaiians, the New Year's festival was consecrated to the god Lono; but the same festival in Fiji was not associated with any particular divinity. The four tabued periods in the Hawaiian lunar month, which were dedicated to the great gods of the native pantheon, must be considered to have had no original connexion with any divinity, for among the Dayak tribes of Borneo there are numerous tabus attaching to the phases of the moon and imposing communal abstinence. The Bontoc Igorot, a non-Christian folk of N. Luzon, observe a sabbath which occurs, on an average, about every ten days during the year. It is dedicated to Lumawig, the only god throughout the Bontoc culture area. Examination of the evidence indicates that this sabbath in its earlier form was not a periodic but an occasional observance, called forth only by particular emergencies in the communal life. The present form of the institution exhibits a tendency, doubtless directed by the Igorot priesthood, to calendarize seasons of tabu at definite and regular intervals. Its dedication to Lumawig is probably only a natural outcome of the pre-eminence assigned to that supreme god, who stands out in such bold relief against the crowd of ancestral spirits, good and bad, investing the Igorot world.[1] Some of the Dravidian peoples of India hold festivals in honour of their local deities, when labour is usually suspended. Mother Earth, an object of much devotion in Bengal, is worshipped at the end of the hot season. The goddess generally manifests herself as the benignant source of all things, but sometimes she brings disease and hence requires a propitiatory festival. At this time all ploughing, sowing, and other work cease, and Bengali widows refrain from eating cooked rice.[2] A similar sabbath in honour of Mother Earth is very strictly observed by the natives of the Malabar coast.[3] Turning to W. Africa, we find on the Slave Coast an annual All Souls' festival kept as a period of abstinence. The festival is held in honour of Egungun, a god who is supposed to have arisen from the dead, and after whom a powerful secret society has been named. A similar ceremony, imposing a cessation of work for eight days, is observed by the Gold Coast tribes, who, however, have not dedicated it to a god. These instances, which do not exhaust the evidence, illustrate the passage of the tabued day into the god's sacred day.

4. Sabbatarian aspects of market-days.—Rest-days, more or less regular in occurrence and following at short intervals after periods of continuous labour, are frequently observed by primitive agriculturists. Sabbaths of this sort appear to be unknown among migratory hunting and fishing peoples or among nomadic pastoral tribes. A wandering hunter requires no regular day of rest, since his life passes in alternations of continuous labour, while following the chase, and of almost uninterrupted idleness after a successful hunt. For the herdsman there can be no relaxation of the diurnal duties, for the cattle must be driven to

[1] A. E. Jenks, *The Bontoc Igorot* (Ethnological Survey Publications), Manila, 1905, i. 205 ff.

[2] W. Crooke, *Natives of N. India*, London, 1907, p. 232.

[3] C. K. Menon, in *Madras Government Museum Bulletin*, v. [1906] 104 f.

pasture every morning; they must be watched and watered; and at night they must be milked. Again, the shepherd, compared with the farmer, scarcely needs a regular rest-day; his occupation requires so little continuous exertion that he can pursue it all the year round without any injury to his health. A farmer, however, is benefited by a period of rest occurring more or less regularly; and, though agricultural pursuits are dependent upon the seasons and the weather, he is usually able to postpone his work for a brief period without serious loss. It might be argued, therefore, that the change from pastoral to agricultural life would itself be sufficient to call into existence the institution of periodic rest-days. It seems true, however, that the connexion of the rest-days with the farmer's pursuits is due to the obvious fact that a regular sabbath implies a settled life, a fairly well-developed form of social organization, and something approaching a calendar system.

The greater number of periodic rest-days observed by agricultural peoples in the lower stages of culture are associated with the institution of the market (*q.v.*). Days on which markets regularly take place are not infrequently characterized by sabbatarian regulations. Such market-days have a wide diffusion. Markets every fifth day are found in various parts of New Guinea, in Celebes, Sumatra, and Java, and among the natives of Tongking, Siam, and Burma. Throughout the central parts of Africa, from the British and German possessions in the east to those of the Portuguese and French in the west, there are numerous market-places where neighbouring communities meet regularly to exchange their productions. Usually every fourth day is a market-day and is observed by the cessation of ordinary occupations. A similar custom exists among the peoples on both banks of the lower Congo. The market is a well-developed institution among the semi-civilized negroes about the Gulf of Guinea. Here we find market-weeks varying from three to ten days in length. One week-day is usually reserved for the market and is often regarded as the appropriate time for abstaining from toilsome labour. Similar market-days, kept as general holidays, were known in ancient Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and Peru.

A market-day is necessarily more or less of a rest-day. Those who attend a market must abandon for the time being their usual occupations. It is also a holiday, affording opportunities for social intercourse, sports, and amusements of all sorts. Such seems to be the character of most of the market-days found in S.E. Asia and the adjacent islands, as well as in some parts of Africa. In the Congo region, however, the market-day sometimes bears an unlucky character, and a distinct tendency exists to attach various restrictions to it. In the Guinea region the market-day often (though not always) coincides with the general day of rest observed by an entire community. As such it may be consecrated to a god and rigorously observed. This extensive development of sabbatarian regulations appears to be confined to Africa.

5. Unlucky days as sabbaths.—The observance of unlucky days is a familiar phenomenon in primitive society and among peoples of archaic civilization. Under the attenuated form of a survival the superstition still lingers in civilized lands. The precautions which characterize these days—not to engage in various activities, not to eat specified foods, not to indulge in sexual intercourse, not to travel, not to buy or sell—illustrate clearly enough the general likeness between periods tabued and periods deemed unlucky.

A common source of the belief in unlucky days is to be sought in the erroneous association of ideas. If an unfortunate event has taken place on a certain day, the notion easily arises that all actions performed on the recurrence of the day will have a similarly unfortunate issue. Among the Tshi of W. Africa, *e.g.*, the most unlucky day is the anniversary of the Saturday on which Osai Tutu was slain in ambush near Acromanti in 1731.[1]

The observation of natural phenomena often accounts for the unlucky character assigned to certain occasions. Many superstitions attach themselves particularly to the moon. Various primitive peoples have pronounced beliefs respecting the unfavourable influence of the moon on human activities. A partial or complete abstention from work may be required during the waning moon, as well as during the two or three days of the moon's invisibility at the end of the lunation. Eclipses of the moon are sometimes considered unlucky for work and are accompanied by fasting and other forms of abstinence. During such times of uncanny and terrifying darkness it is thought wise to avoid every sort of activity, as well as the consumption of food which may be tainted with mysterious evil. Thus, in S. India, when an eclipse occurs, the people retire to their houses and remain behind closed doors. No one would think of initiating any important work at this time.[2]

Among many peoples in the lower culture the time of new moon and full moon, much less commonly of each half moon, is a season of restriction and abstinence. The lunar day is sometimes a holy day dedicated to a god, who may be identified with the moon itself. Instances of this sort are to be correlated with the general course of religious development, involving, as it does, the emergence of polytheistic cults and the schematization of the ritual. But under more primitive conditions the lunar day is an unlucky (or tabued) day, quite independent of any association with a deity. The existence of these lunar tabus in Polynesia, Indonesia, and Africa, to say nothing of the survivals of them in Asiatic and European lands, throws light on the origin of the Hebrew Sabbath and its assumed Babylonian original.

The observance of unlucky days has undoubtedly retarded human progress. They hinder individual initiative and tend to prevent the undertaking of lengthy enterprises which may be interrupted by the recurrence of an unfavourable period. Their extensive development compels fitful, intermittent labour, rather than a steady and continuous occupation. They may even directly affect political and social conditions where, as in modern Ashanti and ancient Rome, assemblies could not be held, or courts of justice stand open, or armies engage the enemy, when the unlucky day came round. It is equally obvious that all such beliefs play into the hands of the astrologer and magician, and thus tend further to strengthen the chains with which superstition fetters its votaries.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the article. For a much fuller discussion of the subject, together with an extensive bibliography, see Hutton Webster, *Rest Days*, New York, 1916, esp. chs. i.–v., ix.

HUTTON WEBSTER.

SABBATH (Babylonian). — Notwithstanding that the Sabbath, as we know it, may be a specifically Hebrew institution, there is every probability that it had its origin in Babylonia. In that country, however, it was not the rest-day ending the seven-day week, owing to the Creator having rested from His work on that day (Gn 2[2]), but was due to the festival of the full moon on the 15th

[1] A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, London, 1887, p. 219 f.

[2] E. Thurston, *Omens and Superstitions of S. India*, London, 1912, p. 44.

day of the month, when the earth's satellite 'rested' for a while at the height of his brilliancy.

1. The Akkadian (Semitic Babylonian) word for 'Sabbath' and its origin.—The word by which the Babylonian Sabbath is designated is the somewhat rare term *šapattu*^{m} or *šabattu*^{m}, long known to Assyriologists, and early recognized as the probable original of the Hebrew *sabbath*. The second (labial) radical, however, is apparently not *bb*, but *b* or *p*,[1] and the third (the dental) is doubled. The word originated in the Sumerian *ša-bat*, a compound meaning 'mid-rest' or 'heart-rest' (*šaq*, 'heart'; *bat*, 'to reach the end,' 'to die'). This the Semitic Babylonians paraphrased as *ûm nûḫ libbi*, 'day of rest of the heart' ('day of mid-repose'), in *WAI* II. pl. 32, 16*ab*. That this was not the designation of the last day of the seven-day week, however, is shown by the fragment published in *WAI* III. pl. 56, no. 4, l. 27, completed by the duplicate in *PSBA* xxvi. [1904] pl., and pp. 51–56, where it is explained as the 15th day of the month, when the moon was more or less at the full.

2. The moon's 'mid-rest' in the creation-story.—The reason of the adoption of the 15th day of the month as the moon's sabbath seems to be clearly stated in the fifth tablet of the Semitic Story of the Creation,[2] notwithstanding that the text is unfortunately imperfect, the greater part of an essential character being broken away. The justification for the restoration of the damaged word as *šapattu*, however, is shown by the context. The passage refers to Merodach's ordering of the heavenly bodies:

> 'Nannaru (the moon) he caused to shine, ruling the night:
> He set him then as a creature of the night, to make known the days [*i.e.* the festivals].
> Monthly, unfailing, he provided him with a tiara.
> At the beginning of the month then, appearing in the land,
> The horns shine forth to make known the seasons.
> "On the 7th day the tiara perfecting,
> A sabbath ([*ša*]*pattu*) shalt thou then encounter, mid-[month ly."'

The trace of the first character of *šapattu* lends itself to either of the two signs having the phonetic value of *ša*.

3. The Babylonian Sabbath and the seven-day week.—This is the week with which we are so well acquainted, and which Christians have adopted from the Hebrews, merely changing the day of rest from the seventh to the first day. Here, however, *ša-bat* and *šapattu*, its derivative, were not applied to the seventh day by the Babylonians, but another word was used which they evidently considered more appropriate, namely *û-ḫul-gallum*, from the Sumerian *û-ḫul-gala*, which they translated by *ûmu limnu*, 'evil day.' This was the 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th days of every month, so that, as the Babylonian months had 29 or 30 days each, every month consisted of three weeks of seven days each, and one of nine or ten days, according to the length of the month. Two reasons may be suggested for the adoption of this seven-day period: (1) the seven (divine) planetary bodies, and (2) the fact that the period of a lunation may be divided, roughly, into four sections of seven days each.[3] The following is the paragraph given by the hemerologies for the observance of the seventh day of the month as a sabbath:

> 'The 7th day is a holy day (*nubattu*^{m}) of Merodach and Zêr-panîtum—an acceptable day, an evil day (*û-ḫulgallu*^{m}). The shepherd of the great tribes (*nâṣi rabâti*)[4] shall not eat salted meat cooked over the embers, he shall not change his body-clothing, he shall not be clothed in white, he shall not offer a sacrifice. The king shall not ride in a chariot, he shall not talk victoriously.[1] The seer shall not make declaration with regard to a sacred place. A physician shall not touch a sick man. It is not suitable to make a wish.'

To this the hemerology for the intercalary Elul adds:

> 'In the night the king shall bring his offering into the presence of Merodach and Ištar, he shall make the sacrifice. The raising of his hand (in prayer) is acceptable with the god.'

The entries for the other weekly *dies nefasti* are the same, except that the 14th was dedicated to Nin-lila and Nergal, to whom the king brought offerings and sacrifices at night-time; the 21st was the day of votive offering to Sin (the moon-god) and Šamaš (the sun-god), when, at dawn, the king made his offering to Šamaš and 'the Lady of the lands,' to Sin and Maḫ, Merodach's spouse, whilst the 28th was the day of Êa (god of the deep and of unfathomable wisdom) and the 'rest-day' (Sumerian *û-naam*, Semitic *bubbulu*^{m}) of Nergal, the god of war, disease, and death. On the 28th the king made his offerings to Êa and Maḫ.

The contract-tablets seem to indicate that trading and mercantile transactions, including those requiring legal advice and composition, were continued on the Babylonian 'evil,' 'unlucky,' or 'unsuitable' days just as on any other week-day, though oracles or omens may have been consulted beforehand. The directions given in the hemerologies, therefore, refer only to the personages and officials named—the high-priest (who apparently occupied a position comparable with that of a bishop), the king, the seer, and the physician (all of them, probably, in what the Babylonians would have regarded as 'holy orders'). As the next phrase (that concerning the making of a wish) is in general terms, this alone seems to refer to the ordinary man. At nightfall the ban was apparently removed, for sacrifices and prayer were then allowed to be offered.

Of special interest in connexion with the seven-day week is the 19th[2] day of the month, which was a 'week of weeks' from the first day of the preceding month. This, like the others, was an *û-ḫulgallu*^{m}; but it had a special designation, namely *ûm ibbû*, explained as *ûmu ûggati*, 'day of anger' (*ib* or *iba* in Sumerian means 'anger'; hence this rendering). It may therefore be supposed that the prohibitions of the ordinary weekly Sabbath were strengthened on that of the week of weeks. This great day was dedicated to Gula, or Bau, the goddess of healing, and the evening sacrifices were for En-urtu (formerly read Ninip), who, in Babylonian mythology, is associated with her.

4. The weekly Sabbath in the inscriptions.—This is revealed only, and that dimly, in certain lists of offerings found at Warka (the Erech of Gn 10[10]). These tablets, which are of late date, are best represented by the series in A. T. Clay, 'Babylonian Texts.'[3] The texts which they bear are in tabular form, and deal with sheep for slaughter and sacrifice. On the 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th days of the months to which the tablets refer a sacrificial kid (or lamb) was to be offered, though the dates are not always constant. Thus in Chislev of the 5th year of Cyrus, when the month had only 29 days, the four sacrificial days are as indicated here; in Tebet (also 29 days) of the accession-year of Cambyses the first three dates only occur, that of the 28th being omitted; in Tebet (30 days) of the 1st year of Cambyses the sacrificial kid of the 6th and that of the 13th are recorded, two kids for unindicated dates being set down for the latter part of the month; in Tebet

[1] Probably *sabath* would be more correct than *sabbath*. Another example of *dagesh lene* transcribed as *dagesh forte* is the name Zerubbabel, the Babylonian Zêru-Bâbili, 'seed of Babel.'

[2] Lines 1[5]–1[8]

[3] See the 6th line of the translation in § 2, above.

[4] Probably the old States of Babylonia, such as Sumer, Akkad, Kiš, Larsa, Erech, Nippur, etc.

[1] *Šalṭiš*, probably really meaning 'with pride in his exploits,' implying also that he was not to take part in affairs of State.

[2] Often written *u-mu-lala-pi*, 'day 20 less 1.'

[3] *Yale Oriental Series*, vol. i. pp. 75–81 and plates 36–38.

(29 days) of the 3rd year of Cambyses the dates are the 6th, 14th, 21st, and 27th; and in Nisan (30 days) of the 5th and 6th years of Cambyses the four dates are in both years normal. This seems to indicate that the day was not observed very strictly, but the varying dates for the sacrifices may be due simply to the necessity of performing the sacrifices in the early morning or in the evening,[1] while it was still dark. The names of the gods to whom the offerings were made are in no case given, but the chief deities worshipped at Erech were Anu and Ištar. The 'week of weeks' is not noticed in these lists of offerings.[2]

In one other respect the Erech tablets confirm, as far as they go, the directions of the hemerologies—namely, that these sacrifices were made by members of the priestly orders, the animals having been sent for the purpose by the temple herdsman in whose charge they were.

LITERATURE.—W. Lotz, *Quæstiones de Historia Sabbati*, Leipzig, 1883; T. G. Pinches, in *PSBA* xxvi. [1904] 51-56, 162 f.; A. H. Sayce, in *ExpT* xxvii. [1916] 522a; A. T. Clay, in *Yale Oriental Series*, vol. i., New Haven, U.S.A., 1915, pp. 75-80. See also art. CALENDAR (Babylonian).

T. G. PINCHES.

SABBATH (Jewish).—**1. A sign.**—It is still far from clear whether or not the Hebrew Sabbath was a derivative from Babylonia. But, whatever its origin, it became one of the most specifically Hebraic institutions. So much was this the case that the day was regarded as a symbol of the close relationship between Israel and God. Ezekiel, reviewing the history of Israel from the day when the people was chosen (20[5]), presents the message: 'Hallow my sabbaths,' 'a *sign* between me and them, that they might know that I am the Lord that sanctify them' (20[20, 12]). The same conception of the Sabbath as a sign of the covenant reappears in Ex 31[13, 17]. Israel hallows the Sabbath as a sign of the people's sanctification by God. In part the sign implies the marking off of Israel from the rest of the world—a conception which finds expression in the *Book of Jubilees*,[3] in the early Midrash, and in the liturgy of the Synagogue. But more prominently the distinction is less of Israel than of the day. 'And the Creator of all things blessed this day which he had created for a blessing and a sanctification and a glory above all days.'[4] Hence in the liturgy the commonest epithet applied to the Sabbath is 'holy.' The two ideas are closely interwoven. The observance of the Sabbath constitutes a sign at once of Israel's and of God's fidelity to the covenant. In the epigrammatic phrase of a popular Sabbath table-hymn composed by Abraham Ibn Ezra (12th cent.), 'I keep the Sabbath, God keeps me: it is an eternal sign between Him and me.' In part, again, the sign was associated with the Creation (as in the Decalogue in Ex 31[17] and in Gn 2[3]); thus the observance of the Sabbath gives evidence of a belief in 'Him who spake and the world was.'[5] And in part the sign was historical. This is shown in the association of the Sabbath with the experiences of Israel in Egypt.[6] Perhaps nothing in the Hebrew Bible is more beautiful than the use made of Israel's sufferings in Egypt. They are to be motive for kindness to the stranger (Lv 19[34]), and are to prompt the Israelite to give rest to his servants on the Sabbath (see the Decalogue in Dt 5[15]).

2. Sanctification. — All these aspects of the Sabbath—as a memorial of God's power as Creator, of His love as Redeemer from Egyptian bondage, and of the choice of Israel—are summed up in the liturgical *Kiddush*, or sanctification, prescribed for use in the home (and also in the synagogue) on the Friday eve. After quoting Gn 1[31]–2[3], the *Kiddush* runs thus:

'Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who createst the fruit of the vine.

Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast sanctified us by thy commandments and hast taken pleasure in us, and in love and favour hast given us thy holy Sabbath as an inheritance, a memorial of the creation—that day being also the first of the holy convocations, in remembrance of the departure from Egypt. For thou hast chosen us and sanctified us above all nations, and in love and favour hast given us thy holy Sabbath as an inheritance. Blessed art thou, O Lord, who hallowest the Sabbath.

Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who bringest forth bread from the earth.'[1]

3. Eschatology.—The sign is also eschatological. In *Jubilees* the identity between heaven and earth with regard to the Sabbath observance is asserted. The same idea is preserved in the Talmud. The earthly Sabbath points forward to the Sabbath in another world, 'a world which is entirely Sabbath.'[2] So with the liturgy. In the grace after meals for the Sabbath occurs this sentence: 'May the All-merciful let us inherit the day which shall be wholly a Sabbath and rest in the life everlasting.'[3] And, just as this thought worked forwards to the world to come, so it worked backwards to the patriarchal age. In the *Apocalypse of Baruch* we read:

'The unwritten law was named amongst them [Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob], and the works of the commandments were then fulfilled, and belief in the coming judgment was then generated, and hope of the world that was to be renewed was then built up, and the promise of the life that should come hereafter was implanted.'

Jubilees,[4] too, is animated with the same desire to include those who lived before the Law in the observance of its behests. The same thought is found in the Talmud.[5] Again, it will be best to quote a passage from the liturgy, which (like the passage cited above) sums up so much of Jewish thought regarding the Sabbath that it will save much exposition. The quotation that follows is from the Sabbath afternoon service.

'Thou art One and thy name is One, and who is like thy people Israel, an unique nation on the earth? Glorious greatness and a crown of salvation, even the day of rest and holiness, thou hast given unto thy people: Abraham was glad, Isaac rejoiced, Jacob and his sons rested thereon: a rest vouchsafed in generous love, a true and faithful rest, a rest in peace and tranquillity, in quietude and safety, a perfect rest wherein thou delightest. Let thy children perceive and know that this their rest is from thee, and by their rest may they hallow thy name.

Our God and God of our fathers, accept our rest; sanctify us by thy commandments, and grant our portion in thy Law; satisfy us with thy goodness, and gladden us with thy salvation; purify our hearts to serve thee in truth; and in thy love and favour, O Lord our God, let us inherit thy holy Sabbath; and may Israel, who hallow thy name, rest thereon. Blessed art thou, O Lord, who hallowest the Sabbath.'[6]

4. Rest.—On the physical side, the predominant feature of the Sabbath was naturally, as the name implies, cessation from labour. The Pentateuch does not define the term 'labour,' but there are incidental references to the prohibition of gathering sticks (Nu 15[32]), kindling fire (Ex 35[3]), cooking and baking (16[23]), travelling (16[29], but cf. 2 K 4[23]), bearing burdens, and conducting business (Am 8[5],

[1] As with the Jews, the day in Babylonia began in the evening at sunset.

[2] In the Calendar of Lucky and Unlucky days, referred to in *ERE* iii. 76b (§ 9), of which the original is published in *WAI* v. plates 48 and 49, there are no recognizable sabbaths—any day of the month might be lucky or unlucky, and suitable or unsuitable for work. Thus the 7th of Sivan has the word *martu*[m], 'bitterness,' the 14th and 19th are stated to be 'unlucky,' the 21st has the recommendation not to 'ride in a boat' (or 'ship'), and the 28th was 'unlucky.' Among the more noteworthy entries are 'fortunate in lawsuit' for Nisan the 14th, 'lucky for the king' for the 19th and 21st of Tammuz, whilst on the 7th of Ab 'lion-attacks' (were to be feared), and the 14th, 19th, 21st, and 28th were simply 'unlucky.' On the 28th of Chislev one ought not to take a wife, 'it is not prosperous' (Sum. *nu-sisa*).

[3] ii. 19, 31. [4] *Jub.* ii. 32.

[5] *Mechilta*, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1870, p. 103 f.

[6] *Ib.* 104a.

[1] See the present writer's notes on p. cxxxix of the *Annotated Edition of the Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, London, 1914.

[2] *Mech.* 103b; T.B. *Rōsh Hoshanāh*, 31a.

[3] *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, p. 284; see Mishnāh, *Tamid*, vii. 4.

[4] lvii. 2, ed. R. H. Charles, London, 1896, p. 99; Bar. lvii. 2.

[5] *Yōmā*, 21b; Gen. *Rabbāh*, xi., lxxix.

[6] *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, p. 175 f.

Jer 17[21], Neh 13[15]). The Mishnāh[1] defines the main 39 categories of forbidden work; to these were added others which, though not included in these categories, were liable to result in a breach of the Sabbath laws.[2] The criticism of these Sabbath laws is too familiar to need discussion; undoubtedly there was an excessive development of legalistic minutiæ, but it is not so certain that the consequence was a sacrifice of spirit to letter.[3] It must here suffice to indicate that no Sabbatical regulation was, in Rabbinic law, permitted to stand in the way of saving life in cases of illness or danger. The Law, it was held, was given that man might *live* by it (Lv 18[5]); hence the Sabbath must not be pleaded as a reason for permitting man to *die* thereon.[4] Perhaps the most perverse attack on the Sabbath as a day of rest is found in some of the Greek and Latin authors.[5] This type of attack culminates in Seneca. To Seneca the Jewish Sabbath is a worthless institution:

'To remain idle every seventh day is to lose a seventh part of life, while many pressing interests suffer by this idleness.'[6]

The difficulty of maintaining a genuine Sabbatical rest, while making the allowances necessary for life, has always been felt. In modern times economical reasons have led to many new anxieties, for which a solution has not yet been found. To revert to the older difficulties, the Maccabees, after experiencing the danger of refusing to fight on the Sabbath against foes who took advantage of the refusal, discriminated between offensive and defensive warfare. Josephus shows that mean advantage was taken by Pompey of this discrimination:

'Pompey utilized the seventh days, on which the Jews abstain from all sorts of work for religious worship, and raised his bank then, but restrained his soldiers from fighting on those days; for the Jews only acted on the defensive on Sabbath-days.'[7]

On the whole, the Rabbinic laws as to the permissible and the forbidden succeeded in avoiding the two extremes. This is seen when the Rabbinic system is compared with that of the Ḳaraites (*q.v.*). Anan, the founder of the sect, insisted on sitting in darkness on Friday nights (Ex 35[3]), and forbade his adherents to leave the house on Sabbath, except to attend public worship (16[29]). Similarly with the Samaritans and Sadducees.[8] Rabbinic custom permitted movement within limits, and also not merely allowed but ordained that lights be kindled before sunset. Great relief was obtained also by employing (under rigid restrictions, however) non-Jewish labour. The legalistic attitude led to certain 'legal fictions'; but on the whole it had the advantage that, by reducing the exceptions to code, it effected the maintenance of the general principle of rest.[9]

5. Joyousness.—The idea that the Sabbath was felt as a burden has no foundation whatever. Once for all this misconception was dispelled by S. Schechter in his *Studies in Judaism*.[10] The Sabbath was given in love;[11] it was a 'good gift'; it was a day of happiness or delight.

'Sanctify or honour the Sabbath by choice meals, beautiful garments; delight your soul with pleasure and I will reward you (for this very pleasure)'[12]—an idea based on Is 58[13].

[1] *Shebbath*, vii. 2.

[2] M. Friedländer, *The Jewish Religion*, London, 1891, p. 351.

[3] The famous controversies between Jesus and the Pharisees are examined, from the Pharisaic point of view, by the present writer in his *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, Cambridge, 1917, ch. xvii.

[4] T.B *'Abodah Zarah*, 27*b*; *Mech.* 103*b*.

[5] See T. Reinach, *Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains relatifs au judaïsme*, Paris, 1895, Index, *s.v.* 'Sabbat.'

[6] Quoted by Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, vi. 11; Reinach, p. 262.

[7] *Bel.* i. vii. 3.

[8] Cf. *JE* x. 592.

[9] A fine treatment of the question is given in C. G. Montefiore, *The Bible for Home Reading*, London, 1896-99, pt. i. p. 86; and in M. Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*[2], do. 1910, bk. ii. ch. iii.

[10] 1st ser., London, 1896, p. 297 ff.

[11] *Tosefta Berakhôth*, iii. 7.

[12] Midrash to Ps 92.

The liturgy speaks of the Sabbath as a hallowed and blessed day which 'in holiness giveth rest unto a people sated with delights.'[1] The three Sabbath meals were a religious duty.[2] It was a day of happiness in the home, inaugurated by a sanctification and closed by a ceremony (*habdalah*). This happiness was at once material and spiritual. The mystical came in to help. Typified as the Bride, the Sabbath was greeted with a wonderful chorus of welcome.[3] Husband praised wife by reciting the eulogy of the virtuous wife (Pr 31[10-31]), and invoked a blessing on his children. Heine's poem on the Princess Sabbath conveys some of the charm which pervaded the Sabbath as a result of the idealization which became the source of a large number of remarkably beautiful home-rites. Nor did the charm end with the home in which it began.

6. Worship.—Domestic joys were supplemented by special synagogue services, by the reading of the Bible and the religious literature. The majority of Jewish congregations retain the Babylonian custom in accordance with which the whole of the Pentateuch is read through once a year. In a few cases the older Palestine usage (of reading the Pentateuch in a triennial cycle) has been restored. Most of the liberal congregations, however, have introduced lectionaries. There are also regular readings from the Prophets (*haftārāh*), while special prayers and Psalms are naturally introduced. Discourses, anciently in the houses of study, now more often in the synagogues, are also a regular feature of the Sabbath services.[4] Seneca's misconception of the Sabbath as a day of idleness is due to his ignorance of the use made of the day as opportunity alike for study, prayer, and recreation. This combination of the austerity of rest with the joyousness of active spiritual and domestic gladness finds a unique expression in the hymns sung at the table on the Friday night. Space must be found for one of these, for, like the quotations already made, it throws a clear light on the Jewish feeling regarding the Sabbath.

'*This day is for Israel light and rejoicing,*
A Sabbath of rest.
Thou badest us standing assembled at Sinai
That all the years through we should keep thy behest—
To set out a table full-laden, to honour
The Sabbath of rest.
This day is for Israel light and rejoicing,
A Sabbath of rest.

Treasure of heart for the broken people,
Gift of new soul for the souls distrest,
Soother of sighs for the prisoned spirit—
The Sabbath of rest.
This day is for Israel light and rejoicing,
A Sabbath of rest.

When the work of the worlds in their wonder was finished,
Thou madest this day to be holy and blest,
And those heavy-laden found safety and stillness,
A Sabbath of rest.
This day is for Israel light and rejoicing,
A Sabbath of rest.

If I keep Thy command I inherit a kingdom,
If I treasure the Sabbath I bring Thee the best—
The noblest of offerings, the sweetest of incense—
A Sabbath of rest.
This day is for Israel light and rejoicing,
A Sabbath of rest.

Restore us our shrine—O remember our ruin
And save now and comfort the sorely opprest
Now sitting at Sabbath, all singing and praising
The Sabbath of rest.
This day is for Israel light and rejoicing,
A Sabbath of rest.'[5]

[1] *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, p. 120.

[2] On these and on Sabbath recreations see I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896, Index, *s.v.* 'Sabbath.'

[3] Cf. *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, p. cxx.

[4] On the Sabbath see I. Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst*, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 107 f., 155 f.

[5] For Hebrew text see *Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, p. cclxix. The English version (p. cclxx f.) is by Mrs. R. N. Salaman.

The most remarkable phrase in this hymn is contained in the second verse, which introduces, with lyric pathos, the idea of the over-soul, which resides in man during the Sabbath.[1] The hymn is probably of the 13th century.[2]

7. Modern conditions. — Reference has been made to the problem presented by modern economic pressure. Myriads of Jews continue to observe the Saturday Sabbath, despite all difficulties and commercial losses. Many, however, are induced, either by laxity or by the exigencies of labour conditions, to work on Saturday. There has not been any serious movement to transfer the Sabbath from Saturday to Sunday. The question was raised in the early part of the 19th cent., when the liberal movement was organized.[3] It was, however, soon realized that it would not be possible to retain the Sabbath atmosphere if the day were violently changed, unless the alteration were effected with a unanimity which obviously could not be attained. The fact that the Jewish Sabbath begins on Friday evening has been of considerable value in conserving the Sabbath spirit even when the Saturday rest was no longer observed. The home-rites and sentiments of the Sabbath have been thereby retained in cases where work is done on the following morning. In many congregations in America and on the Continent there are special Friday night services in the synagogue. In London the Jewish Liberal Synagogue holds its chief (though not its only) Sabbath service on Saturday afternoon. These methods have not solved the problem, but they have mitigated it. Throughout modern times the spiritual elements of the Sabbath have been recognized as more or less independent of the strict cessation of labour. In various parts of America special Sunday services are held, but these are not treated as Sabbath services. Holdheim, who in 1846 advocated the transference of the Jewish Sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week, remained without serious following. Besides the economic problem, liturgical questions have for the past century greatly exercised directors of the synagogues.[4] Prominent among these questions has been the employment of instrumental music on the Sabbath. The first organ was introduced in a Berlin synagogue in 1815; in 1840 an organ was for the first time set up in America; the invention was also introduced in London in 1859. Organs are still extremely rare in English synagogues, though they are common on the Continent and in America. At first the objection to instrumental music was not exclusively Sabbatical. Music ceased at Jewish worship after the destruction of the Temple, as a token of mourning. Gradually, however, it crept into use again, especially at weddings, and nowadays orthodox synagogues (which refuse to build organs as permanent structures) often admit instrumental music at weddings and at some other functions on week-days. The reason for the objection is partly that the innovation has the appearance of imitation from Church usages. Objection was long felt to mixed choirs,[5] on other grounds, but this objection no longer holds uniformly with orthodox congregations. Nowadays, with regard to instrumental music, the strongest opposition is due to Sabbatical considerations, for playing on an instrument is held to be a breach of the Sabbath rest.[6] But neither economic nor liturgical problems have destroyed the essential import of the Sabbath. For, all difficulties notwithstanding, the Sabbath retains some of its beneficent influence as a day of spiritual and domestic tranquillity and happiness.

LITERATURE.—See the works quoted throughout.

I. ABRAHAMS.

[1] T.B. *Beṣa*, 16; *Ta'anith*, 27.

[2] L. Zunz, *Literaturgeschichte der synagogalen Poesie*, Berlin, 1865, p. 555.

[3] See D. Philipson, *The Reform Movement in Judaism*, New York, 1907, Index, *s.v.* 'Sunday.'

[4] Cf. art. LIBERAL JUDAISM.

[5] *JE* iv. 41.

[6] Maimonides' Code, *Shabbath*, xxiii.; *Oraḥ Ḥayyim*, 338, 339.

SABBATH (Muhammadan). — Among the Muhammadans Friday, called by them *yaum ul-jum'ah*, 'day of assembly,' takes the place of the Christian Sunday and the Jewish Sabbath. They are not, indeed, enjoined to treat it as a day of complete rest from work or business, but its special sanctity is emphatically marked by the particular form of mid-day service that is used on it, and by the strict rule of attendance at the mosque, incumbent on all male adults among freemen,[1] in order to be present at its recital.

The outstanding feature of this service is the *khuṭbah*, or sermon, which is ordered to precede the common *ṣalāt*, or prayer, of two *rak'ahs*, or prostrations, though it is, by way of performing a specially meritorious act, itself usually preceded by another *ṣalāt* of two *rak'ahs*. From Qur'ān, lxii., it follows that the practice of holding a service of special obligation on Fridays dates from the time of Muhammad himself, or more accurately from the time of his stay at Medīna; but there were naturally developments and diversities of practice at successive periods in later times. There is thus a difference of opinion among the ritual sects with regard to the number of Muslims that have to be present in order to make a *jum'ah* (the Friday mid-day prayer being itself so called) valid, one of the schools maintaining that the attendance must number at least 40, whilst others declare that it is only necessary for the service to be held in a community of some size. Many divines, again, hold that, except in cases of necessity, the Friday service should not be held in more than one mosque in the same place, whilst others would not subject the faithful to such a limitation. In the time of Muhammad the *khuṭbah*, of course, consisted of the Prophet's own utterances or revelations, which may be presumed to have been later incorporated in the Qur'ān, but the later *khuṭbah*, which was in subsequent times (as it is now) preceded by the *adān* (or cry of the *mu'addin*: *'Allāhu akbar*, etc., 'God is great,' etc.), is naturally of a much less weighty order and of varying quality. The rules laid down are that it must be in Arabic, and must include prayers for Muhammad, for the Companions, and, in one form or another, for the sovereign, but its composition and contents are, for the rest, left to the ability and discretion of the preacher.

The only passage in the Qur'ān in which the *yaum ul-jum'ah* is referred to runs as follows:

> 'O ye, who believe! when ye are summoned to prayer on the day of assembly, haste to the commemoration of God, and quit merchandise. . . . And when the prayer is ended, then disperse yourselves abroad and go in quest of the bounty of God. . . . But when they get a sight of traffic or sport, they disperse after it, and leave thee alone.'[2]

According to the plain sense (idealized, however, by a specially pious mode of interpretation) of the passage, traffic or business is prohibited only at prayer time, and not after or before the *ṣalāt*; and we are incidentally presented with a realistic picture of the Prophet being sometimes left standing alone in the *minbar*, or pulpit, of his *masjid* when his Medinese followers happened to catch sight of sport or a trading caravan. Tradition has, however, been busy providing embellishments and divine sanction of a particularly flattering kind for

[1] This limitation of the rule reminds one of the Talmudic declaration that women, slaves, and boys under the age of thirteen are exempt from the duty of reciting the *Shema'* and of putting on phylacteries (Mishnāh, *Berākhōth*, iii. 3). It should in addition be observed that Muhammadan law also exempts persons who are not legally resident in a locality from attendance at the mosque on Friday.

[2] lxii. 9–11.

Muhammad's day of assembly. In the *Mishkāt ul-Maṣābīḥ* (see Literature below) the excellences of the day are, on the Prophet's authority, summed up as follows:

'The best day on which the sun appears is Friday; for on this day Adam was created; on this day Adam was taken into paradise, and turned out from it also on this day [this hardly a recommendation, however!]; and the day of resurrection will not be on any day but Friday.'[1]

Again:

'When Friday comes, angels stand at the door of the Masjid, and write the names of all those who come first,' etc.[2]

It is also declared that there is a certain hour on Friday on which any Muslim asking a favour of God will receive it, and that, on the other hand, Muhammad prayed that God may 'put a seal' on the heart of any Muslim who, through negligence, omits the prayers of three Fridays.

The prosaic fact seems to be that Friday was used as a day of assembly of some kind long before the Prophet's time, and the name of the day itself is reported to have been given it by one of Muhammad's ancestors. It is, indeed, conceivable, and may even be regarded as probable, that, if the Prophet had succeeded in attaching a great number of Jews to his cause, he might have made the Sabbath the sacred weekly day for his followers. But, the trend of events having made this impossible, and the Christian Sunday being *per se* excluded from his scheme of ordinances, he naturally settled instead on the old day of assembly, and the name *al-jum'ah* thus superseded the former general designation *al-'arūbah* (Talmudic ערובתא), which stamped the day as merely the eve or preparation of the day following. The attitude taken up by Muhammad towards the Sabbath itself may be regarded as clearly shown in Qur'ān, xvi. 125, where it is declared that 'the Sabbath was only ordained for those who differed about it,' which is by a tradition explained to mean that Moses himself had wished to set aside Friday as the sacred day, but that the Jews insisted on keeping the Sabbath-day, because on that day God rested from the work of creation, 'for which reason they were commanded to keep the day they had chosen in the strictest manner.'[3] 'The people of the Sabbath'[4] must, indeed, adhere strictly to the Sabbath order,[5] but for the followers of the Prophet of Allāh the truly excellent day, namely Friday, has been ordained as the great day of the week.

Goldziher[6] suggests that Parsi influence may have had its share in the rejection of the Jewish Sabbath by Muhammad. For the Parsis, who say that the world was created in six periods of time, have a festival for each of these periods, but none for the conclusion of creation. But, if (as, indeed, seems legitimate) influence of this kind be once admitted, there seems no reason why the early Babylonian idea which attaches the character of a *dies nefastus* to what may be regarded as the prototype of the Jewish Sabbath should not in some way have been perpetuated in Arabia, where, as is well attested, the Babylonian and Assyrian sphere of authority had been extensive. With regard, however, to the further suggestion that Muhammad had an objection to speaking of God as resting on the Sabbath-day, Goldziher himself[7] draws attention to the fact that the phrase 'he then [*i.e.* after the work of creation] mounted the throne,' used in Qur'ān, vii. 52, x. 3, xxxii. 3, may be taken to show that the Prophet had no particular objection to the idea of God resting; though, on the other hand, the absence of exhaustion at the end of creation is clearly indicated in Qur'ān, l. 14, 37. In this respect, indeed, there need not have been any radical difference between the Prophet and Rabbinic exegesis, which also emphatically rejects the idea of exhaustion and explains the word ויכל in Ex 20[11] to mean that rest was granted to the world that had been called into being.[1]

[1] Bk. v., ch. xliii. [2] *Ib.* ch. xlv.
[3] Sab., *in loco*, where also the authorities are named.
[4] *Qur'ān*, iv. 50. [5] See also *ib.* ii. 61, iv. 153, vii. 163.
[6] 'The Sabbathinstitution im Islam,' p. 91. [7] P. 90.

LITERATURE.—Besides the Qur'ān and some parallels from Jewish sources already indicated: *Mishkat ul-Masabih*, originally compiled under the title *Maṣābīḥ ul-Sunnah* by Husain al-Baghawi († A.H. 510 or 516), Eng. tr. by A. N. Matthews, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1809-10; G. Sale, *The Koran*, London, 1734 and subsequent edd., 'Preliminary Discourse' and notes in text; I. Goldziher, 'Die Sabbathinstitution im Islam,' in *Gedenkbuch zur Erinnerung an David Kaufmann*, ed. M. Brann and F. Rosenthal, Breslau, 1900, pp. 86-105; A. Geiger, *Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?* Bonn, 1833, pp. 54, 65; T. P. Hughes, *DI*, *s.vv.* 'Friday,' 'Khuṭbah,' and 'Sabbath'; *EI*, *s.v.* 'Djum'a,' where a fuller bibliography will also be found.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

SABBATICAL YEAR.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew).

SABELLIANISM.—See MONARCHIANISM.

SABIANS.—See ELKESAITES, HARRANIANS, MANDÆANS.

SACS.—See ALGONQUINS (Prairie Tribes).

SACERDOTALISM.—The word 'sacerdotalism' does not appear in the English language till the middle of the 19th century. It was called into existence, it would seem, by the controversies and the revival of theological studies which resulted from the Oxford Movement (*q.v.*). It has been used in two senses, a good and a bad. In the first place, it is used to denote the existence in the Christian Church of a ministry consisting of certain persons set apart or ordained by the authority of the Church to minister the things of God to their fellow-men, and to be the exclusive instruments in the divine covenant of sacramental graces. On the other hand, it is used in the sense of an assumption and claim on the part of the clergy to an undue power and authority over the laity.[2]

The existence of a priesthood is found in religion from the very earliest period of the history of mankind, and there is practically no ancient form of religion in which the priest does not appear in some aspect or other. The priest is the individual who is in some way inspired or illuminated by the divine influence and is thereby enabled to act as the interpreter of God and the will of God to his fellow-men. He it is, moreover, who on behalf of his fellow-men presents their offerings to God in such a way and with such forms and rituals as will render them acceptable to God. Thus he is in a sense the guide and the means by which his fellows find access or approach to God, and as such is naturally their adviser and teacher in spiritual things (see artt. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD).

The conception of a ministry endowed with certain sacerdotal or priestly powers is found very early in the history of the Christian Church. Christianity was the fulfilment of Judaism, and in Judaism there was an elaborate priestly system and system of sacrifice. Christianity did not claim to replace Judaism, but rather to fulfil it. The sacrifices of the old dispensation, the functions of the priests, were good and efficacious until the old dispensation was fulfilled and made perfect in the new. The priest and priesthood of the old dispensation were necessary until they were replaced by the perfect priesthood of Christ, and the old sacrifices were consummated in the one perfect sacrifice of Christ—a sacrifice so complete and perfect and efficacious for all time for the sins of all mankind, past, present, and future, that it need

[1] *Bereshith Rabbah*, ch. x., near end. [2] *OED*, *s.v.*

never, nor can it ever, be repeated. Christ is the perfect priest offering the one perfect sacrifice of Himself to the Eternal Father, the intercessor and advocate of all the race of men, the means of perfect and complete access to God.

But Christianity is not merely the fulfilment of Judaism; it is much more. It is the fulfilment and satisfaction of all the aspirations of mankind after God. These aspirations and longings for the truth were manifesting themselves in many ways at the time of the foundation of Christ's Church. Heathenism was agape with the desire for truth, and the old materialism of religion no longer satisfied a world that was beginning to realize clearly that matter was not all. New religions sprang up on every side, cults and mysteries, offering, to those who sought, the knowledge of God and purification from sin. Even the old material conception of the gods began to receive a spiritual interpretation.

Thus both Judaism and all that was good in heathenism found their goal and fulfilment in Christianity, and the sacrifices of Judaism and the initiations of heathenism in the perfect offering for the sins of the whole world presented to the Eternal Father in the divinely-appointed commemoration of the One Sacrifice in the Christian mysteries, which were at once the supreme act of worship of the Christian Church and the means by which the efficacy of the act of redemption was applied to the souls of men in gifts of sacramental grace.

In the earliest days of the Church there is a noticeable absence of any analogy between the priesthood of the old and the ministry of the new dispensation. The danger of Jewish formalism in the infant Church was considerable. Still less is there any sign of any acknowledgment of the existence of even a partial apprehension of truth in the religious systems of the heathen world. Nevertheless St. Paul does use technical terms when he speaks of himself as 'the minister of Jesus Christ, the sacrificing priest of the gospel of God, that the offering of the Gentiles might be made acceptable' (Ro 15^{16}), where he is using definite technical sacrificial words (λειτουργός, ἱερουργέω, προσφορά). In the same way he uses the terminology of the Greek mysteries in the words 'perfect' (τέλειος), 'sealing' (σφραγίζεσθαι), 'learned the secret' (μυέω), and his technical use of the words is recognized and imitated by Ignatius when he speaks of the Ephesians as being 'initiated into the mysteries of the gospel with the blessed Paul.'[1] Even in the Epistle to the Hebrews we find no sign as yet of the idea of a Christian priesthood offering a Christian sacrifice. The author of the Epistle confines himself to the theme that in Christ are summed up the perfection of priesthood and the finality of sacrifice. He comes near to the definite conception of the Eucharist as in some sense a sacrifice in close connexion with the sacrifice of Christ, when he says 'We have an altar, whereof they have no right to eat which serve the tabernacle. . . . By him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is, the fruit of our lips, giving thanks to his name' ($13^{10.\ 15}$). In the NT, then, we find that the Church is conceived of as consisting of a priestly people with a ministry authoritatively appointed to give expression to its worship (1 P 2^5, Rev 1^6 5^{10} 20^6).

When we come to the sub-apostolic age, we find that already there has been a development at least of technical terms. In the *Didache* we find the Eucharist spoken of as the 'pure offering' (καθαρὰ ἡ θυσία) which is to be offered in every place.[2] Clement of Rome, inculcating the necessity of decency and reverence in the celebration of Christian worship, calls these acts of worship 'offerings and sacrifices' (προσφοραὶ καὶ λειτουργίαι), and it is significant that he uses the analogy of the Jewish ministry of high-priest, priests, and Levites to illustrate the orderly differentiation in the Church between the orders of the ministry and the layfolk generally.[1] Again, he denotes the ministerial functions of the πρεσβύτερος by the word λειτουργία. Ignatius is still more definitely technical. To be 'within the precincts of the altar' (ἐντὸς τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου) denotes with him membership of the Catholic Church with the privilege of communion in the Eucharist,[2] and the bishop (the normal celebrant of the Eucharist) represents Christ.[3]

[1] *Ad Eph.* xii. [2] *Did.* xiv.; Mal $1^{6f.}$.

From this time onwards sacrificial terms are constantly used to denote the Eucharist and the functions of the Christian ministry. Justin uses the word 'sacrifice' (θυσία) of the Eucharist,[4] and in Irenæus we find such expressions as 'the offering of the Church' (*oblatio ecclesiæ*), 'the pure sacrifice' (*purum sacrificium*), and in Clement of Alexandria 'the offering' (προσφορά) as regular normal names of the Eucharist.[5]

In Tertullian and Cyprian we find in regular use such words as *altare, sacrificium, sacerdos*.[6] Tertullian, followed by Cyprian, regards the threefold Christian ministry as the successor of the three orders of the Jewish priesthood. The bishop is the high-priest;[7] the priesthood ordained by God among the Jews passed to the Church of Christ when the Jews crucified the Saviour.[8] Tertullian, again, is quite clear and explicit that, while the Christian community generally is a 'royal priesthood,' having access to God, yet in that community there is a separate ministry and a priestly discipline (*sacerdotalis disciplina*) which exercises the priestly functions of the Church. In Cyprian the word *sacerdos* generally, as often elsewhere and much later, denotes the bishop, but occasionally the presbyter,[9] and in one passage he uses the expression *sacerdotes et ministri* of the whole ministerial body.[10] In Cyprian, too, we find the theory of the Eucharistic sacrifice thus expressed:

'Nam, si Jesus Christus Dominus et Deus noster ipse est summus sacerdos Dei Patris, et sacrificium Patri se ipsum primus obtulit, et hoc fieri in sui commemorationem praecepit, utique ille sacerdos vice Christi vere fungitur qui id quod Christus fecit imitatur, et sacrificium verum et plenum tunc offert in ecclesia Deo Patri.'[11]

From the time of Cyprian onwards the sacerdotal character of the Church's ministry is taken for granted. The acceptation on all sides of the sacrificial character of the Eucharist necessarily implied the sacerdotal character of the priest. In the West in particular the civilization of old Rome, with its wonderful legal system, which became the inheritance of the new nations of Europe, tended to define more and more the doctrines and practices of the Church and the duties and functions of the ministry. From the 6th to the 9th cent. there was an active development of liturgy and ritual, all of course accentuating more and more the distinction between cleric and layman. Moreover, the task which the Church had to face during this period ever more and more enhanced the sacerdotal character of the ministry in the direction of increasing the prestige and authority of the clergy over the mass of the people. The Church was called upon to evangelize new and barbarian peoples, Goth and Frank, Burgundian and Lombard. The gross ignorance of their converts rendered it necessary to present the faith to them in its simplest form, and hence the duties of worship and practice, the teaching of the sacraments and penance, were

[1] i. 40. [2] *Eph.* 5, *Phil.* 4.
[3] *Eph.* 6. [4] *Dial.* 41.
[5] Iren. iv. xxxi. 3; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. xix.
[6] Tert. *de Cult. Fem.* ii. 11; Cypr. *Ep.* lxiii. 14.
[7] *De Bapt.* 17: 'summus sacerdos qui est episcopus.'
[8] Cypr. *Ep.* lxix. 8. [9] *Ep.* xl.
[10] *Ep.* i. 2. [11] *Ep.* lxiii. 14.

reduced to simple rules and systematized as much as possible, while for their part the new converts adapted their old belief in magic and the virtue of charms to the mysterious awfulness of the holy sacraments. At the same time the grossness of the people, the low state of morality, and the intervention of penance led to less and less frequency of communion till, with the requirement of confession in the case of all of adult age, communion was rarely made more frequently than once a year, if as often as that. Thus the duty of worship at the Mass took the place of the duty of weekly communion, and in the popular mind the Mass was regarded as a repetition of the sacrifice of Calvary. Hence came the scandalous traffic in masses of the Middle Ages, which, however, those in high places in the Church were constantly trying to repress, and it was commonly believed that a sufficient number of masses said for a man's soul would atone for a life however evil. The sacerdotal theory of the priesthood was then at its highest for some three centuries before the Reformation, and the priesthood, with its powers of remitting or retaining, was believed to hold in its hands the salvation or damnation of the soul.

The Reformation (*q.v.*) was the outcome on the whole of a great advance in the education generally of the people. Knowledge was no longer confined to the clergy, and with the new spread of knowledge men of intelligence rebelled against the old formality of religion, and against a conception of the doctrine of *opus operatum* in the sacraments that more or less relieved the individual of any responsibility, and overshadowed the teaching of the Church that the reception of the virtue of the sacraments depended upon the proper disposition of the recipient. Thus the Reformation was against sacerdotalism in the sense of an assumption of authority on the part of the priesthood to undertake the whole charge and responsibility of the souls of the people. In England the Reformation was a reformation only, while elsewhere it destroyed the Church in the old sense of the word. It is made clear in the preface to the ordination rites of the English Church, in the retaining of the three orders of bishop, priest, and deacon, and in the forms with which these orders are conferred, that the Church claims to be the old historic Church and no new invention, regarding herself as united with the Church of the apostles by the unbroken line of succession of her bishops, and one with it in doctrine and practice. The great defenders of the English Church against the assaults of Romanism have always strenuously taken this line, and have appealed to the Ordinal as proving the truth of their position. Thus, while the Reformation in England was a reformation proper, it purged the Church of many errors and superstitions. The whole status of the clergy was affected, and the restoration to the individual of the sense of personal responsibility lessened immensely the authority of the priesthood over the individual conscience. But, on the other hand, the ministry of the Church retained a definite sacerdotal aspect. Confession was retained and the power of priestly absolution; only it was not required as essential generally. This was maintained generally by the great divines of the 17th cent., and, moreover, the sacrifice of the Eucharist was maintained in the sense of its being a 'commemorative sacrifice.' In such a sense even Cranmer admitted that the Eucharist was a sacrifice. Andrewes, in a defence of the Church of England that was almost official, could say to Bellarmine:

'Take [illegible] Mass your Transubstantiation; and we will have no difference with you about the sacrifice.'[1]

and in his first *Answer to Cardinal Perron's Reply*:

'The Eucharist ever was, and by us is considered, both as a Sacrament, and as a Sacrifice.'[1]

A long list of names might be quoted in support of this view of the Eucharistic sacrifice—Cranmer, Andrewes, Overall, Montagu, Cosin, Sparrow, Jeremy Taylor, Waterland, and many others. Jeremy Taylor explains thus:

'As Christ, in virtue of His sacrifice on the Cross, intercedes for us with His Father, so does the minister of Christ's priesthood here; that the virtue of the Eternal Sacrifice may be salutary and effectual to all the needs of the Church, both for things temporal and eternal.'[2]

And, indeed, the teaching of the Church of England is clearly enough shown in the prayer of oblation in the Holy Communion:

'We thy humble servants entirely desire thy fatherly goodness mercifully to accept this our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving; most humbly beseeching thee to grant, that by the merits and death of thy Son Jesus Christ, and through faith in his blood, we and all thy whole Church may obtain remission of our sins, and all other benefits of his passion. . . . And although we be unworthy, through our manifold sins, to offer unto thee any sacrifice, yet we beseech thee to accept this our bounden duty and service.'

The controversies resultant on the Oxford Movement brought these matters very much to the front, and the word 'sacerdotalism' came into existence. The Church at this time was living on its past. The only theology was that of the great writers of bygone generations. The meaning of the Church's forms and ceremonies, of its theory of orders, of the doctrine of the sacraments, was very little apprehended by the majority of the people. Perhaps one of the great difficulties of the time lay in the absence of any official body of theology. This was one of the great losses consequent on the Reformation, which discredited entirely the old scholastic theology, with all its clearly defined technical terms, and substituted nothing in its place, with the exception of leaving a certain amount of the old technical language enshrined in the formularies of the Book of Common Prayer. The Oxford Movement, therefore, was simply a restatement of what the Prayer Book contains, re-asserting the sacerdotal character of the priesthood as exercised in the celebration of the sacraments, especially in the Holy Communion and the ministry of absolution. The controversies arising raged acutely for a generation, chiefly over the use of technical words and phrases, and then gradually subsided, leaving their mark unmistakably on the Church.

Thus the 'sacerdotalism' of the Church of England is moderate and reasonable. The ministry exists, and always has existed, for the bringing of the sacramental means of grace to the people of Christ. The priest is the minister or steward of Christ authoritatively appointed to his office by Christ's Church, and he is in this way the divinely-constituted organ of a body which is throughout priestly, the *servus servorum*, the servant of his fellow-servants, ministering to them in the orderly manner prescribed by the Church the gifts given by God for the nourishment and health of their souls.

LITERATURE.—Clement of Rome, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Cyprian; works of Thomas Cranmer, Lancelot Andrewes, John Overall, Richard Montagu, John Bramhall, John Cosin, Jeremy Taylor, Anthony Sparrow, Daniel Waterland (most of these are in the *Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology*); works on the Oxford Movement (*q.v.*): R. C. Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood*, London, 1897; T. T. Carter, *The Doctrine of the Priesthood in the Church of England*[3], do. 1876; W. Sanday, *Conception of Priesthood in the Early Church and in the Church of England*, do. 1898; C. Gore, *The Body of Christ*, do. 1901, *Orders and Unity*, do. 1909.

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[1] *Resp. ad Apol. Card. Bellarm.*, London, 1610, ch. viii. (184)

[1] London, 1629, § v.

[2] *The Worthy Communicant*, London, 1660, ch. i. § 1.

SACRAMENTS.

Primitive and Ethnic (J. A. MacCulloch), p. 897.
Christian—
Eastern (R. G. Parsons), p. 902.
Western (T. A. Lacey), p. 903.
Christian—
Lutheran (H. E. Jacobs), p. 909.
Reformed (J. Stalker), p. 912.
Hindu.—See 'Primitive and Ethnic.'
Parsi.—See 'Primitive and Ethnic.'

SACRAMENTS (Primitive and Ethnic).—In early Christian usage the word *sacramentum*, though applied especially to Baptism and the Eucharist, was widely used as the name of any ritual observance among Christians, as well as of any sacred thing. In this wide sense sacraments may be said to exist in ethnic religions. Washings or baptisms, ceremonial name-giving, initiations, anointings, and many other rites have a sacramental aspect in this sense of the word. These and other rites have already been fully considered under separate headings.[1] This article is devoted to inquiring how far rites of actual sacramental communion—viewing the word 'sacrament' in a narrow, yet popular, sense — exist among savages and in the higher ethnic religions. Many of the usual examples of this cited by various authorities are to be regarded as inferences rather than explicit facts. Thus, even where the worshippers feast on the remains of a sacrifice, it is doubtful whether this is to be looked upon as more than a meal eaten in common with the god. He, being satisfied with his share of the feast, as it were, invites his worshippers to eat with him. The idea that sacrifice originated from a meal on a divine being or a totem cannot be sustained. Even the idea of kinship with the god, renewed through eating with him, is far from being clearly expressed, and is rather an inference from a given rite. Sacrifice is first the food of the gods, by which they are nourished, strengthened, and made benevolent to men. If now worshippers partake of this food, they are eating with him, and we may suppose them to be similarly nourished and strengthened. There certainly could not have been at first the sacramental eating of a divinity incarnate in the sacrificial victim. That came later, and perhaps only sporadically. Even if the animal is one not usually eaten, or if, being one usually eaten, it is first sacrificially slain and its blood offered to the god, no more than a common meal with the god need be generally inferred. In the latter case the animal is sacrificially slain on the principle that man should always give something of his own to the gods—the same principle as is seen in the offering of firstfruits (*q.v.*).

The theory of Hubert and Mauss—that sacrifice consists 'in establishing a communication between the sacred world and the profane world by means of a victim, *i.e.* a consecrated thing destroyed in the course of the ceremony,' and that the moral state of the person who performs this religious act or of certain things in which he is interested is thus modified—rests on the Brāhmanic interpretation of Vedic sacrifices, and can be sustained only with difficulty.[2] If the theory were true, then the victim would always be sacrosanct, filled with the spirit of the divine world, and therefore to eat of it would be a sacramental act, filling the eater with divine vigour. But this 'sacralization' is not proved for sacrifice generally, either savage or civilized.[3]

Theories of the origin of sacrifice are apt to lay too much stress upon occasional rites, out of harmony with the ordinary and usual rites which are known to us in detail. The real meaning of these occasional rites is often unknown or is the guess of a scholiast or mystic; they are sometimes described vaguely in a late classical author. An example of this is found in the Bouphonia (below, § 3 [*b*]). At the same time rites of quite different import are usually classed together, and a similar reason for the slaying and eating of the victim is assigned to instances where it is out of place.

1. The basis of the principle of sacramental communion.—As already shown in the art. Cannibalism (vol. iii. p. 197[b]), the eating of food, with its result of strengthening or refreshing the body, easily suggested the idea that any special qualities in the animal, or even the man, from whom the food was prepared—strength, courage, wisdom, etc., as well as the contrary qualities (hence tabus on such foods as might transmit these)—could be assimilated by the eater. Added to this, the belief in magic made men assume that, as far as the transmission of such qualities was concerned, a part was as valuable as the whole. Food might also become a vehicle of qualities pertaining to this or that object with which it had been in contact. This is the basis of the idea of sacramental communion with deity in a more or less material sense, as apart from the idea of food eaten symbolizing a virtue or grace spiritually received. The flesh of an animal regarded as the incarnation of a deity, a cereal image, and the like would make the eater a recipient of divine qualities or divine life.

2. Was the sacrificial meal also sacramental?—The meal upon sacrificial food cannot now be regarded as the survival or the equivalent of eating a totem animal in a sacramental mystery (below, § 4). Nor is the conception of kinship between victim and worshippers more than an inference. The sacrificial meal, eaten as in Israel at the holy place, was one in which god and men shared. There was communion between them just in so far as the eating of food at any time strengthened the bond between table-companions. Beyond that we can hardly go. Sacrifice was primarily a feeding of a god, who either ate the actual food or was regaled by the blood, or by its odour, or even by its essence.[1] In the latter instances, where most of the flesh still remained, it was natural that it should be consumed by the worshippers. How far it was regarded as hallowed or even as a vehicle of divine qualities, because part of it had been consumed by a god or offered on an altar, is largely a matter of conjecture. This sacrificial meal is a common aspect of sacrificial rites both in the lower cultures and in higher religions as far back as these can be traced.

In Fiji 'native belief apportions the soul [of the offering] to the gods, who are described as being enormous eaters; the substance is consumed by the worshippers.'[2]

In Israel one large class of sacrifices was eaten by the worshippers, after having formed a repast for the divinity. In Babylon the elements of sacrifice were the foods which men commonly ate; animal victims were not apparently regarded as sacred, and the officiants ate the remains 'without appearing to experience the least terror, and without taking extra precautions.'[3] In Greece, in the

[1] See artt. Anointing, Baptism, Initiation, Names.

[2] H. Hubert and M. Mauss, 'Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice,' in *Mélanges d'hist. des religions*, Paris, 1909, pp. 15, 124.

[3] Cf. G. Foucart, *Hist. des religions et méthode comparative*, Paris, 1912, p. 136 ff.

[1] The last is forcibly expressed by the Limboos of Darjeeling, who, when they eat the sacrifice, say that they dedicate the life-breath to the gods, the flesh to themselves (J. S. Campbell, *TES*, new ser., vii. [1869] 153).

[2] T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, London, 1858, i. 231; cf. art. Dravidians (N. India), vol. v. p. 8[a].

[3] Foucart, p. 162.

case of those offerings not wholly made over to divinities, the priests had their share of the sacrifice, and the worshippers feasted on the remains.

This is seen, *e.g.*, in Homer, who describes the prayers, the slaughter of the victims, the cooking of selected portions, and the joyous feast which followed.[1]

In Roman sacrificial rites the general rule was that, after the offering of the *exta* to the god, the remainder of the animal was then considered not sacred, and was eaten by the priests or worshippers, or on official occasions by the senators and magistrates. Sacrifice was the offering of a repast to the gods, in which men had a share.[2]

Toutain insists that the theory of W. R. Smith and others of a kinship between god, victim, and worshippers, renewed through eating the victim—of a sacrificial communion—is not discoverable in the Roman sacrificial ritual.[3]

In Egypt the remains of the sacrifice were simply eaten by the officers and servants of the temple and by the worshippers. 'They spread a banquet of what remains of the victims.'[4] According to Foucart, there is no trace in Egyptian texts concerning sacrifice of sacramental communion or of a meal of kinship with the deity in this sacrificial meal, and he speaks of

'l'absence radical, fût-ce en une ligne d'un seul auteur, d'une allusion au sacrifice *communiel* de la victime en Egypte.'[5]

Vedic sacrifices were intended as food for hungry gods, who were thus rendered well-disposed to men. The gods ate first, leaving the remains to be eaten by those who offered them.

Oldenberg says that 'it is impossible to discover in the ceremonies themselves, or in the verses or formulæ which accompanied them, the least allusion to any method of regarding the repast on the sacrifice as a repast of communion (*alliance*) or a renewing of kinship.'[6]

Whatever later priestly theories arose regarding sacrifice, the early view remains fairly constant, and in modern Hindu or Dravidian ritual the remains of the sacrifice are commonly eaten by the worshippers.[7] But in the cult of Kṛṣṇa the cooked food offered to the god is eaten by the priests or distributed to the worshippers, who eagerly receive it as holy or as divine nutriment.[8] Here a more sacramental view appears. Finally, among the Teutons the evidence is summed up by Grimm as follows. Human food is agreeable to the gods, who are invited to eat their share of the sacrifice. At the same time sacrifice is a banquet: an appointed portion of the victim is placed before the god; the rest is cut up, distributed, and consumed in the assembly. The people thus become partakers in the holy offering, and the god is regarded as feasting with them at their meal.[9]

To these examples must be added those in which the victim is a human being, and a cannibalistic feast on his flesh follows. Here there is no true sacrament, save where the victim is regarded as representing or incarnating a divinity, as in Mexico and in Dionysiac rites in Crete.[10]

Thus the widest evidence of sacrificial rites, apart from all modern theory, is that in a large proportion of sacrifices the worshippers enjoyed a sacrificial repast, and joined in eating with the god. That probably indicated fellowship with the god or promoted it still further. But how far it was also regarded as a sacramental eating, in the sense that divine virtue passed over to the eater, is a matter of conjecture. Yet it may be admitted that here are the elements out of which a sacramental ritual might easily arise.

The idea that gods and men shared in a sacrificial meal is illustrated by the expressions on recently-found papyri in which a person invites guests to dine with him at the table of a god (the lord Sarapis) on a certain date.[1] Sarapis was here the real host. Unless St. Paul was continuing OT sacrificial language, this may be the source of what he says regarding the impossibility of partaking at once of the table of the Lord and of the table of demons (*i.e.* eating meat which had formed part of a sacrifice). He regards that act as 'having communion with demons' (1 Co $10^{20f.}$), because the meat is eaten consciously as a thing sacrificed to idols (10^{19} and cf. 8^{7}). This shows that he regarded the act of eating as an act of communion with the god—probably the view then current in the eastern Mediterranean area. This communion, however, was nothing more than the relationship existing between a host and guests at any meal—a token of fellowship with him on the part of those who recognize the deity. In such sacrificial meals, in the words of the *Clementine Recognitions*,[2] the eater is 'a guest of demons' and has 'fellowship with that demon whose aspect he has fashioned in his mind.' How far this idea of fellowship or communion with a god in and through sacrificial meals existed elsewhere and in other ages it is difficult to say. The custom is analogous to that of the feasts with the dead—common meals at which dead and living were present.[3]

3. Eating a sacred animal.—When an animal was regarded as sacred—one devoted to the service of a god, or his representative or symbol, or even his incarnation, or as itself divine—it was nevertheless sometimes sacrificed to him, the reasons for this sacrifice not being the same in all cases. It is important to bear the latter fact in mind. But, in so far as the animal is sacred and the flesh is eaten, there is here a sacramental eating, depending upon the degree of sacredness of the animal. Where the animal is divine or a divine incarnation, there would be an actual eating of the god's flesh. In a sense all animals sacrificed to a god became for the time sacred to him, but we are here contemplating the case of animals more peculiarly sacred. The ceremonial slaying of such animals is perhaps the origin of those so-called mystic sacrifices in which certain animals, more particularly those regarded as 'unclean,' *i.e.* too sacred for common use, were immolated and sometimes ceremonially eaten. Where such eating took place, its purpose was probably sacramental: it was to obtain some benefit not to be obtained in any other way—*e.g.*, the strength and life of a god. The examples cited by W. R. Smith[4] are in point here, though his theory of their connexion with earlier totem sacraments has not been verified. The instances range from savagery up to comparatively high levels of civilization.

(*a*) Certain Hebrews in pre-Exilic days seem to have adopted curious rites from their pagan neighbours or revived earlier rites of their own. Among these was the sacrifice of the swine, the mouse, and the 'abomination.' These animals were unclean, yet they were actually eaten at this rite after some preliminary method of preparation and purification. After sanctifying and purifying themselves, the worshippers are said to have eaten swine's flesh, the mouse, the 'abomination,' while 'broth of abominable things' was in their vessels, no doubt for purposes of a meal (Is 65^{4} 66^{17}).[5] Doubtless these animals were sacred to certain divinities, and this, rather than their 'unclean' character, aroused the prophet's indignation. The result of the eating was the assertion of a peculiar holiness. Similarly, at a later time the Harranians sacrificed the swine and ate the flesh

[1] *Il.* i. 457 ff.; see, however, L. R. Farnell, *ERE* vi. 398[a], and 'Sacrificial Communion in Greek Religion,' in *HJ* ii. [1904] 306 f., where his views are more speculative than strictly evidential.

[2] G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 352 f.; J. Toutain, 'Le Sacrifice et les rites du sacrifice à Rome,' *Études de mythologie et d'hist. des religions antiques*, Paris, 1909, p. 158.

[3] Toutain, p. 151 f.

[4] Herod. ii. 40.

[5] Foucart, pp. 155, 171.

[6] H. Oldenberg, *La Religion du Véda*, tr. V. Henry, Paris, 1903, p. [illegible]

[7] W. Crooke, *PR* i. 32, 117, 263; H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 179; cf. *ERE* ii. 486[b].

[8] M. Monier Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism: Religious Thought and Life in India*[4], London, 1891, p. 145; J. A. Dubois, *Description of the Character, Manners, and Customs of the People of India*, Eng. tr., do. 1817, p. 401.

[9] J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882-88, i. 41, 46, 57.

[10] See art. CRETAN RELIGION, vol. iii. pp. 204[b], 205[a].

[1] *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, London, 1898-1904, i. 110 cf. *ERE* vi. 377[b].

[2] ii. 71.

[3] See art. FEASTING, vol. v. p. 803[b].

[4] *Religion of the Semites*[2], p. 290 f.

[5] Cf. Ezk 8^{10}; W. R. Smith[2], p. 343.

once a year. Among the ancient Peruvians, after a three days' fast, the festival of the sun at the summer solstice was observed. Fire was kindled by means of a concave mirror reflecting the sun's rays. Then llamas, the animals sacred to the sun, were sacrificed, and of these a burnt-offering was made. The flesh of other llamas, part of 'the flocks of the sun,' was eaten at a banquet by the Inca and his lords, and distributed to the people. The flesh was eaten along with sacred cakes prepared by the virgins of the sun, and with goblets of fermented liquor of maize. In the latter part of this feast the Spaniards detected a Satanic counterfeit of the Eucharist.[1]

(*b*) Some animal victims may be regarded as divine incarnations. The people of the district of Huanca (Peru) were found by the Inca Pachacutec to have a dog deity represented in their temple. A living dog was chosen to be its incarnation; sacrifice and prayer were offered to it; then it was slain, and parts of its flesh were eaten by the worshippers.[2] Similarly, in Arkansas an American Indian tribe who traced their descent from a mythic dog ancestor are said to have eaten the flesh of a dog representing this ancestor in an annual rite.[3]

In the Dionysos cult, the origin of which is to be sought in Thrace, whence it was brought to Greece, there is a fairly clear example of the belief that a god may incarnate himself temporarily in animal or even human form. In the frenzied observance of the cult the myth of Dionysos pursued by the Titans, assuming different forms, and finally in bull shape being rent asunder by them, was reproduced in ritual. An ox, a goat, or sometimes even a boy, representing or incarnating the god, was rent by the maddened worshippers, and the raw flesh was devoured. By such a sacramental feast, and probably also by stimulants, 'the celebrant of the meal of raw flesh'[4] was made one with the god. He became *ἔνθεος*, and was inspired to new ecstasy, or *ἐνθουσιασμός*, and to acts not possible under normal conditions.[5]

Arnobius says: 'In order that you may show yourselves full of majesty and divinity, you mangle with gory lips the flesh of bleating goats.'[6] A scholiast on Clem. Alex. *Protrept.*[7] says that those initiated into the Dionysiac mysteries ate raw flesh, and that this symbolized Dionysos' being rent by the Titans.

In this savage sacrament, which, though not without occasional parallels elsewhere, must not be taken as typical of all religions at a certain stage, there appears the dim craving of the soul for union with deity. When the ritual was transferred to Greece and there tamed and transformed, how far this sacramental act continued is uncertain, though modified survivals of it have been found in Chios and Tenedos at a late date.[8] Its existence in the Dionysiac-Orphic brotherhoods cannot be proved.

In the *βουφόνια* at the Diipolia on the Acropolis there is one of those mysterious and sporadic rites apt to be taken as typical and made the basis of a large amount of theory. The rite is described by Pausanias and Porphyry.

Of a number of oxen led up to the altar the one which ate wheat and barley lying upon it was slain by a priest, who was regarded as the murderer of the ox, and finally the blame was laid on the axe or knife. Of those who afterwards flayed the ox all tasted its flesh; then they sewed up the hide, stuffing it with hay, and yoked it to a plough. The rite was traced back to a slaying by Sopatros of an ox which had eaten his cereal offering. In remorse he fled. Dearth followed, and an oracle announced that the murderer must be punished and the dead raised up. It would also be better for them if, at the same sacrifice in which the ox died, all should taste of its flesh. Sopatros agreed to return, but said that he must be made a citizen, that an ox must be slain, and that all must help him. This was agreed to, and the ritual of the *βουφόνια* was founded.[1]

W. R. Smith regarded this rite as a survival from the time when all pastoral animals were sacred and regarded as kindred with man and his divinities. Hence to slaughter one of them, even ritually, was murder (*βουφονεῖν*), and to eat the flesh was a sacramental rite. These ideas had been derived from earlier totemism, with sanctity and kinship of wild animals.[2] In this he is partly followed by L. R. Farnell.[3] J. G. Frazer finds in the rite an example of slaying an animal representing the corn-spirit—'the ox which tasted the corn was viewed as the corn-deity taking possession of his own.'[4]

It seems probable that the clue to the *βουφόνια* is lost. Among savage pastoral tribes who regard their cattle as sacred the occasional slaying of them is not regarded as murder, nor are they invariably considered as of one kin with the clan. For some reason unknown the ox of the *βουφόνια* was regarded as sacred in a way in which the cattle of ordinary sacrifices never had been. This is shown by its killing being regarded as murder. The eating of the flesh by the slayers has thus a sacramental aspect, in whatever manner the animal was sacred, whether in itself or as representing or incarnating a spirit or god.

(*c*) W. R. Smith's theory of the slaying of pastoral animals in cases where such animals are seldom or never killed, viz. that the animals are kinsmen to the tribe or group, is hardly borne out by instances from actual pastoral tribes.

With the Todas the lives of the people are devoted to the tending of their herds of buffaloes. These are divided into two classes—(1) ordinary buffaloes, with no special ritual connected with their tendance and milking and no restrictions on the use of their milk; (2) sacred buffaloes of various grades of sanctity, with herdsmen regarded as priests, and dairies for the churning of milk which are regarded as shrines. In the case of the latter the ordinary operations of the dairy have become a religious ritual, each dairy of each class having its own peculiarities and complexities of ritual. Both ordinary and sacred buffaloes are the property not of the clan, but of families or individuals, in that division of the Todas known as Teivaliol. Male buffaloes have little or no sanctity even when born of the most sacred cows, and these in fact are mated with ordinary bulls. Buffaloes were created by one of the chief Toda gods, On, and his wife. On's buffaloes were ancestors of the sacred animals, those created by his wife of ordinary buffaloes. Sacred dairies and sacred buffaloes are regarded in some measure as the property of the gods. Buffaloes are not eaten, but, after due ceremonies for counteracting possible danger, the milk of even sacred buffaloes, converted into butter, may be used even by people who are not Todas.[5] At one feast people of the clan and of other clans may partake of the milk of *sacred* buffaloes, which is not ordinarily used by them. Rivers sees in this some resemblance to those religious ceremonies of communion 'with the divine by eating and drinking the divine.'[6] Although the buffalo is not ordinarily eaten, there are certain rites called *ĕrkumptthpimi* ('male buffalo we kill') in which a male buffalo calf is slain and eaten, whenever a suitable one is available. At the *tĭ* dairy the rite takes place thrice yearly. The chief officiant is the *palikârtmokh*, or dairyman of the village, who must be of the same clan as those performing the sacrifice. The animal is killed by striking with a club made of the wood of the sacred *tŭḑr*-tree. The flesh is roasted on a sacred fire made by friction. Of this the *palikârtmokh* eats the *tutmîs*, and the others present may eat any portion. Certain parts must not be eaten by women. The remainder of the feast is carried to the village and may be eaten by any one.[7] At the *tĭ* sacrifice the *tutmîs* is eaten by the *palol* (or priest of this ultra-sacred dairy), certain other parts by him and the *kaltmokh* (assistant). Some parts, again, may be eaten by the *kaltmokh* and privileged visitors (*mòrol*) to the *tĭ*. Other parts are taken to the outskirts of the priests' sleeping-hut and given to any Todas who may visit the dairy.[8]

The significance of the ceremony is unknown; the male buffalo is not sacred in the sense in which the female sacred buffalo is. From the prayer used before the slaying of the animal Rivers conjectures that the purpose of the rite is the general welfare of the buffaloes. He also thinks it possible that, as the flesh is eaten, the Todas may have preferred

[1] W. H. Prescott, *Hist. of the Conquest of Peru*, London, 1890, pp. 25, 51 f.
[2] D. G. Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*[3], Philadelphia, 1896, p. 160.
[3] *NR* iii. 316.
[4] Euripides, frag. Κρῆτες.
[5] O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, Munich, 1897–1906, ii. 731 f.; cf. *ERE* iii. 765, 767, vi. 403[a].
[6] *Adv. Gentes*, v. 19.
[7] i. 433 (Dind.).
[8] Cf. *ERE* iii. 205, vi. 408.

[1] Paus. i. xxiv. 4, xxviii. 10; Porphyry, *de Abst.* ii. 29 f.
[2] *Rel. Sem.*[2], pp. 304 f., 353 f.
[3] *CGS* i. 86 f., and cf. *ERE* iii. 767[b].
[4] *GB*[3], pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 4, 6.
[5] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, pp. 38 ff., 184, 231 f.
[6] *Ib.* pp. 232, 240.
[7] *Ib.* p. 274 f.
[8] *Ib.* p. 285 f.

to use for this purpose less sacred animals out of fear of evil consequences.[1] There does not appear to be any clear evidence of kinship with their buffaloes among the Todas.[2] Nor does there appear to be a sacramental eating of the animal in the sense of eating a victim regarded as divine.

If Rivers' explanation of this meal among the Todas is correct, we may see an analogy to it in the custom of pastoral tribes in the Caucasus who, when obliged to sell their herds to strangers, avert the danger which such sacrilege incurs by consecrating one of the herd, slaying it, and solemnly eating it, afterwards treating the bones with all due respect.[3]

The eating of the raw flesh of a heifer sacrificed to the spirit of the Nile by heads of clans among the Agaos[4] and the eating of half-raw flesh of a camel by the clan or tent-group among the Arabs of the Sinaitic peninsula when other food failed[5] are very vaguely sacramental.

(*d*) The last group of rites described perhaps shows that at one time all killing of animals was regarded as an act to be gone about circumspectly, for all animals, if not divine or even sacred, have power greater than man's, either in life or after death. Hence, too, innumerable rites of propitiation in connexion with the slaying even of wild animals, by way of averting their vengeance or that of members of the same species. These sometimes crystallize into one definite communal rite, in which propitiation, prayer, ritual slaughter, and ritual eating all have a part. But the slaying is not sacrificial, and the whole rite is perhaps analogous to the solemn eating of firstfruits (below, § 5) before all the harvest becomes available for common food. This rite is most marked in the Ainu bear festival.

With the Ainus, Gilyaks, and other peoples of N. Asia the bear is regarded with respect, if not as divine, but it is freely slain and eaten as food. But one bear is kept in captivity with every evidence of respect; then it is ritually slain with propitiations and apologetic explanations and prayers. Offerings are made to the dead bear. Its blood is drunk by the men present to obtain its courage and other virtues, and part of its flesh, having been offered in 'a cup of offering to its head,' is solemnly eaten by all present. Then all join in eating the rest of the flesh. The liver is said by a 17th cent. authority to be eaten as a medicine for various diseases.[6]

The prayers show that the bear is expected to return to life so as to be slain anew, and in Saghalien the killing is for the purpose of sending messages to the forest-god by means of the bear.[7] The solemn eating of the bear by all is obviously meant as a propitiatory rite which will make possible the common eating of bear's flesh by all who have thus had communion with the bear.

4. **The totem sacrament.** — The theory of a general, though occasional, sacrifice and sacramental eating of a totem animal or plant by the men of a totem clan is now generally abandoned for lack of evidence.[8] With its abandonment the explanation of all solemn eating of a slain or sacrificed animal as due to an earlier totem sacrament must also be given up. Among all actual totem peoples the ceremonial eating of a totem has been found in three instances only, and Frazer points out that in one of these (Arunta) the object of the eating is not mystical communion with a deity, but to ensure the supply of food for others not of that totem. It is magical, not religious, and the animals in question are not regarded as divine.[1]

The Arunta once freely ate their totems, and even now there is no absolute restriction by which a man may not eat of his totem, except in the case of the wild cat, which is also forbidden food to the whole tribe. Besides permission to eat sparingly of his totem at all times, each man at the *intichiuma* ceremonies, for the increasing of the totem animal or plant, must eat of his totem, in order that the totem species may be increased for the benefit of fellow-tribesmen of other totem groups. Without this eating the magical increase ceremonies would not be complete. Members of the totem group now refrain from eating their totem till it is full-grown or plentiful. When that happens, members of other groups may not eat until the members of this group have eaten sparingly of their totem within the camp. This second ceremonial eating is thus akin to the solemn eating of firstfruits by certain persons before all can eat freely. This second ceremonial is obligatory; non-eating would result in the decrease of the totem.[2]

The second instance is from Benin. Some families of the Bini, at the burial ceremonies, make soup from their totem and offer it in sacrifice to the dead man. This portion may also be put to the lips of members of the family and then thrown away. The rest is thrown away or eaten by the family or strangers. Obviously some benefit to dead and living is here expected.[3]

The third instance is from Assam, where the Kacharis were formerly divided into totem clans. In two cases the ceremonial eating of a revered animal or plant has been noted. The Leech folk hold the leech in high regard and do not kill it. But once in a lifetime at a certain religious ceremony the Leech folk must chew a leech with vegetables. The Jute folk must also chew jute at great religious ceremonies.[4]

In none of these instances is the totem worshipped as a divinity, and they are all contrary to general practice among totem peoples. They do not lend support to the derivation from totemism of the slaying and eating of sacred animals at higher stages.

5. **Firstfruits eaten ritually or sacramentally.**—This has already been fully discussed.[5] But it is obvious that here the word 'sacramentally' will bear various shades of meaning according as the firstfruits are looked upon merely as set apart from ordinary usage, or as sacrificial food, or as actually containing or being a spirit or god.

6. **Ceremonial eating of images of dough or other substances.**—In cases where the image is described as the god and is eaten there is clearly some idea of sacramental communion. The best instance of this is found in the ancient Mexican religion, where the solemn eating was called *tsoqualo*, 'god is eaten.'[6] Similarly, the Ḥanīfa, in time of famine, made an image of dates kneaded with butter and sour milk and ate it.[7] Communion with a deity by means of swallowing part of the image is also found among the Mālas of S. India and among the Huichol Indians of Mexico.[8] These and similar instances may be compared with the ritual offering (though not always eating) of cakes in the form of or stamped with the effigy of a divinity.[9] These may also be connected with the offering and eating of firstfruits made into a cake or even baked in human form (probably representing the corn-spirit, as Frazer thinks).

The sacramental aspect of eating such dough images is well shown by Acosta's description of the Mexican eating of the image of Huitzilopochtli: the people 'received it with such tears, fears, and reverence as it was an admirable thing, saying that they did eat the flesh and bones of God, wherewith they were grieved.'[10]

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1 [illegible], p. [illegible].
2 *Ib.* p. [illegible].
3 A. [illegible], in *Verhandlungen der berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte*, Berlin, 1870-71, p. 54.
4 *L.L.B.*, [illegible]. 5 W. R. Smith², p. 281.
6 [illegible] Bergh, *Annales des voyages*, Paris, 1814, xxix. 154 f.; J. Batchelor, *The Ainu and their Folk-lore*, London, 1901, p. 485 f.; *G.B.*, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 19 ff.; cf. art. Ainos, vol. i. p. 249, Animals, vol. i. p. [illegible].
7 P. [illegible], *En Extrême russe, l'Isle de Sakhaline*, Paris, 1903, p. [illegible].
8 [illegible] S. Reinach, *Cultes, mythes, et religions*, 3 vols., Paris [illegible], and art. Communion with Deity (Greek and Roman), vol. iii. p. 767.

1 J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iv. 231.
2 Spencer-Gillen², p. 167 ff.
3 Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 588, from information supplied by N. W. Thomas.
4 *Ib.* iv. 297 f., from information supplied by S. Endle.
5 Artt. Firstfruits (Introductory and Primitive), vol. vi. p. 438, § 2; Eating the God, vol. v. p. 137.
6 Art. Eating the God, vol. v. p. 136b; cf. *NR* iii. 299, 316, 385 f.
7 W. R. Smith², p. 225; F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, p. 436 ff.
8 E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, [illegible] iv. 357 f.; C. Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, London, 1903, ii. 166 f.
9 See instances in Liebrecht, p. 436 f., 'Die aufgegessene Gott.'
10 *G.B.*, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, ii. 86 ff. Acosta, cited in *NR* iii. 313. See also art. Fasting (Introductory and non-Christian), vol. v. p. 761a.

7. Swallowing sacred substances.—Under this heading may be grouped a variety of rites with a sacramental aspect. As an example from a low level of culture the following case from the Gold Coast may be taken. If the members of a family were about to separate, the fetish-priest ground a fetish to powder, and, having mixed it with a liquid, gave the draught to each member of the family. By this means they were still bound together.[1] In the ceremonies of the various fraternities among the Zuñi Indians the drinking of consecrated 'medicine-water' has a prominent place. The consecration is accomplished with prayers to the gods, the dropping of fetishes into the water, prayer invoking the presence of the gods, etc. The altar and the worshippers are sprinkled with the water, and the males present receive a drink of it; on the next night of the ceremonies male and female members drink it; and on the fourth evening the novices receive it.[2] Plant medicines, each the property and food of a god, are used in other fraternities in a kind of sacramental magic—to cure disease, to make a brave heart, for safety, and the like.[3] In India the water in which a sacred image has been washed is drunk as holy water.[4] The drinking of the *haoma* in Zoroastrian religion and its supposed effects on the partaker have already been fully described in the art. HAOMA. It is also given to the dying as a last sacrament, or φάρμακον ἀθανασίας. Its counterpart in Vedic and later Indian religion is *soma* (*q.v.*), both having been originally one. *Soma* was the drink of the gods, and a draught of immortality both for them and for men. It also healed physical and moral ills and gave wisdom. This drink of the gods could also be prepared for men on earth, just as *haoma* was. The drink made the worshipper a new man; the draught of the gods flowed in his veins, purifying and sanctifying him.[5] The nectar of the Greeks is a similar drink of immortality;[6] and it is probable that primitive intoxicants, because of the elation caused by them, were regarded as the drink of the gods, conferring immortality and other desirable qualities on them, like Goibniu's 'ale of immortality' in Celtic mythology.[7] In Babylonian mythology 'food of life' and 'water of life' were the property of the gods, giving immortality, as is seen in the myth of Adapa.[8] The refreshing powers of water caused it also to be regarded mythically, and in the other world it had magical immortal powers. Fijian mythology shows this. On the way to paradise the dead drank of the 'water of solace,' which caused the grief of the ghost and the mourners on earth to be assuaged.[9] So at a far higher level, in Orphic-Pythagorean circles, the dead drank 'cool water flowing from the Lake of Memory,' and thereafter had lordship among the other heroes.[10]

The idea of the Tree of Life and its effects in Hebrew, early Christian, and Gnostic mythologies may be compared with the mythical concepts here set forth. In Egypt analogous ideas, though of a curious kind, are found. A funerary text speaks of a dead king slaying and devouring the gods to obtain their powers and to become eternal. Similarly, by sucking the milk of a goddess a mortal might acquire immortality.[11]

[1] A. Réville, *Les Religions des peuples non-civilisés*, Paris, 1883, i. 84.
[2] M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW* [1904], pp. 492 ff., 540, 552, 561, 572.
[3] *Ib.* p. 560 f.
[4] Monier-Williams, p. 145.
[5] *Ib.* p. 359.
[6] Cf. Lucian, *Dial. Deorum*, no. 4.
[7] See art. CELTS, vol. iii. p. 285b.
[8] M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 544.
[9] B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 117 ff.
[10] The various formulæ are given in J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*², Cambridge, 1908, p. 573 ff.
[11] E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Papyrus of Ani*, 2 vols., London, 1895, p. lxxviii; A. Wiedemann, *Die Toten und ihre Reiche im Glauben der alten Aegypten*, Leipzig, 1902, p. 18.

8. Sacraments in mystery religions. — It is possible that the conceptions discussed in the last section underlie such sacramental rites as may be found in mystery-religions, though here we must beware of reading too much between the lines of the scanty evidence transmitted to us.

(*a*) In the Eleusinia certain acts of a sacramental character had a place. What that place was and what precise meaning was attached to them are largely matters of conjecture. As a preparation for the mysteries, the candidates had to be free from crime, and purity of heart and life was necessary. Ceremonial purifications were also used, and before entering the sacred enclosure at night the μύσται fasted. Apart from other things done or seen, they partook of a cup of κυκέων—a thick gruel of meal and water, resembling the draught of barley, groats, water, and penny-royal leaves drunk by the mourning Demeter after her nine days' fast.[1] If the emendation by Lobeck[2] of the text in which Clement of Alexandria describes this rite is correct, possibly sacred bread or cake was also eaten.

'I fasted, I drank the κυκέων, I took from the ark, and, having tasted (ἐγγευσάμενος), I put it away in the basket and from the basket into the ark.'[3]

The unemended text suggests the handling (ἐργασάμενος) of a sacred object rather than the tasting of sacred food. What did this drinking and eating mean to the worshippers? Some inquirers have seen in it a sacramental communion with Demeter in her passion—an infusion of her life into the worshipper.[4] The secret of Eleusis has been well kept, and these views are quite hypothetical. But the whole group of rites, including this 'sacrament,' was certainly regarded as beneficial and assuring immortality. The μύσται were thrice-blessed and believed that divinity was present with them.[5] These effects were probably not attached to the sacramental rite only.

(*b*) In the mysteries of Attis, besides the smearing of the lips of the μύσται with holy oil and the uttering of the words, 'Be assured, O μύσται, the god has been saved: thus for you there shall be salvation from ills,'[6] at some point in the ritual, they ate and drank sacred food according to a formula preserved by Clement and Firmicus Maternus. The nature of the food is unknown. Firmicus says that into the inner parts of a temple a man about to die (symbolically or ritually?) was admitted and said:

'I have eaten out of the tympanum, I have drunk from the cymbal; I am an initiate of Attis.'[7]

Clement gives the formula as:

'I have eaten from the tympanum, I have drunk from the cymbal; I have carried the *kernos* [a tray with cups]; I have gone beneath the *pastos*.'[8]

Tympanum and cymbal figured in the myth of Attis. Here again the purpose of the rite is obscure, though some writers boldly maintain that it was to bring the μύσται into closer communion with the god.[9] Dieterich thinks that the initiate, about to die a symbolic death, was reborn through the sacramental food, for Firmicus goes on to commend the true food of life—the Christian Eucharist — as conferring immortality, whereas 'thou hast eaten poison and drunk the cup of death.'[10]

[1] Cf. *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, 206 f.; Eustathius, on Homer, *Il.* xi. 638.
[2] *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829, p. 831.
[3] Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* ii. 21 (89).
[4] F. B. Jevons, *An Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, London, 1896, ch. xxiv.; Farnell, in *EBr*¹¹ xix. 120 f., *HJ* ii. 315 f., *ERE* vi. 409ᵃ; P. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, London, 1892, p. 383 f., *The Origin of the Lord's Supper*, do. 1893, p. 17.
[5] Pindar, frag. cxvi.
[6] Firm. Mat. *de Errore Profan. Relig.*, ed. K. Ziegler, Leipzig, 1907, p. 57.
[7] *Ib.* p. 43.
[8] Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* ii. 15 (47 ff.).
[9] *GB*³, pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 274.
[10] A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 103, 163.

(*c*) In Mithraism there was some form of sacrament, as the words of Justin Martyr and Tertullian show. Justin says that bread and a cup of water were set forth with certain words of blessing in the sacred rites.[1] Tertullian says that Mithra signs his soldiers in their foreheads, celebrates an oblation of bread, and introduces a symbol of the resurrection.[2] Both Fathers looked upon this sacrament and other rites as a parody of Christian rites suggested by demons. It is not at all improbable that the sacramental rite was adopted as an imitation of the Eucharist. Pliny, however, speaks of *magicis cœnis* in Mithraism.[3] On a bas-relief from Konjica (Bosnia) this sacrament is supposed to be represented. Two figures, one holding a drinking-horn, recline at a table, in front of which is a tripod holding small loaves of bread. On either side stand human figures, one a Persian, two with masks representing a lion and a raven, and a fourth mutilated figure. The Persian holds aloft a drinking-horn.[4] Is this the rite to which Justin refers? If it is, it tells us nothing of its meaning, and Pfleiderer's assertion that the standing figures represent the nature of Mithra under different attributes, and show that they have thus 'put on' the god, is somewhat extravagant.[5] The figures seem to be initiates of the different degrees, and there is no evidence that the sacrament was a mystic communion with Mithra, a partaking of his divine nature, as other writers have also asserted. The likeness which the Fathers saw between this rite and the Eucharist leaves its actual purpose doubtful, and we can only regard it as a rite of communion in a somewhat vague sense, like most of such rites in the mysteries. Cumont interprets it as communicating to the neophyte force to combat evil spirits and conferring on him, as on his god, a glorious immortality.[6] There is certainly no proof that the rite had any connexion with the slaying of a bull, so often represented in Mithraic bas-reliefs, or with the Zoroastrian future mythic slaying of the bull Hadhayāṣ, by Saoshyant at the last day, from the fat of which, mixed with the juice of white *haoma*, a drink would be prepared which would assure immortality to all men.

(*d*) In the cult of the gods of Samothrace, as a recently discovered but incomplete inscription shows, some rite of eating and drinking occurred. The priest 'broke the cake and poured forth the cup for the *μύσται*.' The inscription has been restored in this sense, and, if it is correct, some sacramental act seems to be suggested.[7]

For sacraments in Mandaeism see *ERE* viii. 387[a], 389, and, further, A. J. H. W. Brandt, *Die mandaische Religion*, Leipzig, 1889, pp. 107 f., 293 f.

In this connexion it should be noted that the phrases expressing mystic union, desired or realized, with a god, in the so-called Mithras Liturgy ('Remain with me in my soul'), in the London Papyrus ('Come to me, Lord Hermes, as babes into the wombs of women'), and in the Leyden Papyrus ('For Thou art I, and I am Thou'), quoted by Dieterich,[8] have no connexion with a sacramental meal.

Did these sacramental rites in the mystery religions impart new life and immortality? Quite possibly they were thought to do so. Plutarch says that the worshippers at the sacrificial banquets looked beyond the mere feast and had a good hope and the belief that God was present with them, and that He accepted their service graciously. Much of this may have been present in the mysteries also. Considering, however, that we know so little of the nature of those sacramental rites, it is ludicrous to find several writers regarding them, not merely as resembling, but actually as the source of, the Christian Eucharist. Nor is there any real evidence that a rite of 'eating the god' was a common or usual one in paganism when Christianity was first founded and promulgated.

[1] Justin, *Apol.* i. 66, *Dial. c. Tryph.* 70.
[2] *De Praescr. Haer.* 40. [3] Pliny, *HN* xxx. 2 (6).
[4] F. Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1896–99, i. 157 f.
[5] O. Pfleiderer, *The Early Christian Conception of Christ*, London, 1905, p. 129 f.
[6] Cumont, i. 321 [7] Dieterich, p. 104 f. [8] P. 97

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SACRAMENTS (Christian, Eastern).—The doctrine of the Holy Orthodox Eastern Church concerning the 'mysteries' (*i.e.* the sacraments) is officially stated in (1) *The Orthodox Confession of Faith*, composed by Peter Mogila, metropolitan of Kiev (1623–47),[1] and (2) the *Acts of the Synod of Jerusalem* (Bethlehem) of 1672.[2] In these documents the Orthodox sacramental system has been defined, in opposition to that of the Reformed Churches, in terms more in harmony with those of contemporary Roman Catholicism than with those of the early Eastern Fathers.

A mystery is defined as 'a rite, which under some visible form (*εἶδος*) is the cause of, and conveys to the soul of a faithful man, the invisible grace of God; instituted by our Lord, through whom each of the faithful receives divine grace.'[3] Mysteries were instituted to be 'badges (*σημάδια*) of the true sons of God,' 'sure signs (*σημεῖα*)' of our faith, and 'indubitable remedies (*ἰατρικά*)' against sins.[4]

Three things are necessary in a mystery: (*a*) its proper matter (*ὕλη*)—*e.g.*, water in baptism; (*b*) a properly ordained priest (*ἱερεύς*) or bishop; (*c*) the invocation (*ἐπίκλησις*) of the Holy Spirit, with the form of words, 'whereby the Priest consecrates the Mystery by the Power of the Holy Spirit, if he have the definite intention (*γνώμη ἀποφασισμένη*) of consecrating it.'[5] This insistence on the Epiclesis and the operation of the Spirit is a marked characteristic of Orthodox sacramental teaching.

There are seven mysteries: Baptism, Chrism, the Holy Eucharist, the Priesthood, Penitence, Marriage, Unction.

1. Baptism is administered by triple immersion in pure water, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, normally by a priest, but in cases of necessity by any Orthodox person. Those to be baptized must either themselves or, if infants, by an Orthodox sponsor renounce the devil and all his works and confess the ('Nicene') Creed. The fruits of baptism are the abolition of all sin previously contracted, original and actual, with its penalties, regeneration or renewal into a state of complete purification (*τέλεια κάθαρσις*)[6] and original justification,[7] and conferring of the indelible 'character' of members of Christ's Body and immortality.[8]

2. Chrism (*τὸ μύρον τοῦ χρίσματος*).—The baptized

[1] See questions xcvii.–cxiv. of pt. i. of 'Ὀρθόδοξος ὁμολογία τῆς πίστεως τῆς καθολικῆς καὶ ἀποστολικῆς ἐκκλησίας τῆς ἀνατολικῆς,' in E. J. Kimmel, *Monumenta Fidei Ecclesiae Orientalis*, pt. i. pp. 169–197. The Greek translation of Mogila's Russian *Confession* was authorized by the four Eastern patriarchs at Constantinople in 1643 as 'faithfully following the Dogmas of Christ's Church, and agreeable to the Holy Canons.'
[2] See 'Synodus Hierosolymitana adversus Calvinistas,' in Kimmel, pt. i. pp. 308, 404–406, 448–463 (= *Dosithei Confessio*, decreta xv.–xviii.). The Latin translation is not always reliable. This Synod holds a position in the Eastern Church similar to that of the Council of Trent in the Roman. Its main concern was to anathematize Cyril Lucar's attempt in his *Oriental Confession* to bring the Orthodox theology into harmony with the Reformed.
[3] *Orthodox Confession*, p. 170. The references throughout are to Kimmel's *Monumenta*.
[4] *Ib.* p. 171. [5] *Ib.* p. 171. [6] *Ib.* p. 455.
[7] *Ib.* p. 175. [8] *Ib.* pp. 172–175, 452–456

are at once anointed with chrism (a mixture of oil, balsam, and ointments) consecrated by a bishop, and applied by a priest to the brow, eyes, nostrils, mouth, and ears, with the words, 'The Seal of the Gift of the Holy Spirit. Amen.' This rite is the equivalent of the Western 'confirmation,' and is held to effect participation in the Holy Spirit, and increase and confirmation (βεβαίωσις) in grace. Lk 24[49] is the authority quoted for its institution by Christ.[1]

3. **The Holy Eucharist** excels all other mysteries. It can be celebrated only by a lawful (νόμιμος) priest, and on an altar (θυσιαστήριον) or consecrated cloth (ἀντιμίσιον). Leavened bread is used and pure wine, mingled with water during the rite. At the time of consecration the priest must intend that the substance (οὐσία) of the bread and wine be changed into the substance (οὐσία) of the true Body and Blood of Christ, by the operation of the Holy Spirit, expressly invoked by him for this definite purpose. This invocation immediately (παρευθύς) effects a 'change of substance' (μετουσίωσις),[2] apart from the use of the elements for communion; thereafter only the forms (εἴδη) of the bread and wine remain; 'truly and in reality and in substance' (ἀληθῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς καὶ οὐσιωδῶς) the bread and wine become the very Body and Blood of Christ;[3] in the mystery Christ is 'really present' (κατὰ πρᾶγμα παρών), and it is right 'to worship and adore (λατρεύειν) the Holy Eucharist even as our Saviour Himself.'[4] The Eucharist is an 'unbloody sacrifice' (ἀναίμαστος θυσία), propitiatory (ἱλαστική), offered on behalf of all the faithful, living and departed.[5] The Holy Communion is given to all the faithful under both kinds—to the clergy separately, to the laity by means of intinction. Newly-baptized infants are communicated immediately after receiving the chrism. The fruits of the mystery are remembrance of the passion and death of Christ, propitiation for sins, defence against temptations, and the indwelling of Christ in the faithful. Preparation for communion consists of confession, fasting, and reconciliation with all men.[6]

4. **Priesthood** (ἱερωσύνη) is (*a*) 'spiritual,' which is shared by all believers (cf. 1 P 2[5, 9], Rev 5[10], Ro 12[1]); and (*b*) 'sacramental' (μυστηριώδης). The latter can be conferred only by bishops who have received authority for that purpose from the Apostles in unbroken succession. The 'matter' of this mystery is the laying on of hands (ἐπίθεσις τῶν χείρων, χειροτονία), the formula the invocation of the Holy Spirit, with express mention of the function for which ordination is conferred. The functions of the higher 'orders' (τάξεις) include those of the lower. A bishop, after his election has been confirmed by the bishops of the patriarchate or province, must be ordained by at least three other bishops. The episcopate is necessary for the very existence of the Church; without a bishop the Church could not be governed; he is 'the fount of all the mysteries,' and 'the living image of God upon earth.'[7] He alone can ordain priests, confer the lower orders, and consecrate the chrism. Priests can administer all the mysteries except priesthood; their chief functions are to consecrate and offer the Eucharist, and, if authorized thereto by the bishop, preach and absolve penitents.[1] There are also deacons, subdeacons, readers, exorcists, door-keepers, singers, light-bearers.[2] The fruit of ordination is authority (ἐξουσία) and grace to perform the functions of the order.[3]

5. **Penitence** (μετάνοια) consists of oral confession to an Orthodox priest, who assesses penance and pronounces absolution; in doing so he declares himself a sinner and God the Pardoner. This mystery is fruitless unless the penitent is an Orthodox Christian, truly sorry for his sins, purposeful of amendment, and prepared to carry out the penance imposed. Confession should be made at least once, but normally four times, a year. In practice it is frequently of a very formal nature.[4]

6. **Honourable marriage** (ὁ τίμιος γάμος).—This mystery is in the first place celebrated by the mutual consent of a man and a woman (there being no impediment), but is not considered by the Church a true (ἀληθινός) marriage unless they confirm their consent in the presence of a priest, and, having joined hands, promise to be faithful to each other till death. The civil law of the Eastern Empire permitted divorce *a vinculo*, and the Eastern Church permits such divorce not only for adultery, but for high treason, insanity, leprosy, and other causes. The innocent party may re-marry; no one may obtain a divorce more than once.[5]

7. **Unction** (τὸ εὐχέλαιον), instituted by Christ (Mk 6[13]) for the sick, is administered only by a priest, with pure oil, a prayer setting forth its efficacy being said during the anointing. This unction is not, as among the Latins, reserved for those *in extremis*, but is administered with a view to the recovery of the sick person. Its recipient must first have confessed to a priest.[6]

Of the seven mysteries the Eastern Orthodox Church affirms that they are 'effectual instruments of grace to the initiated, of necessity' (ὄργανα δραστικὰ τοῖς μυομένοις χάριτος ἐξ ἀνάγκης),[7] which amounts to a declaration that they are efficacious *ex opere operato*. Each of the mysteries is administered with lengthy rites and elaborate ceremony, but these are not regarded as necessary to their efficacy, but may vary in different parts of the Church, provided the essentials, as stated, are maintained.

The sacramental system in the separated Monophysite and Nestorian Churches is the same as that of the Orthodox in principle and in practice; there are, however, considerable variations in the liturgical framework of the mysteries and in their accompanying ceremonies, nor has their sacramental doctrine been so definitely formulated.

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[1] *Orthodox Confession*, pp. 175–179, 449.
[2] *Ib.* p. 180.
[3] *Ib.* p. 462.
[4] *Ib.* pp. 126 and 183. Although the mode of this change of substance is not defined (*ib.* p. 461), it is stated to be 'not typically or figuratively (οὐ τυπικῶς οὐδ' εἰκονικῶς), not by virtue of abounding grace (οὐδὲ χάριτι ὑπερβαλλούσῃ),' *i.e.* the Calvinist doctrine (p. 461, 2), nor 'by impanation' (κατ' ἀναρτισμόν), *i.e.* Luther's 'consubstantiation' (p. 459), but in such wise that the Body and Blood of Christ are given to 'the mouth and stomach' of both faithful and unfaithful receivers (p. 458). The verbs μεταποιεῖσθαι, μεταβάλλεσθαι, μεταρρυθμίζεσθαι, are used to describe the change (p. 457).
[5] Pp. 183, 461, 464.
[6] P. 184.
[7] Pp. 437, 442, 438.

SACRAMENTS (Christian, Western).—The word *sacramentum* first appears in Christian use as the accepted equivalent of the Greek μυστήριον, standing uniformly for it in the O.L. of the canonical books. There is nothing in the known classical use of the word to account for this. It is there found in two senses: (1) of the pledge or security deposited in public keeping by the parties engaged

[1] P. 441.
[2] P. 188; cf. *Metrophanis Confessio*, in Kimmel, pt. ii. p. 139.
[3] P. 441.
[4] Pp. 164, 189–193.
[5] Pp. 193–195; cf. art. MARRIAGE (Christian), vol. viii. p. 437 ff.
[6] Pp. 195–197.
[7] P. 450.

in a lawsuit, and thence of a lawsuit in general; (2) of the oath taken by Roman soldiers to their *imperator*, and thence loosely of any oath. Both senses had some effect on the development of Christian doctrine, but they do not account for the adoption of the word as a rendering of *μυστήριον*. It is probable that there was a popular sense of the word which has left no trace in extant literature apart from Christian writers. If so, it must be determined by the earliest Christian use.

Here it is necessary to refer to the letter of Pliny[1] regarding the Christians of his province. He observed that they assembled for worship, 'seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent.' He evidently understood the word of a pledge or oath, but his description does not answer to anything known in Christian origins, and it seems certain that he misunderstood the information given him. What is interesting is the use of the word *sacramentum*. It must have been used either by the Christians examined, if they spoke Latin, or by an interpreter. In the latter case it will be an example of the popular sense here assumed.

What that sense was may be gathered from Tertullian, *de Præscr.* 20, where he speaks of the unity of Christians:

'Dum est illis communicatio pacis, et appellatio fraternitatis, et contesseratio hospitalitatis; quae iura non alia ratio regit quam eiusdem sacramenti una traditio.'

Here *sacramentum* can be nothing less than the whole Christian religion.[2] The word seems to signify any kind of religious institution, general or particular. Thus for St. Cyprian the Church is 'sacramentum unitatis.' By insisting on the likeness of baptism and other 'sacramenta divina' to the Mithraic and other mysteries, Tertullian[3] recalls the Greek original and shows that he considered the word a just translation. It is possible that St. Thomas Aquinas, in his etymological guess[4] relating *sacramentum* to *sacrare* exactly as *ornamentum* to *ornare*, lighted upon the true development of the word.

Another sense emerges when Tertullian calls the types of the OT 'figurarum sacramenta.'[5] With this we may compare Cyprian's saying about the seamless robe: 'Sacramento uestis et signo declarauit ecclesiae unitatem.'[6]

When Tertullian says 'Vocati sumus ad militiam Dei uiui iam tunc, cum in sacramenti uerba respondimus,'[7] he has in mind the military oath, and perhaps plays consciously on the word, likening the mystical initiation of baptism to the soldier's enrolment. Cæcilius of Biltha, in the Council convened by Cyprian, used the phrase 'sacramentum interrogat' in much the same way,[8] and the analogy became a commonplace.

Cyprian's collocation of *sacramentum* and *signum* suggests a current use of the word which may enable us to establish more precisely its equivalence to *μυστήριον*. The legal deposit or security of a lawsuit had a symbolic value as well as its real value, representing the whole matter in dispute. It may have been called *sacramentum* for this reason, or, on the other hand, that word may have acquired the generic sense of a symbol from this specific use. There is no direct evidence for either conclusion, but the religious formalities and sanctions of Roman jurisprudence, which involved this use of a word evidently of sacred associations, would facilitate its retransfer to religious uses with a new sense thus acquired. It would then stand for any kind of religious symbolism, and in particular for the rites of a mystery-religion. Such use is certainly implied when St. Augustine says that signs or symbolic actions, 'cum ad res diuinas pertinent, sacramenta appellantur.'[9] The words

[illegible] reference (*de Res. Carn.* 23) to St. Paul's knowledge [illegible] 'sacramenta' (1 Co 13[illegible]), and to the Christian understanding of the 'sacramenta Dei' (*c. Marc.* iii. 16).

[illegible] *de Bapt.* 5.

[4] *In IV. Sent.* i. 1. 5.

[5] *C. Marc.* v. 1.

[6] *De Cath. Eccl. Unit.* 7.

[7] *Ad Mart.* 3.

[illegible] ed. G. Hartel, Vienna, 1868-71, p. 437.

[illegible]

of *Serm.* 272, 'Ista dicuntur sacramenta, quia in eis aliud uidetur, aliud intellegitur,' look like an appeal to the common understanding; and in the same connexion he renews the identification of *mysterium* and *sacramentum*, saying, 'Mysterium uestrum in mensa dominica positum est,' that is to say, 'the mystery or sacrament of what you yourselves are,' namely, the Body of Christ. In *de Civ. Dei*, x. 5, he seems to be defining *sacramentum*:

'Sacrificium uisibile inuisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum, est.'

But he probably did not intend a formal definition, any more than when he called sacraments 'signacula ueritatis.'[1] His constant recurrence to this idea, however, prepared the way for the formal definition which Isidore of Seville propounded towards the end of the 7th century:

'Sacramentum est in aliqua celebratione, cum res gesta ita fit, ut aliquid significari intellegatur quod sancte accipiendum est.'[2]

Augustine used the word in its widest extension of meaning, as did Leo the Great,[3] but he moved in the direction of making it more specific, as when he spoke of the 'pauca sacramenta saluberrima' of the gospel,[4] or contrasted the manifold rites of the OT with the few of the NT, saying:

'Sacramentis numero paucissimis, obseruatione facillimis, significatione praestantissimis, societatem noui populi colligauit.'[5]

This implies the same limitation which the word *celebratio* imports into Isidore's definition. The movement was slow. It is noteworthy that Isidore himself could still speak of 'sacramentum Trinitatis.'[6] But the tendency was to restrict the use of the word to some action, *res gesta*, done with symbolic significance as a rite of the Church.

The fact that St. Jerome contemporaneously substituted *mysterium* for *sacramentum* in many passages of his revised version of the Scriptures does not seem to have any bearing on this movement, for he evidently did not distinguish the words on any principle. They were still true equivalents. He retained *sacramentum* in the following texts: Dn 2^{18} 4^{6}, To 12^{7}, Wis 2^{22}, Eph 1^{9} $3^{3.9}$ 5^{32}, 1 Ti 3^{16}, Rev 1^{20}. The whole range of meaning which *μυστήριον* can have is here included.

The importance of the symbolic sense has a consequence. The compendious definition 'signum rei sacrae' involves the distinction between *signum* and *res*, which appears definitely in the writings of Augustine, and acquires great importance in the system of theology ultimately elaborated from his teaching. At times he makes the distinction very sharp. The *signum* is visible, or presented to other senses than sight; the *res* is invisible. He notes two kinds of *signa*—those which are *naturalia*, as the track of an animal or smoke showing where there is fire, and those which are *data*, or merely conventional;[7] and sacraments are evidently of the latter kind, so that *signum* and *res* are arbitrarily conjoined. Elsewhere he observes that in the case of such conventions the sign may be identified with (*sustinere personam*) the thing signified, as when St. Paul says 'That rock was Christ,'[8] but only by a figure of speech. This of *signa* in general; in a passage often quoted he says much the same of sacraments:

'Si sacramenta quamdam similitudinem earum rerum quarum sacramenta sunt non haberent, omnino sacramenta non essent. Ex hac autem similitudine plerumque etiam ipsarum rerum nomina accipiunt. Sicut ergo secundum quemdam modum sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est, sacramentum sanguinis Christi sanguis Christi est, ita sacramentum fidei fides est.'

But this must be read with the context. He has been asked how an infant brought to baptism can be said to have faith; he replies that the child has *fidem* because he has the *sacramentum fidei*, and he goes on to say that this is sufficient for salva-

[1] *De Ver. Rel.* 17.

[2] *Etym.* vi. 19.

[3] *E.g.*, 'sacramentum incarnationis' (*Serm.* 24).

[4] *De Ver. Rel.* 17.

[5] *Ep.* 54.

[6] *C. Jud.* i. 4.

[7] *De Doctr. Christ.* ii. 1.

[8] *De Civ. Dei* xviii. 48.

tion if subsequent sin does not undo what is done. He has said immediately before:

'Nonne semel immolatus est Christus in seipso, et tamen in sacramento non solum per omnes Paschae solemnitates sed omni die populis immolatur, nec utique mentitur qui interrogatus eum responderit immolari.'[1]

This crucial passage therefore sets up something more than a typical or figurative relation between *signum* and *res*, and from this beginning proceeded the theology of the School.

So far the meaning of *sacramentum* is narrowed only to the case where there is a sensible sign of an intelligible reality. But Augustine did much more than impress on the word this connotation. His elaborated doctrine of grace, and his insistence on the connexion of this with certain sacraments, and especially with baptism, afforded ground for a narrower distinction. His statements must be read with care. When he says 'Sacramenta Noui Testamenti dant salutem; sacramenta Veteris Testamenti promiserunt Saluatorem,'[2] he probably means the whole content of revelation. His conception of the working of grace made it impossible for him to tie this absolutely to particular rites or ordinances, and he was constantly enlarging on the futility of such a notion, but he was equally clear that certain sacraments were the ordinary vehicles for the conveyance of grace to the soul. It followed that certain ordinances might be distinguished as so used, and this distinction became the basis of the subsequent doctrine of the sacraments.

It is noteworthy that in the case of marriage, the *sacramentum magnum* of Eph 5[32], he does not seem to have recognized any conveyance of saving grace. The *bona matrimonii* were *proles, fides, et sacramentum*, but by *sacramentum* he seems to have meant only its symbolism of Christ and the Church, in consequence of which marriage became (*a*) indissoluble, as it would not be by natural law 'nisi alicuius rei maioris . . . quoddam sacramentum adhiberetur,'[3] and (*b*) so sacred that the liberties taken even by virtuous pagans, such as Cato, were now intolerable.[4]

It was not, however, until the 12th cent. that the doctrine was formulated. Even then Hugh of St. Victor[5] spoke of sacraments with the older generality, enumerating no fewer than 30 in particular. Shortly after his date appeared the *Libri Sententiarum* of Peter Lombard, which speedily became a textbook of the Schools and so acquired an importance disproportionate to its merits. He distinguished seven sacraments specifically conferring grace: Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Order, and Marriage. The various grounds given by his commentators for this limitation and enumeration indicate that it was in fact arbitrary. St. Thomas Aquinas seems to state the whole truth when he propounds, as the reason for maintaining it, the fact 'quod communiter ordinantur ab omnibus sacramenta, sicut prius dictum est.'[6]

In the *Summa c. Gentiles*, iv. 58, Aquinas develops an analogy with nature. Corporal life has three essential needs: birth, growth, and nutriment, to which correspond Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist; and one *per accidens* in case of need, *i.e.* healing, to which answer Penance and Extreme Unction. There are further required a source and an ordering of life, parents and governors, which are provided in the system of the Church by the sacraments of Order, supplying spiritual needs alone, and of Marriage, supplying both spiritual and corporal needs. Other *scholia* are even more forced and artificial. Some better varieties are collected in *Summa Theol.* III. lxv. 2.

Yet this septenary system, however ill-founded it may seem, bore the test of criticism as understood in the Schools of the Middle Ages; and its general acceptance by the Greeks, who were not much disposed to borrow doctrine from Latins, seems to indicate that it was either drawn from a wider tradition or based on a larger sense of fitness than appears on the surface. It is not pretended that the number is anywhere found expressed earlier than the 12th cent., when Otto of Bamberg introduced it into a catechetical instruction for his Pomeranian converts (*c.* 1127), but he propounds it as an accepted tradition. Shortly after him Hugh of St. Victor, though using the word more generally, distinguishes the 'septem principalia sacramenta,' which were later set in a category apart. Contemporary with them was Gregory of Bergamo, who has the same classification in his treatise *de Veritate Corporis Christi*. A scheme recognized by men of such diverse associations, and not put forward as a novelty, must certainly have been for some time current, though it can be traced no higher. This must be remembered when the general adoption of the scheme is attributed with good reason to the influence of Peter Lombard and his commentators in the schools of theology. From the 13th cent. onwards the seven sacraments were mentioned with more or less of dogmatic assertion by numerous minor councils, by the General Council of Constance, and notably in the *Decretum pro Armenis* promulgated by Eugenius IV. at the Council of Florence, which followed almost verbally the *Opusculum Quartum* of Thomas Aquinas. Finally the Council of Trent condemned under anathema any who should say 'sacramenta nouae legis non fuisse omnia a Iesu Christo Domino nostro instituta, aut esse plura uel pauciora quam septem.'[1]

There is a subordinate classification of *sacramenta mortuorum*, which confer first grace (Baptism and Penance), and *sacramenta uiuorum*, which confer special graces on persons in the state of grace.

This more precise teaching, which had been gradually gaining ground, is in evident conflict with the language of the Fathers and of many writers down to the 12th cent., and in particular with the statement of St. Bernard[2] that the washing of feet is a sacrament for the remission of venial sins. He says emphatically that our Lord's action was done 'pro sacramento, non pro solo exemplo.' To avoid this difficulty, theologians have generally argued that sacraments are spoken of either *sensu generico* or *sensu proprio*. A sacrament *proprie dictum* is one of the seven, and it is argued, not very successfully, that Bernard himself observed this distinction and used the word in the generic sense. The distinction first appears in Peter Lombard's definition:

'Sacramentum proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae Dei, et inuisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa existat.'[3]

The weakness of the distinction lies in the implication that the name originally belonged to the ordinances thus specified, and was then extended in a loose sense to others, which is an exact inversion of the historic movement. The difficulty is thinly disguised by the practice, common to theologians, of calling other ordinances resembling the proper sacraments by the name of *sacramentalia*. Such are the anointing of kings, the clothing and consecration of nuns, and various benedictions.

The several sacraments being treated in this work under their proper heads, it is sufficient here to speak in general terms of what is common to them.

1. Institution. — According to the Tridentine definition, all sacraments were instituted by our Lord Jesus Christ. This follows from the limitation of the term confining it to ordinances by which grace is conferred. Thomas Aquinas carefully distinguishes between the divine nature, which is the source of grace, and the humanity of our Lord, by which the gift is mediated to us, the

[1] *Ep.* 98; cf. *in Ps.* 21.
[2] *In Ps.* 73.
[3] *De Bono Coniug.* 7.
[4] *De Fide et Operibus*, 7.
[5] *De Sacr. Chr. Fidei.*
[6] *Summa Theol.* III. lxv. 2.

[1] Sess. vii. can. 1.
[2] *Serm. in Cena Dom.* p. 897, ed. Mabillon.
[3] *In IV. Sent.* IV. i. 2.

sacraments being by His authority an extension of this mediation, though 'Ipse potuit effectum sacramentorum sine exteriori sacramento conferre.'[1] He has been closely followed by all theologians, but obvious lack of evidence in the case of some sacraments has led to a distinction between immediate institution by our Lord and institution by others acting on His authority. St. John Bonaventura argued that Confirmation and Extreme Unction were thus instituted by the Apostles.[2] Alexander of Hales went so far as to ascribe the origin of Confirmation to a council of the 9th century.[3] The point has been laboured since the Council of Trent by almost all commentators; some assert that immediate institution by our Lord while on earth, and the committal of the institution to the written or unwritten tradition of the Church, are defined as *de fide* by the Council; others say that it certainly follows from the words of the Council, but is not expressly defined; others deny the necessity of this consequence, but will not venture to call the conclusion in doubt; Franzelin[4] and other moderns find it hard to believe that the Council anathematized the teaching of St. Bonaventura or determined a historic question of such dubiety, but nevertheless maintain on *a priori* grounds the narrowest interpretation of the definition. In the Pontifical Letter *Lamentabili* of 1907 Pius X. condemned various propositions calling in question the immediate institution of the sacraments by Christ Himself.

2. **Ordering.**—The institution of the sacraments by our Lord being assumed, it seems to follow that some conditions of their valid administration are imposed. Since they derive their efficacy only from divine appointment, those conditions must be jealously guarded. Hence comes the theological notion of the 'substance' of the sacraments which the Church has no power to vary.

The decree of the Council of Trent invalidating marriages contracted without the presence of the *parochus* was opposed on this ground. If the consent of the parties was sufficient, as had always been held, to constitute a valid marriage, to vary this rule was to touch the substance of the sacrament. The objection is overruled by the fine distinction that the effect of the decree is only to render the parties *inhabiles*.[5]

The same consideration imposes the rule of tutiorism. Where there is any possibility of doubt as to the content of the substance of a sacrament, nothing must be neglected which there is even slender ground for supposing necessary. The safer course of including it must be followed in practice.

The factors in the substance of a sacrament are conveniently summarized under three heads: the minister, the intention of the minister, the matter and form. The intention of the minister has been treated elsewhere (art. INTENTION [Theological]); the other two heads can be more simply examined here.

(*a*) *Minister.*—Since in a sacrament there is always something done, a doer is required; and, since it is to be done by the appointment of Christ, it is important to ascertain who has authority to act. Apart from the Ignatian insistence on the part of the bishop in the Eucharist, which might be treated as mere matter of discipline, the earliest question raised on this head appears in the baptismal controversy of the 3rd century. Cyprian maintained with logical consistency that Baptism, being a conveyance of the gifts of grace deposited in the Church, could be administered only by the Church. Narrowly defining the Church, he denied that heretics or schismatics could baptize. In other words, the minister of the sacrament must be a Catholic Christian. Arguing thus, he defended the practice of his predecessor Agrippinus, and apparently of all the African bishops, who rebaptized all heretics coming to them. Stephen of Rome maintained that this was an innovation, meeting it with the peremptory demand, 'Nihil innouetur nisi quod traditum est.'[1] The historic question is not easily determined. There had probably been a long-standing divergence of practice. Cyprian was supported by Firmilian of Cæsarea and other Easterns; the Donatists inherited his contention, and pressed it; but Augustine asserts that the contrary opinion, fortified by conciliar decisions, was already exclusively held among Catholics before the date of his birth, A.D. 353.[2] This conclusion about Baptism carried with it a like consequence in regard to other sacraments, and the Council of Nicæa agreed to receive Novatian bishops as validly ordained.

In the Western Church, however, disputes about the validity of schismatical ordinations long continued, as witness the history of St. Wilfrid in England, and of Formosus at Rome. The scandals arising out of the latter case led to the establishment of the judgment in favour of such ordinations secured by the influence of St. Peter Damian.[3]

During the later Middle Ages the contention of the Donatists was revived in a new form by the Puritan sects to which the practical corruptions of the Church gave rise. The power of ministering the sacraments was restricted by them to men of openly virtuous life. In the Profession of Faith imposed on the Waldensians by Innocent III. this opinion is expressly repudiated. It re-appeared in the teaching of Wyclif, was condemned by John XXII. in his Constitution against the Fraticelli, and by the Council of Constance in dealing with the Hussites.

The common teaching of theologians as against these errors is that a sacrament has its effect from God and from the institution of Christ, and not from anything which the minister himself contributes, his action being purely ministerial. When he performs what is required of him in this immediate connexion, the act is complete. The doctrine is safeguarded by the assertion that a sacrament is effective *ex opere operato*. The phrase first becomes conspicuous in the treatise *de Sacro Altaris Myst.* of Innocent III., who seems to have been taught it by his master Pierre of Poictiers in the school of Paris. He fixes the meaning precisely:

'Quamuis opus operans aliquando sit immundum, semper tamen opus operatum est mundum.'[4]

The *opus operans* is the personal action of the minister; *opus operatum* is the sacramental effect produced by this action. The distinction was repeated by William of Auxerre and by Alexander of Hales, but was not yet fully established in use when Aquinas wrote his commentary on the Sentences, for he there says only that it was employed 'a quibusdam.'[5] He also varied the sense of the distinction as used by his predecessors, making *opus operans* equivalent to *usus sacramenti*. Later theologians have preferred the form *opus operantis*, which fixes the meaning more exactly on the personal action of the minister or the recipient. The other member of the distinction is perfectly stable; *opus operatum* is the thing done according to the institution of Christ, and having its effect therefrom. It was ultimately defined in the Council of Trent that by the sacraments of the New Law grace is conferred *ex opere operato*.[6]

It will be convenient to mention here the doctrine of *obex*. The word dates from Augustine, who, in his critical Letter to

[1] *Summa Theol.* III. lxiv. 3.
[2] *In IV. Sent.* VII. i. 1, XXIII. i. 2.
[3] *In IV. Sent.* IX. i.
[4] *De Sacr. in Gen.* xiv.
[5] De Smet, *De Sponsalibus et Matrimonio*, Bruges, 1910, p. 264, note (2), citing the authority of Benedict XIV.

[1] Cypr. *Ep.* 74.
[2] *De Bapt.* ii. 14.
[3] The subject is fully treated by L. Saltet, *Les Reordinations*, Paris, 1907.
[4] III. 5.
[5] *In IV. Sent.* I. v. 1.
[6] Sess. VII. 'de Sacr. in Gen.' 8.

Boniface on the baptism of infants, wrote that the child 'etiamsi fidem nondum habeat in cogitatione, non ei tamen obicem contrariae cogitationis opponit, unde sacramentum eius salubriter percipit.'[1] The *obex* here is a mental state opposed to faith, which in the case of an adult might annul the saving effect of the sacrament. The argument has been extended to the operation of the sacraments in general. An *obex* must be distinguished from a defect such as lack of necessary intention, or a personal incapacity for sacramental grace (*e.g.*, lack of baptism in the case of other sacraments, and certain diriment impediments in the case of marriage) which is nullifying in a different manner. The sacrament is in this case understood to be valid; it impresses character, if it be one of those having that effect; it may ultimately confer grace by reviviscence when the *obex* is removed; but the soul receives no benefit of justifying grace from the immediate operation. The *obex* is a state of soul actively repugnant to the working of grace. A favourably active disposition is not required in such sort that the infusion of grace will be due to the co-operation of the recipient, as if *ex opere operantis*; a passive disposition suffices for adults as for infants; but, where an *obex* exists, the active operation of the recipient is needed for its removal, since the hindering state of soul cannot be changed without his will. The Council of Trent anathematized 'si quis dixerit, sacramenta nouae legis . . . gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem non conferre.'[2]

So far it is seen only that neither orthodoxy nor personal sanctity is requisite in the minister of a sacrament. A larger licence, of which obscure indications are found in earlier times, appears definitely in the *Responsa ad Bulgaros* of Nicolaus I. The pope considers two cases. The first (ch. 14) is that of a pretended priest who had baptized many converts; the answer is that persons baptized 'a quocunque Christiano' are not to be rebaptized. The second (ch. 104) is that of a Jew—whether Christian or unbeliever was not ascertained—who also had baptized many. In respect of these the pope answers:

'Hi profecto, si in nomine Sanctae Trinitatis, uel tantum in nomine Christi sicut in Actibus Apostolorum legimus, baptizati sunt (unum quippe idemque est, ut sanctus exponit Ambrosius), constat eos non esse denuo baptizandos.'

Yet he directs inquiry whether the man were a Christian or not, for what purpose is not clear, concluding with a citation from Augustine:

'Baptismum Christi nulla peruersitate hominis, siue dantis, siue accipientis, posse uiolari.'[3]

This halting treatment suggests that he was not sure of his ground, lacking definite precedents; but his practical ruling in favour of baptism administered by any layman, or even by one who was not a Christian, was the starting-point of a doctrine that became firmly established in the schools of theology.

It follows that any human being is capable of acting as minister of a sacrament. Parity of reasoning might seem to extend this conclusion to other sacraments equally with Baptism, but the inference has not been drawn; the practice of the Church, supported by more or less weighty argument, has restricted the administration of other sacraments to particularly qualified persons. To determine who is an 'idoneus minister,' one must refer to the theology of the several sacraments.

(*b*) *Matter and form.* — A sacrament being a sensible sign of grace, it is obvious that something visible or audible or tangible, and so forth, is requisite; and this something must be determined by the institution of Christ. Theologians have debated the question whether such determination may be generic, or must be specific. If generic, it may then be left to the Church to determine specifically what shall be used, and this may even be determined differently in various parts of the Church; if specific, no variation is possible. In the case of Baptism specific determination is universally accepted; baptism must be by water in the name of the Holy Trinity. Yet even here the teaching of Nicolaus I., quoted above, about baptism 'in nomine Christi' may raise a doubt; and it is perhaps only on tutiorist grounds that the normal formula can be treated as indispensable.[1] In some other cases generic determination seems to be indicated by actual variations in the practice of the Church. Again, determination may be more or less specific; the use of bread in the Eucharist is determined by the institution of Christ, but all Western theologians agree that it may be indifferently leavened or unleavened; they discuss hypothetically whether wheaten bread is indispensable, to the exclusion of barley bread, but in practice the use of wheaten bread is imposed on tutiorist grounds.

The importance of such determination is attested from early times by the practical watchfulness of the Church against innovations, as in the case of the Aquarian heresy. The use of water in place of wine for the Eucharist was not merely a disorderly proceeding, but an offence against the doctrine of the Church. But there was little theorizing until the introduction of the Peripatetic metaphysic in the 13th cent., when the distinction of matter and form was applied to the sacraments. William of Auxerre is credited with this innovation, but it is doubtful whether his 'materia et forma verborum' should be understood in the sense of *forma essentialis*. The true distinction was, however, in vogue soon after his time. The saying of Augustine about baptism, 'accedit uerbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum,'[2] detached from its context and treated as a quasi-definition of a sacrament in general, lent itself to the new mode of thought. The sensible act or thing used in the administration of a sacrament was likened to formless matter, being indeterminate in use and adaptable to many purposes; it was determined to a spiritual significance by the use of words, which thus played the part of the metaphysical *forma essentialis*. Some ingenuity was required to fit this conception to all the seven sacraments. There were various schemes. The one set out by Aquinas in his *Opusculum Quartum* obtained a great vogue; it was incorporated by Eugenius IV. in his *Decretum pro Armenis* at the Council of Florence, and with some modification in regard to Holy Order it still holds the field. The Council of Trent spoke in general terms[3] of 'materia et forma quibus sacramenti essentia perficitur.' It is a postulate of current theology, therefore, that the sacraments were thus instituted by Christ, either immediately or mediately, either generically or specifically. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that theologians hold themselves bound to the Peripatetic theory of matter and form, sometimes known as hylomorphism. It is rather the case that phrases derived from that theory have been adapted to the facts of sacramental practice, and are retained as consecrated by long usage in the Church.

3. Efficacy.—Before the rise of the Pelagian controversy (see art. PELAGIANISM AND SEMI-PELAGIANISM) there was no analytical teaching about the effect of the Christian sacraments. This began with Augustine's insistence on the practice of infant baptism as proving against Pelagius that infants stood in need of saving grace. The argument induced inquiry into the effect of baptism, and this led to a comparison with circumcision as a sacrament of the OT. St. Paul had declared that there was no justification 'by the works of the law'; circumcision was a work of the Law, though anterior to Moses, and the Apostle emphasized this by insisting that

[1] *Ep.* 98. [2] Sess. vii. 'de Sacr. in Gen.' 6.
[3] *De Bapt.* vi. 1. The compatibility of this with his doctrine of *obex* is secured by a distinction which he proceeds to draw between *sacramentum* and *effectus uel usus sacramenti*. He remarks that Cyprian failed to observe this distinction.

[1] The same expression as used by Stephen I. (Cypr. *Ep.* lxxiii. 16) possibly meant 'Christian Baptism' in general. For the use of the Creed as *form* of baptism in the 3rd cent. see F. E. Brightman, *Essays on the Early History of the Church and Ministry* (1918), p. 344 ff.
[2] *In Joh.* 80. [3] Sess. xiv. 2.

Abraham was justified by his faith before the institution of the sacrament. How did baptism differ from this? Augustine replied that circumcision was a sacrament or sign of a Deliverer to come, by faith in whom the people of God so marked were justified; but the Deliverer, being come, has instituted the sacrament of Baptism 'ad innouationem hominis.'[1] He adds that even before circumcision there was presumably some 'sacramentum iustificationis ex fide' latent in the working of God. From this distinction there proceeded with increasing precision a doctrine almost uniform in all Latin writers, that the sacraments of the OT were ineffective signs or symbols of a work of grace wrought independently of them, while the sacraments of the NT were instruments for the doing of that work.

Earlier expositions of this doctrine had been very crude. According to Tertullian, there was a *uis sanctificandi* in the water of baptism by descent of the Holy Spirit.[2] Augustine's studies in the doctrine of grace led to refinements which sometimes seem to reduce a sacrament to the standing rather of a pledge of grace given (a suggestion drawn from one use of the word *ut supra*), or of a 'conditio sine qua non'; but the later theology followed the main current of his thought, and was expressly concerned with the exclusion of these minimizing conceptions. A sacrament was taken to be a *uera causa* of grace. Aquinas in particular laboured this point, but in defining the nature of the causality he wavered, and gave occasion for a dispute which still engages the attention of theologians. In his commentary on the Sentences[3] he taught that a sacrament is an *instrumental* cause of a certain disposition in the soul which is followed by the infusion of grace, but is not even instrumentally a cause of that infusion. In his later works he abandoned this distinction, adopting a theory of sacramental operation which seems to exclude his previous negation. In *Summa*, III. lxii. 5, he contrasts the human hand as *instrumentum coniunctum* with a stick as *instrumentum separatum*, both being operated by the principal cause, which is the man. So in the operation of grace God is the principal cause, the humanity of Christ is *instrumentum coniunctum*, a sacrament is *instrumentum separatum*; but it is evident that the same effect is produced whether the *instrumentum separatum* be used or not. Therefore he concludes:

'Sacramenta ecclesiae specialiter habent virtutem ex passione Christi, cuius virtus quodam modo nobis copulatur per susceptionem sacramentorum.'[4]

Among the later Scholastics those who adhered to the earlier teaching of Aquinas attributed the dispositive effect of the sacraments to a *physical* causation (Cajetan being apparently the first to use this phrase) which could not reasonably be extended to the actual infusion of grace. Those who adhered to his later teaching attributed the whole efficacy of the sacraments to a *moral* causation, as being instruments of an action of Christ Himself in His sacred humanity which is the moral cause of our justification.[5] Melchior Cano, the first formulator of this conception, was followed later by Vasquez and De Lugo. Suarez, on the other hand, extended the notion of physical causation to the infusion of grace. His argument is that every creature of God has a natural adaptability to any end which the Creator may appoint (*potentia obedientialis*), and that this potentiality becomes active in the sacraments, by the supernatural appointment of God, to the production of supernatural grace.[1] Among his followers the severely Thomist Drouin avows that the teachers of physical causation in the sacraments 'uirtutem aliquam diuinitus acceptam in eis agnoscant, per quam proprie ueroque influxu sacramentales effectus in suscipientium corda insinuent.'[2] This opinion, after giving way for some time before the teaching of Vasquez and De Lugo, has recently been revived in the American *CE*, *s.v.* 'Sacraments.' On the other hand Billot[3] has moved in the contrary direction, reducing the effect of sacramental causation to the creation of a *title* to grace, and so approximating to the first position of Aquinas.

The indelible effect of a sacrament as imposing character, and the vexed question of the reviviscence of grace in those who have received it without the necessary disposition for its salutary working, concerns the specific theology of those sacraments which have this effect, viz. Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Order.

With the doctrine of sacramental causation is intimately connected the phrase *continere gratiam*, current from the time of its use by Hugh of St. Victor.[4] The Council of Trent anathematized 'si quis dixerit, sacramenta nouae legis non continere gratiam, quam significant.'[5] The phrase cannot safely be rendered by the English word 'contain,' which seems to be used only in a spatial or quasi-spatial sense and in the sense of restraint. Neither sense is applicable here; the grace signified is not tied restrictively to the sacraments, nor is there any spatial connexion, except so far as the sacrament operates at a certain place on persons there present. Grace is in the sacraments, says Aquinas,[6] only as signified by them ('sicut in signo'), or as an effect is in the cause. It is not in them 'sicut in vase,' except only as a vessel may be considered an instrument of conveyance. It should be observed that the Tridentine canon sets *continere gratiam* in contrast with the notion that sacraments are 'signa tantum externa acceptae per fidem gratiae uel iustitiae.' The sense of *continere* here is that of immediate and continuous connexion, the connexion being specifically causal. It is a conception which falls in more easily with the theory of physical causation than with that of moral causation, but it is not inconsistent with the latter, and is in fact held along with it as a necessary consequence of the Tridentine definition. According to either theory, the causal connexion is unaffected by the occurrence of an *obex*, which interrupts the flow of the content of the sacrament to the soul of the recipient, but does not reduce it to a nullity.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned throughout, the following are of firstrate importance: T. de V. G. Cajetan (the first of the modern school), Commentary on *Summa Theol.*, pt. III., contained in the Leonine ed. of St. Thomas Aquinas, Rome, 1888; F. Suarez, 'De Sacramentis in Genere,' in *Opera*, Venice, 1740–57, xviii.; R. F. R. Bellarmine, 'De Sacramentis,' in *Disputationes de controversiis Fidei*, Cologne, 1617, iii.; F. de Lugo, 'De Sacramentis in Genere,' in *Opera*, Venice, 1718, v.; H. Tournely (Lafosse), 'De Sacramentis,' in *Prælectiones Theologicæ*, Paris, 1725–30; C. R. Billuart, *Summa Sancti Thomæ*, Liège, 1746–51 (containing severe criticism of Tournely, from the extreme Thomist standpoint, abridged in *Summa Summæ*, Ghent, 1763); G. Perrone, *Prælectiones Theologicæ*, Rome, 1835–42 (a full course at the Collegium Romanum, once of great vogue, but superseded by Franzelin); J. A. Möhler, *Symbolik*, Mainz, 1832, tr. J. B. Robertson, *Symbolism*[5], London, 1906; F. Probst, *Sakramente und Sakramentalien in den drei ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten*, Tübingen, 1872; J. B. Franzelin, *Tractatus de Sacramentis in Genere*[2], Rome, 1888 (the last great work of the kind before the Thomist revival under Leo XIII.); L. Billot, *De Ecclesiæ Sacramentis*, Rome, 1907 (the chief exponent of the new Thomism at the Collegium Romanum).

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[1] *De Nupt. et Concup.* ii. 11.
[2] *De Bapt.* 4.
[3] iv. 1.
[4] Cf. *Quodlibet*, XII. x. 14.
[5] A moral cause is defined as that which, on account of some quality inherent in it, affords a reason for the operation of a second cause. The love of God is here the physical cause of justification.

[1] *De Sacr. in Gen.* Disput. ix., *Op.* ed. 1870, tom. 20, p. 147 ff.
[2] *De Re Sacr.* i. iii. 2 (Venice, 1757); we attribute this anonymous treatise to Drouin on the authority of H. Hurter, *Nomenclator literarius recentioris theologiæ catholicæ*[3], Innsbruck, 1903–13, iv. 1405.
[3] *De Eccl. Sacr.* 7.
[4] *De Sacr. Chr. Fid.* i. ix. 2.
[5] Sess. vii. 'De Sacr. in Gen.' 6.
[6] *Summa Theol.* III. lxii. 3.

SACRAMENTS (Christian, Lutheran).—The doctrine of the sacraments, as understood and taught in the Lutheran Church, is a practical application of the doctrine of justification by faith. As the discussions of the Reformation period were occupied with a thorough criticism of the definition not only of 'justification,' but also of such closely related terms as 'grace' and 'faith,' so they inevitably led also to a radical change in the conception of 'sacrament.'

Recognizing the fact that the term in its ecclesiastical sense is not Scriptural, and that therefore considerable latitude could be allowed in its signification, the Lutheran Reformers were concerned only that a unique place should be assigned to Baptism and the Lord's Supper as means of grace, and that no rites, however useful in their place, that have not been instituted by divine authority for the same purpose as these two ordinances should be elevated to the same rank.[1] The term *sacramentum* in the Vulgate, as the equivalent of the Greek μυστήριον (in such places as Dn 2^{18}, To 12^{7}), designates what is in general secret and mysterious, and, because of being so, awakens wonder and inquiry that can be answered only by supernatural revelation. As such, it is applied repeatedly in the NT to the Incarnation (1 Ti 3^{16}, Col 1^{27}, Eph 1^{9} $3^{3, 9}$ 5^{32}). In Patristic usage it was generally applied to any 'sacred sign' or 'a visible seal (*signaculum*) of invisible divine things,' 'a symbol of a sacred thing and a visible form of invisible grace.' The term was applied to manifold customs and rites, and at a very early date its pertinency to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, above all other rites, was generally recognized. The Reformers found in force the Decree of Florence (1439), designating the number as seven, viz. Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Ordination, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction; and at Augsburg they were forced by the criticism of art. xiii. of the *Augsburg Confession*, on the part of the authors of the *Confutation*, to define clearly their position as to the number. This necessarily involved a fixing of the definition. Prior to this Luther had, years before, in his private writings, freely criticized the teaching hitherto current. Of fundamental importance is his *Treatise on the New Testament* (1520); but he expresses himself at greater length in the *Prelude on the Babylonian Captivity*, written later in the same year—a trenchant criticism of the entire mediæval sacramental system.

'I must deny,' he says, 'that there are seven sacraments, and for the present hold to but three—baptism, penance, and bread. . . . To be sure, if I desired to use the term in the scriptural sense, I should allow but a single sacrament, with three sacramental signs.' Then he adds in conclusion: 'There are, strictly speaking, but two sacraments, baptism and bread; for only in these two do we find both the divinely instituted sign and the promise of the forgiveness of sins.'

Melanchthon, in the *Loci Communes* (1521), simply re-echoes these statements:

'What others call sacraments we call signs, or, if you please, sacramental signs. For Paul calls Christ Himself the Sacrament. But if the name "sign" displease you, you may call them seals, and thus more nearly express the force of the sacraments. . . . Two signs have been instituted by Christ in the Gospel, viz. baptism and the participation of the Lord's Table.'

Accordingly, the *Apology* (1531) proposes the definition: 'Sacraments are rites which have the command of God, and to which the promise of grace has been added,' *i.e.* the promise of the gratuitous forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake, or the gospel. It also became a prominent feature of the Lutheran conception of a sacrament to emphasize the fact that this promise of grace is individualized in the administration of the sacrament.

'Christ causes the promise of the Gospel to be offered not only in general, but through the sacraments, which He attaches as seals of the promise. He seals and thereby especially confirms the certainty of the Gospel to every believer.'[1]

Thus the sacrament is not only a visible word, but it is the visible word individualized.

The efficacy of the sacrament lies, therefore, neither in the character nor in the intention nor in the regular ordination of its ministers, nor in the element received, nor in the sacramental transaction itself, but solely in the word of divine grace which it applies to the individual receiving it. The sacrament, being not man's but God's act, cannot profit as an act of obedience on the part of man. Man's part in it is entirely receptive. Most important is the distinction between a sacrament and a sacrifice.

'A sacrament is a ceremony or work, in which God presents to us that which the promise annexed to the ceremony offers, as baptism is a work, not which we offer to God, but in which God baptizes us, *i.e.* a minister in place of God; . . . A sacrifice, on the contrary, is a ceremony or work which we render God.'[2]

This position Luther most strenuously maintained against the extreme of Romanism on the one hand, which changed the Lord's Supper into a propitiatory sacrifice in the Mass, and of the radical reaction against Rome on the other, which regarded it as only a Eucharistic sacrifice.

'We should not presume to give God something in the sacrament, when it is He who therein gives us all things.'[3]

Nor have they profit as works wrought for men by a priest. With the greatest decision the Reformers repudiated the Scholastic doctrine that a sacrament profits *ex opere operato*, except where recipients intentionally oppose an obstacle (such as a mortal sin, or the purpose to commit sin) to its efficacy. Against such a mechanical theory the value of the sacrament was placed solely in its communication of the word of grace, to be apprehended by the intelligence of the subject, and appropriated by faith. The best known of all Luther's books, the *Small Catechism*, says:

'It is not the water that produces these effects, but the Word of God which accompanies and is connected with the water, and our faith which relies on the Word of God connected with the water'; and 'The eating and drinking do not produce these great effects, but the words which stand here, "Given and shed for you for the remission of sins."' 'He who believes these words has what they set forth, namely the remission of sins'; and, to quote the *Treatise on the NT* once more, 'Sacrament without testament is the case without the jewel.'

The mechanical theory of the sacrament broke down with the scholastic theory of justification. This failed in the recognition of the Pauline doctrine of justification as an act of God with reference to man, and regarded it, on the other hand, as wrought within man, in a continuous, gradual process, by the infusion of grace, through the sacraments. But, according to the NT, grace, in the proper sense, is no quality inhering in man, or communicable to man, but a disposition of God toward man, *i.e.* God's favour shown man without merit on man's part. The grace of God reaches man through a promise, and that promise is apprehended only by faith. Nor is justification a process wrought within man, but a simple and complete act of God, without stages or degrees. Sanctification, or the process by which man grows in all the gifts of grace, is one thing; justification, by which God places man in a new relation with God Himself, is quite another. There are also degrees of faith by which the promise is apprehended; but, wherever justification is present, it is always of the same value, namely that of the complete obedience of Christ; and this is the gift offered in the sacraments.

Nor is this most clearly enunciated theory of

[1] See *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*, p. 213, and the chapter of the *Examen Concilii Tridentini* of Chemnitz, ii. 2 ff., 'de Vocabulo Sacramenti.'

[1] *Formula of Concord*, p. 656 (quotations from the Confessions of the Lutheran Church are from the Eng. tr. of *Book of Concord*, Philadelphia, 1911).

[2] *Apology*, 262. 18.

[3] Luther, *Treatise on the NT*.

the sacraments in any way contradicted by difficulties connected with the explanation of the agency of the Holy Spirit in infant baptism upon the mind and heart of the child baptized. For, even with respect to adults, the work of regeneration always remains a mystery (Jn 3[8]); and, however emphatically Luther connects regeneration and baptism, nevertheless the ground and motive of infant baptism is not that faith may be wrought in an unconscious child, but that Christ's command concerning it may be obeyed.

'Everything depends upon the word and command of God.'[1] 'We bring the child in the purpose and hope that it may believe, and we pray that God may grant it faith; but we do not baptize it upon that, but solely upon the command of God.'[2] 'It is very certain that the promise of God belongs also to little children. . . . Therefore, it is necessary to baptize little children, that the promise of salvation may be applied to them, according to Mt 28[19]. Just as there is salvation offered to all, to men, women, and children, so baptism is offered to all—men, women, children, infants. It clearly follows, therefore, that infants are to be baptized, because with baptism salvation is offered.'[3] 'Through baptism is offered the grace of God, and children, being offered to God through baptism, are received into His grace.'[4]

Where, then, God thus offers His grace, it is believed that He provides also a certain measure of receptivity for it, even although we cannot define either method or measure. All explanations attempted are pure hypotheses and not articles of faith, and cannot be admitted as standards according to which a universal principle concerning the sacraments may be deduced, particularly if such principle antagonize what is no hypothesis. It is enough to know that the word of promise is offered in baptism, and 'is and remains efficacious until we pass from this estate of misery to eternal glory';[5] and to this promise faith is to recur throughout all subsequent periods of life. The stress, however, lies always not on the faith of the recipient, but on the surety of the promise made to the individual, just as the adult is justified not because of his faith, but because of the grace of God and the merit of Christ that his faith apprehends.

For a proper estimate of the office of the sacraments, a consideration of the doctrine of the Word of God as taught by Luther is also important. In his judgment the Word is no mere directory, informing men of the way of life; besides being such, it brings the very life whereof it teaches. The activity of the Holy Spirit is not supplementary to the Word; nor is there any inner Word, apart from the Word as written, preached, and announced in the sacraments. The outward Word, which is heard and read, is the true means through which the Holy Spirit works. Outward and inner Word, if distinguished, are only two sides or relations of one and the same thing. Nor are the means of grace institutions by which man approaches God; they are institutions by which God comes to man (Ro 10[6-15]). Strictly speaking, there is but one means of grace, viz. the Word, and that, too, the Word of the gospel; but, since this Word comes in two forms, we speak, in the wider sense, of both Word and sacraments as the means of grace.

The grace, therefore, offered and received in the sacraments in no way differs from that offered and received in hearing and reading the Word. The promise of the sacraments is the very same as is offered in the Word without the sacraments. The necessity of the Word is absolute; without it there is no salvation; that of the sacraments is relative. We are bound to them because God has instituted and enjoined them.

Nevertheless, 'since the testament is far more important than the sacrament, so the words are far more important than the signs. For the signs might be lacking, if one only have the words, and thus might be saved without sacrament, yet not without testament.'[1]

The relative necessity of sacraments arises out of a gracious accommodation of God to the weakness of man's faith.

'Mens humana non tantum per se non nouit promissionem de gratuita reconciliatione, verumetiam quando illa verbo nobis reuelatur, . . . difficulter illam ut privatim ad me etiam pertinentem apprehendere et retinere potest. Deus igitur Sacramenta instituit, ut essent externa et visibilia signa et pignora gratiae et uoluntatis Dei erga nos: quibus illustri uisibili testimonio testificetur, quod promissio ad singulos illos pertineat, qui fide eam in usu Sacramentorum amplectuntur.'[2]

Faith contributes nothing, therefore, to the efficacy of the sacraments, since all their power comes from the Holy Spirit in and through the Word of the promise which they apply. Their virtue is objective, dependent alone on their divine institution; but faith is the organ by which the promise is received. God's Word is living and powerful, whether I receive it or not; but it is so in me only as by faith it enters and controls my heart. A sacrament is received by faith when the Word attached to the sacrament has entrance. Even though at the time of the administration faith should be absent, the promise is there for appropriation and saving application, at whatever time thereafter the one to whom the sacrament has been given turns to God in repentance and faith.

Most important therefore is it that in the administration the words of each sacrament should have the central place, and that the attention of those receiving it be not diverted by a multitude of ceremonies that dazzle the eye from the simple word of the gospel, which it is the office of the sacrament to apply and on which all else should be focused. Still greater is the loss where the words are omitted, as, in the Roman Mass, 'given and shed for you for the remission of sins' fell out, or where the words of institution are recited in a language unknown to the people, or in low and subdued tones that cannot reach them, even though they understand the language. For how can faith be enkindled by the Word when hidden under an unintelligible form? As the gospel is the power of God to salvation, not from any magical or occult power inhering in the syllables, but from the revelation of God's will which it brings to man's intellect and heart, so also with the sacraments. Luther's object in the reformation of the Mass was, first of all, that the promise and pledge of the sacrament should reach every mind, and, through the mind, touch every heart of those participating.[3]

Nor is the change in the ministers of the sacraments made by the Lutheran Reformation to be overlooked; for the authority to administer them was not limited to a priestly self-perpetuating order within the Church, both because a sacrament is not a sacrifice and because such authority is vested in the entire Church and dare not be usurped by any part.

'For wherever the Church is, there is the authority to administer the Gospel. Wherefore it is necessary for the Church to retain the authority to call, elect, and ordain ministers.'[4]

Ministers are the executives of the Church, and in discharging functions which God has entrusted to the Church they are no less the representatives of God; and the Church is 'where two or three are gathered' in Christ's name.

In rejecting the errors of the mediæval Church, the Lutheran Church has also been careful to guard against exaggerations arising from a more radical reaction against Roman Catholicism. While there is, indeed, a sense in which sacraments

[1] *Large Catechism*, 472. [2] *Ib.* 473.
[3] *Apology*, 173. [4] *Augsburg Conf.*, art. ix.
[5] *Large Catechism*, 474.

[1] Luther, *On NT*.
[2] Chemnitz, fi. 19, 'de Necessitate Sacramentorum.'
[3] For full discussion see his *Formula Missæ* (1523) and *Deutsche Messe* (1526).
[4] Appendix to *Schmalkald Articles*, 340.

are 'marks of Christian profession among men,' this pertains rather to their use than to the sacraments themselves. For, as they are God's and not man's work, they are 'rather signs and testimonies of the will of God toward us, instituted to awaken and confirm faith.'[1] Man's profession of faith is not a sacramental but a sacrificial act, in response to the sacramental Word. For a like reason, they are not simply 'symbols of Christian fellowship,' although this fellowship also is attested in our use of the sacrament (1 Co 10^{17}). Nor are they allegories either of divine grace or of Christian virtues, or mere testimonies of a grace previously bestowed.

In Lutheran countries baptism is generally administered within a few days after the birth of the child. The meaning and efficacy of baptism receive particular recognition and emphasis in the rite of confirmation, which is so far removed from the Roman sacrament known by that name as to constitute an entirely different ceremony. The Reformers urged not only that the so-called sacrament of confirmation was without divine institution, but that it derogated from the recognition of the efficacy of baptism, since it was extolled as conferring the fullness of gifts of the Holy Spirit, for which baptism furnished only a preparatory grace. Accordingly, confirmation fell into almost entire disuse among Lutherans, until, since its gradual reintroduction in another sense by Spener (1635–1705), it is to-day universally observed by them, as an edifying ecclesiastical rite, in which the contents and claims of the divine covenant made in baptism are recalled to those who are about to receive the Lord's Supper for the first time, while they, on their part, solemnly declare that they realize not only what their baptism meant when administered, but also what it means at all times, since it is the formal affirmation in mature life of their full understanding and believing acceptance of what was done for them in their infancy.

Baptism is never to be repeated—not because of the Roman figment of any *character indelibilis*, but because baptism is a perpetual covenant on God's part, and by repentance we are daily to return to our baptism.

'For though we were a hundred times put under the water, it would, nevertheless, be but one baptism.'[2]

In the Lord's Supper the sacramental conception culminates. While Baptism is the sacrament of initiation, the Lord's Supper is the sacrament of the mature Christian life. The former concerns the foundation, the latter the growth of faith. The former gives the general assurance of divine favour; the latter announces that a 'new testament' shows forth the Lord's death, and tenders His glorified Body and Blood as the seal of completed redemption to the individual who has already been baptized, for the comfort and strengthening of the faith previously received.

The controversy as to the presence of the glorified humanity was one which Luther and his associates could not avoid; and yet it has obscured the main stress of the doctrine. For, while Luther insists that the chief thing in the sacrament is the words, 'given and shed for you,' etc., nevertheless he could yield nothing of what he found in the words of institution, nor was he willing to surrender the comfort of the Real Presence by removing the humanity from the Holy Supper to a distance greater than that which separates heaven and earth. Nor could he reconcile himself to the thought that nothing but a sign or figure of the absent Body is present, or that Christ is present only in His divine nature, offering the sympathy and support of His far-remote humanity. For faith forbids us to place any limitations upon the ability of Christ to be present wherever He wills to be, or to do whatever He wills to do. No theory of Christ's ubiquity, as is often asserted, but only the words of institution determine the Lutheran teaching on this point, although the main attacks upon this teaching, Luther promptly showed, involved a misconception of what is meant by 'the right hand of God' as well as of Christology in general. Transubstantiation and all other attempts to define specifically this presence were repudiated. Every attempt to formulate it in philosophical terms must fail; it is enough to know that the real body of Christ is truly present—not, indeed, in a natural, but in a supernatural and heavenly way.

'Nos uero praesentiam ipsam, quia testimonium habet uerbi Dei, simpliciter credimus: de modo uero praesentiae, quia uerbo Dei reuelatus non est, judicamus non esse disputandum. Non igitur definimus certum modum illius praesentiae, sed eum humiliter commendamus sapientiae et omnipotentiae Dei.'[1]

Strenuous as was the controversy, however, and often as it may have degenerated into an academic question and have been diverted into Scholastic subtleties, with Luther its deeply religious side was central. To him the Lord's Supper was the sign and sacrament of completed redemption; but he saw the sign not in the element, but in the heavenly object by which it was accompanied. The Body and Blood of Christ, actually tendered to the communicant with the bread and wine, tell not only of sin and guilt and the need of redemption above man's ability to provide, but also of the completion of redemption, and God's gracious will that the communicant to whom they are offered should personally share in all that Christ has and is.

But man's faith cannot create this presence. Whether man believe or not, the presence exists solely because of Christ's institution. Only by faith, however, can the gospel, as thus offered in the sacrament, be appropriated. While the sacramental and the spiritual receptions of Christ are carefully distinguished, while the spiritual may occur without the sacramental, and the sacramental without the spiritual, nevertheless the end of the sacramental giving and receiving of Christ is that He may be received in the highest measure spiritually, *i.e.* by faith.

In the canon of the Mass the priest offers to a just and wrathful God the Body and Blood of Christ, as a sacrifice for the sins of the living and the dead; and, as the representative of the penitent people, he intercedes that, by the interposition of this offering, God's wrath may be appeased and punishment immediately and hereafter impending averted. But, in the evangelical communion, as restored by Luther, the perfection of Christ's sacrifice offered on the Cross once for all, and the all-availing intercession which He continually makes for all believers, completely reverse the activity. The Body and Blood of Christ have become the pledges offered by God, through the administrator of the sacrament, to each and every communicant, that His thoughts are only those of love. Christ and all that Christ is are given with the bread and wine, to assure him that, with Christ, he is to possess all things. This pledge is given in the sacramental act, of which the words of distribution, as given by Christ at the original institution, are the most important part. The consecration of the elements is not effected by the prayer either of minister or of congregation, or by the recitation at the time of the original words of institution, but by those words, as they were originally uttered by Christ, which, like the marriage blessing (Gn 1^{28}), remain effective throughout all subsequent ages. Those words are to be proclaimed and never to be omitted when the sacrament is administered, 'that

[1] *Augsburg Confession*, art. xiii. [2] *Large Catechism*, 475.

[1] Chemnitz, ii. 76, 'de Reali Præsentia.'

the faith of the hearers may be excited and strengthened by Christ's word.'[1] The proper preparation for the Lord's Supper is occupied also with the same words. Through them the sense of need is awakened, that they who hunger and thirst after righteousness may be filled. The imagination that one may be rendered worthy of its reception on the ground of character or a good purpose, or through the regimen of ascetic exercises, or by the purifying effects of either bodily or mental pain, only increases unworthiness. Confession of sins is of no benefit if it be thought that the confession itself removes guilt and gives a better title for approach. As Luther says, 'the only thing we can bring to the altar is a broken and empty heart.' All confessional services, whether private or public, that are in use have as their end the promotion of such spirit in all who would partake.

'He is truly worthy and well-prepared who believes these words: "*Given, and shed for you, for the remission of sins.*" But he who does not believe these words, or who doubts, is unworthy and unfit; for the words: "*for you*" require truly believing hearts.'[2]

Holding, further, that 'the communion of the unworthy' (1 Co 11[27]) cannot refer to the weak in faith (since it was just for such that it was especially instituted) or to believers coming to the sacrament without proper self-examination (since the condemnation whereof warning is given cannot apply to those who are in Christ [Ro 8[1]]), and having in mind the judgment announced in 1 Co 11[28f.], the Lutheran takes great care to guard against any thoughtless approach, out of mere habit, or from any motive other than a longing for the spiritual benefit offered to faith in the sacramental Word. This is the explanation of the provision described in the *Augsburg Confession*:[3]

'It is not usual to give the body of the Lord, except to them that have been previously examined and absolved.'

The withholding of the cup from the laity—an acknowledged departure from apostolic usage—being recognized as a mutilation of the sacrament, was promptly remedied as the principles of the Reformation were applied to a revision of the liturgy.

Attention should be called to the fact that the Lutheran conception of the sacraments was a gradual growth. As in every formative movement, there are stages through which it passed before it reached consistent expression. In the Lutheran Confessions and the more mature treatises of Luther the sources are found for learning the results attained, while among those known as Lutherans individual opinions, in various lands and ages, show decided variations, as one or the other extreme of either ecclesiasticism or radical subjectivism has had influence.

LITERATURE.—The primary sources of information are the Confessions of the Lutheran Church (in German and Latin: J. T. Müller, *Die symbolischen Bücher der evang.-luther. Kirche*[19], Gütersloh, 1907; in English: *Book of Concord*, ed. H. E. Jacobs, Philadelphia, 1911); the writings of Luther (see art. LUTHER) and Melanchthon (*Corpus Reformatorum*, vols. i.–xxviii., ed. C. G. Bretschneider and H. E. Bindseil, Halle and Brunswick, 1834–60); and the numerous Church Orders of the 16th cent., as found in the collections of A. L. Richter (2 vols., Weimar, 1846) and E. Sehling (5 vols., Leipzig, 1904–13). The secondary sources are the dogmaticians of the purer period, [illegible] Martin Chemnitz, *Examen Concilii Tridentini*, [illegible] Frankfurt, 15[illegible]–73, and later eds., who gives more [illegible] subtle expression than any of his successors to the [illegible] of Luther. See also J. Köstlin, *Luthers Theologie*[2], 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1883, Eng. tr., Philadelphia, 1897; P. [illegible]kert, *Die Entstehung der lutherischen und reformierten Kirchenlehre*, Göttingen, 1910; the histories of doctrine of G. Thomasius (ed. R. Seeberg, Leipzig, 1886–89), A. Harnack (Eng. tr., London, 1894–99), R. Seeberg, [illegible] and F. Loofs (Halle, 1906), and the *Symbolik* [illegible] of G. F. Oehler.

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[1] [illegible] 615 f.
[2] *Small Catechism*, [illegible] (vi.)
[3] Art. xxv.

SACRAMENTS (Christian, Reformed).—Calvin not only encountered this subject as a *locus communis* of theology, handling it in the fourth book of the *Institutes* (chs. xiv.–xix.), that on the Church, and not only had he, as a reformer, to assail it as part and parcel of the sacerdotal system which he was out to overthrow, but he was brought into close contact with the subject in more than one incident which formed part of his day's work. When he first emerged on the scene, Protestantism was being vexed and weakened with a controversy between the followers of Luther and those of Zwingli over the sacraments, and it concerned him vitally to keep this away from the sphere of his own labours. For this purpose he entered into negotiations with Zwingli's successor, Bullinger, and with such success that the entire Swiss Church became united in a detailed statement on the sacraments in the Consensus of Zürich, 1549. So conciliatory was he, and so fully did he include what was of most importance in the Lutheran view, that between him and Melanchthon there sprang up the closest friendship, and even Luther is reported to have said, at an early stage of the proceedings, that, if Zwingli had spoken in such tones, there would never have been any war between them. But in other quarters the success of the peace negotiations produced a different impression. To such a degree did the clearness and reasonableness of Calvin's view begin to tell that there was a wide-spread turning towards the Reformed as distinguished from the Lutheran point of view. This alarmed the protagonists on the Lutheran side, and one of them, Westphal, a theologian of Hamburg, began to attack Calvin in no measured terms. This man, indeed, passes in history for a controversialist of the worst type—noisy, obstinate, and unfair, making use of the most truculent language, as was, however, the custom of the time. Calvin at first handled him lightly; but, when his restraint seemed to be doing no good, he met violence with the incisiveness and sarcasm which, when necessary, he was able to wield; and this controversy perfected the development of his own views. As, however, all this was past before the production of the last edition of the *Institutes* (1559), that issue may be regarded as containing his fully matured convictions.

He begins with defining a sacrament:

'It is an external sign, by which the Lord seals on our consciences his promises of goodwill towards us, in order to sustain the weakness of our faith, and we in our turn testify our piety towards him, both before himself, and before angels as well as men.'[1]

He adds the definition of Augustine—'a visible form of an invisible grace'—but says there is no difference between the longer and the shorter definition. The word 'sacrament' does not express all this in itself; its use arose from its being employed in the Vulgate in place of the Greek μυστήριον; what the Latins call *sacramenta* the Greeks call μυστήρια. He does not add—what is the case—that the transference to the rites of the Church of the word μυστήριον was a departure from the use of the word in the NT, where it means something which had been hidden from the knowledge of men in the earlier dispensation but revealed in the dispensation of the gospel. In this confusing, at the beginning, of things that differed lay the origin of many mistakes which were subsequently to darken the mind of the Church. 'Sacrament' is not a Biblical word, and with its misuse are connected not a few of the saddest pages in the history of the Church.

Calvin proceeds:

'From the definition which we have given, we perceive that

[1] *Institutes*, tr. H. Beveridge, Edinburgh, 1863, bk. iv. ch. xiv. § 1.

there never is a sacrament without an antecedent promise, the sacrament being added as a kind of appendix, with the view of confirming and sealing the promise.'[1]

This is not for the sake of establishing the truth, which needs no confirmation except from itself; but it is a concession to human weakness, to facilitate our apprehension of the truth.

'This is commonly expressed by saying that a sacrament consists of the word and the external sign.'[2]

The phrase has, indeed, been misapplied, the 'word' being understood of the muttering by the priest in a tongue unknown to the multitude.

'Very different is the doctrine of Augustine concerning the sacramental word: "Let the word be added to the element and it will become a sacrament. For whence can there be so much virtue in water as to touch the body and cleanse the heart, unless by the agency of the word, and this not because it is said, but because it is believed?" . . . Therefore, when we hear mention made of the sacramental word, let us understand the promise, which, proclaimed aloud by the minister, leads the people by the hand to that to which the sign tends and directs us.'[3]

To this view of the sacrament as 'a visible word'—to quote another phrase of Augustine—it might be objected that the sacrament was a superfluity, since the true will of God was sufficiently known through the Word, and the sacrament could make us no wiser. But to this the reply is made:

'The seals which are affixed to diplomas, and other public deeds, are nothing considered in themselves, and would be affixed to no purpose if nothing were written on the parchment, and yet this does not prevent them from sealing and confirming when they are appended to writing.' . . . 'Sacraments bring with them the clearest promises, and, when compared with the word, have this peculiarity, that they represent promises to the life, as if painted in a picture.'[4]

He goes on to give other illustrations of the virtue of signs or seals with a liveliness of imagination for which he would hardly have received credit, and with the result of demonstrating that the clarifying or confirming of faith is no superfluity.

'It had been better for the objectors to pray, with the apostles, "Lord, increase our faith." . . . Let them explain what kind of faith his was who said, "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief."'[5]

It is no disparagement to the Holy Spirit to assign to the sacraments this office of increasing and confirming faith; for they are only the instrumentality through which He acts.

'The sacraments duly perform their office only when accompanied by the Spirit, the internal Master, whose energy alone penetrates the heart, stirs up the affections, and procures access for the sacraments into our souls. If he is wanting, the sacraments can avail us no more than the sun shining on the eyeballs of the blind, or sounds uttered in the ears of the deaf.'[6]

This, however, is no more than might be said of the Word of God itself, which none would dare to consider superfluous in the region of grace.

'God uses the means and instruments which he sees to be expedient, in order that all things may be subservient to his glory, he being the Lord and disposer of all.'[7]

At this point the author refers, in rather a tone of deprecation, to the importance attached by some to the meaning of *sacramentum* in the sense of the soldier's oath of loyalty, sworn in Roman times in the Campus Martius before setting forth on a campaign.

'So by our signs we acknowledge Christ to be our commander, and declare that we serve under his standard. As the toga distinguished the Romans from the Greeks, who wore the pallium; and as the different orders of Romans were distinguished from each other by their peculiar insignia;—*e.g.*, the senatorial from the equestrian by purple, and crescent shoes, and the equestrian from the plebeian by a ring, so we wear our symbols to distinguish us from the profane.'[8]

Such similitudes he does not reject, but, in obvious allusion to the Zwinglians, he condemns those by whom that which they signify is made 'the first, and indeed the only thing.' A little later he returns to this side of the subject, quoting Chrysostom, who calls sacraments 'pactions, by which God enters into covenant with us, and we become bound to holiness and purity of life, because a mutual stipulation is here interposed between God and us.'[1] But he does not develop this aspect of the sacraments with fullness or sympathy, and to this extent he fails in giving a well-balanced exposition of the definition with which, as was noted above, he started. He is too preoccupied with the more negative side of the truth, limiting what he has said about the use of the sacraments by the Holy Spirit. This, he remarks, does not include 'a kind of secret virtue,' or what he has earlier called 'a kind of secret efficacy perpetually inherent in them.' Here he is doubtless alluding to the Lutherans, but far more to the Roman Catholics, and his language in reference to the latter is very strong indeed. He appeals to St. Augustine (whom he quotes so often, as he says on a later page, as being 'the best and most faithful witness of all antiquity'), who distinguishes between the sacrament and the matter of the sacrament.

'The sacrament,' says this authority, 'is one thing, the virtue of the sacrament another. Why is it that many partake of the altar and die, and die by partaking? For even the cup of the Lord was poison to Judas, not because he received what was evil, but, being wicked, he wickedly received what was good.'[2]

The author goes on, in his own name, with the warning:

'A sacrament is so separated from the reality by the unworthiness of the partaker, that nothing remains but an empty and useless figure. Now, in order that you may have . . . the thing with the sign, the word which is included in it must be apprehended by faith.'[3] 'Let it be a fixed point that the office of the sacraments differs not from the word of God; and this is to hold forth and offer Christ to us, and, in him, the treasures of heavenly grace. . . . The sacraments are to us what messengers of good news are to men, or earnests in ratifying pactions. They do not of themselves bestow any grace, but they announce and manifest it, and, like earnests and badges, give a ratification of the gifts which the divine liberality has bestowed upon us. The Holy Spirit, whom the sacraments do not bring promiscuously to all, but whom the Lord specially confers upon his people, brings the gifts of God along with him, makes way for the sacraments, and causes them to bear fruit. . . . In this doctrine of the sacraments, their dignity is highly extolled, their use plainly shown, their utility sufficiently proclaimed, and moderation in all things duly maintained; so that nothing is attributed to them which ought not to be attributed, and nothing denied them which they ought to possess.'[4]

There follows a discourse on the sacraments of the OT, especially circumcision, the view being taken that these set forth Christ just as certainly as do the sacraments of the NT, the only defect in their way of presenting Him arising from the fact that He was then enveloped in the mist of futurity, whereas now He stands in the clear light of history.

It has been taken for granted throughout this whole chapter that the sacraments of the NT are only two, Baptism and the Lord's Supper; but, after these two have been thoroughly explained in chs. xv.–xviii., the author returns in ch. xix. to a discussion of the pseudo-sacraments, as he considers them, of Confirmation, Penance, Extreme Unction, Orders, and Marriage. In somewhat the same way as in the Anglican Church not a few have been disposed to show a partiality for the first of these, as being, if not exactly on the level of the two undoubted sacraments, at least near it, Calvin, while deprecating the chrism and the notion that only a bishop is equal to the performance of the ordinance, acknowledges that admission to the membership of the Church is an occasion of great importance, which might well be dignified by such a ceremony as the laying on of hands, though he does not allow that this rises to the rank of a sacrament. But his tone in dealing with the rest of the so-called sacraments is

1 *Institutes*, bk. iv. ch. xiv. § 3.
2 *Ib.* § 4. 3 *Ib.* 4 *Ib.* § 5.
5 *Ib.* § 7. 6 *Ib.* § 9. 7 *Ib.* § 12.
8 *Ib.* § 13.

1 *Institutes*, bk. iv. ch. xiv. § 19. 2 *In Johann. Hom.* 26.
3 *Institutes*, bk. iv. ch. xiv. § 16. 4 *Ib.* § 17.

extremely severe; and, to account for this, we must remember the height to which in the Church before the Reformation the multiplication of ceremonies and symbolism had been carried. A glance, *e.g.*, into Hamilton's *Catechism*—a *vademecum* with which the clergy were supplied for the performance of their functions by an archbishop of St. Andrews just before the Reformation—will show that the simple rite of baptism had been converted into a perfect cycle of ceremonies, some of them perhaps beautiful, but others the reverse, and some very obscure. The people were supposed to understand these, but the clergy themselves did not always understand them, and this was the reason for the publication of Hamilton's instructions. Calvin makes fun of the variety of meanings attributed to the ceremony of the tonsure, and any one who turns to *A Catholic Dictionary* will discover how utterly at a loss the most scholarly are even at the present day to explain a practice so common. But, indeed, it is the Mass itself that is the greatest of all combinations of symbolism. Nothing could be more unlike the simple, domestic observance of the first Lord's Supper than is the performance of a Mass in a great cathedral; and Calvin was doing an unspeakable service to Christianity when he contended that the original mode of administering the sacrament was the best model for all time.

John Knox was, if not in scholarship, at least in spirit, the best disciple of Calvin; and his statement, in the old Scots Confession of 1560, though brief, excels even that of the master. It begins, instead of ending, with the sacraments of the OT; it is much more vigorous than Calvin could afford to be in repudiating the shortcomings of the Zwinglians; and—best of all—it states with warmth and fullness the positive element which was always lacking in the Zwinglian creed, namely, that, besides the commemoration of the past and the profession of loyalty for the future, there is in the sacrament a transaction here and now between the Saviour and the communicant, each giving himself to the other and receiving the other as an everlasting possession.

'As the Fatheris under the Law, besydis the veritie of the sacrifices, had two cheaf Sacramentis, to witt, Circumcisioun and the Passover, the despysaris and contemnaris whairof war not reputed for Godis people; so [do] we acknawledge and confesse that we now, in the tyme of the Evangell, have two Sacramentis onlie, institutit be the Lord Jesus, and commanded to be used of all those that will be reputed members of his body, to witt, Baptisme and the Supper, or Table of the Lord Jesus, called The Communioun of his body and bloode. And these sacramentis (alsweill of the Auld as of the New Testament) war institut of God, not onlie to maik ane visible difference betwixt his people and those that war without his league; but also to exercise the faith of his children; and by participatioun of the same sacramentis, to seall in thair heartis the assurance of his promeis, and of that most blessed conjunctioun, unioun, and societie, whiche the Elect have with thair head, Christ Jesus.'[1]

At a time when the use of the seven sacraments is being commended to the Church of England by one so highly placed and much esteemed as Bishop Gore the words of the Thirty-nine Articles have special importance:

'There are two sacraments ordained of Christ our Lord in the Gospel, that is to say, Baptism and the Supper of the Lord. Those five, commonly called Sacraments, that is to say, Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction, are not to be counted for Sacraments of the Gospel, being such as have grown partly of the corrupt following of the Apostles, partly are states of life, allowed in the Scriptures; but yet have not like nature of Sacraments with Baptism and the Lord's Supper, for that they have not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God.'[2]

In the *Heidelberg Catechism* the question 'What are the Sacraments?' is answered as follows:

'They are visible, holy signs and seals, appointed of God for this end, that by the use thereof He may the more fully declare and seal to us the promise of the Gospel; namely, that He grants us out of free grace the forgiveness of sins and everlasting life, for the sake of the one sacrifice of Christ accomplished on the Cross.'[1]

The workmanship of the Westminster Assembly of Divines on this subject is careful and learned in all the documents, but it is specially felicitous in the *Shorter Catechism*, where the three following questions and answers form an almost perfect summary of Reformed doctrine:

'How do the sacraments become effectual means of salvation?

The sacraments become effectual means of salvation, not from any virtue in them, or in him that doth administer them; but only by the blessing of Christ, and the working of His Spirit in them that by faith receive them.

What is a sacrament?

A sacrament is an holy ordinance instituted by Christ; wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers.

Which are the sacraments of the New Testament?

The sacraments of the New Testament are Baptism and the Lord's Supper.'[2]

There was never any serious difference of opinion in the Reformed Church itself in the post-Reformation period, unless it was in the transactions leading up to the Synod of Dort, when the Arminians were accused of minimizing the value of sacraments; but, the contest with both Roman Catholics and Lutherans still continuing, the affirmations and the denials of the Reformed theologians became more and more informed and distinct: and so both the statement and the defence of the Reformed position became more and more easy. Hence works of recent date afford clear and thorough knowledge on every point, but none can perhaps compete with that of Charles Hodge in his *Systematic Theology* (3 vols., Edinburgh, 1872–73), where the discussion is included under 'Soteriology.'

The sacraments are expounded by Hodge under five heads—their nature, their number, their efficacy, their necessity, and their validity. In investigating their nature he imposes on himself as the true method 'to take those ordinances which by common consent are admitted to be sacraments, and by analyzing them determine what are their essential elements or characteristics,' and then 'exclude from the category all other ordinances, human or divine, in which those characteristics are not found.'[3] As for their number, Calvin had been able to prove that Augustine, though himself fond of significant numbers, said not a word about the number seven; but his knowledge did not enable him to go farther down. Hodge, on the contrary, is able to show that, so far from this number being primitive or scriptural, it was not current before the 12th century. What is said on the efficacy of the sacraments is practically an exposition of the questions of the *Shorter Catechism* quoted above. The necessity is what is called a *necessitas præcepti*; *i.e.*, the use of sacraments is necessary because it is commanded by God—but it is not a *sine qua non*, because the same blessings which are communicated through the sacraments can be obtained without them, nothing being conveyed through them that may not be conveyed through other channels, especially the Word of God.

Under his last head—their validity—Hodge takes up an interesting question, namely, whether sacraments are rendered invalid if administered by any but lawfully ordained ministers. In ordinary circumstances it is unseemly and wrong that they be administered otherwise; but in special circumstances is the presence of such an administrator imperative?

'If a number of pious Christians assemble, where no minister can be had, to celebrate the Lord's Supper, in what sense is such a service invalid? Do they not commemorate the death of

[1] Art. xxv.

[2] See *The Reformation of the Church*, London, 1910, ch. iv.

[1] Qu. 66.

[2] Qu. 91 ff.

[3] iii. 487.

Christ? Are not the bread and wine to them the symbols of his body and blood? If faith be in exercise, may they not receive those symbols to their spiritual nourishment and growth in grace? Again, if baptism be a washing with water in the name of the Holy Trinity, to signify and seal our engrafting into Christ, does it cease to be, or to signify this if not administered by an ordained minister? Does not the man thus baptized make a profession of his faith in Christ? and does he not thereby become a member of that great body which confesses Him before men? Can it, therefore, be any more invalid than the Gospel, when preached by a layman?'[1]

The liberality of such sentiments has doubtless been learnt in the United States through the exigencies of ecclesiastical life on the frontiers in the Far West; but the learned and orthodox author conveniently forgets that this view is flatly contradictory of the Confession of Faith. Indeed, in the First Book of Discipline the administration of the sacraments by any but lawfully ordained ministers is declared to be worthy of death.

A few years ago, in the Presbyterian Church of England, the question was raised whether elders, being ordained men, might officiate at the distribution of the communion elements in missions connected with city churches where the services of a minister could not be easily secured as frequently as might be necessary; and, after prolonged discussion, the Synod, in 1907, decided in the negative.

Since, in 1817, the union of Lutheran and Reformed Churches was secured in Prussia, the movement extending soon to other German States, there has naturally been a disposition among Protestant theologians to emphasize the points of sacramental theory and practice on which both sides are agreed, though the controversy of both with Rome has not ceased. Schleiermacher, who was the son of a Reformed pastor, threw out the suggestion that the sacraments may be regarded as acts in the work of the risen Christ—an idea germane to that of Dorner, who treated the Church as the domain of the Holy Ghost.

Speculations of the most radical description have not been lacking in recent times, doubt being cast on the institution of the sacraments by the Author of Christianity, and the question specially raised whether He had any intention of making the Lord's Supper a permanent institution or only celebrated it once with His disciples in a genial hour, without any thought about the future. By a certain school a very close connexion has been assumed as having existed between the sacraments of Christianity and the initiatory rites of other religions by which it was surrounded in the primitive age and from which it drew its converts; and some regard the sacramental system as a vagrant boulder projected into Paulinism from the outside and inconsistent in its nature with the rest of the landscape. With such notions Reformed doctrine has nothing special to do.

It has, however, to do with novel ideas which some have been bringing back from the War, since among the Reformed the tradition has always been specially strong that the preaching of the Word is the great means of grace. Some of the Presbyterian chaplains, when serving abroad, have obtained occasional glimpses of stately worship in the Roman Catholic Churches; they have seen how the celebration of the Eucharist supplies form and body to the Anglican service; they have witnessed the eagerness with which the members of their own denomination have welcomed a communion service; and some of them have ventured to invite all present who were desirous to partake, whether members of the Church at home or not. From such experiences they have derived the impression that in their Church at home enough is not made of the sacraments; and some of them have been proposing that the Lord's Supper should form a part—the most prominent part—of the principal diet of worship every Sunday, as well as that the Table should always be open to all who desire to come, without questions asked. Such suggestions deserve the attention always due to impressions received from first-hand experience; but the Church will also bring to bear on their solution its older experience, which is very ample in regard to some of the points raised. Changes may be made and experiments tried; but the Reformed Church will not turn her back on her own past, by displacing preaching from its position of primacy, as long as she remembers the statement in the gospel, 'Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples,' and the words of St. Paul, 'Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel.'

LITERATURE.—All the writings of Calvin on the sacraments, outside the *Institutes*, will be found in vol. viii. of the *Opera Omnia*, Amsterdam, 1667–71, as well as in vol. ii. of his *Tracts*, tr. H. Beveridge, Calvin Translation Society, Edinburgh, 1849. The passage from the old Scots Confession of 1560 is extracted from John Knox, *Works*, ed. D. Laing, Edinburgh, 1864, vol. ii., and that from the *Heidelberg Catechism* from A. Smellie's ed., London, 1900. For other confessional statements, as well as that quoted from the XXXIX. Articles, see P. Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom*, New York and London, 1877, iii., 'The Evangelical Protestant Creeds,' or E. F. K. Mueller, *Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformierten Kirche*, Leipzig, 1903. Much solid matter will be found in W. Cunningham, *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1862 (esp. Essay v. 'Zwingli and the Doctrine of the Sacraments'), as well as in Alexander Schweizer, *Die protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwicklung innerhalb der reformierten Kirche*, 2 vols., Zürich, 1854–56. Among recent books may be mentioned J. S. Candlish, *The Christian Sacraments*, Edinburgh, 1881, and J. C. Lambert, *The Sacraments in the New Testament*, do. 1903.

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